




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

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
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
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
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THE CANADIAN MILITIA.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.—Importance of enquiry into our condition for defence—Duties of Leaders of a State—Growing feeling in Canada towards immediate action in re-organization of the Militia—Militia questions should be independent of Politics—Popular solution of the problem as to best system—National Defence is National Insurance—Our only possible Enemy—Results of a War between England and the United States—No cause for discouragement.

Of all the questions which can at the present moment be submitted to the consideration of the Canadian people, there is none of more vital importance than that involved in the inquiry whether our Military Defences are in a state of real and practical efficiency. If any man, after mature deliberation, arrives at the conclusion that they are able to bear any strain that is likely to be put upon them, he may sleep in quiet and devote his waking energies to the various questions of internal economy which have been so all-absorbing in the past; but if, on the contrary, it should appear that any other State on this Continent is better armed and more fully prepared for a contest than we are, it would be well that he and every one should devote themselves to remedy this condition of affairs.

Rulers and statesmen stand in the same relation to their country as mariners and pilots to the big ships which traverse the ocean. Entrusted with the safe conduct of vessels of State, it is their province and duty so to trim the sails and so to hold the helm, as that the winds and storms of public opinion may be reasonably controlled, and made subservient to the legitimate

progress and vital good of the people they govern. In the mental as well as in the terrestrial atmosphere, all winds are not fair winds; and when statesmen have to contend with an ill-instructed public opinion, inflated by fanaticism, or swayed by political passion, their responsibility is one of no ordinary character. With a full fair breeze, on the other hand, the ruler's task becomes so easy that he has but to spread sufficient canvas, and keep his vessel well before the wind, to insure a rapid voyage and triumphant entrance into the desired haven. Who can doubt that the people of this Dominion of Canada are now possessed with an unanimity of desire touching the great subject of Military organization and Militia reformation? Exclude those who repudiate armies, but suggest no practicable substitute for settling the disputes—the inevitable disputes—of nations, and there remains a mighty mass of consentient humanity. Respecting the question of our defences, indeed, something very like a steady gale of public opinion is blowing—and the statesmen now at the helm have a splendid opportunity of earning the lasting gratitude of the country if they will only adopt measures, full and fair, for satisfying this most reasonable, this most legitimate desire of the Canadian people.

Vast masses of the people never think, cannot think for themselves, but blindly follow some leader or party to whom, as the result of accident, education or self-interest, they have proffered their allegiance. What those leaders advise they commend and follow, no matter whither the policy tends. Hence it is that many thoughtful men are desirous of detaching our Militia matters as much as possible from politics. We should like to see the Militia Department conducted on principles independent of all personal and party control, so that the Minister of Militia would not have to create or reform, to increase or diminish, in connexion with the politics of his party, but simply to administer the service on a system approved by the best authorities and determined beforehand by Parliament. In this way the united pa-

triotism and best talent of the House of Commons would be brought to bear on military discussions, and each member would feel at liberty to propose or support measures for the good of the country rather than for the good of his political friends. The voters, whose suffrages elected our present House of Commons have, as regards this truly national question of Military Defence, no differences of opinion. They are on this question one in desire and aim, and, if Parliament will only consider and supply our military deficiencies in the same spirit of accord, what may not be accomplished during the next few months towards allaying the well-grounded anxieties of our friends, and discomfiting those sinister calculations of our enemies, which the existing state of things justifies and encourages? We must defend the Dominion. We must prepare a considerable force, so as to have it always available at short notice. We must organize and properly equip our Militia forces, that we may be in a position to crush any invasion as between jaws of iron. Such are the convictions of the great bulk of the people. They point also to the splendid men-material Canada can boast of, and ask why these hosts of patriotic and willing warriors are not arranged and ordered, trained and equipped without further delay. To the practical common sense of the people the main problem of defence seems to be one very easy of solution. Multitudes are saying, as with one voice: "Deal with existing materials first, and defer all theoretical and minor questions to subsequent consideration. Put the Dominion into an immediate attitude of reasonable defence, and then at your leisure go over the whole system with a careful scrutiny, and reform all actual abuses, until something like a moderate approach to perfection is attained."

We confess that we have always been totally unable to comprehend the principle on which certain persons have objected to any outlay for perfecting such a defensive system as should place this country in a position of security against a possible attack by foreign powers, and so remove the temptation offered by the state

of weakness into which our defences have fallen. No man would neglect to insure his warehouse or his barn, because his neighbours declared that they were animated by the most friendly feelings towards him, and had no intention of applying the torch to his property. National defence is national insurance; and we do not think any Government can maintain a character for prudence that neglects to complete the insurance of this country against aggression, although we may not only continue to receive the most pacific assurances from foreign governments, but even give them the fullest credit for sincerity in their professions.

It is desirable that we should ascertain two points—that the premium we are called upon to pay is not too high; and that the insurance, when completed, will be valid. With regard to the first, we are confident that if any reader will picture to himself the horrors which would attend the invasion of our country by a hostile army—and the utmost force of his imagination cannot overcharge the picture—he will confess that no price can be too high to pay for immunity. The remarks we are about to offer on that branch of the public service immediately connected with the defence of the country, and on some of the schemes for improving it, cannot fail to be interesting in themselves: and while they will show what has been effected, it will be highly satisfactory if we find that a system of defence, calculated to secure our country against aggression, can be completed at the cost of but a fraction of our present expenditure, and entailing but a moderate subsequent annual increase.

We do not understand the merit of making a mystery of what we are doing, or of hesitating to name the quarter from which we might most reasonably anticipate an attack; on the contrary, we are of opinion that by showing to the world how easily we may be rendered completely prepared for the contingency of an invasion of Canada, by showing how desperate such an attempt would be, and how many chances there are against its success, we remove one of the strongest inducements to make it,

The country whose geographical position affords the most favorable opportunities for attacking us, is the territory of the United States of America: the invasion of Canada is a threat heard commonly there; and although the educated classes look upon the project with ill favor, they are wholly without influence should the masses determine on an attack. How much wiser then it will be to discuss freely and openly our situation, if by so doing we can convince the monsters who would hail with acclamation such an outrage, that, provided we are true to ourselves, the attempt must almost as inevitably as deservedly be utterly and disgracefully defeated. Let it then be taken for granted that the blow, if it must come, will come from the people of the United States; if sufficiently defended against their attacks, we need fear those of no other nation.

Now, although our well-wishers put a bold front on the matter, and declare that an organization which will enable the Dominion to put forth her whole power in the very best form will enable her to preserve her liberty and independence, in case of a war with the neighbouring States, and we Canadians openly accept this dictum as true; yet the unthinking masses in the secret recesses of their hearts are divided only as to the method of meeting this awful contingency, one party meditating immediate surrender, another, a determined resistance, while both are persuaded that the result would be the same, viz., a triumph for the Great United Republic.

Unless we can give courage to the faint hearts which beat beneath a mask of boldness, our schemes are *ab initio* futile,—any expenditure on defence would be like putting elaborate and expensive propelling machinery into a rotten bottom.

Imagine war declared against England by the Government at Washington! The civilized world at once seeks to discover what are the opposing forces,—where the battle field—and what the probable result.

We believe that the signing of the declaration of war by the

President would be the signal for the dismemberment of that mighty incongruous mass bearing the lofty title of the "United States of America;" a power which might defy the world in arms if unity guided its counsels, but liable to break up into several weak and mutually antagonistic communities if a serious danger threatened, more especially a danger brought about solely through the overbearing and mistaken policy of the Washington Government.

The order placing on a war footing the Military and Naval forces of the United States, would, from the local interests of the West, the impatience of unprofitable war taxes on the Pacific coast, and the smothered but inextinguishable hatred of the South, cause a disruption of the Union. And in place of a united host of six millions of fighting men ranging themselves under the same standard to effect the same ends, we should find the country divide itself into four sections. Two sections would be determined to remain neutral in a struggle with Great Britain,—one section inimical to England, and seeking to injure her by every means, however unscrupulous and indefensible,—and one section filled with deadly animosity towards the Anglophobian section, and willing to assist England or any other Power or project promising that the rule of the hated North should be broken for ever.

These divisions in detail would be :—

1st Section—In favor of war with England,—comprising the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the District of Columbia, having an aggregate population of, say, eleven millions.

2nd Section—Hostile to first section, and which could be relied on to support actively offensive operations against it,—including Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas, with a population of fifteen and one-half millions.

3rd Section—Neutral—embracing Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota. Population, eleven millions.

4th Section—Neutral—consisting of California, Oregon, Nevada, Nebraska and the Territories; containing a population of one million.

The inhabitants of the United States, thirty-eight and one-half millions in number, would then be ranged as follows :

On the side of Great Britain, fifteen and one-half millions ; opposed to Great Britain, eleven millions ; neutral, twelve millions.

Allowing for all contingencies, and supposing the friends and enemies equal, or even that the enemies muster strongest, it requires no arguments to show the value of Canada's hardy and warlike four millions, and to which side victory would lean when they, as true and loyal subjects of Albion, were thrown into the scale.

The diverse sentiments and want of cohesion, we have premised to exist among the different States of the Republic, are not imaginary or chimerical, their reality has been proved by history, and is plainly evident to the most careless student of their life and manners, and the utterances in Congress and writings in the press. Should such a catastrophe occur—which Heaven long avert—as a declaration of war by the Executive at Washington against the Mother Country, it would require but the most simple diplomacy, on the part of the Ministers of Great Britain, to secure such a division, into friends, neutrals and enemies as we have roughly sketched. Negotiations opened with the South and West, and a treaty of strict alliance with the former would infallibly bring about the desired consummation.

We have supposed that England's battles in this war would be fought out on this continent, without the personal interference of a single European. But can we imagine any concatena-

tion of circumstances by which England would be prevented from giving her friends the aid of a portion of that stupendous power which her people can bring into action when fairly aroused and thoroughly in earnest? If she did so, then the Northern and Middle States would find themselves attacked at once by land on the North and South, and on the East by sea.

The worst that can happen to us is to find our country invaded by an army or armies, raised from one State or more, whose population does not, in the aggregate, exceed that of the five Eastern Provinces of Canada.

And shall we, so soon as our walls are breached and the enemy lodged on our ramparts, surrender, and implore the mercy of the conqueror? There are, we trust, few Canadians who would not answer at once to this question: that nothing would induce them to give in; that they and every man in the land would fight to the death, and either perish in the attempt, or drive the invaders into the St. Lawrence! All this they mean, and all this they are no doubt prepared to attempt, and think they can do. But the question must be met in a very different spirit from that in which it has been taken up in the past; for to resist without a chance of success is merely to court murder and misery: a wiser plan would be to attempt to buy off the invaders, as the degenerate Romans of the later Empire did the Barbarians.

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CHAPTER II.

Political situation of Canada—Independence—Consolidation of British Empire—Causes of Colonial irritation against Mother Country—Representation in the British Parliament.

To counteract the pernicious cry of "annexation"—or the precocious drivell about "immediate independence," by which cowardly or impolitic course, a few, a very few, of those living among us pretend, and unreasonably pretend, they would save expense and bloodshed on our part in case of a rupture between England and the United States—let us glance for a moment at our political situation..

Politically, then, whither is this young and highly thriving society of ours tending? Is it to remain attached by some bond, however slight, to the mother country? Or is it destined to become annexed to the United States, forming part of a vast Northern Confederacy? For ourselves we see no reason why Canada should not, as regards the United States, preserve her independence. The enormous regions, consisting of British Provinces which extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans, will ere long teem with populations destined to become a mighty nation or cluster of nations of themselves. The government of these rapidly growing Provinces is, as it seems to us, far more attractive to Canadian Statesmen than the idea of merging their country in the United States. So great is the freedom and independence of Canada in her present relations with Great Britain, that she has now nothing to gain, and much to lose, by severing herself completely from the mother country. But the sense of her growing importance and dignity may easily overpower all considerations

of material interests, when the question of declaring her independence is agitated; and, unless England prepares herself so to remould her constitution as to enable her to assemble representatives from her numerous Colonies, who may in some sort form part of a Parliament of the British Empire, in which all subjects of Imperial interest may be discussed and determined on, she must look for the time, possibly not far distant, when her vast American Colonies, as well as others of her possessions, will transform themselves into Sovereign States.

The Colonies of Great Britain have reason for complaint. They are subjected to a rule which is meddlesome without being well informed. Met with a semi-alien treatment in the offices of the Imperial Government they are called on for a full obedience; and when they complain of removable ills, flowing from Imperial determinations, they find they have no hearing, except by grace of some pains-taking patriot who speaks for them, by favor, where others are struggling for equal audience. Disheartened, if not disgusted, they remember they once were Englishmen, and apprehend with regret that the time may come when they can be Englishmen no more. The Constitution, slowly expanding to the necessities of successive ages, has not yet opened widely enough to receive them, and the solemn question now waiting for solution is,—will it receive them before they must otherwise retire?

What, in the absence of every symptom, and certainly of every necessary cause of real alienation of feeling, is the occasion of these patent and continually repeated complaints?

The chief occasion we believe to be the absence of a constitutional arrangement for the public discussion in England of colonial questions, under which, like British questions in the British Parliament, they could be opened and debated *as of right*. It may be said, indeed, that the Colonies have Local Legislatures, and that they can resort to Parliament. But their Local Legislatures, however liberal the constitutions under which they exist, are necessarily confined in their powers to local subjects, and they are

essentially powerless to deal with the matters external to each Colony but relating to the whole, which threaten the coherency of the body, while to the British Parliament the Colonists have no such access as will ensure their interests being debated at their time, or their interests represented in their spirit, or with their earnestness and information. It is true the press is open to them; but the British press, like the British Parliament, is subject to a thousand other influences, and encumbered with a thousand other subjects; it will admit or exclude colonial or other matters of debate, only as the temper and occupation of the British public mind will permit. The rightful representation of colonial affairs can hardly be provided for by any means short of an Assembly specially dedicated to them.

Such a colonial representative body, restricted, if need be, in its functions, to discussion and advice, would effectually remedy colonial discontents, and for ever close the mouths of those now whispering of independence. The tide of public opinion is strongly setting in the direction of a closer union of all the English dependencies, and we may trust ere long to see established a confederation greater, more pacific, and safer at once to those within and without it, than the state of the world has ever before permitted.

Has not the question, even as one of philanthropy, a rational and sober side? Surely the earth is not doomed to everlasting discord! But how are the aspirations of mankind to be raised and purified? Never did a country hold, in relation to the rest of the world, the position now held by England. It is not a eulogium on Englishmen, but a tribute to the influences which have operated on them to say, that with all their faults, never was power so extensive held with so strong a disposition to use it beneficently. We—Englishmen or their descendents,—are placed by parts, in every region, and at opposite ends of the earth, dispersed yet closely knit, with highly diversified conditions and pursuits yet of one mind and tradition. Every tribe we touch admits our

superiority, and looks to us either in the conscious fear of weakness, or with the brightening hope of participating in our elevation. Have we this high station for nothing? Or shall we not rather hope that the federalization of the British Colonies, on principles sanctioned by constitutional history and experience, may prove one of the means of fulfilling the high purposes for which pre-eminence has been given to the British race?

CHAPTER 3.

Our Counsellors on military subjects—diverse opinions—none to be hastily adopted—unprofessional men may advise on military questions.

To return to the question more immediately before us, viz., the Militia Defences of Canada. If the dictum of Solomon be true, that "in the multitude of counsellors there is safety," we ought long ere this to have discovered the right path to security and confidence. Where so many offer advice, the conflict of opinion must be necessarily great; but in the case before us, it is not only that the doctors disagree, but that we have had to deal with the opinions of many most thorough quacks, who know nothing whatever of the subject upon which they attempt to lay down the law. Every one, in fact, considers himself as competent to give an opinion on military subjects; and what is more, many conceive themselves even military engineers by intuition, and capable of passing judgment upon arrangements which are of the most complex character; they see errors which are generally acknowledged to be such; and invent remedies for them, without perceiving that in doing so, they run into others which are ten times more injurious. On this subject of our defences, great differences of opinion are entertained; there is therefore a large field open for argument, and as no subject, from its importance and magnitude, is of deeper interest to the country, it is not surprising that it has raised a considerable amount of discussion.

The question, as I remarked before, is further complicated by the opposition of various parties; some of them deny the military, and others the political necessity of well-planned and elaborate measures of defence; while a third party, holding extreme opinions, denounces all armaments of any kind whatever. On one side, we have the solemn warnings of those whom we have been taught to consider military authorities, that our position is one of danger, demanding immediate measures to be undertaken to avert the consequences of a possible calamity;—another party, weak in numbers, but proportionately clamorous, considers it to be altogether a false alarm, and that there is neither power nor inclination on the part of our neighbours to molest us. The influence of this party is supported by overdrawn pictures of the frightful outlay demanded for the defences, and of the effects of the consequent necessary taxation—burdens on industry and commerce,—and no cry is so well calculated to arouse a popular feeling in their favor.

In an age of criticism like this, when merely to “take” a position over a man and his work, is supposed to include proportionately superior powers of judgment, though not one discovery, argument, or searching remark, be advanced in proof,—any person may gravely seat himself, in the fancy of unknowing readers, far above men who may have performed meritorious deeds, or who may have published works of genius, learning, knowledge and experience, at the very period that their self-constituted judge was perhaps learning to write at school, therefore, it is only becoming, in an attempt like that of the present paper, to disclaim all assumption of finality of judgment upon the opinions, decisions and writings of men of established reputation.

But again it will not do, yielding perhaps to the authority of some respected name, too hastily to adopt any opinions on this subject. To the history of military defence, and the present condition of Canada in that respect, we must direct our readers' attention. They will then be prepared to judge of the correctness of the deductions made by various writers thereon, as well as to make

their own; these last may justly differ from ours, for we neither claim infallibility of judgment, nor assume the right of authoritative dictation. We shall but set forth, with as much simplicity and plainness of language as we can command, the facts, and present such deductions therefrom, as seem to be just to the mind of a plain man who aspires to no higher intellectual position than that of possessing in common with the mass of his countrymen around him, *common sense*.

The unprofessional man must speak with hesitation in presence of one skilled in his craft, and not only in his presence, but generally, he who is a comparative stranger to any profession must be aware of his own disadvantages when speaking of the subject of that profession. Yet, consider, on the one hand, that no one man in the common course of things has more than one profession; is he then to be silent, or to feel himself incapable of passing any judgment upon the subjects of all professions except that one? And consider further, that professional men may labour under some disadvantages of their own, looking at their calling from within always and never from without; and from their very devotion to it, not being apt to see it in its relations with other matters; clearly then there is a distinction to be drawn somewhere, there must be a point up to which an unprofessional judgment may be not only competent, but of considerable authority because independent; although beyond that point it cannot venture without presumption and folly:—

The distinction seems to lie originally in the difference between the power of doing a thing, and that of perceiving whether it be well done or not. He who lives in the house, says Aristotle, is a better judge of its being a good or a bad one, than the builder of it. He can tell not only whether the house is good or bad, but wherein its defects consist; he can say to the builder, this chimney smokes, or has a bad draught: or this arrangement of the rooms is inconvenient; and yet he may be quite unable to cure the chimney, or to draw out a plan for his rooms which would on

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the whole suit him better. Nay, sometimes he can even see where the fault is which has caused the mischief, and yet he may not know practically how to remedy it. Following up this principle, it would appear that what we understand least in the profession of another is the detail of his practice; we may appreciate his object, may see where he has missed it, or where he is pursuing it ill; nay, may understand generally the method of setting about it; but we fail in the minute details. Applying this to the art of war, we shall see that the part which unprofessional men can least understand is what is technically called "tactics," the practical management of the men in action or even upon parade; the handling so to speak, of the men themselves, no less than the actual handling of their weapons. Let a man be as versed as he will in military history, he must well know that in these last mentioned points he is helpless, and that the rawest sergeant, or even the last-joined private, knows infinitely more of the matter than he does. But in proportion as we recede from these details to more general points,—first, to what is technically called strategy, that is to say, the directing the movements of an army with a view to the accomplishment of the object of the campaign; and next to the whole conduct of the war, as political or moral questions may affect it, in that proportion general knowledge and powers of mind come into play, and an unprofessional person may without blame speak or write on military subjects, and may judge of them sufficiently well, to speak of them without incurring the reproach of vanity.

We are Canadian born. Our military antecedents consist of some ten years continuous, active and unsparing service in the Canadian Volunteer Militia, serving in that period as both private and officer, and as Rifleman, Artilleryman, and "Red Soldier." We have had also, by personal contact, opportunities of becoming more or less acquainted with the Militia of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, P. E. Island, the United States, England and France.

With these premises then, we venture to submit our ideas, with

the hope that if our views are not received with favorable eyes, they will at least be judged as showing an earnest desire to benefit the country by advocating such measures as will form a military force which, instead of being as it now is, a very rope of sand, may in some degree become a bar of iron.

CHAPTER 4

Officers of the British Army as our critics, organizers, and controllers—less fitted to act as such by reason of their peculiar education, want of colonial experience, and want of knowledge of our country—Canadian officers the best judges.

The caption of our essay might have been "The Canadian Militia, and its English critics." By these latter we mean those officers of the regular army of England, who, by the policy of our statesmen have been placed at the head of our Militia force as its organizers and controllers. These men have done their duty more or less faithfully, but from the nature of things were unfitted for the position, and as each sailed for England, he left our forces in no better condition than he found them in on his arrival. We also include those officers of the Royal Army, who, after a brief sojourn among us, regarding only the mischievous results produced by the acts of men of the same stamp as themselves, immediately give utterance to dogmatic opinions ("suggestions") as to the best remedy for the evil; blaming not their fellow-craftsmen, the distinguished army officers, the originators of the unsound condition of affairs, but the Government and people of Canada.

Deplorable mischief is caused by some of these English-officer opinions, from the fact that no matter what they may be, or who utters them, they are received as indisputable by the good people of Canada.

Now we wish to dispel this popular delusion, and considering ourselves as the opponent of these officers, so far as they are the enunciators of ill-adapted schemes, it is our part to shew that

from his education, experience, &c., the average English army officer is not likely to be well fitted to judge of the merits or demerits of the Canadian Militia System, but that any feasible suggestions as to its reform must come from those born and bred in the country.

Aristotle in his Rhetoric advises that :

“The last speaker should first bring forward what makes against his adversary's speech, annulling its effect and drawing opposite inferences, and particularly should the arguments of the first speaker have been well received. For just as one's mind does not cordially receive a person on whom a slur has been previously cast ; in the same way neither does it favorably listen to a speech, if the speaker contradicting it makes it appear that he speaks the truth.”

Of what stuff are our critics made ? • What claims as censors have these military mentors upon our undivided attention ? In answer we quote from an English military work :

“The soldiers of the British army are possessed of elements to enable them under a chief of abilities to be the first troops in the world. They neither require brandy nor self-conceit to be brave ; their courage is innate ; it is a national instinct. The officers are men of greater information than all other European officers, because, in general education is more attended to in England than elsewhere ; they are attached to their profession, and follow it rather from generous motives and military spirit, than like mercenaries, from interest ; but we must at the same time confess that they want experience.”

In a similar but severer tone writes an English reviewer in 1871 :

“And here we should like to digress for a moment upon our very lax definition of a ‘good officer.’ We know our officers generally as a body to be such a nice, gentlemanly set of fellows, travelled, tolerably educated, well-dressed, smart on parade ; we have such pleasant recollections of evenings with them at mess ; we know how gallantly they have ever led their men in danger ; we positively refuse to admit the possibility of their not being not only good officers, but the best officers in the world. The boasted Prussian creature who is never out of his uniform, who knows nothing of the town, who has never ridden to hounds, who cannot even probably play cricket, may be all very well in his way, but he is not to be compared to our fox-hunters and cricketers, to whom the great Duke of Wellington owed his victories, and all the rest of it. But we fear this conventional idea of the sort of man really required to make a good officer has done incalculable harm to our army. * * * We must insist, that men like these however fine fellows they may be, are in a military point of view, and the view in which a State should look at the qualifications of its servants, essentially not good, but essentially bad officers ; and officers who afford no justification whatever of the system under which they flourish, and under which they rise to command.”

Sir Francis B. Head, writing in 1850, remarks as follows in his book entitled, "*The Defenceless State of Great Britain*":—

"The foregoing brief sketch of the condition of the various departments of the British Army up to the retirement in 1818 of the army of occupation, will, we believe, sufficiently demonstrate that under all circumstances the intrepid courage of our troops has done honor to the country of their birth. There is, however, in warfare, as in mechanics, a point beyond which physical resistance is unable to withstand the simple combinations of science; and accordingly, for the reasons we have just detailed, namely, from sheer ignorance and inexperience in its field duties, our army, though composed of the noblest elements, was, until about forty years ago, almost invariably defeated. By the efforts, the talents, the *experience* of the Duke of Wellington, who, by the minute organization we have described, not only *made* the army he commanded, but by doing so saved *himself* from inevitable defeat, the wheel of fortune has since 1808 been completely reversed, but the principles of the machinery remained unaltered; and therefore, for the very reason that it has been indisputably proved by a series of battles that a British army properly commanded and controlled is, when opposed to an equal force invincible, we ought—without allowing ourselves to be dazzled by the brightness of its existing character, or by that prestige which, like a glorious halo, now surrounds its name—prudently to consider whether the fabric of our military power is composed of perishable or imperishable materials; or, in other words, whether for future wars we can as safely rely on able generalship, experienced officers, and field discipline, as we undoubtedly can on the calm intrepidity of our troops."

After setting forth some of the data necessary for forming a judgment on this important subject, he concludes his chapter thus:

"From the foregoing facts it appears to be the fixed policy of England, that while the immense youthful armies of Europe, in extensive encampments such as we have described, as well as in garrisons, each containing a little army, are studiously learning grand measures and evolutions, *siege* duties as well as the minutest details of field exercise and discipline, the British army stricken in years, and deprived of every opportunity of learning its duties,—shall, to satiate the anti-military propensities of the nation, be made to revert to the unorganized condition in which its various departments existed in 1808; in short, that from the difficulties experienced, overcome, and pointed out in the despatches of the Duke of Wellington, we shall in the words of Napoleon, 'Have learned nothing, and have forgotten all!'"

It is true that our able critic wrote in the year 1850. But we will ask any candid, intelligent man whether succeeding years have shewn anything to contradict or even modify this severe reproof; whether the Crimean, Indian, Persian, Chinese, Abyssinian and Ashantee campaigns have not supported conclusively the sad story so honestly and fearlessly told by the learned

Baronet ; whether, in fine, had Sir Francis written his book this day, he could have conscientiously written about the organization of the British army in any other strain than the one he employed in 1850.

We cannot close this part of our subject with greater propriety and fitness than by means of an extract from one of the Wellington Prize Essays, written at Sandhurst, England, in the year 1872 :

"Already," Lieut. King writes, "has the principle foreshadowed in these lines become an accomplished fact, and periodical field manoeuvres, the only school in which the true art of war can be studied during long years of peace, form part of the military history of the year. At length we have not feared to adopt a, to us, novel system of instruction, though we have lost valuable time by our past apathy, and have only been induced to its adoption by the successes of a foreign power. We have till recently proudly refused to learn from the experience of others, and yet a good principle is none the less sound because it has been applied successfully by another nation. We might well take a lesson from foreigners themselves on this point. They do not think it beneath them to study, and if necessary accept the good features of any system, come whence it may. In all other matters in, private or commercial life, we do not deem it derogatory to utilize inventions, discoveries, ideas that have been brought forward beyond the narrow circle of our own realm. Had we done so, England would assuredly be behind the age in more ways than one. But in our military service we are contented too frequently to rest on traditional knowledge, on ancient theories, and to disregard the lessons that might be learnt from the action of other nations, because this plan is too French, that too German for Englishmen. A principle is sound or not on its own merits, regardless of the source whence it comes.

"The spirit of enquiry must not be allowed again to drop because our first camp of instruction has not recorded any grave failure in our application of an existing system. We as a nation, have been too prone to rest on our hard-won laurels, and commence each new campaign with but the knowledge and experience of the last.

"In the science of war, as in all others, there is no period of inaction—no period of rest. To cope with foreign powers successfully, even on our own soil, pace must be kept with the times, and the moral of the old fable of the tortoise and the hare must no longer find a parallel in our apathetic custom of 'resting und being thankful.' A victorious campaign rather than teaching us we can sleep and rest, should but point out that the steady, undeviating progress of other nations inevitably introduces new modifications into all details of the art of war, and makes each battle we may have to fight more difficult to win."

So much for the military capacity of our would-be instructors generally. But perhaps their knowledge of our country is such that they can apply to very great advantage their knowledge of

the art of war and military engineering. What does an English author think on this subject when writing in 1861 :

“ Every day, every hour of this long tour has only convinced me more and more how little the English people know of their brothers in Canada. So runs the conclusion of the *Times* chronicler of the tour of the Prince of Wales, and he was not far wrong. The mass of our educated people even, have a dim, vague idea of Canada as a dreary region covered with dense icicle-hung woods, that are scantily peopled with fur-clad back-woodsmen, who have to keep bears and wolves off while they wield the axe ; in fact, as a country the very thought of which makes one shiver and shudder ; and, as if the horrors of such a picture could be heightened, they imagine frequent raids from grim, inexorable Indians, who silently, but surely, carry off a full tale of scalps from the aforesaid unfortunates. All other American varieties are calmly lumped together as almighty-dollar-worshipping, dinner-bolting, tobacco-chewing, spitting, liquoring, suivelling Yankees.”

Here we have the deliberately recorded opinions of their own countrymen on the powers of the average British officer, and the knowledge of Canada which he possesses in common with the educated class of Englishmen.

It might perhaps be considered unfair, as beyond our argument, to make use of the dictum of a French General, who, writing of the English army, says : “ Les officiers de toutes les armes ne faisaient que boire et mener vie joyeuse.” It is better suited to our purpose to know the opinion of an English statesman, that the British have no living General capable of handling with any credit 50,000 men.

Now we think that we have quoted enough to show that it would be unreasonable to expect the British officer, good as he is on certain points of detail, to be capable of originating a scheme which will bring into the most effective action the splendid and peculiar qualities of the Canadian Militia. Chiefly, as we said before, through want of experience, but partly also from ignorance of the habits, mode of life, and institutions of us Canucks, and our neighboring rivals the Yankees.

We ask our readers calmly to study the condition of the Militia in England, which has been for centuries under the rule of men of the same calibre as those who now pick holes in a

system, which, defective as it is, is superior to the one in the home land, and one which has in many instances initiated modes of Military instruction, now common to both.

For the purposes of our country, the judgment of Lord Elcho, the English volunteer, should weigh heavier than that of the Duke of Cambridge, the English Commander-in-chief, but the advice given by one of our own Brigade Majors should far outweigh in value to us that of these two officers combined.

We are not of those who seek difficulties where none exist, we would prevent every possibility of ill-feeling between our militia forces and Her Majesty's regular troops. We can assert that no such feeling exists at present except in the breasts of a few individuals. If the time should unhappily arrive when the services of all will be called into requisition, we doubt not that it will find true brotherhood existing between all sections of the armed subjects of our Queen. In the meantime a good understanding should exist among military men of whatever class. The officers of the British army may be sure that they have no warmer friends than the officers and men of the Canadian Militia, and that if they receive friendly criticism it is only because they, as professional men, have been too harsh and unsparing in their remarks on the Militia or Volunteer forces in Britain or Her Majesty's possession. If the British troops were of little value as soldiers little would be said about them. It is because they have already done so much and have done it so well, that we unprofessioned colonists—blood relations as we are—interest ourselves in their further success, and hail any step taken in their upward march to improvement in a spirit of pride and satisfaction and hearty good will.

CHAPTER 5.

The State, its duties, and its rights—Public Defence—May be provided for by two methods, viz. : Militia or a Standing Army—Tendency towards the former—Mischiefs arising from the latter—National Military Training should be part of National Education—Power of a State lies in cultivating a spirit of true patriotism—Results of life in a regular army—A Militia rapidly becomes an army when in the field.

I understand by the State, a community organized for the purpose of government,—a united whole, bound together by one and the same system of civil administration. The State stands in need of power, for its government or organism through which it obtains, or strives to obtain, State objects. Let us call it public power. Public power may rest on a moral basis, for instance people obey a law because it is a law, not because a penalty is attached to it. Or Government may have the right to bestow honours, and thereby exercise power. Or public power may rest on a physical basis, for instance, when the constable with his assistants, carries off a person, or Government sends soldiers to enforce obedience. Or it may rest on a basis of a mixed character, for instance, the pecuniary means at the disposal of Government. Pecuniary reward cannot be strictly called physical or moral.

Why does the State want power for its government? Because :

1. Power for the Government is necessary, in order to protect the *jural* relations of the citizens, each one of whom can only see and feel first through himself. If, then, every man is to have his due, how can this be otherwise done than by a higher authority, and power to sustain that authority?

2. The State, through its Government, must protect each citizen against any violation of his rights by wrongdoers within, or enemies without.

3. The State, as a whole, must maintain and protect itself against evil designs against its existence from within, and attacks upon its independence from without.

4. The State, a jural society, must maintain its character as such. It must punish violations of rights, not only with a view to individual protection, but also to maintain its own character as the society of right.

5. One of the main State objects is the obtaining jointly that which is necessary for society, and cannot be obtained by individual exertion,—to obtain publicly, what cannot be obtained privately. This, too, requires power.

The first duty of the State, that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force—the instrument of war. The right of making war is necessary to the existence of the State, as a distinct and independent agent, which is sovereign over all its subjects within it, and protects them from all harm from without. If its subjects be injured, or its independence assailed by a foreign State, it has no resource but remonstrance, which may inevitably lead to war; since States have no common tribunal before which injury done by one to the other can be inquired into and redress given.

The art of war, as it is certainly the protectress of all arts, so in the progress of improvement it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them. The state of the mechanical, as well as of some other arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time. In order to carry it to the highest degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens. A private citizen who in time of profound peace, and without any particular encouragement from the public, should spend the greater part of his time in military exercises, might, no doubt, im-

prove himself very much in them, and amuse himself very well ; but he certainly would not promote his own interest.

A farmer, in the rude state of husbandry, or in a newly opened country, has some leisure time ; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The first may, without any loss, employ some part of his time in martial exercises ; but the latter cannot employ a single hour in them without some loss, and his attention to his own interest naturally leads him to neglect them altogether. These improvements in agriculture, too, which the progress of arts and manufactures necessarily introduces, leave the farmer almost as little leisure as the artificer. Military exercises come to be as much neglected by the inhabitants of the country as by those of the town, and the great body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike. That wealth, at the same time, which always follows the improvements of agriculture and manufactures, and which in reality is no more than the accumulated produce of those improvements, provokes the invasion of their neighbors. An industrious, and upon that account a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked ; and unless the State takes measures for the public defence, the natural habits of the people would render them altogether incapable of defending themselves.

In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the State can make any tolerable provision for the public defence.

It may either, first, enforce the practice of military exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry on ; and this in some cases in spite of the whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people.

Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in the constant practice of military exercises, it may

render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.

If the State has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military force is said to consist in a militia; if to the second, it is said to consist in a standing army. The practice of military exercises is the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and the maintenance or pay which the State affords them is the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is only the occasional occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence from some other occupation. In a militia, the character of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier; in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over every other character; and in this distinction seems to consist the essential difference between those two different species of military force.

We are of those, who think on the one hand, that the tendency of true civilization is to substitute armed nations, as in Germany and Switzerland, for standing armies such as those of Russia and France; and, on the other hand, that the institution of standing armies, so far from tending to abolish war, created it,—created it, that is to say, in the modern sense of hostilities on a vast scale, waged by immense forces, and protracted often for many years. The feudal militia was a defensive institution, by its structure wholly incapacitated for other than petty hostilities, by its interests at home indisposed for long or distant campaigns, and under no obligations to undertake them in the interests of a monarch. It is a remarkable example of the error of looking at one side of the shield, that powerful reasoners could regard as pacific institutions, the rise at the same time of military monarchies, and of a special class devoted to warfare, by their interests bound to it, placed at the disposal of a single chief who wielded the resources of a whole nation, and who was enabled by the very existence of such a class, monopolizing al-

military knowledge and discipline, to defy the wishes of the great body of his subjects for peace. The men of peace were disarmed, while the men of war were armed with the deadliest weapons. The mere establishment of permanent armies placed forces adequate and disposed to great wars upon foot, but they did much more to create such wars by placing at their head the very person who suffers least by the interruption of peace, who feels none of the privations of a campaign, and need incur none of its dangers, even if he takes the field in person; who can stop the war if he tires of it, who has all the pride and ambition generated by immense power and supreme rank—a rank, moreover, which among his few equals in other nations, is proportionate not to the wealth and prosperity of the nation under his control, and disposing it to peace, but to his own military power and success. Lord Bacon, no mean authority in matters of kingcraft, treating of “the true greatness of nations,” and meaning literally the greatness of nations as contra-distinguished from kingdoms, has authoritatively pronounced :

“In all experience you shall find but three things that prepare and dispose a State for war: the ambition of governors, a state of soldiers prepared, and the bar^l means to live “of many subjects.”

It may therefore be asserted, generally speaking, that if nations are naturally prone to peace from their interests and their propensities, they are constantly drawn to war and revolutions by their armies. When a nation perceives that it is inwardly affected by the restless ambition of its army, the first thought which occurs is to give this inconvenient ambition an object by going to war. All military rulers who rise up in great nations find it easier to conquer with their armies, than to make their armies live at peace after conquest. There are two things which a people will always find very difficult,—to begin a war, and to end it. Although war gratifies the army, it embarrasses and exasperates that countless multitude of men whose every day desires require peace in order to be satisfied. Thus there is some risk of its causing, under another form, the disturbance it is intended to prevent.

There are, we believe, two preliminary steps requisite to put an end to wars—the establishment of free institutions, and the substitution of national militias for standing armies; but the danger of war can never disappear altogether until the civilized world has a common legislature for international affairs. So opposite to the national interest for peace are the interests of personal government, that after showing how popular institutions disincline nations for war by the prosperity they create, and the intelligence they arouse, M. de Tocqueville lays it down as the first maxim in the science of tyranny, that the shortest and surest method of destroying political liberty in a nation is to make war, for that is the way to establish a standing army.

The militia is, however, a force which is more constitutional and far less expensive, possessing none of the dangerous properties of a standing army, and for our purposes of defence it would really be found efficient, notwithstanding the shaking of heads on the part of our professional military authorities, who show an absurd jealousy of everybody that does not wear a red coat.

The only means that seems really available is to train and arm the mass of the people as riflemen, and induce them to prepare to defend their homes as patriotic citizens ought to do. If this expedient is to be effectual, the Government must be prepared to second it honestly and earnestly, and it must be done on a very large scale. Most military men are inclined to sneer at these citizen soldiers. Yet history will tell them how severely some of the best regular troops of the English army were handled by a small number of volunteer riflemen at New Orleans; and how in fact England lost her colonies in the first instance, and was unable to chastise them in the second war, wholly through the opposition of untrained levies. Even now, though the regular army of the United States is only some 25,000 strong (and is being annually reduced), and although their volunteer and militia arrangements are very far from complete, there is not a General in Europe who would undertake the conquest of that country with a picked army of

100,000 of the best troops in Europe. Those who remember the troubles of 1837, look with dread at the idea of putting arms into the hands of our people, and teaching them to use them effectively. Times, however, have changed, and this country must now be governed with and through the people : they may be guided, but hardly opposed. We do not fear teaching our citizens the use of arms, and we think nothing but good will arise from the circumstance of the whole people being made more or less accustomed to military organization. National training in military exercises we consider an important part of national education, which it is the duty of a State to supervise and enforce, even if we overlook it as a direct means of national defence.

“ Even though the martial spirit of the people, says Adam Smith, the great social philosopher, were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most serious attention of government.”

In our country of Canada, indeed, that martial spirit, alone and unsupported by a standing army, would be quite sufficient for the defence and security of the society.

How thinks Francis of Verulam, the wisest of uninspired men, on this subject :

“ Fortified towns, well-stored arsenals, noble breeds of war-horses, armed chariots, elephants, engines, all kinds of artillery, arms, and the like, are nothing more than a sheep in a lion's skin, unless the nation itself be, from its origin and temper, stout and warlike. Nor is the number of troops itself of any great service, where the soldiers are weak and enervate : for, as Virgil well observes, “ The wolf cares not how large the flock is.” The Persian army in the plains of Arbela, appeared to the eyes of the Macedonians as an immense ocean of people ; inasmuch that Alexander's leaders, being struck at the sight, counselled their general to fall upon them by night ;—but he replied, “ I will not steal the victory :” and it was found an easier victory than he expected, Tigranes, encamped upon a hill, with an army of four hundred thousand men, seeing the Roman army, consisting but of fourteen thousand, making up to him, he jested at it, and said, “ Those men are too many for an embassy, but much too few for a battle,” yet before sunset he found them enough to give him chase, with infinite slaughter ; and we have abundant examples of the great inequality betwixt number and strength. This, therefore, may be first set down as a sure and certain maxim, and the capital of all the rest, with regard to the greatness of a state, that the people be of a military race, or both by origin and disposition warlike. The sinews of war are not money, if the sinews of

"mens' arms be wanting, as they are in a soft and effeminate nation. It was a just answer of Solon to Cræsus, who showed him all his treasure: "Yes, sir, but if another should come with better iron than you, he would be master of all this gold." And, therefore all princes whose native subjects are not hardy and military, should make a very modest estimate of their power; as, on the other hand, those who rule a stout and martial people, may well enough know their own strength, if they be not otherwise wanting to themselves. As to hired forces, which is the usual remedy when native forces are wanting, there are numerous examples, which clearly show, that whatever state depends upon them though it may perhaps for a time extend its feathers beyond its nest, yet they will mew soon after."

Those who have lived in a garrison town need not be told of the mass of idleness and immorality found within the barracks of a regular army. And most of my readers have no doubt felt the unpleasant sensation of pain mingled with pity produced by a personal experience of the utter worthlessness, in the majority of instances, of the discharged soldier, unfitted for work or physical exertion, and shewing too plainly that depravity in morals which the enforced idleness of a soldier's life engenders.

Cowper, in his *Task*, keenly satirises the evils arising even from three years compulsory service in the militia :

" 'Tis universal soldiership has stabb'd
 " The heart of merit in the meaner class.
 " Arms, through the vanity and brainless rage
 " Of those that bear them, in whatever cause,
 " Seem most at variance with all moral good,
 " And incompatible with serious thought.
 " The clown, the child of nature, without guile,
 " Blest with an infant's ignorance of all
 " But his own simple pleasures; now and then
 " A wrestling match, a foot-race, or a fair;
 " Is balloted, and trembles at the news:
 " Sheepish he doffs his hat, and mumbling swears
 " A bible-oath to do whate'er they please,
 " To do he knows not what. The *task* perform'd,
 " That instant he becomes the serjeant's care,
 " His pupil, and his torment, and his jest.
 " His awkward gai', his introverted toes,
 " Bent knees, round shoulders, and dejected looks,
 " Procure him many a' curse. By slow degrees
 " Unapt to learn, and form'd of stubborn stuff,
 " He yet by slow degrees puts off himself,

" Grows conscious of a change, and likes it well ;
 " He stands erect ; his slouch becomes a walk ;
 " He steps right onward, martial is his air,
 " His form and movement, is as smart above
 " As meal and larded locks can make him ; wears
 " His hat, or his plumed helmet, with a grace ;
 " And, his three years of hero-ship expired,
 " Returns indignant to the slighted plough.
 " He hates the field, in which no life or drum
 " Attends him ; drives his cattle to a march ;
 " And sighs for the smart comrades he has left.
 " 'Twere well if his exterior change were all—
 " But with his clumsy port the wretch has lost
 " His ignorance and harmless manners too.
 " To swear, to game, to drink ; to show at home,
 " By lewdness, idleness, and Sabbath breach,
 " The great proficiency he made abroad ;
 " To astonish and to grieve his gazing friends ;
 " To break some maiden's and his mother's heart ;
 " To be a pest where he was useful once ;
 " Are his sole aim, and all his glory now."

Though this is poetry and written in the eighteenth century, yet it contains a true picture of the result of regular army life, in peace, in our own times.

Let us beware, my friends, of the growth of that deadly incubus, a standing army, and nip in the bud any scheme which in the guise of military schools, Government police, caretakers, or otherwise, would eventually saddle the country with a full-blown military machine, a far greater scourge to its supporters than to its enemies.

Those who believe in the irresistible superiority which a well-regulated standing army has over a militia force, should remember that this inequality is only true at the very opening of the campaign, where the two systems are opposed. A Militia force of any kind which has served even a very short time in the field, becomes in every respect a standing army. The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their arms, and being constantly under the command of their officers, are habituated to the same prompt obedience which takes place in standing armies. What

they were before they took the field, is of little importance, provided they are courageous, stalwart men. They necessarily become equal to a standing army, after they have passed a short time in the field.

In De Tocqueville's language the power of the militia when aroused is clearly put :

" I am therefore of opinion, he says, " that, when a democratic people engages in a war after a long peace, it incurs much more risk of defeat than any other nation ; but " it ought not easily to be cast down by its reverses, for the chances of success for such an " army are increased by the duration of the war. When a war has at length, by its long " continuance, roused the whole community from their peaceful occupations and ruined " their minor undertakings, the same passions which made them attach so much importance " to the maintenance of peace will be turned to arms. War, after it has destroyed all modes " of speculation, becomes itself the great and sole speculation, to which all the ardent and " ambitious desires which equally engenders are exclusively directed. Hence it is that " the self-same democratic nations which are so reluctant to engage in hostilities, some- " times perform prodigious achievements when once they have taken the field."

In these cases the major premiss is begged, namely, that the case is Militia vs. Regular troops, but as we have indicated, and will enlarge upon further on, in our case it would be now, and is likely to be for years to come, Militia vs. Militia.

CHAPTER 6 .

Changes in Historical order, in Militia laws of the Dominion and its component Provinces—Province of Canada—Nova Scotia—New Brunswick—Prince Edward Island—British Columbia—Dominion of Canada.

We have now reached a point where it becomes necessary to leave generalities and pass to particulars. To discuss the present Militia system of Canada it will be proper to treat of its successive development or history.

Let us epitomise chronologically those changes, *which bear most on our argument*, in the systems of the various Provinces now forming the united whole known as the Dominion of Canada,—and in that of the Dominion itself.

OLD CANADA.

Previous to the union of Upper and Lower Canada, in 1841, the system in Lower Canada was (see old Revised Statutes p. 587) one making all persons resident in Province from 16 to 60 years of age, militiamen. Captains were obliged to send Rolls of Companies each year to the Colonels commanding the Districts. Militia to muster one day in each of months of June, July and August, in each year, to review arms, to fire at marks, and for instruction in the exercise.

In Upper Canada (old Revised Statutes p. 941) the Militia was composed of all the male inhabitants between ages of 18 and 60, to be enrolled by Captains every year on 4th June. Colonels might assemble militia one day in each month for drill and inspection; retired Battalions were formed of those incapable of active service.

We find little or no change, after the union of the two Provinces, until 1846, when by 9 V. c. 28, it was enacted that militia of United Canada should consist of males between 18 and 60, divided into two classes: 1st class between 18 and 40; second class 40 and 60; in time of peace privates to be taken from the 1st class only. Government might divide the Province into Regimental and Battalion Divisions; officers commanding Battalion might divide it into Company Divisions. Militiamen of both classes to enrol themselves in month of June in each year, with the officer commanding the company within the limits of which they reside. Officer commanding Battalion to make return to Adj. General, who should inform the Colonel of the number of men required for active service. Officer commanding company to muster all the first class men, from whom he was to obtain by volunteers or ballot his quota for active service. Governor to order men balloted or taken, to assemble for purpose of being formed into companies or battalions—ordinary quota of militiamen not to exceed 30,000 men. Militiamen only required to serve for two years at a time. Governor might on emergency embody whole of any regiment. Substitutes

allowed. Governor may form volunteer corps. Inspecting Field Officers may be appointed within inspection districts. First class of militia to assemble for one day [29th June] in each year for muster and discipline: 1 Adjutant General and 2 Deputy Adjutant Generals may be appointed.

By 18 V. c. 77 [1855] 2 divisions of militia were recognized, viz.: Sedentary and active or volunteer; 18 military districts erected, with Regimental, Battalion and Company Divisions. Enrolment to be by Captains annually, one muster day per annum. Active or volunteer companies formed not to exceed 5,000 men. Arms of sedentary militia to be kept in armories or distributed among the men.

By 19 V. c. 44 annual muster day might be dispensed with, and unpaid volunteer corps authorized.

By 22 V. c. 18, the Volunteer Militia forces were ordered to drill for 6 consecutive days in each year, with pay at rate of \$1.00 per diem. Assistant Adjutants General appointed without pay.

By 25 V. c. 1 Volunteer Corps were not to exceed in aggregate 10,000 men. Brigade Majors appointed for each military district;—days of drill of active militia to be 12, not necessarily consecutive, and pay to be 50 cents per diem—paid Instructors authorized for active and sedentary militia—drill associations authorized.

By 27 V. c. 2 Militia divided into 1st class service men, 2nd class service men, reserve and non-reserve militiamen—each county to be a regimental division—service militia may be drilled for 6 days at 50 cents—3 years to be length of service—Adjutant General and Deputy Adjutants General appointed—schools of military instructions established with allowances to pupils—no service or drill required of non-service militia, but must enrol from time to time—one muster day appointed for other classes. Regimental divisions divided into Battalion divisions and Company divisions.

By 27 V. c. 3, Volunteer Militia force may be raised to 35,000 men.

By 27—28 V. c. 10, Volunteer Militia to be paid 50 cents per diem for 16 days drill—examinations for officers appointed.

By 29 V. c. 6, Service Militia may be called out for 6 days, at 50 cents per diem.

By 29—30 V. c. 12 pay of volunteers, when on active service, to be same as that of H. M. regular troops.

NOVA SCOTIA.

In Nova Scotia, by the Revised Statutes, 3rd series (1864),—the militia embraced all males between ages of 16 and 60—two classes of militia, 1st from 16 to 45 years ; 2nd, 45 to 60 years—only first class to be called out in time of peace, second class to be reserve—each company to assemble once a year for enrolment—country divided into regimental divisions, Company divisions and squad divisions.—Militia may be called out for 28 days squad drill, but only for 8 days battalion and company drill, of two hours each drill—examination of officers provided for—returns to be sent in once per annum by Captains—volunteer corps divided into effectives, non-effectives and honorary, and may be combined with the militia—12 days drill required—one-third of cost of armories to belong to Province—in case of emergency from invasion &c., one-sixth of 1st class to be called out.

By 28 V. c. 16, boards of officers for examinations authorized.

By 29 V. c. 34, Government to pay two-thirds cost of drill sheds ; and two-thirds cost of uniform.

By 30 V. c. 25, Government to pay three-fourths of cost of drill sheds.

NEW BRUNSWICK.

By revised Statutes [1854] Militia consists of all white male inhabitants from 16 to 60 years. Battalions to be formed by counties—Militia to assemble by Regiment or Battalion, one day in each year for inspection and exercise—each Battalion to rendez-

vous 2 days in each year for discipline, &c. When called out Militia to have same pay as H. M. Regular Forces.

By 25 V. c. 20 [1862] Militia divided into two classes, Active and Sedentary ;—Active, of men from 18 years of age to 40 ;—Sedentary from 45 to 60. Active divided into 3 classes : Class A, Class B, Class C. Class A, Volunteer Cavalry, Artillery and Riflemen ; Class B, unmarried men and widowers without children. Class C, married men and widowers with children. Uniform, arms and accoutrements at the expense of the public. Class A drilled for 6 days per annum—ammunition at the expense of the Province. Classes B and C to be enrolled, and muster one day in each year. Sedentary Militia only required to enrol from time to time. Province to be divided into Military Districts, Regimental Divisions, and Battalion Divisions. Inspecting Officer for each District.

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND.

By 20 Geo. 3 (1780) all persons between 16 and 60 years to bear arms.

By 3 Will. 4 c. 30, Militia divided into Regiments, Battalions Companies—to be called out once a year. Militiamen above 45 years of age to be formed into reserved corps. Inspector appointed with salary.

By 9 Vic. c. 6, Volunteer Companies may be formed in each regiment, and trained for 20 days per annum.

By 14 Vict., c. 6 Militia for future not to be called out for training or muster except in cases of emergency.

By 24 Vict. c. 11, volunteer corps accepted, to be mustered 16 times per annum.

By 29 Vict. c. 2 Militia divided into active and sedentary ; active divided into volunteer and regular militia—counties divided into regimental districts—schools of military instruction established—allowance of £1 per annum granted to each uniformed volunteer militiaman—regular militia to consist of men between

years 16 and 45—drill of this class not to exceed 10 days per annum—sedentary militia embraces those between 45 and 60 years of age.

BRITISH COLUMBIA.

By Revised Statutes (1871) No. 117, Volunteer corps authorized—allowances to be:—\$5 to each effective volunteer; \$10 to each "marksman," in annual class of shooting; \$500 for each corps of not less than 30 members, for expenses of establishment—arms to be supplied by colony.

DOMINION OF CANADA.

By the Union Act (30 V. c. 3 Imp.) the exclusive Legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to the militia, military and naval service, and defence, consequently all the laws now governing these subjects will be found in Statutes of the Dominion of Canada.

31 Vict. c. 40, provides for the militia and defence of the Dominion.

Department of militia constituted—Militia consists of all male British subjects between 18 and 60—to be called to serve in following order of classes, viz.: 1st class, 18 to 30 unmarried. 2nd from 30 to 45 unmarried. 3rd, 18 to 45 married. 4th, 45 to 60. Widowers without children rank as unmarried; with them, as married. It is also divided into the active and reserve. The active includes the volunteer, the regular, and the marine militia. The regular militia are those who voluntarily enlist to serve in the same, or men balloted, or in part of both. The marine is made up of persons whose usual occupation is on sailing or steam craft navigating the waters of the Dominion. Volunteers to serve for 3 years—regular and marine militia to serve for 2 years—nine military divisions are provided for—Ont. 4; Que. 3; N. S. 1; N.B. 1; Her Majesty may alter these, and may subdivide into brigade, regimental and company divisions. (Manitoba, 1; B. Columbia, 1; and P. E. Island 1; subsequently added by 34 V. c. 17, and 37 V.

c. 35). Company officers to enrol the militia in February in each year,—active militia to consist of cavalry, field artillery, mounted infantry, engineers, garrison artillery, infantry and naval and marine corps. When enough men do not volunteer, ballot must be resorted to. No one can be appointed an officer of active militia (except provisionally) without a military school or board certificate—40,000 active militiamen to be drilled each year—drills of 3 hours per diem, and from 8 to 16 days per annum—allowance 50 cts. per day. When called out for actual service they are to receive pay of regular army. Inspections provided for. Provision is made for rifle ranges at or near headquarters of regimental divisions. Military school and camps of instruction may be established. This act is amended by 33 V. c. 22 as to signing of commissions—by 34 V. c. 17, increasing number of active militiamen to 45,000, &c.,—by 36 V. c. 46 as to calling out militia in aid of civil power, and courts-martial, &c.

By 37 V. c. 36, the establishment of a Military College was authorized—3 instructors to be appointed by Governor—candidates for admission to pass entrance examination. Number of candidates at opening limited to 22. For first two years annual admission not to exceed 3 from each military district, and after 3rd year, 2 in each year from each military district—10 officers of active militia to be admitted temporarily—cadets to be paid \$300 per annum.

CHAPTER 7.

Character and nature of Canadian organization—Judgment of public opinion thereon—Principal defects considered—Economy with efficiency to be regarded in expenditure—Excessive absolute cost of Militia service—Excessive expenditure as compared with other countries—Expensive Staff—Absence of discipline—Weakness in enforcing Penal Code—Appointment of Officers—Want of State Military School—Evils of too much dependence on the Volunteer Force.

The character and nature of the Canadian organization is described by Adjutant General Ross, in his report for year 1870. From which we take the following extract, though [necessarily a repetition. Referring to the Fenian inroad in April, 1870, he writes :—

“ It will be seen from the above events, that, not only is the Active Militia of Canada ready at a moment's notice to turn out in strength in defence of their country, and well able to repel any such invasion, but in the event of a great national struggle, the ranks of the Active Militia of the Dominion could be readily reinforced and increased from the Reserve until its numbers became very formidable ; and with a sufficient supply of arms and military stores for its equipment, in each district, supported, as it would be, in the event of foreign war, by the fleet and army of Great Britain, with Quebec, Montreal, and a few other strategical points properly fortified, aided by that powerful ally, a Canadian winter, and above all relying upon the courage of its people, the conquest of Canada would probably prove again (if ever attempted), as it has done before, beyond the power of its enemies.

ORGANIZATION.

“ At the present moment, when most nations (and notably so, the Mother Country) are from force of circumstances compelled to turn their serious attention to the proper organization of their military forces, it may not be amiss (for general information) here briefly to describe the character and nature of the Canadian organization.

“ This organization is based upon the principle that every man owes it to his country to serve in its defence against its enemies. All the male inhabitants of the Dominion, between the ages of 18 and 60, not exempted or disqualified by law, and who are British subjects by birth or naturalization, are liable to serve.

“ The population of the country is upwards of four millions, and the number liable to serve in the Militia about six hundred and seventy-five thousand, and divided into four classes :—

“ First class, ages 18 to 30, unmarried men, or widowers without children.

“ Second class, ages 30 to 45, unmarried men, or widowers without children.

“ Third class, ages 18 to 45, married men or widowers with children.

“ Fourth class, 45 to 60.

" And the above is the order, in which the male population is liable to be called upon to serve.

" The following persons only, between the ages of 18 and 60 years, are exempt from enrolment, and from actual service at any time :—

" The Judges of all the Courts of Law or Equity in the Dominion of Canada ;

" The clergy and ministers of all religious denominations ;

" The professors in any college or university, and all teachers in religious orders :

" The warden, keepers and guards of the penitentiaries, and the officers, keepers and guards of all public Lunatic Asylums ;

" Persons disabled by bodily infirmity ;

" The only son of a widow, being her only support ;

" And the following, though enrolled, shall be exempt from actual service at any time except in case of war, invasion or insurrection :—

" Half-pay and retired officers of Her Majesty's army or navy ;

" Seafaring men and sailors actually employed in their calling ;

" Pilots and apprentice pilots during the season of navigation ;

" Masters of public and common schools actually engaged in teaching.

" The enrolment is held to be an embodiment of all the militia men enrolled, and renders them liable to serve unless exempt by law.

" In order that the enrolment may be correctly taken, and the Militia organization perfected for purposes of command, the whole country is divided into Military Districts, sub-divided into Brigade Divisions, again into Regimental Divisions, and, lastly, into Company Divisions ; each regimental division has appointed to it one Lieut.-Colonel and two Majors, and each company division one Captain and two sub-officers of Reserve Militia, who must be resident therein. The Captain is charged with the duty of keeping at all times a correct roll of the whole of the militia within his division, and, when called upon, is required to furnish for active service, such numbers of men, either as volunteers, or through the operation of the ballot, as may be necessary to make good his proportion of any quota required from the regimental division, of which his company division forms a part.

" To interfere as little as possible with ordinary routine, the limits of these regimental and company divisions are made, as nearly as practicable, identical with the limits of the territorial divisions for electoral and municipal purposes, and through this means the men are not called upon to remember any other territorial divisions for militia purposes than those within which they, or those representing the property within the company division, exercise their elective franchise.

" To the several regimental divisions grouped into a brigade division, a Brigade Major is attached, and for the brigade divisions which comprise a military district, a Deputy Adjutant General is appointed, who resides within the district, and who has the command of the militia in his district, while the Adjutant General, who resides at headquarters, Ottawa, is charged, under the orders of Her Majesty, with the military command and discipline of the whole of the Militia in the Dominion.

" Under the Militia Law now in force, the active or that portion of the militia to be annually drilled is 40,000, a number slightly exceeding one in every 100 of the population ; the actual nominal strength of the Active Militia at present, however, is 44,415'

“ or equal to 1 in 15 of all the men in the Dominion liable to serve. The men are raised
 “ in the several regimental divisions in proportion to the strength of the enrolled militia
 “ constituting the reserve in each ; the period of service for purposes of drill in time of
 “ peace is three years for the Volunteer Militia, but if the ballot has to be put in operation
 “ the period of service for men drawn by this means is two years, and the men who have
 “ thus completed such a period of drill return to the reserve, and are not liable to be again
 “ taken for drill and training until all the other men in the same company division have
 “ volunteered or been ballotted to serve.

“ The officers of the Reserve Militia being appointed principally for purposes of
 “ enrolment and ballot, their being resident within their respective divisions, which is
 “ insisted on, enables them to become personally acquainted with the men liable for
 “ service, and tends to secure fairness in all the details of the ballot whenever the necessity
 “ for supplementing the active force through that means may arise, and thus, in the event
 “ of war, these officers would form a numerous and effective recruiting staff, through whose
 “ instrumentality the men required to reinforce those in the field could be readily obtained
 “ and forwarded.

“ This simple and admirable arrangement (based upon territorial distribution) is well
 “ suited to the institutions of the country, and in a military point of view of the greatest
 “ possible importance, for in time of war every regimental and company division through-
 “ out the length and breadth of the Dominion would become a recruiting district, with its
 “ own recruiting agents (viz., the officers of reserve), always resident therein. And thus
 “ this most important part of military organization, viz., the creation of an ample reserve
 “ force, is fairly and fully provided for, in just proportion also (according to age and
 “ circumstances) to the full extent of the resources of the country in men ; the machinery.
 “ [Moreover, for calling the same into existence whenever required, being kept in working
 “ order by the periodical re-enrolment of the whole force. The Militia Law of Canada
 “ has therefore, undoubtedly, solved the problem (as yet found so difficult to do in
 “ England) of how to create a large reserve force, and has also in the most inexpensive
 “ manner, provided the necessary machinery to call it into action.”

These are the words of a man whose livelihood depended on the color he gave to the picture of our forces, which is yearly held up to the view of the people or their representatives. Had he painted with unflinching honesty and truth, the picture would have assumed a sombre, gloomy aspect approaching to blackness, and the design would have shewn unmistakable signs of feebleness in conception. But by unsparing use of *couleur de rose*,—the picture,—not being allowed to be too keenly criticised, much less handled—seemed fair to sight, the estimate for its purchase passed, and the Adjutant General breathed freely once more, until the ensuing year called for another exhibition of this costly panorama.

But what does *public opinion* say as to the merits of our Canadian system, tested in all its details for the past five years both in peace, riot, and Fenian raid? We are aware that in speaking of such matters it is not easy to avoid exaggeration both in thought and expression; but we may go wrong, no less by feeling and speaking too little, than by feeling and speaking too much. It is profane and foolish to deify public opinion; but it is not right, it is not safe, to err on the other side, and ignore and vilipend it. In one sense public opinion is a very commonplace subject, in another it is one of the chiefest of the powers of God, one of the most signal instruments in His hand, for moving on to their consummation His unalterable decrees. There never was a time in the world's history, and there never was a people in which this mighty agent made head as it is doing now, and in ours. That it sometimes goes wrong and does wrong is merely to say that it works by human means; but that in the main it is on the right road and on the right errand, and that thus far it is divine, and has in it the very breath of the power of God, no man surely who discerns the times and the seasons, will deny.

What is the judgment of this public opinion—this spirit of the age? Why, that this much-lauded militia system of ours is faulty—wrong in its conception for a country like our own—poorly carried out—and showing its defects principally in the following points:—

- 1st. Excessive absolute cost of the Militia.
- 2nd. Excessive relative cost in proportion to expenditure of other countries, looking at the result obtained.
- 3rd. Too numerous and expensive a staff.
- 4th. The almost total absence of discipline or subordination and submission to orders, regulations and laws.
- 5th. The weakness of its military penal code, in conse-

quence of which the superior cannot enforce obedience, or maintain that respect due to his rank.

6th. The influence of politics upon the appointment of officers.

7th. The want of an institution to supply and practically educate the officers, *i. e.*, a State military school or college.

8th. The fact that depending upon the volunteer system, the equal burden of military service is not shared by its young men, and this burden falls on the "willing few," who also alone receive any benefit from the drill and military instruction; and portions of the Dominion are left without any military force whatever for the protection of person and property, in districts destitute of military spirit.

The country should clearly understand, and is beginning to do so, the real nature of its military force.

All we desire is, let there be no further deception about the matter, no mocking delusion that we have by lavish expenditure gained impregnable strength. Let the country clearly understand that we have not now a single battalion of infantry maintained on a footing which would enable it to leave its parade ground without disaster, or which could be safely trusted in the field, and that we have not a battery or a troop fit for immediate service of any duration; and let no fanciful idea that we have a mighty army of enrolled militia men, upon whom we can rely as on a tower of strength, be hugged with flattering unction to the soul. There is no one who really knows the composition of our volunteers or active militia, and who has studied the necessities of the class from whom they come, who will suppose that it would be possible to put into the field, and keep there for six weeks, anything more than a mere handful, of them.

It is good sometimes to look realities in the face, and not to sleep on in the happy ignorance induced by pretty tables of military statistics neatly drawn up. We are well aware that

many think still that our system is perfect, and are satisfied with the instruction in the goose-step of a few thousand clothed and armed volunteers, and these by no means the bone and sinew of the country ; and the sending forth from our military schools of a few score of cadets per annum—some of whom find attending these schools more profitable than sawing firewood or sweeping chimneys,—the sending of these graduates to their rural homes being intended to leaven the great mass of Reserve Militia which nevertheless remains unarmed, uneducated, uninstructed in anything tending to create warriors. Having these, our good citizens believe that we are fit for the strain of war. It is those only, whom bitter experience in the hour of trial has taught, who can estimate at its true value a system of defence like ours, a system so ill suited to us as to be utterly beyond our money powers to carry out in its entirety as defined in our statute book. May the time never come when this country will be awakened by the rude trial of war, for if it does, it will be when it is too late, amidst the ruin of its people and the crash of the falling Dominion. We are fully sensible of the importance of exercising economy in every branch of State expenditure. We would not advocate profusion, or an indiscriminate compliance with every demand made. Let economy, and a limitation to that which is strictly necessary be rigidly enforced ; but let the expenditure be with reference to the real wants of our militia service, and not to a given sum, which, right or wrong, it must be made to fit.

In a late memorandum on the militia system of Canada, the Military Secretary to His Excellency the Governor General, well remarks on the question of expenditure :

“ Now in all matters involving large military expenditure there is one problem presenting itself under different aspects, which, simple in its formula, is yet extremely difficult of solution. The problem may be stated in these terms :—Given the number of men required, and the efficiency to which they are to obtain, what amount of money will be annually necessary ? or, as it is stated in Canada—Given the amount of money voted, and the number of men required, what is to be the standard of efficiency ? or again—Given the amount of money and the required efficiency, how many men can be raised ?

" This problem comprises the whole principle of the organization of a military force under ordinary conditions, when the national spirit is not excited by imminent danger, or not roused by enthusiastic feeling."

We would avoid every species of extravagance of outlay—first, fixing upon the necessity of a case, let the most rigid economy be observed in making the required provision ; let the smallest means, and those the least costly, be provided, so that they be adequate, but do not let the matter be treated as a question of expenditure in the abstract, without reference to the vast importance of the object, which is no less than to prevent the loss of our very existence as an independent people.

An officer quartered in Ireland had a large quantity of ball ammunition which he was obliged to expend somehow by a specified time. The locality where he was stationed offering no facilities whatever for target practice, he hit upon a very effectual expedient for disposing of his encumbrance by sinking the cask that contained it in a river and in his report returning the ammunition as expended, a proceeding for which he was, under the particular circumstances, in no respects blameable, though it can hardly be maintained that even an indefinite repetition of this operation would have been calculated to improve his men in the art of shooting.

Now, our statesmen holding the helm and purse, have for many years acted in a manner extremely analogous to that of this officer, so fertile in expedients. Our English critics having solemnly pronounced that without a yearly expenditure of \$1,500,000 on its defences, Canada would not begin to be secure from the greedy Republic. Like unthinking and unreasoning children we obeyed and have voted this amount annually. Unfortunately, in adopting this expenditure as the price of our safety, our rulers listening again to these critics have as yet failed to devise a scheme suitable to our country, its position, population and wealth, and, looking at the useful results produced,

our hard earned dollars have been, metaphorically, packed in casks and pitched into the St. Lawrence. And this is not the worst, for our public men seem inclined to perpetuate this folly, and act as if this dollar drowning process, if only continued long enough, must inevitably render every Canadian hamlet a Gibraltar, every private in the Militia a Cromwellian Ironside, and every officer in it a Marlborough.

It is impossible to dispute the absolute necessity of our adopting strong measures for our protection. It is not a question of dollars and cents, for the alternative is frightful, and the direct losses sustained by it would throw any such expenditure into the shade; it would be in fact ruin and desolation. At the same time, the country has a right to demand that although the means to be provided be ample, they shall be on the best and most economical system: that is the real problem which we have to solve, and it is one most difficult of solution; nor is the difficulty diminished by the numerous confident and sometimes plausible specifics prescribed.

We have enumerated some eight plague spots in our present Militia system. Now, our purpose being to advocate the adoption of a system founded on entirely different principles, and seeing that these defects are acknowledged to exist by almost all but the interested ones, but borne with for want of suggestion towards a better, we might stop here. Yet as a dogmatic Q.E.D. without the proof weighs not in argument, and in deference to the few luke-warm friends of the present Militia system, we shall bring forward some facts in support of our judgment:—

1st. The absolute cost of the Militia and Defence of Canada.

The expenditure for the service since Confederation may be tabulated, from the official documents, as follows:—

1867-68	\$1,013,015 69
1868-69	937,513 35
1869-70	1,245,972 83

1870-71.....	908,732 86
1871-72.....	1,654,255 34
1872-73	1,248,663 93
1873-74.....	1,000,000 00
1874-75.....	1,313,500 00

The expenditure on this item forms one of the greatest charges on the Consolidated Revenue Fund,—up to the last two years, far exceeding the sums voted for the Public Works of the whole Dominion of Canada.

These amounts may seem extravagantly large to any business man or statesman, but our military critics step in and say you must place the Militia on a military basis, and you are not spending enough. One of this class wrote seriously that in order to guarantee the security of the country 500,000 trained men would be required, at an annual cost of \$30,000,000; and Col. Jervois, R. E., taking a more modest view, thinks that 299,750 men with an expenditure of \$22,088,500 would be the least he would advise, anything less would make him tremble for our future. In a Lecture on the "*Defence of Canada*," recently given by a member of His Excellency's staff, the Lecturer, in his scheme, asked for so many gunboats, forts, earthworks, block-houses and strong bodies of men, that to carry out his plan the Government of Canada would require the wealth of England, the population of China, and the autocratic power of the Emperor of Russia.

We ought not to act uniquely in this matter, but we ought to act as do our neighbors, *i. e.* as do those communities in similar positions with ourselves. So we must now look at the 2nd objection to the established Militia *regime*, *viz.*, its relative cost, or its cost, regarding the result obtained, when compared with that of other states.

Statistical returns give the following rates of the expense of the regular army (not including militia) as paid by each inhabitant in the principal civilized States of the world:

It is in England.....	\$2 63
France'.....	2 35
Prussia	1 50
United States of America.....	90
Russia.....	80
Austria	78
For a defensive force consisting entirely of Militia, there is paid per head in .	
Canada	42
Switzerland	17

It is somewhat difficult to draw correct conclusions from any bare array of figures, and more especially so seeing that Canada holds an almost unique status among the peoples of the world. It would not be fair to compare her for our purposes with the mis-governed, semi-barbarous, bankrupt States of South America or Asia, among whom warfare is the rule, and in most cases more than one-half of whose revenues are expended on their fighting men. So again it is not quite just to make comparisons with the over-peopled and wealthy States of Europe where *the balance of power* is continually disturbed by the placing of an extra quantity of powder, shot, flesh and money in the scale occupied by one or more of its great powers.

The above list shows that of the eight States enumerated Canada stands seventh, or in other words, her people are taxed the lightest of all, (with the exception of Switzerland.) Each of her inhabitants pays but 42 cents towards the defence of the country, whereas the English, for example, pay \$2.63 per head for the support of their army alone.

But what have these nations to shew for their expenditure ?

England has in her embodied regular army, on its peace footing, 134,000 men of all ranks, paid out of the army grants.

France has 545,000 men.

Prussia, 300,000 men.

United States of America, 30,000 men.

Russia, 500,000 men, and

Austria, 300,000 men.

These enormous figures may cause melancholy reflections to the social philosopher, but they are a source of pride and vain glory to the men who direct their employment, and the nation when paying for the enforced idleness of its soldiers, has the dreary satisfaction of knowing that it has an army ever ready for action, and these States rank themselves according to their ability to disturb the peace, and the fear they inspire in consequence.

The last on our list is Switzerland, whose constitution forbids the maintenance of a standing army within the limits of the Confederation. Now of all nations, Switzerland bears the closest resemblance to Canada, in her natural situation as to powerful neighbors, population (mixed races and various religious creeds embodied in it), civilization and character of the people. The strength of the armed forces of the Republic of Switzerland is 201,257 men, annually and periodically trained and exercised. On this formidable army of effective freemen, with a complete system of organization, instruction, &c., the State expends but \$490,000 per annum, or about 17 cents from each inhabitant. Further on we shall enlarge on the military system of this proud and independent little State.

Canada boasts of her 44,000 active militiamen, and her 660,600 reserve militia, supported at a cost of 42 cents per head of population, but we have already given an opinion as to what we really possess for our money.

We come now to the third cardinal defect in our system, viz., the employment of too large and expensive a staff for the work to do and done.

It would be an ungrateful task for us to particularise in this direction, and one from which we must be permitted to shrink on this occasion.

In estimating the annual expenses of our military establishments with a view to their efficiency and to our own safety, the leading points for our consideration, undoubtedly are ; 1st, the living forces ; 2ndly, material ; 3rdly, fortifications. We should be glad to think that the money spent on these, the most important heads of expenditure, formed the whole amount of our army estimates. It is, however, well known that large sums are swallowed up in other contingencies attendant upon military establishments ; and in no other country, we believe, is this the case in a larger proportion than in our own. Let those, therefore, whose duty it is to reduce estimates, consider well how far they can bring their reductions to bear upon such matters before they trench upon the more important items of expenditure which we have enumerated, the reduction of the gross estimates for the militia service should be effected by adopting an economical system of administration, and not by reducing the numbers of men, amounts of stores and supplies, or extent of fortifications, below what is necessary for the safety of the country.

The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh faults in our system, which we have enumerated, viz. : (4) The almost total absence of discipline, which does not mean instruction in manual exercise and evolutions alone, but also subordination and submission to orders, regulations and laws. (5) The weak manner in which our military penal code is carried out, in consequence of which the superior cannot enforce obedience, or maintain that respect due to his rank. (6) That in the appointment of officers, political, family or monied power exerts its pernicious influence, where ability and character should be considered sufficient recommendations. (7) The want of an institution to supply and practically educate our officers, *i.e.*, a State Military School or College. (By 37 V. c. 36 the establishment of one is authorized.) These four faults may all be summed up in brief in what we have called the eighth defect : We refer to the exclusive dependence we place upon our *Volunteer* Militiamen. To the evils contained in which

practice is traceable the origin of these four preceding weak points.

As our Militia law stands now, our national forces *may* consist of drafted militiamen, volunteers, or both combined, *practically* we are guarded by volunteers, or men voluntarily engaging to serve in the active force for a certain number of years, under certain conditions. If drafting were resorted to, every able-bodied man would be liable to it, or be compelled to pay a large bounty for a substitute, besides paying his share of the whole expense. Putting the question therefore on no higher grounds than dollars and cents, it is the interest of every man and especially of business men, manufacturers and merchants, to make the volunteer force as large and effective as possible by treating it liberally and fairly and thus inducing the youth of the country to enrol themselves in the volunteer ranks. But it is an acknowledged fact that instead of the patriotism of the volunteers securing for them the countenance and consideration of their employers, it is actually a bar to their receiving or being able to retain employment. Besides the proof of a grasping disposition and low state of morality on the part of wealthy men which such conduct affords, it is in the highest degree suicidal. Now, for the welfare of our present military organization (if it is retained), justice should be demanded from the wealth of the country; for in order to be successful any scheme must be based upon strict impartiality, which can never be the case so long as any number of persons are permitted to escape their fair share of the burden and expense attending defensive organization. It is undoubtedly true, that in the face of imminent danger, both the officers and men of the force would throw themselves into the breach without a thought of pecuniary aid, or of the consequences to themselves individually; but it is quite another thing to attend to the unremitting drudgery of drill, marching and counter-marching, burnishing, pipe-claying and brushing, to work for nothing and pay your own expenses, in order to be prepared for defence, and only to receive in return

for your pains the self-satisfied smile of the unpatriotic and the sneer of the thrifty prudent. Nor are the officers alone subjected to unjust expenses. The men have many little charges to meet, and if their magnificent stipend of \$8 per annum covers the amount they ought to be exceedingly thankful. All this is decidedly wrong. The wealthy people of the country do not, as a general thing, belong to the volunteers; the companies, both officers and men, being almost wholly composed of spirited young men, who depend upon their own right hands for subsistence, and have their position yet to win in the world. But it is the wealthy who would lose most in the event of the country being overrun by a foreign invader, or subjected to the incendiary torch of the home-bred rioter. Now it is not only disgraceful but absolutely dishonest on the part of the wealthy to put the whole burden of keeping up a defensive force in time of peace on the shoulders of the volunteer officers, simply because they are too spirited and patriotic to refuse.

Such is and has been the position of Military affairs in Canada. And what is the result. The Government, yielding to the pressure of the monied interest, are unwilling to carry out unflinchingly the power given them by the laws, and refrain from that course of action which would displease the dollar-worshipping potentates. The resources and influence of the Militia Department are employed in coaxing the officers of the Militia to keep up and maintain their commands, and these officers lavish time and money in a vain endeavor to shew numbers, where quality is so absolutely essential. The ranks of the small force, now authorized for annual drill, are filled to a very large extent with "the maimed, the halt, and the blind," and with boys of the most undersized and unhealthy description, having no other qualifications as soldiers, than that they are of the male sex and have nothing better to do. The supply of this material even bids fair

to fail at no very distant time, the muster of the various corps becoming annually less in the number of men.

So long as this is allowed to go on, so long will it be impossible to put the general discipline of the force on a sound footing. While men feel that they are doing more work than their neighbors, and are conferring a favor upon their officers and comrades by joining a volunteer corps, while they think that they are doing nothing very reprehensible when they see fit to set themselves against their officers, while they see officers themselves wanting in respect to their superior officers and throwing up their commissions at some fancied slight, they will never learn that obedience is the first duty of a soldier, to which smartness in drill is a very secondary consideration ; and they will have to learn it in a stern school, and at the sore cost of time most precious to the nation, if ever they go out to fight.

If the lesson of obedience is systematically taught, it will be easily and quickly learned ; but if commanding officers continue to take any man they can get, to let them practically do as they like, dress as they like, and think they are efficient soldiers because they submit to obey the word of command when actually in line, the lesson is not taught at all. If, on the other hand, colonels will be more careful to enlist recruits of the right class than eager merely to swell their ranks ; if they make those under their command see that no wilful disobedience to any regulation is ever passed over, their regiments will improve in tone as surely as they will in appearance and efficiency, and the whole force will gradually become leavened with a spirit of discipline, the possession of which will admit of its organization being made available at the first moment of alarm.

The same laws which govern, the same spirit of discipline which animates the regular army, are applicable and essential to the militia, modified in some degree it is true, but still not so much modified as to change their inherent qualities, and the moment the latter assume their uniform and arms, they should

be subject to the Imperial army regulations, that is if they are organized for protection, defence and police. If it is for mere display and amusement, which many of our legislators deem is their only object, then they should be discouraged as prejudicial to the spirit of our institutions, and denied the support of the Government.

Without discipline firmly administered, and regulations founded on a just appreciation of the difficulties and ends of a soldier's life, a militia organization only tends to give a false idea of the duties of a soldier, and is totally useless for the purposes of war and police. When everybody believes himself a soldier, nobody is really so, and civic troops generally consider they pay the debt due to their country, by sometimes putting on a handsome uniform to mount guard in a city or pass in review on a holiday.

Would that the writer's pen could make apparent the chief cause of our Militia's decadence and present inefficiency! It is almost entirely owing to the absence of stern and impartial discipline. What is there so repulsive in the word **MUST**, from which our people recoil with distrust and mistrusted independence? It is only another term for or application of that law which throws its ægis over the citizen and his rights wherever the Anglo-Saxon race is found, its institutions honored, and its influence acknowledged. Obedience to God, submission to authority and law, and the fulfilling of individual duty, are, one and all, the offspring of that **MUST**, known in military parlance as *discipline*, which is the soul of an army—the very life-blood—whose regular pulsation constitutes its vitality. Without discipline, an army is worse than a mob; impotent for good, potent for evil. Discipline is the soul and life of armies, the first element of military greatness and success. And yet, our Militia organization claims to exist without that vital principle! If the fact must be told, *we have no real Militia.*

CHAPTER 8.

Three schemes for defence discussed :—A standing army,—A small body of well-drilled and well-paid militia,—To make every citizen a soldier.

Experience having taught us the inefficiency of our present Militia establishment, it is our bounden duty to find a remedy, and to enquire into the best scheme for placing our citizen soldiery on such a footing as to be quite ready at all times for active service, and capable of producing when in contact with the enemy, the maximum effect, with the minimum of cost and annoyance to the country in time of peace.

The whole matter resolves itself into this : Is the end to be attained the maintenance of a standing army, or is the formation of a small but reliable force selected or drafted from the great body of those enrolled, the result to be effected, or is the object to be the transformation of every citizen into an available soldier.

We have said sufficient to shew that a standing army is not a desirable burden, even if our resources permitted such a costly instrument of war, and we think it by no means necessary to enable our Dominion to be well prepared to defend its liberties, and to be relieved from degrading fears of invasion.

As to the formation of a small but reliable force, &c., this is exactly what our own lawgivers have attempted to do for us. We see with what result. Ignorance and conceit must be superseded by instruction and practice, insubordination and indiscipline by discipline and responsibility ; appointments through political influence and intrigue, by selections and promotions—the rewards of energy, capability and devotion. These points attained, and not till then, the friends of the Militia may dare to hope ; but without these changes, a Gustavus, a Frederic, a Wellington, or a Napoleon, might despair of creating an armament worthy even to be styled a Militia.

As bearing on the subject of the third scheme, viz., the making every citizen a soldier in fact, as he is by law, we cannot resist the opportunity to quote the following opinions of General John Jacob, no mere theorist, but a man whose life had been spent in action. In the chapter "On the arming of a free people, and on the true principles of the organization of the armies of England," written in 1856, he says :

"The maintenance of a large standing army by a perfectly free people is an unnecessary expenditure, and diminishes the total available amount of national labour, and, consequently, of national wealth. This expenditure is unnecessary, because every legitimate object for which a standing army is maintained would be more effectually attained by the abolition than by the support of such a force; and it diminishes the total of national labour and wealth, because it implies the setting apart of a portion of that labour exclusively for the unproductive business of war.

"The legitimate object for the maintenance of a standing army is the defence of the nation; and this object could be most effectually attained, in the case of a people really free, by abolishing a separate army, and rendering the entire nation defensively warlike.

"The abolition of the separate army would imply its incorporation with the remainder of the people; and thus, while the abolition of a separate army would involve a direct saving to that remainder, it would also increase the total amount of available national labour by the amount which the incorporation of the separate would add to the general national stock.

"To understand what is meant by rendering a nation defensively warlike, we need only look back through English history, to a period prior to that of the first introduction of a standing army, when the English people really were thus warlike. In those times, every village had its archery-ground, every country church its place of arms, and every graveyard its yews. The entire youth and peasantry of the country were then trained by habitual practice to the skilful use of those weapons, which, in the event of war, they would be called upon to use in battle. The effect of thus habituating the people to the use of warlike weapons, and of associating the use with their pastimes and sport, was the highest development of individual skill, combined with pride and pleasure and absolute faith in the use of the weapon, qualities which have ever been found to be invaluable in actual war, and which while they admitted of the soldiers readily understanding combined action, rendered them also independent and self-reliant. Accustom the peasantry of England to the use of those arms which the advanced state of mechanical science and art have enabled us to invent, as our ancestors were accustomed to the use of the bow, and the native qualities of the Englishman would soon again become as pre-eminently valuable as were those of the bowmen of Cressy, Poitiers, Agincourt, or even of Homildon Hill and Flodden, and it would be impossible for any foreign power to insult them on their own ground."

In these few vigorous lines this practically scientific soldier has touched the key note of the true system of military organisation. He has, in desiring for England the return to universal service which existed with such good effect previous to the establishment of a regular army, anticipated by some years the opinion of European Governments as to the desirability or rather necessity of such a system. The arguments as given by General Jacob are those which now present themselves, supported by the uncontrovertible test of experience, to the various States of Europe, whose exchequers are either bankrupt or in a very unsound condition, which would not be the case if their army expenses were reduced to the extent that the "every man a soldier" system would permit.

General Jacob wrote with special reference to England, her defences, and her neighbours. His honest and uncompromising opinions, so novel and so unorthodox, were necessarily shocking to the "old soldier" critics of that country. They held, and held fast, to the *dicta* of men like General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, who, writing in 1846, under the caption of "Observations on the possible results of a war with France, under our present system of military preparation," says :

"Englishmen are very apt to delude themselves with the idea of the thousands or hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic men, who would spring to arms to repel an invading foe.

"But this is a complete fallacy; suppose they did so rise, they would sink to nothing before the pressure of an organized disciplined army.

"Such efforts may have succeeded in a *poor, wild, and strong country of great extent*, and after a long contest, but never has, nor ever will, in one of plains covered with large open rich towns."

Then again we have an article from General Burgoyne's pen, written for the "United Service Magazine," in March, 1853. In this he writes :

"None can possibly doubt the indignation with which the whole of Great Britain would be impressed at any attack of its territory by a foreign power; every cause of internal differences would at once be stifled, and the most thorough unanimity would prevail against the invader. It would be absurd to waste words in proof of the spirit

' and courage of Englishmen when put into action ; those qualities are undisputed ; and
 " that there would be any number whatever to stand forward, willing to take the field
 " in case of such an emergency, will be assented to by any who are well acquainted with
 " the general feeling. These are undoubted facts. Here you have the raw material in
 " abundance, and of the finest quality ; but alas ! how different from the manufactured
 " article,—soldiers—collected and put together with all the artistic combination and
 " refinement of a regiment and army. You might as well present a great cotton spinner
 " with some tons of iron, of however superior quality, and tell him that there is his steam
 " engine to enable him to compete with the foreign manufacturer, as bring masses of men
 " in this state to oppose a regular army."

And in 1850, reviewing Sir F. B. Head's " Defenceless state of Great Britain," General Burgoyne declares that :

" Under any circumstances, a *levée en masse* of the people is worse than useless in
 " opposing an enemy invading England ; they can only be turned to account in desul-
 " tory warfare, in mountainous countries, or in defensible towns ; and even then with
 " more or less effect in proportion to the amount of system adopted for the regulation of
 " their proceedings."

But in all these extracts from General Burgoyne's writings, the English Militia is regarded as pitted against regular troops ; and he argues the impossibility of defending England by Militia from the attacks of " an organised disciplined army," or " a regular army," contradicting, in this particular in the case of England's defence, General Jacob, whose opinion we have given at length. But when the judgments of these warriors are applied to a country like Canada, we find perfect unanimity. General Jacob's principles are of general application, and General Burgoyne admits, in the case of a general uprising, that " such effects may " have succeeded in a poor, wild, and strong country, of great " extent, and after a long contest." And this, too, when pre-supposing the existence of an opposing " organized disciplined army."

CHAPTER 9

Militia laws and forces of State of New York considered at length—Lessons to be learned from reported experience of the Militia Officers of this State—Encampments—Target practice, &c.

In the outset we argued that in all human probability in the event of a war between England and the United States (Canada remaining loyal), the utmost we should have to prepare for, would be the invasion of our country by a force drawn from a population equal in numbers to our own. So that provided we always keep our forces in a slightly superior condition to that of the States immediately bordering upon us, we may rest easy as to the result, should unfortunately such an unhappy contingency arise as a trial of strength in war.

Let us examine briefly the laws governing the condition of the Militia force of the State of New York, the wealthiest, most populous and intelligent of our neighbours, and so insanely cursed with Anglo-phobia, that in the event of a war we should find it also the most relentless and determined.

By the "Military Code" or Cap. 80 of the laws of New York, 93rd session [1870,] all able-bodied white male citizens, between 18 and 45 years, are subject to military duty, with certain exceptions as to United States regulars, firemen, men who have served seven years in the Militia, &c. *Organization of Militia.* The uniformed Militia or "National Guard" is not to exceed in time of peace 20,000 men. The Commander-in-chief [the Governor] to appoint the officers, and the commandant of the Regimental District to appoint the N. C. O's necessary for organization. After that they are elected by the votes of the members of the Companies, &c. *Organization of General Staff.* General Staff to consist of Adjutant General, Inspector General, Commissary General or Chief of Ordnance, Engineer-in-chief, Judge Ad-

vocate General, Surgeon General, Quartermaster General, Paymaster General, Commissary General of Subsistence, with Assistants.

Commander-in-chief [Governor] may make such changes in the organization of the staff corps as he deems expedient. All the members of the staff, except the Adjutant General and Chief of Ordnance, shall be nominated and appointed by the Governor, with the consent of the State Senate, and their appointments shall expire with the term for which the Governor appointing them shall have been elected. Commander-in-Chief may appoint Military Examining Board, for the examination of commissioned officers, who shall be discharged from service if report of Board is unfavorable.

Arms, Uniforms, &c. Officers, N. C. O's and privates to furnish their own uniforms, State to furnish arms. State to pay N. C. O's and privates \$5 annually, in aid of uniform, provided they paraded seven times during preceding year. *Armories.* Commanding officers of each regiment are responsible for arms and equipments. Supervisors of County to erect or rent armories. *Drills and Parades.* Uniformed Militia to parade annually between 1st September and 1st November for muster, discipline, inspection and review. Inspection to be by Brigade Inspector. In addition to this annual inspection, six drills or parades are required in each year. In addition, monthly company drills may be required by commanding officers of Companies. The commanding officer of Brigade, Regiment or Battalion, may require officers and non-commissioned officers to meet for exercise and improvement at such times and places as he shall appoint—officers to be formed into corps of instruction, and to be instructed in theoretical and practical details of duty. Division Commandant to inspect one, at least, of brigades in his division every year. Commander-in-Chief may order such parades or drills of the troops, or any part of them, as he shall deem proper. Division camps of instruction

once in each year, may be held at order of commander-in-chief; but not more than 10,000 men for ten days to be ordered. Commander-in-chief may order not more than 1,000 men for ten days in each year to be stationed in forts for instruction in the management of heavy artillery.

Compensation. Pay, rations, &c., in actual service, same as the United States army.

Pay at encampments, forts, &c. Privates and non-commissioned officers, \$1 per diem; company officers, below captains, \$2; captains, \$3; commanding officers of regiments, \$5; nurses, \$1 per diem. Adjutant General to have a salary of \$2,000 per annum, and expenses. *Fines.* Commissioned officers for non-attendance, and all ranks for disobedience of orders, shall be subject to a fine of from \$5 to \$100. Non-commissioned officers and privates for non-attendance at parade, &c., \$6 per day.

With respect to this code, which the Inspector General of the State [of New York] qualifies as containing everything necessary to provide a perfect system of government for the National Guard of the State (Report, 31 December, 1869,) the Adjutant General remarks (Annual Report for year ending 31 December, 1869) :

"Believing that great benefit would be derived from a re-enactment of the Military Code, incorporating all that is desirable in the present one, and also all the desirable amendments that have been made thereto, I have drawn a Bill for such purpose, to be submitted to the Legislature at its ensuing session. In preparing this Bill I took great pains to obtain from superior and experienced officers of the National Guard their views upon the matter, and a great many of those favored me with valuable suggestions, and evinced an interest in the subject that was most gratifying. The enactment of this new code would make but few radical changes in existing laws, and of these the principal one is the mode of uniforming the N. C. Officers, musicians and privates."

And again in the same Report :—

"In appearing before the Military and Finance Committees of the Legislature, I took the ground that twenty thousand (20,000) was a sufficient number for the aggregate force of the National Guard, and that for arming in its support two hundred thousand dollars should be appropriated annually, to be paid out of the general fund of the state."

“ In urging these views, I called attention to the fact that, for all the purposes that a “ standing arm;” could be required by the state the National Guard answered perfectly “ well, and that the expense to the state of only ten dollars per man yearly, was certainly “ very moderate.”

What are the commentaries on this Military code or “ perfect system of government,” acknowledged by its framer to be the old law with a few unimportant changes and additions. We shall continue to use the Reports of the New York Adjutant General himself, which we know from our own experience of men bearing that title to be really written with the same object for which lime is smeared over the knots in a board fence before painting it, viz., in order to kill the natural exudations and prevent ugly blemishes on the painted surface. So that we may be exceeding sure of the truth of what is stated, if it makes against the perfection of the legal system of defence.

In the Report of the Adjutant General, for the year ending 31st December, 1870, we read this oily paragraph :

“ The efficient and otherwise satisfactory condition of the National Guard, of which “ I spoke in my last annual report, has continued to characterize the organization during “ the past year, and in many respects there has been great improvement. Indeed (it “ may be fairly assumed that), never before, in time of peace at least, has this important “ branch of the state government enlisted the interest of the people so much as at present, “ and the result is, that in localities where heretofore little, if any, disposition has existed “ on the part of either the local authorities or the citizens, to aid the National Guard, “ great interest is now manifested, and liberal appropriations of money have been made. “ It is a matter of great importance to the state and to the country, that the National “ Guard should be maintained in such a state of discipline and efficiency as will make it “ available in case of emergency. To keep it in such condition will require an annual “ appropriation from the state of two hundred thousand dollars (\$200,000.)”

With reference to encampments and target practice, provided for by the Act, we are told, in the same Report, that :—

“ During the past year there have been several encampments of organizations of the “ National Guard. I am impressed with the belief that the advantages derived in the “ short time that can be devoted to these encampments are more than counterbalanced “ by the great expense to the state which attends them, and the inconvenience occasioned “ by the loss of time and consequent injury to business to which the officers and men are “ subjected by reason of their absence from their regular pursuits for several consecutive “ days. Field days for target practice, at which the men might obtain a perfect know-

"ledge of the weapon with which they are armed, and acquire confidence, skill and efficiency in its use, would, in my opinion, be preferable, and enure in a much greater degree to the benefit of the service. The mere routine of camp life will be easily learned when the troops are called to active duty."

And in the Report of the Inspector General, for the same year, we read :—

" My experience induces the belief that the benefits derived from encampments hardly compensate the trouble and expense. If encampments could be held remote from cities and large villages; if the men could be induced to remain during the entire period assigned, and would discharge their duties as soldiers faithfully, and with a sincere desire to improve in martial exercises, I have no doubt encampments could be made highly beneficial to the service; but, with the liberal extension of furloughs, which is the practice, and the restlessness under the restraints of discipline, which unfortunately manifests itself, particularly in organizations outside of the larger cities, I doubt whether much benefit is derived. Frequent field days and constant target practice are better calculated to promote the efficiency of the National Guard than encampments."

These are weighty words, which our Militia Department would do well to write in their hearts, as gathered from the experience of the people of the State of New York, and being also in fact the opinion of the long suffering and patient people of Canada, who have had their moneys squandered on a camping Militia system, inaugurated with flourish of trumpet by the last incumbent holding office as Adjutant General of Canada.

The New York Adjutant General's report for the year ending 31st December, 1872, opens with the usual mouthful of honey, to wit :

" The excellence of the National Guard in drill, discipline and general efficiency has continued, and it may be safely assumed that never before in its history has it stood higher in reputation or enjoyed in a greater degree the good will of the people."

But under the heading "Target practice" he again flashes forth a gleam of truthful, aiding light, to our worn out and sinking Militia system :—

" The Legislature having, at its last session, made an appropriation of twenty-five thousand dollars (\$25,000) to aid the National Rifle Association in procuring and fitting up a rifle-range, I had hoped that a complete system of target practice would be initiated during the year; but owing to the time that was necessarily taken in selecting the grounds and fitting up the same, and also in changing the arms from muzzle-loaders to breech-loaders, I have been disappointed. * * * My appreciation

"of the importance of target practice is such, that I regret exceedingly that this delay has occurred; but the advantages of that practice are so obvious, that I feel assured that it will no longer be neglected, now that the greatest difficulties have been overcome."

The Inspector General, in his Report for the same year, remarks :--

"The National Guard is now handsomely uniformed (although greatly in need of overcoats), equipped with serviceable accoutrements, except knapsacks, and armed with breech-loading rifle-muskets of the most approved construction. Its *personnel* is excellent; and the discipline of the better regiments highly creditable to the patriotism and public spirit of citizens who voluntarily assume the fatiguing duties of the soldier, and cheerfully assume the somewhat irksome restraints of military rule. But, although notably worthy of the highest commendation in certain cases, it must be admitted that the discipline of the National Guard is not uniformly good. Carelessness in details of administration, and lack of proper respect for officers, are too often observable in some regiments. Full ranks, imposing bands of music, and resplendent uniforms, do not of themselves make good regiments."

The total expenditure on the army of the United States being (in 1873) \$35,372,157, the proportion of this expenditure indirectly paid by the State of New York, added to the \$200,000 annually voted by its Assembly far exceeds *in toto* that paid by the Dominion of Canada for its items of defence. But if we examine the practical working of the armed force at the disposal of the Governor of New York State, we shall find that it must necessarily be of the feeblest and least trustworthy character. Why does the State of New York pay but \$10 per annum per man for its National Guard, while the Dominion of Canada pays \$40 per annum per man for the same number of men? The answer is, that beyond the clothing, the New York State Militia costs the State but very little. For with the exception of inspection parade or drill, the men, as a rule, are never ordered out for drill and paid for their attendance, the expenditure on ammunition is *nil*, and the arms and equipments are provided at the expense of the General Government.

The citizens of the State of New York, in spite of their perfect Military Code, and the interested descriptions of their

Adjutant General, would seem at heart to endorse the assertion of their fellow-citizen, who writing on State Governments, declares that :

“ Laws abolishing trainings and musters of the great body of the militia, are growing into favor, and for these, among other reasons : First. the militia system produces no material improvement in discipline ; secondly, the time spent in these useless exercises, and the money expended for arms and equipments, are burdensome to many citizens ; and thirdly, there is no probability of an occasion requiring a large portion of the militia to be called into immediate service. The volunteer companies and the standing army of the nation, are deemed sufficient for any supposable emergency.”

Thus reiterating the sentiment of the poet Dryden :—

“ The country rings around with loud alarms,
 “ And raw in fields the rude militia swarms ;
 “ Months without hands, maintained at vast expense,
 “ In peace a charge, in war a weak defence.”

The opinion of Lieutenant Colonel Martin, of the French army, on the Militia of England, might with more justice apply to ours, to the National Guard of the State of New York, and *a fortiori* to the whole Militia force of the United States :

“ Mal commandée, mal instruite, portant de très mince valeur, tactiquement parlant, elle impose cependant à l'état des sacrifices hors de toute proportion avec les services qu'elle peut rendre.” [Ch. Martin, Puissance Militaire de la France et de l'Angleterre.]

The regular army of the United States, now reduced to 25,000 men, being solely retained for outpost duty, cannot be concentrated so as to attack or give assistance to part attacked, in any considerable numbers. So that at the present moment, weak and expensive as our system is, we Canadians would have nothing to dread in a hostile encounter with the National Guard of the State of New York.

Man for man, Militia vs. National Guards, we have nothing to fear from the neighboring States, and nothing to learn, even from the perfect military code of the State of New York. Our Militia law is good of its kind, but unsuited to the times we live in, our circumstances, and our purses. The laws for the government, &c., of the New York National Guard, in fact the Militia laws

of all the Eastern States, are good also, but they seek to give the citizens of these States more defenders with a greater expenditure than they think necessary or wish for, and have consequently dropped into abeyance and neglect. In the words of Col. Martin before cited :

“Abrités contre les enterprises du continent Européen par un fossé bien autrement large que l'Angleterre, les Américains ont complètement négligé les institutions indispensables sur lesquelles repose la puissance défensive d'une nation.”

CHAPTER 10.

Description of force required by Canada—Examination in detail of Swiss Military System—Its success—Absolutely a Militia force—Division into classes—Training and instruction—Pay—Education of officers—Expenditure—Corps of cadets—Vigor and power of Switzerland's institutions—Advantages to be derived from adoption of Swiss military system—Only a defensive Militia based on training while at school.

At the time of Confederation our *puissance défensive* had sunk to a very feeble condition, owing to our habit of leaning trustingly and heavily on the right arm of mother Britannia. But when we became a Dominion, taking the hint from Mr. Gladstone, it was at once considered proper by our rulers to have a Volunteer army, chiefly, no doubt, for the third reason for the maintenance of a military force given by Col. Fletcher in his memorandum on the Militia system of Canada, viz., “to be a symbol of the State which pertains to all nations, aspiring to rank as such among their compeers.”

This latter gentleman, the Military Secretary to His Excellency the Governor General, places the Military position of Canada, and its military requirements clearly and forcibly before us in the following words :

"The only enemy that appears likely seriously to threaten Canada is her powerful
 "and now friendly neighbor the United States of America. There, in contradistinction
 "to the condition of Europe, the military force is reduced very low, the total number of
 "regular troops being about 30,000, scattered for the most part on the Indian frontier;
 "whilst, since the great civil war, the militia and volunteers, which constituted on
 "either side the vast majority of the army, have received but little training. In fact, the
 "aspect of affairs appears so peaceful that some may be tempted to question the necessity
 "on the part of Canada of keeping up any military force, and to ask why the money so
 "applied should not rather be applied in developing the resources of the country.
 "No reply, except a reference to history, can be given to those who broach such opinions.
 "There, however, the lessons have been so oft repeated that they may be considered as
 "conclusive. Periods of peace have never continued for any length of time, and clear as
 "the political horizon now is, there are still clouds, no larger perhaps than a man's hand,
 "which may be seen by those who not dazzled by its brilliancy. On the other hand, the
 "smallness of the force at the disposal of the United States, permits her neighbour to dis-
 "pense with all but the skeleton of an army, sufficient to be a nucleus of a larger force
 "in the event of war, and adapted for the minor but still necessary purposes already
 "indicated. What description of force is best suited for these requirements is the question
 "at issue."

What description of force is best suited for our requirements is the question at issue. Shall we retain our present Military system, which, to carry out thoroughly in all its details, would entail immediate bankruptcy? *Cui bono*, for what good purpose all this financial ruin? The same question, in the same matter, with the same premises, is asked of their rulers in the neighboring States, and the people wait anxiously for an answer.

Col. Fletcher says that no reply except a reference to history can be given. He writes:

"There is a feeling in the Dominion that the present militia system, admirable in its
 "conception and good in many of its details, yet scarcely fulfils the expectations enter-
 "tained when it was first framed, and that the time has come for a modification of some
 "of its features. To suggest any alterations without first stating the grounds for so
 "doing, would be presumptuous, and it is only by appealing to the teachings of recent
 "events, on both sides of the Atlantic, that any opinions that may be urged would merit
 "consideration."

He then instances the late secession war in America, and the Franco-Prussian contest. But only with a view of shewing that principles recognized in Europe have been proved by practice as applicable to the condition of society on this side of the Atlantic.

In other words to establish the necessity of training those who aspire to lead troops, whether as commissioned officers, or in the lower grades, Canada must have men, he says, whose business it is to study the art of war as professionals and not as amateurs. He then proceeds to discuss how the want of educated officers can be supplied.

The importance of military schools or training schools, we admit, and will dwell upon their organization, &c., further on. But we wish, if possible, to decide first what description of force would suit us best, and what is the best method of conducting the yearly training of the Militia. Col. Fletcher, after devoting nearly ten pages of his pamphlet to the discussion of the *professional instruction* question, gives but one page—containing no new matter and not a single new suggestion—to the training of the great body of the Militia, although, according to him, the Active Militia alone should consist of 34,000 men, and be maintained at a cost of \$889,900 per annum.

Now, if we have found that we have nothing to learn from the system of defence as carried on in the neighbouring States; and if the teachings of the last wars in Europe point to the great result, viz. :

“That modern armies will in future be of vast size, and beyond the possibility of being maintained at full efficiency during times of peace, consequently the greater portion of the force will partake of the character of militia;” and, if “principles recognized in Europe have been proved by practice as applicable to the condition of society on this side of the Atlantic,”

We cannot employ our time to better purpose than by examining the Militia system of Europe best adapted to our use.

There is probably no country in the world from whose military, or rather militia system, Canada can learn so much, as from that of the Swiss Confederation. A Confederation of Independent Cantons, whose populations are occupied with the most diverse pursuits, speaking the most opposite languages, and professing the most antagonistic modes of worship, the whole are, notwith-

standing, bound together by such homogeneous views, interests and wise institutions, that, although surrounded by the great military powers of Europe, under the most despotic forms of Government, they have been enabled to make themselves felt and respected, and maintain their independence without a Standing Army, by the wise organization alone of their citizen soldiery, aided, it is true, in a great measure, by the bravery, intelligence, and activity of their people, naturally inclined to the profession of arms. How do the Swiss attain this exemption from the expense of a regular armament? The answer should never be forgotten or unheeded by a Canadian: 1. By a rigid system of discipline, enforced with severity and impartiality. 2. By thorough instruction for officers and men. 3. By the maintenance in different localities, of military schools and colleges, particularly for the education of officers destined for scientific service. 4. By keeping up the cadres and staff, and the general staff, complete in every Department, not, as in Canada, in name, but ready at a moment's notice, and competent to the discharge of every duty connected with the pay, subsistence, clothing, medical, hospital, transportation, judicial, ordnance and engineering services, in a word, acquainted with that science of sciences, strategy, without a thorough comprehension of which an army can accomplish but little, and that little at the cost of great sacrifices, terrible suffering, and enormous expenditure of treasure and life.

The principle which has guided the Swiss in their military system is similar to that, however different the form, which prevails with England, Canada, and indeed with all nations who value highly personal freedom, and consider it the basis of political life. This principle may be thus expressed: "There shall be no compulsion to lead the life of a professional soldier in times of peace, but it will be the duty of all to take up arms in case of war." We, in this country have, unwisely as events have shewn, decided to carry the principle of personal freedom to the utmost limit, so that we even trust to voluntary enlistment to fill the

ranks of our militia (active.) The Swiss military forces belong entirely to the category of militia, even the scientific corps. In fact the 13th article of the Federal Constitution of September 12th, 1848, expressly excludes the right to keep up any body of regular troops within the limits of the Confederation.

The troops of the Republic are divided into four classes, namely :

1. The 'Bundes-auszug,' or Federal army, consisting of all men able to bear arms, from the age of 20 to 30. All cantons are obliged by the terms of the constitution to furnish at least 3 per cent of their population to the 'Auszug.'

2. The army of reserve, consisting of all men who have served in the first class, from the age of 31 to 40. The numbers are calculated to amount to $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the population.

3. The "Landwehr," or militia, comprising all men from the 41st to the completed 44th year.

4. The "Landsturm," or army of defence, including all under 20, and all above 45, until the term when they are disabled by age from military service.

The whole term of military service, therefore, including that in the local militia, is twenty-five years, so that it is of longer duration than that in any standing army, the Russian alone excepted.

The numbers in the first three classes, in actual readiness to take the field, were as follows at the end of September, 1872 :—

1. Bundes-Auszug.....	84,369
2. Reserve.....	50,069
3. Landwehr	65,981

Total..... 200,419

The number of men belonging to the fourth class, the Landsturm, was estimated at 150,000.

Thus it will be seen that there is no country in the world able to rely for defence on so large a proportion of the population as Switzerland, nor, if forced into war, so capable of supplying the loss of efficient soldiers, by others in reserve, nearly equally vigorous and well-trained. Another bright feature in Switzerland is this: every man considers it a privilege as well as a duty, to serve his country. Such is the public spirit and general desire for military instruction displayed in all the cantons, that although the Federal Government does not require the literal fulfilment of the law, but is satisfied with 3 and 1½ per cent of the population for the "Auszug" and "Reserve," respectively, yet there are always many more men trained and held in readiness to serve.

We will now glance at the way in which these men, and officers also, of the Swiss Militia forces are trained and instructed. Everything is so arranged as to economize time as much, and to interfere with productive labor as little, as possible. The number of days' drill, and the period of the year at which it takes place, vary somewhat in the different cantons, according to the principal occupations of the people. The "laws of the military organization of the Swiss Confederation" require that no recruit can belong to the Auszug until a course of instruction shall have been gone through, lasting

If for the infantry, at least 28 days.

If for the rifles, at least 35 days.

If for the cavalry, engineers and artillery, at least 42 days

But previous to undergoing these courses of instruction at the regular military depots of the cantons, the young men have obtained a certain amount of military knowledge at their district schools, besides having gone through many local squad drills. Riflemen and sharpshooters, moreover, will have had ball practice upon sound and generally adopted principles, so as to have nothing to unlearn. In the second year after appointment to the Auszug, the yearly drill in their respective cantons amounts only:

For the infantry soldiers to 3 days.

For the cavalry soldiers to 7 days.

For the scientific corps to 12 days.

But the days of assembly are not included in these repetition drills, and, for all arms, previous to the assembling of the privates, the non-commissioned officers are brought together to have preparatory exercises. Thus, in the infantry they meet three days sooner than the privates. In the scientific corps, cavalry, &c., proportionately earlier. Besides these rules as to regular training and exercises, a certain amount of yearly target practice is required by the Government for the whole of the infantry soldiers, whether in the Auszug, Reserve, or Landwehr. For the Reserve the yearly repetition drills last but two days for the privates. For the Landwehr, one. To complete the education of the militiamen, however, every second year sufficient bodies of troops to form a division, or perhaps *corps d'armee*, are brought into cantonments or encamped in some suitable part of the country, and for several weeks manœuvres on a grand scale are carried out. The last four days, the troops of all branches being divided into two parts, a sham fight takes place, and all bivouac each night in the open country. The men by this means are prepared for actual campaigning, whilst the superior officers have opportunities of developing their strategical talents; in fact, the beneficial results of this admirable system extend to all ranks and branches of the Militia forces.

The confederation pays the expense of the instruction of the recruits and troops. At the same time the canton furnish everything connected with the exercises, viz.: (pay, rations, arms, accoutrements, horses, cannon, military carriages, barracks, &c.), subject to Federal regulations.

In a country where all who are fit must serve (Government officials only being exempt, whilst all who have become dishonored are excluded), of course all those who are highly educated

and wealthy aspire to become officers. There is, however, no other qualification for command than merit. The cantons appoint the infantry officers of their contingents, rejecting such candidates as cannot pass an examination after the 28 days instruction, and sending them into the ranks. The candidates for appointment as officers of the scientific corps and sharpshooters are instructed at the expense of the Federal Government, at their special military educational establishments; they go through a longer course. The Federal general staff for all branches of the service is numerous and efficient, being open to merit.

The officers of the general staff are on permanent pay. All other officers receive pay only when they are out; but the mounted officers of infantry have a small allowance for forage. At the head of the whole military organization is a general commanding-in-chief, appointed, together with the chief of the staff of the army, by the Federal Assembly.

The total expenditure by the Federal Government on account of the army, was \$455,885.03 in 1871, distributed as follows:—

Central Military Administration.....	\$21,804 40
Organization of Instruction.....	35,445 64
Pay of Army Instructors.....	315,368 58
War Material.....	46,656 79
Frontier Guards and Fortifications.....	19,469 55
Office of Commander-in-Chief and Staff.....	9,932 40
Construction of Barracks.....	1,526 87
Printing and Advertising.....	5,575 53
Miscellaneous Expenses.....	105 27
	<hr/>
Total.....	\$455,885 03

Not included in the above account is the maintenance of the Military School at Thun, which has a fund of its own, the annual income of which surpasses the expenditure.

The Swiss possess an admirable nursery for officers in their corps of cadets. In many of the best schools, too, the pupils of twelve to sixteen and eighteen years of age receive military instruction, being clothed, armed, and organised as soldiers, under the charge of well-qualified officers. This is not a mere matter of play or amusement, but is carried out with all due earnestness; for the Government and all classes of citizens take the greatest interest in the military exercises of the boys. Frequently public fêtes are given to the cadets, when these future defenders of the country assemble by thousands from distant cantons, and when to the manœuvres of the infantry, artillery practice with two or four pounders is added. On these occasions, military officers of the highest rank do not consider it below their dignity to take the command, and to draw up plans for the manœuvres of the youthful soldiers. These fêtes are among the most popular and interesting in Switzerland. The military instruction imparted to the cadets and other pupils is far from being mechanical only. They are well grounded in essentials, and encouraged to take a deep and lasting interest in military matters; and as their education is in other respects superior, to fit them for their civilian callings, they are in every way prepared to become in time admirable and thoughtful officers.

Other most popular fêtes in Switzerland are the frequent rifle shooting matches, open to all, and at which prizes of very considerable value may be gained. Those who know the Swiss best, and are otherwise qualified to do so, speak in the highest terms of the amount of the military education of the people, and the patriotic feelings and strong spirit of independence which animate the nation. Though powerful and despotic neighbours may hate their free institutions, still the Swiss fear not invasion. It is luckily known to these despotic powers that it is not the mountains only which form the bulwark of Swiss liberty.

The Swiss, with their military system, are offering an example to the world which, we trust, in the course of time, will

be imitated in other European States as soon as their policy becomes enlightened and free from an aggressive character.

For the most part, the proof of a great truth is not difficult; but to make others admit it and acknowledge its benefits, is so. In this case, however, actions speak louder than words; and time, the touchstone which reveals the force and weakness of every system, has but served to bring out clearly the wisdom and vigor of that of Helvetia. The Swiss institutions have gone through a fiery ordeal, to which those of no similar Government have ever been subjected, and come forth not only unscathed, but with renewed strength.

Besides maintaining her honor and independence amid perils and intrigues, such as have never assailed another people without obvious effects, if not ruinous results, amid all the throes of revolutionized Europe (1848-49), she stood unshaken. Threatened by three great military powers—France, Austria, and Prussia, (1852 and 1853)—who encircled her with a zone of a million sabres and bayonets, she shouted back the defiance of a nation of Freemen, strong in the traditions of a hundred victories, won by the undaunted courage and stalwart arms of the same citizen-soldiery on which she has ever relied.

Switzerland, with a population of little more than two and one-half millions, possesses a well trained militia, numbering, as we have said, over 200,000 effectives. The yearly cost of this defensive army is only eight and one-half million francs (\$1,530,000.)

Nothing is now omitted in Switzerland that can contribute to its defensive power in the most inexpensive way, and with the least abstraction of the male population from productive labour. Such is the love of the people for their independence, their zeal for their political liberty, that all the cantons do even more as regards the number and training of their militiamen than the Central Government demands. The Swiss see and acknowledge that the possession of political rights by all is connected with the duty of all to contribute to the defence of the State. To bear

arms is considered one of their cherished rights. None but criminal and dishonored men, and bankrupts, (and, of course, the weakly) are excluded.

The example of Switzerland is sufficient to show that a standing army is by no means necessary to enable a nation to be well prepared to defend its liberties, and to be relieved from degrading fears of invasion, even by surrounding and inimical States supporting enormous standing armies.

One of the most talented and accredited military writers in Germany of the present day, in an article "On the military system of Switzerland" says :

" Whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the value of militia forces compared with standing armies, there can be no doubt that if it were possible to abolish the latter in every country, and to supply their place entirely by the introduction of the militia system, it would be by far the greatest of all imaginable social and politico-economical reforms. Without taking into account the navies of Europe, we may put down the expenditure for the support of the standing armies alone, in a round sum, at (\$600,000,000.) In this sum is included, according to the latest budgets of the different European States, the yearly outlay (\$340,000,000) for military purposes. But this gives only the immediate expenditure of the Governments for the military services they require in times of peace, and therefore for a time when such services are entirely unproductive, since it is for a state of war that all military arrangements are intended. If we further consider that of the four millions of soldiers in Europe (or thereabouts), at least the one-half are always doing duty ; and if we calculate the consequences of the withdrawal of so many men in the prime of life from productive labour, we may (estimating the workdays in the year at 300, and the value of a day's labour, on the average, at 25 cents) safely put down the sum of (\$150,000,000) as the equivalent of this loss. The remainder of the above named sum (\$110,000,000) is made up by various indirect expenses connected with the maintenance of military establishments, billet money, &c. In Switzerland the yearly outlay of the Confederation for military purposes amounts to about (\$240,000), that of the separate cantons to about (\$400,000) more. If to this we reckon the expenses of the self-equipment of the greater portion of the militiamen, we may altogether estimate the outlays for military purposes at (\$900,000) nine hundred thousand dollars.

" By means of this yearly expenditure in time of peace, Switzerland is always prepared in a few weeks to bring together an army of 160,000 men of all branches of the service, perfectly armed and equipped, and full of zeal for the defence of the country. This is more than six per cent. of the population ; and even this considerable army is far from including the whole of Switzerland's defensive forces. On the other hand, the European powers with standing armies cannot command, on an average, more

" than two per cent. of their populations. Yet the yearly military expenditure of the European States, comprising more than 160,000,000 of population, is, as already stated, about (\$600,000,000) ; whereas in Switzerland, with its not quite two and a-half millions of inhabitants, it does not amount to (\$1,100,000) if we include in our reckoning about (\$200,000) as the yearly loss in productive labour, in consequence of the trainings and exercises of the militia. It follows, therefore, that if the plan pursued in Switzerland were to be adopted by the European States, the yearly expenditure for their land forces would not quite reach the sum of (\$72,000,000.) Consequently in proportion to the population, the average expense of the standing armies is between six and seven times greater than for militia forces like those of Switzerland. This means, in other words, that if the Swiss defensive militia system were to be adopted in all the States of Europe, no less a sum than (\$500,000,000) would be saved in their military peace establishments, whilst for defensive purposes these States could nevertheless count upon a five-fold amount of force than they can at present."

In this country in which but few persons are to be found so enamored of the parade of regular military life as not to see the dark side of the picture, it would be superfluous to state more politico-economical and philanthropic facts and arguments in condemnation of standing armies than we have done in our previous pages. Nevertheless there are some few supporters of a standing military force amongst us, who would like to see the division of labor principle adhered to as consistently in military as in their manufacturing and trading occupations. When the possibility of an invasion of this country has been the subject of conversation, words to this effect have been uttered: " Well, if we must look to our means of defence, let us have regular soldiers, we can afford to pay for a regiment or two, it will be far better than troubling ourselves about volunteers or attempting to keep up the militia, which never can be so efficient as a permanent soldiery." For Canadians who can reason thus, we will again quote from the same writer:

" On yet another ground the Swiss militia system ought to be advocated. Its general adoption would make the barbarism of war and the wholesale slaughtering of human beings almost impossible. According to the experience hitherto gained, States with abiding armies have hardly been able to employ more than 1 per cent. of their population in aggressive warfare, and if we imagine a militia system like the Swiss to be introduced, it would be still more difficult for any monarch or government, however ambitious or desirous of war, to send ever 1 per cent. of the population to attack another

"nation. On the other hand, any State which should be attacked would be able to employ more than 6 percent. of its population for its defence, not including considerable bodies of local levies possessing some amount of military training. Accordingly the means of defence would be increased in such a degree that even a nation of only a few millions would not have to fear the enmity of a great military power. Still less would this be the case, were several small States to form a military league for mutual defence. And in proportion as the prospect of success in aggressive war diminishes, the nearer the time approaches when unscrupulous ambition no longer can cause the scourge of war to sweep over a devoted country."

The danger to national liberty and peace created by a standing army is indeed such that M. de Tocqueville (De la Démocratie en Amérique) after demonstrating that popular institutions necessarily incline a nation to peace, observes that in the army there must always remain an element of despotism and aggression, against which he despairs of guarding by any species of military organization.

Against this danger, at least, the Swiss military system makes ample provision, while it saves the huge cost of a long deduction from the productive life of the manhood of the country which is entailed in other European States owing to the time wasted in their barracks. Every male citizen of Switzerland is bound to serve in the army in defence of his country, from the age of 20 to 45. But the actual service in time of peace, during the recruit's first year, is but 28 days for the infantry, and 42 for the cavalry, artillery and engineers. During the subsequent period of military obligation, three days a year, or six days in each alternate year, of military exercises, with one day's rifle shooting annually, and a few days in camp at some part of the whole period, from 20 to 45, make up the entire deduction from peaceful pursuits, for military purposes, of the army of Switzerland. The infantry soldier's whole service makes from 100 to 110 days, the cavalry soldier's about 170. Strong testimony is borne to the efficiency of this system. Speaking from the amplest official reference, and with a patriotic purpose, which would incline him to attempt a reform rather than a concealment of the defects of the army of his country, M. Staempfli, at one time a member of the Federal Council

of Switzerland, and chief of the Military Department, in a work entitled "Organization Militaire," pronounces :

1. *La technique des armes.*—Bonnes armes et bon matériel de guerre, a cet égard la Suisse est aussi avancée que quelque armée permanente que ce soit. 2. *Habilitéé dans les armes.*—Habilitéé dans le maniement des armes, précision du tir de l'artillerie et des armes portatives, combat à la baïonnette, manœuvres et combat en masse ou d'homme à homme, à l'arme blanche. Sous ce rapport la Suisse n'est pas en arrière non plus.

3. *Discipline.*—La discipline est aussi bonne que celle des armées permanentes. Cette discipline n'est, du reste, pas l'effet de la vie de caserne, elle a sa source dans le sentiment inné du devoir et de la subordination."

This panegyric is corroborated by many foreign witnesses.

It must be always borne in mind that the Swiss system, in the first place, is only intended to produce a defensive militia ; and in the second, it has for its base a preliminary military training at school, which throws back from the productive to the unproductive period of life the acquisition of military discipline and art, and at the same time affords the amplest time, even if years instead of months be requisite, to acquire them.

CHAPTER 11.

Proposed military training in Canada—To be considered in 3 stages, viz. : preparatory or instruction to boys ; training of national militia ; instruction of officers—Patriotic spirit of the people to be developed—Whole male population to be exercised—Boys in schools to be carefully drilled—Value of military exercises in civil and industrial occupations—Spartan institutions might be imitated in part—Necessity for education of officers of militia—Abuses in our military schools—Blame rested with examiners for admission—Importance of staff officers—Establishment of State Military Academy—West Point Academy—Opinions as to what should be taught in Canadian Military College.

We must now consider what ought to be the military training in Canada. This training may be divided into three stages :—

1. That which is connected with the preparatory education, or that intended to give military instruction to boys below 16 who may be considered non-combatants and should not be enrolled in the militia.

2. The system of military exercises of the national militia, or that for all able-bodied males between 16 and 60.

3. The higher professional instruction, or training in special duties of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers already in the militia service.

At the present moment in Canada a barrier of apathy, prejudice or dislike, exists between the employers of labour and the active militia force, which prevents the youth of the country and men in dependent circumstances from joining the ranks. That barrier may be removed by raising the military spirit of the population, by teaching all classes that it is not only their duty but their interest to join in the defence of the country, and so, in different degrees, making the whole male population capable of bearing arms available for that purpose, with little cost to the nation or inconvenience to the individual.

We advocate to the fullest the training, so far as practicable, the whole able-bodied male population to arms, and we do so by no means for the purpose of making it a feeder to any small permanent body of troops; it is as constituting in itself the materials of a powerful national force for the defence of the country, and again, as elevating and strengthening the nation itself, that we think a general military training chiefly desirable. We may venture to propose a system by which this general training may be begun and carried to a considerable extent, in the simplest manner, almost without cost, and free from the practical difficulties that might seem to oppose the introduction of compulsory military discipline into a country with a population unaccustomed to Government interference in the disposal of their time.

The principle of the chief measure which we have to propose is an old one, involved in the old practice of the Kingdom of England, when every local community, every parish and borough, was required to exercise the whole male population, beginning with the very young, in military exercises and the use of the bow. We propose to shift the commencement of military exercises from the productive adult to the non-productive juvenile, or to the earliest of the school stages; and to provide that in all schools throughout the Dominion, whether aided by the State or not, the boys shall be trained in military exercises and appropriate gymnastics. We could support this proposition by the evidence of the results obtained by long and practical experience in different parts of the civilized world, and by the testimony of intelligent non-commissioned officers who have been engaged in training recruits. These officers all agree that the earlier they begin this training the better they succeed; that they do with children what is difficult to do with more advanced age, and what they cannot do at all with many men in the adult stages. In the infantile stage we have to bend the tender twig; in the juvenile stage we have to straighten the crooked sapling; and in the adult stage we have often to reform the gnarled oak.

For drill-masters the services of the graduates of the Dominion Military Academy, or training establishments, of which we shall speak hereafter, will be required and made available.

Assuming that the exercises used are made general, popular, and thorough amongst the whole of the population in the school stage: whatsoever may be the military arrangement superinduced for the adult stages, it will be of advantage to have the drill and exercises carried out as thoroughly as possible and completed as a foundation for them, in the school stages. Further, by this early training we get a population which may be readily put in line for any defensive purposes.

In connexion with the subject, it is proper to direct attention to the special value of military, and (in Canada's position) naval exercises, for the physical training of the population for civil industrial occupations, even if we were to suppose that the Canadian people were to enjoy perpetual peace. It is proved that these exercises give a much-needed physical as well as moral training—a training which adds to their productive power and value for all sorts of civil work. It is naval and military drill, the practice of moving together, pulling together, lifting together, thus developing the capacity for united action, which is as important for civil as it is for military service, and which goes far to make up the gain in efficiency achieved by drilled over ordinary labor. To these gains is to be added the important gain from the sanitary element—the prolonged duration of the improved working ability from increased health and strength. In the civil and economic aspect of the question, it may be perceived that if we get by the labor of three the produce of five, we get an important surplus increase of produce to compensate the capitalist or the consumer of produce for the increase of wages, which, in the future of our labor market must necessarily be maintained. But there are moral as well as intellectual advantages proved to be derived from the early physical training of children. The physical ex-

ercise in the military drill is a visible moral exercise in all that is implied in the term discipline, namely, duty, obedience, order, self-restraint, punctuality, and patience.

In support of the above conclusions, we may cite extracts from the evidence laid before an English Parliamentary Education Commission. Mr. Aubin, Superintendent of the Central London District School who has been engaged in the business of school-training and tuition upwards of thirty years, and has had upwards of 15,000 children under his charge, stated :

"I am, however, for one day's school, and one day's industrial training, as the most eligible course according to my experience. As to the increased value of the labor produced by the naval and military drill, there cannot be a second opinion, that is to say, looking only to the training of the pupil for civil life, and irrespective of any military service."

The Rev. Isaac Holmes, Head-master of the Liverpool Industrial School, on being asked what, from experience, was his view of the expediency of introducing either the naval or the military drill, or both, as part of a systematized course of gymnastics in popular education, replied :

"I certainly would recommend both one and the other for the whole management of the children whilst at school, and for its general bearing upon them in after life. We find that it tends considerably to sharpen the intellect, to promote habits of attention and obedience, as well as to improve their physical condition. It is clear to me that it has a beneficial effect upon them in civil life, as well as being, of course, a good preparation for the service of the country. The boys are passionately fond of the naval drill.

We are confident that every member of the Volunteer force in Canada can attest the truth of all above asserted with respect to the tendency of military exercise in the company of numbers and under command, to correct the peculiar physical, intellectual and moral defects of individuals, to communicate readiness, sharpness, presence of mind, temper, public spirit, and the power both to obey and command in proper place. Nor can there be a reasonable doubt that a universal training of the Canadian youth would add to the numbers and efficiency of the Volunteer Force (if it is

considered expedient to keep up its organization), a force which is at present little more than an ineffectual demonstration of the public military spirit in the land.

We propose, therefore, in the first place, that the military training of boys should form henceforward by law a compulsory part of education in all schools in Canada; and, secondly, that the military training of boys should be followed by a compulsory system of military exercises during a few days in each year, for all able-bodied males between the ages of sixteen and sixty.

We cannot admire unreservedly the Spartan institutions, and must condemn their exclusively warlike tendency; and it can scarcely be denied that the life of a Spartan was a continual preparation for war. But well would it be for Canada if her citizens possessed more of the Spartan virtues. To pride themselves in the fortitude with which they meet privation and suffering; to place their point of honor in disdaining all superfluous enjoyment, and shrink from whatever serves merely to make life pleasant and easy as unmanly and pernicious luxury.

The Spartan education was simple in its objects; it was not the result of any general view of human nature, or of any attempt to unfold its various capacities; it aimed at training men who were to live in the midst of difficulty and danger, and who could only be safe themselves while they held rule over others. The citizen was to be always ready for the defence of himself and his country, at home and abroad; and he was, therefore, to be equally fitted to command and to obey. His body, his mind and his character were formed for this purpose and for no other; and hence the Spartan system, making directly for its main end, and rejecting all that was foreign to it, attained, within its own sphere, to a perfection which it is impossible not to admire. The young Spartan was perhaps unable either to read or write; he scarcely possessed the elements of any of the arts or sciences by which society is enriched or adorned; but he could run, leap, wrestle,

hurl the disc or the javelin, and wield every other weapon, with a vigor, agility and grace which were nowhere surpassed.

Although we have not the forced position of the Spartan community, we are not an invading army in the midst of a hostile and half-subdued people ; nor would we wish to transform Canada into a perpetual camp, nor feel we the slightest animosity towards our neighbors. Yet, we must like the Spartans be ever on guard. This can be done with greatest advantage to ourselves, and least offence and irritation to our neighbors, by accustoming, as the little Greek State did, our people to military exercises, from youth upwards, until they become habitual and are performed with pleasure and delight.



Postponing for the moment the consideration of the military education or training of the adult stage or rank and file of the militia, let us now attempt to find a remedy for what we stated in a foregoing page to be the seventh cardinal defect in our present militia system, viz. :—The want of an institution to supply and practically educate the officers. The absence of an academy which could supply the militia with the highest class of officers, with the means for special training for the various branches of the service, and with teachers to instruct the lower grades.

Some plan must at once be devised for the proper examination of candidates for commissions in the Militia force, and for the encouragement among officers of habits of study and self-discipline. War is a condition of human society which cannot, in the nature of things, become chronic ; but as often as it does occur, it is best conducted by gentlemen who go to it instructed in the theory of a very scientific profession. But is such our condition ? By no means. We have elsewhere spoken in terms of just admiration of the physical strength and the courage of our militiamen. We entertain no doubt, that as often as they come into collision with the enemy, they will behave, as their fathers did before them, nobly. But this conviction is accompanied by the depress-




ing knowledge that the officers of the Canadian militia are, as a body, in respect of professional accomplishments below the mark which it is desirable and practicable for them to attain. Are we to be told because, in years of war gone by, the hereditary pluck of Canadian soldiers, and the constitutional courage of their leaders, was sufficient to bear down opposition in the fight, that therefore it is unnecessary to superadd to these qualities the general information which makes a man fourfold a man—the science which can devise, and the skill which can apply, sudden remedies to sudden mishaps—the ingenuity which apprehends at once how unlooked-for obstacles are to be surmounted—the knowledge which suggests the suitable defences against an unexpected danger? Surely they reason upon very untenable grounds, who can hold such language as this! For as there is no antagonism between courage and science, the scientific soldier must be—*quoad* his science—a better man in a campaign than his untutored comrade. Surely it indicates a lamentable deficiency of intellect to argue, that because once or twice in his lifetime a man's physical courage may be of more worth than any other quality, therefore, it is unnecessary to inspire him with a love of such pursuits as elevate his nature, and thereby induce him to become the champion of moral and intellectual improvement, as well as of his country's honor in the field of battle. But why argue this point any farther? Whatever opinions may be entertained by elderly gentlemen who have grown grey in their ignorance, whatever aversion to study may exist among the young men who have obtained commissions in the Militia force of Canada for every other reason but that the duties of the appointment promised to insure to them exercise for their minds, the country weighing the causes of victory and defeat in late European struggles, has arrived at the conclusion that it has a right to look for intelligence and high moral feeling, as well as for valor in its officers.

No doubt we have had since 1864, and have now our schools of military instruction. But they have served the Militia only





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thus far—that out of some 6,000 (six thousand) passed cadets, there may perhaps be 500 (five hundred) gentlemen who had received civil education reasonably liberal, and were after examination in the military schools qualified to serve Her Majesty in the grade of subaltern officers of the Canadian Militia. After they had left the schools, all study, in the proper acceptation of term, came to an end,—that it ever had a beginning was left to the discretion of the cadet. There were no more books to be read, no more examinations to be encountered. Provided they scrambled through the meagre course furnished at these institutions, they were all alike eligible for promotion, (i. e., if they joined the Active or Reserve Militia,) and could win their way to high rank by dint of money and interest.

Col. Walker Powell, Deputy Adjutant General of the Militia of Canada, in his Report for the year 1868, with seeming satisfaction asserts that:—

“ Although many young men have passed through these schools whose services cannot be made available as officers, yet, taken as a whole, the same economical and satisfactory result could not have been obtained in any other way, the very many useful officers thus trained, has enabled the Department to advance steadily onward in securing a primary knowledge of drill in every part of the country.”

Col. Robertson Ross, Adjutant-General of Militia, in his Annual Report for the year 1869, apparently with earnest pride and satisfaction, (but we cannot but suspect that he wrote in a vein of true sarcasm,) says, speaking under the head of Military Schools, of the numerical strength of the cadets:—

“ The result is that throughout the entire Provinces of Ontario and Quebec no town, and but few villages of importance are to be found where the military school cadet is unknown. A considerable number of these cadets have joined the active militia, but far the greater part of them are at large, and will prove of great service to the commanding officers of the reserve militia battalions, should their services ever be called for. With this result obtained, there can be no cause to complain of these schools, or of the system of instruction which has hitherto obtained in them.”

The 56th section of the Militia and Defence Act, 1868, provides that:—

“ Her Majesty shall, from time to time, from among the applicants for such purpose, select such persons in each Province of the Dominion as may be fit to attend such schools of military instruction, and if necessary remove them, &c.”

And the 55th section begins :—

“ For the purpose of enabling officers of the Militia, or candidates for commissions or promotion in the Militia, to perfect themselves in a knowledge of their military duties, drill, and discipline, there may be established schools of military instruction in each Province of the Dominion, &c.”

Thus giving us clearly to understand that all selections of pupils were made by Her Majesty, with the ultimate design of their becoming officers in the Militia. Now with all due and loyal respect for our Queen, we cannot say that as a rule the selection shows any discernment whatever in discovering the physical, moral and intellectual qualities which make up the officer and the gentleman. Col. Ross says :

“ No town and but few villages of importance are to be found, where the Military School Cadet is unknown ”

This is true, but in a far different sense to that which is apparently intended to be conveyed. The cadet is known in many cases, not as being a high spirited youth, of fair education, anxious to acquire a knowledge of the art of war, the protectress art of all arts, solely for the purpose of giving his country the benefit of his skill; but as an idle, shiftless, ne'er do well, “ of narrow mind, and still of narrower soul,” of by no means patrician descent or a follower of the liberal arts or learned professions, in many cases supplementing the “ allowances to be paid to such persons during their stay at the school,” by wages earned in the useful and active, but not soul-elevating or nature refining work of cutting firewood and kindred occupations.

The Adjutant General also says, with contradictory complacency, that the greater part of these cadets are *at large*, and will prove of great service should their services ever be called for. Now why should these men be at large in their own country, when the schools were established for the sole purpose of

officering the Militia. By their being at large, perhaps the Colonel means gone across the border of the United States; but even an Adjutant General with a situation to keep, and, in consequence, a compulsorily favorable annual report to make would shrink from saying with the next breath that "with this result obtained, there can be no cause to complain of the establishment of these schools." Another interpretation would be that Col. Ross wished to satisfy the public mind that these cadets are at large in another sense, i. e., not cribbed or confined in gaol. This is necessary comfort, for to one knowing, as most Canadians do, the stuff that these men are made of, their natural abiding place would be reckoned to be behind bolts and bars, in those large and commodious public (yet very private) boarding houses, yecept gaols or houses of correction. Very many of our cadets resemble Falstaff's recruits:

"Such as indeed were never soldiers, but discarded, unjust serving men, younger sons to younger brothers, revolted tapsters, and ostlers trade fallen; the cankers of a calm world and a long peace."

There is a grim sense of humor in the dictum that the cadets will prove of great service *should their services ever be called for*. No Adjutant General would be mad enough to require their services as officers. Every soldier of France may carry a Marshal's *bâton* in his knapsack, but as we do not live in France, the prospects that most of our cadets have of rising to high rank in the Militia force are as feeble and uncertain as the light from an Ottawa street lamp, or the final success of the Tichborne claimant.

The blame for such a state of affairs lies with the examiners for *admission* to these schools. By paragraph 99 of the "Regulations for the Active Militia," 1870:

"All candidates for admission to the schools of Military Instruction will be required, before admission, to satisfy a Board of Officers of their competence for the position of commissioned officers of the Militia."

The single purpose of preliminary examinations for public

employment, civil or military, is or ought to be this: that competent judges shall be satisfied that candidates are possessed of such an amount of general education and ability, as shall qualify them for the right discharge of the duties which it is proposed to assign to them. Now the ordinary duties of subaltern officers in every army are exceedingly simple; and were men to continue subalterns all their days, the degree of mental culture necessary to fit them for that position might be as minute as you please. But seeing that young men join the Militia with a view or hope to rise to stations of responsibility therein, the Government is justified in requiring that they shall not begin their career in a state of absolute ignorance

General Lindsay, writing in 1870, before his departure for England, leaves with us the following vigorous but friendly opinion and advice:—

“It is not necessary for me to bear testimony to the spirit and adaptability to war of the Canadian Militia. They are recognized by everybody, and shewn by the past history of the force.

“To give effect to these excellent qualities, discipline and military instruction are required, and as it is impossible to embody the men, these can only be secured by carefully training the officers beforehand.

“It is only by this previous preparation of the officers, by instilling into them a high sense of duty, by insisting upon their possessing superior professional knowledge, and by their soldier-like bearing, that, in the social system that prevails in Canada, they can hope to command the obedience, confidence and respect of their men.”

In the Militia Report for 1870, of Col. Robertson Ross, late Adjutant General of Canada, we read:—

“In connection with the subject of Military Schools, I would respectfully point out, that while these schools furnish a ready means for enabling officers to learn drill, and to undertake the duties of commanding companies and battalions, and are of great advantage, yet no military school or staff college has been established for the training of Canadian staff officers intended to fill positions on the staff, and, if required, to command considerable bodies of troops in the field. Indeed, it may be considered that this at present is the weakest point in the organization of the defensive forces of the Dominion.

“The men composing the Active Militia are an admirable body physically, and although as yet, from the too limited period of time allowed for annual drill, very insufficiently practised in rifle shooting, they are, generally speaking, well enough ac-

"quainted with company and battalion drill to enter into a campaign at once, for in
 "these days when fighting from behind cover and intrenchments is so much in use,
 "manœuvring in the open field, when in the presence of the enemy and under fire, is
 "avoided as much as possible. The company and battalion officers have also, generally
 "speaking, a fair knowledge of drill, and very many of them, as well as some command-
 "ers of battalions, have attained to great proficiency; but for the training of officers to
 "the higher duties of the staff, no means have as yet been supplied. Under these cir-
 "cumstances therefore, in view moreover of the dimensions which the Dominion has now
 "attained, and its increasing importance and position in the world, I would respectfully
 "represent that the time has arrived for the establishment in the Dominion, on a small
 "scale, of a Military Academy somewhat similar in organization to the Staff College in
 "England. It should always be borne in mind that an efficient staff is the most impor-
 "tant element in a military body, and that the appointment of unqualified and un-
 "trained persons to the staff of an army is fatal to its efficiency or success, and it being
 "recommended, in this report, that the five year's tenure of office system for appoint-
 "ments to the staff should be brought into operation in future, and that none but quali-
 "fied officers who have undergone a special examination should hereafter be appointed to
 "the staff, the propriety of establishing a Staff College to afford the means for qualifica-
 "tion and supply this great want in the military system of the country, is respectfully
 "submitted for the serious consideration of the Government; no great difficulty need
 "arise in effecting this object, and I would recommend that encouragement be given to
 "some intelligent and zealous officers already in the force, to qualify for instruction in
 "the higher branches of military science, with a view ultimately of becoming instructors
 "in a Canadian Staff College."

Col. Walker Powell, in his Report for 1873, when acting Ad-
 jutant General of Militia, observes, with regard to the schools of
 instruction, in plain and simple language, without the usual re-
 port-padding bombast :

"These schools have been most useful in imparting primary instruction to the offi-
 "cers of corps and candidates for commissions in the Militia. It is, however evident
 "that they are not sufficient to supply the higher class of instruction which has become
 "indispensable to the maintenance of the present force in a satisfactory condition; nor
 "do they supply instruction such as is necessary for the education of those who may be
 "required for the future military necessities of the Dominion.

"The ordinary duties of an officer may be performed without special training, but
 "the higher class of duties and the capacity for superior command, can only be reached
 "through a long course of study and preparation. It is therefore certain that some pro-
 "vision beyond that now existing is needed. This want might be met in two ways—1st.
 "By sending a number of young men to England, where suitable facilities are available.
 "2nd. By the establishment of a high class military school in Canada.

"As distance would likely prove an impediment to the first course being adopted,
 "the second will, no doubt, commend itself as worthy of consideration. An institution
 "at which young men could secure a superior military and scientific education would

" produce results alike beneficial to the Dominion and to those who join for instruction.
 " To the Dominion it would prove a ready and economical means of providing officers
 " whose military services could be utilized hereafter in the different districts, and to the
 " cadet an education which would fit him for both civil and military duties, and would
 " give undoubted facilities for remunerative employment at all times.

The great desideratum of a military organization is a nucleus of educated and intelligent officers, conversant with elementary tactics, and theoretically instructed in strategy, that difficult art which enables leaders to provide for and transport their troops with economy and effect. Very many of the States of the neighbouring Republic possess military schools or colleges, organized on the basis of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point; and the Dominion of Canada can easily afford to educate a body of young men sufficiently to become good company or staff officers, and enable them to understand, to some degree, the duties and acquire the qualifications which constitute a soldier. There is no power abroad but has provided for the education of young men destined for the career of arms, and even those whose national means are the most circumscribed, (Switzerland for example), by economical yet able regulations, have shown themselves aware of the absolute necessity of setting aside funds for the instruction of those destined to lead their people in the hour of danger, and uphold the national honor. There should be a State Military Academy for the education of officers, *uniting civil and Military instruction*. Particular attention should be paid to Engineering, so that the State should therefrom take her Engineers for the public works.

Every nation of Europe is now paying particular attention to the duties of Staff Officers, on whom depend in so great a degree the welfare, safety and conduct of large bodies of men. It is extremely important in the present state of our forces, in which the active or trained part bears such a limited proportion to the total number of untrained men capable of bearing arms, that a cadre or nucleus should be effective and complete. Of this cadre the staff proper is by no means the least valuable. Ac-

According to our present system the General Staff Officers of this Dominion are such only in name, and the want of experience and definite jurisdiction, renders our Militia Staff Officers much more ornamental than useful. In fact they are, in most cases, worse than useless, for while the Dominion nominally possesses a complete organization by Districts, actually, in case of difficulty, she would have to get rid of the majority of those holding Staff Commissions, who have never performed any duty, connected with their indispensable offices, which they would be called upon to fulfil at once on being ordered into the field.

“A good staff, says Jomini, is indispensable to the constitution of an army. * * * It has the advantage of being more durable than the genius of a single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it may safely be affirmed that it constitutes for an army the best of all safeguards. * * * A well appointed staff is to an army what a skillful minister is to a monarch. It seconds the views of the chief even though it be in a condition to direct all things itself; it prevents the commission of faults, even though the Commanding General be wanting in experience, by furnishing him good counsels. The staff is the eye of the army; through it a leader watches—has an insight into what is passing around him, and the want of a good staff is often the cause of great misfortunes.

“To move skilfully, a large army,” says General Lamargue, “he who commands it must have a hundred eyes, a hundred voices and a hundred ears. These voices, these eyes, these ears are the officers of his staff.

“A good staff,” says General Jomini, again, “is indispensable to the proper establishment of an army; it should be considered as the nursery garden whence the General in Chief may borrow the instruments which he makes use of;—as a collection of officers whose abilities should assist his own.

Or as our Sir Garnet Wolseley puts it:—“The staff is to an army what steam is to a locomotive. The machine itself may be of the highest order, the engineer who directs it may be a man of first-class talent, but without the motive power of steam it is merely a huge collection of well-polished material.

“Every successive invention applicable to military service adds to the necessity for a staff, increases its duties, and entails the employment of more officers on it. It is not possible for the most transcendent genius to command an army successfully without able assistance from others in matters of detail. Armies are held together by discipline, and discipline is essentially a matter of detail and attention to small things. By no means the smallest talent of great soldiers has been that which they have displayed in their selection of able assistants.”

Words are useless to impress the importance of this subject on those who are blind to the errors of our present system, and deaf to the trumpet tones of experience, a voice which appeals from

the battle fields of Europe and America, where the blood of the patriot and the hero, have sealed their devotion to a cause which might have succeeded if its operations had been based on education and discipline. Even without legislative action, some benefit might be obtained from attention to this subject, for, as we have advocated in previous pages, there might be in the public schools a union of civil and military instruction, and drill in marching and evolutions without arms. If this had no other effect it would serve to set up the youth, advance their physical development, and improve their health. The inculcation of the military virtues of perseverance, and prompt and punctual obedience, would be of signal value even in the ordinary pursuits of after life, for on them mainly depend the success of all great enterprises.

We should like to see the great principles of gymnastics, which develop the powers of men to their *natural* capacity, that is at least double or treble those ordinarily possessed by men in civilized life, introduced into our public schools, that they might take effect before the stiffness of manhood interferes. Then indeed we might hear of soldiers being made in a day. But as such schools could only be administered by those fully educated themselves, the first step would be the establishment of a State Military Academy, somewhat on the plan of the United States Military Academy at West Point, which, making some change in the studies, and insisting upon a thorough course of muscular education, would send forth teachers for our schools, officers for the staff, and instructors for our militia, and most competent men for all our public works.

In our estimate of the position of West Point Academy in the scale of educational agencies, it is not to be forgotten that it is not wholly and merely a professional school. In colleges of medicine, law, and theology, the student is supposed to have completed his elementary and general course of instruction, before the commencement of his membership of the professional college. The military academy does not, in this manner, confine its action to

the preparation for the profession of arms of men already educated. It undertakes the elementary as well as the professional education of the cadets, requiring no qualification for admission beyond the rudimental instruction of the domestic fireside or the district school. The prizes secured by those who graduate, are as often *civil as military*, the education they have received ensuring them remunerative employment in the former line of life. For this twofold character of the institution, the very satisfactory reason assigned is, that to require a liberal course of study for preparing the candidate for entrance into the academy, would be to shut out from the benefits of the institution those sons of the republic whose means are not adequate to the acquisition of this extended educational preparation.

Lieut.-Colonel T. B. Strange, Dominion Inspector of Artillery for the Province of Quebec, has just published a very interesting pamphlet, entitled: "*An Artillery retrospect on the last great war, 1870; with its lessons for Canadians.*"

The sum total, according to him, of the lessons to be learned by Canadians being the absolute and immediate necessity of a Military College for the production of scientifically trained officers, and of permanent artillery corps or *nuclei* to be attached to this College, and to Provincial Schools of Gunnery.

In the conclusion of his essay, after enumerating his professional antecedents and experience, and his qualifications as a military teacher and counsellor, the Colonel goes on to say:—

"I ventured to suppose, therefore, that I might be of some little service in forming the Canadian Military College. With that view I visited West Point, and offered to send in a report, which, I was officially informed, was not required, an ample one having been furnished by Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, Scots Fusilier Guards, Military Secretary to His Excellency."

Upon examining the accepted Report on the Military Academy at West Point, U. S.,—the preference for which at headquarters has evidently piqued and hurt Col. Strange,—we find Col. Fletcher's conclusions embodied in the following paragraph:

" There is considerable analogy between the defensive force now organized in Canada
 " and the troops raised by the Union of the several States during the revolutionary war.
 " The men are of much the same class, and if called out for service would show a similar
 " spirit and equal capacity ; but these men require at least a leaven of officers who have
 " been educated professionally, and have received a training superior to what is within
 " the reach of those who have given their service to the militia. Therefore, unless
 " Canada rely on the Imperial army for educated officers, she must be prepared to
 " organize a system of professional training, and should she with this object in view de-
 " termine on the establishment of a military academy somewhat on the model of West
 " Point, she would find but little difficulty in adapting the means at her disposal to the
 " purpose required. Able men as professors and instructors could be obtained either in
 " Canada or from the Imperial army ; the staff college in England not only educates
 " officers for such positions, but preserves a record of their several capacities. Students
 " would probably offer themselves, if sufficient inducements were held out, whilst a site
 " combining many of the advantages of West Point could readily be secured. To initiate
 " a military academy cure and a certain expenditure of money are alone necessary, but to
 " render it really efficient, and to imbue it with the spirit which animates the otherwise
 " dry bones of West Point training, a career must be open to the students, and some means
 " found of continuing the education received at the Academy, so that the knowledge
 " acquired from books may be supplemented by contact with military life. In fact, regi-
 " mental training should follow scholastic education and discipline, whilst in the future
 " should be seen the prospect of honorable employment connected with the profession of
 " arms."

CHAPTER 12.

Professional soldiers' policy is to create permanent forces—Extravagant methods of defence proposed by them—Their sentiments dangerous to political condition of State—Evils induced by large military establishments—True patriotism, what is it?—Motives that lead to selection of military life—War a less evil than subjugation—Obligation of national defence—Opinions against standing armies.

We began our paper by boldly declaring that we should give no favor to our English military critics; citing authorities to show that, from want of experience of military operations carried out on a grand and scientific scale, the British army officer was not to be held an infallible guide in military organization and defence, in cases where millions of souls are concerned. Should our efforts have failed to convince our countrymen to this extent, we trust they have had at least the effect of causing them to receive with great caution, and only after due deliberation thereon, the opinions of these men when enunciated in an authoritative or dictatorial manner.

Although the professional man of war may, as we said before, best understand what is technically known as tactics, yet as in the organisation for defence of a whole nation, where political or moral questions must be held of importance, general knowledge comes into play, an unprofessional person may without blame speak or write on military subjects, and may judge of them sufficiently well; and farther, professional men labor under some disadvantages of their own, looking at their calling from within always, and never from without, and from their very devotion to it, not being apt to see it in its relations with other matters.

It is this very devotion to their profession which is so dangerous to society, and the greater the enthusiast, the more his doctrines are to be feared. Next to a spiritual arrogance, a military arrogance is most to be dreaded:

The professional soldier is forever flashing his sword in the eyes of the world. Using the words of Pyrgopolinices, in Plautus' comedy of the "Braggart Captain," he shouts :

"Take ye care that the lustre of my shield is more bright than the rays of the sun are wont to be when the sky is clear; that when occasion comes, the battle being joined, 'mid the fierce ranks right opposite it may dazzle the eyesight of the enemy. But I wish to console this sabre of mine, that it may not lament nor be downcast in spirit, because I have thus long been wearing it keeping holiday, which so longs right dreadfully to make havoc of the enemy."

The honest self-opinion of all soldiers agrees with that held by the old General, (the story is told by Southey in his *Colloquies*), who, one day when he was reproving a Grenadier for some neglect of duty, and telling him he could not bear to see a Grenadier bring disgrace upon his corps, grew warm with the subject, and clapping him on the shoulder said :

"Why, man, do you know that a Grenadier is the greatest character in this world,"

And, after a moment's pause, adding the emphasis of an oath to his speech,

"And, I believe, in the next, too!"

The sole aim of these modern knights in armor seems to be, in the words of Colonel Fletcher, to obtain for the whole world : "honorable employment in the profession of arms." Their panacea for States is a permanent force of soldiers.

Nor do they prescribe in homœopathic dose either. The following modes of determining the number of troops our Dominion should permanently maintain, would by no means seem too extravagant to be uttered by an army officer : "The boundary line between Canada and the United States is 5,280,000 yards in length, now a Battalion in line occupies 250 yards, and as the best military authorities consider that a State should possess enough troops to cover its whole extent of inland border, and have a force of equal strength in reserve, I think Canada should keep up a regular force of 42,240 Battalions, or 31,680,000 men." Another favorite way of arriving at a result is this : Canada has as a neighbor a country

containing forty millions of inhabitants ;—now in Europe a State with a population of forty millions would maintain a permanent army of 600,000 men, therefore Canada should keep on a permanent footing a force of this strength to resist prospective possible invasion by this big neighbor. These methods of determination are simple and intelligible, but then the results are so confoundedly expensive ; and if the neighboring country thinks them a foolish waste of money, and does not seem inclined to follow a European model, these propositions should be declined with thanks.

A soldier, if allowed to follow his inclinations unchecked, would turn the world into a camp, and those citizens who were not strutting about in red tunics and shakoes, but were engaged in the despised civil avocations, would be but soldiers on furlough.

Past and passing events in Europe show us that a policy based on sentiments like these does not only assail the prosperity and morals of a community ; its influence on its political condition is threatening. It arms Government with a dangerous patronage, multiplies dependents and instruments of oppression, and generates a power, which, in the hands of the energetic and aspiring, endangers a free constitution. It organizes a body of men, who lose the feelings of the citizen in the soldier ; whose habits detach them from the community ; whose ruling passion is devotion to a chief ; who are inured in the camp to despotic sway ; who are accustomed to accomplish their ends by force, and to have little regard for the rights and happiness of their fellow beings ; and who turn with disgust and scorn from the quiet labors of peace. Is it wonderful that such protectors of a state should look with contempt on the weakness of the *protected*, and should lend themselves (ready instruments) to the subversion of that freedom which they do not themselves enjoy ? In a community in which precedence is given to the military profession, freedom cannot long endure. The encroachments of power at home are expiated by foreign triumphs. The essential interests and rights of the State are sacrificed to a false and fatal glory. Its intelligence and

vigor, instead of presenting a bulwark against domestic usurpation, are expended in military achievements. Its most active and aspiring citizens rush to the army, and become subservient to the power which dispenses honor. The nation is victorious over other nations, but the recompense of its toils is a yoke as galling as that which it imposes on the vanquished.

When large military establishments are formed, and a false and misdirected military spirit kindled, war becomes a necessary part of policy. A foreign field must be found for the energies and passions of a martial people. To disband a numerous and veteran soldiery, would be to let loose a dangerous horde on society. The blood-hounds must be set upon other communities, lest they rend the bosom of their own country. War tends to multiply and perpetuate itself without end. It feeds and grows on the blood which it sheds. The passions from which it springs gain strength and fury from indulgence. The successful nation, flushed by victory, pants for new laurels; whilst the humbled nation, irritated by defeat, is impatient to redeem its honor and repair its losses. Peace becomes a truce, a feverish repose, a respite to sharpen anew the sword, and to prepare for future struggles. Under professions of friendship lurk hatred and distrust, and a spark suffices to renew the mighty conflagration. No sooner is one storm scattered than the sky is darkened with the gathering horrors of another. Accordingly, war has been the mournful legacy of every generation to that which succeeded it. Every age has had its conflicts. Every country has in turn been the seat of devastation and slaughter. The dearest interests and rights of every nation have been again and again committed to the hazards of a game of all others the most uncertain, and in which, from its very nature, success too often attends on unpitiful fierceness and the basest fraud.

It will be asked, is it not honorable to serve one's country, and to expose one's life in its cause? Yes, our country deserves love and service; and let her faithful friends, her loyal sons, who,

under the guidance of duty and disinterested zeal, have poured out their blood in her cause, live in the hearts of a grateful posterity. But who does not know that this moral heroism is a very different thing from the common military spirit? Who is so simple as to believe that this all-sacrificing patriotism of principle is the motive which fills the ranks of war, and leads men to adopt the profession of arms? Does this sentiment influence the common soldier, who enlists because driven from all other modes of support, and hires himself to be shot at for a few cents a day? Or does it reign in the officer, who, for pay and promotion, from the sense of reputation or dread of disgrace, meets the foe with a fearless front? There is, indeed, a vulgar patriotism nourished by war; I mean that which burns to humble other nations, and to purchase for our own the exultation of triumph and superior force. But as for true patriotism, which has its root in benevolence, and which desires the real and enduring happiness of our country, nothing is more averse to it than war, and no class of men have less of it than those engaged in war. Perhaps in no class is the passion for display and distinction so strong; and in accordance with this infirmity, they are apt to regard as the highest interest of the State, a career of conquests, which makes a show and dazzles the multitude, however desolating or unjust in regard to foreign nations, or however blighting to the prosperity of their own.

The motives which generally lead to the choice of a military life, strip it of all special claim to honor. There are employments which, from their vary nature, should be undertaken only from high motives. This is peculiarly the case with the profession of arms. Its work is bloodshed, destruction, the infliction of the most dreaded evils, not only on wrong-doers, oppressors, usurpers, but on the innocent, weak, defenceless. From this task humanity recoils, and nothing should reconcile us to it but the solemn conviction of duty to God, to our country, to mankind. The man who undertakes this work solely or chiefly to earn money or pro-

motion, commits, however unconsciously, a great wrong. Let it be conceded that he who engages in military life is bound, as in other professions, to ensure from his employers the means of support, and that he may innocently seek the honor which is awarded to faithful and successful service. Still from the peculiar character of the profession, from the solemnity and terribleness of its agency, no man can engage in it innocently or honorably, who does not deplore its necessity, and does not adopt it from generous motives, from the power of moral and public considerations. That these are not the motives which now fill armies is too notorious to need proof. How common is it for military men to desire war, as giving rich prizes and as advancing them in their profession. They are willing to slaughter their fellow-creatures for money and distinction; and is the profession of such men peculiarly glorious? We are not prepared to deny that human life may sometimes be justly taken; but it ought to be taken under the solemn conviction of duty, and for great public ends. To destroy our fellow creatures for profit or promotion, is to incur a guilt from which most men would shrink, could it be brought distinctly before their minds. That there may be soldiers of principle, men who abhor the thought of shedding human blood, and who consent to the painful office only because it seems to them imposed by their country and the best interests of mankind, is freely granted. Such men spring up especially in periods of revolution, when the liberties of a nation are at stake. But this is not the spirit of the military profession. Men generally enter this profession from selfish motives, and hire themselves to kill for personal remuneration and advantage. They are ready to slay their fellow-creatures from inducements nor a whit more disinterested than those which lead other men to fell an ox or crush an insect; and, of consequence, the profession has no peculiar title to respect. I know that society views this subject differently, and that more blame should be attached to society than to the soldier; but still the character of the profession remains degraded by the motives

which most commonly actuate its members; and war as now carried on is certainly among the last vocations which are entitled to be called honorable.

In fine, let us keep aloof from and refuse to listen to those men in whose writings on the "Defence of Canada," we find expressions advocating a standing army, *e.g.*: *a small permanently embodied force; the nucleus of an army; the careful training of a small force; the prospect of honorable employment connected with the profession of arms; a military career after a military education; permanent nuclei; a small force, well trained, and officered by men who have learned their profession.*

But in concluding the observations which we have to offer on this branch of the subject, we feel bound to suggest an important caution. Let not the cause of peace be injured by the assertion of extreme and indefensible principles. We particularly refer to the principle that war is absolutely, and in all possible cases, unlawful, and prohibited by Christianity. This doctrine is considered by a great majority of the judicious and enlightened as endangering the best interests of society. War, as it is commonly waged, is indeed a tremendous evil; *but national subjugation is a greater evil than a war of defence*; and a community seems to us to possess an indisputable right to take up arms when all other means have failed, for the security of its existence or freedom. It is universally admitted that a community may employ force to repress the rapacity and violence of its own citizens, to disarm and restrain its internal foes; and on what ground can we deny to it the right of repelling the inroads and aggressions of a foreign power? If a government may not lawfully resist a foreign army invading its territory to desolate and subdue, on what principles can we justify resistance to a combination of its own citizens for the same injurious purpose? Government is instituted for the very purpose of protecting the community from all violence, no matter by what hands it may be offered; and rulers would be unfaithful to their trust, were they to abandon the rights, inter-

ests, and improvements of society, to unprincipled rapacity, whether of domestic or foreign foes.

In the words of Dr. Whewell :—

“ The obligation of national defence is the first obligation of a nation, for it is necessary to the existence of a nation. Without the fulfilment of this obligation, a State cannot exist even in the most imperfect form. A State which used no means of defending itself, would soon be blotted out of the map by the pressure of surrounding States.”

As Dr. Haven puts it :—

“ No State is under obligation to commit suicide, or to suffer itself to be overrun by invasion and conquest, and trampled out of existence by unscrupulous and lawless force, so long as it can resist and repel this violence.”

“ Yes,” cry the faint-hearted, “ granted, *so long as it can resist and repel this violence*. But this is the question, and the question you must beg in setting out any rational scheme of defence for Canada.”

We have endeavored to show that we Canadians *can* resist, and with certainty of success. That instead of having a compact and united foe of forty millions of souls, to crush us, in the event of a disagreement between the Imperial and Washington Governments, we should see the colossal Republic spontaneously disintegrated into four or five sections mutually inimical, by the declaration of war alone ; the invading forces of any one of which sections, it would be shame on us not to make short work of.

With this hopeful assurance, we can afford to spend a little time in the consideration of what is the best and most economical system of defence for Canada, at the same time taking care to select one capable of a cheap, ready and economical expansion to meet any efforts which may be put forth in the same direction, either in time of peace or war, by our neighbours and possible enemies.

We have in former pages declaimed at length against the evils consequent upon the employment of standing armies or permanent forces (no matter what their numbers) as the means of defence ; we will close this part of our subject by extracts from eminent politicians, in further support of our views.

In Lord Bolingbroke's "Remarks on the history of England," we read :—

"Let us conclude that all standing armies, for whatsoever purpose instituted, or in whatsoever habit clothed, may be easily made the instruments of faction ; because a body of men, separated in many respects from the rest of the nation, constrained to different customs, and in some measure subjected to different laws, may be easily persuaded that they have a different interest. Let us conclude that these casuists in red are the most dangerous in this respect, that having swords by their sides, they are able at once to cut those gordian knots, which others must untie by degrees."

In the "*Freeholder's Political Catechism*" the opinions of the same orator, statesman, and philosophical essayist, on this point, are more fully discovered in the following question and answer :

"Q. Why dost thou not love armies, in time of peace? A. Because armies have overturned the liberties of most countries ; and all, who are well affected to liberty, ever hated them ; because they are subject to an implicit obedience to their officers, and to a law of their own ; because they are so many lusty men taken from work, and maintained at an extravagant expense upon the labour of the rest ; because they are many ways burthensome to the people in their quarters, even under the best discipline, especially in dear countries ; because there are so many preferments in the hands of designing Ministers ; and lastly, because the King will never be denied an army as great as he pleaseth, *when it is necessary.*

Among the political writings of Benjamin Franklin, was found the following paper, written about the year 1786. Franklin, we need hardly say, was a man who, in every character, whether as an humble individual or a public diplomatist, as a philosophical inquirer or the legislator of an enlightened nation, constantly proved throughout his long and eventful career, that he estimated his extraordinary talents as blessings so far only as they enabled him to promote the happiness of all mankind.

"MILITIA PREFERABLE TO REGULAR TROOPS."

"Abbe Morellet's questions and B. Franklin's answers.

"Je prie Monsieur Franklin de vouloir bien répondre aux questions suivantes, by a *yes or no.* Croit-il que les Etats Unis puissent dans la suite et après leur indépendance reconnoître se passer de troupes régulières toujours sur pied ? Yes.

"Feront-ils mieux de n' avoir que des milices nationales ? Certainly.

"Des milices conteraient elles moins cher à l'état ou plutôt à la nation ? Car ne peut on pas dire que dans un état de choses où tous les citoyens doivent s'exercer à porter les armes il y a en fin de compte, en perte de tems, en dépenses pour l'armement, pour

" l'habillement, pour le rassemblement des troupes à certains tems de l'année, &c., une
 " dépense réelle plus grande que celle qu'il faudroit pour tenir sur pied un petit nombre
 " de troupes régulières ?

" Supposing a general militia to be equally expensive with a body of regular troops,
 " yet the militia is preferable ; because the whole being especially disciplined, has nothing
 " to fear from a part.

" Monsieur Franklin croit-il qu'on puisse entretenir en Amérique un corps de troupes
 " sur pied dans chaque province confédérée sans mettre la liberté en danger ?

" Europe was without regular troops till lately ; one powerful prince keeping an army
 " always on foot makes it necessary for his neighbor to do the same to prevent surpr
 " We have no such dangerous neighbors in America. We shall probably keep magazines
 " of arms and ammunition always filled, and no European power will ever find us so un-
 " provided as England found us at the beginning of this war, or can prepare to invade us
 " with a sufficient force in so short a time as not to give us time sufficient to discipline
 " force sufficient to repel the invader. Mr. F. therefore thinks, that to avoid not the ex-
 " pense, but the danger of keeping up a body of regular troops in time of peace, none of
 " the States separately will do it, nor the congress for the whole."

CHAPTER 13.

System of military exercises for Canadian militia proper—Objections to present drill and
 books of instruction—Rifle practice insisted on—Science in modern warfare—Best
 rifles must be procured—Individual skill tells now in battle as it did in old time—
 Physical education must be encouraged and use of weapons made habitual—Efficiency
 in handling rifle of paramount importance.

We have, up to this point, treated only of the training most
 necessary and suitable for the males of our population below
 16,—a class not in ordinary cases to be enrolled in the Militia,—
 and generally of the higher professional instruction or training in
 special duties of officers, to be given by a State Military College.
 We must now, in turn, consider what would be the fittest system
 of military exercises for the rank and file of our Militia proper.
 What is the training now authorized by law for this portion of
 the Canadian Militia :—

"MILITIA GENERAL ORDERS.

"HEAD-QUARTERS.

"Ottawa, 3rd June, 1874.

"GENERAL ORDERS (14).

"ACTIVE MILITIA.

"REGULATIONS FOR THE ANNUAL DRILL OF 1874-5, DOMINION OF CANADA.

* * * * *

"The annual drill for 1874-5 will be carried out, so far as the same may be practicable, in Brigade Camps of exercise, at which the Cavalry, Field Artillery and Infantry corps within the Brigade Division, who may be authorized to attend such camps, will be concentrated for twelve days drill and training.

* * * * *

"CITY CORPS.

"In cases where local circumstances prevent city corps from going into Brigade camp with other corps in the same Brigade Division, such corps may be permitted to perform twelve days' drill at their local Headquarters on different days, as may be most convenient, subject to the approval of the Deputy Adjutant General of the District

* * * * *

ISOLATED CORPS.

"In any Brigade Division where there is not more than one Battalion of Infantry, or where any Battalion is remote from the place appointed for the brigade camp, the drill of such corps is to be in camp at battalion headquarters. * * * * *

"In any military district where there are rural companies not in battalion, such companies may be attached, where practicable, to a battalion in camp, for purposes of drill; but where such cannot be conveniently arranged on account of distance, or any other proper cause, the corps may be permitted to drill at company headquarters."

* * * * *

As a matter of fact the training sanctioned by our authorities, and with which they are satisfied, is the acquisition, in a more or less imperfect manner, of the manual exercise, and a few absurdly useless movements on the planked floor of a dimly lighted drill shed, or, at most, on a levelled parade ground.

As to the profit gained by training such as this,—even by H. M. regular troops, who execute the field exercise movements with all the precision humanly possible,—we will use the words of Canada's old friend, Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, C.B., K.C.M.G., whose opinions may be held as the best possible to be obtained. In his essay written for the Wellington prize, in 1872, this hater of red-tape, and head-quarters humbug, remarks :—

“ The field exercise book should, I think, be remodelled at once, not so much by instituting a new system of drill generally, as by wiping out from it the drill-sergeant and barrack-square peculiarities that render our present system of drill unsuited for war.

“ All our movements are made upon points : now the use of such points on the day of battle would be impossible. We, therefore, during peace, pursue a system of movements that we could not practise in presence of an enemy, and we rely for executing them accurately upon aids which we are necessarily deprived of when these movements have to be made for a real purpose.

“ The movements that are performed in war are few : when those are practised in peace, they should be carried out as nearly as possible in the same manner as they would be in presence of an enemy. The foreign officers who had recently come from the actions of a great war, must have laughed to themselves as they saw our infantry, during the autumn manœuvres, deploying under an imaginary fire with a slowness and attention to dressing that was more suited for the stage than for actual warfare.”

We give the following extract from the essay of Lieut. C. Cooper King, Royal Marine Artillery, written to the same effect and in competition for the same prize :—

“ The basis of all strategical and tactical dispositions is the study of ground. No fixed rules can be laid down for the minor movements of a regiment. All we can hope to do is to utilise the drill the men have had in the broadest and freest sense, according to the topographical peculiarities of the field, and it is in this more than all else our military system fails. We convert the civilian into a drilled machine, we teach him habits of obedience and discipline, we make him move with regularity at the word of command, and there, at the very point where his true education should begin, we leave him. How to utilise cover, how to occupy a village or a wood without the risk of being cut off or captured, how and when to make the rush forward that brings success, or the retreat that prevents disaster, is, to the mass of the English soldiery, a sealed book. We have taught him how to spell, not how to combine his words, his details of drill, when the time arrives. The true soldier's art only begins at this point, never ends there. * * * Mere drill, the details of a simple movement, are of no great moment in the field. In rough, broken ground the accurate deployment of a line, or the actual continuity of the regiments, are even now recognised as impossible. But the deployment is still carried out in a very rough practical way, probably, and the men recollect only the general principles, not the details, of the drill-book. Thus all mere parade-work is equally valuable for training the soldier to combined movement, equally valuable if pedantically insisted on in the field.”

On reading this, our Minister of Militia will no doubt stand aghast and say,—But if all foot-drill and parade movements are useless, what are we to do ? How can I spend the money voted without resorting to fraudulent practices ? I have so many *Field*

Exercise books in store—are all these to be wasted? what a pity! they look so nice in their red covers. Their contents must be valuable, for they puzzle me exceedingly. We reply to the Honorable Gentleman by opening another red book entitled, "*Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction, 1870,*" and read to him from page 134:—

"The rifle is placed in the soldier's hands for the destruction of the enemy; his own safety depends upon his efficient use of it; it cannot, therefore, be too strongly inculcated, that every man who has no defect in his sight may be made a good shot; and that no degree of perfection he may have attained in the other parts of his drill, can upon service, remedy any want of proficiency in this; in fact, all his other instruction in marching and manœuvring can do no more than place him in the best possible situation for using his weapon with effect. A soldier who cannot shoot is useless, and an embarrassment to the battalion."

The Government of Canada must adopt every means to inspire a popular taste for the use of the rifle, and almost the whole of the period of drill of our active militia, must be solely devoted to rifle practice.

The words of Col. R. P. Anderson, in his late work, (1873), entitled "*Victories and Defeats,*" have even more force when applied to us than to the people of England.

"And as for your infantry, reduce the standard; any man who can use a rifle is as good as a giant, with the advantage of being a smaller animated target for an enemy to fire at. Take in recruits of even fifteen, and pay more attention to accuracy of firing than to the size or weight of the men. It would not be difficult to train all boys when at school from thirteen upwards to the expert use of the rifle. We feel sure that as the boys love gymnastics, so they would go in heart and soul to learn the art of firing. The greatest ambition of the plucky British boy is to have a small pistol; and to have a gun! why he would go half wild with delight. Thus, without introducing the 'Landwehr' or 'Landsturm' systems existing in Prussia, we should obtain a huge army. In case of invasion our youths of nineteen and twenty would form an enormous reserve of intelligent soldiers, ready at a day's notice for the service of Her Majesty."

Let us ever remember that a nation can never keep its freedom, unless ready to maintain it at any time, and that for its own security it must make use of those means which Providence has placed at its disposal. When, centuries ago, our forefathers first introduced gunpowder into warfare, they did so simply because

they thought a discovery had been made which would give them greater power over their enemies ; they were unacquainted with its real nature, and never for a moment dreamt to what it would lead. But we have no such excuse. The experience of five hundred years has shown us that those masses, which were once kept in ignorance and serfdom by the help of the buckler and battle-axe, have been able to emancipate themselves by means of the fire-arm. And if the first introduction of gunpowder was the cause of the destruction of the feudal system,—if it has assisted to overthrow, throughout the world, the prejudices and superstitions of ages,—and if it has enabled Great Britain to spread civilization over the most distant portions of the Globe,—surely, while wondering at the extraordinary power which science has evoked from so simple a matter, we ought to endeavor to bring it to a higher state of perfection,—not forgetting, however, that it should be used but in self-defence, and even then reluctantly ; for the greater our power, the greater should be our forbearance.

We must arm our militia with the very best military rifle, and never allow the weapon in their hands to become inferior to that of other States. If anything, however, is to be made of this force, it will be necessary to begin immediately. We should not rest until there is in the possession of every male Canadian capable of bearing arms, one rifle with sett of accoutrements.

But even supposing that a sufficient number of rifles did exist in the country, there is at present a very large proportion of our countrymen who have not the smallest idea how to use them. Unless rifle shooting becomes a permanent institution, unless it is fostered with care and kept continually in exercise, it will certainly prove a delusion ; but, if properly managed, it would in a few years deter any one from attempting the invasion of this country. Either we are very much mistaken in our estimate of ourselves, or we are equal man for man to our neighbours across the line of 45°. At present we are an unarmed, and, for military purposes, an utterly unorganized people. Organization we can

improvise to a very great extent, but rifled arms we cannot, nor can we learn how to use them without long and steady practice; and it is to this point that we ought immediately and earnestly to turn our attention.

The skill of the old English archers is one of the many facts in history, which everybody recognizes as a general proposition, but of the actual power which they wielded there is at this day but little realizing appreciation.

We know, generally, that many of the hardest fought battles of those days were won by the power and skill with which they plied the bow, but comparatively few people are aware how important a part that weapon has played in England's history, or to what an extent its use was encouraged and enforced upon the people. The social and military necessities of the present day are so changed from those which existed five hundred years ago, that it is as difficult for us to realize the feelings and interests which then held the most prominent place in the minds of the great masses of the people, as it would have been for them to anticipate the day when the knowledge of arms would be looked upon as a vain acquisition, unworthy the thought or attention of men who aspired to distinguished social or civil position.

In our zeal for the promotion of the objects which we now consider most essential for the advancement of civilization and happiness we have too much neglected the physical training which men thought a primary necessity for their preservation. Invennerated by the prosperity and luxury which we have enjoyed, we have certainly lost that taste for the skilful use of arms which alone is capable of imparting the individual confidence of power, which constitutes the vital strength of military discipline.

For a period of five hundred years succeeding the battle of Hastings, fought on the 14th October, 1066, the archers of England constituted a National Guard, whose efficiency was known and feared throughout Europe, and the most vigilant

care was exercised by the Government to maintain the supremacy they had acquired. Every able-bodied man between the ages of seventeen and sixty was obliged, under a severe penalty, to have a bow of his own length, and a certain number of arrows, and to practice habitually in shooting at the butts or targets which were established in every parish, at distances prescribed by law.

On holidays and festive occasions, prize shooting was always one of the standard sports, and every effort was used to dignify and excite an interest in the attainment of an art on which the power and even the very existence of the nation was felt to be dependent.

A little reflection upon the obvious results of such a tone of public feeling, as compared with those arising from the prevailing sentiment of the present day, will enable us, in some degree, to realize the change which has taken place, and to appreciate the danger of neglecting so important a branch of popular education as that of the use of arms.

The use of the gun has been regarded by many among us as a species of idle dissipation, which at best could only be looked upon as a mere waste of time. Instead of making it a part of every boy's education, and having him instructed and drilled till he became so familiar with the weapon that no danger was to be apprehended to himself or others, it has been a forbidden implement in the house, and he has had no other instruction than he could gather for himself, perhaps by stealth; for whatever may be the explanation, the fact cannot be denied, that a craving for its use is one of the strongest instincts of a boy's nature, and with many it is so strong as to be irresistible.

How different would be our situation at this moment did the old English laws and customs prevail, under which every man was trained to the familiar use of his weapon, and the attainment of the greatest possible perfection was stimulated by the prospect of public honor, and a certainty of the most vigorous competition, no one can fail to acknowledge that we have at least been guilty

of a grievous sin of omission in suffering such a change to come upon us.

The fact, however, seems generally to have escaped observation, that the spirit of emulation which existed in the days of archery was in a great measure owing to the character of the weapon itself, whose efficiency was so largely dependent upon the strength and skill of the one who used it, as to furnish a never failing incentive to exertion in perfecting himself in its use by constant practice.

With the invention of gunpowder, with a projectile force entirely independent of the strength of the shooter, while the weapons in which it was first used afforded little scope for the display of superior skill, the archery meetings and prize shootings which for so long a time had formed an important feature of the life and education of the English people, passed into disuse except as a mere sport.

For the two centuries prior to 1854 the British soldier was armed with a weapon possessed of no responsive power to the exertion of skill in its use, which should lead to a feeling of reliance, amounting almost to affection on the part of its owner, but whose execution could only be estimated in the aggregate, and of course afforded no evidence of individual skill or prowess. The improvements which have been made in our own day, however, in the construction of the rifle, have wrought a revolution in the use of arms, which bids fair to awaken a popular spirit not at all inferior to that of the days of archery, with the substitution of a weapon whose amazing power and efficiency, as well as its wonderful precision, and the readiness with which it seems to acknowledge its obedience to the will of a skilful master, constitute such an arm as has never before been wielded in the struggles between right and might, which comprise so large a portion of the world's history. The day is past when battles could be won with so feeble a weapon as the smooth-bored musket, and the Governments of Europe have awakened to

the fact that the element of individual skill must again become an essential ingredient in the composition of an army.

Without efficiency in the handling of his rifle, no degree of perfection he may have obtained in the other parts of his drill will be of any avail, for the grand object of discipline is to place him in the field in such a position that he may use his weapon with effect, and if he does not know how to use it, the object for which he is sent into the field is defeated. But such knowledge implies much more than merely knowing how to load and fire, and until soldiers are thoroughly instructed in target shooting, it may as well be conceded that little or nothing will be gained by arming them with weapons whose superiority would give them an incalculable advantage if they were capable of improving it.

Discipline confers the confidence of power derived from the best possible arrangement of the masses whose united strength is relied on to accomplish the desired object ; but individual skill gives to each of the units composing those masses the self confidence which in fact constitutes their strength.

No one at this day will deny that henceforth a powerful military organization must be one of the necessities of our national existence. Whatever may be the plan of organization we adopt, the essential point on which military efficiency must depend in the hour of trial, consists in such familiarity with the use of arms as the civilian may attain without the necessity of military drill, and which once acquired will give him such confidence of power as no mere drilling can inspire.

It is, therefore, as a means of increasing our national strength by having in the country a large body of men who may at any time be converted into efficient troops, that it is desirable to inspire a popular taste for the use of the rifle,—the most formidable weapon which has ever yet been placed in the hands of the soldier, and on which we must mainly rely for the performance of the work of war.

It will not suffice for the leaders of public opinion to tell the

people to set about the work. They must begin it themselves, and say by example as well as precept: "This is what every man must do who would contribute to the national strength." And the appeal will be answered with willing hearts and hands, and in the day of need it will be found that we have power ready to answer the call, instead of having to create it at a ruinous expense.

We may rest assured that the other civilized nations of the earth are fully awake to the importance of popular education in the use of arms, and unless we also recognize and act upon the fact that the day has come round again when individual skill constitutes a vitally important element of military education, we shall some day pay dearly for being taught the lesson in the field.

CHAPTER 14.

Canada has great available military resources—These should be developed—Proposed Organisation—Division into Classes—Division into Battalions—Staff—Drill of Officers—Armories—Artillery—Drill of Seamen, &c.—Times of muster and drill of different classes—District Staff, &c.—Accounts, &c.—Drill in schools—Medals—State Military College—Preparation of Military Code—Working of system—Its elasticity—Economy—What provided by Dominion—What by Municipalities—Estimate of expenditure.

In the preceding pages, wherein free use has been made of the writings of others, we have examined the military deficiencies and want of our Dominion, with the remedies for the existing evils, and we have considered the duties and responsibilities which devolve on Canadians, to determine and carry into operation the system of defence which is best suited to the country, and which it so much needs. We may have presently to pay dearly in blood and ruin for the shortcomings in our Militia organization. If we stir not, the day of reckoning will come; let us at least get ready, so as not to aggravate our sufferings by pre-

vious neglects ; so as not to waste the precious lives of our sons and brethren beyond that point which is inevitable. Our people lack nothing but the wisdom and the will necessary to dispose and organize existing military resources in order to make the country secure. We have, physically speaking, the finest men in the world, already leavened with a small amount of military training, which may be turned to advantage. We possess mechanical power. We boast breeds of horses suitable for war, and our finances and our credit are good. With such advantages, we ought to be really powerful, and our continuance any longer in a state of disorganization and unpreparedness, is discreditable to our rulers, and a threatening danger to ourselves. With the proper machinery of war always in active existence, with the organization into able-officered companies and regiments, supplemented by the more advanced organization into brigades and divisions, with stores and *matériel* ready for immediate use, *with constant and universal rifle practice*, our militia force proper *i.e.*, every able-bodied man in the country, would only require a little smart drill to enable them to take the field in anticipation of an enemy, with full confidence, and certain of success.

Canada should, and may in reason, place reliance only in her own *measures* to provide effectually for the safety of the State ; and, in a cause so righteous, put her trust in Almighty God, that he will bless with success the plans formed by human skill, to enable her to repel any unprovoked aggression that may be attempted against her independence, and thus avert from this favored land the greatest of national calamities.

To put Canada in a perfect state of security, we would deferentially offer the following suggestions for a Militia organization :

Proposed Canadian Organization.

1st. The Militia should consist of all the male inhabitants of Canada between the ages of sixteen years and sixty ; though all the male inhabitants of the Dominion, capable of bearing arms, ought to be required to serve in case of a *levée en masse*.

The male population so liable to serve should be divided into four classes :

The *first* class to comprise all men from 16 to 30. We find the grand total of the number in this class in the Dominion to be about 480,000.

The *second* class between the ages of 30 and 40, amounting to, say, 190,000.

The *third* class between the ages of 40 and 50, numbering about 140,000.

The *fourth* class, ages of 50 and 60, including nearly 100,000. And in this order they should be called upon to serve.

2ndly. Retaining the existing Military Districts and Brigade Divisions with as little alteration as possible, divide all the able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 60, resident in a Brigade Division, into Battalions of 800 strong, each, (10 companies of 80), or say 1,000 Battalions in all Canada.

3rdly. In each Military District, Brigade Division and Battalion Division, there should be a complete nucleus or cadre of Staff, Field and Battalion Officers appointed by the Governor General; and non-commissioned officers appointed by the Battalion commander. Staff Officers to be graduates of the Military Schools or College. The non-commissioned officers to be compelled to serve, under severe penalties for refusal, when thus selected; for on them, in a great measure, will depend the organization and usefulness of each company.

4thly. In each Battalion Division, the commissioned officers thereof should be drilled as Artillery, Cavalry and Infantry by an Instructor from the State School.

5thly. At the headquarters of each Battalion Division, there should be an armory, with sergt. armorer in charge, a powder magazine, a rifle range complete, and parade ground.

6thly. At the Battalion headquarters should be stationed one field gun with side arms, stores and ammunition complete.

7thly. Along the sea coast, and at certain ports on the great

lakes, the resident seamen, boatmen, fishermen, and all the inhabitants who derive their support from similar pursuits, should be enrolled and liable to boat service for the defence of the coast and inland harbors.

8thly. The men enrolled in each battalion division should be called out for drill and training in the following proportions, order, and for the periods mentioned :—

The *first* class to furnish a quota of 100,000 men, to be drilled and exercised for a period of *two* days in each year.

The *second* class to contribute 25,000 men, to assemble for the same purpose *one* day in each year.

The *third* class, 25,000 men, *one* day per annum.

The *fourth* class, 25,000 men, *one* day annually.

Provided always that the men in the same class should parade together, and on different days from those on which the other classes muster.

The period of drill, for all classes, shall be devoted to military exercises, under the direction of a Military College graduate, as follows :—

- a. Primarily and chiefly to rifle instruction and practice.
- b. Skirmishing drill.
- c. Company movements in close order.

The Staff Officers to be paid for work done ; the battalion officers \$1 for each day's drill ; the N. C. O's and men, \$1 per day's drill.

The quota furnished by each class to be renewed annually, so that, ordinarily, no man should, while in same class, parade for training and drill two years consecutively.

Militiamen, on the rolls and liable to serve in the class from which the men are to be taken, should be accepted, or taken, or balloted, to serve in the yearly quota of the class, as may be thought necessary or advisable.

Every alternate *fifth* year, all the Militiamen in the *first* class in each battalion division should muster for *one* day only for drill,

&c., and in each succeeding and alternate *fifth* year all the men in the classes 2, 3 and 4 should assemble for the same period and purpose.

9thly. Besides the Adjutant General at Ottawa, there should be as many Asst. Adjutant Generals as there are Military Districts charged with the duties of Inspecting Officers and Paymasters. These officers ought never to be assigned to the districts in which they reside, but their annual tour of Inspection should be designated by the Chief of their department. The advantages of this system are obvious :—ties of neighborhood, intimacy, interest, relationship, politics, or family, would not sway an officer in a strange district. The result would be, that the law and regulations of the service would be rigidly enforced, and correct returns demonstrate the real strength of the Militia. All these officers should be supplied by the State Military College.

10thly. All Rosters, Returns, Accounts, &c., should be verified in the strictest manner on oath, under penalty for perjury.

11thly. No person should be commissioned as an officer until he has passed a satisfactory examination before the examiners of the Military College ;—unless he be a graduate of the College, these last having the preference over all others.

12thly. Compulsory military drill and rifle practice, in all schools throughout the country. The Instructors to be furnished by the State Military College of Canada. It may be objected that the Dominion Government has no power to make use of the machinery of the Provincial Common Schools or Private Schools, without the consent of their Legislatures or the Proprietors. But it has power to order that all boys between certain ages shall be drilled : and if it furnishes the means of training, viz., instructors, pay, arms, &c., the authorities and all parties interested in each Province would find it to their advantage to sanction the drilling of the boys when assembled in their various schools.

13thly. In order to distinguish officers who have faithfully

served for more than ten [10] years, such officers might be authorized to wear, as a mark of distinction, a medal, of material and pattern according to rank. This decoration would at once designate long and meritorious service, and distinguish between officers who accepted commissions merely to avoid other duties and those who take a pride and persevere in their profession at a sacrifice of time, labor, and too often of their means.

14thly. At some healthful, central and otherwise fitting location, a State Military School should be established on a basis similar to that of the United States Military Academy at West Point. The course of study to last for four [4] years, a fair proportion of which time to be devoted to such studies as will fit the pupils for the usual pursuits of life, so that they will have resources in themselves when they leave the State service. The pupils should remain at the disposition of the Government for two [2] years after their studies are completed, as an equivalent for their education; and be employed as Adjutants or in other Staff Offices, as Inspectors and Instructors of the Schools and Militia, Engineers of the public works, and as Professors and Teachers in the Dominion College.

The number of cadets with which the College might be opened should not exceed 25, and thereafter the annual admission should not exceed 25. The pupils to be chosen in the following proportion from the Military Districts of the various Provinces in the Dominion, viz. :—Ontario 4, Quebec 3, New Brunswick 1, Nova Scotia 1, British Columbia 1, Prince Edward Island 1. The number of pupils at any time in the College would in this way never exceed one hundred [100].

The average annual expenditure on West Point Academy being something less than \$150,000 for the education of 250 cadets;—the cost to Canada for a similar institution need not exceed \$80,000.

15thly. The preparation of an Act,—in effect the mere framework or skeleton of a law, founded on mature consideration of

the advantages of foreign systems of National Defence,—more especially that of the Swiss so admirably applicable to this country. The provisions of this draft should be worked out in detail by Order in Council on the recommendation of a Board of experienced officers, convened at Ottawa for that purpose. Such a course would meet the views of all, avoid sectional prejudices, and give the Militia that standing which alone can win general respect and good will. In order to represent the wishes of the Militia throughout the Dominion, each Battalion of the present active Militia force should designate a person fit to serve on such Board. These again should choose one for each Military District, and the present Adjutant General should have the power of designating two. This board would then consult authorities, receive and examine communications and suggestions from every one able and willing to lay them before it,—weigh every section dispassionately, and select the most beneficial: the provisions finally adopted to become the law of the land.

WORKING OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM.

Under the proposed Militia Law, Canada would be divided into Military Districts, subdivided into Brigade, Battalion and Company Divisions, each having its complete number of officers residing in the division. The Battalions consisting of *all* the able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 60, resident within a territorial division, it would evidently produce the most disastrous effect were the Battalion Divisions to be stripped of all their men even for the shortest length of time, and the aged, the sick, the women and children left alone to provide for themselves. For the sake of illustration, we will take a Battalion of 800 strong (this number including, of course, every man in the territorial division between 16 and 60), and we will suppose the Battalion to be divided into 10 companies consisting of 80 men each. Although, for the reasons above stated, the whole battalion could not be spared, for even a few day's drill, much less a lengthy

campaign, yet a portion of it, say 100 men, might be taken from their civil avocations without inflicting any great injury or inconvenience; but if any one complete company were taken, the population of the company division, whence it was drawn, would suffer as above stated, while that of the remaining divisions would be left untouched; therefore the only just method of getting the number would be to take 8 men from each company, leaving the remainder to cultivate the land. No doubt these men would be missed, but freedom and independence cannot be maintained without some slight sacrifice. As we suggested before, the Militia for purposes of drill should muster by *classes* on different days; we would suggest, for sake of effectiveness, maintaining in time of war as well as peace, the distinction between the classes, into which the Militia would be divided. In the event of war the proposed system would work in the following manner: In a Battalion division *all* the men in the *first* class (16 to 30) would at once be assembled at the Battalion Armory, and *all* the men in the *second* class ordered to hold themselves in readiness. If more men were required the *second* class would take the field,—and be replaced by *third* class, and so for the *fourth* class. With a view of making the force serviceable in the field, the separate bodies of *first* class men drawn from adjoining Battalions would be brought together and formed into one Battalion or principal unit for active service—the field officers and staff being selected according to their merits, from amongst the officers of the Battalions thus united, or being, if necessary, specially appointed from elsewhere.

If the proposed system is carried out, we cannot but think that it would gain in popularity, day by day, in its working in the rural districts, and would soon become so completely interwoven in the habits and ideas of the people that nothing would interrupt its welfare. The military Districts, Brigade Divisions, and Battalion Divisions would be arranged,—fitting them upon the existing divisions, with as little alteration as possible; this

done, fully detailed instructions and returns would be sent to each battalion division,—and a roster of men in each class would be made out and deposited at the *chef lieu* of each battalion division. Qualified men (*i.e.*, 1st class Military School men, and afterwards graduates of the Military College) would be sent through the country to afford any assistance or give any information required. Every encouragement would be given to the people of the country to manage their own Battalions among themselves, giving them assistance if required, and every means would be taken to create emulation in rifle shooting, &c., amongst the battalions of Militia,—the fact of their having their own armories and rifle ranges in the centre of their battalion divisions, under their own responsibility, would increase this feeling of *esprit de corps*.

The system proposed if carried out at once, in its entirety might be beyond the financial strength of the country. But, on examination, it will be found that besides offering a means of increasing, in a few years, the defensive power of the country from zero to an invincible force of a million of Canadian sharpshooters, carefully organized and well officered—the expense of an organization such as we have described, carried out on true principles, will but keep pace with the power developed.

Without injury to the effectiveness of this military organization, which will yearly become more firmly rooted in the Dominion and will at length enable the population to rise and oppose an overwhelming force against an enemy however suddenly it might be attacked, we can by paying moderately, at first, for a good, solid, enduring, foundation, constructed on true principles, afford to purchase,—as time calls for and our treasury permits,—the materials for a highly wrought superstructure.

To keep up the metaphor,—we have been building our tower of defence on a quicksand; the fort on which we have spent millions looks well to the careless eye; but, on inspection we find

it to be harmless to the enemy and no defence to those within. It is without guns in its embrasures, undergarrisoned by awkward squads, and its foundations threaten to give way and bring the mass toppling over.

Success will very much depend in future warfare upon cool firing, accurate aim, well judged distances, ability to adapt movements to the nature of the ground, and fearless exposure or careful concealment at the proper moment.

The materials for a good system of defence for Canada arrange themselves in the following order of importance, and should be secured by us in that order, viz.: Men, Rifles, Ammunition, Targets, educated Officers, exercised school boys, an intelligent Staff, an experienced (in Canadian Militia service) Adjutant General.

Each Battalion division should be charged with the erection of an armory, the lease of parade ground and rifle range, and repairs of the same, purchasing of targets and billeting of men while out for drill;—leaving to the State to supply rifles, guns, ammunition, stores, uniform, (which should be of the plainest and simplest character, and only issued to corps when ordered out for actual service), instructors, and the pay for staff, employees, instructors, officers and men.

The State would have to purchase 50,000 rifles per annum, until each militiaman was supplied,—with corresponding ammunition. For the first year, the 60,000 Snider Rifles, and Ammunition, already in the country, would suffice if distributed equally, more than one man firing with each rifle at practice. The targets, to save expense to municipalities, might be made of stretched and painted canvas of one pattern.

The estimate of expenditure by Dominion for *first* year of working the system, might be roughly estimated as follows:—

100,000 men (1st Class), 2 days, @ \$1 per diem...\$200,000.

25,000 " (2nd Class), 1 day, @ \$1 " ... 25,000.

25,000	"	(3rd Class), 1 day, @ \$1	"	...	25,000.
25,000	"	(4th Class), 1 day, @ \$1	"	...	25,000.
Rifles (now in possession of Govt.)					<i>nil.</i>
Ammunition (do. do.)					<i>nil.</i>
Targets (provided by Battalion Division)					<i>nil.</i>
Military Clothing (not required)					<i>nil.</i>
Military College					80,000.
Ordinary Contingent Militia Services, viz. :					
Salaries of and remunerations to Military	}	Branch and District Staff, &c., Contingen-	cies, &c.		100,000.
					<hr/> \$455,000.

In succeeding years would be added, say \$150,000 for interest on purchase of Martini-Henry or other Rifles, Ammunition, &c. The drill pay would also, in the fifth year after going into operation of this system, and every fifth year after, be increased by \$125,000, owing to the calling out of all the first class men, or all the second, third, and fourth class men. Should these amounts bear too heavily on our finances, it would be for the Legislature to postpone or otherwise vary the calling out of any one or more of the classes.

We have done wrong perhaps in attempting to particularize and enter into detail in any part; it has been our aim to confine ourselves as much as possible to general principles. As the commonest laborer can tear down a condemned edifice, and can but bring together the materials for abler hands to rebuild on the same site,—just so have we pulled to pieces the present system, and then dumped down our experience and the experience of others to aid in reconstruction.

"Si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti; si non, his utere mecum."

We cannot claim even the merit of originality in these pages of ours, many of the thoughts have suggested themselves to others,

and may have been expressed by other pens,—we have but acted the part of the cabinet maker who, selecting the various woods to produce the best effect in a determined end, works up, dovetails and polishes the blocks he starts with. We have but suggested the basis of an organization, which at the same time would comply with the requisitions of our constitution, and establish such a Militia as would serve for the protection of property and the defence of the State.

CHAPTER 15.

Imperial despatches, &c, on Militia Organization of Canada.

In 1862, the Government of the then Province of Canada, urged on by Imperial pressure, appointed a commission to report on the best means of reorganizing the Militia. This commission (in reality Col. D. Lysons, C.B.) reported; and a bill was introduced embodying their suggestions; but the expenditure required to carry out the plan led to its rejection.

As shewing the opinion of Imperial statesmen as to the system required by Canada, and the feeling of England's rulers towards their colony, we give at length the despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, written after the rejection of the bill above mentioned:—

(Copy—Canada—No. 163.)

“DOWNING STREET, 21st August, 1862.

“MY LORD,—Now that the Session of Parliament has been brought to a close, I feel it my duty to call your Lordship's attention, in a more formal manner than I have hitherto done, since the rejection of the Militia Bill by the Legislature of Canada, and the consequent change of your responsible advisers, to the want of preparation for defence of the British North American Provinces, in the event of an interruption of the present amicable relations of this country with the United States, and to the anxiety which was expressed upon this subject, on more than one occasion, both in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons.

"I trust that the general spirit of these debates will not have been misinterpreted. I feel no less confidence, that the object of the present despatch will not be mistaken as implying either mistrust of the Canadian people or an alteration by Her Majesty's Government of the view which they have frequently expressed of the relations which ought to exist between England and the Colony.

"On the one hand, the promptitude with which troops and stores were despatched last winter, with much inconvenience to the soldiers, and at no inconsiderable expense to this country, shews the readiness of England to defend Canada with the whole power of the Empire; whilst, on the other hand, the reception of those troops and the loyal enthusiasm of the people of Canada, give ample assurance of the fact that Canada is attached to this country, and faithful to the Queen.

"It cannot be denied, however, that the rejection of the Militia Bill has produced a disadvantageous impression on the minds of the English people. The public cannot be expected to see that the adoption or rejection of a particular measure may sometimes turn, not so much on the merits of the measure itself as on other considerations, though Her Majesty's Government are aware that Parliamentary tactics in a free Representative Assembly not unfrequently make that appear the real issue, which is in fact only the occasion.

"They do not, therefore, infer from the rejection of this measure, that either the Canadian Ministry or the Canadian people are reluctant to make proper provision for their own defence, but they do regret that, at such a moment, both should be exposed to misconstruction of their motives and intentions, not only by the people of England, but by those of the United States.

"Her Majesty's Government disclaim both the right and the desire to interfere in the party politics of Canada, and they would evince no concern in the late change of your advisers, if it were not connected with an event which appears to impugn the patriotism of her people.

"If I urge upon you the importance of speedily resuming measures for some better military organization of the inhabitants of Canada than that which now exists, it must not be supposed that Her Majesty's Government is influenced by any particular apprehension of an attack on the Colony at the present moment, but undoubtedly the necessity for preparation, which has from time to time been urged by successive Secretaries of State, is greatly increased by the presence, for the first time on the American Continent, of a large standing army, and the unsettled condition of the neighboring States. Moreover, the growing importance of the Colony, and its attachment to free institutions, make it every day more essential that it should possess in itself, that, without which no free institutions can be secure—adequate means of self-defence. The adequacy of those means is materially influenced by the peculiar position of the country. Its extent of frontier is such that it can be safe only when its population capable of bearing arms, is ready and competent to fight. That the population is ready, no one will venture to doubt; that it cannot be competent, is no less certain, until it has received that organization, and acquired that habit of discipline, which constitute the difference between a trained force and an armed mob. The drill required in the regular army, or even in the best Volunteer Battalion, is not necessary, nor would it be possible, in a country like Canada, for so large a body of men as ought to be prepared for any emergency; but the Government should

be able to avail itself of the services of the strong and healthy portion of the male adult population at short notice, if the dangers of invasion by an already organized army are to be provided against.

"We have the opinions of the best military authorities, that no body of troops which England could send, would be able to make Canada safe without the efficient aid of the Canadian people. Not only is it impossible to send sufficient troops, but if there were four times the numbers which we are now maintaining in British North America, they could not secure the whole of the frontier. The main dependence of such a country must be upon its own people. The irregular forces which can be formed from the population, know the passes of the woods, are well acquainted with the country, its roads, its rivers, its defiles; and for defensive warfare [for aggression they will never be wanted] would be far more available than regular soldiers.

"It is not, therefore, the unwillingness, or the inability of Her Majesty's Government to furnish sufficient troops, but the uselessness of such troops without an adequate militia force, that I wish to impress upon you.

"In your despatch of the 17th May last, you informed me that there were then 14,760 Volunteers enrolled, besides others who had been more or less drilled. It is far, indeed, from my intention to discredit either the zeal or the efficiency of these Volunteers who have, I hope, greatly increased in number since the date of your despatch; but they constitute a force which cannot suffice for Canada in the event of war. They might form an admirable small contingent, but what would be required would be a large army. They might form a force stronger than is necessary in time of peace to secure internal tranquility, but would be inadequate to repel external attack in time of war. Past experience shows that no reasonable amount of encouragement can raise the number of volunteers to the required extent.

"It appears to me that the smallest number of men partially drilled, which it would be essential to provide within a given time, is 50,000. The remainder of the Militia would of course be liable to be called upon in an emergency. Perhaps the best course would be to drill every year one or more companies of each Battalion of the Sedentary Militia. In this manner the training of a large number of men might be effected, and all companies so drilled should once at least in two years, if not in each year, be exercised in Battalion drill, so as to keep up their training.

"I put forward these suggestions for the consideration of the Canadian Government and Parliament, but Her Majesty's Government have no desire to dictate as to details, or to interfere with the internal Government of the Colony. Their only object is to assist and guide its action in the matter of the Militia as to make that force efficient, at the least possible cost to the Province and to the mother country.

"The Canadian Government will doubtless be fully alive to the important fact that a well organized system of Militia will contribute much towards sustaining the high position with reference to pecuniary credit, which, in spite of its large debt, and its deficient revenue for the past few years, the Colony has hitherto held in the money markets of Europe. A country, which, however unjustly, is suspected of inability or indisposition to provide for its own defence, does not in the present circumstances of America, offer a tempting field for investment in public funds, or the outlay of private capital. Men question the stable condition of affairs in a land which is not competent to protect itself.

"It may no doubt be argued on the other hand, that the increased charge of a Militia would diminish rather than enlarge the credit of the colony. I am convinced that such would not be the case if steps were taken for securing a basis of taxation sounder in itself than the almost exclusive reliance on Customs duties. It is my belief that a step in this direction would not only supply funds for the Militia but would remove all apprehension which exists as to the resources of the Colony.

"Whatever other steps may be taken for the improved organization of the Militia, it appears to Her Majesty's Government to be of essential importance that its administration and the supply of funds for its support, should be exempt from the disturbing action of ordinary politics. Unless this be done, there can be no confidence that in the appointment of officers and in other matters of a purely military character, no other object than the efficiency of the force is kept in view. Were it not that it might fairly be considered too great an interference with the privileges of the representatives of the people, I should be inclined to suggest that the charge for the militia, or a certain fixed portion of it, should be defrayed from the Consolidated Fund of Canada, or voted for a period of three or five years.

"It has further occurred to me that the whole of the British Provinces on the continent of North America, have in this matter of defence common interests and common duties. Is it impossible that with the free consent of each of these Colonies, one uniform system of militia training and organization should be introduced into all of them? The numbers of men to be raised and trained in each would have to be fixed, and the expenses of the whole would be defrayed from a common fund, contributed in fair proportion by each of the Colonies. If the Governor General of Canada were Commander-in-Chief of the whole, the Lieutenant Governors of the other Colonies would act as Generals of Division under him, but it would be essential that an Adjutant General of the whole force, approved by Her Majesty's Government, should move to and fro, as occasion might require, so as to give uniformity to the training of the whole, and cohesion to the force itself.

"As such a scheme would affect more than one Colony, it must, of course, emanate from the Secretary of State, but Her Majesty's Government would not entertain it unless they were convinced that it would be acceptable both to the people of Canada and to the other Colonies, and they desire to know in the first instance, in what light any such plan would be viewed by the members of your Executive Council. I understand that the Lieutenant Governors of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, availing themselves of the leave of absence lately accorded to them, intend to meet you in Quebec in the course of the ensuing month. This visit will afford you a good opportunity for consulting them upon this important question.

"The political union of the North American Colonies has often been discussed. The merits of that measure, and the difficulties in the way of its accomplishment have been well considered, but none of the objections which oppose it seem to impede a union for defence. This matter is one in which all the Colonies have interests common with each other and identical with the policy of England.

"I conclude by again urging upon you the necessity for an early decision upon this most important question. I should hear with very great satisfaction that your Government had decided upon advising you to summon the Parliament of Canada to meet at an

early period, so that the winter shall not pass over without obtaining from the Legislature such powers as may enable you to commence a well arranged Military organization of the Provinces, and prepare for such emergencies as, though they cannot be accurately foreseen, it must be evident to everybody, may possibly arise, and are at present very inadequately provided for. It is in time of peace that preliminary measures of defence should be perfected, so that in the event of war they may be found so far ready as to ensure that an enemy shall not obtain a footing in the country, before aid is forthcoming from other portions of the Empire.

" I have, &c.,

" [Signed,] NEWCASTLE.

" Governor Viscount Monck, &c., &c., &c."

Lord Monck, whose astuteness and ability none can doubt, feeling, we must suppose, that the above despatch was in part aimed at him, for his apparent want of vigor, prepared the following Memorandum, which we lay before our readers, with the introductory correspondence :—

(Copy No. 4.)

" GOVERNMENT HOUSE, Quebec, January 9th, 1863.

" MY LORD DUKE,—I have the honor to transmit for your Grace's information a copy of a memorandum which I have thought right to place before the Executive Council of this Province on the subject of the Militia organization, together with a note from me to Mr. Macdonald, the Prime Minister, when sending him this memorandum.

" Early in the autumn the Governor appointed Lieut. Col. Wiley to proceed through the Province and make an inspection and confidential report on the state of the Active Force. This inspection occupied a considerable time, and the memorandum which I have now the honor to enclose to your Grace was written by me on the report made by Lieut. Col. Wiley.

" It is right I should add that the numbers of the Active Force have been largely increased since the time of Lieut. Col. Wiley's inspection, and that they at present amount to more than 18,000 men.

" I have, &c.,

" [Signed,] MONCK.

" His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, K.G., &c., &c., &c.

" QUEBEC, December 17th, 1862.

" MY DEAR MR. MACDONALD,—I send you some observations which have occurred to me in connection with Lieut. Col. Wiley's report on the state of the Active Force.

" I should be glad that you would bring these views before your colleagues in order that you and they may consider before the meeting of Parliament, whether you would think it well to introduce any measure to correct the defects of the present Militia Law.

" Believe me, &c.,

" [Signed,] MONCK.

" The Honorable J. S. Macdonald, &c., &c., &c.

MEMORANDUM.

"Lieutenant Colonel Wiley having concluded his inspection of the Active Force of the Province and completed his reports upon it, the Governor General wishes to lay before the Ministers of the Crown the considerations which have been suggested to his mind by a careful perusal of Lieut. Col. Wiley's report, as well as his views on the general organization of the Provincial Militia.

"The Governor General desires in the first place to express his satisfaction at the excellent spirit displayed generally by the officers and men constituting the Active Force, and at the large proportion of the nominal strength of the force which turned out for inspection by Lieut. Col. Wiley at very short notice.

"The total strength, on the rolls, of the force inspected by Lieut. Col. Wiley was 684 officers and 9526 non-commissioned officers and men. Of this number, 476 officers and 7207 non-commissioned officers and men turned out for inspection.

"The Governor General does not intend to enter into the question of the efficiency in drill or discipline of the several corps constituting the Active Force, although Lieut. Col. Wiley has in every case reported in favour of them, and in many cases favourably on these points, because the period is so recent at which any sufficient means of instruction has been placed within reach of the members of the Active Force, that it would be most unwise to censure them for any shortcomings in this respect, and the Governor General feels certain that they will generally and with diligence avail themselves of the opportunities now offered to them to perfect themselves in military training.

"The Governor General desires most especially to guard himself against the supposition that it is his wish to say one word in disparagement of the conduct of the Active Force. On the contrary he considers the members of that body worthy of the highest praise. They have voluntarily come forward with very scant encouragement from the authorities, have in a large measure contributed their money, and given, what in many instances was even more valuable, their time, in order to qualify themselves for the defence of their country if the necessity for defending it should ever arise.

"But there is a great and evident difference between discussing the *conduct* of the Volunteer Force, for which the members of that body are responsible, and the *system* under which they are embodied, for which they are not and cannot be held accountable.

"The conviction has been forced on the mind of the Governor General by all the facts which have come to his knowledge during his residence in the Province, and has been confirmed by the contents of Lieut. Col. Wiley's reports that the present Active Force organization, however valuable as a supplement, can never be made effective or sufficient for the purpose to which it is now applied as the *sole* organization for defence.

"This is shown more particularly in the composition of the force as detailed in Lieut. Col. Wiley's reports.

"At the time of Lieut. Col. Wiley's inspection the nominal rolls included, as already stated, 684 officers and 9526 non-commissioned officers and men, of this number 495 officers and 7705 non-commissioned officers and men belonged to the seven cities of Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton and London, leaving 189 officers and 1821 men the contribution of the remainder of Canada towards the number of the force!

"The population of Canada by the late census was.....	2,506,755
"The aggregate population of the above seven cities at the same time was	245,316
"Difference.....	2,261,439

"The contribution of which population to the Volunteer Force, as seen above, was 189 officers and 1821 non-commissioned officers and men ! thus shewing that the main body of the volunteers are drawn from the population of the cities and large towns, and that the agricultural portion of the community scarcely contributes at all to its ranks.

"It is no reflection either on the loyalty or the warlike spirit of the agricultural population that this should be the case ; it might have been expected from the nature of the volunteer organization.

"The creation of a Volunteer Force such as that existing in Canada implies in the population amongst which it obtains, a facility for meeting together in considerable numbers and a habit of acting in common for the attainment of specified objects. These conditions are found to exist amongst the inhabitants of cities and large towns, but are wanting in the rural and sparsely inhabited districts of the Province, and it was therefore only to be expected that a system of this sort would break down when sought to be applied to a population whose circumstances did not favor its success.

"The Governor General sees no reason to expect that these reasons will not operate to give to any additions which may be made to the number of the Active Force, the same character as that which attaches to the force now in existence.

"But it needs only a very cursory perusal of the Militia Law to see that in the scheme which was embodied in that law, the institution of the Active Force (or Volunteers) was never meant to supersede the organization of the population generally for the purpose of defence. The Volunteers were merely meant to be Corps d'Elite, to the expense of whose training in a limited degree the Exchequer of the Province contributed, but the creation of that force was entirely extra the general organization intended to be called into existence by that Act, and it is most unfair to the Volunteer system and to the men who compose the force to expect that it will perform functions beyond its capacity and which it was never originally intended to discharge.

"It is obvious that there are two distinct questions involved in the consideration of defensive preparations.

"1st. That of *organization*, the solution of which ought to give a plan which would include the population generally.

"That of the *number* of men who should, at any given time, be armed, clothed and drilled.

"The Governor General proposes to discuss the subject in this division. What is required in the preparation for defence, by its own people, of a country circumstanced like Canada, is a system which will create and maintain in time of peace an *organization* of the whole mass of the population capable of bearing arms in such a manner as to provide that on the occurrence of an emergency, any given number of men may be, at short notice, turned out for service with their appropriate officers in Battalion divisions.

"To illustrate what is meant the plan should work so that at the annual muster the officers and men should be so arranged in battalions and companies, that if an occasion for the

services of any battalion or any number of battalions arose, the Commander-in-Chief would only have to issue an order to the Lieut. Col. to desire that his battalion should parade for service and that every officer and man should know his place in the battalion.

“ Any scheme which does not accomplish this result is useless.

“ It is essential in fairness to the people at large, that, if actual service be required the population should be called upon to serve by means of the supposed organization in such an order as will, from the age and circumstances of those called upon, cause the smallest amount of general inconvenience.

“ The preparatory organization which it is proper to create in time of peace against the prospect of war should further contemplate the means of supplying the casualties of actual service by the provision of a reserve force.

“ The ideas here put forward have no claim to originality. They are, in fact, those upon which the organization of the Sedentary Militia of the Province under the present law was based :—for,

“ 1. It includes the entire population of the country capable of bearing arms.

“ 2. It provides that the men shall be called out for active service in an order regulated by age and circumstances.

“ 3. It professes to provide a reserve force to meet the casualties of actual war.

“ But while the present system of Sedentary Militia combines these necessary elements of a sound scheme, their operation is effectually neutralized, and the entire plan rendered worthless in practice by the mode in which the principles on which it is based are applied.

“ By the law enacting the present system, the Province was ordered to be divided into “ Military Districts ;” these again into “ Regimental Districts ;” the “ Regimental Districts ” into “ Battalion Districts ;” and the “ Battalion Districts ” were to be further subdivided into “ Company Districts ;” each Company District including a population of men over eighteen and under sixty years of age sufficient to form a company of Sedentary Militia, with its officers, and so on upwards in the scale.

“ In this arrangement the “ Military District ” might be supposed to represent a Division, the “ Regimental District ” a Brigade, and the “ Battalion District,” as its name implies, a Battalion.

“ The territorial nature of the arrangement so far as regarded “ Military Districts ” and “ Regimental Districts,” was perhaps as good as any other that could have been adopted, but when the same principle was applied to the Battalion, the unit of the army when embodied, it rendered the whole plan unworkable for any practical operation, because it is obvious that if a Battalion of the Sedentary Militia were called out for active service, the whole male population under sixty years of age of the district of which it was the battalion would be exhausted, to the exoneration of the inhabitants of all the surrounding districts of the country.

“ It would besides have been in direct violation of another portion of the law which enacts that the whole population shall be divided into three classes, according to age and circumstances, namely: “ 1st class service men,” “ 2nd class service men ” and “ Reserve men,” and that in case of need the people shall be called out for service in this order.

"As therefore a Battalion of the Sedentary Militia from being attached to a territorial division of the country, included within its ranks promiscuously, "1st class service men," "2nd class service men" and "reserve men," it is obvious it could not be called out for service as a Battalion without violating this provision of the law.

"It is therefore evident that in consequence of making the Battalions of Sedentary Militia, so to speak, *adscripti glebor*, the whole machinery of the law was rendered practically useless, and if war actually occurred, this machinery would afford no assistance whatever in the creation of a Canadian army for actual service.

"The whole process of embodying the "first class service men" in battalions, appointing the officers and making the other necessary preliminary arrangements for service, would have to be gone through on the breaking out of hostilities precisely in the same manner as if the Sedentary Militia organization had never existed.

"The Governor General is desirous to impress these considerations connected with the general organization of the people of Canada, and the manifest inutility, for any practical purpose, of the present system, on the minds of the members of the Administration, with a view to the remedy of these defects, by legislation, in the approaching session of Parliament.

"There remains still to be considered in connection with the facts disclosed in Lieut. Col. Wiley's report, the second question as to the number of men whom it is expedient to arm, clothe and discipline at the present time.

"The nominal roll of the Volunteers at the period of Lieut. Col. Wiley's inspection, contained a total, as already stated, of 684 officers and 9226 non-commissioned officers and men.

"This number has since been increased to the nominal strength of about 921 officers and 15,005 non-commissioned officers and men.

"It has been already shewn, as might have been expected, that the force at the time of Lieut. Col. Wiley's inspection was mainly drawn from the inhabitants of the cities and large towns, and as the causes which produced this result are permanent in their operation there is no reason to expect that the present or future additions to this force will be derived from the rural districts.

"A Commission composed of military officers of high reputation and great experience, was appointed this year by the Governor General to make a confidential report on the military defence of Canada.

"The attention of this Commission was naturally directed, amongst other considerations, to the support which the population of Canada should give to Her Majesty's troops in the defence of the Province in the event of war, and the deliberate opinion of the members of that Commission was that the contingent of Canadians under such circumstances, should not be, including reserves, less than 150,000 men.

"Assuming that an effective plan for the general organization of the people were in existence, and that the machinery were created by which, at short notice, the reserves could be placed on foot, the Governor General has reason to believe that if one-third of the above number of men were at the present time organized, clothed and even partially drilled, the military authorities would, in a professional point of view, be satisfied that enough had been done to secure the safety of the Province from foreign attack.

"The present volunteer force might be adopted as part of this number and the quota might be filled up by calling for volunteers from the different battalions of first class service men, particularly in the rural districts, as soon as these should have been formed, but this number of men should be kept prepared, *in every respect*, to turn out at a moment's notice.

"The Governor General has no scruple in pressing thus strongly upon the members of the Administration the necessity for the suggested improvement in the general organization of the people, and the propriety of largely increasing the number of men under drill, because the former change will cost nothing, and the Governor General has lately submitted to the Cabinet a plan by which, if successful, the latter object would be accomplished without any considerable addition to the expenditure of the Province.

"QUEBEC, 17th December, 1862."

CHAPTER 16.

The art of war is progressive—Consequences of remaining as we are.

The art of war—to use the recognised term—is one of those arts which time has seen by turns improve, stand still, retrograde and again take a sudden advance side by side with the general civilisation to which its condition seems bound. The most recent events in the history of the world give us no hope of the speedy realisation of that Utopia, not long since dreamed of, where it shall be unknown. And if it be acknowledged as a necessity of the existing state of things, its progress must follow closely that of other great branches of knowledge which affect the general good. For, viewed in its highest aspect, it is but the application of a nation's strength to the protection of the commerce, freedom, and order of its citizens; and the abuse of warlike power for the mere purpose of aggression, is but a proof that to be independent it is necessary to avoid that decay of military spirit and resources which may invite attack.

Unless some great and immediate change takes place in the military education of the Canadian people, we may in all seriousness confidently expect, before long, the appearance in the *Official Gazette* of an order similar to the following, which is altered from the *London Punch* :

REGULATIONS FOR THE CANADIAN MILITIA,

MILITIA GENERAL ORDERS,

Headquarters, Ottawa, ——— 1875

General Order :

Her Majesty's Government of Canada having decided to refuse the customary grant for the militia, unless that force is put in a proper state of efficiency, the following regulations are to be observed by officers commanding the Active Militia of Canada. It must, however, be understood that these regulations having been drawn up to meet the present exigencies of the case, will be liable to alteration and modification as the force increases in numbers and efficiency.

1. The proportionate numbers of officers and men should be so regulated that the number of officers should in no case exceed that of privates.

2. Strong regiments should be equalised so that there should be only three privates to each officer retained on the regimental books. The remainder should be drafted to weaker regiments, so that their establishments may be completed.

3. It having been considered desirable for the present to appoint no militia officer to a grade senior to that of Lieutenant Colonel, applications for the *bâton* of Field Marshal can no longer be received by this Department.

4. Regiments having regimental bands should (when feasible) maintain an establishment of two musicians, of which the Drum or Bugle Major may be one.

5. A Sergeant Major (when harnessed to the regimental water cart) should never be required to carry more than one of the colors.

6. Annexed to this circular are forms of requisition for arms, which should be properly filled and returned to this Department as quickly as possible. Until further orders, twelve rifles and eighteen bayonets will be allowed to every private, so that the estimates may be adjusted to the satisfaction of the public.

7. Until regiments are recruited to their full strength, squares may be formed in circles, according to the rules laid down in the old *Irish Field Exercises*, part II, edition of 1814, a copy of which work is enclosed for the information of officers commanding battalions of infantry.

8. In cases where regiments are weak, a prisoner may be used as a sentry to guard his own cell, but this practice is only to be resorted to on occasions of emergency, and when an outbreak is imminent from within, at other times the cells will be left unguarded. This regulation will also be found in the *Irish Drill Book*, to which reference has already been made.

9. Squads should be drilled in English or French according to the prevalent

languages of the men. Recruits who can speak neither English nor French, should be drafted into the band, and should be frequently encouraged by their officers to express their sentiments on the trombone, while they are engaged in learning the language regimentally in use. By this means a thorough mastery of the instrument specified will be gradually attained.

"10. Lastly, officers commanding regiments are warned against permitting any company drill or other exercise taking place within view of the territory of the United States of America, as such measures executed by such soldiers, would be calculated to cause alarm among the citizens of that Republic, with whom it is advisable that the inhabitants of Canada should remain on terms of cordial friendship.

By command,

Old Fogey Barrack Square,

Field-Marshal commanding the Militia of the Dominion, and Adjutant-General.

CHAPTER 17

When war will cease.

When and how is the world to be cured of its passion for the game of war? As to the *when*, we may safely say it is not yet come. In her voyage down the great stream, our world has not yet floated into that spacious and blessed Pacific, where birds sit brooding on the charmed wave. We fear we cannot yet dispense with our cartridges. We cannot afford to beat all our swords into plough-shares. But we firmly believe that we are on our way to this, and that the peace-men are doing much good. The idea of peace, as a thing quite practicable, is gaining the ear of the public, and from thence it will find its way into its brain, and down to its heart, and thence out in act by its will. As to the *how*, chiefly in three ways: *First*, By the commercial principles of profit and loss, of a heavy balance against war coming to influence the transactions of nations, as it has long done those of private and social life—free trade, mutual connexion and inter-

course, the proof, publicly brought out, that the interest of the body politic is also that of every one of its members, and the good of the whole, that also specially of each part—the adoption, not merely in theory, but in practice, of a law of nations, by the great leading powers, and the submitting disputes regarding territory, commerce, and all the questions arising out of active multifarious dealings among the nations, to reason and fixed rules, and settling them by the arbitration of intelligent, humane men, instead of by the discharge of a park of artillery. *Secondly*, by the art of war being by scientific discovery so advanced in the degree and in the immediateness of its destructiveness, so likely utterly to destroy one of the sides, or, better still, both, that it would come to be as much in reality abolished among well-bred, enlightened nations, as the duel would be among civilized men, if it were certain that one or both would be extinguished on the spot. “Satisfaction” would not be so often demanded by nations or individuals, and dissatisfaction not so often expressed, were this accomplished. *Thirdly*, and chiefly, by nations not only becoming shrewder and more truly aware of their own interests, or such “dead shots” as to make the issue of any war rapid and fatal, but most of all by their becoming, in the only true sense, better—more under the habitual influence of genuine virtue, more informed with the knowledge, and the fear and the love of God and of His laws.

Colonel R. P. Anderson, 34th Bengal Infantry, in his late work before cited, entitled “Victories and Defeats,” puts almost the same ideas into terse and soldierly language :—

“War,” he writes, “is a malady which is to be cured like many the physician deals with—by *mind*. If rifled guns carry miles, it may be found prudent to fight with smaller armies. The smaller nations then, may yet be a match for the greatest, in the same way as in our navy, 4 huge guns do now instead of 120 small ones. In other words, as science progresses it will be no more wonderful for the meanest nations to command respect and assist in upholding the general peace of the world, than it is to see huge railway vans raised by the mere pressure of the handle of a powerful machine. Towards this all is tending. ‘As the body has many members, but all have not the same office,’ so nations are all members of the body of humanity, working their own ways, doing the particular work that God has required of them.”

" One is the 'head' and the other the 'legs'; both acting apart for a certain period to be
 " brought finally together. The gradual improvement in fire-arms is acting in this direc-
 " tion ; each ruler will learn to cultivate friendship and peace, and those who rebel will
 " be overpowered, or forced to submit. There is evidence of this in the 'balance of
 " 'power'—a principle which is still in its youth, or, perhaps, approaching its manhood ;
 " it will arrive at its full maturity when civilization has reached that point where man-
 " kind acknowledges that war and peace, although extremes, have met, and that discor-
 " dant notes aptly arranged produce harmony. How can we think otherwise when we
 " find that the engines of war are now becoming so terrific that their very power
 " to destroy life is an indication that they are ultimately intended to *preserve*
 " it? The fact is evident that man was made a free agent so that he might work
 " out his own destiny. What is seen in a school is but the type of what is done in
 " the world ; a lot of boys fight away till they find that it is better to live in peace.
 " The human family has been brought into collision, as nations, at different ages or
 " periods ; and generations were required to make such a huge school fully aware of
 " the advantages of peace. As moral training brings boys to their senses, so will the in-
 " tellectual portion of humanity, which rapid civilization is now making so formidable,
 " come forward to insist upon peace being upheld. As time draws on, science—or intel-
 " lect developed—will give the preponderance to the thinkers of society : invention will
 " make up for superiority of numbers, and thus the opposition of the ruder members who
 " delight in war and violence will be checked. Truth may be compared to a permanent
 " perfume. Fresh from the scent shop it is of course more perceptible to our senses than
 " after long exposure to the air ; but like the soul of man it retains its innate worth long
 " after the body has evaporated, or disappeared from our gaze. The action of an atmos-
 " phere of falsehood may partly deprive truth of its most powerful influences, still it re-
 " mains immortal, and can never be quite annihilated. It may be, and often is, hidden
 " like the sun, only to burst forth with redoubled splendour. 'Steady progress' is the
 " very opposite of 'go-a-head' haste. The first is based on a previous calm and dispa-
 " sionate investigation of all new theories or inventions ere we adopt them in room of
 " antiquated systems. On the other hand, the latter may tempt its votaries to adopt all
 " novel ideas and schemes too hurriedly, and without mature thought or deliberation. It
 " consequently breaks down. Truth is to be found by watchful care and by using our
 " powers of judging by analogy. It is the precious metal mixed up with dross, and to see
 " it in its beauty the mass must be melted down. The time draws on when there will be
 " the 'drawn battle between barbarism and civilisation' ; the two gladiators well
 " matched, will shake hands and retire for ever from the 'arena of war' ; then will be
 " fulfilled these words, 'when men shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their
 " 'spears into pruning hooks ; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall
 " 'they learn war any more.' A millennium of peace will then ensue such as we are
 " taught in our Bibles to believe."

In taking leave of our readers, we can assure them that we
 have for many years conscientiously labored in the cause of their
 defence, and have in these pages recommended what our experi-

ence has led us to believe to be the best system of organization for Canada ; and, in concluding, we will use words of a writer on the same subject :—

“ I can only venture to express a hope that those who are cognizant of the subject will criticize it freely, adopting or rejecting the whole or portions of it as they may consider most applicable for the good of the militia, and for the well-being of the Dominion.”

By adopting a well-considered militia system, we need have no further occasion for calling out the militia for actual service. By nurturing a nation of skilled and hardy riflemen, Canada would render herself impregnable against attack ; and as for a war of offence, we hope that future historians may be proudly able to write of this country as Southey did [and any one might do now] of England :—

“ It is something to see in the counsels of this Kingdom a plain, upright, unimpeachable system of policy towards other countries, proclaimed and pursued, in the consciousness of honor, and rectitude, and strength. There is hope for the world as well as for ourselves, when a nation, which is second to no other in resources and in renown, sees clearly that it needs no aggrandizement, abstains from all aggression, and disclaims ambition, that alone excepted of maintaining the station to which its own exertions, and the blessing of God, have raised it.”

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.

