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NOTES FOR A SPEECH  
BY THE HONOURABLE GERALD REGAN,  
MINISTER OF LABOUR,  
AT THE CLOSING OF THE  
1981 MEETING OF THE PUGWASH CONFERENCE  
ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS,  
BANFF,  
SEPTEMBER 2, 1981

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The Annual Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs has made a notable contribution over the years to discussion and understanding between scientists and others of different societies on some of the fundamental questions involved in the maintenance of world peace. I welcome this opportunity to address this closing session of your conference in Banff, especially since it marks your return to Canada after an absence of 23 years. This occasion also enables me to renew my connections with the Pugwash movement which go back to the time when I was Premier of Nova Scotia from 1970-78 and used to go to speak to the Canadian-American Pugwash Conferences at the founding site in Pugwash, Nova Scotia.

It is relevant to recall that, when the first Pugwash conferences were convened at the Eaton Lodge in 1957 and 1958, there was a need to open channels of communication between the West and the East. Although more channels of communication exist today than 23 years ago, we must ask ourselves whether they are being used as effectively as they might be. Conferences such as this offer the opportunity for concerned scientists to discuss ways in which they may make realistic proposals which would assist their governments to move forward toward mutually acceptable arms control and disarmament agreements. Indeed the presence at this conference of so many distinguished scientists from the developing countries underlines the need for North-South as well as East-West dialogue.

It is important now, as it was 23 years ago, for scientists from all over the world to get together for discussion because of your concern over the risks entailed for humanity in an unbridled arms race, and the enormous expenditure of resources on armaments, resources which could be better spent for development and social objectives. The Canadian Government strongly supports the Pugwash objective of discussion among concerned scientists of all nations of the issues involved in maintaining world peace and security and pressing forward with international development. It

has been glad to make a contribution to the holding of this conference in Banff and is pleased that the Government of Alberta has done so too.

Although other commitments have prevented me from attending your meetings I have been glad to receive a report on the highlights of your discussions which I understand have been fruitful.

In considering the invitation to speak at your closing session I thought that you would wish me to say something about Canadian policies on arms control and disarmament. I suppose that in holding your conferences in different countries the Pugwash movement has the opportunity to listen to many national viewpoints.

The theme of your meeting, "The Search for Peace in a World in Crisis", is not new -- unfortunately -- although the crisis we face is perhaps of a new dimension. From the perspective of the Canadian Government, the search for peace is inextricably linked to the search for international security. I am pleased to note that this has been one of the major agenda subjects of this conference.

The first sentence of the Charter of the United Nations states that its purpose is the maintenance of international peace and security. If we acknowledge that there can be no lasting peace without a condition of security, what then are the prerequisites of security?

In my Government's view, real security rests on a foundation of three elements. The first, and the most basic, is the ability of each government to defend its citizens. For Canada this means the capacity, in partnership with our allies, to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to defend ourselves. Until the arrangements for maintaining international peace and security contained in the U.N. Charter can be made effective, Canada will rely on the regional collective security arrangements of NATO. But, in spite of the fact that the system of mutual deterrence has kept man, for over 36 years, from using again his most terrible weapon, this first element of security is woefully incomplete without a second: that of arms control and

disarmament. The control of armaments and their reduction is what I wish to concentrate on in these remarks, but not before I touch on the third element of security, that of the peaceful settlement of disputes. This is an area which, like arms control and disarmament, has not evolved in sophistication to the same degree as the technology of armaments. The use of the U.N. to settle disputes, the International Court of Justice, the process of arbitration or mediation by these bodies or other third parties; these means are used but not to the degree they should be. In addition, it is an important plank of Canadian foreign policy that the international community must address the economic and ideological differences which are often underlying causes of international disputes.

Although there is not sufficient time to review the full range of Canadian policies and activities in arms control and disarmament, I should like to highlight the main elements. The first is our belief that there is no substitute for the painstaking negotiation of verifiable agreements by those parties at risk of conflict. I do not believe that unilateral disarmament is a viable option. Experience has shown that it is difficult to conduct meaningful negotiations when an imbalance in forces exists. A state or an alliance which perceives itself to be in an inferior position has no interest in limitations that would codify its inferiority. A nation or an alliance which sees itself to be in a superior position has no incentive to limit its own forces in exchange for limitations of those on the other side, unless that side has clearly shown the capacity and resolve to restore the balance.

I said that agreements must be verifiable. Verification is not a tactic to prevent success in negotiations; more than ever before, it is a prerequisite for their success. Each party to the agreement must have confidence that the other party or parties are abiding by its terms. Canada does not insist on absolute verifiability, which in most cases is unobtainable. Each state must be prepared to take certain risks in the interest of progress in controlling the level and sophistication of armaments. But if an agreement is not considered to be adequately verifiable,

it will be the cause of further tensions, not an instrument for their reduction.

It follows from the requirement for adequate verification that a degree of openness must be agreed upon. Openness is not only necessary to permit verification, it is necessary to build and maintain confidence, an essential ingredient to the arms control and disarmament process. This call for openness is not an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, it is rather an attempt to dispel suspicion and mistrust, which are encouraged by tight secrecy in all military-related subjects.

If one accepts that the negotiation of verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements is the most effective route to achieving lower levels of armaments with undiminished security, which agreements should be the goal? The Canadian Government believes that negotiation related to nuclear weapons should be given priority, and I would like to use this occasion to reaffirm the validity of one of the main proposals put forward by Prime Minister Trudeau at the first special session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978.

The Prime Minister expressed his particular concern about the "technological impulse that continues to lie behind the development of strategic nuclear weaponry". This, he said, governs "national policies (that) are pre-empted for long periods ahead"; current intentions are inferred "from military postures that may be the result of decisions taken a decade earlier". Such considerations, he said, suggest "that stable ... deterrence ... the basis for the preservation of peace and security between the nuclear powers and their allies today ... remains an inadequate concept".

He then proposed a "strategy of suffocation", the main elements of which are: a comprehensive test ban treaty, a ban on the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles, a ban on production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes, and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems. These elements were not new to the arms control discussions. What was new was the concept of their interaction in combination to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons among heretofore non-nuclear weapons states or the nuclear weapons states themselves.

Three years later the concept of the strategy of suffocation remains valid. I therefore take this opportunity to underline the importance the Canadian Government attaches to this strategy, and in particular, to an early resumption of the SALT\* process, which is a pre-requisite for progress on the elements of the strategy.

In addition to the resumption of the SALT process, Canadian priorities are: the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; the conclusion of a ban on chemical weapons, the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and negotiations to limit and reduce conventional weapons. These priorities will guide Canadian preparations for the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament next year in which Canada intends to take an active part.

The Canadian Government believes that the Second Special Session should review the implementation of the Final Document of the First Session, and should give renewed impetus to its implementation by suggesting new measures, approaches and procedures. In the lead-up to the Session we hope for citizen participation in the preparation of realistic proposals for positions and initiatives to be taken. Members of the Pugwash movement will undoubtedly wish to use the on-coming session as a catalyst for their efforts.

Ladies and gentlemen, we undoubtedly agree that the first objective in attempting to limit nuclear and other weapons is to lessen the possibility of war. But apart from the disastrous effects of a nuclear war, the fact that five to six per cent of world global output is presently allocated to military purposes must be a powerful incentive to people of goodwill to redirect these resources to social and economic development, especially of the developing countries. Not only for our own security but also to relieve the suffering of the world's poorer peoples, Canada will therefore press on in its efforts toward progress in limiting armaments and armies. But efforts of governments depend, to a large degree, on individuals like yourselves, who devote their energy and time in the common search for solutions. I therefore wish to encourage you to continue in your own efforts whose importance, given the magnitude of the problem, cannot be underestimated.