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No. 53/30 Text of an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, to the Harvard University Alumni Association, Cambridge, Mass., on Thursday, June 11, 1953.

... When he was a young man, Francis Parkman, whose life work made such a great contribution to the history both of Canada and the United States, said that it was his ambition to write the history of the forest. This task would have been an easy one compared with that of any conscientious historian of our age who wished to pick his way through the wilderness of tangled conspiracies in our contemporary international forest. We live, indeed, in what might with some truth be called an age of conspiracy.

We are not likely soon to forget the plot hatched in the beer cellars in Munich, which grew to such monstrous size that it threatened to cast a blight over the whole world; until it was finally reduced to the cramped bunker in Berlin, where Hitler intrigued to the sordid end with his doomed and ludicrous court.

There is today also the Communist conspiracy, even more dangerous because less hysterical, which by its alliance with Soviet imperialism, and by its secret operations throughout the whole world, is the cause of so many of our present difficulties; the source of so much of our fear.

The story of these conspiracies would bulk large in any history of our times. Future historians also will have to record with regret that some of those who have gone about to eliminate the real menace of the Communist conspiracy have done so by methods which weaken our democratic concept of law and justice; which, by spreading needless division and distrust, have threatened to destroy that feeling of community on which free society must be based. These methods play into the hands of the Communists by giving some of them, the more dangerous because they have been able to conceal their purposes and affiliations, a chance to pose as victims of persecution and hysteria. They become a kind of conspiracy themselves.

Opposed to all these conspiracies which draw their strength from dark places, there is, however, the constructive co-operation of tolerant and enlightened persons, working together in societies of which this university is a heartening and illustrious example.

No one on this occasion and at Harvard could be unmindful of the debt which freedom - personal and political - owes to the belief that the pursuit of knowledge is good of itself and must be continued at any price, wherever it leads. We meet here in the shade of those learned and wise men who believed that, subject though it is, and always has been, to its own torments, such pursuit is our main source of progress and achievement. They dedicated their lives to the proposition that reason can unravel the knots and difficulties caused by the increasing intricacy of social and economic organization and by the bewildering advance of science. They insisted, moreover, that tradition is the starting point for orderly progress; that without it our life would lose much of its savor and our political institutions much of their stability.

It is hardly necessary for me, therefore, in this place, to elaborate on the duty of universities to foster exact learning and to promote free and unprejudiced enquiry. But I would like to say a little about their duty to encourage tolerance and magnanimity, in public, as well as in private life. There can be no quarter in hunting down those who abuse the liberty granted by our society in order to subvert it. They must expect to be punished under the laws they have broken; and they must be prevented from holding positions of trust which they could use for disloyal ends. But to say that is not enough. Man's powers for good and evil are too strangely intertwined for his quality to be decided merely by actions with which the law can deal or solely in matters of which the state can take cognizance.

More than one hundred years ago Herman Melville wrote, "Knaves, fools, and murderers there may be; men may have mean and meagre faces; but man, in the ideal, is so noble and so sparkling, such a grand and glowing creature, that over any ignominious blemish in him, all his fellows should run to throw their costliest robes." Our public life would be dangerously impoverished if we were ever completely to lose sight of this generosity and this humility of mind. It is alarmingly easy to do so today, when hard and sharp exposure, at times indecent exposure, by camera, screen or printed word, is not only exhibiting but often manufacturing blemishes.

The world, being what it is, will always be a place where those in whom the spirit burns brightest will often feel themselves outnumbered and ignored. Nor are such rare persons to be found only in our universities. Melville learned more on the whaler in which he sailed to the South Seas than he perhaps could have learned even at Harvard College. Completely unlettered individuals, as we all know, can, by the grace of God, be wiser than most professors. I hope that this is a comfort to those who have graduated without "laude". In few parts of the world has that fact received more effective and practical recognition than at Harvard, where education from the earliest days has been so broadly based, without unnecessary dependence on forms or formulae.

There are many contributions, apart from the pursuit of knowledge, and the cultivation of magnanimity to be made by a university community such as this and which are vital if we are to survive successfully our present trials. One of them is to foster what has always

seemed to me to be a special quality of American thought, when it is at its best. It is the power to be conscious both of the reality of evil and danger, and yet reject a cynical or even a tragic view of life. Nowhere more than in the United States have those two attitudes been held in balance. I think, for example, of William James, who returned from his researches into the areas of unreason with his confidence in the constructive powers of intelligence unimpaired. I think of Mr. Justice Holmes, who insisted grimly all through his life that "Every society is founded on the death of men"; who is said to have kept in his cupboard until the day he died the tunic in which he was wounded at Balls Bluff; and who yet was prepared to sanction what seemed to him the most visionary social experiments. Today, although recognizing the grim aspects of human and political life, we need, as never before, to be able to see beyond them with courage and with obstinate confidence in the future; to keep our vision steady and to keep it true.

I venture to refer to this fine and enviable quality of American thought and life because this is a moment when it is needed, perhaps as never before, in the direction of the policy of this country. It is, I hope, not inappropriate for an outsider - even one so close as a Canadian - to refer to American policy - and actions - because they largely determine the fate of all the rest of us.

This country, devoted to the ideals of peace, progress and freedom under the law, has not sought (but thank God has not refused) the leadership of the free world - a leadership which has indeed been thrust upon it by the hard and inescapable facts of power and position. It is moreover discharging this responsibility in close cooperation with other peoples who share the same ideals and are working towards the same goals; especially the peoples of the Atlantic and Western Europe.

Leadership, by a pistol at the back of sullen and forced allies is one thing. Leadership of free and democratic peoples, who can be convinced but not coerced, is something else.

Such leadership, I suggest, has never been tried, let alone succeeded in circumstances such as those in which we live today, when scientific material progress has far outstripped social, political and moral development; when the plain and challenging facts of interdependence on a shrinking globe make solitary progress almost as difficult and unrewarding as solitary confinement.

Kipling, in a more spacious, free-for-all age, could write:

"Down to Gehenna and up to the throne
He travels fastest who travels alone".

It might be argued that in 1953 this motto applies only to the first part of the journey. To reach the right goals we must advance together.

A coalition such as ours, however, can only move together on the basis of full consultation and agreement on basic policies and objectives. It must combine freedom

of the parts with concerted and effective action by the whole. This is a terribly difficult combination to achieve and it can be brought about only by working out policies together on the principle of give-and-take. Concession and compromise, which we have learned to apply, however grudgingly at times - in domestic affairs as essential for freedom and order.

In this spirit, the leader of the coalition, the United States, has had to accept - and it is not always easy - some of the penalties as well as the privileges of leadership. These include being misunderstood and criticised, being urged to go forward by one and asked to hold back by another. All this requires the exercise of patience and tolerance and magnanimity about which I have been talking; and an understanding of the fact that pulling the eagle's feathers is one of the ways by which his ascendancy among the birds is recognized. The lion had to learn that long ago about his tail.

The other members, the less powerful members of this partnership, have also their own obligations and duties. These include full recognition of the greater responsibilities of and the stupendous essential contribution by the United States in our combined effort. They call for concessions and compromises also; at times the abandonment of a particular point of view in the interest of effective direction and action. They require that - within our resources - every member of the coalition must play its part in carrying out agreed policies, even though that part may be secondary, and at times not easily recognizable. There is no disgrace in playing second fiddle to the United States; a part in the international orchestra which Mr. Gromyko contemptuously gave Canada a few weeks ago in New York. The second fiddle is a respectable instrument and can be very important if the orchestra is trying to play a symphony. The real disgrace would come, I suppose, if we threw away our fiddle in the middle of a well-conducted performance or deliberately played some discordant notes when the score didn't call for them.

Abandoning this somewhat tricky musical metaphor, I would add that we should also remember that smaller countries are not necessarily wiser or more righteous than the big and powerful ones. They only seem so because of the limited and relatively unimportant consequences that usually flow from their mistakes or wrong doing.

There is, however, no refuge of this kind for the United States. That is another penalty of power. One mistake - political, or economic, or strategic - by the colossus and the rest of us may be dangerously, and even fatally affected. You must not therefore be surprised or disturbed when the relief and admiration with which we view your great and overpowering strength is at times tinged with a shade of anxiety.

Reducing these abstractions to more concrete terms, I would say that this anxiety today expresses itself most noticeably in economic and in Far Eastern developments. It is here that are to be found the most serious threats to close co-operation within the Atlantic and free world coalition.

As to the first, I can only say - though I would like to say a lot more - that political co-operation and economic conflict are incompatible.

On the second difficult, however, I would elaborate a little.

New forces have swept across the Far East since World War II. Some of these reflect the pulsations of the international Communist conspiracy. Others are primarily related to the awakening urge of millions of Asians for national freedom and a better life. If we of the West are not able to agree on the distinction between these two forces which require a different approach by us, our co-operation in this part of the world may weaken and disappear to the joy and relief of those forces centred in Moscow and Peiping who are using foul means and fair to bring about just such a result.

This is an actual, and not an imaginary danger, because there is a real difference of view within our coalition as to the meaning of these Asian developments and on what our reaction to them should be. This difference involves, in fact, basic questions of Asian policy.

There is no dispute over the necessity of resisting Communist military aggression, so determined by the United Nations, or even, in certain circumstances, without such formal determination. There will, of course, inevitably be differences over the means for defeating such aggression and as to the relative contributions of those taking part in the operation. Korea is an example of this kind of difference which can be disagreeable without being fatal.

A far more serious dispute may arise, however - there are signs that it has already arisen - over the nature and extent of our collective obligations, if any, to defeat Communism, as such, in Asia.

There are some who believe that Asian Communism is an implacable foe, bound hand and foot to Moscow, and that to negotiate with it in any circumstances is futile and perilous. Therefore, they argue we must all do everything we can through governmental action short of all-out-war - but even at some risk of war - to prevent the appearance of Asian Communist governments; and to weaken and destroy them if they have managed to obtain power. This may require the active encouragement of and support for anti-Communist elements in Communist countries, and by continuing and strong support for any regime which is opposed to Communism, irrespective of its nature or its popular support in its own country.

There are others, however - individuals, groups and governments - who will have none of this policy. They feel that Communism in Asia, though it may be far deeper and more sinister than "agrarian reform", is a social, economic and political development, growing out of special Asian conditions and one primarily for Asians to deal with; that the only justification for direct Western intervention is when Communism expresses itself in military aggression. It is felt that our obligation in this matter is positive, not negative; not to intervene against Asian Communism, an intervention which would be stigmatized in Asia as Western

and colonial; but to intervene in favour of democracy and to help Asian governments build up free and stable institutions which will defeat Communism by doing more for the welfare of the under-privileged and undernourished millions of the East than Communism can ever hope to do. We should also, according to this view, not expect Asian governments or Asian people automatically to accept our Western views of the cold war and the Kremlin conspiracy.

Those are the two viewpoints, each of which has its advocates within our Western coalition. The latter may not always take sufficient account of the aggressive nature of Communism or of the efforts that are being made by the United States to build up a democratic security system in the Pacific. But I also believe - and firmly - that there can be no effective or successful collective action or policy on the basis of the first concept. I believe this because such a policy would have to be worked out and agreed on at the United Nations or in the North Atlantic alliance, and, frankly, I can see no possibility of such agreement.

It would mean that we would have to extend our specific obligations to the removal of Communist governments in North Korea and Peiping, and not merely to the defeat of military aggression. There are few countries inside the Western alliance willing to accept this obligation, especially in the terms in which it is sometimes presented in this country.

Now that the signing of an armistice in Korea will soon mark - as we hope - the end of aggression there, this particular problem of our general policy towards Asian Communism becomes one of immediate urgency. The armistice in Korea is to be followed by a political conference on Korean and possibly on related problems. At this conference, the United Nations will be represented. But so will Communist Asian governments. We are moving from the military to the political aspect of Far Eastern problems and it is to be hoped that we on the United Nations non-Communist side, can move in unison. I can think of no more important subject for discussion at the forthcoming three-power conference in Bermuda than how to ensure this unison. The other free countries who will not be at the Conference, but who cannot escape its consequences or isolate themselves from its decisions, will hope that those consequences will be good and those decisions wise; as we now face the political problems of an Asia which is in ferment and whose stirrings and yearnings cannot be ignored.

I have already exceeded my oratorical time limit, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize. The other day, an American newspaper, the "Philadelphia Bulletin" editorialized to the effect that Foreign Office people talked too much these days. True. The newspaper went on to fix the blame for this unhappy development on the introduction to formal diplomatic wear of the soft collar which allowed the speaker "to wag his jaw freely".

"In the old days" it went on, "whenever an Ambassador (and I suppose also a Foreign Minister) started to say something, the sharp points of his starched wing collar scratched his throat, reminding him that nobody ever put his foot in his mouth with closed lips".

My collar point was not, I fear, very sharp. But it has at last reached my throat and reminded me that, while expressing once again my great appreciation for the privilege of being with you this afternoon, I should now resume that attitude of proud but modest silence which becomes one who has so newly graduated from this university.

s/c