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
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# ASIA AND THE WAR

BY

A. E. DUCHESNE

SECOND IMPRESSION


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### ASIA AND THE WAR

In any consideration of the Asiatic attitude towards the present conflict Turkey must on no account be lost sight of. During the centuries that the Turks have maintained a footing in Europe they have never lost their Asiatic characteristics. Nor have they altogether forgone their Asiatic ambitions any more than they have been deprived of their Asiatic possessions. The strongest claim of Turkey to the general adherence of the Mohammedan world rests on the belief that the Sultan of Turkey is, as such, the Khalif, the head of Islam.

It is true that as the only Mohammedan sovereign ted to the comity of European nations, as the last representative of that tremendous conquering impulse which at one time threatened to subdue the West, and as the visible embodiment of the old tradition of Mohammedan supremacy, the Sublime Porte expects and receives the homage of Mohammedans of every country. Nevertheless it is a mistake to suppose that the Sultan has always and everywhere been recognized as the Khalif. It is one to that the Khalif be an tribe of Mohammed Arab of the tribe of K the prophet. On this point islam is unchangeable, and its doctors agree. The orthodox text-books are unanimous on the point. The Delhi text-book says: 'It is a necessary condition that the Khalif be of the Kareish tribe.' A former Grand Mufti of Cairo states: 'It is the unanimous opinion of the ancient doctors that the Khalif must be of the Kareish tribe'.

The point is interesting historically. When Selim conquered Egypt the Khalifate ceased ipso facto to exist. inasmuch as the spiritual and temporal powers thereof, hitherto united in one personality, were separated. The Sultan seized the temporal and political power, whilst the spiritual power was placed in commission with the Ulema, represented in Turkey by the Sheikh-ul-Islam. That this is recognized in the Ottoman Empire is abundantly evident from the fact that no act of the Sultan, even of a political or administrative character, is valid till it has received the sanction of the Sheikh-ul-Islam. This is a practical recognition of the fact that the Ottoman dynasty, not being of the Kareish (being in fact of Central Asian and not of Arab descent at all), cannot exercise the spiritual powers of the Khalifate. Sublime Porte has never had any recognition of its pretensions to spiritual supremacy in Arabia, Afghanistan Morocco, Persia, or in India under the Mogul Empire.

When the 'Young Turk' revolution was accomplished, it is extremely doubtful whether the limited Khalifate enjoyed by the ex-Sultan was handed on to his successor. At any rate, very few Indian Mohammedans would now be prepared to admit that the Khalifate is vested in the Ottoman sovereign.

Nevertheless the intrigues of Prussia in Turkey owe their origin to this belief in the Turkish Khalifate and its widespread influence. If we may take von Bernhardi as in any way authoritative, we find in his book, 'Germany and the Next War', continual reference to the Pan-Islamic movement, to the supposed intrigues of England in Arabia for the creation 'of a new religious centre in opposition to the Caliphate'. Turkey is regarded as 'the only State which might seriously threaten the English position in Egypt by land'. Again:

'It is our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey as far as we can.' 'Turkey is an essential member of the Triple Alliance.' 'Turkey is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it is emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her.' 'Turkey is the only Power which can threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England.' 'Pan-Islamism, thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of Bengal.'

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Accordingly, German effort has for years past been directed towards three ends in Turkey. First, to induce in the Turks an oblivion of Britain's past championship of their cause, particularly at the Berlin Congress, and to persuade them that 'Codlin is the friend, not Short'. To this end terrible stories are circulated of the miseries of Mohammedans under British rule. The occupation of Egypt is continually referred to as flouting Turkish suzerainty, and the operations in the Soudan consistently misrepresented as a deliberate attack on Islam. It must be remembered that the Mahdist movement was essentially heretical, and certainly never had the sanction of the Ulema.

Secondly, the endeavour is to Prussianize Turkey's Army, Navy, and Finance. This has been going on steadily for years. Von Goltz's training of the Turkish army was not conspicuously successful, but Turkey is still leaning on the Prussian reed for her finance and her navy. German money, German munitions, German officers and men have been poured into Turkey. The Goeben and the Breslau have beeome units of the Turkish fleet. Von Goltz has gone back to Constantinople. The

Sultan, 'in conformity with the Fetwas' (!) has called all Islam to a Holy War against England, France, and Russia.

Thirdly, Turkey is being urged to assert the Khalifate, to preach Jehad in Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, and India. This is, of course, primarily to embarrass Britain and France, but also to compel Italy's active co-operation with the Triple Alliance. Turkey, like Austria in the Schleswig-Holstein affair, is to be the catspaw of Prussia. Whatever the final result of the war, she will share Austria's then fate. She has already been in unsuccessful conflict with Russian troops on the Caucasus frontier, she has been worsted by an Indian expeditionary force in the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates Valley, she has advanced troops towards the Egyptian border. Forgetful of Bernhardi's astute advice she has gone far to embroil herself with Italy. She has experienced a foretaste of our naval methods in the sinking of the Massoudieh by the British submarine B 11. The Aga Khan, leader of Islamic India, has issued a manifesto in which he says: 'The action of Turkey is due to the influence of Germany. Having drawn the sword in an impious cause, Turkey ceases to be the protector of Islam, and consequently all British and Russian Moslems have the right to fight against Turkey in the armies of the countries of which they are subjects.'

So far as this country is concerned, interest naturally directs itself to Egypt and India. The absence from Egypt of Britain's strong man may perhaps tend towards the revival of that turbulent intrigue which Lord Kitchener's energy, devotion, and tact had so effectually quelched, but the situation so far would seem to present no alarming features.

In any case the disquiet in Egypt was never among the fellaheen, rapidly waxing prosperous under British protection, but among the former instruments of tyranny and corruption, uneasy at the loss of the r nefarious influence and their infamous emoluments, irritated by the restraints of the Occupying Power, and appealing to the vanished suzerainty of the Porte to support their retrograde ambitions and to cloak their sinister designs. It is among this class that Prussian intrigue has been most active. When I was in Egypt in 1906 these intrigues were frequently mentioned in conversation with my acquaintances among the trading classes in Cairo and Alexandria. This was more particularly the case with the domiciled Jews, who owe everything to British justice. Surprise was expressed that attention was not given by the British authorities to the many German, Austrian, and Levantine commercial employés who were prominent in the campaign of vilification of Doubtless, however, by this time everything British. all necessary precautions have been taken. The Khedive, by accompanying the Sultan to the opening of the Turkish Parliament, has definitely thrown in his lot with Turkey, or rather with Prussia, since it is due to the longcontinued Prussian intrigue that Abbas has been consistently hostile to Britain and its representatives. credulous Khedive was promised an independent kingdom if he abetted the Kaiser's designs. The presence in Egypt of strong Territorial and Indian contingents, and the British command of the sea, have practically rendered abortive the Turkish plan of a land advance through the Sinai peninsula. The Egyptian army is loyal. Its only discontented members are those who are not likely to have the privilege of fighting for us. A retired Egyptian officer writes in the Arabic paper Al-Mokattam of Cairo:

I ask you to help me to volunteer as an officer in the English army, and I am sure that if my brother officers on the retired list were also permitted to volunteer, they would form a large army to fight under your flag in recognition of the great services you have rendered to our country.

In India there is not a cloud on the horizon. The 'revolutionary (!) elements in Bengal 'have indeed united with the Mohammedans, but it is to express their honest and fervent loyalty to the Empire. The Mohammedans everywhere have shown their traditional loyalty, and indignantly protest that 'The (German) insinuation that Mussulmans are likely to prove disloyal is an impudent and dastardly libel '. A resolution of the British Moslems' Association declares:

Our Holy Faith enjoins upon us to be loyal to whatever country under whose protection we reside. Recognizing the religious liberty, equity, and justice accorded by England to the Mussulmans who dwell under its flag, we feel confident that our brethren throughout the British Empire will decline to listen to the wicked behests of Germany, and refuse to be made the tools of a selfish, brutal, and unprincipled nation, which disregards treaties, even though signed by itself, and has plunged Europe into a bloody strife.

The Association desired to affirm the Moslems' 'unflinehing loyalty to King George, and to assure him that all his subjects of the Islamic faith were fully prepared and burning with a desire to shed their blood on behalf of England side by side with the sons of Islam, natives of Algeria, who were already fighting for France'. The Moslems 'now know Germany to be like Shaitan (the Devil)'! Prayers for British success are now offered in all the mosques throughout India.

The Prussian idea of our position in India is derived from their own psychology. Because the Prussian ideal

of government is a domination to which weaker races must bow, we are pictured as holding India in the same way as the Alsatian Reichsland or Polish Prussia is held. Nothing could be farther from the truth. We do not hold India by the sword, nor could we administer it effectively in accordance with the canons of justice and tolerance if we did. It is true that we have fought in India. We fought against the decadent Mogul power at Plassy, against the Marathas at Assaye, against mutinous Brahmins and Moslems at Lucknow, Delhi, and Campore. But in each case there were men of Indian race and Moslem or Hindu religion who fought for us. Thus our wars in India have been much less of conquest than of administration. In every one of them we have had the assistance, the cordial co-operation, of our Indian fellow subjects. Those whom we have subdued have in very brief space of time become our allies and supporters.

Men soon recognized that with all our faults we were in the main honest, and that loyal co-operation with us was the shortest road to happiness and prosperity. Even with this recognition our task has been a difficult one. Without it the attempt to impose peace, to evolve order out of chaos, to establish and enhance the prosperity of city and district, would have been doomed to ignominious failure. Differences, of course, there have been, differences of ideal, of tradition, of habit, of mode of expression; but on the whole the contact between Briton and Indian has been one of mutual esteem and appreciation. The officer sahib swears by the men of his regiment. The men regard him as their father. To the Anglo-Indian sportsman there is no one like his old shikari. The district officer is full of the many good points of his people. This appreciation is well repaid by a touching devotion of which numberless instances could be given.

The ineffable Bernhardi, misunderstanding the position in India, says: 'England so far, in accordance with the principle of divide et impera, has attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population.' I cannot do better than refer the reader to the Asiatic Review for August. In this Dr. Pollen, the Honorary Secretary of the East India Association, gives a complete refutation of the 'divide and rule' theory of our Indian administration.

At the present moment a tremendous wave of enthusiasm is passing through India. It is recognized that Britain is fighting the fight of liberty, that she is actuated by the same honourable determination as keeps inviolate the treaties and agreements between the Government of India and the Feudatory States. From the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Maharaja of Mysore down to the smallest chieftain of Kathiawar or Scinde all the Chiefs have poured forth offers of men and money, hospital ships and equipment. The regular Indian Army is of course silent, but the Chiefs are transported with delight at being allowed the privilege of sending their own State forces to the Empire's war. Hyderabad, Bhopal, and Bahawalpur are Moslem, Mysore and Baroda are Hindu, Patiala is Sikh, the independent State of Nepaul is mainly Buddhist; but all are of one faith in this, that they believe in the justice of our Empire's cause. The Dalai Lama has tendered Tibetan troops, and prayers are daily offcred in Tibet for the success of our army.

This manly enthusiasm is not confined to the princes and nobles. The lawyers, merchants, bank employés, shopkeepers, peasants, and petty traders: all have joined in the protestations of loyalty, all have proffered

their services. The Bengali barristers desire to form a volunteer corps in Calcutta. The Parsis, who are already permitted to belong to the Poona Volunteer Corps, would dearly love to send a contingent to the front. The leading Indian citizens have guaranteed the freedom from disturbance of their districts during the war. Factions are abolished. For the first time in history the terms 'cow-slaver' and 'idolater' are banished from the Indian vocabulary. Tilak, who has suffered a long imprisonment for sedition, proclaims an admiration for the British adherence to the pledged word, and calls on his fellow countrymen, the erstwhile turbulent Marathas, to be loyal and support the Govern-Surendranath Banerji and Dadabhai Naoroji, old champions of the Congress attacks on the Government, have issued similar adjurations.

Thus we may consider with every confidence that the internal peace of India is assured. Externally as long as our naval supremacy remains there is absolutely no fear of foreign aggression. The turbulent tribes on the North-West Frontier may endeavour to make themselves objectionable, but they will be very easily dealt with. The Amir of Afghanistan has loudly proclaimed his neutrality. It would indeed be the unforeseen which would require the presence in India just now of any large body of our troops.

The Indian Government, then, has done well in yielding to the expressed desire of the peoples of India that theirs should be a share in the struggle, theirs the privilege to fight side by side with the Briton in Europe as they have fought side by side with him in Asia. The Indian army has long suffered from a species of injustice, having its genesis, it is true, in equity but nevertheless galling to the proud Rajput or the martial Sikh. That

injustice was the idea that Indian troops should as little as possible be employed beyond the limits of the Indian Empire. By a sort of eoneession to Imperial needs we garrison Ceylon, Singapore, and Hong Kong with Indian troops, but these are insignificant exceptions. Obviously we do not wish that an army with the glorious traditions of the Indian army should degenerate into a mere band of mereenaries, paid by whatever British Dominionnow African, now Australian—required its services. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that we must not saddle the patient Indian taxpayer with the eost of defence of other dominions than his own. In the present war we are fighting for the whole British Empire and all it represents. If we go down, farewell to liberty, farewell to all the hopes and aspirations of our Indian Hence, neither of these objections weighs comrades. now. Whoever bears the actual money cost, the battle is as much in defence of India as Britain. As a matter of faet, it has now been settled that India bears such proportion of the expense as would have been incurred if the troops had not left the country, while the magnificent contribution of £333,000 from the Mysore State goes towards the eost of the actual expedition. has the approval of all India.

The German Ambassador at Washington, referring to the subject of native soldiery, is reported to have stated that Great Britain and France had no right to condemn the Louvain outrage since they were employing coloured troops to hinder Germany's mission of culture and civilization. Such a statement, if it were made, is inexeusable. As to the Indian troops, it was well said by Lord Crewe that they were high-souled men of ancient civilization. The Rajput of 'Solar' race traces his ancestry back to a date when the Prussians were unheard

of. The Panjabi has often Greek blood in him. All are chivalrous with that unassuming chivalry which made Lord Roberts describe our soldiers in South Africa as constituting an army of gentlemen. Among the princes coming with the force are such typical Indian Chiefs as Sir Pertab Singh, the very perfect, stainless knight of Indian chivalry; the Maharaja of Bikanir, cqually distinguished as an administrator, a courtier, a soldier, and a mighty hunter; the Maharaja of Patiala, head of the great Sikh State, and renowned

sportsman.

From every point of view the employment of the Indian troops is to be commended. It exemplifies to the world the unity and majesty of the British Empire. It fills the soul of all India with the joy of fulfilled aspiration. It is in no sense the calling of a mercenary horde to the assistance of our tottering power, but the admission of well-tried and proven comrades to the inner brotherhood of our militant order. The magnificent proclamation of the King-Emperor, dignified, gracious, and inspired, rang like a trumpet-blast through the mists of Prussian falsehood, awaking an echo in every Indian heart. That a Biluchi and a Dogra should have been the first Indians to gain the V.C. is at once a proof of the valour and worth of all the races represented in the Indian contingent, and a tribute to the Sovereign's gracious foresight in admitting Indian soldiers to the privilege.

To those who know the East and have watched the steady growth of Japanese influence in the Western Pacific, the Japanese ultimatum gave no occasion for

surprise.

In the first place Japan is under treaty obligations to this country, which she is perfectly willing, and indeed

eager, 'o fulfil. It is provided that there must be no disturbance of the peace in Eastern waters without Japan coming in as our ally in war as in peace. Since Germany is in a state of war with Great Britain, the presence of any armed forces of Germany—whether naval or military-in the Pacific regions gives very good reason for Japanese intervention. To take measures 'to remove the causes of all disturbance of peace in the Far East' is not only to act in accordance with the terms of the treaty of alliance, but also to safeguard Japanese and Chinese interests. Ostensibly it is unfair that European warfare should be waged in Asiatic waters or on Asiatic soil. The disturbance to the comity of nations Asiatic eaused by the presence of forces of the belligerent powers on the China coast need not be endured by those nations if any one of them is strong enough to enforce her will on either of the Powers concerned. It is merely parallel to what would happen in similar circumstances on the Eastern Pacific or the Atlantic if the United States decided to act under their Monroe Doctrine.

But there is no doubt that Japan had other and more personal reasons which urged her to action against Germany. It is to German intervention that Japan, with much reason, attributes the snatching of Port Arthur out of her victorious grasp after the Chino-Japanese war. To Germany is debited the cost in blood and treasure of recovering that influence in Manchuria which Japan considers to be rightly hers. It is significant that the Japanese ultimatum was worded almost precisely in the terms of Germany's notice to Japan over Port Arthur.

Further, any action taken against Germany is bound to be very popular with all classes in Japan. At the time of the Boxer troubles the military men noted, and have not forgotten, the contrast between the British and Prussian treatment of Asiatics. Even Japanese officers of position were exposed to the boorishness which seems inseparable from the Prussian attitude towards those considered inferior. At times the friction threatened to become serious, and British self-effacement in allowing a Prussian officer to be generalissime of the combined forces occasioned surprise and a certain amount of adverse comment. The German interference with all Japan's schemes of finance has merely inspired the sublime Oriental patience of the Japanese, who are content to wait till the hour has struck for reprisals. That hour has now struck.

At the present moment the German navy may be ruled out as an effective world force. The fall of Tsing-Tao and the passing of Kiau-Chau out of German hands, followed by the destruction off the Falkland Isles of the Kiau-Chau squadron, has afforded a very practical justification of Japan's intervention. The Mikado's Government has with true instinct refrained from embarrassing us by any designs on Samoa, the Carolines, or New Guinea, and has given up to Australasia the islands which she had for strategic reasons taken from Germany.

New Zealand has already annexed German Samoa, and Australia has taken New Guinea. A German pied-d-terre so near the Australian coast has always been a source of disquietude to the island-continent. We have perhaps already forgotten that thirty years ago a vigorous Queensland Administration did annex Papua, but the move was disowned by the British Colonial Office, and Australia has ever since lamented that illipudged weakness.

Japan's action is striking evidence of the world-wide antagonism which Prussian aims and methods have

aroused. The whole of Asia applauds the Mikado's prompt decision. The reception by the Japanese of General Barnardiston, lately in command of the British Tsing-Tao Force, is proof of the cordial understanding existing between us and our Far Eastern Allies.

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