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The Disarmament Bulletin

Dept. of External Affairs
A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities
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Leaders Resolve to Tackle Proliferation

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Canada's call for action echoes through high-level meetings

Spurred by the Gulf War, political leaders around the world have taken up the call sounded by Canada in February for stronger efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, missiles and excessive build-ups of conventional arms. The spring and summer saw a series of high-level declarations condemning proliferation and committing governments to action.

At the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly held from June 3 to 8 in Santiago, Chile, OAS foreign ministers — Canada's Barbara McDougall among them — recognized the perils of proliferation and agreed to begin consultations on hemispheric security, including proliferation issues. Member States subsequently gave unanimous approval to a resolution proposed by Canada that condemned proliferation and initiated OAS study of the subject, including the possibility of exchanging information about arms transfer policies and of consulting about excessive arms build-ups.

In Copenhagen on June 6 and 7, Mrs. McDougall and her NATO counterparts discussed the dangers to international security posed by proliferation and renewed their commitment to early progress in international fora dealing with proliferation issues.

CSCE foreign ministers meeting in Berlin on June 19 and 20 agreed, at Canada's encouragement, that halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and promoting restraint and transparency in conventional arms



At the G7 London summit: SSEA Barbara McDougall, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, USA President George Bush, Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek and Netherlands Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers.

Bill McCarthy, PMO

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transfers should be a priority of CSCE governments. They decided to maintain a dialogue on these issues.

Such statements were paralleled in fora of which Canada is not a member.

This was followed on July 8 and 9 by a USA-initiated meeting in Paris of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to review issues related to non-proliferation and conventional

arms transfers, with emphasis on the Middle East. The five — China, France, the UK, the USA and the USSR — agreed to support the establishment of a UN arms transfer register, to develop and

observe rules of restraint for transferring arms, and to consult and exchange information about arms transfers to the Middle East. They also supported the goal of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Canada welcomed the outcome of the Paris meeting, which followed closely the objectives Canada has been promoting on a global basis. As the world's major arms exporters, the Security Council "Permanent Five" have a spe-

cial responsibility to prevent excessive arms build-ups. The Paris meeting made clear that they recognize and accept this responsibility.

Canada's attempts to ensure priority consideration of proliferation issues met with further success at the summit meeting of the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries held in London in mid-July. In a declaration issued on July 16, Prime Minister Mulroney and the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA expressed their determination to tackle the unchecked spread of weapons.

On conventional arms, the Group of Seven (G7) pledged to work for the early adoption of a UN arms transfer register, to encourage all countries to exercise restraint in transferring arms, especially in cases of advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of concern, and to give these issues their continuing close attention.

On nuclear weapons, they agreed to work towards maintaining and reinforcing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995, improving the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and achieving Nuclear Suppliers Group measures to ensure adequate export controls on dual-use items.

The G7 also committed themselves to pursuit of a strengthened BTWC, to conclusion of a chemical weapons convention as soon as possible, and to improved control of exports that could contribute to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. In addition, they called on all countries to adopt the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines for missile technology transfer.

This recent proliferation of non-proliferation declarations is encouraging and increases the likelihood of faster action to stop the spread of dangerous weapons. One of Canada's objectives in launching its February initiative was to stimulate leaders to inject political will into existing efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to begin efforts to curb unwarranted accumulations of conventional arms. This objective is well on its way to being reached.

Recent declarations increase likelihood of faster action to stop the spread of dangerous weapons.

On June 29, leaders of the European Community issued a declaration supporting strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, improvement of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and early agreement on a chemical weapons convention. They also advocated immediate international action to promote restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and said they hoped to strive towards harmonization of national arms export policies.

CSCE Ministers' Conclusions

The following are highlights from the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin on June 19 and 20.

2. The Ministers welcomed the Republic of Albania as a participating State of the CSCE.
6. They adopted a mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard to emergency situations.
7. They decided that the communication network, to be established under the provisions of the Vienna CSBM Document 1990, will be preferably used for all communications foreseen in the procedures in emergency situations.
9. They welcomed the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
15. They looked forward to a range of informal discussions and consultations on new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all CSCE participating States. In this context, they requested their representatives in Vienna...to start informal preparatory consultations in September this year aimed at establishing by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all participating States as set out in the Charter of Paris. They decided that formal preparatory negotiations for the new forum will be carried out at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.
17. In the light of the recent experience in the Gulf region, the Ministers see a need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and for restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and weapons technologies, particularly to regions of tension. This should be a priority of CSCE governments, and Ministers agreed to maintain a dialogue on these issues among CSCE countries.

Canada continues to believe that there is value in convening a high-level meeting of representatives from states around the globe to focus on proliferation issues. By attempting to bridge the North-South, supplier-recipient divide, such a meeting would complement the work of other, primarily supplier-based fora such as the G7 and the Permanent Five. It also has the potential to encourage all countries to work together towards objectives that are in the interests of the entire international community. Further to its February call for a World Summit on proliferation, Canada is consulting with a regionally-representative group of countries on ways to jointly promote non-proliferation objectives, including the possibility of a high-level meeting.

Canada also continues to pursue the points of its action plan on non-proliferation, described in *Disarmament Bulletin 16*. As you will read in this *Bulletin*,

we are seeking to strengthen the BTWC at its Third Review Conference and, in collaboration with others, are drafting a UN resolution to establish a global arms trade register. In addition, we are working to conclude a global chemical weapons convention, to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to improve the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Canada will actively follow-up on the declarations made in the OAS, the CSCE, the G7 and other fora to ensure that proliferation issues receive continuing, priority attention and that political commitments are translated into something tangible. A sustained combination of political will and serious action should make the secretive build-up of an Iraqi-style arsenal — with its destabilizing effects on regional and international security — much less likely in future. ■

Canada Welcomes Accessions to NPT

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been bolstered and brought closer to the goal of universal adherence over recent months with the accession, or decision to accede, by several states.

Zambia, Tanzania and South Africa deposited their instruments of accession to the Treaty in the May-July period. Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall welcomed all three accessions and expressed Canada's confidence that the states in the southern African region that remain outside the NPT — Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe — will also join at an early date.

Canada was equally pleased by the announcements of France and China, two nuclear-weapon states, of their intentions to accede to the NPT. The French "decision in principle" to join the Treaty was announced on June 3 by President Mitterrand in the context of his "Arms Control and Disarmament Plan." In early August, China indicated its plans to accede. Neither state has specified the date on which it intends to submit its instrument of accession. Canada looks forward to the early accession of both states, which will bring all acknowledged nuclear-weapon states into the Treaty.

The NPT currently has 145 parties, making it the most widely adhered-to arms control treaty. As a staunch supporter of the NPT, Canada has vigorously encouraged all non-parties to accede and will continue such efforts until the goal of universal adherence is achieved. ■

No Summer Issue

Due to resource constraints, there was no Summer 1991 issue of *The Disarmament Bulletin*. With the current issue, the *Bulletin* begins publication on a three (rather than four) times-per-year schedule.

New SSEA



On April 21, the Honourable Barbara McDougall was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA). She replaces the Right Honourable Joe Clark, who had held the post since September 1984. Mr. Clark is now Minister Responsible for Constitutional Affairs and President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada.

Mrs. McDougall was first elected to Parliament in September 1984 to represent the Toronto riding of St. Paul's. She has served as Minister of State (Finance), Minister of State (Privatization), Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, Minister Responsible for Regulatory Affairs and Minister of Employment and Immigration.

Prior to her election in 1984, Mrs. McDougall had a distinguished career in the financial sector in Vancouver, Edmonton and Toronto.

Mrs. McDougall serves as Chairperson of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy. She sits on the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet and is also a member of the Cabinet Committee on Canadian Unity and Constitutional Negotiations.

Roiling the waters: Canada Spurs OAS Consideration of Proliferation Issues



Canada's SSEA Barbara McDougall (front row, second from the left) at the 21st OAS General Assembly in Santiago, Chile.

"Throwing a bomb into the quiet waters of the OAS" is how one was described Canada's proposal, broached in April, to include on the agenda of the 21st General Assembly an item dealing with weapons' proliferation. Indeed, Canadian officials had to work overtime in Ottawa, Washington and other OAS capitals to dispel initial concerns that the subject was unsuitable for OAS attention and that its consideration would adversely affect hemispheric security.

OAS sends important political signal about its commitment to international peace and security in the post-Cold-War era.

By the time delegations gathered in Santiago in early June, however, bemused or resistant reactions had turned to support. Member States adopted by consensus a resolution in which they resolved to support efforts aimed at stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to exer-

cise sensitivity in arms transfers and to initiate a study of the problems posed for international security by arms proliferation (see text on next page). Among the resolution's 23 co-sponsors were Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the USA.

In adopting the resolution, the General Assembly was guided by the decision taken by OAS foreign ministers earlier in the week to initiate a process of consultation on hemispheric security, including arms proliferation. Canada's Barbara McDougall, who had urged her colleagues to deal with proliferation in the so-called Santiago Commitment, welcomed the decision. "In addressing this problem," she said, "OAS foreign ministers are sending an important political signal to all regions of the world about our commitment to contributing to international peace and security in the post-Cold-War era."

Canada's initiative in the OAS was an outgrowth of its global non-proliferation initiative launched in February. Canada believed that the OAS was particularly well-placed to take a lead in combatting proliferation and excessive arms build-ups because of the steps Member States had already taken to reduce arms, military spending and tensions within the hemisphere. Although the General Assembly had in the past dealt with arms-control-related matters such as clandestine arms traffic, conventional arms limitation and the advisability of establishing a mechanism for the inspection of weapons and military personnel, it had never looked at the broader issue of proliferation.

As a result of the resolution, the OAS has established a working group to study questions related to arms proliferation and excessive arms build-ups. Among other things, the group will examine the possibility of exchanging information about national policies, laws and administrative procedures governing the transfer and procurement of arms, and the possibility of establishing a mechanism for consultations about situations where excessive arms build-ups appear to be developing. The working group will also study questions related to hemispheric security in general, as follow-up to a Honduran-initiated resolution adopted by the General Assembly.

The OAS's attention to proliferation is particularly important insofar as the Organization is the first regional group that includes a substantial number of developing-world arms suppliers and recipients to seriously address these questions. In adopting the Canadian-initiated resolution, Member States signalled their willingness to consider closer cooperation in issues related to arms transfers and restrictions. OAS study of the subject should lend support to international processes to curb proliferation. In addition, it has the potential to result in regional arrangements that are tailored to the particular needs of the hemisphere and might go beyond what can be agreed internationally. ■

**COOPERATION FOR SECURITY IN THE HEMISPHERE.
CURBING THE PROLIFERATION OF INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, CONSIDERING:

That the Organization of American States, to fulfil its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, has proclaimed that among the essential purposes of the Organization are:

- the strengthening of peace and security in the hemisphere,
- the achievement of an effective limitation of arms that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the Member States;

That cooperation for security in the hemisphere is of fundamental importance in fulfilling these purposes;

That such cooperation must address, in a positive and active manner, significant themes bearing on security, among them the encouragement of arms control and disarmament;

That a climate of enhanced peace and security, both globally and within the hemisphere, should liberate human and material resources needed for the promotion and strengthening of democracy, the furtherance of economic and social development, the protection of the environment and the safeguarding of human rights;

That all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction undermine international security and risk a perilous escalation of conflict in regions of tension;

That the convergence of views in the Geneva negotiations on the need for the global, effective and complete elimination of chemical weapons is of relevance to negotiations in other areas of disarmament and arms limitation;

That measures aimed at regulating international exchanges of sensitive technologies should take into account the need to preserve and permit access to use of such technologies for peaceful purposes;

That OAS Member States are proud of their efforts with respect to the control of arms and, in particular, of steps taken by the democratic countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, which are among the least armed and militarized countries in the world;

That build-ups of arms beyond legitimate defence requirements contribute to instability and increase the risk of armed conflict, and that increased transparency and consultation surrounding the acquisition and transfer of arms would contribute to the growth of confidence and security,

RESOLVES:

1. To express its strong support for efforts in bilateral and multilateral deliberations, and in particular in the United Nations, to eliminate all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to bring about a global and more effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and dissemination of chemical and biological weapons.
2. To urge all members of the international community to exercise sensitivity in transfers of arms and technologies related to arms systems, particularly with respect to countries involved in or under the imminent threat of hostilities or involved in unwarranted build-ups of arms.
3. To request the Permanent Council to study the problems posed for international security, and for the furtherance of economic and social development, by the proliferation of instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction, and to examine the possibility of exchanging information regarding national policies, laws and administrative procedures governing the transfer and procurement of arms, including the establishment of a mechanism for consultations about situations where excessive arms build-ups appear to be developing.
4. To recommend to the Secretary General that he bring this resolution to the attention of the Member States and that he report on its implementation at the next session of the General Assembly.

G7 Address Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation

The following is the text of the Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Non-Proliferation issued on July 16 by the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA at their economic summit in London.

1. At our meeting in Houston last year, we, the Heads of State and Government and the representatives of the European Community, underlined the threats to international security posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of associated missile delivery systems. The Gulf crisis has highlighted the dangers posed by the unchecked spread of these weapons and by excessive holdings of conventional weapons. The responsibility to prevent the re-emergence of such dangers is to be shared by both arms suppliers and recipient countries as well as the international community as a whole. As is clear from the various initiatives which several of us have proposed jointly and individually, we are each determined to tackle, in appropriate fora, these dangers both in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Conventional arms transfers

2. We accept that many states depend on arms imports to assure a reasonable level of security and the inherent right of self-defence is recognized in the United Nations Charter. Tensions will persist in international relations so long as underlying conflicts of interest are not tackled and resolved. But the Gulf conflict showed the way in which peace and stability can be undermined when a country is able to acquire a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of self-defence and threatens its neighbours. We are determined to ensure such abuse should not happen again. We believe that progress can be made if all states apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action.

3. The principle of *transparency* should be extended to international transfers of conventional weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction, we support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations and will work for its early adoption. Such a register would alert the international community to an attempt by a state to build up holdings of conventional weapons beyond a reasonable level. Information should be provided by all states on a regular basis after transfers have taken place. We also urge greater openness about overall holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking clarification, would be a valuable confidence- and security-building measure.

4. The principle of *consultation* should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading arms exporters with the aim of agreeing on a common approach to the guidelines that are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons. We welcome the recent opening of discussions on this subject. These include the encouraging talks in Paris among the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council on 8-9 July, as well as ongoing discussions within the framework of the European Community and its Member States. Each of us will continue to play a constructive part in this important process, in these and other appropriate fora.

5. The principle of *action* requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end, all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilizing or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of particular concern. A special effort should be made to define sensitive items and production capacity for advanced weapons, to the transfer of which similar restraints could be applied. All states should take steps to ensure that these criteria are strictly enforced. We intend to give these issues our continuing close attention.

6. Iraqi aggression and the ensuing Gulf War illustrate the huge costs to the international community of military conflict. We believe that moderation in the level of military expenditure is a key aspect of sound economic policy and good government. While all countries are struggling with competing claims on scarce resources, excessive spending on arms of all kinds diverts resources from the overriding need to tackle economic development. It can also build up large debts without creating the means by which these may be serviced. We note with favour the recent report issued by the United Nations Development Program and the recent decisions by several donor countries to take account of military expenditure where it is disproportionate when setting up aid programs and encourage all other donor countries to take similar action. We welcome the attention that the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the World Bank have recently given to excessive military spending, in the context of reducing unproductive public expenditure.

Non-proliferation

7. We are deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems. We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the non-proliferation regimes.

8. Iraq must fully abide by Security Council Resolution 687, which sets out requirements for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its nuclear, biological and chemical warfare and missile capabilities, as well as for verification and long-term monitoring to ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with the relevant UN resolutions, we will provide every assistance to the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that they can fully carry out their tasks.

9. In the nuclear field, we:

- re-affirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in

favour of an equitable and stable non-proliferation regime based on a balance between nuclear non-proliferation and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

- re-affirm the importance of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and call on all other non-signatory states to subscribe to this agreement;
- call on all non-nuclear-weapon states to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, which are the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime;
- urge all supplier states to adopt and implement the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

We welcome the decision of Brazil and Argentina to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, as well as the accession of South Africa to the NPT.

10. Each of us will also work to achieve:

- our common purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the NPT regime beyond 1995;
- a strengthened and improved IAEA safeguards system;
- new measures in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure adequate export controls on dual-use items.

11. We anticipate that the Biological Weapons Review Conference in September will succeed in strengthening implementation of the Convention's existing provisions by reinforcing and extending its confidence-building measures and exploring the scope for effective verification measures. Each of us will encourage accession to the Convention by other states and urge all parties strictly to fulfil their obligations under the convention. We each believe that a successful Review Conference leading to strengthened implementation of the BTWC would make an important contribution to preventing the proliferation of biological weapons.

12. The successful negotiation of a strong, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons, to which all states subscribe, is the best way to prevent the spread of



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (right) with UK Prime Minister John Major at the G7 London summit.
Bill McCarthy, PMO

chemical weapons. We welcome recent announcements by the United States which we believe will contribute to the swift conclusion of such a convention. We hope that the negotiation will be successfully concluded as soon as possible. We re-affirm our intention to become original parties to the convention. We urge others to become parties at the earliest opportunity so that it can enter into force as soon as possible.

13. We must also strengthen controls on exports that could contribute to the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. We welcome the measures taken by members of the Australia Group and by other states on the control of exports of chemical weapons precursors and related equipment. We seek to achieve increasingly close convergence of practice between all exporting states. We urge all states to support these efforts.

14. Our aim is a total and effective ban of chemical and biological weapons. Use of such weapons is an outrage against humanity. In the event that a state uses such weapons, each of us agrees to give immediate consideration to imposing severe measures against it both in the UN Security Council and elsewhere.

15. The spread of missile delivery systems has added a new dimension of instability to international security in many regions of the world. As the founders of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), we welcome its extension to many other states in the last two years. We endorse the joint appeal issued at the Tokyo MTCR meeting in March 1991 for all countries to adopt these guidelines. These are not intended to inhibit cooperation in the use of space for peaceful and scientific purposes.

16. We can make an important contribution to reducing the dangers of proliferation and conventional arms transfers. Our efforts and consultations on these issues, including with other supplier countries, will be continued in all appropriate fora so as to establish a new climate of global restraint. We will only succeed if others, including recipient countries, support us and if the international community unites in a new effort to remove these threats which can imperil the safety of all our peoples. ■

Need for Supply-Side Controls and Global Measures

The following are excerpts from a June 21 address by Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Conference on the Supply-Side Control of Weapons Proliferation. The conference, which was held in Ottawa, was sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

The phrase "lessons of the Gulf War" has been bandied about a great deal during the past several months. It often seems as if as many lessons are being drawn as there are people drawing lessons. But one indisputable lesson, recognized even before the War's end by Institute staff when they began to finalize

the conference program in February, is that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and excessive build-ups of conventional arms are destabilizing, dangerous and must be stopped.

This is not a new lesson. Those of you working every day in the peace and security field did not need the Gulf War to unveil this revelation. What the Gulf War did, though, was bring this lesson home to publics. Each day, through countless television sets, newspapers, magazines and radios, people around the world were brought face-to-face with the consequences of Iraq's missile-launching capability, with fears about its chemical and biological weapons poten-

tial, and with the absurdity of Coalition forces being under threat from Coalition-supplied equipment. In touching publics, the Gulf War touched politicians. Proliferation — already recognized by specialists as the biggest arms control challenge of the 1990s — became a public challenge and a political challenge.

This happened no less in Canada than elsewhere. The Canadian government was the first to publicly advance a comprehensive proposal for combatting proliferation in the post-Gulf-War world, both regionally and globally. We recognized that Iraq was but one, Kafkaesque example of what can happen in

START Signed

In Moscow on July 30, USA President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which, once ratified, will lead to a reduction in the two countries' long-range nuclear weapons.

The Treaty limits each party to a maximum of 1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers, with a sub-limit of 154 deployed heavy ICBMs (only the USSR deploys heavy ICBMs). It further limits each party to 6,000 "accountable" warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, with sub-limits of 4,900 on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and 1,540 on heavy ICBMs. The remaining 1,100 warheads must be deployed on heavy bombers in the form of air-launched cruise missiles, bombs or short-range attack missiles. Because the START counting rules "discount" bomber weapons (i.e., each may count as less than one warhead), each party will in fact be permitted to deploy more than 6,000 warheads.

In addition to mandating reductions in superpower nuclear forces, the Treaty prescribes intrusive verification measures, including 12 types of on-site inspection.

Canada has long regarded the successful negotiation of START as an arms control priority. We welcomed the Treaty's signature and look forward to its ratification and implementation. START will enhance strategic stability at lower levels of nuclear arms and will thus contribute to collective security. The USA and the USSR have established a working group to consider follow-on negotiations to START. In Canada's view, the objective of strategic stability should remain paramount throughout follow-on negotiations on long-range nuclear forces, and on defence and space arms.

a world where the non-proliferation of weapons and technology is not effectively pursued. We recognized that Canadians' support for the War effort was in part conditional on the government doing everything in its power to make sure we would not find ourselves in a similar situation a few years down the road. Parenthetically, that is why Canada has also been in the forefront of those calling for a strengthening of the UN system.

On the proliferation front, we believed that what was needed, in the first instance, was a jolt of political energy to spur ongoing efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, as well as to encourage progress in non-proliferation negotiations and the development of measures to deal with the virtually untouched realm of conventional arms accumulation.

As a consequence, the initiative launched by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs on February 8 had two components. We are pursuing both with vigour. The first consists of the mobilization of political

will by encouraging leaders of all states to commit themselves publicly and unequivocally to do their utmost to condemn and combat weapons' proliferation. In gathering political commitments at the highest levels, we hope to generate and maintain the momentum necessary to free specific negotiations and processes from the complacency or technical minutiae in which they have tended to become mired and thus to make progress on what are among the most urgent security issues of our time.

The second component of our initiative consists of an action program for moving ahead in each area of concern...

One of the reasons for Canada's success in ensuring that proliferation issues receive the required attention at the political level has been that our initiative has found a tremendous resonance in the international community. In the months since we put forward our proposal, numerous countries have come forward with their suggestions for dealing with proliferation in the post-Gulf-War world, echoing ideas prominent in the Canadian initiative... We welcome all of these proposals,

which complement Canadian efforts to advance the same objectives.

Expressions of political concern, however...while extremely welcome and clearly necessary, are not sufficient to bring about an end to proliferation. As we continue to garner high-level commitments, we must make sure that these commitments are reflected in progress at the nuts-and-bolts level. We have no illusions about the practical, technical difficulties involved in the measures we are proposing.

You have dealt with many of these difficulties — and possibilities — in your conference. Supply-side control represents the front line of the war against proliferation. It is not an ideal solution. There are questions about effectiveness, about comprehensiveness, about verification, about capturing dual-use goods and technology, about capturing services, about discrimination and about implications for legitimate, non-military transactions. But we do not live in an ideal world.

In tackling proliferation in the real world, it is a question of doing what is feasible, while bearing always in mind the ideal and striving towards it wherever possible. Where effective movement can be made towards curbing the spread of clearly unacceptable weapons, movement should be made. This may mean tightening and better-coordinating national export controls. It may mean an agreement among countries in a region not to acquire particular types of weapons. We would hope it could mean a common effort by the entire international community, working on a common understanding that what is prohibited to one should ultimately be prohibited to all. But Canada does not believe that the best should be the enemy of the good, or even the enemy of the next-to-worst, if that is all that is attainable at any one moment.

Supply-side control is one part of what is feasible and attainable now. It will not on its own stop proliferation, as many of you have remarked over these past few days. What is ultimately required is a comprehensive approach that deals with both supply and demand and draws as many states as possible into effective, global regimes. In the interim, however, where no global instru-

ment exists, supply-side controls are frequently the only means available for curbing proliferation of the weapons system in question.

Supplier states that have adopted a policy of self-restraint have a moral and practical obligation to their publics and to their exporting communities to ensure that their products and technologies are not being diverted to purposes other than those intended. Even where global instruments exist, as in the case of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, there will continue to be a need for effective supply-side controls. Supply-side controls provide an important means of preventing the spread of prohibited weapons to states that remain outside global treaties. They also provide a double check for ensuring that the self-restraint on the part of potential suppliers and potential recipients that has been codified in a multilateral instrument is being respected.

But supply-side controls are primarily a short-term measure. They buy time — for building confidence, for dampening regional tensions, for gathering a consensus on the value of restraining weapons acquisition, for forestalling the rise of dangerously-armed powers in unstable situations. This is valuable time admittedly, but it does not provide the assurance on non-proliferation that we are all seeking, assurance that can only come from effective, comprehensive non-proliferation regimes adhered to by as many states as possible.

That is why the Canadian program of action I discussed earlier includes a blend of supply-side and global measures. It calls for enhancing efforts in relation to the Australia Group, as well as for conclusion of a chemical weapons convention and for strengthening of the BTWC. It calls for strong and effective multilateral controls on dual-use nuclear goods, as well as for shoring up the NPT. It calls for consultations among major conventional arms suppliers, as well as for consultations among suppliers and recipients. It calls for strengthening the MTCR, as well as for reaching a global consensus on the need to stop missile proliferation. In the short-term, in the absence of global non-proliferation measures, our emphasis

may have to be on supply-side control. Even in the long-term, supply-side control will be required to deal with those states that — for whatever reason — remain outside of global regimes. What we advocate is a gradual shift of emphasis away from primary reliance on supply-side control, as we secure agreement on the global measures we need.

Such measures cannot be dictated by suppliers. They can only be arrived at through the cooperation of the international community as a whole. This is why Canada, in seeking to advance its initiative, is assembling a core group of interested countries that includes both suppliers and recipients, countries from East, West, North and South. It is also why we were extremely interested in the proposal by Argentina and Brazil at this year's session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on seeking norms in the international transfer of sensitive technologies that command universal support. This is an objective in which Canada sees merit.

We fully recognize the right of access of all states to the peaceful uses of technology. In our view, though, this is not a right of assured access. Some states would argue that if you provide us with the technology we will be on our best behaviour; we would respond that you have to be on your best behaviour before we provide you with the technology.

Canada's goal is a global framework of equitable, comprehensive and verifiable non-proliferation regimes of which all well-intentioned members of the international community are part. This is an ambitious goal. It is a necessary goal. We believe it is an attainable goal. The 1990s, marked by the end of the Cold War, the growing commitment to cooperative security globally as well as regionally, and the focusing of minds of the Gulf War, provide us with an unprecedented opportunity to effectively stop proliferation. We must seize this opportunity. Through a combination of political will, public support, official endeavour, and analytic input, we can translate our burgeoning concerns about proliferation into tangible, durable results. We can build a more stable world with fewer and less dangerous weapons. ■

Canadians Brief Space Committee

"Satellites Harming Other Satellites" was the subject of a June 25 briefing to the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space by Dr. Peter Hughes, a leading Canadian space scientist and founder of Toronto's Dynacon Enterprises Ltd., and Mr. Peter Stibrany of Spar Aerospace Ltd. The briefing was based on an innovative research project conducted by Dynacon and funded by EAITC's Verification Research Program.

Mr. Stibrany outlined for Committee members the concept of a "Harmfulness Index," which involves the rigorous classification of the modes of harm one satellite can cause another. Project researchers have developed a computer program called HARMDEX, which can generate a quantitative estimate of the potential harmfulness of any satellite vis-à-vis another. This methodology could form one basis for confidence-building measures (CBMs) in space.

Dr. Hughes demonstrated the pros and cons of various types of keep-out zones, which have been suggested for building confidence regarding the safety of satellites in space. Summarizing Dynacon's work, Dr. Hughes highlighted how an estimate of satellite harmfulness could assist in managing a flexible, "free space" keep-out zone more securely. He also described an outer space CBM involving the use of verification beacons on satellites.

Dr. Hughes' summary of Dynacon's research, entitled "Satellites Harming Other Satellites," has been published by EAITC as *Arms Control Verification Occasional Paper No. 7*.

During the 1991 Conference on Disarmament session, the Verification Research Program also provided expert support on legal matters concerning outer space. Dr. Lucy Stojak of McGill University's Centre for Air and Space Law attended a number of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. She concentrated her efforts on the legal aspects of keep-out zones and terminological questions related to arms control and outer space. ■

Commission Verifies Iraq's Compliance with Resolution 687



UN team inspecting nuclear reactor at the Tuwaitha research facility near Baghdad.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council undertook a number of actions aimed at restoring peace and security in the Middle East. Most notably, it mandated the establishment of a 21-member United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) with the objective of verifying Iraq's compliance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of EAITC's Verification Research Unit, was appointed to the Commission by the UN Secretary General.

Under Resolution 687, Iraq is required, *inter alia*, to "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision," of all its chemical and biological weapons and/or stocks of precursor agents. In addition, Iraq must dispose of "all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities." Similar measures were applied to Iraq's activities in the nuclear field. In particular, Iraq is compelled to renounce forever the acquisition of nuclear weapons and is required to sub-

mit to stringent inspections. The Special Commission has been directed to develop a plan for verification of future compliance by Iraq with all these obligations.

UNSCOM has been authorized not only to verify the veracity of Iraqi weapons declarations by visiting any sites within Iraq it needs to inspect, but also to organize "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of the proscribed material. In the overall verification task, UNSCOM is authorized to seek expert assistance from such agencies as the World Health Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required. The UN Secretariat is also deeply involved in this process.

Since its initial meeting on May 6 under the leadership of Sweden's Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, who was appointed Executive Chairman, the Special Commission has initiated or participated in an extraordinary series of difficult and technically-complex on-site inspections relating to Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology and to its ballistic missile capabilities. The nuclear-related inspections have been conducted by teams organized and led by the IAEA, with the support and cooperation of UNSCOM. The remainder of the inspections have been organized by UNSCOM, drawing on expertise from UN member states,

from specialized UN agencies and from the UN Secretariat.

Canadians have been active in all aspects of UNSCOM operations. Mr. Cleminson participated in the first nuclear inspection, which took place from May 14 to 22 at the Tuwaitha research facility just outside Baghdad. He continues as one of four commissioners focussing on future compliance. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Knapp and Dr. Peter Lockwood, a scientist with the Defence Research Establishment at Suffield, Alberta (DRES), were active in the first chemical weapons inspection near Samarra the following month. Colonel Knapp has continued to operate with UNSCOM as a staff officer based in New York, while Dr. Lockwood has agreed to act as an advisor to the Commission on safety matters. They will both be engaged with approximately 70 other scientists in the chemical weapons "super inspection" scheduled to take place in September.

Dr. John McCandeless of DRES has been participating as a Canadian expert on UNSCOM's panel on chemical weapons destruction. DND has contributed a number of explosive demolition experts to other inspections as well. It is expected that Canadian leadership and technology, coordinated through a close partnership between DND and EAITC, will figure prominently in UNSCOM's future activity. ■



Inspectors at the Tuwaitha research facility.

Bill C-6 Allows Restricted Export of Automatic Weapons

Parliamentary committee to study Canadian arms export policy

A bill passed by the House of Commons in June provides for the severely-restricted import, possession and export of automatic weapons for certain narrowly-defined military and related industrial purposes. Bill C-6 removes an anomaly in the Criminal Code that has effectively prevented Canadian defence firms from manufacturing automatic weapons for our NATO allies and close defence partners. As well, it establishes a new Automatic Firearms Country Control List on which any prospective recipient of Canadian automatic weapons must first be placed.

In passing the bill, the government and opposition parties mandated the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade to study and report on Canadian arms export and defence production policies. The Committee will hold public hearings and submit its report by December 31, 1991.

Until the Parliamentary report is completed, the government will include on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List only those ten countries with which it already has the required bilateral defence research, development and production agreements. It will also include Saudi Arabia, assuming the required agreements can be successfully negotiated by the end of the year. No Canadian export of automatic weapons to Saudi Arabia will be permitted before the end of the year, except of those mounted on light armoured vehicles under a proposed sale by General Motors.

The following are excerpts of an address by the Honourable Michael Wilson, Minister of Industry, Science and Technology and Minister for International Trade, to the House of Commons during debate on second reading of Bill C-6 on May 30.

Under present law, alone among Canada's few manufacturers of military materiel, our producers of automatic firearms and related equipment are effectively prevented from competing on a level playing field, even in that small part of the international market to

which Canadian foreign policy would quite properly limit their access.

As things stand now, these firms can manufacture such equipment only for the Canadian military or police. They may not even produce for Canada's allies and closest defence partners, while foreign firms are at liberty to sell to Canada's armed forces. The restrictions put Canadian companies at an unnecessary disadvantage and threaten the viability of some. They could eventually preclude Canada from meeting its own future requirements for weapons.

Introducing carefully-defined new flexibility to permit exports of automatic firearms to our NATO allies and close defence partners will demonstrate Canada's commitment to meeting its own requirements for basic defence products from Canadian sources. It will also enhance Canada's contribution to joint allied preparedness, most notably its role in the North American defence industrial base.

As everyone in this House knows, Canada's role in UN peacekeeping is long-standing and widely respected. Imagine Canada's peacekeeping forces in country "x." Could they do their job without the appropriate weapons? And if our troops were there side-by-side with other UN peacekeeping forces, be they Swedish, Australian or whatever, would it be wrong for those Swedes or Australians to be armed with Canadian firearms? I think not.

Bill C-6 will place very tight controls on exports of automatic firearms from Canada by establishing a new Automatic Firearms Country Control List under the Export and Import Permits Act... The authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to approve permits for exports of automatic firearms will be limited to those countries listed on [the List]. Her authority to refuse inappropriate applications remains total and un-

diminished. The List is to include only those countries with which Canada has an intergovernmental defence research, development and production agreement... In keeping with the concern shared by most Canadians for restraining the arms trade, the required defence production arrangements will be concluded only with Canada's NATO allies and close defence partners. Those countries will be made known through the publication of the Automatic Firearms Country Control List... Sales will be permitted only to governments and acceptable designated consignees approved by the Canadian government. Sales to civilians will not be permitted.

Canada currently has defence production arrangements with ten countries, of which Sweden is the only one not a member of NATO. An arrangement with Spain is under negotiation... Proposals to include other countries on the List will be subject to an intense, case-by-case basis review to confirm that:

- the requirement for automatic firearms is legitimate and reasonable;
- defence cooperation with Canada will enhance regional cooperation and security; and
- the country being considered for defence cooperation does not threaten regional or world security,

Exports allowed only to countries on Automatic Firearms Country Control List. Inclusion on List does not guarantee export.

and does not maintain an excessive level of armaments...

A country's inclusion on the new control List does not in itself constitute authority to export automatic firearms to that country... Applications to export automatic firearms will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and will be subject to the same strict guidelines and licensing procedures applied to all exports of military goods from Canada... Certainly

no permit would ever be approved to export automatic weapons from Canada to a country that undertook [an excessive] build-up of arms. It simply would not happen. If a country with which Canada had a defence production agreement began to develop its military arsenal to the point of threatening its neighbours and regional security, we would simply stop issuing export permits and suspend all outstanding ones.

Such action is within the discretionary authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs... It has been exercised in the past in response to changing security considerations, and would be used in the future without hesitation if necessary... Our intention is to control more effectively, not to prohibit, sales of military equipment. Canada will be extremely careful in deciding which countries it should sell firearms to. We will also make known which military goods are exported and to which countries.

Consistency with arms control policies

The following are excerpts from a May 30 statement on Bill C-6 by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

I join the debate on Bill C-6...to respond to the suggestions that the proposed amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) are inconsistent with the arms control proposals made in February by the Prime Minister and Mr. Clark. No such inconsistency exists.

Under the proposed amendments, exports of automatic weapons will be subject to the same stringent controls that have long been applied to the export of other military goods from Canada. These controls fully reflect Canada's arms control and disarmament policies. They are, in fact, driven by Canada's security policy, of which arms control and disarmament are a major component. They allow, and have always allowed, the export of particular types of military equipment to particular countries under particular circumstances. At the same time, they ensure, and will continue to ensure, that Canada does not contribute to the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction or to excessive build-ups of conventional arms.

What Canada proposed in February was that countries learn from the Gulf War that proliferation and excessive arms build-ups are destabilizing, dangerous and must be stopped. We put forward a range of proposals aimed at mobilizing the political will and the mechanisms necessary to minimize these dangers in the future in the Middle East and elsewhere. We proposed expanding and strengthening existing regimes to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also proposed measures to promote international transparency, consultations and restraint with a view to preventing excessive build-ups of conventional arms. By excessive build-ups of conventional arms we mean the acquisition of quantities of conventional arms that go beyond legitimate defence requirements.

As my predecessor made very clear before a Committee of this House in March, we are not proposing to put an end to the arms trade. Nor are we proposing to constrain any country's ability to acquire arms for legitimate defence purposes. We have never suggested that defence needs should be left unmet. What we are proposing is that the international community should take appropriate measures to ensure that states will not in future be allowed to overarm themselves as Iraq did...

In February, this Government made a commitment to work to diminish the likelihood and risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and excessive build-ups of conventional arms. That commitment remains strong and, as I have explained, is in no way diminished by or inconsistent with the proposed amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act.

The EIPA is the main legal instrument under which the government controls exports and imports. The Act provides for control of exports on the basis of product using the Export Control List and on the basis of destination using the Area Control List.

Goods and technologies may be placed on the Export Control List for a number of reasons, including the protection of the security of Canada and its allies. The majority of items are on the List to fulfil international commitments to control the proliferation of arms and to deny potential adversaries access to industrial goods that might have a

Review process ensures Canadian exports do not contribute to excessive arms build-ups.

military or strategic application. These commitments have been made in the context of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls.

In addition, export permits are required for all exports to countries on the Area Control List, regardless of whether the particular goods or technologies are listed on the Export Control List.

Canadian export controls are among the most restrictive of all western countries, particularly with respect to the transfer of arms. A standard review process exists for the proposed export of military equipment to any destination, except to members of the NATO alliance and a handful of other countries, including Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland. All proposals to export military goods or technology to a country aside from those just noted are reviewed by the Departments of National Defence and Industry, Science and Technology, as well as extensively within EAITC. The export of offensive military equipment requires my own personal review and approval. The export of non-offensive military equipment requires my review and approval if the country of destination is engaged in or under imminent threat of hostilities, has a record of human rights abuses, is under United Nations sanctions or is deemed to be a threat to Canada and its allies.

These amendments do not affect this review process, which remains in place

and in fact will be extended to cover any proposal to export automatic firearms. All other controls provided for under the EIPA remain unchanged.

As Secretary of State for External Affairs, I am responsible for developing

and implementing Canada's arms control and disarmament policies. I am also responsible for issuing permits under the EIPA. I will continue to ensure that all of our military exports — including any as a result of the proposed amend-

ments to the Act — are fully consistent with our arms control and disarmament policies and do not contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or to excessive build-ups of conventional arms. ■

UN Group of Experts Calls for Arms Transfer Register

The UN Group of Experts on Arms Transfer Transparency wound up its final meeting on July 5 with agreement on a report that calls for greater transparency in the international arms trade and recommends the establishment of a UN arms transfer register as soon as possible. Under such a register, states would voluntarily report their arms exports and imports each year to the UN, which would make the information publicly available.

The Experts recommend that the register be set up on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, including both arms suppliers and arms recipients. States should report transfers according to agreed categories, so that the information provided can readily be compared.

The Experts also call on states to make all their military activities as open as practicable, and suggest that the arms transfer register could usefully be supplemented by measures to promote transparency in other areas such as military holdings and procurement and military doctrines. They encourage states to pursue regional and sub-regional, as well as global, transparency measures.

The Group's report devotes a section to the illicit arms trade, defined as trade contrary to national or international law. The objective in this case is not the promotion of transparency but rather eradication through tighter control. In general, the Experts urge states to have in place the legal and administrative machinery necessary to effectively regulate and monitor their arms transfers. This is particularly important with respect to preventing illicit trade, as are measures to control borders, to combat bribery and corruption, and to share with other countries information about trafficking and detection of illicit arms.

Canada was delighted with the Group's report. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs told the UN General Assembly in September 1990, Canada believes it is important to make arms transfers and procurement as transparent as is prudent and practical. The establishment of a global arms transfer register has been a major goal of Canada's post-Gulf-War action plan to stop excessive build-ups of conventional arms.

As noted by the Experts, an arms transfer register has the potential to build confidence among states, to promote restraint in arms transfers and to assist the identification of trends in the arms trade.

Increased transparency in military matters between members of NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization has helped considerably to reduce tensions and create conditions conducive to arms control and disarmament in Europe. The regular, voluntary sharing of information about arms transfers is likely to promote similar confidence in military capabilities and intentions on both a global and a regional scale. It may encourage cooperation in other areas affecting military security, and should reduce the likelihood of arms races and wars based on misperceptions about military capabilities.

Arms transfer transparency could also help to provide states with advance

warning of situations where arms are being acquired to excess. This could discourage further transfers to the country involved and lead to measures to deal with potential hostilities before they become actual.

An exchange of information on arms transfers would also provide a better database for policy projections and research. Questions about the effects of arms transfers on national economies and regional stability have been the subject of international debate since the early 1970s. A register could contribute to this debate by providing reliable information for further study and monitoring.

Canada is now working with other countries to draft a General Assembly resolution that establishes a UN register. Canada is proposing that the resolution promote transparency in arms procurement and holdings as well as in transfers. We are also suggesting that the resolution establish a mechanism whereby states can consult about the operation of the register and exchange views on the data provided to it.

Canada was represented on the UN Experts' Group by Mr. Ernie Regehr, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Waterloo and Research Coordinator of the non-governmental organization Project Ploughshares. The Group's report will be published by the UN later this year. ■

What is Transparency?

The UN Experts' Group defines transparency as "involving the systematic provision of information on specific aspects of activities in the military field under informal or formal international arrangements." Transparency is related to openness, which involves a general national policy of making information about military matters public. Transparency reflects the willingness of all states participating in transparency measures to practice openness in the areas covered by those measures.

1991 UNDC: Fiddling Over Militarism's Flames

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held its annual substantive session from April 22 to May 13 at United Nations headquarters in New York.

The 1991 session marked the beginning of the UNDC's work under a reformed structure. The new structure limits the number of items on the working agenda to four, thereby preventing the problem of an overloaded agenda which, in the view of many observers, hindered the UNDC's work in the late 1980s. The reforms also limit consideration of any item on the agenda to a maximum of three years. Canada and others hope this will pressure delegations to move towards conclusions in their deliberations, rather than fall into limitless debate without clear direction or outcome.

The Canadian delegation, led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, played an active role in all four UNDC working groups. Canada believes that the work of the 1991 session offers some grounds for optimism that the reformed UNDC may acquire a more constructive and relevant role in multilateral arms control and disarmament than it has occupied in the past.

Canada was particularly pleased that an item entitled "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" was included on the agenda. This reflects Canada's view that sources of tension and causes of arms build-ups in certain regions are primarily of a regional nature, rather than an extension of a broader East-West conflict. This has become increasingly evident in recent years as East-West relations have improved dramatically, yet a number of regions continue to be characterized by chronic tensions and high levels of armament.

In her opening statement to the working group, Ambassador Mason summarized Canada's approach to this subject. She stated that "regional approaches to disarmament have a unique and irreplaceable place in our collective pursuit of the broader objectives of disarmament and international security. Measures implemented in a regional context complement steps that, because

of their nature, may be more appropriately undertaken at a global level or, in some cases, bilaterally."

A number of useful papers were submitted to this working group touching on various aspects of regional disarmament. Canada tabled a paper entitled "Open Skies in other Regional Contexts: Lessons of the Current Negotiations," the purpose of which was to inform the international community at large of the principal issues occupying the Open Skies negotiations and to draw conclusions that might be of value should states in another regional context someday endeavour to negotiate a similar type of regime.

"The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" was another new item of constructive discussion. In the words of its final report, the group addressed "a wide-ranging and challenging mandate encompassing matters that have never before been dealt with in a systematic debate in the UN." One of the most interesting and important themes considered by this working group was the issue of transfers of sensitive high tech-

nologies with military applications, an issue of great significance in addressing weapons proliferation concerns.

A third item on the agenda was "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons." This item, which addressed the full range of nuclear disarmament issues, regrettably demonstrated the lack of progress that characterized work on a similar item in previous years.

Finally, the UNDC continued its consideration of the item entitled "Objective information on military matters," initiated at the 1990 session. This working group considered a number of ways of increasing openness and transparency, including extending the UN reporting system on military expenditures and establishing a UN register of conventional arms transfers. Consideration of this item will be concluded at next year's session and Canada hopes that an agreed-upon set of principles and recommendations will emerge.

Despite the stimulating exchange of views that took place at the 1991 session, the Canadian delegation registered



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason and Canadian Mission Counsellor Colonel Douglas Fraser at the 1991 UNDC session in New York.

Photo courtesy of Sentinel

profound concern, in its closing statement, about the reluctance of some delegations to allow working groups to consolidate important areas of agreement in the form of a report that could serve as a basis for further progress at next year's session.

Ambassador Mason criticized delegations for refusing to acknowledge areas of agreement, even in the form of

UNDC is at a crossroads: danger of irrelevancy versus need for action.

general principles, when such agreement was clearly in evidence. The argument by some that nothing needed to be agreed upon in the first year of an item's consideration represented, in Canada's view, an abdication of responsibility. It resulted in UNDC failure to seize important opportunities to advance multilateral disarmament and to restore the tarnished reputation of the Commission itself. In Ambassador Mason's words to the plenary:

"In the past, when every aspect of the UN was frozen in the prism of Cold War confrontation, to have a constructive discussion of issues was a worthwhile goal in and of itself, and I am not suggesting that mere discussion is still not a very worthwhile activity. But now that action is possible, discussion — however constructive — is simply not good enough, not when the problems we face are so daunting and urgent, and not when our colleagues in the Security Council, in the Committee on Peacekeeping and in the specialized agencies dealing with humanitarian needs have already moved beyond talking and are acting together in the most sensitive, delicate and difficult of areas.

"In my culture, one of the quintessential symbols of utter abdication of responsibility is that of the leader Nero, who played the fiddle while his city, Rome, burned to the ground. During the crucial period when action could have been taken to stop the fire before it became too large, he did not act to stop it; he amused himself with pleasant diversions.

"While the flames of militarism continue unabated in many regions of this world, I ask what did we, the distinguished representatives of the 1991 session of the UNDC, do?"

"Well, we pointed out in great detail the height of the flames. We exchanged a diversity of views on the heat generated by those flames. We identified in admirable detail the destruction being wreaked in various parts of the world by those flames, but when it came to agreeing on the most basic steps in combatting those flames, then the argu-

ment was put forward that there was simply no need to rush. We have two more years to agree on what type of fire-fighting equipment to purchase, who should pay for it and, above all, who should take the lead in actually beginning to fight the flames. Why all the rush? Why indeed!...

"At the end of the 1989 session of the [UN General Assembly] First Committee, Canada very reluctantly decided that we would no longer participate in the Ad Hoc Committee on the IOZOP [Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace]. We have not left completely, as some chose to do, but we are not participating.

"I believe that this was the first time Canada took such an action in a multilateral forum dealing with disarmament issues. The Canadian representative on that committee was dividing his time between discussions there, which have not advanced in some 13 years beyond a completely sterile and futile effort to assign blame to one group or another for every ill in the zone, and discussions in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping on how to make the UN response in this area more comprehensive, more timely — in short, more effective.

"As the gap between the sterile rhetoric of the IOZOP Committee and the ever-increasing, action-oriented work on the Special Committee on Peacekeeping grew, it became clear where Canada wished to focus its attention, given the resource and personnel constraints we are facing. Increasingly those resource constraints are forcing us to make difficult choices. But is the

choice so difficult when it is between form and substance, between making endless lists and agreeing to concrete actions?"

"I believe that the UNDC is at a historic crossroads. One path points backwards and leads to irrelevancy. It is the way of Nero. The other points forward. It is not an easy road and it is one that cannot be travelled alone because the challenges that face this newly multipolar world are beyond the capacity of any one country or group of countries to solve alone. This new path of shared responsibility beckons to us all. Let us go down it together."

Canada and most other delegations represented at the 1991 session demonstrated which path they wish to follow. At the UNDC's 1992 session, Canada will continue its efforts to revitalize this body. We will vigorously press all members to allow the Disarmament Commission to assume its mandate effectively and to make a meaningful contribution to the multilateral pursuit of disarmament objectives. ■

UNGA 46 First Committee Starts Work

The First Committee of the 46th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 46), which considers resolutions dealing with arms control and disarmament issues, begins its work on October 14. The Canadian delegation to the First Committee will be headed by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason and will take an active role in the negotiation and promotion of several resolutions.

As in previous years, Canada will provide leadership, jointly with Poland, in drafting a resolution calling for the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. This resolution will be particularly important as negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva are under intense pressure from their governments to conclude such a convention during the CD's 1991 session. A strong UNGA

resolution, adopted by consensus, should provide a clear signal to negotiators of a global political determination to achieve an effective and verifiable abolition of these reprehensible weapons.

Another resolution to which Canada attaches special importance is one on the subject of international arms transfers. This resolution is expected to acknowledge the report of the UN Secretary-General on ways and means of promoting transparency in international arms transfers.

This report, which was prepared by a Group of Experts including Mr. Ernie Regehr from Canada, was requested by the General Assembly at its 1988 session. As recommended in the report, Canada favours the establishment of an international arms transfer register, under UN auspices, as a means of building confidence and of discouraging states from embarking on excessive accumulations of conventional arms. Canada is pleased that support for an arms transfer register has become very broad and is optimistic that UNGA 46 will create such a system.

The Canadian delegation will again work within a core group of six countries to elaborate a resolution entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty." This year's resolution is expected to acknowledge developments over the past year relevant to a nuclear test ban treaty, and to add momentum to ongoing efforts towards this fundamental Canadian arms control objective.

As in the past, Canada will introduce a procedural resolution on a prohibition of the production of fissionable materials.

The important achievements of arms control and disarmament negotiations over the last year — notably the signing of the START and CFE treaties and the significant progress towards conclusion of a chemical weapons convention — is expected to contribute to a positive atmosphere at the UNGA 46 First Committee. Canada will seek to ensure that the Committee's work reflects positive developments and encourages further progress in all areas of arms control and disarmament. ■

Ambassador Consults on Arms Control and Disarmament Issues in Asia-Pacific



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason (standing, centre) in Kyoto, Japan.

From May 27 to 30, Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason participated in the Second United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, which was held in the ancient temple city of Kyoto, Japan. This timely international conference brought together politicians, diplomats specializing in disarmament issues, academics, technical experts and representatives of a wide range of non-governmental organizations. Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu addressed the opening plenary, as did the foreign ministers of Japan, Australia, the Philippines and the Russian Republic, as well as the head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Under the broad theme of challenges to multilateral disarmament, participants focussed on regional approaches to disarmament, control of weapons' proliferation and problems arising from the implementation of disarmament measures.

Ambassador Mason was invited to address the issue of "non-proliferation regimes versus partial or comprehensive prohibitions." In her remarks, she noted that Canada sees the topic not as an opposition — not a "versus" — but as a unison — an "and." In Canada's view, both non-proliferation regimes and partial or comprehensive prohibitions have their role in preventing the spread of weapon systems. This is why Canada, in framing its own initiative to encourage urgent international attention to curbing proliferation, is not trying to dictate a particular approach.

As Ambassador Mason explained, "We are not attempting to force decisions on the relative merits of the NPT versus the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, or a chemical weapons convention versus a mechanism such as the Australia Group. We recognize that there are differing, legitimate views within the international community on how best to deal with proliferation. We recognize as well that national decisions often cannot continue to wait upon more broadly-based action. What we are proposing is that each individual state commit itself to move ahead in the various existing non-proliferation regimes, forums and processes, be these unilateral, regional or global, *as it sees fit.*"

Conference participants discovered no quick fixes. Indeed, in the area of the implementation of verification accords, participants were struck by the many daunting problems surrounding the destruction of arms. Nonetheless, the Conference deepened multilateral understanding of current challenges and opportunities in the disarmament field, and of the increasingly interdependent and multidimensional nature of security.

At the close of the Conference, many of the participants joined in a tour of the Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima, a poignant reminder of the urgent need to find enduring ways to resolve disputes peacefully.

Following the Conference, Ambassador Mason spent ten days in the Asia-Pacific region, where she engaged in disarmament consultations with officials, academics and NGO representatives. In addition to Japan, she visited New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea.

While in Wellington, Ambassador Mason met with members of the New Zealand government's Advisory Committee on Disarmament Affairs — made up of members of the public — and, while in Canberra, she visited the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University.

The Ambassador's consultations provided an excellent opportunity to follow up on the work of the 1991 session of the UN Disarmament Commission and to begin preparations for the 46th session of the UN General Assembly. She also discussed security issues in the Pacific region and Canada's proposal for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue.

In addition, Ambassador Mason focussed on efforts to improve the functioning of multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies and on the need to promote enhanced cooperation on disarmament issues among like-minded countries from both the developed and developing worlds.

On June 27, shortly after returning from the tour, the Ambassador gave a seminar to students and faculty at York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies on the results of her consultations. ■

Consultative Group Looks at Arms Control and Disarmament in the 1990s

Arms control and disarmament in the 1990s was the focus of discussion when Quebec members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met with Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason in Montreal on March 20.

Participants heard from three speakers: Professor Harold Klepak of the Strategic Studies Department at the Royal Military College of St-Jean, who offered a North-South perspective; Ms Janine Krieber, PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (residing in Washington), who presented an East-West perspective; and Professor Jules Dufour of the Social Sciences Department at the University of Quebec in Chicoutimi, who took a functionalist approach.

A North-South perspective

Professor Klepak cautioned that the optimism that is justified in the East-West arms control context is misplaced when it comes to the Third World. While the end of superpower competition will have some beneficial effects, Third World states continue to have genuine security needs to which arms are a response. He went through the range of proliferation issues likely to dominate North-South arms control and disarmament relations in the 1990s.

On nuclear weapons, Professor Klepak saw signs that augur well for progress, including Brazil's and Argentina's agreement on nuclear cooperation, South Africa's announcement that it would sign the NPT, and Pakistan's and India's declared intention to take more seriously their agreements on not attacking one another's nuclear facilities.

On missile systems, Professor Klepak expressed greater pessimism. Ballistic missiles are an extremely attractive delivery system to Third World states; the Gulf War demonstrated their political — if not military — effectiveness; and the MTCR is limited in scope and membership. On chemical weapons, Professor Klepak was similarly unhopeful. Although such weapons were not

used in the Gulf War, their prestige may have been augmented as "the world held its breath." On conventional weapons, aside from Latin America, where improved relations have led to the possibility of negotiations, he did not see strong prospects for arms control.

Professor Klepak concluded by observing that Third World states recognize recent shifts in the international power balance and are scrambling to find their place in the new world order. Security questions are high on their agenda. If the North does not assist in providing security arrangements through diplomacy, the South will not disarm. He argued in favour of the parallel pursuit of arms control and conflict resolution, on a regional basis.

An East-West perspective

Ms Krieber focused on the meaning and implications of the "new world order." She noted that President Bush's conception of a world governed by the rule of law between nations is a long-standing ideal, also held by the creators of the UN, that in practice will be hard to construct. In her view, the post-Cold-War international system is characterized by interdependence, the end of bipolarity, the splintering of blocs and — as the USA and the USSR become proportionately less dominant — increased autonomy for middle powers. It is a more complex world, also a more dangerous one. Conflicts are likely to be smaller but also more frequent and more numerous.

Ms Krieber opined that the world is moving towards a balance-of-power system, where alliances are supple — witness the Gulf Coalition — and conflicts can come from any quarter. To counter the inherent instability of such a system, she advocated the use of diplomacy, treaties and multilateral understandings to regulate activities and reduce the need for arms. She favoured the retention of Cold War institutions like NATO which could develop into political bodies capable of promoting adherence to a code of conduct among states.

She advocated arms control and disarmament for the same reason, as long as the objectives are realistic.

Ms Krieger argued that with the superpowers reducing their defence budgets and exercising less control over the system, the question of the dissemination of weapons becomes of utmost importance. She argued in favour of stricter national arms export controls.

A functionalist perspective

According to Professor Dufour, the 1990s will be characterized by increases in armed conflict, in terrorism, in economic problems and in ecological catastrophes. He opined that the mainstream, arms controller approach to peace and security — namely to maintain the established order through deterrence and use of force if necessary — is costly and difficult to sustain. He advocated an alternative approach, promoted by peace and environmental movements, which emphasizes justice, equal sharing of planetary resources, common security and respect for human rights and the environment.

Professor Dufour argued that Canada's international image as a peacemaker suffered during the Gulf War and that, to regain this image, Canada should make tangible gestures for peace and disarmament in the 1990s. He recommended that the government develop and adopt a "White Plan" for peace, in collaboration with non-governmental organizations. As examples of policies that could be incorporated into such a plan, he proposed:

- introducing an obligatory course on disarmament and peace in Canadian universities;
- withdrawing from NATO;
- eliminating all Canadian weapons and converting the Canadian arms industry to non-military production;
- transforming DND into a Department for Security and Peace, which would incorporate the functions of Environment Canada; and
- creating "zones of security" or "parks of peace" across Canada and making the country a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

During the lively discussion that followed, several participants expressed support for Professor Dufour's

proposals. Others disagreed with his assumptions, pointing out that Canada is not participating in an arms race and that the defence budget has not been keeping pace with inflation. They further noted that much of the defence budget goes to support regional economic development. These participants argued that Canada cannot charge ahead and disarm the world, but must work slowly and steadily within the limits of the international system.

Conversion

Several participants argued that the government should develop a national conversion plan and support industrial conversion efforts in Canada. They suggested that the Defence Industry Productivity Program, which provides funds to companies for military research and development, could be a source of funding for conversion studies and support. Participants noted that employee and other non-governmental organizations in Quebec have already done much study in this area and that government and industry could usefully draw on this expertise when developing policy.

Arms transfers

Pointing to the difficulty of identifying stable regions and noting that stable regions can quickly become unstable, some participants argued that Canada should stop exporting military goods. It was also recommended that Canada strengthen its policy guidelines to prohibit the export of military goods to any country that violates human rights, and that the government stop subsidizing the defence industry.

Nuclear proliferation

One participant argued that the NPT is a disaster in the long run. By selling nuclear technology, we are building "nuclear mines" around the world and thus creating the potential for proliferation under the guise of non-proliferation. He recommended that NPT Article IV, which encourages cooperation to facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, be amended to encourage the sharing of "energy" technology, without specifying nuclear. This proposal received some support. It was further suggested that possession of nuclear

weapons should be regarded akin to apartheid and slavery, and that countries engaging in the practice should be shunned as international pariahs.

Other participants argued that Canada must deal with the reality of the international system, where competing national interests and state sovereignty rule. They opined that the elimination of nuclear weapons would be more dangerous than the control thereof. Another participant observed that there is a tendency among Canadians to believe international problems can be regulated by law. Outside Canada, international law and the UN are far from being seen as important. Security problems are looked at in bilateral and regional perspective.

Other

It was also suggested that the government do the following:

- put the environmental consequences of military activities on the agenda of the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, to be held in Brazil in 1992;
- ban war toys and other cultural objects that promote the use of arms as a means of solving conflicts;
- stop uranium exports and cruise missile testing;
- reduce DND's share of the federal budget;
- make Canada a "zone of peace," i.e., disarm completely and put in place a system of local, non-violent civil defence;
- use the West's desire for indefinite NPT extension as a bargaining chip to convince the USA to stop further development of nuclear weapons; and
- extend the MTCR approach to cover other dangerous technologies.

The Consultative Group consists of academics, peace activists, private researchers and former officials who meet periodically to advise the government on its arms control and disarmament policies. In addition to Consultative Group members, the Montreal consultation included a number of other individuals from Quebec who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues, as well as officials from EAITC and DND. ■

Canada Calls for BTWC Compliance Regime

As this Bulletin went to press, States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) were gathered in Geneva to review the Convention's operation with a view to assuring its purposes and provisions are being realized. The BTWC, which prohibits the development, production, acquisition and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, was negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (the forerunner of today's Conference on Disarmament) and was opened for signature in April 1972. Canada deposited its instrument of ratification in September 1972. The BTWC entered into force in March 1975. More than 115 states now adhere to the Convention, including all permanent members of the UN Security Council. Previous review conferences were held in 1980 and 1986.

Below are excerpts from the opening statement by the head of the Canadian delegation to the Third Review Conference, Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. The Conference was held from September 9 to 27.

If ever there was any doubt as to the horror associated by our publics with the prospect of the use of biological weapons, the recent Gulf War has erased that doubt and indeed has underscored through press reports the full extent of that public horror. There can be no justification whatsoever for the use, or threat of use, of such terrible instruments of terrorism, capable of causing casualties and death on a massive scale. Outright condemnation of such weapons is the very foundation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which seeks to ensure — by banning their development, production and stockpiling — that these weapons will never be available for use.

The Gulf War and its aftermath, particularly the work of the United Nations Special Commission, have highlighted not only the timeliness of this Review Conference but also the urgent need for States Parties to consider all appropriate measures to strengthen the legal and moral ban enshrined in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

The general purpose of this Review Conference is already established by the Convention itself: it is to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized. It has also been established that the review will take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

My delegation is pleased to join with others who have distributed material on the subject of scientific and technological developments — developments both dramatic in nature and swift in their impact. In this regard, I am referring to the document entitled "Novel Toxins and Bioregulators: The Emerging Scientific and Technological Issues Relating to Verification and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention" which Canada has distributed to delegations through the Secretariat. This document describes some of the exciting work that has taken place relatively recently in the field of biotechnology, and it expresses some concern about the potential for diversion of such materials and technologies to hostile purposes.

This brings me to another important element on the agenda of the Third Review Conference. The Final Declaration in 1986 specified that we would consider not only whether further cooperative (or politically-binding) measures might be warranted, but also that we would consider whether legally-binding improvements to the Convention, or a combination of both, might be

called for. On these matters there will undoubtedly be a variety of views and a need to find suitable compromises. However, let me state clearly at the outset that my delegation is fully prepared to consider the creation of additional legally-binding commitments, whether for the purpose of confidence-building or verification or both.

With respect to verification, we do not believe this will be a simple matter open to simple solutions. In fact, the document that we have circulated adds additional weight to the view that there

are many complex dimensions to the verification issue, particularly as regards the diffuse biotechnology sector. Nevertheless, verification is not just a yes-or-no, all-or-nothing proposition, and Canada is of the view that, despite the difficulties, progress can be made in strengthening this vital aspect of the Convention. We must begin to tackle the questions as to exactly what can be done and how best to go about it, and my delegation very much looks forward to a constructive and imaginative discussion of these questions.

Let me turn to the cooperative measures agreed at the Second Review Conference and the modalities subsequently agreed by an Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts. My delegation recognizes that there may have been some confusion in relation to what action was expected on the part of States Parties in order to implement the agreed measures. Surely this Review Conference will ensure that we can lay to rest these misperceptions and emerge with a common understanding on this important matter. The time has come for us to demonstrate solidarity on what has already been agreed, as a necessary step along the road to the effective consideration of further measures. In the meantime, we can derive some satisfac-

Verification is not a simple matter open to simple solutions. Obligations entail national efforts and costs.

tion from the fact that there has been a noticeable increase in the number of annual reports submitted to the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs.

One thing is clear, however. It is not sufficient simply to argue in favour of, or lend support to, establishing obligations, whether legally- or politically-binding. We must all face up to the fact that such agreed measures entail subsequent national efforts and costs. Much has been said about the "peace dividend" that can arise from spending less money on armaments and diverting

Canada Withdraws BW Reservations to Geneva Protocol

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Barbara McDougall, and the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Marcel Masse, announced in September that Canada is withdrawing its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol so that they no longer apply to bacteriological weapons.

"Let there be no doubt as to the depth of Canada's abhorrence of biological weapons," said Mrs. McDougall. "Our decision to withdraw these reservations underlines Canada's long-standing view that there is no justification whatsoever for the use, or threat of use, of such terrible weapons."

In 1925 when signing the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Canada retained the right to retaliate in certain circumstances, such as where biological or chemical weapons are used against Canadian citizens. As long ago as 1970, however, the Canadian government declared that it would not use biological or toxin weapons at any time in the future.

"The Canadian Forces have never used chemical or biological weapons. We do not possess them nor do we have the intention of ever acquiring them," said Mr. Masse. "We have only ensured our troops have adequate training and equipment to protect themselves against such an attack. Withdrawing these reservations further entrenches our opposition to their use as a means of waging war."

that expenditure to much more socially-productive uses. In such a case, spending less in one area can lead in certain circumstances to spending more elsewhere, for the common good.

There is also an arms control peace dividend, but it works slightly differently. It involves making an investment up front — spending money on negotiations, contributing to the creation of international mechanisms to verify agreements, as well as setting up national mechanisms to ensure the fulfilment of obligations — so as to create the improved security environment whereby other substantial savings can be realized and the funds diverted to more productive purposes. In our determination to make prudent decisions in light of current fiscal realities, we must take due account of this "multiplier effect" and of the longer-term benefits to be realized through such reasonable initial investments. To put it another way, what price will we pay in the longer term if we fail to do what we can now?

I believe there are many delegations gathered here that are prepared to consider additional confidence-building measures and, indeed, the establishment of a compliance or verification regime. In the case of confidence-building

measures, there are many candidates for consideration. Some non-government organizations, in particular, have been very active in producing proposals for our consideration, and I am certain that my delegation is not alone in expressing its gratitude for these helpful and thoughtful suggestions. Much effort and a great deal of technical expertise have been offered in a true spirit of altruism, and this effort deserves to bear fruit.

We government representatives shall have hard choices to make from the generous menu before us. In this regard, my delegation shall strive to evaluate the various proposals while bearing three characteristics, or criteria, in mind:

- practicability;
- effectiveness in enhancing transparency in relation to compliance with the Convention; and
- economy.

Although it is probably premature at this stage to recite a list of confidence-building measures that may find support at this Conference, there are three in particular that I would like to mention. Canada is of the view that more information can be provided by States Parties with respect to relevant defence research programs, including contractor-performed research. On this subject of

openness, my delegation will soon be circulating through the Secretariat a document entitled "Transparency Mechanisms for the Canadian Chemical and Biological Defence Program." In particular, this document describes the establishment and functioning of a Review Committee which allows certain respected members of Canada's non-governmental community to have access to all aspects of our chemical and biological defence program. We hope that other States Parties may find this experience to be of some interest, and that it will help stimulate further discussion on the subject of openness with respect to such programs.

In the civilian sphere, we also believe that more can be done in terms of reporting certain facilities. Again with a view to stimulating such discussion, my delegation will also be circulating a document prepared by Health and Welfare Canada on the subject of "Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines" outlining Canadian practices in relation to classification of agents according to risk and related physical containment levels.

A final point on the subject of confidence-building measures is warranted. My delegation will be pleased to join with others in proposing that a small group be established and tasked directly with responsibility for a number of Convention-support activities between Review Conferences, including follow-up in relation to annual reports in accordance with agreed confidence-building measures.

The issue of verification has been discussed at previous Review Conferences, as it shall be over the next three weeks. As I have already mentioned, this discussion often gets bogged down in all-or-nothing rhetoric, with the "good" possibly being held hostage to perfection, to paraphrase a popular expression. Furthermore, the discussion often tends to focus on technical matters, forgetting that there is an important political dimension to verification, both at the international and national level. Verification regimes, it seems, are often portrayed as magic black boxes, to which a compliance question is inserted at one end and an unequivocal answer comes out at the other. Of course, we

know that such a view misconstrues the real process of verification.

It has been said many times that verification is a process, just as confidence-building is a process, whereby States Parties can focus attention on compliance matters of concern and work together to address those concerns. That is why my delegation prefers to speak in terms of the creation of a "compliance regime" for the Convention that will encompass not only confidence-building measures but also verification measures — with the latter perhaps focussed on particular situations.

What is the difference in a name? Most importantly, the title of compliance regime conveys very clearly that it is the obligation of States Parties to *demonstrate compliance* with the Convention. In this way, we mean to put the emphasis on cooperative approaches to the resolution of any concerns that may occur.

Such a compliance regime could combine:

- the politically-binding commitments of States Parties on confidence-building measures;
- a provision for fact finding in circumstances when one or more States Parties may desire clarification, and this coupled with a strengthened consultation mechanism; and
- the establishment of institutional/procedural arrangements necessary for effective implementation.

Canada believes that such an integrated approach would constitute a practical and positive contribution to strengthening the international security regime of which we are all a part. My delegation is prepared to cooperate with others in moving forward in each of these areas...

I would like to take a moment to address the important issue of universal adherence to this Convention. Canada welcomes the new States Parties that have joined the vast majority of states in declaring clearly and forcefully that there is no place in this world for biological and toxin weapons. In fact, Canadians find it difficult to understand how it is that some countries still stand outside this circle. Surely these countries cannot be any more secure in knowing that, by standing apart, they

themselves may be promoting suspicions among others. The fact that some of those countries are attending this Review Conference is an encouraging sign, and the warmth of our welcome could only be further enhanced by their becoming full participants as States Parties to the Convention. Some, in fact, have already taken the first step in signing the Convention, and we regard this as more than just a symbolic gesture. We recognize that the very act of signing the Convention carries with it certain obligations under international law.

As the final substantive point of my intervention — but not the least important — I would like to take this opportunity to announce that Canada has recently modified its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons and of bacteriological methods of warfare, by removing the reservations insofar as they relate to bacteriological methods of warfare. As long ago as 1970, the Canadian Government unilaterally declared that it would not use biological or toxin weapons at any time in the future. The more recent formal action taken with regard to the 1925 Geneva Protocol is meant simply to ensure that there can be no suggestion of uncertainty anywhere as to the extent of Canada's abhorrence of biological warfare and the means of conducting it.

This is an exciting time in the field of biotechnology and indeed in international affairs. Canada believes that the many triumphs of science can be harnessed and applied where they are most needed for the general good, and the perversions of distrust and hostility defeated. This is, however, not the work of a single moment, a single signature. It requires a continuous application, cooperation among states and scientists, and willingness to move forward in our levels of commitment and vigilance.

Our goal is nothing less than a universal Convention with the strict adherence of all States Parties to its purposes and provisions. It is, I believe, an achievable goal. ■

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, October 1991 through January 1992

Ongoing: CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE 1A Negotiation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE 1 Joint Consultative Group meetings, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies negotiations, Vienna

October 14 - late November: UNGA First Committee, New York

November-December: CD inter-sessional meetings, Geneva ■

Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee Releases Report

The Honourable Marcel Masse, Minister of National Defence, announced on August 15 the release of the Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee's (BCDRC) first annual report. The Committee concluded that the Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces (DND/CF) biological and chemical self-defence programs, including research, training and facilities, are managed in a professional manner with no threat to public safety or the environment.

The BCDRC was established in May 1990 as a result of the 1989 Barton Report, a comprehensive review of the conduct of biological and chemical defence within the DND/CF. The Committee consists of prominent members of Canada's scientific community. It is chaired by Dr. E.R.W. Neale of Calgary, with Dr. C.E. Holloway of York University and Dr. G.L. Plaa of the University of Montreal as members.

"The BCDRC Report makes a number of practical suggestions concerning defence in a hostile biological and chemical environment," said Mr. Masse. "In particular, it emphasizes that CF personnel must continue to have the highest level of training and equipment to protect themselves against exposure to a variety of nerve agents."

Canada and USSR Sign Agreement on PDMA



General Moiseyev (seated, left) and General de Chastelain (seated, right) signing the Agreement. *Canadian Forces photo*

In Ottawa on May 10, the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and First Deputy Defence Minister of the USSR, General M.A. Moiseyev, signed on behalf of their respective governments an Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (PDMA).

The Agreement is designed to ensure the safety of personnel and the protection of equipment when the armed forces of the USSR and the armed forces of Canada exercise or operate in close proximity to each other. The Agreement, which is guided by the principles and rules of international law, commits both parties to avoid dangerous military activities and to resolve any incidents quickly and peacefully. The parties will meet regularly to review the Agreement's implementation. The USSR signed a similar agreement with the USA in 1989.

General Moiseyev was in Ottawa to discuss a wide range of bilateral issues, including international and European security, arms control, and the future of Soviet-Canadian military visits and exchanges. A two-year program of visits and exchanges, including bilateral military staff talks, began in 1990. While in Canada, General Moiseyev became acquainted with the life and activities of Canadian Forces personnel through visits to the Royal Roads Military College in Victoria, B.C., and to a number of naval, land and air force installations across the country.

In the summer of 1990, General de Chastelain became the first Canadian defence chief to visit the USSR, where he spoke to members of the Military Academy of the Soviet General Staff and visited military installations in Leningrad and the Kola Peninsula.

According to the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Marcel Masse, "General Moiseyev's visit and the signing of the Agreement are both reflections of the greater understanding and professional friendships that have been fostered between our two forces over the past year."

NATO Ministers Issue Communiqué

The following communiqué was issued in Copenhagen on June 7 by NATO foreign ministers.

At their Summit in London last July, our Heads of State and Government committed our Alliance of free and democratic nations to a process of adaptation commensurate with the changes that have reshaped the face of Europe. The fundamental review that they mandated of the Alliance's political and military strategy is being carried out on all levels and is approaching completion. Our Heads of State and Government will convene in Rome on 7th and 8th November to bring this process to its conclusion.

The process initiated by the London Declaration is an important contribution to enhancing stability and security within a free Europe. Our efforts to ensure stability in peace and freedom will recognize the political, economic, social and ecological elements of security, along with indispensable defence dimension. The Alliance, and the EC, the WEU, the CSCE and the Council of Europe are key institutions in this endeavour. We are guided by our ultimate goal of establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in the whole of Europe.

To this end, much has been achieved recently. Following the entry into force of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, united Germany for the first time participates in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level as a fully sovereign member of this Alliance. As we noted in our statement issued yesterday, the division of Europe has been overcome. In fulfilment of the undertakings contained in the Charter of Paris and the Joint Declaration of 22 States signed last November, which now assume ever greater relevance, we are cooperating with the Soviet Union and the other Central and Eastern European states more closely than before. We will work to make the forthcoming meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin a decisive new step in the development of the CSCE process.

In adapting to the new era in Europe and in striving to develop cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free, the Alliance will continue to perform its enduring basic missions. Today we have issued a separate statement setting out these core security functions of the Alliance. They will provide an essential basis from which the Allies will be able to take full advantage of new opportunities in building the new Europe.

* * *

1. A transformed Atlantic Alliance constitutes an essential element in the new architecture of an undivided Europe; we are agreed that the Alliance must have the flexibility to continue to develop and evolve as the security situation dictates. An important basis for this transformation is the agreement of all Allies to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members. We welcome efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognize the significance of the progress made by the countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.

2. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. We will continue, in particular, to ensure the Alliance's capability to fulfil its essential functions. The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty, as expressed in the statement on NATO's core security functions accompanying this communique. We all agree that the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of the Allies must

be maintained. This applies in particular to the integrated military structure for the Allied countries that participate in it.

3. Recognizing that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the Western European Union, and the Alliance. There will be a need, in particular, to establish appropriate links and consultation procedures between them in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security.

4. Allies are convinced that arms control and confidence-building measures will continue to shape and consolidate a new cooperative order in Europe in which no country need harbour fears for its security. The CFE Treaty is the keystone for such a stable and lasting peace on the continent. In our separate statement yesterday, we expressed our hope that a binding agreement can soon be reached to resolve the problems which had arisen with respect to the Treaty, allowing it to move forward to early ratification and entry into force and full implementation. Once concluded, such an agreement will open the way for us to make new proposals on military manpower in Europe without delay in the CFE 1A Negotiation now taking place in Vienna. In the CSBM Negotiations, we will seek further to strengthen openness and stability. Work within the Alliance is moving forward in preparation for new negotiations on conventional arms in Europe, open to all CSCE members, after the Helsinki CSCE Follow-up Meeting in 1992. We look forward to informal preparatory consultations on this

subject with CSCE partners in the autumn.

5. The Allies attach high importance to the earliest possible establishment of an Open Skies regime as an essential contribution to transparency among all participants. We have recently made fresh proposals to that end, and we call on all participants to join us in a prompt resumption of productive negotiations.

6. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Allies support the United States' efforts to reach a final agreement that will provide a framework for strategic stability into the next century. Preparations among the Allies concerned are advancing on an arms control framework for USA-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of their short-range nuclear forces.

7. Allies have worked for many years to advance progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament on a regional and global basis. The Gulf crisis demonstrated what we have long recognized: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missiles capable of delivering them, and excessive transfers of conventional arms undermine international security and increase the risk of armed conflict throughout the world. To meet this challenge, we have renewed our commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the international

Allies renew commitment to earliest possible advances in fora dealing with proliferation issues.

fora dealing with specific proliferation issues. We fully endorse the goal of concluding a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention by mid-1992 and support President Bush's initiative of 13th May to that effect. We will also seek in September 1991, at the Third Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention, to strengthen that Convention and to encourage further accessions to it. We will urgently pursue efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere to

address the problem of excessive build-ups of conventional arms by ensuring transparency and restraint. Several of our leaders have recently proposed arms control and non-proliferation initiatives, including for the Middle East. These initiatives reflect our commitment to the goals described above.

8. The Gulf conflict confirmed the importance of intra-Alliance consultations and information-sharing, which helped to reinforce political solidarity among Allies throughout the crisis. The collective expression of support for the Ally facing a direct threat demonstrated our resolve to stand by our commitments under Article V of the Washington Treaty and helped to deter a further expansion of hostilities. Although NATO itself was not involved in the Gulf War, the long practice of cooperation, common procedures, collective defence arrangements and infrastructure developed by NATO provided valuable assistance to those Allies that chose to make use of them in their respective efforts in support of the UN Security Council resolutions on the Gulf.

9. Looking to the future, we believe that just and lasting solutions to the problems of the Gulf and the Middle East are urgently needed. We thus support current efforts for comprehensive negotiated settlements to the problems of that region.

10. The Gulf crisis underlined that, in an interdependent world that is increasingly affected by technological advances, we must be prepared to address other unpredictable developments that are beyond the focus of traditional Alliance concerns, but that can have direct implications for our security. Now more than ever, worldwide developments which affect our security interests are legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate, coordination among us. We will thus increasingly need to address broader issues and new global challenges. We will seek to do so in our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral fora, in the widest possible cooperation with other states.

11. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by Her Majesty the Queen and the Government of Denmark. ■



SSEA Barbara McDougall with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Copenhagen in June.

NATO's Core Security Functions

The following statement was issued by NATO foreign ministers on June 7.

The purpose of the Alliance

1. NATO's essential purpose...is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.

The nature of the Alliance

2. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

3. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realize their essential national security objectives.

4. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

The fundamental tasks of the Alliance

5. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent

war and to provide for effective defence; and overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

6. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

II. To serve, as provided for in Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

7. Other European institutions such as the European Community, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However, the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

8. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above,

member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged. ■

CFE Update

The problem arising from the USSR's interpretation of Article III, the "counting rules" of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), was resolved on June 14 following several months of discussion and negotiation. Final resolution of the problem occurred within the framework of the CFE itself: an Extraordinary Conference pursuant to Article XXI was convened to permit the 22 signatory states to issue legally-binding statements which constitute a separate international agreement. A meeting of the Joint Consultative Group was also held to permit the USSR to issue a statement on military equipment held east of the Ural Mountains, where it is not covered by CFE.

The USSR addressed the concerns of all other signatories on the Article III issue by stating its willingness to assume several obligations. It agreed to place a cap on the holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the treaty (TLE) to be held by its Naval Infantry, Coastal Defence and Strategic Rocket Forces within the CFE area of application. The caps would be at levels existing on November 19, 1990. The USSR also agreed that the only TLE assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces would be armoured personnel carriers.

Furthermore, the USSR undertook to reduce the number of TLE held by other units within the CFE's area of application so that its total holdings of TLE within the area would conform with all CFE numerical limitations. Most importantly, in order to clarify CFE counting rules for the future, the USSR also agreed that irrespective of assignment or subordination, unless otherwise specified in the Treaty or the statements exchanged on June 14, all TLE based on land within the area of application would be subject to CFE limitations.

The identical statements of the other 21 signatories in response to the USSR's

statement accepted the legally-binding nature of the statements, agreed that these statements would enter into force simultaneously with CFE, and noted that the USSR statement provided a satisfactory basis for proceeding towards ratification and implementation of the CFE. In the ensuing months, Czechoslovakia was the first state to deposit its instrument of ratification. Others are expected to do so in the next few months. It is anticipated, however, that the restructuring of the USSR, and the separation of the Baltic states in particular, may require some additional adjustments in order to implement all CFE obligations. ■

Open Skies Talks Resume

Negotiations on an Open Skies agreement resumed in Vienna on September 9 among the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Open Skies proposal calls for unarmed, short-notice surveillance flights designed to build confidence among participating countries. Previous rounds of Open Skies talks were held in Ottawa in February 1990 and in Budapest in April 1990. In April of this year, Canada presented a new compromise position to the USSR on behalf of the NATO allies.

In announcing the resumption of negotiations jointly with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Mr. Gesa Jeszensky, SSEA Barbara McDougall observed that "an Open Skies regime is an important component of a new security order. We are delighted to work so closely with Hungary in these talks."

Mr. Jeszensky said, "We hope that the experience gained from both the Canada-Hungary trial flight [of January 1990], as well as the bilateral Open Skies regime that Hungary established with Romania, will contribute to the successful conclusion of these negotiations."

Talks on Open Skies will continue throughout the fall. Initial indications are that all sides are considering compromises and that an agreement can be reached within the next six months. ■

Focus: On Biological Weapons

Focus is written primarily for secondary school students.

By the time you read this article, over 70 countries, including Canada, will just have spent three weeks looking at ways to improve a disarmament treaty known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Because their use in modern times has been so rare and unspectacular, biological weapons are usually overshadowed in the news by their cousins in the mass destruction business — nuclear and chemical weapons. Like nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are capable of causing death and suffering on a huge scale. Fortunately, unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, they are under an international ban.

What are biological weapons?

Biological weapons — which are sometimes called “bacteriological” or “germ” weapons — are made up of two parts: a biological warfare agent and a delivery system.

Biological warfare agents are living organisms — such as viruses, fungi and bacteria — that cause disease or death in humans, animals or plants. In the case of humans, biological warfare agents can enter the body through the digestive system (by being eaten or drunk), the respiratory system (by being inhaled) or the skin (through bites or injections). They multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked and can often spread to others. Typhus, cholera, anthrax and yellow fever are examples of biological warfare agents.

The delivery system is the means of carrying the biological warfare agent to its target. The delivery system can be a city's water supply or a building's ventilation system, contaminated by a terrorist. It can be an infected insect, such as a mosquito, a louse or a mite. Most likely it will be a shell or a spray that delivers biological warfare agents in the form of clouds of tiny particles. The particles are then carried by the wind and inhaled by victims. Aircraft, bombs, artillery shells and missiles can be designed for this type of delivery.

The effects of biological weapons vary depending on the agents used and the targets attacked. For example, anthrax can cause high fever, breathing difficulties, collapse and often death within 18 to 24 hours. On the other hand, brucellosis causes headaches, weight loss and a fever that lasts from several weeks to several months.

A biological weapons attack could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, which is why biological weapons are considered one of the “weapons of mass destruction” (the others are nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons). The World Health Organization has estimated that if anthrax were sprayed over a city with a population of 5 million, 100,000 people would die and a further 150,000 would be incapacitated. Another report, by the University of Sussex, says that some biological weapons could kill as many people as high-yield nuclear weapons could.

Biological weapons are different from chemical weapons, which consist of chemical (as opposed to living) substances. Chemical weapons cannot multiply themselves. They work strictly through their direct, poisonous effects on humans, animals and plants.

Toxins are another class of poisons that can be used for weapons purposes. Although they are chemical compounds and cannot reproduce themselves, toxins are usually grouped with biological weapons because in their naturally-occurring form they are produced by animals, plants or micro-organisms. Toxins can also be made and manipulated in the laboratory. Botulism toxin, shellfish poison and snake venom are examples of toxins.

Biological weapons' use

Primitive forms of biological weapons (BW) were used in ancient times. The Greeks and Romans are reported to have poisoned drinking wells with human and animal corpses. In modern times, even though Britain, Germany, Japan, the USA and the USSR all started BW research programs in the 1930s or 1940s, the use of BW has been rare. It is believed that the Japanese used BW against Chinese cities between

1940 and 1944, killing some 700 victims. There is also evidence that at least 3,000 prisoners of war died in BW experiments carried out by the Japanese during World War II. More recently, the USA accused the USSR of using toxin weapons in Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan, and the USSR accused the USA of using BW in Cuba. Both parties have denied the allegations.

BW use has been rare for a number of reasons. BW are hard to stockpile because many biological warfare agents deteriorate when stored for long periods. BW also tend to be unreliable when used. Few germs can survive contact with air pollutants, sunlight and humidity different from what they are used to. As a result, many BW lose their strength by the time they reach their targets. The effectiveness of BW also depends on the wind speed and direction, which can't be controlled by the attacker. Given that many BW are highly infectious, the attacker risks damaging not only the target population but also its own, or that of neutrals and allies. The attacker could try to immunize its military and civilians, but this could alert the enemy to the prospect of BW use and make it hard to achieve surprise. Even if BW reach the target population, their effects take time to develop and spread. In a fast-moving battle, they might not make much difference to the outcome.

The rarity of BW use is probably also due in part to the widespread belief that such weapons are immoral. Biological warfare would be a deliberate reversal of the disease prevention and health care measures all countries have painstakingly worked towards in the 20th century. Also, as described below, BW are illegal.

Biological weapons treaties

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the use in war of poisonous gases and of biological methods of warfare. It does not ban the development, production or stockpiling of these weapons. Neither does it say what countries should do if the treaty is violated and BW are used in war. Over 125 countries have ratified the Geneva Protocol. Many of these countries reserve the right to use BW if BW are used against them.

In 1972, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was signed. It bans the development, production, acquisition and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. It also requires the destruction or conversion to peaceful purposes of existing BW. Over 115 countries are party to the BTWC.

Canada and BW

Canada does not possess biological or toxin weapons.

Canada ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1930. Like most other parties, Canada reserved the right to use BW against countries that didn't sign the treaty, and to use BW if BW were used against it. In 1970, to draw more attention to the need to control BW, Canada announced its clear policy not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use BW at any time. To ensure that there is no confusion, Canada recently removed its reservations to the Geneva Protocol with respect to bacteriological methods of warfare. That is, Canada will never use BW, no matter what the circumstances.

Canada played an important role in the negotiation of the BTWC. We signed and ratified the treaty in 1972, further committing ourselves to never develop, produce or stockpile biological or toxin weapons.

Since not all countries have signed the Geneva Protocol and the BTWC, it is possible that the Canadian Forces will someday have to participate in a war or a peacekeeping operation where BW might be used. During the Gulf War, for example, it was thought that Iraq might try to use BW. To make sure that Canadian personnel would be properly protected in such a case, the Department of National Defence carries out research into defensive measures against BW. These include protective clothing, respirators, anti-toxins and vaccines. This type of research is consistent with the terms of the BTWC.

Canada is concerned about the possibility that some countries might be developing and stockpiling biological or toxin weapons. As a result, the federal government has started a program to make Canadian industry and universities aware of the dangers of BW proliferation. They are advised to be on the look-out for suspicious attempts to gain knowledge about the use of biological technologies, as well as for attempts to acquire materials and equipment that could have BW uses. The goal is to make sure that Canadians involved in research and production for peaceful purposes do not contribute, either directly or unintentionally, to another country's biological or toxin weapons program.

Canada is also working to make the BTWC more effective. At a conference held in September to review the BTWC, Canada and other countries proposed that the treaty be strengthened to promote transparency (in other words, sharing of information) and to ensure compliance (in other words, to ensure that parties are acting in accordance with the terms of the BTWC).

Some arms controllers are worried that recent advances in biotechnology — especially genetic engineering — could make BW more effective and reliable, and thus a more attractive option to some countries. Biotechnology techniques make it easier for countries to come up with new biological warfare agents and to produce toxins on a large scale. At the same time, the equipment for doing so is becoming smaller and more difficult to track, and the range of civilian research with potential military applications is increasing. There are therefore some serious challenges to making arms control a reality in this evolving field.

So far, the world has had a relatively lucky track record with biological weapons. The goal is to make sure that the treaties banning these horrible weapons, and the national means for their control, remain effective and up-to-date. ■

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1 - September 30, 1991

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. North American Model United Nations (Toronto) — 1992 Simulation of UN General Assembly	\$5,000
2. North Coast Tribal Council (Prince Rupert, B.C.) — Nuclear conference, April 1991	1,000
3. UN Association in Canada (Vancouver branch) — Conference on naval arms control, November 1991	5,000
4. Canadian Association of NATO Defence College Anciens (Ottawa) — Symposium on "Canada and NATO," October 1991	4,000
5. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (Toronto) — Canadian Strategic Forecast 1991 seminar	3,000
6. Division of University Extension, University of Victoria — Public forum on "Canada's Role in Disarmament, Arms Control and Arms Trade," October 1991	5,000
7. Park View Education Centre (Bridgewater, N.S.) — 1992 Atlantic Coast Model UN on the Arms Trade	5,000
8. Peace and Environment Resource Centre (Ottawa) — Purchase of books about disarmament for library	1,000
9. Voice of Women (national office, Toronto) — 1991 Study tour of UN General Assembly	3,000
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$32,000

GRANTS


1. Project Ploughshares (Waterloo, Ont.) — Research and publication on naval arms control	7,000
2. Jocelyn Coulon (Outremont, Que.) — Book on Canada and the Gulf War	2,500
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$9,500

TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS	\$41,500 ■
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Acronyms

ACD — arms control and disarmament
 BCDRC — Biological and Chemical
 Defence Review Committee
 BTWC — Biological and Toxin
 Weapons Convention
 BW — biological weapons
 CBM — confidence-building measure
 CD — Conference on Disarmament
 CF(B) — Canadian Forces (Base)
 CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in
 Europe
 CSBM — confidence- and security-
 building measure
 CSCE — Conference on Security and
 Cooperation in Europe
 DND — Department of National
 Defence
 DRES — Defence Research Establish-
 ment Suffield
 EAITC — External Affairs and Interna-
 tional Trade Canada
 EC — European Community
 EIPA — Export and Import Permits Act
 G7 — Group of Seven leading in-
 dustrialized countries
 IAEA — International Atomic Energy
 Agency
 ICBM — intercontinental ballistic mis-
 sile
 IOZOP — Indian Ocean as a Zone of
 Peace
 MTCR — Missile Technology Control
 Regime
 NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Or-
 ganization
 NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
 of Nuclear Weapons
 OAS — Organization of American
 States
 PDMA — [Agreement on the] Preven-
 tion of Dangerous Military Activities
 SLBM — sea-launched ballistic missile
 SSEA — Secretary of State for External
 Affairs
 START — Strategic Arms Reduction
 Talks/Treaty
 TLE — treaty-limited equipment
 UNDC — UN Disarmament Commis-
 sion
 UNGA — UN General Assembly
 UNSCOM — UN Special Commission
 WEU — Western European Union ■

Verification from a New Perspective



The assembled aerostat.

EAITC's Verification Research Unit has been investigating the use of an air-
 borne, helium-filled blimp system as an arms control verification tool. The Unit has
 contracted Aeroblimp Incorporated, a Waterloo-based manufacturer and supplier
 of portable blimps or aerostats, to demonstrate an overhead surveillance system
 using a tethered aerostat as the platform.

During the past year, the Verification Research Unit conducted three evaluation
 tests of this innovative monitoring system: one at Canadian Forces Base (CFB)
 Petawawa, one at CFB Lahr in Germany and one at CFB Uplands in Ottawa. The
 main purpose of the tests was to evaluate an overhead imaging system in support of
 on-site inspections for arms control verification operations. Although the CFE
 Treaty does not presently allow for overhead monitoring, this system could be used
 for portal perimeter and traffic monitoring, and for area and object-of-verification
 surveillance. Other potential applications include drug enforcement, peacekeeping
 and search-and-rescue operations.

The aerostat is approximately 11 metres long and, when fully inflated with helium,
 is capable of supporting a 25 kilogram payload. For demonstration purposes, a
 35 mm camera was coupled to a high resolution video camera and operated from a
 height of 37 metres. Both cameras can be operated from the ground. By manipu-
 lation of a joystick, high-resolution 35 mm images were obtained using the video
 camera and its zoom capability as a viewing and directional guide. The tests
 demonstrated that the imaging camera system could adequately monitor a radius of
 approximately three kilometres (or 28 square kilometres) on a continuous basis. ■



At right: photo taken from aerostat during
 test at CFB Lahr. Aircraft are Belgian Air
 Force F-16 fighter jets.

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