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

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PRINCIPLES OF WESTERN
CIVILISATION

*BEING THE FIRST VOLUME OF A SYSTEM
OF EVOLUTIONARY PHILOSOPHY*

PRINCIPLES OF WESTERN CIVILISATION

BY

BENJAMIN KIDD.

AUTHOR OF "SOCIAL EVOLUTION," "THE CONTROL OF THE
TROPICS," ETC.

TORONTO

GEORGE N. MORANG & COMPANY, LIMITED

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WESTERN CIVILISATION

CHAPTER I

THE CLOSE OF AN ERA

It would be impossible for any informed observer at the present time, in the midst of our Western civilisation, to remain altogether unconscious of the character and dimensions of a vast process of change which, beneath the outward surface of events, is in progress in the world around us. The great controversies, scientific and religious, which filled the nineteenth century, have broadened out far beyond the narrow boundaries within which the specialists imagined them to be confined. The older antagonists in many of these controversies still continue, as they will doubtless continue to the end, to confront each other in the same attitudes of opposition as at the beginning. But the general mind is no longer closely engaged with the past aspects of these disputes. It is becoming more and more preoccupied with the larger problems beyond, which the new knowledge has brought fully into view, and with the immense social and political issues which are now seen to be ultimately involved.

The precursor of every great period of social and

political reconstruction has invariably been, as John Stuart Mill has pointed out, "a great change in the opinions and modes of thinking of society."¹ There is no era in Western history which can offer any parallel in this respect to the period in which we are living. There is no department of knowledge dealing with man in society, however authoritative its traditions, however exclusive and self-contained its position, which is not separated now by an immense interval from its standpoint fifty years ago. The modern doctrine of evolution is only the last of a long chain of sequences. But the changes which it has already effected in the tendencies of the deeper processes of thought altogether exceed in import any previously experienced. Even its general results have a significance which immediately arrests the attention of the thoughtful observer. The final aspect of authority and completeness which it has given to the work accomplished by a set of revolutionary tendencies in thought, which for four centuries have struggled with the most conservative elements in our civilisation, has so profoundly influenced the average mind, that the culminating effect of the revolution has been felt almost as if the meaning of the whole movement had been compressed into the lifetime of a single generation. The Western intellect has, as it were, passed at last through the initiatory phase of what Hegel called the terrible discipline of self-knowledge. The tendencies which John Addington Symonds beheld slowly transforming our civilisation—the audacious speculation, the bold explanatory studies, the sound methods of criticism, the free range of the

¹ *System of Logic*, by John Stuart Mill, vi. c. x.

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intellect over every field of knowledge¹—have all but accomplished the first stage of their work.

The extraordinary reach of the changes which the evolutionary doctrine is, to all appearance, destined to accomplish is not as yet fully perceived by any school of thought. But, if the attempt be made to grasp the application of what we may now distinguish to be one of its central principles, some general idea may be obtained of the remarkable character of the results towards which our Western world is rapidly moving.

Hitherto nearly all the systems of political and social philosophy that have controlled the mind of our civilisation, and all the schemes of human conduct and of human interest which they have involved, have had one leading feature in common. They have been all considered, in effect, to revolve round a fixed and central principle; namely, the interests of the existing individuals considered either separately as individuals, or collectively as members of political society. But the point of view in all these attempts has been altered by a revolution, the significance of which is without any parallel in the history of thought. For what we are coming to see is that, if we accept the law of Natural Selection as a controlling principle in the process of our social evolution, we must, by inherent necessity, also accept it as operating in the manner in which, in the long run, it produces the largest and most effective results. Our attention throughout the course of human history has been concentrated hitherto on the interests of the individuals who for the time being comprised what we

¹ *The Renaissance in Italy*, by John Addington Symonds, vol. vii. c. xiv.

call society. Yet what we are now brought to see is that the overwhelming weight of numbers, as of interests, in the evolutionary process, is never in the present. It is always in the future. It is not the interests of those existing individuals with which all our systems of thought and of political science have concerned themselves, but the interests of the future, which weight the meaning of the evolutionary process in history. We are, in other words, brought face to face with the fact that, in the scientific formula of the life of any existing type of social order destined to maintain its place in the future, the interests of these existing individuals, with which we have been so preoccupied, possess no meaning, except so far as they are included in, and are subordinate to, the interests of a developing system of social order the overwhelming proportion of whose members are still in the future.

Never before has a principle of such reach in the social sciences emerged into view. We look at all the processes of our civilisation in an entirely new light. How far we are carried beyond all existing theories of the phenomenon of modern democracy is at once apparent. For in nearly all these theories the observer perceives that he is always in the presence of the same fact. The intellectual outlook everywhere shuts down around him along one definite line, namely, that which marks the horizon bounding the interests included within the limits of the political consciousness of the existing individuals. Almost all the systems of political and social theory, which endeavoured during the nineteenth century to formulate for us the principles behind the unfolding of the pro-

cesses of Western democracy, have been constructed bodily within this narrow foreground. Through all the literature which has come down to us from the Revolution in France, through nearly all the present literature of the social revolt in Germany, through all the theories of that school of social philosophy long dominant in England, developed by Bentham, Austin, James Mill, Stewart, Malthus, Grote, Ricardo, and J. S. Mill, there runs one fundamental conception into which all others are ultimately fitted; namely, that the science of society is the science of the interests of those capable at any particular moment of exercising the rights of universal suffrage, and that the interest of society is always the same thing as the interest of the individuals comprised within the limits of its political consciousness.

Yet what we see now is that the theory of society as a whole has been lifted to an entirely different plane. For if there is one principle more than another which the evolutionary hypothesis tends to set forth in a clear light it is that the forces which are shaping the development of progressive peoples are not primarily concerned with these interests at all. The winning peoples who now inherit the world are they whose history in the past has been the theatre of the operation of principles the meaning of which must have at every point transcended the meaning of the interests of those who at any time comprised the existing members of society. Nay, more, the people in the present who are already destined to inherit the future are not they whose institutions revolve round any ideal schemes of the interests of existing members of society. They are simply the peoples who

already bear on their shoulders the burden of the principles with which the interests of the future are identified.

The controlling centre of the evolutionary process in our social history is, in short, not in the present at all, but in the future. It is in favour of the interests of the future that Natural Selection continually discriminates. The majority with which the principles that are working out the process of our social development are primarily concerned is a majority that never votes. It is that silent majority which is always in the future. The process of life included in Western history is, we begin to dimly distinguish, a process of development which is, beyond doubt, overlaid with a meaning that no school of scientific thought in the past has enunciated. Our Western civilisation, we are beginning now to understand, must be, over and above everything else, the history of a movement through which, in all the spheres of ethics, of politics, of philosophy, of economics, and of religion, there runs the dominating meaning of a cosmic struggle, in which not simply the individual but society itself is being broken to the ends of a social efficiency, which the human intellect can never more include within the limits of any theory of utilitarian politics in the state.

The extraordinary reach of this new master-principle in the science of society only continues to more deeply impress the mind on reflection. All the first attempts to apply the conception of evolution to human society — made, of necessity, by writers whose systems of thought were already practically formed before being influenced by the new knowledge — have,

we see, moved within the circle of an idea inherited from the past which is no longer tenable. The ruling conception which dominated nearly all theories of our social development in the nineteenth century was that the central feature of our social progress consisted in the struggle between the present and the past. This is the conception which expressed itself with such emphasis in the social writings of the English Utilitarians in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. But it was also the central principle around which Mr. Herbert Spencer, as an early exponent of the doctrine of evolution, constructed the theory of social and political development set forth in his *Synthetic Philosophy*.¹ It is the leading idea which expresses itself in Mr. Spencer's conception of the modern development towards industrial democracy.² It is the idea, continually reiterated, which underlies his theory of ecclesiastical institutions as forms through which the rule of the past expresses

¹ Spencer's dispute with the Utilitarians (cf. *Principles of Ethics*, §§ 21-110) never included any difference on this account. It was, in effect, only a difference between that Utilitarianism (as represented by James and J. S. Mill) "which recognises only the principles of conduct reached by induction," and the Utilitarianism (as represented by Spencer) "which deduces these principles from the processes of life as carried on under established conditions of existence" (*Principles of Ethics*, § 21). Spencer's theory of social development remained throughout, even on its ethical side, simply a theory of movement towards "an associated state," where "the lives of each and all may be the greatest possible in length and breadth" (§ 48). It was, that is to say, a theory of the realisation of the interests of the ascendant present, contemplating an eventual state of social order in which there should be no social claims at variance with the claims of the individual (cf. § 49, *Principles of Ethics*).

² Cf. *Principles of Sociology*, §§ 434-582.

itself.¹ It is the fundamental conception upon which he has built his principles of psychology, in which — Hume's idea² being carried a step farther — the content of the human mind is considered as related simply to past experiences either of the individual or of the race.³ But, as we see now, the character of the evolutionary drama in progress in our civilisation can never more be viewed by the human intellect as dominated by such a ruling principle. It is, we see, the meaning, not of the relation of the present to the past, but of the relation of the present to the future, to which all other meanings are subordinate, and which controls all the ultimate tendencies of the process of progress in which we are living.⁴

Since the great development of ideas to which Lessing, Herder, Jacobi, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel contributed, reached its full limits in Germany, and became in part discredited in the land which produced it, it may be perceived that Western thought, so far as it has endeavoured to rest itself on a scientific basis of phenomenology, has come to pursue a clearly defined line of development along which it has slowly contracted upon one central idea. Following this line of development in the movement

¹ Cf. *Principles of Sociology*, §§ 583-660.

² *Treatise on Human Nature*, i. and iii.

³ Cf. *Principles of Biology*, §§ 297-314; *Principles of Psychology*, §§ 223-273 and 430; *Principles of Ethics*, §§ 24-62.

⁴ We may, in short, apply to the future what Mr. Albion W. Small has so strikingly said of the individual in modern sociology: "Sociology is still struggling with this preposterous initial fact of the individual. He is the only possible social unit, and he is no longer a thinkable possibility. He is the only real presence, and he is never present" (*American Journal of Sociology*, vol. v. 4, "The Scope of Sociology").

begun in England with the English deists, carried still further on the continent of Europe under the theories of the French Revolution, and in its return wave culminating in England in that utilitarian theory of ethics and of the state, in the ascendant in England during the greater part of the nineteenth century, we have the meaning of this central conception now clearly in view. In ethics it found its consistent expression in the unhesitating assertion that, in the last resort, human conduct required no principle of support whatever but that of self-interest in society well understood. This was the assertion which, developed in the theories of continental writers like Condorcet, Diderot, and Helvétius, reached in one of its phases in England its highest expression in the writings of John Stuart Mill.¹ It is an assertion which, under many forms, exercises at the present time a dominant influence in a wide range of ethical thought throughout our civilisation.² Carried into the sphere of religion the same fundamental conception had its correlative affirmation equally clearly and equally unhesitatingly expressed. This was that the direction of progress in our Western world was to empty the concepts of the system of religious belief associated with our civilisation of that distinctive quality which projected their meaning beyond the

¹ Cf. *Utilitarianism*, by J. S. Mill; also his *System of Logic and Three Essays on Religion*.

² See *The Methods of Ethics*, by Henry Sidgwick, for the later position; and *Prolegomena to Ethics*, by T. H. Green, B. iv. c. iv., particularly § 366, for a definition of the fundamental difficulty it has involved. One of the principal recent growing points in English thought of an opposing development has been supplied in the writings of Edward Caird.

limits of social consciousness.¹ Translated, finally, into a theory of our social development, it became that assertion now fully in view in the most widely read class of social literature in Germany, namely, that the interests of society being the same thing as the interests of its component members, for the time being, the economic factor is, therefore, the ruling factor in human history; and that all human beliefs and institutions are ultimately the outcome of economic conditions — that is to say, of the rivalry of interests between the existing members of society.² As formerly we used to be told that all economics were relative to history, so now, says Mr. J. Bonar,³ we are asked to believe "that all history is relative to economics, men having been made what they are by economical causes."⁴

The inter-relation of all these phases of thought, the clear and consistently developed premises upon which they rest, and the central conception from which they all proceed, is at once apparent. What

¹ Compare James Mill's *Ethics*, or his article in the *London Review*, 1835, quoted by Mr. Leslie Stephen in *The English Utilitarians*, vol. ii. pp. 61, 62, with Mr. Bernard Bosanquet's essay on "The Future of Religious Observance" (*The Civilisation of Christendom*).

² Cf. *Capital*, by Karl Marx, c. i. n. 4, and *German Social Democracy*, by Bertrand Russell, l. i. See Professor Achille Loria's *Les bases économiques de la constitution sociale* (French translation by A. Boucard) for the current Italian form of this doctrine.

³ *The Economic Journal*, vol. viii. p. 443.

⁴ Mr. Bonar's remark on the doctrine goes to the root of the subject. "Both dogmas seem not so much obviously untrue as obviously beyond testing, for if all is tainted with relativity these dogmas themselves will be so tainted, and we could not have formulated either of them without unclothing ourselves of one epoch and rising above time and circumstance" (*Ibid.* p. 443).

they represent is a theory of progress in which the ascendancy of the present is regarded as the ideal towards which we are travelling, and in which the struggle that this ascendant present maintains against the forms, the beliefs, and institutions under which the past had hitherto ruled it, occupies the whole field of intellectual vision. The theory of our social progress in all its parts becomes, in short, simply a theory of movement towards a fixed social and political condition in which this self-conscious and self-contained present shall be at last completely emancipated from the past in conditions in which the gratification of the desires, and the furtherance of the interests, of the component individuals shall have been made as complete as possible.¹

¹ Compare the chapter "Of the Stationary State," J. S. Mill's *Political Economy*, book iv., with Marx's *Capital*, chaps. i. s. 4, and cxxxii.; also with Spencer's *Principles of Ethics*, §§ 48, 49. Mr. James Bonar thus describes the causes which tended to impress the German socialists with the idea that all social progress is nothing more than economic progress: "What impressed the German socialists—Marx, Lasalle, Engels, Kautsky—was the demonstrably economic character of many political changes of the last 300 years. In the course of industrial changes the mediæval landowners gave up their power to the capitalists, and the capitalists to the employers of labour. Therefore, said the German socialists, all is due to a change in the prevailing form of production. Where agriculture prevails we have a territorial aristocracy, a certain political system, and certain social institutions and laws; where commerce prevails we have another system; where manufacture, a third. This explains the rise of the middle classes into political power, but also the advance of the working classes as a power that will displace them and be (as we are told it ought to be) all in all. As in the economic theory of Marx and Engels all value is from labour, so on the great scale of politics all power is to be with the labouring class. Economic progress is thus the only real progress; the essence of all history is economics; the essence of all economics is labour" (*The Economic Journal*, vol. viii. No. 32).

There has been no system of ideas that has ever held the mind of the world from which the intellectual basis has been so completely struck away. That theory of human religions which so many minds have followed and surpassed Mr. Spencer in developing merely as a theory of survivals in the present; that theory of psychology, developed from Hume to Huxley, in which the content of the human mind is viewed simply as a condition in which the present is related to past experience either in the individual or in the race; that widely prevalent conception of social progress developed from Voltaire to Marx as a movement towards a state in which the self-conscious present is to be finally organised towards the complete expression of its own ascendant interests; has each passed definitely into the background never more to receive the authoritative assent of the human intellect to its premises. It is the shadow of the infinite future which rests now on the process of progress. It is to the future and not to the past that the theory of development has now become primarily related. We see now how true was the instinct with which the half-reluctant Schopenhauer dimly perceived the greatness of Kant in his hold upon the infinite.¹ For amongst the winning sections of the race, the direction of development at every growing point of the human mind, whether we be conscious of it or not, must, we see, be along the line where the present is being increasingly drawn into the sweep of an integrating process, the controlling meaning of which is once and for ever projected beyond the content of

¹ *Studies in Pessimism*, a series of essays by Arthur Schopenhauer, translated by T. Bailey Saunders, p. 34.

all theories of the interests of society as included within the limits of merely political consciousness.

It is impossible to look round us in our civilisation at the present time without perceiving how far-reaching is the process of change involved in such a shifting of the centre of significance in thought as is here involved. Systems of theory that have nourished the intellectual life of the world for centuries have become in large part obsolete. They may retain for a space the outward appearance of authority. But the foundations upon which they rested have been bodily undermined. It is only a question of time till the ruin which has overtaken them will have become a commonplace of Western knowledge.

If attention is directed to the tendencies in progress beneath the surface of events in the political life of the time, the impression made on the mind by the position in thought here described cannot fail to continue to be deepened. Any one who has mastered what may be described as the psychology of Western politics in the modern period, must have been impressed at some stage of his study — and probably all the more so if he has been able to detach himself from the local egoisms of nationality — with the world-wide influence which the system of ideas behind the political party representing the cause of progress in England has exercised on the development of our civilisation during that period.

The political party in England which has been most closely identified with the cause of progress in the past has inherited what is beyond doubt, and judging it from many standpoints widely removed

from each other, the greatest tradition in politics which our civilisation has produced. The movement with which that party is associated is directly related to almost all the principal results included in the modern drama of progress. From the period of the English revolution in the seventeenth century—the events of which were held to have justified Pitt in the minds of his contemporaries, and even before the close of the century which followed, in describing the doctrine of the right of princes, otherwise than as derived from the people, as already “sunk into contempt and almost oblivion”¹—down to the modern period—in which the industrial and political expansion of England and the United States have rendered all recent political and economic science scarcely more than a study or a criticism of the principles under which that expansion has taken place—it is the ideas associated with the movement which the party of progress in England represents

¹ The words were used in the House of Commons in 1788, in the debate on the right of the Prince of Wales to the unrestricted regency. The following is the account given in the *Buckingham Memoirs*: “Mr. Pitt asserted that the right of providing a remedy for the suspension of the regular powers of Government rested solely with the people. . . . The language, he held, upon this occasion is remarkable not only for its constitutional soundness, but for the perspicuity with which it states the actual question in contest, stripped of all disguises and evasions. ‘To assert the inherent right of the Prince of Wales to assume the government is virtually to revive those exploded ideas of the divine and indefeasible authority of princes which have so justly sunk into contempt and almost oblivion. Kings and princes derive their power from the people; and to the people alone, through the organ of their representatives, does it appertain to decide in cases for which the constitution has made no specific or positive provision’” (*Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third*, by the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, vol. ii. p. 39).

the* have been in the ascendant in the process of political development throughout the world.

It is the conceptions of the Included movement which are registered in the constitutional documents in which the people of the United States have expressed their political convictions. It is mainly the theories of society evolved in the still earlier phase of the struggle in England between the principle of authority and the popular will that were put into circulation in France by Rousseau, Voltaire, Condorcet, Diderot, D'Alembert, and which we follow towards our own time through the subsequent literature of the French Revolution.¹ It is the prestige of the theory of government as evolved in this movement, and principally among the English-speaking peoples, that has dominated the modern development towards democratic institutions throughout the world. All the principal landmarks in modern thought, from Hobbes onward, including Kant's *Critique* and the Darwinian hypothesis itself, have direct relations to fundamental intellectual conceptions of this movement.² In whatever light we regard it, we are bound to consider the movement, as a whole, as the channel

¹ Cf. *Natural Right* by David G. Ritchie, chap. i.

² Kant's work in the *Critique* presented itself to its author (cf. Kant's Introduction to the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*) as a criticism of Hume's fundamental position that the content of the human mind is related to experience. This is the position which has been closely associated with the utilitarian movement in England, and which has since received its most characteristic expression in English thought in Mr. Herbert Spencer's philosophy. The principal conception upon which the Darwinian hypothesis is based took shape in Darwin's mind after reading Malthus's *Theory of Population*, one of the most characteristic productions of the English Utilitarians (cf. *Life and Letters of Darwin*, by his son, F. Darwin, vol. i.).

through which, in modern times, the main stream of the evolutionary process has come down through Western history. The system of ideas associated with it, is that under which the most important development in modern history has taken place—the process of expansion in which a few millions of the least significant of Western peoples have, within two centuries, become a fourth of the white population of the world, and under which some five-twelfths of the human race have passed under the direct influence of their government, laws, and institutions.¹

If, however, at the opening of the twentieth century, we look in England at the party which has

¹ The total population of the United States and Dependencies, and of the British Empire with Dependencies and Protectorates, at the beginning of the twentieth century, was 522 millions. Speaking of the position of the white races at the beginning of the twentieth century Sir R. Giffen says: "The population of Europe and of nations of European origin, like the United States, might now be put at something over 500 millions. The United States themselves might be put at nearly 80 millions; Russia in its recent census showed a population which must already have grown to about 135 millions; Germany about 55 millions; the United Kingdom, with the self-governing colonies of Canada and Australasia and the white population of South Africa, 55 millions; Austria-Hungary, 45 millions; France, 40 millions; Italy, 32 millions; Spain and Portugal, 25 millions; Scandinavian countries, 10 millions; Holland and Belgium, 10 millions; and other European countries, 20 millions. A century ago the corresponding figure to this 500 millions would not have been more than about 170 millions. . . . The development was for the most part not uniform among the European populations. It was most marked in the Anglo-American section. The increase here was from a population of not more than about 20 millions, which was the population of the United States and the United Kingdom together a hundred years ago, to a population of not less than 130 millions at the present time. Russia and Germany also showed remarkable increases, but nothing like this" (Address to the Manchester Statistical Society, October, 1900).

behind it the tradition of such an imposing process of progress, the spectacle is one of peculiar interest. The great utilitarian movement of the nineteenth century has run its course, having brought under the domination of its principles almost all the leading tendencies of political and economic development in England and the United States. But the signs on all hands are apparent which mark how profoundly the dim prescience of the significance of the position which has been reached in Western thought has begun to affect the party which has thus so directly represented in the past the causes that are carrying the modern world forward.

To the more thinking mind the nature of the revolution which has been effected has already begun to be apparent. "The basis of the old radicalism has gone," says one of the most radical of recent political writers in England.¹ The one idea, it is pointed out, which had become common to all the groups of English, Continental, and American Radicals in the past, was the organisation of society towards the gratification of the desires, and the furtherance of the interests, of the existing individuals in political societies. It was this conception that the old radicalism held always in the foreground. It was, therefore, towards the ideal of finality in political institutions, and of a fixed social order in which all problems would be solved and the conciliation of all interests effected, that its purposes moved.² But all this, it is perceived, has been changed. An absolutely new world of ideas has been born beneath it. In the words of

¹ William Clarke, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xiv.

² *Ibid.*

the writer in question: "The radical notion of political finality has been doomed. Since radicalism was first preached as a creed in England, all political as well as all scientific thinking has been vitally affected by the conception of evolution."¹

As we regard the situation developing itself under our eyes we may distinguish how deep beneath the surface of events the principles to which its meaning is related in reality extend. They are principles which cannot be expressed in any theory of temporary or local causes. "There is no more patent and significant fact in contemporary Europe," says the same writer elsewhere, "than the failure, if not the absolute collapse, of parliamentary government. In France and Italy the Chamber of Deputies is half-dreaded, half-despised. In Austria, fortunately, the Reichsrath does not govern."² In England, the accompaniment of the conditions already described has been "a visible decline in the esteem in which Parliament is held, and of the genuine authority which it possesses."³ In Germany the Liberalism of the middle decades of the nineteenth century has ended in disillusionment, tending, amongst the parties that have succeeded those which professed it, towards a condition of avowed materialism in life and thought.

Now when the mind is carried back over the history of the past, it may be perceived that there is a noteworthy fact to which the movement which has hitherto represented the cause of progress throughout the English-speaking world has been primarily

¹ *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xiv.

² "Bismarck," *Contemporary Review*, No. 397.

³ *Ibid.*

related. That movement, as it began its course both in England and America, rested ultimately on a broad basis, which was the same in both countries, namely, the existence of a deep moral enthusiasm for certain principles which had in the last resort a very definite meaning for their adherents. They were the principles to which it was firmly believed the inner and higher meaning of our civilisation was vitally related. They were principles which were held, accordingly, to make one characteristic demand upon their adherents. All interests, local, personal, and institutional — including those of the State itself as conceived within the furthest limits of political consciousness — were held ultimately to go down before the claim which they made on the minds of men. The movement towards individualism, towards personal responsibility, towards the enfranchisement of the individual in all his rights, powers, capacities, and opportunities, was closely related to this fundamental principle with which modern Liberalism set out in England and America alike. It has been, beyond doubt, the consciousness, never expressed in formulas, but always present in the background, of the relationship of the individual to larger claims on him than any included within the purposes of the State, which has dominated the strenuous inner life of that process of political enfranchisement with which the genius of the English-speaking peoples has been identified during the modern period in history.

As, however, we watch the great movement of modern progress approaching our time, and follow the gradual development of the theory of society which accompanies it, we become conscious that we

have in sight a phenomenon of altogether exceptional interest in the history of thought. We observe this characteristic principle in Western Liberalism, the ultimate effect of which was to project the controlling meaning of the evolutionary process beyond the control of all mere theories of the State, gradually sinking out of sight; until in the form in which the theory of social progress reaches us at last it has practically disappeared beneath the surface of modern thought. It is the theory of the State alone which remains in view. The prevailing conception of modern progress has become, that is to say, no more than a conception of the adjustment of forces within the State — a mere theory, therefore, of the organisation of interests included within the limits of political consciousness. That characteristic principle which, as we now begin to dimly understand, must divide by a clear line of demarcation the meaning of our civilisation from that of the ancient world has disappeared. In the current theories of our social development it is as if we had been carried back twenty-three centuries of history, and occupied once more the standpoint of the world in the *Politics* of Aristotle.

As we look now at the problem which we see taking shape in our civilisation, the extraordinary character of its outlines begins to slowly reveal itself to view. In the light of the modern theory of evolution the ruling meaning which expressed itself through all the forms of the ancient civilisations is becoming clear. In these civilisations, in which the purposes of the State included the whole life and interests of the individual — material, moral, and religious — the ultimate fact to which all others stood related was

the ascendancy of the present in the evolutionary process. It was the rule of the present, and the ascendancy of all the powers, forces, institutions, and interests able to dominate it, which constituted the characteristic fact to which the meaning of all other facts was related in this phase of the world's history. The significance of our civilisation, on the other hand, as expressed through the modern movement of enfranchisement, has been, as we are now beginning to understand, to break this hitherto universal ascendancy of the present. And the process of social evolution in which this end is being accomplished is one in which all human activities — in economics, politics, ethics, and religion — are being drawn into the sweep of an integrating process, the controlling meaning of which tends to be projected beyond the content of all theories of the interests of society as included within the limits of the consciousness of the State.

What, therefore, is the significance of the remarkable position in modern politics wherein we see the forward movement in our time so deeply committed to a theory of progress in which it is this conception of the ascendancy of the present that is again everywhere in evidence? It is when, for answer, we turn now to the inner life of the party with which the cause of progress is identified that we realise to the full the nature of the situation with which Western Liberalism is beginning to find itself confronted in our civilisation.

The leading fact in Western history, which has accompanied the development of the intellectual theory of society here described, has been the passing of the political and economic life of the English-speaking peoples, under the dominance of the ideas

of that school of political and economic theory which has come to be generally known in our time as the Manchester school. Although many of the theories with which this school of thought accompanied its teaching, and in particular the doctrine of international trade with which its name became associated in England, have failed to obtain general acceptance outside of Great Britain, the significance of the school is not to be judged from this fact. It is the general spirit of the ideas from which its fundamental premises were developed that has become the dominant influence in the modern epoch of commercialism throughout our civilisation.

The central and most characteristic conception of the Manchester school, to which all others were related, may be briefly stated. It was the principle of *laissez-faire* competition as applied consistently through the phases of the economic process in society; first of all to the relations of capital to labour, then to the relations to each other of competing industries and undertakings within the State, and finally—in the form in which the conception was accepted in England—to the processes of international trade throughout the world. In the ideal condition of social order which was contemplated, the members of society were conceived as released in the State into a kind of free and uncontrolled struggle in pursuit of individual gain. In the state of unrestricted competition, contemplated by exponents of the school in England, the conditions in wages, rewards, prices, standards, and results were conceived as slowly moving towards a phase of ultimate economic equalisation throughout the world.

Here we have in view the perfectly clear and consistent theory of social order as it was presented by the Manchester school. Its characteristic principle remains, however, to be emphasised. As the advocates of this theory of social order held that, in the state of uncontrolled and unrestricted competition which it contemplated, the tendency of all economic evils would be to cure themselves, a further assumption followed. All sense of responsibility—personal, social, or collective—was therefore regarded as divorced from the incidents and results of the competitive process. The leading conception of the school was, in short, that of non-interference with men in their pursuit of gain throughout the world. And the ultimate conception of the State was that of an irresistible power in the background organised primarily towards providing strict guarantees to men for the possession of what they had secured.¹

¹ It has been pointed out of England, by the writer quoted, that, although "when we speak to-day of the old Radicalism we almost at once think of Manchesterism," the ideas of the modern Liberal movement in England did not at the outset necessarily imply such a conception of organised public life as here indicated. There has been a retrogression. The conditions under which the remarkable transition which has taken place in England was accomplished are considered to be associated with two causes: The transition "was due, in the first place, to the isolation of the economic factor from all the other varied factors of political life, and the making of that one factor the expression of all public purpose. In the second place, it was apparently largely due to the action of that section of the Chartists who, under the lead of Feargus O'Connor, resolutely and vehemently drifted from the middle-class Radicals, leaving the latter immersed in business, without the helping hand of labour, absorbed (as it was inevitable they should be) in the problem of material production, and with no fruitful view of the position and functions of the state" (*Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xiv. pp. 82, 83).

Whatever may have been the intention with which the Manchester school set out; whatever may have been the desires of its individual members; or the conviction of its individual exponents to the effect that economic evils left alone would cure themselves; whatever may even be the eventual justification of its theories as those of a necessary condition of society intervening between two epochs of the world's development; there can apparently be no longer any doubt as to the essential meaning of the phase of social development which Manchesterism represents. As the evolutionist watches the world-process slowly falling throughout our civilisation to the level of its ruling factor; as he sees it gradually, but inevitably in the conditions described, eliminating from economic competition in its various phases all qualities and conditions but those contributing to success and survival therein—the impression produced on the mind becomes definite. The largeness of the stage upon which the world-drama is being enacted obscures for a time the controlling meaning. But the distinctive character of the process as a whole begins at last to be manifest. The principles of the Manchester school have, he sees, one meaning which ultimately overlies and over-reaches all others. They are the characteristic vehicle through which the present has endeavoured to express its ascendancy in the modern political drama in our civilisation. They are the principles which correspond to the position in thought that has just been described. In the future history of social development it is with the era of the ascendancy of the present in the economic activities of the world that the distinctive meaning of the Manchester

school is destined to be identified. It is as if the conditions of the irresponsible struggle to the death between men in the ancient civilisations had been changed from a military to an economic basis, while as yet every one of its other ruling principles had remained unaltered.¹

As in this light we look at the applied results of this conception of society as they have been developed in our civilisation down into the period in which we are living, the relationship to each other of the leading phases of the economic process may be distinguished.

In the long characteristic struggle maintained throughout our civilisation in the modern period by labour against the terms of capital, all the details are, we begin to see, related to the fact which is here emphasised. Whatever the accompaniments of this struggle, or whatever the passing rights or wrongs on either side, it is now beginning to be clear that the one fact which weights its meaning is that it is primarily a conflict in which society is confronted with the ascendancy of the present in the economic pro-

¹ In an interesting analysis, Dr. Cunningham brings out the fact that, despite the larger humanitarian and cosmopolitan conceptions often associated with the application of the modern theories of trade, there was really nothing cosmopolitan in the views with which the Manchester school set out in England. In their principles they "set wealth in the foreground and ignored national power as an independent aim." But both in internal and external relations the ruling principle was related to the pursuit of wealth. For, "it was reasonable to maintain that each individual knew his own interest best, that, in pursuing his own interest, he accumulated most wealth for himself, and that, in so far as each individual acted in this fashion, the aggregate wealth of all individuals and the total wealth of the nation would increase" (*The Growth of English Industry and Commerce in Modern Times*, by W. Cunningham, pp. 584-585).

cess. It is a struggle in which we see labour setting out in the modern period able, even in its collective expression, to wield only the weapon of the right to reduce profits, against the power of capital to refuse the right to live. It has been a struggle, therefore, in which society has found itself oppressed with the barbarous and disorganising methods of strikes and lock-outs on a growing scale; in which, even where labour has succeeded, it has often been successful only in conditions in which neither its own higher interests nor those of society are tending to be ultimately realised; and in which, as through the long process of modern labour-legislation the primary conceptions of the Manchester school have become challenged by an increasing social instinct, the outlines of an immensely larger problem behind, towards which we are moving, have slowly become visible.

In the wider phases of the industrial process it is the same fact of the ascendancy of the present with which society is becoming more and more consciously envisaged. As under the ruling spirit of the conceptions of the Manchester school, unrestricted competition in industry has tended to become essentially a free struggle for gain, divorced from all sense of responsibility, we see how the process has, by inherent necessity, tended to eliminate from it all qualities and principles save those contributing to success and survival in a conflict waged under such conditions. The resulting tendency of industry and commerce to pass gradually under the control of aggregations of capital effectively organised for conflict, while the outstanding rivals gravitate towards the phenomenon of monopoly control on a gigantic scale; the growth

of wealth and power in such organisations until they have become rivals in some respects of the State itself; the exercise of such unusual and immense powers, with no sense of responsibility other than that of the self-interest of capital in pursuit of gain; the earning of profits which, when all allowance is made for benefits rendered in the organisation of industry, tend more and more to correspond to conditions of monopoly and less and less to equivalent in terms of social service; with, incidentally, the accumulation in individual hands of private fortunes tending to equal in capital amount the annual revenue of first-class States: are all features of a state of society in which, under the characteristic economic activities of the modern world, we see the ruling conditions of the ancient civilisations again being reproduced. They are all expressions of a single fact, namely, that ascendancy of the present in the economic process, which is the correlative of the position in thought already described, but which, nevertheless, cannot be, as would appear, the condition towards which human society is developing.

As such a phase of social development moves slowly in our time toward its highest expression on the world-stage, it is the lurid and gigantic details of the same principle that continue to hold the mind. As in the international exploitation of the resources of the world all nations have tended to come at last into a common market to compete for a diminishing margin of profit; as, therefore, in a competition for gain divorced from the sense of responsibility, we see the process here also falling to the level of its ruling factor, one of the most remarkable situations in history has gradually

become defined. With the development of the movement towards the equalisation of economic conditions throughout the world there has emerged into the view of the leading peoples a tendency, inherent in the process from the beginning, compelling capital at an ultimate stage of the process to close with the causes opposing it; and, in a sustained and organised effort, to maintain the process of exploitation in trade and industry in the world at the level of its lowest standards in human life and labour, that is to say, at the standards of the less developed races of mankind.

This is the phase of the problem which has already begun to dimly haunt the consciousness of labour in our civilisation, and which, in a hundred complex forms, already makes itself felt in the international relations of our time. Yet it was the spectacle which the late Charles H. Pearson, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, calmly contemplated as likely to be realised at no distant time, and as the natural and apparently legitimate culmination in practice of the theories of the Manchester school. The day was probably not far distant, he assured us, when we should see the races of our Western civilisation elbowed and hustled, and in large measure superseded, by the yellow races of the world, through the destiny of capital to find in these latter its most effective instruments when it proceeded in due course, and in obedience to its inherent tendencies, to wage the economic conflict throughout the world under the lowest possible standards of human life and human labour.¹

¹ *National Life and Character*, chaps. i.-iii.

The profound materialism of this final conception, which—blind to the significance of the principle which our civilisation represents, and blind, therefore, to the meaning of the causes for which that civilisation has wrought and suffered for a thousand years—contemplated the lower sections of the race extinguishing the higher, simply by reason of their ability to wage an economic struggle on more purely animal conditions, could hardly be carried farther. In it we see the conception of the ascendancy of the present in the modern economic process which led James Mill in the early decades of the nineteenth century to assert that there was no place in the theory of society for a moral sense, as it was not required to discern "Utility,"¹ carried, as it were, to its final expression in the world process.

This is the position in Western thought with which an era closes.² In the current literature of the social revolt throughout our civilisation, we only see, as it were, the theories of the middle decades of the nineteenth century carried to their logical application. It is, in reality, the governing idea of Bentham, the Mills,

¹ Mr. Leslie Stephen, speaking of this polemic of James Mill against the moral sense theory in the dispute with Mackintosh, says justly, that it "reveals the really critical points of the true utilitarian doctrine. Mill would cut down the moral sense root and branch. The 'moral sense' means a 'particular faculty' necessary to discern right and wrong. But no particular faculty is necessary to discern 'utility.' . . . The utility is not the 'criterion' of the morality, but itself constitutes the morality" (*The English Utilitarians*, by Leslie Stephen, vol. ii. p. 321).

² In it we see how, to use John Morley's words, "great economic and social forces flow with a tidal sweep over communities that are only half-conscious of that which is befalling them" (*The Life of Richard Cobden*, vol. ii. chap. xx.).

and the group of writers who developed the theories of the Manchester school in England that we encounter again in Loria's conception, as applied to modern Italy, of the dominance of the economic factor in society, — Marx's conception, as applied to our civilisation at large, of the materialistic interpretation of history; in Nietzsche's conception, as applied to the occupying classes in modern Germany, of the superlative claims of the *Uehermenschen*.² The point of view may be altered according to the nature of the interest concerned; but the essential conception is the same in all cases — the ascendancy of the present in the economic process in history.

The relation to each other of all the phases of thought and action here discussed will be evident. They are all but the closely related aspects of the influence on the human mind of a single conception, the meaning of which may be said to have dominated the theory of our social progress through the democratic development of the nineteenth century, namely, that the controlling centre of the evolutionary process in the drama of human progress is in the present, and that the ascendancy of the interests of the present is the end toward which the whole order of our social and political development moves. This is the conception from which the intellectual foundations have been removed.

¹ *Les bases économiques de la constitution sociale.* — BOUCHARD.

² *The Twilight of the Idols, and Zarathustra.*

CHAPTER II

THE SHIFTING OF THE CENTRE OF SIGNIFICANCE IN THE EVOLUTIONARY HYPOTHESIS—THE PRINCIPLE OF PROJECTED EFFICIENCY

To obtain some definite view of the nature of the remarkable position towards which the theory of our Western progress has been carried by recent developments in the evolutionary hypothesis, it is in the highest degree desirable that the observer should, in the first instance, endeavour, as far as possible, to detach his point of view from those more current and transient phases of social controversy which largely occupy the attention of the world.

The first step towards realising the condition of mind in which it is desirable to approach the consideration of the problem of modern progress through the medium of the biological sciences is that which every really scientific observer who has followed the trend of recent thought will in all probability have taken for himself. There is possibly no one at the present time, who has made progress towards understanding something of the governing principles of our social development, that has not arrived at a point where he has felt the necessity for definitely and finally putting away from him a conception which pervaded almost all departments of social philosophy in the past; namely, the conception that

there can be such a thing as a true science of human life and progress apart by itself. There cannot be, we must understand, such a science regarded as an isolated section of knowledge; or in any other sense than as a department of higher biology. All that vast and complex series of phenomena, which we have in the history of our social progress, constitute, it would appear, only the last and highest phase in the history of life, the latest orderly events in a chain of law and sequence stretching back to the beginning of sentient existence. There has been only one process of development throughout: there is only one system of law therein. Every phase of the social life around us, political, economic, and ethical,¹ however self-centred and self-contained it may appear to the beholders themselves, occupies, and will apparently for ever occupy, strictly controlled and subordinate relationship to this central process of development. We must, in short, put away from us, once and for all, the idea that we can understand any part of this process as an isolated study. Its last human details — those with which the social sciences are concerned, and those in particular which carry us down into the midst of Western progress — can, like all those which have preceded them, only be studied with profit by science when we understand something of the nature of the process as a whole, and of the laws that have controlled it throughout.

¹ The distinction made by Huxley (Oxford, Romanes Lecture, 1893) between the cosmic process and the ethical process is entirely superficial. As Huxley afterwards pointed out in a note to the lecture, it must be taken that the social life and the ethical process in virtue of which it advances towards perfection are part and parcel of the general process of evolution (cf. *Evolution and Ethics*, note 20, p. 114).

Now, the observer who has noted the direction in which the biological sciences have been affected by recent developments in the evolutionary hypothesis, and who has perceived the relationship of the conclusions which have been reached, to theories and principles of human society accepted without question in the past, will probably find that there is a conviction which has gradually come to assume shape and to attain to definitiveness in his mind. It will come to be seen in the future, he perceives, that during the last few decades through which the world has lived an entirely new direction has been given to the course of human thought. The Darwinian hypothesis, as it left the hands of Charles Darwin, remains in all its main features unshaken. It has survived, practically without serious challenge, the criticisms to which it has been subjected. And yet it has been already overlaid by a meaning which carries us almost as far beyond the import of Darwin's contribution to knowledge as the Darwinian hypothesis itself carried us beyond the more elementary evolutionary conceptions of Goethe and Lamarck.

We have, it would appear, passed into a new era of knowledge by a development in our conception of the process of biological evolution, which will almost certainly be seen, when viewed from the horizon from which the philosopher and historian of a later period will regard our time, to dwarf into comparative insignificance other features of contemporary thought upon which attention has been concentrated to a far greater degree. No worker in any department of social philosophy, however great and varied his qualifications in other respects, can any longer be

said to be fully equipped for the discussion of those problems of our social development with which the world is struggling until he has perceived, in general effect at least, the hearing of the change which has been effected on the process of our social evolution as a whole. Let us see, therefore, if we can, in the first place, bring into view the nature of the development which has taken place in the hypothesis of biological evolution since it left the hands of Darwin.

The main outlines of the Darwinian theory of the evolution of life are, in our own time, familiar to nearly all informed persons. It may be well, however, in order to bring more clearly before the mind their relationship to the subject with which we are about to deal, to briefly pass them in review.

The fundamental conceptions of the Darwinian theory are only two in number. We have, in the first place, the enormous power of increase with which every form of life, from the lowest to the highest, appears to be endowed; so that its numbers continually tend to press upon, and even to altogether outrun the means of comfortable existence for the time being. "There is no exception," says Darwin, "to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so high a rate that, if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair."¹ The increase of life, as Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace points out, is always in a geometrical ratio.² Linnæus has calculated that, if an annual plant produced only two seeds—and there is no plant so unproductive as this—and their seedlings next year produced two, and so on, then in

¹ *Origin of Species*, chap. iii.

² *Darwinism*, p. 25.

twenty years there would be a million plants.¹ "Even slow-breeding man," says Darwin, "has doubled in twenty-five years, and, at this rate, in less than a thousand years there would literally not be standing room for his progeny."² Of every form of life in the world the same law holds good: its rate of increase tends to overhalance the conditions of its life.³

This is the first fundamental principle with which we are concerned in the Darwinian hypothesis. The second principle which we have to take into account is, that we find in the individuals so produced a tendency to variation in all directions within small degrees, with the capacity for the transmission to offspring of the result. This individual variability, as Mr. Wallace has taken considerable pains to show in a lengthy examination of the evidence,⁴ "is a general character of all common and widespread species of animals or plants"; and, further, "it extends, so far as we know, to every part and organ, whether external or internal, as well as to every mental faculty"; and, still further, "each part or organ varies to a considerable extent independently of other parts."⁵

From these two great classes of facts, now gen-

¹ Exactly 1,048,576.

² *Origin of Species*, chap. iii.

³ The elephant is reckoned the slowest breeder of all known animals. Assuming that it begins breeding when thirty years old, and goes on till ninety years of age, bringing forth only six young in the interval, and surviving till one hundred years old, Darwin reckoned that in a period of some 750 years there would be living, as the descendants of a single pair, nearly nineteen million elephants (*Origin of Species*, c. iii. p. 51).

⁴ *Darwinism*, c. iii. and iv.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 81.

erally accepted without question, there has been deduced the distinctive law of Natural Selection, which, in the words of Darwin, consists of "the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life." Despite the overwhelming ratio at which life is produced — so great, as we have seen, that even in the case of the slowest breeding animals it has only to be imagined to continue to any appreciable length of time to see that the numbers would exceed all possible conditions of existence — there is, under ordinary circumstances, no perceptible increase in the numbers of any species. The balance of nature is evenly maintained from generation to generation through prolonged periods of time. There must be, therefore, at some point, or indeed at a great number of points, in the life of every individual a tremendous struggle for a place in the categories of life. Here we have what appears to Darwin's mind to be the doctrine of Malthus on a universal scale. For, "as many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary, however slightly, in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be *naturally selected*."¹ From the strong principle of inheritance,

¹ The close connection between the Darwinian hypothesis (of which the law of Natural Selection as here stated is the essential part) and the system of ideas which the Manchester school represented in England has been remarked on. The law of Natural Selection, in the terms above quoted, was suggested to Darwin by reading Malthus on Population, and in the text of the *Origin of Species* he describes it as "the doctrine of Malthus applied to the whole animal

any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form."¹

It is, in short, to the accumulation through infinite tracts of time of small variations useful or beneficial to the organism, acquired in a ceaseless rivalry, and in an environment continually changing, that we owe the extraordinarily varied and complex forms of life in the teeming world around us at the present time. As the result of the ceaseless operation of such a cause, it has come about, as Darwin points out, that "the structure of every organic being is related, in the most essential yet often hidden manner, to that of all the other organic beings with which it comes into competition for food or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it preys."² It may be metaphorically said, he continues in another striking passage, "that Natural Selection is daily and hourly scrutinising throughout the world the slightest variations—rejecting those that are bad, preserving and adding up all that are good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life. We see nothing of these slow changes in progress until the hand of time has marked the lapse of ages, and then so imperfect is our view into long-past geological ages, that we see only that the forms of life are now different from what they formerly were."³

and vegetable kingdoms" (p. 3). It will be of some interest to keep this fact in view in endeavouring to present to the mind the relationship between the political conceptions of the Manchester school of thought and the development which has since taken place in the Darwinian hypothesis.

¹ *Origin of Species*, Introduction.

² *Ibid.* c. iii.

³ *Ibid.* c. iv.

In all this it is necessary to keep clearly in view certain governing principles to which all others are subordinate. The first tendency of all elementary criticism is to find in life itself internal causes for development or divergence along certain lines. But we must never lose sight of the tremendous power and universality of the agencies at work.¹ We must never forget the reach of the ever recurring process of selection; that the increase of life is infinite; that only the few are selected; and that the selection is determined by some cause in every case.² In all the controversies between the Darwinians and the older naturalists, who saw "laws of growth" projecting themselves in all directions through life, the consistent tendency of the discussion has been to show how, whether such laws exist or not, they must have coincided with the fittest in every other respect, or else they would have been overruled or rendered nugatory.³ In the processes of life extending over vast stretches of time, we must, in short, consider the law to have been always the same. To put it in Mr. Wallace's words: "The best organised, or the most healthy, or the most active, or the best protected, or the most intelligent, will inevitably, in the long run, gain an advantage over those which are inferior in these qualities—that is, the *fittest will survive*."⁴ And they will tend to transmit to their descendants in cumulative degree the qualities upon which that fitness depended.

¹ *Darwinism*, by A. R. Wallace, p. 122.

² *Ibid.* 123.

³ See in this respect Mr. A. R. Wallace's striking argument as to the preponderance of Natural Selection over sexual preference (*Darwinism*, c. x.).

⁴ *Darwinism*, p. 123.

This, in brief recapitulation, is the outline of the Darwinian theory of biological evolution, as it has stood the test of attack and examination from innumerable points of view in one of the most strenuous and remarkable intellectual periods in history. Possibly no other single conception of the human mind has produced throughout so many departments of knowledge results at once so profoundly disintegrating and so radically reconstructive. It has, to use the words of Romanes, "created a revolution in the thought of our time, the magnitude of which, in many of its far-reaching consequences, we are not even yet in a position to appreciate, but the action of which has already wrought a transformation in general philosophy as well as in the more special science of biology that is without a parallel in the history of mankind."¹ Whatever may have been thought of the hypothesis in the period of discussion through which it has survived, there are probably few thoughtful minds at the present time who, having once grasped the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, have not received a deep and lasting impression of its relation to actualities, and of the extraordinary significance of the tendencies in knowledge which it has set in motion amongst us.²

¹ *Darwin and after Darwin*, G. J. Romanes, vol. i. p. 259.

² It is only by long familiarity with the processes of thought which the application of the law of Natural Selection implies that the intellectual reach of the principle is fully perceived. It was not an unfitting tribute which Professor Sayce paid to the conception when, speaking of it at a comparatively early stage of the discussion, he placed it among the class of abstract ideas, the discoursing of which constituted landmarks in the development of the world, "To have won for the race a single idea like that of *Natural Selection* is a higher glory than the

So far the attempt has been made to present the Darwinian hypothesis as nearly as possible in its original form. Let us see now if we can bring home to the mind some idea of the character of the development which has taken place in the conception since it left Darwin's hands.

Any one who has kept in touch with the work which down to the present time has been done, in England, Germany, and America, in slowly organising the evidence upon which the evolutionary view rests, will be conscious of a peculiar extension which has been taking place in the conception of the law of Natural Selection. Like nearly all important departures, the change has been effected gradually and under a number of phases, so that many of those who are well acquainted with the details of knowledge, which under one or more heads have contributed to it, have remained unconscious of the character and significance of the process of movement as a whole.

At the present day any close student of the *Origin of Species* can hardly rise from the study of that book without having left on his mind at least one clear and definite impression. He will in all probability feel, over and above everything else, how steadily and consistently Darwin kept before him the vision of the keen, long-drawn-out, and never-relaxed struggle in which every form of life is of necessity engaged; and the conception of the dominating importance of every feature and quality contributing to success and survival in this supreme rivalry.

conquests of a Cæsar" (*The Science of Language*, by A. H. Sayce, vol. i. pp. 102, 103).

Now, keeping this in mind, there is a point of great interest which it is of importance to notice. It will be observed, if we follow closely the argument developed in the *Origin of Species*, that those profitable features and qualities which Darwin had before his mind, and which he beheld ever accumulating in various directions under the influence of natural selection, possessed one invariable characteristic. They were those profitable to the actually existing individuals, or to the majority of their kind for the time being.

There can be no doubt under this head. Darwin repeatedly expresses himself in the *Origin of Species* in terms which leave us in no obscurity as to his meaning. When he sets out at the beginning of the *Origin of Species* with a statement of the principle of Natural Selection, the terms used are worthy of attention. "Any being," he says, "if it vary however slightly in any manner *profitable to itself*, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected."¹ The import of the words here put in italics will be obvious; and in all the later references in the *Origin of Species* to the effects of the law of Natural Selection, the terms used may be seen to be always limited to the same meaning. The significance of this fact, in the relation with which we are here concerned with it, is, that to Darwin, when speaking of the operation of the principle of Natural Selection, the centre of significance was always in the present time. It is the effects on the existing individuals, or at most on their

¹ *Origin of Species*, p. 3.

young, that we see he has always in mind. The passages in which this fact is brought out clearly are numerous. Natural Selection, we are told in chap. iv., "acts exclusively by the preservation and accumulation of variations *which are beneficial under the organic and inorganic conditions to which each creature is exposed at all periods of life.*"¹ Natural Selection, he points out later, "only takes advantage of such variations as arise and are beneficial to each creature under its complex relations of life."² And in the concluding chapter of the *Origin of Species*, in which the progressive character of the theory of evolution he has expounded is emphasised, the fact is again insisted on that the object throughout has been to show that Natural Selection works *solely by and for the good of each being.*³

It may be readily distinguished from this, and a large class of similar evidence, that Darwin regarded the law of Natural Selection, as it operated throughout life, simply in its relation to the interests of the individuals taking part in the struggle for existence as it went on at any particular time. The meaning of the process of progress and development, as he conceived it in life, had reference, therefore, solely to the interests of the individuals who were engaged in maintaining a place in this rivalry for the time being.⁴ All biological development, that is to say,

¹ *Origin of Species*, p. 97.

² *Ibid.* p. 98.

³ *Ibid.* p. 428.

⁴ The process of evolution was, Darwin considered, a process of progress, but it was progress regarded by him strictly in the light of the individual's welfare in, or relations to, existing conditions. "It leads to the improvement of each creature in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life" (cf. *Origin of Species*, p. 103).

had relation to the qualities necessary to securing the individual's own place or that of its young, in this contemporary struggle for existence. The whole drama of progress in life was, in short, regarded by him as proceeding in the direction, and through the medium, of the qualities contributing to success and survival in a kind of free fight amongst the individuals of each generation. The qualities with which he dealt were simply those which had relation to success or survival for the time being in this struggle. They had no relation to any other function or utility whatever.

Now it will be seen, if the present condition of knowledge is compared with that at the period at which Darwin thus left the hypothesis of Natural Selection, that a development of great significance has taken place—a development which must inevitably be associated in the future with a shifting of the channels in which thought has hitherto flowed. While, on one hand, the distinctive Darwinian principle of Natural Selection holds its ground with all its old significance, the free struggle for existence in the present and the qualities necessary to success therein, which Darwin saw shaping the whole course of progress, is, on the other hand, coming slowly but surely to occupy a changed position in relation to this law. We see the curtain being gradually lifted, as it were, from a wider range of phenomena behind, to which the interests of the existing generation of individuals in this struggle are coming to stand in altogether subordinate relationship.

When we look at the statement of the law of Natural Selection as Darwin left it, it may be perceived

on reflection that there is a consequence involved in it which is not at first sight apparent. It is evident that the very essence of the principle is that it must act in the manner in which it produces the most effective results. It must act through the medium of the largest numbers. The qualities in favour of which it must, in the long run, consistently discriminate, are those which most effectively subserve the interests of the largest majority. Yet this majority in the processes of life can never be in the present. It is always, of necessity, the majority which constitutes the long roll of the yet unborn generations. Other things being equal, that is to say, the winning qualities in the evolutionary process must of necessity be those qualities by which the interests of the existing individuals have been most effectively subordinated to those of the generations yet to be born.

It cannot, in short, have been simply the qualities useful to the individuals in a mere struggle for present existence which have directed the process of Natural Selection as a whole. When that process is viewed in operation over a long period this fact becomes evident. In the strenuous æons of time during which progress followed its upward path, it must have been, on the whole, in the evolution of the qualities contributing to the interests of the vast majority in the future that the controlling meaning of the deeper life-processes always centred. It must have been in the interests of this majority that Natural Selection, in the long run, continuously discriminated. It must have been always these infinitely larger interests in the future that overweighted all

others. Nay, we may go so far as to say that, under the law of Natural Selection, as we come to understand it in this light, the interests of the individual in those adjustments "profitable to itself," which filled so large a place in the minds of the early Darwinians, have actually no place, except in so far as they are included in, and have contributed to, this larger end in the future.

Accordingly, if we follow now the course of the work and research which, since Darwin's death, has been enlarging the scope of his work, it may be distinguished that there has been a gradual but certain shifting of what may be called the centre of significance in the evolutionary conception. It is not so much that there has been a growing tendency to emphasise the struggle for the life of the young; or the struggle for the life of the majority of the species as at any time existing; or the struggle for the life of the social aggregate—as against the struggle for the life of the individual *qua* individual. All these features have received deserved and increasing attention. But they do not, in principle, carry the law of Natural Selection beyond the point at which Darwin left it. That is to say, the centre of significance in the evolutionary process is, in such discussions, still left in effect where Darwin placed it, namely, in the present.¹ The principle with which

¹ In a passage in the *Origin of Species*, Darwin comes almost in sight of the principle here discussed. Speaking of the term 'struggle for existence,' as used in a large sense, he says: "I should premise that I use this term in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in having progeny" (c. iii.). The idea which this passage covers was, however,

we are here concerned has a different and altogether wider significance.¹

One of the first contributions, which may be said to have directed general attention to the importance of the view which it is desired here to emphasise, was a remarkable essay² read before the association of German naturalists held at Salzberg in 1881, seven months after Darwin's death. The writer was Professor August Weismann, of the University of Freiburg in Breisgau. In this paper the causes which determine the duration of individual existence in various forms of life were discussed from a point of view which at once attracted notice. Hitherto the prevailing opinions as to the causes which determine the average length of individual life may be said to have run along two main lines, with which readers of Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Biology* will be familiar. According to one theory, to which Leuckart and other writers had given support, and which may be called the theory of external control, the duration of life was to be taken as determined by the size of the individual and the complexity of its structure. Or briefly, to put it in terms used by Mr. Spencer,

very little developed, and of the larger conception of the projection of the controlling centre of the evolutionary process, altogether beyond the concerns and interests of the existing individuals, we do not come in sight.

¹ There is a close connection, as we shall see later, between the effort which has tended to emphasise this feature of the evolutionary hypothesis and that utilitarian movement in English thought, referred to in the last chapter, which has reached its most complete expression in Herbert Spencer's philosophy. The fundamental conception in each case is that the controlling meaning of the evolutionary process lies within the horizon of the present.

² *The Duration of Life.*

greater length and degree of life were to be regarded as a necessary accompaniment of greater integration.¹ According to the other view, which may be described as the theory of internal control, length of life was to be taken as related to the structure, and inherent chemical constitution, of the cells of which the body was composed. It was believed to be largely influenced by the rate at which the vital processes take place, inertness of habit contributing to relatively great length of life, and *vice versa*.

Down to the time at which Professor Weismann's paper was published, it was admitted that there were great and unexplained difficulties in the way of both views, a large class of facts being quite irreconcilable with either. It was perfectly true that there were large animals endowed with great longevity; but so also, and to an equal extent, were many small animals. Similarly, inertness of habit might appear to be correlated with length of life; but, on the other hand, some of the most marked instances of extraordinary longevity were to be found amongst a class of animals where the vital processes take place with the greatest rapidity, namely, the birds; this class also, on the whole, surpassing even the mammalia in average duration of life.²

There was one fact, however, which was held to stand out clearly. It was that Natural Selection must in any case have tended to procure the greatest possible advantage, and the highest possible degree

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, § 172. See also *Principles of Biology*, §§ 31-71.

² Cf. *Essays upon Heredity*, vol. I., by August Weismann; *The Duration of Life*, tra. by A. E. Shipley.

of *self-realisation*, for the individual in the actual conditions of its existence. Mr. Spencer had indeed developed this view in his theory of human society, where he regarded the significance of the culmination of life in the social state as consisting largely in the fact that therein, at last, the lives, not only of each, but of all, tended to be "the greatest possible alike in length and breadth."¹

The deep impression produced by Professor Weismann's paper may be at once understood when it is said that the author not only challenged the assumption underlying all this series of prevailing opinions, but boldly advanced to the remarkable conclusions: (1) that the duration of life in the individual was not primarily due to external physical conditions, nor to molecular causes inherent in organic nature²; (2) that throughout the higher forms of life, so far from nature tending to secure the longest life to the individual, the tendency, on the contrary, was, other things being equal, rather to shorten its duration³; and (3) that duration of life had no ultimate relation to self-realisation in the individual, but was really dependent upon conditions, which involved that, "its length, whether shorter or longer, was governed by the needs of the species."⁴ In other words, the average duration of life was an adaptation developed in the individual under the influence of Natural Selection, and in relation to principles and causes which far transcended the range of his own interests.

The fact which Professor Weismann found in the

¹ *The Principles of Ethics*, § 48.

² *Essays on Heredity*, vol. i.; *The Duration of Life*, p. 24.

³ *The Duration of Life*, p. 11. ⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 9, 24, 25.

ascendant was, therefore, the need of the species as spread over a prolonged period in the conditions of life with which it was confronted. To put his meaning metaphorically, the standard corresponding to this need of the species was, as it were, projected in front of the advancing form of life. It was the average type which conformed most nearly to it that had been selected. The types in which other tendencies had found expression had not survived to represent them. Amongst forms, for instance, existing in an environment which was rapidly changing, the necessary series of variations from which adjustment could be developed, would be more suitably and easily secured in generations which were short-lived than among generations comprised of long-lived individuals. Among the latter adjustment might fail altogether; and their kind would, in any case, tend, after the lapse of time, to be handicapped in competition with the short-lived generations.¹ From actual examples the conclusion was enforced that it was this need of the species, and not simply molecular peculiarity unchangeably inherent in life, which must be held to be the cause controlling and dominating, at least within wide limits, the conflicting facts from which previous observers had endeavoured to construct their theories. To serve the needs of the species, and not the interest

¹ Reading the essay closely now, we see how much farther Professor Weismann's views carry us than even the author appeared to be conscious of at the time. He apparently contemplated the advantage to the species from the shortening of the term of duration of life in the individual to be related to the number of offspring produced. The utility associated with the widened basis for variation may be said to be included in this, but the subject was not developed towards the conclusions which we now see to be inherent in it.

of the individual, it was held that the duration of life had been greatly lengthened out in a great number of cases to which it was possible to point. In other cases, and even in nearly allied species, the duration of life had been shortened to a remarkable degree; and here again obviously under the influence of the same cause of Natural Selection operating towards ends to which "the length and breadth of life in the individual" were quite subordinate.

In this remarkable essay—the first of a series of memoirs the important bearing of which on the tendencies of Western thought is only beginning to be fully understood, and the general meaning of which has been in the past in some degree obscured by the technicalities of the controversies to which it has given rise—the nature of the central idea which carries us beyond Darwin's standpoint is already apparent. We begin to see that in so ultimate and fundamental a matter as the average duration of life in the individual, the determining and controlling end, towards which Natural Selection has operated, must have been, not simply the benefit of the individual, nor even of his contemporaries, in a mere struggle for existence in the present, but a larger advantage, probably always far in the future, to which the individual and the present alike were subordinated. This extended view taken of the operation of the law of Natural Selection, and the consequent shifting into a region no longer bounded by the conception of advantage to existing individuals of the end towards which Natural Selection works, marks the departure we are considering. As the co-author of the Darwinian hypothesis saw, writing seven years

after, the range of the law of Natural Selection had begun to be extended into a new sphere.¹

This was, however, only the example which served to strongly emphasise the nature of the transition which had begun. The idea, to which clear and simple expression had here been given, was to become the connecting and underlying principle in a many-sided movement in biology in which, as we are beginning to perceive, all the tendencies in modern thought are likely, sooner or later, to become involved.²

Now it will be noticed, if we turn again for a moment to the *Origin of Species*, how in this book, and almost to the same extent in the others that followed it, Darwin, in dealing with the effect of Natural Selection operating on individuals engaged in a struggle for existence, carried his examination up to a certain fixed limit and no farther.

¹ Mr. Alfred Russel Wallace, speaking of the exceeding interest of Professor Weismann's essay, mentions that the idea had occurred to himself some twenty years before. It had been hiefly noted down at the time, but subsequently forgotten. See *Darwinism*, p. 437 (note). The idea as jotted down was published by the editors as a footnote to the English translation of the Weismann essay on the *Duration of Life* (see *Essays*, vol. i. p. 23).

² This movement is a good example of the great importance in modern scientific research of the discovery of principles as a cause of progress. Romanes has remarked that his own observation led him to the conclusion that in recent times progress in biological science had been not so much marked by the march of discovery *per se* as by the altered views of method which the march has involved. The tendency at one time had been to trust simply to the collection of facts. Now it was beginning to be seen that it was the discovery of causes or principles to which the collection of facts led that was the ultimate object of scientific quest (*Darwin and after Darwin*, vol. i., Introduction).

Beyond this a wide range of phenomena, amongst which may be included reproduction, sex, variation, death, and to some extent heredity, were accepted as being in a sense irresolvable prime causes, beyond which, therefore, scrutiny was not carried. As, however, from this point forward we watch the reach of the law of Natural Selection being slowly extended, we see these phenomena, one after another, being submitted to analysis with surprising results.

To grasp the significance, as regards the subject with which we are dealing, of the movement in modern biology which the Weismann theories as a whole represent, it is necessary, and more especially when the mind is well acquainted with the technical details of the controversies to which these theories have given rise, that attention should be kept continuously fixed on the central principle with which we are here concerned.

The imagination of the early Darwinians had been impressed with the struggle for existence as they perceived it in the immediate foreground. It was the effects on the existing individuals of this ceaseless contemporary struggle which occupied their attention, and became the subject of most of their theories. In the larger view which now begins to prevail, what we see is, as it were, the battleground on which Natural Selection produces the most important results in the struggle of life projected into the vast stretches of the future. It is those apparently irresolvable phenomena of reproduction, sex, variation, death, and heredity,¹ which become in this

¹ It is a remarkable feature of recent biology that, while the distinctive Darwinian principle of Natural Selection has come to dominate

respect the centres of struggle around which the main problems of efficiency in the drama of evolution are worked out by the operation of the law of Natural Selection. In the process of selection from which the curtain now rises, we see not only individuals, but whole generations, nay, entire species and types, unconsciously pitted against each other for long ages in a struggle in which efficiency in the future is the determining quality; and in which only the types in which the problems involved have progressed farthest towards solution remain at last to transmit their efficiency. We are, in short, brought within view of a wide range of phenomena which Darwin had not discussed, and, in all probability, had not imagined. In the struggle, as we now begin to see it, the interests of the individual and the present alike are presented as overlaid by the interests of a majority which is always in the future. We behold the whole drama of progress in life becoming instinct, as it were, with a meaning which remains continually projected beyond the content of the present.

In the next step in the inquiry we see the principle of Natural Selection carried right into the heart of apparently the most inscrutable of all the problems which Darwin had left untouched. Weismann's theory as to the period of the duration of life had gone to show that amongst the higher forms of life,

all our conceptions of the evolutionary process, Darwin's position, in many cases, has been already left far behind, and mostly by the application of his own principle. Compare, for instance, Darwin's position on such subjects as inheritance, sex, variation, heredity, in his theories of heredity and pangenesis, in *Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, vol. ii. chap. xxvii.; *Descent of Man*, chaps. vii.-x.; and *Origin of Species*, chaps. i.-iv.

so far from the duration of existence in the individual depending ultimately on any inherent molecular constitution of the cells of the body, it had throughout the various forms of life been lengthened or curtailed by Natural Selection just as the needs of the species had required. In the lowest or single-celled forms of life, however, there was nothing corresponding to the phenomena of natural death at all. In these forms the cycle of existence was unending. At a certain stage of growth each individual simply divided into two, each separate part of the parent continuing to live and grow until it again divided, and so on indefinitely. Hence arose the most daring inquiry to which biology had as yet advanced.

If in the lowest types of life the cycle of existence was normally unending: if in the higher forms the cycle of the life of the cells of which the body was composed was capable of being greatly lengthened out or of being rigidly curtailed just as the need of the species required:—was the phenomenon of the periodic death of the individual at the point at which it began to be encountered in nature—namely, amongst the multicellular forms of life—to be considered as due to causes inherent from the beginning in the nature of the cells themselves, any more than the length of the life-cycle in the higher forms of life was to be considered as due to such causes? In other words, had not this phenomenon also some relation to the law of Natural Selection? Had it not behind it, in short, some principle of massive utility in the evolutionary process at the point at which it began to be encountered—a principle of utility the significance of which must have been projected alto-

gether beyond the mere interest of the individual for the time being?

The answer to this question is one of the most remarkable in biology. It may be considered, said Professor Weismann, in effect, that life came to be permanently endowed with a fixed duration in the individual—at the point at which we first encounter this phenomenon, amongst the multicellular forms—under the operation of the law of Natural Selection; and because of the utility of such a phenomenon in the upward process of progress upon which life had entered.¹

The direction in which the suggested principle of utility lay, we may now perceive even more clearly than did Professor Weismann at the time.² The phenomenon at the base of all the progress which life had made was that of variation; for it was this which supplied the raw material upon which Natural Selection had worked. It was evident, how-

¹ *Essays upon Heredity*, vol. i., by August Weismann; *The Duration of Life; Life and Death*.

² While Professor Weismann saw from the outset that the tendency would be for the life of the individual, endowed with an indefinite term of duration, to be shortened by the amount which was useless to the species, he did not clearly connect the utility of short-lived generations with the greater opportunity allowed for variation. Two of the most suggestive passages were those in which it was pointed out that the operation of Natural Selection would be to reduce the life of the individual to a length which would afford the most favourable conditions for the existence of as large a number as possible of vigorous individuals at the same time, and that in which it was stated that "worn-out individuals are not only valueless to the species, but are even harmful, for they take the place of those which are sound." Cf. *Essays*, vol. i.; *Duration of Life*, pp. 24, 25; *Life and Death*, pp. 134-135, and 154-159; *The Significance of Sexual Reproduction in the Theory of Natural Selection*, pp. 284-285.

ever, as soon as attention became fixed upon the causes of variation in the types of life above the unicellular forms, that if the individuals amongst the higher forms of life had continued to be endowed with indefinite length of existence, in one important respect at least, progress would have been handicapped; and that a vast series of results which we have come to associate with the later and higher processes of evolution could not have arisen. For with individuals occupying their places in nature indefinitely, there would have been no room for variation, adaptation, and progress, as we have come to witness these phenomena among the higher forms of life. Such forms must have been, other things being equal, in this respect at least, at a disadvantage in competition with forms represented by periodically recurring generations. The periodical death of the units was, in short, indicated as the necessary accompaniment of the advance which was being made. The individual must die to serve the larger interest of his kind in the immense process of progress upon which life had entered.¹

¹ It may be seen at once, when the mind has mastered the subject, that the Weismann conception of the endowment of life with a fixed duration in the individual, as here discussed, is more essentially scientific, than any alternative theory of the limitation of life in the individual as due to mechanical causes, or to the molecular constitution of the cells. For against the latter theory as mere conjecture (rendered to some extent doubtful, from the fact that the length of the cycle of life in the individual is lengthened out or curtailed under our eyes, to serve the needs of the species), there must be set the certainty that, if forms of life (subject to infinitesimal variation) had been endowed with indefinite longevity, Natural Selection must in the long run have eliminated them and have arrived at the phenomenon of a fixed duration in the individual as we now know it. We are, in short, bound to

The deep significance of the central idea here outlined will become clear if the mind is allowed to dwell upon it. We see the early Darwinian conception — of the individual in the struggle for existence, and of its relation to advantages secured therein "profitable to itself" — being overlaid by a larger meaning. It was evident that when we conceived the law of Natural Selection operating through unlimited periods of time, and concerned with the indefinitely larger interests of numbers always infinite and always in the future, that we had in view a principle of which there had been no clear conception at first, namely, a principle of inherent necessity in the evolutionary process compelling ever towards the sacrifice on a vast scale of the present and the individual in the interests of the future and the universal. The central phenomenon with which life has ever been associated in the human mind has been that of the death of the individual. But here we had this phenomenon presented to us at an early stage in the evolutionary process as the fundamental expression of this principle of the sacrifice of the individual,

accept the Weismann conception as a working hypothesis in preference to the other. If we adopt Herbert Spencer's definition of life as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations" two things will be evident: (1) that the most cumbersome and least efficient method (if we can imagine it as having been possible) of obtaining this continuous adjustment would be where it had to take place in the actual person of a complex individual endowed with indefinite length of life; (2) that on the other hand the most direct and efficient adjustment would take place by selection where the number of effective generations was largest; that is to say, where the life of each individual was limited to the time necessary for reaching maturity and for the production and efficient equipment of offspring. It is this direct path that appears to have been followed in life.

underlying from the outset the vast progression which life had begun to make upwards.

In recent biological thought from this point forward, we may be said to be in full view of the characteristic development we have been endeavouring to describe. We see the centre of gravity in the evolutionary hypothesis in process of being definitely shifted out of the present into the future. We see the Darwinian principle of Natural Selection being accepted with increasing certainty as the ruling principle throughout the processes of life. But we see it no longer regarded as related in all its meaning to the interests of "individuals, "red in tooth and claw with ravine," in a contemporary struggle for existence in the immediate foreground, which filled the imagination of the early Darwinians.

It is not necessary to enter here upon the technicalities of the wide issues which have been raised by the further group of theories enunciated by Professor Weismann under such titles as the Continuity of the Germ-Plasm, the Non-Inheritance of Acquired Qualities, the Significance of Sexual Reproduction in the Theory of Natural Selection, and Retrogressive Development, nor upon the merits of the many controversies that have been waged round them. Our concern here is with the fact which now stands in the background behind all the controversies to which these theories have given rise, namely, the new and larger conception of the method of the operation of the principle of Natural Selection in the evolutionary process. The distinctive feature of the change is the relegation to a secondary place of the interests of the individual and the present, and the emergence

into sight of causes associated with the interests of the future and the universal, through the medium of which Natural Selection, entirely subordinating the former to the latter, dominates the evolutionary process towards particular ends over vast periods of time.

If we take up the subject at any point and read between the lines of existing controversies it may be noticed how marked this feature has become. In the discussion, for instance, of the phenomena of sexual reproduction as related to a principle of massive utility in the phenomenon of variation, there has been brought into view the principle of Natural Selection operating under conditions in which we have continually before us this fact of the interests of the future weighting all the processes of the present. Whatever may be the outcome of conflicts of opinion to which particular views or assertions have given rise, there can be no doubt as to the main outlines of the order of progress as it is now presented in this matter. We see it as a process in which generations, species, and entire types have been matched against each other in a function of selection, weighted always by a meaning in the future, to which the interests of individuals and generations alike have become entirely subordinate. We see the problem of reproduction as it now prevails amongst the higher forms of life, approached by many devious and tentative paths amongst the early types, as the principle of utility lying behind it begins to make itself felt in the rivalry of existence. We watch the outlines of the immense problem gradually revealing themselves, and notice how it is the

burden of the generations to come which in reality controls the direction of the whole process.

Apart from all outstanding controversies the fundamental features of the problem are now clearly apparent. To combine together the hereditary qualities of two distinct individuals, and thereby to secure the advantage to be obtained from the ceaseless mixing together of the individual tendencies to variation of a whole species, was an end which could only be accomplished in one way. In every new life it became necessary for nature to return to the original starting-point, namely, the single cell. For it was at this stage, and here only, that the combination in the new individual of the hereditary qualities of both parents could be accomplished.¹ We perceive, therefore, how a great number of phenomena, affecting, on the one hand, the character of the single cells which form the starting-point, and, on the other hand, the character of the adult individuals, — phenomena for which the most far-fetched and fantastic explanations have been sought by inquirers, — have no other meaning than the simple one that they have been adaptations acquired under the influence of Natural Selection for the purpose of effecting this fundamental necessity to which life had been rendered subject. The principle of utility which lay behind the higher processes of reproduction — utility to the generations always in the future — has been, in short, the sole end which has silently controlled an immense range of modifications in character, function, and form, which we see in progress in all directions as development has continued upwards.

¹ *Essays*, by A. Weismann, vol. i. pp. 152, 153.

As the process has reached the higher forms of life it is the same principle—the subordination of the present in the interests of the future—which is to be observed working itself out at closer distance, and in simpler form. On the one hand, we have the ever-continued progress towards increasing differentiation of function and complexity of structure in the adult individual. On the other hand, we have the fixed and immutable necessity imposed upon nature, by the fundamental conditions of the problem, of returning for every new individual life to exactly the same starting-point as at the beginning—the single cell.¹ The effort to bridge effectively the ever-increasing interval of helplessness in the individual, which intervenes between this starting-point and the adult stage of continuously increasing complexity, gives rise to a new and imposing class of phenomena in the functions which begin to attach to parenthood. We see the hurden of the future continuing to press with ever-increasing weight upon the present as these functions develop under the stress of Natural Selection. We realise how great a struggle has, in reality, centred round this institution of parenthood throughout the evolution of life, and see how one type after another has failed and fallen behind, in the struggle to meet in the most efficient manner the growing demands of the future upon the present. The lower forms of life, in which the young leave the egg in an immature state and are cast upon the world without parental care, are gradually left behind. In the birds the burden of the future is more efficiently met. Development is carried far forward in the egg, and

¹ Cf. *Essays*, by A. Weismann, vol. i. pp. 152, 153.

the young have the advantage of parental care afterwards. In the mammals, another shoot on the tree of life has carried the possibilities of parenthood much higher. The young are no longer subjected to the risks of a separate existence in the egg, and they continue to receive sustenance and care for a lengthened period after birth. In the mammals themselves we see the same stream of development in progress in the rise from the marsupials to the placentals. Entire species and types, failing, as it were, under the burden of the future, gradually drop out of the race as Natural Selection, dominating the evolutionary process towards a particular end over immense stretches of time, carries the leading shoot of life gradually upwards towards man.

As progress has continued toward increasing complexity of structure in the individual, on the one hand, so has the interval of development to be spanned in the life of every individual, continued to be lengthened out, on the other. Heavier and heavier has accordingly grown the burden of parenthood. More and more insistent under the conditions of progress has become the demand of the future upon the present, on the one hand; more and more urgent under the operation of Natural Selection has grown the necessity for meeting it efficiently, on the other.

In all this we have only the simplest and most obvious example at close quarters of the action of a principle which we must regard as operating—and as a rule under much more complex conditions—in every direction throughout life.¹ In the operation

¹ It is interesting to notice in this connection the grounds upon which Mr. A. R. Wallace has recently rejected Darwin's original view

of that deep-seated cause in life which makes it possible for the higher forms to maintain their places only by continuous rivalry and selection, it cannot be said by any stretch of the imagination that the advantage towards which Natural Selection is working is one which is shared in by the existing generation of individuals. With the resulting advantage accruing at a stage always beyond the limit of their existence this cannot be.

Yet in looking back along the road that life has travelled we see at once that, however injurious, or even fatal, to large numbers of the existing indi-

as to the origin of a multitude of colours, markings, plumes, appendages, etc., through the instrumentality of sexual choice made, as was assumed by Darwin, in accordance with some internal aesthetic standards in the mind of the individual of unexplained origin. Mr. Wallace has come to regard the display of colours, plumes, and appendages in question simply as the external indication of maturity and vigour in the male, and therefore on that account necessarily attractive to the female. The aesthetic standard in the sexes is, in fact, itself the direct product of Natural Selection intimately and directly correlated with an end which has been always in the future, namely, the peopling of the world with the largest possible number of healthy and vigorous descendants. Nay more — and here we have the deep import of the principle — no other aesthetic standard with which such a result was not associated, could, in the long run, persist simultaneously with it; for, as Mr. Wallace observes, the “extremely rigid action of Natural Selection must render any attempt to select mere ornament utterly nugatory, unless the most ornamented always coincide with ‘the fittest’ in every other respect” (*Darwinism*, p. 295). There can be no doubt as to the direction in which we are travelling in this subject. The firm ground here reached may with advantage be compared by any interested student with the early position occupied by Darwin in the following passage, “How it comes that certain colours, sounds, and forms should give pleasure to man and the lower animals, — that is, how the sense of beauty in its simplest form was first acquired, — we do not know any more than how certain odours and flavours were first rendered agreeable” (*Origin of Species*, chap. xv.).

viduals at any time may have been the conditions of existence, if such conditions were, nevertheless, those most advantageous to future generations of their kind, Natural Selection must have discriminated in favour of the form of life amongst which they prevailed. The individuals may have had their struggle hurried, their interests sacrificed, the content of their lives curtailed by length and breadth; and yet that form must have come down to us as a winning type, having gradually pushed aside and survived all rivals which were not equipped to this end; and this notwithstanding any other advantage whatever that its competitors may have possessed.

Once we have grasped the general application of the principle here discussed, its importance throughout the entire range of the evolutionary process will be evident. Once we come to regard Natural Selection as the controlling and dominating agency behind all the developments in progress throughout life, there can be no doubt as to the significance of the position towards which modern biology has advanced. The centre of gravity in the evolutionary conception can no longer be regarded as being in the present. We can no longer with the early evolutionists regard only the effects produced by Natural Selection on the individual engaged in a struggle for existence waged simply with those other individuals around it "with which it comes into competition for food or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it preys."¹ From the very nature of the principle of Natural Selection we see that it must produce its most efficient results where it acts through the largest numbers.

¹ *Origin of Species*, chap. iii.

The interests of the existing individuals, and of the present time, as we now see them, are of importance only in so far as they are included in the interests of this unseen majority in the future.

In the development with which we have been concerned, it is necessary to consider results which appear to us to be successive, and separated by vast intervals of time, as being in actual effect as though they had been simultaneous. Keeping this fact in mind, it will be seen from the foregoing that we must regard the evolutionary process in life as proceeding under the domination of a cause which we may here and in future designate as the principle of *Projected Efficiency*. The winning types of life which have come down from the beginning are those which have held their places under the operation of this principle. The types in the present around us to which the future belongs are those which will hold it under the operation of this principle. When the future arrives it will be the forms equipped to the best effect with the qualities through which this principle found expression which will have survived to represent it. If it were possible to construct the scientific formula of life for any existing form destined, *hæres viventis*, to maintain its place in the future, the interests of the existing individuals would be found to have no place in it, except in so far as they were included in the interests of the majority which is in the future.

The condition under which development has proceeded in life throughout measureless epochs of time has been, in short, a condition in which the shadow of the future has continually rested upon the present;

growing and deepening as the upward process has continued. In the course of this process we must consider that it has never been the welfare of the infinitesimal number of individuals at any time existing which constitutes the end towards which Natural Selection may be regarded as working. It is always the advantage of the incomparably larger number of individuals yet to come towards which the whole process moves.

This is the lesson, for the social sciences, of the modern development in biology. To have grasped, however imperfectly, its application, is to have caught a first glimpse of the nature of the extraordinary revolution which the evolutionary hypothesis is eventually destined to accomplish in the sciences dealing with the principles of human society. It is in the principle here discussed that we undoubtedly have the clue to those larger ruling causes that have controlled the course of progress at every point throughout the past history of life. But it is a principle which we have been, so far, regarding at work only in the lower stages of an ascending process. It is as we have now to watch life broadening upwards towards self-consciousness that we begin to understand how large a place on the stage of the world must henceforward be filled with phenomena arising out of the continued predominance of this principle. It is as we come slowly into view of a reasoning creature reaching his full development only in conditions of social order in which the demands made by the future upon the individual and the present continue of necessity to grow ever more and more insistent and exacting; a reasoning creature, withal,

endowed with the power of realising the present at the expense of the future, that we begin to perceive the real nature of the gigantic problem which lies at the base of all society, and towards the solution of which all human development moves.

CHAPTER III

THE POSITION IN MODERN THOUGHT

To any one who comes fresh from the study of the position we have been considering in the last chapter, the modern condition of the sciences dealing with the social phenomena of our civilisation must present features of unusual interest. We have seen in that chapter how the movement in progress in recent biological science is gradually bringing into prominence a principle round which the theory of the evolution of life, by Natural Selection, must now be considered to revolve. Stated in a few words, the effect of the perception of this principle is to bring us to understand how all previous ideas of a conciliation between the interests of the existing individuals of any progressive form of life and those of the majority of their kind, must give way to a conception of life as involved in a vast antinomy in which we see the present continually envisaged with the future, and in which it is never the present, but always the future, which is of larger importance. We have seen how in this conflict it is only those forms of life among which the interests of the existing individuals have been continually subordinated to the greater interest of their kind in the future that have come down to us as winning types, and how amongst every existing form destined to successfully maintain its place in the rivalry of existence, the conditions at

any time prevailing must of necessity be those wherein the process in progress is weighted and controlled at every point, not by the interests of the present individuals, but by those of the generations yet in the future.

As the mind with this position clearly before it is concentrated now on the later phases of the evolutionary process in human history, and more particularly on the aspects of that process as they are presented in the complex social phenomena of the modern world, we become conscious that we are regarding one of the most remarkable spectacles which the history of knowledge presents.

If we recognise that we have before us in human society the last and most important phase of the evolutionary process in life; if, therefore, we consider that the law which we have beheld in operation from the beginning — that law which at every point in the process of progress necessitated the prevalence of conditions in which the interests of the present and the individual were subordinated to those of the future and the universal — cannot have been suspended in human society; if, indeed, we must rather consider that these conditions must be more directly operative, and this law, therefore, be more imperative in human society than ever before in the history of life; — then there can be no doubt as to the nature of the position which confronts us at the threshold of the science of society. It would seem that the controlling fact to which we must discover every principle of the science of society to be related, is that the history of human development is, in the last resort, the history of the development of the principles by

which there is being effected the subordination of the individual to a process, the larger meaning of which is always in the future.

As the evolutionist looks the conclusion here stated in the face the enormous reach of its meaning begins to be visible to him. For, it must be, he sees, in the fact here brought into view—namely, that the history of human development is to be regarded as the history of the development of the conceptions, by which the interests of the present are being subordinated to those of a process, the meaning of which is projected beyond the farthest limits of political consciousness—that we have the ultimate principle to which the philosophy of history is related. It must be primarily along the line of the operation of this principle of Projected Efficiency that Natural Selection is discriminating between the living, the dying, and the dead in human society. All the phenomena of our social development must, therefore, whether we be conscious of the fact or not, stand in subordinate relationship to it. For here, as elsewhere, we see that in the formula of existence for any type of social order destined to maintain its place in the future, the interests of all the visible world around us can have no place, except in so far as they are included in the larger interests of a future to which they are entirely subordinate.

It is when, with these facts in mind, we turn now to the condition of political theory associated with the current life of our civilisation, and to the system of social philosophy from which those theories proceed, that we begin to realise something of the nature of the interval which is likely to separate

the epoch in the history of Western thought through which we have lived from the period of change upon which we are entering.

As we proceed to spread before us, one after another, the maps of the systems of social and political theory constructed by most of the current schools of thought, it may be observed that they present a study of extraordinary interest. As we regard these systems attentively and notice the points of convergence and difference, and the ultimate relation of each to that central problem which they all discuss, we may observe, after a time, how that through nearly all of them there runs one leading idea. In whatever these systems of theory may differ, they nearly all resemble each other in one fact. They are engaged, we may distinguish, in stating the relations to each other of what is always the group of individuals comprised within the limits of political consciousness. Everywhere we encounter the same feature, namely, the theory of States and peoples, on the one hand, and of the classes, parties, and individuals comprising them, on the other, considered in all that pertains to the evolution of society, as moved and governed by one motive, namely, to serve their own ends according to their lights in the present time.

If we confine our attention at the outset to that modern movement of thought in which the endeavour has been made to formulate the principles behind the phenomena of Western democracy, we have this feature presented in a striking light. What we see at once is that nearly all the current theories of democracy resemble each other in one respect. The idea of the nature of the modern state, the concep-

tions underlying the practice of universal suffrage, the ideal of the end of government in the greatest good of the greatest number, are all, we perceive, tacitly accepted as proceeding from the same fact, namely, the conception of society as comprised within the limits enclosing the interests of the existing individuals. The outlook in nearly all the accepted philosophy of society to which modern democracy has given rise closes down, therefore, along a clearly defined line, namely, that which marks the horizon bounding the interests included within the limits of political consciousness.

Yet if the principle of Projected Efficiency be taken as applying to human society, the first and clearest conviction with which the evolutionist must set out, is that in every system of social order destined to maintain its place in the stress of the world, there must exist a deep-seated line of demarcation completely separating the interests of the "State," considered as an organisation of existing individuals, from those of "Society" in process of evolution, considered as an aggregate of individuals in whose welfare these existing individuals have simply not the slightest interest. Nay more, the first and central principle of the continued existence of such a system of social order, in the stress of evolution, must of necessity be that conduct contributing to the welfare of "Society" in this second sense — however onerous it may be to existing individuals — must in the end everywhere, and in all things, control and overrule conduct contributing merely to the welfare of the "State" in this first sense. The science of social progress must, in short, be the science of the

principles by which this subordination is effected. The history of such a type of social order must be, over and above everything else, the history of the phenomena accompanying this process of subordination.

Nevertheless, when we proceed to scrutinise the theory of democracy as it has been presented in the intellectual movement which extends from conceptions of the French Revolution to the end of the eighteenth century, down to the current formulas of social democracy in Germany, the nature of the remarkable spectacle we have in view in Western history cannot be mistaken. The fundamental idea involved in the theory may, we see, be nearly always expressed in a single sentence. It is the theory of the "State" efficiently organised towards the interests of its members, which includes the whole conception of the science and philosophy of society. The keynote to the prevailing theory of social progress is that the interest of the state and the interest of society tend to become one and the same; that the ruling factor in history is therefore the economic factor; and that the tendency of all modern social progress is, therefore, to render, as it were, the spheres of the moralist and of the legislator identical.

If there is any one who feels at first sight inclined to think that this may be an over-statement, he has only to look back over the history of the phase of thought which has sought to identify itself with the democratic movement in the modern period in Western history, to speedily convince himself to the contrary.

As we watch the statement of the principles of individual and of social conduct, as they begin to be

put forward on the eve of the French Revolution in the writings of Condillac, Helvétius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and others, we may distinguish how Western thought had at this point already begun to revolve round a fixed idea. In politics the phase under which the ruling conception tends to express itself is unmistakable. The conception of the State, efficiently organised to serve the ends of its existing members, is the pivot upon which every principle of political and social science is made to turn. "Society" is, as we see, conceived from the outset of the movement as consisting of the existing citizens organised towards their own benefit. The "good of society" and the interests of the existing citizens are everywhere regarded as identical or interconvertible terms. And the content of the welfare of society is always conceived and spoken of as if it was of necessity included in the view which these citizens took of their own interests.

From this point forward, throughout all the literature of the Revolution, we see the developmental process in Western history presented as a process in which the "will of the sovereign people" is tending to progressively realise itself, simply in the interests of the people as organised in the State. In the ideals of Rousseau, as in the later conceptions of Marx, it is the theory of the interests of the people collectively organised in the State which constitutes the science of society. In the theory of social development towards which we are carried, it is, therefore, the economic factor, *i.e.* the interest of the existing individuals, which is everywhere presented to us as the ruling factor in human history. And in the

theory of conduct which we see taking shape side by side with this view, the science of morality, just as we encounter it later in the theories of James Mill¹ and in the conceptions of current social democracy in Germany, becomes, in consequence, simply the science of the interests of the individuals in the well-ordered State. "La science de la morale," in the words of Helvétius, "n'est autre chose que la science même de la législation."²

As we follow the history of this self-centred movement in Western thought, as it tends to more and more closely associate itself with the modern theory of democracy, it is the same spectacle which continues to be presented to view. The science of human society must be, as the evolutionist sees it, the science of the principles through which the whole visible world around us is being subordinated to the ends of a process in which the interests of the individual and of the present alike form a scarcely perceptible link. Yet nowhere in the movement before us, as we watch it gradually expanding now into the main stream of Western thought, is there to be discovered any statement whatever of the principles of society as conceived in such a sense.

In England the history of the great intellectual movement, in which the principles of modern democracy have been developed into something like the form in which they have come down to the current generation, may be said to have begun with Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. As the evolutionist

¹ Cf. *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, by James Mill, ch. xxiii. vol. ii.; and *Fragment on Mackintosh*, by the same author.

² *De l'Esprit*, ii. 17, C. H. Helvétius.

takes his way through this work at the present day, its main idea and purpose are clearly to be distinguished by him. The conceptions of the book represent, in reality, as Mr. Leslie Stephen has recently pointed out,¹ only the spirit of business, and the revolt of men who were at the time building up a vast industrial system against the fetters hitherto imposed on them by traditional legislation. We have before us, as it were, the characteristic protest of the interests in the present against the rule of the past. Yet we see the principles of the purely business State, as therein set forth, beginning, from this point forward, to be received in England by a school of writers of altogether exceptional prestige and authority, as if they constituted the whole science of society. Under the influence of Bentham, Austin, James Mill, Malthus, Ricardo, Grote, and John Stuart Mill, we see Adam Smith's ideas being gradually expanded into a complete and self-contained system of social philosophy more and more closely identifying itself with the theory of modern democracy. Through every part of this system there runs, we see, the influence of a single dominant conception, namely, that the "State" and "Society" are one and the same, and, therefore, that the science of the State is the science of human evolution.

Any inquirer who wishes to follow for himself the history of this remarkable development in Western history finds all its stages clearly marked before him in the literature of English thought during the nineteenth century. As we take down the volumes of Bentham, whose influence in England in the middle

¹ *The English Utilitarians*, vol. i. p. 307.

decades of that century pervaded the entire domain of political theory, and to a considerable extent that of moral science, the characteristic features which have been here emphasised meet us at every step. The conception that the theory of the State embraces the theory of society as a whole has become absolute. That well-ordered conduct in the individual is a mere matter of "felicific calculus," and that the ends of human morality are synonymous with the enlightened self-interest of the individual in the State, are the ideas which meet us at every turn. "The interest of the community is," says Bentham, "the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it."¹ The science of the interest of society is to him the science of the interest of the members whom he sees around him in the State. That there was any principle of antagonism between all such interests and the interests of society in process of evolution; that all the interests visible around us could only be scientifically stated in relation to society in terms of the subordination of these interests to the ends of a process the meaning of which entirely transcended them, there is not the slightest trace.² On the contrary, any theory whatever of the subordination of "interest" to "duty" seemed to Bentham not only meaningless but absurd. Rather, in his opinion, "to interest duty must and will be made subservient."³ For where both were considered in their broad sense, it was Bentham's assertion that "the sacrifice of interest to duty is neither

¹ *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Clarendon Press ed.), p. 3.

² Cf. *Ibid.* chaps. i.-xi.

³ *Deontology*, vol. I, pp. 10, 11.

practicable nor so much as desirable; that it cannot in fact have place; and that if it could, the happiness of mankind would not be promoted by it."¹ To Bentham, in short, the identification of social utility with the self-interest of the individual had become the fundamental principle of the science of society. To use his own words: "If every man, acting correctly for his own interest, obtained the maximum of obtainable happiness, mankind would reach the millennium of accessible bliss; and the end of morality — the general happiness — be accomplished."²

As we watch the conceptions of this school of thought being gradually developed in England in the writings of James Mill and others;³ as we see Adam Smith's doctrine of the individual following his own interests, and thereby unintentionally attaining the highest social good, becoming the basis of a self-contained theory of utilitarian morality; as we see the complete circle of ideas moving at last, in the system of social philosophy of John Stuart Mill, towards the full sovereignty of an accepted theory of modern society: the altogether remarkable nature of the spectacle we are regarding cannot fail to deeply impress the mind. No system of opinion in recent times in England has so profoundly influenced the intellectual centres of Liberalism as that of the school of thought which culminates in the writings of John Stuart Mill.

¹ *Deontology, supra.*

² *Op. cit.* p. 12.

³ See chaps. xxi.—xxv. vol. ii., in James Mill's *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, and Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, c. ii. and c. x. The origin of morality in utility, requiring no "moral sense" to discern it, and operating through sympathy and the association of ideas, has been a characteristic ethical doctrine of the utilitarian school.

No theory of society has been, in its time, so generally accepted in English thought as a presentation of the modern democratic position. Mill's system of ideas, as a consistent whole, has been a leading cause which has determined, down even to the present day in England, the attitude on social questions of nearly all the representatives of the older Liberalism.¹

Yet as the evolutionist follows the ideas developed by J. S. Mill, their controlling meaning is unmistakable. As we turn over the pages of his *System of Logic* and of his essay *On Liberty*, as we read the chapter in the *Principles of Political Economy*, "Of the stationary State," or follow him through the theory of conduct set forth in *Utilitarianism*, the ultimate meaning of it all is plainly before us. The fundamental conception which rules all Mill's ideas is, we see, that the science of the "State" constitutes the whole science of society. "Society," as Mill conceived it, is practically comprised of the individuals capable at any particular moment of exercising the rights of universal suffrage. The ideal of the highest social good is continually presented to us as one and the same thing as that of the highest good of these individuals. The main duty of the individual, as Mill sees it, is, therefore, so to influence the tendencies of development and the provisions of government that this ideal should be reached in practice. The end of human effort, and the ideal in all theories of human conduct, is, in short, to bring about a state in which the conciliation between the self-interest of the individual and of society as a whole

¹ Cf. *Principles of Economics*, by Alfred Marshall, vol. i. p. 65; also *The English Utilitarians*, by Leslie Stephen, vol. iii. c. iii. p. 2.

should be completely attained; and in which, therefore, to use Mill's words, "laws and social arrangements should place the interests of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interests of the whole."¹

As the evolutionist, with the conception in his mind of human society as involved in the sweep of an antinomy, in which he sees all the tendencies of human development tending to be more and more directly governed by the meaning of a process in which the present is being subordinated to the future, rises from the study of Mill's writings, the superficiality of the whole system of ideas represented profoundly impresses his mind. It is, he sees, as if the world represented in the era in which we are living had never existed; as if we were transported back again into the theories of society of the ancient civilisations, into the political conceptions of Plato and Aristotle.

That such a system of ideas should really express the meaning of our civilisation, or of our social progress as a whole, must be, he perceives, inherently impossible. For if the nature of the evolutionary process be not altogether misunderstood, if the principle of Projected Efficiency as applied to the evolution of human society be not entirely without meaning, the phenomenon of social progress as represented in human history must, he sees, have a meaning which altogether transcends the content of these conceptions. The process of development which our civilisation represents must be subject to laws more far-reaching than any which could be compressed within the narrow formulæ of such a theory of society.

¹ *Utilitarianism*, by J. S. Mill, p. 25.

The very essence of the process of order represented in our Western world must be that there is within it some organic principle effecting the continued subordination and sacrifice, not only of individuals and of parties, but of whole generations and of entire periods of time to the ends of a larger process of life.

But neither in the philosophy of human history as a whole, nor in the theory of Western progress in particular, as presented in the writings of the school of thought here seeking to give us a theory of the principles of modern democracy, is any such conception of development to be distinguished. Mill's theory of social progress is always, as we see it, simply a theory of progress towards a fixed state in which a conciliation between the self-interest of the individual in the present and the interest of society is to be completed. His theory of human conduct and ethics is, therefore, a theory of a future social condition so ordered that virtue is to be a matter simply of pursuing self-interest in an enlightened manner, and vice, in Bentham's terms, a kind of false moral arithmetic, a mere "miscalculation of chances in estimating the value of pleasures and pains."¹ In the region of ethics, as in the domain of political philosophy, the ideal with which Mill sought to associate the principles of Western Liberalism is, we see, simply a fixed condition of society in which, to use Bentham's terms, there would be given to the social, nothing less and nothing more than the meaning and the influence of the self-regarding motive.²

We see, in short, everywhere the principles of the utilitarian State conceived as if they embraced the

¹ *Deontology*, vol. i. p. 131.

² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

whole theory of society in process of evolution.¹ Nothing can be more remarkable than the absolute unconsciousness displayed by Mill of the profound difference — affecting, as we now see, every principle of social science — which exists between the "State," considered as a piece of social mechanism directed to further the utilitarian ends of its existing members, and "Society" considered as a living organism, and undergoing, under the influence of Natural Selection, a vast process of slow development in which all the interests of the existing individuals are lost sight of in wider issues. A discussion like that in book iv. of the *Principles of Political Economy* — in which Mill objects to the trampling, crushing, and elbowing of the modern industrial world because of their unpleasantness to the individual; in which the stationary social state² is regarded as desirable and normal; in which the limitation of population by prudential restraints, dictated by the "enlightened selfishness" of the individual, is set up as a social ideal — already belongs simply to the literature of a pre-scientific epoch when men possessed as yet no real insight into the character of the natural forces at work in the evolution of society.

Remarkable in every particular must appear to the mind of the evolutionist the position which has just been described. Yet we cannot fully understand how completely the tendencies of Western thought have been controlled down into the period in which we are living, by the conceptions from which it arose,

¹ Compare Mr. Frederic Harrison's remarks in this respect in his article on Mill in the *Nineteenth Century*, No. 235.

² Ch. vi. bk. iv., *Principles of Political Economy*, by J. S. Mill.

until we proceed further to extend our view and carry it beyond the circle of ideas which the school of English utilitarians as a whole represents.


If we look closely at the idea of social progress, which has held the mind of our Western world throughout the nineteenth century, its main characteristic may readily be distinguished. In nearly all the leading movements in thought we may see that the principles of our social progress have been presented as being, for the most part, those of a struggle between the present and the past. The theory of social development which we encounter in Western thought and politics during the nineteenth century is, therefore, a theory according to which existing interests are considered as passing out from under the control of the past towards an organisation of society in which the interests of the present are at last to be supreme in every particular. It is this theory of the ascendancy of the present in the evolutionary process—a theory in which the relations of the present to the future have no place—that is represented in English thought in the movement which extends from Hume and Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill. It is the distinctive theory of social progress which has come down from the French Revolution, which continues to be represented in a multitude of forms in current French thought, and which in one of its phases has found its most characteristic expression in the current conceptions of social democracy in Germany.

Now, when with this fact in mind we turn in a different direction and follow that development in current thought which is presented to us for the



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
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most part in the social philosophy of Herbert Spencer, it is to find that the position with which we are confronted is even more remarkable than that which we have just been considering.

In the Synthetic Philosophy of Herbert Spencer we have before us an immense effort, practically extending over the entire space of the last half of the nineteenth century, to construct a theory of human society from the avowed standpoint that all investigations in other fields of knowledge are merely preliminary to the definition of the principles underlying the process of our social development. But when the observer, who has in some measure caught sight of the significance of the position here defined, has slowly and patiently endeavoured to get to the heart of the Synthetic Philosophy, he will probably rise at last from the study of Mr. Spencer's writings with the feeling which has hitherto filled his mind deepened and intensified in every respect.

Mr. Spencer's first important work, *Social Statics*, was published in 1851, some eight years before Darwin's *Origin of Species*, and the development of his system of social philosophy extends over the succeeding half century. Despite the reverence due to the author for the great services he has rendered to knowledge in familiarising the general mind with the idea of development as applied to the world around us, and to the history of society in particular, no student of social philosophy who has once perceived the significance of the later developments of the Darwinian law of Natural Selection can let this fact now hide from him, after he has steeped his mind in Mr. Spencer's writings, the hearing of one leading fact

which will probably possess his mind concerning the Synthetic Philosophy. Mr. Spencer's work, as a conception of social progress, is, he will see, in all its essential features a presentation of the theory of society which prevailed in the early decades of the nineteenth century. This theory has been set out under the phraseology of modern evolutionary science; but it remains, this fact notwithstanding, in all its characteristic features, practically the same conception of society as that developed by the school of thought which culminated in England in the writings of John Stuart Mill.¹

¹ It has been a fact tending, beyond doubt, to greatly retard the application of Darwin's theories to the science of society in England that, apart from Darwin's own writings, the principal medium through which the evolutionary view has in the past been made to impinge upon the general attention has been the philosophy of Mr. Spencer and the discourses and addresses of the late Professor Huxley. For no close student can fail to see that both writers belong essentially to the pre-Darwinian period of knowledge. It has not been possible for Mr. Spencer to deal with the Darwinian hypothesis in its later and more fundamental applications without recasting a great part of his earlier work, to the conclusions in which these later developments run counter. As regards Huxley, an interesting and significant fact bearing in the same direction has recently come to notice on the publication of his memoirs. It is, that, three years before the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, Huxley delivered a discourse at the Royal Institution in London in which the main conception upon which the Darwinian hypothesis was afterwards made to rest, was not only opposed, but treated as inherently absurd. Huxley's words are as follows: "Regarding a case of birds, or of butterflies, or examine the shell of an echinus, or a group of foraminifera, sifted out of the first handful of sea-sand. Is it to be supposed for a moment that the beauty of outline and colour of the first, the geometrical regularity of the second, or the extreme variety and elegance of the third are any good to the animals? that they perform any of the actions of their lives more easily and better for being bright and graceful rather than if they were dull and plain? So, to go deeper, is it conceivable that the harmonious variation of a common plan which we

There can be no doubt in the mind of the student as to this fact. As we follow Mr. Spencer through the successive stages of his theory of social development, we see how he conceives human progress to be controlled in all its features by one fact, namely, the relation of the past to the present in a struggle in which the interests in the present are becoming the ascendant factor in our social evolution. Of that deeper conception of human progress as an integrating social process, of which all the principles are in the last resort controlled by the fact that the present is in reality not so much related to the past as passing out under the control of the future, there is to be distinguished no real perception in Mr. Spencer's writings.

find everywhere in Nature serves any utilitarian purpose? that the innumerable varieties of antelopes, of frogs, of elupeoid fishes, of beetles and bivalve mollusks, of polyzoa, of actinozoa, and hydrozoa, are adaptations to as many different kinds of life, and consequently varying physiological necessities? Such a supposition in regard to the three last, at any rate, would be absurd. . . . If we turn to the vegetable world we find it one vast illustration of the same truth. Who has ever dreamed of finding an utilitarian purpose in the forms and colours of flowers, in the sculpture of pollen-grains, in the varied figures of the frond of the ferns? What 'purpose' is served by the strange numerical relations of the parts of plants, the threes and fives of monocotyledons and dicotyledons?" (*The Scientific Memoirs of T. H. Huxley*, vol. i. p. 311.) This passage is very remarkable, as showing how absolutely foreign to Huxley's mind at this period — he had already established his reputation — was the very principle which was about to become the central conception of the Darwinian hypothesis. It tends to explain in some measure that fact of Huxley's subsequent failure to apply the evolutionary hypothesis with any measure of success in the explanation of the phenomena of human society, which was in evidence in his Romanes Lecture in 1893, in the conception therein discussed of the cosmic process *versus* the ethical process (cf. *Evolution and Ethics*, by T. H. Huxley).

We encounter the expression of this fact everywhere from the outset. If we take up the advance to the study of the science of society in Mr. Spencer's writings with the *Principles of Psychology*, the application of the conception to which we are there carried forward is, we see, merely the application of the old-world conception of Condorcet, Cousin, and Quinet, according to which the theory of sociological principles is to be deduced from the introspective study of the individual mind. Of that transforming truth to which all the principles of psychology will be seen to be related in the future, namely, that the study of the individual mind must be itself approached from the standpoint of sociological principles; and that the content of the human mind is, therefore, ultimately governed by its relations to a sociological process, the controlling meaning of which is not in the past, but in the future, there is no discernment visible in Mr. Spencer's theories.

We see how the significance of the principle underlying this fact meets us at every point in Mr. Spencer's theories. For instance, to have once grasped the nature of the position to which the biological sciences have advanced in our time, in bringing us to see the process of human development as a history of the progressive subordination of the present and the individual to the future and the infinite, is to perceive that the history of human evolution must present itself to science in the future as being primarily the history of the evolution in the human mind of the sanction for sacrifice. But as we see Mr. Spencer struggling with the stupendous class of phenomena to which this principle has already given rise in the human mind,

and seeking to associate its meaning simply with the past history of the race, we have in sight a noteworthy spectacle. His explanation of the idea of sacrifice that projects itself with increasing insistence through all the creeds of humanity, becomes, accordingly, little more than a suggestion that it is to be accounted for as a *survival* from cannibal ancestors who delighted in witnessing tortures.¹ The extraordinary triviality and superficiality of the conception underlying such a theory is immediately obvious to any mind which has once caught sight of the meaning of the evolutionary process in human society as we are now beginning to understand it. Yet we see that Mr. Spencer's conclusion here is but the expression of the fundamental idea which runs through all his system of theory. It is but the same conception of the relations of the present merely to the past that we have in his theory of the origin of religions from ancestor worship and a belief in ghosts.² It is still the same conception which runs through his theory of *Ecclesiastical Institutions*, in which all the comparatively insignificant influences which he attributes to this class of phenomena, are, so far as they have any scientific meaning at all, made to revolve round one principle, namely, their influence in tending to establish the authority of the past over the present.³ Their relation to that deeper principle of human evolution, the subordination of the present to the future, does not come within the purview of Mr. Spencer's mind.

But it is as we watch Mr. Spencer developing his principles into a theory of human society as we see it

¹ *Data of Ethics*, chap. viii. ² *Principles of Sociology*, §§ 60-210.

³ *Ibid.* §§ 622-627.

around us in the modern world, that we realise to the full how essentially that theory, in all the leading features we have been considering, corresponds to the theory of social development of the earlier school of English Utilitarianism. In his *Political Institutions* it is only the theory of the emancipation of the present from the past that we have always in view. The characteristic principle of the social process in recent Western history, as Mr. Spencer enunciates it, is practically the same as the Mills conceived it to be. Our social evolution, that is to say, is regarded, in effect, as a struggle between the interests of the present and the rule of the past.¹ The theory of social progress, accordingly, becomes the theory of progress towards a social state in which the ascendancy of the present in the evolutionary process is to be at last complete. And the ideal towards which it is taken that political effort should be directed is, therefore, the same as J. S. Mill held before the minds of English Liberalism in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, namely, a fixed social state in which the interest of the individual and of society hitherto at variance, shall at last become one and identical in an era of the complete ascendancy of the present.²

As we follow Mr. Spencer through the *Principles of Ethics* we have all the culminating phases of this conception clearly in sight. In his view of political society, as in his theory of conduct, we see Mr. Spencer, like the old French Encyclopædists, contemplating the progress of the world towards an ideal

¹ Cf. *Principles of Sociology*, §§ 434-581.

² Cf. *Principles of Ethics*, §§ 48-55.

where, to use his own words, he beholds a "conciliation taking place between the interest of each citizen and the interests of citizens at large—tending ever towards a state in which the two become merged into one, and in which the feelings answering to them respectively fall into complete concord."¹ Like John Stuart Mill, that is to say, he is regarding our social progress as progress towards a future social state in which the interests of every individual shall be at last completely harmonised with the interests of the whole.² Like Bentham he is, in reality, in this respect carrying the science of society back to the point at which it left the hand of the Greek theorist, where the science of "the associated state" and the science of the interests of the individuals comprising it were considered to be one and the same.

In the later part of his career Mr. Spencer has been anxious to refute the charge that his principles gave support to the theories of society which find expression in German social democracy. Yet in this respect his critics have been quite consistent. For, as in the case of Mill, we see that he really has in view, like the Marxian socialists, a state of society in which the sphere of law, of morality, and of economic action are necessarily coincident and coextensive, and in which, in consequence, just as Marx imagined, the requirements of the existing State must, in the end, overrun every domain of human activity. Mr. Spencer's work represents, in other words, the endeavour to represent our social evolution in terms

¹ *Principles of Ethics*, § 92; see also §§ 48-55.

² *Utilitarianism*, p. 25.

of the interests of the individuals comprised within the limits of political consciousness. Of the profound antagonism involved between the principles governing the life and welfare of all the individuals included in these limits, and those governing the life and welfare of the race in process of evolution; and of the nature of the phenomena accompanying a resulting process of stress and subordination infinite in its reach, there is no conception in his writings.¹

Deeply impressed as the mind may be by the position here disclosed, we must carry our scrutiny yet farther before the position, towards which we have travelled in Western thought, is fully realised. It will probably have occurred to many who have followed the argument here developed, that however representative in character, however wide in influence

¹ Answer may be made here to any disciple of Mr. Spencer who feels prompted to question this view on the strength of isolated passages in the Synthetic Philosophy, in which it is acknowledged that the interests of the species or of the organism must prevail over those of the individual, where the two come into conflict (e.g. *Data of Ethics*, pp. 133-134, and *Principles of Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 6). The principle involved here is the subordination of the present to the future and the universal. No close student of Mr. Spencer would be likely to hold the view that the author had in mind any real conception of the necessarily inherent antagonism involved between the principles governing the two classes of interests. On the contrary, Mr. Spencer has continually in view, in human history, the progress of society towards a state in which the interests of the individual shall become harmonised and identical with those of society (cf. *Data of Ethics*, chap. viii.). In the result there is to be found in the Synthetic Philosophy no conception of the real meaning of the class of phenomena which is accompanying in human history this progressive subordination of the individual and the present to the ends of a process, the meaning of which is, of necessity, always projected beyond the limits of political consciousness.

the views and opinions hitherto discussed, they do not include the whole outlook in modern thought. It may be said that the conception of the ascendancy of the present in the social process which we see here expressing itself through the views of the English Utilitarians down to Mr. Spencer; which is represented in the literature of the Marxian movement in Germany, and in the theories of the school which the writings of Professor Loria represent in modern Italy; and which we encounter in almost every phase in current French art, literature, and philosophy;—does not characteristically present the position to which Western thought has advanced. When, however, we turn now and carry our view in yet another direction, the results are hardly less striking in any particular.

One of the most representative minds in recent thought in that region where we see the theory of the principles of human conduct impinging on the theory of social development has been the late Professor Sidgwick. No recent writer has perceived more clearly the nature of the cardinal difficulty which underlies that conception of the modern state which the Manchester school in England developed from the principles of the Utilitarians, namely, the difficulty inherent in the fact that there is resident in our civilisation an ethical principle which must ultimately render the modern consciousness absolutely intolerant of the fundamental principles of a purely business conception of "society."¹ No

¹ Compare, for example, *Political Economy and Ethics*, by Henry Sidgwick, in the article on "Political Economy" in the *Dictionary of Political Economy*, vol. iii.

mind in recent times, in reviewing the results obtained in modern thought — as it has advanced, on the one hand, through the conceptions here described, and, on the other, through that movement which has developed in Germany, Scotland, and England, through Kant and Hegel — has seen more accurately than Sidgwick's, the nature of the fundamental contradiction involved in all attempts to rationalise within the limits of political consciousness the conceptions of "duty" and "self-interest" in the individual.¹ And no modern student of social phenomena has arrived by more deliberate and cautious steps at a position in which that question which underlies the evolutionary position presented itself to him — the question whether it was not, after all, impossible to construct a scientific theory of ethics within such limits, and whether, therefore, in his own words, "we were not in the last resort forced to borrow a fundamental and indispensable premiss" from conceptions which transcended them.²

But when we proceed to follow Professor Sidgwick through his writings, in which we might expect to find the application of such views to the science of society or to a science of the social process in history, we only find that we have once more returned to the science of the political State presented as the science of society. It is true that in his *Elements of Politics* we find a few sentences in

¹ Cf. *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, pp. 259-283, and *Methods of Ethics*, 507-508.

² The *Methods of Ethics*, by Henry Sidgwick, p. 506. See also Professor Mackenzie's *Manual of Ethics*, bk. ii. chap. i. and chap. iv. 3d ed., chap. ii. 2d ed.

which the view is advanced that the welfare of the community may be interpreted to mean the welfare, not only of the human beings who are actually living,¹ but of those who are to live hereafter. But, after this, we encounter in a book of 632 pages nothing to show that Professor Sidgwick had attained to any conception of the relation of this fact to the science of politics as a whole,² or to any law or principle of government, or to any principle of social development. Yet, if the principle of Projected Efficiency be taken as applying to society, a fundamental fact of human evolution must be that the welfare of society in this larger sense is not coincident with, and can never be made coincident with, that of any of the classes or parties or majorities with which we see governments to be concerned. The only aspect in which the meaning of our civilisation as a system of social order, destined to hold its place in the future, could be set forth in a really scientific light must, as we perceive, necessarily present us throughout Western history with the spectacle of these ruling classes or majorities moving and ordering the world in the endeavour to reach their own ends; and yet everywhere encountering the effect of a slow

¹ *Elements of Politics*, by Henry Sidgwick, pp. 34, 35.

² We might, for instance, have expected Sidgwick to have seen the meaning of the position which lies behind that characteristic tendency of recent English thought noted by Sir Frederick Pollock and Professor Holland (the expression, as we shall see later, of a deep-seated, though more or less unconscious, principle of our social evolution) which is accomplishing the complete differentiation of the analytical branch of political science from the science of ethics as a whole (cf. Pollock's *History of the Science of Politics*, pp. 113-114, and Holland's *Elements of Jurisprudence*, chap. iii.).

subordinating process of evolution ever consistently preventing those ends from being attained. But we find no presentation in Sidgwick's writings of any consistent science of society conceived in this sense. It is to the theory of the political State that we always return in the end.¹

In modern Germany, when we regard the history of the movement which has come down from Kant through the Hegelian development, we have a striking presentation of the result of the prevailing tendency. The two extreme and opposing phases which this movement may be said to have reached in Germany have now one characteristic feature in common. In the phase which has reached its expression in the materialistic interpretation of history, the theory of the existing collective State and the ascendancy of the interests of its members is, as a matter of course, presented as the whole science of society. Yet, in the opposing interpretation of history to which the Hegelian development has carried a section of German thought, the meaning of the evolutionary process in history has come to be almost as closely associated with the purposes and machinery of the existing State. In it we see, as it were, the post-reformation ideas of modern history allied with the conception of the omnipotent State which Henry IV. sought to realise in the Empire in mediæval Europe. We have, therefore, that striking spectacle in modern politics, namely, the dominance in all schools of thought in the current life of Germany of the theory of the omnipotence of

¹ Compare Sidgwick's position in this respect with the development to be noted, e.g. in Professor Gidding's *Elements of Sociology*, chap. xxiv.

the State—with the resulting identification of the science of the political State with the science of society in process of evolution. In the result, it may be said of modern Germany, as a recent writer has correctly remarked, "that, notwithstanding their manifold divergencies, all the leading political parties are based on substantially the same idea of the omnipotence of the State. Here the Conservative and the Social Democrat take the same ground, whatever may be their differences in regard to the ways of the manifestation of authority by the State and the regulations as to the distribution of property."¹

When the mind is carried to the standpoint of the socialistic parties in Germany, who frankly adopt the theories of Marx, and who, therefore, openly accept the materialistic interpretation of history, we see now how the earlier theories of Bentham and the Mills in England have been carried at last to their full logical application. For here the ascendancy of the present, and, therefore, of the economic factor, is no longer simply an implied principle in the historical process. It has become now the avowed end to which every tendency of current social progress is necessarily made subservient. In this respect the two phases of modern thought represented by Marx, on the one hand, and by Nietzsche, on the other, appear as the complements of each other. The principles of Marx represent, as it were, only the extreme socialistic expression of the views of which Nietzsche may be said to represent the extreme individualistic interpretation. For in each case the principle which is

¹ "Bismarck," by William Clarke, *Contemporary Review*, No. 397.

held before us is the same, namely, the ascendancy of the present in the social process in history.

To Nietzsche, as is well known, the modern world is merely a world in which the real masters and superiors have been robbed of their rights—a world in which the *Uebermenschen*, the natural ruling caste, have been drugged and anæsthetised by the sentiments and beliefs of our civilisation into yielding their position to a democracy of whom they are the natural superiors, and against whom they would otherwise be immeasurably the stronger.¹ But to Marx equally, in the last analysis, it is might only which is right. The party whom he champions is, we see, justified in the social process for the same reason as the party which Nietzsche represents, that is to say, in respect of its strength. For there is in Marx's theories, as Mr. Russell has correctly pointed out, neither justice, nor virtue, nor morality²—only the blind growth of the productive forces and the resulting necessity, as Marx conceives it, for the dominance in the end of the interests with which he is concerned. In the one case, as in the other, the standpoint is, therefore, the same: we ultimately stand face to face in the historical process with but one characteristic principle—the ascendancy of the present, and the elimination from society of every cause, sentiment, principle, and belief which prevents the strongest interest in the present from realising itself. As the evolutionist looks back, therefore, over the

¹ *The Twilight of the Idols*, by Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. by T. Common, p. 155. See also *Antichrist* and *Zarathustra*.

² *German Social Democracy*, by Bertrand Russell, I. See also the author's *Social Evolution*, chap. viii.

history of the clearly defined movement in modern thought, in which the endeavour has been more and more authoritatively made to interpret to us the phenomenon of our Western democracy, he sees that it is justifiable to make in respect of it a deeply significant assertion. It is that this movement — in all the phases in which it has contemplated the ascendancy of the interests of the present in the evolutionary process, and in which, therefore, we see it identifying the interests of society with the interests of the individuals comprised within the limits of political consciousness — has not carried the theory of society, in any scientific principle, a step beyond the position which it occupied twenty-three centuries ago in Greek thought. It is the theory of the State alone which we again encounter in all the developments of the time. In modern thought, as we see it represented in this movement, the interest of the State has become again, just as in the Greek civilisation, the ultimate principle in the science of society, the controlling end in the theory of human conduct. The State itself has become, to use the words of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, an "être mystérieux dont tant de prétendus sages prononcent le nom avec adoration, que tous les hommes invoquent, que tous se disputent, et qui semble être le seul dieu auquel le monde moderne veuille garder respect et confiance."¹ We have returned, as it were, to the standpoint of the ancient world, when the ascendancy of the interests of the present, expressing themselves through the State, becomes once more the ultimate fact to which every principle of society and of human life is made subservient.

¹ *L'État moderne et ses fonctions*, par Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, p. 25.

As the mind, with such a conclusion in view, reverts to the meaning of that characteristic principle of the subordination of the present to the future which we saw to have governed the evolution of life from the beginning; as we begin to perceive the application to the science of society of that great conception, which German idealism struggled for 150 years to bring to the birth in coherent utterance, namely, that the history of the world is the history of the ideas by which the subordination of the individual to a world-process infinite in its meaning has been effected;—the character of the position in modern thought begins to impress the imagination. For, as we catch sight of what must be the real meaning of the great process of life which has developed towards our Western democracy; as we perceive the significance of the fact that that process of life has come to occupy the place it fills on the stage of the world only in virtue of some deep-seated and inherent principle of fitness in the stress out of which it has come; as we begin to realise something of the nature of the organic, subordinating, and integrating principles which must be resident in it,—principles involving the subordination of the individual and all his interests, and even those of whole movements and epochs of time to the ends of a process of life moving forward through the slow cosmic stress of the centuries; nay, as we see how it is those same principles, which must continue to control our developing civilisation, should it be destined to continue to hold its place in the stress of the world in the future;—there rises at last in the mind an over-

mastering conviction of the extraordinary incompleteness and insufficiency of all the conceptions of the science of society we have been here considering. The nature of the main position in thought, which underlies that attitude of doubt, of hesitation, and even of revolt, which the younger and rising minds in so many schools of thought present to the social philosophy of the past, begins to be revealed to us. It is no question, we see, merely of faults, local or personal, in the systems of thought around us. We are regarding no merely passing phase of temporary interest, but a position in thought which separates two epochs in the intellectual development of the world.

For, as for a vast period of time the old philosophers constructed their systems of Ptolemaic cosmogony to centre in the observer and revolve round the little world upon which he stood; so, down into the midst of the time in which we are living, we see the systems of social theory we have been considering similarly constructed to centre in the observer, similarly conceived to revolve round the petty interests which the same individual saw comprised within the limits of his own political consciousness. We have reached a crisis in thought where, to use words of Mr. Leslie Stephen, the scenery has at last become too wide for the drama, where, through the roof of the theatre in which our theorists have unfolded these little conceptions of human progress, we see the eternal stars shining in silent contempt of such petty imaginings.¹

¹ *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. I. p. 82.

CHAPTER IV

THE PHENOMENON OF WESTERN LIBERALISM

WHEN we have become conscious, however imperfectly, of the nature of the position defined in the last chapter, the interest of the situation will, in all probability, be felt to deepen as soon as the attempt is made to carry the analysis a stage further. When it is once realised that the development in Western history which has slowly carried our civilisation towards the forms of Democracy cannot, of necessity, be expressed in any mere theory of the State, or in any of those current formulas in which the interests of the individuals, comprised within the limits of political consciousness, are conceived as the dominant factor in human evolution; the mind turns instinctively to scrutinise the phenomenon of Western Liberalism as a whole. How is it that the meaning of the progressive movement which it represents has come to be interpreted to us in the terms in which we have thus found it to be set forth in current thought?

Nothing can be more remarkable than the position to which modern Liberalism has been actually reduced in practice by the endeavour to present it as a movement resting under all its forms on a theory of existing interests in the State. The paralysing contradictions resulting from the attempt are a characteristic feature of the time. The most striking

spectacle in modern history, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, is the position arising, not only in internal politics, but in international relations, from the endeavour to represent the meaning of the world-process, in the midst of which we are living, by a business theory of the State. Following the analysis in the preceding chapters we have only to read between the lines of Professor Ritchie's examination¹ of the formulas of "Natural Rights," which modern thought has essayed to put into the mouth of Demos, from the French Revolution onwards, to realise in what irretrievable ruin the theories which have accompanied that attempt lie around us at the present time.

In what, then, consists the ultimate claim of Western Liberalism as a principle of progress? It cannot represent simply the claim of the interests in the present to be the dominant factor in the evolutionary process, as we have seen that claim expressed in the conceptions of utilitarianism, and in the theories alike of Nietzsche and of Marx. Nor can it be the claim of individualism. For how could the individual be greater than society? Nor can it be the claim of the majority to rule. For to attempt to reduce the individuals, comprised even within our own civilisation at the present day, to the rule of the majority, would be to attempt to put the world's progress back a thousand years. Nay, it would be undoubtedly to provoke from the advanced peoples, and even from many of the advocates of universal peace amongst them, a resistance as determined, as unhesitating, and

¹ *Natural Rights*, by David G. Ritchie.

as bloody as any of which history could furnish record. Nor can it be the claim of Democracy as a form of government. For we have only to reflect to see that peoples have lived, and still live, under Democracy as a form of government, while remaining separated by an immense interval from the spirit and the meaning of the civilisation represented by the advanced peoples of the present day. Nor can it be, in the last resort, the claim of nationality. For one of the most curious spectacles of the modern world is that of mere tribal or local egoisms which have expressed themselves under the forms of nationality, claiming, in this respect alone, the rights and tolerance of our civilisation. The inherent contradiction is often painfully felt by the best-intentioned minds; it being dimly perceived that, according to existing theories of nationality, all that interval of progress which divides the life of the highest civilisation from that of the lowest social state would have to be condemned, there being no single step in that interval, whereby a higher form of social life had replaced a lower form, which could be justified under current conceptions of the rights of nationalities.

On what, therefore, in the last resort, rests the claim of Western Liberalism? How has the movement towards Democracy, which it represents, come to be associated in history with interpretations which the evolutionist sees must be essentially superficial, and even utterly misrepresentative of the real meaning of the phenomenon we are regarding?

Now, if we endeavour to regard Western Liberalism as any other natural phenomenon, and, therefore, in so doing, endeavour to keep the mind entirely

detached from the prejudices and prepossessions that have unavoidably become associated with it in modern thought, there will probably be little doubt or hesitation as to the point at which we must take up the study of the movement towards Democracy with which it is associated.

For the origin of that movement we shall have to go back beyond the period of the French Revolution. No one nowadays, says Borgeaud, attributes the theory of the social contract to Rousseau.¹ The Revolution in France is, strictly speaking, to be regarded as no more than a local incident in a movement in Western thought which had become general, a product born at a stage when that movement had resulted, to use words of William Clarke, in "a general European culture common to all the thinkers of the later part of the eighteenth century—to Kant and Rousseau, to Franklin and Turgot, nay, to such Conservatives as Gibbon and Hume, and such a Welt-Kind as Goethe."² Every article in the creed of the French Revolution, as Professor Ritchie has shown in detail,³ had been already formulated in an earlier development of Western thought.

For the real origin of the movement in which Western Democracy takes its rise, we must go back to the revolution which we behold in progress in England more than a century earlier. It is here that we stand and watch the unloosening of the forces which have set in motion the modern world.

¹ *The Rise of Modern Democracy in Old and New England*, by Charles Borgeaud, Member of the Faculty of Law, Geneva, c. iii.

² "Bismarck," by Wm. Clarke, *Contemporary Review*, No. 397.

³ *Natural Rights*, by David G. Ritchie, chap. i.

"Although no such inference could be drawn from English phraseology, there is no doubt," says Maine, "that the modern popular government of our day is of purely English origin."¹ It is in the movement which upheaved England in the seventeenth century, as Borgeaud points out, that we see being formulated for the first time in Western thought the political manifestoes of modern Democracy.²

Now, if we concentrate attention on the revolution in progress in England in the seventeenth century, we shall have to note certain facts of great interest respecting it. The characteristic doctrines of Democracy to which that revolution gave rise were undoubtedly, as Maine has pointed out,³ entirely different from any which had hitherto prevailed in the world. They were, moreover, it may be observed, inherent in the movement itself. They constituted its distinctive and essential teaching. They were not only clearly defined at an early stage of the movement, but they were set forth at that stage in practically the identical form in which they have since been included in the programme of the modern progressive movement in nearly every country embraced in our civilisation.

If, for instance, we turn, in Mr. Gardiner's *Constitutional Documents*, to the *Agreement of the People*, dated 15th of January, 1649,⁴ and presented in the name of the army which had broken up the forces of the king in England, we find already outlined at this

¹ *Popular Government*, by Sir Henry Sumner Maine, p. 8.

² *The Rise of Modern Democracy in Old and New England*, by Charles Borgeaud, c. iv. ³ Cf. *Popular Government*, pp. 8-60.

⁴ *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, by S. R. Gardiner, No. 81, p. 359.

stage the actual political principles around which the progressive movement in the modern world has since, in the main, centred. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people; of supreme power vested in a single representative assembly elected for a limited term; of equal voting power vested in all those who pay taxes; of religious freedom; of the separation of Church and State; and even that doctrine, subsequently adopted in the Constitution of the United States of America, of the limitation for the time being of the power of the representative assembly itself by certain fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution; — are all clearly formulated in this document. These are doctrines representing, for the most part, principles different from any which had been enunciated in any previous period. They are the doctrines which have since controlled the course of political development in England and amongst the English-speaking people, which have profoundly influenced the political history of modern Europe as a whole, and which we find included at the present day in the political constitutions of democracies like those of France, Switzerland, and the United States.

If we ask now what it was that led to the promulgation of principles destined thus to influence the development of the modern world — principles which, it may be observed, were widely different in significance from those which had hitherto prevailed in history — there can be no doubt as to the nature of the answer which must be given. They were, we see, in the last analysis, principles proceeding directly from the conceptions which had so profoundly influenced men's minds in the great religious revolution which

had just swept over the face of Europe. They were unmistakably the result of these conceptions; they were everywhere intimately and inseparably associated with them in the minds of the leaders of the political movement which was transforming society.

When we regard closely the leaders of this movement in England—who were thus engaged in formulating the principles upon which the political development of the modern world has since proceeded—we must be struck with one unmistakable characteristic of their standpoint. These men were engaged in the endeavour to establish what they held to be the first principles of political society. Yet we have to remark upon the fact that the last thing they had in mind was the utilitarian interests of society comprised within the limits of political consciousness. Nay more, the very essence of their work lay, as we see, in the fact that they were endeavouring to project the ruling principles of society altogether beyond the meaning of those institutions and causes which had, throughout the past, entangled them within the meaning of the State.

We cannot, therefore, fail to notice the tremendous assumption which underlay every one of the principles which these men were propounding. The most fundamental political doctrine of modern Democracy is, for instance, that of the native equality of all men. It is, in reality, around this doctrine that every phase of the progressive political movement in our civilisation has centred for the last two centuries. It is this doctrine which is asserted in the political constitution of every country where the principles of Western Liberalism have been ac-

cepted. It is this doctrine which is denied in all other political constitutions. It is the doctrine of the native equality of men that has been behind the long movement in our Western world which has emancipated the people and slowly equipped them with political power; and it is the repudiation of it which constitutes the ultimate fact in every phase and stage of the resistance which this movement has encountered. Professor Ritchie has enumerated¹ the "natural rights" which have been most commonly claimed as such in the modern movement towards Democracy, as the rights of life, of liberty, of toleration, of public meeting and association, of contract, of resistance to oppression, of equality, of property, and of pursuing and obtaining happiness. But they may all be resolved into the claim of the native equality of men. Under whatever form expressed, and through whatever involved process we follow it, down even into the theories of the followers of Marx, it is this doctrine of the equality of men which underlies, as a first principle, the creed of every democratic party in the politics of the modern world.

Nevertheless, what we see is that by the men with whom the assertion of "natural right" originated in England the doctrine of the native equality of men was most certainly not accepted as a first principle. It had no meaning apart by itself. We see that it was accepted at the time, as it was accepted later in Locke's writings,² only as a corollary to a conception of the relationship in which men were held to stand to a meaning in their lives which transcended the

¹ Cf. *Natural Rights*, chaps. vi.-xiv.

² Cf. *Two Treatises of Government*, bk. ii. chap. ii.

meaning of the interests included within the limits of political consciousness. Without this conception the theory of equality would have presented itself to its original sponsors as being just as lacking of support from the teaching of reason and experience as the most hostile critic of Democracy has endeavoured to prove it. Nay more, it would have appeared as immeasurably and as inconceivably absurd as even Nietzsche in his fierce invective has in our time asserted it to be.

When the scrutiny is continued we must notice again how fundamental was the assumption these men had in mind in laying down that doctrine which Maine has pointed out to be absolutely new and exceptional in history—the central doctrine upon which the whole theory and practice of modern Democracy has since been founded—namely, that all authority is ultimately resident in the people, and that governments hold their power only by delegation from them.¹

In the movement in progress in England in the seventeenth century the people were placed in the seat of the king. But we notice at once the significance of the conception by which the transition was justified at the time. It did not involve the assumption that there remained no ruling principle resident in society beyond the will of society directed towards the realisation of the utilitarian interests of its existing members. Nothing could have been further from the minds of the propounders of the doctrine underlying the change. The accompanying conception represented almost the very opposite of such an assumption. It represented, in the last analysis,

¹ *Popular Government*, pp. 8-13.

rather the endeavour to project the controlling principles of society altogether beyond the limits of political consciousness. For the characteristic meaning of the revolution which was in progress arose from the fact that it was within those limits that the governing principles of society had necessarily been entangled in all previous theories of ultimate authority conceived as resident either in the Church, the King, or the State.

The far-reaching significance of the principle underlying the transition is, in short, immediately evident as soon as we reflect on the nature of the inherent tendency of human development, as discussed in the preceding chapters, to project the controlling meaning of the evolutionary process in society beyond the limits of political consciousness. We begin to distinguish the character of the interval which separates such a conception of civil society, not only from that which existed in the ancient civilisations, but from that which had hitherto prevailed in Western Europe. The character of the principle introduced remained as yet undefined in men's minds. It was unanalysed in any of the prevailing theories of society. But the import of the new departure is unmistakable to the evolutionist.

As the observer follows the development of the theory of society here launched into view the interest continues. The first political writers who present themselves in England as endeavouring to deal on scientific methods with the principles of that new order of society which was to ripen towards the modern epoch, consist of a group in which Hobbes and Locke are the most prominent examples. Of

these Locke in particular stands out as a commanding figure, destined as he was, more than any single writer of the period, to influence both directly and indirectly throughout Western Europe the subsequent development of the theory of the modern State.

Now if we take the political works of these two writers and analyse them carefully at the present time—following the principles enunciated by Hobbes into the form in which they became developed by Locke¹—the result is very striking. We descend at once, as it were, beneath the surface of things into a region of twilight where, as in a vast workshop, we see being slowly extended the great framework of principles on which the modern theory of society has been reared. As we traverse backwards and forwards this region of realities, and begin to understand the nature of the spectacle before us, the effect on the mind is remarkable. Here we see are all the doctrines of the French Revolution, and of a later era of Democracy. Here is the doctrine of “the state of nature,” of the “social contract” of the “sovereign people.” Here also is the doctrine of the native equality of men, of the separation of Church and State, and of fundamental principles resident in society and limiting the powers of legislators and of governments. They are the doctrines round which the stress of the political life of our Western world has since centred. They are doctrines of which the greater number are accepted at the present day as first principles in the teaching

¹ Compare chaps. xii.–xxxii. in Hobbes' *Leviathan* (Sir William Molesworth's edition, 1839), and the three essays, *Liberty, Dominion, Religion*, with Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, bk. ii.

which Democracy is offered at the hands of its interpreters.

Yet, as the mind endeavours to establish the intimate relationship of the doctrines here in sight, a primary conviction regarding them becomes irresistible. None of them we see is accepted here as a first principle. For, underneath all the discussion of the outward utilitarian features of society that we observe proceeding, there extends the fundamental assumptions that have been already referred to. It is upon these assumptions that all the principles which are being enunciated ultimately rest. Everywhere in the theories of Hobbes and Locke we find, if the examination is carried far enough, that we stand in the presence of the same fact. Society and all its members, and all the purposes for which it is constituted, are regarded in the last resort as standing in subordinate relationship to ends and principles which transcend the limits of political consciousness.

In the theories of both Hobbes and Locke, for instance, men were conceived, before governments as yet came into being, as existing in "a state of nature," — free, equal, and independent.¹ The great question of the time to which the civil Revolution in England had directed attention was: What was the nature of the restrictions men made in giving up part of their assumed rights in a state of nature to establish civil authority and obtain the benefits of government? What was, therefore, the nature of the ultimate appeal from civil authority so established? Hobbes, supported by Spinoza, Puffendorf, and other

¹ *Leviathan*, c. xiii.-xxi. and c. xxxi. ; *Two Treatises of Government*, I. c. ii. iii.

writers on the continent of Europe, maintained that once established the authority became absolute. Locke and those who followed him maintained, on the contrary, that having failed in its purpose it might be deposed.¹ But we have only to carry the examination far enough to find that the assumption upon which the argument rested in one case equally with the other was that men were in all these relations regarded as standing in a position of personal responsibility to principles, the meaning, the claim, and the operation of which were conceived as projected beyond the bounds of political consciousness. Although to Hobbes the "state of nature" was a state of war, when his argument is followed in the first thirty-one chapters of the *Leviathan*, or in chapter iv. of the essay on Liberty² (entitled "That the Law of Nature is a Divine Law") it may be seen how this fundamental assumption controls the entire argument. In Locke's imaginary "state of nature," again, the primary conception from which the argument proceeds is that men in a state of nature were to be regarded as born equal and independent. But when one after another of the passages in the *Two Treatises of Government* is passed before the mind, it may be perceived how characteristic and fundamental is the assumption on which the conception is made to rest. The state of nature, says Locke, in effect, has itself a law to govern it—a law which, when we come to inquire into its character, is per-

¹ *Two Treatises of Government*, c. xix. (of the Dissolution of Governments).

² Cf. Hobbes' works, edited by Sir William Molesworth, vol. ii. *Liberty—Dominion—Religion*.

ceived to be so far-reaching that it controls all the principles of the political state which is regarded as having succeeded to it.¹

When men were regarded as having left the state of nature, and as organised into societies under government, the tacit assumption underlying and pervading the entire argument is found to be still the same. Hobbes, from his point of view, undertook to prove that men owed absolute obedience to the civil authority once constituted. But it is only necessary to examine the stages of the argument to see how it is all in the end bound up with the same assumption of a sense of responsibility in men to principles, the claims of which, on the individual, transcended the utilitarian interests of existing society.² Locke from

¹ Speaking of the "state of nature," Locke continues: "But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license; though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's, pleasure" (*Two Treatises of Government*, by John Locke, bk. ii. chap. ii.).

² Obedience to constituted authority "where it is not repugnant to the laws of God," was what Hobbes considered he had proved in the first thirty chapters of the *Leviathan*. "There wants only," he continued, "for the entire knowledge of civil duty to know what are those laws of God"; and he proceeds to give an exposition in which the assumed sense of continued and personal responsibility to an authority outside of society presents itself as the central and dominant feature. See *Leviathan*, by Thomas Hobbes, chap. xxxi. and following.

a different standpoint insisted that the supreme authority in civil society could not assume to itself any power which was not in accordance with certain fundamental laws. But here again, when the examination is carried far enough, it becomes evident that the argument still rests, in the last resort, on the assumption of principles operative in society, the content of which transcended that of the utilitarian interests of its existing members.¹

In all this it is of the first importance to keep in mind the character of the revolution in England which had produced the movement in thought we are here regarding. That revolution represents, we must always remember, not, indeed, the attempt to set forth the theory of human development as a theory of the utilitarian interests of the existing members of society. It represents, in effect, rather the first profound effort of the human mind to entirely disengage principles, the claim of which on the individual was conceived as transcending that of all interests included within the limits of political consciousness, from all theories whatever of the political State with which they had been hitherto entangled. The deep import of the spectacle is, in short, unmistakable. Masked beneath the assumptions of the time, still undefined and unanalysed in men's minds, there lies hidden in the process in progress a new principle of society. We are really

¹ Locke considered the power of legislators always limited by one principle: "The rules that they make for other men's actions must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of nature, *i.e.* to the will of God." — *Two Treatises of Government*, bk. ii. chap. xi.

watching a development in which the principles of government are being completely disentangled from those of absolute ethics; the overwhelming significance of the transition consisting, as the evolutionist begins to distinguish, in the fact that the governing principles of the social process are thereby, for the first time in human history, being projected altogether beyond the control of merely political consciousness. Hobbes in this light is to be regarded as the first social theorist who marked off the domain of positive law in society from the region of ethics, in which there continued to be still involved the larger and fundamental principles of "society" as a whole. And he began the process, as Sir Frederick Pollock with deep insight points out, unconsciously and of necessity, through trying to make legal supremacy the final and conclusive standard of political right.¹

It is from this point forward that we have now to watch the development of one of the most remarkable situations in the history of thought. What we have seen so far has been the theory of the utilitarian State beginning to be disengaged from those larger principles of human conduct in society which had hitherto included it. But what we have now to watch is a development in which we see this same theory of the utilitarian State, as it becomes thus differentiated, gradually tending in Western thought

¹ Cf. *History of the Science of Politics*, iv. But as a consequence of his position, Hobbes has had the fate of appearing henceforward in a development of Western thought, the real significance of which is only beginning to be understood, as the intellectual father of the mechanical and frankly materialistic school of social theory.

to be accepted, by itself alone, as *the whole science of our social evolution*. Gradually dissociated in the minds of men from the fundamental assumptions to which it was related at the outset, and upon which, as we have seen, rested the central and characteristic doctrines of modern Democracy, it becomes slowly developed through the literature of the French Revolution into that theory of Western Liberalism which, as it culminated at last in England in the writings of John Stuart Mill, must excite the amazement of every mind which has mastered, in the light of the modern doctrine of evolution, the nature of the system of life unfolding itself in Western civilisation. As if in effect, says Nietzsche—speaking from his own point of view—as if the whole train of ideas leading to the modern development towards Democracy, and springing from the system of religious belief associated with our civilisation, is not a self-contained system, a view of things consistent and complete in itself! “As if we could break out of it a fundamental idea and thereby not break the whole into pieces!”¹

As we turn our faces now from the period of Locke onwards, we have in view, in the subsequent history of Western thought, a spectacle so extraordinary that, if it were not presented in the clearest outline, it must have appeared to verge on the incredible.

The first aspect of this development presents itself as we behold the ideas which Hobbes had set in motion in England obtaining a wider currency on the continent of Europe. The theory of government

¹ Cf. *The Twilight of the Idols*, by Friedrich Nietzsche.

and of conduct developed by Hobbes was soon taken up, and, in many of its leading features, expanded by Spinoza. Yet we notice at once a certain difference beneath the surface. The utilitarian theory of the State is, it may be distinguished, already tending to be developed on the continent as a self-contained science of society, apart from those fundamental assumptions with which it was at first associated in England. Hobbes' theory of the ultimate causes of human conduct in selfishness is on its way, in the hands of Spinoza, to be developed into that complete self-centred equilibrium of ethical principles which later, in the hands of Bentham and John Stuart Mill, was to be considered as revolving in all its phases round the central conception of the enlightened self-interest of the individual in the existing political State.

When the period of the French Revolution is reached, great progress, it may be observed, has been already made in the direction in which this development is proceeding. To all outward appearance, it is still the principles of the English revolutionists of the seventeenth century which are everywhere dominant in Western thought. That men are born free, equal, and independent, and in possession of certain inherent and inalienable rights, has become a universal assumption.¹ Locke's principles have influenced in every direction the work of the Encyclopædists in France. In the hands of Diderot, D'Alembert, Holbach, and others, they have been used with far-reaching effect against the old order of things in

¹ Cf. Ritchie's *Natural Rights*, c. i.; Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, vol. i. c. xxxvii.

France. They have crossed the Atlantic, and have become associated with the spirit of government throughout English-speaking America. They are expressed in a declaration—soon to be repeated in the constitutions of other American States—of the “Bill of Rights” of Virginia in 1776; in the Declaration of American Independence of the same year;¹ and they constitute the central principles of the French Revolution as set forth in the Declarations of 1791 and 1793.²

Yet if we look beneath all the outward similarity of words and forms, we may perceive that, on the continent of Europe, a clearly defined process of development, away from the position of Locke, is proceeding in thought. It is the theory of the utilitarian State alone which is coming to be regarded as embracing the whole science of society. And in the science of society, as thus conceived, no essential connection is assumed to exist between the principles on which it is made to rest and those ideas with which we observed the principles of society to be involved in the minds of the civil revolutionists in England in the midst of the religious movement of the seventeenth century. The principles of modern Democracy, which in England in that century were based on certain fundamental assumptions without which they were regarded as having absolutely no meaning, are coming, it may be observed, to be accepted as standing entirely alone, on

¹ Macdonald's *Select Documents Illustrative of the History of the United States*, No. 1.

² See Paine's *Rights of Man*; Baine's *Wars of the French Revolution*, vol. i., Introduction; and Ritchie's *Natural Rights*, Appendix.

their own merits and in their own right. Outward forms of words serve to mask the transition which is taking place, but the character of the process is unmistakable. By the end of the eighteenth century the intellectual conception of Western Liberalism, as we see it presented in the literature of the French Revolution, has come to represent simply the theory of the political State. It is already detached from history and from the development in our civilisation which produced it.¹

¹ A closer insight reveals immediately that the remarkable confusion of thought and theory which marks the period of the French Revolution, results largely from the fact that we find the theorists in various stages of a transition, from the fundamental assumption underlying the principles of Hobbes and Locke, which was destined to be fully accomplished only at a later period. Excepting Turgot, most of the Encyclopedists may be regarded as thinkers who regarded the concepts of the system of belief associated with our civilisation as having no meaning which extended beyond the range of political consciousness. But in Rousseau we have an intermediate stage of great interest, in which the nature of the process that is proceeding is revealed with great clearness. Rousseau went so far in one direction that he wished to have an established political religion. "The tenets of political religion," he said, "should be few and simple; they should be laid down with precision and without comment. The existence of a deity, powerful, intelligent, beneficent, prescient, and provident; a future state, the reward of the righteous, the punishment of the wicked, the sacred nature of the social contract and of the laws — these should be its positive tenets. As to negative dogmas, I limit them to one — it is intolerance. Those who affect to make a distinction between civil and religious intolerance are in my opinion mistaken. These two intolerances are inseparable. It is impossible to live in peace with those whom we firmly believe devoted to damnation; to love them would be to hate God who punishes them. It is therefore absolutely necessary for us either to torment or to convert them. Wherever theological intolerance is admitted, it is impossible that it should not have some civil effect; and so soon as it has, the sovereign is no longer sovereign even in secular matters; the priests become the real masters,

In the growing light of the time in which we are living, it is of the highest interest to note a solitary form which stands out in bold relief against the background of events in this period of transition. It is the figure of Burke, to whom the modern mind in England has already begun to turn with instinctive perception of the relation to a coming epoch of knowledge of the message of which he struggled to deliver himself in the period of the French Revolution. Burke has been continually charged by critics with inconsistency. He is pointed to at one stage of his career as applauding the principles of Locke in the Revolution in America. We are called to witness him later standing, a commanding figure, denouncing with a passionate eloquence, almost beyond the measure of anything else of the kind in literature, what to many minds appeared to be exactly the same principles expressed

and kings are only their officers" (*The Social Contract*). Most writers who have dealt with this passage have noted only the inconsistency involved, or the hostility of Rousseau to the Church in France. But the student of the development of social theory finds in it a much deeper interest than this. For, in the doctrine of the prescription of religious principles *on account of their civil effects*, we have to distinguish a midway stage in a development which was henceforward to follow widely diverging lines. Along one characteristic line, as we shall see later, the theory of the political State was to be developed apart from the theory of religion and absolute ethics; along the other line there was to be the frank return to the standpoint of the ancient world, the controlling centre of consciousness being once more placed in the midst of the existing civil organisation. Rousseau's intermediate position may with advantage be compared with that developed later in modern Marxian socialism, where, the centre of social consciousness being now avowedly positioned in the existing political organisation, the subject of religion is logically eliminated, and the stage of antagonism to the principle which is subordinating the present to the future is clearly defined.

in the Revolution in France. "A light of great wisdom," says Sir Frederick Pollock finely, "shines in almost everything of Burke's making, but it is a diffused light of which the focus is not revealed, but only conjectured."¹ We are beginning to understand now something of the profound social instinct from which this illumination proceeds, as well as to perceive the character of the principle Burke had in sight, which reconciles the apparent contradiction here described.

Burke unmistakably gave voice in English thought to a conviction, widespread, deep, and sincere, which has never since ceased to be representative both in England and the United States of the most characteristic of all forces behind the phenomenon of Western Liberalism, namely, the conviction that the principles of Democracy, formulated as they were in the French Revolution (that is to say, as a theory of the interests of the political State, resting logically on the materialistic interpretation of history), are not only different from the principles of Western Liberalism which have come down through Locke and the English and American Revolutions; but that they are not, and never can be, the principles of that Democracy which our civilisation is destined to carry forward to ultimate fruition.

As we, therefore, turn over the pages of Burke at the present day in the light of the position outlined beneath the modern evolutionary development, it is impossible to resist a feeling of profound surprise. For Burke, we see, had, even at the date in question, risen to the height of perceiving society as

¹ *History of the Science of Politics*, by Sir Frederick Pollock, p. 86.

science will undoubtedly perceive it in the future — that is to say, as a living and developing organism, the centre of whose life amongst the progressive peoples can nevermore be in the present time, and the science of whose life can, therefore, nevermore be regarded as the science of the interests of the present time or of the existing political State. We see Burke, accordingly, propounding the doctrine, already becoming strange to the theorists of the French Revolution, that even the whole people have no right to make a law prejudicial to the whole community. We see him, therefore, vehemently asserting, as against the prevailing theories of his time, that society could never be considered as a mere partnership for the mutual profit of its existing members. For "society," as he declared, was a "partnership, not only between those who are living, but between those who are living and those who are dead, and those who are to be born." Nay more, we see him speaking of the "social contract" itself as a contract which, if it ever existed, could be no more than "a clause in the great contract of eternal society."¹

¹ "Society," said Burke, "is, indeed, a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure; but the State ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living and those who are dead, and those who are to be born"

As we follow from this period forward through the nineteenth century the history of the movement in thought which, with gradually increasing concentration, has endeavoured to express the meaning of the social process in Western history by a mere theory of the political State, the result appears striking in the last degree. Although, as we shall see later, it is impossible on a review of history to resist the conclusion that the course of political development, both in England and the United States, during the nineteenth century, did not cease to be controlled and directed at every point by the profound conviction to which Burke gave utterance—the conviction that the principles of Democracy, which find their ultimate expression in the materialistic interpretation of history, are not the principles of that Democracy which our civilisation is destined to realise—yet there is to be found no accepted synthesis of knowledge in which this conviction attained to scientific expression. We have in sight in England for nearly a century the remarkable spectacle of the almost complete disappearance beneath the surface of thought of that great stream of tendency which is carrying our civilisation forward, and the rise, first of all into ascendancy, and then into close and authoritative association with the theory of Liberalism, of that utilitarian school of social and moral philosophy described in the last chapter.

In the absence of such a synthesis, it may be observed that it is everywhere the conception of the

(Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London relative to that Event, by the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, 1790).

political State alone — the conception of its economic and business welfare, and of the ascendancy of the interests of the individuals comprising it — which is presented, in the prevailing school of English thought, as the science of society. In that long utilitarian movement, described in the last chapter as more and more closely identifying itself throughout the nineteenth century with the philosophy of Liberalism in England, it is the theory of the ascendancy of the interests of the present which has become the whole science of society. In the movement which extends from Hume and Adam Smith, almost down into the time in which we are living, we have, as we saw in the last chapter, all the steps, in which this transition has been accomplished, clearly before us.

As this movement expresses itself at last in England in the writings of John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, the theory of the ascendancy of the present has become absolute. The evolutionist sees that the ruling meaning of the social process in Western history must be that of a process in which the present is being subordinated to the future. Yet in Mill's conception of progress it is the ideal of the ascendant present in a stationary State which is set before us as the *summum bonum* in political development. We see the restriction of population advocated by means of prudential restraints; the rivalry of the modern State condemned because of its "unpleasantness" to the individual; the theory of internal politics and of international relations expressed in a conception of business interests in the State; and the whole meaning of the social process in history summed up in the contemplation of the movement of the world towards

an ideal in which laws and social arrangement shall at last bring the interests of society as a whole into harmony with the enlightened self-interest of all the individuals comprised within the limits of the existing political State. Similarly in the political philosophy of Mr. Spencer it is only the aspect of progress as a struggle between the present and the past that we have continually in sight. Of the larger and characteristic significance of the historical process in Western society as that of a struggle between the present and the future there is no perception. The meaning of the political development which has carried our civilisation towards the principles of Western Liberalism presents itself, therefore, to Mr. Spencer as capable of being all included, as we saw, in a mere theory according to which existing social interests are to be considered as passing out from under the control of the past, towards an organisation of society in which a conciliation is to take place between the interests of each and the interests of all; and in which the interests of the present are to be at last ascendant and supreme in every particular.

As we look back at last, from the level of our own time, over the history of the nineteenth century, the interest in this remarkable development in Western thought culminates. Under a multitude of forms we see that the movement in social philosophy has, in reality, run its course as the complement and supplement of corresponding theories in the domain of moral philosophy and of religion. In the corresponding theory in moral philosophy the tendency has been to assert that in the last resort human conduct requires no principle of support whatever other than

that of self-interest in society well understood. In the corresponding theory in religion, the tendency has accordingly been to assert, with equal emphasis, that the tendency of the evolutionary process in human history is to empty the concepts of the system of belief associated with our civilisation of that distinctive quality which projects their significance beyond the limits of political consciousness. Under all three forms we are regarding, we see, but the different and closely related phases of a single movement in Western history. The fundamental conception underlying them all is the same. It is the conception that it is possible to express the meaning of our social evolution, just as it was expressed in the civilisations of the ancient Greek and Roman world, namely, by a mere theory of human interests comprised within the limits of political consciousness.

In France of the present day it is impossible to come into contact with the higher thought of the nation at any point without feeling how completely that unanalysed element, which in the theories of Hobbes and Locke had projected the controlling principles of society outside the limits of political consciousness, has been eliminated from the synthesis of knowledge associated with the theory of Western Liberalism. In the current life of the French people all those sociological symptoms which attract the attention of observers; the grave symptoms which accompany the phenomenon of depopulation, on the one hand; the still graver symptoms which are associated with the ascendancy of the conception of the political State as expressing itself under the ethics of militarism, on the other, may be

summed up in a single sentence. They are the symptoms of a people in whom the social consciousness is, as it were, in process of slow contraction upon itself, and, therefore, of a people in whom that consciousness is again tending, as in the ancient civilisations, to be no longer projected beyond the principles and interests of political society.

In the position towards which evolutionary science has carried us, we see the race being lifted forward by irresistible causes towards a condition in which the consciousness of the winning sections must be more and more surely projected beyond the plane of merely political consciousness; toward a condition in which a political consciousness is, beyond doubt, destined, in the end, to be transformed into a cosmic consciousness. Yet in recent French thought it may be observed on all hands how the tendency sets in the opposite direction. We observe a thinker like Renan surveying the problems of the modern world with a scarcely concealed consciousness of a troubled future, and yet with so little perception of the meaning of the great process of life which has culminated in the forms of Western Democracy, that he seems to have no clearer message to deliver than that religious beliefs are a surviving phenomenon destined to die slowly out, undermined by primary instruction.¹ We observe a writer like Arsène Dumont viewing with concern in modern France that result, which Mill and leaders of the Manchester school actually wished to see accomplished in England, namely, the general restriction of births. We see him discussing the ominous phenomenon of the resulting depopula-

¹ *Studies in Religious History.*

tion and the consequent failure of the French people to preserve their ancient place in our civilisation; and yet seeking to carry forward his analysis of the condition of his times only to the assertion that "des deux termes de la contradiction entre la démocratie et la religion, c'est bien ce dernier qui doit être éliminé."¹ We see the development in modern thought which began with Darwin more and more surely presenting the history of the evolutionary process in human society as the history of the conceptions which are subordinating the individual and society alike to the meaning of a process infinite in the future; and yet have to observe this writer with nothing better to offer the mind of modern France than the conclusion that "l'hypothèse Dieu est insoutenable et d'elle-même s'élimine par la seule action des causes qui l'ont produite."² M. Dumont sees perfectly clearly the relation to the problem with which he is struggling, of the fact that "l'homme sait fort aisément éviter la fécondité en conservant le plaisir."³ But of the relationship of the same principle of the ascendancy of the present to the problem in the great evolutionary drama in progress in Western history he has no conception. In current French thought, "l'hypothèse Dieu s'élimine." And so in France, in the theory of society which accompanies the conception, it has come about that, to use the words of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu — "the State remains the sole God of the modern world."⁴

But it is in Germany of the present day that the

¹ *Dépopulation et Civilisation*, par Arsène Dumont, c. xxv.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 31.

⁴ *L'État Moderne et ses Fonctions*, par Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, p. 18.

movement in modern thought, which has presented the meaning of Western Liberalism as a theory of material interests within the limits of political consciousness, has obtained the clearest definition, and already reached the inevitable stage at which it has begun to develop its own antithesis. On the one side of this movement in Germany of the present day we have the Marx-Engels theory of modern society. Hitherto general attention has been so closely occupied with the economic aspect of Marxian socialism that the fact of first importance connected with it has received little attention. This is that Marxian socialism is not merely, or even chiefly, an economic theory, but rather a complete self-contained philosophy of human life and society. In Marx's theories of society those fundamental assumptions upon which the principles of Democracy were, in the last resort, made to rest in the theories of Locke, have completely disappeared. For there is now, to use the words of Mr. Russell, "no question of justice or virtue. no appeal to human sympathy or morality; might alone is right, communism is justified by its inevitable victory." Marx "rests his doctrine not on 'justice' preached by Utopia-mongers (as he calls his Socialist predecessors), not a sentimental love of man, which he never mentions without immeasurable scorn, but on historical necessity alone, on the blind growth of productive forces, which must in the end swallow up the capitalist."¹ Social Democracy in Germany "denies wholly and unreservedly any spiritual purpose in the universe." It is optimistic

¹ *German Social Democracy*, by Bertrand Russell, p. 14.

simply because it believes in a better world now and here.¹ In the movement represented by John Stuart Mill in the middle decades of the nineteenth century in England there was lacking what may be termed the full intellectual consistency which was necessary to carry its principles to their complete logical development. But in Marx this has been supplied, and the inherent and inevitable attitude of antagonism to the whole system of religious belief on which our civilisation is founded is at length clearly in sight.

There has been reached, in short, the stage of frank political materialism. It is not by accident therefore, but of strict logical necessity, that we find the *Sozialdemokrat* anticipating in Germany, with Arsène Dumont in France, the day when "l'hypothèse Dieu" shall be "expelled from human brains." For it is inherent in the Marxian position, that in a condition of society in which the interests of the present are considered as in the ascendant; in which, therefore, the economic factor is conceived as the ruling factor in human history; and in which, consequently, the sphere of law, morality, and economic action are coincident and co-extensive;—there should be absolutely no place or meaning for the principles and conceptions by which, if the meaning of the evolutionary process as presented in the preceding chapters be not entirely misinterpreted, the present and all its interests are to be conceived as being subordinated to the ends of a process of which the controlling meaning is infinite in the future.² The world,

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 94.

² Marx considered religion destined to finally vanish when social relations became reasonable according to his view. Although the sixth

as has been said, has been hitherto occupied for the most part with economic criticisms of the manifestoes of Marxian social Democracy. Nothing, however, can exhibit in a more striking light the deficiency in the existing science of society. All such criticism is in reality beside the question. For the full criticism of the Marxian position cannot be put into any merely economic formulas.¹ A condition of social

clause of the demands of the social democratic party of Germany in the programme of the Congress of Erfurt (1891) contains a declaration that religion is a private affair, we must regard this as no more than evidence that the previously avowed standpoint of the party in this matter was felt to be a tactical mistake in practical politics. No close student of Marx, and of the existing movement, can fail to see that not simply is the condition of dissociation implied, but that the principle of direct antagonism is necessarily involved. As Mr. Russell, speaking of the history of the social democratic movement in Germany, points out, "At the annual congress of 1872 a resolution was passed, desiring all members of the party to withdraw from religious organisations, and, from this time on, the attitude of the party has been avowedly hostile to all existing religions. It is sufficiently evident that the materialistic theory of history leaves no room for religion since it regards all dogmas as the product of economic conditions" (*German Social Democracy*).

¹ The present writer has shown at length elsewhere (*Social Evolution*, chap. viii.) that the factor in modern life which has enabled Marx to anticipate the growing power of the workers, and to picture a stage at which they will proceed to seize and socialise the means of production, is entirely independent of the economic situation. The real factor is that the exploited classes, as the result of the ethical development associated with our civilisation, are being slowly admitted to the exercise of political power on a footing which tends more and more to be one of actual equality with those who have hitherto held them in subjection. The materialistic evolution of Marx depends, in short, for its motive power on a movement of which Marx would cut off the springs by the materialistic theory of history. Mr. Russell, who has since dealt with this aspect of the Marxian movement, puts the position quite clearly, "A great confusion thus arises between Marx's wholly unmoral fatalism, and the purely moral demand for justice and equality on the part

Democracy, founded on the materialistic interpretation of history, carries with it in its bosom its own answer and its own final criticism.

It is modern Germany which has given the world the first glimpse of the nature of the real answer—as that answer must be enacted in history—to a theory of social Democracy founded, in actual practice, on the materialistic interpretation of history. In modern Germany Nietzsche, equally with the *Sozialdemokrat* and Arsène Dumont, anticipates the day when "l'hypothèse Dieu" shall be expelled from human brains. Like Marx, he regards the form of religious belief on which our civilisation is founded as a cause associated with existing economic conditions. Progress to him also is a gradual emancipation from the system of morality proceeding from that belief. But here Nietzsche once and for ever parts company with the "scientific socialist." It continues to be the same materialistic interpretation of history. But the application is different. "The great European narcotic of Christianity"¹ is associated with the existing order of things. Only too true, asserts Nietzsche in effect. It has enabled the serf population in our civilisation to invent a "slave morality," to enlist sympathy, to obtain votes, to slowly gain predominance over their natural and destined superiors. What is this ideal of "sympathy and brotherly

of his followers. This confusion could not fail to arise, for Marx's fatalism is based on the moral ideas of the proletariat and their necessary victory; proletariat disciples of Marx, therefore, as soon as they work for the realisation of his theories, are forced to rest their claims on those very moral ideas which formed Marx's facts" (p. 167).

¹ *The Twilight of the Idols*, the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Thomas Common, p. 155.

love" made by Western Liberalism to support these movements of the modern world? asks Nietzsche in effect. Mere contemptible consideration for the inferior, is the reply; mere lack of self-assertion in the natural superior. What is our Western Liberalism at best? Increased herding animality. What is Democracy itself? A declining type of the State in which the natural superior is enslaved with sympathies so that he may be kept out of his own.¹

Turning with fierce and concentrated scorn from all the ideals and tendencies which express themselves in modern Democracy in Germany, Nietzsche delivers, as it were, to the occupying classes the gospel *for them* of the materialistic interpretation of history. "A new table, O my brethren, I put over you. Become hard."² No more weak parleying about the rights of man, those empty formulas of a religion of which we have given up the substance. We are in possession, we are the superiors, we are the strongest. "The best things belong to me and mine, and if men give us nothing then we take them; the best food, the purest sky, the strongest thoughts, the fairest women."³

In modern literature no man of international reputation except Nietzsche has yet dared to utter such thoughts so directly. Nevertheless they all, equally with the anticipations of Marx, proceed from the materialistic interpretation of history—from the interpretation of the world in terms of the ruling interests of the present. They are the convictions, however, which express themselves, not in treatises on the relations of capital and labour, not in discus-

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 200-210; and *The Antichrist*, pp. 241-246.

² *The Twilight of the Idols*, p. 235.

³ *Zarathustra*.

sions as to the ethical claims of the recipients of surplus-value; but in the fulness of time, through all the avenues of power and authority in the State in which progress towards the materialistic interpretation of history has already in practice begun.

The imagination halts, falters, and turns back on its task as there rises before it the picture of the modern world in which the demands of social Democracy tend thus to be met by the occupying classes in the same spirit in which they are made by Marx; when through all the corporations which regulate the produce of the worker; when through all the trusts and organisations of capital which control not only the activities of industry, but the organs of public opinion and even the acts of public authority; nay, when, in the last resort, through the vast machine of militarism itself, there comes the same terrible whisper uttered now in the strength of resolved conviction: "Be hard, O my brethren. For we are emancipated. The world belongs to us. We are the strongest. And if men do not give us these things we take them. It is the materialistic interpretation of history."

Only the evolutionist realises to the full the nature of the soil upon which this teaching of Nietzsche falls in our Western world. Only in his ears there sounds down the corridors of time the full meaning of the æons in the past. For it is *we*, the ruling classes of the ruling races of the Western world, who are survivors in our own stern right. It is *We* who have come out of the countless ages of a world-process of military selection wherein the present was always in the ascendant; wherein might alone was always indefeasible right; wherein the interpretation of history was

always materialistic. If this, indeed, be all the import of two thousand years of our civilisation, the meaning of its stress and suffering, the end of its ideals of self-sacrifice before which we have agonised: then be it so. Who, then, amongst us does not already feel his nostrils dilate and his pagan heart swell against his bosom at the very insolence of the demands which the claims of Western Liberalism imply. To your tents, O Israel! What inheritance have we in the "sympathies" which enslave us! We are the superiors. We are the stronger. A new commandment, O my brethren, I put over you. Become hard. It is the materialistic interpretation of history!

And so our survey has reached the horizon. Looking back over the course of the evolutionary process in human society, and then concentrating attention on the phases of thought which have just been considered, it seems impossible to resist the conclusion which presents itself. Theories and discussions as to the economics of the modern world only serve to disguise the underlying fact of central significance in the developments we have followed; namely, the retreat which has taken place all along the line to the standpoint of the ancient world. The controlling meaning of the evolutionary process in human society is in all of them once more frankly and avowedly posited within the bounds of political consciousness. In none of the developments that have been passed in review is there, in short, to be distinguished the claim by which Western Liberalism can alone be justified as the controlling principle of progress in the modern world, namely, its claim to

project the meaning of the social process in Western history beyond all theories of the State, economic or political, beyond the content of all theories whatever of interests in the present.

In France of the present day we appear to have, neither in the Revolution nor in the counter-revolution, any synthesis of thought which can be said to represent the characteristic meaning of our Western civilisation. In the Revolution we appear to see only M. Dumont's contradiction, "la démocratie et la religion," with the conviction in the mind of its exponents that of these two terms "it is indeed the latter which must be eliminated." And in the counter-revolution, so far as it exists in France, we appear to be only carried back to the principles of society as these were presented in mediæval Europe before the upheaval which created the modern world.

In Germany, as in England, the great movement of thought which produced such transforming results in the sixteenth century has continued to run its course. But we may already dimly perceive how profoundly the interpretation of that movement already differs in modern Germany and in modern England. As we shall see clearly later, it has begun to flow in those two countries in widely different channels, the courses of which are tending to be increasingly divergent. In Germany both the Revolution and the counter-revolution have tended to reach their current expression in conceptions of the omnipotence of the political State. In the Revolution which has found its current expression in Marxian social Democracy, resting on the

materialistic interpretation of history, one of the terms of M. Dumont's contradiction is already practically eliminated. And in the counter-revolution, as represented in modern Germany, it is Democracy itself which is tending to be eliminated.¹

In England and the United States we have, in reality, neither the Revolution nor the counter-revolution. The great stream of tendency which is carrying development forward has simply disappeared beneath the surface of intellectual life in both countries. Deep down in the minds of the people, both in England and the United States, there may be distinguished once more the same conviction which found expression in Burke in the period of the French Revolution. Deeper than any theory of Liberalism in the past, deeper than any intellectual perception in the present, there is still to be found, throughout the whole English-speaking world, the immovable conviction that the life-principles of Western Liberalism transcend the meaning of all theories whatever of business, economic, or material interests in the political State; and that the principles of the Democracy which our civilisation is destined to realise

¹ The pressing need above all others in modern Germany is, says Mr. Russell, not simply friendliness towards the working classes by the propertied classes, but common justice and common humanity towards them. "To all who wish the present tense hostility between rich and poor in Germany to be peacefully diminished, there can be but one hope: that the governing classes will, at last, show some small measure of political insight, of courage, and of generosity. They have shown none in the past, and they show little at present. . . . Cessation of persecution, complete and entire Democracy, absolute freedom of coalition, of speech, and of the press — these alone can save Germany, and these, we most fervently hope, the German rulers will grant before it is too late" (*German Social Democracy*, p. 163).

are incompatible with the materialistic interpretation of history. But it is a conviction which has remained almost without reasoned expression in the modern science of society.

The spectacle, which presents itself at the present day behind the social question in England and the United States alike, is one which waits for the scientific imagination of the historian of the future to do full justice to it. It is that of the hosts of the great army of progress which has fought the hard-won battles of Liberalism in the past, of that army upon which rest the sole hope and promise of Western Liberalism in the future, of that cause whose very life in the past has been the inner knowledge that the meaning of Liberalism is, in the last resort, the meaning of that system of life which has come down in Western history from the beginning of our era — standing grim, silent, scornful before the professors who know only the materialistic interpretation of history. It is an army which moves not. Restive, sullen, majestic, it waits for the restatement of its faith in other terms.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM

THE main features of the problem with which we are concerned in the study of Western society now begin to present themselves in outline. There is no form of contemporary literature in which the deep human interest of that spectacle has as yet found any adequate expression. There is no department of knowledge in which there has yet arisen a writer who has brought within the full grasp of the intellect the significance which it will almost certainly present in the eyes of future generations. If we have been right so far, neither the meaning of modern Democracy, nor of Western Liberalism, nor of the social process in the era in which we are living, can any longer be conceived as capable of being expressed in any mere theory of political or of economic interests in the State. We are living in the midst of a type of social order which can only have come to hold its place in the past, and which can only continue to hold its place in the future, in respect of one ruling quality alone, namely, its own fitness in the never-relaxed strain and stress of an ascending process of evolution. And the ruling principle of that process of increasing efficiency is, as we have seen it, that every interest of the present in society around us must in the end stand in subservient and subordinate relationship to interests which cannot, in the nature of things, be

included within any boundaries of merely political consciousness.

If, therefore, the process of social order in the midst of which we are living in Western history be destined to maintain its place in the future, that principle of the evolutionary process brought into prominence in a previous chapter must be held to apply to it; and we may say that, in the scientific formula of its life, the interests of the existing individuals possess neither place nor meaning, except in so far as they are included in, and are subordinate to, the interests of a developing system of order the overwhelming proportion of whose members are still in the future. We may have any opinions whatever about our own interests or those of society. But, as J. Novicow points out, except the ideal we have in view conforms to the natural laws which are governing the evolutionary process as a whole, all our desires and attempts to permanently realise it are no more than—to use this writer's phrase—“de purs gaspillages,” vain efforts flung waste and squandered beneath the wheels of destiny.¹

¹ One of the commonest errors to be met with in discussions as to the ultimate principles of society is that man has become filled with some power peculiar to himself of suspending the cosmic process, and of substituting for it another of his own imagining. “La faculté de prévoir,” says M. Novicow, “est la source de tous les progrès de l'humanité. Imaginer un état à venir est le seul moyen d'en désirer la réalisation. Mais cet idéal peut ne pas être conforme aux lois naturelles. Il peut constituer une véritable utopie. Alors tous les efforts pour le mettre en pratique sont de purs gaspillages qui ralentissent le taux d'accroissement du bien être. Déterminer la trajectoire d'une force naturelle et s'abandonner à son courant, c'est tout le progrès. Prévoir l'avenir, signifie se soumettre aux lois de la nature. Or la science seule

Stripped of all metaphysical swaddling-clothes and reduced to its plainest terms, the conception with which we are confronted in modern evolutionary science as applied to the process of social progress is this. The history of the world has become, in the last analysis, the history of the development of the conceptions by which the individual is being subordinated to the meaning of a world-process infinite in its reach — the history of a development in which we are concerned with a creature moving by inherent necessity towards a consciousness no longer merely local, or national, or political, but cosmic, and from whom the subordination in progress must, in the last resort, be demanded in terms of his own mind. It is, therefore, in the meaning of the great social systems founded on the conceptions which are effecting this process, and not in any petty theory of the State conceived as an organisation of the political or economic interests of the existing members of society, that science will have to find in the future the controlling principles of the process of social development which the race is undergoing. Our first duty is, accordingly, to endeavour to understand as an organic whole the process of life represented in our civilisation.

It has been pointed out by Professor Marshall¹

pourra déterminer un jour la trajectoire de l'évolution sociale;" (*Les Luites entre Sociétés Humaines*, par J. Novicow, p. 175).

Compare with Professor Marshall's statement that our first duty in the study of social forces is "never to allow our estimates as to what forces will prove the strongest in any social contingency to be biased by our opinion as to what forces ought to prove the strongest" (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xi.).

¹ "The Old Generation of Economists and the New," by Alfred Marshall, *op. cit.*

that one of the principal results of recent work in the study of society, even in its economic relations, is to bring home to the mind the conclusion that the infinite variety and complexity of natural forms with which we are concerned therein is compatible with a remarkable latent simplicity of governing principle. If we apply this direction in a wider sense it will lead us, in endeavouring to consider the social process in our civilisation as an organic unity, to take up at the outset a position sufficiently detached to allow at first only the holder outlines of the evolutionary process to fall full and clear upon the mind. What, therefore, as viewed from such a position, is the nature of the governing principle which is distinctive and characteristic of the process of social development in our Western era? And whither is the principle of social efficiency which that process represents tending to carry the future?

If we turn to the process of social order presented in the civilisation of our Western era, one of the first facts concerning it with which we are confronted, is the almost overwhelming strength of the conviction in the general mind, that our civilisation not only represents a type of social life which is quite different in principle from that of the Greek and Roman worlds which preceded it, but that it represents a type which is entirely exceptional in history. Although the fact of the unbroken continuity of Western civilisation from the Greek and Roman times down into our own is one of the commonplaces of knowledge, yet an immovable general instinct, going deeper than the outward facts of history, conceives the system of civilisation beginning with our era as separated from

that which preceded it by one of the most clearly marked lines of demarcation in the history of life. On one side of the line this general instinct sees the cosmic process operating under one set of conditions. On the other side it conceives it as having entered on a new phase, subject to other principles, and proceeding towards problems quite different from any that have ever before been encountered.

Now, in regarding the development upwards towards higher social efficiency of a rational creature in which, as it were, the cosmos itself moves towards consciousness, it will become more and more evident on reflection that the process at a particular stage must possess features of extraordinary interest. The development in progress in human society is, it may be observed, over and above everything else a process of progress towards higher social efficiency. The individual, it must always be remembered, has in that process once and for ever ceased to be the factor of the first importance. For as society is of necessity greater and more effective than the individual, it has been, from the beginning, the efficiency of the system of social order to which the individual belongs that has become the determining element of success in the process which is progress. And, as, under the operation of the law of Natural Selection, it must have happened from the outset that it was the types of social order in which the subordination of the interests of the individual to those of the social system around him was most complete and most efficient which proved to be the winning types; so it must be the increasing subordination of the interests of the individual

to the larger interests of society which must constitute the dominant and controlling feature underlying all the details of the upward process of social evolution.

If we turn now and regard closely the nature of the laws governing this process of subordination, as a whole, an important fact respecting it comes into view. It must, of inherent necessity, we perceive, fall into two great eras or epochs. In each of these epochs, moreover, there must be a characteristic ruling principle in the ascendant to which all the details of the development in progress will, in the last resort, stand in subordinate relationship. If we endeavour to state the ruling principle of the first epoch it may be put briefly into terms as follows:—

In the first epoch of social development the characteristic and ruling feature is the supremacy of the causes which are contributing to social efficiency by subordinating the individual merely to the existing political organisation.

The conditions which must prevail throughout the whole of this first epoch of social evolution may readily be imagined. From the low level at which the struggle for existence was necessarily waged amongst the earliest groups of men, it was inevitable that under the influence of Natural Selection the kind of social efficiency to which the highest importance would attach in this first stage would be that in which the military subordination of the individual to the group of which he was a member was most complete and efficient. For, we come to see at once that whatever efficiency in any other sense society at this stage might have possessed, it

is absolutely certain that if it was not also efficient in a military sense it would in time have disappeared in the stress of existence. Social efficiency in the first stage was, in short, by force of circumstances practically equivalent to military efficiency.

In the first epoch of social development we have, therefore, a fundamental fact clearly in sight. "Society," as yet, can consist, as it were, of little more than a single stratum, namely, the existing members whose interests are supreme. We are regarding society in the great era of human time before the social consciousness is as yet projected beyond the present, the period of development during which the social consciousness remains rimmed within the horizon of the existing political organisation. It is, therefore, the era in which, in all the conditions of thought, "Society" and the "State" are as yet regarded as one and the same—the era in which the existing political organisation still everywhere embraces the whole life, duties, rights, and religion of the individual in relation to all his kind. It is, in short, the long-drawn-out period of human development in which the present is in the ascendant, and in which the fact of the ascendancy of the present has stamped its dominating meaning on every detail and principle of the evolutionary process in society.

Now, as we concentrate attention at this point on the process which is in progress in the evolution of society, the fact which gradually reveals itself to view is that in the development of society, just as in the evolution of life in general, a stage must at length

supervene at which a new controlling principle will emerge into sight. For, as in the evolution of life in general, so in the evolution of society, it is always the future which is of most importance. It is, therefore, the social systems in which, other things being equal, conditions prevail which are favourable to the interests of the majority which is always in the future, rather than to the interests of that comparatively small minority of individuals which is in the present, which must in the end constitute the winning types. There must, that is to say, inevitably arise in the evolution of society a second stage in which the future will begin to control the present, a stage at which, under the operation of the law of Natural Selection, the more efficient social type, in which this end is being achieved, will gradually become ascendant, and in the end tend to eliminate all others. The whole process of our social evolution must, in short, become in time weighted in every detail by the interests of this larger future.

As, therefore, in that *first* epoch of social development in which social efficiency was synonymous with military efficiency, the characteristic and ruling principle of the epoch was seen to be the supremacy of the causes which contributed to social efficiency by subordinating the individual simply to the existing social organisation; so now in the *second* epoch the distinctive ruling principle may be stated with equal clearness. It may be put into brief terms as follows:—

In the second epoch of the evolution of human society we begin to be concerned with the rise to ascendancy of the ruling causes which contribute to a higher

type of social efficiency by subordinating society itself with all its interests in the present to its own future.

When we pause for a moment and regard closely the scientific principle of extraordinary interest which here emerges into view, we begin to perceive the significance and magnitude of the class of phenomena which must accompany its slow rise into prominence as the controlling cause in the second epoch of social evolution. Along the frontiers where the first stage merges into the second, and where society itself begins to pass under the control of its own future, the imagination catches sight for the first time of the stupendous reach of the world-drama, towards the real study of which science has scarcely more than begun to advance.

When the evolutionist stands in history in the midst of the period preceding the rise of the civilisation of our era, there slowly awakens in his mind the consciousness that the interest with which the dim instinct of many generations of men in our Western world has tended to surround this period in the past, is likely to be equalled if not surpassed in the literature of science in the future. For he begins to realise that it is in this period that he is in reality looking along the border zone where the principles of the two processes which dominate the whole span of human evolution run into and overlap each other.

On the one side, in the great civilisations of the ancient world, we have the highest phase of an era of human development of enormously prolonged duration, the immense, world-evolving stress of which the imagination can only feebly picture. It is the culminating period of that epoch of time in which the

present was always in the ascendant, and in which the long, slow struggle of the race upwards was dominated in all its aspects by the one controlling principle of military efficiency. On the other side we have dimly portrayed before us the outlines of the first great organic system of society in which there is destined to rise into ascendancy at last the causes which are to project the controlling principles of the evolutionary process beyond the present. There is, in reality, no clearly defined boundary line. Far away into the future there still runs the influence of the dominating principle of the ascendancy of the present which has hitherto controlled the course of human development. But it is along a downward curve. The culminating period in the first stage of the human process has been passed.

Now when the endeavour is made to concentrate the mind at the point in the evolutionary process at which we see society thus beginning to pass definitely under the control of the future, there comes slowly into view a fact the importance of which soon forces itself upon the attention. It may be observed on reflection that, while the whole trend of development in the second epoch of social evolution must be towards the subordination of the present to the future, the battle-ground upon which Natural Selection can alone distinguish between such types of social efficiency as may arise must, nevertheless, remain always in the present time. There comes into view, therefore, at this point a remarkable principle in our social evolution. It is that no progress can be made towards that second and higher stage in which the future will begin to control the present until Natural Selection

has first of all developed to the highest possible extent, for the time being, that type of society which, of all others, possesses most power of holding its own in the present time. For no efficiency in respect of the future would avail any type of society which did not also possess the power of being efficient in such conditions as existed in the present. If it were not able to hold its own in competition with other societies organised to obtain the highest potency in the present time it must simply disappear from view in the stress of evolution.

The most potent type of organised society in such conditions would be, beyond doubt, that in which every element and interest had been subordinated to the end of military efficiency. What we come, therefore, to perceive is that the type of society organised towards military efficiency must at this point not only become the rival of all other types, but that towards the end of that first stage it will be the one supreme and surviving type before which all others have disappeared. Nay, more, we see that the rise to ascendancy of the causes which are to subordinate the present to the future in the second stage cannot begin until this culmination has actually taken place. We seem, therefore, to have, in addition to the principle of the two stages already enunciated, this additional fact in view :—

It is only from the type of society in which there is still potential the highest military efficiency that there can be developed that principle of social efficiency which, in the second epoch of social evolution, must ultimately subordinate organised society itself to its own future.

As we reflect on the nature of the situation which is here presented, its features begin to grow upon the mind. Slowly we distinguish that we have before us conditions leading up to a supreme crisis from which there must proceed some of the most remarkable phenomena that the evolution of society is destined to present. From far back beyond the earliest mists of human history we see the workings of that stage of social development in which the subordination of the individual to organised society is being effected — involved in the tendencies of a vast military process which must culminate in a type of social organisation of which the very life-principle must be that of vigorous, conscious self-assertion; and in which every institution must bear upon it, in the last resort, the mark of its relationship to the condition of military ascendancy. And yet it is from this type of society that the new social order must arise. It is from the peoples who stand forth in the evolutionary process as the supreme survivors of these untold ages of military selection, and from these alone, that there must now be developed that higher type of social efficiency of which the essential life-principle is that every interest of the existing social order must be subordinated to interests which are not only not included within the present time, or within the existing social organisation, but which must remain projected beyond the content of even political consciousness.

We have evidently here the outlines of a cardinal position in the development of human society, a situation in which the master-principles that are shaping the course of human evolution must meet and come

into conflict. As the mind is carried back to the first epoch of the social process, where we observe the individual simply passing under the control of the existing social organisation, there rises before it a picture of the opposition, stubborn, sullen, indefinitely prolonged, which has accompanied this first stage of subordination, and of the immense range of phenomena through which the process has been gradually effected. Out of the resulting resistance there have arisen all the great systems of custom, of social morality, and of law, in operation throughout the world around us; the function of which has been to subordinate the individual merely to the existing interests of society.

Yet the resistance which the individual offered to a process subordinating him to the existing political organisation — a resistance from which proceeds even now all the more profound and tragic impulses throughout the whole realm of art and literature — can be, it is perceived, nothing more than the feeble anticipation of that resistance which organised society will itself offer in the second stage to a process which must in the end subordinate it to the interests of a future beyond the limits of its political consciousness.

Nay more, as the efficiency of the individual, *qua* individual, has been — as every master-worker in the art and the literature of the emotions always intuitively perceives — itself the measure of the intensity of the resistance offered to the process subordinating him to organised society,¹ so now the efficiency of

¹ The profound transition which all the standards in art, in literature, and the drama are slowly undergoing in the modern world is one

organised society must be itself the measure of the resistance which society will offer to its own subordination to interests beyond the limits of its political consciousness. What we see is that the entire range of the processes of the human mind in its highest manifestations must be drawn into the vortex of this supreme conflict. In it we stand at the very pivot of the evolutionary process in human history. The whole content of systems of thought, of philosophy, of morality, of ethics, and of religion, must in time be caught into it. It is in the resulting demiurgic stress that rival systems of society will be unconsciously pitted against each other; that nations, and peoples, and great types of civilisation will meet, and clash, and have their principles tested. And it is in

of the most interesting subjects of study to the evolutionist who has grasped the relationship to each other of the governing principles of the two eras of human evolution here described. The character of the transition will be more fully dealt with in relation to the standards in Greek art discussed in the next chapter. The tendency of the emerging emotions which are related to the second epoch of social evolution is not yet clearly perceived, although it is one of the most disturbing influences in modern art. The still dominating influence of the impulses and emotions which are related to the first era of our social evolution is, however, well understood in the art of the drama. In a recent address in England to an audience interested in the drama, Mr. W. L. Courtney created discussion by setting his hearers a psychological problem. In the first place, he asked, could a very good man be a hero. With all fear of certain dramatic critics before his eyes, he answered, "No"; the exceptionally good man could not be a hero of drama. The reasons were obvious. In the first place, the drama dealt with action, and the saint was passive. In the second place, the drama dealt with emotions, and, *ex hypothesi*, the saint was a man who had subdued emotion. In the third place, what an audience looked for in a hero was an exhibition of mastery, of force, of something which would engage their interest and make the hero significant. — *Address to the O. P. Club, London.*

respect of the controlling principle of the conflict—the degree of efficiency of the subordination of the present to the future—that Natural Selection will continue to discriminate between the living and the dead as the progress of the world continues.

This is the problem upon which the curtain rises in Western history in the era of our civilisation in which we are living. In the whole span of the history of the included period hardly more than the first outlines of the problem have yet begun to be portrayed. It is the distant-voiced consciousness of the position therein being defined which runs like a cosmic undertone throughout all the philosophy of the race. No essential of the dramatic, no element of the sublime, is wanting. Every quality of the deepest human pathos, every constituent of the highest scientific interest, is present.

CHAPTER VI

THE ASCENDENCY OF THE PRESENT

WE can never hope to fully understand the principles of the world-drama which has begun to unfold itself in the civilisation of our era, or the nature of the interval which separates that civilisation from all the past history of the race, until the mind has obtained a clear intellectual grasp of the character of the process which culminated in the civilisations which preceded its rise.

As in the light of modern research the veil is being slowly lifted from the various phases — social, political, ethical, and religious — of the civilisations of the Greek and Roman peoples, the whole presents to the evolutionist a study, the interest of which not only equals, but exceeds that for which a long series of generations of students in the past instinctively turned to it. In it we have outlined the culminating phases of that immense epoch of human development in which the present was always in the ascendant; the isolated pinnacles of achievement that rise above the silent and unfathomable ocean of prehistoric time which covers the long, slow struggle of the race upwards under the controlling principle of military efficiency. In it we have presented the study of a world in which the evolutionary process, already on the threshold of a new era, is yet about to exhibit, within the narrow limits which the mechanism of the

past has imposed upon it, the very highest potentiality of the governing principle which has hitherto controlled it; and to display, in a comparatively brief period, and in almost every department of activity, the energy, the efficiency, and the domination of every form of human force capable of reaching its highest expression in the ascendant present.

In endeavouring to bring clearly into view the fact that in Greek and Roman history we have portrayed a type of civilisation in which the ruling causes in every department of social organisation are but projections through the various mediums of human activity of the single governing principle of the ascendancy of the present, which found its highest outward expression in a military order of society; it will be well to present to the mind for a short space a view of the relation of these civilisations themselves to the larger world-movement of which they form part. Who, it may be asked, are these Western peoples in whose life history the civilisation of Greece and Rome are themselves, in one sense, no more than passing incidents? Who are those peoples who are thus about to carry the military phase of evolution to its highest expression, and amongst whom, if we have been right in the previous chapter, there can alone be produced the vast historical *milieu* necessary for the rise into ascendancy of the governing principle of that second epoch of human development in which the controlling centre of the evolutionary process is destined to be projected out of the present into the future?

If we endeavour to answer this question there is immediately called up before the mind, even in

the broken and disjointed sequences in which science is as yet able to present it, an imposing spectacle. For thousands of years, first of all through the buried records of the past, then in the dim twilight of tradition, and last of all in the full light of history, we see moving across the territories of Europe, in successive waves from the north and east, the ancestors of the peoples who have made, and who continue still to make to an increasing degree, the most notable part of the recorded history of the human race. Although many cardinal points concerning the invasions, the migrations, and the conflicts of the conquering peoples, from whom the prevailing races in later European history, as well as the races which founded the Greek and Roman civilisations, are descended, are as yet under dispute; of the movements themselves, of their general character, and of the world-shaping effects of conflict and conquest to which they gave rise, there is no room for doubt. From the period at which, long before the dawn of history, the migrations and conquests of the tribes from which the existing European races are descended began, down to the period in history when, in the presence of the decaying Roman empire, the last waves of the conquering invaders were brought to rest in the territories they were to occupy in modern history, we have presented a movement in the world's history with an impetus and a meaning behind it of which there can be no mistaking the character.

It is impossible for science as yet to follow in any close detail the course of the process of conquest, of extermination, and of fusion which this long-drawn-out conflict of peoples represents. Some faint idea

of its duration, its intensity, and its magnitude may be obtained by the distribution, on the Eurasian continent of to-day, of the languages of a common or of nearly related stock which the ascendant peoples spread over the immense territories to which their activities and invasions extended.

Far away in the East, in the Indic branch, embracing Sanscrit with all its modern derivatives, we have the mark of the impact of the tide of invasion and conquest upon India. Further west still in Asia, in the Iranic, Galchic, and Armenic branches — with their subordinate Zend and Afghan, Persian, Pamir, Hindu-Kush, Armenian, and other groups of languages — we have represented other lines of advance. Coming into Europe, the great Hellenic group of languages, with its ancient and modern derivatives, represents another area of conquest. Further west we have marked the advance of the Italic branch with its ancient Oscan, Sabine, Umbrian, and kindred languages, of which we catch sight in history before they have yet gone down before the later world-subduing Latin. Further north in Europe we have the region of the Lithuanic branch, and yet again the great area of conquest represented by the once widely-distributed Celtic tongues. And, last of all, we have the successive waves of advance and conquest which are marked by the present distribution of the representatives of the great Slavic and Teutonic divisions of speech. Even when all allowance is made for the extension of a language by other means than war, what a course of unimagined and unimaginable conquest does the mere recapitulation of such a list represent. For an immense period of time the successive waves

of invaders must have continued their impact upon each other, or upon the peoples whom they encountered; conquering and exterminating, taking possession, settling and absorbing, and again moving to repeat the process. Although the advancing waves must again and again have broken and dispersed, the movement as a whole must have continued with little intermission for thousands of years before the dawn of history.

With the opening of the historic period we have it at last in view on European territory in an advanced stage. Illyrians and Letts, Greeks and Latins, Celts, Slavs, and Teutons—these represent but the later waves of the invasions. Viewed in their proper perspective, the histories of the classic civilisations themselves represent but the last phases in which this movement of conquest in Europe is tending to reach its climax. The earliest history of Greece opens with the tribes in conflict with related peoples pressing on their borders. During the period in which it became the destiny of the Greeks to leave their mark indelibly impressed upon the world, they maintained uninterrupted conflict with peoples representing other waves of advance of the same stock. And, later still, as they sink out of sight in European history, their blood is swamped at last in the still incoming tide of Slavs and kindred peoples from the north.

We view the history of Rome in the same perspective. With the first rise of Roman history we catch the echo of the strife of the tribes of Latin stock, and kindred peoples, who have wandered into the Italian peninsula. On the edge of history we see the future mistress of the world with Brennus and his tribes from

the north beleaguering her. The history of the Roman dominion is but a vast chapter in this long-drawn-out process, in which the governing principle—the ideal of unrestrained conquest—tends at last to reach its inherent and inevitable climax in the realisation of universal dominion. Viewed in its larger relations, the last stage of all—the invasion of the Roman territories by the harrarians of the north and the overthrow of the outward dominion of Rome by the tribesmen—is but part of the same movement slowly reaching its climax in history. For the relationships and the institutions of the later invaders but carry us back to the Greeks of the Homeric age; and the barbarians who overran the Roman empire were dealing, to use Freeman's words, "not with forefathers, but elder brethren, men whose institutions and whose speech were simply other forms of their own."¹ We see them, at last, Markomans and Franks, Goths and Suevi, Vandals and Longobards, Slavs, Angles, and Saxons—each in turn representing last eddies in the great tide of military conquest, each in turn representing the survival of untold ages of movement, of advance, and of military selection—surging now into the vast arena which the mistress of the world had cleared for them in history, coming to rest now at last in the seats they were finally to occupy, in the visible presence and under the actual thrall of the forms and mechanism of that empire in which the ideal of universal conquest had once and for ever culminated.

The ruling fact which stands out clearly before the imagination in regarding this movement of peoples as

¹ Cf. *Chief Periods of European History*, by E. A. Freeman, pp. 7, 8.

a whole, is that it must have represented a process of military selection, probably the most sustained, prolonged, and culminating in character that the race has ever undergone. Every item of information, which recent science and research have been able to contribute to our knowledge of it, adds to the reasons for estimating it in this light. In the history of all the movements of the conquering peoples, we appear to be always in the presence of races of pure white stock; inhabitants, therefore, at the outset, of territories where the struggle with nature for existence had been for long ages continuous and severe. In all their wanderings, conflicts, and conquests, it must have been the bravest, the strongest, the most daring, who continuously went forward. The fittest who survived were those who did so in their own stern right. The process as a whole must have been one of unexampled stress in all its stages; a process of military selection, rigorous, effective, and immensely prolonged in time.

This is the stupendous framework in which we see set that period of the world's development in which the type of society organised to obtain the highest potentiality in the present time is now about to become the rival of all other types; and in which the process of social order organised towards military efficiency is about to attain, before the opening of the second epoch of social evolution, the position of the one surviving type which has become supreme over all others.

When, therefore, in imagination the evolutionist takes his stand in history in the midst of that phase of social order represented in the empires of the ancient world, he beholds the process of life around

him tense with a more characteristic virility, instinct with a larger and deeper meaning, than he finds anywhere disclosed in the more or less local studies of the political histories of these civilisations which have for the most part filled the literature of the past. In the civilisations of the ancient oligarchies, of the Greek states, and of the Roman empire he is regarding, he sees, not some isolated and distinct type of society, the principles of which can be studied apart in themselves; but one in which is represented the last phase of an epoch of development which has occupied the greater part of the past history of the race. All the relationships of the time must have, he feels, the same mark upon them. Every tendency in ethics, every principle in politics, every instinct in art, every ideal in religion, must have some relationship to the omnipotent governing principle of the ascendancy of the present which has hitherto controlled the development of the world. And the highest outward expression, in which all the tendencies must meet and culminate, will be, he realises, the military State bounded in its energies only by the resistance of others, acknowledging no complete end short of absolute dominion, staying its course before no possible ideal short of universal conquest.

Now we can never get to the heart of the two last and greatest civilisations of the ancient world until we understand the nature of the peculiar and exclusive significance to be attached to the central fact upon which they rested, and from which proceeded the governing spirit of the ancient State in all its phases. This was the institution of exclusive

citizenship. The deeper we get in the history of the Greek and Roman peoples the more clearly do we see how the whole fabric of the ancient civilisations, military and civil, legal and religious, is ultimately related to this institution. The military ideals of the State; the conditions of land tenure; the relation of the units in a military organisation of society; the attitude of the Greek and Roman peoples throughout their history to slaves, to conquered races, and to all other nations; the prevailing standards of conduct; the ideals in public and private life; the standpoint in that remarkable product of the ancient world, the Roman *ius civile*; and last, but not least, the significance of that epoch in the history of the world in which we watch the Roman *ius civile* being slowly superseded by the *ius gentium*, without any influx of new life to a type of social order which was organically united to the forms under which the spirit of the old *ius civile* expressed itself; — can all be fully understood only when we have grasped the inner significance of the institution of citizenship in the ancient world.

Throughout the ancient civilisations from the earliest times the institution of citizenship was, to use words of Mommsen, "altogether of a moral-religious nature."¹ What, therefore, in the first place, was the origin and character of this moral-religious bond to which the entire constitution of the ancient State — moral, political, and military — was in the last resort related?

When we regard attentively the present state of

¹ Mommsen's *History of Rome*, translated by W. P. Dickson, vol. i. p. 246.

knowledge concerning the development of religious beliefs, a very striking natural law regarding them may be seen to be slowly emerging into view.¹ It is that all the religious systems that have influenced the race fall into two great and clearly defined categories; and further, that the growth of the religious faculty itself is proceeding along the line of development by which a system of religion rises from the first of these categories into the second.

If we look closely, first of all, at the second category, which includes all the higher forms of religious belief existing amongst the advanced peoples, the characteristic which is distinctive of it may be perceived at once. This is that the vital interests with which the religious beliefs included therein are concerned are not primarily interests of a material character, or even interests which are to any important degree expressed in the present time. What we have represented, over and above everything else, in the systems of belief in this higher category, is a series of ideas and conceptions by which the individual is brought into a state of consciousness of his relation to the universal and the infinite, and through which every material interest of the present is made to sink into a position of comparative insignificance.²

But when we turn now to the other category, its distinctive feature, as soon as it is pointed out, is

¹ Compare the position reached in Edward Caird's *Evolution of Religion* and his *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*.

² We are so constantly and familiarly brought into contact with this characteristic in the prevailing forms of religious belief in our Western world, that we are hardly conscious of one significant fact regarding it. It is entirely new and recent in the history of religious development.

grasped with equal readiness by the mind. Through all the systems of religious belief included in this lower category there runs also a feature which is characteristic. It is that the great object of the religion is held by its adherents to be that of obtaining material advantage in the present time for those observing its rites and ceremonies. It is around the material interests of the existing individuals at the present time that the whole cultus of the religion tends to centre. The characteristic and consistent feature of all the systems included in this category is, in short, that the controlling aims of the religious consciousness are in the present time.

The profound significance of the transition which is indicated in the development from the lower to the higher of these two categories of religious belief, is evidently closely related to that of the law of the two great eras of social evolution, referred to in the last chapter; in the first of which we see the individual being subordinated simply to the existing social organisation, and in the second of which we see society itself being subordinated to a meaning which transcends the content of all its existing interests.

Now when we look closely at the religious systems of the Greek and Roman worlds two facts are apparent. In the first place, it is immediately perceived that these systems belong to the category in which the religious consciousness is related to ends which express themselves, for the most part, in the present time. In the second place, it may be perceived on examination that the governing idea of the systems — to which all other ideas stand in subordinate relationship — is that of an exclusive religious fellowship,

in which all the members of the community or of the State are joined; but in which outsiders cannot participate without sacrilege. This is the central idea in all the religious systems of the ancient world. It is from it that the conception of exclusive citizenship — the fundamental fact of the Greek and Roman civilisations — proceeds. It is the ruling idea to which, in the last resort, all the life and institutions of the social systems of the ancient world were related. What, therefore, is the significance of this conception of exclusive citizenship, "altogether moral-religious in its nature," in that epoch of history in which the development of society under the controlling principle of military efficiency is about to culminate?

Almost the first point which occupies attention in such an inquiry is the fact that the fundamental conceptions underlying the institution of citizenship in the ancient civilisations were not, as may readily be imagined, in any way peculiar to the early Greek and Latin communities. They were conceptions associated with an organisation of society which was common at the time to a vast number of similar communities spread over wide territories in Europe and Asia. They were conceptions which had doubtless persisted for an immense period of time, and they appear to have characterised at one stage the history of all the races from which have been descended the peoples that in modern times have come to play a leading part on the stage of the world. They have, beyond doubt, some vital significance in relation to the principle of overmastering efficiency in the present which governs the first of the two eras of social evolution described in the last chapter.

Now, in the light of the modern tendencies of research, it has come to be seen that we have undoubtedly in the religious systems of Greece and Rome nothing more or less than a highly specialised form of a religious phenomenon which has profoundly influenced for an immense period the history and development of nearly every section of the human race; namely, the institution of Ancestor Worship. At the present day, as the course of modern research brings slowly to light the conditions under which the first advances of the race towards a social state were made, every student of the early institutions of mankind finds himself brought into continual contact, and at a multitude of points, with the subject of Ancestor Worship. On all the peoples who are playing a leading part in the world nowadays, on a great number even of existing social institutions, and on nearly every religion, Ancestor Worship appears to have left its mark deeply and indelibly impressed.¹

When the evolutionist comes to take up for himself the question of the significance in human development of the immense range of phenomena connected with the institution of Ancestor Worship, he soon becomes conscious that it is impossible to accept as sufficient those more or less trivial explanations of the origin of the institution which prevail in the literature of the time, and of which Mr. Herbert Spencer has hitherto been regarded as the principal

¹ Its influence may be traced, even in the present day, on the beliefs and social customs of peoples so far apart as the existing Chinese, the Semitic races of the East, and the Celtic populations of the British islands. Cf. *The Structure of Greek Tribal Society*, by Hugh E. Seebohm, p. 19.

exponent. In these explanations the phenomenon of Ancestor Worship is said to arise from an introspective and purely imaginary process of thought assumed to take place in the minds of early men in relation to a supposed belief in ghosts. Its origin is considered, that is to say, in relation to a subjective, fanciful, and entirely trivial train of ideas in the mind of the individual, and not to any serious extent in relation to any principle of our social evolution.¹

We see after a time, in short, that the origin of the institution of Ancestor Worship must have some other and altogether deeper significance than this. A phenomenon which is represented on so vast

¹ Briefly summarised, Mr. Spencer's theory is as follows: Changes in the sky and on the earth, with shadows, echoes, dreams, insensibility, and sleep, foster in the childish mind of primitive man the notion of duality — of a spirit which can leave the body at will, and which, with one kind of unconsciousness, does not come back at all — with death. The belief grows that these ghosts or the doubles of dead men are the causes of all strange and mysterious things in nature, and primitive man begins to propitiate them by prayer and sacrifice. When the chief or some leader of influence dies who has been held in awe during his life, his spirit is held in greater awe, and is assumed to possess greater powers on death, and he is worshipped as a superhuman being. Leaders and chiefs of conquering races tend especially to become objects of worship after death, and so, Mr. Spencer considers, the multiplication of deities continues until Ancestor Worship becomes the root of all existing religions. Thus, to quote Mr. Spencer's summary, setting out with the wandering double which the dream suggests; passing to the double which goes away at death; advancing from this ghost, supposed but to have a transitory second life, to ghosts which exist permanently, and, therefore, accumulate, primitive man is led gradually to people surrounding space with supernatural beings, until, using the phrase in the broadest sense as comprehending all worship of the dead, Mr. Spencer finds Ancestor Worship to be the root of every religion (*Principles of Sociology*, §§ 68-207).

a scale, and which has undoubtedly played so immense a part in the evolution of early society, must be related to some constant, deep-seated, and universal principle of social development, different in kind from any of which account is taken in the comparatively slight explanations just mentioned.

What, then, is this principle of social development? There can be little doubt as to the character of the answer which must be given to this question. What we come to see is that in the stage of the world's development, in which every feature of social organisation is inevitably, and from the beginning, involved in the sweep of a vast, slowly developing military process, the institution of Ancestor Worship must be directly related to the controlling principle of the epoch. It was, we must come to see, through the type of social order developed from the institution of Ancestor Worship, and having for its central feature the conception of exclusive citizenship, and through this type alone, that it was possible to reach the culminating phase of that first epoch of human evolution in which the social consciousness is related to ends expressing themselves exclusively through the existing political organisation; and of which the outward political ideal was of necessity the military State, ever grimly tending towards the only possible goal of its epoch—universal military conquest.

It may be observed, accordingly, that at the period when the tribal groups of the ancestors of the Greek and Roman peoples wandered into the territories upon which they afterwards founded the two last and greatest civilisations of the ancient world, they possessed that type of social organisation which, as

already mentioned, prevailed at one time amongst all the leading peoples of the world. In it we have already clearly outlined, not only the fundamental conception which, throughout the whole period of Greek and Roman history, underlies the bond of citizenship; but also the direct evidence of the relationship of that bond to the institution of Ancestor Worship, on the one hand, and to an immense period of military development in the still earlier past, on the other.

Within these early tribal groups, each of which existed quite apart and independent of the others, we find the members held together under conditions of most extraordinary severity. The privilege of membership of the group is hedged round with the most jealous precautions. Admission from the outside is almost impossible, or is at best permitted only under the most rare and exceptional circumstances or conditions; and the theory underlying the membership of the groups is invariably that of blood-relationship, to which is attached a religious significance of the first importance.

When we inquire what is the nature of this significant blood-relationship, we have in view at once the source from whence springs the entire conception of citizenship, with its peculiarly exacting demands, its unexampled exclusiveness, and its extraordinary potency and efficiency as a principle in human evolution. The tribal groups, it has been said, are religious communities of the strictest type. But the relationship of the communities to the deities who are worshipped is always the same. These deities invariably appear as gods or deified heroes, from

whom direct descent is claimed by the whole group. This is the origin of the conception of blood-relationship, to which is attached a religious significance of the first importance. It is from this conception that there springs, naturally and inevitably, the institution of a citizenship to which is attached a sense of exclusiveness and of superiority to all outsiders which is almost beyond conception at the present day.¹

As the deities worshipped are supposed to belong to the community alone, to be its protectors in peace, and its associates and leaders in war; there springs inevitably from the conception of common descent from deified ancestors a system of morality the exclusiveness of which it is almost impossible for us to fully realise; a system of morality in which there is to be distinguished a feeling of *obligation* to regard all outside the tie of the resulting moral-religious citizenship, as not only without the pale of all duty and obligation, and beyond the range of even those feelings which to us seem to be the outcome of a conception of a common humanity; but as persons whom it would actually be a kind of sacrilege to admit under any circumstances as equals.

The enormous political significance of this conception will be immediately evident. During the whole period of the history of Greek and Roman peoples, it may be distinguished, accordingly, that there are

¹The visible evidence of the possession of tribal blood, and at a later stage of citizenship in the Greek States, was, accordingly, to use the expressive words of Mr. Seebohm, "the undisputed participation, as one of kindred in the common religious ceremonies, from which the blood-polluted and the stranger-in-blood are strictly shut out" (*The Structure of Greek Tribal Society*, by Hugh E. Seebohm, p. 4; see also Fowler's *City-States of the Greeks and Romans*, pp. 28-33).

always two fundamental ideas underlying the bond of citizenship. In the first place, it has a deep religious significance; in the second place, this significance is associated with the conception of exclusive blood-relationship in the State.¹ Down to a comparatively late period in Roman history we may trace both these ideas surviving, however degraded the form under which they have come to exist. Looking back over that history, it may be said of the Romans, in words used by Professor Dill in speaking of the idealised genius of the Latin peoples in the last days of the Western empire, "In every step of that marvellous career the ancient gods had been their partners. The forms of its ancestral religion were inextricably intertwined with the whole fabric of the State. Imbedded in law, language, literature, the deepest instincts of the people, her ancient worship seemed inseparable from the very identity of Rome. The true Roman, even though his religious faith might not be very deep or warm, inherited the most ancient belief of his race that the gods of a city were sharers in all its fortunes."² The same ideas are always in evidence throughout Greek history. In Athens, says Mr. Seebohm, "the actual similarity of the sentiment

¹The confidence in an ultimately divine origin was, to use the words of Professor Wheeler, "an essential part of every family tree among the noble families. All the great heroes were sons of gods. If Minos was the son of Zeus, Theseus must needs, as Bacchylides' pæan shows it, prove himself Poseidon's son. The gods were, as ancestors, dignified to be the citizens of honour in the State. That was what made the State and gave it its dignity. It was a fraternity in which great immortals, known as gods, were members" (*Alexander the Great*, by B. L. Wheeler, Professor of Greek, Cornell University).

²*Roman Society in the last Century of the Western Empire*, by Samuel Dill, i. c. i.

which surrounded the possession of the privileges of tribal blood and the title to citizenship can hardly be exaggerated."¹ Throughout the Greek States the bond of citizenship was everywhere regarded as one possessing deep religious significance, this significance, we may distinguish, being always accepted as resting on a supposed blood relationship, "the citizen inheriting with his blood responsibilities towards the community into which he was born, as towards a larger kindred."²

The exclusive and absorbing demand of the claims of this larger kindred on the whole moral and religious nature of the individual altogether exceeded, in the ancient world, even the highest modern ideals of duty and obligation within the circle of family relationship. We may obtain some idea of the peculiar religious sanctity attached to the bond of citizenship, and of the spirit which pervaded the fabric of the ancient State, from Cicero's assertion that no man could lay claim to the title of good who would hesitate to die for his country; and that the love owed by the citizen towards this larger community of which he was a member was holier and more profound than that due from him to his nearest kinsman.

Whatever other characteristic may be expected to be associated with, or to proceed from, such a type of social organisation, the evolutionist at once distinguishes in it its significant feature. We have represented therein the most potent principle of military efficiency which it would be possible to conceive. Under no other type of social order could the princi-

¹ *The Structure of Greek Tribal Society*, by Hugh E. Seebohm, p. 138.

² *Op. cit.*

ple of military ascendancy so surely reach its culminating stage. Under no other theory of society could the ideal of conquest, by a people naturally fitted to conquer, lead so directly to conquest on a universal scale.

As, accordingly, we watch how the isolated groups of the original stock from which sprang the civilisations of Greece and Rome concentrating upon each other amid the clash of arms and the stress of incessant warfare, the whole process of life is, to the evolutionist, characterised by a deeper meaning than he finds anywhere disclosed in merely political studies of these civilisations. All the details and features which he has spread before him in history relate, he sees, to the later stages of a world-process in which the final causes are innate, and of which all the master-principles have worked together from the beginning towards an end which is inevitable.

When the City-State of the Greek and Roman civilisations appears in view, in the full processes of its life as revealed in history, it stands before us with all the essential characteristics that have distinguished the social organisation in its earlier stages now indelibly stamped upon it. The early type of caste society to which Homer introduces us — in which, to use words of Mr. Mahaffy, "the key to the comprehension of all details depends upon one leading principle, that consideration is due to the members of the class and even to its dependents, but that beyond its pale even the most deserving are of no account save as objects of plunder"¹ — is verging at last towards the ideal of universal dominion; resting, however,

¹ *Social Life in Greece*, by J. P. Mahaffy, p. 44.

ultimately on the same characteristic and vital concept as at the beginning, namely, that of exclusive citizenship.

As we watch the steps in the transition in which the various elements of the originally isolated groups become the City-State, grouped round the common hearth of the State with an official priesthood and a common religious tradition, we may clearly distinguish how, not only the political institutions, the prevailing type of social organisation, and the existing standards of social morality, but the very life-principle of the State itself are indissolubly associated with the same characteristic causes which gave to the original groups their peculiar strength and individuality.

There is in this respect no difference to be made in any fundamental governing principle, between the Greek States and Rome as we see them in history. In each we have developed, as Mr. Fowler expresses it,¹ the same kind of polity, in which, although directed to different aims, the same governing principles carry the same form of political organisation through similar stages of growth. In each we have the same conception of exclusive citizenship; the same tradition of community of blood by descent, to which religious significance is attached; the same institution of common worship, associated now with the State and in the hands of a civil priesthood, but everywhere presenting with its omens, auguries, and public rites the original characteristics of that stage of religious development in which all the functions relate to material ends, and in which the centre of all consciousness

¹ *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*, by W. W. Fowler, pp. 5, 6.

is in the present time and in the existing political organisation.¹ In the later epoch of the State the greater gods of the tribes have developed into State deities whose rites and ceremonies are performed by a priesthood, always presenting to us the feature that its office and functions are regarded as civil. The principal aim of both is considered to be to avert evil from the existing State, to obtain material favour for it from the deities, and generally to keep it on good terms with its protectors.²

As soon as we begin to understand the nature of the type of polity we are regarding, we perceive now how the almost inconceivable feeling of hatred and contempt for all outsiders springs as a matter of course from the governing principles of the social organisation. It is the distinctive product of Ancestor Worship—the idea of exclusive citizenship proceeding from community of blood by descent—which constitutes, we see, the pivot upon which turns the entire political, social, moral, and religious life of the ancient world. Throughout the history of the Greek and Roman peoples we may distinguish that there runs one leading idea. Each people, says Professor

¹ Cf. *The Institutes of Justinian* (Sandars), Introd.

² Behind the greater deities, in gradual transition from the general to the individual interest, we have a great number of others whose influence is conceived of as operating within gradually narrowing spheres. We have the deities or spirits of harvests, of seasons, of occupations, of times, of places, of minor localities, and of minor events. In these lesser conceptions also it may be observed that we are always in the presence of the fact, which is distinctive of a form of religious belief in the lower of the two categories mentioned. It is in the desire to avert evil, or to obtain aid or material advantage in the present time for those practising the prescribed rites and ceremonies of the religion, that we have the main object of its adherents.


Fowler, "believed in certain great deities whom they associated with their history and their fortunes; and each looked on these deities as *localised* in their cities, as belonging to none but themselves, and as incapable of deserting them except as a consequence of their own shortcomings."¹ In all this the identity of the idea, which prompted the attitude of contempt for those outside the bond of citizenship, with the fundamental conception of Ancestor Worship — citizenship founded on exclusive religious community of blood by descent — is unmistakable.

In the legal codes of the ancient world, as Sohm points out, the resulting fact of the antithesis of mutually exclusive States was an inherent and fundamental principle.² Much has been written in a superficial spirit respecting the liberal and tolerant ideas which prevailed in the later period at which the spread of Roman conquest had brought the Roman rule into contact with a multitude of foreign peoples; when, to use words of Sandars, Rome was engaged in "connecting herself with her subject allies by conceding them privileges proportionate to their importance or their services"; and³ when the *ius Latinum*, the *ius Italicum*, and last of all, the *ius gentium*, were already amplifying, modifying, and evading the stern exclusive spirit of the original *ius civile*. But the evolutionist sees how brief in the life-history of a world-process, which had already passed its climax,

¹ *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*, by W. Warde Fowler, pp. 3, 4.


² *The Institutes of Roman Law*, by Rudolph Sohm (Eng. tra. by J. C. Ledlie), pp. 116, 117.

³ *The Institutes of Justinian*, with Introduction, by Thomas Collett Sandars.



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are these phenomena, and how they represent, not a process of life at all, but one of decay. It was with the spirit of the *ius civile* that the life-principle of the military civilisation of Rome was associated. The later spirit had not only no power to stay the ebbing vitality of the Roman empire, but it was itself in one sense the very symbol of the causes which were producing it. In an eloquent passage of the later period in Tacitus¹ we have the boast of an emperor² as to the men of other lands that the Roman State had admitted and absorbed as citizens. But this was not the real spirit of Rome. Rather, in the words of a recent writer, "she protested, even while she admitted to her citizenship the Greek poets, the Asiatic and Egyptian sacred rites, the foreigners who thronged inside her walls and who ascended to her seats of honour. She detested every society which had not asked her permission to exist."³

This was the true genius of the Roman State in the period of its vigorous life. It was the spirit which had made Rome the mistress of the world. It was the spirit which represented the inner life of that immense epoch of human development which had culminated in the ancient civilisations. It was the spirit which was representative of the epoch of force; the true world-spirit of the era of the merciless, material, but omnipotent present.

From the fundamental conceptions upon which the ancient State rested, there was, therefore, almost entirely shut out all view of these wider ideals of

¹ Tac. *Ann.*, lib. xi. c. xxiv.

² Claudius in the Roman Senate, A.U.C. 801.

³ "The Genius of Rome," *Quarterly Review*, vol. clxxxix.

duty and obligation with which we are about to become familiar in the second epoch of social evolution. All those activities, for instance, which in the higher forms of religion spring from the individual's sense of his relationship to the infinite and the universal tended in the ancient State to express themselves solely in relation to the ideals involved in the conception of exclusive citizenship. The entire consciousness in its outward expressions was related to activities hounded in their aim by the horizon of the existing political organisation. The sum of individual and social energy was, as it were, caught in the sweep of a process of which the culminating expression was a type of society in which every form of human activity tended to be raised to its highest expression in terms of the present.

The existing political State embraced, accordingly, the whole aim, meaning, responsibility, and interest in the life of the individual. In the writings of the Greek philosophers, and in most of the works of the Roman political writers, we encounter this conception at every turn. As we follow Aristotle through the pages of the two of his works which, of all the products of the Greek mind, have probably exercised the widest influence on the modern philosophy of society, namely, the "Politics" and the "Ethics," we may perceive that we are everywhere in the presence of a fundamental idea. It is that the goal of all human effort is in the attainment of the most perfect possible life in the existing political organisation. It is the State which is made the theatre of all the ends to which consciousness is related. It is out of this conception that there proceeds the scheme of individual

ethics, on the one hand, and of political theory, on the other, throughout the ancient world. In all the discussions, for instance, which Aristotle is conducting as to the nature of virtue, we always come in sight, in the last analysis, of the fact, curiously strange at first to our minds, that virtue is conceived as a form of *political* activity. Similarly, in all theories of the State in the ancient world, we always come into view of that fundamental conception which pervades the political literature of Greece and Rome, that, to use the words of Professor Mahaffy, "all citizens should be regarded as the property of the State;"¹ or that — to put it in Bluntschli's more detailed phrases — the sovereignty of the State was absolute, that individual freedom as against the State was unknown, and that the existing political relations embraced the whole life of the individual, the whole range of his duties and activities — civil, social, moral, and religious.²

The enormous military significance of such a conception of society, when associated with the principle of exclusive citizenship, resting in the last resort on a moral-religious basis, is only fully brought into prominence on reflection. The deeper we go in the study of the life of the Greek and Roman peoples at the period of their highest development, the more clearly does the fact reveal itself that the State as organised was a condition in which the principal end and business of the people was war; not simply from the desires of the citizens, but from causes which were innate in the State itself. It was of necessity an organisation of society in which, to use the forcible

¹ *Problems in Greek History*, by J. P. Mahaffy, p. 89.

² *The Theory of the State*, by J. K. Bluntschli, p. 58 *et seq.*

words of Bagehot, "every intellectual gain was made use of, was invested, and taken out in war."¹ An organisation, that is to say, in which, as Plato makes Clinias of Crete say in the *Laws*, the supreme end of effort was victory in war, when "that which men call peace is only a name, the reality being war, according to nature, to all against all States."² It was a condition of society in which the only limit to conquest was, therefore, the successful resistance of others, and of which the only possible final ideal was universal dominion.

Proceeding from this constitution of the State, with its inherent conception of exclusive citizenship, we see how naturally and inevitably there arose, therefore, all those social features which present the ancient civilisations to the imagination of the present time as the incarnation of the rule of force. It was the accepted position in the Greek States, as it remained to the end a fundamental principle of the public law of Rome, that the lands and persons of the conquered belonged absolutely to the conquerors.³ We have, accordingly, always in sight the spectacle in each case of a comparatively small citizen class living amongst vast populations to which even the elementary rights of humanity were denied, and the existence of which was for the most part the direct result of war. In many of the Greek cities the slaves must have considerably outnumbered the free population; and, although estimates, in which the former have been

¹ *Physics and Politics*, by Walter Bagehot, p. 49. ² *Laws*, I.

³ *The Institutes of Roman Law*, by Rudolph Sohm; *Inst. Just.*, lib. i. tit. iii.; and *Public Lands and Agrarian Laws of the Roman Empire*, by Andrew Stephenson (Johns Hopkins University Studies).

made to appear as vastly more numerous than the latter, are probably exaggerations, there can be no doubt that the slave population was large in proportion to the citizen class.¹ The citizen looked down with contempt, not only upon this population of slaves, but also upon large numbers of freedmen and unqualified residents who were similarly excluded permanently from all participation in the rights of the State. "In no case could the freedman, the foreigner, or even the dependent ally obtain citizenship by residence or even by birth in the land."² At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the slave population of Attica is put by Beloch,³ in a moderate estimate, at 100,000, as

¹ Cf. *An Essay on Western Civilisation in its Economic Aspects (Ancient Times)*, by W. Cunningham, ii. c. ii.

² *History of Federal Government (Greek Federations)*, by E. A. Freeman, vol. i. c. ii.

³ *Bevölkerung*. Cf. Fowler's *City-State of the Greeks and Romans*, c. vi. Beloch's estimate is the most moderate of those recently made in which the subject has been carefully considered. Wallon, after an examination of the conditions of Attica about this period, gives the following detailed estimate:—

"Nous trouvons donc en récapitulant:—

Esclaves domestiques	40,000
Esclaves agricoles	35,000
Esclaves des mines	10,000
Esclaves employés dans l'industrie, le commerce et la navigation	90,000
Enfants an-dessous de 12 ans pour 40,000 femmes	20,000
Vieillards an-dessus de 70 ans	6,000
Total	<u>201,000</u>

Non compris les esclaves publics, parmi lesquels 1200 archers scythes.
A quoi il faut joindre la population libre:—

Athéniens	67,000
Métèques	40,000

En tout, de 308,000 à 310,000 habitants" (*Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité*, par H. Wallon, t. i. c. viii.).

against a free population of 135,000. The conditions were the same in Rome.¹ The citizenship of the Roman City-State was a privilege long jealously guarded; and the extensions of the franchise which were eventually made came, as we have seen, only with the ebbing vitality of the principles upon which the State had been founded. Probably at no time did the free populations of the entire Roman empire outnumber the slaves. Estimating from the Roman census of 684, Mommsen puts the free population of the Italian peninsula at six or seven millions, as against the slave population of thirteen or fourteen millions;² and Gibbon estimates³ that in the time of Claudius the slaves were, throughout the entire Roman world, at least equal in number to the free inhabitants.⁴

Yet we do not reach the true inwardness of the principle upon which the institution of slavery rested in the ancient State from these facts. It is the custom to associate the condition of slavery with an

¹ With the growth of luxury in Rome the employment of slaves greatly increased. "Ce qui résulte aussi, je pense, de l'impression des témoignages que nous avons réunis, c'est que l'emploi de ces esclaves était beaucoup plus répandu chez les Romains que chez les Grecs, dans la classe aisée" (*Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité*, t. ii. c. iii.).

² Mommsen's *History of Rome*, tra. by W. P. Dickson, vol. ii. p. 76.

³ *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, c. ii.

⁴ Wallon, after an exhaustive examination of the conditions in the Roman State as it approaches the period of the empire, concludes: "Ces évaluations sont trop hypothétiques pour que nous cherchions à leur donner par le calcul un faux air de précision; mais il nous semble qu'à la diminution du nombre des hommes libres a correspondu, généralement, une augmentation des esclaves, et que ce dernier nombre plus faible que l'autre au commencement de la seconde guerre punique, l'a maintenant au moins égalé" (*Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquité*, t. ii. c. iii.).

inferior race. But the cultured Greek made slaves of other Greeks when they became his by conquest in war, or by other recognised methods. During the historic period slaves were made not only in contests between Hellenes and barbarians, but between Hellenes and Hellenes; and the fact that during this period slaves in Greece were mostly of outside races was, as Bluemner points out,¹ due simply to the fact that captive Greek slaves were generally exchanged. In later Rome the talents of cultivated slaves became a large source of income. The richer capitalists had often great numbers of educated slaves who, as writers, lecturers, bankers, physicians, or architects, often earned large profits, which they were required to turn over to their masters.

It is only slowly, and as the mind is steeped in the spirit of the ancient civilisations, that the real nature of the immense interval which separates their inner life from that of the modern world begins to be realised. It often comes as a surprise, for instance, to the modern mind that a cultivated citizen of the Roman or Greek world could calmly consign an educated fellow-creature to all the unutterable degradation that the position of slave in that period involved, simply because the latter had been taken prisoner honourably in war. If, however, we turn to the thought of even so late, and comparatively liberal, a period as that of the *Institutes of Justinian*, we have the explanation. In the *Institutes* we find it asserted that "slaves are denominated *servi* because generals order their captives to be sold, and by this means are wont to preserve them and not to put

¹ *Leben und Sitten der Griechen* (English trs. by A. Zimmer), c. xv.

them to death."¹ The inner meaning of these words, in which there is expressed the still surviving spirit of the ancient civilisations, only becomes visible on reflection. The pride, the contempt, the intolerant exclusiveness of citizenship lurking in them is to us almost inconceivable. For they mean nothing more or less than that it had been the spirit of the Roman law to assume, as a matter of course, that a person who was at war with the exclusive body of citizens, and who, therefore, was outside its claims, had absolutely no right to exist. Any position, therefore, however degraded, to which he might be consigned, had been locked upon, not in the light of a punishment, but as a mitigation of the death penalty; and, therefore, as a favour for which he had every cause to be grateful.

A certain detachment of mind from tendencies prevailing in the recent uncritical and unscientific past is, in short, necessary to a perception of the full measure of the difference which separates the modern spirit from that of the epoch of human evolution here represented. Comparisons of outward forms and superficial resemblances, common in past studies of the life-principles of the ancient civilisations, are in the highest degree misleading.²

¹ *Servi autem ex eo appellati sunt, quod imperatores captivos vendere jubent ac per hoc servare nec occidere solent* (*Instit. Just.* lib. i. tit. iii.).

² The standpoint in Grote's comparisons is referred to elsewhere. Compare, however, Seeley's much more recent standpoint in many of the lectures included in his *Introduction to Political Science* (e.g. lec. vii.). At times it almost seems as if Seeley conceived the fundamental difference between our modern civilisation and that of the ancient States to be no more than that arising from the larger size of the territory of the modern State, and the problems of government by representation involved in it.

If we turn to Aristotle's *Ethics*, we observe the highest good defined as consisting in "virtuous energies,"¹ and happiness defined as "energy directed to the pursuit of virtue."² Such terms may be, and sometimes are, even by current writers, taken as if they were intended in the sense in which we use them. But when we look closely we see that they imply, in reality, something so substantially different as to be almost beyond the possibility of immediate comprehension. For, when we turn to Aristotle's *Politics*, we see that the "virtue" of which he is speaking is merely a form of activity related to ends comprised within the limits of the existing State; and that even in this sense its practice is limited to a small class. To the "barbarians" Aristotle considered the Greeks had no more duties than to wild beasts.

In the scheme of a well-governed State which Aristotle has in view in the *Politics*, it was accordingly asserted that "none of the citizens should be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or to follow merchandise;"³ and yet further, "if choice could be exercised, the husbandmen should by all means be slaves."⁴ The reason given for these ideals reveals at once the vastness of the interval which separates us from the author. It is that all these classes must be excluded from the possibility of being virtuous."⁵ They have no part, that is to say, in the principles which are assumed to uphold the privileged life of the select body of persons constituting the exclusive State. It is the

¹ *Ethics*, i. and x.

³ *Politics*, vii. ix.

⁵ *Ibid.* vii. ix.

² *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.* vii. x.

practice of these principles, by those whose interests they exclusively concern, that constitutes virtue.

In all the discussions by the Greek writers as to the highest good, alike in politics, in ethics, and in religion, the one fact which we have continually to note is the prevailing absence of the conceptions which spring from that sense of relationship to the universal and to the infinite which so profoundly affects the higher thought and action of the modern world. In Plato's *Republic* the ideal State and the individual, exclusive and privileged, are only multiples or reflections of the qualities of each other. The horizon of desires related to the ascendant present is the horizon of the ideal life of each. The fact, which may be distinguished in any of the characteristic conceptions of the *Republic* (as, for example those in the fifth Book) is that the meaning attached to all qualities and institutions — to individual virtue, social morality, the sexual relations, and even to the rights of life itself — falls completely within these limits.¹

It is not, of course, to be expected that in a period of the world's history, when the first epoch of social evolution was soon to merge into the second, that conceptions of relationship to the infinite and the universal should be absolutely unrep-

¹ One of the proposals under discussion is the best method of bearing children to the State. That for which approval is claimed is that woman in the ideal State should bear children to the State to the age of 40, the man being bound to the age of 55. After this the sexes were to be free to follow their own inclinations. If children were afterwards conceived they were not to be brought to the light, or if brought forth, were to be exposed as creatures for whom no provision was made (*Rep. v.*).

resented in the thought and literature of the Greek period. But what the scientific observer has always to keep clearly in view is the fact, that so far as such ideas existed, they simply had no relationship to the principles upon which society was constructed. The key to the comprehension of all details is the one never absent underlying assumption that the ideal ends to which consciousness related were in the present time, and comprised within the narrow limits of the associated life of the existing body of citizens.

It may, in consequence, always be distinguished that in the last resort the military ideals overlie and overrule all others. The consistent and growing tendency of the modern epoch has been to ennoble the ideal of work. But it was the business of war and of government, which alone was ennobled in the ancient State. To Socrates it was idleness which was the sister of freedom. Every occupation which required its follower to work and to receive pay was viewed with contempt. It made no difference that the condemnation might and did include in its sweep the greatest architects, painters, and sculptors that the world has ever produced.¹ To Aristotle the only classes worthy of respect were the citizens of a privileged and exclusive order of society in their capacity as soldiers, judges, or priests.² A State with a large number of mechanics and few soldiers he considered could not be great.³

¹ Cf. Blenmer, *Leben und Sitten der Griechen* (Eng. trans. A. Zimmern, chap. xiv.). The feeling of Greek society in this respect is unmistakable. It expresses itself in a continuous undertone in Plato's writings. Sometimes, as in Aristotle, *Politics*, vii., it is very marked. See also Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece*, chap. ix.

² *Politics*, vii.

³ *Ibid.*

The deeper we continue to get beneath the surface the more fully do we realise how all-pervading was the influence of these governing principles of the life of the ancient State, and how absolutely they controlled the expression of its energies, even in directions where their action is as yet, as a general rule, only imperfectly perceived. To many modern authorities, for instance, it still remains one of the remarkable facts of history, unexplained by the geographical and similar theories of Montesquieu,¹ Cousin, Freeman, and others, why the limited populations of the Greek States should have reached a standard of excellence in nearly every form of art, which has since remained not only unsurpassed, but unapproached by any other section of the race—a standard of excellence so extraordinarily high, that the deeper and more scientific tendencies of current research have, on the whole, brought with them no serious disposition to question the view that Greek genius attained therein almost the highest limits of perfection. The counterpart of the problem, equally striking, has been that the Roman people, sprung from a stock nearly related ethnologically, developing the same kind of polity, and attaining to the greatest example in history of military rule and ordered administration, should yet have displayed no corresponding excellence in those respects in which the Greek genius reached the very highest level of perfection.

What we begin to see now, however, is that the explanation of this problem must be considered to

¹ Most subsequent theories have been expansions of Montesquieu's in *De l'Esprit des Loix*, xiv.-xviii.

lie in the fact of the conditions under which the principle of the ascendancy of the present reached its culminating phase in Greece. The clue to the problem is, moreover, evidently related to the same cause in the case of both the Roman and Greek peoples. In Greece, although the military ideals were exactly the same as amongst the Roman peoples, a number of small independent States long contended for a mastery, which none was able so definitely to acquire as to enable it to absorb the others. To anticipate the military history of the Roman universal empire was, therefore, impossible in Greece. But the genius of the people, as expressing the culminating phase of the principle of the ascendant present, came to utter itself in a different though no less characteristic form, the significance of which is beginning to be understood by the modern evolutionist.

In the Greek world, where self-consciousness was always related to present ends, and where, therefore, as under the military ideals of the Roman world, it sought an outlook in every available direction, under its most vigorous and most potent expression, art was entirely untrammelled by an influence which it encounters at every turn in the modern world. Probably no modern mind, Professor Gardner has recently insisted, can fully realise the part played by the æsthetic emotions in Greece, or the conditions under which the arts were exercised. "With the Greeks," to use this writer's words, "it was one of the first necessities of their nature to utter in some visible form, in monument and sculptured group, their strongest emotions. Their sur-

roundings expressed them as clearly as the shell of the snail indicates its species. They were always, so to speak, blossoming in works of art; they thought and felt in stone or marble, or in the great national pictures which adorned all the places of public resort."¹

Now as in the light of the modern doctrine of evolution progress has been made towards understanding the origin and relations, in the development of the race, of those profound æsthetic feelings and emotions which, as Professor Gardner insists, it was one of the first necessities of the Greek nature to utter in visible form in the creations of art, a significant fact is brought into prominence. These æsthetic faculties, we are now coming to perceive, are essentially related in their origin and intensity to deep-lying utilities in the past history of the race. The æsthetic emotions with which we are concerned in Greek art have their roots, that is to say, in the experience of the race in that long-drawn-out first epoch of social evolution, when the present was always in the ascendant; and when every human force and activity tended to reach its highest expression in terms of the unrestrained and dominant present.²

¹ "Greek History and Greek Monuments," by Percy Gardner, Professor of Classic Archæology, Oxford University, *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. lxxxiv.

² Compare, for instance, *Darwinism*, by A. R. Wallace, chap. x.; *Physiological Æsthetics*, by Grant Allen; "Beauty in the Eyes of an Evolutionist," *Science Journal*, 1882; "Thoughts upon the Musical Sense in Animals and Man," by August Weismann, *Essays upon Heredity*, vol. ii. (Eng. trs., Poulton and Shipley); Schopenhauer's *Essay on the Metaphysics of Fine Art* (Eng. trs., Saunders); "Naturalism and Æsthetics," part i. chap. ii. Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*; with Alison's *Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste*.

As we regard this fact attentively, a natural principle of great interest emerges into view. It is, that the period of human evolution in which this class of æsthetic feelings and emotions must tend to reach their highest expression will be, therefore, that in which the epoch of the ascendancy of the present culminates. Nay, further, and here the importance of the principle impresses the mind, it would seem that in the second epoch in which the present begins to pass out under the control of the future, and while as yet another and higher class of æsthetic emotions are nascent, a slowly increasing conflict — between the unrestrained expression of the æsthetic emotions which are related in their fullest intensity to the experience of the race in the first epoch, and the governing principles of the era in which the present is passing under the control of the future — will develop itself.

There may, accordingly, be traced throughout every leading phase of modern Western art the deepening shadow of this conflict. Its influence is perceptible in all that class of effort expressing itself in the literature of the emotions, in the higher forms of the drama, and in most of the controversies which are continually being waged round the standards of taste in the plastic and pictoric arts. In the modern world art is, in short, in the presence of an influence absolutely unknown in the Greek period; an influence restraining, and at the same time upheaving, which is related to a deep-lying principle of social evolution, and which, as Tolstoy has correctly perceived, is in the last analysis ethical in character.¹ "Nowhere in

¹Cf. *What is Art?* by Leo Tolstoy, tra. from the Russian by Aylmer Maude. Compare also Nietzsche's *The Case of Wagner*. As regards

the modern world," says Professor Gardner, "is it harder to realise the conditions of Greek art than in current England and the United States." A recent art critic makes practically the same statement, extending it, however, to the Germanic peoples generally, amongst whom it is stated that the lucid Greek and Latin spirit has now come into permanent conflict with a quality which the writer endeavours to describe as "a haunting sense of the infinite."¹

We see, in short, that this conflict is not imaginary or transient, or simply racial or local, as it is sometimes stated to be. It is actual, permanent, and growing; and it arises directly from a deep-seated principle of our social evolution;—from the fact, that is to say, that in an epoch in which the ascendancy of the present is being slowly overlaid by a higher master-principle of the evolutionary process, the æsthetic feelings and emotions, which in their intensest expression are related to the epoch of the ascendancy of the present, are no longer free to utter themselves as under the unrestrained and culminatin

the drama the influence of the conflict may be traced in recent English thought in Bernard Shaw's *Essays on Ibsen and Wagner*, William Archer's dramatic criticisms, and the writings and addresses of W. L. Courtney, H. W. Massingham, and many other writers. See also in this connection Professor Dowden's "Puritanism and English Literature," *Contemporary Review*, No. 403.

¹ This is but another method of expressing the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing pages. Where amongst the Latin peoples of to-day other standards prevail in art, the clue is to be sought, the same writer remarks, in the fact that the Latin methods proceed from the deeply rooted belief that the social life of man, *i.e.* in the State, is, as in the ancient civilisations, the end of the greatest consequence to men ("The Superfluous Critic," by Aline Gorren, the *Century Magazine*, vol. iv.).

conditions in which Greek art flourished. The wide interval which, in such circumstances, separates the modern world from the conditions which governed the expression of the æsthetic emotions in Greece, may be estimated from many points of view. Of all the master minds of the Greeks that of Plato was probably most influenced by those ideas of the infinite and the universal destined to play so great a part in the subsequent development of the world. Nevertheless, when we see Plato, in one of the Dialogues,¹ attempting to interpret conceptions of this kind through forms of æsthetic expression related to the unrestrained standards of his time, the result, although producing no sense of the unseemly in the Greek mind, is to us so inexpressible that the real meaning of the images used is never openly discussed in modern literature. In the epoch of Greek art it was, in short, a canon in keeping with every fundamental principle upon which society was constructed, that to the artist it should be "one of the first necessities of his nature to utter in some visible form his strongest emotions." It was the natural and legitimate effort, according to the standards of the time in every other direction, for self-consciousness thus to realise itself unrestrained in its highest potency in art; and solely for its own sake and satisfaction. The standards in art were, as it were, but the highest expression in Greece of the universal standards in the era of the ascendancy of the present; and it was, in the conditions which prevailed in the Greek world, and in these alone, that the æsthetic emotions, having their roots in the past experience of the race, could attain their

¹ *Phædrus*.

highest results and reach their culminating stage of expression.

It was, in other words, the same causes which rendered the Roman empire the culminating phase of the ideals of military dominion, that gave us in the Greek world the culminating phase in which art, for the time being, attained to what has been described as almost the highest limits of perfection. In each case we are in the presence of the controlling principle we have been discussing throughout. Under each form we have but reached the highest point of that epoch of development in which all human energies endeavour to find their most unrestrained and forceful expression in relation to existing ends; of that long stage of human evolution in which the ideals of every human desire included in the ascendant present tended to reach some form of culminating expression.

It is, therefore, as we have seen, this principle of the ascendancy of the present which carries the inquirer into the inner meaning of every detail of the life of the ancient civilisations. The sacredness of life in the modern State, as compared with the ancient world, is still often explained as if it were related merely to different and more efficient standards of public law and order. But we see that there is an altogether deeper explanation than this. In a condition of civilisation in which life was not simply of less account, but in which the lives of children and of slaves were at the absolute disposal, even to death, of the parent or master; in which the absolute rights of the head of the family were such as were included in the Roman *patria potestas*, and those of the husband

such as the Roman *manus* involved; in which the exposure of children and infanticide were usual practices which called for no condemnation;— we are in the presence of principles which mark not simply a difference of degree, but one of kind from the standards of the civilisation of our era. What has to be noted is the complete absence of that assumption, deep, potent, and all-pervading in its effects, which underlies all the outward standards of the civilisation of our time—the assumption that, in the last resort, the life of the individual is related to ends and principles which entirely transcend the objects for which the political organisation around us itself exists.

The same difference in principle underlies all forms and institutions which, because of common names or outward resemblances, are often compared with those in the civilisation of our era. In the hard-fought struggle for liberty in all its aspects, which has projected itself through the history of our later civilisation, liberty is often spoken of as if it were merely related to the principles which governed the State when the State, as in the ancient civilisations, still embraced the whole life of the individual. But there was completely absent in the ancient State that distinctive principle which has been the prime force behind the struggle for liberty in all its modern phases; namely, the assumption that the principles to which individual liberty, as individual life, is ultimately related, transcend all the purposes of the existing political State. It is the same as to the phenomenon of Democracy. The comparisons which Grote instituted between ancient and modern Democracy—the ideas involved in which may be traced

through the phase of thought represented in the modern utilitarian movement—are entirely superficial.¹ It is not simply that Democracy in the ancient world rested on slavery. The difference goes far deeper than this. That deep-lying assumption, which may be distinguished beneath the surface in all the crises of political life in the modern world, and which, in that world, has slowly undermined the foundations of an earlier order of society—namely, the assumption that in the last resort we have a duty, not only to our fellow-creatures, but to principles which transcend all the purposes for which our own lives and the life of the political State exists—was unknown in the ancient world. No sense of responsibility to principles transcending the meaning of the

¹ The distinct feature of these studies is the absence of any really scientific perception of the meaning in human evolution of the interval which divides the modern conception of the State—with those standards of conduct and duty in the individual upon which that conception rests—from the ideal of the State in the ancient world. Austin in England, in the special department of jurisprudence, applied the principles to which Bentham had sought to give more general effect. "Plato," said D. C. Heron, writing about the time of Austin's death, and at the period of the ascendancy of the utilitarian theories of society in England (*History of Jurisprudence*, 1860), "considered that all human duties came within the province and control of public authority . . . assuredly in our present imperfect state of knowledge and development we cannot say with certainty that a time may not come when, in accordance with the theory of Plato, all the virtues may be so enforced." This confusion still widely prevails. It is, for instance, impossible at the present time to take up any considerable study in the current political literature of Western Europe or America without becoming aware that there are in progress in our midst political movements, enlisting in their activities much earnest endeavour and thought, in which the argument and discussion still proceeds, in the last resort, upon the assumption that the accepted conception of the modern State is the same as that which prevailed in the ancient world.

State had as yet projected the controlling aims of human consciousness out of the ascendant present.

This is the meaning of the ancient world. When all the details of the life of these civilisations are seen in their relation to the larger process of human evolution, the culminating effect, focussed through many mediums, is so unmistakable as to bring to the mind a sense of irresistible conviction as to their essential meaning. Looking back over the history of Greece and Rome, we may see that the characteristic features are related to a ruling principle the operation of which has woven a gigantic pattern through an immense period of human evolution; a pattern in which the life and history of these civilisations are themselves no more than local details. We see the history of these States now, not as some wonderful and mysterious page in the development of humanity that must be studied with a kind of awe apart by itself; but rather as the culminating phase of that epoch of human development in which the ruling end that is being attained is the subordination of the individual to existing society; and in which the later governing principle by which existing society is itself destined to be subordinated to a meaning projected beyond the content of its political consciousness has not yet begun to operate.

It is the last stage of that epoch in which the content of human consciousness is as yet bounded by the horizon of the existing political organisation; of that epoch in which the State, therefore, claims the entire rights, duties, and life of the individual; of that epoch in which the whole tendency of human development is, therefore, caught in the sweep of a vast

process, in which the present is in the ascendant, and in which every impulse of the human will, and every form of human energy tends, therefore, to reach its highest potentiality in relation to desires expressing themselves in the omnipotent present. It is the culminating phase of that great epoch in the history of the race, in which all its religions are as yet primarily related to material ends; in which society has not as yet passed under the control of a meaning infinite in the future; in which, therefore, humanity itself, however efficient its purposes, however splendid its achievements, however transforming its genius, is yet, as it were, without a soul.

CHAPTER VII

THE PASSING OF THE PRESENT UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE FUTURE

IN that epoch of social evolution which begins in Western civilisation with the gradual break-up of the political fabric of the Roman empire, we have developed from the outset upon the stage of the world the terms of a profound antinomy. Nothing like it has before been presented in the evolutionary process in life ; and it is only slowly, and as the mind is able to take in the full reach of the principles involved, that the significance of the struggle between the forces representing the two opposing terms therein is realised.

Almost the first conclusion which takes definite shape in the mind, after prolonged study of the development in history which opens with the rise into ascendancy of the principles of the system of religious belief associated with the era in which we are living, is that it is impossible to form any true conception, either of the reach or of the import of the process unfolding itself in our Western world, from observation of it in the midst of the events to which it at any period gives rise. The meaning of the development in progress so evidently transcends the limits of every form and of every institution within which its exponents endeavour, for the time being, to confine it ; the inherent impetus is so much greater

than that which appears to be behind the events of the centuries which at any point spread themselves before the immediate view of the historian; the mean life-centre of the process as a whole is, from the beginning, as it still continues to be, so immeasurably remote in the future;—that it is only when the mind is, by an effort, withdrawn to a considerable distance that we are able to hold clearly in view that governing principle of the movement with which science is, over and above everything else, concerned.

When the observer, from such a standpoint, looks along the centuries of our era in Western history he appears, at first sight, to have in view the working of the same principles of history that ruled in the epoch through which the world has passed. It is to all outward appearance the same changing conflict of peoples; the same rise and fall of nationalities; and ever, beneath the surface of all the events of history, the same rule of force as in the past. Nevertheless, the future is no longer destined to resemble the past. The controlling meaning of the social process in human history has been changed. The opposing terms in that process in the past have been the interests of the existing individual and the interests of existing society. In the phase of evolution with which we are about to be concerned in the future, a new antinomy has been opened in history. All the interests of the existing individuals, all the interests of the existing political organisation, are now about to constitute but a single term in a new antithesis. The interests of "society," as society has hitherto been conceived, are now themselves about to be subordinated to the ends of a social process, the meaning

of which can never more be included within the bounds of political consciousness.

The great drama upon which the curtain begins to rise in Western history is, in short, one which, by inherent necessity, must gradually envelop in its influence all the activities of society and of the human mind. For, as we have seen, the enormously prolonged conflict in which the individual has passed under the control of the existing social organisation — a conflict out of which has arisen all the phenomena of law and of government in the past, and out of which still proceeds some of the profoundest emotions with which the highest literature and the highest art continue to be occupied — can furnish no more than a feeble anticipation of the phenomena which must accompany the passing of society itself under the control of interests projected beyond the furthest limits of its political consciousness. Into the cosmic sweep of such a process all the activities of the race in history must in time be drawn. It is a process, the duration of which must extend beyond the furthest reach of the imagination. The entire period of Western civilisation so far included in our era, furnishes, as has been already stated, hardly more than room for the bare outlines of the main features of the problem which it involves to become visible in history.

When the imagination of the evolutionist is allowed to dwell on the features of that phase of history which opens before him in the first centuries of our era, he must gradually realise to what an unusual degree the elements of scientific interest have been accumulated in the period. He is stand-

ing, as it were, in history, watching the last waves of the military migrations, that so long flowed westward over Europe, coming slowly to rest. They are the waves of that process which have flowed strongest and farthest; and which represent the peoples amongst whom the process of military selection has been most searching and most prolonged. He has in sight, as it were, the races in whom the tide of military conquest has reached its flood, and to whom the future of the world is now about to pass; the races who, for a period immense and indefinitely prolonged in the future, are about to provide and keep clear in the world the stage upon which a new epoch of evolution is destined to open. And it is into the great matrix provided in history by the still standing political fabric of that empire, in which the ideal of military conquest has once and for ever culminated, that he sees these races, the latest and still virgin product of a world-process of military selection, coming to rest at last to receive the impress upon them of the forces about to be unloosed in the world.

In the world of history into which these races were thus ushered, on their contact alike with the political forms of the Roman empire and with the products of Greek culture, a single governing principle had hitherto held all others in subjection. It was the world of the ascendant present. It was the world in which the ultimate meaning that every human institution yielded on analysis was, that, as there was nothing more important than the present, so there was nothing higher than the forces which ruled the present. It was the world where every form of

human distinction and every essential of honour had hitherto rested on force; where a rule of force had made all labour degrading; where idleness was the sister of freedom; and where the social, the economic, and even the intellectual life had rested on a basis of slavery. It was the world in which the spirit of aristocracy resting ultimately on force, had breathed through every work of the political genius of the most gifted people the race had produced. It was a world in which a rule of force had culminated at last in the most colossal and ruthless expression of unrestrained force it was possible to reach—an empire of universal conquest in which the chief and symbol of omnipotent military force had come at last to receive divine honours and to be worshipped as a god.

The omnipotence of the present was, therefore, written over all things. It was the present that had lived in Greek art. It was the present that had reasoned in Greek philosophy. It was the ruling present which had made virtue and enlightened pleasure synonymous for the individual, which had made virtue and enlightened self-interest synonymous in the State. It was the present which, conceiving, in the words of one of the noblest of the Romans, that every man's life lies all within it,¹ had found the highest expression for virtue in the egoisms of Roman Stoicism. It was the present which, conceiving the existing world entirely occupied with its own affairs,² had found intellectual shelter for its vices under the name of Epicurus. It was the forceful, passionate, dominating present

¹ Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, iii. x.

² Cf. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, i. 44.

which lived alike in Attic marble, in Greek song, and in the nameless institutions of Roman sensuality. It was the rule of the present which drove the greatest idealist of the Greeks to render his conceptions of truth and justice in their essences in the inexpressible imagery of the *Phædrus*. It was the present which, knowing no right or duty to anything higher in life than itself, had held the world in the spirit of the Roman *ius civile*; of which the expression in the individual was the rights of the *patria potestas*; of which the culminating expression in the State was the empire of universal military conquest; of which the all-pervading expression in society was the institution of slavery in that form in which, to extend the description of Wallon, the central figure was a being possessing all the attraction of a man, and yet a human being to whom society stood absolved from every moral obligation of humanity, a being in whom and to whom all the wildest excesses, all the deepest degradations, were lawful, provided they were commanded by a master.

It was, in short, the world in which was represented the culminating age of that long epoch of human development in which the significance that underlay every human institution, in the last analysis, was the conception that there were no rights and no responsibilities in man, no meaning and no significance in life, no hopes and no desires in the world, save such as were related to present ends. All the wants, the desires, the passions, the ambitions of men, were correlated with the things which men saw around them. It was the world in which all the theories of the State, all the ideals of art, all the

principles of conduct, all the conceptions of religion, centred round the things which men hungered and thirsted for in that material and omnipotent present in which they lived.

It was in such a world and in such an environment that the evolutionist sees now projected into the minds of men an ideal, developed among an insignificant non-military people in an eastern province of the Roman empire, involving the absolute negation of the ruling principle which had thus moved and shaped the development of the world in every leading detail of the past. The mind has to be able to state to itself in terms of modern Darwinian principles, the nature of the world-process at work in human history, to realise the full significance of the transition which the acceptance of this ideal involved in the epoch of evolution which now opens.

There is no more imposing spectacle disclosed in the research into human origins, when we perceive the nature of the evolutionary process in history, than the growing definition in the human mind of the concepts by which the controlling consciousness of the race becomes destined to be projected at last beyond the content of all interests in the present; and by which that consciousness becomes related at last, in a sense of personal, direct, and compelling responsibility, to principles which transcend the meaning of the individual, the present, the State, and the whole visible world as it exists.

Far back in the religious systems of early Egypt, while as yet the military process that was in time to envelop the northern world in its influence had not begun to leave its record in history, we see being

developed, amongst an agricultural people, who had already carried the arts of life to a high state of cultivation, the first outlines of the concept of monotheism. It is everywhere deeply overlaid in the general mind by those crude and gross concepts of the present and the material that are peculiar to the first stage of human evolution; and it is only through the expositions of the higher minds that we catch sight at times, beneath this overgrowth, of the expression of the first contact of the human mind with that ascending process into which the sum of human activities is destined in time to be drawn.

With progress ever continuing in the same direction, through the vicissitudes of peoples and races, we see the concept taking shape, and the expression of it growing clearer in the religious systems of the Eastern peoples who have come under its influence. Throughout a prolonged period, moreover, in which the record of the growth and purification of this concept is presented in the history of the Jewish people, we have clearly in sight a phenomenon of the first scientific interest; namely, the development of an utterly opposing principle to that full, vigorous, and intense expression of the ascendancy and efficiency of life, in all its uninterrupted play in the present, which was to reach its climax in the Greek ethos. We see the Hebrew spirit, in some of the finest passages in the literature of the race, rising in superior and eloquent scorn to all the works of an existing world resting on force. In the vision of universal justice which haunts the consciousness of the Jewish people throughout its history it is the poor, the oppressed, the fallen, the weak, the disinherited, that become all that the gifted,

the noble, the darling aristocrat of strength and perfection in the present are to the Greek. We follow the development of this conception in Jewish history till it grows greater than the nation, greater than all its present, greater than the race itself; till associated at last with an ideal of self-suhordination and self-ahnegation which has hurst all the bounds of the present and the material, while it has become touched with the profoundest quality of human emotion, it goes forth in the first century of our era to suhdue that world in which the principle of the ascendancy of the present has reached its culminating form of expression; to conquer the peoples able alone to provide for it a milieu in history—the peoples amongst whom a process of military selection, probahly the most searching, strenuous, and prolonged that the race has undergone, has reached its climax.¹

As the observer recalls at this point the principle of development which came into view in an earlier chapter—namely, that no progress could be made towards that second and higher stage of social evolution, in which the future begins to control the present, until natural selection had first of all developed a people or a type of society able to hold the world against all comers in the present—the significance of the conditions into which the new ideal has been pro-

¹ How to reconcile the two opposing and seemingly irreconcilable tendencies summed up in the words Hebraism and Hellenism is, says Professor Butcher with insight, the problem of modern civilisation:—how to nrite the Hebrew ideal, in which the controlling meaning, to which human consciousness is related, is projected out of the present, “with the Hellenic conception of human energies, manifold and expansive, each of which claims for itself uninterrupted play” (cf. *Some Aspects of Greek Genius*, by S. H. Butcher, p. 45).

jected begins to hold the imagination. For we see how far removed from each other are the terms of the antinomy. The peoples upon whom has devolved this new destiny in history are, of necessity, not allied to, but alien to the spirit of the new ideal. They are in the nature of things the very pagans of the pagan world.¹ We have disclosed to view, that is to say, the terms of an evolutionary problem of the first order, evidently destined to become related to an immense sequence of phenomena in the future—a problem of such a character that thousands of years must obviously elapse before its full outlines and magnitude can become disclosed on the stage of history.²

¹ It is necessary to always keep clearly before the mind a permanent fact, the import of which still underlies the meaning of Western history, namely, that the peoples among whom the development in progress in our civilisation is taking place represent by descent the great pagan stock of the world; the stock, that is to say, amongst whom the pagan spirit reached its fullest development and produced its most characteristic results. Compare in this connection "Race and Religion in India," by A. M. Fairhairn, *Contemporary Review*, No. 404; and "The Influence of Europe on Asia," by M. Townsend, *op. cit.* No. 422.

² Throughout a long period in the past, during which the life and literature of Greece and Rome have been made the subject of close study by Western scholars, we may distinguish on the whole a certain consciousness of the contrast between the remarkable results produced by these civilisations in almost every department of human activity—and in particular between the general range and depth of the products of the Greek intellect—and the crudeness and grossness of the practical ideal which appear to be represented in the religious systems of the two peoples. If the mind has remained fully open to the effect, a comparison between the general ideas and conceptions expressed in the religious systems of Greece and Rome, and those which had already begun to so profoundly influence the human mind in other religious systems of the Eastern world, makes a marked impression on the observer. The clue to the contrast lies, however, as will be perceived, in the fact, upon which emphasis has been laid in the preceding chapters,

As the evolutionist, therefore, at the present day turns over the literature of the first centuries of our era, and follows, in the outward record of events therein, the contact of this ideal with every existing phase of human activity; it must be, if he has been able to retain his position of detachment from all current theories and prepossessions, with a clear and definite impression growing in his mind. Sooner or later the conviction must take possession of him, that there must be underlying the phenomena he is regarding a meaning, in relation to the central problem of human evolution, which is altogether larger than any he is able to find expressed in the departments of knowledge which have dealt with these phenomena in the past.

As he follows the movement itself in the inner history of it presented in that most remarkable record of the human mind, the writings of the early Fathers of the Church; as he then turns outwards and notes the contact of the movement with the Roman, the Greek, and the Alexandrian tendencies in the philosophy of the ancient world, its contact with the mind of the northern military races, with the public opinion of the Roman world, and, last of all, with the political institutions of the Roman empire; and as he then turns once more and closely regards the movement itself, with the schisms, the conflicts, the developments which crowd around the low level from which it rises in history, and which almost serve to conceal from view the integrating process of life which is

namely, the relationship of the religious systems of Greece and Rome to the governing principle of that prolonged epoch of military selection which had culminated amongst the Western races.

slowly rising through them all, — one central idea will in all probability have taken possession of his mind. We are watching beneath it all — he must feel convinced — a development of the first importance in the evolution of life. Whatever the shape the movement may have taken for the time being, whatever the developments it may be destined to undergo in the future, of a central fact underlying it as a whole there can be absolutely no doubt. An evolutionary principle of entirely new significance has begun to operate in society.

The time has gone by in our day when we can imagine that in discussing in the name of science the meaning of the displays of ignorance and credulity, or of the savage paroxysms of human passions which have from time to time found expression throughout this movement, we are discussing the meaning of the movement itself. Beneath all these things we are concerned with a vast process of development, rising slowly through the centuries, the life-centre of which is still immeasurably remote in the future. The time has come when this phenomenon must be discussed in the same spirit of austere devotion to the truth, and therefore in that same attitude of passionless indifference to all preconceived opinions and beliefs whatever, which has now come to be the ideal, if not the characteristic, of the higher work of science in every other department of knowledge.

Now we can never understand the real significance of the development, which begins in Western history with the rise into ascendancy of the influence of the new system of religious belief, until we get

to the heart of a curious intellectual phenomenon of the ancient world. If we ask ourselves what was the ultimate meaning which the ancient philosophy was trying to express at the point in history in which it comes into contact with the new movement, the reply which we receive is of great interest. If we look round us at the present day at the literature of current thought, it may be noticed that there is sometimes expressed in it the views of a class of writers who, perplexed with the modern outlook, carry the mind back with a kind of half-formed longing to the days of that humanitarian philosophy which influenced some of the best minds in the first centuries of the Roman empire. The lofty moral earnestness of Seneca and Epictetus, the noble disciplined humanity of Marcus Aurelius, even nowadays makes so distinct an impression on the mind that there are some who are inclined to regard the intervening period of history as a kind of retrogression. What they seem almost to think is that if the world had only been allowed to develop the inheritance won for the race by the intellect of Greece and the political genius of Rome, it might have ripened down to the present time, in view of a broader humanitarian ideal; and with an outlook which would have equalled if not surpassed in promise that which the most optimistic minds amongst us are now able to look forward to.

In support of this view much plausible reasoning is often adduced. Nevertheless it represents a conception entirely superficial. It involves a misunderstanding not only of the distinctive principle which is shaping the development of the modern world,

but of the very life-principle of the ancient world itself.

On more than one occasion in his life Freeman referred with great emphasis to a crisis in the development of his view of ancient history which had evidently left a deep impression on his mind. In his Oxford lectures for the year 1884-85, the subject was referred to with much earnestness. He well remembered, he said, how startled he was when he first realised, through the teaching of Finlay, "that the age which we commonly look on as the most glorious in Grecian history, the fifth century before Christ, was in truth an age of Greek decline."¹ The Greek mind was yet to produce much of its highest work—the wider outlook in thought, and that more humanitarian tendency in philosophy which was afterwards to reach its loftiest expression in Roman Stoicism and in the later developments of Roman jurisprudence, were almost entirely the products of a subsequent period. And yet—to use Freeman's words of the period—"the Greece of the fifth century before Christ is like the Rome of the fourth century after Christ."² What we sometimes fail to see of it Herodotus saw clearly . . . for the Greek people as a whole all over the world it was an age of decline."³

It may seem to many to be curious that the perception of a fact which often makes so little mark on the mind, even when it is fully recognised, should have so deeply impressed Freeman. We have to

¹ *Chief Periods of European History*, by E. A. Freeman, p. 21.

² *Ibid.* p. 22.

³ *Ibid.* p. 21.

turn elsewhere to perceive the direction in which the larger meaning which is behind it carries us.

It must be within the experience of more than one student of the history of Roman law, that there has happened in the development of his view of Roman jurisprudence a crisis which will at once suggest a remarkable relation to the experience of Freeman in Greek history here related. There is hardly any more striking spectacle in Roman history than the gradual growth and expansion of legal conception within the empire, as the Romans were brought into ever extending political and commercial relations with the wider world they had conquered. We see the haughty *civis* of the third century B.C. wrapt in the rights, the privileges, and the protection of the original local law of the city of Rome, shutting the door of the *ius civile* in the face of the world, and excluding the peoples he had conquered from the coveted privileges of the Roman *civitas*. We watch Rome meanwhile gradually becoming the political and commercial capital of the world, and see the growth outside of the *ius civile*, within which the citizen has entrenched himself, of the *ius gentium* or the body of laws of the excluded aliens. We follow the gradually transforming influence of the conceptions of the latter upon those of the former; and the slow yielding of the ideals of exclusive citizenship under the pressure of cosmopolitan necessity on the one hand, under the influence of Hellenic culture on the other. We see the principles, the phraseology, and the humanitarian conceptions of Stoicism being gradually incorporated in the system of Roman public law; while *pari passu* there is in progress the grad-

ual extension of the rights of citizenship; until Caracalla, in the third century, confers the *civitas* on all Roman subjects who are members of some political community; until Justinian at last, in the sixth century, in constituting every free subject of the Roman empire as such a full Roman citizen, sweeps away the entire antithesis between the *ius civile* and the *ius gentium*, and finally annihilates the fundamental principle of exclusiveness upon which Rome was founded and developed.

The spectacle is, in many respects, one of the most striking and imposing in ancient history.¹ Nevertheless, there must have come to more than one student who has carried his point of view beyond that of the ordinary text-book of Roman law, a time when he has been himself startled by the perception of a fact underlying it all, similar to that in Greek history which so deeply impressed the mind of Freeman. It has been, when the conviction has suddenly come upon him with irresistible force that the whole development here described in Roman history was not a phenomenon of life at all, but a process of death; that it progressed equally with, and side by side with, the causes which were slowly undermining the ancient state; and that it was in reality, strange as it may seem, but a phenomenon belonging to the same group of symptoms of the decay and dissolution of the life of the Roman empire with which he had been so familiar elsewhere. It was not with the cosmopolitan principles of the *ius gentium*, but with the stern institutions of the *ius*

¹ Cf. *Institutes of Roman Law*, by Rudolph Sohm (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 40, 41, and 116-119.

civile that the life of ancient Rome was bound up. It was not to the humanitarianism of Epictetus and of Marcus Aurelius, but to the almost savage exclusiveness of the moral code of Aristotle, that the life-principle of the ancient civilisations was ultimately united. Nay more, hard as it may be at first to realise it, we see that if the principles which had found their highest expression in the generous cosmopolitanism of the later Greek philosophy, and in the lofty ideas of Roman Stoicism, had been in the ascendant in the ancient world, there would have been no Greek civilisation, there could have been no Roman empire. The tendency which produced the results with which we are concerned was the expression, in reality, in each case of a process of dissolution. It involved a principle absolutely incompatible with, and antagonistic to, the life of the civilisation with which the results are identified.

This is the first great truth respecting the philosophy of the ancient world which we have to grasp in all its applications. Yet we have to get farther even than this. The development which had taken place in the ancient philosophy was not only incompatible with the life-principle of the civilisation which had produced it. It contained no life-principle in itself. There remained absolutely unrepresented in it the principle which was to constitute the characteristic evolutionary significance of the movement about to begin in the world. But it is only when we turn now and observe the relation of the ancient philosophy to the new movement opening in history that we come to understand, on the one hand, why this was so; and to perceive, on the other hand, wherein

lay the distinctive principle of that movement which was to constitute it an evolutionary force of the first order in the world.

Now it will probably be seen at no remote period in the future, when the study of the human mind is approached from the standpoint of sociological principles, rather than from the introspective standpoint of the individual, that there is one distinguishing characteristic of the Christian religion to which all the phenomena thereof with which science is concerned are essentially related. We have present in that religion underlying all its phases, however varied, however obscure, one central phenomenon which constitutes not only the essential fact of its inner life, but the distinctive principle to which its evolutionary significance is related. It is the opening in the individual mind of the terms of a profound antithesis, of which the characteristic feature always remains the same, namely, that it is incapable of being again bridged or closed by any principle operating merely within the limits of present consciousness. It is this antithesis which represents the expression in the individual of that principle in human evolution which is in the ascendant in modern civilisation, and which is characteristic of that civilisation. But it is an antithesis which is not represented either in the philosophy or in the history of the ancient world.

When we search carefully through the literature of the higher philosophy of the pagan world at the point at which the Christian movement begins to impinge upon it, it may be perceived that there is also a principle which is absolutely characteristic of the ancient philosophy. Throughout all the phases of Greek

thought, and not least where it reaches its noblest expression in the highest minds, it may be distinguished that the condition of virtue was regarded as a kind of stable equilibrium within the bounds of social or political consciousness. There was no conception of any antithesis in the mind of the individual within these limits. The wise man was essentially the virtuous man. It was the business of the wise man to discover the laws of the world around him to which he was subject, and to conform to them. We have seen how the principle of the untrammelled expression of nature in the present was represented in the art of Greece and the empire of Rome. So also in the standards of virtue in the ancient philosophy. All virtue was, in its essence, regarded as conformity to nature. It was, therefore, the superiority of the wise man to all the changing reverses of fortune, the dignity of the individual, and the equilibrium of the intellect which constituted the dominant note in all the higher philosophy of the time.¹

The two great rival systems of Epicureanism and Stoicism were really the same in this respect. Epicureanism in its founder might be held to be shrewd, calculating, utilitarian; in Horace it might sometimes be taken as rising to a consistent heroism amid the crash of misfortune. But in both the distinctive feature of the virtue aimed at was the establishment of

¹ In Aristotle's *Ethics* (ii.-x.) and Plato's *Republic* and *Dialogues* (e.g. Protagoras), as in the *Discourses* of Epictetus (I. xii.-xiii.; II. i., and III. vii.-viii.) and the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius (ii.-ix.), the object of virtue, it may be distinguished, is assumed to be to get the most out of the individual's relations to the existing world by an enlightened and philosophic adjustment of the desires and passions in all circumstances whatever which might arise.

an equilibrium between the individual and his surroundings. In neither was there a conception of any antithesis between the individual and any principle which transcended all his interests in the present. The ideal of virtue was, in short, a self-centred stable equilibrium in the present. Stoicism might, and did in the best minds, rise to a high, passionless conception of philanthropy, and even reach, at times, to a vision of the fraternity of all men. But we distinguish beneath it always, that its main effort was directed simply towards creating a kind of equilibrium of the intellect centred in self and in the present time. It reduced all virtue, to use the expressive words of a modern writer, to a kind of majestic egotism.¹ Even where Stoicism appeared to rise beyond all the ends of the present, there remained in reality the same relationship of consciousness to these ends when it seemed to rise superior to them. As death in all the systems was either avowedly or practically regarded as the end of all things — any belief to the contrary being scarcely more than a sentiment exercising no practical influence in relation to existing standards of conduct — so the Stoical doctrine of the legitimacy of suicide in presence of misfortune is, in reality, to be rightly regarded as the culminating feature of the ancient philosophy.² It indeed represented the last supreme effort of the human mind to preserve the sense of its own equilibrium and sufficiency in the self-centred present. For it contained the only certain refuge against despair and extreme suffering. "Remember," said Epictetus, "if suffering be not

¹ Lecky's *History of European Morals*, vol. i. p. 191.

² *Ibid.* p. 222.

worth your while, the door is open." ¹ "Every man's life," said Marcus Aurelius, "lies all within the present," ² and "it the room smoke I leave it, and there is the end." ³ Notwithstanding, in short, all outward changes which took place in the later stages of the higher philosophy of Greece and Rome, in the one fundamental principle which underlay the entire political, social, and moral life of the civilisation they represented, there was no change. That characteristic conception of the ancient world, of an equilibrium between virtue and existing nature, between the individual and the present, between the present and the untrammelled expression therein of the human will and of human desire, was still everywhere unmistakably represented.

Now it is impossible to present anything more striking to the imagination, especially when we begin to distinguish the far-reaching evolutionary significance of the fact, than the contrast offered to all this in the antithesis which we see now opened in the human mind under the influence of the new religion. Almost the first thing to be noticed when we turn first of all to the history of the religious movement itself, is the profound change which has taken place in the standpoint of the individual. We are, as it were, in a new world. We move amongst men in whom the sense of an equilibrium between the individual and his surroundings, between the individual and his interests in the present, between the individual and his own nature, has been absolutely annihilated.

¹ *Discourses*, ii. i. 3.

² *Meditations*, iii. x.; see also ii. xiv.; and viii. xxv.

³ *Ibid.* v.

If attention is confined, first of all, to the inner life of the movement itself, we may perceive evidence of this on every hand. We are in a world in which it is no longer the dignity of the individual, or his virtue as the expression of his equipoise in a kind of imposing egoism, with which we are concerned. It is rather the profound abasement, the utter contempt of self, which constitutes the characteristic prevailing note throughout the whole range of the phenomena we are regarding. The nature of the revolution is unmistakable. There is no fact in religious history more startling, says a modern writer, than the radical change which has taken place in this respect.¹ For "no philosopher of antiquity ever questioned that a good man reviewing his life might look upon it without shame and even with positive complacency."² But all this has been changed. The antithesis between the individual and the world around him, and, it is important to note, between the individual and his own nature, has become one of the most striking spectacles in the history of the human mind. The conception of virtue as conformity to nature has absolutely vanished. "O the abyss of man's conscience," says St. Augustine, ". . . my groaning beareth witness . . . I am ashamed of myself and renounce myself."³

Even where we see the adherents of the new movement prepared to meet destiny with all the outward serenity which Stoicism endeavoured to supply, we may perceive how entirely altered has become the standpoint of the individual mind.

¹ *History of European Morals*, by W. E. H. Lecky, vol. i. p. 207.

² *Ibid.* p. 207.

³ *Confessions*, b. I.

"What," asks Marcus Aurelius, "if people will not let you live as you would? Why then leave life, but by no means make a misfortune of it,"¹ is the haughty reply of the Stoic. "Let your tormenting irons harrow our flesh," says Tertullian; "let your gibbets exalt us, or your fires lick up our bodies . . . We are in position of defence against all the evils you can crowd upon us."² The standpoint outwardly is the same; but a world of difference between the two is revealed when we reach the consciousness beneath from which the action in each case is proceeding. The attempt of the Stoic to preserve the dignity and equilibrium of the Ego in relation to the surrounding world has absolutely vanished. The consuming desire to which the effort of the mind corresponds in the new movement is now seen to transcend all the ends in the present to which human consciousness is related. "My God, my life, my holy joy," says St. Augustine, "what am I to Thee that Thou demandest love from me . . . Hide not Thy face from me. Let me die (that I die not) that I may see Thy face."³

As we continue to watch the inner life of the movement we see how the terms of the antithesis become gradually more and more clearly defined. The interesting and significant observation has been made that it was only during the early period of the new faith in Rome that the epithet "well-deserving," which was a usual inscription on the tombs of the ancient Romans, continued to be an inscription in the Christian catacombs. The surviving influence which this indicated of one of the most fundamental

¹ *Meditations*, v.

² *Apology*, cxxx.

³ *Confessions*, i.

ideas of the pagan world soon entirely disappeared. With the development of the Pelagian controversy we begin to realise how essential and inherent in the deeper life of the movement is the antithesis which has been opened in the human mind. The conception of the innate and utter insufficiency of the individual gradually becomes visible in all its strength, as with the banishment of Pelagius in 418, and his condemnation by the Council of Ephesus in 431, it bears down all opposition.¹ Where in the ancient world all virtue was regarded as conformity to nature, where the wise man was held to represent a kind of stable equilibrium, where all evil in the individual was accordingly regarded as disease, we are met now by a new phenomenon. We see the religious consciousness definitely condemning as a heresy the doctrine that the individual is able by his own natural powers to fulfil the entire law, and to do every act necessary to his salvation. We have a new religious concept in the minds of men. In respect of no merely human virtue, however great, is it now regarded as possible for the individual to render himself acceptable to the Deity.

It may be noticed on every hand in the inner life of the new movement during the first centuries of its history, how great is the interval which has begun to separate us from the standards of the ancient civilisations. We see that not only has human consciousness become related to principles which transcend all the existing interests of the individual and all the recognised aims of the State; but that the conception which underlay the whole fabric of the

¹ *History of the Later Roman Empire*, by J. B. Bury, vol. I. ii. ix.

religious, ethical, and political life of the ancient civilisations, namely, that of an equilibrium between the conditions of virtue and the unrestrained expression in the present of human nature, is no longer recognised. Nay more, it is significant to note that it is this latter conception which is intuitively singled out for special condemnation. It is the doctrine directly contrary to it of the entire insufficiency of the individual in respect of his own nature to fulfil the standards required of him by any merit, however transcendent, which becomes visible as the central and fundamental principle of the movement now in progress in the world.¹

The significance of the position here being developed is unmistakable. The fundamental concept which it involves, as we shall realise more clearly later on, is nothing less than the expression, for the time being, in the individual mind of that larger principle of the evolutionary process, which, if we have been right in the position reached in the previous chapters, is destined in time to control all the phenomena of history. For, by the concept of the entire insufficiency of any conduct, however meritorious, and of the utter inability of the individual, in respect of his own nature, to rise to the standard of duty required of him, we see that we have now opened in the human mind an antithesis which it becomes impossible to bridge again in any scheme

¹ It may be remarked how the change extended to the conception of the Deity; Greek and Roman deities were not, on the whole, regarded as holier than men. "Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedit deum. Ille naturae beneficio, non suo, sapiens est : ecce res magna, habere imbecillitatem hominis, securitatem dei" (Seneca, *Epist.* 53).

of ethics conceiving a self-centred equilibrium in the present time; or in any standard of duty in which virtue is made to correspond to conformity to the conditions of the existing world around us. There is involved, in reality, nothing less than the definite passing of the controlling centre of human consciousness out of the present. The only concept by which an equilibrium in such an antagonism can be again restored must involve, not only a rise of the individual consciousness to the cosmic; but a sense of relationship to the cosmic as direct, as personal, and as compelling as any by which the human mind has hitherto been related to the present.

As the mind begins to slowly apprehend the relation of the position here outlined to that central principle of human development which we have been insisting on throughout; namely, that the present and all its interests is, by necessity inherent in the evolutionary process, destined in time to pass entirely under the control of the future and the infinite; we feel that we have travelled to the verge of the statement of a natural law of wide reach and significance. As we look forward through history we catch a glimpse for a moment of the real meaning of that fundamental instinct which, since the opening of our era, may be perceived to have continuously struggled to obtain scientific expression in Western thought; namely, that the life of our civilisation involves some principle which not only transcends all theories of an equilibrium of enlightened self-interest in the present, but a principle which cannot be included in any theory of the corporate interests of the State, however extended. Nay, more, there flashes on the

mind at this point a first view of the scientific significance in the great drama of evolution of those concepts of the Christian religion, such as "justification," "salvation," and "atonement," over which the human will has for ages waged such dogged, prolonged, and bitter controversy. They are concepts of that character by which, in the epoch in which the present and the finite begin to pass under the control of the future and the infinite, the antithesis which has been opened in the human mind can alone be closed. They are the concepts by which the human mind has first risen to that necessary sense, already indicated, of direct and personal responsibility to principles cosmic in their reach. So far, however, from the antithesis itself tending to disappear, what we begin to see is that its real significance consists in the fact that, under whatever form it may continue, it is destined to endure; nay, that it constitutes the growing feature of human evolution, and that its essential meaning involves that it can *never* be closed in any equilibrium of the human mind ringed within the rim of the present, or within any boundaries of political consciousness, however widely conceived.

As, in the light of the fundamental meaning of this antinomy, we follow now under a multitude of forms the long early struggle throughout the world of the new movement with the spirit of the ancient philosophy, it is remarkable to observe how the clear scientific principle underlying it all begins to stand out at every important crisis. We distinguish at once, for instance, even beneath all the phenomena of ignorance and credulity in the time, the outlines

of the great cosmic principle which rises through the schisms, the movements, and the controversies of the period of the early history of the movement. It is almost startling, for instance, to find that nearly all the leading doctrines eventually condemned as heresies in the early history of the Christian movement may be reduced to a single meaning. They nearly all, we may distinguish, represent the attempt to bring back the point of view of the human mind to that state of equilibrium between the individual and the conditions of the existing world, which formed the characteristic principle underlying all human institutions, in that epoch of evolution of which the life of the ancient civilisations represented the highest phase. They nearly all represent, therefore, under one form or another, the attempt either to weaken again or to close entirely the profound antithesis opened in the mind as the controlling meaning of human action begins to pass out of the present, and to become related to ends no longer comprised within the limits of merely political consciousness.

In the great Gnostic controversy, for instance, of the second century, as in later controversies of a similar kind in which the spirit of the ancient philosophy under the forms of Neo-Platonism struggled with Christianity, we may distinguish this plainly. In that controversy we have clearly in view the continually expressed tendency to lose sight again of the essential nature of the ideas from which this antithesis sprung. And, in the result, we have equally clearly in view the fact of the religious consciousness finally and definitely refusing to confuse, or lessen, or

attenuate in any way either the nature or the dimensions of the antithesis, by insisting upon keeping clearly in view the central concept upon which it rested; namely, the insufficiency of the individual and the resulting necessity of what is described as his redemption from evil. In the Arian heresy we have in view a similar spectacle. We see the same profound instinct of the religious consciousness resolutely opposing a tendency which made in the same direction. We see it persistently resisting any weakening whatever of that main concept associated with the work of the Founder of Christianity upon which the antithesis rested; and again, in the result, we see it once more retaining undiminished the uncompromising definition of the cosmic nature of the concept by which alone that antithesis could be bridged, and the individual thereby brought into a sense of the closest personal responsibility to principles infinite and universal in their reach. In the Pelagian controversy, at last, we have the same spectacle repeated in even clearer definition. Through more than a century of conflict, from the Council of Ephesus in 431 to the Third Council of Valence in 530, we have the attempts again and again repeated to close the antithesis. But we have still the spectacle of the religious consciousness set unchangingly against the doctrine of the normalcy of the individual, and, therefore, against the conception of virtue as conformity to his own nature in the conditions of the world around him. Once more we have the emphatic assertion of the antithesis in its most inflexible terms, in the doctrine of the entire insufficiency of the individual in respect of his own powers to rise to the

standard required of him, or to fulfil, in virtue of his own nature, the conditions held to be necessary to his salvation.

The mind can have little insight into the nature of the central position involved in the drama of human evolution if it does not at this point perceive the cosmic reach of the principle into the action of which the life of our Western civilisation now begins to be slowly drawn. As we turn to follow the movement proceeding from the new system of belief in its first contact with the outward phenomena of the world, what it is of the first importance to notice is the change in the standpoint of the human mind which is in preparation: beneath the face of history; a change of which the most characteristic results are as yet immeasurably distant in the future; but a change, nevertheless, so fundamental that it is already evident that there must proceed from it a sequence of phenomena entirely different from any before witnessed in the development of society.

In this change it is always the character of the developing antithesis before mentioned which must be kept in view. Almost the first indication through which we catch sight of what is taking place beneath the surface of society, and of the transforming evolutionary significance which is latent in the concepts of the new movement, is that of the attitude of responsibility towards human life.

We have seen in a previous chapter how the life of the individual was regarded in the Greek and Roman worlds as having no relation to any ends or principles which transcended the meaning of the present, as expressed within the limits of the existing political con-

sciousness. The points at which the private life of the individual in the days of the Roman empire continued to come into direct and immediate contact with this principle, of which the right of the State to the life of the individual, and the power of the *paterfamilias* over the lives and persons of the family was the outward expression, were innumerable. The custom, however, in which the right of the parent to dispose of his children, even to death, survived in all its primitive strength down into the first centuries of the era in which we are living, was that of the exposure of infants.

From early time the abandonment, and even the actual putting to death, of children which were the result of legal marriage, but which were considered either surplus or useless, was a general custom of the poor and rich alike amongst the Greek and Roman peoples. This custom, which involved no moral reprobation, was entirely in keeping with the spirit of the ancient world. It was not only practised from the point of view of expediency to the parent, but it was defended on the grounds of its utility to the community, and Seneca's dictum on the subject in one of its aspects, "*non ira, sed ratio est, a sanis inutilia secernere,*"¹ doubtless faithfully represented the prevailing average view. Such of the exposed children as were rescued were generally brought up as slaves, and the collecting of female infants to be so reared and to be afterwards used for immoral purposes was often followed as an occupation of profit.

One of the earlier results of the changed attitude towards human life in the first centuries of the era in which we are living was the diminution, and in time

¹ *De Ira*, i. 15.

the cessation, of this practice of Infanticide. Now in a certain class of literature where the attempt is made to derive morality from sympathy and the association of ideas, the effectlessness of humanitarian ideals, arising from sympathy, in suppressing a practice such as infanticide is still often discussed. We can, however, never obtain any deep insight into one of the most distinctive and fundamental principles of our civilisation until we have grasped in all its bearings a fundamental fact connected with this subject. This is, that the humanitarian standards, even of the later time in which we are living, if it were possible to regard them as separated from the characteristic principle of our civilisation to which they are related and from which they proceed, would in themselves represent scarcely more than a kind of atavism, or a return to a former stage of evolution undoubtedly once represented amongst softer and more effeminate peoples long extinguished in the process of military selection which the race has undergone. It was, beyond doubt, largely owing to what may be described as a long process of discrimination against those softer feelings, that the stock from which the foremost peoples of the present day are descended won its way to the destiny which has devolved upon it. It was undoubtedly in virtue of this cause that the races which produced the military civilisations of Greece and Rome came to occupy the leading place which they filled in the world in the past. This is the fact, in short, in which we have the principal explanation of that phenomenon already noticed, namely, that the development of the gentler feelings in the ancient civilisations was, in itself, not only pro-

ductive of no new principle of life, but that it began with the period of decline, and progressed *pari passu* with other symptoms of decay.

One of the first duties of the scientific observer is, therefore, to recognise in all its bearings the pregnant fact that the deep sense of responsibility towards human life, of which we have here the first outward symptom and which is destined afterwards to play so great a part in the development of Western civilisation, is, at the point at which it is first encountered, presented to us as related to a principle entirely different, not only in degree, but in kind, to that which found expression in the humanitarianism of the ancient philosophy. The fact which stands out at the beginning in relation to the cause which suppressed the custom of infanticide is the nature of the antinomy which has been opened in the human mind. We are not in the presence merely of the result of humanitarian feeling. We are watching the first influence on the human mind of concepts by which human life has become related to principles which transcend all the limits of the present, and to responsibilities beside which feelings and interests related to the present become dwarfed and shrunken to insignificant proportions.

A concurrent first, and also outward symptom of the fundamental change in the standpoint of the world proceeding beneath the surface of society, of which the profounder effects were also as yet remote in the future, was that immediately indicated in the new relation of the human mind to the institution of slavery. It has been a main end of endeavour in a previous chapter to help the mind to clearly realise,

how that, despite all the later magnificence of the Greek and Roman States, these civilisations represented the governing principle — raised at last to its highest expression — of that epoch of social evolution in which all prevailing institutions were related to the same ultimate fact, namely, that no human interest was recognised as transcending the interest of the existing social order. There were two principal forms in which this fact expressed itself. Within the restricted and privileged circle of this social order the remainder of the world was considered, disguised though the fact may have been under the outward forms of a comparatively high civilisation, as little more than "a vast hunting ground and preserve in which men and their works should supply the objects and zest of the chase."¹ Within the exclusive circle this attitude of the members to the outside world was repeated and reproduced, in the relation of society itself to that fundamental institution which underlay the whole fabric of its life; namely, the institution of slavery — in which, in the searching words already used, the central figure was a being to whom society stood absolved from every moral obligation of humanity, and in whom all the deepest degradations were lawful, provided they were commanded by a master.

Now, as we watch the conflict of the new system of belief with the institution of slavery, it has to be noticed here also how partial and incomplete are the still surviving explanations of the change which begins to take place, that attribute the transition principally to the altered economic conditions of the

¹ *The Beginning of the Middle Ages*, R. W. Church, p. 26.

world, or to the growth of humanitarian feeling. The change in the economic conditions in Western Europe, as the slave system became merged in the collocate and serf system,¹ was of course far-reaching in its effects. But a brief reflection will enable the mind, when it has grasped the character of the evolutionary process as a whole, to see that the economic change, in itself, involved no new principle that could have carried the world a step beyond the ruling conditions of the past under which slavery had been a universal institution. The economic conditions were themselves only secondary causes related, in the last resort, to the deeper governing principles of society. Similarly, it was not the influence simply of humanitarian feeling, nor of any vague conception of the rights of the individual under some imaginary law of nature such as we find traces of in the Stoic philosophy, that furnishes the prime cause that effected the transformation in the attitude of the general mind which soon began to take place, and which was in time to abolish the institution of slavery throughout Western Europe. When we catch sight of the nature of the underlying principles to which the change is related, we perceive that the movement against slavery is but another of the early symptoms of the altered standpoint of the human mind, as the controlling consciousness in the evolutionary process rises to a sense of direct responsibility to principles transcending the meaning of all interests comprised within the limits of political society.²

¹ Cf. *History of the Later Roman Empire*, by J. B. Bury, vol. i. iv. iii.

² It makes no difference that the influence behind the transition operated, as it has continued to operate in the world, to a large extent

From an early period it may, accordingly, be noticed how incompatible with the spirit of the new movement the institution of slavery became. We continually encounter in the early literature of the movement the emphatic assertion that there were neither bond nor free from the standpoint of the new fellowship. The feeling on the subject is to be distinguished in innumerable utterances and acts of the early Church Councils against slavery. The standpoint therein, beneath the circumlocution of ecclesiastical expression, is ever consistent and unmistakable. We are always in the presence of the same antithesis, in which the controlling centre of human action is seen to have become related to ends no longer included within the horizon of merely political consciousness; an antithesis in which the sense of human responsibility now involves a principle, the meaning of which is no longer contained within the ideal of the State. It is *pro remedio animae meae*, or *pro peccatis minuendis*, and not in relation to any end for which the State exists, that we continually find the testator of the Middle Ages manumitting his slaves on death. It is not because of any relation of men to any interest in the existing social order, but because *Redemptor noster totius conditor naturae humanam carnem voluerit assumere*, that we find Pope Gregory the Great in the sixth century urging the restoration of slaves to liberty.

In the inner life of the movement which begins to set in throughout Europe against slavery we are con-

indirectly ; and that it reached the minds of millions of men who were ignorant of its origin, only through its effect on the standards of public opinion.

tinually in sight of the same principle. Stripped of all the phraseology with which a religious movement has surrounded them, and reduced to the terms of a clear scientific principle, there can be no doubt as to the essential relation of the concepts influencing men's minds to that shifting of the controlling centre in the evolutionary process which we have endeavoured to define as characteristic of the development proceeding in our civilisation. They are all reduciòle, we see, to the terms of the same fact. We are in the presence of a principle operating in the human mind involving a sense of relationship to ends no longer comprised within the limits of the State, and involving a sense of responsibility to a cause which transcends all the bounds of political consciousness.

These are all, it must be once more emphasised, but the first outward expressions of the alteration in the standpoint of the human mind which was in progress deep down beneath the surface of society, and of which the profounder evolutionary results were still incalculably remote in the future. At the point at which the new movement came into relations with the outward forms of the Roman empire, it is the same principle which furnishes the clue to the phenomena we are regarding. In its light we distinguish clearly the real nature of that vast, half-formed, subconscious instinct of the populations of the ancient world against the new belief in its earlier stages. Beneath all the confusing and conflicting phenomena of distrust and hostility resulting from the contact of the movement with the institutions of the Roman world, what we have in sight is, in reality, nothing less than the ultimate fact of the pagan world instinc-

tively standing at bay before a cause, the operation of which was absolutely incompatible with the life-principle of every institution which was characteristic of it. The instinct which, in the Decian persecution of 249, and in the Diocletian persecution of 303, produced deliberate attempts, supported by the whole machinery of Roman government, to extirpate the new system of belief from the world,¹ rightly recognised the essential nature of the movement it confronted. That world, which could behold with tolerance a thousand forms of religion existing under Roman rule,² but in all of which it nevertheless saw the highest human interests and the highest human ideals still conceived as comprised within the limits of the State, dimly but rightly recognised that a religion by which there was opened in the human mind an over-ruling sense of responsibility to principles which transcended all the interests of the State, and all the ends for which the State existed, carried men entirely out of that epoch in which they had hitherto lived. It struck at the very roots of the system of social life around them. It was, therefore, we see, on no mere cause of disrespect to the gods, or of impiety to the emperor, that the accusations against the adherents of the new movement in the last resort rested. Profoundly, but clearly, the general mind must have felt the difference between the spirit of that movement and those developments of the ancient philosophy which, to superficial observation, even still appear to run in the same direction. "The philosophers," said Tertullian, "destroy your

¹ Lecky's *European Morals*, vol. i. pp. 449-462.

² Cf. Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. i. chap. xvi.

gods openly, and write against your superstitions; but with your approbation. Nay, many of them not only snarl, but bark aloud against the emperors; and you not only bear it very contentedly, but give them statues and pensions in return." It is only us, he adds, you throw to the beasts for so doing.¹

As the antithesis continues to develop in the human mind, we follow it under a multitude of forms. Crude, coarse and even repellent, as may be some of these, we may still distinguish beneath the surface that they are all reducible to terms of the same principle.

How widely removed are the terms involved in the antinomy, how world-embracing is the character of the struggle inherent in its very nature, the evolutionist, however, only begins to realise to the full when he catches sight of the first working in history of that principle to which prominence was given in a previous chapter, and to which the ultimate meaning of every phase of Western history down into the time in which we are living, continues to be closely related:—namely, that from necessity, inherent in the conditions under which Natural Selection can act, it is only the peoples amongst whom the qualities contributing to efficiency in the present have reached the highest development, that can hold the stage of the world during the period in which it becomes the destiny of the present to pass under the control of the future.

In the middle of the seventh century the Western world was almost suddenly confronted with the rise and spread of Mohammedanism. Looking at this

¹ *Apology*, xlvi.

system of belief at the present day in the light of the principle of development we have been discussing throughout, there can be no doubt as to its relation to a lower stage of the evolutionary process than that which the potentiality of the movement in progress in Western history at the time of its rise represented. It is not simply in respect of what may be termed the lower concepts of Mohammedanism that this assertion has to be made. It has to be noted that even in the highest concepts of this form of belief there is to be distinguished only the same restricted evolutionary significance which we saw, on analysis, was to be attached to the characteristic heresies of the early period of Christianity. Nevertheless, in a short period Mohammedanism swept over the vast regions associated with the origin of Christianity, practically accomplishing the complete annihilation of the latter amongst the softer peoples amongst whom it had been born into the world. Throughout Syria, into Egypt, westward throughout Northern Africa, and then northward into Spain and France, the movement was carried by the arms of its adherents in little more than a century; the tide of conquest being only stayed at last, and finally, in the west, on the banks of the Loire, by Charles Martel in the seven-day battle of Tours in 732.

In the conditions of our modern civilisation, where the principles regulating a rule of force are often greatly misunderstood, the extreme rapidity and effectiveness with which, in certain circumstances, the future may be extinguished in the womb of the present is scarcely ever realised. There are certain simple and effective acts of war which a

nation, a people, or even a civilisation cannot survive. One of these was that practised by the Mohammedan conquerors; namely, the confiscation of women. It was, as a modern writer points out,¹ the institution of polygamy, based on the confiscation of the women in the vanquished countries, that permanently secured the Mohammedan rule in the countries in which it became established. For the children of the resulting unions immediately gloried in their descent from their conquering fathers, so that in North Africa, "in little more than a single generation, the khalif was informed by his officers that the tribute must cease; for all the children born in that region were Mohammedans, and all spoke Arabic."² In scarcely more than a century, in short, Christianity was almost completely extinguished in southern and eastern countries; and of the five Christian capitals of the world, Jerusalem, Carthage, Alexandria, Constantinople, and Rome, three — Jerusalem, Carthage, and Alexandria, all closely associated with its early history and development — were lost; the downfall of the fourth, Constantinople, the capital of the Eastern Roman empire, being only deferred.

With these events the conditions of the antinomy in Western history may be said to be complete. It is to the peoples alone who represent in themselves, and in the highest development, the two opposing terms in that antinomy, to whom the future is henceforward to belong. It is amongst the peoples who represent the highest expression of force in the world, that there are to arise the conditions in which

¹ *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*, by J. W. Draper, chap. iii.

² *Ibid.*

force itself, the governing principle of all the past development of the race, is to pass out under the control of a higher principle of human efficiency.¹ It is not upon the softer Eastern races, who may be said to have represented but one term of the antithesis,² that the work in the new era has devolved. It is to the barbarian out of the twilight of the stern north; to the man able to do all, able to dare all; to the man able, as has been finely said, to live his life as a man amongst men, while yet hearing ever hidden within his breast the little scroll of the higher ideal,³ that the future of the world has passed.

It is in the light of the bearing of these facts on a wider development to come that we have to view the sombrous significance of what may be called the last act of the conversion of the military races of Northern Europe to the Christian religion. In that act we see Charlemagne, the barbarian chief of these races, becoming, in effect, in the year 800, protector of the Bishop of Rome. And in return we see the head of the new religion in Western Europe placing what men still held to be the crown of the Cæsars—the outward symbol of that empire in which the military epoch of human evolution culminated—upon the

¹ The essence of this position, as it has been defined in a previous chapter, consists in the fact that it is only the peoples amongst whom the qualities contributing to efficiency in the present have reached their highest development, that can hold the stage of the world during that epoch of human evolution in which it becomes the destiny of the present to pass under the control of the future.

² Cf. "Race and Religion in India," by A. M. Fairbairn, *Contemporary Review*, No. 404.

³ Lord Rosebery, address at Winchester, *King Alfred Millenary Commemoration*.

head of the leader and representative of the peoples upon whom the destinies of a new world¹ had devolved.² Many Continental historians, and in England the late Professor Freeman, and, in particular, Mr. Bryce, have done much to enable us to realise the significance in history of this act. But to the mind of the evolutionist it must possess even a deeper meaning than any which the historian, occupied with the relations of the shadowy Holy Roman Empire—an ideal beyond which the evolutionist sees the world to have moved even at the moment of its inception—has been able to give it.

It is upon the antinomy, slowly developing beneath the surface of history, which the act suggests rather than represents, that the scientific imagination continues to be concentrated. There is no more profoundly dramatic spectacle in history than that of the Teutonic peoples of the ninth century being slowly involved in the sweep of the movement which has now begun to fill the Western world; of Charlemagne endeavouring through the capitularies³ to govern, in the terms of St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*,⁴ a world still removed but a little from the background of universal paganism; of an emperor at-

¹ It was a world, nevertheless, in which the history of Western civilisation was to become outwardly continuous, and in which no gain nor product of the civilisations of Greece or of Rome was to be eventually lost to us; even though they were to be taken up, for the most part, as disintegrated organic products are taken up by a new system of life subject to other laws of vitality.

² Cf. *The Holy Roman Empire*, by James Bryce, chap. iv.

³ Cf. Capitulary of Charlemagne, issued in 802, *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, by E. F. Henderson, ii. ii.

⁴ St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* was the favourite reading of Charlemagne.

tempting to regulate through the Missi Dominici vast populations to whom the new movement is scarcely more than a name, begging them "for their souls' sake" to pay the just penalties of their parricides, their fratricides, and their murders," by which many Christian people perish."¹ We see the Pope who has crowned him living in a world in which the forms, the institutions, the very ideals and the thoughts, are all as yet cast in a mould scarcely more than pagan. Yet we see each standing not simply on the threshold of another order of civilisation, but in the vestibule of a new epoch of human evolution, dreaming, pope and emperor alike, each he knows not what—dreaming of the accomplishment in a lifetime, in a thousand years, in a thousand decades, of a transformation immeasurably greater in reach than that which has already occupied untold aeons of human development.

In this world, still pagan in all its outward forms, still to remain scarcely more than pagan in forms, and even in spirit, for ages to come, there have been unloosed forces destined never again to be bound; forces destined to make impossible all the ideals of the State, and of government, and of society, under which men had hitherto lived. The monks of Cluny have already begun to see visions of a kingdom greater than the world, and withal a kingdom of the world.² They are dreams greater than the

¹ Capitulary of Charlemagne, E. F. Henderson's *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*.

² Cf. Letter of Gregory VII. to Bishop Hermann of Metz, March 15th, 1081, Henderson's *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, iv. Gregory VII. was one of the three popes who in the eleventh and twelfth centuries went forth from Cluny.

poor dreamers who have dreamed them; nursed in the spirit of a pagan world, seeing only through its images, and thinking only through its thoughts. But they are dreams of which no one who has caught the meaning of the controlling principle of the evolutionary drama unfolding itself in human society, will be likely in future to miss the significance. They are dreams in which we feel the very pulses of the cosmos; they are visions through which there runs the inner spirit of that antithesis which can never again be closed within any limits of the State or of the social consciousness.

Far down in the under strata of society we already begin to catch the meaning of that spirit which springs from the antithesis which has been opened within the State; that spirit which is destined to dissolve every principle upon which the State has hitherto rested; that spirit of responsibility to principles transcending the interests of the family, of blood-relationship, of party, and of the State itself; which is to enfranchise not simply the slave and the serf, but the sullen, long-bound, silent peoples; which is to question not simply the right of kings, but of majorities; nay, the right of force itself, that last basis upon which every ideal that men had hitherto known in the world had ultimately rested.

It is a world to all appearance sunk many degrees below the level of the civilisations which it succeeded, a world scarcely to be distinguished in its outward features from primitive barbarism, a state of social order in which feudalism — that protest of barbarism against itself, to use the expressive simile of Hegel — is still to reach its fullest development. But it is a

new world ; a world like the wrack of a nebula in space, its chaos and disorder invisibly caught in the sweep of an integrating principle infinite in reach. Through unmeasured epochs of time there has come down to us the sound of that struggle, still with us, in which the individual and all his powers and interests are being broken to the ends of a social efficiency visibly and consciously embodied in the State. But now into the vortex of a vaster struggle, a struggle in which the interests of society itself are destined to be broken to the ends of an efficiency beyond the furthest limits of its political consciousness, we are about to witness being slowly drawn, all the phenomena of Western thought and of Western action ; all the content of politics, of philosophy, and of religion in our Western world.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREAT ANTI-NOMY IN WESTERN HISTORY: FIRST STAGE

It is now possible for the intellect in some measure to grasp the outlines of the conflict in which the entire life and activities of our Western civilisation have begun to be involved. That principle of the evolutionary process which has been designated the law of Projected Efficiency — under the operation of which, in human society, the present is destined to be in the end controlled, not by its own interests, but by interests in the future beyond the limits of its political consciousness — has reached at last in history the stage upon which its more characteristic results begin to be visible. In the development of the great anti-nomy now opened in Western history, in which we have the growing definition through the stress of the centuries, of the present becoming envisaged with the principles governing a future to which it must be subordinated, we have beyond doubt the most important and imposing spectacle with which science can be concerned. All the work which has been done in other fields, in helping us to understand the governing principles of the evolutionary process in general, comes now but to subserve the main end of enabling the intellect to grasp the character of the development which here begins to unfold itself in society beneath our eyes.

We have seen how that throughout the first epoch of social evolution all the forms of society and of the State, and of every institution upon which the State and society rested, had borne upon them the impress of a single fact, namely, the ascendancy of the present. In such conditions, therefore, every human institution may be said to have constituted a kind of closed imperium, in which the ascendant interests and the ruling passions were those through which the present was able to express itself in its highest potentiality. What we have now to witness is the spectacle of all these closed imperiums, in which the present hitherto ruled omnipotent in thought and action, being slowly broken up by a cause acting on the foundations upon which they rested; while the human energies hitherto imprisoned within them are released into an entirely new order of progress. In the result we have to witness the gradual development in Western history of such conditions of social efficiency as were not only unimagined in the world in the past, but which were impossible under any organisation of society which had hitherto prevailed.

As the character of the new process becomes visible it may be seen to consist essentially in the development throughout the whole social organisation of the conditions of a free conflict of forces; this conflict possessing two well-marked and characteristic features. It is, in the first place, as has been said, a free conflict of forces such as in reach, in intensity, and in efficiency has never before prevailed in human society. But it is, in the second place, a free conflict, the efficiency and even the very existence of which is dependent, nevertheless, on a single condition, namely,

that the controlling meaning to which human consciousness has become related is no longer in the present time. The distinctive life-principle of the conflict, under all its changing features, is, in short, that, as the controlling principles of human consciousness and of human responsibility are no longer in the present, it has, therefore, become impossible to shut up again the human will in any system of thought, of action, of government, or even of religion, through which the tyranny of the forces tending to express themselves in the present could once more become absolute and omnipotent.

It is only as the inter-relation of these two features of the modern phase of the evolutionary process becomes visible to the mind that the tendencies of the developing type of life represented in our Western civilisation can be fully grasped. All Western history, down to the time in which we are living, is but the record of the successive phases of the slowly widening struggle in which the foundations of the closed empires through which the ascendant present had hitherto expressed itself are being broken up and dissolved. As a step towards understanding the nature of the process in its later and more important aspects, it is necessary now to concentrate attention for a short space on that first and stupendous phase of it which precedes the rise of the modern world. It is a phase in which we have the history of the struggle to which the essential meaning of the whole period of the Middle Ages is related; a struggle in the development of which the history of every Western country for nearly 500 years becomes scarcely more than a subordinate and contributing chapter.

Now, as soon as the mind, after prolonged study of the development which sets towards the modern world from the Middle Ages, is able to withdraw itself to a position of detachment, from which alone it is possible to get the proper focus to view the outlines of the anti-nomy in Western history with which we are about to be concerned, there is presented to it a phenomenon the first view of which is likely to take it completely by surprise.

Students of the writings of the late Sir Henry Maine will remember, that almost from the earliest of the works of this jurist down to his latest criticisms of politics, there runs the influence of a conviction often clearly and strongly expressed by him in words; namely, that the modern philosophy of society had not as yet given us the explanation of the difference between the recently developed and rapidly progressing societies of our Western world and that almost stationary social state which he perceived to have been normal to the race throughout the greatest part of its past.¹ The cause of this difference Maine held to be, "one of the great secrets which inquiry has yet to penetrate."²

In an early chapter of the treatise on *Ancient Law*, in which this subject is first discussed, Maine called attention to the fact that in the history of all the families of mankind there has occurred "a stage at which a rule of law is not yet discriminated from a rule of religion";³ the characteristic of this stage being, as he pointed out, that "the members of such a society consider that the transgression of a religious

¹ Cf. *Ancient Law*, pp. 22-24, and *Popular Government*, p. 170.

² *Ancient Law*, p. 23.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 22-24.

ordinance should be punished by civil penalties, and that the violation of a civil duty exposes the delinquent to divine correction.¹ It was this stage, as we said in a previous chapter, which lasted down into the midst of the civilisations of the ancient world. It was only the Romans, as Bluntschli points out, who first began to distinguish law from morality;² and so far as the distinction went, even amongst them, it was practically a product of the later empire. The ascendancy of the ruling principle of the stage to which Maine refers may be seen throughout Roman history in the conception of the priesthood as a political office, in the ascription to the emperor down to a late period of divine attributes, and in the conceptions of the ceremonies and functions of the Roman State as religious in character.

Now in order to understand the character of the phenomenon we are about to consider, we must be able to realise that, if we have been right in the position taken up in the previous chapters, this prolonged stage of human evolution to which Maine here refers, — the period, that is to say, in which a rule of religion and a rule of law are identical — is nothing else than that stage of development we have discussed at length in a previous chapter; namely, that in which the controlling centre of the social process being, as yet, in the present time, all the ends to which the religious consciousness relates are either directly or indirectly connected with the interests of the existing individual as a member of the social order present around him. It is the stage in which the interests with which reli-

¹ *Ancient Law*, pp. 22-24.

² *The Theory of the State*, by J. K. Bluntschli, I. iii.

gion is concerned, and the interests with which politics are concerned, are as yet, to all intents and purposes, coincident and coextensive.

The great secret, in short, on the brink of which Maine was standing, and towards the elucidation of which he saw the course of modern inquiry was tending, was, we begin to see now — if we may anticipate a conclusion the significance of which we shall understand more clearly in a later chapter — that it has been the projection of the controlling principles of human consciousness beyond the present, which is breaking up all the imperiums through which the omnipotent present would otherwise shut down upon us; and which has given us, in the result, the era of that free conflict of forces in which our modern progressive societies have taken their rise.

As soon as we thus hold in hand the clue to the evolutionary drama upon which the curtain continues to rise in Western history, we are in a position to understand something of the nature of the phenomena upon which our attention is now to be concentrated. The meaning of the conflict which underlies the developmental process in progress in the world around us, is that it is a conflict in which the present has become envisaged with the future in a struggle in which it is destined to be eventually subordinated to the future. But the remarkable result we have now to consider is, that the battle-ground, upon which the opening phase of this gigantic struggle between the present and the future is to be fought out in our civilisation, lies, of necessity, in the first place, in the centre of that system of belief in which the potentiality of this process of subordination appears to be inherent.

The first political idea which we see developing in the minds of men in connection with this system of belief, is, in short, one in which it is considered that a rule of religion and a rule of law should again become, as in the ancient world, coincident and coextensive.

Now in the last chapter we saw how consistently, and, after long struggle, the principles involved in the new system of belief overcame at last all the attempts made, in what are called the heresies of the first centuries of our era, to bring the human mind back to the self-centred standpoint of the ancient philosophy; and how profound was that instinct which in the early councils of the new religion resisted the efforts that, through the concepts of Neo-Platonism, would have closed again the very antithesis opened in the human mind wherein lay all the characteristic potentiality of the future. What we have now to watch is this same conflict assuming another form, and being raised to another plane. The objective which becomes visible in the world in the new struggle is that of a condition of society in which a rule of religion shall again be made coincident and coextensive with a rule of law, and in which there may, therefore, be observed, after a time, the same tendency to obscure that profound antithesis opened in the human mind wherein lay all the distinctive potentiality in the future of the new form of belief.

In the resulting struggle around this ideal, almost the entire intellectual and political activities of our Western world become for the time being involved. The influence of the conflict has lasted down even to the present day, and is still with us under many

forms. To perceive the bearing of the conflict on the process of our social evolution is the first step towards understanding the principles of modern history. Let us see now if we can place the nature of the issue involved clearly before us.

In one of his essays Sir Frederick Pollock brings clearly into view a fundamental fact of social development, the significance of which is apparent on reflection; but the perception of which is calculated to come upon the mind, in the first instance, with something of the nature of a shock. It is that in human history theological persecution, in the strict sense, is of entirely recent origin.¹ Or to put the statement in the more emphatic words used by Mr. Ritchie in a chapter of his *Natural Rights*, persecution — viewing it as an historical fact, and apart from any discussion as to whether it is involved or not in the true interpretations of the tenets of the religion now associated with our civilisation — “persecution in the sense of repression for the purposes of maintaining true doctrine is the outcome of Christianity.”²

However startling this statement may appear at first to the ordinary mind, there can be no doubt that, as the expression of a fact of history, it is to all intents and purposes strictly true. The contradiction, indeed, which immediately suggests itself to the mind as being capable of being supplied by that vast body of evidence seemingly pointing in another direction; which is furnished in that stage of development when the deities worshipped are regarded as the special patrons of the community — evidence of

¹ Cf. *Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics*, pp. 145-175.

² *Natural Rights*, by D. S. Ritchie, c. viii.

which the persecutions of Christianity itself under the Roman empire, or of the punishment of religious innovators like Socrates in the Greek civilisation, may be taken as examples—vanishes immediately on inquiry. For what we see is that nearly all such persecutions, preceding the rise of the Christian religion, prove on examination to have been really related to what are usually known as temporal or secular ends. There was absolutely no concern with what becomes afterwards known in controversy as the spiritual interest of the offender himself. The gravamen of the charges against the acts or opinions of the accused person, lay strictly in the fact that such acts or opinions were held to be calculated to bring temporal evil or injury to the existing social organisation or its members.¹

It may be distinguished that this was the point of view even where the acts or opinions were condemned because they were held to be displeasing to the deity. For it was the tangible results of the withdrawal of the favour of the tutelary deity or

¹ For instance, in Plato's dialogue *Euthyphron*—in which Socrates is represented, after his indictment by Melitus for impiety in introducing new gods and corrupting the youth of Athens, as meeting Euthyphron before the trial takes place, and discussing with him the meaning involved in a charge of impiety—the general standpoint of the time in the charge against Socrates is well brought out. Socrates' close questioning at last drives Euthyphron, who is represented as learned in the subject, to the statement: "This, however, I tell you simply, that if any one knows how to speak and to do things grateful to the gods, by praying and sacrificing, these things are holy; and such things preserve both private homes and the general weal of cities; but the contraries to things acceptable to them are impious, which also subvert and ruin all things." This was undoubtedly the characteristic position of the time involved in the charge against Socrates.

deities, on whose good-will the existing temporal welfare was held to depend that was always feared. The principle underlying all such acts of persecution may indeed, after what has gone before, be readily perceived. They are all, we see, directly related to the fact already discussed at length, namely, that the controlling centre of the evolutionary process is still in the present. The conception which we have insisted on as characteristic of the second of the two great stages of human evolution — that conception in which the standpoint is that the interests included in what is called spiritual welfare transcend in importance those merely temporal in nature — was altogether absent.

Now directly we conceive the human mind to have reached the standpoint at which the standard is set up that those interests, which become known at a later stage under the head of spiritual welfare, are actually more important than temporal interests, we are confronted with a position of altogether peculiar interest. To all appearance we have reached a kind of impass in human evolution. As the full nature of the position discloses itself on reflection, its essential features only seem to stand out with more unpromising clearness. We seem, in the evolution of life, to have travelled to the brink of a problem to which there is no visible solution — a problem which must, beyond doubt, give rise to a class of phenomena entirely new and quite special to itself.

The outlines of the situation are capable of being readily grasped by the mind. They may be presented in this wise. The controlling centre of human consciousness has hitherto been, as we have

seen, in the present time. But, as has been throughout insisted, by a necessity from which there is no escape, and which is inherent in the very nature of the evolutionary process itself, this controlling centre is sooner or later destined to be shifted into the future. Yet now, as the concepts accompanying this transfer begin to take shape in the human mind; as we actually see the human consciousness clearly defining to itself in the full light of history the concept that the interests which it has come to include under the head of "spiritual," are of more importance than its temporal welfare; there looms out before us an issue more far-reaching and more complex than has ever before been encountered.

For, if the human mind is now really to rise to the position of holding with absolute conviction that the interests which it defines to itself as spiritual are more important than its temporal welfare, what must happen? To all appearance there is involved in the very nature of the concept through which such a subordination can alone be effected, a principle which must again imprison all human activities in a tyranny even greater than any from which they have just emerged. In the past, as we have seen, the interests of the future were entirely at the mercy of the tyrannies through which the omnipotent present expressed itself. But now, although the operation of Natural Selection tends to be, as it were, projected into the future, the battle-ground, it must be remembered, remains, and must forever remain, in the present time. No tyranny, therefore, within which the present could cramp the free play of human energies, could ever be so overwhelming as that which appears

to present itself as lying latent and involved in the concept that what is defined as spiritual welfare is of more importance than temporal interests.

Nay more, we even see that the more firmly the conviction is held by the human mind, that what is called temporal welfare is inferior to what is called spiritual welfare, the more overwhelming, to all appearance, must the new tyranny become. In the first era of evolution there was at least a rivalry of forms through which the present expressed itself. But now, if it is to be actually believed that temporal welfare is no longer to be compared in importance to what are called spiritual interests; then it would appear that all the tyrannies of the past must merge themselves in one. In art, in literature, in morals, in the State, in religion itself, when we stand in the presence of the concept that the present is no longer of the first importance, there can, apparently, never be in the present that free conflict of forces out of which the larger future can alone be evolved. A new tyranny, different from any in the past, must apparently absorb all other tyrannies, and must in the end become greater than them all.

Here we have emerged into the presence of the central problem which begins to underlie the unfolding of the human mind in our civilisation. No other of equal interest has hitherto presented itself. To its definition nearly all the leading events of the Middle Ages contribute their meaning. Along what lines will the solution begin to develop itself? Will that free play of forces within the present, which alone can emancipate the future, out of which the larger future can alone be born, and towards which

the whole process of human development appears to have moved, remain, after all, unachieved? Are the activities of the human will really destined to be thus imprisoned again in a new tyranny? Is the human mind in the end—beaten, baffled, disillusioned—destined to retrace its steps, and to abandon the conviction that what it has come to call its spiritual interests are indeed more important than its temporal interests? Is it really destined to return again to that self-centred standpoint in the present beyond which the world appeared to have moved? Or is our Western world, beneath it all, to be carried forward by forces larger than it wots of to an entirely new synthesis of knowledge, hidden as yet from view below the horizon of thought?

As the evolutionist looks the problem here defined in the face, it is impossible to escape a sense of its containing magnitude. Our whole Western world has moved, he sees, into the shadow of a crisis which must gradually engage all its interests, which must pass through many phases, and which can only develop slowly as the entire range of the world's activities are drawn into its influence. That the human mind should indeed go backward, and, reversing the tendency of the evolutionary process, should return again to the standpoint of the epoch out of which it has moved, would seem hardly possible. For when the imagination, with such an alternative before it, travels again over the outlines of the evolutionary process, it is only to note how inherent therein appears to be the principle of the ultimate shifting of the controlling centre of human consciousness out of the present time. The conviction at length only holds

the intellect with increased strength that in this matter the human mind cannot go backward again even if it would. Yet wherein lies the solution? How is the race to rise to a sense of direct, personal, and compelling responsibility to a principle cosmic in its reach — to a principle which must of necessity transcend every power and purpose included within the limits of political consciousness — and yet be so occupied with its present as to set free therein the play of its highest powers? How are we to witness the controlling principles of human consciousness projected out of the present; and yet see opened within the present that untrammelled play of all human powers and activities which alone can emancipate the future, that unrestricted rivalry of all human energies such as has never been in the world before, and towards which the whole process of evolution seems to have moved?

This is the problem to which our Western civilisation has to address itself. It is the problem in the solution of which there becomes visible in time a difference destined at length to divide by a clear line of demarcation, never again to be crossed, the meaning underlying the sum of all Western things from the ultimate significance underlying all other forms and phases whatever through which human activities have come to express themselves. It is the problem which, in the method of its attempted solution, begins in time, even in our Western world, to differentiate, as by an invisible line projected into the future, between the living and the dead, between the peoples whose work no longer belongs to the future, and those through whose activities and ideals it becomes the

destiny of the race to see the main current of the world's history descend towards the ages to come.

As we turn now and watch the unfolding of this development in Western history, we may observe how predestined, as it were, by inherent necessity are the lines upon which it begins to move. To every student who has endeavoured to thoroughly master any section of European history comprised in the Middle Ages there must come, at some stage of his work, the same experience. As soon as he has got deeply into his subject he begins to be possessed, to an ever-increasing degree, with a sense of the limitations under which he must labour — however well equipped he may be in every other respect — if he endeavours to understand the section before him apart from the larger organic process which is proceeding beneath the face of Western history. It matters not in what department of political or of social development, or even in the history of what country, the study is pursued. When progress has been made up to a certain point, the intellect always becomes conscious of the same want. It reaches out towards the comprehension of those larger principles which are evidently controlling the life-process as a whole which is at work beneath the outward face of our civilisation.

If we take up, for instance, in the present day, in England that series of State charters, of economic monographs, and of original public and other documents from which the historian of the social or of the constitutional development of England during the Middle Ages has endeavoured to work, we feel at once, when we have got to the heart of the sub-

ject, that in all these we are but in touch with the outward phenomena of a system of life of which the real meaning lies elsewhere. The particulars, for instance, of the development in England under exceptional conditions of the ideas and customs of certain German tribes; of the local modifications of the feudal system; of the operation of conflicting racial characteristics and institutions; of the resulting interaction in circumstances special and local in England of the various claims and powers of the nobles, the people, and the king;—are all of great interest and importance. Nevertheless, what we feel is that the real meaning of the forces which are making the history of our civilisation, and, therefore, the real meaning of the forces which are afterwards to express themselves in the problems for which the history of England is to stand in the future, is not, in the last resort, comprised in these things. There is, it may be perceived, no characteristic cause or principle in any one of them, or in all of them together, which could serve in itself to differentiate, in any important particular, the world in the future from the world as it has always been in the past.¹ It is only as they are to contribute to the development of a higher system of life that they are later to become instinct with meaning and significance.

It is therefore towards the principles of a larger order of life than these things by themselves imply, a system of life the pulsations of which may already be distinguished even beneath the clauses of Magna Charta, that the intellect goes out. It is the meaning of that central problem in the unfolding of the

¹ Cf. *The Holy Roman Empire*, by James Bryce, p. 242.

human mind now beginning to define itself in Western history that holds the attention — that problem of which we catch sight in the history of England in the ordinance of William I. dividing the secular from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction;¹ in the struggle between the king of England and Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury; in the causes which produced the Constitutions of Clarendon; in the drama being enacted as a king of England receives his kingdom as a fief from the see of Rome; in the long conflict over investiture; in the statute of mortmain;² and in the Bull of Clericis Laicos.³ It is the unfolding of the problem in human development represented in the process of life from which these events begin to proceed that is about to control the course of history in England, as in Western Europe during the centuries which are to come.

When we turn to follow this system of life to its centre on the continent of Europe in the Middle Ages, it may be observed that the character of the problem underlying the development of the Western world has already progressed towards definition. The new system of belief that we saw in the last chapter undermining the foundations upon which the ancient State had rested, and which, through its action in projecting the controlling principles of human consciousness out of the present, we saw apparently destined to dissolve all those tyrannies through which the present had hitherto expressed

¹ Stubbs' *Select Charters*, p. 85, and Henderson's *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, p. 9.

² *Select Charters*, vii. v.; *Select Documents*, i. viii.

³ *Select Documents*, iv. vi.

itself, has gradually moved with the centuries towards an ideal which has begun to hold the imagination of the world.

There is no more striking spectacle in history, when we are able to appreciate its meaning, than that presented by the human mind during the first thirteen centuries of our era, when — in the midst of the races in whom a world-process of military selection has culminated, and with all the instincts, the passions, and the ideals of an epoch of military stress of unimagined length still close behind it — we see it slowly passing under the influence of the greatest evolutionary principle to which life has yet been subjected; when, with as yet no clear idea of the nature of the vortex into which its activities are being drawn, we see it struggling with the phenomena which successively arise as this evolutionary principle gradually impinges on the whole life of these military races in our Western world through the medium of a single idea — the concept that the welfare which has now come to be described as spiritual is more important than its temporal interests. To understand the spectacle presented by our civilisation during this period we must, as far as possible, detach our standpoint from all the conditions of time and place. Centuries, countries, peoples, races, nationalities, throughout this period in Europe, all present the same face to us. It is the same problem with which they are all struggling. It is towards the same culminating crisis of the first phase of the problem with which the human mind has now become confronted that all the tendencies of European history are hastening.

To bring clearly before the mind the full outlines of the problem involved in the conflict between the temporal and spiritual power in the Middle Ages, as the prolonged struggle between the Emperor and the Pope — which may be taken as representative of all minor and local phases of the conflict — becomes the life-centre of Western history in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, it is necessary to carry the mind back over the conditions in which the problem begins to define itself, and through which it gradually rises towards its climax.

As we first catch sight, in the writings of the early Fathers of the new religion, of the influence of the concept that the welfare that had now come to be described as spiritual was of more importance than temporal interests, the effect on the mind of the individual is perceived to have been direct and unmistakable. There was inculcated through the influence of the new concept a contempt for wealth and power, and all that the world had to offer. The renunciation of the satisfaction of all the desires and passions, for which men had hitherto lived, was the ideal which was held before the mind; and the subjection of the body, the stamping on its passions, appetites, and very wants, grew accordingly into the marvellous vigours of hermits and anchorites, into the sufferings of almost inconceivably enduring pillar-saints and at last, in the early centuries of our era, into the aims and ideals of a world-embracing asceticism.

All this presented, however, but the subjective effect on the individual mind of the concept at the outset. It is as the spirit, which lies behind these

purely subjective phenomena, moves towards its objective realisation in the outward organisation of the world that there becomes visible the ideal which was latent therein, and towards the realisation of which all the events of Western history now begin to slowly gravitate.

The first question as regards the outward world to suggest itself under the influence of the new concept must have sprung almost spontaneously to the mind. If now, indeed, spiritual welfare is of more importance than temporal interests, what then, it must have been asked, is to be the meaning of this world with which men are occupied? what is to be the character of the ends to which men are collectively to direct it by their activities therein? When such a question was asked in the days when the new belief was as yet struggling for its life, for a foothold, for bare tolerance in the world, men were satisfied to turn inward rather than outward for an answer. But as the new belief gradually extended its sway over the State; as it gratefully accepted, at first the countenance, and then the support of the civil power; as it at last, through the help of the latter, gradually extended its conquest, not simply over the Roman world, but over the minds of the incoming peoples of Western, of Northern, and of Eastern Europe;—a new answer began to silently shape itself behind the events of history.

For now, men must have argued, if the State was indeed no longer pagan, but converted to the doctrines and ideals of the new belief, then surely it must become the highest object of the State to have its powers and interests directed to fulfil the greater

ends to which men had come to hold allegiance. It must be the desire, nay, it must be the highest and imperative duty of the State to fulfil the office of guardian, of regulator, of champion of the spiritual interests which were now placed above the end of temporal welfare.

Slowly, therefore, as the world was caught in the toil of forces inherent in the new concept, we see it being carried irresistibly forward in a direction already determined by inherent necessity.

At an early period after the outward conversion of the State, we see, accordingly, the emperors claiming, in the name of the State regarded as the highest embodiment of the new religion, to exercise the highest authority in all religious matters. We have the spectacle of Constantius attempting to impose Arianism on the empire. We see the emperor for the time being deciding the issues in conflicts of religious opinion. We have the spectacle of Zeno, Justinian, and Heraclius, Leo the Isaurian, and Constantine the Fifth,¹ each claiming to interfere in religious controversy, and to direct and interpret by imperial authority the doctrines and interests of the Church.

But it is when we turn to Western Europe that we see the world becoming gradually and steadily enveloped in the influence of a single all-embracing idea. As the spread of the new belief amongst the peoples of Western and Northern Europe rises towards the central events of the Middle Ages,²

¹ Cf. *History of the Later Roman Empire*, by J. B. Bury, vol. ii. vi. vi.

² Cf. *The Holy Roman Empire*, by James Bryce, chap. v.

namely, the alliance of the see of Rome with the temporal power of the incoming races of the North — signalled at last in the historic spectacle of the crowning by the Pope in the year 800 of Charlemagne as the successor in men's minds of the Roman emperors of the West — we have in reality but one controlling principle developing beneath all the events of Western history.

To perceive the significance of the central problem of the Middle Ages, it is necessary for the evolutionist to keep steadily in view the principal political symbol in Western history for nearly a thousand years; namely, that of the Holy Roman Empire, which may be said to have been begun with the crowning of Charlemagne in the year 800, though more formally with the accession of Otto I. in 962, and to have lasted down to 1806. In the image which the empire represented in the period of its highest development the underlying conception was that of a universal State, the Pope representing the spiritual head and the Emperor the temporal head; both possessing universal jurisdiction over Christendom. From the popular identification of the empire with the history of mediæval Germany, it is sometimes overlooked how near this ideal often was to actual realisation in Western history. In it, as Mr. Bryce has remarked, the world's highest dignity remained for many centuries in Europe the only civil office to which any free-born Christian was legally eligible.¹ Even the rulers of States claiming virtual independence of the empire in most cases admitted the superior rank of the Emperor. For the office of

¹ *The Holy Roman Empire*, chap. xxi.

Emperor the competition was often international, not only princes of German, but of Italian, French, Spanish, and English nationality being from time to time amongst the candidates. And when the dignity of emperor was united with the powers of a reigning prince of first rank outside of Germany—as when the ruler in Spain, Naples, the Netherlands, and other dominions became the Emperor Charles V., after an election in which Francis I. of France and Henry VIII. of England had been his competitors—the Holy Roman Empire was in fact as well as in theory the principal symbol of universal politics in Western history.

Now as the evolutionist turns over at the present day the surviving records of this institution as it first becomes visible in Europe, nothing can be more clearly revealed than the nature of the position, as disclosed on almost every page, up to which the human mind had travelled at this point in the history of our civilisation. Nothing can also be clearer than the nature of the climax towards which it was being carried irresistibly forward. As he takes up, for instance, that remarkable document of the Middle Ages, the Capitulary of the year 802,¹ correctly described as the foundation charter of the empire, the standpoint which underlies the working of the human mind is apparent in nearly every clause. The concept that the spiritual welfare of the world is of more importance than its temporal interests being accepted as unquestioned, there follows a series of steps, each to all appearance natural and inevitable, but to which all the controlling events in the history of Western

¹ Henderson's *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, ii. ii.

civilisation for centuries in the future are about to become related.

The highest embodiment of human interests and activities in the world being the State, it is taken by Charlemagne simply as a self-evident truth that the State should be directed towards the realisation of the ideal of the spiritual welfare of the world. The highest representative of the power of the State being the Emperor, the next step follows, apparently, with the same inherent inevitableness. We have in the Capitulary, accordingly, the spectacle of the Emperor conceiving himself as standing not simply as the head of the political organisation, and as the impersonification of military power and civil justice; but as placed at the head of all morality and religion, to hold in his hands the interests of morality, of doctrine, and of the Church; even to the extent of charging himself, in the last resort, with the rule and ordering of the clergy.¹

Now as the evolutionist looks closely at the position here defined, the remarkable features which are inherent in it may be readily distinguished. It will be remembered that the inquiry which has been hitherto followed led us up to the conclusion that the essential characteristic of that epoch of evolution upon which the world entered when it passed out of the era of the ancient civilisations, in which a rule of law and a rule of religion had been one and identical,² consisted in the fact that there had been opened in the human mind an antithesis, the evolutionary significance of which springs from the principle that it is not capable of being again bridged in any equilibrium within the

¹ Cf. *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, ii. ii.

² Cf. Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 23.

horizon of the present, nor within any boundaries of political consciousness, however widely conceived. Yet what we now appear to have in sight in this Capitulary of Charlemagne is the spectacle of the world already moving, as it were, within a closed circle in the State towards an ideal, the effect of which must be, to all appearance, to actually bring the world back again to the stage described by Maine, when a rule of religion and a rule of law will be once more one and identical.

We have in sight, in short, in the climax towards which the events of history appear to be carrying us, the endeavour of the world to express once more in a political ideal in which a rule of religion necessarily tends to become again coincident with a rule of law, a concept the meaning and potentiality of which is absolutely irreconcilable with such an ideal. For, if we have been right so far, the new concept is one from which there must proceed, as its most profoundly significant evolutionary result, a fundamental and characteristic distinction, ever widening as human development continues, between the whole sphere of civil and political law (of which the characteristic is that it remains limited by the horizon of the State), and the whole sphere of ethics and religion (of which the characteristic is that it has now come to be related to principles the meaning and operation of which transcend the limits of political consciousness).

As we regard the situation attentively, the nature of the central position upon which the human mind is slowly converging grows into definition. We have actually in view, we perceive, all the steps by which it is about to reach the climax of that crisis which we saw foreshadowed at the beginning of the chapter ;

as the concept, by which the controlling principles of human consciousness begin to be projected out of the present time, rises into ascendancy in the world. That the resulting conditions are destined to ripen towards a crisis of capital importance, and that they must, as already indicated, give rise to a class of phenomena entirely new and special, is already clear.

When, therefore, from the eleventh century onward to the sixteenth we regard the history of any country in Western Europe, the phenomenon which has been already noted as characteristic of the history of England is immediately apparent. At whatever point the historical student stands in Europe his face during these centuries turns towards the same centre. It is the great problem in human development, becoming visible as the claims, inherent in the very nature of the concept we have been discussing, grow more and more clearly into view, and are at length uncompromisingly formulated by the human mind, which underlies all the political life of our Western world. It matters not in what country the point of view of the student is taken; the position in the State is found to be everywhere the same; until at length, as we approach the period embraced in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, only one great question, to use words of Sir Frederick Pollock,¹ "draws to itself whatever power or interest men's minds then had in the theoretical treatment of affairs of State." This is the controversy between the temporal and the spiritual power.²






¹ *History of the Science of Politics*, p. 34.

² In regarding the capital position towards which this controversy ripens, the evolutionist soon understands that one of the first things he



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In following this controversy through its first phase we must never lose sight of the main fact behind it, namely, that the conflict between the representatives of the civil and of the spiritual power in the Middle Ages is but preliminary. It decided who was to be the ultimate authority in directing the State towards a certain ideal. But the great and supreme problem for which the principal attention of the evolutionist must be reserved from the outset is the ideal itself — that to which the human mind advances through this conflict to reach the ultimate climax beyond, in which a rule of religion and a rule of law become again practically one and coincident in our civilisation.

The long-drawn-out controversy between the spiritual power and the temporal power, in the persons of the Pope and the Emperor, begins in its acute phase soon after the accession of Pope Gregory VII. in 1073; and in the resulting movement it may be said to carry us down into the midst of the crisis known in history as the Reformation. In regarding this

has to realise is, that he must not allow his attention to be primarily concerned with those causes, often necessarily of the deepest interest to a certain class of students, which led to the see of Rome becoming the representative of the claims now put forward. For as the intellect is fixed on the matter which claims its principal attention, namely, the nature of the central position towards which the human mind is developing, what it soon distinguishes is that the claims formulated by successive Popes were, in the prevailing conditions of the world, inherent in the concept associated with our developing civilisation; that these claims must at a certain stage of development have defined themselves, and have been enunciated on behalf of the spiritual authority just as we find them here being enunciated. They are, indeed, to be distinguished long after inherent in the concepts of Churches and parties which had never acknowledged, or which had ceased to acknowledge, the authority of Rome.

controversy it is necessary to keep always clearly before the mind, that throughout the entire history of the presentation of the claims put forward by both sides there runs the dominant influence of one principle which is implicitly accepted by each side alike; namely, the conception — now clearly applied in theory to politics on a universal scale — that what is described as the spiritual welfare of the world is of more importance than any interest which is comprised merely within the limits of political consciousness. The conclusion which men saw apparently involved in, and proceeding inevitably from the acceptance of this concept was, that the State should be directed towards the realisation of the spiritual welfare of the world. The point at which the controversy begins to arise is, therefore, in the formulation of an answer to the question: Who is ultimately the supreme authority in directing the State towards this end?¹

As the dispute opens between Gregory VII. and the Emperor Henry IV., we see, as soon as we understand the existing conditions of the world, and the nature of the concept common to both sides, how predestined are the lines along which it must proceed, and how impossible from the outset was the position

¹ The world saw only two answers to this question. Either Emperor or Pope — either the civil or religious ruler. But the mind of the evolutionist continues to be concentrated on the problem which stands behind either answer — the supreme problem of our development — civilisation. For with either answer the development of the human mind appears to have become involved in the closed circle already referred to. With development along either line the world must to all appearance be carried back again to the condition of that earlier stage described by Maine when a rule of religion is identical with a rule of law, when the breach of a religious ordinance will be punished again by civil penalties.

taken up by the representative of the civil power as against the claims of the representative of the spiritual authority.

That ideal of the State which Henry IV. and his successors represented, which at the time underlay the claims of the temporal power throughout the whole of Western Europe, and which still lingers in certain quarters in our civilisation as a legitimate conception, was that which we have already seen outlined in Charlemagne's Capitulary of 802.¹ It was that in which the sovereign of the State was concerned as standing not simply at the head of the civil and military power, but at the head of morality, of religion, and of the Church. The nature of the controversy in its opening terms as regards the empire is well defined by Sir Frederick Pollock: "It was the common ground of the disputants that the papacy and the empire were both divinely ordained, and each in its own sphere had universal jurisdiction over Christendom. The point of difference was as to the relation of these two jurisdictions to one another. Was the temporal ruler in the last resort subordinate to the spiritual, as the lesser to the greater light? or were their dignities co-ordinate and equal?"² Or was the temporal ruler — as Frederick II. afterwards aimed at making himself — actually "supreme in spiritual as well as temporal government?"³

This was the outline of the controversy at the beginning. As we look at it now, we see that from the outset there could be no doubt as to the issue which must be reached. Once the human mind, in the ex-

¹ *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, ii. ii.

² *History of the Science of Politics*, p. 34.

³ *Ibid.*

isting conditions of the world, had accepted the position involved in the concept that its spiritual welfare was of more importance than its temporal interests, the advance to the position which was soon to be reached was to all appearance inevitable.

As accordingly that conception of the greatness of the spiritual authority, which had dawned on the imagination of the monks of Cluny, begins to be embodied in the claims of the papal power, the lines along which the development proceeds follow an inevitable course. The first matter in which issue is joined is that of lay investiture, in which the position on either side had become already well defined. It is necessary to remember that in that political ideal, which had now become general throughout Western Europe, in which the head of the State, following Charlemagne's ideal, was conceived as the ultimate authority alike in matters of temporal and of the spiritual power, the choice of the bishops of the Church was in practice made by the head of the State. With the development of the feudal system there had arisen a natural consequence. A bishop had now become not only a dignitary of the Church, but also a prince of the realm, whose duty it was to send contingents to the king's army and also to act as councillor at his court. Half the land and wealth of Germany is said to have thus passed into the hands of bishops and abbots of the Church.¹ As we had one side of Charlemagne's ideal of the *Civitas Dei* in the fact that it is recorded that in the Anglo-Saxon States after conversion thirty queens and kings went into the cloister;²

¹ *The Holy Roman Empire*, by James Bryce, c. x.

² *Civilisation during the Middle Ages*, by G. B. Adams, c. xi.

so we had now the other side of the development in the fact, that we are told that within thirty years, towards the close of the ninth century, two archbishops and eight bishops died on the field of battle fighting by the side of counts and lords.¹ The result which followed was inevitable. The fiefs and jurisdictions of the bishoprics came, therefore, to be given by the head of the State to faithful followers; and not only as a reward for their past services, but also in consideration of those in the future.²

It was against the subordination of the conception of the spiritual power which all this essentially implied, and against the practice of lay investiture which it immediately involved, that the genius and imagination of Pope Gregory VII. now rose in revolt.

In the resulting conflict, in which the political life of the whole of Western Europe becomes deeply involved, the steps follow each other with dramatic effect. In the opening act we have five of Henry IV's councillors excommunicated by Gregory for having attained ecclesiastical office by means of simony,³

¹ *The Beginning of the Middle Ages*, by R. W. Church, c. x.

² *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, by E. F. Henderson, iv. Intro.

³ Adams gives the following description of the charge of simony at this period: Technically, it involved "securing an ecclesiastical office by bribery, named from the incident recorded in the eighth chapter of the Acts concerning Simon Magus. But at this time the desire for the complete independence of the Church had given to it a new and wider meaning, which made it include all appointment to positions in the Church by laymen, including kings and the Emperor. It is the plainest of historical facts that such appointment had gone on, practically undisputed, from the earliest times. Under both the public and the private law of all the German States the king had such a right. According to the private law the founder was the patron, and as such enjoyed the right of appointment. According to the conception of the public

and Henry is ordered to desist from exercising any further influence on episcopal elections. The Emperor,¹ true to that conception of his office as head not only of the State but of the spiritual power, proceeded, in reply, to summon a council at Worms, which was attended by two of the archbishops and two-thirds of all the bishops of Germany. "Thou hast not shunned to rise up against the royal power conferred upon us by God, daring to threaten to divest us of it,"² said Henry in his letter to the Pope, "as if we had received our kingdom from thee."³ "I am not to be deposed for any crime,"⁴ was the assertion; "I am subject to the judgment of God alone,"⁵ was the claim. The council of the Emperor, in reply, proceeded to declare Gregory himself deposed,⁶ after

law the bishop was an officer of the State. He had, in the great majority of cases, political duties to perform as important as his ecclesiastical duties. The lands which formed the endowment of his office had always been considered as being, still more directly than any other feudal land, the property of the State, and were treated as such when the occasion demanded, from times before Charles Martel to times after Gregory VII. At this period these lands had clearly defined feudal obligations to perform, which constituted a very considerable proportion of the resources of the State. It was a matter of vital importance whether officers exercising such important functions and controlling so large a part of its area — probably everywhere as much as one-third of the territory — should be selected by the State or by some foreign power beyond its reach and having its own peculiar interests to seek" (*Civilisation during the Middle Ages*, by George Burton Adams, chap. x.).

¹ Henry's title was as yet, strictly speaking, only "King of the Romans." He was crowned as Emperor in 1084 by the Anti-Pope Wibert.

² The Emperor Henry IV.'s answer to Gregory VII., Jan. 24, 1076, *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, Henderson, iv. ii. 5.

³ *Ibid.* ⁴ *Ibid.* ⁵ *Ibid.* See also iv. ii. 8, *Summons of Henry IV.*

⁶ *Select Historical Documents*, iv. ii. 6, Letter of the Bishops to Gregory VII., 24th Jan. 1076.

which the Pope and his synod retaliated by banning all the dissentient bishops as well as the Emperor, declaring the royal power of the latter forfeit, and all his subjects loosed from their allegiance.¹

As the conflict deepens, we distinguish the inevitable weakness of the position taken up by the ruler in the name of the civil power.² "I am not to be deposed for any crime," said Henry at the height of his claims, "unless—which God forbid"—he adds parenthetically, "I should have strayed from the faith."³ But who was to be the ultimate authority in such a matter? In the presence of the conception common to both positions that the spiritual welfare of the world was of greater importance than its temporal interests, the Pope was able, with relentless logic, to proceed to assert the inferiority of all temporal kings and emperors—swollen with worldly glory, sprung from those who, by force, pride, plunder, and even crimes, inherited a servile and transitory kingdom.⁴ The necks of their greatest were bowed before the knees of priests.⁵ Even the mightiest of them were not so great as many who were poor and meek and lowly, the subjects of a kingdom of liberty and eternity.⁶ How monstrous, therefore, and intolerable were these their claims on "the servant of the servants of God," on the bishops and abbots of the Church, that these should be so occupied

¹ *Select Historical Documents*, iv. ii. 7.

² Cf. Lecky's *Rise of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. ii. p. 144, and *The Holy Roman Empire* (Bryce), chap. x.

³ *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, iv. ii. 5.

⁴ Letter of Gregory VII. to Bishop Hermann of Metz, 15th March 1081, *Select Historical Documents*, iv. ii. 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

by secular cares "that they are compelled assiduously to frequent the court and to perform military service. Which things indeed are scarcely, if at all, carried on without plunder, sacrilege, arson."¹

The spectacle of the human mind in these letters and bulls struggling to express itself through the medium of the conceptions and the religious imagery of an epoch of development which it had already left behind; struggling, as we can see now, in the closed circle of an ideal which could only bring the world back again to the ruling principle of an era beyond which it had for ever advanced, does not for a moment obscure the greatness of the concept which shines through the whole controversy. But the development proceeds in history towards its inherent climax. Notwithstanding the great amount of support received by the representative of the civil power from a section of the Church, it was impossible for the Emperor to escape the inherent consequences of the position in which the world was involved; and, within a short time from the opening of the controversy, Henry IV. was a penitent to the Pope at Canossa, begging absolution from the ban of the spiritual power.

From this point forward events rise rapidly towards the crisis of the Middle Ages. As the conflict widens, its tendency is ever in one direction. The compromise of the Concordat of Worms in 1122, nearly fifty years after the opening of the controversy, only thinly veiled the triumph of the popes in establishing

¹ Negotiations between Paschal II. and Henry V., Paschal's Privilege of the First Convention, Feb. 12th, 1111, *Select Historical Documents*, iv. ii. 15.

the supremacy of the forces represented by the spiritual authority. "It was manifest," says Hallam, "that the see of Rome had conquered."¹ But the full meaning of what was taking place cannot be compressed into such a formula. In Germany, Italy, France, and England the larger question from which the dispute itself proceeded continued to be the deepest issue beneath the surface of political life. When the peace of Venice brought the controversy for the time being to an end in 1177, the supremacy of the spiritual dominion had become firmly established. The spiritual power had come forth victorious from the long struggle. When its victory had been signalled by that scene enacted at the spot where three red slabs in the church of St. Mark's point out the spot where another Emperor knelt before the Pope, the end of the first stage, towards the climax which we saw foreshadowed at the outset, had been reached. After a hundred years of conflict the Western world saw it established on seemingly unassailable foundations that if, indeed, the spiritual welfare of the world is of greater importance than all those temporal interests with which the State is concerned; then the power in whose hands the spiritual interests are placed is higher than any ruler in the name of the State; his will, as representing those interests, rises superior to every power and purpose for which the temporal State exists.

In these events we appear to see the human mind in the historical process deliberately advancing step by step to the very heart of the remarkable problem

¹ *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*, by Henry Hallam, c. vii.

which was outlined at the outset. Inherent, to all appearance, in the actual concept by which alone it is possible that the future can be emancipated, by which alone the controlling principles of human action can be projected beyond the limits of political consciousness, there would appear to be involved a principle which must prevent that free play of forces within the present out of which alone the larger future can be born; a principle which must apparently again imprison all human energies in a tyranny greater than any from which they had emerged. We have reached the brink of a world in which it seems inevitable that a rule of religion and a rule of law should become again one and identical; nay, more, a world in which, to use Maine's phrase, the transgressor of a religious ordinance will again be punished by civil penalties. But with this momentous difference: A rule of religion now no longer, as in the ancient world, relates to the interests of the existing political State. It is considered to rise superior to, and supreme over, every temporal purpose whatever for which the State exists. No such tremendous potentiality of absolutism ever lurked in the ancient world beneath any of the tyrannies through which the present expressed itself. The further and greater steps which proceed from the position here defined follow each other henceforward in rapid succession. With the triumph in universal politics of the conception that spiritual interests are superior to the temporal welfare of the world, the authority representing the former gradually rises supreme over every power and purpose of the temporal State, and the dream of the monks of Cluny passes

towards its realisation : "The possibility of assuming the control of the whole Christian world, political as well as ecclesiastical, which had dawned upon the consciousness of the Roman Church,"¹ is at last visibly embodied in the ideal towards which the world is moving.

The steps by which we watch the growing claims being asserted in the final stage are to be followed throughout the public life of nearly all the States of Europe. In Spain, Hungary, England, France, Ireland, Scandinavia, and even Russia, the influence of the ideal towards which they tend in political affairs is in sight. The claim underlying that ideal is, at times, clearly expressed in words. It is, as the King of Munster in Ireland is informed, that "all sovereigns are subjects of St. Peter, and that all the world owes allegiance to him and to his vicar."² In the thirteenth century the Latin rulers in the East are subject to the Pope; Aragon, Hungary, and England are fiefs of Rome; King John of England, in words of his own Act, freely conceding "the whole kingdom of England and the whole kingdom of Ireland with all their rights and appurtenances . . . and now receiving and holding them, as it were, a vassal from God and the Roman Church."³

¹ Adams' *Civilisation during the Middle Ages*, c. x.

² *Ibid.*

³ Volentes nos ipsos humiliare pro Illo Qui Se pro nobis humiliavit usque ad mortem, gratia Sancti Spiritus inspirante, non vi inducti nec timore coacti, sed nostra bona spontaneaque voluntate ac communi consilio baronum nostrorum, offerimus et libere concedimus Deo et sanctis apostolis Ejus Petro et Paulo et sanctae Romanae ecclesiae matris nostrae, ac domino nostro papae Innocentio ejusque catholicis successoribus, totum regnum Angliae et totum regnum Hiberniae, cum omni jure et pertinentiis suis, pro remissione peccatorum nostrorum et totius generis nostri tam pro vivis quam defunctis; et amodo illa a Deo et ecclesia

It sometimes happens that, through the detached standpoint of English historians, the dispute between John and the Pope is spoken of as if it were an incident in English history, scarcely to be conceived of apart from the weakness of the king or the special circumstances of his reign. The deeper student of history sees how local this view is. The character of John inflamed the conditions of the dispute and produced the full measure of his humiliation. But it is the conflict from which the incident itself proceeds which constitutes at the time the largest and deepest issue in the unfolding of our civilisation. And the power in that civilisation which had already broken the Emperor Henry IV. and humbled the Emperor Frederick I., was not likely to be lightly resisted by any sovereign of England who would have confronted it upon a like issue.

On the threshold of the fourteenth century we have reached the Bull "Clericis Laicos" of Boniface VIII., to which a greater sovereign of England than John found it convenient to render a qualified

Romana tanquam feudatarius recipientes et tenentes, in praesentia prudentis viri Pandulfi, domini papae subdiaconi et familiaris, fidelitatem exinde praedicto domino nostro papae Innocentio, ejusque catholicis successoribus et ecclesiae Romanae, secundum subscriptam formam facimus et juramus, et homagium ligium in praesentia domini papae, si coram eo esse poterimus, eidem faciemus; successores et haeredes nostros de uxore nostra in perpetuum obligantes, ut simili modo summo pontifici qui pro tempore fuerit, et ecclesiae Romanae, sine contradictione debeant fidelitatem praestare et homagium recognoscere: From the Act of Submission made by John to Pandulf at Dover on the 15th May 1213, and renewed to Nicolas, Bishop of Tusculum, at London on 3rd October, with a golden *bulle*, and with the actual performance of liege homage here promised to the Pope.—Stubbs' *Select Charters* (John).

obedience. In this document there has been reached almost the last stage of the definition of the problem outlined at the outset. It is declared by the Bull to be forbidden and illegal for laymen of whatever degree or estate, whether claiming as "emperors, kings, or princes, dukes, counts or barons, podestas, captains, or officials, or rectors — by whatever name they are called,"¹ to submit representatives of the spiritual authority to secular jurisdiction. In the uncompromising words of the Bull: "All jurisdiction is denied them over the clergy — over both the persons and the goods of ecclesiastics."² The custom of appealing to Rome begun in England under Henry I. had, in a hundred years, grown to such an extent that the king's jurisdiction over ecclesiastics had become almost nominal in criminal matters.³ The significant words of this Bull mark the limits to which the claim of the spiritual authority now extended.

The tendency which accompanied these claims throughout Europe went much further, it has to be noted, than the mere emancipation of the spiritual authorities from civil jurisdiction. The aim underlying it worked steadily in the direction of bringing the whole civil jurisdiction within the direct control of the Church. With the gradual growth of the

¹ Henderson's *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, iv. vi.

² *Ibid.*

³ The brief but significant words with which cap. iii. of the Constitutions of Clarendon concludes — "Et si clericus convictus vel confessus fuerit, non debet de cetero eum ecclesia tueri" (Stubbs' *Select Charters*) — referred, in practice, to a condition of affairs in which the ecclesiastical tribunals had not only encroached on the secular, but in which generally they had begun to obtain a real ascendancy.

canon law, founded on the rescripts of popes and the decrees of councils, there arose throughout Europe a new legal code and a new class of legal practitioners. In the canon law, as Hallam points out, "the superiority of ecclesiastical to temporal power, or at least the absolute independence of the former, may be considered as a sort of key-note which regulates every passage."¹ This superiority, moreover, existed not simply in theory. Throughout the temporal governments of Christendom most effective measures were taken by the spiritual authority to gradually extend its control to general causes, to the temporal judges, and at length to all civil suits. The conditions through which this end was achieved often lay ready at hand. Large classes of persons, which were not in the ordinary sense considered as ecclesiastical, were nevertheless technically considered to come within ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The poor, the orphans, and the widows, for instance, were held to be under the protection of the Church, and as such could not be sued before any lay tribunal.² Spiritual causes, again, it was agreed by both sides, appertained to the spiritual tribunal. But as it was held that the Church was always bound to prevent and chastise sin, the common differences of individuals, which generally involved some charge of wilful injury, were by this means without difficulty brought under ecclesiastical jurisdiction.³ Even in actions relating to real property in land a similar interpretation produced a like

¹*View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*, by Henry Hallam, chap. vii.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

result. For the ecclesiastical tribunals took cognisance of breaches of contract, at least where an oath had been pledged, and of personal trusts, and they were able to claim jurisdiction on this ground.¹ It is true that excommunication continued to be, in theory, the only chastisement which the Church could directly inflict. But it must be remembered that sentences of excommunication were enforced by the civil magistrate, by imprisonment and confiscation, and at times even by the death penalty.²

Measures, practices, and interpretations of this kind tended to extend the jurisdiction of the Church on all sides. From the twelfth century onward,

¹ *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*, by Henry Hallam, chap. vii.

² When the object of punishment went further than the individual, "the Church," says Hallam, "had recourse to a more comprehensive punishment. For the offence of a nobleman, she put a county, for that of a prince, his entire kingdom, under an interdict, or suspension of religious offices. During an interdict, the churches were closed, the bells silent, the dead unburied, no rite but those of baptism and extreme unction performed. The penalty fell upon those who had neither partaken in nor could have prevented the offence; . . . Interdicts were so rare before the time of Gregory VII. that some have referred them to him as their author; instances may, however, be found of an earlier date, and especially that which accompanied the excommunication of Robert, king of France. They were afterwards issued not unfrequently against kingdoms; but in particular districts they continually occurred. This was the mainspring of the machinery that the clergy set in motion, the lever by which they moved the world. From the moment that these interdicts and excommunications had been tried, the powers of the earth might be said to have existed only by sufferance. Nor was the validity of such denunciations supposed to depend upon their justice. The imposer, indeed, of an unjust excommunication was guilty of a sin; but the party subjected to it had no remedy but submission" (*View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*, chap. vii.).

says Hallam, the boundary between temporal and spiritual offences grew continually less distinct,¹ so that towards the fourteenth century ecclesiastical jurisdiction "rapidly encroached upon the secular tribunals, and seemed to threaten the usurpation of an exclusive supremacy over all persons and causes."²

In the conflict following the resistance by Philip of France to the claims enunciated in the Bull "Clericis Laicos," we reach at last the complete definition of the capital position towards which the process at work in Western history had moved for more than a thousand years; and have disclosed, beneath the position in history in our civilisation, the full outlines of the remarkable problem which we saw foreshadowed at the beginning. In the Bull "Unam Sanctam,"³ issued at the opening of the fourteenth century, and towards the close of the struggle with Philip, the claims of the spiritual authority are enunciated with an uncompromising clearness which leaves nothing to be desired. The superiority of spiritual interests to temporal welfare, being taken as a concept fundamental and unchallenged, the long dispute of the centuries as to who was to be the ultimate authority in spiritual matters reaches at last its inevitable culmination. The claim of the civil ruler is once and for all disposed of. The spectacle, which had repeated itself throughout the centuries in the past, of the temporal

¹ *View of the State of Europe during the . . . Middle Ages*, c. vii.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages* (Henderson), iv. vii.

sovereign against whom a censure or a bull of excommunication had been launched, assembling a council of the bishops or powers of his own people to condemn the excommunication or censure, and to retaliate on the power which had launched it¹ — may still be repeated, as it was about to be repeated in France. But it has been met in the Bull "Unam Sanctam" by the inevitable overruling counter claim: "there is one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, outside of which there is neither salvation nor remission of sins,"² and "we declare, announce, and define that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff."³ The position involved in such a claim throughout the secular affairs of the world is stated at last with clearness and precision. It is that towards which the movement of history had ripened through the struggles of the past. There were in the world, it is asserted in the Bull, two swords — the spiritual and the temporal — but the claim respecting them is now definite and emphatic. It is that "both swords, the spiritual and the material, therefore, are in the power of the Church; the one, indeed, to be wielded for the Church, the other by the Church; the one by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and knights, but at the will and sufferance of the priest. One sword, moreover, ought to be under the other,

¹ Cf. *History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, by W. E. H. Lecky, vol. ii. p. 144.

² The Bull "Unam Sanctam," in Henderson's *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*, the text being quoted from the latest revision in *Revue des questions historiques*, July 1889. ³ *Ibid.*

and the temporal authority to be subjected to the spiritual. . . . For, the truth bearing witness, the spiritual power has to establish the earthly power, and to judge it if it be not good."¹

There could be no doubt as to the nature of the position here reached, or of the meaning of it as applied to the secular affairs of the world. Our civilisation has reached the climax of the problem towards which the tendencies of thirteen centuries of history had developed. In the name of the highest power in Christendom, the principle is in effect enunciated that a rule of religion must be, in the last resort, a rule of law. We have entered on the stage when the transgressor of a religious ordinance is about to be punished by civil penalties on a scale of which there is no previous example; and with a thoroughness and completeness that even the ancient civilisations fell far short of. But, as has been said, with this significant difference: The rule of religion from which a rule of law in the present now proceeds, while it is enforced by the State, is no longer bounded by any interest of the State. The religious ordinance, the transgression of which is about to be punished on a universal scale by civil penalties in the present, is no longer related to any object of the State. The object of the punishment claims to issue superior to every interest included within the bounds of civil consciousness, to rise supreme over every power and purpose for which the temporal State as such exists. No forms in which the tyrannies of the ancient world could have imprisoned the energies of the human mind or of

¹ Cf. *supra*.

the human will could, to all appearance, have possessed such an illimitable potentiality of absolutism. We have advanced, in short, to the heart of the first great crisis of the human mind in the history of the development in which it becomes the destiny of the present to pass under the control of the future in our Western civilisation.

In the first centuries of the era in which we are living, we saw how the leading crises of the system of belief which had become associated with our civilisation were but the outward expression of a single fact. There was represented in them, we saw, the effort, again and again repeated, to close the antithesis which had been opened in the human mind; and by so doing to bring the world back again to that equilibrium within the horizon of existing consciousness which was represented in the philosophy of the ancient world. So now, even where the nature of the supreme concept to which the human mind has become related is clearly visible beneath all the events of history, we see the process still caught, as it were, within the closed circle of the State, still involved in conditions in which a rule of religion must, by inherent necessity, become a rule of law, enforced in the last resort by civil penalties. To all appearance, the movement in which there was involved the infinite potentiality of the emancipation of the future in the present—in which there lay inherent that free conflict of forces out of which the greater future can alone be born, and towards which the whole process of evolution in human society must ultimately ascend—is itself imprisoned in an absolutism of the still ascendant present.

Looking back over the period through which Western history has run since the opening of the new epoch, the spectacle presented is remarkable in the last degree. The universal conditions accompanying the progress of the development here described have been scarcely less striking than the development itself.

With the rise of the spiritual authority into a position of ultimate control in the State, the progress of our Western world has been towards a condition in which an almost complete paralysis of the speculative and critical faculties of the human mind has supervened; and in which men have sunk gradually into a stupor of ignorance and credulity. Mr. Lecky's sombre description of the conditions of the world as they presented themselves throughout this period can hardly be considered to be overstated. The spirit which prevailed had produced a condition in thought in which, says Mr. Lecky, "the very sense of truth seemed blotted out from the minds of men."¹ During these ages "every mental disposition which philosophy pronounces to be essential to a legitimate research was almost uniformly branded as a sin, and a large proportion of the most deadly intellectual vices were deliberately inculcated as virtues. . . . It was sinful to study with equal attention and with an indifferent mind the writings on both sides, sinful to resolve to follow the light of evidence wherever it might lead, sinful to remain poised in doubt between conflicting opinions, sinful to give only a qualified assent to indecisive arguments, sinful even to recognise the moral or intellectual excellence of opponents. . . .

¹ *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. I. p. 397.

The theologians, by destroying every book that could generate discussion, by diffusing to every field of knowledge a spirit of houndless credulity, and, above all, by persecuting with atrocious cruelty those who differed from their opinions, succeeded . . . in almost arresting the action of the European mind." ¹

The conditions of the problem are complete. It is an altogether remarkable spectacle. Yet the evolutionist, who has succeeded in preserving his standpoint of detachment, feels that he must never for a moment lose sight of the central position upon which attention must continue to be concentrated. It remains to him, under all its features, still a spectacle remarkable in one particular over and above every other. It is the potentiality of the cosmic drama which is unfolding itself that holds the intellect as the supreme fact to which every detail is subordinate. In an age when the human mind has come to discuss in a scientific spirit the import, on the distant verge of social consciousness, of institutions like Totemism and Ancestor Worship, it is absolutely impossible for the evolutionist, who has emancipated himself from the prepossessions and prejudices of the unscientific spirit bred in the disputes of the past, to doubt for a moment the overwhelming evolutionary significance of the principle at work in the world. Its very excesses, its very absolutism, are hardly more than the measure of its potentiality.

Yet w^hither is the progress of the world tending? We have travelled to the brink of the period when

¹ *The Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. i. pp. 87, 88.

the flames of universal persecution in the cause of the new absolutism rise on the horizon; when religious persecution, for the first time in the history of the world, is actually about to possess on a universal scale that ominous significance which Mr. Ritchie distinguishes in it as associated with the faith of Christianity.¹ The institution of the Inquisition, founded as early as the beginning of the thirteenth century, and the decree of the Fourth Council of the Lateran of a few years later, enjoining all rulers "to exterminate from their dominions all those who are branded as heretics by the Church,"² is soon to acquire in this relation a grim significance throughout the greater part of our Western world.³ We are close to the period when the Spanish peninsula, under the forms of the Inquisition, is to be invaded by a tyranny unknown in the world of the ancients;⁴ when religious persecution is to prevail throughout Western Europe as it was never known in the world⁵ before; when Paul IV. is to institute the *Index Expurgatorius*;⁶ when the Emperor Charles V. and Philip II. of Spain are to become associated with that movement in which a sentence of death is to be formulated against *all* the inhabitants of the Netherlands as heretics,⁷ the spiritual authority leaving to the able and willing civil power the selection of the victims in

¹ Cf. *Natural Rights*, chap. viii.

² Cf. *Lecky's Rise of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. ii. p. 30.

³ Cf. *Ibid.*, vol. ii. chap. iv.

⁴ Ranke's *History of the Popes*, ii. § 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Lecky's Rise of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. ii. p. 119; and Ranke's *History of the Popes*, ii. § 6.

⁷ Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, chap. ii. part i. and chap. ii. part iii.

a condemnation in which, as Motley points out, all being sentenced alike to a common grave, it was possible for any, without warning, difficulty, or trial, to be carried to the scaffold or the stake.¹ Nay, more, we have almost reached the period when, looking into the future, we see the spirit which rises to question this absolutism, itself caught in the influence of the same ideas, and differing neither in tendency nor in will to make its own absolutism as unquestioned as that which it challenged.

What, therefore, is the solution of the problem towards which the world is advancing? Is the Western mind destined to reach a synthesis of knowledge hidden as yet beneath the horizon? Is it destined to retrace its steps, and, baffled and disillusioned, to abandon that conviction to which we have seen it advance in the full light of history—the conviction that what it has come to call its spiritual welfare is more important than its temporal interests?

The principles of the evolutionary process which are working out the destiny of the peoples who are to inherit the future are principles which can never more be comprised within the content of political consciousness. The peoples to whom the future belongs are they who already bear upon their shoulders the burden of the principles with which the interests of that future are identified. And yet, how is the future to be emancipated in the present? How is the race to rise to a sense of direct, personal, and compelling responsibility to a principle transcending every power and purpose included in the limits of its

¹ Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, chap. ii. part i. and chap. ii. part iii.

political consciousness; and still be so occupied with its present as to set free therein the play of its highest powers? How are we to witness the controlling principles of human consciousness projected out of the present; and yet see opened within the present a free conflict of forces such as has never been in the world before, out of which the greater future can alone be born, and towards which the whole process of evolution in society must ultimately ascend?

CHAPTER IX

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREAT ANTI-NOMY IN WESTERN HISTORY: SECOND STAGE

IN the study of the many-sided movement which, dating from the Renaissance in Europe, and which, taking its course through the religious and political upheaval known in history as the Reformation, carries us rapidly forward into the midst of the principles governing the development of the modern world, it is of the first importance that the attention of the observer should continue to be concentrated on the character of the central problem with which we have been concerned from the beginning. That problem in its briefest terms involves, as we saw, the realisation in Western history of conditions in which the principle of Projected Efficiency is to become more effectively operative than has ever been possible in the world before.

Standing at this point for a moment and looking back over the history of the progress which the race has made, it may be recalled that the conditions under which development has been possible in the social process have had one characteristic feature. While progress has been identified from the beginning with competition, the inherent tendency of all competition, in the era of the ascendancy of the present, has, of necessity, been for the strongest competitive forces to become absolute, and so to suppress in time those

conditions of really free conflict out of which the most effective future could arise. This has been the key, as we saw, to that condition of the world which culminated in the ancient civilisations.

If we have been right so far, the significance of Western civilisation from the beginning of our era has been related to a single cause; namely, the potentiality of a principle inherent in it to project the controlling principles of its consciousness beyond the present; and so ultimately to operate in breaking up all the closed imperiums in government, in action, in thought, and in religion, through which the omnipotent present had hitherto been able to become absolute. The controlling principles of human responsibility being no longer confined within the present, the evolutionary significance of the social process in Western history consists, in short, in its tendency to produce the condition of such a free rivalry of forces as has never been in the world before; by rendering it impossible to shut up again the human will in any system of government, of action, or of thought, through which the tyranny of forces expressing themselves within the limits of political consciousness could once more become absolute. It is upon the conditions of the world-embracing struggle in which the future is thus to be emancipated, and in which the hitherto prevailing ascendancy of the present in the world is destined to be ultimately broken, that the attention of the mind has now to be fixed.

No situation can be of more absorbing interest to the evolutionist than that which presents itself to him when, with the conditions of the remarkable

problem foreshadowed in the previous chapters fresh in his mind, he watches now the activities of our Western world being slowly drawn into the influence of that modern struggle from out of which, at the end of centuries of strife, there is to emerge gradually into view the first rough outlines of the master-principle of a new world. It is to be a world in which every cause, and institution, and opinion will in the end hold its very life at the challenge of such criticism and competition as the human mind has never known before. But it is to be a world, withal, in which the entire phenomena of progress must continue to be related to a single underlying life-principle, namely, that the ultimate controlling principles of human action have been projected beyond the content of all systems of interest whatever included within the limits of political consciousness.

Now as we regard the conditions towards which our Western world has moved at the close of the Middle Ages, it may be observed that the ideal which has come once more to hold the human mind is that of a universal empire resting ultimately on force. The universal empire is indeed no longer an empire in which the ideal of men is that the strongest material interests in the present should become absolute and omnipotent. It is a universal empire in which a particular belief has become absolute; in which it is again conceived that a rule of religion should, in the last resort, be a rule of civil law; in which it is considered that the State itself exists now for no higher end than that all its machinery, and purposes, and powers should be devoted to establishing and maintaining throughout the world the sway of

one accepted and authoritative interpretation of absolute truth, which the human mind has come to place higher than any interest whatever comprised within the limits of political consciousness.

What we have now to watch is the tremendous concept upon which this ideal rested in the minds of men — a concept still entangled, as we may perceive, in the theory of the State, still allied to the principle of universal force, and, therefore, as we may see, still imprisoned within the closed circle of the yet ascendant present — moving now at last in Western history towards a realisation of that potentiality which has been inherent in it from the beginning. In the resulting revolution we are destined to witness our civilisation carried far beyond the content of any synthesis of knowledge which the human mind had as yet imagined, and to see the systems of thought representing the new spirit, themselves impelled, by forces greater than they understood, towards a goal of which they had no perception at the beginning, and of which the full significance is even as yet but dimly realised by the Western mind.

It has been usual in the past in nearly all studies of the period in which the Middle Ages merge into the modern world to consider this epoch of upheaval as dating from, or at all events as inseparably associated with, the movement taking its rise in Italy towards the end of the fourteenth century, and known as the Renaissance. As the evolutionist looks long and closely at the history of the Italian Renaissance he comes, however, sooner or later, to perceive that it is not really through this movement, in the first instance, that he has to follow the main stream of

Western development as it descends through its principal current towards the future. Just as in the period at the beginning of our era in which a long, culminating epoch of absolutism under many phases had produced the tendencies of thought to be distinguished in the Roman world; so now, in the earlier Renaissance, we have in sight the movements in which the minds of men attempt to rise above, or to separate themselves from, the extraordinary results which have been produced. And yet, as in the Roman world, without being in themselves representative, for the time being, of any new principle of life.

In the movements, accordingly, in which we see the Italian intellect turning again with enthusiasm, and a sense of awe, to the revived study of the literature, the art, and the knowledge of the ancient civilisations — in which we see the mind of Machiavelli captivated with the old Roman theory of the State and its inherent ideal of the secularisation of religion;¹ in which we see philosophy, in the theories of Pico della Mirandola, Telesio, and a crowd of others,² moving again, on the one hand, towards the concepts of Neo-Platonism and, on the other, towards the ideals of a vague pantheistic humanism — we have much that suggests a close parallel to the period when the humanitarian ideals of the ancient philosophy held the mind of the Roman world at the beginning of our era, without being able to supply any new life-principle to a system of society the governing causes of which they antagonised.³

¹ Cf. Machiavelli's *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius*, i. xi.-xv. and iii. xv.-xvii.

² Cf. *History of Modern Philosophy*, by Kuno Fischer, chap. v. ³ *Ibid.*

In all the earlier movements of the Renaissance we may distinguish, accordingly, that we have the same characteristic standpoint. The effort which these movements represent is an effort, not to accentuate that antithesis which has been opened in the Western mind — and to which we have seen the characteristic potentiality of our civilisation to be related — but an effort to close it again.¹ As in the outlook of the Stoics, and in the theories of Neo-Platonism, the tendency of the movements themselves is only to bring the world back to a standpoint beyond which the evolutionary process has, in reality, moved.²

¹ Cf. *The Ethic of Free Thought*, by Karl Pearson, ii. viii.

² The name of world-wide renown which has come down through history as representative of this tendency in politics is that of Machiavelli. To Machiavelli, in the midst of the wretchedness and the debased circumstances of the time, the return to the study of the ancient civilisations had been a kind of intoxication. The old Roman State contrasted with the prevailing condition of the world became to him a pattern, an ideal, an inspiration. The religion of the ancient Romans was the State; the State was the end of all human effort; the State represented the ultimate meaning of all human morals. The sense of opposition between the secular State and something which had since been introduced into the world presented itself to Machiavelli, in the end, as a kind of abnormality in nature. (Compare the influence in this connection of his contemporary, *Pietro Pomponatius*.) If only the State could be made again the supreme end of human effort, the overruling object of human moral (Compare the *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius* and *The Prince*, in which the ethics, the aims, the ideals, and polity of the ancient Roman State are the examples held up for imitation.) This was the ideal for which Machiavelli stood, so far as it can be expressed in so few words. But of the deeper tendency which these principles involved as their influence was to be mingled with that of other causes in the historical development in our civilisation — the tendency to the separation of the theory of the State from the principles of ethics and religion — Machiavelli himself remained entirely unconscious.

Vanini, indeed, towards the close of the Renaissance, like Plethon at its beginning, like Porphyry in the Neo-Platonism of the third century, was still imagining the return of our civilisation to the standpoint of the ancient philosophy. Nay, like so many who had preceded him, he was dreaming of the abandonment by the Western mind of that system of religious belief with which it became associated at the beginning of our era. To many minds of the Italian Renaissance—as to Voltaire in the seventeenth century, as to James Mill in the nineteenth century, as to many minds still amongst us—that element in the concepts of the system of belief associated with our civilisation which projects the principles of human conduct beyond any possible equilibrium in the present had simply no meaning.¹

¹ Compare the two in Machiavelli's *Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius*, i. xi.-xv. and iii. xv.-xvii. On its intellectual side the Italian Renaissance in many of its representatives expressed a development towards a kind of nature philosophy, a movement resembling in many of its deeper intellectual features the earlier Neo-Platonism discussed in a previous chapter. We recognise this characteristic feature under many forms—literary, artistic, philosophical, and religious—in the early *Gemistos Plethon* as in the later *Campanella*, in the mystical *von Nettesheim* as in the naturalistic *Telesio*. Beneath the surface of the humanist movement there is, in short, to be always distinguished the ultimate conception of the sufficiency of existing human nature, and the longing for the free and unrestrained expression of it as in the ancient civilisations, this tendency rising in some of its forms to a kind of deifying of nature. The difference between this phase of the movement and the Neo-Platonism of an earlier period has often been discussed at length. But the leading fact of the movement as a whole, with which we are here concerned, stands out clearly. It is that in this feature of the Renaissance, as in that political phase represented by Machiavelli, we see the human mind on the threshold of a new e.a., already indeed feeling the vast stirrings of its spirit, but as yet dream-

The absolutely cosmic significance of the antithesis which these concepts had opened in the human mind; the infinite reach of a process in which the whole period of the era in which men were living, contained as yet scarcely more than the opening phase of a world-drama in which the present was being slowly envisaged with a future to which it was to be subordinated, and in which every principle of the human mind was destined in the end to be broken to the ends of a social efficiency beyond the furthest limits of political consciousness, had not dawned on the imaginations of men.

All the main tendencies of the Renaissance, as a movement liberating the human mind; all the characteristic spirit of inquiry which produced the revival of art, of literature, and of research throughout Europe; all the nascent movements in science and in political philosophy which implied, as we shall see later, although men did not know it at the time, the beginning of the separation of the theory of the State from the principles of ethics and religion; were results destined, each and all, to contribute their meaning later in the developing process of our civilisation. But we have in none of these things, as yet, the life-principle of the movement which is to carry the world forward into that stage of development towards the brink of which it has now advanced. The revival of the knowledge of the ancient civilisations; the discovery of the world of which Columbus had dreamed; the

ing only of carrying forward the process at work in our civilisation, by entirely closing that characteristic antithesis which we have throughout regarded as the evolutionary cause which divides the significance of our era from that of all the past history of the race.

outlook on that infinite universe which the works and theories of Copernicus, Bruno, and Galileo had already brought within range of the human imagination; the printing press which was soon to spread rapidly the new tendencies in knowledge from mind to mind;— were all influences in Western thought powerfully stimulative of change. But all these principles and phases of human activity were but secondary and contributory. We have to look elsewhere to see the real forces of the revolution which is destined to carry our civilisation forward into its next stage, slowly gathering round their life-centre.

Now it will be remembered that in a previous chapter we found the characteristic and distinctive feature of the inner life of the system of religious belief associated with our civilisation, to consist in a single fact which differentiated it from all other systems of belief whatever which had preceded it. There had been opened in the human mind the terms of a profound antithesis which presented certain constant and characteristic features under all conditions. It was an antithesis, we saw, which was not capable of being bridged again in any terms of the individual's own nature, or by any principle operating within the limits of merely political consciousness.

The profound evolutionary significance of the concepts upon which this antithesis rested, in the cosmic drama in which the controlling principles of the evolutionary process were being projected out of the present in Western history, was apparent. And the fact may be recalled that, stripped of their theological garb, we saw nearly all the doctrines which the early Councils of the new religion recognised and con-

demned as heresies were capable of being reduced to a single meaning. They nearly all represented, as we observed, the attempt, under one form or another, to weaken or attenuate the terms or the meaning of this profound antithesis.

Nothing can be more striking, therefore, to the evolutionist than the spectacle which is presented when, with these facts in mind, and with the nature of the problem towards which the human mind is advancing in Western history clearly before him, he turns now from the outward events of the Renaissance to the real centre around which the forces were gathering that were to set in motion that revolution the stress and conflict of which were to fill the centuries in the future. From whatever point the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century is approached it is the same fact which meets the observer. After an interval of more than a thousand years it is, he sees, round the terms of the same antithesis that fierce religious conflict has again begun to be waged. It is upon the conditions in which it is alleged that the meaning of this antithesis has become obscured or obliterated—in a development in which a rule of religion claiming to represent absolute truth is tending to become again a rule of law resting ultimately on force throughout the world—that the religious consciousness has once more become concentrated.

There can be no doubt of this fact as the mind follows closely the characteristic features of the religious revolution of the sixteenth century. Amid the scholastic gloom of the monasteries of North Germany; among the homes of the Swiss Cantons; in the furtive meetings of the wandering artisans of the cities

of the empire ; among the Swabian peasants and the Netherlandian burghers ;¹ nay, even in the shadow of the Curia itself, among the members of the "Oratory of Divine Love ;"² the question to which the attention of men was again directed was the character of the profound antithesis opened in the human mind by the concept of the insufficiency of human nature. Beneath all the outward events of the time it is, we see, the assertion of the conviction of the absolute impossibility of bridging that antithesis in any terms of the sufficiency of human nature itself which has begun once more to move towards its outward expression in Western history.

Looking therefore beneath the surface of the vast, tumultuous, and gloomy world in which the movement known in history as the Reformation was in progress, the first matter which attracts attention is the nature of the problem upon which the Western mind had begun to concentrate itself. At the very heart of the organised ecclesiastical dominion, which for nearly a thousand years had, throughout Western Europe, represented the greatest absolutism within which the human spirit had ever been confined, there had been opened a vast controversy. The underlying problem presented itself under a number of phases. On either side of it all the principal powers and forces represented in our civilisation—all the jealousies and ambitions of the rising nationalities of Europe, all the resurgent activities of the Western mind now represented in the Renaissance—were soon to become

¹ Cf. *History of the Christian Church*, vol. iii. 1517-1648, Wilhelm Moeller; trs. J. H. Freese, 1st, 2nd, and 3d divisions.

² Cf. Ranke's *History of the Popes*, ii. § 1.

involved. But of the nature of the life-centre, around which all the accessory elements of conflict were in the last resort to centre, there can be no doubt from the beginning.

The dispute as to the position of the Church in our civilisation was related, we may perceive, in all its essential significance to one principal fact. This was the conviction slowly settling upon the minds of a party throughout our Western world, that in that development of doctrine which had organised the Church, as the representative of absolute truth, into a world-power coextensive with the State and resting ultimately on force — and by which, therefore, the religious position of the State, on the one hand, and of the individual, on the other, were made dependent on the observance of the Church's authority and ordinances — the meaning of that profoundly significant antithesis opened in the human mind, by which the individual sense of responsibility was projected beyond the meaning of all systems of authority expressing themselves through the present, had tended, in some manner, to become obscured or obliterated.

It is accordingly, the evolutionist notes with interest, upon the concepts through which this antithesis is again tending to be expressed in its most extreme and uncompromising terms, that we see the mind of the party representing the movement known in history as the Reformation concentrating itself through the stress of the sixteenth century.¹ It is, for instance, the theological concepts of "the insufficiency of human nature," of "the absolute incapacity of the natural man for good," of "reconciliation," and of

¹ Cf. *History of Modern Philosophy*, by Kuno Fischer, v.

"justification by faith" as opposed to the prevailing doctrine of "justification by works," that we continually encounter through all the fierce controversies of the period.

As the observer reads between the lines in the controversies of the time he readily grasps the nature of the situation with which the Western mind is gradually closing, as it rises at last to a full view of the dimensions of the problem we saw gradually unfolding itself in the last chapter. Looking back over the development which has taken place, it may be noticed with what inherent inevitableness the steps appear to have followed each other. From the concept that what is known as the spiritual welfare of the world is of more importance than its temporal interests there proceeded, as we saw, the ideal, apparently inherent in it, of the subordination of all the powers and purposes of the political State to the aims of the religious consciousness. In the effort to realise this ideal there arose, therefore, the long struggle between the head of the State and the head of the Church which resulted — apparently with the same inevitableness — in the definition of the latter as the ultimate authority in directing the powers and purposes of the State in subordination to spiritual ends. Of the same inherent necessity there followed the exaltation of the Church over all civil authority whatever. And now, in the final stage of the ideal — that in which, therefore, the State is conceived as dependent for its authority, and the individual for his religious position, upon the authority and the ordinances of the religious consciousness, as organised in a universal Church in which a rule of religion necessarily tends to become

again a rule of civil law—the chain of sequences is complete. The human mind is to all appearance still involved in the ascendancy of the present; still imprisoned within the closed circle of the State, and in a tyranny greater than has ever prevailed in the world before.

It is, therefore, the evolutionist sees, the profound sense of some inherent contradiction between the condition of the religious consciousness as it has become thus organised throughout the world, and the essential meaning of the antithesis opened in the individual mind whereby the sense of human responsibility tends to be projected beyond all systems of authority whatever, expressing themselves through the present, which gives to the concepts of the movement now in progress throughout the Western world that distinctive and characteristic meaning which they may be perceived to possess.

The closer we look at the position involved the more striking does the nature of the situation now developing in Europe appear to the mind. The observer here, as in a previous chapter, will do well to put aside all questions as to the place of particular organisations of the religious consciousness in the controversy in progress. The real problem involved is, he sees, one of the development of the religious consciousness itself. It proceeds directly from the nature of the great antinomy being gradually defined in the world, in which the controlling meaning of the evolutionary process is tending to be ultimately projected beyond the present. It is a problem therefore which has become developed, step by step, in Western history as the human mind has slowly

closed with the cosmic concept, that what it has come to know as its spiritual welfare is of more importance than its temporal interests. The solution is, as yet, far beyond the vision of the disputants on either side. Throughout the whole of the controversy of the period we see, indeed, the question at issue presenting itself to various minds as if it involved nothing more than the claims of particular organisations of the religious consciousness to authoritatively represent the system of belief associated with our civilisation. But the problem to be solved involves, of necessity, the release into the world of a principle inherent in that system of belief which transcends the terms of such a controversy; a principle destined to carry the human mind forward towards a new synthesis of knowledge, nay, towards such a conception of the nature of absolute truth itself, which has not, as yet, dawned on the minds of any of the parties involved.

As we follow the movement in progress in the world, we see, therefore, how that it continues to be carried forward in one direction by the same inherent momentum proceeding from the system of ideas of which the development was traced in the last chapter. The concepts of the movement known as the Reformation, which endeavoured to project the sense of individual responsibility beyond the principle of authority now conceived as resident in the organised Church, were in their very nature incompatible with the ideal which had come to hold the mind of the world. The leaders of the revolution in reality challenged the very life-principle, of that ideal. The concepts which they represented could, we see now,

never be reconciled with it. The position which the movement of the Reformation involved could, in short, from its essential nature, and from the beginning, only be recognised as a movement of rebellion striking at the root of that principle of authority around which the ideal of the Church had come to be organised.¹

Slowly, therefore, but with clear and consistent purpose, we see the organised Church, through all the long series of events which led up to and which followed the Council of Trent, moving towards the application of that principle which had been inherent from the beginning in the ideal in which a rule of religion was destined to become again a rule of law supported in the last resort by civil authority. The Church, in short, braced itself in the supreme crisis now approaching in Western civilisation to the application of force — of force universal and irresistible, applied now through all those secular instruments of the State which, as a first principle of its position, it regarded as existing throughout Christendom in organised subordination to its own purposes and ends.

With the history of the Church during the latter half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, that long-drawn-out phase of human development represented in the first period of our era passes towards its culmination. Throughout the whole of Western Europe — in the affairs of the empire, in the history of Italy, of Germany, of Spain, and of France, and in the development in

¹ Compare the position of the emperor up to 1541, e.g. Ranke's *History of the Popes*, b. ii. § 2, and Moeller's *History of the Christian Church*, vol. iii. d. i. chap. vi.

progress in England, in Scotland, and in the Scandinavian countries—the battle which was waged round that ideal which had hitherto controlled the mind of the world, slowly broadened out into a single, clearly defined issue. That issue implied the attempt to enforce the authority of the Church with all the powers of the secular State, and all the organised machinery of that secular world of which the Church had obtained control. From the election in 1519 of the Emperor Charles V., who regarded himself as called to the imperial office by divine appointment as champion and protector of the Church in the crisis upon which it had entered, to the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1649, that is to say, for a period of 130 years, only one prime issue underlay the political life of Western Europe. In that period of almost incessant war a multitude of class, of personal, and of national ambitions sought to obtain ends of their own amid the clash of arms and the continuous stress of diplomacy. But there can never be at any time a doubt as to the real nature of the world-embracing struggle which was in progress beneath the surface of events. In the international conflict of the counter-Reformation, in the States in which the Revolution had gained a firm footing, the Church organised, inspired, and directed to the full extent of its powers the secular forces of the world against the rebellion in its corporate aspect. In the conflict with the individual States it placed its rebels outside the pale of legality. It excommunicated the rulers; it absolved the subjects from allegiance to government. Within the borders of the States themselves it carried the same warfare to its utmost

limits against the individual; looking always, in the open processes of its hostility as in the secret courts of the Inquisition, to the secular arm of the civil law to execute its judgments against those whom it branded as heretics and rebels.

The development which had taken place in our civilisation had, in short, reached its last logical outcome. The conditions of a past era of evolution, in which the controlling centre of religious consciousness was still in the present, and in which it was, therefore, considered that the transgression of a religious ordinance should be punished by civil penalties, had survived into the new era. But under the forms of our civilisation, and as the great antinomy represented therein had gradually defined itself, the old conditions had become instinct with a tyranny of which the human mind had never before dreamed. For the policy of the Church, it must be perceived, was dictated throughout with an absolute and unchanging belief that, as the spiritual welfare of the world was of greater importance than temporal interests, so the aims of the absolutism which it represented outweighed every other interest with which it was confronted. Its warfare was waged, therefore, the evolutionist sees, not in the spirit the controversialist often still speaks of it as having been waged, but, even under the darkest phases of the Inquisition, with a deep, concentrated, and steadfast determination, with an intense devotion, with a self-sacrificing and all-consuming zeal on the part of its chosen instruments, which is probably without any parallel on so great a scale in human history.

Even at this distance of time it is not possible for

the nature of the part which has been played in that development by the military peoples of the world to altogether escape the attention of the observer. Over the peoples of Southern Europe the movement known as the Reformation passed, leaving in the end scarcely a trace.¹ We must probably go farther than Hegel's explanation for the causes from which this result proceeded.² There were probably many causes. But prominent among them a place must be given to one which goes deeper than those usually mentioned by historians, and to which, in all probability, other causes were related; namely, the abiding effect produced on the whole fabric of the social and intellectual life of the Southern peoples by the closer contact which they had undergone with the ideals of that epoch of human evolution represented by the life of the Roman empire and the spirit of the ancient civilisations. Under these ideals the instinct to see the deeper principles of society in that complex and antithetical aspect, in which all the phenomena of the social and religious development of a world passing out from under the control of the hitherto ascendant present, must of necessity present themselves to the human mind, had obtained little room for development. The Latin mind tended, therefore, in all probability, to see truth—as, indeed, it still tends to see it—only in that more readily comprehensible, but also more elementary aspect in which it appears to be compressed into the severely consistent and logical forms which are, in reality, related to the governing principles of an earlier era of human evolution.

¹ Cf. Moeller, *Hist. of Chr. Church*, vol. iii. d. iii. and v.

² Cf. *Philosophy of History*, by G. W. F. Hegel, pt. iv. sec. iii. chap. 1.

But when it became a question of enforcing this instinct of the Latin mind against the more Northern peoples, we see how significant became again the part played by the military races of the North in continuing to hold the stage of history as the cosmic drama, in which the ascendancy of the present was being challenged, continued to unfold itself in our civilisation. In the Latin countries of Italy and Spain the revolution was soon entirely suppressed by the unsparing use of force,—this end being the more rapidly attained as the movement in these countries had found little general support among the people, and was from the beginning almost limited to the more educated and inquiring classes. In France, after a brief and desperate period of opposition, punctuated by the Huguenot wars, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the events which were to lead up to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the same result followed. It was in Germany first, and in England afterwards, that the movement rocked and swayed in terrible convulsions round its life-centre, and that the era of successful resistance, based on military force, passed gradually outwards towards a new world-era in development.

By the middle of the seventeenth century the issue of the struggle had been decided in Western Europe. Driven by an instinct, the reach and depth of which the Western mind even as yet but dimly understands, we see the human spirit, in the midst of the stress of a century and a half of world-shaking conflict, achieving the definition, in more uncompromising terms than it had ever before been stated, of the antinomy which had been opened in history. Centuries are

yet to pass before the real meaning of the profoundly significant transition which has been accomplished is destined to fully permeate the religious consciousness of our civilisation. Whole periods of thought are destined yet to develop and to pass, before the relationship, to every phase of social evolution included under the head of modern progress, of the cause which had thus begun to project the controlling principles of the religious consciousness beyond the theory of the State, beyond the widest limits of political consciousness, beyond all the forms and principles under which the ascendancy of the present had hitherto expressed itself, is to be clearly grasped by the Western intellect. But the first great crisis in Western history in which this transition is in process of accomplishment has been passed.

Looking at the world over which the storm of the Reformation has passed, it presents at first sight an extraordinary spectacle in the uncertain light of the grey morning of the modern world. Our Western civilisation has moved into an epoch of which the ruling principle is to be entirely different from any which has ever prevailed in the world before. Viewing the system of belief associated with that civilisation—in its aspect as a developmental principle in history—an immense interval is destined to be placed between its evolutionary significance in the future and its import as an evolutionary cause under the principles which had prevailed in the past. Yet looking out over Europe immediately after the events just described, it is remarkable to see how profoundly unconscious the human mind remains, and is yet for long to remain, of the potentiality of principles under-

lying the result which has been accomplished, and of the nature of the goal towards which the life-processes of Western civilisation have now begun to be carried rapidly forward.

As we watch from this point forward the development towards modern history of the two sides of the antinomy in which the infinite future is being slowly ranged in conflict through every phase of human activity with the still ascendant present—and of which the ultimate significance is destined to be the emancipation of the future in such a free conflict of forces as has never been in the world before—we begin to have a clearer view of the outlines of the stupendous problem which has been involved from the beginning in the projection of the centre of significance in the evolutionary process out of the present.

On looking back over the remarkable position which has so far resulted from the first contact in Western history of the human mind with the concept that what it has come to know as its spiritual welfare is of more importance than temporal interests, we see now that there is only one way in which the controlling principles of the religious consciousness can be ultimately projected beyond the content of all systems of authority whatever in which the ascendant present has hitherto been able to imprison the human spirit. The Western mind, we begin to realise, is destined, sooner or later, to rise to a conception of the nature of truth itself different from any that has hitherto prevailed in the world. It must conceive truth at last, we perceive, as being capable of being correctly presented in the human process in history, only as we see it presented in all forms of developing

life; namely, as the net resultant of forces which are in themselves apparently opposed and conflicting.

Such a conception of truth is, in reality, quite new to the world. It is entirely foreign to all those conditions of mind which are peculiar to the childhood of the race, and which still continue to be characteristic of the childhood of the individual. It was a conception completely alien to the genius of the ancient civilisations. Profoundly as it has already come to modify, as we shall see later, the institutions, the deeper mental processes, and the attitude of the religious consciousness amongst those peoples to whom the future of the world, to all appearance, now belongs, it still remains altogether foreign to the vast majority of our fellow-creatures, and even to a considerable proportion of the less advanced peoples included among modern nations. But it is to such a conception of absolute truth, held not simply as an intellectual principle, but as the ultimate controlling conviction of religious consciousness, that we see the Western mind now about to be compelled to rise, as it begins at last to move towards that universal empire which has been inherent in Western civilisation from the beginning of our era — a universal empire in which the future is to be at last emancipated in a free and necessarily tolerant conflict of forces; but a conflict, nevertheless, in the stress of which every cause and opinion and institution is to hold its life only at the challenge of such criticism and competition as has never been possible in the world before.¹

¹ Compare the position in *Natural Rights*, chap. viii., by D. G. Ritchie, with that in Schlegel's *Philosophy of History* (Robertson), and E. Caird's *Philosophy of Kant*, vol. ii. (eg. pp. 365-372).

One of the most remarkable periods in Western history is that included in the centuries which immediately followed the movement known as the Reformation. It is a period in which, as has been stated, we see the mind of the time still, to all appearance, entirely unconscious of the nature of the principle which had been released into the world; still moving within the circle of the ideas hitherto ascendant in history; and yet, withal, being carried irresistibly forward towards a goal altogether different from any which had been imagined in the past. By nearly all historians these centuries are included in the modern period of history. Yet, strange as it may seem to many minds, in any scientific division of the periods of our civilisation they belong, strictly speaking, to the pre-Reformation epoch of history. In almost every country in which the new form of doctrine attained to ascendancy the first result was the same. Its adherents immediately attempted to associate it with the State, and to enforce through the organisation of civil government the new interpretation of truth.

Looking first to Germany, the spectacle which is presented to view is of the deepest interest. In almost every part of that country in which the movement of the Reformation triumphed the same result followed. We see the party representing that movement conceiving itself now in turn as the representative of absolute truth; and, therefore, setting out almost from the beginning with its face, to all appearance, directed towards exactly the same goal that the organised Church had reached in Europe through that long development of the centuries

already described. In the numerous Church communities¹ early formed in North Germany on the model of the Brunswick Church Ordinances, the affairs of the Church from the beginning were considered as forming part of the various city administrations. Later on, as the movement developed, we see the reigning princes of the German States which accepted the Reformation following in the same direction; and, as a matter of course, taking their places in the Church as organisers and administrators of its affairs.² Everywhere we appear to see the new movement endeavouring to follow the same principle of the past; identifying the ecclesiastical organisation with the civil community, attempting the suppression of what are considered to be false views, and the punishment of offenders; and always, in so doing, seeking, as a matter of course, as in the days of the Carolingian empire, to make the civil authority the executive organ of the ecclesiastical community.³ By the religious peace of 1648 we have the *ius reformandi* given to the civil governments in Germany, and the association and amalgamation of the powers of the sovereign and the Church duly recognised in practice.⁴

In Switzerland we have in view a still more remarkable spectacle. In the German States the tendency had been, throughout the progress of the Reformation movement, for the authorities and reigning princes to assume episcopal authority in a

¹ Moeller, *Hist. of Chr. Church*, vol. iii. divs. i. and iv.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Cf. *Transactions of the Rhenish Provincial Synod, 1844*, trans. in *Constitution of the Church of the Future*, by C. C. J. Bunsen.

Church organisation still considered as episcopal. But in Switzerland the tendency was towards the forms of a republic in the new religious communities. Yet, here again, the identification of the rule of the Church with the civil law of the community was accepted as a matter beyond question. Nay, it was soon made even more complete than in the German States. We see Calvin demanding from the civil authority in Switzerland the recognition of the Church's order of discipline; and we watch the gradual development in the city of Geneva, towards the middle of the sixteenth century, of one of the most remarkable examples of a theocracy under the forms of ecclesiastical republicanism that has ever existed in the world.¹

Under the rule of the civil authorities but one true faith was tolerated in Geneva. The strictest inquisition was maintained into the private life and morals of the citizens. Any falling away from the true faith was counted a crime against the State. Convicted heretics were punished by civil authority. Revolt, like that of Ami Perrin, was visited with the utmost severity. For theological heterodoxy like that of Servetus the punishment was death at the stake, with Calvin's approval. Calvin, in short, to quote the words of an accepted authority, "pressed for the severest penal laws possible, and the merciless execution of the same: pious authorities must be strict. Within five years fifty-eight death sentences and seventy-six banishments were carried out amongst the inhabitants of Geneva, who numbered about 20,000. . . . The Consistory performed the

¹ Cf. Moeller, *Hist. of Chr. Church*, vol. iii. div. ii. chap. ii.

functions of a keen police board of morals, exercising a strict watch, and acting on Calvin's principle, that it is better that many innocent persons should be punished than that one guilty person should remain unpunished."¹

Throughout Northern Europe the development continued with unabated pace. In Sweden dissenters were banished by the civil authorities. The duty of the civil power to punish heretics was expressed in the Swiss, Scottish, and Belgic "Confessions" of the new movement. Even the Anabaptists, mentioned towards the end of the seventeenth century by Bossuet as one of the only two bodies of Christians then known to him which did not maintain the right of the civil magistrate to punish false doctrine,² turned naturally to force for the suppression of religious error in that disastrous experiment at government in Münster which Karl Pearson has so graphically though characteristically described.³ The ideas underlying the experiment of Calvin in Geneva profoundly impressed, as time went on, the religious life of Western Europe.⁴ In England they were for

¹ Cf. Moeller, *Hist. of Chr. Church*, vol. iii. div. ii. chap. ii.

² *Hist. Variat. Protestantis*, liv. x. chap. 56; cf. Lecky's *Europ. Rail.* vol. ii. 53.

³ *Ethic of Free Thought*, by Karl Pearson, pp. 263-313; cf. Moeller, *Hist. of Chr. Church*, vol. iii. div. i. chap. v. p. 4.

⁴ "Calvin," as Mr. Morley has said, "shaped the mould in which the bronze of Puritanism was cast. That commanding figure, of such vast power, yet somehow with so little lustre, by his unbending will, his pride, his severity, his French spirit of system, his gift for government, for legislation, for dialectic in every field, his incomparable industry and persistence, had conquered a more than pontifical ascendancy in the Protestant world. He meets us in England, as in Scotland, Holland, France, Switzerland, and the rising England across the Atlantic. He

a period paramount.¹ In Scotland, under the influence of Knox, they became the basis of that severe, consistent, ecclesiastical republicanism which moved Moeller to admiration;² in which the ideal of the State from the beginning was a theocracy of the sternest type; in which the civil law was the arm of the Church against offenders; and in which the authorities were expected to purge the State of false doctrine after the manner of the pious kings of Israel.³ And this even while at the same time — as during the greater part of the reign of the Stuarts — there was, at the instigation of the Scotch bishops (themselves representing the Reformation movement in another phase), directed against the very doctrines upon which this ideal rested, a persecution which left its mark deep on the Scottish mind and character, in which the Presbyterians were hunted and tortured by the civil power, and transported as criminals to the Barbados.⁴

died (1564) a generation before Cromwell was born, but his influence was still at its height. Nothing less than to create in man a new nature was his far-reaching aim, to regenerate character, to simplify and consolidate religious faith. His scheme comprehended a doctrine that went to the very root of man's relations with the scheme of universal things; a Church order as closely compacted as that of Rome; a system of moral discipline as concise and as imperative as the code of Napoleon. He built it all upon a certain theory of the government of the universe, which by his agency has exerted an amazing influence upon the world" (*Oliver Cromwell*, by Right Hon. John Morley).

¹ "In England, at the end of Elizabeth's reign," says Professor Gardiner, "the doctrines taught and accepted by the vast majority of that part of the clergy which was in any real sense of the word religious, was Calvinistic" (*Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, Intro. xx.).

² *Hist. of the Chr. Church*, vol. iii. p. 3; 2nd div. chap. ii.; and 4th div. chap. iv.

³ *Ibid.* vol. iii. 5th div. chap. iii.

⁴ *The Rise of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. ii. p. 41.

But it was in England that the tendency reached its freest and most characteristic development. Here the forces, representing the new ideas, armed themselves almost from the beginning with civil power. This was used at first against those supporting the pre-Reformation principles. But soon the forces representing the various tendencies within the post-Reformation development entered in England upon a struggle amongst themselves of altogether exceptional bitterness, intensity, and duration; in which success from time to time appeared to favour now one party and now another. It became in time such a struggle of each for mastery as has been paralleled nowhere else in the world. Out of it, at the end of a prolonged period of profound political and religious convulsion, there began to emerge slowly into the sight of men the principle of a new epoch of human evolution; that ruling principle which, in a scientific division of Western time, will in future be seen to divide the Middle Ages from the modern world.

For nearly two centuries beneath the shifting scenes of this struggle in England, only one idea continued to occupy the minds of all the combatants, namely, the deadliness of the liberty of religious error, and the necessity, therefore, for enlisting the arm of civil authority against it. For 140 years, from the passing of the Act of Uniformity in 1549 to the Toleration Act of 1689, the statute book of England presents one of the most extraordinary records in the history of our civilisation, in the long list of measures with which it armed the civil authority from time to time with repressive powers against what the ruling party for the time being considered to be false doctrine.

When the combatants in the struggle in progress in England crossed the Atlantic and sought a refuge for their ideas in the New England settlements, the principle which held men's minds still carried them forward to the same result. Massachusetts early became the centre of colonies on the other side of the Atlantic where the refugees endeavoured to carry out their ideas of theocratic States which rested, in the last resort, on exactly the same alliance — between civil authority and a particular interpretation of religious doctrine believed to be right — as they had left behind them at home. Decidedly liberal and democratic as were the refugees' ideals at first, their ecclesiastical conceptions soon turned in favour of the enforcement of strict conformity to law;¹ and the right of the civil authorities to punish lapses from the accepted doctrine was in time, in more than one of the New England colonies, exercised with as great severity as by the Presbyterians at home.²

In England itself the stern logic of facts progressed slowly through history to the last analysis, in a series of events the evolutionary significance of which has even as yet hardly reached the general mind. As we read between the lines of the Grand Remonstrance presented to the king in 1641, on the eve of the great struggle of the civil war, we see how inexorable were the tendencies of the development in which both sides alike were caught. In the clauses numbered from 183 to 187,³ the aim of the times is most clearly set forth. It was to secure the enforcement through the State, and as against the king, of

¹ Moeller, *Hist. of Chr. Church*, vol. iii. 5th div. c. iii. ² *Ibid.*

³ *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, No. 43.

the religious opinions of the party behind it. In the words of Professor Gardiner, "there was to be no toleration of nonconformity, the plan of the framers of the Grand Remonstrance was to substitute the general enforcement of their own form of Church government and worship for that which had recently been enforced by the authority of the king and the bishops."¹

One of the most remarkable of recent contributions to our knowledge of the Cromwellian period in England has been made by Professor Gardiner, in bringing to light the single clue which, going deeper than any of the merely political interpretations of that period, underlies all the apparently conflicting policies and experiments in government undertaken by Cromwell. "After the violent dissolution of the Long Parliament," says Professor Gardiner, "Cromwell in turn supported systems as opposed to one another as those of the Nominated Parliament, the Instrument of Government, arbitrary rule with the help of the major-generals, the new Parliamentary Constitution of the Humble Petition and Advice; and to all appearance would have rallied to yet another plan if his career had not been cut short by death." Yet in all these acts one consistent aim and determination is traced by Professor Gardiner. To use his actual words: "In England the whole struggle against regal power had been carried on by a minority." But in this struggle what appeared to Cromwell as the one thing necessary above all others, was that "the whole burden of government in the interest of the nation must

¹ *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, Intro. p. xxxix.

be entrusted to a minority composed of the godly or honest people of the nation, in the hope that the broad views and beneficent actions of this minority would in time convert it into a majority. So far as I know, Cromwell never swerved from this view of the national requirements. *To the end of his life he strove to maintain the ascendancy of a Puritan oligarchy.*"¹

No one familiar with the inner history of the period in question will doubt that in this matter Professor Gardiner is right;² and that, in the statement of the aim expressed in the words here put into italics, he has correctly interpreted the inner purpose of Cromwell. It was, in short, in this purpose — the maintenance of an oligarchy founded on religious opinion as opposed to another oligarchy also, in the last resort, founded on religious opinion — that we have the real secret of the Cromwellian epoch in England. It was the same aim which underlay alike the struggle against the regal power and the execution of the king, the purge of Parliament, and the scheme for the government of England through the major-generals. The method varied from the absolutist standards of the past to what were the forms, and at times almost the spirit, of the later principle of tolerance to which men were being compelled to rise. But it was still always, as yet, one clear ideal — the ascendancy in the State, and the alliance with civil authority,

¹ "Cromwell's Constitutional Aims," by S. R. Gardiner, *Contemporary Review*, No. 409.

² Compare closely in this connection the Document "Declaration by the Lord-General and the Council on the dissolution of the Long Parliament" (*Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, part v. No. 95).

of a system of religious doctrines believed to be right — which held the mind even of the parliamentary leader in this fateful turning period of English history.

It is absolutely necessary, if we would obtain a clear view of the meaning of the world-process developing beneath our eyes, that the existence of this large group of facts should be kept well before the mind, and that its purport in the development of our civilisation should not be missed. It would seem, if the endeavour continues to be made to preserve a position of detachment from all preconceived ideas, that we are confronted in history at this point with a deeper truth than is to be distinguished, at first sight, in any of the controversies of the time. It is not the aspect of these controversies as men were regarding them; but the development which the religious consciousness is itself slowly undergoing beneath the events of the time that calls for attention. It is the development in which we catch a first distant glimpse of the only condition under which it is possible to conceive the emancipation of the future being accomplished in the evolutionary process in history — the condition, that is to say, in which the human mind is destined to be compelled to rise to a conception of truth in which the principle of tolerance is to be held in the only way in which it can ever become permanently operative in the world, namely, as an ultimate conviction of the religious consciousness — which holds the scientific imagination.¹ Viewed in this light, we see that it was, in

¹ Compare Caird's *Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 365-372, with J. St. Loe Strachey's statement to the effect that the essence of the characteristic

reality, not so much in the movement usually known as the Reformation, as in the development in the two centuries immediately succeeding it, that a principle which had controlled an immense epoch of human history, and which had been projected into our era from an earlier stage of the evolutionary process, reached its ultimate phase. And it was in this period that the operation of that principle culminated at last in the only conditions which could prepare the way for the release into the world of the infinite potentiality which had been inherent in Western civilisation since the beginning of our era.

It has been said that in almost every country in which the new form of doctrine triumphed it had immediately attempted to associate itself with the State, and to enforce once more, through the organisation of civil government, its own interpretation of absolute truth. But it is not under this aspect alone that we have to watch the human mind in the evolutionary process in Western history being gradually driven step by step from one position to another; still ever looking back, still ever dreaming that it was moving within the circle of the ideals of the past; and yet, in reality, gradually but surely passing out under the control of an entirely new ruling principle in the development of the world.

The events which have been here passed in review constitute the development—every step in which may be said to have been inevitable from the begin-

truth to which the modern religious consciousness has advanced is "that toleration is *per se* a religious act, and not a mere convention based on convenience—a course of action founded on the principle of reciprocity" (*Grave to Gay*, p. 159).

ning—leading to the slow dissociation of the religious consciousness from all ultimate alliance with the authority of the State. But on the other side of the process the separation of civil authority—claiming through the conception of divine right in the State—from its association with the religious consciousness has progressed equally, through all the events of history, with almost the same inexorable consistency of the law of gravitation.

At the beginning of the Reformation period in England we see the ruling sovereign¹ told by his advisers, that in the act of his breach with Rome, and in constituting himself the only supreme head of the Church in his dominions, he was but restoring the Church in England to a position similar to that which it occupied on the continent of Europe in the age of Charlemagne. He himself imagined that he was at least allying the despotic civil power of the house of Tudor with the principle of divine right in the State. Yet we see him as but a cork on the stream of history. At a later stage Elizabeth, as the movement progressed, was also ready to ally her own government with the new forces in religion; these forces being in the main those which bore her to success and triumph.² But in the middle of her career we see her reminded by a Scottish deputation, that there must also be considered to be latent in the theory of divine right in the State, as it was now understood, the doctrine that nations were in the last resort superior to the sovereigns who dif-

¹ Henry VIII.

² *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, Intro. xv., by S. R. Gardiner.

ferred from them. Still later, James I. and his son Charles I. saw in the alliance between their own authority and that of the established Episcopal Church in England the form of government that, in the words of the chronicler, "best compared with their own idea of monarchical power."¹ But the stern Calvinists behind the Long Parliament were ready to support, and did support through all the bitter consequences of the overthrow of Charles and the ascendancy of Cromwell, the assertion that the theory of divine right in the State, as it had come to be now understood, was in their opinion associated with quite other conceptions of civil government.

Later yet we see neither the civil authority for the time being nor Presbyterianism itself, after it had reached the notable position of influence which it occupied in England² the period of the Westminster Assembly, finally, any firm principle in the alliance between the ideals represented by the two. And still later we see Cromwell, in the remarkable passage already quoted, ever striving and yet ever failing, alike under the forms of freedom as under the principles of despotism, to secure through the Puritan ascendancy in England the same alliance between the civil power of the State and a particular interpretation of religious doctrine. Again and again, through a hundred channels of authority in England the doctrine had been preached of the deadly sinfulness of resistance to the ruling civil authority. But in the midst of the vast transition in progress it happened, as has been said, that "doctrines concerning the sin-

¹ Moeller, *Hist. of Chr. Church*, vol. iii. p. 345.

fulness of rebellion which were urged with the most dogmatic certainty and supported by the most terrific threats, swayed to and fro with each vicissitude of fortune."¹ They changed with the passing ascendancy of every interest of the time.

And so the inevitable development of the cosmic drama continued in history. It had been supposed that the authority of the Church had passed to the king. But with the close of the Puritan Revolution in England the great end which had been attained — that end by the accomplishment of which, as has been rightly insisted, the restoration of Charles II. was alone made possible — was, that the predominance of Parliament in the Church and over the bishops had been in turn substituted for that of the king.² This was the beginning of the final stage. In the second Revolution, completed twenty-eight years later with the flight of James II., and producing as its result the Toleration Act and the Bill of Rights, there began in England the modern era of parliamentary government by the system of mutually opposing parties. In this final transition, the steps of which carry us down into our own time, the inevitable end was already in sight. For it had become at last only a matter of time when there must necessarily be accomplished in England the emancipation, now in turn, of the religious consciousness from the control of Parliament, in a parliamentary system in which all the leading parties in the State were necessarily represented.

¹ *History of Rationalism in Europe*, vol. ii. pp. 198-199.

² *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*, Intro. xxxviii. and lxvii.

It was amongst the English-speaking peoples, although not in England, that the final stage of this immense drama of progress was first reached in the course of inevitable development. In one of the most interesting chapters in modern history, enacted in the English-speaking settlements in America, the progress of events, free from the local disturbing causes which had operated in England, was more rapid and more definite. In English-speaking America nearly every colony began, to use Mr. Bryce's words, "with an establishment and endowment of religion by the civil power. After the American Revolution had turned the colonies into States, every State in which such an establishment existed threw it off, some by a sudden effort, like Virginia, some by a slow process, like Connecticut and Massachusetts. No new State has ever set it up."¹ In the first article of those in addition to and in amendment of the Constitution of the United States, proposed by Congress to the Legislatures of the States 25th September 1789, and ratified 1789-91, it is at last enacted that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."² Slowly, but with ever-increasing insistence, the stern logic of inherent principles expressed itself in the events of history, and brought home to men's minds the fact that they were yet for long to refuse to admit in principle,

¹ Pref. to L. W. Bacon's *History of American Christianity*, by James Bryce; see also *The American Commonwealth*, vol. i. chap. xxxvii. and vol. ii. chap. cvi.

² Cf. Macdonald's *Select Documents illustrative of the History of the United States*, No. 5. The amendment went into effect on 3rd Nov. 1791.

namely, that the grounds upon which there had hitherto rested that greatest of all despotisms of the present — that which must of necessity express itself through the alliance of civil authority with a form of religious belief conceived as concerned with the greatest of all human interests — had been once and for ever struck away from it in our civilisation.

We, therefore, see at last in true perspective — and as constituting but the details of a single developmental process in history — all the events in the movement, prolonged over seven centuries, which began with the struggle between Pope Gregory VII. and the Emperor in the eleventh century, and which reached its issue at last in the definite terms registered in the Constitution of the United States of America. In the article in the American Constitution just quoted, we have in Western history the first complete expression remaining unchanged to the present day, of the actual projection of the controlling consciousness of the system of religious belief associated with our civilisation beyond all the forms and principles of the present; beyond the content of all systems of authority whatever in which it had hitherto been imprisoned within the bounds of political consciousness. The most significant turning-point within the horizon of Western history had been passed. Unseen, unrealised; to be for centuries yet but tacitly acknowledged, but dimly comprehended, or even entirely misunderstood of men, the ruling principle of a new era in the developmental process at work in human history had risen into ascendancy in the world.

Along one line of intellectual development the Western mind has yet to reach, in the inexorable

events of the historical process, the import of the fact already visible through the analysis undertaken in Chapter III. — namely, that there is not, and that there never will be, amongst the peoples to whom the future belongs, any ultimate sanction for the principle of such tolerance in the State as can emancipate the future, save that furnished by a conviction of responsibility in the human mind transcending the content of all interests within the limits of political consciousness — before the real nature is fully perceived of the tremendous problem with which the human mind has wrestled in the cosmic stress of the centuries of our era that have passed.¹ It is only in the first light of the principle of Projected Efficiency, as applied to the social process in history, that we begin to see the nature of the right in which the peoples to whom the future belongs will hold the world: The world in which the future is to be emancipated is to be a world in which every cause, and institution, and opinion, and interest will hold its very life at the challenge of such criticism and competition as has never been known before. But it is to be a world, nevertheless, in which all the phenomena of progress, and of the free conflict which prevails, remain related to a single underlying cause; namely, that the ultimate controlling principles of human action have been projected beyond the content of all systems whatever of interest or of authority in the present.

It is in the highest degree important to note here, in passing, the significance of the conditions in which

¹The scientific side of the position with which Kant closed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and in the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*, henceforward becomes clearly visible in the historical process.

this result was attained. It has been pointed out that the necessary fact accompanying the projection of the controlling centre of the evolutionary process out of the present, has been the attainment by the human mind of such a conception of truth as was absolutely unknown to it during the epoch which culminated in the ancient civilisations, and as remained entirely foreign to it during almost seventeen centuries of our era; namely, the conception of truth as the net resultant of forces and standards apparently in themselves opposed and conflicting. It was, accordingly, among the peoples where the vast conflict of the movement following the Reformation reached its most characteristic development that the conditions tending most to produce this result prevailed. It was among the English-speaking peoples of England and America — constituting the representatives of the most purely German of the political systems which sprang from the ruins of the Roman empire, constituting in particular the only large group of Northern peoples who attained to political maturity free from the old-world shadow of the ancient civilisations,¹ and almost free from the old-world spirit of the Roman law,² — that this result of the Reformation, transforming in its future consequences, slowly, but only slowly, began to be visible in our Western world.

It is in this projection of the controlling centre of the religious consciousness of our civilisation out of the present, expressing itself in a principle of toler-

¹ Cf. *Comparative Politics*, by E. A. Freeman, pp. 46, 47.

² Cf. *Civilisation during the Middle Ages*, by G. B. Adams, p. 325. Cf. also Bryce's "Roman and English Law" in *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, E. ii.

ance, held in the last resort as a religious principle, and therefore itself becoming iron at the point at which its own principle of tolerance is threatened, that we have the most remarkable, as it is the most characteristic, result of the evolutionary process in our Western world. We shall presently have to deal with it in its wider aspect as a cause behind all the phenomena of modern progress. But the movement which has produced it has been so prolonged; its effects are so deep, so far-reaching, and on so large a scale; they lie, moreover, as yet so largely in the future;—that no system of modern philosophy has as yet seen it whole. And the intellectual process, which in the modern era of our civilisation has progressed side by side with the historical process in which the result has been accomplished, has itself been on a scale so vast that the horizon of its meaning has hitherto fallen beyond the view even of the minds which have most assisted in working out its principles.

But the main outline of that meaning, as it has begun at last to come within the field of intellectual vision, is very remarkable. Side by side with the process just referred to, in which, in the dissociation of the religious consciousness from all alliance with civil authority, we have the outward historical expression of the projection of the controlling centre of the evolutionary process beyond the bounds of political consciousness, it may be noticed that there are to be distinguished in modern thought two main streams of tendency. Each of these, involving a development incomplete in itself, and forming but an outward symptom of a deeper movement beneath,

has slowly but inevitably progressed in our time towards the exhibition of its own insufficiency. In one of these developments we follow from the Reformation onward through modern times, first of all in English and later in German thought, a slowly descending line of search after the principle of authority in politics allied with the sanction of the system of religious belief associated with our civilisation. The ideal of this quest may be said to have reached its last attenuation in Western thought in the Hegelian conception of civil authority in the Christian State.¹

In the other development we follow a long-sustained, but also gradually faltering quest of the intellect, to find, in the interests of the existing political State alone, the sole ruling principle in our social evolution. This development takes its way through the literature of the French Revolution into the Utilitarian conceptions of Bentham and the Mills; and in its turn it may be said to have reached, as Laveleye has correctly pointed out, its last logical inferences in Western thought in the purely materialistic theories of Marxian socialism.² Down to the present time the Latin mind in our civilisation has tended to swing between the extreme logical expression of the concepts underlying these two ideals—between the principles of the pre-Reformation period, in which the Church is regarded as the ultimate and

¹ Compare John Henry Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, chap. i. (to the year 1833), for a sense of the failure of this conception reached in a section of English religious thought in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

² Cf. *The English Utilitarians*, by Leslie Stephen, vol. iii. pp. 224-237.

supreme power in the organisation of civil authority, and the principles of the polity of the ancient civilisations, in which the materialistic State is regarded as containing within itself the whole theory of human ends and interests. It is principally in the English-speaking world that the profound evolutionary significance of the larger synthesis of knowledge which lies between these two developments is becoming visible. The first aspect of it has already, with insight, been distinguished by Sir Frederick Pollock in the assertion already referred to¹ — that the characteristic result of all recent English thought as applied to the science of society has been a clearly defined progress, not towards the ideals of either of these movements, but towards such a complete separation of all the field of analytical political science, on the one hand, from what has become the domain of ethics and religion, on the other, as has taken place nowhere else in our civilisation.²

¹ *History of the Science of Politics*, pp. 113-114.

² Compare, in this connection, Professor Holland's lucid explanation of the effect of recent tendencies in English thought as they apply to the current science of jurisprudence in England. The moral sciences he describes as tending in our time to fall into two grand divisions. The first division he classifies as "Ethics." In the second division, which he describes as possessing hitherto no received collective name, and which he proceeds to provisionally designate "Nomology," we are concerned, he says, simply with the science of the office of external regulation in the State. The complete dissociation of English jurisprudence from the first group is emphasised in these words: "The moral sciences having thus been grouped under the head of Ethic, in which the object of investigation is the conformity of the will to a rule; and of Nomology, in which the object of investigation is the conformity of acts to a rule, we pass by the former as foreign to our subject, and confine our attention to the latter." The laws with which it is concerned no longer relate to any kind of teleology of the State and its

This result, entirely absent in countries where the standards of the pre-Reformation period still prevail,¹ largely absent, as yet, even in Germany and in German thought, where the development which has followed the Reformation has left the religious consciousness still deeply entangled with the theory of the State,² is itself the distinctive mark of the advanced stage which the evolutionary process has reached in the English-speaking world. It is the necessary accompaniment and the outward sign of the actual accomplishment of that vast transition we have been here describing, in which, with the projection of the controlling centre of the evolutionary process out of the present, a rule of law has been finally differentiated

institutions, but are simply "general rules of human action enforced by a sovereign political authority" (*The Elements of Jurisprudence*, by Thomas Erskine Holland, chap. iii.). Compare with this Sir Frederick Pollock's assertion, that in English thought the analytical branch of political science has become altogether independent of ethical theories. "And that is the definite scientific result which we in England say that the work of the past century has given us" (*History of the Science of Politics*, pp. 113-114).

¹ For instance, at a conference of the bishops of Spain, held at Burgos in September 1899, seventeen principles of action in the State were formulated. "Amongst those enumerated in a summary given in the *Times* were that 'toleration should be confined to the narrowest limit allowed by the Constitution,' that 'no ecclesiastic should be punished by the ordinary civil courts of justice,' that marriages by the Church should always have civil effect, that bishops should recover legacies from pious testators without any intervention of lay authority, and that all associations which are not Catholic should be prohibited."

² Cf. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, pt. iii. sec. iii. §§ 257-360; and *Philosophy of History*, Intro. and pt. iv. Hegel as yet saw in the post-Reformation development in the German State only "the reconciliation of religion with legal right," and "no religious conscience in a state of separation from, or perhaps even hostility to, secular right" (*Philosophy of History*, pt. iv. sec. iii. chap. iii.).

from a rule of religion. It is a result the completion of which marks the beginning of an entirely new era of synthesis in Western thought.

But its meaning is as yet scarcely at all understood outside the pale of the English-speaking world,¹ where it is giving to our modern progress a certain double aspect which is responsible for one of the most curious illusions of our time. Mr. Bryce has remarked on one of the little understood phenomena of the current life of the United States of America, namely, the entire dissociation of the religious consciousness from all forms of civil authority, existing side by side with an intensity of belief in the acceptance of the form of religious belief associated with our civilisation, and of the standards of conduct which it prescribes, as one of the main causes with which a great national destiny is identified.² By many, however, who have for long followed under one of the phases of thought here discussed, the ever-increasing concentration in the English-speaking world of the social mind on the utilitarian aspect of the political sciences, and the theory of the State which it involves, there is a continuous tendency to imagine — that emptiest of all

¹ Sir Frederick Pollock justly notes how entirely misunderstood on the continent of Europe is the precision and abstraction which the English school has succeeded in giving to technical terms in the analytical branch of political science as a result of its entire separation from the domain of ethics (cf. *History of the Science of Politics*, pp. 114, 115).

² For instance: "So far from thinking their commonwealth godless, the Americans conceive that the religious character of a government consists in nothing but the religious belief of the individual citizens, and the conformity of their conduct to that belief. They deem the general acceptance of Christianity to be one of the main sources of their national prosperity, and their nation a special object of the divine favour" (*The American Commonwealth*, by James Bryce, vol. ii. chap. cvi.)

dreams to the evolutionist who has once perceived the nature of the process in which human development is involved — that the direction of advance in Western history is, therefore, again to subordinate all human activities, as in the ancient civilisations, to the social consciousness as expressed through the State.¹ The real secret of our Western world — the cause, as we shall see directly, of all its extraordinary and ever-growing efficiency in history — consists, on the contrary, in the fact that the controlling centre of the evolutionary process therein has been at last projected altogether beyond the content of political consciousness.

We are living, in short, in Western history in the midst of a movement in which through the whole realm of art, of ethics, of literature, of philosophy, of politics, and of religion, there runs the undertone of a cosmic struggle in which now, not only the individual and all his powers, but society itself, with all its aims and efforts, is being slowly broken to the ends of a social efficiency no longer included within the limits of political consciousness. It is in the processes of this struggle, the single acts of which extend themselves over centuries, that Natural Selection is discriminating between the living, the dying, and the dead among modern peoples. It is a world in which, with the passing of the present under the control of the future, there is being accomplished for the first time in the development of the race the emancipation of the future in the present.

¹ This is the idea against which Mr. Herbert Spencer may be perceived to be struggling in the Essays included in *The Man versus the State*.

It is the world, therefore, in which all the imperiums in which the present had hitherto strangled the interests of the greater future, are in process of slow disintegration, and in which we have, in consequence, entered upon an era of such a free rivalry of forces as has never been before in the history of the race.

It is to the consideration of such a world that we have now to address ourselves. There are, proceeding from the conditions here described, two leading facts of our time, the significance of which will in all probability be fully visible within a century to come. The first is, that the leading place in our civilisation has passed to the peoples amongst whom there has first been accomplished this result of the projection of the controlling centre of the evolutionary process out of the present in the long-drawn-out struggle which has here been described. The other result, already becoming visible beneath the profoundly complex life of the United States of America, constitutes probably the most pregnant and remarkable fact in modern history. It is that the actual life-centre of the system of religious belief associated with our civilisation has been definitely shifted for the present within the pale of the activities of these peoples.

CHAPTER X

THE MODERN WORLD-CONFLICT

As soon as the mind has endeavoured to realise the nature of the position outlined in the last chapter, it is impossible to avoid receiving a deep impression of the significance of its bearing on the complex movement of development, which, under many phases, is unfolding itself beneath our eyes in the modern world-process. If we have been right so far, we appear to have in sight a single controlling principle, the operation of which divides, as by a clear line of demarcation, the meaning of the era in which we are living from that of all the past history of the race. We are regarding an integrating process, the larger meaning of which is still in the future, the first stage of which has occupied nearly two thousand years, and into the influence of which all the tendencies of development in our civilisation are being slowly and increasingly drawn. The impression made at first sight on the mind by the character of the position reached loses nothing on reflection. On the contrary, the tendency is rather for it to grow and deepen as the nature of the transition in which the future is being emancipated in history is better understood. In the modern conflict between tendencies in ethics, in the State, in government, in national development, and in universal politics, it is the meaning of the struggle between the future and the present which weights all the

processes of the intellect and all the developments of history. The races and peoples who are competitors in the struggle may have any theory they please of their interests, or of the ends or ideals of politics or of government. But, if the principle of Projected Efficiency be accepted as operating in society in the conditions described, then in respect of none of these alone will they retain their places in the conflict. The winning conditions in the struggle are determined. They are those of the people who already most efficiently bear on their shoulders in the present, the burden of the principles with which the meaning of a process infinite in the future is identified. Let us see, therefore, if we can follow, into the midst of the current life of the time, the application of that principle under which we see the ascendancy of the present moving now towards its challenge throughout the whole range of the modern world-conflict.

If the mind is fixed on that period of Western history which begins at the point up to which we had advanced with the close of the last chapter — that is to say, with the opening of the eighteenth century, and which thence extends down into the midst of the time in which we are living — there are certain features of the epoch embraced which immediately arrest attention. Between the dates mentioned there is included an interval of time so altogether remarkable in results that to institute any real parallel between it and a previous period of history is impossible. It may be imagined that at the beginning of the eighteenth century it must have appeared to the reflective mind, that, so far as progress in the arts and sciences and in general material results were concerned, the

interval which, up to that time, had been placed between our civilisation and that of the ancient Roman world had not been, on the whole, very considerable. Yet since that time—that is to say, during a brief period of some two hundred years—our Western world has been transformed. The increase in natural resources, in wealth, in population, and in the distance which has been placed between our modern civilisation and any past condition of the race, has been enormous. During the last half of this period, that is to say, during the nineteenth century alone, while the population of the rest of the world remained nearly stationary, the actual numbers of the European peoples rose from 170,000,000 to 500,000,000.¹ The impetus from which this increase proceeded continues, moreover, to be so immense that we may even accept the assertion that there is “a reasonable probability that, unless some great internal change should take place in the ideas and conduct of the European races themselves, this population of 500,000,000 will in another century become one of 1,500,000,000 to 2,000,000,000”;² the remainder of the population of the world being, so far as can be seen, destined to remain comparatively stationary.

These figures are to be taken only as an index to the stupendous changes which have taken place, and which are still in progress, beneath the surface of life and thought throughout the entire fabric of our civilisation. It matters not in what direction we look, the character of the revolution which has been effected is

¹ *Address to the Manchester Statistical Society*, October 1900, by Sir Robert Giffen, see p. 15.

² *Ibid.*

the same. In inventions, in commerce, in the arts of civilised life, in most of the theoretical and applied sciences, and in nearly every department of investigation and research, the progress of Western knowledge and equipment during the period in question has been striking beyond comparison. In many directions it has been so great that it undoubtedly exceeds in this brief period the sum of all the previous advance made by the race.

A significant feature, too, is that the process of change and progress has continued and still continues to grow in intensity. The results obtained, for instance, during the nineteenth century, altogether exceed in range and magnitude those achieved during the eighteenth. The results of the second half of the nineteenth century similarly surpass in importance those of the first half. And yet never before has the expectancy with which the world waits on the future been so intense as in the time at which we have arrived. There is scarcely an important department of practical or of speculative knowledge which is not pregnant with possibilities greater than any that have already been achieved. Such is the nature of existing Western conditions, that there is scarcely any appliance of civilisation, however well established; scarcely any invention, however all-embracing its hold on the world, which the well-informed mind is not prepared to see entirely superseded within a comparatively brief period in the future.

The movements which have been developing beneath the face of history and to which these outward results are related are still more remarkable. This vast advance has been accompanied by conditions of

the rapid disintegration of all absolutisms within which the human spirit had hitherto been confined. In a world moving towards the emancipation of the future in such a free conflict of forces as has never been possible before, all the speculations, the opinions, the beliefs, and the institutions through which the ascendant present had hitherto shut down on the activities of the human mind, have tended to be more and more deprived of the support of those organised imperiums in human affairs through which the present had imposed itself upon the world in the past.¹ It has been the age of the unfettering of discussion and of competition; of the enfranchisement of the individual, of classes, of parties, of opinions, of commerce, of industry, and of thought. Into the resulting conditions of the social order all the forces, powers, and equipments of human nature have been unloosed. It has been the age of the development throughout our civilisation of the conditions of such rivalry and strenuousness, of such conflict and stress, as has never prevailed in the world before.

It is, however, the actual vitality, the undoubted permanence of the principle from which this progress proceeds, which finally leaves the deepest impression on the mind. When we realise, however dimly, the real nature of the ultimate principle in which all the movement around us has its origin; when we stand in the midst of the rushing tide of the life of New York or Chicago, and catch sight of the actual relationship between the deep-seated, inherent antinomies of the English-speaking world as they were

¹ Cf. "The True American Spirit in Literature," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. lxxxiv., Charles Johnston.

discussed in the last chapter, and the fierce stress and freedom of American life, industry, and progress at the present day ;— an overwhelming sense of the character of the future takes possession of the mind. It is the principles of our Western civilisation as here displayed, and no others, that we feel are destined to hold the future of the world. It is not into the end but into the beginning of an era that we have been born. One of those fateful turning periods in which a new determining principle has begun to operate in the evolutionary process has been passed. We are living in the midst of a system of things by the side of which no other system will in the end survive as a rival in the world.

What, then, is the nature of this cause which is at work in our Western world, and which has simultaneously affected with such stupendous results so many spheres of human activity? What is this new ruling principle which appears to have risen into the ascendant in Western history? There can be no doubt as to what the answer to this question must be. We are in sight of the working in the world of that principle with which the civilisation of our era had been pregnant from the beginning, and which was slowly born into the world during the long stress of the development described in the previous chapters. By the gradual projection of the controlling meaning of the evolutionary process beyond the bounds of political consciousness, and by the resulting dissolution of all the absolutisms in which the hitherto ascendant present had strangled the future, we are being brought into contact with the first results of the actual working in history of the most

effective cause of progress that has ever prevailed in the world. And it is inevitable that before the virility and efficiency of the system of social order proceeding from it, all other systems whatever must in the end go down.

In the midst of the reconstruction that has been taking place in the modern world—a reconstruction so profound that entire systems of thought have, as we have seen, mistaken for a time even the direction in which we have been moving—it is not easy for the mind to grasp at once the reach of the process which thus connects all the apparently complex phenomena of change and progress of our time with an underlying principle of the evolutionary process so simple and yet so far-reaching. Let us see now if it is possible to bring directly home to the mind some conception of the manner in which this principle actually works, as the determining cause behind the phenomena of modern progress.

Now it is necessary to keep in view from this point forward a fact the overshadowing significance of which will be more clearly realised in the next chapter. It may be distinguished that, as the result of the developments described in the preceding chapters, the evolutionary process must in the next stage in Western history carry us into the midst of a supreme struggle, the outlines of which are already in sight. The controlling principle to which all the events of social development must become related as this struggle defines itself is very remarkable. It involves nothing less than the challenge of the ascendancy of the present in the economic process in the whole domain of human activities throughout the world.

There is no department of the activities of our time which seems to the ordinary observer to be more remote from, and to have less association with, the principle of the projection of the controlling centre of the evolutionary process outside the limits of political consciousness, than that which is embraced in the economic life of our civilisation. By large numbers of observers, and even by many who would not necessarily be prepared to assert with Marx that the economic factor is the ruling factor in human history, the department of affairs with which economic theory is concerned is regarded as a sphere of human activity peculiarly self-centred. The world to which the science of political economy relates—the science which Bagehot described as tending to become in England simply the science of Business or of the Great Commerce¹—is, in short, the world in which the rule of average commercial self-interest in the existing political conditions of civilisation is regarded as ultimately supreme. No department of human activity would seem to be more completely occupied with the present; and, therefore, to be altogether more remote from the action of the principle we have been describing. Nevertheless, all the world-shaping conflict in the domain of religion, of thought, of politics, with which we have so far been occupied is but preliminary to the vast struggle towards which the modern world moves; a struggle in which the ascendancy of the present is destined to be broken in the economic process, in the conditions of such a free and efficient conflict of forces as has never prevailed in the world before.

¹ *The Postulates of English Political Economy*, by the late Walter Bagehot, with pref. by Alfred Marshall, p. 7.

When the observer, at the present time, has advanced some distance towards the mastery of the principles underlying the economic development in progress in the English-speaking world on both sides of the Atlantic, it is impossible to avoid being struck with the significance of the process as a whole. In the section of that world represented in the United States, we have in view the economic process in conditions of undoubtedly the highest intensity and potentiality it has ever reached in the world. In the section of which England is the centre we catch sight, moreover, for the first time in history, of a conception round which a practical system of world-politics — in the face of difficulties, still from time to time pronounced by its critics to be insurmountable — is actually slowly beginning to centre; namely, the ideal of a stateless competition of all the individuals of every land, in which the competitive potentiality of all natural powers shall be at last completely enfranchised in the world.

Despite the undoubted survival in great strength into this process, as it is now represented in both sections of the English-speaking world, of many conceptions and principles representing a past era of human evolution; despite the vigorous expression therein of ideals which represent the ascendancy of the present under some of the most colossal phases it has attained in history; — of the tendency of the process as a whole, of the character of the forces behind it, and of the place in the world of the new system of order which it is destined to produce there can be no doubt.

When the observer stands at the present time in the midst of the industrial life of the eastern and mid-

dle states of America, it gradually dawns on his mind, if he has mastered the subject, that there is a fact in the equipment of the United States in the economic struggle upon which the world is entering, the overwhelming significance of which is hardly ever fully grasped by the European student. This is the degree of intensity at present reached in the economic process in that country. Never before in the world, and nowhere else in the world at the present time, has the economic process attained to the conditions that are here represented. The attention of the world is still fixed on a great number of other causes, to which it attributes the enormous industrial expansion of the United States which is in progress under its eyes. The history of the country, its geographical position, and the great natural resources and endowments of the land, are all pointed to in turn. There need be no disposition to underrate any of these advantages. But it will in all probability be distinguished in the future that it is to none of them that the expansion of the United States is in the first instance due.

In respect of no such material advantages, for instance, could it have been foretold, in the midst of the European development described in the last chapter, that the insignificant section of European peoples who spoke English were about in a brief period to become a fourth of the white population of the earth, and to see nearly half the world pass under the direct influence of their laws and institutions. So now it is to none of these material or mechanical causes alone that we must look for the true reason of the exceptional expansion of the United States. It is upon the causes that have produced the extraordinary intensity

of the economic conditions obtaining amongst the people of the United States that the attention of the observer of insight will be concentrated from the beginning. It is the intensity of these conditions that exercises so marked an influence on the entire life-habits of the people, that is producing a continually increasing effect upon the industrial development of our civilisation, and that must in time profoundly influence the tendencies of progress throughout the whole world. Without this cause even the great natural resources of the United States would not have counted. For without it the economic process in the United States would have taken at least a century longer to have reached its present advanced stage of development. It is the immeasurably deeper intensity of the economic and industrial conflict prevailing over the widest area of freedom hitherto cleared in the world which, more than any other cause, and more than all other causes together, has equipped the people of the United States with the irresistible potency they are about to exercise in the world in the economic era upon which we are entering.

Confining our attention, therefore, for the time being to the English-speaking section of the advanced peoples;—how, it may be asked, have these peoples come to receive the equipment which has at the present day reached its most developed phase in the intensity of the economic conditions prevailing in the United States? It is an equipment, the import of which has been, as yet, scarcely grasped by the modern mind. It is necessary to look beneath the surface of the political and economic life of the age, and to see how deeply during the past century the spirit,

the example, and the methods of the system of social order which has grown up in the English-speaking world have already influenced the whole of Western civilisation to realise for how much the principles that have produced it count in the world. The full significance of these principles can, indeed, be grasped only when their relationship is perceived to that ultimate fact of Western history we have been discussing throughout, namely, that all other systems of social order must in the end go down before those within which the future has been emancipated in the freest and most efficient conflict of forces in the present.

When we regard the conditions in which the evolutionary process is slowly advancing towards the challenge of the ascendancy of the present in the economic life of the modern world, we have in view a spectacle of the highest interest. To understand, however, the character of the forces involved it is desirable that the mind should, as far as possible, continue its advance from the position reached in the last chapter. Now, if we look beneath the surface of the life of the English-speaking world at the present day, it may readily be perceived, if the examination is carried far enough, how profoundly the entire character of the social process amongst the included peoples has been influenced as the great antinomy, of which the development was traced through Western history in the previous chapters, has come in its modern form to draw into its influence the entire practical affairs of the world. The conditions of almost every form of human activity have, almost insensibly, passed under the control of a new ruling principle in the evolutionary process. In the first result, they may

already be perceived to have become intensified beyond any standard that has ever prevailed in the world before. It matters not from what side we take up the examination, the facts continue to point in the same direction, and the culminating effect on the mind is in the highest degree impressive.

If attention is directed at first to the domain of abstract thought, it may be perceived that the result attained in the conditions which prevail at the present day in the English-speaking world is very remarkable. By the necessary tolerance of each other of many conflicting views; behind all of which there exists the all-pervading influence of the principle — of necessity tacitly accepted even by individuals who reject the premises — that, while truth is to be considered, on the one hand, as transcending the content of any welfare comprised within the bounds of political consciousness, it is only to be conceived, on the other, as the net resultant of forces and standards apparently in themselves conflicting; there has been almost imperceptibly developed an entirely new attitude of the human mind towards every system of action, of power, of knowledge, and of opinion representing itself for the time being as the embodiment of a principle claiming general assent.

The first large outward expression of this attitude, as a working principle in the political life of our civilisation, is that which we have in view in the rise of the system of Party Government, the immediate development of which in public life in England was coincident with the close of the era described in the last chapter. If the mind is carried back over the recent political history of the English-

speaking world it may be noticed that in almost every quarter it presents the same feature. Side by side with the increasing assertion of the right of every community, from the hamlet to a continent, to manage its own local affairs, there has been developed that phenomenon in public affairs now known as the system of government by party. No system of government has been more sweepingly condemned outside the countries where it exists. In it there survives, as indeed there still survives in most of the institutions of the present day, many of the evils of the era of evolution out of which the world is moving. No system of government is from time to time more scathingly criticised even in England and America. Nevertheless, no system has ever been invented which has given such efficient results as a cause of progress. Throughout the public affairs of the whole of the English-speaking peoples at the present day it is the life-principle of all effective criticism; the most potent fact behind every condition of good government. For 150 years it has been the soul of that orderly unceasing stress of competing principles, from out of which the rapid but unhasting political progress of the English-speaking world has proceeded. Whatever its faults, it is the first large outward result in the political life of our civilisation of the ascendancy of the principle which emerged out of the long stress of the development described in the last chapter.

Now if we look closely at the system of government by party, it may be perceived that what it essentially represents is the unconscious organisation, on each side of a line of cleavage, of all the

opposing elements in any situation utilised against each other to the full extent of their powers as forces of criticism and progress. The essence of the system is that there are of necessity only two principal parties, each continually organised in opposition to the other;¹ and that, as in the system of legal trial developed in the conditions of English jurisprudence,² each side proceeds from the point of view that it is itself entirely in the right, and that its opponent is of necessity equally and entirely in the wrong. Vital, essential, and fundamental as is the system of party government in the circumstances mentioned, it is nevertheless almost outside the forms and recognition of written constitutions. A system in the conduct of public affairs which appears so entirely bewildering, and even absurd, to the observer who has not grasped its meaning, is only made possible by a condition which is always in the background, but which is never expressed in any constitutional formula. It is a condition the influence of which has come to permeate the entire atmosphere of the intellectual and ethical life of the English-speaking world, as the result of the ascendancy therein of the

¹ The character of the party system, as an organisation of two great parties only in the government of the State, is as remarkable in the United States as in England. Looking through the records, in *Stanwood's History of the Presidency*, of the last ten presidential elections included in the nineteenth century, the fact has to be noted that of the 59 candidates for the Presidency, for whom votes were cast by the members of various parties, the 20 official candidates of the two great opposing parties in the United States received over 94 per cent of the total votes. All the other 39 candidates of other parties received together less than 6 per cent.

² Compare in this connection Note, p. 361, in relation to differences in principles of jurisprudence in Latin countries.

principle which emerged into view in the development described in the last chapter. It is a condition which may be perceived to represent, in the last resort, the tacit assumption, even when the individual may appear to repudiate it, that the claim of right upon those who profess to be its adherents goes deeper than the claim of loyalty to any system of government, or of party, or of authority, representing itself for the time being as its expression. It is, in short, the subconscious admission of the fact that, however intense our convictions, we are not the ultimate repositories of truth, and that therefore our opponents may after all be right.¹

This is why the peoples who have not been beaten out in history beneath the tremendous blows of the developmental process described in the last chapter, and whose habit of mind it is, consequently, to see right or truth absolute in a principle or institution, have on the whole failed to successfully develop the system of Party in government, or even to grasp its essential meaning. The vast assumption which underlies it involves, it may be perceived, a conception of the nature of ultimate principles which they have never accepted. The fact that parties or their leaders should be at once uncompromisingly hostile and yet be mutually tolerant; that they should enforce their principles on the whole community at the point of the narrowest majority, and yet expect that

¹ The fundamental difference in this respect which separates even the abstract idea of the State in Latin countries on the continent of Europe from the idea of the State in England, where the limitation of all powers and rights is deeply rooted in the subconsciousness of the community, will be often obvious in current affairs at the present day to the deeper student of politics.

their successors on acceding to power should not attempt to reverse the law they have made; that they should be, as has sometimes been the case in the United States, divided by a principle scarcely visible to outsiders,¹ and yet proceed to call out all the strength of their adherents on the assumption that the opposing party is in all its proposals the representative of absolute error; that they should, even after the most bitterly contested struggles, accept the result as conclusive for the time being, and with that immediate subsidence of excitement which has been characteristic of the great historic party struggles in the United States;² nay, that they should in their organs of opinion even go out of their way, as has sometimes happened in England, to regret the lack of organisation or strength in their opponents as being bad for their own side; — are all matters which appear from time to time to a large class of critics as utterly irreconcilable with standards of right conduct as they prevail elsewhere in our civilisation. They present themselves either, at the best, as bewildering absurdities, or, at the worst, as conclusive evidence of the consistent and organised hypocrisy of the public life of the peoples amongst whom they are found.

At first sight, in short, no more illogical, anarchic, or impossible principle of government could be conceived. Yet no more elemental condition of progress has ever existed in the world. It is the first fundamental working principle in public life contributing to the freedom and intensity of conditions that pre-

¹ Cf. *The Lesson of Popular Government*, by Gamaliel Bradford, vol. i. c. xix.

² *A History of the Presidency*, by Edward Stanwood, c. xxxi.

vail amongst the English-speaking peoples. So naturally has it sprung from the principles underlying the development of those peoples, that it has nearly always proved impossible in practical life to keep its influence out of the affairs of the smallest township or precinct. So entirely foreign has its meaning proved to the peoples amongst whom the development described in the last chapter has not run its full course, that as a successful working system of government it is at the present day almost unrepresented outside the limits of the English-speaking world.¹

If we follow, from the first outward contact with it under this form, the influence on the general life of the advanced peoples, of this conception of responsibility to principles projected beyond the claims of all systems of authority, bounded by the limits of political consciousness, the reach of its action in other spheres of activity continues to be apparent. There is no single cause which has operated more

¹ Compare in this connection the standpoint in the legal systems of the peoples amongst whom the development described in the last chapter ran its course, for the most part free from the influence of the spirit of Roman law. A recent writer dealing with jurisprudence in the United States, summarises characteristic differences between the standpoint in the systems of the Latin nations of Europe and those of the English-speaking peoples in general. The former peoples, he points out, are governed by their executives; the latter by their judges. With the latter the judiciary is independent; with the former it is more or less the servant of the executive. Latin law is always codified; the common law of the English-speaking peoples cannot be so treated. The conspicuous figure in a court of the former peoples is the judge dispensing justice; in a court of the latter peoples the lawyer fighting for it. "The basic difference between the two systems of jurisprudence is that the one accords privileges, while the other protects rights" (W. S. Logan, *Forum*, xxvi.).

profoundly in bringing about the existing conditions of the exploitation of the world by the advanced peoples, than the application of science to the general affairs of life. But the results obtained in applied science are themselves the product of certain conditions in thought and in the cultivation of pure science which have only recently come to prevail in our civilisation. They are conditions which have resulted directly from the ascendancy in our civilisation of the conception that emerged out of the conflict described in the last chapter.

It is only necessary to look through the current literature of the European peoples to realise how peculiar and how strictly circumscribed these conditions in reality are. If we regard, in the first instance, the existing educational controversies of the peoples who have not passed through the development described in the last chapter it may be perceived, when all due allowance is made for explanations that may be offered, how the scope of research and inquiry has remained restricted on every hand by the standards that have continued to prevail. Yet, on the other hand, when the mind is carried in the opposite direction it is confronted with a fact scarcely less significant. This is the inevitableness with which a purely intellectual demand for freedom carries us back once more to a mere theory of the interests of the individuals comprised within the limits of political consciousness. For as we see how inherent in the problem of human evolution is the fact that there is not, and that there never can be, any purely intellectual sanction for the submission of the individual to a world-process in which he has absolutely no interest; so we see that a purely

intellectual demand for freedom of thought must always, in the last resort, be bounded by the claims and tyrannies of interests within the limits of political consciousness. We return, in short, quickly and inevitably under such standards to schemes like those of "the scientific breeding of the human race," and that class of proposals with which the Greeks were so familiar,¹ the inner mark and meaning of which is simply the ascendancy of the present in the evolutionary process.

We are, in short, confronted amongst the advanced peoples with the almost startling fact, as underlying the conditions of intensity towards which these peoples move, that the principles of intellectual tolerance, just as the principles of religious tolerance, and — as we shall see directly — the principles of political tolerance, can only be held, in the last resort, as a conviction of the religious consciousness. They must proceed, that is to say, from a sense of responsibility to principles transcending the claim of any system of ideas, of thought, of knowledge, of authority, or even of welfare, embodied within the limits of political consciousness.² To the emancipated intellect, which has completely divested itself of the bitterness engendered

¹ Cf. Plato, *Rep. V.*

² Nothing is the cause of deeper misunderstandings between the English mind and the French mind, in the existing conditions of the world, than the adhesion at times of the French people to the principle that loyalty to the State, or to its institutions, or to parties, or even to the welfare of individuals, should be held to override loyalty to the deeper-lying principles of our social evolution which transcend the limits of political consciousness. The difference of standards within our civilisation in this respect is already so marked, that it may often be distinguished in art as expressed in literature. For instance, a standard

In the protracted struggle maintained against science through the ecclesiastical era in Western history, no conclusion appears to be more clearly involved in the modern evolutionary hypothesis than that, in the absence of this condition, there is not to be discovered any cause inherent in the intellect itself which could prevent human activities from being again shut up in the tyrannies of interests defined within the limits of political consciousness.

The influence of the condition here described on all the activities of the human mind amongst the advanced peoples has been profound. It has operated towards the freeing of every capacity and equipment, and towards the gradual intensification of all the conditions of progress. It has given to every department of inquiry and research the right to carry its results up to that utmost limit at which they are controlled only by the results obtained in other departments of inquiry or activity with equal freedom. The results already obtained have been so great that the prestige of them has come, almost insensibly, to affect all the standards of our civilisation. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that many of the peoples included in our civilisation, who have been influenced, have accepted the results only as Eastern races have ac-

common in the literature of the novel in France is one in accordance with which loyalty to the welfare of the local or personal is represented as opposed to this deeper social principle, while it is nevertheless presented by the artist as the overruling motive with which the reader's sympathies are expected to be enlisted. Employed by Rudyard Kipling in his earlier writings (probably under the influence of his Indian environment), the effect on the general English mind, e.g. in the tale *Thrown Away*, is so foreign, that it quite interferes with the artistic result as intended by the writer.

cepted Western civilisation. They have copied them without accepting the principles on which they rest; and without going through the intervening stage of development. It is, therefore, always necessary to remember that, if we have been right so far, it must be taken that, in the last resort, the maintenance of the principles to which the results in question are due, depends, as yet, almost entirely on the peoples who have passed through the full stress of the development described in the preceding chapters.


No observer, preserving his position of detachment and looking through the history of thought and research in England, the United States, and Germany for a century past, can doubt the enormous potentiality in the world of the principles with which he sees the human mind therein being equipped. Whatever the attitude may be towards the principles underlying the change in standards which has taken place in our civilisation, there can be no doubt as to the influence of the spirit that is behind the modern search after truth in intensifying all the conditions of progress, or of the fact that the peoples amongst whom that spirit first became dominant have received a long start in the modern world-process.

But so far only the general tendencies resulting from the development described in the last chapter have been considered. It is as we watch the larger process of emancipation which has been inherent in our civilisation from the beginning, broadening out at last under these conditions into the full stream of modern tendencies, that we begin to realise the real nature of the forces making for the intensity of the social process amongst the advanced peoples. It is



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when we get to the heart of the political revolution, which for nearly two centuries has been in progress in Western society — that revolution which has been bringing the people into the modern world-conflict on conditions of equal political rights, and which is carrying us into the midst of an era of economic transition undoubtedly pregnant of changes more transforming than any that have been hitherto experienced — that we catch a glimpse of the full reach of the causes which are producing the stress of conditions in that phase of the evolutionary process unfolding itself beneath our eyes in modern history.

In the realm of political affairs the conception of responsibility to a principle rising superior to the claims of all systems of thought, of knowledge, of authority, or of welfare embodied within the limits of political consciousness, has proved the most radical principle that has ever operated in the world. It is the ultimate cause behind that organic process of change which Maine saw reversing the universal order of the past in the phenomenon of modern Democracy.¹ It has broken, in turn, the theory of absolute right in the Church, in the Sovereign, in the State. It is destined to break the absolute right of Majorities, and even of Force. It has brought to the birth, in the long process of the centuries, the modern conception of the People. And only the vision of the few has caught a glimpse of the nature of the transformation inherent in it, as it moves slowly in our time towards the challenge of the ascendancy of the present in the economic process throughout the world.

¹ *Popular Government*, i. and iv.

Now it may be observed that the first purely political cause which has operated directly towards the production of the present intensity of the social process in Western history, is one which is rarely discussed in any detail, and is often not mentioned, in treatises on social or economic subjects. This is the fact of the recent accession, by the masses of the people, to political power, as secured to them by universal suffrage or by a political franchise very widely extended. This revolution, the significance of which underlies all existing controversies as to the organisation of society and the prevailing distribution of wealth, dates back for its beginning scarcely more than a century. In England, where parliamentary government, almost in its modern form, appears to carry us back to Cromwell and Locke, it was not till 1832 that the franchise was conferred on the middle classes, and not till 1867 and 1885 that it was extended so as to include the great bulk of the people. On the continent of Europe the period mentioned has witnessed the establishment of universal suffrage, or forms of electoral franchise falling little short of it, in France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Spain, and other less important States; Germany in 1867 and 1871, Spain in 1890, and Belgium in 1893, being amongst the more important countries which have recently adopted it. Even the government of the United States at the period of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 was virtually aristocratic, and it continued to be so till after the close of the revolution in 1783, up to which period a property qualification for the exercise of political power was still required in every State.

Throughout the greater part of our Western world, and in the midst of the greatest accumulation of every form of human energy, wealth, and resources that the world has seen, there has, therefore, taken place within the space of little more than a century, and for the most part silently beneath the surface of society, one of the greatest and most significant political transformations recorded in history.

Now amongst a certain section of modern peoples one of the commonest of political assumptions is that of the right of every man to voting power irrespective of position, or of creed, or of opinion; and further, and more important, of the right of every man to *equal* voting power irrespective of the nature or the amount of his interest in the State.

If we look closely at this conception, it may be perceived that it is only our familiarity with it which leads us to overlook the fact that not only is it altogether exceptional in the world, but that there is no real explanation of it to be found in any existing theory of the purely political State. It is a conception which has been held by only a comparatively small number of people during an insignificant space in recent history. Even by no inconsiderable proportion of persons amongst the advanced peoples of the present day the right of every man to equal voting power, irrespective either of his intelligence, or of his capacity, or of the amount of his property in the State, is but little understood. Nay, it is often covertly resented, and is outwardly accepted in principle only because the prestige of the results obtained by the advanced peoples amongst whom it has prevailed has created a tendency in affairs against which

it is felt to be useless to struggle. But down into the recent past, in the almost universal opinion of the world, the conception would undoubtedly have presented itself, as it has actually done in our time to Nietzsche, and as it still does to the overwhelming proportion of our fellow-creatures in the world, simply as one so inherently absurd as to be beyond the bounds of reasonable discussion.

When we look back over the history of the process in which the conception has risen into ascendancy in politics, it presents many remarkable features. It is this conception of equal political weight in the State which, we may perceive, has broken down the social and political barriers erected against the people by the power-holding classes in the past. It is this conception which, in bringing the people into the social conflict on terms of equality, has produced the environment in which the causes already discussed have been able to achieve in the existing world the remarkable results described. It is this conception which has been the direct political cause, more than any other, tending to the intensity of modern conditions. It is this conception which is producing those vast changes in the distribution of wealth to which current economic science is adjusting its theories. And, last of all, it is this conception which constitutes the cause, upon the continued ascendancy of which in politics, every existing political reformer including the Marxian Socialist is counting for the realisation of that larger social and economic transformation which is perceived to lie in the future.

If it be asked to what reason we must attribute the ascendancy in Western history of this conception,

entirely new and altogether exceptional in the world, — a conception which the almost universal opinion of the world down to the recent past would have regarded as absurd, and yet a conception, to all appearance, fundamentally related to the central meaning of that phase of the evolutionary process in the midst of which we are living — there can be no doubt as to what the answer must be. The cause which has led to the ascendancy among the advanced peoples of the conception of the right of every man to equal voting power, irrespective of birth, of creed, of intelligence, of capacity, or even of the nature or amount of his interest in the State, has beyond doubt no relation to any theory of the State bounded by the limits of political consciousness. It simply cannot be fitted into any theory of society based on the relation to each other of existing interests in the State. In the end it overleaps all such considerations. In the last analysis we perceive that it undoubtedly results from the existence in men's minds of a sense of responsibility to each other which is projected beyond all the objects for which the political State is conceived as existing.

When, in short, we reach the cause which has given men political equality irrespective of all conditions and qualifications, we stand once more in the presence of the principle we have been discussing throughout. In other words, strange though it may appear, the fundamental principle of political tolerance, which is implied in this theory of equality, can, like the fundamental principle of intellectual tolerance — and whether the individual be conscious of it or not — only be held by the world as an ultimate

conviction of the religious consciousness. It is, that is to say, the principle through which the evolutionary process is accomplishing the subordination of the present to a future transcending the content of political consciousness, which constitutes the controlling cause behind all the outward phenomena of political equality in the modern world.

When, in the light of this circumstance, we look more closely at the political development proceeding in the State, we may perceive the larger meaning that certain features of it begin now to assume before the mind. We may even go so far as to compress into a formula the clue to the political process in modern society. What we see is that it is along the line where the ethical phenomena, proceeding from the existence in men's minds of this sense of responsibility to principles transcending their conception of the State, have come into conflict with occupying interests, sheltering themselves behind the State, that the stress of the forward movement is developing itself in modern politics.

Still confining observation to the history of the English-speaking peoples, it may accordingly be distinguished how, from the conclusion of the conflict described in the last chapter down to the present day, it is this principle operating in men's minds which has set them to struggle in grim and devoted strife against that almost equally determined resistance which every occupying interest in the State has offered to the modern spirit. It is sometimes taken for granted that the conditions of modern progress are but the expression of tendencies that have always existed in the world. But, as Maine insists, "it is

indisputable that much the greatest part of mankind has never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be improved since the moment when external completeness was first given to them by their embodiment in some permanent record."¹ It has only been, in short, a cause more elemental than itself that has overcome that unrelenting resistance to change in the vested order of the world, which Maine correctly distinguished to be the universal characteristic of all human society down into the existing era of Western civilisation. This is why that, despite the transforming results accomplished by the modern spirit among the English-speaking peoples, it is, nevertheless, at the same time true, extraordinary as the statement may seem, that, to use the words of a recent English writer, "there is in the English character scarcely anything in sympathy with the spirit of modern Liberalism."² The native Teutonic habit of mind, underlying the English, American, and German character, represents, of necessity, certain qualities — tenacity of purpose, determination in the presence of opposition, love for action, and hunger for power, all tending to express themselves through the State — which were the necessary equipment of that military type which has won in the supreme stress of Natural Selection its right of place as the only type able to hold the stage of the world in the long epoch during which the present is destined to pass under the control of the future. But, for the same cause, it is simply a matter of course that there should be in such a type of character, of its own nature,

¹ *Ancient Law*, c. i.

² "The Future of Liberalism," *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. lxxii.

"scarcely anything in sympathy with the spirit of modern Liberalism."

The modern progressive movement in politics among the English-speaking peoples has, therefore, represented a dynamic force in history so immense that the ordinary mind has little or no conception of it. Nothing is more common in current economic studies, than to see the prolonged movement, which resulted in the establishment of the principles of free-trade in England, discussed as if it sprang simply from the conscious and organised effort of parties and interests in the State to further their own selfish ends.¹ Like nearly every other movement in our civilisation it has become in its turn, as we shall see in the next chapter, deeply involved in the toils of the ascendant present. But in that phase in which it represented the attempt in England to break the rule of the feudal past in the economic process in society, the springs of its life came from a cause deeper, more far-reaching, and more elemental than class-selfishness. So true is this, that it is almost startling to be reminded at the present day that Adam Smith, the formulator of the free-trade doctrine in England, regarded the interests against it as so general, so powerful, and so determined, that he despaired of their resistance ever being overcome, and that he declared that "to expect that the doctrine would ever become a practice in the United Kingdom was as absurd as to expect the establishment of a

¹ Even in studies like those of Professor Davidson's, of the trade relations between England and her colonies, we may distinguish something of this spirit. Cf. "England's Commercial Policy towards her Colonies since the Treaty of Paris," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. xiv.

Utopia."¹ The forces behind the forward movement in England eventually bore down all opposition before them. But they were forces proceeding from a cause far more radical than any conscious theory of interests in the State. They were the forces of which we catch sight in Morley's description of Bright and Cobden in the midst of the agitation in England as presenting a spectacle 'which had about it something of the apostolic'²—"the two men who had only become orators because they had something to say . . . the two plain men leaving their homes and their business, and going over the length and breadth of the land to convert the nation," as to a new religion.³

The general observer sees the forward movement in politics carrying along with it a thousand interests and a multitude of sub-movements, the selfish objects of which its direction for the time being happens to favour. But it must never be forgotten that not in the superficial conclusions often drawn from these appearances have we the meaning of Western Liberalism. Deep below the surface of such phenomena, the cause which is carrying development forward has been the expression of a force unparalleled in history; a force which has always represented, in the last resort, a sense of responsibility in men's minds outweighing the claims of all political interests and a quality of conviction transcending the content of every political creed.

We are apt, in short, to regard the existence and results of modern Liberalism as something inherent

¹ "The Manchester School," *Dict. of Political Economy*, vol. ii.

² *Life of Richard Cobden*, vol. i. ix.

³ *Ibid.*

in the political organism as such.¹ But we forget, as a writer already quoted reminds us of England, "the tremendous struggles that were needed before the crust of sluggishness and prejudice could be broken through; the lives willingly sacrificed, the careers ruined, the fortunes flung away, the imprisonment and dragooning, the ostracism and social persecution readily accepted before a Liberal party in the modern sense could come into existence."² No fact has left a more lasting mark on the English mind in its relation to politics than this deep-seated conviction that Western Liberalism as a political creed is, in the last resort, a creed, not of ease and of conscious political Utilitarianism, but of sacrifice; the principles of which cannot be confined within any theories of interests in the State as such. In every serious crisis through which the advancing political movement has passed in England, the introspection of this conviction may be traced in its results, as by a broad pathway, through the literature of the transition period. The deeper we get into the causes behind the modern progressive movement, not only in England but equally in the United States, the more clearly do we see that it is in this circumstance that we have the real cause which

¹ The only really scientific and absolutely destructive criticism of the Marxian conception of modern society is that which, going far beyond any examination of the economic theories associated with the name of Marx brings home to the mind a vivid realisation of the fixed impossibility of getting a scientific conception of society out of any theory of interests in the State bounded by the limits of political consciousness. All such conceptions have been reduced to meaninglessness in the presence of the vaster import of the evolutionary process as we are coming now to understand it, — namely, as a process slowly accomplishing the subordination of the present to the future.

² "The Future of Liberalism," *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. lxxii.

differentiates at the present day the forward movement in progress among the advanced peoples from the same movement as we see it amongst the peoples of the countries in which the development described in the last chapter has not been accomplished. Amongst the latter we, as a rule, appear to see the forward movement under its various phases, whether moderate or extreme, attempting a task the successful accomplishment of which — if the view we have taken of the meaning of the evolutionary hypothesis, as applied to society, be correct — is impossible, namely, the task of getting a scientific conception of society out of a theory of interests in the State hounded by the limits of political consciousness. Deep down in the subconsciousness of the progressive movement amongst the advanced peoples, we have always to deal, in the last resort, with a fact of different significance. In every period of upheaval it is to be encountered in the general mind in the shape of a conviction widely and instinctively held, that while Western Liberalism is the force which is transforming all political institutions, it is itself a thing which is ultimately outside of all theories of the State, and independent of, and superior to, all interests in the State on whatever scale they may be represented.

This is the ultimate cause why the meaning of Modern Liberalism in England and the United States goes far deeper than political forms and institutions. It represents a cause which, while acting on every institution within the State, is nevertheless ultimately related to principles transcending the consciousness of all of them alike. Whatever the outward forms, it, therefore, holds every tendency to absolutism in

continued check. It interposes, as it were, between the present and the future a principle which prevents every natural despotism in thought and action from exercising its inherent tendency to again shut down upon us. It represents, in short, the progressive development, as it has reached the domain of politics, of the great antinomy we have traced through Western history.

If the examination be continued beyond the intellectual and political causes which are thus making for the intensity of the process of progress amongst the advanced peoples, and the scrutiny be carried now into the midst of the conditions in which we see Western development moving slowly towards the challenge of the ascendancy of the present in the economic process in all its phases throughout the world, the interest of the spectacle continues to increase. If we may anticipate for a moment the discussion of a feature to be fully dealt with in the next chapter, it may be briefly said that the movement in which the Manchester school of economics in England endeavoured to produce the conditions of free competition in the world was from the beginning involved in a closed circle. It represented little more than the struggle of existing economic interests to free themselves from the incumbrances which the feudal rule of the past had hitherto imposed on society. The larger meaning of the vast struggle between the future and the present in the economic process had as yet scarcely any place or meaning in it. It is not, we may perceive, upon free competition itself, but rather upon the first crude attempts to apply it to human affairs, that the mind of the world has been concentrated in

its preoccupation with the economic situation as it has been presented hitherto in the theories of the Manchester school in England.

What we are coming to see, therefore, is that by the policy of *laissez-faire*, or leaving things alone, with which the Manchester school of economics first associated the conception of free exchange in England, it has been absolutely impossible to get such a thing in the modern world as free play of the competitive forces. The present is still everywhere in the ascendant. The tendency which has projected itself through the whole fabric of economic society at the present time represents, in short, nothing more than the survival into existing conditions of that universal principle of a past era of evolution which it has been the destiny of our civilisation from the beginning to interrupt and suspend; namely, the tendency of the strongest competitive force to become absolute, and so to restrain, and in time suppress, the conditions of free competition. This, as we have seen, is the condition which our civilisation has already broken in thought, in knowledge, and in politics, in the long stress of the centuries of conflict already described. But it is the condition which still remains almost unregulated and unbroken in economics.

There runs, accordingly, it may be seen, through all the phases of current economic development one consistent and integrating principle. The story of the economic conflict in modern history is now in turn coming to be simply the story of the long-drawn-out struggle between two opposing forces in the great antinomy, the course of which we have traced through Western history. On the one side we have repre-

sented the survival of the old-world law of an earlier era of evolution, through which every existing dominant force endeavours, in its own interests, to shut down in the present upon the higher potentialities of society in the future. On the other side, we have the influence of the fundamental conception inherent in our civilisation, which, in gradually projecting the sense of human responsibility outside the limits of all political creeds and interests, is—in economics as already in thought and in politics—slowly breaking and dissolving all the closed imperiums in which the free play of human activities would otherwise tend to be restrained and imprisoned.

In a remarkable study published shortly before his death, Professor Henry Sidgwick, in examining the relationship between political economy and ethics,¹ succeeded in bringing clearly before the general mind the lines along which this principle is destined to operate in producing the economic transformation which is slowly succeeding the revolution already accomplished in politics, and the effect of which must be everywhere to deepen the intensity of modern conditions.

Now the main stream of tendency in economics which is producing the gradual intensification of modern conditions may be presented in general terms as involving the same ideal as in an earlier stage in politics. As in politics the movement has been towards equal political rights; so in economics it is now a movement towards equality of economic opportunity. In the modern world it has already become, says Pro-

¹ "Political Economy and Ethics," *Dict. of Political Economy*, vol. iii.

fessor Sidgwick, "an ethical postulate that the distribution of wealth in a well-ordered State should aim at realising political justice."¹ Yet in the era of unorganised and unrestricted competition which has succeeded the prevalence in the world of the *laissez-faire* conceptions with which the standards of the Manchester school of free exchange became associated, what we see is, says Professor Sidgwick in effect, that society is struggling with the fact that the so-called free exchange of the past, even without intentional fraud or coercion, is not a fair exchange. In a world in which the interests of the present are still in the ascendant in the economic process, and in which the strongest competitive forces therefore tend in the end to become more or less absolute, there cannot really be such a thing as fair exchange or free competition under existing conditions. We have, therefore, the two sides of the great antinomy in Western history once more slowly but clearly beginning to define themselves. On the one side we have, as we shall see in the next chapter, all the colossal forms and organisations through which the ascendancy of the present is tending to express itself in the existing economic situation. On the other side we have the simple fact that amongst the advanced peoples it has already become "an ethical postulate that the distribution of wealth should aim at realising political justice." As Professor Sidgwick points out, the resulting inequality of opportunity cannot, in consequence, be justified before the common social conscience. It fails to satisfy the current moral consciousness; to an

¹ "Political Economy and Ethics," *Dict. of Political Economy*, vol. III.

ever increasing degree, that one party should be in a position to profit not only by inevitable ignorance or distress, but by the actual disability or the enforced disadvantage of the other.¹ A deep-lying but gradually increasing dualism is, therefore, tending to develop itself in the existing economic condition of the world.

The tremendous reach of the principle just enunciated, as it begins to work in modern economic development, may not be immediately perceived. But that it is bound to carry us as far in the economic process as it has already carried us in the other developments that have taken place in Western history will be apparent on reflection. It is the influence of the same sense of responsibility projected outside the State that we have still in sight; a principle which, acting through the consciousness of society, is, in economics, just as in thought, in knowledge, and in politics, gradually interposing between the present and the future a principle which operates towards preventing the natural despotisms of the time from exercising their inherent tendency to close in upon us in the present. In the result we have, therefore, the gradually increasing tendency towards the interference of society with the principles regulating the affairs of modern industry. Beginning with the relations of capital to labour, it has resulted in the tendency of society to enable the worker — although as yet in conditions in which the principles of a past era of development still survive in great strength on both sides of the struggle — to reach under the law a position in which he is in a condition to take part on

¹ "Political Economy and Ethics," *Dict. of Political Economy*, vol. iii.

more equal terms in the conflict of forces going on around him.¹ It is resulting in the tendency of society to equip the worker in the competition of life more and more efficiently at the general expense. But, over and above everything else, we may perceive that this conception, as all the circumstances of the modern world-struggle are becoming deeply influenced by the emotion of social justice, is slowly developing, and is bound to continue to develop, in the State itself an entirely new attitude of collective responsibility towards all the principles regulating and controlling that play of forces of which modern business and industry have become the theatre.

The enormous potentiality of the antithesis thus being developed in current economic history, and thus presenting, as we may perceive, but the latest phase of the antinomy of which we have traced the development through Western history, is calculated when it is clearly perceived to deeply impress the scientific imagination. To appreciate the full significance of the evolutionary principle which is at work among the advanced peoples, it is necessary to look as yet rather beyond the horizon of accepted results, and into the stress of those conditions of the street and the market-place, in which the new forces that are striving to assert themselves already impinge on the consciousness of the individual. The problem which Professor Sidgwick has defined presents practically the same features in England and the United States. But in many of its phases it has already reached a more advanced development in the latter country.

¹Cf. *History of Trade Unionism*, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.

We may already perceive, for instance, how profoundly and inherently antagonistic, in the long run, must be the significance of the acceptance of the ethical postulate "that the distribution of wealth in a well-ordered State should aim at realising political justice," to the spirit of the conditions which, under the name of free competition, allows a private citizen to amass a fortune, equal in capital amount to the annual revenue of a first-class State, out of his competitors or customers. The conditions themselves obviously represent the ascendancy in the economic process of the ruling principle of the era of evolution out of which we have moved. They have about them an inherent aspect of elemental barbarism which the modern consciousness cannot be expected to continue to tolerate. The soul of the social question, asserted Professor Graham Taylor,¹ speaking recently of existing conditions in the United States, which will not down, and which will have to be met, is the rising revolt of the general conscience against the present ethical dualism in trade and competition. "Those who live protected lives under the shelter of assured incomes can little imagine," said the same writer, "the stress and strain of an increasing multitude who are exposed to the frightful struggle for economic existence both in the ranks of capital and labour";² and the result of the prevailing conditions he distinguished to be, a definite and increasing tendency towards a condition of self-stultification which, already profoundly felt, must in the end become insuffer-

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. v. 3, "The Social Function of the Church."

² *Ibid.*; compare also *Wealth against Commonwealth*, by H. D. Lloyd.

able.¹ It is impossible, points out Professor Shailer Mathews, that the religious consciousness should not sooner or later see the inconsistency between its teaching and prevailing forms of economic oppression and corruption, by whatever euphemistic synonym such acts may be described.²

What we must duly note on all hands, is how the personal sense of moral responsibility, transcending the demands of any political Utilitarianism of the kind imagined by Bentham and the Mills,³ is beginning to express itself through the social consciousness in relation to the economic situation. That consciousness as it impinges on the modern world-conflict is evidently, under this influence, becoming profoundly moved with a sense of responsibility to an ideal of social justice which transcends the content of the consciousness of the State. How the sense of self-stultification so clearly indicated in Professor Sidgwick's statement, as involved in the modern social problem, has begun to painfully haunt the individual, there are accumulating signs on all hands. Whether we agree with the conclusions to which many current writers desire to carry us or not, we have in sight, as will be seen, clearly defined, the nature of the tremendous force which continues to be represented in the antinomy which is developed in Western history. We see in it a cause intensely active, perma-

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. v. 3, "The Social Function of the Church." Cf. "Relation of Wealth to Morals," *World's Work*, No. 2.

² "The Church and the Social Movement," *Am. Jour. Sociology*.

³ Cf. *An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, by David Hume, pp. 237-431 (Works, vol. iv. 1826); *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, by Jeremy Bentham, chaps. i.-ix.; *Utilitarianism*, by John Stuart Mill, chap. iii.; *The English Utilitarians*, by Leslie Stephen, vol. ii. chap. vii., vol. iii. chaps. iv.-vi.

nent, inherent, and fundamental, and unmistakably operating to prevent the absolutisms inherent in the economic situation from shutting down on us in the present.

No one who has grasped the real nature of the organic movement that has come down through our civilisation will be likely to underrate the significance of the general position which is here defining itself. There is clearly indicated in it, as we shall see more fully in the next chapter, the lines along which the great antinomy in Western history will continue to develop. But to realise its import in the intensification of modern conditions it is necessary to have in mind some idea of the nature of the milieu in the historical process in which it has begun to operate.

Now as the principles of the modern more empirical school of political economy developed in England have come to be illuminated by the results obtained by the historical methods of German workers like Roscher, List, Hildebrand, Knies, and Schmoller, the economic life of our civilisation has begun to present to view the outlines of a large organic process slowly unfolding itself in Western history along certain clearly-defined lines of development. The leading principle of this process is very striking; and yet it is in a large way so simple that it may readily be grasped by the general mind when it is once pointed out. Put into a few words, it is that our economic progress represents the steps in a slowly ascending development in which the winning systems are those within which the economic process is tending to reach the highest intensity as the result of the gradual subordination of the particular to the universal.

No modern worker has done more to bring into view the steps in the process by which this result is being accomplished than Schmoller; and although the economic process in Germany, in the conditions under which he discusses it, is still some stages behind the phase it has already reached in England and the United States, the importance of his work, in enabling us the more thoroughly to grasp the full significance of the antinomy we have been endeavouring to describe, is scarcely lessened on that account.

When Schmoller takes up the economic process in Europe at the period of the break-up of feudalism, the conditions that present themselves, as the veil is drawn aside from the economic life of the world, are remarkable. We are, as it were, transported back again into the midst of the standards and principles of the ancient civilisations. These have now all their exact counterparts in Europe, in the economic conditions of the early mediæval town. We are, it is true, no longer in the presence of the military city-State, regarding all outsiders as subjects to be subdued and exploited by military force. The unit throughout Europe has become the economic life of the town. But it is the economic life of a town organised strictly on the principles of the ancient State. To use the striking words in which Schmoller summarises the result of his researches, "Each separate town felt itself to be a privileged community, gaining right after right by struggles kept up for hundreds of years, and forcing its way, by negotiation and purchase, into one political and economic position after the other. The citizen-body looked upon itself as forming a whole, and a whole that was limited as narrowly as

possible, and for ever bound together. It received into itself only the man who was able to contribute, who satisfied definite conditions, proved a certain amount of property, took an oath, and furnished security that he would stay a certain number of years. . . . The omnipotence of the council ruled the economic life of the town, when in its prime, with scarcely any limit; it was supported in all its action by the most hard-hearted town selfishness and the keenest town patriotism, — whether it were to crush a competing neighbour or a competing suburb, to lay heavier fetters on the country around, to encourage local trade, or to stimulate local industries.”¹

The soul of this policy of the town of the Middle Ages may be perceived at a glance. It aimed at preserving the economic life of the town as a protected area existing apart from, and in opposition to, the rest of the world. It always, says Schmoller, consisted simply in this — “the putting of fellow-citizens at an advantage, and of competitors from the outside at a disadvantage.”² In the furtherance of this policy every weapon that could be employed was pressed into the service of the town. Restrictive taxes, differential tolls, and the coercive regulation of exports, imports, and currency were continually resorted to. All the resources of municipal diplomacy, of constitutional struggle between the political orders, and, in the last resort, of violence, were employed by the towns to gain their ends.³ The economic town of the Middle Ages throughout Europe formed, in short, says Schmoller, “a complete system of currency, credit,

¹ *The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance*, by Gustav Schmoller (ed. W. J. Ashley), pp. 7, 8. ² *Ibid.* ³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

trade, tolls, and finance, shut up in itself." It was managed as a united whole, its centre of gravity was exclusively in local interests, and the policy which it pursued with all its strength was to maintain the area of its interests at war with, and strictly protected from, the competition of all the outside world.¹

This is the real starting-point of the economic life of the civilisation of our era—a starting-point at which we may distinguish that the ruling principle is still the same as that upon which the whole social fabric of the ancient civilisations was reared. The development which begins gradually to succeed to this condition is very remarkable. With a comprehensive grasp of the facts of the historical process, Schmoller traces the steps by which this exclusive life of the towns throughout Europe becomes overlaid by the economic life of ever larger and larger communities; these, however, continuing to preserve, for the time being, the same attitude of self-sufficiency against the world; while they had won freedom of economic movement within their own boundaries. The economic life of the town Schmoller sees expanding in this manner, first of all into that of the territory—a unit which had for its characteristic the association of town *and* country, similarly organised for war with other territories; then into that of the national State organised on a like principle; then into that of the mercantile system organised by England in the eighteenth century on a similar basis, and now in process of imitation by modern Germany in many of its features.

If we look closely at this development for a moment,

¹ *The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance*, by Gustav Schmoller (ed. W. J. Ashley), p. 11.

there are certain features of great interest in it which have to be noticed. In the first place, it was no automatic process unfolding itself without stress in history. Every step in it was resisted — and not, as the theories of the Manchester school might have led us to suppose, resisted mistakenly — by the interests concerned. We see distinctly, for instance, how that it was not, as might at first sight be assumed, the immediate economic interest of the towns to become merged in the territories, or of the territories in turn to become merged in the national State. So clearly was this recognised at the time that the process was one in which the fiercest conflict was maintained at all points by the particular and present interests which these represented as against the larger tendency which was overruling them.¹ In obedience to the cause at work, the territorial governments, only step by step, and in the face of the most strenuous opposition, broke down the exclusive economic life of the towns.² Then followed for centuries a similar economic struggle between the territory and the State. In short, says Schmoller, "the whole internal history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not only in Germany, but everywhere else, is summed up in the opposition of the economic policy of the State to that of the town, the district, and the several estates."³

Of the essential nature of the two leading features of this development there can be no doubt. It represented, over and above everything else, the growing intensity of the economic process as the barriers which protected against outside competition were one

¹ *The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance*, by Gustav Schmoller (ed. W. J. Ashley), p. 22. ² *Ibid.*, p. 36. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

by one broken down, and the area of economic freedom was extended in larger and larger communities. This is the first principle represented. The second principle is equally clear. The steps which led to this development of intenser conditions and higher efficiency within the ever-growing areas of freedom were, nevertheless, certainly not considered by the economic interests concerned to represent their benefit. It involved the principle of the subordination of their present and particular interests to the larger future which the whole process represented.

What was the nature of the subordinating cause here represented? Schmoller gives us no real answer to this question.¹ So far as any explanation is at-

¹ The failure at this point is the characteristic weakness of the German Historical School of Economics. As a recent writer puts it, in words which, however, must be held to apply rather to Schmoller's predecessors: "The insistence on data could scarcely be carried to a higher pitch than it was carried by the first generation of the Historical school; and yet no economics is farther from being an evolutionary science than the received economics of the Historical school. The whole broad range of erudition and research that engaged the energies of that school commonly falls short of being scientific, in that, when consistent, they have contented themselves with an enumeration of data and a narrative account of industrial development, and have not presumed to offer a theory of anything or to elaborate their results into a consistent body of knowledge" (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol. xii: "Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?" (Thorstein Veblen)). On the other hand, it is interesting to note how equally characteristic has been the weakness on the historical side of the English empirical school of economics which has come down through Adam Smith and the Manchester school. "It can hardly be doubted," says Professor W. J. Ashley ("Historical School of Economics," *Dict. Pol. Econ.*), "that (Adam) Smith's frame of mind was, on the whole, essentially unhistorical, and that historical narrative and inductive reasoning were with him subordinate to a deductive movement of thought."

tempted, he simply identifies the principle with a tendency to what he calls *State-making* or *Nation-making*.¹ To answer the question we must turn to the consideration of the economic process in the most advanced phase it has yet attained, namely, as we see it represented at the present day, principally within the pale of the English-speaking world.

Now, it has been already remarked that in the business and industrial life of the United States at the present time, the fact that most profoundly impresses the evolutionist, when he perceives its relation to the future, is the degree of intensity tending to be reached in the economic process in that country. As the observer moves from the Eastern and Middle to the Western States, a conviction of the enormous potentiality in the future, if the development of the United States continues to be along healthy lines, of the conditions making towards the free conflict of economic forces which he sees extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, grows upon the mind. He has before him what he realises to be, beyond doubt, immeasurably the most important area hitherto cleared in the world within which the conditions of such freedom are tending to prevail. Ever as regards the conditions of free exchange, it is within this area that there has already been reached the largest practical application in the world of the principle of Free Trade.

¹ Schmoller notices at the beginning that the process of economic assimilation and emancipation proceeded most quickly in those areas in which it coincided with the movement towards nationhood (p. 16). At the stage at which the process of development reached the mercantile system, he asserts that, "The essence of the system lies not in some doctrine of money, or in the balance of trade; not in tariff barriers, protective duties, or navigation laws; but in something far greater. . . ."

What has been the vast cause that, so far, must have overruled the multitude of local, of present, and of particular interests which here—and to a far greater degree than at the stage Schmoller described—must have found their own natural aims ranged in inevitable opposition to the operation of that larger cause subordinating the particular to the universal which, in producing the prevailing intensity of conditions, is about to win for the United States in general such a commanding place in the future?

The answer to this question appears simple and obvious. And yet, as soon as we see its ultimate application, we have extended our view indefinitely beyond the horizon of all theories of the State and of nationality. The cause is, we see, simply the same deep-lying organic cause which has made the population of the United States a single people; which decided at the beginning that the original States should not set up barriers against each other; which later, and at a supreme crisis of their existence, prevented them from breaking up into two separate nationalities. It is the cause which has driven the same people to absorb into this unity, and to digest with a rapidity and completeness elsewhere unknown, the various fragments of the Latin civilisations with which they were originally surrounded. It is the cause which has driven them to absorb with equal rapidity, and to build up into a new social order, the millions which Europe has continued to pour upon them. But in all this we must realise that it is no mere expansion of a race or of a nationality we are watching here. It is

In its innermost kernel it is nothing but state-making" (*The Mercantile System*, pp. 50, 51).

the conquering march of principles becoming conscious — the principles born into the world through the long stress of the process we have been describing throughout. The cause at work is similar in all respects to that which, moving in the minds of another branch of the peoples representing the same principles, has recently resulted in the federation of the Australian continent — or which, acting on others, leads them to dream of still wider ideals of unity among English-speaking peoples. But it is a cause which has no direct relation to the conscious machinery of governments, of politics, or of States. It represents rather the slow convergence towards each other in a majestic process of natural development of the forces and factors with which the ultimate meaning of our civilisation is identified, and under the control of which the world is destined to pass in the future towards which we continue to move.

When in the light of this process we turn now and look back over the development of which Schmoller described the first stages,¹ it has, we must observe, become pregnant with a larger meaning. A principle that we now perceive to be inherent in it has become visible. In the earlier phases of the progress of the economic process towards intensity and efficiency through the extension of the areas of economic freedom in ever larger and larger communities, we saw the process of economic development in Western history centring round those inchoate ideals which Schmoller, for want of a better expression, described as ideals of "Nationality" or of "State-making."² So far as the basis of these ideals presented itself

¹ *The Mercantile Theory.*

² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 16, 50, 51.

consciously to the human mind in early times, it doubtless represented little more than the expression of the tribal or local egoism characteristic of a former era of evolution. But the deeper import of the process at a later stage has now become visible. A higher consciousness than that of mere nationality has begun to express itself through it.

As with the growth of knowledge the peoples who occupy the foremost place in our civilisation at the present day come to realise the tremendous significance in the world of those principles of free conflict of which they have become the representatives in history; as they begin to realise that it is through the long stress of their history that these principles have been born into the world; as they come to realise in particular that in the open stress of Natural Selection they have become the exponents of the principle through which the main stream of the evolutionary process has come down through Western history, and through which it descends towards the future; — then a sense of community different in kind, and also in intensity to any that has ever existed before, must come to express itself through the process which these peoples are carrying forward in the world. The development towards economic enfranchisement which Schmoller saw pursuing its course subconsciously in history will, as it were, have attained to consciousness; and with an immeasurably higher meaning and sterner sanction behind it than that of any of the tribal or local egoisms hitherto expressing themselves under the ideals of nationality.

On the horizon of modern thought we are, in short, in sight of the fact that in the progress of the world

the days of "nationalities" in the old sense are numbered. The evolutionary process in Western history is slowly but surely converging towards a stage at which the struggle will be between a few great systems of social order, of which the political and economic structure will be, in the last resort, the outward expression of different interpretations of fundamental ethical conceptions. And the determining cause, in respect of which Natural Selection will eventually discriminate in the rivalry between them, must inevitably be the degree of efficiency with which they have embodied in the world-process that principle towards the expression of which the whole evolutionary drama moves—the subordination of the present to the future.

In the current literature of the time all kinds of Utopian dreams are indulged in as to the character of the future that is before us. We may, however, almost at a glance, put most of them aside as unreal and impossible. There can be no doubt as to the nature of the principles with which the future of the world is identified. It is by no broad pathway through Elysian fields of ordered ease that the peoples to whom the future of the world belongs are advancing to the goal which is before them. It is through conditions more strenuous than have ever prevailed in the world before.

The meaning of the evolutionary drama that is working itself out in Western history has been the same from the beginning. It continues to be the same as far as human eye can forecast the future. It is, so far as science is concerned with it, the great drama in which the tyranny of the present is being lifted, for

the first time in the world's history, from the shoulders of the human race. The principle which is accomplishing so tremendous an achievement is the projection of the controlling sense of human responsibility outside the bounds of political consciousness. But the principles with which the import of that process is necessarily identified in the present, are the principles of such a free conflict of forces as has never prevailed in the world before. The very standard of truth, in the presence of which the peoples who have won their way through it live and move, is a standard according to which truth itself can only be conceived as the net resultant of forces apparently opposed and in themselves conflicting. The conditions resulting are the only conditions in which the tyrannies of the present could be broken. They are the only conceivable conditions in which it is possible for the larger future to be born. Whatever we may think of them, they are the only ruling conditions which will be identified with the state of social order destined to prevail among the peoples to whom the future of the world belongs.

The peoples who hold the foremost place in the advancing ranks of our civilisation at the present day, are those who have won their way to right of place through the prolonged stress of the development in which these principles have been born into the world. That development itself has been the sequel to the earlier struggle, in which the same peoples won in the supreme stress of military selection their right of place as the only type able to hold the stage of the world during the long epoch in which it became the destiny of the present to pass under the control of the future.

The ideal toward which they are carrying the world is that of a fair, open, and free rivalry of all the forces within the social consciousness — a rivalry in which the best organisations, the best methods, the best skill, the best abilities, the best government, and the best standards of action and of belief, shall have the right of universal opportunity.

This is the ideal which has been inherent in Western civilisation from the beginning of our era. It is an ideal which rests ultimately, as we have seen, on one principle, always in the background — the principle of tolerance held as an ultimate conviction of the religious consciousness. It is an ideal involving, therefore, an attitude towards the world becoming inflexible and inexorable at the point at which its own principle of tolerance is threatened. It is the only ideal under which the lesser present can pass under the control of the greater future. It is the ideal which in its ultimate form must reach the limits of a Stateless competition of all the individuals of every land, in which the competitive potentiality of all natural powers shall be completely enfranchised. And it is advancing towards realisation in modern history, not through the powers of States or of Governments to enforce it; but in virtue of the sterner fact that in the stress of Natural Selection every other system of social order must in the end go down before the strenuousness and efficiency of the life of the peoples who have won their way towards it.

CHAPTER XI

TOWARDS THE FUTURE

WHEN the evolutionist, who has carried so far his survey of the process unfolding itself in Western history, pauses for a space at this stage and looks back over its meaning in the past, it is almost inevitable that a conviction of the unusual importance of the period towards which the world is moving should settle slowly upon the mind. However it may be regarded, it is, he perceives, on the whole impossible to conceive the development we have been discussing in the preceding chapters as any merely partial or secondary phase of the evolutionary process. The more clearly we distinguish, in relation to the past history of the race, the outlines of the fundamental problem with which the human mind is struggling therein, and the more thoroughly we have grasped the character of the essential unity under all its phases of the movement we have followed so far throughout our civilisation, the more clearly do we also perceive that in the development in progress under our eyes in Western history we are regarding the main sequence of events along which the meaning of the cosmic process in human history is descending towards the future.

Transforming as has been the many-sided conflict we have followed through the past, it can, therefore, hardly be regarded as more than the prelude to

the wider and more conscious phase of the struggle towards which the world is converging. The development we have been considering has evidently inherent in it an enormous impetus. But it has been hitherto a movement which can hardly be said to have risen to consciousness in the intellectual processes of our civilisation. It has involved of necessity developments, alike in religious thought and in political theory, which could only have yielded their real meaning in the stern analysis to which they have been subjected in the actual stress of the evolutionary process in history. If existing indications are not misinterpreted, an epoch of analysis of exceptional significance is drawing to a close in Western history, and we have travelled to the verge of a new era of synthesis. In endeavouring to estimate the impetus behind the social transformation to be accomplished in the stage towards which the historical process is advancing, it is desirable, therefore, that we should, in the first place, briefly consider a position in thought in which we see, as it were, the world-process itself trembling on the brink of consciousness.

Now if we endeavour to detach the mind from all preconceived ideas on the subject, nothing can well be more remarkable than the spectacle which is presented, when we reflect for a moment on the position that has been reached in relation to existing systems of Western thought, if the principles we have so far endeavoured to set forth be accepted as correct. If we turn at the outset to the domain of pure thought, and take first that great intellectual movement which began in Germany with the theories of Kant, and which has influenced so deeply and in so many direc-

tions the course of modern thought, the result as it begins to stand out before the mind is very striking.

So far as it is possible to compress into a few words the problem which we see Kant discussing in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,¹ to which we see him later bidding farewell in the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*,² and around which for over a century so much controversy has centred, it might be put as follows:—Kant asserted, from an analysis of the human mind, that there was to be distinguished in it a quality or a conviction relating to ends to be described as transcendental, and as such lying beyond the limit of the understanding; and yet a quality or conviction which was also to be described, not only as true, but as vitally associated with the whole theory of human conduct in regard to human interests in the world around us.

If we take now, on the other hand, the leading tenet of the opposing empirical school of thought which has come down through Hume, and the influence of which has lasted down to the present day, and endeavour to compress it into similarly brief terms, it would amount practically to this. So far from giving any countenance to Kant's conception, it asserted with emphasis that the content of the human mind proceeded simply from sensations related to experience;³ or — to put the conception

¹ *The Critique of Pure Reason*, by Immanuel Kant, translated by F. Max Müller, vol. ii. ; see in particular pp. 403-713.

² *The Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic*, translated by J. P. Mahaffy and J. H. Bernard.

³ Cf. *A Treatise on Human Nature*, by David Hume, original edition, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, v. i. and iii. ; and iii.

into the more developed form it reached later in Herbert Spencer's theories — it proceeded from the past experience either of the individual or of the race.¹ Translated into the language of psychology, this conception of the empirical school of thought became in our time an assertion that all the faculties and intuitions of the human mind have arisen from the consolidated experience of antecedent individuals who have bequeathed their nervous organisations to the existing individuals.² Translated into a principle of ethics, it became an assertion that all ethical ideas represent simply the inherited experience of utilities.³ Translated into the fundamental maxim of Marxian socialism, it became the assertion that all human institutions and beliefs are ultimately in the last analysis the outcome of economic conditions.⁴

The conclusion, in short, to which Kant advanced has been regarded by the adherents of the empirical school of thought as offering no solid ground for assent. For in the conception, for instance, which reaches its most developed phase in Herbert Spencer's theories — that conception in which the clue to individual and social development alike is summed up in the relations of the ascendant present to the past

¹ Cf. *Principles of Biology*, §§ 297-314; *Principles of Psychology*, §§ 223-273, and § 430.

² Cf. *Principles of Psychology*, § 129 to end.

³ Cf. *Principles of Ethics*, §§ 24-62. The position with which the English school set out may be compared, in the first book of Locke's *Essay concerning the Human Understanding*, with that reached by Mr. Spencer.

⁴ Cf. *Capital*, by Karl Marx (trans. by Moon and Aveling), chap. i. sec. 4, and chap. xxxii.; also *German Social Democracy*, by Bertrand Russell, lecture i.

— Kant's conclusion necessarily presented itself as being without any correlative in the evolution of the individual mind, on the one hand, or in the evolution of the social process as it was understood, on the other. To others, equally positive, Kant's conclusions, nevertheless, appeared in some manner to have plumbed the deepest depths of human consciousness. And so the controversy, advancing to no permanent conclusion through the Hegelian development, remained suspended in modern thought.

It is almost startling to observe now the effect which is produced when we look at Kant's conception in the light of the ruling principle of the evolutionary process as we have endeavoured to set it forth in the previous chapters. By one bound the mind springs, as it were, to the very centre of Kant's position. For if, indeed, all the phenomena of our Western world are related to the ultimate fact that the controlling centre of the evolutionary process therein is being projected out of the present ; if, indeed, it is no longer the relations of the human mind to the past, but to the future of the evolutionary process that has become of the first importance in the study of the development which the race is undergoing ; if, in short, we are living in Western history in the midst of a movement in which, as has been said, there runs through the whole realm of art, of ethics, of literature, of philosophy, of religion, of politics, and of economics, the deep cosmic note of a struggle in which the individual and society alike are being slowly broken to the ends of a social efficiency which can never more be included within the limits of political consciousness,—then the meaning towards which Kant endeav-

oured to lift his generation has become no more than the simple commonplace of a new era of knowledge. In the clear, cold meaning of a simple scientific principle, as in the light of a new dawn, there stand revealed the outlines of that land through which the human mind has struggled to advance in the dark. Almost with a glance the intellectual vision takes in the whole content of the position to which Kant, central figure as he must always remain in Western thought, actually essayed to give us a plan in the gaunt and cumbrous survey of the Transcendental Philosophy.¹

As we look backward and forward through the history of thought, the impression received by the mind at the outset continues to deepen. There has never before, in the process of our social evolution, emerged into view so great and so far-reaching a master-principle. It matters not in what direction we apply its meaning; the result is almost equally illuminative. As we understand the nature of the evolutionary problem that is being solved in the historical process in Western history, the line of demarcation which divides the meaning of our era from the ultimate significance of all other phases and all other epochs of human development stands out before the mind. When we perceive the central meaning of that

¹ Many of what will be seen to be simple and obvious inferences from the position defined in the foregoing chapters could hardly be stated in better words than those in which they are set forth by Kant towards the end of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, after they have been reached as conclusions by the difficult road of the "Transcendental Analytic" and "Transcendental Dialectic." Compare, for example, pp. 502-508, 541-550, and 588-602 in Max Müller's translation, vol. ii. of *The Critique*.

era to be that it is the period in which the present is passing out under the control of the infinite, it is impossible to mistake the scientific import of phases of the process hitherto veiled in obscurity.

As we follow the path which the human mind has taken through the various movements in Western thought that have succeeded each other from the period of the Reformation onwards, we appear to have in sight a phenomenon of striking interest. We seem to see, as it were, the conscious intellectual process in our civilisation slowly overtaking the meaning of the evolutionary process which, independent of that consciousness, has been taking its way through history in advance of it.¹ And, as in the first efforts of the Greek mind to interpret the physical cosmos, we see how childlike, how limited, and how intensely local have been many of the ideas of the first stages. With the ascendancy, for instance, in Western thought of the conception that there is nothing in the human mind but what is related to past experience, and that there is nothing in the theory of social progress but what is related to the interests of the individuals comprised within the limits of political consciousness, we see how completely, at first, the central meaning of the evolutionary drama in progress in our Western world has, of necessity, been missed. For, in the midst of a process in which the present is passing out under the control of the larger future, the direction of development at every growing point of the human mind amongst the winning peoples must have been in the line along which the present is being gradually

¹ Cf. *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, by Edward Caird, pp. 366 *et seq.*, vol. ii.

drawn into the meaning of the future. It is not to the past, but to the future that our position in the present has become primarily related. It is to the principle of Projected Efficiency in the social process that every other principle whatever must ultimately stand in subordinate relationship.

We see, therefore, after what futile issues, whole movements in philosophy, in ethics, in religion have been directed. We see in what a closed circle, ever turning inward upon itself, the leaders have travelled in quests vain from the beginning. That great movement in Western thought which began with the English Deists, which was developed on the continent of Europe in the eighteenth century under various forms of Rationalism, and which, in its return influence on English thought, culminated in England in the utilitarian theories of ethics and of the State, stands revealed to us in the new light shrunken of the meaning its leaders dreamed of. Almost with a single glance the mind takes in its limited relationship to the reality it endeavoured to interpret. To conceive, as that school of thought has done under one of its aspects, that the direction of progress in our Western world was to empty the concepts of the system of religious belief associated with our civilisation of that distinctive quality which projected their meaning beyond the limits of political consciousness;¹ to imagine, therefore, that conduct in the last resort required no principle of support in the evolutionary process, but that of self-interest well understood;² or as Hume,

¹ Cf. *German Culture and Christianity, their Controversy 1770-1880*, by Joseph Gostwick, pp. 18-59.

² Cf. *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, by Jeremy Bentham, c.

anticipating Bentham, put it, that morality demanded, not self-denial, but "just calculation";¹ to dream therefore, as the Utilitarians dreamed at last in England, that the scheme of progress unfolded by them revealed the fact that the influence of an enlightened self-interest, first of all upon the actions, and afterwards upon the character of mankind, is shown to be sufficient to construct the whole edifice of civilisation;² — is to present to us now but the progressive stages of an illusion. The nature of the deep dividing line which separates the principles of morals (covering conduct related to ends in the evolutionary process necessarily projected beyond the limits of political consciousness) from the principles of the State (concerned with interests within the limits of political consciousness) has, we see, remained entirely outside the vision of the Utilitarians.³

i.-iv. ; *Utilitarianism*, by J. S. Mill, c. ii. ; *Data of Ethics*, by Herbert Spencer, §§ 92-98 ; and *The English Utilitarians*, by Leslie Stephen, vol. i. c. vi. vol. ii. p. 313, to end.

¹ *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, by David Hume.

² *Rationalism in Europe*, by W. E. H. Lecky, vol. ii. p. 368 ; cf. *Utilitarianism*, by J. S. Mill, pp. 24, 25. Mill speaks vaguely of his principle of utility applying to the "collective interests of mankind" ; but he does not in practice carry us any farther than Bentham, who speaks of it as applying either to the interest of the individual or the interest of the community, and proceeds forthwith to define the interest of the community as simply "the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it." *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 3.

³ Mr. J. S. Mackenzie rightly points out that "the chief claims of utilitarianism to practical value seem to rest on (a) the principle of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' in legislation, and (b) the principle of 'Utilities' in Economics," *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, chap. iv. Within these limits, and apart from its more ambitious theories, Utilitarianism has, of course, been an important factor in that distinctively English development already noticed as characterised by a tendency to the complete differentiation of the theory of the State from the science of ethics.

In the growing light we perceive of what incomplete conceptions of the principles underlying the evolutionary process many of the positions taken up have been the expression. The assertion, repeated in many keys in movements of the time, that the economic factor—that is the self-interest of the individuals within the limits of political consciousness—is the ruling factor in human history, has become no more than an empty formula from which the meaning has vanished in the presence of the reality that we perceive to lie beyond it. The conception which Paul Bert wished to see the ruling principle in the development of modern France, namely, that our natural instincts—meaning thereby the instincts that are related to the past history of the race—are the real basis of conduct and morality, has become scarcely more than a formula of atavism. The correlative maxim in art—that the end of art is for its own sake, that is, for the sake of sensations related to the past experience of the race instead of for the sake of the meaning of the infinite process into which we are being drawn in the future—has become in turn merely a belated survival into the modern era. The meaning which the later Tolstoy, like the earlier Kant, has endeavoured to portray here also shines before us as a simple commonplace in the light.

And so the illumination continues. We see how empty of real meaning has been Herbert Spencer's attempt to explain the vast process in Western history that has resulted in the gradual differentiation of aim between the Church and the State, as if it represented hardly more than the survival into our time of that phase of the relations of the present to

the past which he portrayed in his original theory of Ancestor Worship.¹ We are, in truth, no longer primarily concerned in discussing the phenomena of the system of religious belief associated with our civilisation, in relation to a fact upon which a huge fabric of trivial theory has been constructed by writers who have followed Mr. Spencer's lead in this matter; namely, the fact that there is to be distinguished in the concepts of that system of belief ideas which may be held to represent survivals from a past stage in the development of the race.² It is the relation in which these ideas stand to the future, and not to the past, which has become of overshadowing importance in the study of the evolutionary process. It is with their significance as participations, and not as survivals, that we have become concerned. They represent, we see now, but the first points of attachment, along the line of which human consciousness has begun to be drawn into the ever-increasing sweep of an integrating process, of which the controlling meaning is not in the past but in the future.

The central idea, in short, around which Mr. Spencer constructed his theory of human development in the *Synthetic Philosophy*, namely, that the meaning of the evolutionary process in history lies in the progress of the struggle between the present and the past, has

¹ To Herbert Spencer the increasing difference of aim between the Church and the State in our civilisation is practically only a form of the question whether the living ruler, with his organisation of civil and military subordinates (as represented in the State), shall or shall not yield to the organisation (as represented in the religious consciousness) of those who represent dead rulers and profess to utter their commands; cf. *Ecclesiastical Institutions*, §§ 638-641.

² Cf. *The Evolution of the Idea of God*, by Grant Allen.

been relegated to a place in the background. The central principle of the evolutionary drama in progress in the world, namely, that it is the meaning of the struggle between the future and the present which controls all the ultimate tendencies of progress, and into which all the phenomena of history are being gradually drawn, has remained, we see, outside the field of Mr. Spencer's vision.

There is no exaggeration in any of these respects of the transformation in knowledge which we see accomplished under our eyes. There can be no mistake as to the impetus it must give to a far-reaching process of change. On whatever side we extend our vision the effect of the illumination continues to be distinguished. As the mind travels slowly over the outlines of the developmental process in Western history we have endeavoured to describe, the containing significance is unmistakable. The existence of the necessity in the evolutionary process which must sooner or later subordinate the present and all its interests to the interests of a future which is infinite; the nature of the supreme concepts associated with the era in which we are living, by which the human mind has risen to a sense of personal responsibility to a principle of sacrifice cosmic in its significance; the character of the resulting, slowly developing movement in our civilisation, the potentiality of which, entirely different from any represented in the ancient world, has in consequence been from the beginning to project the controlling centre of the evolutionary process beyond the contents of principles operating merely within the limits of political consciousness; the resulting gradual dissociation in Western history

of the religious consciousness from all alliance with the powers and purposes of the State, in that prolonged struggle in which the human mind has risen to the conception of truth expressing itself as the resultant of forces apparently in themselves conflicting; the consequent slow disintegration, still in progress, of all the absolutisms in opinion, in government, in ethics, in religion, by which the present, operating principally through the powers of the State, or through the compulsion of accepted standards of truth regarded as absolute, had hitherto strangled the future; the gradual opening, therefore, in the present of the conditions of such a free and tolerant conflict of forces as has never been in the world before, but a free conflict of which the very existence, nevertheless, depends at every point on the all-pervading influence in our civilisation of the concepts that continue to maintain the controlling meaning of the evolutionary process dissociated from all the interests and compulsions of the present, and in its condition of projection beyond the limits of political consciousness; — all form the links in a process of related sequences which profoundly and permanently impresses the intellect. We appear, in short, in Western history to have reached the stage when the intellectual process is about to overtake the meaning of the evolutionary process which has pursued a course hitherto in advance of it; a stage at which all the stress and strenuousness of the modern world-conflict, instead of being considered as something external to that system of belief which is associated with our civilisation, will be regarded by science as a natural phenomenon inherent in it from the beginning, and coming at last actually and visibly within the sphere of its highest meaning.

The historical process in our civilisation has reached the brink of consciousness. This is the pregnant fact which it is necessary to take into consideration in endeavouring to estimate the character of the impetus likely to be behind it in the stage in which it moves towards the great struggle of the modern era; the struggle inherent in, and proceeding from the development described in the preceding chapters; namely, that in which there is ultimately involved the challenge of the ascendancy of the present in the economic process throughout the world. That the result is destined to be enlarging and reconstructive beyond that proceeding from any previous period of transition in our history, no mind which has grasped the principles of the situation can ultimately doubt.

Now, standing at the present time in the midst of what may be called the first stage of the competitive era in Western history, it is necessary, in endeavouring to understand the future tendencies of our civilisation, to first of all recall before the mind a fact of the evolutionary process which, although it has been involved from the beginning in the principle of Projected Efficiency, brings to the mind even at this stage a certain feeling of surprise, when it is clearly and succinctly stated. It may be observed that in considering the recent past of the evolutionary process in the modern world, the outward feature with which we have been principally occupied has been capable of being summed up in the single word — emancipation. The period has been one of the general enfranchisement of all the conditions and forms of human activity. It has been the era of the emancipation of creeds and of commerce, of industry and

of thought, of individuals, of classes, and of nationalities. In the literature of the forward movement in the modern world we follow the tendencies of progress in a period of history through which the glorification of this principle of freedom resounds ever in our ears as a sustained and world-intoxicating pæan. We can, however, never clearly understand the nature of the relationship of the present to the future in our civilisation, until we have grasped the central fact from which the whole significance of this Western movement towards liberty in the last resort proceeds. It may be briefly put into the statement that :—

The setting free in the modern world of the activities of the individual as against all the absolutisms which would have otherwise enthralled them is, in its ultimate meaning, only a process of progress towards a more advanced and complete stage of social subordination than has ever prevailed in the world before.

It is, in short, only because there is involved in the freedom of the individual the development of those standards and forces by which the present is being subordinated to the future, that the movement towards liberty associated with our time attains to the importance it assumes in the modern science of society. It is not, therefore, with the interests of the individual therein, nor even with those of classes, of races, or of nationalities that we are primarily concerned. It is the meaning of the social process which is everywhere in the ascendant. It is to this dominant fact that all the tendencies of the prolonged development described in the previous chapters are ultimately related. All the steps towards a free conflict of forces—towards equality of conditions, of rights,

and of opportunities, and towards the liberty and freedom of the individual under all forms,—are simply but stages of progress in an increasing process of social subordination. It is upon none of these things regarded by themselves that we must fix attention in considering the future. It is upon the meaning of the evolutionary process as a whole that the mind must continue to be concentrated.

If we look back over the first period of the competitive era in Western history, particularly in England and the United States, where its phases have reached the most advanced development, we have in sight a spectacle of extreme interest. We have before us in this period the phenomena of an epoch in which the advocates of the principle of an uncontrolled play of forces in the State have first risen to the position of clearly perceiving the enormous importance in the modern world-process of the principle of free competition. Nevertheless, what we see is that here, just as in the earlier phases of the evolutionary process in Western history in which the ascendancy of the present was first challenged, the insight of the leaders of the time has carried them up to a fixed point, and no further. The advocates of an uncontrolled play of forces in society are, we see, everywhere, as yet, regarding as the dominant principle of the social process, nothing more than a condition of competition in which the action of every individual is supposed to proceed from the standpoint of his own enlightened self-interest within the limits of political consciousness. In all the early literature of the competitive movement in England and the United States it is the glorification of the principle of free competi-

tion within these limits which is always in evidence. The absolute potency of the uncontrolled action of the competitive forces in such circumstances to carry forward the whole social process is taken for granted. And the inherent tendency of all economic evils to cure themselves if simply left alone—the characteristic doctrine of the Manchester school of thought in England—becomes, accordingly, the central and fundamental article of belief throughout all that rigid system of social theory, in the influence of which almost the entire intellectual life of England and the United States begins to be held by the last half of the nineteenth century.

When we look closely at the position which is here defined, the fundamental principle it discloses on analysis is very remarkable. Despite the greatly widened area of the process of freedom won for the world, as the doctrine of competition in this form carries the peoples involved in it a long step forward in the direction in which the development described by Schmoller is proceeding; despite even the gigantic results which immediately follow the increasing intensity of conditions; the fact is indubitable that—just as in the first stages of all the other developments towards the emancipation of the future which have taken place in our civilisation—economic development as a whole remains still imprisoned within certain inexorable limits. It still moves in all its details within the closed circle of the ascendant present. It is only the immensity of the stage upon which the process is being enacted which obscures for a time the nature of the goal towards which the whole movement slowly advances. In endeavouring to understand the modern

world-problem, it is, therefore, of the highest importance that the intellect should endeavour to hold firmly from the outset the character of certain principles which ultimately govern it.

Now it has been pointed out by an American writer, Professor H. C. Adams, that in the conditions of an unregulated competition for commercial supremacy there is a result always inherent in the resulting struggle which must sooner or later become visible. It is impossible, this writer points out, for the conditions of such a struggle to rise beyond a certain fixed level. They must always in the end adjust themselves, not to the level of the qualities that we may consider desirable from the social or from any other point of view, but of those which contribute most directly to one end — fitness to survive in the state of unregulated competition which prevails. The struggle must, as it were, always tend to reduce itself in the end to the level of this its permanent governing denominator.

For example, to quote Professor Adams' words, "Suppose ten manufacturers competing with each other to supply the market with cottons. Assume that nine of them, recognising the rights of childhood, would gladly exclude from their employ all but adult labour. But the tenth man has no moral sense. His business is conducted solely with a view to large sales and a broad market. As child labour is actually cheaper than adult labour, he gives it a decided preference. What is the result? Since his goods come into competition with the goods of the other manufacturers, and since we who buy goods only ask respecting quality and price, the nine men, whose moral

instincts we commend, will be obliged, if they would maintain themselves in business, to adopt the methods of the tenth man, whose immoral character we condemn. Thus the moral tone of business is brought down to the level of the worst man who can sustain himself in it."¹

When we examine the fact which is here briefly stated in the light of the principle discussed in a previous chapter, the remarkable feature already referred to becomes visible. What we see is that in such a state of unregulated competition the ultimate governing principle by which the struggle must be regulated is of necessity that of a past era of the evolutionary drama. We are simply in the presence of the principle of the ascendancy of the present represented in all its strength in the social process. It is the ability to survive in a free and irresponsible struggle for gain, all the meaning of which is in the present, that is here the sole determining factor of development. Only the largeness of the stage upon which the economic process is being enacted prevents us for a time from perceiving that in such a phase of the competitive era there is really no principle at work which differentiates us from that phase of the evolutionary process beyond which it is the inherent and characteristic meaning of our civilisation to carry the world. There is absolutely no cause present which can prevent that condition from ultimately arising which has been the peculiar and distinctive feature of all the

¹ *An Interpretation of the Social Movements of Our Time.* To perceive the full reach of Mr. Adams' principle, compare this statement of it with Ricardo's well-known law of rent as set forth in his *Principles of Political Economy*, c. ii.

barbarisms of the past; namely, that condition at which the strongest competitive forces in a free-fight in the present tend to become absolute, and to extinguish altogether the circumstances of free competition. It can be only a matter of time, as the process gradually develops itself, and as it eliminates from the struggle all elements but those contributing to success therein, for the world to see that the distinctive principle for which our civilisation stands — that principle the characteristic effect of which is to secure the conditions of really free competition by emancipating the evolutionary process from the tyrannies through which the present tends to strangle the future — is as yet entirely unrepresented and unexpressed in this first conception of the principles of free competition.

If we look, accordingly, at the history of the movement proceeding from the Manchester school of thought in England — that movement with which the first intoxication of the perception of the importance of the principle of free competition in our civilisation must always remain identified — the fate which we see to be overtaking it in our time is presented in an aspect so striking, that the interest of the situation falls little short of the dramatic.

A quarter of a century after Adam Smith had published the *Wealth of Nations* in England, we see Ricardo already beginning to assume the absolute potency of the uncontrolled competitive forces to regulate the entire social process. This was the time when, under the conditions of uncontrolled competition, women and young children were being employed for twelve and fifteen hours a day in the factories of Great Britain in circumstances so terrible, and with

results so appalling, that the memory of them still haunts like a nightmare the literature of the modern industrial revolution in England. It was the time when it was said that half the infants of Manchester died before reaching the age of three years, and in which, in certain factory districts, the surviving youthful population was said to be in large part physically worn out before reaching adult age.

The first timorous attempt of the State to regulate such conditions of uncontrolled competition was made in England in the year 1802. In this it ventured as yet to interfere only on behalf of apprenticed pauper children; attempting to make no limit as to the age below which young children should not be employed, and limiting only the working hours of pauper children to twelve daily. It was not till nearly two decades later that the State attempted to interfere in England on behalf of young children generally, prohibiting the employment of those under nine years of age, and fixing a twelve hours' day for all young persons under the age of sixteen. In the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, when the Utilitarians had come to assert with almost the emphasis of a religious dogma, the tendency of economic evils to cure themselves without the interference of the State, the Manchester capitalists were still vigorously and successfully challenging the principle of State interference with the conditions of the employment of "free" adult labour; and it is only from this period forward that there begins in England that long list of measures — the bearing of which in the development of modern society is even as yet not always fully perceived — in which the State, in response to the growing conscious-

ness of the time, has interfered to an increasing degree in the relations between capital and labour.

The intellectual phenomena which developed side by side with these results in England were still more noteworthy. Slowly in English thought during the nineteenth century there came into view the economic theory, accepted as orthodox for the time being, of this "free" labour. According to the received opinion, the labouring classes were considered as condemned by natural law to live and breed under the control of capital on that minimum reward which — to quote Ricardo's definition of the natural price of labour — was "necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist, and to perpetuate their race without either decrease or diminution."¹ The remarkable conception which accompanied this theory, and which runs through the whole of J. S. Mill's *Political Economy*, delivered the labourer helplessly and permanently bound, as it were, into the hands of the capitalist class, making all efforts to free himself appear hopeless. This conception was presented in the now practically exploded theory of a wages' fund — implicitly accepted, strange as it may appear, by the dominant school of English economists through all the period from 1820 to 1870² — according to which the amount of the wages' fund being considered as fixed by the prevailing conditions of capital, "any

¹ *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, by David Ricardo (1821), p. 86.

² In an interesting review of the history of the theory of a "Wages' Fund," Mr. Spooner brings out (*Dict. of Pol. Econ.* vol. iii. p. 638) a fact not always recognised, namely, that J. S. Mill before his death acknowledged (*Fortnightly Review*, May, 1869) himself in error in the position he had previously taken up in this matter.

attempts which the working class might make to gain better terms from their employers by means of trade unions or otherwise, were either foredoomed to failure, or, if successful, did but benefit one particular class or section of the labouring classes at the expense of all the rest."¹ Finally, this conception had its corollary in that notorious theory of population propounded by Malthus — socially suicidal, and biologically foolish as we now perceive it to be — which led J. S. Mill to actually propose to the labourers as the main remedy for low wages, that they should restrain their numbers, and endeavour to look upon every one of their class, "who had more than the number of children which the circumstances of society allowed to each, as doing him a wrong, as filling up the place which he was entitled to share."²

It seems hard to believe that only a short interval of time separates us from the period when these ideas were actually authoritatively taught by leaders of opinion in England. Nay more, that in this recent period such ideas were implicitly associated in the minds of statesmen, philosophers, and philanthropists with the import and significance of the principle of free competition in our civilisation. We see now in the clearest light that they in reality represent nothing more or less than the projection into modern economic conditions of the central principle of the barbarisms of a past epoch of the world's history. The distinctive principle for which our civilisation stands in the evolutionary process is entirely unrepresented therein. There could be no real free play of the competitive

¹ *Dict. of Pol. Economy*, vol. iii. p. 636 (Spooner).

² *Principles of Political Economy*, by John Stuart Mill, ii., xiii.

forces in such conditions. Under the conception that all economic evils tend to cure themselves in a state of uncontrolled competition, the struggle must, in the terms of Professor Adams' example, sooner or later fall to the level of its governing denominator. The strongest competitive forces must in time eliminate all elements from the struggle but those contributing to success therein. In its relations to its own competitors capital must, by a principle inherent in the conditions from the beginning, tend by its very success to ultimately embody some colossal attitude of absolutism towards society. In the relations between capital and labour, where in the struggle to secure the conditions of profit capital is able to enforce against labour the right to withhold the conditions of existence, free competition cannot exist. The struggle must ultimately be regulated at the level of its governing denominator. Even if labour is comparatively successful in the struggle through its collective expression in trades unionism, it must tend, in self-defence, to embody a latent principle of passive resistance to the conditions of its highest energy and productivity as tending to diminish employment. The ultimate conditions of free competition do not in reality exist. They have never existed. On neither one side nor the other is the distinctive meaning of the social process in our civilisation as yet represented.

As we look forward, therefore, to the future, the meaning of the process of transition, of which we are living in but the opening phases, begins to grow upon the imagination. For we see that the development now in progress in the world is but the beginning of a general movement, in which this early conception

of the principles of free competition is destined in turn to be slowly broken to the overruling meaning of the social process as a whole ;— but broken only in a struggle which, gradually extending outwards from the relations of labour to capital, into the domain of industry, of business, of commerce, and of international relations, must in time consciously involve in its reach all the tendencies of the world-conflict in Western history.

The entire movement represented by modern socialism is, in this respect, to be regarded as bearing a close analogy to that Renaissance of the middle ages which preceded the upheaval out of which was to arise a new governing principle of the evolutionary process. All its faults and failings notwithstanding ; far as its leaders have sometimes wandered from the meaning of our era ; completely as many of those leaders have missed, as did the leaders of the Italian Renaissance, the essential meaning of the great antinomy represented in the evolution of our Western world ; the movement, nevertheless, represents in a true sense a general revolt of the consciousness of our time against economic conditions tending towards absolutism in which the characteristic principle that our civilisation represents in the evolutionary process is as yet inoperative. In it there is expressed in effect the first general effort of the masses of the world to impose on the economic conditions represented by the early crude conceptions of the competitive era that distinctive meaning which the social process as a whole is destined, sooner or later, to acquire in our civilisation.

As we look, therefore, at the fate which appears to

be overtaking the advocates of that development in thought which received its principal impetus from the Manchester school in England, the remarkable and dramatic features of the situation before referred to become gradually visible. Inspired as the leaders of this movement have been with the inward vision of one of the greatest of modern scientific truths, namely, the importance of the principle of free competition in the evolution of society; perceiving clearly, moreover, despite all the phenomena of opposition, the fundamental relationship of this master-principle to the causes which are irresistibly carrying forward the advancing peoples of the world; we see them in our time as the advocates of the principle of uncontrolled competition, standing, almost as stood the leaders of the mediæval Church — resolute, sullen, unconvinced — at bay before a visibly increasing purpose in our civilisation, which seems to them to threaten the central and supreme article of their faith. It is when we turn to the conditions under which the development with which we have been dealing begins to extend now beyond the relations simply of capital to labour, and to draw into its influence the more extensive phenomena of our civilisation, that the deeper interest of the situation takes firm hold upon the mind.

When we look back once again over the history of the early competitive era in our civilisation, it may be perceived that there is one idea which forms the leading conception of the school of thought in England identified with the principles of that period. It is in reality the idea which provided the central principle around which all the conceptions of the Manchester school revolved. It is an idea which can be stated

more clearly and satisfactorily if, in words at least, we disengage it altogether from the theories of free-trade and free exchange. In its simplest and most scientific form it might be put as follows: It was held to be the natural and ultimate tendency in the existing world for the conditions in industry, commerce, and business, just as in the relations of capital to labour, to reach their highest and most efficient development in the interest of society, simply in obedience to their own natural and inherent tendencies.

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, when industry and commerce were still suffering from the policy of governments avaricious on behalf of classes or of interests, it was only natural that the most enlightened minds should advance to the conclusion that all interference of the State, as in the past, was an unmixed evil. In the writings of Adam Smith, Ricardo, and the Mills, and in the speeches of Cobden, we are always in the presence of the feeling associated with this fact. It was the officers who sit at the receipt of custom to take tithe and toll for the benefit of particular classes that excited the anger of Cobden.¹ It was but a step which involved a scarcely perceptible advance further to imagine, and to assert with conviction, not only that industry and business best attained, unaided by the State, the ends desired by traders, but that they tended, as was conceived of the relations of capital to labour, to reach their highest and most efficient development in the interest of society, simply in obedience to their own tendencies, in that condition which allowed of the uncontrolled competition of all rival interests.

¹ *Speeches*, p. 41.

As we watch the next phase unfolding itself in Western history, it soon becomes apparent that all the phenomena of the economic process are closely related to a single governing principle, and that in the affairs of industry, as in the relations of capital to labour, it is only the confusion and incompleteness of the first stages of the competitive era which intervene to prevent the mind, for a time, from realising that the characteristic and essential condition of free competition which it has become the significant destiny of our civilisation to import into the evolutionary process is in reality not present at all.

As the economic process has continued to develop in recent times the tendencies inherent in it have become gradually visible. In the first place, it has become obvious that through an immense range of activities in modern industry and commerce, the effectiveness of the competitors has on the whole tended to rapidly increase with the size and centralisation of the concerns concerned. This is a result due to two causes which are of importance to keep quite distinct in the mind. It is undoubtedly true that, in economy of working, and in the increased efficiency of centralised management, large organisations under modern conditions tend as a matter of course to become up to a definite point the natural superiors of their smaller competitors. But beyond this there is a further cause which, although it remains in the background at first, becomes visible at a subsequent stage as a ruling factor of the competitive process. In the modern conditions of unregulated conflict it has become obvious that the larger organisations also secure, in respect of

their size and resources, and altogether apart from their efficiency, an immense advantage over the lesser rivals, because of the peculiar inherent strength of which they become possessed simply as fighting organisations tending in time to become absolute.

For a time the largeness of the stage upon which the economic drama is being enacted makes it difficult for the mind to hold the controlling principle of the situation. Yet as the small industry grows by the natural laws of the competitive struggle into the great industry, there begins to arrive a condition in which we see, just as in the relations of capital to labour, that the ultimate conditions of free competition are not really present. Despite the great advance that has been made from the past in the conditions of competition, the ultimate governing principle of economic development remains that of a past phase of the evolutionary process. We are regarding a free fight, of which the principles and controlling meaning are still entirely in the present, in which the forces engaged must tend to eliminate all elements but those contributing to success in a free fight, and in which the whole process must fall in time to the level of its governing principle. Sooner or later, a stage must be reached when it will become visible that the ultimate conditions are not those of a free rivalry of forces, but of approximate monopoly.

It may be noticed, accordingly, as the development of the phase of the competitive process between rival organisations in industry and trade has progressed, how strikingly its ruling principles resemble those of the phase already discussed. Here also, as in the relations of capital to labour, we see the advocates of uncon-

trolled competition emphatic at the beginning in the assertion of the sufficiency of the economic process, not only to right itself, but to serve the best interests of society in obedience to its own inherent tendencies in a state of uncontrolled competition. Here also, as in the history of these relations, we see being developed for a time a large body of authoritative economic doctrine defending and inculcating the prevailing conception of free competition. As the tendency in industry and commerce towards the combination and concentration of the concerns engaged develops, we see the failure of the first ambitious attempts of large combinations of capital, that have aimed in the direction of monopoly, complacently emphasised as proof of the assertion that the difficulties in the way of reaching the stage of monopoly were to be considered insurmountable. But we see the attempts themselves continuing to be made; growing the while bolder, more far-reaching, and more successful, and gradually bringing into clear relief the inherent natural principle which they involve. The growing tendency of such organisations to cross international boundaries, and to draw together with the avowed aim of attaining to monopoly, and of extracting from the resulting conditions profits altogether exceeding the remuneration of social service or of efficiency, becomes gradually more marked. As we approach the time in which we are living, the tendency becomes visible, not only in the large cities, but in the smallest towns, for all the great avenues through which the general wants of the world are supplied to be controlled by a limited number of large organisations tending to further concentration of their growing powers and

resources. In the United States in our own time we see combinations in industry and commerce at last attaining to a phase, which seems to openly challenge all the ideas of the adherents of the policy of uncontrolled competition as advocated in an earlier period of the competitive era.

The first large combination of capital to come within sight of the conditions of actual monopoly, after a period of competition in which it practically destroyed all its competitors, and in which the inherent tendency of the struggle always to be maintained at the level of its lowest denominator was well exemplified, has been the Standard Oil Trust of the United States, organised as such in 1882. The record of the long struggle in which the end of practical monopoly was attained by this organisation; the account of the practices which have been charged to it, and of the methods which have been employed by it in obedience to the ruling maxim of the modern competitive era, namely, that every such organisation is in business to make all the pecuniary profit it can within the rules of its own interests and within the limits of an uncontrolled competitive conflict; forms one of the most striking and remarkable chapters in the history of modern industry,¹ the real significance of which can hardly be said, as yet, to have reached the general consciousness.

Within two decades of the successful organisation of this combination of capital, we have clearly in view what is undoubtedly the most remarkable economic phenomenon of the modern world; namely, the general tendency for all the highest activities in industry

¹ Cf. *Wealth against Commonwealth*, by H. D. Lloyd.

and commerce in the United States to be drawn into the vortex of the same conditions, and of the unmistakable natural tendency of these conditions to become universal. Despite the temporary checks which are inevitable, the formation of trusts and combinations of capital in the United States has, on the whole, continued with rapidity during the period in question. It is in full progress in England,¹ and is rapidly extending to the industries of the continent of Europe. The assertions that such combinations were likely to be ultimately successful only in respect of what have been termed natural monopolies; that they could not succeed in permanently raising prices; that they were in any case only the product of conditions of protection peculiar to the United States, all seem on the way to be proved to be as devoid of any real foundation as have been the other assertions of a like nature made at an earlier stage by the advocates of uncontrolled competition. So far from being a product extraneous to the conditions of unrestricted competition, such combinations of capital are rather the characteristic products of those conditions. As Paul de Rousiers has shown, they are, in many respects, to be regarded as a direct consequence of the spirit prevailing in the English-speaking world, under the standards of *laissez-faire* competition. In the United States they have been produced, as he points out, by the action of the very arrangements by which the State has endeavoured to keep companies dealing in large public utilities in competition with each other; so that monopoly, in the result, has become "natu-

¹ Compare various articles of Mr. Robert Donald on the development of the Trust System in Europe.

ral, normal, and obligatory, and nothing is efficient against it." ¹

¹ The conditions under which the development took place in the United States of America are thus described:—"Monopoly constituted in opposition to the will of cities or states is a purely American phenomenon. The administration of continental Europe offers no examples of it. It results from the peculiar conception which obtained in the United States in the first half of this century concerning the functions of the State, of local government, and of city administration. These functions were reduced to a minimum. Material conditions then permitted it; agriculture was the ruling occupation, and there were few great fortunes. Besides, Anglo-Saxon spirit tended to organise strongly private life, and to defend it from all intervention of public powers, rather than to assure the development of these latter. But the habit of treating public affairs as if they were private produced a veritable confusion. Concessions were granted to companies in every case where they could be made. But, in place of imposing guarantees upon these companies in ceding to them all or part of their monopoly, the public authorities exercised their ingenuity to put them in competition with one another, thinking that competition would assure cheapness here as in ordinary affairs. Since the public put all its hope in the efficiency of competition, it was very disagreeably surprised to see that here competition did not long persist. The situation was all the more serious because the public found itself disarmed. Monopoly was organised against it and without compensation. The means which people had imagined would prevent it proved an illusion. The companies, often provided with perpetual charters, shut themselves up in their rights. The only resource which remained was to attack them in the name of the common law, or by means of laws against trusts, which declared null all combinations which aimed at monopoly. Neither of these means, however, has been very efficacious. While in private industry a conjunction of exceptional circumstances is necessary to create monopoly, in the organisation of public services it is the nature of the business which creates the monopoly. Instead of being exceptional, as in ordinary affairs, monopoly is here natural, normal, obligatory, and nothing is efficient against it. The abandonment of a public service without sufficient guarantee is here what has produced the abuse" (Paul de Rousiers, "Les services publics et la question des monopoles aux États-Unis," *Revue politique et parlementaire*, October 1898; *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. iv. 5).

The many drastic legislative measures that have been directed against trusts in the United States are considered to have all failed of their purpose. But in this result, as Mr. J. D. Forrest in a recent examination of the subject¹ points out, the noteworthy fact which confronts the observer is that they have failed because they have not been able to strike at trusts without at the same time striking at something which is inherent in the competitive process as it now exists, namely, the 'Great Industry' in private hands. For the combinations of capital in trusts represent, in effect, but the phenomenon of the drawing together of the outstanding rivals in the competitive struggle to prevent the mutual exhaustion, waste, and effort of the final stages of the competitive conflict. But, if the struggle had continued to the end, the last phase in any case must have been the Great Industry. And all the laws against trusts betray the fatal weakness, says Mr. Forrest, that none of them have been able to strike directly at this, the main fact. The Great Industry is, in short, a result so closely interwoven with the meaning of the competitive process as it has hitherto existed in the English-speaking world that, as Mr. Forrest points out, even if legislative action had ventured to attack it, "constitutional limitations, so far, would render the law void."²

As, however, the development has rapidly proceeded, features of the situation, at first in the background, have come at last to present themselves vividly to the general imagination. The combination and concentration of capital engaged in the same business, and

¹ *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 7, 2, "The Control of Trusts."

² *Ibid.*

then in businesses nearly allied, has proceeded apace until the total of the wealth represented has altogether exceeded anything imagined in the earlier phases of the competitive era. Combinations in the United States, in which a capital of fifty millions of dollars was at first considered to be an enormous sum, have been left far behind in point of magnitude. Capitals of fifty millions have grown rapidly into capitals of hundreds of millions, and even these mount towards thousands of millions, the tendency towards aggregation continuing to be as pronounced as before. The powers, the resources, the aims of these combinations tend to overshadow those of the State itself. Yet what is becoming clear to the general mind is, that not only are they all exercised without any relation to the social responsibilities with which the purposes of the State are identified, but that, under existing conditions, it is an inherent law of their being that they should be so exercised. For Professor Adams' law of the inherent necessity of the unregulated competitive process to reduce itself to the level of its lowest ruling factor meets them at every step. It is strikingly illustrated in the well-known maxim of all such organisations, that they are in business simply to make all the money they can. That it should be otherwise is not only impracticable, it is in the end impossible. That such organisations of capital should not endeavour to extract the greatest profit out of the situation, that they should not endeavour to obtain the best prices possible for their wares, would be felt to be incongruous even by their critics. "The spectacle of a trust of shrewd American business men asking the benediction of its fellow-

citizens upon its own philanthropy," says a recent writer sarcastically, nevertheless with just insight, "is, to say the least, a touching testimony to the credulity of those to whom the appeal is addressed."

As the concentration in a few hands of the gigantic resources and powers of such organisations of capital has continued, a distinctive feature has accordingly been their tendency to use this irresponsible strength in accordance with the inherent purpose of their existence. Beneath the surface of national and even of international affairs their influence has begun to make itself felt. "I see enough every day," are the quoted words of a politician in the United States, with opportunities of judging of the tendencies of the movement in its early stages, "to satisfy me that the petitions, prayers, protestations, and profanity of sixty millions of people are not as strong to control legislative action as the influence and effort of the head of a single combine with fifty millions of dollars at his back." And already, in speaking of combinations of capital, the aggregate quoted might be more than twenty times as large.¹ The inevitable and far-reaching tendencies of such a condition within the body politic may well be imagined. No description within the limits of a treatise of this sort could do justice to it. However well-intentioned the individual in the struggle, however high or exemplary his wishes, he is in the thrall of conditions which are inexorable. The law of the conflict before mentioned, that it must regulate itself at the level of its ruling factor, that the competitors

¹ Cf. *The Lesson of Popular Government*, by Gamaliel Bradford, vol. i. p. 509, *q. fr.* Hon. B. H. Butterfield of Ohio.

who are destined to survive in it must survive in a struggle to make all the money they can in an irresponsible free fight for private profit, meets him at every step.

In the result we have the development of a vast social phenomenon peculiar to our time, namely, the accumulation by a comparatively small number of persons under these conditions of fortunes of colossal magnitude. No conditions which prevailed under the most rigorous absolutisms of the ancient world allowed of such results. The inherent and elemental barbarism of conditions—even when due allowance is made for services rendered to society in the first stages in the organisation of industry—under which a private citizen is able to accumulate out of what must ultimately be the “enforced disadvantage” of the community, a fortune tending to equal in capital amount the annual revenue of the United States or Great Britain begins to deeply impress the general imagination.

Even where the individual, as is often, and even generally the case, rises at last in the disposal of such a fortune above the level of the conditions which have produced it, the result is hardly less striking. The subconscious effort to reconcile the dualism between the standards of two entirely different epochs of the world's evolution as represented in the modern economic process is plainly in evidence. As the knights and barons of the early feudal ages, when brought under the influence of Christianity, devoted the wealth which they had acquired under other standards to the founding of churches and the endowment of charities, so the pos-

sessors of the colossal fortunes acquired under the conditions of the phase of the competitive process in which we are living, tend in some measure to endeavour to restore them to the public by the founding of libraries, the endowment of universities, and the initiation of large works of public philanthropy.

Yet the crudity and even barbarism of the principle that has projected itself into the modern economic process remains visible even in these circumstances. The deterioration likely to be produced by charity to the individual, even under the most carefully guarded conditions, is well known. There is no reason to expect that the same result could ultimately be avoided in the case of charity on a large scale to the public or the State. It is not necessary to agree with the statement recently made in a responsible manner,¹ that the effect of capitalistic influences in American academic endowments will be marked for evil in the future political evolution of the United States, to see what is clearly in evidence in other respects in England, namely, that it is not a healthy social state in which enormous sums of wealth and capital are devoted to public purposes, under such conditions of private charity or munificence however well intentioned. It is easy to conceive to what a state of profound public and private demoralisation, and even degradation, such practices might lead if continued on a large scale through a few generations.

If we go now a step farther and lift the veil from the inner working of the prevailing phase of the competitive process as it is displayed in the general business life of the world, it may be distinguished how

¹ F. C. S. Schiller, *The Spectator*, 16th March 1901.

the whole process falls gradually, as by an inherent law of gravity, in a particular direction. As the competitive process in modern business has grown slowly to its full natural intensity, the effect has been more and more to eliminate all principles and considerations from the struggle but those contributing to fitness therein. But as the process is essentially a free unregulated fight, of which all the meaning and principles are in the present, it has of necessity tended to ultimately regulate itself at the level simply of the qualities contributing to success and survival in a struggle of such a character.

When, therefore, attention is withdrawn from those superficial details of persons and causes which only maintain themselves in a more or less sheltered or artificial existence in the interstices of the business life of the time, and is concentrated on the governing realities of the commercial struggle of the modern world, we have a spectacle which is in all respects the supplement to that which we have just been considering. No student of social conditions, who looks beneath the surface of the business life of the present day in England, can doubt for a moment the existence of a deepening consciousness in the general mind of a wide interval between what may be termed the business and the private conscience of the individual in the current phase of the economic process. It may be studied in documents like the annual reports made to Parliament under the Companies' Winding-up Act, or the report of the special committee appointed by the London Chamber of Commerce to inquire into secret commissions in trade. It is equally notorious in the United States. The profoundly felt sense of

moral self-stultification already referred to as the daily experience of an increasing multitude, both in the ranks of capital and labour, is undoubtedly a significant social phenomenon of the time. It is to be encountered in all phases of commercial life. It is a problem which confronts the student of social ethics under innumerable forms, involving results which are rightly described as being often beyond the imagination of those who live protected lives under shelter of assured incomes.¹

That this moral dualism in business is not confined to the lower grades of commercial life where the struggle for existence might be considered to be severest, but that it is a result more distinctive of the higher financial phases of commercialism may also be distinguished. A characteristic feature accompanying the present tendencies of capital to accumulation in trusts and corporations in the United States is, says Mr. Forrest, the dishonesty "which mercilessly fleeces the legitimate investor in the securities of the corporation."² In these combinations the capitalisation is often commonly inflated on paper merely in the interests of those who promote them, so that, "the manipulation of this stock, not the carrying on of the industry, is the main interest of the promoters."³ The fortunes to be made in the result are such as to excite the cupidity of men. "But, it is added significantly, "the great prizes are for the most unscrupulous."⁴

It must not be taken that such tendencies and results are in any way peculiar to the conditions

¹ Graham Taylor, *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. v. 3.

² "The Control of Trusts," by J. D. Forrest, University of Indianapolis, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. v. 2.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

prevailing in the United States. They are at least equally well marked in Great Britain. In the Report of the Inspector-General in Companies' Liquidation, England, made in the penultimate year of the nineteenth century, it was stated that in the preceding twelve months there were 4653 new companies registered, while the number that went into liquidation was 1745.¹ As to the actual sums lost, the figures complete as far as two years previously were given. They revealed what a daily journal described as "the appalling fact that in that year, on companies representing a total capital of 46½ millions, the public lost no less a sum than 21 millions sterling."² That fraud and misrepresentation must have been rampant on every hand is taken to be obvious. The journal significantly adds: "What is most menacing to the interests of the investor is the utter lack of commercial morality in every department of business connected with company promotion. If an individual buys a business, or a mine, or a brewery, for five thousand pounds, and goes to a capitalist and asks him to buy it of him for thirty thousand pounds, and to work it as well, he is very properly treated as a lunatic. But if the same individual asks the public to buy his bargain of him on the same terms his impudence is not only condoned, but justified by the company-promoting world on the ground that the public must look after itself. . . . Then it is considered a fair thing for seven or more men, themselves perfectly solvent, to embark in a particular enterprise, involving great risk, which is floated on the credit of

¹ Eighth Annual Report by the Board of Trade under sec. 29 of the Companies' (Winding-up) Act. ² *Pall Mall Gazette*, 7th Dec. 1899.

their individual reputations, and to incur liabilities on the strength of the same reputations; then, if the enterprise fails, to shelter themselves behind their limited liability and leave the creditors in the lurch. In neither case is it honest trading. But the law allows it, and it is done."¹

And so the dualism is in evidence on all hands. It is often considered that joint-stock enterprises, undertaken by a company of shareholders and managed by a board of directors, are but the expression of the application to business and industry of the principles of modern representative government. But any observer who, going beyond the academic theories of an earlier phase of the competitive process, studies the subject practically for himself, finds sooner or later how entirely superficial, and even absurd, such a conception really is. There must have been in the past, as there still continue to be, private enterprises, owned by a corporate body of shareholders, all fairly informed; all intelligently interested in the distant and solid success of the undertaking; all joined, moreover, in such feelings of loyalty to a common cause and a collective undertaking as operate elsewhere in the world. But what the observer begins gradually to realise is that such a condition is almost entirely foreign to the spirit of modern speculative enterprise. The management of such enterprises, although it may deal with affairs of the widest public interest and importance, is mostly conducted entirely in the dark. Although it may be concerned with financial affairs almost on the scale of those of the State itself, it is generally concentrated

¹ *Pall Mall Gazette.*

in a few hands and autocratic in the highest degree. Most serious of all, there is, therefore, no informed public opinion either to criticise it or keep it in check. In such circumstances the shareholders tend to become a mere body of isolated units without information, whose interest must, necessarily, be largely speculative, and with a considerable element of the gambling spirit behind it. Readjustments, amalgamations, or reorganisations, causing wide fluctuations in values, encourage this attitude, and by enabling fortunes to be made in a short time by those possessing inner knowledge of the affairs of the undertaking tend to demoralise all concerned. The dualism which prevails meets the observer at every step. Even in cases where gross mismanagement or fraud has brought affairs to the brink of ruin, the observer is often surprised to find how different is the attitude of those most deeply concerned to that which might be expected. The spectacle is often not so much that a number of partners loyally coöperating to put an enterprise once more on its feet, as that of a body of ignorant speculators anxious to come to some specious arrangement by which they may sell their holdings to the public, with advantage to themselves — with the feeling in the background that if, in so doing, they act as they would not dream of acting as private individuals, their conduct will be in the words of the journal already quoted, “not only condoned, but justified by the company-promoting world on the ground that the public must look after itself.” The process, in short, everywhere tends, as in Professor Adams’ example, to be governed at the level of its lowest and ruling denominator.

It must not be considered that it is the intention of the State to allow the evils, of which those here mentioned are but the outside fringe, to continue. The attempt is constantly being made in England to grapple with them by legislation. But the deeply significant fact is that the cry goes up continually that the remedies attempted are inoperative. What we seem to have in view is a stage of the economic process when the conceptions of the first phase of the competitive era are no longer applicable. For here, just as in the United States with the measures passed to control trusts, the problem with which failure is associated, the problem with which the law is always confronted in the last resort, is, how to take any effective measures against the evil which it is desired to suppress; and yet not strike, at the same time, at what have been universally accepted as fundamental principles of business, of speculation, and of enterprise in the phase of the competitive process through which we have lived.

It is impossible to avoid receiving a deep impression of the significance of these results and tendencies in our time. They are undoubtedly all phases of the same development. It would seem that we have reached a period in which it is becoming evident that the governing principle of the social process in our civilisation altogether transcends the meaning associated with the conception of free competition in the phase of the competitive era through which we have passed. Even in relation to matters so fundamental as the principles regulating supply and demand throughout the world, it has become the duty of the economist, as so thoughtful a repre-

sentative of the historical school as Professor Ashley informs us, to consider that we are probably on the verge of a state of society in which prices generally will be no longer determined by competition.¹ Yet, before we endeavour to interpret the character of the future, towards which these events appear to be advancing, it is desirable to turn our attention for a moment to an examination of the remarkable position which is the correlative of them; namely, that to which we have been carried in the world by the application of the most characteristic of all the doctrines of the early competitive era, the doctrine of international trade, as it has been developed by the *laissez-faire* school of thought in England.

Now we have seen, in following through the preceding chapters the unfolding of the evolutionary process in our Western era, that its meaning must be held to consist essentially in the fact that it represents the great drama of development in which the world is passing under the control of the governing principles with which the larger interests of the future are identified. The ideal towards which the advanced peoples are being carried therein is, therefore, of necessity, that of an open, fair, and free rivalry, in which, in the interests of this future, the potentiality of all natural powers shall be completely enfranchised. And the characteristic principle, the development of which is represented in our civilisation, is that which is emancipating the future from the tyranny of all the forces tending to become absolute in the present. We have seen that the necessary cause and condition which accompanies this development is the projec-

¹ Cf. *Economic Journal*, No. 34, "American Trusts," by W. J. Ashley.

tion of the controlling sense of human responsibility out of the present. That is to say, social development among the winning peoples is, by necessity inherent in the evolutionary process, tending more and more to represent a principle which is projecting its meaning beyond the content of all existing interests. The process of progress, in short, no longer tends, as in the ancient civilisations, towards the ascendancy therein of qualities merely necessary to success and survival in a free fight, all the principles of which are contained within the limits of political consciousness.

If the observer looks back over the history of the movement in England, in which the first conception of free competition was extended to the principles of commerce between nations, it may be observed that, almost from the beginning, a very clearly defined attitude or policy in international relations accompanied the economic theories of the Manchester school. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century this attitude came to be described by various names, according to the point of view of those who discussed it. It is, on the whole, most generally known as the attitude of Non-intervention, although, as we shall see presently, it would in many senses be still more correctly described as the attitude of *Non-responsibility*. To understand the nature of the international position to which we are now slowly advancing in the world, it is of great importance that the mind should, at this point, clearly grasp the relationship of this policy, of non-responsibility in international relations, to the fundamental ideas, already described, of the *laissez-faire* or Manchester school, and to perceive

how naturally the whole theory of international trade with which it is associated has proceeded from the fundamental position taken up by that school in the two phases of the competitive era already described.

Now, if we recall the character of the movement in Western history towards economic freedom, of which Schmoller described the first stages in our civilisation, it will be found that its leading features have a strongly marked character. This movement, as we have before pointed out—contrary to the impression which might have been received of it from the theories of the Manchester school—represented in the past no automatic process unfolding itself without stress in history, in obedience to the dictates of existing interest. On the contrary, every step in it was resisted, and resisted in perfect good faith and intelligence, by the interests concerned. It was *not* to the immediate interest of the town to have its economic life merged in that of the territory. It similarly was *not* to the advantage of the territory, in turn, to have its economic life merged in that of the national State. The fiercest conflict against the process was waged at all points; and the opposition was borne down only in the presence of a larger overruling cause, which already represented, in effect, the subordination of the present to the future. It was, in short, around those inchoate ideals which embodied this principle of the subordination of the present to the future—ideals imperfectly described by Schmoller as those of nationality or state-making—that the whole process of economic development centred.¹

¹ We have a phase of the same idea represented in Professor Giddings' theory of kinship as a factor in the evolutionary process in society.

It will be remembered how, in the relations of capital to labour within the limits of industry, the Manchester school consistently held it to be no function of the State to interfere between the adult employed and the employer in that condition of "free contract" which, it was asserted, prevailed in a state of *laissez-faire* competition within the State. Similarly, carrying this idea into the relations to each other of industries, still within the limits of the State, it was held to be no function of Government to interfere with the results obtained in the conflict between rival industries in the same condition of uncontrolled competition. In both cases all criticism was met with the confident, but, as we have seen, entirely unfounded assertion that the tendency of all economic evils was to cure themselves if simply left alone to the free play of the forces of self-interest.

This was the attitude which we have now to see carried one stage further, to its last and highest application, in that theory of international trade which, allowing for all outward exceptions, has dominated the consciousness of the English-speaking world and, through it, that of our civilisation in general, for the greater part of the epoch in which we are living.

In the larger world of international relations the principle of non-intervention or of non-responsibility as asserted by the *laissez-faire* school yielded a singularly clear and consistent attitude. No country, it was asserted in effect, had, as a general principle, any concern with the internal affairs of other peoples, or with the character of the Government, or with the standards of conduct or of social development which prevailed. What was desired was simply the

removal of all barriers to trade and the opening up of the international world to a condition of *laissez-faire* competition in business and commerce. It was confidently predicted, here also, that in the resulting conditions of unrestrained competition in pursuit of self-interest, economic evils would cure themselves; and that a large part of those which afflicted the world would finally disappear in obedience to the inherent tendencies of the uncontrolled competitive process, carried thus to its last and highest development in the process of international trade.

As, accordingly, this wider phase of the economic process has unfolded itself on the stage of history, principally at first under the lead of England, the tendencies that have gradually become visible in it are of great interest. Looking back over the history of the economic development of Great Britain for nearly a century it presents a remarkable spectacle. The dissociation of what may be called the collective consciousness of the English-speaking peoples from the course of the commercial process in its international relations has been almost complete. The trader has followed the interests of commerce in all directions as these interests have led him. Where the activities of Great Britain have come into contact throughout the world with those of peoples in all stages of development, the trader has supplied to all comers her manufactured products, machinery, processes, instruction, management, and capital, on no other principle than that of the private profit of the interests concerned. In the uncontrolled pursuit of the end of private gain the capitalist or the trader has, therefore, gone inside all frontiers. He has

carried on his operations under all standards of government and systems of religion, and under every phase of ethical development. He has exploited all opportunities, all natural resources, and all conditions of human society and of human labour. And the ruling principle has been everywhere the same; that of self-interest in an uncontrolled competition for private gain. Capital in pursuit of this object has, therefore, professed no principle and acknowledged no responsibility. "We have no commission," said Cobden, with emphasis, "to administer justice to the world." The dissociation of collective sense of responsibility from the operations of the international trader has been practically complete.

As this third phase of the competitive era gradually advances towards its climax the interest deepens. The conditions of feverish activity in every department of trade and commerce which have followed the application by Great Britain and the United States to their affairs of the conception of *laissez-faire* competition in international trade, have in time affected all the advanced peoples. Despite prevailing exceptions the spirit proceeding from these conditions must undoubtedly, as we have said, be considered to be the distinctive and characteristic quality in the ascendant in modern commercialism throughout the world.

If we look now at the result, it may already be distinguished to be in all respects the complement and sequel of the two phases of economic development already described. The immensity of the stage upon which the world-wide development is in progress here also obscures, for a time, and to a far greater degree than in the other phases, the ruling principles

of the situation. But slowly, as the tendency to the equalisation of conditions continues throughout the world, we see the whole process, in this case as in the others, gravitating to a level beyond which it has no inherent tendency to rise.

In the two phases of the competitive era already described, that is to say, first of all, in the struggle between capital in its relation to labour, and then in the struggle between industries in their relation to society, we saw that every organisation of capital was of necessity in the competition of business to make all the money it could within the limits of its own interests. So now we begin to see that the governing principle of all international trade, whatever other purpose it may incidentally subserve, being essentially that of an uncontrolled struggle for private gain, one result has been from the beginning inherent in the international process in progress in the world. The capitalist and trader who went inside all frontiers, and exploited all conditions of society and of human labour, did so always in the lien of conditions from which he was in the end powerless to escape. The competition in which he was engaged with his fellows necessarily tended, just as in the example cited by Professor Adams, to eliminate in the end all principles and considerations from the struggle but those which contributed to success. And so, as in the two phases of *laissez-faire* competition previously described, we see the international process in trade slowly tending, throughout the world, to be regulated in all its details at the level of the lowest qualities governing it, namely, those contributing to success and survival in a free fight for private gain.

Now the evolutionary significance of the characteristic development represented by the civilisation of our era consists, as we have seen, in raising the human process beyond the level of that struggle for existence in the present at which it had hitherto been conducted in the world. That is to say, its tendency has been, in all the development which has succeeded the life of the ancient civilisations, to project the meaning of the social process altogether beyond the content of those lower qualities contributing merely to success and survival in a free fight, all the principles of which are hounded by the horizon of the present. This is the meaning, in the first phase of the existing competitive era, of that demand for the regulation of the conditions for the employment of women, of children, and of unskilled labour; of the cry for a living wage; and of the struggle for the standard of life. This is the meaning, also, in the second phase of that era, of the determination, now visibly rising throughout our civilisation, to subordinate the uncontrolled rivalry between aggregates of capital to the larger meaning of the social process as a whole. In all these facts we are, as it were, in the presence of the first phenomena which mark the conditions under which the development we have traced through the preceding chapters, in which the ascendancy of the present in the evolutionary process is being gradually challenged throughout the whole range of human activities, begins to impinge, at last, upon the economic process in the modern world.

As, however, that current phase of the international economic process in which we are living reaches its final development in the conditions in which the

capitalist and trader have gone inside all frontiers to exploit all human conditions, while owning no responsibility and no principles save those contributing to success and survival in a free fight for private gain, the outlines of one of the most remarkable situations in history become rapidly filled in.

In the first phase of the modern competitive era in our civilisation, it was the conditions arising from the exploitation by capital, for private gain, of helpless and unskilled labour within the State, in a struggle which the Manchester school sought to divorce from all sense of social responsibility, and which was bound, therefore, to fall to the level of its lowest governing factor, that constituted the basis upon which the whole economic structure rested. So, in the international phase of *laissez-faire* competition, the first fact which we encounter is this same phenomenon raised to its highest expression on the world-stage. It is now the conditions arising throughout the world, from the exploitation of the less developed peoples of the human family in the same irresponsible and uncontrolled struggle for private profit, which tends to confront us as the ruling fact in the prevailing economic situation throughout the modern world.

If we turn, first, to the consideration of this question in connection with the growth of the British empire, we have presented to us an extraordinary record. In the history of the expansion of that empire from the period at which the British peoples took over the responsibility for the government of the mismanaged commercial empire of the East India Company, down to the last phase of its development in Africa, we see as it were the collective consciousness

of the English-speaking people struggling, just as in the other phases of the economic process already described, with the tendencies of two entirely distinct eras of human evolution. At times in this conflict we see it giving the reins completely to the governing tendencies of the past; and yet again at transient moments, overmastered by the subconscious inspiration of the future, we see it giving effect in its more instinctive acts to a meaning and part in the world-process completely transcending the objects of its conscious policy. During the greater part of the phase of the competitive process of which we are speaking, the ascendancy in the councils of the home government in England of that central principle of the Manchester school, which dissociated the sense of responsibility from the course of the economic process throughout the world, has been almost complete. Yet as the exploitation of the less developed peoples of the world in the interests of private gain has continued, a series of unforeseen results, often at first sight confusing to an extraordinary degree but in reality all proceeding from the same cause, have followed.

In the first stage, the results of the irresponsible exploitation of less developed peoples in the interests of private cupidity have been such that they have continually engaged attention, and at times revolted the general conscience at home to such a degree, that the stage of non-responsibility has, by force of circumstances, and often in conditions of explosion, passed over to the stage of direct political control. At a later stage still, as other European peoples have begun to take part in the exploitation of the world,

and the British trader and capitalist have come into competition with those of other nationalities, in a process in which all the countries of the world tend to come into a common market to compete for a falling margin of profit, another development has followed. The British trader in the new circumstances has found himself confronted with rivals whose methods were more frankly barbarous than his own, — and yet, withal, engaged with them in a competitive process of exploitation necessarily governed in the last resort at the level of its lowest factor. The results in the long run have tended, as might be expected, still more surely to outrage the general conscience at home. They have, therefore, even more directly, operated to drag the influence of the home government at the heels of trade in other lands; and the stage of non-interference has in this case also, and still more rapidly, tended to pass over into that of political control.

It has been, in short, a process in which the expansion of the British empire has continued without thought; without defined responsibility; almost without consent. In it we see, as it were, the collective consciousness of the British peoples halting between the governing principles of two distinct epochs of the world's evolution; on the one hand repudiating, with consistency and intention under the ruling standards of the Manchester school, the whole theory of empire, of government, and of responsibility in relation to the peoples with whom it came into contact in the processes of trade. And yet, on the other hand, as the foremost representative in Western history of a still deeper principle involved in our civilisation from the

beginning, and, therefore, in obedience to a sense of responsibility from which it found itself in the last resort impossible to escape, building up, even by the very mechanism of the superficial theory of repudiation itself, that empire without parallel or precedent in history, which in the opening year of the twentieth century had come to embrace a third of the entire population of the world.

As we follow within the frontiers of the empire the course of the same development, in which we see a universal process of exploitation in trade falling gradually to the level of its lowest factor under the ruling principle of non-responsibility, the results are hardly less striking. It is nowadays a matter of common knowledge, that in one of the modern phases of the development proceeding throughout the world British capital exhibits a tendency to migrate from the irksomeness in England of the State regulation of the factory system, of the living wage, and of that rising standard of life for labour which has marked the impingement upon the economic process of the vast development we have traced through Western history in the preceding chapters. British capital, for instance, has endeavoured to establish itself in India, to take from Lancashire its trade in cotton with China, by the competition of Indian mills, worked by cheaper labour in India under standards of life separated by an immense interval of development from those so hardly won in England. As the development of the world under the influence of *laissez-faire* competition has proceeded, the process has, however, shown no tendency to stop here. One of the last of the less developed peoples to be brought

under the influence of Western conditions has been the Japanese. But as the Japanese have been slowly caught in the influence of an economic process continuing to fall throughout the world to the level of its ruling factor, they have in their turn now tended to enter the lists to compete with Indian capitalists for the same end of supplying China with cotton goods. Let us, therefore, having in view the tremendous struggle which Lancashire labour waged throughout the greater part of a century past to secure higher standards of life for its class, draw aside now for a moment the veil from the prevailing labour conditions in Japan, with which Lancashire tends thus to be confronted in the world-process, at the other end of a chain of sequences, all the links of which here disclose themselves to view under our eyes.

In an article published in the first year of the twentieth century an American writer gives a striking description of a characteristic scene of industrial Japan, the significance of which is only enhanced by the fact that the scene itself is described without any reference to the problem we are here discussing. "If I were asked," says the writer in question,¹ "to say, of all that I saw in Japan, what that is that lives most vividly in my memory, I should probably shock my artistic reader by saying that it was the loading of a steamship at Nagasaki with coal. The huge vessel, the *Empress of Japan*, was one morning, soon after its arrival at Nagasaki, suddenly festooned — I can use no other word — from stem to stern on each side with a series of hanging platforms, the broadest nearest the base and diminishing as they rose, strung together

¹ The Right Rev. H. C. Potter, Bishop of New York.

by ropes, and ascending from the sampans, or huge boats in which the coal had been brought alongside the steamer, until the highest and narrowest platform was just below the particular port-hole through which it was received into the ship. There were, in each case, all along the sides of the ship, some four or five of these platforms, one above another, on each of which stood a young girl. On board the sampans men were busy filling a long line of baskets holding, I should think, each about two buckets of coal, and these were passed up from the sampans in a continuous and unbroken line until they reached their destination, each young girl, as she stood on her particular platform, passing, or rather almost throwing, these huge basketfuls of coals to the girl above her, and she again to her mate above her, and so on to the end. The rapidity, skill, and, above all, the rhythmic precision with which, for hours, this really tremendous task was performed, was an achievement which might well fill an American athlete with envy and dismay. . . . And at this task these girls continued, uninterruptedly and blithely, from ten o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the afternoon, putting on board in that time, I was told, more than one thousand tons of coal. I am quite free to say that I do not believe that there is another body of work-folk in the world who could have performed the same task in the same time and with the same ease."¹

The concluding remarks here quoted may be in all respects true. There may, indeed, be no other body of work-folk in the world who could have performed the task here described with the same ease and in the

¹ "Impressions of Japan," *The Century*, vol. lxi, 5.

same way. But as the mind gradually takes in all that this typical scene really implies; as there is passed before it the history of that long struggle, described in the preceding chapters, with which the meaning of our civilisation is identified; as there is recalled before it the character of the evolutionary process in which the emancipating principles have been born into the world which have gradually raised the position of woman above the animal conditions here implied; as there is presented to the imagination even the last phases, still with us in England and America, of that tremendous struggle in which the standards of existence for labour have been lifted with such prolonged, determined, and devoted effort to even the comparatively low level they have so far attained; there grows upon it an overmastering sense of the essential shallowness and immaturity in relation to the deeper life-processes of our civilisation of that entire view of the Manchester school, which sought to divorce all sense of responsibility from the results reached in national and international trade and production in obedience to their own inherent tendencies. We begin, in short, to have some sense of the real nature of the problem which overshadows the consciousness of Western Democracy, as it sees the international process in trade and industry tending throughout the world to be forced to the level of its lowest and most animal conditions in human labour, simply in obedience to that law of universal equalisation of economic conditions by capital, in the irresponsible scramble for private gain divorced from all sense of responsibility which the Manchester school consistently contemplated.

It must not be supposed that this represents any extreme or forced view of a principle. It is a sober presentation of what has been already actually foreseen and contemplated. It may be recalled here that in the last decade of the nineteenth century a scientific forecast of the ultimate phase of the *laissez-faire* competitive process in international trade throughout the world was attempted by the late Charles Pearson, in which the author, carrying the principles of the Manchester school to their last application, calmly contemplated as a probable fact of the near future a condition of civilisation in which, the tendency to equalisation in the international economic process having proceeded to its limits, that process *would* continue to be permanently ruled throughout the world at the level of this lowest factor, namely, the prevailing standards of life of the less developed peoples, and particularly of the yellow races.¹ We were, therefore, to awake to a day not far distant, Mr. Pearson predicted, when we should look round the globe and see it girdled by a continuous zone of the black and yellow races, no longer too weak for aggression, but monopolising the trade of their own regions, circumscribing the industry of the European, taken up into the social relations of the Western peoples, and admitted to intermarriage with the white races. The time was not improbably close at hand, Mr. Pearson assumed, when, in consequence, we should by force of circumstances have to realise that the idea that the future of the world belonged to the Aryan peoples, to the Christian faith, and to our Western

¹ *National Life and Character*, c. i.-iii.

civilisation, had been little more than a passing delusion.¹

Despite the profound materialism of such a prediction; despite the surroundings of moral and intellectual squalor towards which it contemplated the world as moving; despite even the inherent absurdity which, in the face of the obvious meaning of the social evolutionary process in the past, actually saw the lower forms of human society extinguishing the higher, by reason of their capacity to wage an economic struggle on more purely animal conditions, the deep and lasting impression which the prediction produced on a large circle of well-informed minds, particularly in England, went to show how accurately it was recognised as being, in reality, no more than the legitimate application of those theories of the Manchester school which had been in the ascendant in Great Britain for the greater part of the nineteenth century.

From time to time, particularly as we approach the period in which we are living, deep, volcanic impulses of human nature have disturbed the complacent theories of non-responsibility that have made a prediction of this nature possible. The refusal of labour in the United States and Australia to admit the Chinese as citizens, who would by their competition reduce the standards of wages and of living far below those to which they have been raised with such effort in our civilisation, has been an incident in which determined expression has been found for a far-reaching instinct, with which governments, otherwise under the influence of the ascendant conceptions of *laissez-faire* competi-

¹ *National Life and Character*, c. i.


tion, have had to count. It has been a fact, which, though for the moment producing little outward effect on prevailing theories, has operated powerfully, as other features of the underlying situation have continued to define themselves, to bring home to more thoughtful minds how far indeed, here as everywhere else, the problems with which *laissez-faire* competition now tends to confront us throughout the world have outgrown in character the earlier conceptions of the competitive era in England.

In China, the twentieth century opened upon a spectacle in which we see the principle here described carried, as it were, to its last expression in the world-process. Under the inspiration of the old policy of non-responsibility, practically two ideals were presented to the English-speaking world, as the capitalistic exploitation of the Chinese peoples began to make progress in our time. The first was that which we saw in the ascendant in the minds of the English people during the greater part of the nineteenth century. It was that under which, all responsibility for results in China being repudiated, it was maintained that the trader or capitalist should be allowed to follow his purposes in the competitive process of trade under the ruling principle of non-interference. As, however, all Western civilisation had gradually become enveloped in the influences and methods of the commercial process as it had spread outwards from England and the United States, and as the traders and capitalists of other nations had now become equally keen in the competitive struggle for private gain, this idea, in China as elsewhere, became in a few decades impossible of



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realisation. The process, therefore, under our eyes passed rapidly to its next stage, in which all efforts became concentrated on the second objective of the school of *laissez-faire* competition, namely, that of keeping the door of trade equally open to comers of all nationalities, while still repudiating all responsibility for the tendencies and results of the competitive process. In the result we see that process once more continuing to fall, inevitably, and now with extreme rapidity, to the level of its ruling factor. With the instinctive, and at times explosive resistance of the Chinese to all that the conditions must imply, there has tended of necessity to be produced a kind of international control by all the Powers concerned, including Japan. In this ring of control we have represented the standards of human society in almost every stage of development from those of Japan to those of England and the United States. In such conditions the principles we have seen horn into the world as the result of the long development described in the preceding chapters — the principles of which the English-speaking peoples have in other circumstances considered themselves the most advanced representatives — tend to be reduced to a common denominator with those of powers and peoples separated from them by entire epochs of the world's development. And in the resulting circumstances, the competitive exploitation of Chinese resources proceeds in an environment of international intrigue, of social squalor, and of moral outrage and degradation almost without equal in history. This is the phase of the situation which is still with us.

And so the principle of *laissez-faire* and non-

responsibility in the competitive process, ascending gradually from the relations of capital to labour through a range of economic phenomena of unparalleled significance in our time, passes in these conditions to its last expression in the international world-process. The whole of the phenomena we have been regarding are the features of a single development. They are all related to the fact of the ascendancy of the present in the economic process. They are all expressions, moreover, of the fact that the struggle, the development of which we traced through Western history in the previous chapters, has projected itself at last into that process under all its aspects throughout the world. Under almost every condition of the economic life of the modern world, the forces and tyrannies which represent merely the present are now in turn become envisaged in conflict with the principles representing the future, as the development of which our civilisation is the seat continues to slowly unfold itself in Western history. This is the nature of the situation that is outlined on the stage of our civilisation throughout the world. Into the meaning of the cosmic drama which underlies it all the activities of the advanced peoples are destined to be drawn. And it is the peoples who are about to solve the resulting problem in economic development, as the earlier phases of the problem have been already solved in the developments described in the preceding chapters, to whom the leadership of the world undoubtedly belongs in the epoch towards which our civilisation is moving.

It may be observed that the idea still continues to

prevail amongst intelligent minds that the principle underlying the spectacle of *laissez-faire* competition, that we have here, under so many phases, attempted to describe — that is to say, the principle which has dissociated all sense of responsibility from the competitive process in industry, in trade, in commerce, and in the international exploitation of the resources of the world — is actually the same principle that has been behind the development in Western history described in the preceding chapters as projecting the controlling sense of responsibility out of the present. The opinion, it may be noticed, survives in many minds that the prevailing conditions of competition in our civilisation actually represent the still advancing front of this development in history. All due allowance being made for the advance which the principle of *laissez-faire* competition involved when compared with the frank feudalism of the State which preceded it, it is, of course, impossible to imagine any conception more completely inaccurate than that here described. It represents what, in many respects, is almost the exact opposite of the truth. For the evolutionary significance of the development which is projecting the sense of human responsibility out of the present, and which is dissociating the controlling meaning of the historical process from all the interests and compulsions within the limits of political consciousness, cannot be mistaken. It consists in the fact that it is enabling the competitive process to be raised to its highest condition of efficiency by the emancipation of the future from the tyranny of all forces tending to become absolute within the horizon of the present. But in the economic process, as

we have seen it under the prevailing conditions of competition, this is the principle which is entirely absent. In all the phases of *laissez-faire* competition we have been considering we are everywhere, in the last resort, simply in the presence of the conditions of a free fight, falling slowly throughout the world to the level of the qualities necessary to success and survival in a struggle of such a character. All the principles and meanings of the process are, therefore, still, as in the civilisations of the ancient world, bounded by the present. The distinctive and characteristic principle of the developmental process in the civilisation of our era is as yet unrepresented.

When, however, we turn to that other great body of advanced opinion which has left the theories of the Manchester school behind, that body of opinion, that is to say, which expresses itself in various forms throughout our civilisation under the phenomena of the socialist movement, we have a spectacle almost equally striking. If it be asked whence comes the strength of conviction which has supported this movement under all its phases, there can also be no doubt whatever as to what the reply must be. The characteristic instinct which is common to all the movements of thought which socialism has produced, however they may have mistaken the character of the evolutionary process in Western civilisation, may be readily distinguished by any observer of close insight. It consists essentially in the clear recognition that the principle underlying all the forms of *laissez-faire* competition is, in the last resort, nothing more or less than what we have here found it to be; namely, a surviving principle of barbarism, necessarily tending,

under all its phases, towards the conditions of absolutism. In the last analysis it does not represent, and it can never represent, the characteristic social principle with which the meaning of our civilisation has been from the beginning identified in the evolutionary process.

Here, however, it may be observed, a curious result has followed. The main body of thought which socialism has hitherto produced has been principally the product of the earlier stage of the struggle between capital and labour in those conditions of *laissez-faire* competition that have been already described. It has, therefore, happened that in the socialistic conception of society which has so far obtained most adherents, namely, that which is associated with the name of Marx, the whole social process has tended to be presented as if it constituted merely the phenomena of a gigantic class war between labour and capital. A characteristic feature, therefore, of Marxian socialism, as has been insisted throughout these pages, is that it tends to interpret all the principles of social development merely in terms of an economic struggle, that is to say, in terms of a war of interests between the existing members of society. Of that altogether deeper meaning of the evolutionary process in Western history; namely, that the characteristic struggle around which the whole process of development has centred from the beginning of our civilisation—the struggle of which the economic situation is itself but the latest phase—is essentially not a class war in the present, but a struggle in which the interests representing the hitherto ascendant

present are being slowly envisaged in conflict with those representing the infinite future, to which they must be subordinated, there has been no conception in the Marxian presentation of socialism.

We are, therefore, face to face, under the phenomena of socialism also, with a significant position. It is that the consistent, thorough-going, but essentially superficial materialism which has of necessity accompanied the Marxian attempt to interpret our social development merely in terms of an economic conflict—that is to say in terms of the present—and which has its correlative in more or less mechanical schemes for the regimentation of existing society, taking us, in effect, back to the principles of the ancient Greek world, is, of necessity, rejected by a large class of thinking minds throughout our civilisation as obviously falling short of a scientific interpretation of the process unfolding itself in our civilisation. It provides only a theory of society which is instinctively perceived to fail in that it finds no place or meaning for those characteristic qualities in the human process by which alone, as we see now, the winning peoples must, under the principle of Projected Efficiency, maintain their place in the evolutionary process; namely, the qualities contributing to success in that tremendous struggle to adjust the current interests of the world to a meaning which infinitely transcends them.

Now if we have been right in the view taken in these chapters of the character of the evolutionary process unfolding itself in Western history, nothing can be more certain than that the future, towards which the development in progress in our civilisation

is carrying the world, must have this characteristic. We must be able to distinguish in it the principle of continuity which at once reconciles and extends both these, to all appearance, conflicting views. We must be able to see in it, at the outset, how the profound instinct of the Manchester school of thought in England, that the future of the world belongs to the principle of free competition, is reconciled with the equally profound instinct which has come to express itself through the theories of socialism, that the conditions of *laissez-faire* competition in the phases just described are nothing more or less than conditions of barbarism representing the survival into modern economic history of the ruling principle of a past epoch of development, which now, under all the phases described, moves slowly towards its challenge in the world-process.

It will be recalled at this point how continuously in past chapters emphasis has been laid upon a significant fact of our civilisation. Western civilisation, we saw, has from the beginning of our era represented a state of social order in which all the forces that tend to become absolute in the present are, in a long process of development, being broken and subordinated to the larger meaning of the evolutionary process in a future which is infinite. In it, therefore, there is represented the antithesis of the ruling principle of the military civilisations of the ancient world, the ultimate meaning of which was that they expressed, in effect, the ascendancy of the present in the evolutionary process. Our civilisation represents that type of social order in which, if existing indications are not entirely misleading, the military order of society is

actually destined to come to an end. And yet, as we have seen, the advanced peoples who comprise it themselves represent, not by accident, but as a first principle of the development which is taking place, that stock of the human family amongst whom the military process has culminated in the race. We are *par excellence* the military peoples, not only of the entire world, but of the evolutionary process itself in human history in the past.

The dominating significance of this fact in the evolution of society has been throughout insisted on. Under no other conceivable conditions could the principle which our civilisation represents be successfully born into the world. It was only by the conversion to a sense of responsibility transcending all interests in the present of the peoples representing the highest possibilities of militarism in the world, — the peoples, that is to say, able to hold the present for the future against all comers, — that the permanent conditions could ever arise in which the controlling centre of the evolutionary process could begin to be projected out of the present.

But it is, it may be perceived, exactly the same principle which has been behind the whole process of development in our civilisation as described in the preceding chapters. It was only the conversion to the new order of ideas, in the upheaval which closed the Middle Ages, of an element of force in our civilisation strong enough to hold for the future the stage of the world on which these ideas were to develop, that enabled the modern epoch to be born in our civilisation. It was only by the later conversion, amongst the advanced peoples, of the State itself —

with the machinery of its irresistible power in the background — to a principle of tolerance resting ultimately on a sense of responsibility to principles projected beyond the content of all interests within the bounds of political consciousness, that it became possible for the present to be held for the future in modern political development. It has been the principle of tolerance so held that has made possible the phenomenon of party government among the English-speaking peoples; that has constituted the ultimate fact behind that conception of political equality from which the forward movement in the modern State has proceeded; nay, which has made possible the very conditions of free thought itself by preventing the absolutism naturally inherent in every theory of interests bounded by the limits of political consciousness from again closing down upon us in the present. The principle identified at every point with the development of the winning peoples in our civilisation has been the same as that which made it possible to develop our civilisation itself only from the leading military stock of the world. It has been the fact of the all-powerful State converted to a principle of tolerance projected beyond the limits of its own political consciousness, and, therefore, becoming rigid, irresistible, and inexorable when this principle of tolerance is threatened, which has given us the modern world and all the conditions of modern progress. And even such conditions of freedom in the modern sense as prevail amongst peoples who have not accepted this principle are scarcely more than its indirect results, ultimately maintained in the world only by the example and overwhelming prestige of the

conditions proceeding from it amongst the peoples who have evolved it.

Now, if we apply this principle to the conditions in which we see the conception of *laissez-faire* competition being confronted with that body of thought which is rapidly passing to the challenge of the ascendancy of the present in the economic process throughout the world, there emerges into sight a clear and striking conclusion. The principle of *laissez-faire* competition, as we have just seen it, under all its phases, reaching its last expression in the world-process, cannot by any pretence be said to represent that condition of the social process with which the efficiency of the future is identified — that condition in which all natural powers are to be enfranchised in the world in a regulated process of fair, open, and free rivalry. It represents, as we have seen, in the last resort, nothing more than the survival into the economic process of the ascendancy of the forces expressing themselves through the present and tending under all conditions towards absolution in some form; the principle, that is to say, of that past order of the world's development which it is the destiny of our civilisation to supersede.

There is, therefore, in the economic process also but one condition in which the present can ultimately pass under the control of the future. All the political developments which have taken place are but steps leading up to the establishment of that condition. It is only by the conscious conversion to a sense of responsibility transcending the claims of all present interests of the only power able in the economic process to hold the stage in the present

that the new order of society can be born into the world. There is only one conceivable condition in which this result can be accomplished. The consciousness of society, expressing itself through the State, but here also in obedience to a sense of responsibility rising superior to all the interests within the limits of the State, must, in the economic process, hold the stage free and open in the present during the epoch in which it has become the destiny of the present to pass under the control of the future.

As we reflect on the principle which here gradually becomes visible, its full meaning grows, in time, upon the mind. We begin to see in perspective the real outlines of that development with the tendencies of which the advanced peoples have already been struggling for the greater part of a century. Sooner or later, we see, the general will must, by its own determinative act, and in obedience to that sense of responsibility inherent in our civilisation, and transcending the bounds of all existing interests and the limits of political consciousness itself, project the meaning of the economic process beyond the content of that mere free fight in the present to which we see it now confined. It is, in reality, we begin to perceive, nothing more than the dim consciousness of this fact that has consistently inspired that movement of opinion which, under so many forms, has already come into conflict with the phenomena of *laissez-faire* competition in the economic process throughout the world. This has been, it may be distinguished, the ultimate meaning of that instinct, however wrongly directed it may have been in its

manifestations in the past, which has consistently insisted that it is only through the aid of the law that unskilled labour can ever be enfranchised in its relation to capital. This has been, we see, the meaning of the struggle towards expression in that continual appeal of labour to society to recognise its right to a minimum wage, to uphold its standards of life, and, generally, to enforce by law a class of claims representing in the last analysis nothing more than the first bare conditions of free competition in its relations to capital on the one hand and to its own kind on the other.

It is the same instinct — that nothing else than the general will consciously acting under a sense of responsibility to principles transcending all the claims of existing competitors, and acting, therefore, in the interests of the process of our social evolution as a whole, can ever hold the stage open and free in the conditions in which we see modern industrial competition tending universally towards monopoly control — which is in reality behind all the demands, however crudely formulated as yet, that tend to bring us into view of an era in which increments in the profit ownership of the instruments and materials of production which are unearned in terms of social utility shall form part of a common inheritance to which the energies and abilities of the individual shall be applied in conditions tending towards equal economic opportunity. In no other condition, as we begin to see, can that characteristic significance of really free competition, towards which it has been from the beginning the destiny of our civilisation to carry the world, be realised. In no other conditions

can the controlling meaning of the economic process in relation to the problems of modern industry ever be projected beyond the content of a struggle, bounded always by the horizon of existing interests; wherein we now see the strongest competitors, simply in virtue of the qualities contributing to survival in a free fight in the present, tending to become absolute in conditions of power as irresponsible and of monopoly as colossal as any which characterised the civilisations of the ancient world.

As in the light of the same principle the mind continues to look along the horizon where the present merges into the future, we catch sight of the meaning of that still deeper instinct with which it may be distinguished that all the peoples representing the advancing life of our civilisation are struggling at the present time—that instinct, that is to say, which Schmoller and the historical school in economics imperfectly endeavoured to express under the conception of nationality. The mistaken conception of the Manchester school, that the progress won for the race could be maintained, and that the ideal of an open, fair, and free rivalry under which all human capacities should have the right of universal opportunity could ever be realised in the conditions of a process of competitive trade, regulated of necessity at the level of the qualities governing an international scramble for private gain, already belongs to the immature imaginings of a period beyond which the world has moved. What we see is that in this case also the principle we have traced throughout as represented in the development of our civilisation must eventually come into operation.

In other words :— *It is only within the great spaces cleared in the world-process round ideals which are in the last resort the expression of the ethical principle here enunciated, and which are held open, and free in the present by an irresistible will operating in obedience to a sense of responsibility to a principle of tolerance transcending the claims of all existing interests, that the controlling meaning of the economic process can ever be permanently projected out of the present on the world-stage.*

This is the meaning which the peoples that represent certain organised phases of the advancing life of our civilisation are now struggling to express, in the consciousness of a collective life in those great ethical ideals which are tending amongst these peoples to take the place of those represented in the past under the concepts of nationality. It is undoubtedly amongst the peoples who have already carried farthest the characteristic principles of the development we have followed through Western history since the beginning of our era, that the cause here described is destined in the near future to play the greatest part in the world-process. The observer can have little insight into the tendencies of current events who does not perceive that amongst the advanced peoples at the present day this movement of the developmental principles of our civilisation towards consciousness, is already a fact in Western history, the significance of which overshadows that of any other tendency of the time. In the existing territory of United States it is, as was indicated in the previous chapter, the real cause beneath the surface which has huilt up the group of peoples from the Atlantic to the Pacific into a conscious organic unity, which has enabled that unity

to absorb, with a rapidity and completeness of which only the highest organic life could be capable, the millions which surrounded them and which have been poured upon them. It is the cause which has made the United States the largest free-trading area in the world; and which in this, and a multitude of other respects, constitutes the ultimate fact behind those conditions of intensity, and that outlook on the world which is so significant for the future of this section of the English-speaking peoples. Similarly in England at the present day, the observer can have gone little beneath the surface-meaning of current events, who does not realise in the same cause one of the profoundest nascent forces in existing politics. It is the cause behind that instinct which already associates with the collective life of that loosely federated commonwealth of peoples, incorrectly known as the British empire, a sense of responsibility, a meaning and a destiny in the future—in upholding throughout the world the conditions of development, and the standards of life won with such effort in our civilisation—the significance of which entirely transcends the content of the utilitarian Liberalism which prevailed in England in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. And in the English-speaking world as a whole it is already a cause from which proceeds an impetus of which no mind has as yet either measured the reach or foreseen the destiny. It is an impetus, moreover, which, proceeding from a cause that has no relation either to the conditions or aims of current politics, but which, going deeper than all outward forms of politics and of governments, has its seat in the growing sense of organic unity amongst this

group of peoples as the conscious representatives in history of the principles through which the main stream of the evolutionary process in Western history has come down from the past in our civilisation, and is descending towards the future in the world.

When the adjustments in respect of natural and legitimate aspirations that have not been satisfied in the past have been made, there can, in short, be no doubt as to the nature of the future towards which our civilisation is drawing in this respect. The day of such concepts of nationality, as express merely the tribal or local egoisms of a people, would appear to be over. What we must expect to see in the future towards which we are moving, is the life of the world, under the lead of our civilisation, converging gradually towards a stage at which the rivalry will be between a few great, clearly defined systems of social order; these systems being, in the last resort, nothing more or less than different outward expressions, in terms of the social and economic life of the included peoples, of that principle of the subordination of the present to the future with which the meaning of our civilisation has been from the beginning identified in the evolutionary process. And in the eventual world-rivalry between these systems the determining factor of success will undoubtedly be the degree of efficiency with which this principle has obtained expression in the life-processes of the included peoples.

For the peoples who represent the advancing front of the development we have thus traced through Western history, and amongst whom the principle of competition has already produced its most important

results, there has been reached a period in which it has become the clear duty of the party representing the cause of progress to place before it the one central principle around which all the details of the main conflict in the local, political, social, and international life of our civilisation must in future be waged. This is, that in the relations of the individual to society the conditions which express the ascendancy of the present in the economic process belong to an epoch of development beyond the meaning of which our civilisation must be considered to have definitely moved.

The fact through which the ascendancy of the present continues to express itself in the economic process is everywhere the same. We have it in view under the phenomenon of the legalised enforcement, whether by individuals, or classes, or corporations, or sometimes even by whole peoples, of rights which do not correspond to an equivalent in social utility. This is the phenomenon which John Stuart Mill and the English Utilitarians had in view in their early attack on the institution of unearned increments. This is the phenomenon which, in the last analysis, we see Henry George endeavouring to combat in his denouncement of the monopoly ownership of natural utilities. This is the phenomenon with which we see Marx struggling in his theory of surplus value, so far as it is true — the phenomenon, that is to say, of the acquirement by capital of values in the produce of labour which represent monopoly rights not earned by capital in terms of function. It is the phenomenon we have in view in that class of fortunes accumulated in stock exchange values which have not been earned in terms of function. It is the fact underlying

every form of private right accruing from increase, unearned in terms of social utility, in the profit ownership of the instruments and materials of production. It is the phenomenon we have in view in the now universal tendency in modern industry to monopoly ownership, or its equivalent in monopoly control; with the resulting accumulation of vast private fortunes through the enforced disadvantage of classes, of whole communities, and even of entire nations. It is the fact underlying every form of the exploitation of a less developed people, whether by special tariffs or otherwise, by a ruling race for its own private advantage. And last of all, it is the phenomenon which meets us in its final colossal phase in the international world-process, under the tendency of aggregates of capital, in an uncontrolled and irresponsible scramble for profit governed in the last resort simply by the qualities contributing to success and survival in a free fight for private gain, to control the general exploitation of the natural resources of the world at the level of its lowest standards in human life and human labour.

These are all but differing expressions of a single world-embracing fact—the ascendancy of the present in the economic process in our time. It has been the conflict in which this ascendancy of the present in the evolutionary process has been challenged, shaken, and overthrown in the developments of thought and action that have led up to the struggle now before us, which has formed the central theme in the history of the process of development we have traced so far through our civilisation. Upon the party representing the cause of progress in Western

history has now devolved the task of lifting this conflict to a higher stage than any it has yet reached — of carrying it into the arena of the economic process in all its manifestations throughout the world. Never before has that party had set before it a cause more calculated to inspire its inward faith, and to call forth all the qualities of a stern, controlled, centralised and disciplined enthusiasm. Behind the struggle towards which we have advanced lies all the impetus of past development in our civilisation, all the meaning inherent in that civilisation from the beginning of our era. The gradual organisation and direction through the State, under the sense of responsibility here defined, of the activities of industry and production, moving slowly, not to any fixed condition of ordered ease, but towards an era of such free and efficient conflict of all natural forces as has never been in the world before, is no dream of excited imaginations. Divested of all the cruder proposals of confiscation and of the regimentation of society, divorced from the threats and not unnatural exaggerations of classes wronged and oppressed in the past, it is no more than a simple and sober reality of the future, which must, by necessity inherent in the evolutionary process, ultimately prevail amongst the winning peoples. It is the goal which has been inherent from the beginning in that organic process of development, the steps in the unfolding of which in our Western civilisation we have endeavoured to describe. It represents the only effective condition in which the future can ever be emancipated in the present in human society.

No mind in our civilisation has, in all probability, as yet imagined the full possibilities of the collective

organisation — under the direction of a highly centralised and informed intelligence, acting under the sense of responsibility here described — of all the activities of industry and production, moving steadily towards the goal of the endowment of all human capacities in a free conflict of forces. It is only necessary for the observer who has once grasped the meaning of the development described in the preceding chapters to stand at almost any point in the life of the English-speaking world of the present day to realise how far society has, in reality, moved beyond that conception of its joint effort which prevailed in the early period of the competitive era — the conception of the State as an irresponsible and almost brainless Colossus, organised primarily towards the end of securing men in possession of the gains they had obtained in an uncontrolled scramble for gain divorced from all sense of responsibility.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the peoples who have lived through this phase of the competitive process, and amongst whom such competition as has prevailed has achieved the highest results, will start towards the new era with a great advantage in their favour. For it must be expected that where the development in progress continues to be efficiently maintained, the new system will succeed the old, not by force or coercion, but by its own merits; and, in conditions in which it will become the increasing function of an informed and centralised system of public opinion to hold continually before the general mind through all the phases of public activity — local, social, political, and international — the character of the principles governing the epoch of development on

which we have entered; and to see that the benefits accruing from the era of competition through which we have lived shall be retained and increased for society by compelling the new social order to make its way simply on its merits in free and fair rivalry with those activities of private effort which it is destined to supersede.

The enfranchisement of the future in a development in which the race is passing slowly under the control of the principles governing a process infinite in the future is a principle before which all others must eventually go down in the process of human progress. It is the principle with which the potentiality of our civilisation has been associated from the beginning. It is the characteristic principle with which the advance of the peoples destined to maintain a leading place in that civilisation must continue to be identified. No human foresight could, even at a period recent in history, have predicted, without insight into such a cause, the world-embracing future to which, irrespective of race, position, population, wealth, or natural resources, the action of this principle was about to raise in a comparatively brief period of time the small group of English-speaking peoples, otherwise so insignificant a component in our Western civilisation. So now all attempts to judge the future by any precedents drawn from the past, or by any comparisons whatever with standards which the world has known before, are entirely vain and meaningless. In the ancient civilisations the universal empire towards which the world had moved throughout unknown periods in the past had one meaning which controlled all others. It represented

the culminating fact of the ascendancy of the present in the process of human evolution. The universal empire towards which our civilisation moves — that universal empire the principles of which have obtained their first firm foothold in human history in that stupendous, complex, and long-drawn-out conflict of which the history of the English-speaking peoples has been the principal theatre in modern history — has a meaning which transcends this. It represents that empire in which it has become the destiny of our Western Demos, in full consciousness of the nature of the majestic process of cosmic ethics that has engendered him, to project the controlling meaning of the world-process beyond the present. All the developments that have hitherto taken place in our civilisation are but the steps leading up to the gigantic struggle now closing in upon us, as the ruling principle of a past era of human evolution moves slowly towards its challenge, in the economic process in all its manifestations throughout the world.



A 'PENDIX

CONTAINING CERTAIN HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN THE PRECEDING CHAP- TERS, OR BEARING ON SUBJECTS DISCUSSED

I. ORDINANCE OF WILLIAM I. OF ENGLAND SEPARATING THE SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL COURTS

William by the grace of God king of the English, to R. Bainard and G. de Magnavilla, and P. de Valoines, and to my other faithful ones of Essex and of Hertfordshire and of Middlesex, greeting. Know all of you and my other faithful ones who remain in England, that in a common council and by the advice of the archbishops and bishops, and abbots, and of all the princes of my kingdom, I have decided that the episcopal laws, which up to my time in the kingdom of the English have not been right or according to the precepts of the holy canons, shall be emended. Wherefore I command, and by royal authority decree, that no bishop or archdeacon shall any longer hold, in the hundred court, pleas pertaining to the episcopal laws, nor shall they bring before the judgment of secular men any case which pertains to the rule of souls; but whoever shall be summoned, according to the episcopal laws, in any case or for any fault, shall come to the place which the bishop shall choose or name for this purpose, and shall there answer in his case or for his fault, and shall perform his law before God and his bishop not according to the hundred court, but according to the canons and the episcopal laws. But if any one, elated by pride, shall scorn or be unwilling to come before the judgment seat of the bishop, he shall be summoned once and a second and a third time; and if not even then he come to make amends, he shall be excommunicated; and, if it be needful to give

effect to this, the power and justice of the king or the sheriff shall be called in. But he who was summoned before the judgment seat of the bishop shall, for each summons, pay the episcopal fine. This also I forbid, and by my authority interdict, that any sheriff, or prevoist, or minister of the king, or any layman, concern himself in the matter of laws which pertain to the bishop, nor shall any layman summon another man to judgment apart from the jurisdiction of the bishop. But judgment shall be passed in no place except within the episcopal see, or in such place as the bishop shall fix upon for this purpose.

2-3. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE EMPERORS AND THE POPES

(2, 3, 4 and 5 are reprinted by permission from Dr. Henderson' text in *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages.*)

2. *Henry IV's Answer to Gregory VII., Jan. 24, 1076*

Henry, king not through usurpation, but through the holy ordination of God, to Hildebrand, at present not pope but false monk. Such greeting as this hast thou merited through thy disturbances, inasmuch as there is no grade in the church which thou hast omitted to make a partaker not of honour but of confusion, not of benediction but of malediction. For, to mention few and especial cases out of many, not only hast thou not feared to lay hands upon the rulers of the holy church, the anointed of the Lord — the archbishops, namely, bishops and priests — but thou hast trodden them under foot like slaves ignorant of what their master is doing. Thou hast won favour from the common herd by crushing them; thou hast looked upon all of them as knowing nothing, upon thy sole self, moreover, as knowing all things. This knowledge, however, thou hast used not for edification but for destruction; so that with reason we believe that St. Gregory, whose name thou hast usurped for thyself, was prophesying concerning thee when he said: "The pride of him who is in power increases the more the greater the number of those subject to him; and he thinks that he himself can do more

than all." And we, indeed, have endured all this, being eager to guard the honour of the apostolic see; thou, however, hast understood our bumility to be fear, and hast not, accordingly, shunned to rise up against the royal power conferred upon us by God, daring to threaten to divest us of it. As if we had received our kingdom from thee! As if the kingdom and the empire were in thine and not in God's hand! And this although our Lord Jesus Christ did call us to the kingdom, did not, however, call thee to the priesthood. For thou hast ascended by the following steps. By wiles, namely, which the profession of monk abhors, thou hast achieved money; by money, favour; by the sword, the throne of peace. And from the throne of peace thou hast disturbed peace, inasmuch as thou hast armed subjects against those in authority over them; inasmuch as thou, who wert not called, hast taught that our bishops called of God are to be despised; inasmuch as thou hast usurped for laymen the ministry over their priests, allowing them to depose or condemn those whom they themselves had received as teachers from the hand of God through the laying on of hands of the bishops. On me also who, although unworthy to be among the anointed, have nevertheless been anointed to the kingdom, thou hast lain thy hand; me who—as the tradition of the holy Fathers teaches, declaring that I am not to be deposed for any crime unless, which God forbid, I should have strayed from the faith—am subject to the judgment of God alone. For the wisdom of the holy Fathers committed even Julian the apostate not to themselves, but to God alone, to be judged and to be deposed. For himself the true pope, Peter, also exclaims: "Fear God, honour the king." But thou, who dost not fear God, dost dishonour in me his appointed one. Wherefore St. Paul, when he has not spared an angel of heaven if he shall have preached otherwise, has not excepted thee also who dost teach otherwise upon earth. For he says: "If any one, either I or an angel from heaven, should preach a gospel other than that which has been preached to you, he shall be damned. Thou, therefore, damned by this curse and by the judgment of all our bishops

and by our own, descend and relinquish the apostolic chair which thou hast usurped. Let another ascend the throne of St. Peter, who shall not practise violence under the cloak of religion, but shall teach the sound doctrine of St. Peter. I Henry, king by the grace of God, do say unto thee, together with all our bishops: Descend, descend, to be damned throughout the ages.

3. *First Deposition and Banning of Henry IV. by Gregory VII., February 22, 1076*

O St. Peter, chief of the apostles, incline to us, I beg, thy holy ears, and hear me thy servant whom thou hast nourished from infancy, and whom, until this day, thou hast freed from the hand of the wicked, who have hated and do hate me for my faithfulness to thee. Thou, and my mistress the mother of God, and thy brother St. Paul, are witnesses for me among all the saints that thy holy Roman church drew me to its helm against my will; that I had no thought of ascending thy chair through force, and that I would rather have ended my life as a pilgrim than, by secular means, to have seized thy throne for the sake of earthly glory. And therefore I believe it to be through thy grace, and not through my own deeds, that it has pleased and does please thee that the Christian people, who have been especially committed to thee, should obey me. And especially to me, as thy representative and by thy favour, has the power been granted by God of binding and loosing in heaven and on earth. On the strength of this belief, therefore, for the honour and security of thy church, in the name of Almighty God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, I withdraw, through thy power and authority, from Henry the king, son of Henry the emperor, who has risen against thy church with unheard of insolence, the rule over the whole kingdom of the Germans and over Italy. And I absolve all Christians from the bonds of the oath which they have made or shall make to him; and I forbid any one to serve him as king. For it is fitting that he who strives to lessen the honour of thy church should

himself lose the honour which belongs to him. And since he has scorned to obey as a Christian, and has not returned to God whom he had deserted — holding intercourse with the excommunicated ; practising manifold iniquities ; spurning my commands which, as thou dost bear witness, I issued to him for his own salvation ; separating himself from thy church, and striving to rend it ; — I bind him in thy stead with the chain of the anathema. And, leaning on thee, I so bind him that the people may know and have proof that thou art Peter, and above thy rock the Son of the living God hath built His church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

4. THE BULL "CLERICIS LAICOS," 1296 A.D.

(Rymer's *Foedera*, ed. 1816, vol. i. pt. ii. p. 836.)

Bishop Boniface, servant of the servants of God, in perpetual memory of this matter. Antiquity teaches us that laymen are in a high degree hostile to the clergy, a fact which also the experiences of the present times declare and make manifest ; inasmuch as, not content within their own bounds, they strive after what is forbidden, and loose the reins in pursuit of what is unlawful. Nor have they the prudence to consider that all jurisdiction is denied them over the clergy — over both the persons and the goods of ecclesiastics. On the prelates of the churches and on ecclesiastical persons, monastic and secular, they impose heavy burdens, tax them, and declare levies upon them. They exact and extort from them the half, the tenth or twentieth or some other portion or quota of their revenues or of their goods ; and they attempt in many ways to subject them to slavery and reduce them to their sway. And, with grief do we mention it, some prelates of the churches and ecclesiastical persons, fearing where they ought not to fear, seeking a transitory peace, dreading more to offend the temporal than the eternal majesty, without obtaining the authority or permission of the apostolic chair, do acquiesce, not so much rashly, as improvidently, in the abuses of such persons. We, therefore,

wishing to put a stop to such iniquitous acts, by the counsel of our brothers, of the apostolic authority, have decreed: that whatever prelates, or ecclesiastical persons, monastic or secular, of whatever grade, condition or standing, shall pay, or promise, or agree to pay any levies or talliages to laymen the tenth, twentieth, or hundredth part of their own and their churches' revenues or goods — or any other quantity, portion, or quota of those same revenues or goods, of their estimated or of their real value — under the name of an aid, loan, subvention, subsidy or gift, or under any other name, manner or clever pretence, without the authority of that same chair: likewise emperors, kings, or princes, dukes, counts or barons, podestas, captains or officials or rectors — by whatever name they are called, whether of cities, castles, or any places whatever, wherever situated; and any other persons, of whatever pre-eminence, condition, or standing who shall impose, exact, or receive such payments, or shall anywhere arrest, seize or presume to take possession of the belongings of churches or ecclesiastical persons which are deposited in the sacred buildings, or shall order them to be arrested, seized or taken possession of, or shall receive them when taken possession of, seized or arrested; — also all who shall knowingly give aid, counsel, or favour in the aforesaid things, whether publicly or secretly; — shall incur, by the act itself, the sentence of excommunication. Corporations, moreover, which shall be guilty in these matters, we place under the ecclesiastical interdict. The prelates and above mentioned ecclesiastical persons we strictly command, by virtue of their obedience and under penalty of deposition, that they by no means acquiesce in such demands, without express permission of the aforesaid chair; and that they pay nothing under pretext of any obligation, promise and confession made hitherto, or to be made hereafter before such constitution, notice or decree shall come to their notice; nor shall the aforesaid secular persons in any way receive anything. And if they shall pay, or if the aforesaid persons shall receive, they shall fall by the the act itself under sentence of excommunication. From the aforesaid sentences of excommunica-

tion and interdict, moreover, no one shall be able to be absolved, except in the throes of death, without the authority and special permission of the apostolic chair; since it is our intention by no means to pass over with dissimulation so horrid an abuse of the secular powers. Notwithstanding any privileges whatever — under whatever tenor, form, or manner or conception of words — that have been granted to emperors, kings, and other persons mentioned above; as to which privileges we will that, against what we have here laid down, they in no wise avail any person or persons. Let no man at all, then, infringe this page of our constitution, prohibition or decree, or, with rash daring, act counter to it; but if any one shall presume to attempt this, he shall know that he is about to incur the indignation of Almighty God and of His blessed apostles Peter and Paul.

Given at Rome at St. Peter's on the sixth day before the Calends of March (Feb. 25), in the second year of our pontificate.

5. THE BULL "UNAM SANCTAM"

(From the latest revision of the text in *Œuvre des Questions historiques*, July 1889, p. 255.)

We are compelled, our faith urging us, to believe and to hold — and we do firmly believe and simply confess — that there is one holy catholic and apostolic church, outside of which there is neither salvation nor remission of sins; her Spouse proclaiming it in the Canticles: "My dove, my undefiled is but one, she is the choice one of her that bare her;" which represents one mystic body, of which body the head is Christ; but of Christ, God. In this church there is one Lord, one faith and one baptism. There was one ark of Noah, indeed, at the time of the flood, symbolising one church; and this being finished in one cubit had, namely, one Noah as helmsman and commander. And, with the exception of this ark, all things existing upon the earth were, as we read, destroyed. This church, moreover, we venerate as the only one, the Lord saying through His prophet: "Deliver my soul from the sword, my darling from

the power of the dog." He prayed at the same time for His soul—that is, for Himself the head—and for His body,—which body, namely, he called the one and only church on account of the unity of the faith promised, of the sacraments, and of the love of the church. She is that seamless garment of the Lord which was not cut but which fell by lot. Therefore of this one and only church there is one body and one head—not two heads as if it were a monster:—Christ, namely, and the vicar of Christ, St. Peter, and the successor of Peter. For the Lord Himself said to Peter, Feed my sheep. My sheep, He said, using a general term, and not designating these or those particular sheep; from which it is plain that He committed to him *all* His sheep. If, then, the Greeks or others say that they were not committed to the care of Peter and his successors, they necessarily confess that they are not of the sheep of Christ; for the Lord says, in John, that there is one fold, one shepherd, and one only. We are told by the word of the gospel that in this His fold there are two swords,—a spiritual, namely, and a temporal. For when the apostles said "Behold here are two swords"—when, namely, the apostles were speaking in the church—the Lord did not reply that this was too much, but enough. Surely he who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter wrongly interprets the word of the Lord when he says: "Put up thy sword in its scabbard." Both swords, the spiritual and the material, therefore, are in the power of the church; the one, indeed, to be wielded for the church, the other by the church; the one by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and knights, but at the will and sufferance of the priest. One sword, moreover, ought to be under the other, and the temporal authority to be subjected to the spiritual. For when the apostle says "there is no power but of God, and the powers that are of God are ordained," they would not be ordained unless sword were under sword, and the lesser one, as it were, were led by the other to great deeds. For, according to St. Dionysius the law of divinity is to lead the lowest through the intermediate

to the highest things. Not therefore, according to the law of the universe, are all things reduced to order equally and immediately; but the lowest through the intermediate, the intermediate through the higher. But that the spiritual exceeds any earthly power in dignity and nobility we ought the more openly to confess the more spiritual things excel temporal ones. This also is made plain to our eyes from the giving of tithes, and the benediction and the sanctification; from the acceptance of this same power, from the control over those same things. For, the truth bearing witness, the spiritual power has to establish the earthly power, and to judge if it be not good. Thus concerning the church and the ecclesiastical power is verified the prophecy of Jeremiah: "See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms," and the other things which follow. Therefore if the earthly power err it shall be judged by the spiritual power; but if the lesser spiritual power err, by the greater. But if the greatest, it can be judged by God alone, not by man, the apostle bearing witness. A spiritual man judges all things, but he himself is judged by no one. This authority, moreover, even though it is given to man and exercised through man, is not human, but rather divine, being given by divine lips to Peter and founded on a rock for him and his successors through Christ himself whom he has confessed; the Lord himself saying to Peter: " whatsoever thou shalt bind," etc. Whoever, therefore, resists this power thus ordained by God, resists the ordination of God, unless he makes believe, like the Manichean, that there are two beginnings. This we consider false and heretical, since by the testimony of Moses, not "in the beginnings," but "in the beginning" God created the Heavens and the earth. Indeed we declare, announce and define, that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff. The Lateran, Nov. 14, in our 8th year. As a perpetual memorial of this matter.

6. THE AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE

(As presented to the House of Commons, January 20, 1649.)

(The text below follows that in Mr. S. R. Gardiner's *Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution*.)

An Agreement of the People of England, and the places therewith incorporated, for a secure and present peace, upon grounds of common right, freedom, and safety.

Having, by our late labours and hazards, made it appear to the world at how high a rate we value our just freedom, and God having so far owned our cause as to deliver the enemies thereof into our hands, we do now hold ourselves bound, in mutual duty to each other, to take the best care we can for the future, to avoid both the danger of returning into a slavish condition and the chargeable remedy of another war; for as it cannot be imagined that so many of our countrymen would have opposed us in this quarrel if they had understood their own good, so may we hopefully promise to ourselves, that when our common rights and liberties shall be cleared, their endeavours will be disappointed that seek to make themselves our masters. Since, therefore, our former oppressions and not-yet-ended troubles have been occasioned either by want of frequent national meetings in council, or by the undue or unequal constitution thereof, or by rendering those meetings ineffectual, we are fully agreed and resolved, God willing, to provide, that hereafter our Representatives be neither left to an uncertainty for times nor be unequally constituted, nor made useless to the ends for which they are intended. In order whereunto we declare and agree,

First, that to prevent the many inconveniences apparently arising from the long continuance of the same persons in supreme authority, this present Parliament end and dissolve upon, or before, the last day of April 1649.

Secondly, that the people of England (being at this day very unequally distributed by counties, cities, and boroughs, for the election of their Representatives) be indifferently pro-

portioned ; and, to this end, that the Representatives of the whole nation shall consist of 400 persons, or not above ; and in each county, and the places thereto subjoined, there shall be chosen, to make up the said Representatives at all times, the several numbers here mentioned, viz. (Here follow the names and numbers.)

Provided, that the first or second Representative may, if they see cause, assign the remainder of the 400 representers, not hereby assigned, or so many of them as they shall see cause for, unto such counties as shall appear in this present distribution to have less than their due proportion. Provided also, that where any city or borough, to which one representer or more is assigned, shall be found, in a due proportion, not competent alone to elect a representer, or the number of representers assigned thereto, it is left to future Representatives to assign such a number of parishes or villages near adjoining to such city or borough, to be joined therewith in the elections, as may make the same proportionable.

Thirdly. That the people do, of course, choose themselves a Representative once in two years, and shall meet for that purpose upon the first Thursday in every second May, by eleven in the morning ; and the Representatives so chosen to meet upon the second Thursday in the June following, at the usual place in Westminster, or such other place as, by the foregoing Representative, or the Council of State in the interval, shall be, from time to time, appointed and published to the people, at the least twenty days before the time of election ; and to continue their sessions there, or elsewhere, until the second Thursday in December following, unless they shall adjourn or dissolve themselves sooner ; but not to continue longer. The election of the first Representative to be on the first Thursday in May 1649 ; and that, and all future elections, to be according to the rules prescribed for the same purpose in this Agreement, viz. 1. That the electors in every division shall be natives or denizens of England ; not persons receiving alms, but such as are assessed ordinarily towards the relief of the poor ; no servants to, and

receiving wages from, any particular person ; and in all elections, except for the Universities, they shall be men of twenty-one years of age or upwards, and housekeepers, dwelling within the division for which the election is : provided, that (until the end of seven years next ensuing the time herein limited for the end of this present Parliament) no person shall be admitted to, or have any hand or voice in, such elections who hath adhered unto or assisted the King against the Parliament in any of the late wars or insurrections, or who shall make or join in, or abet, any forcible opposition against this Agreement. 2. That such persons, and such only, may be elected to be of the Representative, who, by the rule aforesaid, are to have voice in elections in one place or other. Provided, that of those none shall be eligible for the first or second Representative who have not voluntarily assisted the Parliament against the King, either in person before the 14th of June 1645, or else in money, plate, horse, or arms, lent upon the Propositions, before the end of May 1643 ; or who have joined in, or abetted the treasonable engagement in London in 1647 ; or who declared or engaged themselves for a cessation of arms with the Scots that invaded this nation the last summer ; or for compliance with the actors in any insurrections of the same summer ; or with the Prince of Wales, or his accomplices, in the revolted fleet. Provided also, that such persons as, by the rules in the preceding Article, are not capable of electing until the end of seven years, shall not be capable to be elected until the end of fourteen years next ensuing. And we desire and recommend it to all men, that, in all times the persons to be chosen for this great trust may be men of courage, fearing God, and hating covetousness ; and that our Representatives would make the best provisions for that end. 3. That whoever, by the rules in the two preceding Articles, are incapable of electing, or to be elected, shall presume to vote in, or be present at, such election for the first or second Representative ; or, being elected, shall presume to sit or vote in either of the said Representatives, shall incur the pain of confiscation of the moiety of his estate, to the use of the public, in

case he have any visible estate to the value of £50, and if he has not such an estate, then shall incur the pain of imprisonment for three months. And if any person shall forcibly oppose, molest, or hinder the people capable of electing as aforesaid, in their quiet and free election of representatives, for the first Representative, then each person so offending shall incur the penalty or confiscation of his whole estate, both real and personal; and, if he has not an estate to the value of £50, shall suffer imprisonment during one whole year without bail or mainprize. Provided, that the offender in each such case be convicted within three months next after the committing of his offence, and the first Representative is to make further provision for the avoiding of these evils in future elections. 4. That to the end all officers of state may be certainly accountable, and no faction made to maintain corrupt interests, no member of a Council of State, nor any officer of any salary-forces in army or garrison, nor any treasurer or receiver of public money, shall, while such, be elected to be of a Representative; and in case any such election shall be, the same to be void. And in case any lawyer shall be chosen into any Representative or Council of State, then he shall be incapable of practice as a lawyer during that trust. 5. For the more convenient election of Representatives, each county, wherein more than three representatives are to be chosen, with the town corporate and cities, if there be any, lying within the compass thereof, to which no representatives are herein assigned, shall be divided by a due proportion into so many and such parts, as each part may elect two, and no part above three representatives. For the setting forth of which divisions, and the ascertaining of other circumstances hereafter expressed, so as to make the elections less subject to confusion or mistake, in order to the next Representative, Thomas Lord Grey of Groby, Sir John Danvers, Sir Henry Holcroft, knights; Moses Wall, gentleman; Samuel Moyer, John Langley, Wm. Hawkins, Abraham Babington, Daniel Taylor, Mark Hilsley, Rd. Price, and Col. John White, citizens of London, or any five or more of them, are intrusted to nominate and appoint, under

their hands and seals, three or more fit persons in each county, and in each city and borough, to which one representor or more is assigned, to be as Commissioners for the ends aforesaid, in the respective counties, cities, and boroughs; and, by like writing under their hands and seals, shall certify into the Parliament Records, before the 11th of February next, the names of the Commissioners so appointed for the respective counties, cities, and boroughs, which Commissioners, or any three or more of them, for the respective counties, cities, and boroughs, shall before the end of February next, by writing under their hands and seals, appoint two fit and faithful persons, or more, in each hundred, lathe, or wapentake, within the respective counties, and in each ward within the City of London, to take care for the orderly taking of all voluntary subscriptions to this Agreement, by fit persons to be employed for that purpose in every parish, who are to return the subscriptions so taken to the persons that employed them, keeping a transcript thereof to themselves; and those persons, keeping like transcripts, to return the original subscriptions to the respective Commissioners by whom they were appointed, at or before the 14th day of April next, to be registered and kept in the chief court within the respective cities and boroughs. And the said Commissioners, or any three or more of them, for the several counties, cities, and boroughs, respectively, shall, where more than three representors are to be chosen, divide such counties, as also the City of London, into so many and such parts as are aforementioned, and shall set forth the bounds of such divisions; and shall, in every county, city, and borough, where any representors are to be chosen, and in every such division as aforesaid within the City of London, and within the several counties so divided, respectively, appoint one place certain wherein the people shall meet for the choice of the representors; and some one fit person, or more, inhabiting within each borough, city, county, or division respectively, to be present at the time and place of election, in the nature of Sheriffs, to regulate the elections; and by poll, or otherwise, clearly to distinguish and judge thereof, and to make

return of the person or persons elected, as is hereafter expressed; and shall likewise, in writing under their hands and seals, make certificates of the several divisions, with the bounds thereof, by them set forth, and of the certain places of meeting, and persons, in the nature of Sheriff, appointed in them respectively as aforesaid; and cause such certificates to be returned into the Parliament Records before the end of April next; and before that time shall also cause the same to be published in every parish within the counties, cities, and boroughs respectively; and shall in every such parish likewise nominate and appoint, by warrant under their hands and seals, one trusty person, or more, inhabiting therein, to make a true list of all the persons within their respective parishes, who, according to the rules aforesaid, are to have voice in the elections; and expressing who amongst them are, by the same rules, capable of being elected; and such list, with the said warrant, to bring in and return, at the time and place of election, unto the person appointed in the nature of Sheriff, as aforesaid, for that borough, city, county, or division respectively; which person so appointed as Sheriff, being present at the time and place of election; or, in case of his absence by the space of one hour after the time limited for the people's meeting, then any person present that is eligible, as aforesaid, whom the people then and there assembled shall choose for that end, shall receive and keep the said lists and admit the persons therein contained, or so many of them as are present, unto a free vote in the said elections; and, having first caused this Agreement to be publicly read in the audience of the people, shall proceed unto, and regulate and keep peace and order in the elections; and, by poll or otherwise, openly distinguish and judge of the same; and thereof, by certificate or writing under the hands and seals of himself, and six or more of the electors, nominating the person or persons duly elected, shall make a true return into the Parliament Records within twenty-one days after the election, under pain for default thereof, or, for making any false return, to forfeit £100 to the public use; and also cause indentures to be made, and

unchangeably sealed and delivered, between himself and six or more of the said electors, on the one part, and the persons, or each person, elected severally, on the other part, expressing their election of him as a representer of them according to this Agreement, and his acceptance of that trust, and his promise accordingly to perform the same with faithfulness, to the best of his understanding and ability, for the glory of God and good of the people. This course is to hold for the first Representative, which is to provide for the ascertaining of these circumstances in order to future Representatives.

Fourthly. That 150 members at least be always present in each sitting of the Representative, at the passing of any law or doing of any act whereby the people are to be bound; saving, that the number of sixty may make a House for debates or resolutions that are preparatory thereunto.

Fifthly. That the Representative shall, within twenty days after their first meeting, appoint a Council of State for the managing of public affairs, until the tenth day after the meeting of the next Representative, unless that next Representative think fit to put an end to that trust sooner. And the same Council to act and proceed therein, according to such instructions and limitations as the Representative shall give, and not otherwise.

Sixthly. That in each interval between biennial Representatives, the Council of State, in case of imminent danger or extreme necessity, may summon a Representative to be forthwith chosen, and to meet; so as the Session thereof continue not above eighty days; and so as it dissolve at least fifty days before the appointed time for the next biennial Representative; and upon the fiftieth day so preceding it shall dissolve of course, if not otherwise dissolved sooner.

Seventhly. That no member of any Representative be made either receiver, treasurer, or other officer, during that employment, saving to be a member of the Council of State.

Eighthly. That the Representatives have, and shall be understood to have, the supreme trust in order to the preservation and government of the whole; and that their power

extend, without the consent or concurrence of any other person or persons, to the erecting and abolishing of Courts of Justice and public offices, and to the enacting, altering, repealing, and declaring of laws, and the highest and final judgment, concerning all natural or civil things, but not concerning things spiritual or evangelical. Provided that, even in things natural and civil, these six particulars next following are, and shall be, understood to be excepted and reserved from our Representatives, viz. 1. We do not empower them to impress or constrain any person to serve in foreign war, either by sea or land, nor for any military service within the kingdom; save that they may take order for the forming, training, and exercising of the people in a military way, to be in readiness for resisting of foreign invasions, suppressing of sudden insurrections, or for assisting in execution of the laws; and may take order for the employing and conducting of them for those ends; provided, that, even in such cases, none be compellable to go out of the county he lives in, if he procure another to serve in his room. 2. That, after the time herein limited for the commencement of the first Representative, none of the people may be at any time questioned for any thing said or done in relation to the late wars or public differences, otherwise than in execution or pursuance of the determinations of the present House of Commons, against such as have adhered to the King, or his interest, against the people; and saving that accomptants for public moneys received, shall remain accountable for the same. 3. That no securities given, or to be given, by the public faith of the nation, nor any engagements of the public faith for satisfaction of debts and damages, shall be made void or invalid by the next or any future Representatives; except to such creditors as have, or shall have, justly forfeited the same: and saving, that the next Representative may confirm or make null, in part or in whole, all gifts of lands, moneys, offices, or otherwise, made by the present Parliament to any member or attendant of either House. 4. That, in any laws hereafter to be made, no person, by virtue of any tenure, grant, charter, patent, degree or birth, shall be privi-

leged from subjection thereto, or from being bound thereby, as well as others. 5. That the Representative may not give judgment upon any man's person or estate, where no law hath before provided; save only in calling to account and punishing public officers for abusing or failing in their trust. 6. That no Representative may in anywise render up, or give, or take away, any of the foundations of common right, liberty, and safety contained in this Agreement, nor level men's estates, destroy property, or make all things common; and that, in all matters of such fundamental concernment, there shall be a liberty to particular members of the said Representatives to enter their dissents from the major vote.

Ninthly. Concerning religion we agreed as followeth:—

1. It is intended that the Christian religion be held forth and recommended as the public profession in this nation, which we desire may, by the grace of God, be reformed to the greatest purity in doctrine, worship, and discipline, according to the Word of God; the instructing the people thereunto in a public way, so it be not compulsive; as also the maintaining of able teachers for that end, and for the confutation or discovering of heresy, error, and whatsoever is contrary to sound doctrine, is allowed to be provided for by our Representatives; the maintenance of which teachers may be out of a public treasury, and, we desire, not by tithes: provided, that Popery or Prelacy be not held forth as the public way or profession in this nation. 2. That, to the public profession so held forth, none be compelled by penalties or otherwise; but only may be endeavoured to be won by sound doctrine and the example of a good conversation. 3. That such as profess faith in God by Jesus Christ, however differing in judgment from the doctrine, worship, or discipline publicly held forth, as aforesaid, shall not be restrained from, but shall be protected in, the profession of their faith and exercise of religion, according to their consciences, in any place except such as shall be set apart for the public worship; where we provide not for them, unless they have leave, so as they abuse not this liberty to the civil injury of others or to actual disturbance of the public peace

on their parts. Nevertheless, it is not intended to be hereby provided that the liberty shall necessarily extend to Popery or Prelacy. 4. That all laws, ordinances, statutes, and clauses in any law, statute, or ordinance to the contrary of the liberty herein provided for, in the two particulars next preceding concerning religion, be, and are hereby, repealed and made void.

Tenthly. It is agreed, that whosoever shall by force of arms, resist the orders of the next or any future Representative (except in case where such Representative shall evidently render up, or give, or take away the foundations of common right, liberty, and safety, contained in this Agreement), he shall forthwith, after his or their such resistance, lose the benefit and protection of the laws, and shall be punishable with death, as an enemy and traitor to the nation. Of the things expressed in this Agreement: the certain ending of this Parliament, as the first Article; the equal or proportionable distribution of the number of the representers to be elected, as in the second; the certainty of the people's meeting to elect for Representatives biennial, and their freedom in elections; with the certainty of meeting, sitting, and ending of Representatives so elected, which are provided for in the third Article; as also the qualifications of persons to elect or be elected, as in the first and second particulars under the third Article; also the certainty of a number for passing a law or preparatory debates, provided for in the fourth Article; the matter of the fifth Article, concerning the Council of State, and of the sixth, concerning the calling, sitting and ending of Representatives extraordinary; also the power of Representatives to be, as in the eighth Article, and limited, as in the six reserves next following the same: likewise the second and third particulars under the ninth Article concerning religion, and the whole matter of the tenth Article; all these we do account and declare to be fundamental to our common right, liberty, and safety; and therefore do both agree thereunto, and resolve to maintain the same as God shall enable us. The rest of the matters in this Agreement we account to be useful and

good for the public ; and the particular circumstances of numbers, times, and places, expressed in the several Articles, we account not fundamental ; but we find them necessary to be here determined, for the making the Agreement certain and practicable, and do hold these most convenient that are here set down ; and therefore do positively agree thereunto. By the appointment of his Excellency the Lord-General and his General Council of Officers.

JOHN RUSHWORTH, *Sec.*

7. LOCKE, ON THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER. 1690

The great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society, the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power, as the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern even the legislative itself is the preservation of the society and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the bands where the community have once placed it. Nor can any edict of anybody else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed ; for without this the law could not have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent of the society, over whom nobody can have a power to make laws but by their own consent and by authority received from them ; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts. Nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant

to their trust, nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted or farther than they do allow, it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society which is not the supreme.

Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth; yet, first, it is not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state of Nature before they entered into society, and gave it up to the community. For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of Nature gave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects; the obligations of the law of Nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have, by human laws, known penalties annexed to them to enforce their observation. Thus the law of Nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men's actions must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of Nature, *i.e.* to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of Nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid against it.

Secondly. The legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges. For the law of Nature being unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of men, they who, through passion or interest, shall miscite or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge; and so it serves not as it ought, to determine the rights and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case; and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries or punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences which disorder men's properties in the state of Nature, men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of Nature.

Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under were it not to preserve their lives, liberties, and fortunes; and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give any one or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them; this were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature,

wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man or many in combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition that is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man who has the command of a hundred thousand than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of a hundred thousand single men, nobody being secure, that his will who has such a command is better than that of other men, though his force be a hundred thousand times stronger. And, therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions, for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of Nature if they shall have armed one or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment, unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions. For all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws, that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law, and the rulers, too, kept within their due bounds, and not be tempted by the power they have in their hands to employ it to purposes, and by such measures as they would not have known, and own not willingly.

Thirdly. The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that by enter-

ing into society, which was the end for which they entered into it ; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men, therefore, in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody hath a right to take them, or any part of them, from them without their own consent ; without this they have no property at all. For I have truly no property in that which another can by right take from me when he pleases against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists wholly or in part in assemblies which are variable, whose members upon the dissolution of the assembly are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments where the legislative is in one lasting assembly, always in being, or in one man as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power by taking what they think fit from the people. For a man's property is not at all secure, though there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow-subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.

But government into whosoever hands it is put, being as I have before showed, entrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties, the prince or senate, however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects' property without their own consent ; for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us see that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason, and con-

ned to those ends which required it in some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline. For the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see that neither the serjeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or not obeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command anything, and hang for the least disobedience. Because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end for which the commander has his power—viz., the preservation of the rest, but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it.

It is true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent—*i.e.* the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them; for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government. For what property have I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself?

Fourthly. The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the

people have said, "We will submit, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms," nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can they be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorised to make laws for them.

These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society and the law of God and Nature have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government. First: They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at Court, and the countryman at plough. Secondly: These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the people. Thirdly: They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people given by themselves or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. Fourthly: Legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have. — *Two Treatises of Government*, c. xii.

8. THE VIRGINIAN DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, JUNE 12, 1776

(The text follows that in D. G. Ritchie's *Natural Rights*, Appendix.)

A declaration of rights made by the Representatives of the good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free Convention, which rights do pertain to them and their posterity as the basis and foundation of government.

I. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact

deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

II. That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.

III. That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and that, when a government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.

IV. That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services, which not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary.

V. That the legislative, executive, and judicial powers should be separate and distinct; and that the members thereof may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the burthens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into that body from which they were originally taken, and the vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular elections, in which all, or any part of the former members to be again eligible or ineligible, as the laws shall direct.

VI. That all elections ought to be free, and that all men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed, or deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which

they have not in like manner assented, for the public good.

VII. That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.

VIII. That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.

IX. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

X. That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.

XI. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury of twelve men is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.

XII. That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments.

XIII. That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that standing armies in time of peace should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.

XIV. That the people have a right to uniform government;

and therefore that no government separate from or independent of the government of Virginia ought to be erected or established within the limits thereof.

XV. That no free government, or the blessing of liberty, can be preserved to any people but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.

XVI. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.

9. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, JULY 4, 1776

(Macdonald's *Select Documents illustrative of the History of the United States.*)

June 7, 1776. — Richard Henry Lee of Virginia submitted to the Continental Congress three resolutions, the first of which declared "That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved." The resolutions were seconded by John Adams, and on the 10th a committee, consisting of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston, was appointed "to prepare a declaration to the effect of the said first resolution." On the 28th the committee brought in a draft of a declaration of independence. The resolution previously submitted was adopted July 2; on the 4th the Declaration of Independence was agreed to, and signed by John Hancock as president of the Congress. Congress directed that copies be sent "to the several Assemblies, Conventions, and Committees or Councils of Safety, and to the several commanding officers of the continental troops; that it be proclaimed in each of the United States, and at the head of the army." The members of Congress signed the Declaration August 2.

In Congress, July 4, 1776

*The unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States
of America*

When, in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organising its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.—Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great

Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

(Here follows a recapitulation of grievances.)

10. ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

(Went into effect: 3rd Nov. 1791.)

(Macdonald's Select Documents.)

ARTICLE I.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

(Here follow the other articles.)

11. DÉCLARATIONS DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN
DE 23 JUIN 1793

Prefixed to Constitution of June 24, 1793

Le peuple français, convaincu que l'oubli et le mépris des droits naturels de l'homme sont les seules causes des malheurs du monde, a résolu d'exposer, dans une déclaration solennelle, ces droits sacrés et inaliénables, afin que tous les citoyens, pouvant comparer sans cesse les actes du gouvernement avec le but de toute institution sociale, ne se laissent jamais opprimer et avilir par la tyrannie; afin que le peuple ait toujours devant les yeux les bases de sa liberté et de son bonheur; le magistrat, la règle de ses devoirs; le législateur, l'objet de sa mission. En conséquence il proclame, en présence de l'Être Suprême, la déclaration suivante des Droits de l'homme et du Citoyen.

Art. 1^{er}. Le but de la société est le bonheur commun. Le

gouvernement est institué pour garantir à l'homme la jouissance de ces droits naturels et imprescriptibles.

2. Ces droits sont l'égalité, la liberté, la sûreté, la propriété,

3. Tous les hommes sont égaux par la nature et devant la loi.

4. La loi est l'expression libre et solennelle de la volonté générale; elle est la même pour tous, soit qu'elle protège, soit qu'elle punisse; elle ne peut ordonner que ce qui est juste et utile à la société; elle ne peut défendre que ce qui lui est nuisible.

5. Tous les citoyens sont également admissibles aux emplois publics. Les peuples libres ne connaissent d'autres motifs de préférence dans leurs élections que les vertus et les talents.

6. La liberté est le pouvoir qui appartient à l'homme de faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas aux droits d'autrui: elle a pour principe la nature, pour règle la justice, pour sauve-garde la loi; sa limite morale est dans cette maxime: *Ne fais pas à un autre ce que tu ne veux pas qui te soit fait.*

7. Le droit de manifester sa pensée et ses opinions, soit par la voie de la presse, soit de toute autre manière, le droit de s'assembler paisiblement, le libre exercice des cultes, ne peuvent être interdits. La nécessité d'énoncer ses droits suppose ou la présence ou le souvenir récent du despotisme.

8. La sûreté consiste dans la protection accordée par la société à chacun des ses membres pour la conservation de sa personne, de ses droits et de ses propriétés.

9. La loi doit protéger la liberté publique et individuelle contre l'oppression de ceux qui gouvernent.

10. Nul ne doit être accusé, arrêté ni détenu, que dans les cas déterminés par la loi et selon les formes qu'elle a prescrites. Tout citoyen, appelé ou saisi par l'autorité de la loi, doit obéir à l'instant; il se rend coupable par la résistance.

11. Toute acte exercé contre un homme hors des cas et sans les formes que la loi détermine, est arbitraire et tyrannique; celui contre lequel on voudrait l'exécuter par la violence, a le droit de la repousser par la force.

12. Ceux qui solliciteraient, expédieraient, signeraient,

exécuteraient ou feraient exécuter des actes arbitraires, sont coupables, et doivent être punis.

13. Tout homme étant présumé innocent jusqu'à ce qu'il ait été déclaré coupable, s'il est jugé indispensable de l'arrêter, toute rigueur qui ne serait pas nécessaire pour s'assurer de sa personne, doit être sévèrement réprimée par la loi.

14. Nul ne doit être jugé ou puni qu'après avoir été entendu ou légalement appelé, et qu'en vertu d'une loi promulguée antérieurement au délit. La loi qui punirait des délits commis avant qu'elle existât serait une tyrannie ; l'effet rétroactif donné à la loi serait un crime.

15. La loi ne doit décerner que des peines strictement et évidemment nécessaires : les peines doivent être proportionnées au délit et utiles à la société.

16. Le droit de propriété est celui qui appartient à tout citoyen de jouir et de disposer à son gré de ses biens, de ses revenus, du fruit de son travail et de son industrie.

17. Nul genre de travail, de culture, de commerce, ne peut être interdit à l'industrie des citoyens.

18. Tout homme peut engager ses services, son temps ; mais il ne peut se vendre ni être vendu. Sa personne n'est pas une propriété aliénable. La loi ne reconnaît point de domesticité ; il ne peut exister qu'un engagement de soins et de reconnaissance entre l'homme qui travaille et celui qui l'emploie.

19. Nul ne peut être privé de la moindre portion de sa propriété, sans son consentement, si ce n'est lorsque la nécessité publique légalement constatée l'exige, et sous la condition d'une juste et préalable indemnité.

20. Nulle contribution ne peut être établie que pour l'utilité générale. Tous les citoyens ont droit de concourir à l'établissement des contributions, d'en surveiller l'emploi et de s'en faire rendre compte.

21. Les secours publics sont une dette sacrée. La société doit la subsistance aux citoyens malheureux, soit en leur procurant du travail, soit en assurant les moyens d'exister à ceux qui sont hors d'état de travailler.

22. L'instruction est le besoin de tous. La société doit favoriser de tout son pouvoir les progrès de la raison publique, et mettre l'instruction à la portée de tous les citoyens.
23. La garantie sociale consiste dans l'action de tous pour assurer à chacun la jouissance et la conservation de ses droits : cette garantie repose sur la souveraineté nationale.
24. Elle ne peut exister, si les limites des fonctions publiques ne sont pas clairement déterminées par la loi, et si la responsabilité de tous les fonctionnaires n'est pas assurée.
25. La souveraineté réside dans le peuple ; elle est une et indivisible, imprescriptible et inaliénable.
26. Aucune portion du peuple ne peut exercer la puissance du peuple entier ; mais chaque section du souverains assemblés doit jouir du droit d'exprimer sa volonté avec une entière liberté.
27. Que tout individu qui usurperait la souveraineté soit à l'instant mis à mort par les hommes libres.
28. Un peuple a toujours le droit de revoir, de réformer et de changer sa constitution. Une génération ne peut assujétir à ses lois les générations futures.
29. Chaque citoyen a un droit égal de concourir à la formation de la loi et à la nomination de ses mandataires ou de ses agents.
30. Les fonctions publiques sont essentiellement temporaires ; elles ne peuvent être considérées comme des distinctions ni comme des récompenses, mais comme des devoirs.
31. Les délits des mandataires du peuple et de ses agents ne doivent jamais être impunis. Nul n'a le droit de se prétendre plus inviolable que les autres citoyens.
32. Le droit de présenter des pétitions aux dépositaires de l'autorité publique ne peut, en aucun cas, être entendu, suspendu ni limité.
33. La résistance à l'oppression est la conséquence des autres droits de l'homme.
34. Il y a oppression contre le corps social, lorsqu'un seul de ses membres est opprimé : il y a oppression contre chaque membre, lorsque le corps social est opprimé.
35. Quand le gouvernement viole les droits du peuple,

l'insurrection est pour le peuple et pour chaque portion du peuple, le plus sacré des droits et le plus indispensable des devoirs.

12. REPORT TO THE LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE FROM
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SECRET COMMISSIONS, 1898

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To the Council of the London Chamber of Commerce.

GENTLEMEN — Your Committee at its first meeting elected Mr. David Howard, J.P. (Vice-President of the Chamber) and Mr. Walter Hazell, M.P., Chairman and Deputy-Chairman respectively of the Committee, and also added additional representatives of Trade and Professional Associations apart from the Chamber and other gentlemen to their number, to make the Committee more thoroughly representative. No less than twenty of the Trade Sections of the Chamber were represented on the Committee by either their Chairmen or Deputy-Chairmen.

2. With a view to obtaining evidence as to the prevalence of secret commissions in the various trades, and the extent to which the same obtained, the Committee caused communications to be addressed to the members of the Chamber, the various Trade Associations, Chambers of Commerce, and also to the general public, by the insertion of a letter published in the various trade papers and the press generally, asking for information.

3. In response to these invitations, your Committee received numerous communications on the subject, both written and verbal. Most of them were received under a promise that they would be treated as strictly private and confidential, but in a few cases the persons giving the information were not unwilling that their names should appear.

4. Your Committee much regret that in this way only were they able to obtain information, as they are fully conscious of the value which would attach to communications made public with all particulars, and substantiated by the

names of the parties communicating the same. The information thus furnished to your Committee is, of course, varied as regards its character; in some cases it has been vague, in other cases specific, but in no case has your Committee come to a conclusion except upon evidence which they believe to be trustworthy.

5. Your Committee conclude from the evidence before them that secret commissions in various forms are prevalent in almost all trades and professions to a great extent, and that in some trades the practice has increased, and is increasing, and they are of opinion that the practice is producing great evil, alike to the morals of the commercial community and to the profits of honest traders.

6. Bribes in all forms, including secret commissions, owe their existence sometimes to the desire of the donor to obtain the assistance of the donee; sometimes to the demand expressed or implied of the donee that the bribe shall be given.

7. In the first class of cases your Committee have reason to believe that the bribe is often given unwillingly and with a pang of conscience, as the result of the keen competition in trade, and in the fear, too often well founded, that unless given other less scrupulous rivals will obtain an advantage; many cases have come before your Committee in which traders have believed (often though not perhaps always without reason) that their entire failure to obtain orders has been due to the want of a bribe.

8. The second class of cases are those in which the recipient extorts the bribe from those who have established business relations with his principal. This practice is rendered more effective and oppressive by a combination between the blackmailers. The servant or agent who demands a commission and fails to receive it, not infrequently warns his fellows in the same position in the trade against the honest trader, who thus finds himself shut out from dealing with a whole circle of firms.

9. In stating the result of the information received in relation to the several trades, and also to some professions,

your Committee do not wish to suggest that these practices are by any means universal in any trade or profession.

10. The bribes given naturally take many forms; most generally they are given in the simple form of a money payment, the worst form of which is a *pro rata* commission on the business done; sometimes in the shape of a loan, which places the borrower at the absolute mercy of the lender, who, if he be dissatisfied with the amount of custom he receives, can call in, or threaten to call in, the loan; sometimes the bribe consists of presents of plate, wine, or other things, and not infrequently it is administered in the form of lavish hospitality and treating.

11. One frequent practice with those who venture to put their offer of bribes on paper, is to describe the sum offered as a "discount," though the offer is made, of course, not to the principal, but to his agent.

12. The mass of corruption which the evidence before the Committee shows to exist may appear to some persons so great and complex as to render it hopeless to struggle towards purity. Your Committee do not take this view of the matter. They believe that the discussion of the subject and the publicity of some cases before the Law Courts have already done some good, and they recall the undoubted fact that corruption formerly existed in this country in regions where it is now entirely unknown; that there are cases in past times in which bribery threw a stain upon occupants of the Bench; that at one time a large number of the members of the House of Commons were in the pay of the Crown; and that commissions and other secret forms of bribery abounded in Government Departments. Your Committee accept the improvement which has taken place in these directions in the last fifty years as a fact full of encouragement for the commercial community of Great Britain. The question of whether it is desirable to introduce legislation to check the abuses which still remain has been considered by your Committee. On the one hand, it is forcibly urged that the Act of Parliament which makes criminal all bribery occurring in the case of officers of

Government Departments and Public Bodies has produced advantageous results; and that many persons who allow themselves to be parties to an *illegal* transaction, would shrink with fear from the same transaction when made *criminal*. On the other hand, several difficulties present themselves in the way of effective legislation. In the first place, it is never safe for criminal legislation to advance very far beyond the public conscience, and it is doubtful how far that conscience is yet enlightened on the matter; in the next place, it would be a matter of difficulty to define the offences with adequate breadth without including acts of an innocent or trivial character; and, lastly, occurs the consideration that the transactions aimed at are very often secret, and that it would be difficult to obtain confirmatory evidence, and unsafe to convict on a single unconfirmed oath.

13. If legislation is to be attempted, it appears to your Committee that it should render criminal the payment, the receipt, the offering, and the solicitation of any corrupt payment; and also the giving of any invoice or other document calculated to enable the recipient to commit a fraud upon his principal, and that it is expedient that such legislation should be initiated by your Chamber or supported by a petition by them.

14. Your Committee submit that the question of the desirability of legislation should be fully and immediately considered by the Chamber, and that if an affirmative conclusion be arrived at, the matter should be remitted to a Committee for the preparation of a suitable Bill, with such assistance as they may think proper to invite.

15. But meanwhile, and independently of legislation, it appears to your Committee that much may be done if only the community will rouse themselves to the task. Your Committee make with this view the following suggestions:—

16. The more frequent enforcement of the civil rights of the principal; and they are advised that these rights may be thus stated:—

(a) A master or principal may recover from his servant or agent everything which has been received by him by

way of secret commissions in the course of his service or agency, and if the accounts have been settled between the principal and his agent, and it can be shown in a single instance that the accounts are tainted with fraud or wilful omission, the accounts may be reopened, and the agent be required to restate and verify them by oath.

- (b) A master or principal may as a general rule dismiss without notice, or without payment in lieu of notice, any servant or agent who has received and not disclosed a bribe.
- (c) A contracting party may repudiate and rescind any contract entered into through an agent who has received a bribe from the other side.
- (d) A contracting party may recover from the briber, and the bribed, or either of them, any sum which he has paid under the contract, and which in consequence of the bribe was in excess of the fair or market price.
- (e) A contracting party whose agent has been bribed by the other party during the execution of the contract may, in spite of its being part performed, rescind and recover what he paid, both to the briber and the bribed.

17. The great benefits which may be derived from the enforcement of the appropriate civil remedy have been forcibly shown by the experience of a member of your Committee, Mr. Oetzmann, the plaintiff in the well-known case before the Lord Chief Justice, who says:— [Here follow particulars.]

18. Your Committee further suggest:—

That all professional and trade bodies (such as those representing the medical, legal, artistic, and other professions and trades) be recommended to make an emphatic declaration on the subject of secret commissions, and adopt the course already taken by the Royal Institute of British Architects, the Institution of Civil Engineers, and other bodies, by inserting into their bye-laws a stipulation that any member guilty of the pernicious practice will be expelled the Society by the Council. In order to make such a provision effec-

tive this would require the aid of the general public, as well as of the members of the several professions and trades.

19. That traders should make with all with whom they deal a definite agreement, similar to that entered into by the members of the Calico Printers' Association, undertaking that nothing in the form of a bribe, commission, or present shall be offered or given by them to any one.

20. It would be highly advantageous if masters and principals when entering into engagements with servants and agents would call attention to the subject, and make the refusal of all bribes an express, instead of an implied term of the contract of service or agency. Such an explicit stipulation would probably give moral as well as legal support to servants and agents in resisting the temptation when offered under the pretence of a thing which is always done.

21. Your Committee are of opinion that much good in many cases may be done by circulars or notices warning against the payment or receipt of bribes. In one case a nurseryman is in the habit of issuing a notice to all gardeners of his refusal to pay commissions on orders; in another case another of your Committee having discovered the misdeeds of one of his buyers addressed a circular on the subject to all the firms from which he was in the habit of buying. In some cases notices have, your Committee believe, been circulated by householders amongst the shops serving them warning them against the payment of commissions to the servants employed, and corresponding notices by the tradesmen to the servants of the houses which they supply would be useful.

22. Something may be done to check commissions by the exercise of increased vigilance on the actions and proceedings of the servants and agents employed, especially of buyers and salesmen, and of persons employed to inspect and pass goods. If principals would always inquire for themselves why goods were refused, or why advice is given hostile to the particular manufacturers or tradesmen, they would sometimes find that the defect was not in the goods, but in the bribe. This necessity for vigilance applies with special force to the case of large institutions, such as workhouses, hospitals, asylums,

and to large commercial joint-stock concerns, such as railways, and to co-operative stores.

23. In many cases buyers and others who are employed in very responsible positions, and have very important duties to perform, are paid inadequate salaries, and are thus rendered especially liable to the temptation of accepting bribes. This, in our opinion, demands the careful consideration of the heads of firms.

24. The existence of a great system of technical education throughout the country should be utilised as a means of disseminating clearer views than often exist of the immorality of the giving and receiving of bribes. The managers of these institutions would no doubt give the necessary permission and allow influence in the right direction to be brought home to the young people in their schools, whether by means of written papers, or of oral addresses.

25. Lastly, your Committee recommend the holding of a public meeting to call the attention of the public and all concerned to the heinousness of the system of secret commissions and its detrimental effect upon morals and business.


DAVID HOWARD,
Chairman of Committee.

Adopted by the Council of the Chamber, 7th July 1898.

THOMAS F. BLACKWELL,
Chairman of Council.

KENRIC B. MURRAY,
Secretary.

N.B. — The greatest care has been taken by the Committee to see that the statements contained in the Appendices have been made on reliable authority, but necessarily the Committee and the Chamber cannot accept responsibility for their absolute accuracy.



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