




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


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To . . . from the author

Wth Hon^{ble} George Ponsonby M^{rs}

ON
THE NECESSITY
OF A
MORE EFFECTUAL SYSTEM
OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE.

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THE UNIVERSITY
OF
MADRID
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ON
THE NECESSITY
OF A
MORE EFFECTUAL SYSTEM
OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE,
AND
THE MEANS OF ESTABLISHING
THE PERMANENT SECURITY
OF
THE KINGDOM.

BY THE EARL OF SELKIRK.

London:

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AND
A. CONSTABLE AND CO., EDINBURGH.

1808.

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF KING CHARLES THE FIRST

BY JOHN BURNET

IN TWO VOLUMES

LONDON

Printed by J. Sturges, in the Strand

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN the course of the following pages, some topics occur, into the discussion of which it may seem presumptuous to enter, without having had direct experience of military affairs. As an apology for this, I may be allowed to mention that, on every question of this nature, I have studied to correct my own ideas by a reference to the opinion of professional men. The military reasonings which I have ventured to introduce, may, perhaps, meet with some attention from the public, when it is known that they have received the approbation of men highly distinguished by their military talents.

It forms no part of my object to discuss the merits of a plan, which has recently been submitted to Parliament by His Majesty's Ministers. Before that plan was brought forward,


ward, these pages were nearly ready for the public eye. I have entered, however, into many general reasonings, which may, perhaps, be found to bear upon the proposal.

The term "Local Militia," which I have had occasion to repeat very frequently, has been applied by Lord CASTLEREAGH to an establishment of a very different nature, and upon a much more limited scale. I could have wished to avoid the ambiguity to which this circumstance may give rise. But in the actual state of my publication, I found it impossible to alter the term which I had adopted. I must therefore entreat the reader, not to confound the Local Militia, which I have ventured to recommend, with that which is proposed by the noble Secretary of State.

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THE NECESSITY
OF
A MORE EFFECTUAL SYSTEM
OF
NATIONAL DEFENCE.

WITHIN the last three years an entire change has taken place in the aspect of European affairs. A train of disastrous events, terminating on the plains of Friedland, has annihilated every appearance of a balance of power on the Continent. The main principle and foundation of the system of European politics is thus at an end. A new æra in history is begun; and the maxims on which the conduct of nations has hither-

to been governed, can no longer be referred to, as applicable to the actual circumstances of the world.

Though Great Britain has not been immediately involved in the catastrophe of the Continent, yet her policy cannot remain uninfluenced by so vast a change in all that surrounds her. To us, as well as to the nations of the Continent, this must be a new era: our arrangements, internal as well as external, must be adapted to our new circumstances. Britain has long maintained a rivalry against a country containing more than double her population, and, in point of natural advantages, still more her superior. If, against so great a disproportion of physical strength, we have been enabled hitherto to maintain an equal contest, it is not to be entirely ascribed to the advantage of our insular situation. Our inferiority in regular military force has not yet occasioned very imminent danger to our national independence, because the great military powers of the Continent kept our adversary

adversary in awe, and prevented the full exertion of her strength against us. That check is now no more. We are deprived of all extraneous support, while the force against which we have to contend, has been increased beyond all bounds. If, therefore, we are to remain on the list of nations, it must be by exertions yet unprecedented in the improvement of our internal resources. Formerly we have been engaged in struggles for dominion: the question now is, whether we can maintain our national existence. Formerly our independence may have been in peril, under some fortuitous concurrence of circumstances: it will now be in a permanent state of danger. Temporary expedients are out of date; and we can have no hope of safety, unless our means of defence be extended in proportion to the increased power of our rivals, and placed on a basis as permanent as the ascendancy of France on the Continent.

That our naval superiority can alone be

sufficient to secure us from all attack, is an idea on the futility of which it is scarcely necessary to dwell. The extensive preparations, which have hitherto been made to repel invasion, are a sufficient proof that our Government has not given way to an infatuation of so dangerous a tendency. The animated zeal, too, with which all ranks came forward, four years ago, to assist in the defence of the country, shows that the great body of well-informed men were then sensible, that our independence was not secure from hazard. Our danger has since been incomparably increased; yet indifference and apathy have succeeded to a rational and manly vigilance. Now, indeed, our adversary utters no threats of invasion: but was it only because he threatened, that we thought ourselves in danger? When he was encamped at Boulogne, his threats redoubled in exact proportion to the motives, which weighed against his leaving the Continent; but he uttered no threats against the Austrian monarchy, which he was then ready to overwhelm. Shall we,
too,

too, be lulled into security, and only begin our preparations when the mine is sprung?

Whether invasion be an event remote or near at hand, we have no reason to expect long previous notice of the movements of the invading force. In the ports of Holland the enemy may collect a multitude of coasting vessels and river craft, which, with their activity and skill, may be converted, even in a few days, into a most formidable military conveyance. I shall not here enter into any minute investigation of the means, by which such a flotilla may be enabled to elude or to defy our naval superiority. It is enough that such men as Lord Nelson and Sir Sidney Smith have deemed the attempt not impracticable. Difficult it is, undoubtedly; and a concurrence of favourable circumstances may be requisite to give it effect. These difficulties, however, do not amount to an impossibility: repeated experience has proved

proved that the greatest naval superiority may be eluded ; and a successful landing of the enemy is still to be reckoned among the events, for which Great Britain ought to be prepared.

True it is, that invasion has often been threatened by our enemies, and they have never seriously made the attempt ; but to infer that they never will, would be rash indeed. We are placed in circumstances so entirely new, that the events of other times afford no criterion, by which to judge of future probabilities. A successful invasion of England would not be more remote from the course of ordinary events, than many of those which the history of the last three tremendous years will record. Four years ago, Napoleon must have staked both his power and his personal safety on the success of the enterprise : his situation is now such, that the failure of an attempt at invasion would endanger neither. We are engaged with an enemy, whose implacable

cable rancour can only be equalled by his formidable power, and the singular ability with which all his enterprises are concerted. The dangers which in former times may have deterred men less bent on their purpose, will now be little regarded. We may be certain, that no sacrifices will be deemed too great, if they can purchase our destruction; that the lives of 100,000 men will be counted as nothing: and if our enemy be thus determined to despise every hazard, there is no enterprise, however desperate, in which a concurrence of fortunate accidents may not open the road to success.

Those even who rely the most on our maritime superiority,—those who are the least disposed to admit the possibility, that, by any contingency, our fleet may be disabled from intercepting the passage of the enemy,—must rest their confidence on the presumption, that our fleet is always to be managed with perfect judgement, and in the most effectual manner. But is this a supposition

supposition upon which we can safely proceed? Can no instance be pointed out, in which an English admiral has been guilty, even of an error of judgement? When the misconduct of one man, the mismanagement of a single day, may open our country to that foe, who has laid the powers of the Continent in the dust, shall we think it unnecessary to provide against the dreadful consequences which might ensue? The fleet is, indeed, our proper weapon of attack, the instrument of the greatness and the glory of England; but to rest our defence on that alone, is only for men who dare not look their real situation in the face. Our wooden walls are with us a never-ceasing theme of praise; and of praise well-merited: but it is no disparagement to our wooden walls, that we should not rest content, while the garrison within is in such a state, that the first breach may prove our ruin.

Without pretending, therefore, to define at what period invasion is to be expected,

pected,—whether a few weeks only or years may intervene,—we cannot lose sight of the probability that it will be attempted, unless we are soon in a better state for resistance. It is on shore that we must ultimately be prepared to defend the liberties of our country; and unless we can maintain the contest upon our own ground, we have no right to expect that our existence, as a nation, will long be preserved.

Since, then, the obstacles to the passage of the enemy are not physically insuperable, it is at least a possible supposition, that they may succeed in landing an army of 100,000 men on the coast of Kent or Essex. It becomes us to consider coolly whether our means of defence are now sufficient to afford a certainty, or even a fair probability, that we may overcome such an invading force.

No one, I presume, will venture to assert,

sert, that our regular forces are adequate to the contest even with the addition of the militia. Of the numerous army maintained by this kingdom, a great part is detached into distant colonial stations, while those at home have so extensive a tract to guard, that there is much difficulty in collecting any considerable number in one place. Those who are best acquainted with the actual state of our military establishments, with the present distribution of our forces, and the extensive demands upon their service, will not be ready to believe that we could easily collect an army, bearing as great a proportion to the supposed force of the invaders, as the Prussians did to the French in the campaign of 1806.

If our commanders attempt to make a stand with a force much inferior in numbers to the enemy, may we not see another such catastrophe as that of Marengo, or of Austerlitz, or of Jena? Our country does
not

not abound in military positions of sufficient strength, to compensate for a very great disproportion of numbers. It is the system of our enemies to trust much to fortune; they will risk every thing to bring the contest to the issue of a battle; and if, in so many enterprises of desperate hazard, they have hitherto been the favourites of fortune, may they not be favoured again? In their style of operations, if the hazards are great, successes are decisive; and if once they prevail in a general engagement, we can have little hope that our army could again collect to make a second stand.

Under all the circumstances of the case, our commanders may naturally wish to avoid a decisive action. The enemy, however, on their part, will lose no opportunity of bringing on a general engagement; and this can only be avoided by continually retreating before them. In a country like England, every where highly cultivated, and altogether of narrow bounds, it is impossible

possible to carry on, with advantage, those plans of protracted warfare which might be followed with effect by an inferior army, in an extensive country thinly inhabited, and full of forests, mountains, or morasses. There is every probability, then, that the attempt to avoid an engagement could not long be successful, and that our army would soon be forced to a battle, under circumstances which would leave no room for any sanguine expectation of a favourable result.

The regular and permanent military force being thus insufficient, our hopes of safety must rest on the support which our army may obtain, from the voluntary zeal and patriotism of the nation at large.

We have no reason to believe that our people will be inclined, like the nations on the Continent, to bend the neck to the yoke, and submit without a murmur to a new master. Neither the exaggerated declamation of Jacobin zealots, nor the disgusting

gusting wrangling of party leaders, have yet convinced the people of England, that their country is not worth fighting for. But it would argue an ignorance of human nature to imagine, that, because our people are brave and attached to their government, no extremity can ever shake their resolution, no circumstances give a check to the promptitude and vigour of their exertions. In the history of the most courageous nations in the world, instances are recorded of the effects of panic; and what so likely to produce a sensation of this nature, as a state of things so unusual; one which the people are not prepared to meet, one which of late years they have even been sedulously taught to believe remote from all probability? If the struggle were to be of long duration, the inherent spirit of the nation might overcome every disadvantage. Britain has had her Alfred and her Wallace; and such would yet again appear, if the circumstances of our times were similar; but we have not now to expect a protracted struggle. We have an antagonist

nist rapid and decisive in his movements, vigilant to preserve every advantage which he gains; and before the nation could have time to discover around whom they might rally with confidence, the struggle would be at an end. Against an enemy such as we have to contend with, the natural resources of the country can be of little avail, unless they be in full readiness for immediate employment.

Confident as we may be in the loyalty of the people, we cannot expect the necessary degree of promptitude in their efforts, except by means of complete previous arrangements. Not a day can be lost without additional danger; and in the critical moment which must decide the fate of the country, any doubt as to the duty required from each individual, may be productive of an embarrassment and confusion, not less fatal than if cowardice and disaffection were the prevailing habits of our people. Every man ought to know exactly what his task is:—How that task

is

is to be performed, is not a lesson to be taught to him when the enemy is on English ground.

It will not be asserted, that our arrangements are already sufficient for giving the utmost possible effect to the exertions of the people at large; and those men whose opinions upon military subjects best deserve attention, are not in general sanguine enough to believe, that our domestic force, in its present state, could give such effectual support to our regular army, as to enable it to cope with a very superior army of invaders. The Volunteer establishment is universally admitted to have lost much of its discipline, and to be in a lower state of efficiency than at any former period. The benefits which have been derived from that institution, the salutary effects which it has produced on the public mind, the brilliant display which it has afforded, of the energy and patriotic ardour which pervade this country, form no argument for adhering to a system of defence, which

which is not adapted to our present circumstances.

Since the first institution of the volunteers, our relative situation to the rest of Europe is totally changed. Our danger might then have been expected to pass away: it has now assumed every appearance of permanence, and cannot be warded off by any momentary effort of spontaneous zeal. The most zealous advocates of the volunteers seem now to be satisfied of the instability, which is involved in the very principle of their formation. It is by no means improbable, that the spirit of the nation might again be roused, that the Volunteer establishment might be restored to as great a state of efficiency as it had formerly attained: but this, even if it were enough for our present emergency, could not be done without great exertions on the part of the people, and great expense to the public treasury. It is to be considered, whether that expense and these exertions may not be better applied; whether,

with

with the same burden on the country, we may not obtain a domestic force more effectually organized, liable to no fluctuation, and to no principle of decay,—a force which will not only provide for the exigency of the moment, but lay a solid and permanent foundation for our future safety.

Impressed with a conviction that, under the present circumstances of the country, the means of defence hitherto adopted are not sufficient, I took occasion, in the course of the last session of Parliament, to state my opinion of the necessity of providing against the permanent dangers with which we are surrounded, by measures of as permanent efficacy. In that view I ventured to recommend the establishment of a Local Militia, in which every young man, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, throughout Great Britain, should be enrolled, and completely trained to military discipline.

Not having then an opportunity of entering into minute details, it was not easy

for me to explain completely the nature and consequences of the proposed institution. I now lay before the public a more enlarged view of the plan, rather for the purpose of illustrating the general principle, and of showing its practicability, than with any idea of exhibiting a perfect system. On a subject so extensive, it is perhaps impossible to bring forward at once such a complete arrangement, as to leave no room for objection or amendment. I trust, however, that the imperfections to which these suggestions may be found liable, will not be so great as to affect the general principle, on which the outlines of the plan are founded.

I hope at least to satisfy the reader that, in our own exertions, this nation may find security from every foreign attack. Without pretending to deny that an institution, such as I recommend, must be, in some degree, inconvenient and burdensome to the public, I may boldly appeal to the feelings of every thinking man, whether
the

the demands I would make, on the time and the exertions of the people, are such as to bear any proportion, to the inestimable value of the objects for which the sacrifice is required. We have no alternative between such sacrifices and the prospect of subjugation by an inveterate foe; nor do the exertions which I propose, appear to be greater than the circumstances of our situation justly demand. In a case in which every thing is involved, that is valuable to us as a nation, it would be a mean and a short-sighted œconomy to be sparing in our preparations. Better, surely, to make sacrifices rather greater than may be absolutely necessary, than to leave our ultimate security in any hazard!

THAT the Government has a right to Sect. 2.
call for the personal service of every man
capable of bearing arms, in the defence

of the country, is a position which no loyal subject will deny. This principle is recognised in many of our laws, and is the only ground on which an attempt can be made, to justify the hardship imposed on individuals by some of our institutions. The present system of militia ballot is an application of this principle; but it is an injudicious and improper application. That service, which is equally the duty of all, is now unfairly distributed, and thrown with oppressive severity on a few. Such an institution must necessarily be the occasion of murmurs; but if the burden of the public service can be so equally divided, as that each individual shall scarcely perceive his load, the country will be served with cheerfulness, whilst the national strength may be augmented in a degree almost incalculable.

At the age of 18, at that period of life when a young man has scarcely determined on his profession, when he is unfettered by the ties of a family, and his habits
are

are as yet unfixed, it is proposed, that three months shall be devoted to the service, which his country has a right to demand of him. Every youth may be allowed to enrol his name for service in any district which he prefers, and the period of the year, at which he is to perform his three months duty, may be left to the determination of the magistracy of the district, so that the convenience of individuals may, as far as possible, be consulted. From the age of 19 upwards, only three weeks, at a fixed period of the year, will be required annually, till the age of 25, after which no one will be subject to any further demands of military service.

In the performance of this duty, no individual will be under the necessity of going to a great distance from his usual residence. The period of three months, employed in the first training, may be spent entirely within his own county. For the exercises of the subsequent years, he may perhaps be called a little further; but,
except

except in the case of actual invasion, never to any remote part of the kingdom. The sacrifice of time required of him, not amounting altogether to eight months in the course of seven years, cannot form an interruption of serious detriment to the plans of life, which any individual may have laid down for himself. The lower orders will not be oppressed by any pecuniary burden, such as the present militia ballot imposes. An adequate allowance of pay will be made by the public to defray all their expenses. The service required does not essentially interfere, either with their domestic ties, or with their prospects of advancement in life; and there is no ground to believe, that great anxiety will be felt to avoid the duty required. By young men in general, it is more probable that the proposed military exercises will be looked upon as a scene of animated recreation.

The demand which is thus made on the exertions of each individual is surely moderate;

derate; yet the aggregate of these small contributions will be sufficient to establish the public security on an immoveable basis, and to render every foreign attack absolutely insignificant.

From the tables constructed by Dr. Price, grounded on a general enumeration of the population of Sweden, and on the registers of mortality kept in that kingdom, it is calculated that, in a population of 100,000 persons of all ages and descriptions, there will be about 811 males between the ages of 18 and 19, and 4724 between 19 and 25, making in all 5535 between the ages of 18 and 25. According to this proportion, the population of Great Britain, amounting to nearly eleven millions, should contain about 605,000 males within these ages. Of this number, however, besides those disabled by infirmity, there must be a considerable proportion already engaged in the army and navy. Sea-faring men too, of all descriptions, being subject to the impress, are justly exempted from all demands

demands of military service on shore. To ascertain, with precision, the deductions to be made on account of these and other exceptions, would require documents, which are not, perhaps, attainable at present. But some approximation to an estimate may be formed, from the enumerations made in the year 1803, under the General Defence Act. At that time, returns were made of 1,831,315 men in Great Britain, effective and liable to duty, between the ages of 17 and 55. According to Dr. Price's tables, the total number of males, between these ages, corresponding to the population of Great Britain, would be about 2,766,000, which is nearly in the proportion of 3 to 2 of those returned in 1803 as effective. If, therefore, from the ascertained population of any district, we calculate, by the tables, the proportion of males between the ages of 18 and 25, and then make a deduction of one third, we shall obtain a result, not very wide, probably, of the real number of men who may be found effective, in the proposed enrolment,

enrolment. According to this estimate, the young men between the age of 18 and 25, liable to serve in the Local Militia, will amount to about 400,000, of whom nearly 60,000 will be between 18 and 19*.

Variations from this rule must, no doubt, be expected, as there are some districts from which a larger proportion of men may have been drawn off to the army, or to the sea, than from others; but these local varieties will not affect the general result, and their amount will not, in all probability, be such, as to deserve attention in the practical arrangement of the measure. A doubt of more importance may perhaps arise on another point: Though it is ascertained that the persons, effective and liable to military duty, according to the principles of the General Defence Act, between the ages of 17 and

* See Appendix, A.

55, amount to two-thirds of the total number of males between these ages, yet it may be questioned whether the same proportion will hold good between the ages of 18 and 25. It is probable that a greater proportion of young than of middle-aged men are absent from their native places, in the army, and in the royal or commercial navy. On the other hand, a smaller proportion will be disabled from service by infirmity in the early periods of life. If, however, on the whole, it should prove that the effective men between 18 and 25 fall very far short of the proportion which has been supposed—that the number of men, requisite for the defence of the country, cannot, therefore, be found within these ages, the deficiency may be supplied by extending the period of service a year or two further.

The arrangements necessary for the instruction of these men in military discipline, will be most readily understood by
taking

taking as an example a particular district, as, for instance, the county of Kent. If the proportion above stated should hold good, the young men in that county between 18 and 19 will amount, after all deductions, to about 1662* liable to duty as local militia. These men may be allotted into four different divisions, and instructed in succession by the same officers. As soon as the men of one division have been brought to a due degree of discipline, they may return home and be replaced by another; and three months being allotted to each division, the whole will be gone through in the course of the year.

The training of the young men throughout the kingdom may thus proceed in a continual succession, and afford uninterrupted employment to a permanent establishment of regular officers. Men of ex-

* See Appendix, A. Table 1.

perience

perience in actual service ought to be selected for this purpose ; and, under their command, each successive body of recruits should be organized into a battalion, and instructed in all the manœuvres of regular troops.

The total number of recruits to be annually trained in this county may be divided into four divisions, of 415 each. That arrangement would have the advantage of simplicity, but it would involve one inconvenience, that, at the end of every three months, the officers would have to begin anew upon a whole battalion of recruits totally uninstructed. In order to distribute the burden of duty more equally over the year, it may be advisable to form the recruits into a greater number of divisions. Thus, for instance :—let the whole be allotted into ten divisions of 166 men each ; in the commencement, let only one division be assembled, so that the attention of the officers

cers may be devoted to them alone for four weeks. After this period, the first division will be, in some degree, advanced in discipline; a second division may then join them, and after four weeks more, a third. The drudgery of instructing the first division may thus, in a considerable degree, be over, before that of the second is begun: the men of the subsequent divisions, being mixed among those already in a state of some proficiency, must derive benefit from the example of their comrades, and their instruction will be a less laborious task, than if the whole battalion were to be taught at once from the beginning. Each division being supposed to remain 12 weeks on duty, the first may return to their homes at the time when the fourth joins the battalion; and at the end of every four weeks, another division will be dismissed, and replaced by a similar number of men entering upon their period of duty.

Thus, through the greater part of the
year,

year, there will be constantly assembled three divisions of 166 men each, or in all about 500 men, a number which may be conveniently manœuvred as one battalion. To the corps thus composed, I would give the name of the Training Battalion. In such a county as Kent, it will require an establishment of two field officers, eight captains, eight lieutenants, and thirty-two serjeants. When the recruits of the first division only are assembled, 166 men, being divided into eight companies, there will only be about 20 men in each, to occupy the attention of two commissioned and four non-commissioned officers. There can be no doubt, that in the course of four weeks, they may bring this small number of men into such a state of proficiency, that, during the next four weeks, their chief attention may be devoted to the second division. When the third division joins, the companies will be at their full complement of about 60 men each; and by this time, it is probable that some of the
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most intelligent men of the first division may have made a sufficient progress, to be capable of acting as non-commissioned officers, under the direction of those of more experience.

According to this progressive plan of instructing the Local Militia, it will be thirty-six weeks, after the commencement of the rotation, before the tenth, or last division of the recruits of the year, will enter upon their period of duty in the Training Battalion, and after twelve weeks more, all will have gone through their allotted course of discipline. Four weeks will still remain to complete the year, in the course of which, I would propose a general assemblage of the whole Local Militia of the county, including the recruits who have been trained during the preceding eleven months, along with all other young men between the ages of 19 and 25. The whole should remain encamped for about three weeks, practising the duty in which they

they have been instructed, and applying themselves more particularly to those manœuvres, which can only be executed by large bodies of men, and to those exercises which have the nearest resemblance to the operations of real warfare.

When this plan has arrived at maturity, all the young men included in the Local Militia will have been formed to military discipline, by three months drilling in one or other of the seven preceding years. The annual recurrence of a sufficient period of exercise will serve to keep up the habits of discipline, which have been acquired in the first training; so that the eldest classes of the Local Militia will continue as completely masters of their duty, as those who have been recently instructed. At the same time, the exercises of the annual assemblage may be made to give, both to the officers and men, a more perfect idea of their duty, than can be imparted by any drilling of separate battalions in quarters.

quarters. The whole body of Local Militia will be formed according to the same organization, and will go through the same operations as if they were in presence of the enemy; and every man will learn exactly the duty which may then be required of him.

If the alarm should be given in the course of the ensuing year, every individual, on joining his battalion, will take the same place which he occupied at the general assemblage. These exercises will thus form a rehearsal of the duties to be performed, in case the actual services of this militia should be required. Following out this principle, it must be observed that the young men who, being in their first year's training, have never yet joined in the general assemblage, will not be reckoned among those from whom real service is to be expected. Thus each individual, though enrolled for training at the age of 18, will not be called upon for real duty against the enemy till he is 19; and, on the other hand, though his last

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attendance at the ordinary exercises of the Local Militia will be at the age of 25, yet during the ensuing year, he must still be ready for duty, if an occasion of emergency should occur.

The period of the general assemblage may be fixed at any season of the year least likely to interfere with the labours of agriculture. The beginning of summer, after the business of the seed-time is brought to a close, and before the harvest is likely to commence, will probably be found the most convenient. From the difference of climate in different parts of the island, it may be advisable that the militia of the southern counties should assemble earlier than those of the northern. It is by no means necessary that the assemblage of all adjoining counties should be at the same time;—on the contrary, many reasons may be stated for appointing them at established intervals: but, in each particular county or district, it should be permanently fixed at one constant period. All the other arrangements
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for the Local Militia will be determined by the time of the general assemblage. Immediately after it, the annual enrolment should be made, of the young men who, in the course of the preceding year, have attained the age of 18. The progressive plan for their instruction will then commence, and will occupy the officers during the whole interval till the next general assemblage.

In the county which has been taken as an example, it has been calculated that the Local Militia, united in the general assemblage, will form a body of above 11,200*. This number may be conveniently divided into 16 battalions of 700 men each. The different battalions should be assigned to different local subdivisions of the county, to be arranged according to the population of each district. These may be called the Local Battalions, as distinguished from the Training Battalion, of

* See Appendix, A.—Table I.

which the organization has already been explained. The Training Battalion is supposed to be constituted merely for the purpose of instructing the successive divisions of recruits ; and, at the end of every year, when that purpose is accomplished, the battalion will no longer remain as a separate body ; the men who have passed through it being parcelled out to the different Local Battalions, to which by residence they are naturally attached. The Local Battalions, on the other hand, though in ordinary circumstances meeting only once in the year, are to be considered as permanently constituted for actual service, and to be always ready to assemble whenever invasion takes place. These Local Battalions must therefore be fully officered, and completely organized for real duty against the enemy.

The chief command of each battalion I would propose to be given to a gentleman of respectable property and popular character in the county ; and, as far as possible,

possible, resident, or personally connected with the district to which the battalion belongs.

If this country has hitherto resisted the storm which overwhelms the rest of Europe, it is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to the internal energy, resulting from that happy connection which subsists between the different orders of society. The insensible gradation of ranks, the mutual dependence of the aristocracy and their inferiors, arising from the peculiar nature of our government, diffuses widely the influence of public opinion, and binds the nation into an united mass, by the firm chain of reciprocal good offices. Hence it is, that the law, which in other countries seldom obtains more than a reluctant obedience, or, at best, a cold acquiescence, is here the object of zealous and affectionate support from the great mass of the nation. This principle it is of infinite consequence to preserve unimpaired; and in
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all our arrangements, military as well as civil, the surest road to success is, that every new establishment should be adapted to the general spirit of our national institutions.

The personal influence of popular characters will at all times be of importance, in smoothing the difficulties which may occur in the execution of such measures as those now suggested. In the first establishment of a system so new, as well as so extensive, this aid must be of peculiar value. Besides this, we adhere to the principles of our original militia establishment, in giving the command of each battalion to a gentleman of respectable property in the county. The volunteer system has diffused a degree of military knowledge so extensively, that there will probably be no great difficulty in finding persons properly qualified for such a command. But, that there may be no risque from a deficiency of professional knowledge,

ledge, the second in command in each battalion may be an officer of the regular service. The persons who, during the course of the year, have acted as captains and lieutenants in the Training Battalion, should, in the general assemblage, act as majors of the Local Battalions.

It has been observed that the Training Battalion of the county of Kent may be conveniently arranged into eight companies; and two commissioned officers being allowed to each, will afford one field-officer to each of the 16 battalions, into which the whole Local Militia of the county may be arranged. These battalions being assigned to local subdivisions of the county, it would be advisable that the Training Battalion should be apportioned into companies, on the same principle. This battalion being divided into eight companies, each of these will require for its supply an eighth part of the county, or two of the sixteen districts to which the Local Battalions are assigned.

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The recruits from each particular district being placed in a particular company of the Training Battalion, all the men who have been trained under the same captain and lieutenant, will be distributed into two Local Battalions. To one of these two battalions the captain, and to the other the lieutenant should be appointed to act as major, in the general assemblage of the Local Militia. They will thus have under their command the same men whom they have previously had under their charge in the Training Battalion; they will have an opportunity of displaying the proficiency of those whom they have instructed. The prospect of this continued personal connection with the same individuals, will be a spur to the exertions of these officers, and insure their attention to the improvement of the men whom it is their duty to train.

On the same principle, the serjeants of each training company ought to be appointed

pointed to some office of distinction, in the two battalions connected with the company which they have been employed in training.

With respect to the inferior officers of the Local Battalions; the captains and subalterns, as well as non-commissioned officers, may be selected from among the young men who are enrolled for duty. Of those who come within the general description of the Local Militia, and from their age are liable to the proposed military service, there will, of course, be many of a condition superior to the common mass; and there can be no difficulty in selecting, from among them, a sufficient number of persons, capable of being instructed in the duty of officers.

In order to avoid any unpleasant interference with the established manners and accustomed order of society, I would propose that all the young men who choose
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to serve at their own expense should be enrolled in a separate corps, under the name of Cadets.- Of these there may be two companies, one of cavalry, and one of infantry, leaving it to the discretion of each individual to choose the species of service most suitable to his inclination, or to his pecuniary resources. These companies may be allowed to drill and to mess apart from the rest, and may be indulged in any other distinction, which is not deemed inconsistent with the acquisition of that military knowledge, and those habits, which it is the object of the proposed institution to diffuse. In their military duty, however, no relaxation can be admitted; and there is no probability that their proficiency will be inferior to that of the battalion at large. The Cadet Companies will, in general, be composed of young men of better education than the rest of the Local Militia. Among the volunteers it has been experienced, that men of education have been much more ready in acquiring a knowledge

knowledge of military exercises, than the recruits who commonly enter into the regular army.

From among these Cadets, all the captains and subaltern officers of the Local Battalions may be selected. The young men appointed to these offices would otherwise be subject to the duty of privates in their respective companies. It is natural to suppose that the situation of an officer will be deemed more agreeable, and that most of the Cadets will be ambitious of such an appointment. There is no reason, therefore, to apprehend any difficulty in finding a sufficient number of persons willing to act as officers; and the duty, either of a captain or a subaltern, is not so difficult, but that any young man of intelligence may soon render himself master of it.

The persons thus appointed cannot in general be expected to take upon themselves the duty of officers any longer than they

they remain subject to the legal demand of military service. After that period is expired, some perhaps may be willing still to contribute their spontaneous exertions. Those who are disposed to remain ought to be encouraged, in order to preserve a greater proportion of experience among the officers of the Local Battalions. It is probable, however, that most of the officers will retire at the expiration of the regular period of duty. Vacancies will therefore occur; these, according to the custom established in other military corps, will be filled up from among the officers of a lower rank. Promotions may thus be expected to take place annually, proceeding through every step, till among the subalterns of the lowest rank there will remain a number of vacancies, to be filled up from among the cadets.

In order to insure a thorough knowledge of military duty, no one should be appointed an officer, till after a certain period of service as a private in the Cadet corps.
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That period, however, need not be very long. Considering the superior facility with which young men of intelligence and education may acquire a proficiency in their military duties, a young man of the cadet company, after four or six weeks training as a private, may perhaps be deemed capable of being appointed to receive a commission as a subaltern. Each of the cadets appointed to fill up the vacancies of the year, should then be required to perform a period of duty, as officers in the Training Battalion, under the direction of the regular and permanent officers, whom they may assist in drilling and manœuvring the successive divisions of recruits, at the same time that they are themselves instructed in their own duty as officers.

It is probable, that, in this way, a young man of good ability may acquire a sufficient knowledge of his duty to act with propriety as an officer in the general assemblage of the Local Militia, though he should

should not devote more time to military instruction than the period required of the ordinary recruits. But it would be of essential benefit to the discipline of the Local Militia, if a number of these officers were to remain for a longer period in the study of their duty, under the superintendence of the permanent officers of the Training Battalion. It may deserve consideration, whether this might not be enjoined as a preparatory exercise for young men destined for a military life. If, in the disposal of subaltern commissions for the regular army, some advantage were given to those who had served for a year or two as assistant officers to the Training Battalions of the Local Militia, and who, in that duty, had merited the approbation of their superior officers, this arrangement would be of benefit to the regular service as well as to the Local Militia. The Local Militia would obtain officers more thoroughly instructed in their duty; and, on the other hand, this employment, of training a succession of recruits, under the direction

rection of experienced soldiers, would be a most instructive exercise for a young officer, and an excellent school for the habits of a military life.

While the discipline of the Local Militia may thus be of peculiar utility to young men destined for the army, the habits of military subordination can scarcely fail to have a beneficial effect even on those who are intended for the pursuits of civil life. It may, perhaps, be apprehended, that the period of military training will form a serious interruption to the studies of the youth of superior condition. But there is no good ground for this apprehension. The period of duty will never be of longer duration than the vacations between the different academic terms; and to accommodate still more the convenience of young men attending the universities, separate local corps might be formed of the students in these institutions.

With respect to the mass of the people,
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the time which the young men have to pass in military duty, may be rendered of material service in diffusing the benefits of education. When a great number are collected together, they may be instructed in many branches of useful knowledge, with a facility which cannot be obtained while they are scattered over the country in their ordinary places of residence*.

Without dilating upon a topic which may appear foreign to the subject immediately under consideration, I may be allowed to remark that a military life is not necessarily a life of idle and dissolute habits. On the contrary, if the intermediate hours when the young recruits cannot be employed in their military exercises, be applied to instruction of a different description; if the studies suggested to them be judiciously chosen, and such as are likely to interest

* A contribution of two or three shillings from every young man who passes through a Training Battalion, would afford a sufficient emolument to attract teachers of respectable ability.

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their curiosity, the period of the proposed military duty may be rendered eminently conducive to those habits of application, which are so important in every pursuit of sober industry.

When the whole Local Militia is assembled, either for real service against the enemy, or for their annual exercises, their organization will approach as nearly as the circumstances of the case can admit, to that of a regular army. From every county there will be a number of battalions, each of them commanded by a gentleman of property, with an officer of experience from the regular service, as his major, or second in command. Under them, the battalions will be officered by young men, selected from among those, on whom the general obligation of service is imposed, and regularly instructed in the particular duty of the situation to which they are appointed. The whole of these battalions will form a brigade or division

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under the general superintendence of the Lieutenant of the county ; and the immediate military command will naturally rest with the field-officers of the Training Battalion, who, during the temporary assemblage of the whole body of Local Militia, may act in the capacity of general and staff-officers. In this way, both in the chief command of each county, and in all inferior stations of importance, if an ostensible precedence be allowed to persons of local influence, they will always have the assistance of experienced military men ; and in every corps there will be a proportion of professional men, sufficient to impart the requisite technical knowledge to the rest of the officers.

The establishment, which has been calculated as suitable for the county of Kent, must admit of some variations in the detail, according to the circumstances of each district. In a county of moderate extent, such as Cheshire, the population amounting

ing to 191,751, will afford about * 7000 Local Militia. The Training Battalion will amount to 300 at its full complement, and may therefore be arranged into five companies of 60 men ; while the general assemblage will form ten Local Battalions of 700. But, in a county of much smaller population than this, the men under training at one time cannot be sufficiently numerous to be conveniently manœuvred as one battalion. On this account the smaller counties should be classed together into districts of a sufficient extent, to afford a Training Battalion of a convenient scale ; and, for the same reason, the most extensive and populous counties should be subdivided. On this principle, the kingdom may be arranged into 42 military districts†, in each of which there will be a separate establishment of permanent officers ; that is to say, in every di-

* See Appendix, A. Table I.

† See Appendix, A. Table II.

strict two field-officers, with as many captains and lieutenants as there are companies of 60 men in the Training Battalion.

The employment thus proposed to be assigned to officers of the regular service; as field-officers, captains, and subalterns of the Training Battalions, and to act occasionally as general and field-officers, in the annual assemblage of the Local Militia, is a portion of duty for which the experience of real service is requisite. Many persons, however, may with propriety be employed in this way, who are not capable of the severer toils, for which an officer must be prepared, when on foreign stations, or in constant active service. The superintendence of the Local Militia will be a situation highly desirable, and an employment perfectly suitable for officers who, though not entirely disabled, have suffered in some degree from the effects of hard service; for those who are past the first vigour
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of youth, and for all those who are married, and desirous of a more settled life than can be reconciled with a continual change of quarters. This plan would therefore furnish an opportunity of employing, with great advantage to the public, many meritorious and valuable officers, whose services are now either lost, for want of a situation suitable to their circumstances, or who are engaged in a species of service for which they are not so well calculated. The duty, however, is not such as can be done by mere invalids, nor would it be proper to consider an appointment of this kind as a provision for superannuated officers. If this idea should be acted upon, the whole duty of training the Local Militia would probably be executed in an imperfect and slovenly manner. As a check upon this abuse, there should be an absolute prohibition against any officer being employed on the establishment of the Local Militia unless within some limited age.

Under the organization which has been detailed, the Local Militia, in their general assemblage,

assemblage, will be sufficiently prepared to practise every evolution, which regular troops can be required to perform. As the militia of two or three adjoining counties may be brought together into one encampment for these annual exercises, they may be assembled even to the amount of 20,000 or 30,000 men together. They may then be manœuvred in bodies sufficiently numerous, to practise all the movements which bear the closest resemblance to the operations of a real campaign. The opportunities of practice thus obtained, will be a school of military science scarcely inferior to any, except to the experience of actual warfare.

We cannot, indeed, expect to render the Local Militia equal to troops who are inured to the dangers of real service. The most important lesson which a soldier has to learn, is one which nothing but the presence of an enemy can teach. Men who are completely habituated to situations of peril, and have learned by practice to preserve

preserve their coolness under every circumstance, must undoubtedly be superior troops to those who have not that experience, however well practised in military evolutions at home. The utmost that can be done, by any system of discipline for a militia, is to prepare them well for this last, and most essential lesson. This, however, is not peculiar to the proposed plan; the same disadvantage attends our present militia, and every species of troops that are confined to home service.

New levies, however, have been known occasionally to distinguish themselves greatly in their first action. Troops of this description, if thoroughly practised in their manœuvres, if accustomed to prompt and implicit obedience to their officers, if commanded by officers in whom they have confidence, and who have confidence in themselves, will certainly be more likely to act with steadiness when brought against the enemy, than if they had been imperfectly instructed, and had to encounter the embarrassment

rassment of a situation for which they are ill prepared, in addition to the agitation which the presence of danger may excite. Next to the acquisition of habitual coolness amidst danger, the most important lesson of military duty, is the habit of prompt and implicit obedience to command,—a habit which, when thoroughly impressed on the minds of soldiers, and accompanied by some degree of awe for their officers, may go far to counteract the strongest feelings of the human mind, and prevent the individual from yielding to impressions of terror, which his own strength of mind could not have resisted.

Habits of strict obedience are therefore of infinitely more consequence, to form soldiers for the purposes of real service, than dexterity in the use of their arms, or even precision in their manœuvres. In this respect there seems to be an essential defect in the Volunteer System, in which the authority of the officers is necessarily precarious, and precludes the possibility of enforcing

cing strict military discipline. In the formation of these corps, we have begun at a wrong point: objects of secondary importance have been insisted upon, before the necessary foundation has been laid in the habits of implicit obedience; and thus the pains which these corps have taken in acquiring a proficiency in their manœuvres have, in a great measure, been thrown away.

In the proposed organization of the Local Militia, this error is avoided. The authority of the officers will be as complete as in the regular service. The men will be, from the first, under the strictest discipline which martial law can enforce; and this for an uninterrupted space of three months; during which the recruits will be withdrawn from every other avocation, from every thing which can interrupt the acquisition of military habits. Whether this be a sufficient period of exercise, to confirm these habits effectually, is a question upon which professional

professional authority must decide. Upon this point I find a difference of opinion. Some officers of experience consider three months as sufficient, and in confirmation of that opinion refer to the French armies, in which the conscripts are esteemed fit for duty in a still shorter time. There are on the other hand, officers of great eminence, who think this period too scanty, for the complete formation of a body of soldiers. It is, however, so much beyond any, which has hitherto been allowed to our domestic forces, that a fair trial may at least be made, before we conclude that more is necessary. If experience prove that it is not sufficient, more time must undoubtedly be allowed, rather than that the Local Militia should remain in a state of inefficiency.

It will have occurred to the reader, that under the arrangements which have been hitherto explained, this system of Local Militia cannot, for several years to come,
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be considered as in a state of maturity, and capable of effecting the purposes for which it is intended. The whole plan proceeds on the supposition, that every recruit is, in the very commencement of his service, to be completely instructed in his military duties, and that a space of three months uninterrupted discipline is to be devoted to this instruction. In the arrangements that have been explained, the means of this instruction are provided only for the young men between 18 and 19. In the course of seven years, those who are now 18 will have reached to 25, and every one below that age, will then have gone through the prescribed course of discipline. The observations hitherto made, have been chiefly directed to the regular and permanent effects of the proposed plan; and to put these in a distinct point of view, they have been described, as if the plan had been established for some time. If, however, the young men between 19 and 25 were now to be assembled, without any further

further preparation than that which has already been explained, they would be in a very different state of proficiency; they would rather be capable of the duty which is expected from them, nor prepared to profit by the opportunities of exercise, which the great annual assemblage would afford to those who have received a sufficient previous instruction.

If the dangers which we have to apprehend were so remote, that we could safely wait for some years, the plan, as it has been already stated, would produce the desired effect in a gradual and progressive manner. But our situation is not such as to admit of this delay, and an effort must be made, to bring our state of defence speedily up to the standard, which the emergency requires. The simple and effectual way to accomplish this is, after enrolling the Local Militia, and organizing them on the principles that have been stated, to call out the whole body, and
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put them at once on permanent duty for three months, or for a sufficient period to be fully disciplined.

To instruct at once so large a body of men, is certainly a task of considerable difficulty. The regular establishment of the Training Battalions was calculated for the progressive instruction of the young men between 18 and 19 only, and cannot be adequate to the immediate accomplishment of the same object with numbers so much larger. It is a question of great importance how this deficiency can be supplied, and officers provided for the commencement of this great establishment.

The first resource that presents itself, is the employment of the volunteer officers, among whom there are many, who have rendered themselves fully masters of their duty, and are not inferior in point of skill to many professional men. As it must require some time before the young officers, who are to be drawn from among the cadets,

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dets, can be fully instructed, it would be very desirable that a great proportion of the volunteer officers could be induced to accept of temporary appointments in the Local Militia. As an encouragement, the officers who thus agree to serve, though not within the age legally subject to military duty, should receive higher allowances, than the ordinary officers of the Local Militia, and such as to form an adequate indemnification for the time, which they sacrifice to the public service. There is a probability, that a great proportion, and the best of the volunteer officers, may be induced to afford their assistance. Men who have taken so much pains to obtain instruction in a duty, remote from their ordinary occupations, must be actuated by motives of zeal and patriotism, which will prompt them to continue their services in a case of equal urgency and importance. They may be the more readily expected to acquiesce in this, as it is only a temporary sacrifice, and they may soon be relieved from attendance, when a sufficient number

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ber. of the cadets are prepared for their duty.

If the volunteer officers in general can be induced to undertake the proposed service, we may expect from them every thing that zeal and assiduity can accomplish. But it will be of material importance, that along with them should be combined a considerable number of men of practical experience in real warfare. This may be obtained in part from the establishment of the Training Battalions, into which the Inspecting Field Officers of the volunteers should immediately be transferred. These officers are now employed in a manner little calculated to afford any important benefit; and their talents may certainly be rendered far more useful to the state than they now are.

An additional resource of great value may be found in the officers on half-pay, many of whom are both able and willing
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to afford the services required, and on all of whom the public has a right to call. These officers are dispersed in all parts of the country, so that they may in many instances perform the duty required with little personal inconvenience; without going to a great distance from their ordinary residence, or interrupting in a very detrimental manner the occupations in which they are engaged.

To complete the arrangements for the first instruction of the Local Militia, officers of rank and ability ought to be appointed to superintend each of the proposed Districts. The operations, which are necessary for converting a body of 8 or 10,000 recruits into efficient soldiers, are of such magnitude and importance, that the ablest men in our army cannot be considered as ill employed in directing their execution. There will be no difficulty in finding proper persons for this charge. The number of generals on the staff,

staff, forms but a small proportion of the officers who have that rank, and who cannot, according to military etiquette, be employed in regimental duty. From this cause a number of excellent officers remain unemployed: if they were called upon to assist in the formation of the Local Militia, a great mass of abilities now lying dormant would be called into action—abilities adequate even to the stupendous task of creating in a few months an army of 400,000 men.

The exertions thus to be made, for rendering our state of defence adequate to the emergency, may be deemed a burdensome effort; but we have no alternative between making this exertion, and the danger of being attacked before we are prepared to meet the invaders—of being taken by surprise, now after we have had twelve years warning of the designs of the enemy! It is, however, to be observed, that no moment could have been chosen, in which such an effort would have occasioned so little inconvenience as at present.

sent. The interruption of our communication with the Continent, has created a stagnation in our manufactures, and has thrown a number of people out of employment. In consequence of this diminution in the general demand for labour, it will occasion no interruption to our commercial concerns if the time of a large number of people should be occupied in the proposed military exercises.

This employment will, in fact, be a seasonable relief to our manufacturing labourers in a moment of difficulty. The advantage will not be confined to those who are immediately called upon and drawn out to be trained; it will operate in an indirect manner in favour of the whole body of manufacturing labourers, by withdrawing the competition of a large portion of the younger workmen, and throwing the employment that remains into the hands of those who are more advanced in life, and more generally burdened with families. This relief, indeed, will be only temporary, but it is only a temporary relief that is wanted.

wanted. Our unemployed manufacturers will, in the course of time, find other employments for themselves,—employments perhaps still more advantageous to the country; but time is requisite for this transfer of their industry, and it is during the interval, that relief is important to soften the abruptness of the change. For the permanent consequences of the attack that our enemies are now making on our commerce, there is no reason for entertaining the slightest uneasiness. On the contrary, we have the strongest reason to believe that the experiment which our antagonist is now compelling us to make may be of essential service. It will prove beyond dispute, that Britain is independent of commerce, that our soil is the essential, the only sure foundation of our prosperity and our greatness. When the first pressure of individual distress is over, it will soon be discovered how small a part of the nation has suffered by the loss of our intercourse with the continent. When the glare of commercial prosperity no longer throws into the shade the vast

amount of our internal resources, every one will perceive how inconsiderable a portion of our national wealth is derived from foreign countries,—how inferior is the importance of those commercial interests, which have long excited such a feverish anxiety, and to which our national policy has so often been made to bend. Such is the stable basis of our national strength, that, when altogether insulated, we may find the means of making greater exertions, than with all our external connections, we have ever yet made.

Sect. 3. TRUSTING that the preceding observations will have sufficiently explained the arrangements that are proposed, I shall now proceed to examine the effect which the adoption of this plan may be expected to produce on the public security. I hope it may be assumed as proved, that, with adequate exertions,

tions, the plan may be brought to a considerable degree of maturity, even in the course of a few months. At all events, in a year or two there can be no difficulty in bringing the Local Militia to a respectable state of discipline; not indeed such as to put them on a level with regular and practised troops, but sufficient to render them a useful force, perhaps in point of efficiency nearly approaching to our present Militia. After this has been accomplished, the power of the kingdom to resist invasion must be incomparably augmented, and a short examination will suffice to show that Great Britain may then be looked upon as nearly invulnerable.

The true criterion of an effectual defensive system is, whether, independently of any advantage in the least degree precarious, we can be sufficiently strong to carry on a regular campaign on English ground, with a prospect of decided superiority. To try our arrangements by that test, let us imagine a French army to be
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established on English ground. I do not mean to undervalue either the difficulties of the passage, or those of the disembarkation,—far less to say that our commanders should neglect the opportunities which they may have, of attacking the enemy while entangled in the embarrassments of a landing;—but as every advantage of that kind is more or less precarious*, we ought to consider, what our case would be, if the enemy had overcome or eluded every such obstacle. Let us suppose, then, that amidst the accidents, to which all naval affairs must be liable, the enemy have found an opportunity of eluding our fleet and landing 100,000 men on our coast. In order that the proposed arrangements may be put to the severest test, let it be supposed not only that the invaders have got over the embarrassments of the disembarkation, but that the arrival of a part of their flotilla on our beach has brought us the first intelligence of their movements.

* See Appendix, C.

The first object of the enemy will undoubtedly be to gain possession of London, and of our great arsenals in its vicinity: the first point of inquiry therefore, is what force our commanders can collect with sufficient promptitude for their defence. The regular troops stationed along the southern and south-eastern coast will of course be drawn together, to obstruct as much as possible the progress of the enemy; but as there is no probability that they can be sufficiently numerous to risk a decisive action, they must retreat before the enemy till they are sufficiently re-inforced. It will depend on the individual ability of our commanders, how long they can retard the approach of the enemy to the metropolis, without exposing themselves to be drawn into a general engagement. In the mean time, however, the alarm will spread, and the Local Militia will be assembling from all quarters. At all events, those of the metropolis itself, of the country in its immediate vicinity, and of the counties through which the enemy must advance, may

may be brought into action, before the contending armies can arrive in the vicinity of London.

According to the calculations, which have already been referred to, the numbers of Local Militia who will thus be available in the course of three days after the alarm is given, will be at least 60,000*; in two days more, further re-inforcements may arrive from all the country within sixty miles of London, and this number will be swelled to 85,000*; in four days more, or in nine from the time the alarm is spread and that orders are dispatched from London, the Local Militia may be assembled from all the country within one hundred and twenty miles, to the amount of not less than 160,000* men; for some time longer every successive day will bring in a further re-inforcement of about 15,000 men.

So far therefore as numbers can ensure

* See Appendix, A, Table III.

success

success we must sooner or later obtain a decisive superiority. But it may be alleged, that the forces thus assembled must be so inferior in point of discipline, that they cannot be relied on when opposed to the legions of Bonaparte, inured to warfare and flushed with success. After every arrangement that can be adopted, for training the Local Militia in the completest manner, it is still to be remembered that they are home troops, unaccustomed to the perils of real service. When troops of this description are brought for the first time to encounter the enemy, it is impossible to rely on their steadiness, with the same confidence as if it had been repeatedly proved in severe actions. The first engagement of a new regiment is an experiment, which will often have a glorious issue, but of which the success cannot beforehand be considered as certain. It is a known fact, that the great Frederick himself, in the first battle at which he was present, felt the infection of a panic, and fled from the field. It is no imputation, then,

then, on the national character, if it be considered as a possible occurrence, that our inexperienced troops may at first exhibit some such lamentable proof of human weakness.

The management of an army chiefly composed of new troops, is indeed a delicate task ; but the vast superiority of our numbers, will compensate for many disadvantages. The war of the French revolution has afforded one splendid instance, that such troops may obtain success against veterans ; and in the judicious conduct of Pichegru we may find an apposite example of the best mode of turning to advantage the resources of our situation.

After Dumourier had retired, the Republican arms met with a continued series of disasters. The French armies, consisting of innumerable hordes of new levies, repeatedly sustained disgraceful checks from very inferior numbers of the Austrian veterans. Pichegru saw the
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the error of his predecessors :—when, with such troops as they had to command, they engaged in general actions, a panic in any part of the line soon spread to the whole, and rendered the greatest superiority of numbers unavailing. He therefore employed his ardent but inexperienced troops in a multitude of partial actions. Expecting that the first division would give way, another body was always ready to replace them ; and these again were succeeded by another, and another. The first division had an opportunity of rallying behind their comrades, and were refreshed by an interval of repose ; recollecting themselves, after the first impression of terror was over, they were eager to wipe off their disgrace, and again, perhaps, in their turn, were brought up to a second charge. The best troops were unable to withstand such a continual succession of fresh assailants, and always gave way at last, exhausted by mere fatigue.

It would be impossible to devise a plan
more

more admirably adapted than this system of Pichegru, for obtaining the greatest possible advantage from his superior numbers, and from the enthusiastic ardour with which his young soldiers were inspired; and at the same time for guarding against the dangerous consequences of that unsteadiness, to which all troops must be liable in their first essay. In our own case, if we profit by this illustrious example, there will be the less reason to apprehend a general panic in our armies, because our commanders will always have the means of supporting their inexperienced home troops by a powerful reserve of steady veterans, and thus retrieving the consequences of any partial misfortune.

Granting then that the Local Militia cannot be equal to practised soldiers, it does not follow that they may not be rendered of great service in the hands of a judicious commander. If, indeed, the liberties of England should hang on the issue of a battle fought entirely by untried soldiers,

soldiers, our fate would be in a state of awful hazard. Such, however, is not the plan here suggested; nor is the Local Militia to be looked upon in any other light than as an accessory force, assisting the regulars, not vainly pretending to rival or to supersede them. A strong body of regular troops, inured to real action, must be the basis of our defence, the firm phalanx around which all our reinforcements of domestic forces must rally, and on which, on every occasion of decisive consequence, our commanders must place their ultimate dependence.

Such being the case, no one will be disposed to deny that every exertion ought to be made, for increasing as much as possible the numbers of regular and experienced troops in that army, which, in case of invasion, is destined first to meet the enemy. In this respect the proposed establishment of Local Militia will have a collateral effect of great value, as it will enable our Government to concentrate in the most important

important stations the troops on whose steadiness the greatest reliance may be placed.

On the necessity of concentrating our forces as much as possible, there is but one opinion among men of the highest military reputation. The campaigns on the Continent have taught a tremendous lesson on this subject. The disgraces of the Austrian arms are chiefly traced to a pertinacious adherence to the idea of guarding equally the whole of a long line of defence; while the French, by the opposite system of bringing their whole force to bear upon the point of chief importance, have gained the most splendid successes.

In spite of this experience, we see a great proportion of our regular troops spread out along the whole extent of our coast, in places where it is very improbable that the enemy should think of making their principal attempt at invasion; and where, if they should effect a descent, it
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could scarcely be more than a petty diversion, or a marauding expedition. By attempting thus to guard every point, the main army on which our national existence depends, must be weakened. It would surely be more proper, to collect the whole of our best troops towards the most important scene of action, and to devolve upon our less experienced domestic force the task of guarding the remoter parts of the kingdom:—those where there is less probability of a descent being seriously attempted, and those where, a temporary success on the part of the enemy would be less likely to have consequences fatal to our independence.

The errors to which I advert, are perhaps chiefly to be ascribed to the mistaken anxiety and importunity of the inhabitants near the sea-coast, who can never imagine the country to be safe, when they see their own particular neighbourhood destitute of troops. While the regular army affords the only protection to which they can trust,

trust, that anxiety ought not perhaps to excite surprise. If, however, an effective Local Militia were established, a defensive force would every where be in readiness, sufficient to remove all ground of anxiety. According to the proposed arrangement, every district will possess within itself the means of repelling a predatory attack. The places which, by their wealth, are most likely to allure the enemy, will be capable of turning out a considerable body of men at once. There is no part of the coast of England, where a battalion of Local Militia might not be assembled in the space of five or six hours after the appearance of an enemy; and 5000 men within forty-eight hours. No great apprehension, then, need be entertained of the consequences of any marauding expedition.

If, on the other hand, the enemy should try to make a diversion in the distant parts of the kingdom, he could not succeed in drawing away our army from the scene of
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the main attack, since the Local Militia would be able, with little assistance, to meet any force that could be sent for this purpose. One of the most likely places perhaps for an attempt of this nature, would be the Frith of Forth. It would probably be a more difficult task for the enemy to reach that station with 12,000 or 15,000 men, than the coast of Essex with 100,000. In three or four days, however, 20,000 men might be collected at Edinburgh from the south of the Forth, and 12,000 more at Stirling, or Queensferry from the north*.

Trusting therefore to the Local Militia for the ordinary defence of the coast, the regular troops should be reserved for stations of paramount national importance. In the south, Portsmouth and Plymouth must not be left exposed, and some troops must remain in garrison at each of these places. It is evident, however, that before


* See Appendix A, Table II.



the enemy can undertake a regular siege, opportunities must occur for throwing into these fortresses ample reinforcements of the Local Militia; and it cannot therefore be necessary to keep large regular garrisons there permanently. On the northern coasts two or three places may be pointed out, as military positions of peculiar importance. In these also a small regular force ought perhaps to be left, to serve as rallying points for the assemblage of the Local Militia.

There are but few stations, for which the Local Militia will not alone be a sufficient defence; and when our regular forces are thus relieved from so great a proportion of the demands which are now made on their services, it is not, perhaps, too much to expect, that the army collected to oppose the main invasion may thereby be nearly doubled.—The immense value of such a reinforcement can require no comment,




In the event of the French effecting a landing

ing in England, it is easy to foresee that all their operations will be marked by an excess of boldness. When, by the very act of embarkation, the existence of their army has been placed on the hazard of the die, we cannot expect that in their subsequent operations they will be deterred by very nice calculations of risk. On the Continent, and in situations where no peculiar disadvantage would have attended a more cautious mode of proceeding, we have seen the French generals throw themselves into perils the most extreme, for the purpose of rendering their successes splendid and decisive. If, on the Continent, they have adopted this system from choice, in England they must follow it from necessity.—Landing in the manner which has been supposed, they can have no assurance of any reinforcement or supply from their own country, and cannot even subsist, except by the fruits of their victories. Success, rapid and decisive success, is necessary to their very existence.





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An absolute defeat could scarcely be more pernicious to them than the consequences of delay. If, on the other hand, they can bring on a general action, we have reason to apprehend, from the daring and decisive character of their tactics, that a victory on their part will be followed by consequences of no trifling amount. If, in this first action, the flower of our regular army, the main dependence of our defence, should be cut off, it is impossible to disguise the extreme difficulty of the task which would remain, of retrieving our affairs with our domestic forces alone, however well organized.

It appears then, that our commanders, if they engage in a general and decisive action, without the most pressing necessity, must be considered as staking the existence of the empire on the precarious issue of a single day: and it is scarcely possible that there can be an absolute necessity for incurring this hazard. When our army

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is pressed by the enemy, the necessity of an immediate action may be eluded by a retreat. If, by giving up some miles of ground, the moment of action be protracted for a day, it is no small gain; for in the mean time, our army has approached to their reinforcements, and these reinforcements have accomplished another day's march. Every day that is thus gained will bring into action an addition of 15,000 or 20,000 Local Militia, while the enemy will be drawn so much further away from any magazines, which he may have formed on the coast.

We have seen that in the course of 10 or 12 days, 160 or 200,000 Local Militia may be brought into action. Of these it may be necessary to throw some into garrisons: but 15 or 20,000 men will probably be amply sufficient for every purpose of this kind. The rest added to our regular forces will form a body too numerous to act together with advantage in one army.

After

After reinforcing the main body, to as great an amount as our generals can desire, numbers will still remain. These may be formed into subsidiary armies to act on the flank and rear of the enemy, to harass his detachments, to prevent his collecting provisions, and to intercept the communication with his magazines. Every step by which he advances must increase these difficulties; and before he has been a fortnight on English ground, he will find himself surrounded by numbers at least double of his own; he will be hemmed in on every side by armies of respectable force, and unable to collect provisions except from the spot which he immediately occupies. If in these circumstances he advance against the main body of our army, and our commanders persist in eluding a general action by retreating before him, to what purpose is it that he gains a few miles of exhausted country on one side, while our forces still close in upon him on the other, and prevent his spreading himself
over

over a sufficient extent of ground to afford subsistence? In the course of these operations a large portion of fertile territory must be laid waste; but it does not seem to admit of a doubt, that sooner or later the enemy may be reduced by absolute famine.

The only circumstance which seems to throw a doubt, upon the efficacy of this plan of operations, is the vicinity of London to the probable scene of action. If the enemy can advance with sufficient rapidity; and if before his provisions are exhausted, he can press our army so close, that no further retreat is left, without exposing the capital, we have no alternative but to abandon it, or to risk an action. If our army be not then so strong, as to render their success nearly certain, we have to recollect that however important the protection of London may be, London is not the kingdom of England. It is better that the capital should be for a few days in possession

possession of the enemy, than that the army, on which the safety of the whole empire depends; should be broken by defeat*.—If the great body of our regular forces be kept in a concentrated position, we may reasonably hope that, with the assistance of the Local Militia immediately on the spot, they may be able to cover the metropolis from insult. But in any event, we can have no reason, under the proposed system, to entertain doubts as to the final discomfiture of the enemy, and the preservation of the liberties of England.

* Though the temporary possession of London by the enemy would have no effects necessarily fatal to the independence of the kingdom, yet the same cannot be said of our great military depôts, which are all accumulated in the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. To allow our *whole* military stores to remain in one place, and that place so near the scene of probable invasion, seems indeed the extreme of improvidence.

THE

The reasonings which have here been Sect. 4. urged, may seem to contradict an assertion made in the outset of these observations; that the nature of our country is adverse to "those plans of protracted warfare, which might be followed with effect by an inferior army, in an extensive country full of forests, mountains, and morasses." But the cases supposed are widely different; plans which could be of no avail to an inferior army, will be of certain efficacy when we can bring against the enemy an immense superiority of numbers. For that superiority we must be indebted to our domestic force. It is utterly impracticable for this kingdom to keep up a regular army, capable of maintaining a contest with the myriads which the despot of the Continent may bring against us.

It seems therefore to require no argument to prove, that unless the resources of our domestic force be effectually called into action, our independence cannot be maintained.

maintained. The only question is, whether the organization which has been here suggested is the best: or whether some other plan may be entitled to a preference. In this view the Volunteer system calls for our attention, as standing in some measure in competition with the proposal of a Local Militia.

The Volunteer system has the advantage of being already established,—an argument which, in the eyes of some, may perhaps outweigh all others; but to those who are capable of reflection, this must appear a very inadequate consideration, to recommend a system, which is subject to essential disadvantages. The decline which has taken place in the numbers and discipline of the Volunteers is not to be considered as an accidental circumstance: it has arisen from the very nature of the institution. A system, the efficiency of which rests so entirely on individual exertion, cannot be permanent and steady in its effects.

At

At the period when the Volunteer establishment was formed, the loyalty and patriotic spirit of the people had been roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. The obvious danger of the country called forth unprecedented exertions of spontaneous zeal; but as the exigency became less apparent, these exertions naturally relaxed. Such vehement efforts of enthusiasm could not be of long continuance: the public mind had been on the stretch, and naturally sunk back into a state of languor.

Though it had been possible to keep up that spirit in its full vigour, much would still have been wanting, to render the Volunteers thoroughly efficient as a military force. Men of education, sensible of the importance of the object for which they are associated, may be induced to pay that zealous attention, which will enable them to acquire a considerable proficiency in military evolutions. But for the common mass of the people something more is requisite to impress those habits of ready
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and implicit obedience, to acquire which is one of the most important and most difficult lessons that a soldier has to learn. The privilege of every individual to quit his corps at pleasure, is an insuperable obstacle to the acquisition of military habits. The slender tenure upon which the officers hold their authority, compels them to humour every caprice of the men under their command: and precludes the possibility of enforcing discipline, with that steadiness without which it is in vain to expect that we can form good soldiers.

The effect of these circumstances has been aggravated by the desultory nature of the exercises which have been prescribed. The greatest part of the time, which the Volunteers devote to this purpose, is spent in drilling on detached days or half-days. Among the most intelligent Volunteer officers, however, there is but one opinion as to the trifling utility of these daily drills, and the incomparably superior importance

importance of a period of permanent duty.—Few corps of Volunteers, however, find it convenient to assemble for a long time at once. Scanty as the period to which they are limited may appear, it is with difficulty that the men can be drawn from their homes for a continued absence even of 15 or 20 days. Nor is this surprising, when we consider how great a proportion of the Volunteers are heads of families, and men who have to superintend agricultural, commercial or manufacturing concerns more or less extensive.

At the time of the original formation of the Volunteer establishment, many incidental motives contributed to induce men of the middle classes of society to enter very generally into these corps, while the lower orders have been in a great measure deterred by the expense, which frequently attends this service. It is evident that the time of such men as those who are now enrolled, must be of incomparably greater value,

value, than that of a set of young men taken indiscriminately from all classes. A young journeyman, or farm-servant, might certainly be spared from his occupation and his home, with infinitely less inconvenience than his master.

This circumstance deserves consideration in another view. If it be difficult for the Volunteers to assemble for long periods of exercise, it must also be a matter of great and perhaps insuperable difficulty to bring together a large body of Volunteers for real service, or to keep them embodied for a great length of time. The operations of the enemy may, however, render it indispensable to require this sacrifice from the persons who compose our defensive force. Previously to the grand attack, we may be harassed by frequent false alarms. The Volunteers may thus be fatigued by long continued preparations; and if their absence from home be long protracted, the interruption to their domestic concerns will be
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of intolerable inconvenience: nor is it easy to judge, how far these circumstances may affect the efficiency of this branch of our force.

While the Volunteer system thus involves so great an interruption to the affairs of individuals, it throws the perils of warfare in an undue proportion upon fathers of families, and the fatigues of military duty on men, who in many cases are not the most capable of sustaining them. On the other hand, the young men, of whom it is proposed to form the Local Militia, are physically the best calculated for the service required. They may be rendered good soldiers with a much smaller sacrifice of time and labour than men of a more advanced time of life. They are of that age, at which new habits are acquired with facility, and at which the fatigues of real service will occasion the least personal suffering. The Volunteer corps include undoubtedly a great number of able and active young men; but they also contain

3 many,

many, whose habits are too much fixed to sustain without inconvenience the hardships, which they may be called upon to endure. In a corps of this mixed description, the less active men will be an impediment to the rest: and it is therefore a material advantage in the Local Militia, that the whole are alike in the prime of youth and vigour.

It is impossible to expect by any modification of the Volunteer corps, to give them as effectual a training as that which has been proposed for the Local Militia. Permanent duty, and that for a considerable period of time without interruption, is indispensably necessary to the acquisition of military habits. The sacrifice which this would require from men established in life, and engaged in business, is too great to be proposed, while to a young man of 18 the inconvenience must be comparatively trifling.—If the present establishment of Volunteers be continued, their exercises cannot perhaps be extended much beyond what they

they now perform. But can any long argument be necessary to point out the difference between a training of two or three weeks, and one of three months; between strict discipline enforced by martial law, and a precarious command over men who may quit their corps at pleasure; between exercises limited to one or two battalions, and those which may include an encampment of 20 or 30,000 men? When such is the difference between the means of instruction afforded to the Volunteers and the Local Militia, can we imagine that no difference will be found in the result?

Those who have considered with attention, the probable consequences of the landing of a French army in England, and the nature of the campaign which may be expected to ensue, must be sensible of the infinite importance of having our domestic forces fully prepared for immediate action, and as perfect in their duty as they can be rendered by previous instruction. The dangers which are to be apprehended from

panic among inexperienced troops have already been adverted to, and it is evident that when soldiers are imperfectly instructed in their duty, the probability of their being seized with a panic must be doubly great; for then, in addition to the agitation of a new and untried danger, they have the embarrassment and indecision of conscious ignorance. Every step by which troops advance in military knowledge is thus of importance.

The imperfections of the Volunteer system are now every day more generally felt; and few perhaps will be disposed seriously to recommend that system as our permanent and only dependence for internal defence. Objections may indeed be felt against any great and immediate change on an institution already established. But if we examine minutely the actual state of the Volunteer corps, it will, I am afraid, appear that they are at this moment far from adequate to the task which may be required of them, and that we have no time to
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lose in organizing our domestic force on a more effectual principle.

Among the Volunteers some corps may be found in a high state of discipline, and fit perhaps to act along with troops of the line. These however are but a small proportion of the whole establishment: a much greater number are only half-disciplined. In many cases their deficiency might be remedied by a short period of the severe discipline of an actual campaign. But when the enemy have effected their landing, it will not be the time for our domestic forces to learn their duty: if in the critical moment they are not ready—fully ready to act their part in the general defence—their services will be of little or no avail. All the time, the labour, and the expense which is sacrificed to give a partial and imperfect instruction will prove to be thrown away: and the nation may deplore when it is too late, the fatal error of resting its defence on a species of force, to which the necessary means of improvement have been denied.

There are some perhaps who are convinced of the unavoidable defects of the Volunteer system, who are yet unwilling to propose a great alteration on the establishment, lest it should offend a numerous and meritorious body of men. This, however, is an imaginary and groundless apprehension. There may be individuals, who have entered among the Volunteers for the mere purpose of obtaining exemption from ballots, or similar privileges, and who may be reluctant to lose these advantages. But the great body of the Volunteers, the men who four or five years ago came forward with so much zeal at the call of their country, can have no wish to continue their laborious exertions any longer than they are necessary. From patriotic motives, they undertook a severe task, in a season of great public alarm; and, from feelings of honour, they have thought themselves bound not to withdraw, while Government continued to demand their services. But the performance is a personal burden, from which it is most natural that they should

should wish, and most proper that they ought to be relieved. When they see every purpose of their institution answered, in a permanent and effectual manner, can they have any reluctance in yielding to their successors, the burdensome post which they have so long and so honourably maintained?

Individuals there may be, who have so deeply imbibed the spirit of military ardour, as to have a wish still to bear a part personally in the defence of their country. That wish may be gratified: there is no necessity for refusing the proffered services of any part of the Volunteers, though, on general principles, the large establishment, now maintained, is no longer considered as necessary. Every Volunteer corps, which is willing to continue its gratuitous services, ought to be thankfully accepted; they may be left in possession of their arms, &c. and rewarded by suitable honorary distinctions. No exemption however from the Local Militia

litia can be admitted, on the ground of service in a Volunteer corps : nor should any further expense be incurred to the public treasury, on account of a force which is no longer requisite for the public service.

An exception must perhaps be allowed for the yeomanry cavalry. These corps are extremely well adapted for maintaining the internal tranquillity of the country ; and for this purpose they are, in some respects, preferable even to regular troops. They are composed of men who have a stake in the country, and are personally interested in the preservation of good order : no doubt can be entertained of their sincere desire to cooperate effectually for the suppression of any disturbance. From their local information, they are better able to check such attempts in their infancy, and are more likely to distinguish with propriety, between the guilty and the innocent, than a body of strangers might be, when irritated by the resist-

resistance of a mob. For these reasons, some expense may with propriety be incurred for keeping up an establishment of yeomanry. The pecuniary allowances, however, ought not to be such as to induce any, but men of respectable condition, to enter into these corps ; and, with persons of that description, honorary distinctions may probably be found a more efficacious encouragement.

Among the plans, which have been suggested for the defence of the kingdom, is that of a general array to include the whole male population of mature age. Upon this system it is to be observed, that by a complete and effectual training, applied to an adequate body of men, the safety of the kingdom will be better secured, than by extending an imperfect and superficial instruction over a greater number. A general array will therefore be of little use, unless military instruction be fully imparted ; and to extend this over the whole people would impose on the country a burden much
greater

greater than the urgency of our present situation-requires. The proposed number of Local Militia appears to be adequate to repel any invasion, which is at present within the bounds of probability. An army of 100,000 men is certainly a small part of the military establishment of France; but while the naval superiority of Great Britain is maintained, an invasion must be an enterprise of the greatest hazard, and the force embarked in it can only be such as our enemies are content to sacrifice for the chance of a signal success. The loss of 100,000 men would not affect the power of Bonaparte, but he would not choose to risk an army of much greater amount. The difficulty of eluding our maritime superiority, must also be incomparably greater, when it is necessary to embark a force of extreme magnitude, instead of a moderate number,

If indeed the French had obtained an ascendancy at sea, and could land their armies at pleasure on any part of our coast, a more numerous defensive force would undoubtedly

doubtedly be necessary ; nor could an arm be spared, that is capable of wielding a weapon in the common defence. Happily, however, there is little probability that such a crisis can soon arise. If in future times this kingdom should be placed in circumstances of such extreme difficulty, increased exertions will be necessary ; but for these the institution of a Local Militia will have prepared the way.

In the course of another generation, our whole male population will have gone through a course of military discipline, at a period of life the best suited to receive durable impressions. Military habits being early fixed may by a small exertion be kept up through life. All our people will thus be prepared to assist in the defence of the country, and without any extraordinary effort, we may obtain the benefit of a general array. We may trust that the spirit of the nation will rise in proportion to the emergency ; and that when an extreme effort

effort is necessary, all will cheerfully submit to the sacrifices which may be required for rendering their services effectual.

The benefit to be derived from the military instruction of the youth, is thus by no means confined to the immediate period, in which they are liable to duty as Local Militia: nor is this an advantage which will only arise after a long interval of time. In the course of a few years a numerous body of young and active men will have passed through the Local Militia, and will be capable of contributing their aid in cases of emergency. Every successive year will add to the number of our defenders.

From these considerations it is evident, that a material advantage will arise from selecting the youngest men to be trained, rather than taking an equal number of miscellaneous ages.—If, instead of training the young men of eighteen, an equal number of
men

men be taken annually by a promiscuous ballot, as for the present militia, from the whole mass of the people between eighteen and forty-five, a considerable proportion of those who are instructed, will very soon be past the age of military service, and the instruction given to them, can be of no use except during the immediate period of the duty imposed. Assuming, therefore, that a certain number of men must be trained, regimented, and kept in constant readiness for immediate military service, there is in every point of view an advantage to the public in selecting the youngest men.

The other classes are less fit for the duty which may be required ; and it would be a needless burden on the country to include them also in the arrangements for military instruction. There may be an advantage, however, in a more general enrolment of the male population, not with a view to any services strictly military, but to obtain with more certainty and effect their assistance

assistance for objects of a subsidiary nature.

There are many services in which men, totally uninstructed in military evolutions, may facilitate the operations of our army, and throw obstructions in the way of the enemy. In cutting up roads, breaking down bridges, driving off cattle and horses, destroying provender, and any other articles that may be useful to the enemy, in assisting our soldiers to construct entrenchments and field fortifications, in transporting every thing requisite for the use of our army, and in an infinite variety of other operations, the assistance of the mere peasantry may be of essential value.

There is no reason to doubt, that our people would be ready voluntarily to render every service of this kind; but these spontaneous services will not be sufficiently prompt to be of real use. It must be ever borne in mind,

mind, that if the enemy land in England, a very short period must decide the contest. In a fortnight, or three weeks, after they set foot on English ground, they must be our prisoners or our masters. No aid, therefore, can be of any value, that is not given with instantaneous readiness; and that promptitude cannot possibly be expected without previous arrangement and organization.

This subject seems of late to have been little attended to, though in the early periods of the present war it had attracted the attention of Government. Many judicious regulations were then adopted, but have since been allowed to drop: though subsequent events ought rather to have called for redoubled vigilance, and for the adoption of those improved arrangements, which experience might naturally have suggested.

It has been very judiciously remarked*,

* General Observations upon the probable Effects of any Measures, which have for their Object the Increase of the Regular Army, &c. by a Country Gentleman.

that

that, in the peculiar state of society which prevails in England, we have no class of men corresponding to the peasantry of some of the less commercial countries on the Continent,—men, who, from the variety of their occupations, and their habits of life, are capable of acting as irregular troops, almost without instruction or direction. Our people are all so much confined, each to his own particular employment, that they cannot be capable of judging for themselves with respect to any military object. They must be superintended and directed in every operation; and their services, of whatever nature, will be of little use, unless, through various gradations of authority regularly organized, the whole mass can receive its impulse from Government.

This object may perhaps be attained without much difficulty, by a general enrolment of the whole effective male population in their respective districts. The individuals must be classed according to
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their age and personal qualifications; and from among those of superior condition a sufficient number of persons must be appointed to act as officers, with a gradation of command so arranged, that, through the medium of the Lieutenancy of the different counties, the whole may receive the orders of Government with rapidity, and be employed in any operation in which they may be deemed most useful. Without any very burdensome sacrifice of time, every individual might learn who is the officer to whose orders he is to attend; and the people in general might be impressed with some ideas of regularity and obedience to command, sufficient to prevent confusion in the moment of alarm.

THE considerations already urged, may Sect. 5. be sufficient to show, that the safety of this kingdom is in our own hands. Our situation

situation may require more or less of exertion, on the part of the people; but means are in our power for defeating the most formidable invasion, and providing amply for the security of Great Britain. A difficult question, however, yet remains:— How is Ireland to be put into a state of defence equally complete?

However widely our political champions may differ, with respect to the causes of the present unsatisfactory state of Ireland, or the means of removing the existing discontents, there is but one opinion, as to the actual prevalence of a lawless and disaffected spirit among a very great proportion of the people. Under these circumstances, any institution similar to the proposed Local Militia, would be liable to insuperable objections. Are the Irish, then, to be exempted from the burden of that service to which the corresponding classes in England are subject; and shall they not be required to contribute in some other way to the general defence of the state?

It

It has been stated, on very high authority*, that the Irish Catholics are averse to enter into the regular army; that in proportion to their number, fewer recruits come from among them than from the rest of our population; and that, if they were to enlist with the same readiness as other classes of people, an addition of 100,000 men might be made to our disposable force. It is a subject highly deserving of a careful and impartial investigation, what are the real causes of so extraordinary a disinclination. That it does not arise merely from the state of the laws respecting the Catholic religion, we have a decisive proof, in the circumstance, that no such disinclination is to be observed in the Highlands of Scotland. There are, in that part of the kingdom, some districts inhabited entirely by Catholics, yet the people of these have never shown less inclination to a military life than the rest of the Highlanders. In the course of the late war, a regiment of

* Speech of the Earl of Moira, March 26, 1807.

Fencibles, chiefly composed of Catholics, was raised in a district of no great extent.

To whatever cause this aversion of the Irish Catholics may be owing, and whatever remedies may be applied to remove it in future, it is not likely that these can have an instantaneous efficacy; and measures of gradual operation, however wise, are not sufficient for our present emergency. ¹A circumstance of this kind, arising unquestionably from some error on the part of Government, cannot be considered as an argument for the use of compulsion. It is, however, sufficient to prove, that if the people of Ireland be exempted from the compulsory service required in England, we are not likely to receive any compensation, in the increase of our regular force by voluntary enlistment, since already, it appears, they do not bear their full share in the common defence.

From the internal state of Ireland, it is impossible to obtain from the people that
service

service which is imposed on the other parts of the kingdom. Can it therefore be deemed improper, if this exemption be counter-balanced by a corresponding demand of compulsory service, in a different form, but for the same general purpose of the defence of the country? On these grounds I will venture to suggest a measure, which is perhaps as little open to essential objections, as the circumstances of so difficult a case will admit.

I would propose, then, that in place of the establishment of a Local Militia, similar to that of England, a levy should be made of a body of Fencibles, to serve for three years only, in any part of the United Kingdom; that this levy should be made by ballot, among the men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five; that any person within that age, on previous payment of a fine of 10*l.*, should be exempted for the next three years from standing the chance of the ballot, but that no person balloted

should be admitted to serve by substitute.

In the appointment of officers to these regiments, attention should be paid to give the chief command of each to persons of popular character and local influence, in the district where the regiment is raised. A chaplain of the established church should be appointed to each regiment ; but, in case one third of the men be of any communion of dissenters, a clergyman of their own persuasion also should attend them, at the expense of Government. In the Roman Catholic districts, a proportion of the officers should always be of that persuasion.

The situation of the officers must be rendered more advantageous, than in the fencible regiments raised in the late war, in order to encourage persons of a proper description to enter into this service. This may be done, either by an assurance
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of half-pay, or more effectually, perhaps, by affording to the officers of these regiments, some advantageous opportunity of entering into the regular army. Thus, for example, to each of these Fencible Regiments, may be attached a second battalion, recruited for general service, on the same permanent establishment as the rest of the army. Into this battalion, any of the balloted men may be allowed to volunteer; and, in case of a certain proportion of men entering in this way for general service, a corresponding number of officers with permanent rank, should be appointed from among those of the first battalion.

The fines levied for exemption from the ballot, should be applied in aid of a fund, for the relief of the families of balloted men who are married, or the parents of those who are dependent on their children for support. If the fines should not prove sufficient for the purpose, the deficiency must be made up by the county in which the

the men are raised ; the support which is given by law to the families of militiamen, must, on every principle of justice, be extended to men of any compulsory levy. In addition to this, a bounty should be paid by Government, fully proportioned to that given for voluntary enlistment, regard being had to the duration of the engagement. Means may, perhaps, be found of bestowing this bounty in a more useful manner to the recruit, than by a sum in hand ; but the essential principle to be attended to, is, that the recruit who is compelled to serve should be as liberally rewarded, all circumstances considered, as if he had enlisted voluntarily into a regiment of the line. Any attempt to economize at the expense of men who are forced away from their homes to serve their country would be truly despicable. If a difference is made, the balance should be cast in favour of the man who is taken for compulsory service, to compensate, in some degree, for that interference with his personal

sonal liberty, which, however mitigated, cannot be totally freed from the character of harshness.

If, however, the demand of compulsory service be accompanied by every attention to the feelings of the men, which can tend to obviate their prejudices against a military life, the odium of the ballot will be very much removed. Under the modifications proposed, a large body of men might be raised, with far less dissatisfaction to the people, than under the form of ballot now established for the militia; and, at the same time, such a levy would interfere in a much smaller degree with the recruiting of the regular army.

To what extent this levy of Fencibles should be carried, is a point of some difficulty. Considering it as a substitute for a Local Militia, it ought to be of such amount, as to afford, if possible, the same degree of security to the empire, yet without

out pressing harder on the people. These, however, are two conditions not easily reconcilable.

Were the circumstances of Ireland such as to admit the establishment of a Local Militia, on the same principles as that of England, it would amount to 160,000 or 170,000 men. If these were all well affected, it would require a very large levy of Fencibles to afford as powerful a defence. A permanent force of 50,000 or 60,000 men, could scarcely appear more than an adequate compensation; but a compulsory levy, to this amount, would be a much greater burden on the people. If, in an establishment of 160,000 Local Militia, we add together the number of weeks which each individual must annually devote to military exercises, they would not amount all together to more of their time than equivalent to the service of about 14,000 men for the whole year. If the levy of Fencibles, in Ireland, be carried further than this, it
must

must be considered as a greater demand upon the people than is made on the corresponding classes in England.

On the other hand, there is a greater disproportion in Ireland, than in other parts of the kingdom, between the population, and the opportunity of industrious employment to which the people have access; and, on this account, it will occasion less inconvenience, if a larger proportion of men be taken for the public service, than in a country where the demand for labour is so great as in England. To this consideration, we must add the urgent necessity of putting the defence of Ireland on a secure foundation, not only in justice to those who are interested in the property of that kingdom, but with a view to the general safety of the empire. If, on these grounds, the levy of Fencibles in Ireland be extended to 30,000 or 40,000 men, it will not, perhaps, be a greater drain than its population can afford, without material inconvenience.

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These Fencibles, being a contribution for the immediate local defence of the country, must be considered as peculiarly belonging to the places where they are levied. There are very evident reasons, however, which dictate the removal of these regiments into other parts of the kingdom. But this ought only to be an interchange; and for every regiment of Fencibles thus withdrawn from Ireland, another regiment, composed of natives of England or Scotland, should take their place. By the proposed levy, a nett addition would thus be made of 30,000 or 40,000 men to the number of troops already stationed in Ireland, a force which would establish a degree of security to which that part of the kingdom has long been a stranger.

The protection thus afforded to the property of Ireland, is too apparent to need any comment. It may not, perhaps, so readily occur, that the proposed arrangements would be materially conducive to
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the interests of those against whom these precautions may appear to be directed—the lower orders and the great body of the Catholics.

The harshness with which the lower orders in Ireland are too frequently treated by their immediate superiors, can never be effectually checked, till the government is rendered stronger than it has hitherto been—strong enough to maintain its own authority, independently of the aid of any party. It is with great injustice, that the English Government has been accused of encouraging a system of proscription and rigour in Ireland. On the contrary, the Cabinet has, for a long time back, shown a disposition to mild and conciliatory measures; and, if our Ministers have erred, in not following out these principles with sufficient steadiness and system, the failure is to be ascribed to the deep-rooted prejudices of persons to whom they felt a necessity of yielding. They could not shut their eyes on the dangerous situation of
Ireland,

Ireland, arising from the extensive prevalence of a refractory spirit, not to be repressed, except by the strong hand of power; they were not in possession of a military force, adequate to the maintenance of tranquillity; and no choice was left but to have recourse to the aid of those among the inhabitants, most immediately interested in the preservation of order. In this way a powerful force was obtained to assist in repressing disturbance; but it was composed of men too much under the influence of ancient prejudices, and too much goaded by the irritating circumstances of their situation, to act on all occasions with coolness and moderation; nor was it an easy task to curb the violence of men, on whose assistance the preservation of the country appeared to depend. Such is the mutual rancour of the different classes of people in Ireland, that, while Government are under the necessity of compromising their principles, and of propping up their authority by the aid of a party, they never can maintain a steady system

system of impartial justice and moderation. By the establishment of a large military force, sufficient both to repel invasion, and to overawe the disaffected, Government will be freed from the trammels in which they have hitherto been entangled, and will be left at liberty to pursue the obvious policy of imposing a restraint on the violence of all parties in that distracted country.

The effectual protection of such a force, as that which has been proposed, will relieve the Protestants in Ireland from a harassing state of insecurity; the feverish jealousy, which attends their present situation, will be diminished; and they will then have less difficulty in opening their eyes, to the perfect safety with which the political claims of the Catholics may be admitted.

We may expect, too, that the mutual rancour of the different parties in Ireland, would in time wear away, if the country were maintained in a state of continued
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tranquillity. Every successive disturbance serves to revive the spirit of animosity, by the repetition of mutual injuries. Much good may indeed be expected, with the aid of time, from the abolition of odious and unnecessary exclusions; but all will not avail to restore harmony, without the aid of a firm and efficient government; — a government capable of repressing violence, wherever it may be found; of maintaining tranquillity by the strong hand of power; and of maintaining it with moderation and impartial justice to all.

It has been observed, that there are evident political reasons for removing into England the Fencible Regiments raised in Ireland, and replacing them by other troops. The same reasons would apply to the Irish militia; and if an interchange of stations could be effected between these and an equivalent number of the English militia, it cannot be denied that an important benefit would be gained to the public service; that many regiments would
be.

be rendered far more efficient, than they can be in their present situation. According to the actual constitution of the militia, however, this interchange cannot legally be made; and objections have been stated against any alteration, chiefly on the ground of personal inconvenience.

In a review of our permanent means of defence, it cannot be deemed improper to enter into some discussion of the reasons, which have led to the establishment of a species of force so extremely limited in its service, that it is not only confined to home duty, but cannot be applied even to the defence of that part of the kingdom, which is generally acknowledged to be the most vulnerable.

The militia regiments of our present establishment are not less expensive to the public than regular troops. They appear, indeed, rather less burdensome to the Treasury; but if to the charges which appear in the public accounts, we add those
incurred

incurred by the different counties, their establishment will be found fully as expensive as the regiments of the line. The money paid for substitutes must also be taken into account: it is a part of the expense of the militia establishment, as much as the recruiting bounties form a part of the expenses of the army. The burden of paying for substitutes is a real addition to the taxes which the people have to pay—a tax, too, most unequal and oppressive; laid on without any regard to the ability of those on whom it is levied.

While the militia regiments are thus equally expensive to the nation, it is evident that they cannot be so useful as an equal number of regulars. They cannot be sent on foreign expeditions, which may occasionally be of great importance, with a view to our own immediate defence. They cannot be sent into that part of the united kingdom where their services may be of most value. Even in the case of an invasion of England, they cannot be equivalent

lent to regulars; from the want of experience in real action, they must be exposed to much of the unsteadiness of new levies. The officers, too, can have, in general, only a theoretical knowledge of their duty. They have no opportunity of acquiring any experience of real service in their own regiments; nor can it be expected that men of professional experience will accept of situations, in which no length of service can obtain any permanent advantage or prospect of promotion. Thus, with an equal, or, perhaps, a heavier burden on the finances of the country, we have a force very inferior in utility.

If any thing could place in a stronger light the disadvantage of the militia establishment, it would be the comparison between the expense of these regiments and that of the proposed Local Militia. If the period employed in the first training of the Local Militia be sufficient for the complete formation of soldiers, and if the subsequent exercises be sufficient to prevent these ha-

bits from being forgotten, daily parades will not make them better soldiers for actual duty. The expense, however, of one of our present militia regiments, is scarcely different from that of a regiment of the line, or about 30*l.* per man, while the Local Militia will scarcely cost 4*l.* per man.—The whole establishment for 400,000 men has been calculated to amount to about 1,600,000*l.**, a sum which would scarcely maintain above 50,000 men on our present militia establishment. He must be a bold disputant who will venture to maintain, either that the militia are as useful to the state as an equal number of disposable troops, or that one man of our present militia can be as useful as seven or eight of the proposed establishment would be.

What, then, can be the inducement to persist in keeping up an establishment that is liable to such objections? The difficulty of raising a sufficient number of men for

* See Appendix, B.

the army may have had some weight ; but it has been proved, with the evidence of demonstration, that the facility afforded by the militia ballot is merely apparent, and that the deficiency of recruits for the line is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to the effects of the ballot, as the high premiums offered for substitutes attract those who are disposed to enlist, and prevent them from accepting of the bounty offered in the regular recruiting service. The militia is thus composed, for the greater part, of the very men who, but for this institution, would have entered into the army ; and if we had no such establishment as the militia, our regular forces might be exactly so much the more numerous.

In opposition to these strong objections, there is little to be stated, except an old prejudice in favour of the militia, and those magical words, “the constitutional force of the country.” The militia, however, has deviated so entirely from the original spirit of its institution, that nothing now remains

of those qualities, which at first recommended it to so high a degree of popularity.

The militia originated in a jealousy of the standing army. It is needless now to enter into any discussion how far that was well founded. The fact is, an idea did prevail, that the standing army might be made an instrument to establish the arbitrary power of the Crown; and it was supposed; that this danger might be counteracted by training the people at large to arms. It was intended that the militia should train; in rotation, the whole, or at least a large proportion of the people; for this purpose, the service of each individual was limited to three years, at the end of which period he was to retire, and to be replaced by another. The officers also were intended to be all men of landed property, naturally connected with those whom it was their duty to command.

Such was the militia in theory. One error

error in practice has subverted the whole of this speculation,—the admission of service by substitute. Substitution was not the prevailing custom for some years after the first institution of the militia. The establishment was formed in the course of Lord Chatham's war, not very long before peace was concluded. In the commencement, the country gentlemen were eager to support and to take a share in a service, which they had warmly recommended. Men of the highest rank were willing to accept of commissions even as subalterns; and this popularity naturally had its effect among the lower orders. The tenantry did not wish to avoid a service, in which they saw their superiors engage with so much zeal. This spirit continued during the remainder of the war, which terminated before the zest of novelty had worn off. During the peace, the service of the militia being confined to a single month in each year, was not a severe burden. But, in the course of the American war, an important change took place.

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The number of our regular army was then by no means adequate to the demands upon their services, nor did the Government find it easy to obtain from Parliament an establishment suitable to the public exigencies. They were, therefore, constrained to employ the militia as a substitute for regulars, and were desirous of rendering them as good soldiers as possible. It was supposed to be conducive to their discipline, to keep them at a distance from their own counties; and many of these regiments were continued for years in stations the most remote from their native residence. The inconvenience arising from this practice, led many individuals to avail themselves of the privilege of serving by substitute. The officers also found the sacrifice required of them to be greater than they could submit to, without a total disregard of their private affairs. The opulent country gentlemen, of course, withdrew by degrees from their situations as officers, and none remained but a few men whose public spirit or military ardour prevailed

prevailed over motives of a personal nature.

Another circumstance concurred to undermine the principles, upon which the institution of the militia was originally formed. The commanders of these regiments having imbibed the idea of rendering their corps as perfect in discipline as possible, observed that the substitutes in general made more complete soldiers than the principals. The persons ready to enter into the militia as substitutes, naturally were those who had no strong tie to engage them to remain at home; and the same motives which led them at first to enter upon a military life, induced them to continue in it as a permanent profession. Men of this description were ready to re-enter at the termination of their first engagement. Remaining permanently in the regiment, they acquired more perfectly the habits of soldiers, and, from the first, perhaps, were more ready to adopt the character and spirit of the military profession, than men who
looked

looked to a speedy return to their former avocations. Thus many officers, with whom the appearance of their regiments on parade was a subject of emulation, were disposed to encourage the practice of serving by substitute.

From these causes the militia regiments came, even in the course of the American war, to be composed principally of substitutes. In the course of the wars in which we have been lately engaged, the same plan has been followed; and when the period of service in the militia was progressively extended to the whole duration of the war, the objections against serving in person became much aggravated, and naturally led to the state of things which we now see,—that no individual, who can possibly gather together a sufficient sum of money to purchase his exemption, will serve in person. The substitutes evidently must be men of the same description, as those who enter into the regulars by voluntary enlistment. Thus the original intention of
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the militia act, to establish a rotation among the privates, and to train in succession a number of men from the mass of the people, is absolutely at an end. Nor are the officers any longer composed of country gentlemen of considerable property, as in the theoretical view of the militia. Excepting the Colonels, and a few others of the highest rank, the officers of the militia, in general, are but little connected by property with the counties to which the regiments belong. With the great mass of the landed property of the kingdom, the officers of the militia are certainly less connected than those of the line, directly or indirectly, are. Whether, therefore, we look to the officers or to the private men, we have no reason to believe that the militia can participate more in the principles and sentiments of the people than the regular army. The single difference, that the officers are not appointed directly by the Crown, is certainly a very slight foundation on which to build the idea, that the militia can be used as a balance against the regular army.

After

After what has been said, it must appear quite superfluous to enter into any discussion concerning this idea, of setting up one part of the military force of the nation as a balance against another, or to expose the contradictions and the labyrinth of impracticability in which the whole system is involved. The original idea of the militia, whether well or ill managed, is now completely lost. The present militia has no resemblance whatsoever to the species of force which it was intended to form; and we only repeat words to which no ideas are affixed, when we persist in calling the militia the Constitutional force of the country.

When we take an impartial view of the militia, we see regiments of a very fine appearance, as perfect in their duty, perhaps, as can be expected of those who have never seen service. The question, however, is not, whether these are good regiments, but, whether they might not be more useful, if they were on the same establishment as the
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rest of the army? The militia establishment would appear to have been contrived with singular ingenuity, so as to lose all peculiar advantages both of a regular army and of a militia. A real militia should be composed of the mass of the people, of those who have a direct interest in the defence of the country; every man fighting by the side of a neighbour or a friend, all united under their natural superiors, and commanded in the field by the same men, whom they have been accustomed to respect in the ordinary intercourse of civil life. Such a force may be expected naturally to possess a degree of patriotic spirit, which cannot easily be infused into the ordinary description of recruits; and if inferior to an army of professional soldiers in regular discipline, and technical dexterity, the disadvantage may be in some measure counterbalanced by a superior degree of enthusiasm for the cause in which they are engaged. Of these advantages our present militia is not, and cannot be possessed; while, on the other hand, the
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inconveniences, which are inseparable from a permanent military force, are not in them compensated by the means of attaining to the highest degree of professional excellence. The men are as little accustomed to the sight of an enemy as any of the mass of the people. The officers have had no opportunity of exercising their judgment on occasions of real service, and they are deprived of that spirit of emulation which would be excited, if they might aspire to the highest honours of the profession. Without any advantage to counterbalance the inconveniences of an army, the militia are excluded from all but the parade of a military life. Can it admit of a doubt, that these regiments would become more effective, if their establishment were so altered as to assimilate them to the regiments of the line, and if the same prospects of promotion could be opened to their officers?

On these grounds it seems to be evident that the militia, as at present constituted, ought

ought not to be kept up as a separate establishment, and that our whole permanent force ought, as far as possible, to be on the footing of regular troops. If the militia regiments were not now embodied, there would be no motive for the formation of such a description of force. When the regular service is rendered so advantageous to the soldier as it now is, there can be no doubt that a sufficient number of men may be obtained by voluntary enlistment, for all the foreign duty which our national interests can require; and the Local Militia may be considered as superseding the necessity of any other demand of compulsory service for home defence. If, therefore, we had to begin, as on the breaking out of a new war, no inconvenience would arise, if the militia of our present establishment were never again to be called out. In our present circumstances, however, we cannot dispense with the immediate services of the regiments now embodied. Our only choice, therefore, lies between keeping up these regiments, such

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as they are, or attempting to render them more useful to the public service, by assimilating them, in some degree, to the troops of the line.

Those principles of good faith, which it is the pride of this country to maintain inviolate, form a bar against any alteration on the present constitution of the militia, except with the consent of the individuals engaged in these regiments; but it does not seem impossible that this consent may be obtained, without any extravagant sacrifice on the part of the public.

The pernicious consequences to the discipline of the militia regiments, which have arisen from allowing individual soldiers to volunteer from the militia into the line, ought to discourage any renewal of that expedient; but if the militia could be induced to volunteer by whole regiments for general service, or, at least, for more extensive service, it would be a great gain to the public. If the constitutional prohibition

hibition were removed, if His Majesty were empowered to accept of their extended services, it does not seem improbable that the consent, both of the officers and men, might be obtained, by an offer of bounty to the men, accompanied by a grant of permanent rank in the army to the officers. It might be too much to propose, that they should enjoy the full advantages of the rank corresponding to that which they hold in the Militia; but an arrangement of this nature would admit of a great variety of modifications, among which some plan may probably be found to reconcile the interest of the militia officers with the public advantage.

FROM all the arrangements which have Sect. 6.
 been proposed, it is sufficiently apparent
 that a great accession will be obtained to
 the national strength, and an immediate
 relief from the dangers which now press
 upon

uonp us. This, however, is but a small part of the considerations which recommend these measures ; for it is only through the establishment of an effectual system of national defence that we can bring the hostilities in which we are now engaged, to a satisfactory termination ; or, indeed, that we can hope in future to enjoy the blessings of peace. If, without any better organization of our defensive force, than that which now subsists, we should be induced to conclude what some people call a Peace, the hand that signs the instrument, will seal the doom of our national independence.

We may be well assured that our antagonist will not reduce his military establishment: there will be no relaxation in his naval preparations: an interval of peace will only enable him to carry them on with increased activity. What, on the other hand, would be the necessary effect of peace upon the naval and military establishment of this country? The reduction of the militia might perhaps
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be compensated by an immediate and ostensible addition to our regular army. But except on the principles which have here been urged, we can have no compensation for the loss of the Volunteer force. Under any semblance of peace, that establishment must immediately fall to pieces. It is impossible to suppose that any thing short of the immediate prospect of impending invasion, can induce this great body of men to neglect their private concerns, and to make a spontaneous sacrifice of their time to the public service,—can animate their exertions, or keep alive that zeal without which they cannot be an efficient military force.

Thus a peace, however hollow and insecure, must reduce our defensive force to the regular army alone; and no one will venture to assert that this kingdom could maintain a regular army sufficient by itself, to resist the immense numbers of the enemy. What then is to be our situation, if the empty show of

pacification should disband our Volunteers, without any effectual means having been adopted to replace them by a more permanent establishment? Disarmed in presence of an enemy who is armed at all points, we may submit to a superior power, but peace we cannot have; unless that is to be called a peace, with which Austria and Russia have been honoured, or that of which Spain is now reaping the fruits.

By the establishment of a numerous and well organized Local Militia, we may secure the permanence of an effective domestic force: our means of resisting invasion will then be liable to no fluctuation,—our enemy can never find us unprepared. The training of the youth to arms will go on with a regular and steady progress, in peace as well as in war: every year will improve the discipline and the efficiency of our internal defensive force,—every year will add to the numbers of those who are prepared to assist in the defence of their country. Whatever addition the enemy can

can make during peace to his naval power and to his means of attack, we shall be able fully to keep pace with him in the improvement of our means of defence on shore. Should the war be renewed, whether sooner or later, we shall not have lost in our relative strength during the interval: nor shall we return to the contest under circumstances of comparative disadvantage. Thus, and thus only, can we conclude peace with undiminished security, and with any prospect of permanence. Thus, and thus only, can we obtain its blessings without the sacrifice of national honour.

If it be imagined, that the proposed establishment would be too great a burden on the finances of the country, I may boldly aver, that by no other method can the same degree of protection be afforded with so small an expense. Many plans have, of late years, been suggested for the increase of the regular army; and, in all the discussions to which they have given

rise, no one ever called in question the advantage of adding to our military force, though such an increase must undoubtedly have led to an increased national expenditure. The failure of so many successive schemes for raising men seems to indicate, that we are not far from the utmost limit of the numbers, which our population can afford for regular military service. If, however, means could be pointed out of making an addition of 50,000 or 100,000 men to our regular army, who is there that would object to it on the ground of expense? Since it is impracticable to obtain an adequate regular force, the deficiency must be supplied by measures of a different description; and if these be effectual for their purpose, the expense cannot be a valid objection, any more than it would be against the increase of our regular army. If at present, with an annual expenditure of more than 40 millions, our national independence is not secure, and if by an addition of 6 or 800,000*l.* annually, it can be placed beyond the reach of
of

of hazard, what part of our expenses can we have less reason to regret?

By the formation of a Local Militia, the Volunteer establishment will be rendered superfluous, and this will make a great deduction from the expense to be incurred. That of the Volunteers, at present, is not much less than a million; and to bring it even within these bounds, it has been necessary to reduce their allowances, and to limit their opportunities of exercise to a degree quite inconsistent with the acquisition of military habits. If real services are to be looked for from the Volunteers, it will be necessary, at least, to replace their establishment upon its original scale, and to incur a corresponding expenditure. In the first three years, the Volunteer establishment was reckoned to have cost the public five millions; while the Local Militia, at its regular and permanent establishment, would cost little more than 1,600,000.*

* See Appendix, B.

annually.

annually. Thus, there would be no great difference between the annual burden of our domestic force on either plan of organization; but, in the result, there would be this immense difference, that in the one case we should have a force which can only remain in vigour during a short period of universal zeal and national enthusiasm; and in the other, we should have a permanent system of defence, liable to no fluctuation, continually improving in its efficacy.

To the regular annual expense of the Local Militia, we have indeed to add the extraordinary charges of the first year, amounting, in all probability, to nearly three millions,—a large sum undoubtedly, yet not greater than we have paid in subsidies to continental powers, for the expenses of a single campaign. But, on what occasion could we entertain an expectation, that, from the co-operation of a continental power, we should derive any benefit to be compared to that, of placing the

the security of England now and for ever beyond the reach of all foreign attack? When we look at the cheerless prospect of unceasing dangers, which our present situation exhibits, and compare to this the perfect security within our reach, may we not consider the pecuniary burden, which must attend the first establishment of an effectual system of national defence, as the premium which we have to pay for a new charter of our national privileges? Let us reflect on all the blessings which this country now enjoys, and all which a French tyrant would annihilate, and then think whether it be a dear purchase, when for three millions we secure the independence of the Crown, and the liberties of England.

That the plan which has been here laid down would interfere, in some degree, with the industrious pursuits of the country, and that inconvenience would arise in the course of its execution to many of those who fall within the range of its operation, or to those connected with them, are points which

which it is needless to deny. The farmer may be deprived of the labour of his servant: the merchant or the manufacturer may be put to inconvenience by the absence of a clerk, a journeyman, or an apprentice. If there be any persons who think these of sufficient importance to be stated as grounds of objection against the measure, I would only wish to ask, whether these inconveniences outweigh the horrors of French conquest? To any man, who can lay much stress on such topics, it is, perhaps, in vain to talk of the consequences which a deficiency of preparation would produce to the country at large: if, however, he think little of the loss of the constitution and liberties of England, let him at least recollect, that if this country follows the fate of Holland, the case will come home to his own pecuniary interest.

Those who may not see absolute and unqualified personal ruin in the pillage and the confiscations of a conquest, or in
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the general subversion of public and private credit, must expect to pay contributions more rigorous and oppressive than the richest cities of the Continent have had to submit to. It is stated, by persons who have ample opportunities of information, that the repeated contributions levied by the French in Holland, have drained off fully two-thirds of the capital which every merchant was possessed of under the government of the House of Orange. We have no reason to suppose that less rigour will be used towards the citizens of London than of Amsterdam. On the contrary, the commercial prosperity of England has been so long an object of envy and jealousy to the French, that our merchants must expect to feel a double weight of vengeance and rapacity. In addition to this, the French appear to entertain such extravagant and exaggerated ideas of the wealth of England, that, after our moneyed men are reduced to absolute beggary, it will still be believed that they have concealed treasures, to obtain the disclosure of which, personal violence, and, perhaps,

perhaps, torture, may be deemed a proper expedient.

Trifling, indeed, must be the greatest inconvenience that can possibly be apprehended from the operation of these defensive measures, in comparison of the evils which they are calculated to avert. The only question, then, which a reasonable man can admit is, Whether any other plan can be devised to give us the same degree of security with less inconvenience, and to avoid the objections which may be made to a Local Militia, without being less efficacious? The force, however, against which we have to contend, is not to be resisted, without the combined exertions of a very great proportion of our people; and when such efforts are required, it is impossible to suppose, that the ordinary business of the country must not suffer some interruption. It will not be easy, consistently with the effectual attainment of the object, to give less interruption than by the plan which has been laid down; for the young men, on whom it imposes the burden of
military

military service, are, of all classes of people, those who can be spared from their ordinary occupations.

In the arrangement of the details of the measure, it must certainly be an object of attention to mitigate, as far as possible, those inconveniences which cannot be entirely removed. Regulations must be adopted to obviate personal wrong, from the interference with the rights of masters over their apprentices, and other similar relations. In all indentures already executed, it would seem equitable, that the period in which the labour of the apprentice is withdrawn from the master, should be made up at the end of the engagement: on the other hand, the corporation laws, which require specific periods of apprenticeship, to entitle a young man to particular privileges, should be so modified, that the time legally employed by an apprentice in military duties, should be reckoned, as if no interruption had been given to his industrious pursuits.

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The various regulations which may be adopted, in order to alleviate, as far as possible, the personal inconvenience arising from the proposed measures, would lead to a minuteness of discussion, into which it does not appear necessary now to enter. I shall only further observe, that if, with this view, any species of substitution should be admitted, any exemption in favour of the higher ranks of society, or any which can be purchased by pecuniary sacrifices, the whole principles and foundation of the plan would be subverted. That all should share alike in the burden of defending their country, is a fundamental principle, not only of justice, but of policy. To lay the burden of compulsory service upon the poor, and not upon the rich, would be contrary to the spirit of that constitution which it is our ambition to preserve. If such a line of policy should be adopted, and if, under the impressions to which it might naturally lead, the mass of the people should contribute the service required of them with reluctance and discontent,

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the consequences might be most fatal. How would the national character be degraded! how would the loyal spirit of the country be undermined, if, in the defence of our liberties, those who are the most deeply interested, should manifest a disposition to throw every burden on their less fortunate neighbours!

The preservation of that Government, under which this country has attained a degree of happiness scarcely paralleled in history, cannot be a matter of indifference even to the poorest man in the realm. But, assuredly, the man of superior condition has a stronger interest in the preservation of that order of things, upon which his greatness depends. In the subjugation of the country, and in the subversion of property which must accompany it, the severest fall awaits those whose situation is now the most elevated. It is, therefore, incumbent on the rich and powerful of every class, and chiefly on the landed aristocracy,

toocracy, to set an example of zeal and of patriotism, and to be foremost in submitting, with alacrity, to the personal sacrifices and toils, which the exigency of the crisis demands.

By those, indeed, from whom these sacrifices are most immediately required, it is scarcely to be apprehended, that they will be at all considered as a toil or a hardship.—Though no exemption can be admitted from those exercises which are requisite for the attainment of military knowledge, yet, as the youth of superior condition are not mixed indiscriminately in the general mass, it may be hoped that nothing will be found in the plan, peculiarly grating to the feelings of the higher orders; and surely it cannot be imagined, that military exercises will of themselves be a severe burden on the youth of an active and high-spirited nation. Such indeed are the animation and the interesting variety of the occupations of a military life, that by
young

young men, in general, they are more frequently considered as an amusement ; and the exercises of the Local Militia will probably be looked upon by most of those on whom they are imposed, as an interval of recreation amidst the drudgery of duller pursuits.

There is more probability of objection on the part of some parents, who suffer lesser considerations to press with undue influence on their minds, and who may object to the military duty required of their sons, lest it should, in some measure, derange the plans of life which they have laid down for them. I trust that there is little cause for the apprehension : but were even greater sacrifices to be demanded, let them view with attention the awful alternative ; let them recollect the miserable and degraded condition in which, but a few years since, we saw the proud nobility of France begging for bread ; let them recollect, that this is the fate which every man of property in Britain must expect from
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the success of our rancorous foe ; let them reflect how thankfully a parent, in these circumstances, would redeem his lost condition, upon much severer terms than the sacrifice of a few months to be spent by his son in military education.

APPEN-

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APPENDIX, A.

IN the first of the subjoined Tables, the Population of every County in Great Britain is set down (in the first column), according to the returns made to Parliament in the year 1801. From these numbers the second and fourth columns are calculated, according to data derived from Dr. Price's Tables; the second column containing the proportion of males between the ages of 19 and 26, and the fourth those between 18 and 19. The third column is in the proportions of two-thirds of the second, and the fifth in the same proportion to the fourth. If, therefore, the hypothesis laid down in page 24, prove correct, the third column may be set down as the estimated number of effective Local Militia in each County, and the fifth as the number of young men who are annually to be trained.—The sixth column shows the number of those who will be embodied in the Training Battalion at one time, being according to the suggestion in page 28, in the proportion of three-tenths of those who are to be trained in the course of the year.

In the construction of this Table, all fractions have been thrown away, so that the totals of the different columns do not correspond with each other minutely, in the proportions that have been stated.—It is also to be observed that the total numbers fall short of the result, which would be obtained, if the same proportions were applied to the population of the kingdom at large. In the general enumeration, the Army, Navy, and Scamen in Registered Shipping, are not

M included

included in any County; and hence the aggregate Population of all the different Counties falls short of that of the whole Kingdom by about one twenty-third part.—It is needless to enter into minute corrections with a view of rectifying these discrepancies; since an approximation to the truth is all that can be expected from data that are in so great a degree hypothetical. These Calculations, however, have been submitted to the revision of men of the first eminence in this line of science, and have appeared to them likely to give results not very wide of the truth, and the best that can be obtained without other documents than are now attainable.

In the second Table, the estimated numbers of effective Local Militia in each County, and of those embodied in the Training Battalions, are extracted from the first Table, and the Counties are classed into Military Districts, as nearly equal in Population as circumstances will admit, and such that each will afford a Training Battalion of a convenient number.

The object of the third Table, is to show how soon, in case of invasion, the quotas of the different Counties and Districts may be brought to act against the enemy; and what numbers of Local Militia may be collected at London within any given number of days after the alarm is given.

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TABLE I.

Counties.	COL. 1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
	Total Population.	Males of the Age of 19 to 26.		Males of the Age of 18 to 19.		
		Total.	Effective	Total.	Effective	Priming
Bedford	63,393	3,476	2,316	514	342	102
Berks	109,215	5,990	3,998	885	590	177
Buckingham	107,444	5,892	3,928	871	580	174
Cambridge	89,346	4,899	3,266	724	482	144
Chester	191,751	10,517	7,010	1,555	1,036	309
Cornwall	188,269	10,325	6,882	1,526	1,016	303
Cumberland	117,230	6,429	4,286	950	632	189
Derby	161,142	8,838	5,898	1,306	870	261
Devon	343,001	18,813	12,542	2,781	1,854	555
Dorset	115,319	6,324	4,216	935	622	186
Durham	160,361	8,795	5,862	1,300	866	258
Essex	226,437	12,419	8,278	1,826	1,224	366
Gloucester	250,809	13,756	9,170	2,034	1,356	405
Hereford	89,191	4,891	3,260	723	482	144
Hertford	97,577	5,351	3,566	791	526	156
Huntingdon	37,568	2,059	1,372	304	202	60
Kent	307,624	16,873	11,248	2,494	1,662	498
Lancaster	672,781	36,898	24,598	5,455	3,636	1,089
Leicester	190,081	7,134	4,756	1,054	702	210
Lincoln	208,557	11,439	7,626	1,691	1,126	336
Middlesex	818,129	44,873	29,914	6,635	4,422	1,326
Monmouth	45,582	2,499	1,666	369	246	72
Norfolk	273,371	14,994	9,996	2,217	1,478	441
Northampton	131,757	7,226	4,816	1,068	712	213
Northumberland	157,101	8,616	5,744	1,274	848	252
Nottingham	140,350	7,698	5,132	1,136	758	225
Oxford	109,620	6,012	4,008	889	592	177
Rutland	16,356	896	596	132	88	24
Salop	167,639	9,194	6,128	1,359	906	270
Somerset	273,750	15,014	10,008	2,220	1,492	447
Southampton	219,656	12,047	8,030	1,781	1,186	354
Stafford	239,153	13,116	8,744	1,939	1,292	387
Suffolk	210,431	11,541	7,694	1,706	1,136	339

Counties.	Total Population.	Males of the Age of 19 to 26.		Males of the Age of 18 to 19.		
		Total.	Effective.	Total.	Effective	Training.
Surry . . .	269,048	14,756	9,836	2,181	1,454	495
Sussex . . .	159,911	8,737	5,824	1,292	860	258
Warwick . . .	208,190	11,416	7,612	1,688	1,124	336
Westmorland . . .	41,617	2,281	1,520	337	224	66
Wilts . . .	185,107	10,132	6,754	1,501	1,000	300
Worcester . . .	139,338	7,642	5,094	1,129	752	225
York East Riding	139,435	7,647	5,094	1,130	752	225
Ditto North ditto	155,506	8,529	5,686	1,261	840	252
Ditto West ditto	563,953	30,932	20,620	4,573	3,048	912
Total of England	3,331,434	156,918	904,598	67,548	45,016	13,458
Anglesey . . .	33,806	1,853	1,234	274	182	54
Brecon . . .	31,633	1,734	1,156	256	170	51
Cardigan . . .	42,956	2,355	1,570	348	232	69
Caermarthen . . .	67,917	3,692	2,460	545	362	108
Carnarvon . . .	41,521	2,276	1,516	336	224	66
Denbigh . . .	60,352	3,310	2,206	489	326	96
Flint . . .	39,622	2,172	1,448	321	214	63
Glamorgan . . .	71,525	3,922	2,614	580	386	114
Merioneth . . .	29,506	1,677	1,078	239	158	45
Montgomery . . .	47,978	2,631	1,754	389	258	75
Pembroke . . .	56,280	3,086	2,056	456	304	90
Radnor . . .	19,050	1,043	694	154	102	30
Total of Wales	541,546	29,691	19,786	4,387	2,918	861
Aberdeen . . .	123,082	6,750	4,500	998	664	198
Argyle . . .	71,859	3,940	2,626	582	388	114
Ayr . . .	84,306	4,623	3,082	683	454	135
Banff . . .	35,807	1,963	1,308	290	192	57
Berwick . . .	30,621	1,679	1,118	248	164	48
Bute . . .	11,791	646	430	95	62	18
Caithness . . .	22,609	1,240	826	183	122	36
Clackmannan . . .	10,858	594	396	88	58	15
Cromarty . . .	3,052	167	110	24	16	3
Dumbarton . . .	20,710	1,135	756	167	110	33
Dumfries . . .	54,597	2,994	1,996	442	294	87
Edinburgh . . .	122,954	6,743	4,494	997	664	198
Elgin . . .	26,705	1,464	976	216	144	42
Fife . . .	93,743	5,141	3,426	760	506	150

of Training	Counties.	Total Population.	Males of the Age of 19 to 26.		Males of the Age of 18 to 19.		
			Total.	Effective.	Total.	Effective.	Training.
435	Forfar	99,127	5,496	3,624	803	594	159
258	Haddington . . .	29,986	1,644	1,096	249	162	48
336	Inverness	74,292	4,074	2,716	602	400	120
66	Kincardine . . .	26,349	1,444	962	213	142	42
300	Kinross	6,725	368	244	54	36	9
225	Kirkeudbright . .	29,211	1,601	1,066	236	156	45
225	Lanark	146,699	8,046	5,364	1,188	792	237
252	Linlithgow	17,844	977	650	144	96	27
912	Nairn	8,257	452	300	66	44	12
13,458	Orkney & Shetland	46,824	2,567	1,710	379	252	75
	Peebles	8,735	478	318	70	46	12
	Perth	126,366	6,930	4,620	1,024	682	204
54	Renfrew	78,056	4,281	2,854	633	422	126
51	Ross	52,291	2,867	1,910	424	282	84
69	Roxburgh	33,682	1,847	1,230	273	182	54
108	Selkirk	5,070	277	184	41	26	6
66	Stirling	50,825	2,786	1,856	412	274	81
96	Sutherland	23,117	1,267	844	187	124	36
63	Wigtoun	22,918	1,256	836	185	122	36
114	Scotland	1,599,068	87,677	58,428	12,950	8,612	2,547
45	England	8,331,434	456,918	304,598	67,548	45,016	13,458
75	Wales	541,546	29,691	19,786	4,387	2,918	861
90		10,472,048	574,486	382,812	84,885	56,546	16,866
30							
861							

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TABLE II.

Counties.	Districts.	Effective Local Militia.	Training Battalions.	
Kent	1	11,248	498	
Sussex	2	5,824	258	
Surry	3	9,836	435	
Middlesex, 3 Districts	4	10,000	1,326 { 453	
	5	29,914 { 10,000		443
	6	9,914		
Essex	7	8,278	366	
Suffolk	8	7,694	339	
Norfolk	9	9,996	441	
Cambridge	10	3,266	144 } 306	
Huntingdon		1,372		60 } 102
Bedford		2,316		
Hertford	11	3,566	156 } 330	
Buckingham		3,928		174
Oxford	12	4,008	177 } 354	
Berks		3,998		177
Southampton	13	8,030	354	
Wilts	14	6,754	300 } 486	
Dorset		4,216		186
Devon	15	12,542	555	
Cornwall	16	6,882	303	
Somerset	17	10,008	447	
Gloucester	18	9,170	405	
Worcester	19	5,094	225 } 441	
Monmouth		1,666		72 } 144
Hereford		3,260		
Salop	20	6,128	270	
Warwick	21	7,612	386	
Stafford	22	8,744	387	
Leicester	23	4,756	210 } 447	
Rutland		596		24 } 213
Northampton		4,816		

Counties.	Districts	Effective Local Militia.	Training Battalions.
Lincoln	24	7,626	336
Nottingham	25	5,132	225
Derby		5,898	
Chester	26	7,010	309
York West Riding, 2	27	20,620	912
Districts			
York East Ditto	29	5,098	225
York North Ditto		5,686	252
Lancaster, 2 Districts	30	12,300	1,089
		31	
Cumberland	*32	4,236	189
Westmorland		1,520	66
Northumberland	33	5,744	252
Durham		5,862	258
		304,598	13,458
Anglesey	34	1,234	54
Carnarvon		1,516	66
Denbigh		2,206	96
Flint		1,448	63
Montgomery		1,754	75
Merioneth		1,078	45
Radnor		694	30
Pembroke		2,056	90
Caermarthen		2,460	108
Cardigan		35	1,570
Glamorgan	2,614		114
Brecon		1,234	51

N. B. A part of Lancashire might be conveniently added to this District.

Counties.	Districts.	Effective Local Militia.	Training Battalions.
Berwick	36	1,118	48
Roxburgh		1,230	54
Selkirk		184	6
Peebles		318	12
Haddington		1,096	48
Edinburgh	37	4,494	198
Linlithgow		650	27
Dumfries		1,996	87
Kirkcudbright		1,066	45
Wigtoun		836	36
Ayr	38	3,082	135
Lanark		5,364	237
Renfrew		2,854	126
Argyle		2,626	114
Bute		430	18
Dumbarton	39	756	33
Stirling		1,856	81
Inverness		2,716	120
Ross		1,910	84
Cromarty		110	3
Sutherland	40	844	36
Caithness		826	36
Orkney		1,710	75
Nairn		300	12
Elgin		976	42
Bamff	41	1,308	57
Aberdeen		4,500	198
Kincardine		962	42
Forfar		3,624	159
Perth		4,620	204
Fife	42	3,426	160
Kinross		244	9
Clackmanan		396	15
		9,090	393
		6,980	303
		8,218	363
		5,668	246
		8,116	354
		8,046	351
		12,310	537

TABLE III.

THE subjoined Table gives a view of the numbers of Local Militia which may be brought into action, within a given time after the appearance of the enemy. On the first alarm, each Battalion is supposed to assemble at its own rendezvous, and, on receiving orders from London, to march separately, by the most direct route, to the place where they are appointed to join the Army. Reckoning from the time that orders are dispatched by Government, the first day may be allowed for the conveyance of these orders, and for the different Corps to assemble and prepare for their march.—Those from the distant counties are then supposed to march at the rate of 15 miles per day towards London.—All the Corps which assemble at posts within 30 miles of London, may therefore be reckoned to arrive at the general rendezvous within three days;—those which are at more than 30, but less than 45 miles, on the fourth day; and so on.—The counties of Kent and Essex being those through which the enemy must advance, their Militia will join the Army near the coast, and may be reckoned, along with those of London itself, as ready almost from the first, or at least before the enemy can possibly reach the capital.—The total number of Local Militia from each county is taken at the same as in Table II., throwing away fractions less than 100; and these totals are divided into different Columns, according to the proportion of population residing within each distance from London.

TABLE III.

Distance beyond London . . .	Less than 30 Miles.	From 30 to 45 Miles.	From 45 to 60 Miles.	From 60 to 90 Miles.	From 90 to 120 Miles.	From 120 to 150 Miles.
Supposed to join .	{ Within 3 Days.	4th Day.	5th Day.	6th & 7th Days.	8th & 9th Days.	10th and 11th Days.
Kent	11,200					
Essex	8,200					
Middlesex	29,900					
Surry	9,000	800				
Hertfordshire	2,800	700				
Bedfordshire	1,100	1,200			
Buckinghamshire	1,000	1,700	1,200			
Berkshire	600	1,200	1,500	700		
Oxfordshire	600	1,400	2,000		
Hampshire	800	2,400	4,000		
Sussex	2,200	3,000	600		
Northamptonshire	4,800		
Huntingdonshire	400	900		
Cambridgeshire	300	1,400	1,500		
Suffolk	600	5,000	2,000	
Norfolk	1,000	8,000	1,000
Rutlandshire	600	
Leicestershire	4,700	
Warwickshire	2,300	5,300	
Gloucestershire	1,000	7,500	600
Wiltshire	3,300	3,400	
Dorsetshire	3,400	800
Somersetshire	4,000	5,000
Worcestershire	4,000	1,000
Monmouthshire	1,200
Herefordshire	3,200	
Carried over						

Distance beyond London . . .	Less than 30 Miles.	From 30 to 45 Miles.	From 45 to 60 Miles.	From 60 to 90 Miles.	From 90 to 120 Miles.	From 120 to 150 Miles.	
Supposed to join . . .	{ Within 3 Days.	4th Day.	5th Day.	6th & 7th Days.	8th & 9th Days.	10th and 11th Days.	
Brought over . . .							
Shropshire . . .						2,000	
Staffordshire . . .					400	7,400	
Derbyshire . . .					500	3,500	
Nottinghamshire . . .					500	4,600	
Lincolnshire . . .					2,800	2,800	
Numbers capable of assembling within	3 Days . . .	62,700 9,400	9,400	13,100	27,100	50,300	29,900
	4 Days . . .	72,100 13,100					
	5 Days . . .	85,200 27,100					
	7 Days . . .	112,300 50,300					
	9 Days . . .	162,600 29,900					
	11 Days . . .	192,500					

APPENDIX, B.

ACCORDING to the arrangement proposed, there will be in the whole kingdom 42 Training Battalions, to each of which will be required, a Lieutenant-Colonel, a Major, an Adjutant, and a Quarter-Master. These Battalions will consist of about 300 Companies ; to each a Captain, a Lieutenant, and 4 Serjeants. Allowing to all these permanent pay, at the same rate as to Officers in corps for limited service, the whole Establishment will amount to about 153,000*l*.

The young men entering annually into the Local Militia will amount to nearly 60,000, whose Arms and Accoutrements will cost 50*s*. per man ; Clothing and Necessaries will also be required to the amount of 3*l*. 10*s*. per man. Part of this clothing must be renewed at the end of 3 years ; but, allowing for casualties, there will be only about 58,000 for whom this second clothing must be provided, at the rate of 44*s*. per man.—These two sets of clothing are supposed to be sufficient for the whole regular period of each man's service.

During the time that the Local Militia are on duty, either as Training Battalions, or in the General Assemblage, the men are supposed to receive pay, at the rate of 1*s*. per day. With respect to the Officers of the Local Battalions, it is to be observed, that the Commandants of Battalions are the only individuals who make a spontaneous sacrifice

of

of their time and trouble by their attendance. All the Captains and Subalterns are persons subject to the same compulsory duty as the common men. There is therefore no call for allowing to them a higher rate of pay, than may be requisite for defraying the extra expenses to which their situation of officers will subject them. For this purpose, it may be deemed sufficient to allow them pay at the same rate as Lieutenants in the Militia and Fencibles. Supposing a Captain and two Subalterns to each Company, the whole amount of their pay for the three weeks of the General Assemblage will be about 20*l.* per Company. The Colonels of the Local Battalions will be subject to a number of extra expenses, for which a liberal indemnification ought to be allowed, and perhaps 30*l.* for each General Assemblage will not be too much for this purpose. Supposing a Local Battalion to consist of 10 Companies, these allowances will amount to 230*l.*; to which if we add 20*l.* for the extra pay of Non-commissioned Officers, over and above their ordinary pay as privates, there will be a charge of 250*l.* for each of about 600 Local Battalions.

Independently of the ordinary pay and allowances, some expense must be incurred by the encampment of large bodies of men in the General Assemblage.—This may, in some respects, be diminished, if the same encampment be occupied in succession by different bodies of men. As the Militia of each County will remain only three weeks encamped, the same preparations may perhaps be made to serve for 4 different Brigades in succession, without extending the periods of the encampments to an inconvenient season.—It will be sufficient therefore to provide camp equipage as for 100,000 men. The tear and wear of this equipage
must

must be allowed for, as well as a number of incidental expenses attending the encampments. It is not easy to estimate these with precision, but it does not seem probable that they can amount to more than 200,000*l.* annually.

Adding together these several articles of expense, the amount will stand as follows :

Officers for the Training Battalions	- -	£.	153,000
Arms and Accoutrements for 60,000 men, at 2 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i>	- - - - } - - - - }		150,000
Clothing, &c. for ditto, at 3 <i>l.</i> 10 <i>s.</i>	- -		210,000
Second Clothing for 58,000 men, at 2 <i>l.</i> 4 <i>s.</i>			127,600
Training 60,000 men, each 84 days, at 1 <i>s.</i>	-		252,000
General Assemblage, 400,000 men, 21 days, at 1 <i>s.</i>	- - - - } - - - - }		420,000
Officers for 600 Local Battalions, at 250 <i>l.</i> each			150,000
Expense of Encampments, &c.	- -		200,000
			<u>£1,662,600</u>

APPENDIX, C.


It cannot be doubted that in the course of the disembarkation, and of the first days after the enemy may have made good their landing, they must be involved in many embarrassing situations, and will often be in a predicament when they might be attacked with advantage. There is no certainty, however, that our forces can be ready to profit by these circumstances; and if we rest much of our defence upon that contingency, it may involve us in the greatest dangers.

It is a supposition destitute of all probability, that our army should be ready encamped exactly at the place at which the enemy make their landing. We have so extensive a coast exposed to invasion, that our army cannot be collected at any one point, without leaving others unprotected. When we hear of the flotilla being in readiness on the shores of Holland, or of Flanders, we have no means of judging whether the destination of the enemy may be for Yarmouth or for Deal. Even when their forces are actually embarked, they may be carried (and in many cases with nearly equal facility) to a number of different points, either north or south of the Thames. If, then, our commanders determine to concentrate their forces, and to keep a respectable army together, they cannot choose any position on the coast, without leaving many others where the enemy may land without opposition. If, on the other hand, they attempt to guard every part of the coast, their





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forces must be drawn out along so extensive a line, that they must necessarily be very weak at each particular point. At no one station could we have a sufficient body of troops to resist the invading army. All the natural obstacles which the situation can afford, will not enable a few regiments effectually to resist a powerful army. The enemy may be expected to use every exertion to bring a large force to act together in one combined attack; and bearing down the feeble detachments which they meet at the shore, they may attack our forces in detail, and gain important advantages before our scattered troops can be drawn together into one army.

In these circumstances, it may certainly admit of a doubt, whether it would not be more prudent to quit the coast altogether, and to occupy some central position, where a respectable army may remain constantly assembled, and ready to meet the enemy in whatever quarter their attack may be made. An intermediate plan may be suggested, and seems, in fact, to meet the ideas of Government, that the great body of our forces should not be stationed exactly at the coast, but in a second line, at some distance back. Their positions will thus extend along a narrower circle, and they may be more easily drawn together into one army, than if they were stationed immediately on the shore. If their communications can be well maintained, this plan is not, perhaps, objectionable. It certainly has the advantage of enabling our commanders, with a part of their force, to meet the enemy more speedily after their landing, than if our whole army were in one camp, at a greater distance back. Even on this plan, however, our troops must be stationed at such a distance from the shore, that an invading army, arriving unexpectedly, may probably

bably establish themselves before a sufficient force can be brought down to give them effectual opposition.

It is not, perhaps, impossible, that an inferior number of our troops may annoy the enemy, to a considerable degree, before they make good their landing; perhaps too, a fortunate concurrence of accidents may enable a judicious commander to gain decisive advantages, while the enemy are involved in the embarrassments of a disembarkation. If we could obtain sufficiently accurate information as to the movements of the enemy, this might not be improbable; but if all the chances of the contrary be considered, we ought perhaps to look upon such an event as one of those contingencies, for which we may possibly be indebted to the good management or the good fortune of our commanders, rather than as an event which we may expect with certainty, and upon which we may safely rest our defence.

THE END.

