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

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ON THE

PAST RELATIONS

BETWEEN

GREAT BRITAIN

AND

THE UNITED STATES.

LONDON:

Printed by G. SIDNEY, Northumberland-Street, Strand.

1813.

REPORT

ON THE PROGRESS OF THE
WORK DURING THE YEAR 1900

PRESENTED TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY
AT THE ANNUAL MEETING

Held at the University of Cambridge
on the 10th of July 1901

By the
SECRETARY

JOHN EDGAR
1901

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A REVIEW

Of the past Relations between Great Britain and the United States of America.

[Extracted from No. 4, of the **NEW QUARTERLY REVIEW**
AND BRITISH COLONIAL REGISTER ;
Published by J. M. Richardson, Cornhill, London.]

OUR commercial relations with the United States of America being now at an end, and the differences existing between the two countries having been brought to the decision of the sword, after wasting more than twenty years in unprofitable concessions, and fruitless negotiations, it would answer no good purpose to go over all the grounds of the many errors we have committed, in our various transactions with the government of these States. The whole diplomatic intercourse of this long period, betrays such a spirit of encroachment and fraud, on the part of the American government, and such a system of forbearance and fluctuation on the part of the British, as has no parallel, perhaps, in the history of nations.

It has been repeatedly shewn, by able and patriotic writers, that we were by our inconsistent conduct, tacitly renouncing, in favour of America, **THE GREAT PRINCIPLES OF OUR MARITIME CODE**, and that too, in behalf of a people who met every concession made by the British government with insult and fresh menaces, and who, in proportion as their extortions were admitted, came, at length, to consider them as so many natural rights. The success of their continued encroachments, and the indiscriminate acquiescence in their demands, served only to increase the haughtiness and extent of their claims; until, availing themselves of the moment when Great Britain had to contend against the united force of all Europe, directed by the evil genius of France, their importunities ripened into an open declaration of war.

Such is the actual state of things: and, that we may not again return into a course which has been productive of so much vexation, embarrassment, and injury to our interests; that we may not, in future, blindly commit ourselves by treaties, which may be the perennial sources of strife and litigation; in short, that we may not, hereafter, evince a total ignorance either of the rights or of the boundaries of the two nations, we shall here endeavour to point out the many oversights in our former negotiations, and the remedies by which such causes of dissension may be removed for the future.

Indeed, the conduct of the different rulers of America has been so flagrantly iniquitous, as to provoke the strongest censures from their constituents, in all the Northern and Eastern

States of the Union; so that it will be a most arduous task, for the most sanguine advocates of America in this country, to efface the just and strong impressions which their remonstrances are calculated to make upon the public mind. In the present critical state of our relations with the United States, it will therefore be proper to exhibit the whole conduct of their government towards Great Britain, from the day of their assumed independence, to the hour when they have wickedly and rashly plunged themselves in war with the parent state, from which they sprung. The result of such an investigation, cannot fail to draw the attention of public men to the pursuit of the **REAL INTERESTS** of the mother country, as well as to those of her colonies and dependencies, in every part of the globe.

The first proposition which we deem it expedient to demonstrate, is, that the commerce of the United States of America, is not so essential to the welfare of the British Empire, as has been too generally imagined; but that, on the contrary, the prosperity, security, and independence, of those States, depend more immediately on the friendship and protection of Great Britain.

If we advert to the condition of our colonies, during the war between Great Britain and America, a period of eight years, when those colonies were bereft of all the usual supplies from the latter, we shall find, that they, nevertheless, flourished exceedingly; a proof of itself, that they **CAN** exist and prosper, without any intercourse with the United States.

One of the most striking features, in the history of colonization, is the extraordinary circumstance of the sudden increase in population, culture, and wealth, of the remaining portion of British America, after the peace of 1783; a portion of our empire, which, until that event, was a mere vast expanse of land and waters, traversed only by wandering tribes of Indians, for the purposes of fishing or hunting, or inhabited by a few straggling settlers, who cultivated small portions of land, in solitude, penury, and destitute of encouragement. Since the separation of the United States of America from this country, it has been fashionable to consider our remaining colonies upon that Continent, as possessions of little comparative value, in a commercial light; and important only as military stations. Many circumstances have contributed toward the currency of this unjust prejudice. The geographers and historians of the United States, in their details of their extent, divisions, resources, and population, scarcely condescended to notice the remaining British settlements in that portion of the globe, as if they were anxious to hide from the inhabitants of Europe, the attractions which

those settlements held out to the emigrant and the cultivator of the soil. MORSE, in his *American Geography*, has contrived to devote only two pages and an half to the British American dominions, in a volume of nearly five hundred pages, descriptive of the topography of the American Continent; and the same defect, probably intentional, may be traced in all the accounts that have been hitherto published by *Americans* of those regions. They were in the habit of announcing, in accents of triumph, the cargoes of Irish and Scotch emigrants, who were disembarked at New York, but no notice whatever was taken of the loyal emigrant, who traversed the Atlantic, to clear the forests of Canada, and who, under the protective shade of BRITISH LAWS, planted a garden in the midst of the wilderness. Yet, it is now a well-ascertained fact, that the British possessions do not yield to any other parts of the Continent of America, either in soil, productions, convenience of navigable rivers, or salubrity of climate. When this fact became more universally known, the rage for emigration to the United States, subsided; and numbers of our countrymen who had gone thither, as to a land of promise, decorated with trees of liberty, have since returned to their native country, disgusted with American manners, disappointed in their visionary expectations, and better disposed towards the venerable usages observed in the land of their fathers. We allude here to that class of persons who removed with some capital, which they designed to lay out in the purchase and cultivation of land. With respect to those artificers and labourers, who were led by American seductions to settle in the United States, under the fallacious prospect of procuring a more comfortable livelihood than they could obtain at home, it is well known that they were almost universally deceived. If the price of labour were greater in America than in Great Britain, the price of many indispensable articles of life was great in proportion; and, if the reader will turn to the second volume of the *DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT's*, "*Travels through the United States and Canada*;" he will find, that the relative condition of the same classes of people on the northern and southern banks of the river St. Laurence, differ materially. On the American side, nothing is observable but pallid sickness and filth; while the English settlers in Canada, are full of activity, enjoying health and the comforts of life. We have selected M. DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULT as an authority, in preference to any other, because he is a Frenchman, and has betrayed, throughout his volumes, a virulent spirit of enmity against the British government in America.

As then the American geographers have kept the British

settlements in the back ground as much as possible, it is natural to enquire, why the British government has not authorized a comprehensive survey to be made, of the capacities and population of its remaining colonies in America? Or, rather, what has been done for the benefit and improvement of those colonies? The answers to these questions will throw great light upon our present discussion.

At the close of the American war, the *commercial connection* was suddenly revived, though the dependence of the United States upon the mother country was rent asunder. Accordingly, the eyes both of politicians and of mercantile men, were directed to the *future* operations of a people who had entered upon the grand theatre of human legislation, on their own account, and with their own capital, industry, and talents. Many of our great commercial houses renewed, and even courted the American connection; and in their anxiety to cause the commerce of the kingdom to flow in its ancient channels, no notice whatever was taken of those colonies, which had remained faithful in their allegiance during the war. The definitive treaty of peace between His Majesty and the United States of America was signed at Paris, on the third day of September, 1783; and, on the 27th of December following, so eager were we to gratify the desires of our late enemies, that a declaration of His Majesty in council, was published in the London Gazette: which, not only gave the first blow to our navigation system, but laid the foundation of that neglect and indifference, with which our remaining colonies in North America have been treated. By that hasty and improvident concession, we made the United States *necessary* to the West India colonies; and a system has grown out of it, which has been the fruitful cause of the greater part of our disputes. Indeed it has so entangled, so completely beset us, on all sides, that it is difficult to convince, even unprejudiced and rational minds, that the West India islands *CAN* exist and flourish without *ANY* communication with the United States. By the declaration to which we have alluded, the commerce between the United States and the West Indies, which had been completely suspended for eight years, was suddenly revived by *public authority*; and as its revival had the infallible tendency to *discourage* the British settlements in North America, by introducing into the commerce of the West Indies, an enterprising and active competitor, the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, &c. were thenceforth deprived of a market, which, if they had enjoyed until the present time, would have rendered them as valuable as any of the possessions under the British Crown. By giving the United States this preference, we gradually made our West India islands tribu-

tary to them, and checked the growth of our remaining settlements in North America. Before the American rebellion, the traffic between the continental colonists and the West Indies, was so great, that the Congress, under the idea of ruining the islands during the war, prohibited all intercourse with them. The experience, however, of eight years, evinced that the West India Islands *could* exist and prosper, even if the United States had been doomed to perpetual sterility. The traders of Great Britain and Ireland seized the opportunity which the rancorous enmity of the Americans afforded them, to extend the commerce which had enriched their fathers during happier times. Even during a consuming and expensive war, when vast fleets and armies were fed beyond the ocean, Great Britain and Ireland sufficiently supplied all those necessities which the West Indians did not readily find in their own economy. Their superabundance even furnished the army that General Grant conducted to their aid, with several months' provisions, while the fleet sometimes partook of what the planters had to spare. The following Custom-house entries will shew whence that abundance was drawn at the beginning, at the middle, and at the end of the war.

Of *salted provisions* that were exported from England alone.

	Irish Beef. Barrels.	Irish Pork. Barrels.	Eng. Beef and Pork. Barrels.	Total Eng. Bacon. Flitches.	Eng. Tripe. Kegs.
In 1773 . .	1,195	383	259	1,787	558
In 1780 . .	9,844	3,471	4,480	17,795	3,369
In 1783 . .	9,843	3,059	3,619	16,526	5,188
					2,559

Contrast with these quantities the West India supply of beef and pork from the revolted colonies, according to an average of three years, ending with 1773..... 14,992

Of *pickled fish* there were exported from England only, during the same period, viz.—

	Red Herrings. Barrels.	White do. Barrels.	Total Barrels.	Pilchards. Hogsheads.	Salmon. Barrels.
In 1773...	514	1,876	2,390	211	5
In 1780...	1,816	7,281	9,097	1,188	109
In 1783...	2,840	15,060	17,900	313	35

Contrast with these the West India supply of *pickled* fish from the revolted colonies, according to an average of three years, ending with 1773..... 16,200

From England only there were exported of butter, cheese, and beer—

	Irish Butter. Cwt.	English ditto. Firkins.	English Cheese. Cwt.	Beer. Tons.
In 1773...	1,195	92	3,247	1,881
In 1780...	9,844	274	3,660	2,042
In 1783...	3,195	522	4,475	3,170

From the foregoing entries, with all their defects, it is obvious, that Great Britain had *regained* the supply of the articles contained in them; and that, as to these necessities the West India demand was amply answered. The planters derived ground provisions from the best of all resources, *their own* diligence and attention; in short, the West Indians began to learn a lesson of the greatest importance for every people to know, that no community ought to depend upon its neighbour for what the necessities of life require; and that the country which is *physically* dependant upon another, must soon become *politically* dependant upon it.

There were besides, actually exported to the British West Indies from England *alone*,

	Wheat-flour. Quarters.	Oatmeal. Quarters.	Bread. Cwt.
In 1773...	0	18	404
In 1780...85,907		758	32,587
In 1783... 4,090		125	6,657

From Scotland there were exported in 1779—wheat-flour, 2,475 quarters; oatmeal, 177 ditto; bread, 5,254 hundred weight.

There were also exported, from England alone,

	Barley. Qurs.	Peas. Qurs.	Beans. Qurs.	Oats. Qurs.	Wheat. Qurs.	Rye. Qurs.
In 1773...	3	356	9,089	16,615	0	350
In 1780...256		1,116	12,291	8,006	1,146	1,116
In 1783...146		755	7,360	6,129	8	755

Of several of these articles, Scotland exported, in 1779, as follows :...peas and beans, 1,327 quarters; oats, 1,052 ditto; barley, 44 ditto; wheat, 4 ditto.

From these Custom-house entries, it is very evident, by contrasting the exports of three years, what was the effect of competition between Great Britain and the United States. The revolted colonies had gradually undermined the parent country, in supplying the British West Indies, with all the productions of agriculture. The BRITISH YEOMANRY, burthened with the payment of rents, tithes, and poor rates, could not contend with the American farmers, who were exempted from all these burthens, and whose public taxes were so much lighter. But, whatever the difference in the price might have been to the West Indians, it should have been considered as a small equivalent, which they ought to have paid to the British consumer, for enjoying the exclusive supply of sugar, rum, and other West India products for the people of the United States having ceased to be our fellow subjects, ought certainly to have been excluded from a right and a benefit which we had formerly relinquished in their favour, when subjects of the Em-

pire. The BRITISH SAILORS AND FARMERS deserved all the protection of the Legislature ; the first fight our battles, the latter supply us with food. The British farmers, therefore, wherever they may be stationed, are entitled to the preference, in supplying the West India markets with all the productions of agriculture ; while our mariners have, at least, an equal claim to the employment which arises from additional freights ; and the public will gain, in the exact proportion, as the interests of these two most useful bodies are promoted.

Having thus demonstrated, with what facility the West India Islands were actually supplied, without the intervention of the United States we shall next proceed to shew, as a necessary deduction from this demonstration, that the British shipping was greatly increased by the exclusion of the Americans.

This comparative view of the shipping employed in the foreign trade of Britain at the commencement and end of the American war, is taken, as it appears, from the register of the insurers at Lloyd's, distinguishing the British from American-built ships.—

The Shipping of 1772-3-4.

	Ships.	Tons.
British built	3,908.....	605,545
American do.	2,311.....	373,618
Total	6,219	979,163

The Shipping of 1781-2-3.

	Ships.	Tons.
British built	3,848.....	708,346
American do.	1,334.....	225,439
Total	5,182	933,785
Deficiency	1,037	45,378
	6,219	979,163

It is, therefore, apparent, that of the whole deficiency of 1,037 vessels, there were only wanting, in 1783, of British ships, 60 ; and of American ships, 977 ; yet, that the total inferiority of the period of war, to the period of peace, amounted only to 45,378 tons ; while there was an increase of 102,701 British tons—and a decrease of 148,179 American tons. It should also be observed, in this place, that there were vast fleets, which, though built by British shipwrights, were not included in the surveys of 1781, 1782, and 1783 ; because they had not touched at any British port, and were employed by government in the transport service. From the report of the commissioners of public accounts, it appears, that there were employed at New York, by the quarter master gene-

ral, the barrack-master, and the commissary general, in the four years, ending with 1780, no fewer than 611 vessels, carrying 44,916 tons. Were this fleet brought to the account of 1783, it would about complete the defective quantity of tonnage, though not the number of ships. Many of those vessels, or, perhaps, a greater number remained till November 1783, to perform the service of final evacuation; and all, or, at least, many of them, again entered into the merchants' employment, after that epoch, and properly filled up the void, which the exclusion of the American shipping had left.

From these authentic documents, it is undeniable, that the West India Islands were supplied, during the term of *eight years*, in all their wants, by the mother country alone, the commercial navigation of the Americans having been intercepted, or rather annihilated, during that period. It may now therefore, be asked, why is the united kingdom, together with its remaining colonies in North America, the culture and population of which have been wonderfully increased since the cession of the United States, presumed to be incompetent to supply the West India colonies, when thirty years ago we supplied all their wants, and that too when we had to contend against the combined naval power of France, Holland and Spain? Have there since occurred any physical causes, to impede this commerce, or to justify its diversion into other channels. These are very important questions, and on the dispassionate solution of them, the whole support of the navigation system of this country rests. Fortunately, we have already surmounted many impediments in the way of forming a correct determination upon the subject; for in the year 1784, the necessity of allowing a free intercourse between the sugar colonies and the United States of America, in *American bottoms*, underwent a full and thorough investigation by the privy council. In the report of the committee of council of the 31st of May, in that year, there is a statement of the allegations and evidence produced, and the opinions of merchants and other persons, both for and against this alleged necessity. The result of this important inquiry was, the *satisfactory conviction, that, by prohibiting or obstructing the intercourse between the United States, and the West India Islands, the people of the United States, will suffer more than His Majesty's subjects; that their lumber and provisions must perish on their hands; and that the British Islands may be furnished with those articles without their assistance.*

The proofs offered in support of, and against the allegations of the West India planters, form a mass of instruction on the subject of our colonial commerce, which is not to be derived from any other source; therefore, we shall here present our readers

with an analysis of them, previous to the exhibition of the facts which we shall adduce, respecting the capacities of the British settlements in North America.

It should be particularly observed, that twenty-eight years have elapsed since this investigation ; and that, in the course of that period, the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, as well as of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Cape Breton, &c. have surprisingly improved in cultivation and number of inhabitants; more especially Upper Canada, which has been annually rising into importance, and advancing in wealth, commerce, and agriculture.

The representations of the West India planters, &c. contained the four following allegations : " First, that his Majesty's sugar colonies were in such great distress, for want of a free intercourse between them and the United States of America, by *American ships*, that not a moment should be lost in granting them relief. Secondly, that the supplies derived to the said sugar colonies, from the dominions of the said United States, were, in many instances, and at many seasons of the year, not to be had from any other country, at any price whatever, and that, in many other instances, such supplies are not to be had from any other places, but at prices wholly ruinous. Thirdly, that the navigation between the North American colonies and His Majesty's sugar colonies, cannot be effectually carried on by British ships, on account of the heavy expence, uncertainty, and delay of such circuitous navigation, beyond that which would attend the direct navigation in American ships. Fourthly, that the planters in His Majesty's sugar colonies can no otherwise pay for the supplies received from the dominions of the said United States, than by the produce of their estates, which produce, in many instances, does not find any adequate vent in Great Britain, and if not taken off by the North Americans, would remain a dead weight upon all the rest of the produce of the said sugar colonies."

In support of the first allegation, an address of the assembly of Jamaica was produced, to prove the scarcity of staves, pine-boards, plank, and building timber, as well as the votes of the assembly, to prove the exorbitant price of flour. It was made to appear, that in Antigua, in October, 1783, provisions had risen nearly 50 per cent. and that the negro provisions and lumber were at a very high price. Evidence was brought to prove, that upon the arrival of the Orders in Council, restricting the intercourse with America, in Barbadoes, lumber rose instantly from 7l. to 25l. currency per thousand feet. A letter was also produced from Grenada, dated February 28, 1784, stating, that every article of lumber, was at a war price; and the same kind of evidence was offered to prove a similar scarcity in Saint Christophers and Tortola-

An abstract of the current prices of lumber and provisions at Kingston, in Jamaica, as published in the Kingston Gazette, and also an account of the prices of the said articles, in time of peace, were transmitted to the committee, by their own desire; and, in the letter of the chairman, transmitting this account, it was said, that provisions of all kinds are of so perishable a nature, in the West Indies, and the consumption both of provisions and lumber, so immense, that, unless the authorized channels of supply were opened, the clandestine ones were not to be relied upon, as sufficient to protect the islands from being again reduced to distress, in the course of a very few weeks.

In opposition to these statements, there was evidence laid before the committee, to the following effect: that from the return made of the imports into the several ports of the island of Jamaica previous to the month of November, 1783, the apprehensions of want, in the articles of lumber, &c. by no means warranted the positive and strong assertions contained in the address of the assembly, to the governor of the island; and that the governor had made early and repeated applications to the governors of Nova Scotia and Canada, for an immediate supply of such of the articles as were, at that time, wanted in the island, but which could not be expected to arrive there to answer the then demand. The distress which ensued upon the publication of His Majesty's Order in Council, was principally owing to the planters not having expected that any restriction, in this respect, would take place; and having omitted, therefore, to make provision of those several articles by other means: for it was evident, from the abstract of prices current, before mentioned, as well as from other evidence, that, in the space of about ten weeks, the prices of lumber and provisions began gradually to fall in the island of Jamaica, and continued falling very considerably: and further, that from the 12th of December, 1783, to the 17th of March, 1784, inclusive, *seventy-five* British vessels, navigated according to law, had arrived at Kingston, with cargoes of lumber and provisions; all which vessels, except about ten, *came from the ports of the United States.* These ships brought to Kingston 18,000 barrels of flour; 559,060 staves and heading; 796,253 feet of boards, scantlings, &c. and 1,450,790 shingles; and it was observed, that 18,000 barrels of flour were equal to the consumption of the island, for nine months. There was also laid before the committee, an account of prices current at Kingston, on the 20th of March, 1784, as transmitted from thence. Evidence was likewise given to the committee, by two eminent merchants, who had resided many years in Jamaica, that they never recollected the article of

flour being so cheap as at that very period ; and that many of the other articles would have been thought very reasonable, even before the war, particularly staves : and, as the prices of those articles at Philadelphia, especially of white and red oak staves, had risen, during and since the war, more than double ; it was inferred, that, in proportion to the first cost in America, they were then cheaper at Jamaica, than before the war. The committee also obtained, from the same authority, the average prices of lumber and provisions at Kingston, for ten years previous to the American war. To throw some light on the contradictory accounts of prices, the committee continued to examine certain merchants of great commercial knowledge and character, who declared, that they never considered the prices current, published in the Kingston Royal Gazette, as very exact ; that they knew the actual prices to vary during the time that the prices appeared in the Gazette to be the same : that besides, they were generally the highest retail prices, and at the longest credit, which is commonly about twelve months ; and that the difference between the prices sent them, and those published in the Kingston Royal Gazette, arose from the former being cargo prices, paid for *in cash*, and that the latter were retail prices, with profit and credit.

It also appeared to the committee, that neither Antigua, Barbadoes, nor Dominica, had any real ground for apprehending a scarcity of lumber, provisions, &c. from His Majesty's Order in Council. It likewise further appeared, that a great part of the rum casks, lately made use of in Jamaica, were puncheons that carried out from Great Britain dry goods or puncheon packs ; that puncheon packs could be shipped from London at 14 shillings sterling ; and, including freight and charge of setting them up, would not cost the planter more than 25 shillings or 20 shillings each ; which is as low a price as was known during ten years preceding the war. The then current prices of white staves at Philadelphia and London were also nearly the same ; being at the former place 6l. per thousand, and, at the latter, 6l. 5s.

In support of the second allegation, it was asserted, that the colonies of North America, which still remain under the dominion of Great Britain, were not capable of supplying the West India islands with provisions and lumber, in a degree proportionate to their wants ; that *the crops in Canada were very uncertain* ; and that, during the American war, the army, amounting to no more than 15,000 men, was supplied entirely from England : that, though the white oak of Canada was *very good for staves*, the other species of lumber were of an inferior quality ; and that such was the scarcity of hands in that colony to get wood, as to make the price of labour to be

from half a dollar to a dollar per day. With respect to Nova Scotia, it was alledged, that though the increase of inhabitants lately gone there, *might in time*, lead to a supply of grain, lumber, and the other articles from that colony, yet, at that time, Nova Scotia itself was supplied with them from other parts. On the other hand, it appeared, from numerous respectable authorities, that the province of Canada, *was able to export great quantities of wheat and flour* for the consumption of the British West India Islands: that from the year 1771 to 1775, inclusive, there was exported from Canada, annually, *an average of 265,000 bushels of wheat*, and that the common price of the grain, before the American war, did not exceed *three shillings a bushel*; and that, although various causes co-operated, during the war, to diminish the cultivation of the country, no flour was imported in that period into Canada, except for the use of the troops and Indians. It was also further represented, that the exportation of grain from Canada, would not only revive *but increase*, if the West India Market was secured to it; and that an annual export of 300,000 bushels might be depended upon from that quarter; while from the erection of many new mills, &c. the flour would, in future, be much finer, more free from bran, and fitter for exportation, than it had hitherto been. It also appeared, that *great quantities of lumber could be furnished from Canada and the market of Quebec*, where it would be exchanged for British manufactures; and that the Canadians had learned to cut their lumber to great advantage, by floating mills of a new construction. It was further stated, that Nova Scotia would soon be able to supply great quantities of lumber; and that, *if grants of land were properly secured to the inhabitants, they would in three years be able to furnish, at moderate prices, most of the articles which the West India Islands could want from North America*. It also appeared to the committee, that there were 1,500,000 acres in the Island of Cape Breton capable of producing any kind of European grain; and that it abounded also with great quantities of lumber, pine of every dimension, and oak of various kinds; ash and elm, beech, birch, and maple, which grew to great scantlings; that these woods were contiguous to the coast, or on navigable rivers; and that there were a great number of streams fit to erect saw mills upon. It was likewise stated, that the disadvantage to which Canada was subject in point of navigation, was reversed, in respect of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, the navigation from those countries to the West India Islands, being performed in a less time than from the ports of the United States. Besides these articles, there were others of which the West Indies stand in need; two of these were rice and Indian corn: the consump-

tion of the first in the islands was very small, amounting, at an average of three years, to no more than 20,563 barrels annually. It was well known, that rice cannot be produced either in Canada or Nova Scotia; Indian corn is a more necessary article; and the quantity imported into our West India Islands, at an average of three years, was 401,464 bushels annually. It appeared, however, that a great quantity of Indian corn was grown in Nova Scotia, and that the cultivation of it was increasing; and although the grain might not be so large and fine as that which was produced in the southern parts of America, it would answer the same purpose nearly as well; at all events, Canada and Nova Scotia produced all the substitutes for Indian corn, viz. peas, beans, barley, oats, and potatoes, at the most reasonable rates; with which, except potatoes, the planters, during the American war, fed their negroes. It was also expected, that, in a short time, great quantities of Indian corn, *of the finest sort*, would be produced in the Bahama Islands, from whence the navigation was very easy and short to the West India Colonies. These Islands might likewise be supplied with live stock from Nova Scotia, from whence the British army was plentifully furnished while it was at Boston. As for salted beef and pork, besides that of Canada and Nova Scotia, the West Indies might be supplied with those articles in plenty; and, all circumstances considered, *at a cheaper rate and of a superior quality*, from Great Britain and Ireland, particularly from the latter; as the salted pork and beef from America was of an open texture, and more subject to decay in hot climates. Another very important article of provision, which the West Indies required, was dried and pickled fish; and different reasons were stated for believing, that *the whole supply* could be furnished by one or other of the fisheries of Great Britain and Ireland; and those of Newfoundland, Canada, and Nova Scotia. The quantity imported into the British West India Islands, was 159,669 quintals of dried fish annually.

In support of the third allegation, the planters and merchants urged, that before the American war, more than three parts in four of the ships employed in carrying on the commerce between the British West India Islands and North America, were Americans; and they produced two accounts, by which it appeared, that the number of ships so employed, in the year 1772, amounted to 1,208, of which only thirteen came from the colonies, then under the dominion of His Majesty: that is, five from Canada, six from Newfoundland, and two from Nova Scotia. They inferred also, from the number of vessels being so considerable, that their tonnage must have been small; and, consequently, that they could

not have been British ships employed in the American trade, which were seldom of less burthen than 250 or 300 tons. They produced also another paper, to shew, that, of 561 sail which entered at the port of Kingston, in Jamaica, in the year 1774, 131 were British built, and 422 American built: they farther declared, that upon an experiment made, for two or three successive years, of carrying on the trade by a circuitous voyage, that is, by sending ships from England to America to take in lumber, and carry the same from thence to the Islands, it was found not to answer. On the contrary, from the evidence of many eminent merchants trading to North America and the West Indies, as well as other persons who had been employed in His Majesty's service in America, it appeared, that there never was a period in which this country was better prepared to enter into a new branch of the carrying trade: that the owners of British vessels concerned in the West India trade had long laboured under great disadvantages, from the difficulty of procuring outward freights for their vessels; but that, by going first to North America, and from thence to the West Indies, and so home, they would be sure of two freights, and, perhaps, three, instead of little more than one, and with very small additional charges, in the payment of seamen's wages and port duties. That though the ships employed in the West India trade from the port of London, called established ships, had not hitherto engaged in this circuitous commerce, ships from the outports were frequently concerned in it. It was also observed, that the number of ships which seized the opportunity of going from North America to the West India Islands with lumber and provisions, on the first notice of the order in council, was a clear proof that this branch of commerce was profitable. It was besides asserted, that there were ten large ships from the port of London then destined for this circuitous trade; and that three others were preparing for the same purpose, whose chief object was to obtain freight from America to Jamaica; and that these ships would go from hence, *even in ballast*, if a freight outwards could not be obtained. It also appeared, that, besides the ships above mentioned, there were 12 sail of British ships established at Jamaica for carrying on the trade between that Island and the continent of America, with others intended to be fitted out; to which might be added the ships of Canada and Nova Scotia, which would be employed in this trade. It was at the same time proved, that many ship carpenters had settled in Nova Scotia, for the purpose of ship building; and if the trade to the West Indies should be confined to British shipping, there was no doubt, but that many more persons of the same description would be induced to settle in Nova Scotia, where they would find tim-

ber of every sort fit for ship-building ; and as the tide in the Bay of Fundy rises very high, the harbours of that country were better calculated for building ships than those on the continent of North America. It was also observed, that, before the American war, ships of between two and three hundred tons were built in Canada, for which purpose they had timber in plenty ; and that the intercourse between the West Indies and America, would be assisted by sloops belonging to the Bermuda and Bahama Islands, which had always had a principal share in this trade.

In support of the fourth allegation, the planters and merchants produced accounts to shew, that besides smaller articles, there were exported to North America, in the year 1773--3,776 hogsheads of sugar ; and 32,265 puncheons of rum ; and, in the succeeding year, 5,325 hogsheads of sugar, and 43,488 puncheons of rum. They alledged, that the Americans then took from the British West India Islands their produce, in payment for nearly the amount of what they imported. In opposition, however to this, it was very strongly stated, that confining the intercourse with our West India Islands to British ships, would be the means of securing to the planters, a greater export of their produce, than if the ships of the United States were allowed to come, as formerly, to the ports of our Islands. It was also asserted, that though the West India planters, and merchants seemed to imagine, that, before the war, the Americans took from the British West India Islands their produce, in payment for nearly the amount of what they imported, the balance was in favour of the Americans, 300,000*l.* for the annual average value of imports from North America into the Islands, as estimated at the port of importation, freight included, amounted to 720,000*l.* while their exportation to North America, freight included, was only 420,000*l.*

Such were the respective merits of the case, in the year 1784 ; and when a fresh investigation took place, in 1791, the former opinion of the Committee of the Privy Council, respecting the competency of the British colonies in America to supply the West Indies, and the necessity of confining that traffic to British vessels, *was substantially and unequivocally confirmed.* The report made upon that occasion, together with the memorials from our colonies in North America, in 1804 and 1805, and the reports of the board of trade upon them, as well as the orders issued in consequence of them, by the administration of that day, form as complete a body* of evidence against

* See collection of Reports, &c. on Navigation and Trade, 2nd edition, 1807. Richardson.

the expediency of allowing this intercourse between the West India Islands and the United States of America, as ever was submitted to the consideration of man.

We have already seen, that, for the space of *eight years*, during the American war, the West India Islands were subsisted wholly without entertaining any commercial intercourse with the United States; that, in that period, they were supplied by the mother country and her dependencies; that they thrived and prospered without America, while our mercantile shipping received full employment, and flourished to a very high degree. The next point, therefore, for our investigation, is, whether since the restoration of peace between Great Britain and the United States, our remaining settlements in North America have undergone any deterioration, so as to incapacitate them from furnishing the supplies required. We request our readers will cast their eyes upon the map of British America, that they may be able to understand us, as we illustrate its resources and improved state of cultivation. It will be proper first to observe, that from the height of land between lake Superior and the lake of the Woods, the waters flow to the northward and westward, into lake Winepeg, the great reservoir, into which the north western waters of the interior, are collected, and are from thence discharged into Hudson's bay, through Nelson's river, that falls into the sea at York fort.

The principal rivers which flow into lake Winepeg, are the SASKATCHEWAN, which rises in the rocky mountains, near the sources of the Missouri, and of the Columbia river, the latter running westward into the Pacific Ocean;---the RED RIVER, which has its source near the head of the Mississippi; and the RIVER WINEPEG, which flows from the lake of the Woods, and has its source in the height of land, near lake Superior, as before stated. The last mentioned river is the route through which the Indian or Fur trade of the interior is conducted. There is a small river, flowing into lake Superior, which it is necessary to ascend in canoes; landing frequently at *portages*, or carrying places, to avoid rapids and falls, which are numerous in this river; as its course, from the height of land into lake Superior, is short and very rapid. Having thus reached the summit, and passed the portage which separates the streams that flow in opposite directions therefrom, the canoes proceed down the western stream, through the Rainy lake, and the lake of the Woods, into lake Winepeg; but the vast regions, which here open themselves to the inquisitive traveller, do not fall within the object of this inquiry; and, at present, concern only those who are engaged in the Indian trade. We must, therefore, turn our view towards the river St. Laurence, where

a new creation has arisen with surprising rapidity in the depths of forests, perhaps as ancient as the world itself. The river St. Laurence may be considered to derive its most distant source from two small lakes, near the head of the Mississippi, out of which, the river St. Louis flows into lake Superior: the latter discharging its waters into lake Huron, through the strait or rapid of St. Mary; and lake Huron, receiving also the waters of lake Michigan, through the navigable strait of Michilimackinac. The accumulated waters of these three great lakes, or inland seas, then flow through lake St. Clair and the river Detroit into lake Erie, from whence they are precipitated over the stupendous cataract of Niagara, and fall into lake Ontario; and it is only on flowing out of this lake, that they assume the name of the river St. Laurence. These lakes are navigable by vessels of any burthen, and all of them communicate with each other, except at the cataract of Niagara and the strait of St. Mary.

Canada contained but a very scanty population at the time of its conquest by the British, in 1759. While it was in the hands of the French, the principal occupation of the settlers consisted in the Indian trade, and in sending corn and lumber to the French West India Islands. But, after the conquest, a greater degree of attention was paid to agriculture, though not adequate to the variety and fertility of the soil. Other causes powerfully conspired to retard the growth of Canada. While our colonies of North America remained true to their allegiance, almost all the emigrants from Europe settled there, in preference to Canada, on account of the greater encouragement afforded to settlers; and the prospect of more immediate gains; and of the prevalent opinion generally disseminated, that the habitable parts of Canada were occupied by Frenchmen solely, who were equally prejudiced in favour of their own laws, language, and religion. At the close of the American rebellion, these circumstances were attended to; and the government at home made considerable exertions to remove those discouragements, and to promote the trade and peopling of the province. Accordingly, on the 25th of February, 1791, His Majesty sent a message to the House of Commons, which stated the benefit that would accrue from dividing the province of Quebec into two separate provinces, to be called the province of Upper Canada, and the province of Lower Canada; and which also recommended Parliament to make the necessary regulations for the government of the two provinces; and to consider of such provisions as might enable His Majesty to make a permanent appropriation of lands, in those provinces, for the support and maintenance of

a Protestant Clergy, within the same. The discussions to which these subjects gave rise, in the House of Commons, will long be remembered, as they furnished the occasion of a public breach between the late Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox. As the Act to make further provisions for the government of the province of Quebec laid the foundation for those rapid improvements which have since occurred in Canada, especially in the upper province; we shall here recite its leading principles, that the reader may perceive with greater ease, the evils it eschewed, and the good it established.

The country was divided into two provinces, subject to two distinct governments. It was enacted, that the legislature should consist of a council and house of assembly for each division; the assembly to be constituted in the usual manner, by election, but the members of the council to be members for life, a power being, at the same time, reserved to His Majesty of annexing to certain honours an hereditary right of sitting in the council. All laws and ordinances were to remain in force until altered by the new legislatures. The Habeas Corpus act, which had been already established by an ordinance of the province, was to be continued as the fundamental principle of the constitution. A provision was to be made for the Protestant Clergy, in both divisions, by an* allotment of lands, in proportion to those which had been already granted. The tenures, which had been a subject of dispute, were to be settled in Lower Canada by the local legislature; but in Upper Canada, as the settlers were British principally, or British colonists, the tenures were to be soccage tenures. A new remedy was also given in causes of appeal. The judgment of the privy council was no longer to be final. The last resort was to the House of Lords: above all, to prevent such discontents as had occasioned the separation of the United States of America from the mother country, it was provided, that the British Parliament should impose no taxes but what were necessary for the regulation of trade and commerce; and that even those should be levied and disposed of by the legislature of each division.

The popular principles of this act, and, above all, the politic

* See No. 3, of the New Quarterly Review, Art. Upper Canada.

† The policy of the separation of Canada into two provinces, has been doubted by many intelligent persons. It is thought, their improvement would have been more rapid and extensive, if there had been but one government, one legislature, and one language; and, until some alteration is made in the constitution of Lower Canada, we do not expect its progress in agriculture, trade, or population, to keep pace with that of the Upper Province: indeed, its extended inter-

separation of the whole into two provinces, had an immediate influence on the population of Upper Canada. Before the passing of this act settlers arrived in the Upper Province but slowly ; for it had been passed over, in a great degree, as a region of eternal frost, covered with impenetrable woods, barren wastes, and dreary unexplored lakes, over which fogs and exhalations were suspended for the greater part of the year. Some progress, however, had been made in settling the province of Upper Canada, from the year 1784 ; for during that year, a census of the inhabitants was taken, by order of GENERAL HALDIMAND, when they amounted in the Lower Province to 113,012 English and French, and in the Upper Province to more than 10,000 souls, principally *loyalists* from the United States. The division of the provinces, and the erection of distinct legislatures, suddenly altered the face of the country. Multitudes of republican Americans, who had made the experiment of American independence grew sick of the phantom they had embraced, soon became partakers of what is still termed American *repentance* ; and, finding the settlers in Upper Canada were exempted from that system of taxation which had caused ostensibly the grounds of difference between the mother country and her revolted colonies ; finding also that lands were to be enjoyed as soccage tenures, and that the soil of Upper Canada was uncommonly fertile ; capable of producing all sorts of garden stuff grown in Europe ; and equal, if not superior in goodness, to that of the United States ; they emigrated in families from those States, and established themselves in the Upper Province. Great numbers of English and Scotch also settled there ; so that Upper Canada presents, at this moment, scenes as different from those depicted before the year 1784, as industry and cultivation are from sloth and wildness. In short, the present state of Upper Canada, answers, in every respect, the description given of it by that intelligent and accurate traveller, CHARLEVOIX. "Every man is possessed of the necessaries of life ; the inhabitant is not acquainted with taxes ; bread is cheap ; fish and flesh are cheap ; the land is good almost every where ; and agriculture does not in the least derogate from its quality. "How many gentlemen, throughout all our provinces, would envy the lot of the inhabitants of Canada, did they but

course with the mother country, renders a revision of its present laws imperatively necessary, and we hope they will become, at no distant period, an object of legislative attention.

Epitome

See Mr. Gray's Letters on Canada, p. 75.

“know it! There is not in the world a more wholesome
 “climate than this; no particular distemper is epidemical
 “here; the fields and woods are full of simples of a wonder-
 “ful efficacy; and the trees distil balms of an excellent
 “quality.”

Through the zeal and indefatigable exertions of the late
GENERAL SIMCOE, who was for a long time, Governor of
 Upper Canada, a very rapid progress was made in the coloni-
 zation and agricultural improvement of the province. It was
 not longer back than the year 1784, as we have already ob-
 served, that a census was taken, when the population of Upper
 Canada was upwards of 10,000 souls. Its provincial militia
 in 1809, consisted of 10,411 men, exclusive of the commis-
 sioned officers; and it appears by the assessment rolls in the
 same year, that 2,448,156 acres of land had been granted to
 resident settlers; and that 204,049 acres of these grants were
 under actual cultivation, having been returned by the occupiers
 as rateable property;* and the influx of people had been so
 great, that even in the town of Niagara and its vicinity, town
 lots, horses, provisions, and every necessary of life rose, be-
 tween the years 1790 and 1794, nearly fifty per cent. in
 value. There are various reasons for this influx of inhabitants,
 and increasing cultivation. Land is a cheaper article in Ca-
 nada, than in the United States. In the latter, it is impossi-
 ble to acquire land without paying for it; and in parts of the
 country where the soil is rich, and where some settlements are
 already made, a tract of land sufficient for a moderate farm,
 is scarcely to be procured under some hundreds of dollars;
 whereas, in Canada, a man has only to make application to
 the government, and, on his taking the oath of allegiance,
 he immediately gets one hundred acres of excellent uncleared
 land, in the neighbourhood of other settlements, gratis; and,
 if able to improve it directly, he can even get a larger quantity.
 And, it is a fact worthy of notice, which banishes every sus-
 picion relative to a diminution of inhabitants taking place by
 emigrations into the States, that great numbers of people from
 the States actually emigrate into Canada annually; whilst none
 of the people of Canada, who have it in their power to dis-
 pose of their property, emigrate into the United States. Mr.
COOPER, of Manchester, who published, some years ago, a
 book for the avowed purpose of inducing the people of this
 country to emigrate to the United States, lays it down as a
 necessary condition of the emigrant's comfort and prosperity,

* See the *New Quarterly Review*, No. 3, p. 160.

that he should commence farmer with a capital of not less than three hundred pounds sterling: but in Canada, a seventh part of that sum will suffice to set a cultivator afloat. Besides, the formidable and just exceptions to the titles to lands in Upper Canada, have been since removed; and, accordingly, the population has proportionably increased. Before unexceptionable titles to the land had been granted, the improvement of the country was considerably retarded; and this circumstance led Mr. WELD to remark, that, "if an opposite system were pursued, the happy effects would soon become visible; the face of the country would be quickly meliorated; and, it is probable, that there would not be any part of North America, where they would, after a short period, be able to boast that improvement had taken place more rapidly. It is very certain, that, were the lands granted in this manner, many more people would annually emigrate into Canada from the United States than at present; for there are numbers who come yearly into the country to explore it, who return solely because they cannot get lands with an indisputable title. I have repeatedly met with these people myself in Upper Canada, and have heard them express the utmost disappointment at not being able to get lands on such terms, even for money; I have heard others in the States also speak to the same purport, after they had been in Canada. It is highly probable, moreover, that many of the people who leave Great Britain and Ireland for America, would then be induced to settle in Canada, instead of the United States; and the British Empire would not, in that case, lose, as it has done, thousands of valuable citizens every year." This intelligent traveller was in Canada, in the year 1796; since which, the country has been divided into two provinces, and the unexceptionable titles done away, by an Act of the Legislature. Since that epoch the inducements to settle in Canada are greatly superior to those which present themselves to a settlement in the United States; land being plentiful not only in Canada, but in Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and at a very low price, and likely to increase; whereas, in the United States, it is at an exorbitant value, so that a man may provide for his family with much more ease in the former than in the latter. In Canada, also, there is a much greater opening for young men, acquainted with any business or profession that can be carried on in America, than there is in the United States. The expence of settling in Canada, is far less also than in any one of the States; for, in the former country, the necessaries and conveniencies of life are remarkably cheap, whilst, on the con-

trary, in the other, they are dearer than in England. In contemplation of those unexceptionable titles being speedily made out to the lands, Mr. WELD observes, "may we not, " whenever that measure shall take place, expect to see those " beautiful provinces, that have so long remained unknown, " rising into general notice? May we not then expect to " behold them increasing rapidly in population, and making " hasty strides towards the attainment of that degree of pros- " perity and consequence, which their soil, climate, and many " other natural advantages, have so eminently qualified them " for enjoying? And surely the Empire at large would be " greatly benefited by such a change in the state of Canada; " for, as the country increased in population, it would increase " in riches; and there would then be a proportionably greater " demand for English manufactures; a still greater trade would " also be carried on between Canada and the West Indies, than " at present, to the great advantage of both countries; a " circumstance that would give employment to a great " number of British ships. *For all those articles of American " produce in demand in the West Indies, may be had on much " better terms in Canada than the United States; and if the " Canadian merchants had sufficient capitals to enable them " to trade thither largely, there can hardly be a doubt but " that the people of the British West India isles would draw " their supplies rather from Canada than from any other part " of America. The few cargoes at present sent from Quebec, " always command a preference in the West India markets " over those sent from any part of the United States."*

It will be recollected that these opinions were published sixteen years ago; and that they were formed from actual observations made upon the means both of Canada and the United States; and without any view to the future discussion of the subject. Of the progress of Canada, since that period, we are, fortunately, able to give a very decided opinion. It has been ascertained from experience, that more certain, greater, and heavier crops are raised on the same quantity of land in Canada, than in any of the northern or midland States of the Union; the land in general is stronger. The State of New York extending from North to South about three hundred miles, is, unquestionably, a fine country; but with the exception of the Genesee country, is much inferior to Upper Canada, which is separated from it only by the river St. Lawrence. Mr. D'ARCY BOLTON, who is perfectly acquainted with every part of the state of New York, and who has resided in Upper Canada, gives the preference, in every respect, to the latter, both for goodness of soil and extent of produce. The land, he says,

is productive to a degree almost unexampled; the soil is not, indeed, excelled by that of any country: thirty bushels of wheat per acre, is reckoned a good crop, but he has known fifty-five. Forty bushels of Indian corn, but still eighty and even ninety, have been produced. Peas succeed, in a very great degree, in most parts of the province. The weight of the wheat also exceeds that in the United States, as it weighs seventy pounds per bushel, and the price of land, as well as the fertility of the soil, are such, that Mr. BOLTON knew many instances where people have actually improved their interest, in the course of seven years, more than one thousand per cent. "The local situation of Upper Canada is such, that it will ever be the most thriving country in America. The Americans are perpetually removing into this province, which produces a regular system of trade in that way. I could instance cases where persons have purchased land for ten or twelve dollars a lot (of two hundred acres) who, in the course of twelve or fourteen years, have refused three hundred pounds for the same land. If a man has great industry, and a family sufficiently advanced to aid, instead of incumbering him, he can, without any money, make a purchase of a single lot of two hundred acres; and, to use a common expression, make the land pay for itself; that is, from its own produce. If a farmer has three or four boys old enough to help him, they can easily clear twenty acres of new land, and, if they have ordinary luck, the first crop will yield five hundred bushels of good wheat; which, if the market price is a dollar, will purchase one hundred and twenty-five pounds currency, that is, double the value of the land. Many hundreds, indeed, there are in this country, who own from eight hundred to two thousand acres, yet began without a capital. I could enumerate many instances of individuals having maintained their families, and in the course of seven years, collected from six to twelve hundred acres of land. Perhaps, in the course of human affairs, a greater instance of rapid improvement was never exhibited than in the instance of Upper Canada." Here we have the testimony of an eye-witness of this rapid improvement; who is fully competent to enter into minute details of the comparative condition of Canada and the United States, from the circumstances of his having visited most parts of those States, from Pennsylvania to the Penobscot river, approaching towards Halifax in Nova Scotia; who has travelled through the interior of that immense country, under circumstances the most advantageous for procuring local information; and who has united to great precision in his narrative the most clear, impartial, dispassionate, and liberal inves-

tigation. This gentleman gives the decided preference to Upper Canada; and, in his dedication to the King, he states, that "few parts of His Majesty's dominions are more deserving of notice than Upper Canada. It presents a country capable of producing the greatest abundance of grain of every description; and, in truth, it has already afforded ample proof of its ability in that respect. In timber it is excelled by no nation on earth. It requires nothing but a continuation of His Majesty's parental care to render it opulent in itself, highly valuable to the world at large, and more especially to His Majesty's dominions."

A very fallacious notion is commonly entertained respecting the produce of this neglected province; the generality of people supposing, that no land is deserving of notice which is not immediately washed by the river St. Laurence; but this is a most egregious mistake. The country is settled to a very different extent; in some places, six or eight miles back, in others forty or fifty. Nor does the distance from the river St. Laurence determine the value; for, in many instances, land produces a greater price, at the distance of forty miles, than at five. Many of the back settlements are well inhabited, and are as near to a market for their superfluous produce, as those on the river. In fact, there is such a multitude of navigable rivers which are tributary to the St. Laurence, and of dimensions that would surprize an European, that some of the interior settlements are infinitely more valuable than those which border on the river. Land, also, produces a greater price in some of those parts. The reason is self-evident; the convenience of those navigable rivers affords to the planter a cheap and easy mode of conveyance: for Upper Canada is bounded by the United States; that is, by a line from the forty-fifth degree of North Latitude, along the middle of the river St. Laurence, into lake Ontario, through the middle of this likewise, until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and lake Erie, and then through the middle of that lake, until it arrives at the water communication between it and lake Huron; thence again through the middle of the lake Huron to the water communication between it and lake Superior; thence through lake Superior northward to the Isles Royal and Philippeaux, to the long lake, and the water communication between it and the lake of the Woods; thence through that lake to the most north-western point thereof, and thence in a due west line to the river Mississippi. To the westward and to the northward, west of the Mississippi, its boundaries are indefinite; the northern limits of Louisiana not being thoroughly known. To the

northward, it is bounded by Hudson's Bay, as settled by the treaty of Utrecht, in the forty-ninth parallel of North Latitude, extending west indefinitely. In the settled parts of this immense tract of country, there are more rivers and means of navigable communication than in all Europe; and the produce raised is precisely that sort of commodity which is necessary to the existence and support of the West Indies. The townships of Lancaster, Charlottenburgh, and Cornwall, which front lake St. Francis, are remarkable for raising of stock, and fattening cattle for market; other townships are equally distinguished for the cultivation of grain; and in Williamsburgh, there are many grist-mills, in different situations on the side of the river; saw-mills abound in various parts of the province; and iron works are erecting under the sanction of government. It is not necessary to enlarge any further upon this topic, as our readers may refer to Mr. D'ARCY BOLTON's work, already cited; and in which he will find a succinct account of the nature of the soil, the produce, the name of every township, from the divisional line, on the North bank of lake St. Francis, which distinguishes the Upper from the Lower province, to the remotest parts. He enumerates above one hundred and twenty townships;* and, from the description he gives of them, it appears, upon the whole, that the fisheries, soil, and climate of Upper Canada, cannot be surpassed, and that its population is continually augmenting.

The emigrations of Americans from the United States to the Upper province, since the division of Canada, would exceed credibility, if we had it not in our power to assign for them motives of the most rational kind.

"In the year 1790," says Mr. Bolton, "the wisdom of the British government was eminently evinced, in dividing the province of Québec into two separate governments, and granting to each a constitution, on the most liberal, as well as disinterested, principles; a constitution, perhaps, unparalleled in the historic page for freedom, and a just regard to the happiness of the subject; with all the advantages enjoyed by the British colonies in America, previous to the revolution, and with many that are additional. No man's property is here taxed for any cause whatever, directly or indirectly; the British government most generously paying the whole expence of the civil establishment. This country is exceeded by none for richness of soil, and the prosperous aspect of agriculture and trade. In fact, every thing that can conduce to make an industrious man happy, may in this country be found. With respect to the govern-

* See No. 3, of the New Quarterly Review, Art. Upper Canada.

"ment, its administration is conducted with every wish and attention
 "to render the situation of those who may settle under it, comfortable
 "and happy. Neither land tax, quit-rent, nor any other tax what-
 "ever, is known, excepting the county rates, payable by the free-
 "holders for the regulation of their internal police."

From the above statement it is manifest, that the elements of prosperity are not only interwoven in the constitutional polity, and engrafted in the soil (if we may be allowed the expression) of Canada; but that nothing is wanting except a generous encouragement from the mother country, to qualify the province to repay, with usurious interest, the services it may receive. To accomplish this desirable purpose, the British government should open a market to the Canadians, whereby their industry and enterprising spirit may meet with encouragement. This could never be effected, while the people of the United States engrossed the supply trade to the West Indies, and our shipping was suffered to go to decay. It is also worthy of observation, that a great part of the articles shipped from the ports of the United States, for the consumption of the West India islands, were actually the produce of Canada, purchased by American factors, and sent from Oswego, along the river of that name; thence into lake Oneida to Canada creek, where the vessels were unloaded, and the cargoes transported in waggons, about ten or eleven miles, as far as the Mohawk river, where they were again launched, and thence proceeded into the Hudson's river; by which navigation they were brought to New York, whence they were exported to the West Indies in American bottoms, as the produce of the United States; so that, in fact, the West Indies were not only supplied in a great measure by means of this contraband trade from Canada; but they also paid a greater price for their articles than they would have done, if they had received them direct, by means of the river St. Laurence. For instance, flour purchased by Americans at Kingston, situated at the extremity of lake Ontario for six dollars a barrel has been re-sold at the Oswego falls for eight dollars and a quarter per barrel; and at Rotterdam, on lake Ontario, at ten dollars per barrel. This profit is enormous; and if we add the expence of conveyance to New York, then the rise in the sale there, and the charge of lading, &c. before it reaches the West Indies, it will be found that our colonies actually paid fifty per cent. more for a barrel of flour from the United States, than they would have done by having their supplies direct from Canada. Even the DUKE DE LIANCOURT admits, "that the navigation through the United States cannot, in any respect, be com-

"pared with that of the river St. Laurence, however imperfect it may be;" and we will add, that the former is also much more tedious and expensive. For the navigation from Oswego to Canada creek cannot be performed by vessels of greater burthen than a ton and a half; independently of the numerous obstructions in descending the river, such as shallow water, carrying places, &c. Whereas, in the lakes of Upper Canada, ships of any burthen can navigate them without impediment. Many decked merchant vessels, schooners, sloops, of from fifty to two hundred tons each, and also numberless sailing batteaux, are perpetually plying between Niagara and Kingston, on lake Ontario, and occasionally stop at other places, in the course of their voyage. So conveniently situated is this province, both for internal commerce and foreign exports, that, from the straits of St. Mary, between lake Superior and lake Huron, to the Niagara river, the navigation is open to large vessels of any burden, which may come down to the eastern extremity of lake Erie in six days. A little beyond this spot, the stupendous cataract of Niagara intercepts the navigation, and the cargoes must be taken out and carried to Queen's Town, on this side of the falls, a distance of nine miles only.

From this landing place they are again re-shipped in vessels of two or three hundred tons burthen; and in less than three days are conveyed, with a fair wind, to Kingston, at the eastern extremity of lake Ontario. At Kingston numberless batteaux are ready to receive the cargoes brought in the larger vessels and to convey them to Montreal. These batteaux are of two tons burthen; and during the whole course of the river St. Laurence, there are but *three* impediments to the navigation; namely, at the rapids above Montreal, at the fall of the thicket, and at the long fall, at each of which it is necessary to lighten the batteaux, if heavily laden. Canals may, however, be easily constructed at each of these places, so as to prevent the trouble of unlading any part of the cargoes. From Montreal to Quebec, ships drawing fourteen feet water, may proceed with safety; and from the latter to the Atlantic, four hundred miles from the mouth of the St. Laurence, ships of the line navigate with ease.

Thus, then, from Kingston, on lake Ontario, to the mouth of the St. Laurence, a distance of 743 miles, the navigation is open, and may be effected in a few days; and we have seen that lake Ontario may be traversed, from its western to its eastern extremity, in less than three days; and that, with the exception of the nine miles portage at the falls of Niagara, the navigation is open to the vessels of any burthen,

from the straits of St. Mary beyond lake Huron, and may be accomplished in six days; therefore from the remotest settlements of Canada to the Atlantic, the passage can be effected in eighteen days or less, and is subjected only to the necessity of unloading the cargoes at one portage of nine miles extent, and below Kingston to the three falls already mentioned. We need not state to our readers, that, from the mouth of the St. Laurence to the West Indies, the navigation is shorter and better than from the northern harbours of the United States. From this statement it not only appears evident, that the St. Laurence opens* a shorter passage from the lakes for the conveyance of supplies, than any other river, but also that the portages are shorter, and fewer than in any other route; that goods may be transported in the same boats from the Lakes to Montreal; whereas, in conveying goods to Washington or New York, it is necessary to employ different boats and men on each different river; or else to transport the boats themselves on carriages, over the portages from one river to another; a circumstance, that must materially increase the expence of carriage, besides incurring the additional risk of pillage, from the goods passing through the hands of a greater number of people. Independently of these considerations, the St. Laurence will, on another account, be found a more commodious channel than any other for carrying on of trade between the lakes and the ocean. Constantly supplied from that immense reservoir of water, lake Ontario, it is never so low, even in the driest season, as not to be sufficiently deep to float laden batteaux. The small streams, on the contrary, which connect Hudson's river, the Patowmac and the Mississippi, with the lakes, are frequently so dried up, during Summer, (which is a greater obstacle to commerce than the freezing of the St. Laurence in winter,) that it is scarcely possible to pass along them, even in canoes.† Yet in despite of the embarrassments and expence attendant on the circuitous routes through the United States, our West Indies are actually supplied with the produce of Canada, under the fictitious name of American produce; when, by a direct communication, through the medium of British ships taking in their cargoes at Montreal, and Quebec, the Islands would be amply supplied, and

* See a Pamphlet, entitled "the British Treaty," of 1806.

† See the account of M. de Liancourt's expedition from Oswego to Albany. In some parts there was so little water, that they were obliged to pass three-fourths of the day in the water, to lift the vessel, and push it along.

at a cheaper rate, with all their wants, and the Shipping* interest of the empire, materially benefited. Indeed, the superabundance of wheat and flour is now so great in Canada, that considerable cargoes have been *annually* shipped from thence to Great Britain, Portugal, and other places. And, Mr. ARCHESON observes, in his excellent work, entitled "American encroachments on British rights," that, "the temporary causes which had checked the cultivation of this province, are, in some respects, removed, and an increased *annual* export of flour and wheat may be depended upon, as the culture of wheat and manufacture of flour are rapidly increasing in that settlement; from whence have been recently exported in one year, 800,000 bushels of wheat, and 30,000 barrels of flour."†

* An Account of the Number and Tonnage of ships that entered inwards, and cleared outwards, the British North American colonies, in the years 1806, 1807, 1808, 1809, and 1810; distinguishing each year.

Years	Inwards.		Outwards.	
	Ships.	Tons.	Ships.	Tons.
1806 - - - -	883	115,893	904	124,247
1807 - - - -	982	133,282	910	129,846
1808 - - - -	1171	186,024	1217	189,573
1809 - - - -	1566	235,409	1501	226,564
1810 - - - -	1702	295,285	1752	309,994

The above account is *exclusive* of the number and tonnage of vessels that entered and cleared *coastwise*, or between one British colony and another in North America.

† See also Appendix to Mr. Archeson's work, p. 189, and the evidence of Mr. Inglis on the 16th July, 1807, before the Committee of the House of Commons on the Commercial State of the West India Islands.

It appears to us, to be the interest of Great Britain, to adhere to the regulations that have been recently adopted, for the encouragement of the *export* trade of the British North American Colonies, not only from the extensive employment it will afford to British shipping, but from the increased demand it will create, for British manufactures. The intercourse between the United States and Canada, by the *interior communication*, should likewise be promoted, and every inducement held out to the inhabitants of those parts of the Union, *which border on the waters, that have their outlet to the Sea by the river St. Lawrence*, to export their grain, timber, and other produce, via Montreal. We also hope a similar preference will be given in Ireland (as in Great Britain,)

The prosperity of Lower Canada, has not kept pace with the progressive increase of the trade of the Upper Province; but of both we cannot have a more striking proof than the number of ships which cleared from Quebec since the peace with America. In 1785, there were 75 ships, tons 12,392; and, in 1811, 532 ships, tons 116,687, which cleared from the port of Quebec. The statements of the exports from Quebec for several years, which include those of Upper Canada, are printed in detail, in numbers 17 and 18 of the minutes of evidence taken before the Committee of the House of Commons, on the 2nd and 3rd June last, on the orders in council, from which it is evident, that the two provinces are capable of affording adequate supplies of the before-mentioned articles, but particularly of pine timber, masts, staves, lumber, pot and pearl ashes, to the mother country, and the British West Indies; and with Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland, of rendering altogether unnecessary, except as to a few articles of inconsiderable importance, the intercourse between the United States and the British West India Islands. The value of these provinces has been better estimated since we have been excluded from the Baltic trade; and it is well known that there is no country more favourable than Canada for the cultivation of hemp, or for the production of all those articles which are necessary for the supply of the West Indies.

The facts we have here adduced respecting the capacity of these colonies, from the extent of their progressive improvement, to supply the West India Islands, apply with much more force to the colonies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; not only because their geographical situation is more advantageous to Great Britain than any other on the continent of North America, but from their connection with Canada, the adjacent British Islands and the fisheries, and also from the superior excellence and number of their harbours, creeks, and inlets, and the facility with which they can supply the British West-India Islands with various kinds of lumber, boards, scantling, staves, and shingles; live stock, such as horses,

to pot ash imported from these Colonies, and that a duty will be imposed there on that article from *foreign* countries. The heavy duties imposed in the countries within the Baltic, on produce and other articles, exported from thence, in British ships, and which have been lately greatly augmented in Sweden, will, we trust, induce the legislature to revise and increase our Alien duties, so as to place, in point of expence, British shipping on an equal footing with those of other countries.

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oxen, sheep, and hogs; pickled and dried fish, and salt provisions, namely, beef, pork, and butter; which articles, were the navigation laws enforced, could be had from thence in British bottoms, and delivered in the British West India Islands, at as cheap rates as they are furnished in American vessels from the United States, and with greater certainty and regularity, instead of the precarious supplies they now receive from thence.* Besides the advantageous circumstance of the harbours of Nova Scotia being accessible at all seasons of the year, the woods abound with all the various kinds of timber to be found in New England. The lands of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, are well adapted also, for the cultivation of all sorts of grain, and of hemp, flax, and tobacco. Fish can be cured and carried from Newfoundland and the bay of Fundy to the West Indies, at as cheap a rate as, and of a superior quality to, most of the fish sent from the United States. Herrings have hitherto been carried to the West Indies from these two provinces,† at a cheaper rate than from Great Britain, and that these colonies are competent to supply the British West Indies with fish, without the aid of the United States, is now beyond dispute. And it is with satisfaction we observe, that by an order of his Majesty in council, *American* fish was not permitted to be imported into the British West India Islands, after the first of July last. Live stock is there raised in the greatest abundance, and sold at the lowest prices, so much so, that His Majesty's navy, on the American station, and occasionally, that on the West India station, together with the King's troops in both provinces, are amply supplied, and several thousand barrels of salted beef and pork are annually exported. There is also a striking fact mentioned by Mr. Atcheson, which goes to prove how easily the United States may be rendered dependent, upon Great Britain, namely, that the United States must, in a very few years, resort to these provinces for coal, as other kinds of fuel have become scarce and dear in the sea-port towns of the eastern provinces of the United States. They, likewise, have for several years, resorted to these provinces, particularly

* Mr. Atcheson's book, p. xliv.

† Ibid. Appendix, p. 190; also No. 3 of the New Quarterly Review, for a comparative statement of fish exported from the British North American Colonies, and of fish imported into the British West Indies, by which it appears, that the quantity of fish annually exported from the former, is considerably above one-third more than the amount of the annual consumption of the latter.

‡ Mr. Atcheson's Book, p. 102.

to New Brunswick, for GYPSUM, which is become an article of great demand; indeed, in some measure of necessity in the United States. In 1806 upwards of 40,000 tons were exported from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and if the contraband trade in this article in Passamaquoddy Bay was suppressed, the export of it to the United States, would annually employ at least 10,000 tons of British shipping. We, therefore, hope the commissioners of His Majesty's Customs will no longer be indifferent to this subject, but strictly enjoin the officers of the revenue in these colonies, to prosecute with vigour and effect all those who may be found engaged in this most injurious traffic. And we trust, the applications which have been made to government, for leave to open and work the seams of coal in Nova Scotia, will be immediately granted, and every encouragement given to the export of an article which is so likely to promote and increase the navigation of the country.

Cape Breton, Prince Edward's Island, and Newfoundland, are the other British settlements, contiguous to the British provinces in North America. Cape Breton may be considered as the key to Canada, and the very valuable fisheries in its neighbourhood depend, for their protection, on the possession of it; as no nation can now carry them on, without some convenient harbour of strength to supply and protect them, and Louisburgh is the principal one for those purposes. Some advantages are now derived from the coal mines in this island, which are situated near the entrance of the harbour, the works of which and the fisheries constitute the chief employment of the inhabitants; but without trading at present directly to the British West India islands, both Cape Breton and Prince Edward's Island serve to increase the exports of Nova Scotia; they likewise supply Newfoundland with cattle, and with proper encouragement would rival some of the more opulent colonies in articles of agriculture.

The war in which we are now engaged, will speedily illustrate and justify all our reasonings. It is no longer in the power of the United States to supply the British West Indies, and we shall, therefore, see how those islands *can* and *will be* supplied without their intervention; and most sincerely it is to be hoped, that this second experience of the fallacy of the doctrines of the American advocates, which we are to derive through the medium of war, will at length open our eyes, and induce us to revive, in all its vigour, the navigation system of England, to give every species of encouragement to our own colonies in America, and to prohibit in future all intercourse.

between the United States, and the British West India Islands.*

These striking proofs which we have adduced, in order to demonstrate our proposition, that the trade of the United States of America is not so *essential* to the welfare of the British empire as has been generally imagined, are rendered much more manifest in the work published some time ago, and to which we have had occasion frequently to refer, by Mr. ARCHERSON, wherein he has shewn, from a mass of official documents, and other authentic sources, that Great Britain and her colonies are not dependent upon America, for any advantages which her trade may supply; and that the prosperity, safety, and independence, of the United States themselves, depend upon the friendship and powerful protection of Great Britain. The following extract from "*An Address of the Members of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States to their Constituents, on the subject of the War with Great Britain*," confirms the truth of these observations.

"Unfortunately," say they, "administration had recourse to a system, complicated in its nature, and destructive in its effects, which instead of relief from the injuries of foreign governments, served only to fill up what was wanting in the measure of evils abroad, by artificial embarrassments at home. As long ago as the year 1794, Mr. MADISON, the present President of the United States, then a member of the House of Representatives, devised and proposed a system of commercial restrictions, which had for its object the coercion of Great Britain, by a denial to her of our products and our market; asserting, that the former was, in a manner, *essential* to her prosperity, either as necessities of life, or as raw materials for her manufactures; and that, without the latter, a great proportion of labouring classes could not subsist. In that day of sage and virtuous forethought, the proposition was rejected. It remained, however, a theme of unceasing paenegyric among an active class of American politicians, who, with a systematic pertinacity, inculcated among the people, that commercial restrictions were a species of warfare, which would ensure success to the United States, and humiliation to Great Britain. There were two circumstances inherent in this system of coercing Great Britain by commercial restrictions, which ought to have made practical politicians very doubtful of its result, and very cautious of its trial. These were the state of opinion in relation to its efficacy

* We trust that this prohibition will be extended also to our Asiatic possessions.

† See the Accounts of Imports and Exports, ordered to be printed by the House of Commons in Feb. 1812, and No. 3, of the New Quarterly Review, p. 18.

"among commercial men in the United States, and the state of feeling, which a resort to it would unavoidably produce in Great Britain. On the one hand, *it was undeniable, that the great body of commercial men in the United States, had no belief in such a dependence of Great Britain upon the United States, either for our produce or our market, as the system implied.* Without the hearty co-operation of this class of men, success in its attempt was obviously unattainable; and, as on them the chief suffering would fall, it was altogether unreasonable to expect that they would become co-operating instruments in support of any system, which was to ruin them, and without hope to their country. On the other hand, as it respects Great Britain, a system proceeding upon the *avowed principle of her dependence upon us*, was among the last to which a proud and powerful nation would yield."

The war with the United States of America, may be justly said to have emancipated Great Britain. We have it now in our power to correct the errors of more than twenty years of idle and inefficient negotiations. All former treaties, all past concessions, may undergo a REVISION during war, preparatory to a final, fixed, plain, and intelligible, system, at its termination. And, if we reflect a little upon the character of the population of the United States; we shall learn henceforward to *avoid all commercial treaties* with a nation which, in all its transactions with Great Britain, has reduced fraud into a system, and has holden in total disregard the most venerable conventions of society. Let a treaty of peace come when it may, a treaty of commerce ought strictly to be avoided with States so irritable, and composed of so many distinct and discordant legislatures, whose policy necessarily partakes of the nature and direction of the constitution of those respective States. The insatiate spirit of land monopoly having introduced a spirit of chicanery in the title, sale, and purchase, of lands, no persons of property from Europe have felt themselves inclined to settle in the United States for the sake of investing their capitals in land. When any well-educated persons have crossed the Atlantic, with a view of staking their fortunes in the United States, they have found themselves coldly received; and, instead of those cultivated lawns and furrowed fields, which their warm imaginations had already possessed before their departure from Europe, they found themselves, with all the advantages of polished minds and abundant purses, consigned to a state of absolute seclusion from the cheerful ways of men, unless they would submit to be swindled and brutalized, that is, to purchase lands at a more exorbitant price than was exacted in Europe; for the gratification of living in the neighbourhood of men more brutish and sordid in their

manners, than the most unpolished clowns of the countries they had left.* Thus disappointed in their expectations, they returned home, leaving the population of America to be increased by emigrant traitors, rebels, and swindlers, fraudulent bankrupts, and deserters. This impure admixture of the refuse of Europe, with the American people, is a state of society extremely unfavourable to liberal sentiments, ingenuous manners, and amiable qualities. If the American policy had been so open as to invite the emigration of men of a better condition, a portion of the civilization of Europe, must, in the course of nearly thirty years, have been infused into the population of that country, which must have influenced its councils, and harmonized them to a more sociable and civil intercourse with Great Britain. But the absence of such men has thrown America into the predicament of a society utterly selfish, divested of all relative affections, and of all those diversified gradations of rank which constitute the beauty, the order, the progressive improvement, and glory of Europe. There is a sameness in the southern parts of America extremely disgusting to a liberal mind, which totally disqualifies them from comprehending the principles by which nations are governed on this side of the Atlantic. They have no opportunities for giving the education suitable to a gentleman; and the inhabitants are so confined within their individual neighbourhood, unconnected with large towns and extensive seminaries, that their numbers tend to increase their prejudices against a country, from which the great body of the people consider themselves as but recently emancipated, after enduring the greatest injuries; while those prejudices are heightened by a mixture of French of every political denomination, and of English, Irish, and some Scotch, renegades from their native country, who leave no means untried to increase the malevolence which has long subsisted among a people, but a slight degree removed, with very few exceptions, in feeling and manners, from a rude state of society, and that degree only in a superiority of gross, vicious, and degenerate habits.

Although the inhabitants of the Northern States are infinitely superior to the Southern parts of the Union, in education, manners, habits, and moral rectitude; yet, from the unlimited equality in the constitution of the government of every State, there flows, without exception, such an instability of political principle, that no sufficient dependence can be placed upon the conduct of their rulers; who, with an eye to elections, at

* Mr. Parkinson and other modern writers on the United States.

short recurring periods, become influenced by motives the most secret, and selfish, unchecked by that spirit of honour which gradually guides the conduct of persons of good education, and possessing pecuniary independence, not acquired by traffic with the lower classes of society. The people of the Southern States are agriculturists ; those of the Northern, traders. Both are destitute of that diversity of pursuits which gives ornament, harmony, and effect, to the politics of a nation. A nation of farmers, a nation of merchants, or a nation composed of persons exercising any one occupation whatever, exclusively, must be narrow in their views ; and in this instance, these two divisions of the same nation, being as much separated by distance as by habits, never can assimilate in any series of pursuits. Until a complete revolution in manners shall have taken place, discord and faction must predominate among themselves, and insult and vulgarity will be the only fruits to be gathered from any intimate interference from foreigners.

A nation so composed of the most opposite and discordant materials, of which, too, its Senates are formed, presents a singular picture in the features of legislation. Hence, we do not perceive, in the proceedings of the American legislature, the least tincture of that liberal policy, which is the distinguishing characteristic of European legislation. The pettifogging litigious spirit of the constituent is carried by his representative into the public councils, and every topic is discussed upon selfish motives and mercenary views. Laws and the foreign relations of the state are determined by the speculative views of the jobber, and the arithmetic of the ledger. Every thing that is mean and sordid enters into the composition of such a political structure ; nothing just, manly, and honourable, can come out of it. Accordingly, the same litigious spirit which governs their internal concerns is employed to trick and overreach in their external relations ; and as every man fancies that America was made for himself, so the State, in its aggregate capacity, fancies that all the rest of the world is made for America.*

With a people of such a character, we should avoid, at the restoration of peace, entering into any commercial treaty. It will be much the easiest and best mode to trade under **THE MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS OF EACH COUNTRY**, which may be rendered reciprocal. For we have seen that almost every article of our commercial treaties with America has only served to entangle us in fresh negotiations, and to encourage

* See the dawnings of these principles in the second number of the *New Quarterly Review*, in the article of Pike, and Lewis and Clarke's travels.

the government of that country to pursue a systematic course of fraud and encroachment, wherever such article has been unfavourable to their own views. And since we have clearly proved that the West India Islands are well supplied with fish,* that article should be strictly prohibited in foreign bottoms, and a duty laid upon every other article imported by the Americans, should the unfortunate prepossession still prevail at the end of the war, that an intercourse between the United States and the West Indies ought still to be allowed. And, for this purpose, the third article of the treaty of 1783 should never be revived; but a sloop of war should, every summer, be stationed in the Straits of Belle-Isle, as commodore, with extraordinary powers to the commander, to protect the British fishermen, and to seize all foreign vessels infringing the regulations.

It will also be of the highest importance to exclude American vessels from the cod fishery on the banks of Newfoundland, and especially from the gulph of St. Laurence and coast of Labrador, where, henceforward, they should not be allowed, under any pretext, to enter, whether to fish, or for any other purpose; nor should any person be permitted to land from American vessels upon any British territory, to dry fish, whether upon a coast uninhabited or not. In fact, the third article of the treaty of 1783 should be considered, from the present hour, as utterly abrogated, and every vestige of its existence completely eradicated. And if we should not be able to obtain the height of land between Canada and the United States, as a new line of boundary, we ought to insist on all the islands in the river St. Laurence and the lakes; nor should any of them be ceded without previous ascertainment by commissioners of their locality and importance.

Another important circumstance will deserve the consideration of the British government, and which it may now substantially realize; we mean securing to Great Britain the possession of the Floridas, which, if the Americans be allowed to establish as their own, will prove of infinite value and importance to them.† For, they will thereby acquire an unlimited supply of *live oak* which grows in no other part of America; but, in our possession, the British navy may procure timber of

* No. 3, of the New Quarterly Review, article on Upper Canada. Likewise the Reports on navigation and trade. Edit. 1807. Richardson.

† Ibid. Article Louisiana, Supplement No. 1; also Talleyrand's account of the war of St. Domingo, and the cession of the Mississippi to France.

the largest dimensions, and of every shape. It appears, that in the spring of 1799, the chief of the Creek nation, GENERAL BOWLES, was in England, and a proposal was submitted to the then ministry, for putting Great Britain in possession of the Spanish part of the Floridas. The offer is stated to have failed, from the tenaciousness which GENERAL BOWLES shewed toward the country, which he claimed as the boundary of his nation; that is, between 30 and 32 degrees north latitude, and 84 and 88 west longitude. If this really were the case, the British government committed an egregious error, and acted with the highest impolicy. Afterwards, GENERAL BOWLES caused another memorial to be presented on the subject, detailing the great advantages of such a conquest; not only on account of the supplies of timber and hemp, which that country will produce in any quantity, but because it would secure the mouths of the Mississippi, and thereby, hold the southern parts of the Union in a greater dependence upon Great Britain. In fact, by means of Canada on the north, as a military post; Nova Scotia to the east, as a naval station; West Florida, as a *lock*, on the western country beyond the Aligany; and East Florida, on the south; the United States must become wholly dependent upon Great Britain. And, had the then British government pursued the wise policy of listening to the overtures of GENERAL BOWLES, whose sole object was to secure his nation against the artful tricks of the Americans, and to civilize his Indian fellow citizens, by the closest union with that power, in whose service he held a commission to his death, and to whose sovereign he was attached by every tie of duty and affection, we should have been secured from the attacks of the Americans, by an army of 10 or 15,000 *well-disciplined* Indians, stationed most advantageously for action, in every quarter, for attack or defence. Thus; instead of being an objection, the independence of the Creek nation ought, in good policy, as well as sound morality, to have stimulated the British government to secure that people from the oppression of the United States; which are now in a fair way to extirpate them, after kidnapping, and then murdering their chief, as they have done every nation of Indians, which has had the misfortune to come within their reach. The late transactions at Amelia Island, and the purchase of Louisiana, are sufficient proofs of the ultimate object the Americans have in view. It is, therefore, to be presumed, now that all former treaties are cancelled, and that the power of the sword will enable us to carry into effect such measures as shall rescue us from the oversights of past times, that the British government will not allow Florida to be incorporated with the United States; but that, deriving wisdom from the bitter experience

of the past, it will look comprehensively to the future. It must, by this time, have learnt thoroughly to appreciate the American character, and its present power; which, if circumscribed by the British possessions, in the manner we have here recommended, can never become very formidable. For the western country must, for ages to come, be a drain to the American possessions on the eastern side of the Aligany. The space between, is a series of mountains of vast broken heights, across which access can be obtained only at a great expence of labour, too great for mercantile advantages. The country between the Aligany and the Atlantic may be divided into two extensive districts; one, from the former to the head of the tides; the other, from the flowing of the tides to the ocean. The country nearest to the Aligany is, or may be rendered, reasonably productive; the lands nearest the tides are capable of culture, but they are inferior by nature, and miserably managed. The lands between the tides and the sea are, generally speaking, vast deserts of sand, not less in extent than 800 miles in length, by an average of 170 wide, containing some few districts, like islands in an ocean, of tolerably good land, and even of some very rich. The lands of the New England States are not, in general, higher than a middle quality; and, therefore, viewing the possessions of the United States, on the eastern side of the Aligany, and considering the drain to which they are liable from the western country, it is natural to infer that they are nearly at the extent of their population and power; and that it depends upon the firm policy of Great Britain, whether these shall increase or not. If, however, we exhibit the same culpable indifference, relative to the future, as we have done for many years, the United States will very soon be a thorn in our side of the most inveterate poignancy. We trust, therefore, that the present ministers will not be deterred by the apprehension of irritating the federal party in the States, from carrying these measures into effect. The federal party are all desirous that Great Britain should continue to possess Canada, because they are aware, that, if it were even taken by conquest, or what is still more improbable, secured to them by treaty, *the French would never rest until they regained possession of it.* For, under whatever dynasty France may be governed, it is, and ever has been, a predominating maxim of her policy, to consider every colony which has been once under her sway, and peopled by Frenchmen, as a possession to which she has an inherent, indefeasible right, to be reclaimed whenever it is in her power to procure restitution by force or negotiation. The manifesto of Count

D'Estaing, to all the French in Canada in 1778,* and the more recent† acquisition of Louisiana, are proofs of this truth. TALLEYRAND, the able monitor of BUONAPARTE, in a memorial, on the cession of the Mississippi to France, addressed to his master, then first consul, holds precisely the same doctrine.

"We must first observe," says he, "that in gaining possession of this territory, (Louisiana) we shall not enter on a desert, where the forest must be first removed before a shelter can be built; whether we must carry the corn and the clothes, necessary to present subsistence, and the seed, the tools, and the cattle, which are requisite to raise a future provision. We have no wars to wage, nor treaties to form with the aboriginal possessors. The empire thus restored to us will not be over English or Spaniards, whose national antipathies would make them ever restless and refractory, but *countrymen and friends; the children of France, who are impatient of a foreign yoke, and who are anxious to return to the bosom of their long estranged ancestors.*"

The same reasoning applies to the Floridas; to which we may add, that their remoteness would prevent the New England States from taking any interest in them. If the public could once bring themselves to regard the United States, in this, their true point of view, they would soon penetrate into their tricking system, and perceive that low cunning and vapouring rhodomontade, aided by the most consummate effrontery and the most persevering mercantile enterprize, have given them all their late advantages in the estimation of the world.

We shall not dwell, in this place, upon another advantage which the dissolution of our political and commercial relations with America, will enable us to obtain; namely, the imposition of restrictions upon the American‡ East India trade, so that they shall not be allowed to enjoy in that quarter of the globe, greater commercial privileges than the great body of British subjects. The important concerns of the East India Company will shortly come under the deliberation of Parliament, when, doubtless, this boon, granted to the Americans, will undergo a scrupulous revision; and the expediency of it, for the future, be finally determined upon, not upon little, nar-

* The State Papers in the Annual Register for 1778.

† No. 2, of the New Quarterly Review, p. 390, Art. Pike's Travels.

‡ See the opinion of the late Chief Justice Eyre in *Wilson v. Marryat*, Ex. Ch. May, 1799, wherein he censures this concession to the United States.

row, and crooked, views of *temporary interest*, but on the broad basis of the general welfare of the Empire.

The dependence of the United States on Great Britain may be further illustrated by the contemplation of the superiority and cheapness of our manufactures. Until these are rivalled by foreign goods, in quality and price, and until foreign commercial houses exceed the British in capital, every American trader will eagerly resort* to the British market for supplies. Mercantile people, from the highest to the lowest, have but one object in view—their pecuniary interest. Can the good-will of the Eastern States be accounted for on any other motive? It is *that* alone which inclines them to think favourably of Great Britain, and if we secure that, we may rely, with confidence, upon their "*lives and fortunes*." They are sensible, that they are completely at the mercy of the British navy, both afloat and along their whole line of coast. But this cannot be said of the inhabitants of the Southern States. With but one town of consequence, every one lives on his plantation or his farm; and wanting no one necessary article of meat, drink, or clothing, the great mass of the population rest in the most perfect indifference to our enmity. In every family, they manufacture their own clothing, and the next distil-house furnishes them with apple or peach brandy, or whiskey, at the rate of a gallon for every bushel of fruit or grain. They have provisions in abundance, and the few manufacturers of iron which they require, are made in the country. This is the embargo state of things, to the southward; and therefore, every master of a family (those only excepted who live in the highest stations and require foreign luxuries, and they are comparatively but few in number) would prefer that his sons and daughters should be obliged, from necessity, to be industrious. For, whenever the store of foreign goods is open to them, the next crop of tobacco, rice, or wheat, is taken up in advance, and very little of it ever gets into the pockets of the grower. These are the most essential differences between the Southern and the Northern States, in respect of their politics; and therefore, it is not difficult to perceive, that a people who have so few wants, and who, from the frequent calls to exercise their franchises, for every petty or important office, from a constable to a senator, and, even to the supreme executive Magistrate, should, when they think themselves free from invasion, hold at defiance the British Government, which they had successfully

* No. 3 of the New Quarterly Review, Art. Mr. Brougham's Speech on the Orders in Council.

combated for eight years, and compelled, finally, to abandon a country which it had attempted, in vain, to subjugate.

Thus, we have made good the propositions with which we set out. In reviewing our past relations with the United States, we have exhibited indubitable evidence to prove that the West India islands can be subsisted amply by our North American colonies, conjointly with the aid of Ireland and Great Britain, if the United States are utterly excluded from all intercourse with those islands, which, in point of fact, would be the most effectual mode of encouraging the British colonies in North America. We have also exposed the encroaching spirit which actuates every portion of American policy; and we have displayed the American character, in its true and proper colours, that our Government may be guarded against entering into any commercial treaty with a people so systematically addicted to the practice of fraud and duplicity in all their dealings. Indeed, we know of no stronger reasoning by which this proposition can be enforced, than by pointing the public attention to the frauds, or rather to the "*war in disguise*," which the United States have tolerated and practised respecting British seamen. The system which they pursued, in this respect, was far more prejudicial to our interests than open war. Independently of her extorting from us as *their* right the privilege of intercourse with our colonies, America seduced our mariners from our service, and encouraged them to desert; by the practice of the most shameless immorality she has sanctioned the grossest perjuries and subornations of perjury; for, while her general laws refuse the privilege of citizenship, under a term of fourteen years local residence, she actually exempted the deserters from our navy, from the necessity of proving their titles. It is enough for the deserter to swear, before an *American Magistrate*, that he is an American citizen, to procure the protection of that Government, and to exclude our commanders from the power of reclaiming them. Often has it happened, that when our naval officers have applied to the constituted authorities for assistance in recovering their deserters, they have been laughed at, and exposed to derision and affronts, from the very men whom they went to reclaim, in the hearing and presence of the American Magistrate. The proceedings at Halifax, after the British deserters had been taken out of the American frigate, *Chesapeake*, developed the iniquitous practices countenanced by the Government of the United States against the maritime rights of this country. It was proved on the trial of those persons, that they were British subjects; that they had been tampered with, and finally seduced, by *American officers*, into the Ameri-

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can service ; and that when they were reclaimed by their own officers, the Americans refused to deliver them up, and openly paraded them, under the American flag, in the streets of Norfolk, and in the sight of their own officers. No friendly nation has a right to detain the subjects of another, engaged in the service of the State, when actually reclaimed by the agents of the power from whom they deserted. GORIUS and VAREL admit, that persons may quit their native country, and settle in another ; but they argue strongly against the propriety of such a measure, when their country is engaged in hostilities, and requires the service of all its members. This reasoning applies, with tenfold force, when we consider, that the men who entered on board of the Chesapeake, did not relinquish their country, in a civil capacity, but actually *deserted* their duty as military servants of the State, who had received the pay of the public, for the express purpose of defending its interests. Their desertion could not affect the *RIGHT* of Great Britain to reclaim them : and, as the principle was admitted by the American Government itself, it became its *duty*, to comply with the request of our officers ; and its refusal was a fraudulent violation of that friendship which subsisted between the two countries. But the system of prevarication, subornation of perjury, and treachery, was as apparent in the American Government itself, as in its subordinate Magistrates. Jenkin Ratford, one of the deserters taken, when called upon for his defence, admitted that he was a British subject and a deserter. What he *did* offer to the Court was merely in extenuation of his guilt, and in this attempt a piece of villany was disclosed, which exhibits, in the fullest light, the frauds, tricks, chicanery, and disbonourable conduct, of the American officers. When Captain Townsend, who mentioned the fact, in his evidence, upon oath, on Ratford's trial, applied to the American Lieutenant Sinclair, who was entering men for the Chesapeake, to have the deserters given up, he received for answer, an infamous, wilful, and deliberate falsehood, namely, that there were no men entered for the Chesapeake, *by the names* which Captain Townsend had mentioned. Moreover, when Captain Townsend applied to him, a second time, and *offered to point out the men*, if Sinclair would allow him to go into the Rendezvous, Sinclair returned no answer. Now, we should never have come at the real state of the case, if Ratford had not, from an anxiety to soften his own criminality, in the eyes of the Court, dropt an unguarded expression, respecting the manœuvres of these *honest, plain-dealing, and virtuous*, republican officers. He stated, that " he, with all the men who had " deserted from the Halifax, were persuaded by the boatswain,

“to enter for the Chesapeake, to protect themselves, which they “did;” Lieutenant Sinclair, the very same man who had denied to Captain Townsend that they had entered into the American service, asking them, “if they had not a second name?” This was an incitement to the commission of fraud, and was unworthy of men exercising the profession of arms, in whom we expect to find the most refined sentiments of honour. The government of Washington partakes of the spirit of its officers. When the British consul remonstrated to the chief magistrate at Norfolk, that officer refused acting in the business, or authorizing any thing that might be done by the British officers to re-take the deserters. This was officially communicated to His Britannic Majesty’s ministers at Washington, who, represented to the Secretary of State, and the President, whose answers were, “that having entered the American Service, and “claimed its protection, they were to be considered as citizens, “and therefore could not be given up.” What was this but a frontless avowal, on the part of the government of the United States, that it fully concurred in the treachery, and participated in the low equivocations and tricking frauds of its subjects? It was neither more nor less than a bold, undisguised, and unprincipled invitation to British Seamen to desert in future; since, to enter into the American service, by an open breach of duty, was enough to entitle the deserter, to claim its protection. This enticing our men from the service of their country, and inducing them to change their names, in order that they may receive American protection, is an act of public fraud which no government can justify, upon any principle of neutrality, or the laws of nations. And this legitimated perjury has been ascertained to have been carried on, upon a very comprehensive scale; so that our men were seduced by wholesale from the service, and the communication between our ships of war and the American shore became of such a precarious nature, that no ship’s boat could be trusted to bring on board the necessary refreshments.

It is vain, therefore, to hope, at the termination of hostilities with America, that any commercial treaty with a people endowed with a character so deeply tinctured with fraud, should ever be observed. Such a treaty would only encourage the spirit of bickering and ill will, which supplants all social principles, and we should find ourselves again called upon to make concessions in order to silence for a while incessant importunities. But, the experience we have already acquired, should teach us, that concessions only give birth to fresh demands, and fresh demands to more concessions. We should again expose our maritime power to be insulted and undermined

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by a vapouring race, whose commercial life depends upon the protection of Great Britain; our seamen would continue to be purloined from the service; and our commerce become subservient to such American good faith, as we have above described. And, what security shall we hold, in case we should reclaim future deserters, against an American secretary of state, or president, telling us, "*that having entered into the American service, and claimed its protection, our deserters are to be considered as American Citizens, and, therefore, not to be given up?*"

If we were to pursue the conduct of America towards Great Britain; we should find it extremely difficult to consider her as having acted the part of a neutral power. Her barefaced partiality to France is a proof of the fact; and their legislators have been actually known to put a different interpretation upon the law of nations, when the conduct of Great Britain and France falls under their deliberation. Thus, the most outrageous acts of tyranny, committed by the French Government on American citizens, has only served to provoke a mild note of expostulation. In proportion as the insolence of the French Government towards America has increased, the humility and friendship of the American Executive, have kept pace with it; until the forbearance, the servile submission, and even the acquiescence, of the American Government, under reiterated wrongs, have emboldened the French to proceed, with the most perfect confidence of impunity. Whereas, if a dispassionate spectator of the events of the last twenty years could be appealed to, he would pronounce a verdict of condemnation upon the treatment we have experienced from the United States. He would declare, that while France was perpetually insulting and trampling under foot the neutral rights of America, that country has winked at her insolencies, and has been solicitous to find grounds of apology for her injustice. On the other hand, America has been haughty, turbulent, filled with animosity and dictatorial, to England. In proportion as our impolicy yielded to her demands, she instantly preferred others, with increased arrogance, until our evident indifference to a spirited assertion of the national dignity, encouraged her to believe, that we had neither the inclination nor the ability to check her encroachments. Amidst all the wrongs of which America has complained, France is treated in the light of a friendly aggressor, while England is denounced as the offender; and when laws are enacted, or resolutions framed, on the other side of the Atlantic, they are all aimed against the violent interpolations which it is said England has inserted in the

public code of nations. All this enmity and provocation we have brought upon ourselves, by giving too much consequence to the American people as a nation ; by our culpable negligence of our own settlements and fisheries in North America ; and by that unfounded opinion, since demonstrated to be such by the American embargo, and the orders in Council, that, without a free intercourse with the United States, the British West India Islands would be ruined. Now that the war has cancelled all treaties, political, and commercial, and put an end to concessions improvidently granted, we have a right to hope, that at its termination, *no relaxations whatever* will take place in the navigation laws of England, and that the United States will never be allowed to renew their intercourse with the British West Indies, since their folly and our necessities have taught us to draw from our improving settlements in North America, the supplies which the islands require. The eyes of the public must be now generally opened to the intrinsic worth of those settlements ; and the long suspension of the trade to the Baltic, has disclosed the valuable productions of which they are capable. In a word, we may say to the British Ministry, in the language of that eminent statesman, LORD CLARENDON, " they who shall be so honest and so wise, constantly to prefer the true interest of England to that of any other country, or people, preserve the religion and the laws, protect and promote the trade of the nation, thriftily and providently administer the public treasure, and study to maintain the sovereignty of the seas, so naturally, so anciently, and so justly, the true defence of the kingdom ; that body whomsoever it shall be composed of, shall have the weight of England on its side ; and if there can be any of another frame, they must, in the end, prove so many miserable rotten reeds."

Thus have we travelled over a very extensive field of argument ; and we will venture, with perfect confidence, to affirm, that, in no argument which we have adduced, have we failed in establishing proofs, so clear and irrefragable in support of each, as to convey the most satisfactory conviction to the mind of every unprejudiced reader of the truth, justice, and reasonableness, of our inferences. We are far from exulting, as some persons are apt to do, in the war in which we are engaged with the United States of America ; for we conceive that our great, firm and patriotic country, had enough to encounter, with it requiring the accession of another enemy, contemptible as that enemy's means of annoyance may, at first sight, appear. But, BEING ACTUALLY AT WAR, we conceive the event may prove ULTIMATELY highly beneficial to

the Colonial and Maritime Interests of Great Britain, if, AT THE END OF IT, the British Ministry shall avoid the gross errors into which preceding administrations have fallen ; if they shall rectify the palpable mistakes of negotiators and agents employed to accommodate former disputes with America ; and give to the new treaty of amity which they must enter into with the United States, a character of plainness, decision, and intelligible simplicity, which all the dexterity of American chicanery, shall in vain seek to elude. The war may, under this consideration, be said to have retrieved our lost ground, and to have placed the assertion of our Maritime Rights totally within our power, *unshackled by the embarrassment of improvident concessions, or of commercial treaties.* All past blunders on our part, have been abrogated by the warlike genius of PRESIDENT MADISON : every thing is to begin anew ; and it is to be hoped, that it will begin in a manner that shall ensure the continuance of the system we may adopt in our future relations with the United States.

Among the many topics of grievance which we have enumerated in our summary of the conduct of the American Government, there is one of the very first importance, which we have not yet touched upon ; but which well deserves the serious attention of our Government. For, it has been ever since the treaty of 1783, a perpetual source of bickering between the two countries, and a forcible stimulus to the encroaching spirit of the Americans. We mean, the culpable indifference, not to say ignorance, betrayed by former administrations or their agents, in the arrangement of *the line of boundaries* between the British and American possessions. It will be in our power, AT THE CLOSE of the present hostilities, to repair these extraordinary oversights in the treaty of 1783, and therefore, we feel it to be our duty to expatiate more particularly upon them, in the present article.

It is scarcely credible, though it is the fact, that, in acceding to the independence of the United States, we not only secured to them *their own* territory, but we also ceded to them an extent of country, then a portion of the province of Quebec, nearly of equal magnitude to the whole United States, although not a foot of the country which was thus ceded, was, at the time, occupied by an American in arms, nor could it have been occupied by the Americans had the war continued. This cession is the more remarkable, as New York and Rhode Island were then in the possession of the British army ; whence it was to be inferred, that the surrender of these valuable places would have required a large equivalent in territory elsewhere

instead of our giving a premium for dispossessing ourselves of them. Yet, such was the ignorance or the negligence of the British Ministry, and those employed by them, relative to the geographical position and local importance of the territory ceded, that when the merchants of London interested in the trade to Canada, waited on Mr. OSWALD,* the negotiator, to represent the impolicy and improvidence of the cession of the upper country, and of the posts which commanded it, namely, Michilimakinac, Detroit, Niagara, &c. and to propose some means for averting the ruinous effects of it on the security of Canada and of the British trade and influence with the Indians; *he actually burst into tears, acknowledged his complete ignorance of such posts being in our possession, or even in existence, or that the country ceded was an object worthy of the least notice!* Unfortunately, it was too late to retrieve the error. But its mischievous consequences were not confined solely to British subjects: they fell upon a body of men whose interests the British negotiator had no authority or right to sacrifice. That country was inhabited by numerous tribes or nations of Indians who were wholly independent of us: they were the true proprietors of the territory; and consequently, we had no right to transfer to others, what did not belong to ourselves, inasmuch as we had never obtained from the native proprietors, any right of acquisition. This was, therefore, a shameless act of injustice, the criminality of which was greatly aggravated by the consideration that the aboriginal natives had been our

* *Mr. Burke*, in his speech on the Bill for the *Provisional Establishment and Regulation of the Trade and Intercourse between Great Britain and the United States*, on the 7th of March, 1783, said, that "when he heard that *Mr. Oswald* was sent to Paris as a negotiator, "he took it for granted, it was to negotiate a commercial treaty. He "could not possibly conceive, that when the Noble Lord at the head "of Administration, had the *most experienced* geographer in the world "at hand, that he would have pitched upon a merchant to negotiate "a *geographical* treaty. That Noble Lord, instead of applying to "those persons who could have given him some information, had "sent merchants *into the woods*, who could give him no assistance. "The two negotiators having passed seven months without having "done any thing for the commerce of the country, put him in mind "of two Irishmen; one of whom being asked, what he was doing, "answered, *nothing*; and the other having been asked the same question, replied, *I am helping him*; so that it looked like *cross reading* "to see men's talents, which nature designed for one line of business, "employed in another for which nature had not qualified them." *Mr. Caleb Whiteford*, noted for his *cross readings* of newspapers, was *Mr. Oswald's* Secretary on this memorable Embassy.

FAITHFUL ALLIES during the whole of the American rebellion; yet, not a single stipulation was made in their favour! According to the sound maxims of the law of nations, that portion of the treaty was null and void *ab initio*; since no power possesses the right of transferring either property or territory which is not its own.

Immediately after the disgraceful treaty of 1783, the Americans commenced their system of bad faith, and shamefully evaded or infringed the stipulations respecting the Loyalists and British debts. In consequence of which fraudulent acts, we retained the upper posts, mentioned above, as pledges until the due performance of those stipulations. * Many years afterwards, when appearances indicated that these posts would be surrendered to America, the merchants of Montreal, who were at that time principally concerned in the Indian trade, preferred two representations, in December, 1791, and April, 1792, to GENERAL SIMCOE, then Governor of Upper Canada, in which they exposed the impolicy of the intended cession, and strained every nerve to induce the British Government to procure a new line of boundary, or demarcation, that should be compatible with the security of Canada and with the protection of the Indians. But these representations were ineffectual. According to Mr. JAY's treaty of 1794, it was agreed, that the posts should be delivered up, on or before the 1st of June, 1796, and the only provision obtained respecting the Indians, was a right of trade with them from Canada, upon the same footing as the Americans, which provision had been suggested in the representations made to GENERAL SIMCOE, as an alternative, desirable only in the event of the impracticability of obtaining a new line of boundary. The posts were given up, in pursuance of the treaty: and here we are furnished with another opportunity of exposing the fraudulent and encroaching character of the Americans, and, of course, with another argument against the policy of concluding any future commercial treaty with them. Notwithstanding the explicit and positive stipulation contained in the treaty of 1794, in favour of an *unrestrained trade* with the Indians, so little regard was paid by the American Government to the faith of treaties, and, in this instance, to a point on which their own faith was solemnly pledged, that they contrived to entrap the Indians into a treaty, which was concluded at Fort Greenville, on the third of August, 1795, whereby the latter consented, that no trader should reside at any Indian town or hunting camp, *without a licence for that pur-*

* Mr. Atcheson's Book, p. ii. and Mr. Justice Marshall's Life of General Washington,

pose, under the authority of the United State. This was an overt and direct breach of the treaty of 1794, to remedy which, an explanatory article was concluded at Philadelphia, on the 4th of May, 1796, between Mr. Bond and Mr. PICKERING, on behalf of their respective governments. The evil complained of, however, was merely suspended, but not removed; and wherever any flaw could be discovered, or any fraud and unnatural interpretation could be given to the meaning of an article in the treaty, the Americans were sure to avail themselves of it, and the English were no less sure to be the sufferers. Thus the British traders were assailed and harassed in various shapes, notwithstanding the explanatory article of 1796, by the extortions practised in the rate of duties which were required to be paid.* In defiance of these vexations, the British traders persevered and continued to participate in the Indian commerce, by which they have contributed, in a great degree, to preserve that attachment of the natives to the British nation, which recent experience has proved to be of great and signal importance to the security of Upper Canada. On the other hand, the American Government was pursuing an unrelenting, savage, and systematic plan, for despoiling them of their lands, by every species of chicanery and injustice; and it carried on its design with such deliberate fraud and cruelty, that the natives became, finally, convinced that their extermination was the real object of that Government and its rapacious land jobbers. In consequence of this just apprehension, wars ensued at different periods.

The hands of Great Britain being tied up by her own impolitic acts, she did not, in the least, interfere: and, although the vexations exercised against the British traders, were not only continued, but more seriously extended, by the seizure of their boats and merchandize navigating on the lakes, in virtue of solemn treaties; yet pacific representations, only, were resorted to, notwithstanding that the compensation for the pecuniary damages sustained by such seizures, and their consequen-

* See the Representations of the Canada merchants to the Lords Commissioners, in 1806, on the treaty which was rejected by Mr. Jefferson. Also the New Quarterly Review, No. II. p. 367. After the acquisition of *Louisiana* by the United States, all intercourse with that part of it, extending to the west side of the *Mississippi* was prohibited to all British traders, who would not abjure their allegiance and become citizens of the United States, which was a flagrant violation of the treaty of 1794, as well as of the explanatory article of 1796. Mr. Atcheson's Book, p. x, &c.

ces, amounting to above 25,000l.* has never been obtained. The war having at length put an end to the baleful treaty of 1783, an opportunity is offered to us to redress the wrongs of the Indians; for we dare assert, and recent facts have gone far in establishing the truth of the proposition, that the Canadas cannot be effectually and durably defended, *without the friendship of the Indians, and the command of the lakes and river St. Laurence.*† Of this friendship we cannot be assured, without rendering the Indian country *completely independent of the United States*, by a new line of boundary. Nor can the command of the lakes and the river long remain in our hands, unless we establish the means of maintaining them; in other words, unless the naval force distributed upon them, be, in all respects, equipped as vessels of war, with officers and seamen from His Majesty's navy. For the American vessels on lake Ontario, and those which they are preparing to build on the lakes, are to be commanded by officers of their navy, and manned with efficient sailors. If we secure a naval superiority on the lakes and river, and enjoy the friendship of the Indians; the Canadas, by the efforts of their own inhabitants, together with the aid of a competent force of regular troops, will be found invulnerable by America. The events that have already occurred, shew the vast importance of the fidelity and attachment of the Indians to us, and the expediency of maintaining a naval superiority on the lakes. Indeed, the jeremiahd of the American GENERAL HULL, in his official dispatch to his government, announcing the fate of his army, ought to be regarded by his Majesty's government, as a standing memento, *never to overlook these objects.* There cannot be a stronger proof of the indignation cherished by the Indians against American injustice, than the general, and almost simultaneous, movement among them, on their first knowledge of our war with the United States. *They hailed that event as the precursor of an era* when their wrongs should be redressed, and security obtained against their future recurrence. Accordingly, *they flocked to the British standard*; and, by their timely co-operation, an handful of British soldiers, from the post of St. Joseph, with the British traders and men in their service, immediately captured the American Fort of Michilimackinac, without shedding a drop of blood. Before this was effected, the Americans under GENERAL HULL, had in-

* New Quarterly Review, No. II p. 393.

† See "the British Treaty, p. 35," by which it appears, it is intended on the part of the United States to claim "an equal right of navigation of the river St. Laurence, from the sea."

vaded Upper Canada, for which they had been many months preparing on the Ohio: but he was kept in check by the Indians, with a few British troops, until he was obliged to retire, disgracefully, across the river. After this, the Indians cut off his supplies, and being led on by the gallant **GENERAL BROCK**, together with a few hundred regulars and militia, **GENERAL HULL** was compelled to surrender, although his army was greatly superior to ours in number. Here, too, British humanity was conspicuous, in saving the lives of those who had threatened extermination to their foes.

Such were the fruits of Indian friendship, within the course of a month; but had the case been reversed, had they acted against us, or had they even been neutral, Upper Canada must have fallen under the American yoke. Now, however, by the above conquest, its line of defence is shortened 600 miles, as Niagara with its dependencies, instead of St. Joseph, is now the flank; and the Indians, with the aid of a moderate British garrison at Detroit, will form a strong cover to that flank; by which His Majesty's forces, in the Upper Province, may be concentrated at other points, with increased effect.

From the facts we have just enumerated, the reader will easily appreciate the friendship of the Indians; and, consequently, it should induce us to consider **THEIR** interests as **OUR OWN**; and to procure the reconveyance of that portion of their territory, which was improvidently, and indeed unjustly, ceded by the treaty of 1783. The boundary necessary for the protection of Indian rights, and the security of Canada, would be, to run a line from Sandusky, over lake Erie, to the nearest waters falling into the Ohio; then down that river, and up the Mississippi, to the mouth of the Missouri; thence up the Missouri, to its principal source: confining the American States to the rocky mountains, as the western boundary; so that they may be excluded from all the country situated to the northward and westward of the lines, above designated, which country should remain wholly for the Indians, as their hunting grounds. No fresh treaty should be concluded without the introduction of this line of boundary; and should the events of the war terminate very favourably to Great Britain, so as to give her a right to assume a high tone in negotiation, it would be greatly conducive to the security of the Canadas, to extend the boundary to the height of land or sources of the waters, along lakes Erie and Ontario, and the river St. Lawrence, so as to exclude the American States from any jurisdiction over that tract of country, situate between the height of land and the lakes and river. The boundary between the United States and the Indians, as fixed by the treaty of Green-

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ville, to which we have before alluded, would, perhaps, answer as the new boundary line, for protection of the Indians, nearly as well as that which we have here suggested. But this is upon the presumption, that all the reservations and conditions in the treaty relative to the various tracts of ground within that line, for the advantage of the United States, and all the other conditions attached by them to it, should be *wholly done away*, and the American Government *excluded from having military posts, territorial jurisdiction, or public property of any kind, within the Indian line*, which line should be extended so as to run up to the Missouri, to its principal source, and the American territory to the westward, be bounded by the rocky mountains, as we have before suggested.

Now that we are on the subject of boundaries, it may not be improper to notice a striking instance of geographical ignorance in those who framed the treaty of 1783, in respect of the boundary, on the side of New Brunswick, for, instead of insisting, according to their instructions, on the river *Penobscot* being the boundary between that province and the United States, they abandoned it, and allowed them to go as far to the eastward as the river *St. Croix*; an extent of *sea coast* of nearly fifty leagues, though the river *Penobscot* is the natural boundary, which Great Britain should, even at this day, have laboured to obtain. The Americans, not content with this improvident concession, have subsequently wished to extend it further, notwithstanding AN AWARD* against them. From ignorance or inattention to the locality and courses of the rivers, there is actually no communication between Lower Canada and New Brunswick, without crossing a part of the American territory, which carries, on the face of it, such a monstrous absurdity, that we deem it sufficient to mention the fact, in order to ensure a remedy in the next treaty; previous to which we, however, trust, as there is nothing now to prevent it, that the possession of Moose Island, and the other islands in Passamaquoddy bay will be resumed. "These islands, it will appear by reference to the treaty of 1783, were admitted to form part of Nova Scotia, now New Brunswick, the former having been divided into two provinces in 1784; but since, by the unjustifiable encroachments of the subjects of the United States, they have been wrested from Great Britain, without any interference or exertion to prevent it; on the contrary, they were to have been, by the *unratified*

* Declaration as to the boundary of the river St. Croix, dated the 25th October, 1798, by Mr. Barclay, Mr. Howell, and Mr. Benson.

"convention of May, 1803, most impolitically ceded to the United States."*

It is also somewhat remarkable, that in an article of treaty concluded between France and the United States of America, within the last twelve years, they mutually guaranteed such lands as they may acquire, in the gulf of St. Laurence. This was at a time when neither of them owned any land in the gulf. The Americans were then in the spirit of purchasing territories. Many persons have supposed, that they had an eye to the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which would be invaluable to them. Should the government of Great Britain be so improvident as to restore again those islands to France, as she has hitherto been in the habit of doing, at the end of every war, † the cession ought to be on the express condition, that they should not be transferable.

But to return to our Indian friends. Of all the connections which Europeans have formed with the uncultivated natives of the forest, none seems to have been framed upon such humane principles of mutual good-will and kindness, as the connection between the Indians and our colonists in Canada. This connection has visibly improved the moral state of the Indians. "In a population of nearly sixty thousand souls, between the straits of Belleisle, in Lat. 48° North, Long. 55° West, and the Great Bear lake, in Lat. 67° North, Long. 125° West, there are, at least, twelve thousand of them capable of the most active warfare; and these, not the vitiated and enfeebled neighbours of the settlements, but men in the full vigour of savage life." "It is not necessary here to decide, what is the real military value of an Indian force, or the expediency of employing it, it being sufficient to observe, that in possessing it, we have that, of which, more than any other, of our means of annoyance, the whole mass of the population of the United States are afraid. In the year 1794, when the treaty, then recently negotiated with Great Britain, was under the consideration of Congress, in which its ratification was strongly opposed, one of the arguments most strenuously urged for acquiescing in it, (an argument well adapted to the interests of

* Mr. Atcheson's book, p. iv, &c.—also Mr. Merry's letter to Governor Ludlow.—Morris's "British Treaty," p. 30 to 41.—The case of the *Scop Falmouth*, in the Vice Admiralty court of New Brunswick, in 1805—Extra official papers, Debret, 1789.—also Mr. Knox's letters.—The Duke of Portland's letter to Governor Carleton, of the 11th April, 1799; Lord Grenville's letter to his Grace; and Mr. Leslie's correspondence with his Lordship on this interesting subject.

† Lord Malmesbury's instructions, in 1796.

"many, and to the feelings of all,) was the means which it afforded, of 'arresting the tomahawk of the savage, raised over the head of the innocent settlers on the frontier.' "* The rumours which made the most serious impression upon the public mind, in the United States, and which were consequently copied from newspaper to newspaper, with the greatest eagerness, were those of preparations on the part of the Indians, under the influence of Great Britain, to commence hostilities.

For men, whose very name is so formidable to an American, and whose friendship has been recently shewn to be of such great importance to us, we cannot do too much.† We should see all their wrongs redressed, their territory restored to them, and themselves rendered, FOR EVER, secure from the sinuosities of American fraud. We trust, that the present war with the

* Mr. Ames' speech on that occasion.

† The following observations, selected from a memorial attributed to Mons. Talleyrand, are entitled to attention. It was printed at Philadelphia in 1803; but, we understand, was soon afterwards suppressed. It is to be regretted it has not been reprinted here, as it is one of the most important tracts which has appeared since the French Revolution.

In page 45 it is observed, "There is still another rein, however, by which the fury of THE STATES may be held at pleasure—by an enemy placed on their Western frontiers. The only aliens and enemies within their borders, are not the blacks. They, indeed, are the most inveterate in their enmity; but the INDIANS are, in many respects, more dangerous inmates. Their savage ignorance; their undisciplined passions, their restless and warlike habits; their notions of ancient right, make them the fittest tools imaginable for disturbing THE STATES. In the territory adjacent to the Ohio, Mississippi and Missouri, there are more than thirty thousand men, whose trade is hunting; and whose delight is war. These men lie at the mercy of any civilized nation who live near them. Such a neighbour can gain their friendship or provoke their enmity, with equal ease. He can make them inactive, or he can rouse them to fury: he can direct their movement in any way he pleases, and make it mischievous or harmless, by supplying their fury with arms and with leaders, or by withholding that supply.

"The pliant and addressful spirit of the French, has always given them an absolute controul over these savages. The office which the laziness, or the insolence of the British found impracticable, was easily performed by us;—and will be still easier hereafter, since we shall enter on the scene, with more advantages than formerly.

"We shall detach thither a sufficient force to maintain possession

United States, will be A SHORT ONE: it ought to be so, when the relative force of the two belligerents is considered; and it certainly will be so, *if vigorous measures be adopted to distract and annoy the enemy.* Now is the fit time for an attack upon New Orleans, which would occupy a very trivial force, and serve as a beneficial diversion, to the war in Canada.* For, if the principle, on which we are to wage war with the Americans, is to be a defensive one on the Canadian line; that very principle will justify us in acting offensively against them elsewhere. In possession of New Orleans, we should require a mighty advantage at the moment of negotiation; and as we are now exonerated from the shackles imposed upon us by the subtilty and encroaching spirit of the Americans, we sincerely hope, that His Majesty's ministers will never suffer them to be renewed; that they will guard the MARITIME RIGHTS of the State from derogation; that they will extend a warm protection to OUR

“against all the efforts of THE STATES, should they, contrary to all
 “their interests, proceed to war *with, or without, provocation.* We
 “shall find, in the Indian tribes, an army permanently cantoned in
 “the most convenient stations; endowed *with skill and temper* best
 “adapted to the nature and the scene of war, and armed and im-
 “pelled with far less trouble and expence than an equal number of
 “our own troops. We shall find a terrible militia, infinitely more
 “destructive, while scattered through the hostile settlements, and
 “along an open frontier, than an equal force of our own. We shall
 “find, in the bowels of THE STATES, a mischief that only wants the
 “touch of a well-directed spark, to involve in its explosion the utter
 “ruin of half their nation. *Such will be the power we shall derive*
 “*from a military station, and a growing colony on the Mississippi.*
 “These will be certain and immediate effects, whatever distance or
 “doubt there may be in the remoter benefits to France, on which I
 “have so warmly expatiated. As a curb on a nation, whose future
 “conduct, in peace and war, will be of great importance to us; this
 “province will be cheaply purchased at ten times the cost to
 “which it will subject us.”

In page 50 it is stated, and the words in a note are said to have been repeated by Talleyrand, as those of Buonaparte:—“My designs on the Mississippi will never be officially announced, till they are executed. Meanwhile the world, if it pleases, may fear and suspect, but nobody will be wise enough to go to war to prevent them. I shall trust to the folly of England and America, to let me go my way, in my own time.”

* See an admirable letter from the late Colonel Fraser, to the late Lord Melville, on this subject, in Supplement, No. 1, to the Collection of reports and papers on Navigation and Trade. Edit. 1807. Richardson.

NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES, as the surest mode of reviving the SHIPPING INTEREST of the Empire, and of rendering every part of His Majesty's dominions capable of contributing to the good of the whole; and, finally, that they will not cease to wield the thunder of the State against America, until that nation, seeing the folly of systematic fraud and encroachment, shall have returned within the boundaries of reason and justice.

ADDENDA.

(Continuation of the second note in page 35.)

The importance of the United States to Great Britain as a market for her manufactures has been much over-rated. It appears from these accounts, that in 1807, when the intercourse was restricted, our exports of British produce and manufactures to the United States, were 11,846,513*l.* and to other parts of America and the West Indies, 10,439,423*l.* In 1808, when the embargo was imposed, and in partial operation, our exports to the United States were only 5,241,739*l.* but those to other parts of America and the West Indies, were 16,591,871*l.* Thus an immediate increase of more than six millions took place in our *direct* exports to those markets, which had before been supplied circuitously through the United States; and Great Britain has another resource which will indemnify her for the loss of the remainder of the exports we formerly made to the United States. Hitherto we have received their tobacco, cotton, rice, indigo, and lumber, to the amount of between five and six millions per annum. The four first of these articles are the indigenous growth of every country between the tropics, and the latter of our own provinces in North America. By prohibiting the import of these articles from the United States, who will not receive our manufactures in return, and taking them from other countries who will, we should secure a market equal in amount to the remaining six millions formerly exported to the United States. It is further to be observed, that the manufactures of the Continent of Europe have of late years been shipped to the foreign West Indies and South America, under the flag of the United States, to the amount of six or seven millions per annum, which can no longer find their way there, in the present state of things, and the want of them must be supplied by British goods. The British manufacturers, therefore, will be amply indemnified for the loss of their export to the United States; but it is unnecessary to pursue this branch of the subject further, as the same is fully noticed in No. 3 of the New Quarterly Review, pp. 18, 30, and 31.

