

THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA



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INTERNATIONAL FRANCOPHONE MEETING

CONFLICT PREVENTION: AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

Ottawa, 19 to 22 September 1995


PROCEEDINGS

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Proceedings of the
INTERNATIONAL FRANCOPHONE MEETING
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Minister of Foreign Affairs



Ministre des Affaires étrangères

Ottawa, Canada K1A 0G2

Dear readers,

Ever since the Chaillot Summit, la Francophonie has sought to find ways to contribute to conflict prevention through its democratic development and human rights program. Despite these efforts, which will yield long-term benefits, the experiences of Rwanda and Burundi challenge us to do more, to do what is necessary to keep conflict from degenerating into violent confrontation. This was why, at the Ouagadougou Ministerial Conference of la Francophonie in 1994, I invited Francophone countries to visit Canada to discuss the issue of conflict prevention and resolution in depth.

La Francophonie responded enthusiastically to our invitation. "The International Francophone Meeting on Conflict Prevention: African Perspective" took place in Ottawa from September 19 to 22, 1995. Of the 51 governments invited, 45 — or virtually all the participating governments as well as some Commonwealth countries — were in attendance. Also represented were the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation, the Conseil permanent de la Francophonie, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and a wide range of non-governmental organizations. In all, there were some 160 delegates at the event.

The following pages contain the proceedings of the Meeting, setting forth what was said by the participants in the plenaries and workshops. We hope that this report will do justice to the deliberations in all their richness. As you will observe in reading the text, it contains an impressive number of noteworthy ideas.

From the Meeting, I draw the distinct impression that la Francophonie is ready to start working actively in the field of conflict prevention. We must now find an innovative approach that will support the actions of the United Nations and regional institutions, such as the Organization of African Unity, working to achieve security and stability for our peoples. I truly hope that the Ottawa Meeting will be the first step in achieving co-operation between la Francophonie and the other international bodies in the vital task of conflict prevention and resolution.

Happy reading!

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "André Ouellet".

André Ouellet

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GLOSSARY

ACCT ACCT	Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation Agence de coopération culturelle et technique
AIPLF AIPLF	International Association of French-Speaking Parliamentarians Assemblée internationale des parlementaires de langue française
ANC ANC	African National Congress Congrès national d'Afrique
ASEAN ANASE	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est
CIDA ACDI	Canadian International Development Agency Agence canadienne de développement international
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development)
CAD	Comité d'assistance au développement (Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPF	Conseil permanent de la Francophonie
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Military Observer Group
ECOWAS CEDEAO	Economic Community of West African States Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
IGADD IGADD	Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development – Africa Autorité intergouvernementale sur la sécheresse et le développement - Afrique
INGO OING	international non-governmental organization organisation internationale non gouvernementale
NGO ONG	non-governmental organization organisation non gouvernementale
OAU OUA	Organization of African Unity Organisation de l'unité africaine

ODA	Official Development Assistance
APD	Aide publique au développement
OMIB	(OAU) Observer Mission in Burundi
MIOB	Mission d'observation au Burundi (OUA)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSCE	Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe
SADC	Southern African Development Community
CDA	Communauté de développement en Afrique Australe
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SADCC	Conférence pour la coordination du développement en Afrique Australe
UN	United Nations
ONU	Organisation des Nations Unies
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
MINUAR	Mission d'assistance des Nations Unies au Rwanda
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNAVEM	Mission de vérification des Nations Unies en Angola
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
PNUD	Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNESCO	Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
MONUL	Mission d'observation des Nations Unies au Libéria
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
ONUSOM	Opération des Nations Unies en Somalie

FOREWORD

La Francophonie is neither a distinct geographic nor political entity but a mosaic of different cultures, political systems and economic structures. Furthermore, it has only a few years' experience as a formal institution. These two facts have hindered the emergence of an integrated approach in the field of conflict prevention and resolution. Nevertheless, la Francophonie can add the weight of its summits to the moral authority exercised by the UN and other international and regional organizations in conflict prevention.

Within the Francophone world, Africa is the site of a large number of current and potential conflicts. Africa still lacks the functioning institutions available to other parts of the world for managing disputes. The fact that these conflicts occur within single states distinguishes them from the interstate confrontations of the Cold War era. The analytical instruments once used to assess threats and the intervention mechanisms developed to defuse interstate crises are of limited use in such circumstances.

Aware of the need for greater involvement, the heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided in Cairo in June 1993 to create within their organization a mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. Several Western countries, including Canada, have agreed to help the OAU design, structure and equip the Mechanism to make it operational as soon as possible. One of the objectives of the Ottawa Meeting was to contribute to this process.

In Africa, OAU preventive diplomacy missions have met with some success. Although as an institution la Francophonie has limited resources for prevention, it nonetheless represents significant political authority since it spans many regions of the globe and transcends the barriers between developed and developing countries. In addition, many of its members have considerable expertise in peacekeeping, conflict management and conflict resolution.


The International Francophone Meeting on Conflict Prevention had two main purposes: first, to facilitate a discussion of the new realities affecting security and stability on the African continent; and second, to encourage participants to draw the inescapable lessons from various experiences in preventive diplomacy. In practical terms, the deliberations and discussions should contribute to improvements in the capacities of la Francophonie and member countries in the field of preventive diplomacy, and should lead to closer co-operation with the UN and the OAU.

In order to stimulate and channel discussion, the Meeting was organized into three workshops. An eminent person from la Francophonie led each workshop, and each started with presentations by several experts. The first workshop examined the conditions required for stability. In the second, participants attempted to define more clearly the concepts of early warning and preventive diplomacy, and considered how

they applied to Africa. The third explored conflict prevention mechanisms and instruments for intervention, as well as the institutional needs of the OAU and la Francophonie.

The following record of proceedings contains an impressive number of ideas warranting further consideration. In view of the informal nature of the meeting no final document was adopted, but the participants did express their agreement with the "Conclusions of the Chair."

As host country, Canada is very satisfied with the work done during the Meeting. We are confident that it will be an important milestone in our collective exploration of the issue, and expect that this document will be a useful reference tool in crafting innovative solutions for the security problems threatening not only Africa but other parts of the world as well.



Marie Bernard-Meunier
Assistant Deputy Minister for Global Issues
and Chair of the Meeting

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

I. PLENARY SESSION DISCUSSIONS

The discussions addressed the nature and causes of conflict in Africa, guidelines and recommendations for conflict prevention, and the original contribution that la Francophonie might make complementing other national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives.

a) Many participants referred to the tensions and conflicts that had arisen in Africa during the rapid restructuring that followed the end of the Cold War. With globalization of trade and the end of bipolarity, the number of stakeholders has increased on the world scene and problems of a transnational nature have arisen. As a result, the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy have become blurred.

b) In this new context, military force has taken a back seat to economic power. The nature of conflict has also changed. Conflict most often arises now within states. What used to be a consequence of war — massive migration and destruction of the environment — has now become a causal factor. The economic slowdown of recent years has noticeably affected the developing countries, especially on the African continent. The inability to meet basic needs, aggravated by galloping population growth, has itself become a source of tension.

c) In Africa, in addition to creating problems within countries, tension and conflict contribute to regional instability because of the porous nature of boundaries. In this context, the dogma of national sovereignty becomes problematic. The tensions arise from an accumulation of social problems, attacks on rights and freedoms, lack of democracy and failure to observe the rule of law. The quality of governance adds new complications to these factors.

d) While a lack of development gives rise to conflict, expenditures on humanitarian aid (necessitated by the conflicts) simply divert money from development.

e) In the face of these challenges democracy, the rule of law and a strong, independent judiciary are the foundations of stability. This structure is essential for preventive diplomacy. In this connection, the words of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN, at the Davos Forum were cited:

By setting in motion these activities to promote democratization, the UN is not trying to encourage states to mimic anyone, or to borrow political forms from elsewhere, or to please certain Western states. On the contrary, let me emphasize again, democracy is no one's private preserve. It can and must be assimilated by all cultures. It can be moulded into many shapes, and made to suit various

peoples. Democracy is not a model to be superimposed on certain states, but an objective to be achieved by all peoples."¹

f) In these circumstances, many participants have become concerned that Africa risks becoming marginalized. As one participant said, "People were pessimistic about Asia barely a quarter-century ago. A Nobel Prize laureate in economics wrote in *Le drame de l'Asie* that industrial logic was incompatible with Confucian and Buddhist tradition. Southeast Asia was thought to be doomed to economic stagnation, famine and war." This proves that pessimistic forecasts can turn out to be wrong, and that trends can be reversed. With conflicts, problems of development take on an urgent nature. Moreover, as the heads of state and government pointed out in the action plan for development and economic integration adopted at the Lagos Summit of the OAU, it is necessary "to emphasize everything concerning human resource development, beginning with the elimination of illiteracy." Human development is a decisive factor in development in general and conflict prevention. Since the 1970s, the dominant concept of development, determined until then essentially in terms of economic growth, has expanded to include the well-being of the individual, making him or her not only a factor of production but also the purpose and means of development.

g) Africa has not stood idly by in the face of these new challenges. A powerful movement of transformation toward a market economy is under way in many countries and sub-regions. Decentralization is also developing in the management of public affairs. At another level, democracy is gaining ground; among its many achievements are the African Human Rights Court.

The emergence of the OAU's conflict prevention mechanism is a valuable asset. It has already enhanced its credibility through successes in the field. The African Centre for Training in Conflict Prevention and Settlement, the Libreville and Nigeria mediations, and the resolution of part of the Tuareg issue all give evidence of the vitality of Africa and the OAU.

h) These efforts deserve the support of la Francophonie. Far from being a structure imposed on Africa, the institution actually emerged there from the determination of Africans, a majority of whom are its members. Its objectives and Africa's coincide, as do its projects and those of the OAU. One participant pointed out that since the Chaillot and Mauritius summits, the heads of state and government of la Francophonie have highlighted the importance of peace and security issues; they have stressed the scope of the tasks ahead; and they have invited members of the international community to become more involved in preventing, managing and solving crises.

i) Some speakers pointed to la Francophonie's lack of political power at a time of major challenges, particularly that of maintaining peace. They recommended combining efforts with inter-African organizations on conflict prevention issues. However,

¹ This and other quotations have been translated from the French.

duplication must be avoided, and for this reason the creation of a mechanism similar to the OAU's would be inappropriate. The services of the ACCT should be supported by a specific instrument for analysing and preventing conflict in Africa. This might take the form of an observation post, as mentioned on the eve of the Mauritius Summit.

j) Other proposals were raised in view of the failure of la Francophonie's initiatives to meet the needs of Africa. New institutional facilities are required. With this in mind, a ministerial committee could be formed to support initiatives and provide political impetus. The AIPLF could also have parliamentarians intervene more frequently. Finally, requirements for flexibility, mobility and rapidity should give substance to the instruments of la Francophonie, by way of what might be called a "peace facility."

k) Other even more functional initiatives might include taking steps to reduce military expenditures and re-allocate the funds to development, clearing land mines in the countries of la Francophonie, and controlling arms trafficking.

II. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF WORKSHOPS

A. Overall Concerns

While dealing with specific themes on their agenda, the three workshops also addressed a number of common issues, the most important of which were the following:

a) In recent years conflicts have been dominated by intra-state crises in which socio-economic problems and the lack of democracy are intertwined. Social and ethnic groups are involved simultaneously as the perpetrators and victims of violence. This situation has led conflict prevention to address new problems requiring considerable adjustments such as wider circulation of reliable information — problems necessitating information, analysis and training.

b) In the new context, effective conflict prevention rests on multi-dimensional preventive policies (development assistance policies, promotion of democracy, consolidation of the rule of law, preventive diplomacy, etc.). This is why traditional policies toward Africa must be refocused on creating conditions of security and stability.

c) Conflict prevention will clearly fail if the timely and accurate assessment of a risk does not lead to timely decisions. At present, reaction times are too slow to cope with the volatility of the African situation.

d) Through the values it upholds and the means available to it, la Francophonie has already contributed to prevention. However, given its innovative nature, it has the capacity to do more. Exactly how to do this must now be determined.

e) The effectiveness of prevention in Africa rests on the support of the OAU — in particular its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution — and on sub-regional organizations. Prevention must expand to civil society and its organizations.

Some topics seemed to require more extensive discussion. How might a country successfully make the transition to democracy? How might the concept of national sovereignty be kept from becoming an obstruction to solidarity should the likelihood of conflict arise? Given the multitude of urgent problems, how might concrete, realistic priorities be set so as to gradually regain control of the situation?

B. Diagnosis of Conflicts and Prevention Mechanisms

Workshop 1: Conflict Prevention from an African Perspective

a) Development assistance and conflict prevention

Development assistance can contribute effectively to conflict prevention, provided that the current criteria for assigning and implementing assistance are properly reviewed. The first day's work led to the drafting of some guidelines.

First of all, aid must be tied to respect for human rights. Democratic development, a condition essential to the establishment of peace, can exist only where there is respect for human rights. At the very least, la Francophonie should be able to exert pressure on its members when they commit serious, systematic violations of fundamental rights. Participants expressed the need to intensify information exchange in this regard.

Conflict prevention also requires that the people affected have increased opportunities for participation in the planning and management of development programs. Women and youth in particular must be involved, for example by promoting community projects.

The question of military expenditures was also dealt with. It was recognized that these must be reduced and the resources redirected as far as possible to education, health and other priority areas. In general, meeting military requirements costs far more than satisfying basic human needs. The struggle to meet such needs is often a source of conflict.

The problem of debt was also seen by many as a major obstacle to conflict prevention, since debt holds back economic recovery and fuels social tensions. Furthermore, development assistance might be used simply to repay the debt if nothing is done to correct the situation. This issue must be included in the debate on development assistance.

In the same spirit, another look must be taken at structural adjustment programs, which are still considered to be the main instrument of recovery. Not only have these programs proven to be ineffective from the viewpoint of economic recovery; they have had disastrous social consequences, which have not been offset by compensatory measures such as "social adjustment dimensions."

Some participants stressed the importance of speeding up the process of allocating and delivering assistance once it has been promised. Frequent delays in the delivery of promised aid too often heighten frustrations and give rise to passivity and cynicism, which in turn generate conflict.

b) Democratic development, civil society and conflict prevention

The strengthening of democracy is a condition essential to peace. Most African countries are now involved in a process of democratization. Democratic development in Africa must naturally take into account the situation and specific constraints of African societies. It must also be seen as a transitional, demanding process not without its difficulties. However, the constraints and difficulties must in no way become pretexts for delaying the fulfilment of the process, which in the long term is essential to the consolidation of peace.

A secure framework is vital to democratic development. Each state must build a national army that can maintain political neutrality in all circumstances — a force subordinate to the political authority of the state. The army must become a factor contributing to social equilibrium. The combatants in war-ravaged areas must be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into society and the economy. A civilian police force must also be established to safeguard the rights of the people. Emergency assistance must be provided for rebuilding; where necessary, land mine clearance operations must be carried out. The control of arms (especially small arms) represents a tremendous challenge, particularly because arms trafficking is so extensive and profitable.

Democratic development further involves creating or consolidating the institutions necessary to ensure the rule of law. To begin with, there must be an efficient, legitimate, universally accessible judicial system. Development assistance should provide assistance for this purpose, both to train magistrates and to provide technical and material support.

Democratic development requires as well the expression of political pluralism through the political parties and the media. Development aid should support the training of journalists and provide physical and technical assistance. Journalism should be governed by a code of ethics or by appropriate legislation.

Another condition essential to the establishment of democracy and peace is civic education, especially training in human rights. A culture of peace must be established throughout. Failure to understand rights is a direct source of conflict. All stakeholders should undergo training in this regard, beginning with the army, police, judiciary and journalists. Women and youth must also take part in the training programs.

The difficulties encountered by the new African democracies often arise from the weakness of civil society, a legacy of authoritarian government. Civil society plays an essential role in regulating and controlling the state, in mobilizing people to take public action, and in developing democratic culture.

Thus democratic development requires strengthening of the institutions and organizations of civil society. Development assistance must address the various components of a civil society, including economic (such as associations of producers and business leaders), developmental (local or regional development associations), civic

(human rights advocacy organizations), social (women's movements and consumer groups) and other components. The strengthening of civil society encourages traditionally marginalized groups such as women and children to participate more.

c) Human rights and conflict prevention

As has been pointed out, respect for human rights must be the foundation for democracy and peace. Africa's urgent situation means that there can be no impunity for violators since this is the most serious obstacle to the establishment of the rule of law, and it encourages the systematic pursuit of lawlessness and violence.

In light of the Rwandan crisis, prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide clearly is an absolute priority since the root causes of the Rwandan genocide are duplicated in a number of African states. These causes include refusal to cede power to another group, incitement to ethnic hatred, political impunity and institutional ineffectiveness. The establishment of the rule of law must therefore begin by putting in place the legal tools needed to combat impunity.

The embedding in law of a clause pertaining to the crime of genocide can be an effective instrument against it. The obligation to prevent genocide is set out in the relevant United Nations Convention adopted by the General Assembly on December 9, 1948. However, this international treaty has been ratified by only about 20 African states. Clearly the obligations arising from the convention are too onerous and demanding; how else might one explain the great reluctance of the states to ratify the convention and apply the concept of genocide?

The ratification of this kind of legal clause will be fully effective only if states have the political will to apply both the letter and the spirit of the law. On this point, la Francophonie can play a decisive role by encouraging and requiring governments to comply with the laws that they have adopted, especially if these laws are linked to international charters or agreements. Too often in Africa inappropriate legal models have been followed, and as a result laws receive mere lip service.

In the case of Rwanda, for example, the existence of a legal clause formally condemning genocide might have proven useful in punishing if not preventing this crime. From the viewpoint of prevention, such a clause would have required states to intervene when the events began to occur, as soon as they took on the character of genocide — in other words relatively early, since everyone really knew what was happening. However, there was no legal obligation to intervene, as there would have been had a specific clause existed on the prevention of genocide.

As for punishment of the crime of genocide, which in turn would have its own preventive effect, states are under no obligation to act with the necessary vigour once the crime is committed. In Europe, punishment of those responsible for the Holocaust has proven to be effective. It should be noted that neither the sole nor the ultimate purpose

of ending impunity is to punish. If it were only this, imprisonment without trial and summary executions would do the job. The main purpose is instead to identify those responsible and be able to judge using equitable, legitimate rules, to indicate that some forms of behaviour are antisocial and unacceptable. Thus the fight against impunity also has a pedagogical objective essential to the rule of law.

Workshop 2: Preventive Diplomacy and African Contexts

a) Early warning and preventive diplomacy

It is difficult to define early warning in an organized system, since non-interference and observation criteria (both subjective and objective) are involved. Political decisions are needed to determine who the observers will be, what their status is and to whom they will report.

Plans for implementing the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution involve the formation of an early warning system with a co-ordination unit located at the Conflict Management Centre planned for Addis Ababa.

While it is easy to categorize the elements of a crisis, it is difficult to scale them according to risk. A "risk grid" with risk coefficients would be needed. This is the route that the OAU seems to prefer.

Analysing these data will require a ranking system, which will be difficult to establish. It will require input from diplomats, journalists, academics, NGOs and other qualified observers.

Crises are almost always the result of situations that are known and studied, but it is difficult to determine exactly when the flashpoint may come. Rapid, effective methods of transmitting information to the highest levels are required. These two elements are essential to early warning.

The system must be planned on a sub-regional basis with focus on three levels: the state, the sub-region and the OAU. The OAU must rely on sub-regional players. The role of the sub-region is essential to the overall process, and countries must be able to adhere to and benefit from sub-regional instruments.

During the debate, emphasis was placed on the importance of this kind of system. It was stressed that, by deciding to establish data banks and an early warning system, the OAU had taken an important step; that the adherence of the countries concerned was essential; that all the parties concerned must take part; and that specific conflict prevention training was necessary. The system must now be refined.

One participant preferred to place less emphasis on the role of NGOs, and pointed out that governments were still the real partners in questions as complex and sensitive as preventive diplomacy — especially since the concept of civil society was not yet firmly rooted in African societies and thinking.

Raising the problem of intervention, the workshop participants reaffirmed the need for any form of this to be preceded by agreement between the countries concerned. However, it was proposed that the regional organization should make the final decision. In this case, the UN would contact the regional organization. This represents an advance on generally accepted law, invoking the duty of states to become involved.

It was also proposed to add to Africa's legal tools by adopting a code of conduct for intervention.

Finally, the participants stressed the importance of taking care not to generate new conflicts when resolving an existing one; of ensuring that mediators were acceptable to the various parties, given their important role; and of influencing public opinion by emphasizing education in tolerance, and especially by promoting national reconciliation and a sense of trust.

b) Preventive diplomacy: the UN experience in Africa

Most of the threats to peace in the world today come from within states. Many operations have been organized by the UN in the past six years. These have encountered problems such as the reluctance of countries to assist and provide personnel, delays in troop deployment despite the need for prompt action, obstacles to co-ordination in the field, and the frustration of dealing with protagonists who have little interest in dialogue. These difficulties demonstrate that, when it is possible, prevention is far more effective.

But while preventive diplomacy is essential, its regional importance is sometimes overestimated. Since early warning is not always sufficient, operations to restore peace will still be required. The initiatives of the OAU, ECOWAS and SADCC in this context must be supported and better co-ordinated. In the same vein, UN-OAU co-ordination must be strengthened. Also needed is better control of the implementation of democratic processes.

There has been no systematic conflict prevention in Africa. The UN Charter makes provision for intervention only in conflicts between states. Preventive diplomacy is carried out informally by the OAU and the UN or bilaterally, generally out of public view. But recognized official mechanisms are needed to provide a systematic, formal approach. This could be achieved through the centre being created by the OAU. However, international aid will continue to be necessary, as will co-operation with other international bodies.

During discussions the participants raised a number of problems, including the following:

- The UN cannot intervene without the consent of the country concerned. This principle might eventually be changed by member states, but doing so again raises the issue of interference.
- It is difficult for the UN to intervene to impose peace in countries that are not psychologically prepared for it.
- Power vacuums may occur.
- Struggles for influence between neighbouring countries make it difficult to resolve conflicts.
- Problems such as drugs and arms proliferation must be addressed.
- Time is an essential factor. Regular funding mechanisms and standing units prepared to intervene are needed for effective prevention.
- Parties financing the war should be included in the peace process and, once committed to it, should be required to contribute to fund the process.
- Co-ordination between the UN and the sub-regional organizations should be made more systematic.
- Countries bordering an area of conflict can play an important role, provided they remain neutral.
- There should be a deterrent capability that can intervene very rapidly when a problem arises.

It is clear, however, that problems will remain unless an imaginative approach is taken to development issues in African countries. Early warning has regional, humanitarian, political and economic dimensions. Refugees can return only if there is national reconciliation and reconstruction in all the countries of the sub-region.

c) Preventive diplomacy: the experience of the OAU and of African sub-regional organizations since 1993

A regional dynamic has existed in Africa since 1993. The OAU has changed its approach. An attempt is under way to organize at the regional level, in particular through the creation of the OAU Mechanism. This has been used in Burundi; in the Congo since the 1992 elections, where its initiatives have quietened the situation, albeit without finding a solution; and in the Nigeria-Cameroon conflict. These examples are proof that the OAU has decided to act.

The OAU has developed co-operative relationships with sub-regional organizations. Since it cannot do everything, the sub-regions will have to find solutions at their level, and the OAU will intervene to support them. It can be an organization for conflict resolution only if its means are increased.

The participants also talked about the need to use every possible avenue for conflict resolution, including traditional methods. They mentioned as well the need to strengthen institutional thinking.

It would be unrealistic to place too much hope in the OAU's ability to find solutions to the conflicts in Africa. It must first be strengthened, its structures overhauled and itself made more credible.

The OAU is seeking a place between the United Nations, whose primacy is acknowledged, and the sub-regional organizations. These organizations have considerable experience in conflict prevention. Security duties must be distributed in an orderly fashion to the various organizations. Progress is being made in establishing rules between the various organizations. A spirit of co-ordination is emerging; the sub-regional level will play a key role.

Reference was also made to the media, which are playing an increasingly important and inescapable part in conflicts. Lack of transparency can only have adverse effects and result in the manipulation of information, even though there are cases where diplomatic discretion is needed. Thus access to the conflict zones must be allowed (isolating a conflict zone reduces the likelihood of peace). The African media must be given a greater opportunity to contribute. They can play a role in prevention and can surmount the hatred that is sometimes vented, fanning the flames of conflict.

The Burundi experiment was cited as an example of intervention by the Mechanism. Some 60 officers are involved; they are neither an intervention force nor a protection force, but participate in all the efforts put forth in the country. To begin with, the focus was on logistical problems and the difficulties of making the various parties understand the mission's role. The aim was to encourage change so that discussion could take place between the various parties. The situation at present is fluid. Finding a solution to the conflict will depend not on the presence of the mission in the field but on the willingness of the protagonists.

It was pointed out that if African countries reduced their military spending as required under structural adjustment policies, they would be less able to provide the personnel needed to intervene in conflicts.

Some participants raised the problem of the OAU's credibility. That it had made considerable efforts in struggles for national liberation was pointed out. It later found itself facing three major changes: the fall of the Berlin Wall triggering, throughout Africa, democratic change that could not be ignored; economic change with the restructuring of the world economy; and structural adjustments.

Africans must be united in the fight for development. Only a community of interests can really protect against war. The political will of Africans has been expressed in funding for the OAU.

Workshop 3: Organizing Peace: The Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

At a time when Africa is facing a twofold danger, namely the eruption of conflicts and the disengagement of major partners now that the Cold War is over, it must take on increased responsibilities. The OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, created in 1993 in Cairo, is more effective than what had previously existed. Discussion of it was a focus of the workshop.

A permanent body designed to play a political role, the Mechanism has an essentially preventive mandate. It has proven more than once that it can be effective provided the parties concerned accept OAU mediation. And because mediation is not enough in this area, efforts must also be directed to economic and social factors. Among the concerns raised about the Mechanism was its place in civil society.

Since prevention does not always work, some workshop participants expressed strong interest in an inter-African intervention force, although not all agreed. Other participants felt that peacekeeping was a United Nations duty. There nonetheless seemed to be agreement that African troops should participate in such efforts, and perhaps not only in Africa. African states should make troops available for collective peacekeeping efforts, meaning that troops from various countries would have to be prepared to act in concert and must have the means available to do so.

The Mechanism does not have all the resources needed to fulfil its mandate. However, progress has been made in the attitude of the OAU, which is now more receptive toward receiving contributions from outside Africa to support its conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts. The OAU also knows that it can benefit from the support of the European Union and the United Nations. For instance, in the training of personnel, the sharing of planning and logistical expertise and the creation of a monitoring centre, as suggested by the OAU Secretary-General, the United Nations (which has such a centre) could provide assistance.

La Francophonie can also make a contribution. So far, it has not been involved in conflict prevention as such, but it has contributed unofficially. Since 1989, in particular through the ACCT, its activities have sought to promote human rights, reinforce the rule of law and strengthen judicial and legal institutions, and to support free and fair elections; it has thus gained considerable expertise that it can share. Nonetheless, la Francophonie does not have the structures for monitoring in the field. Nor is it a regional organization; its activity extends beyond Africa.

La Francophonie has neither the capability nor the desire to take the place of the regional and sub-regional organizations positioned to defend peace in their part of the world; rather, it must support them. One participant pointed out that la Francophonie must not duplicate the work of such organizations, that contradictory messages must not be sent to the field, and that the resources devoted by la Francophonie in these areas would have to be taken from somewhere else. Another suggested that the CPF become

the organ of la Francophonie for addressing conflicts, that this issue should appear regularly on its agenda, and that steps should be taken to provide the funds required to carry out effective action.

La Francophonie cannot take the place of the OAU; similarly the OAU aims not to take the place of the African sub-regional organizations but to support them. Valuable input can be provided from experiments conducted over the years at both these levels, taking the OAU into account as well as organizations such as ECOWAS and the SADCC and agreements such as the ANAD. To go a step further, there are some important needs that la Francophonie could help to meet by supporting the organizations mentioned, in particular the Mechanism.

The needs pertain to finances, of course, but also to training and the exchange of expertise. Already, within the OAU Mechanism, work is being done to build a data bank identifying resource persons. Added to this must be a "typology" of conflicts — a system for categorizing them, including conflicts now occurring. In this system the files describing member countries might contain unflattering references, thereby perhaps creating tensions between the OAU and the countries in question; and so it might be preferable to have an outside agency prepare the files.

On another level, la Francophonie can convey values. Those of its members that are signatories to the Bretton Woods agreements might consider methods of easing Africa's debt load and promoting an appropriate way of sharing the benefits of growth. La Francophonie could again look at the promotion of a culture of peace, the importance of good governance, or the restructuring required in African armies; and it could disseminate the results of its deliberations. In a word, it could help Africa build itself.

The OAU and the various sub-regional organizations have already shown that they are sometimes capable of successful mediation. Reference was made to conflicts avoided through mediations freely accepted and even requested by the parties involved. However, one cannot impose peace, serve as a mediator or, even less, win compliance with the resolutions adopted in these matters unless the parties involved agree to place their trust in the organizations offering to assist. While preventive policies are always appropriate, preventive diplomacy needs the consent of the parties to the conflict.

Intervention must be considered in connection with the need to prevent the outbreak of conflicts that might spill over the borders of the countries within which they arise. In this regard, participants expressed interest in the experience of the OSCE's High Commissioner for National Minorities.

Since the Helsinki Accords of 20 years ago, the signatory countries have recognized the right to express concern about each other's domestic affairs. The position of High Commissioner was created out of the conviction that conflicts between ethnic groups or national minorities can spread from one country to another. The High Commissioner can act with considerable independence; he can take initiatives to defuse

and prevent the escalation of conflict situations, and has a wide range of means for doing so.

Naturally this task would be impossible without the consent of the signatory countries. The existence of the states is not at issue. The High Commissioner acts with the conviction that to question the existence of states would in itself be a source of conflict. The successes enjoyed by this quite recently created position are attributable not to an independent, charismatic personality but to a genuine institution that none of the signatory states would wish to reject.

Peace cannot be installed by decree; it will be established only if a culture of peace is developed. However, the process of promoting peace can and doubtless must be accompanied by a wide variety of measures, including arms control. This process must take into account issues as wide-ranging as economic development and the progress of democracy. It remains to be seen what are the best levers available to us in the search for viable solutions.

III. PREFERRED COURSES OF ACTION

Workshop 1

In conflict prevention, the workshop members suggested that la Francophonie should place special importance on supporting initiatives that encourage the following, among other things:

Official development assistance

- Revising development assistance criteria to put greater stress on respect for human rights and on information exchange.
- Increased focus on investments devoted to socio-economic development rather than military expenditures.
- Converting or cancelling debts, and rethinking structural adjustment programs.
- Encouraging wider public participation, especially on the part of women and youth, in the planning and management of development programs.

Institutional development

- Strengthening the capabilities of institutions required for the orderly functioning of the rule of law, especially in the judiciary, communications, security and defence areas.
- Through educational systems, teaching the principles, laws and regulations concerning human rights; and training police forces, judges and military personnel.
- Strengthening the institutions of civil society, especially those promoting civic education and active participation by youth and women, in particular through revenue-generating programs.

Human rights

- Create a committee to prevent genocide with the mandate of setting forth the obligation of states in this area (in light of the Rwandan crisis). Examine the responsibility of states concerning genocide.

Security

- Co-operation between Francophone countries and their neighbours to support national and sub-regional initiatives seeking to curb arms trafficking and support demobilization and land mine clearance initiatives.

The workshop called for a forum to be held in Africa on democracy, bringing together the members of la Francophonie at the government and civil society level.

Workshop 2

The participants in this workshop reaffirmed the following:

- In conflict prevention in Africa, la Francophonie can act only in co-ordination with the OAU. La Francophonie must not have its own mechanism. Its role will be to give logistical and financial support to the OAU Mechanism, and to assist in preparing the data bank.
- The exchange of information between the OAU and la Francophonie could take place in a clearly defined legal framework (convention to be established). The ACCT, which has observer status in the OAU, could play a part in this context.
- The AIPLF could play a significant role in election processes (assistance in drafting constitutions, opposition status, etc.)
- The ACCT can play the same role in judiciary systems, training of journalists, etc.
- The UPELF-UREF university network can also make a contribution. Numerous researchers could consider these problems and assist in preparing data banks or in translation work.

If la Francophonie is to act effectively, however, a gap must be filled by establishing a ministerial monitoring committee (CPF or other modest structure). With this institutional facility, operational actions can be undertaken, including:

- creating a fund in the ACCT;
- opening the way for periodic consultations;
- assisting the institutions in Francophone countries in the training of magistrates and police, the opening of files, and the social re-integration of former combatants;
- through the influence of la Francophonie, promoting initiatives that might lead countries in conflict situations to accept advice from prevention institutions;
- acting to prevent pirate radio stations from disseminating hate propaganda;
- establishing a list of personalities able to act as mediators;
- helping define the mandate of participants in OAU operations;
- participating in round tables organized by the UN on African countries; and
- promoting legal provisions and mechanisms for judging those responsible for serious human rights violations.

It was stressed that la Francophonie is not a regional organization, and that some activities cannot be carried out within its framework. As for the creation of an institution, it was noted that there already is a conference of heads of state and the CPF. At the political level, however, the Francophone segment of the OAU must mobilize to obtain a greater commitment from member countries on these matters. It must facilitate

humanitarian assistance, strengthening of the rule of law, and the circulation of information and data.

Workshop 3

Three principles for guiding the activities of la Francophonie:

- La Francophonie is a global organization; that is, it has more than a regional dimension.
- The concept of security must be understood in the broadest terms, from various viewpoints (political, socio-economic, cultural, etc.).
- War is not inevitable, but peace cannot be installed simply by decree. It is a result of the will of peoples and their commitment to democracy.

Three objectives for Francophone countries:

- Contribute toward securing peace between states and security within their boundaries, to facilitate development by consolidating the rule of law and democracy.
- Find specific niches so that action by la Francophonie complements rather than duplicates the work of existing agencies and mechanisms. While pursuing dialogue between its members on conflict prevention, la Francophonie must assist and support the OAU Mechanism within the framework of the convention between the ACCT and the OAU Secretary-General.
- Mobilize all government players and civil society to develop a culture of peace, taking into account the fact that co-operative efforts toward sustainable development are essential preconditions to the establishment of permanent internal and external security, and also recognizing that the budgets for co-operation within la Francophonie must be increased.

Three fields of action:

- Strengthen preventive diplomacy as performed by the Burundi mission.
- Use facilities for observation (CPF, parliamentarians, ACCT).
- Create networks of interchange and synergies within la Francophonie between the various geographical zones (OSCE, ASEAN, OAS, OAU, etc.).

Three conditions for action:

- Appropriate human resources
- Sufficient financing (foundations, solidarity fund, etc.)

- Appropriate structures (institutional arrangements, strengthening the role of the CPF).

Promote co-operation between the UN and the OAU

The UN can help strengthen the OAU Mechanism in five ways:

- Provide training assistance for personnel.
- Provide technical assistance to set up an operations monitoring centre.
- Provide technical assistance in developing a data bank, which could be connected electronically to the United Nations bank.
- Assist in the planning and evaluation of the logistical and financial resources required for prevention or peacekeeping operations on the part of the OAU.
- Assist in preparing troops designated by OAU members to participate in peacekeeping operations (improve their capacity to respond rapidly to crisis situations) through:
 - familiarization with peacekeeping operations methods
 - identifying logistical needs
 - identifying ways of overcoming equipment shortages
 - participating in reserve forces arrangements.

Other concerns

- The problem of refugees and the proliferation of small arms.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE CHAIR

Consensus on basic principles

1. Peace and development go hand in hand.
2. Conflict prevention is essential, and la Francophonie must commit to it to avoid both terrible human tragedies as well as enormous costs at a time of resource scarcity. It must be recognized that funds spent on humanitarian assistance, conflict management and conflict resolution are funds not spent on development.
3. La Francophonie must not develop parallel conflict prevention mechanisms, and should support rather than compete with the Organization of African Unity.
4. La Francophonie must better define what can and should be its contribution to conflict prevention — that is, its value-added contribution.

Practical considerations

1. La Francophonie already does many things that are related to conflict prevention but have not always been regarded or perceived as such:
 - programs of the Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation (ACCT)
 - to consolidate democracy
 - to promote the rule of law
 - to develop judicial systems
 - to train judges
 - to train journalists
 - activities of the International Association of French-Speaking Parliamentarians (AIPLF)
 - the key role played by parliamentarians, which could be further developed

2. La Francophonie could do even more in new areas.

For example:

- encourage greater involvement by civil society, including
 - non-governmental organizations
 - the academic community, in order to develop a research network on the origin of conflicts
 - women
- support national, regional and international initiatives related to demobilization, land mine clearance and controlling the proliferation of small weapons
- recognize the role that development assistance can play in conflict prevention
- favour investment in social and economic development over military expenditures

3. Relations between the OAU and la Francophonie must be developed:

- implement the agreement between the ACCT and the OAU
- encourage information sharing between the two institutions
- develop and exchange data bases and lists of personalities able to act as mediators

Conclusion

It is hoped that heads of state and government at the Cotonou Summit in December will reiterate the role of la Francophonie in conflict prevention and their wish to help strengthen the OAU in this area.

PROGRAM

Tuesday, September 19

Afternoon Arrival of participants in Ottawa
 Radisson Hotel, 100 Kent Street

6:00 p.m. Shuttle service between the hotel and the Canadian Museum of Civilization

6:30 p.m. Official welcoming reception
 Location: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 11 Laurier Street, Hull
 Host: The Honourable Jean-Robert Gauthier, Senator, President of
 the Canadian chapter of AIPLF

8:30 p.m. Return to hotel

9:00 p.m. Shuttle service ends

Wednesday, September 20

8:45 a.m. Official opening
 Location: North Ballroom, 2nd floor, Radisson Hotel

Chair of the Meeting

- Ms. Marie Bernard-Meunier, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global Issues and Culture, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Special guests

- Mr. Jean-Louis Roy, Secretary-General, ACCT
- H.E. Lansana Kouyaté, Assistant Secretary-General, UN
- H.E. Mamadou Bah, Director, Political Affairs, OAU
- Dr. Émile-Derlin Zinsou, President, Comité permanent de la Francophonie

Keynote speaker

- H.E. Mohamed Sahnoun, Pearson Fellow, International Development Research Centre (IDRC); former special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Somalia, Assistant Secretary-General of the Arab League, and Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU

10:00 a.m. Workshops begin

- Workshop 1: Conflict Prevention from an African Perspective
Theme 1: "Development Assistance and Conflict Prevention"
(South Ballroom, 2nd floor)
- Workshop 2: Preventive Diplomacy and African Contexts
Theme 1: "Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy"
(Wellington Room, 3rd floor)
- Workshop 3: Organizing Peace: The Institutions and Processes for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution
Theme 1: "The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution: Problems and Perspectives"
(Dalhousie Room, 3rd floor)

11:45 a.m. Shuttle service begins between hotel and Pearson Building, 125 Sussex Drive

12:15 p.m. Official luncheon

- Location: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 9th floor, A Tower, Lester B. Pearson Building, 125 Sussex Drive
- Host: The Honourable André Ouellet, Minister of Foreign Affairs

2:00 p.m. Luncheon ends; return to Radisson Hotel
(End of shuttle service)

2:30 p.m. Workshops continue

- Workshop 1: Conflict Prevention from an African Perspective
Theme 2: "Democratic Development, Civil Society and
Conflict Prevention" (South Ballroom, 2nd floor)
- Workshop 2: Preventive Diplomacy and African Contexts
Theme 2: "Preventive Diplomacy: The UN Experience in
Africa" (Wellington Room, 3rd floor)
- Workshop 3: Organizing Peace: The Institutions and Processes for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution
Theme 2: "A Role for la Francophonie in Conflict
Prevention?" (Dalhousie Room, 3rd floor)

4:00 p.m. Break

4:15 p.m. Workshops continue

- Workshop 1: Conflict Prevention from an African Perspective
Theme 3: "Human Rights and Conflict Prevention"
(South Ballroom, 2nd floor)
- Workshop 2: Preventive Diplomacy and African Contexts

Theme 3: "Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the OAU and African Sub-regional Organizations since 1993" (Wellington Room, 3rd floor)

Workshop 3: Organizing Peace: The Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

Theme 3: "The Experience of the OSCE" (Dalhousie Room, 3rd floor)

6:00 p.m. Workshops end; dinner and evening free

Thursday, September 21

8:45 a.m. Plenary to present the results of the three workshops

Location: North Ballroom

Chair: Ms. Marie Bernard-Meunier

10:30 a.m. Workshops on possible courses of action

Workshop 1: Conflict Prevention from an African Perspective (North Ballroom, 2nd floor)

Workshop 2: Preventive Diplomacy and African Contexts (Wellington Room, 3rd floor)

Workshop 3: Organizing Peace: The Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Dalhousie Room, 3rd floor)

12:00 noon Working luncheon

Location: South Ballroom

Host: Ms. Huguette Labelle

President, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

6:00 p.m. Plenary on the conclusions and recommendations of the Meeting

Location: North Ballroom

Chair: Ms. Marie Bernard-Meunier

7:00 p.m. Dinner and evening free

Friday, September 22

Afternoon Departure from Ottawa

WORKSHOP SCENARIO

WORKSHOP NO. 1

Conflict Prevention from an African Perspective

The first workshop will focus on the conditions required for stability. Since development assistance remains a key factor in the economic equilibrium of several countries, the discussion will focus on the role of assistance in conflict prevention. How can aid become a tool for prevention? Is the development process neutral? The workshop will also focus on the rule of law, respect for human rights and basic freedoms, the role of stakeholders in civil society, and the role of the media in political and economic dynamics. Given the threat posed by the rise of identity-based nationalism, it would also be timely to examine the concept of civic nationalism as a stabilizing factor in the process of nation building. The role of the army in society and levels of military spending should also be considered.

Workshop chair: General Amadou Toumani Touré, former President of Mali

Themes

1.1 Development Assistance and Conflict Prevention

- Presenters: - Mr. Jean-H. Guilmette, Director, Eastern and Central Europe, IDRC, Ottawa (formerly Director General, Strategic Planning, Africa and the Middle East, CIDA)
- Mr. Célestin Monga, Professor, MIT, Boston
- Commentator: - Ms. Iris Almeida, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Montréal

1.2 Democratic Development, Civil Society and Conflict Prevention

- Presenter: - Mr. Tessy Bakary, Professor, Université Laval, Québec
- Commentator: - Mr. Sadikou Alao, GERDDES-Africa, Abidjan

1.3 Human Rights and Conflict Prevention

- Presenter: - Mr. William Schabas, Université du Québec à Montréal
- Commentator: - Mr. René Degni-Segui, Dean, Faculty of Jurisprudence, Abidjan

WORKSHOP NO. 2**Preventive Diplomacy and African Contexts**

In the second workshop, participants will seek a better definition of the concepts of early warning and preventive diplomacy, and will assess how they apply to African contexts. They will reflect on the primary and immediate causes of conflicts. The workshop will seek to determine which indicators and factors of instability best make it possible to predict when and how a crisis situation may degenerate into violent confrontation. To draw on the experience of the participating countries, it will be necessary to determine the degree to which old and new means of conflict prevention and resolution are relevant in the present environment. It will also be necessary to question the effectiveness of traditional means of intervention, especially in internal conflicts.

Workshop chair: H.E. Sadok Fayala, Secretary of State (Africa), Tunisia

Themes**2.1 Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy**

- Presenter: - Mr. Jean-Louis Destans, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Paris
Commentator: - Ms. Danielle Coquoz, Deputy Delegate General for Africa, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva

2.2 Preventive Diplomacy: The UN Experience in Africa

- Presenter: - H.E. Lansana Kouyaté, Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, UN, New York
Commentator: - Mr. Robert Dossou, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Benin

2.3 Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the OAU and African Sub-regional Organizations since 1993

- Presenter: - Mr. Anatole Ayissi, Yaoundé
Commentator: - Mr. Hugo Sada, Reporters sans frontières, Paris

WORKSHOP NO. 3

Organizing Peace: The Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

The third workshop will focus on conflict prevention mechanisms and means of intervention, including military options such as peacekeeping and preventive deployment. It will be useful to identify which institutional needs of the OAU and la Francophonie must be met to enable these organizations to play a more consistent role in conflict prevention and resolution. What should this role be? On what political basis and on what means of intervention should these organizations base their action? The contribution of African sub-regional organizations to preventive diplomacy and peacemaking should also be discussed.

Workshop chair: Mr. Amada Dieng, Secretary-General, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva

Themes

3.1 The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution: Problems and Perspectives

Presenter: - H.E. Mamadou Bah, Director of Political Affairs, OAU, Addis Ababa

Commentator: - Mr. Hédi Annabi, Director (Africa), Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN, New York

3.2 A Role for la Francophonie in Conflict Prevention?

Presenter: - Ms. Christine Desouches, Delegate General, Legal and Judicial Co-operation, ACCT, Paris

Commentator: - Mr. William Eteki M'Boumoua, former Secretary-General, OAU, Yaoundé

3.3 The Experience of the OSCE

Presenter: - Mr. Frans Timmermans, Adviser to the High Commissioner for National Minorities, OSCE, The Hague

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

COUNTRY DELEGATES

Belgium	H.E. Jean De Ruyt, Ambassador, Department of Foreign Affairs, Belgium Mr. Cédric Janssens De Bisthoven, First Secretary, Embassy of Belgium
Benin	H.E. Edgar Yves Monnou, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Benin H.E. Véronique Ahoyo, Ambassador of the Republic of Benin Mr. Moussa Salifou-Traore, First Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Benin Mr. Justin Djidjoho Zannou, Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Benin Ms. Arlette Virgnikin Mr. André-Guy Obogoudou
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Mr. Dysane Dorani, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Djibouti to the United Nations
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Mr. Ezz-Eoine Choukri, Ambassador, Arab Republic of Egypt
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- Mr. Christophe Wurtz, United Nations and International Organizations Branch, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France
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H.E. Aboubacar Abdou, Ambassador of the Republic of Niger
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Mr. Bernardino Regazzoni, Head, Francophonie Service
Mr. Georges Martin, Counsellor, Embassy of Switzerland
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Colonel Assani Tidjani, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Togolese Armed Forces
Mr. Hyacinthe Amakoé Ajavon, Diplomatic Adviser to the Prime Minister
H.E. Biam Bidinabé Hodjo, Ambassador of the Republic of Togo
- Tunisia H.E. Sadok Fayala, Secretary of State
H.E. Khalifa El Hafdhi, Ambassador of the Tunisian Republic
- Vietnam H.E. Tran Quang Co, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Dinh Thi Minh Huyen, Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Mr. Nguyen Van Cung, Deputy Director of the Department of International Organizations
Mr. Pham Quang Nhue
- Zaire Mr. Bakaleja Kuumba Tshimanga, Head of bureau responsible for the OAU
- Zimbabwe Lt. Col. Martin Charles Nhapata, Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe in Paris

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Ms. Christine Desouches, Delegate
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Agreement for Non-Aggression and
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Dr. Émile-Derlin Zinsou, President
Ms. Nicole Relier, Assistant to the
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International Association of
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Mr. Jean-Robert Gauthier, Senator, Chair
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Organization of African Unity
(Addis Ababa)

H.E. Mamadou Bah, Director of Political
Affairs
H.E. Léandre Bassole, Special
Representative of the OAU Secretary-
General in Burundi

Organization for Security and
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Mr. Frans Timmermans, Assistant to the
High Commissioner for National
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United Nations
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H.E. Lansana Kouyaté, Assistant
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Mr. Hédi Annabi, Department of
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Fondation pour l'enfance (Bamako)	Mr. Amadou Toumani Touré, President
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International Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva)	Ms. Danielle Coquoz, Deputy Delegate- General for Africa
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Mr. Mario Dion, Associate Deputy
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Ms. Carole Johnson

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Mr. René Degni-Segui

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Mr. Célestin Monga

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Mr. William Eteki M'Boumoua,
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Mr. Paul George

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Mr. Tessy Bakary

University of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia)

Mr. Anatole Ngah Ayissi

Université du Québec à Montréal

Mr. William Schabas
Ms. Bonnie Campbell

ANNEX I:

Speeches Delivered at the Meeting

The Honourable André Ouellet
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada

Ministers,
Ambassadors,
Mr. Chairman of the Permanent Committee of la Francophonie,
Mr. Secretary-General of the ACCT,
Distinguished guests,
Dear friends:

Welcome to Canada. I see some familiar faces in the room, colleagues that I had the honour of meeting in Ouagadougou in December and at other meetings here or elsewhere. I am also meeting some of you for the first time. I hope that your stay will allow us to get to know one another well. I know that we will all benefit from the atmosphere of honesty and friendship characterizing meetings of la Francophonie, and that the result will be productive discussions.

Unlike other regional and international organizations, la Francophonie has not yet had to play a leading role in conflict prevention and resolution. As I said at the last Ministerial Conference in Ouagadougou, however, the recent events that have shaken some Francophone countries concern and directly affect us all. I said then that la Francophonie was summoned to take action as far as its means would allow. I still believe this to be the case. This observation prompted Canada to propose that a meeting be held in Ottawa to consider establishing a conflict prevention process within la Francophonie. I am happy to see that la Francophonie has answered the call.

We are joined by representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as ambassadors of Commonwealth countries. Their presence underscores the critical nature of our discussions and clearly highlights the importance of conflict prevention in Africa.

Our meeting is innovative and seeks to achieve ambitious objectives. On the one hand, it is the first Francophone meeting of such a nature and thus confirms the desire of Francophone countries to move in this direction. On the other hand, we regard the conference as part of the preparatory process that will lead us to the Cotonou Summit, where I am sure that security issues will have an important place.

Allow me to take this opportunity to share a few thoughts on the very timely topic that you have started to discuss this morning.

For 45 years, the security of nations was threatened by the other side, the enemy without, whose very existence challenged our territorial integrity, our way of life, our political system and our national values. Divided into two ideological camps and obsessed with the danger of atomic war, for too long many nations ignored their own deep, internal social, political and economic divisions and their consequences. Since

1945, more than 100 conflicts have led to the deaths of 20 million people. The fear of nuclear holocaust meant peace for only a few.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the rejection of communism, many saw the dawn of a new era in which the demands of national security would give way to economic and social security and to democratic progress. The most optimistic spoke categorically of the end of History. Others spoke, too hastily, of a new world order. The tragic events in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have shown us a more painful reality.

The new international environment is reminiscent of the bloodbaths of what we had thought were bygone eras. Despite the similarities, the basic facts of the current situation have radically changed. Allow me to outline the most important of these facts, which affect all of our countries:

a) The end of bipolarity has transformed the nature of power in international relations. The number of stakeholders has increased and military force is less significant now than economic strength.

b) Technology and communications have sped up economic globalization and increased the pace of deregulation. Until recently, economic policy was exclusively a matter of national jurisdiction. It must now be considered in conjunction with a range of external factors.

c) Thus problems that transcend national boundaries are erasing the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy.

d) Problems formerly identified with the effects of war, such as mass migration and environmental destruction to name only two, have become factors of instability and conflict.

The power of emerging nations now stems from the vitality of their economy, the influence of their culture and values, and the inclusion of all stakeholders in civil society in the conduct of public affairs. To develop this participation, it seems to me that nations must promote national unity based on equality for all and respect for political, economic and cultural diversity.

The enemy that threatens us is no longer the other side. The enemy lies within. I talked about the new situation with regard to international peace and security. Human security is clearly the very foundation of real peace. Peace and security now depend on the ability of nations to promote the economic and social development of all citizens, both women and men, with respect for differences and for the environment. Factors such as soil depletion, deforestation and desertification have been left out of the security equation for too long. They now dramatically remind us that we are threatened by far more than flags and firearms.

The economic slowdown of recent years has hit developing countries hard, especially in Africa. The continent's collective wealth has decreased, leaving each nation and each individual in a more tenuous situation. Without careful management in distributing national wealth, disparities and resource scarcity will lead inexorably to the breakdown of states, mass population movements, and ethnic and interstate conflict.

To be successful, governments must also recognize the fundamental role of women in economic and social development. Women continue to feed large populations, to pass on the cultural values of peace and solidarity, to rebuild their countries at the grass-roots level. Without the participation of women in the political and economic decision-making processes, countries deprive themselves of an indispensable resource.

Encouraged by the commitment made in Cairo in June 1993 by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, as well as by the action taken by the OAU in Burundi and by certain regional organizations (for instance, in Lesotho), Canada is now actively involved in a dialogue with the OAU Secretariat to develop avenues of co-operation that will help achieve the objectives of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Canada encourages the OAU to promote complementarity with African regional organizations, the UN, la Francophonie and the Commonwealth. Today's conference will help pave the way toward implementing this co-operation.

La Francophonie cannot remain silent in the face of the challenges that ongoing and potential conflicts pose to regional and international security. There is reason to consider whether la Francophonie, in support of the OAU Mechanism, should create institutional means for playing a preventive and mediating role. Of course, we already have programs for the promotion of democratic institutions. But these programs are no longer adequate. It is imperative that member states of la Francophonie make use of the tools available to them by working in concert with the ACCT (Agency for Cultural and Technical Co-operation), the OAU and the UN to devise courses of action for responding to the new realities. When conflicts break out or are on the verge of degenerating into violent confrontations, someone must act quickly.

The power to act is useless without the will to act. Rwanda and now Burundi afford proof that the weakness of preventive diplomacy lies not in a lack of ways to identify conflict situations, but in the international community's inability to decide how best to prevent and contain conflicts. In order to play the part it is capable of, la Francophonie needs a mechanism whereby it can make the necessary decisions to contribute toward the efforts of the UN, the OAU and regional organizations.

Let me now summarize:

First, today's and tomorrow's discussions must continue in each of our capitals and culminate in Cotonou in a solemn declaration by la Francophonie on conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy.

Second, we should consider setting up a select ministerial committee in Cotonou to support the initiatives in this area and provide the necessary political impetus.

Third, at the level of preventive diplomacy, la Francophonie should make more extensive and more frequent use of its parliamentarians; they can play an invaluable role in mediation and observation, as was the case in Burundi. I would like to see an active role for the AIPLF (International Association of French-Speaking Parliamentarians) strongly encouraged and recognized.

Fourth, to add an element of flexibility, mobility and rapidity to the actions of the select ministerial committee and to give more substance to the Francophone instruments already available to us, including the AIPLF, we should consider establishing within la Francophonie what for the time being I will call a "peace facility."

Fifth, given the crucial importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in conflict prevention, I believe, that where they do not exist or are functioning less than optimally, we should promote the creation or strengthening of national human rights advocacy institutions throughout la Francophonie. This emphasis could be incorporated in bilateral and multilateral co-operation.

Sixth, in an environment where military power is giving way to economic dynamism, the security and stability of nations hinges increasingly on the economic and social development of their people. Should our governments not therefore undertake courageous review of the level of military expenditures with a view to reallocating defence resources into fields such as health and education, in order to secure a better future for our peoples?

Seventh, according to the United Nations, more than 90 per cent of the victims of intra-state conflicts are non-combatants. Unless the proliferation of small arms and the use of mines cease, civilian populations will continue to be the victims of sectarian wars. It is imperative that the international community and the governments and groups involved work together to end the use of such weapons. Furthermore, should we not make the political commitment to rid Francophone countries of land mines?

Canada will continue to apply pressure and suggest changes within international institutions to secure peace and stability. With regard to security issues in particular, in a few days I will be tabling before the United Nations General Assembly the results of a Canadian study on the establishment of a rapid reaction capability within the UN. Applying the main recommendations of this study would, in our view, result in a tangible improvement in the UN's peacekeeping performance. I invite you to read this study and promote its recommendations.

The nature of conflict has changed. Faced with threats from outside, many Francophone countries, like the rest of the world, have placed their reliance on military power for protection. These countries must now take a fresh look at the question of internal security. Order without public consent and participation is incompatible with

internal stability and good governance. In my view, the absence of conflict at the expense of freedom is not true peace.

Thank you.

Huguette Labelle
President
Canadian International Development Agency

Greetings, ladies and gentlemen.

As you have had ample opportunity to get to know one another since the beginning of this conference, in the interest of brevity I will skip the usual formal greetings and get right to the subject of my address. I will try to avoid repeating the analysis you have heard over the past two days. I also plan to abstain, as much as possible, from approaching the problem from a strictly political angle. This is not directly within my competence, since I am addressing you as the president of a bilateral development assistance agency.

It has long been said — not without good reason — that development is the new name for peace. The pressing need to prevent and contain conflicts now faces us with new urgency and cannot be denied. The events that concern us are admittedly far from new, but we are barely beginning to gauge their true scope and realize the threat they pose to long-range, sustainable development activities. You are as familiar as I am with the tragic examples of internal conflict that swept away decades of sustained development effort in a few weeks or months. Africa's experience in this regard has been particularly agonizing, and the situation in many countries there continues to cause serious concern. Quite obviously, given the permeability of Africa's boundaries, internal conflicts and the resulting population movements are destabilizing factors at the regional level as well. These tragic situations highlight the necessity for regional or continental co-operation through organizations such as the OAU or ECOWAS; they also underscore the urgency of reconsidering the dogma of the absolute sovereignty of nations and the intangible principle of non-interference in their domestic affairs. These are my only comments on the political dimension of the problem that concerns us.

ODA and Conflict Prevention

It was once easy to maintain that East-West rivalry was played out through proxy conflicts in developing countries. The end of the Cold War forces us to go far beyond this simplistic and reductionist analysis. We are finding that nations have very long memories and that conflicts are often the expression of age-old hatreds. This having been said, I would like to suggest to you today that, by its very nature, development assistance, properly understood and based on an enlightened analysis of various realities, is precisely conducive to promoting conflict prevention. Of course, we must not see it as a panacea and thus neglect other political and diplomatic means to which governments have access. However, I would not hesitate to argue that, in recent decades, official development assistance has undoubtedly had the effect of helping to defuse numerous conflicts that might have erupted in various hot spots around the world.

The paradox is precisely that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate the effectiveness of this type of intervention.

Development co-operation has a leading role to play in dealing with this problem, since conflicts are ultimately rooted in the fact that various segments of the population in developing countries face poverty, social injustice and lack of opportunities for developing peacefully. The conflicts are often the result of unchecked population growth — a key factor in the struggle for access to increasingly limited resources, and in the failure to meet basic needs. These are all problems that official development assistance has a mandate to help resolve. Earlier this year, Canada decided to allocate one quarter of its ODA to these basic needs.

We have, of course, implemented activities in the areas of health, education, and drinking water supply for a long time. I am convinced, however, that integrating these various projects into a framework — one that lays the foundations for sustainable development and establishes a climate conducive to conflict prevention — will enable us to increase both the consistency and the benefits of our activities.

Democratic Development, Human Rights and Good Governance

Africa has experienced a downslide in recent years, and it has faced numerous tragedies representing a giant step backward in terms of development; but the picture is far from being entirely negative. The reforms initiated in the areas of political and economic pluralism, as well as more transparent governance — reforms sought by the people of Africa themselves — reflect the desire for development based on participation by citizens in decisions that concern them, and the desire for greater social cohesiveness.

I emphasize the fact that these are not values or concepts inspired by the West or imposed by donors who are prisoners of a narrow ideological view of reality. Many countries have indeed undertaken to reform their style of government, their planned economies or excessive military spending; they have done so, however, not because of unbearable pressure from donors but, first and foremost, because their own people demanded it. This having been said, it is up to the countries concerned to choose how to implement a process based on universal aspirations.

We felt that these reforms inevitably form part of the process of sustainable development, which assumes conflict prevention; and it is precisely for this reason that we have given them growing importance in our official development assistance in recent years. I wish to note that we do not consider Africa a special region in this regard. We have designed projects of this kind for every region in which we are involved. Naturally, we have made an effort to adapt them to the situation in the field. We have supported the electoral process in numerous countries — among them Haiti, where we have also launched a vast human rights advocacy project and are helping to train the Haitian police. We have created a fund to support gender equity policies throughout Central America. We have established another fund to support dialogue and

development in the Middle East. We have launched a project in the Philippines to prepare women for playing a more active role in the political life of their country. And we have also implemented a regional project in West Africa to promote democracy and human rights. More recently, CIDA launched a major project to support the strengthening of groups and associations within civil society in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali.

I would like to say a word about South Africa. This country's experience in conflict prevention is definitely worth analysing. When Canada designed its first official development assistance program for this country in 1985, it attached central importance to promoting human rights, training black South Africans to prepare them for participating fully in the life of a non-racial society, and implementing various other initiatives in education (such as adult literacy), co-operation with labour organizations, and support for businesses run by blacks.

In the early 1990s, as the situation in the field began to change, Canada implemented various measures to support the electoral process. Starting in 1993, moreover, we sought to build the ANC's capacities for negotiating with the Government of South Africa in various areas, including education, the economy and public administration. We can thus say that, generally speaking, our relations with the anti-apartheid movement were formerly characterized by traditional ties of dependence between donor and recipient, but they have gradually evolved toward capacity and institution building — which are essential elements in a conflict prevention process.

We also feel that decentralization of authority and greater participation by local communities in managing their own priorities are directly in line with conflict prevention. This policy includes managing land tenure systems and arbitrating resource allocation. The Canadian International Development Agency plans to channel significant funding to this kind of decentralization process.

These are only a few of many examples, but I want to emphasize the importance that we attach to activities designed to improve the status of women. We feel that this is not only imperative in terms of human dignity and the effectiveness of development strategies, but also a vital element of any conflict prevention process. The advancement of women can take many forms, including creating credit and savings unions, reforming land tenure systems, and training women to lead labour movements. In Africa, women's groups generally encompass several ethnic groups and constitute unifying agents for change rather than sources of discord between various social groups.

I also wish to draw your attention to some other, more specialized projects implemented by Canada and directly related to the problem of conflict: a project to support awareness and national reconciliation in Mali (the ASERENA project); financial support for the OAU's efforts to develop a conflict prevention, management, and resolution mechanism; and a project to train Francophone African journalists in journalism in a democracy. This project was implemented jointly by Société Radio-Canada and the ACCT.

Before leaving this topic, which I would call "democracy and participation," I would like to mention some of the conditions for effective support by bilateral and multilateral donors for the processes under way in various countries. Programs and projects must first be based on far more detailed and in-depth knowledge of the realities of each country. This assumes open dialogue with numerous spokespersons for civil society and public authorities in recipient countries, and with representatives of regional institutions. This is the specifically North-South dimension of the process. If we learn to consult more with all segments of the population, we will be better able to help strengthen the social fabric of the countries where we are involved. Although I do not have time to go into further detail, I would add that we must ensure better co-ordination with other donors — North-North co-ordination — and with international organizations. In short, using ODA to prevent conflicts requires a combined bilateral, multilateral and international approach.

Conclusion

In closing, I would like to draw your attention to another factor that makes conflict prevention essential for long-term sustainable development. We know that ODA budgets are currently at a standstill for many reasons, and that an increasing share of funding is being allocated to emergency humanitarian assistance. Canadians want us to act to assist people who are victims of either natural or human-caused disasters. The resources used in this way are consequently unavailable for long-term development activities. We must take this situation into consideration and ensure that our ODA is as sound and effective as possible.

It is essential that we share the experiences we have had in various countries, and the lessons we have learned from them. One has only to think of Haiti, Cambodia, and numerous African countries to realize that la Francophonie can make a valuable contribution to the work being done simultaneously in other bodies, especially DAC and the OAU.

Ladies and gentlemen, I hope that the process set in motion here will continue. May it further the deliberations at the upcoming Francophone Summit in Cotonou, and may it also allow a better understanding of the avenues that bilateral and multilateral development assistance could pursue to contribute to conflict prevention.

Thank you.

His Excellency Mohamed Sahnoun
Pearson Fellow
International Development Research Centre

Madam Chair, I would like to thank you very much for your warm words of welcome. I am certainly well aware of what a privilege it is to be among you today for this discussion of conflict prevention at an international meeting of la Francophonie.

Madam Chair, you found the right words in opening this conference when you spoke about security and the deterioration of the environment. I believe that these are indeed the basic parameters.

Over the next 50 years, the world's population will probably grow to over 9 billion people and its economic output will quintuple. It may seem at first that this scenario is not all that disastrous because population growth is largely offset by economic expansion. The reality, however, cannot be captured by mathematical equations. First, the needs of a population that has practically doubled will be much broader and more complex. Second, the economic expansion will be structurally and geographically much more selective and will only be able to meet a small part of these needs.

The pressure exerted by these demographic and economic trends on natural resources will be such that some non-renewable resources, many mining products and some crops will disappear or be severely reduced, while certain regions called arid or semi-arid today will be totally depopulated.

Even some resources that are supposed to be renewable, such as potable water, will become very scarce — as a recent World Bank report has shown. Damage to the ecosystem and impairment of the ecological balance as a result of such things as deforestation (10 million hectares destroyed annually) and soil erosion (6 million hectares lost annually) are becoming widespread and pose a grave threat to the economic foundations and future not only of certain countries but of entire regions. It goes without saying that the political and social consequences of these developments are very serious, and we are already beginning to witness them.

This became clear to me when, in carrying out my mission to Somalia as special representative of the UN Secretary-General, I witnessed a civil war and an institutional and social crisis with deeper roots that were as much ecological as political. It is obvious that poor political management and acute governmental deficiencies, in Somalia and elsewhere, lead to disaster. Simply consider that in the Horn of Africa — particularly in Somalia and Ethiopia — 70 to 80 percent of the soil has been affected by erosion and desertification over little more than half a century. This has led inevitably to very large population movements and precarious economic and social conditions that poor government has only exacerbated. The fault lines in Somalia were not especially obvious because of the ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity of its society.

However, insecurity can conjure unexpected demons from the cultural imagination. In their search for security and survival, Somalis sought shelter within groups, sub-groups or simply families — even if that meant shredding the social fabric, government structures and basic economic systems. A well-functioning government, including both those in power and in opposition, should be alert to the possibility of environmental damage, especially in underdeveloped countries. It should provide ways and means of cushioning the blows and of better managing whatever strengths the society has; these are often greater than might first appear.

Poor government policy accentuates the blows by exacerbating social and ethnic divisions and attempting thereby to perpetuate a system that is often shot through with vain stubbornness and tragic indifference. Environment and government: these are the two basic parameters of the latent and open crises affecting primarily, but not solely, the underdeveloped world. Having emphasized the importance of these two parameters, we should also look at certain historical, cultural or systemic factors that heighten uncertainty and generally encourage conflict to develop and break out. Doing so enables us to determine the exact nature of a crisis, to the extent that we can; unless we do, it is difficult to decide upon and implement an appropriate therapy.

There is an integration process at work in nation-states. In our countries, there are almost always ethnic, tribal or linguistic differences; these harbour a cultural potential that could be advantageous under the right circumstances, but they tend to impede the integration process. A lack of balance and agreement between the various ethnic or tribal components, or any undue hegemony exercised by one group, will prevent the emergence of a nation-state. Unfortunately, there is little or no sign of the catalysts or stabilizing elements needed to foster the cohesion and development of society, such as an inter-ethnic social class feeling some solidarity or a well-informed elite.

Second, there is the decolonization process. The consequences of poorly planned or hastily completed decolonization constitute a major impediment to the formation of nation-states. The old themes of decolonization, the drawing of borders, favouritism and last-minute constitutional frameworks often fanned or roused latent antagonisms, making the integration and stabilization process even more complex.

Third, there is the heritage of the Cold War. It resulted largely in the hijacking, so to speak, of social struggles or wars of liberation by the protagonists of the Cold War, and the infection of these movements with the virus of ideology. Since the body was already weak, the virus was bound to do great damage. Complex conflicts arose, prolonged immeasurably by an abundance of arms and poor advice from the Cold War protagonists.

Fourth, there are religious antagonisms. Acceptance of other religions is a measure of the level of tolerance in a society. It depends on a general sense of security but also on the attitude of religious and political elites. At times, having failed to internalize the religious message themselves, these elites exploit formal differences and

exacerbate apprehensions, distrust and feelings of marginalization in the service of their own ambition or megalomania.

Finally there are what I call modern *Jacqueries*. These are social revolts, whether in the cities or among poor farmers; they are caused by the failures of the political system, perceived injustice and discontent among the socially underprivileged. These revolts are exploited by more or less sincere leaders who decide to play saviour by donning the robes of Savonarola or Che Guevara and launching their troops against the citadels of power. This was the situation in Latin America, especially Central America, but also to some extent in Africa. Religious fundamentalism often lends these leaders an ideological impetus that greatly exacerbates the situation, as can be seen in North Africa and the Middle East.

These are the five main factors behind the outbreak of today's conflicts, and more than one may be present in a given conflict. Once again, though, I should emphasize that these are not necessarily the direct or deeper causes, which are related to the basic parameters of the environment and government. Otherwise it would be very difficult to explain why some countries and societies manage to avoid the disasters that befall others facing the same problems and challenges. It is still essential, however, to analyse correctly all the facets of these factors in each case and to determine our approach and concentrate our efforts on timely preventive action and conflict resolution. Once these conflicts reach tragic proportions they are hard to control and the combatants, unfortunately, are often pacified in the end only by attrition, exhaustion or a lack of resources.

Some conflicts are difficult to classify (I am thinking in particular of those caused directly or indirectly by drug trafficking in Latin America and Asia). It is nevertheless helpful to create a sort of guide to various categories of latent or open internal conflicts. We need to better grasp their development, the roles of various players and interventions, the arms trade, the blind ambition of some military or political leaders, the decay of government infrastructure, the paralysis of traditional mechanisms for conciliation and mediation, and the disregard of humanitarian tragedies. All these are aggravating factors that must be understood, having effects that must be diminished. This is possible if we mobilize those with real authority to better prepare appropriate institutions and logistical resources. Conflict prevention and resolution are delicate tasks, often requiring persistent effort. It is illusory to think that we will achieve satisfactory results without clarity of thought and some firmness and calmness in handling the aggravating factors.

The recipes concocted too late in the ivory towers of international institutions — and here I become a little provocative, Madam Chair — often take the facts on the ground only partially into account and are sometimes motivated by pressure from the media. The result is that these recipes may well prove sterile if not harmful. It would be helpful to review current structures and methods with a view toward decentralization of conflict prevention and management. Decentralization and empowerment: these are the basic principles that must guide far-reaching reform of our current structures in order for

us to better understand and manage internal conflicts, which may well increase greatly in the near future.

At the risk of infringing on certain egos, taboos and bureaucratic habits that have sprung up since the end of the Second World War, we should set to work with great energy and daring to draw practitioners together and adapt our therapy. How do we detect the first signs, arrive at a correct diagnosis and co-ordinate an overall approach to prevent an incipient crisis from degenerating into tragedy? This is possible only if we are nearby, pay attention and have the minimum resources for intervening. Accordingly, as far as possible we can employ local strengths in prevention, the treatment of symptoms and peacebuilding.

In short, we should reinforce the existing immune systems. This means encouraging the promotion, creation or consolidation of regional, sub-regional or national structures for conciliation and mediation. To do this, the co-operation and support of the international community are needed. We need its help — first, to revise the present approach of relying primarily on the UN, and second to encourage new intervention structures, including within civil society. Chapter 8 of the UN Charter requires member states to make every effort to settle disputes first through regional arrangements before calling in the United Nations. Regional and sub-regional organizations have recently taken a few timid steps in this direction with the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

I was personally involved in the process of considering ways and means for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of this mechanism. We must recognize that, despite the presence and availability of human resources completely capable of providing mediation, conciliation and peacekeeping services, the OAU and most regional or sub-regional organizations in the underdeveloped world do not have sufficient logistical resources. I witnessed this deficiency myself when the OAU asked me to make my good offices available to the various parties fighting in the Congo in 1993–94. Our mediation efforts were successful but we found ourselves completely paralysed when the time came to translate these results into the supervision of elections, the provision of arbitration and other concrete measures. I therefore took the initiative, with the agreement of the OAU Secretary-General, of asking the European Union for its co-operation in carrying out a mediation endeavour that was particularly delicate and vital, I would say, for the country concerned.

Thus, for the first time, two regional organizations — one in the North and the other in the South — engaged in highly significant inter-regional co-operation. I believe that this precedent could be broadened. With the approval of the United Nations itself, permanent, systemic relations could be encouraged between regional and sub-regional organizations. The Security Council should seriously consider empowering these regional and sub-regional institutions and recommending that they establish prevention and auto-immune defence systems that are as sophisticated as possible for dealing with conflict. In order to develop, they would need approval and support, including logistical

support, not only from the United Nations but also from partners who feel a natural solidarity and are well aware of the repercussions that such seismic shocks can have far from their epicentres.

There is no reason to be squeamish about this kind of solidarity, which is devoid not only of paternalism but of nervous nationalism as well. Some of us have reservations about including extra-regional countries on the board of directors of regional financial institutions. Experience has shown, however, that this is an unproductive attitude. The same is true today. If we are going to put a stop to internal conflicts and their consequences, we must demonstrate daring and imagination. Decentralization and empowerment require the establishment at regional and sub-regional levels of semi-permanent consultation structures that include partners from other regions who are motivated and interested in understanding and dealing with latent and open conflicts.

An experiment in this area can be seen in the initiative taken by some countries in the Horn of Africa, called the IGADD countries, seeking to provide conciliation in Sudan. The IGADD encouraged the creation of a group of friendly countries, including our host country of Canada, to watch this conciliation and mediation operation and provide advice and support. In addition to this extra-regional, inter-governmental advice and support structure, the IGADD invited a number of people with a good knowledge of the situation on the ground to make technical contributions. I am privileged to belong to this group and can attest to the fruitful co-operation between the various structures. This expanded consultation framework and a decentralized approach can become the linchpins for a demonstration of solidarity by the international community.

Traditional diplomatic activities can be made more effective. With better timing, we could avoid the disastrous confusion that surrounded the tragedy in Rwanda, when we failed to take full advantage of the conciliation process initiated in Arusha. Lack of communication, suspicion and sometimes incompetence produced a climate of intrigue with the sound of clattering guns and, finally, tragedy. Diplomatic action should not be paralysed by poorly understood principles of sovereignty and non-interference. By the same token, diplomatic action must free itself from all misguided concerns about spheres of influence, prestige and trade advantage.

The Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, ASEAN, the Arab League, la Francophonie and the Commonwealth should launch a public debate on ways and means of establishing these consultation structures. The conference that our Canadian friends have had the perspicacity to organize today in the framework of la Francophonie can serve as an example.

One could refer to the Liberian conflict, among others, and retort that examples of successful regional or sub-regional intervention are neither numerous nor particularly impressive. Perhaps. However, the United Nations and the regional organizations of the North do not have particularly brilliant records either, whether in Bosnia or elsewhere. We must also remember once again the serious handicap imposed by inexperience and lack of resources.

We should remember as well that, in its very early years, the OAU (of which I was then Assistant Secretary-General) experienced some success in managing interstate conflict. However, newly acquired independence and the fetishization of "sovereignty" and "non-interference" greatly held back growth in the OAU's ability to understand and manage internal crises. Now we must catch up by drawing on the experience of others and taking advantage of the offers of co-operation that we receive. Ideas and formulas have been advanced at the Biarritz Summit, in Brussels, Rome and London. Let us take up the challenge and examine the advantages and disadvantages of what is proposed, openly and without complexes, but also without polemics in the media.

Having discussed interstate regional and sub-regional structures, let me say a word now about methodology. Here I cannot insist enough on the importance of prompt intervention — on good timing, as they say in English. Excuses and delays always come back to haunt us in ways that are especially costly, often in terms of human lives. I had to deal, one after the other, with Somalia and the Congo, and I emerged with the profound conviction that the anarchy that gradually took over in Somalia was largely due to late intervention. Time is too short for me to expand on this subject, but I would like to emphasize that maximum pressure should be exerted on the governments of countries where crises are beginning to swallow their false pride and accept offers of good offices, mediation and conciliation. Humanitarian situations and institutions must not be allowed to deteriorate. Nothing should be allowed to prevent or impede urgently needed humanitarian assistance, because massively deteriorating situations lead inevitably to a rapid decline in moral values and in a sense of civic duty, and to the disappearance of certain institutional and social landmarks, leaving citizens disoriented and leading directly to anarchy.

Finally, we should avoid resorting too quickly to armed intervention. Political solutions should be emphasized above all. This requires hard, wearisome negotiations with all parties to the conflict, and the marshalling of an entire arsenal of resources and strengths within the country. This is where civil society comes in. We have a very complex notion here which must not be idealized. Civil society in most countries of the South is still not organized or structured. Nevertheless, there are strengths that can be discerned and put to good use. Institutions and individuals from the sphere of religion, traditional chiefs, teachers, medical personnel, business groups, women's groups and human rights associations are generally sources of strength that should be reinforced, comforted and encouraged. These groups should be helped to generate concrete ideas and historical examples that enable them to discover for themselves the means of distancing themselves a little and developing peace strategies in the midst of anxiety and irrational impulses.

A great deal of effort should be devoted to handling the collective memory of previous conflicts. Poor management of this memory and the lack of what I would call the assimilation of traumatic events suffered in times of crisis are major reasons why crises are prolonged. The strengths in local civil society are often best promoted by partners who speak the same language and represent international civil society. As is the case for humanitarian actions, contacts and co-operation should be facilitated. In

addition, transfers of information, knowledge and know-how should be authorized, at the same time that greater security is provided to encourage the search for alternatives to violence.

On the occasion of a UNESCO conference on the culture of peace, we witnessed in the Congo a tremendous mobilization of civil society putting so much pressure on political activities that, to the surprise of all, a government of national unity emerged. The ability of civil society to provide rapid, effective, significant assistance in conflict situations depends on the existence of an extensive system of information networks and relations, involving individuals and organizations working on peace topics. The North should increasingly include individuals and organizations from the so-called underdeveloped world in the networks, and should provide them with encouragement and the necessary support.

In conclusion, whether in regard to intergovernmental structures or the role of civil society, we must get closer to the regions and populations concerned. As a UNESCO manifesto on culture and peace says, the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the two blocs that dominated our planet have changed the role of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in their missions to keep or maintain the peace. Now more than ever, new structures for building peace are needed to facilitate the passage from a culture of war to a culture of peace.

Thank you very much.

N.B. This text is a translation from a transcription of the recording of Ambassador Sahnoun's address.

ANNEX II:

Presentations by Experts

- Workshop 1.1:** **Development Assistance and Conflict Prevention**
- Speaker:** **Jean-H. Guilmette, former Director General, Special Projects Unit, Africa and the Middle-East Branch, Canadian International Development Agency**
- Title:** **BEYOND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE: EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DECISION MAKING**

N.B. The following text introduces the current thinking of the Special Projects Unit on conflict prevention in Africa; we have also included the ideas of the International Humanitarian Assistance Program on the same topic. The document is intended to generate discussion on this important subject in order to adapt current policies to present circumstances. New concepts had to be defined to better understand the situation and to identify new steps of action. This research was initiated under the auspices of CIDA's Africa and the Middle-East Branch.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The African context

Compared to Asia and Latin America, Africa was relatively stable during the first two decades following independence. Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda mark a watershed for the continent, which can no longer be ignored. Three questions arise:

- Is assistance really achieving the desired results?
- Can development assistance help reduce conflicts?
- Does the Rwandan crisis really mean the failure of co-operation?

Demographic growth has irrevocably upset the "existing order of things." Traditionally, conflicts were resolved through the rigid application of complicated social rules. In cases in which these did not suffice, the "palaver tree" would act as a conflict resolution mechanism. And when nothing else worked, the abundant and readily available land permitted the "evacuation" of the conflict. But this era is over, as land is now scarce and populations are adding pressure to the existing socio-economic structures. In addition, fundamentalist movements, AIDS, ethnic rivalries and sectarianism further contribute to the destabilization of the continent.

Social peace is far from assured. For African leaders, a world they had learned to control is no longer adhering to traditional rules. Although Africans have a greater understanding of the subtleties of domestic crises, they are more often than not paralysed and hesitate in making bold decisions and allowing for change. They may need some outside help to coax them into action. Furthermore, the international context has

changed in ways that do not favour African economies. The African context needs to evolve as a result of rapid population growth and increasing globalization.

This does not mean that the continent is without its own resources. There are more than a few untold success stories which demonstrate an impressive ability to evolve, to move toward stability rather than toward chaos. It is both possible, and necessary, for the continent to act prudently in an effort to avoid major conflicts such as experienced in Rwanda.

What is to be done?

If we concentrate our efforts and resources on the prerequisites for peace and on satisfying basic needs, and if we work together with all partners, our contributions will have a surer impact.

A basic observation concerning crisis prevention is that it can only be achieved through a complex set of complementary actions — a spectrum, in fact, dealing with both short- and long-term issues. Five levels, or periods, have been identified, each requiring a different approach:

- Period 1: A "malaise" signifies a crisis in the making. ODA can play a meaningful role during this period.
- Period 2: A crisis turns into an actual conflict, most often left unacknowledged.
- Period 3: The conflict having been left unresolved in its early stages, it now moves into the third period, that of open conflict. At this point, diplomacy begins to play a major role. Development assistance gives way to humanitarian assistance.
- Period 4: The conflict erupts into a war, mitigating peacekeeping initiatives.
- Period 5: Resolution allows for the return of more traditional forms of development work. After reconciliation, reconstruction begins.

The NASA dilemma

In 1986, the *Challenger* space shuttle, carrying six astronauts and commissions worth hundreds of millions of dollars, exploded. It was shown that the accident was predictable and, therefore, avoidable. The cause of the tragedy was the O-ring, and the defect had been identified by NASA employees but no preventive measures had been taken. The authorities decided that the launch should not be delayed. The dilemma seemed insoluble: if NASA delayed the launch to replace the defective joints, everyone

would know exactly how much the delay cost, but it would be impossible to prove how much money would have been saved because the precautionary action would have destroyed the proof that there had been cause for worry.

As this example shows, anticipating a conflict and nipping it in the bud is a process which, to the extent that it is successful, will usually obscure the proof of its own success.

A complementary notion concerns the actors in a given conflict. Four circles of influence have been identified which describe levels of involvement for individual countries, regions and organizations. This concept is an essential component to understanding how conflicts can be resolved in Africa. The circles are identified as follows:

- Circle 1: Countries directly affected — Mali, Mauritania, Algeria, Niger
- Circle 2: Countries indirectly affected — Togo, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal, Benin, Ivory Coast
- Circle 3: Countries providing resources — Libya, Morocco, Arabic Islam
- Circle 4: Countries of the North, national and international organizations — France, USA, EU, UN, OAU

Important and unanswered questions remain

- Are there conflicts that run so deep that nothing can stop them from periodic outbreaks? Or are those exceptional conflicts, which warrant exceptional measures (see section 3.1.2)?
- Are we faced with manufactured conflicts or social conflicts (see section 3.1.1)?
- How do we construct a "multi-international dynamic"? Specifically, how can we develop a consensus on a common agenda and co-operation among actors who have traditionally acted in isolation (see section 4.2)?
- Should we concentrate our efforts and resources at the level of the continent or should we act regionally (see section 4.2)?
- When does humanitarian assistance become part of the problem rather than the solution? What subtle signs should we monitor in order to determine our course of action (see section 4.3.4)?
- How can donors discourage dependence on "international welfare" (see section 4.3.4)?

- How do we prevent emergency aid from prolonging conflicts and thus the suffering of the victims (see section 4.3.4)?
- How will we know that we have succeeded? How can we measure the impact of our action (see section 3)?

INTRODUCTION

The scope of current crises and conflicts in Africa has cast a shadow of doubt and uncertainty over all ODA efforts.

The image of Africa as a huge "black hole" has been reinforced by the Rwandan crisis, coming on the heels of the crises in Liberia and Somalia. Consequently, many of the beliefs and certainties about development and progress, which we had acquired over three decades of co-operation, are being undermined. Everything is being put into question.

- Is assistance really achieving the desired results?
- Can development assistance help reduce conflicts?
- Does the Rwandan crisis really mean the failure of co-operation?

These are difficult questions for aid agencies, and CIDA's Africa and the Middle-East Branch (AMEB) must address them in 1995. To begin with the last question, it cannot be assumed that there is a direct cause-effect link between foreign aid and the bloodbath that began in Rwanda in February 1994. If a patient commits suicide in a hospital a few days after a serious operation, members of the hospital staff may blame themselves; however, the direct connection between the two events remains to be established. The same applies to the relationship between development assistance and these deep social cleavages, whose workings we do not fully understand. An international study on Rwanda, commissioned by the Development Assistance Committee, is currently under way. It will attempt to establish the events leading up to the explosion and genocide of 1994. It would be unwise, therefore, to draw any conclusions before the research team provides us with some points of reference.

OUTLINE

We shall begin by identifying essential factors for conflict prevention and discussing related concepts, based on a typology of conflicts. Secondly, we shall propose foundations for an appropriate AMEB policy. Lastly, we shall suggest innovative transfer mechanisms and models for projects which address these new problems.

1. AFRICA: THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT

1.1 Global factors

As globalization and interdependence converge, it seems appropriate to draw attention to worldwide trends which, in one way or another, are having an impact on the region.

Even taken together, the central banks of the United States, Germany and Japan can no longer control capital flow. Indeed, they are barely able to influence exchange and interest rates. It is therefore illusory to think that the meagre flow of aid has the power to prompt or determine the movement of capital to countries that investors do not perceive as solvent. At the same time, the liberalization of farm prices and trade within and around the major regional blocs is wreaking havoc with old strategies for economic competition and food security.

These structural changes represent a new challenge for ODA policy. Indeed, they are casting doubt on its very foundations as well as its means and ends. And nowhere is the challenge greater than in Africa, which in its search for financing is being forced to come to terms with the different approaches adopted by the Paris Club and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

The new "competition" from East European countries continues to draw away donor countries and investors. In spite of the abundance of emergency assistance to Africa, the significant drop in the inflow of private capital and traditional assistance presents another challenge whose medium- and long-term consequences have not been thoroughly analysed.

The end of the Cold War has been a beneficial event. However, paradoxically, it has also brought instability. For many years, the contest between the two superpowers guaranteed stability around major regional issues. To be sure, the decline of the Soviet Union has created a more favourable environment for peace in the Middle East; but it has also intensified many regional conflicts, and there is no solution in sight. Meanwhile, the UN has proved incapable of acting as an international policeman.

Member states of regional co-operation organizations such as the EU and ASEAN seem to be immune to major local or internal conflicts. By contrast, Africa has been caught in the undertow and is in a poorer position than other regions of the world since it does not have an integrated economic zone as such. Thus far, ECOWAS does not seem to have succeeded in solving the Liberian problem. However, it must be noted that the SADC group has settled a serious problem involving Lesotho. The gradual easing of tensions between Mauritania and Senegal can also be attributed to the bonds forged within the Senegal River Development Organization, demonstrating the value of regional co-operation superstructures of this type.

At the same time, technology is progressing daily at a pace never before seen in the history of humanity, and is being disseminated by communications systems that also are more advanced than ever before. Consequently, significant changes in supply and demand are occurring daily. These changes demand ongoing adaptation of production systems and manpower training. **This worldwide phenomenon is having a pernicious impact on African societies, which possess none of the necessary infrastructures.** Some current assumptions may need to be re-examined and perhaps dismissed.

Promoting social and economic democracy is another concern common to all three parts of the world (North, South and East). However, there are profound differences in the logic of development in these three regions. In eastern and southeastern Asia, democracy has taken shape under a succession of dictatorships which did succeed in promoting economic growth. The key element here was the emergence of a large middle class, which was then in a position to demand a share of power.

By contrast, the authoritarian regimes of Africa, with few exceptions, have essentially failed in their economic task during the past three decades of independence. Their citizens are now demanding a radical change in course and hoping to find in democracy the economic driving force which has been lacking for the past three decades. Thus the elites face a twofold challenge: to simultaneously build democracy and the economy.

Meanwhile, the possibility of a total, even violent, rejection of a purely Western mode of development cannot be dismissed. Such a rejection could bring with it the overthrow of cultural dependence and some of the beliefs it implies. As a result, new "problematics" could emerge, which would pit citizens against their government, ethnic group against ethnic group, religion against politics and traditional values against change more sharply than ever before. Against the background of an increasingly impotent United Nations system, the stakes — namely the effectiveness of the international political system — would be high.

1.2 The continental context

Over the last three decades, rapid population growth has exerted disproportionate pressure on traditional spaces and land, and has resulted in growing rural emigration, exponential urban growth and significant cross-border migration.

- In 1930, Africa south of the Sahara had 130 million inhabitants. By the year 2030, this figure will have increased tenfold to 1.3 billion.
- In 1930, the urban population barely exceeded 6 million. One century later, it will be one hundred times that figure: the region will have 750 million city-dwellers.

- The rate of urbanization between 1960 and 1990 was three times higher than in Europe at the height of the Industrial Revolution. Cities such as Nouackchott, which had no more than 30,000 inhabitants in 1960, now have close to a million.

These figures testify to the fact that the continent is going through a profound transformation, which is putting into question all the traditional mechanisms used to ensure social peace and order.

Thus, in the face of the unprecedented pressures that Africa is experiencing, existing socio-economic structures are no longer sufficient. More than ever, peace and human security are central to solving the region's major problems. **The absence of effective mechanisms is preventing peaceful conflict resolution.** Therefore, structures to promote mutual respect, dialogue and consensus must be created and strengthened.

The satisfaction of basic needs — drinking water, food, basic health care, primary education and shelter — is still far from accomplished. Equitable access to productive resources such as water and land, or to economic instruments such as credit and technology, remains the exception. In fact, the struggle to obtain a fair share of these resources is often a source of conflict. With the lack of paid work (which is a right), the result is a kind of human underdevelopment.

Three other factors are also contributing to the turmoil and social conflicts: a) political opposition from **fundamentalist movements**, often born of poverty and injustice; b) the exacerbation of **ethnic rivalries**, some of which are rooted in the "age-old memory of nations," and which may well shatter the agreement that the borders established in Africa at the time of independence are inviolable; c) the spread of **AIDS**, which is assuming an increasingly predominant role in daily social life. AIDS will have a particularly pernicious impact on the moral fibre and determination of the entire population, from the most impoverished classes to the elites.

On the economic front, **a good number of states have started to liberalize their economies** and promote market principles, as the emergence and expansion of the private sector testify. A number of countries have been successful in boosting agricultural production and increasing life expectancy.

On the political front, **most countries have recently embarked on a process of democratization.** Consequently, civil societies are becoming increasingly aware of the central role they can and must play in development. More dramatic still has been the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. Discreet negotiations are under way between Senegal and Mauritania, heading off a conflict which could easily have degenerated.

From a socio-economic point of view, it must be recognized that African societies have wrought immense changes in their social and economic structures over the past three decades of independence. In many instances, they have been able to contain

violence and prevent the worst excesses. The incredible pace of urban growth is an example of adapting "in turbulence but not in chaos."

The fact that economic growth is hidden in infrastructure development is distorting statistics. A recent study by WALTPS, published under the aegis of the OECD and the ADB, shows unrecorded urban investment on the order of US\$300 billion. If these investments are factored into GDP figures, even recessions are converted into real growth.

*"The rapid growth of cities has led to the rapid creation of immovable capital in the form of public infrastructures (roads, sanitation, utilities) and especially private investment in real estate. The urban capital thus amassed in the region over the past thirty years is not properly reflected in national accounts. Based on the tools developed in the course of this study, we can estimate this capital at US\$300 billion (about two thirds of which was produced by private investment in real estate and 20% of which was used for substandard construction). These investments are well above the cumulative total of financial transfers which the region has received over the past three decades. They represent over twice the region's current GDP."*¹

2. PREREQUISITES FOR DEVELOPMENT

Bilateral assistance took certain things for granted for many years. As soon as a legitimate government became an eligible partner, its internal structures and operations became part of the assumed prerequisites. Neither the society's fundamental values, nor its beliefs, nor its political institutions could be questioned. Any reference to them was considered an intrusion into the nation's "sovereignty," which was inviolable under international law. Therefore, debate on democracy, civil society and culture was long taboo. Only recently has the purview of development assistance widened.

2.1 Prerequisites we have been addressing since 1988

In the 1980s, most of these taboos were shattered. In Africa in particular, aid agencies gradually began to reconsider the "prerequisites for development." They were therefore led to scrutinize each society's values, culture and basic institutions, including the following points:

Support for structural adjustment brought with it the introduction of the concept of "good government." There was increasingly direct and open support for the merits of the market economy and the vigour of the private sector, even in countries which were still officially advocating a planned economy at the time. Then, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the agencies began providing credit and technical assistance to "teach" nations the merits of democracy and multi-party systems. They invested in building

"civil society" and supporting human rights, the electoral process and freedom of the press.

Africa and the Middle-East Branch gradually embarked on this path in the mid-1980s. Canada's ODA strategy, published in 1988, confirmed these priorities. They have now been thoroughly integrated into existing programs and the priorities for 1995-98.

In the 1975-80 strategy, meeting basic needs had been an absolute priority. Many of the results registered in 1995-96 stem from programs and projects which originated during that period. However, a combination of factors has prompted the agencies to gradually move away from even the most essential social investments. These factors include the lack of fiscal resources to properly maintain the infrastructures financed by the agencies during the 1970s. It was thought that financing structural adjustment would be the most appropriate response to recipient countries' poor management and failure to ensure the proper maintenance of past investments.

At this point, African societies are far from satisfying basic needs at an acceptable level. This failing is having unfortunate effects on global productivity and economic growth. More worrisome still, it is having a very negative impact on social peace. After 10 years of reductions in social investments, it would therefore appear appropriate to review our priorities and energetically address the need for safe drinking water, health care and basic schooling in Africa. In some cases, decentralization may make it possible to sidestep major problems stemming from the lack of a tradition of taxation.

Promoting the participation of women in development is a special case. Clearly, this implies a profound change, which is considered an essential condition for genuine development. Development has little chance of success in Africa if it is not essentially geared to the needs and interests of women. Women are not only consumers of primary goods which are necessary for satisfying basic needs but also, particularly in Africa, the main producers of these goods.

Political instability and ethnic and religious strife are major obstacles to social and economic modernization. At the same time, an ethnic or other group which has been shut out of power in a given society is often the first to embrace new technologies. Since it feels oppressed, it reaches for new ideas to help it make headway. Thus, "cultural revolutions" are often made by social or ethnic groups. However, relations between ethnic communities in Africa make for highly explosive situations. Consequently women's groups, which usually draw their members from a number of ethnic groups, are agents of change which are less likely than any other group to exacerbate simmering ethnic conflicts.

2.2 New prerequisites emerge

Development and the establishment of social peace in Africa depend on a number of critical conditions. We will discuss the main ones, which relate to some but not all of the fundamental issues facing Africa. To be sure, their relative importance is determined by a series of factors and variables specific to each region and country.

2.2.1 Changes in socio-economic structures

To emerge from the crisis, African countries must address fundamental ideological questions: Where are we going? What type of society do we want? For the moment, there seems to be a void of innovative ideas. African nations are simultaneously seeking a system of government and an economic model.

In the past, donors often dismissed African attempts to achieve a common vision. In 1981, African heads of government agreed on the ideological foundations of a specifically African social model. The Lagos Plan was largely overlooked by the agencies. It is vital to arrive at a **new agreement among partners based on commitments which governments are prepared to make voluntarily.**

The crisis of African states is heightening the vulnerability of their systems. African states have all been weakened by the economic crisis and by a lack of confidence on the part of their own populations, as well as the donor community. Peace as much as order is a crucial prerequisite for development. **States with no money cannot engage in negotiations which will have lasting effects.** Existing socio-economic structures are inadequate and ill-suited to the demands of increasing participation in the global economy.

Major changes are necessary and they will have to be gradual. The following are worthy of mention.

Land tenure is a serious problem in Africa at present and promises to continue to be so in the future. The uncertainty surrounding land ownership and use is a major source of conflict and is blocking the development and rationalization of industrial and agricultural production. The experience of Asian countries (especially Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea and China) proves beyond a doubt that distributing lands, protected thereafter by means of adequate property law, promotes the expansion of sustainable productive capacity. The lack of principles of property law which enjoy general public acceptance is hampering arbitration of disputes involving land ownership, use and earnings. To begin with, disputes over the use of once-shared resources can be expected. Special attention must also be paid to problems caused by migration to the

urban periphery. Africa's uncertain borders may aggravate disputes over the use of natural resources.

The opposing traditions of nomadic and sedentary populations pose a serious danger, as the course of human history has abundantly illustrated. Nomads and settled populations have seldom been able to live together on a limited land base without major conflicts. For example, the settlement of the Americas produced many bloody combats, all lost by the nomadic populations.

Social investments are jeopardized when recurring costs become too heavy a burden. The fact that many African nations have no adequate tradition of taxation makes it difficult to raise public funds systematically and in sufficient quantity. This problem is largely unrecognized and little research has been done to increase knowledge of the specific features of African traditions. Yet the state's ability to raise public funds is critical to a society's development. Without a rationalized and, most importantly, accepted tax base, it is virtually impossible to meet basic public needs.

Market globalization involves all economic actors. In Africa as in the Middle East, production systems and markets for goods and services are inadequate. Governments will have to make strategic policy and economic choices.

They will have to choose between focusing on neighbouring or distant markets. At present, Africa engages in long-distance trade more than any other continent. Africans sell primary commodities to distant lands and consume their products: wheat from the USA, rice from Thailand, batteries from Pakistan.

Trade with nearby partners is largely hidden in the informal economy and does not appear to make full use of the relative advantages of nearby production. Economic actors are therefore dependent on markets they do not control and on strategic information produced by others. This heavy dependence on distant markets makes existing tensions in African societies still more explosive.

They will have to choose between diversifying and concentrating production. They will also have to decide on how to use new technologies and how they will adapt to them.

It has too often been said that these choices do not depend on Africans but on market forces and the whims of major corporations. This fatalistic view has a demotivating effect on societies and neglects the responsibility of governments. The spirit of initiative of Asian governments and elites, for example, has enabled them to drive production growth in their societies.

African unity remains a theoretical and abstract concept. Many leaders support it but few have adopted policies to further it. The lack of genuine and effective regional co-operation structures is threatening the entire region's potential for economic growth and keeping Africans in a state of dependence on distant markets. **Artificial barriers to the movement of productive, human and material resources are limiting the economic efficiency of the whole and spawning the conflicts of tomorrow.**

2.2.2 More productive relations with technology

While the pace of technological progress is simply a challenge for the Middle East, it augurs the economic marginalization of Africa. Africa is not powerless, but the time has come for African states to make choices.

Economic growth and job creation demand the appropriation and adaptation of technology. This process has two sides. Cultural factors modify technology in line with the users' specific characteristics. But users also have to change their values and attitudes. Management principles, sense of time, the organization of production and the division of labour are affected. These are considerations which the larger "technology transfer" market neglects.

The result has been the rejection of production systems imported from the West without adaptation to local conditions, leading to a spate of bankruptcies and the loss of prestigious investments to which aid agencies had subscribed generously. Today, these ill-understood failures are discouraging all investment and depriving Africa of jobs it needs for both economic and social reasons.

Africa's human resources and savings are under-utilized. Contrary to what official statistics indicate, African savings are not negligible. The World Bank estimates that they equal 90% of Africa's 1991 GDP. Recent studies on household savings in Ghana have shown savings rates of 35%. However, this is not reflected in national statistics. Savings are skilfully camouflaged, often sent abroad and hence "absent" and not productively invested to a sufficient degree.

Finding incentives to keep inventive ingenuity and savings at home is a pressing challenge for governments in general and African states in particular. Hence the importance of creating a favourable political, economic and social climate.

2.2.3 Greater responsibility and socio-political realism

The severity of current crises calls for greater socio-political realism in our discussions and analyses. Most importantly, these crises demand that political authorities shoulder their responsibilities with respect to national, regional and continental problems. The Liberian, Somali and Rwandan crises have roots in neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, many donor countries have tended to look the other way, not having anticipated the profound mutations in such conflicts. These evolved explosively for a number of reasons, including the emergence of the child soldier, total war and the proliferation of easily constructed yet devastating forms of warfare, such as land mines.

Africa is a highly diverse continent which is generally misunderstood by foreigners, a world with complicated, unwritten rules with deep historical, social and spiritual roots. "There are many Africas," said President Diouf, underscoring the specificity of each situation. The actions of foreigners are almost always transformed by local ingenuity, which appropriates them and uses them for its own purposes. Africans are, of course, particularly sensitive to their own problems and can grasp them more clearly. Because of this, they are more adept at predicting the consequences of their outcome.

In many cases, Africans cannot solve these problems themselves and need outside support. For the moment, foreign interests and the role played by foreign countries are a major stumbling-block to solving crises in Africa. The main foreign players are the USA, France, the EU, the UN, the Bretton Woods Group, and the hard-line Islamic states: Iran, Iraq, Libya. China continues to make headway as an exporter of arms, and Japan's influence is on the increase. Canada is a modest player on the continent as a whole. However, Canada is the only G-7 country which belongs to both the Commonwealth and la Francophonie, enabling it to serve as a bridge at times. The interests of the major international players intertwine with those of African states and their neighbours. This interplay of issues, interests and alliances on a particularly conflict-prone stage can only breed poverty and misery for the peoples of the continent.

In most cases, therefore, it will be necessary to arbitrate between the local particularities and those which are managed by foreign actors.

These global, forward-looking concerns have a bearing on AMEB's performance of its mission. They constitute problematics which must be better understood and mastered. AMEB wants to take a more dynamic approach to new challenges. It does not intend to stop responding to emergency situations, which can be expected to occur for many years to come; however, it must do a better job of anticipating events and adopt policies and programs which look beyond the emergency situation.

The situation in Africa is far from desperate. But the deep-rooted obstacles to development will not disappear. Sub-Saharan Africa will be beset by turmoil and instability for at least the next decade. No nation, including the partner countries, should turn a blind eye to these natural and human disasters. Any properly targeted contribution, no matter how modest, will be beneficial. It will be all the more so if donor countries act in concert. And there is a new consideration, which must not be ignored: programs will have to take the unpredictability factor into account.

There remains a realistic working hypothesis: if we concentrate our efforts and resources on the prerequisites for peace and on satisfying basic needs, and if we work together with all other partners, our contributions will have a surer impact.

3. CRISIS PREVENTION: A PREDICTABLE EVOLUTION BETWEEN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS AND THE LONG VIEW

NASA's dilemma

In 1986, as the whole world watched aghast, the *Challenger* space shuttle, carrying six astronauts and commissions worth hundreds of millions of dollars, exploded. The reaction was horror, indignation and an in-depth enquiry. It was shown that the accident was predictable; the cause, the O-ring, had been noted by NASA employees and no preventive measures had been taken. One of the investigators commented that it would have been difficult to act otherwise: the probability of an explosion could not be precisely determined, while the astronomical cost of interrupting the launch schedule was known to the penny. We can imagine what the President of the United States would have said to the Director of NASA: "What? You are risking NASA's future for a scrap of metal and a risk you're not sure of? You know the harsh criticism NASA's astronomical spending is drawing from influential members of Congress." The Director is therefore faced with an insoluble dilemma. If he chooses to delay the launch and replace the defective joints, everyone will know exactly how much the delay cost, but he will not be able to show how much money was saved because his precautionary action will have destroyed the proof that he had cause to be worried.

Over the past three decades, ODA has discreetly defused many conflicts. People who see management by results as a cure-all should perhaps consider the question in greater depth. This being said, it remains that over the past three decades official development assistance has helped defuse tensions between wealthy and less wealthy nations, and to close the gap between rich and poor.

To be sure, many measures have not produced the desired results, but they were generally aimed to prevent major conflicts, on the theory that **public education, improved living conditions and improved economic conditions will help reduce conflicts, class warfare and ethnic strife.** We may never know how many bloody conflicts have been headed off and how many crises have been prevented from

degenerating because assistance, in conjunction with the actions of local governments, provided the strategic ingredient needed to maintain or restore the balance between two communities in the nick of time.

In short, anticipating conflicts and nipping them in the bud is a process which, to the extent that it is successful, will tend to obscure its own successes. Whatever we do and whatever we try to do, there will always be cases in which our actions fail to produce the desired results, and of course ODA tends to be judged on these cases. It will always be easier to justify efforts to resolve declared, full-blown crises — by means of diplomacy, mediation or humanitarian assistance — because we can clearly see their effects.

3.1 A typology of crises

Crisis prevention forms a continuum of short-term and other actions whose effects are very gradual. In the long term, the introduction of modern property law aims to moderate future conflicts and facilitate economic growth. At the same time, many development activities directly address glaring disparities among various segments of society so that differences are not exacerbated; development projects in disadvantaged rural areas are a case in point. Lastly, there are negotiations when conflicts do break out and the settling of disputes between belligerents who have finally decided to seek non-violent means to resolve their differences.


This analysis is confirmed by our colleagues at USAID, who have drawn similar conclusions from the studies they have recently conducted on conflict reduction in the Horn of Africa. They too see a continuum and hold that the solution is to be found within a broader problematic — related in this case to food security.

In the final analysis, **humanitarian assistance to suffering populations during armed conflicts helps to resolve and prevent future conflicts.** Humanitarian assistance is far from ideologically neutral and the decisions made are bound to have a decisive impact on the prevention or development of future crises.

More specifically, **there are five identifiable phases in the development of conflicts, each calling for specific kinds of action.** While these actions are linked and complementary, they require different approaches.

It is useful to note the etymology of the word *crisis*, which comes from the Greek for decision. A crisis is an acute manifestation of a disturbance and it necessarily has a determining influence on the course of events. When tensions become more acute, they become a crisis; and when no decisive action is taken to resolve it, the crisis degenerates into conflict. The following typology is, of course, an ideal type. No individual conflict will, in fact, conform precisely to such a trajectory.

TYOLOGY AND GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE EVOLUTION OF CONFLICTS



1) In surveying the African scene, we can see instances of mounting tension and identify various crises in the making. Other cases are already much more advanced. While governments deny or minimize their existence and even the best-informed observers often cannot bring themselves to speak out, there are certain concrete signs that a crisis has indeed developed. This is phase one.

In such cases, long-term preventive measures are part of the typical array of development assistance tools. Preventive measures include all existing transfer methods and tools. Agency and NGO projects can play a decisive role in resolving a crisis. Identification of potential sources of crises should therefore be part of development analysis, and the selection criteria for projects and programs should include conflict prevention.

2) A crisis cannot remain stable: crises have an inherent and irreversible tendency to escalate. Inertia and neglect cause the situation to deteriorate. For want of a more precise gauge, **any incident involving the loss of more than 20 lives is a serious signal and should be the subject of in-depth analysis.** This is a rough indicator, the first "early warning sign," which must be noted. Previously, these conflicts were generally concealed and denied by government officials, who took shelter behind the doctrine of national sovereignty to prevent outside intervention. In such cases, the involvement of individuals or institutions known for their ability to conciliate in simmering conflict situations should henceforth be considered. The international community, as well as Africans, can contribute to opening up lines of communication.

Negotiations between communities in conflict may be followed by ad hoc development assistance, which can help ease tensions by making more resources available to the communities in question. Here again, traditional ODA tools can play a vital role in keeping the peace, to the extent that they are targeted and linked to the internal conciliation process.

3) When a conflict remains unresolved it eventually comes into the open and becomes a declared conflict; it can sometimes be confined but more often spreads to neighbouring countries and even to entire regions. It is at this stage that the conflict attracts international attention. By this point it has gone on so long and reached such proportions that the government involved can no longer deny its existence. **The instruments of diplomacy constitute an array of tools suited to such situations.** They provide means for coming to terms with national sovereignty and with revolutionary movements tied directly or indirectly to other sovereign states. In many cases, the use of what are called preventive diplomatic measures based on an effective early warning system would make it possible to avoid the worst-case scenario. If need be, they can be paired with military intervention under the auspices of an international force.

At this point, it is uncertain what role development assistance can continue to play. In many cases, it can perform only a marginal role, since the long-term issues are unclear and the parties to the conflict generally attack the sectors targeted by assistance: the population and infrastructures. ODA is thus bereft of means: one does not build a

school on a battlefield. The emphasis thus shifts to humanitarian aid for victims of the conflict.

4) Following the same logic, in the next phase the conflict erupts. With the emergence of serious internal conflicts, emergency humanitarian aid is playing an increasingly important role in Africa; wars have had a disastrous effect on populations which were disadvantaged and impoverished to begin with. According to our analysis, internal and border tensions will continue for at least a decade. Decisions which were previously made on an ad hoc basis can now be made in a more considered manner in order to enhance the impact of humanitarian aid while minimizing any negative effects.

To the extent that early warning systems work properly and serve to pinpoint conflicts that are liable to spread, agencies responsible for emergency humanitarian aid can take advance measures and plan necessary logistics. Co-operation among agencies to better co-ordinate humanitarian aid is already on the agenda in world capitals.

5) The settlement of a major conflict involving one or more states will always be the preserve of diplomacy. Negotiation may serve to set in motion processes leading to "national reconciliation," and open the way to a restoration and reconstruction plan for an area, a country or a number of countries affected by the conflict.

Having come full circle, we can return to the usual development assistance methods. It should be recalled that the foundations of this doctrine were laid well before the Colombo Plan; they originate with the Marshall Plan, which consisted in nothing less than funding a program to rebuild a devastated Europe following the Second World War.

3.1.1 Manufactured conflicts or social conflicts?

This key question, which is at the heart of the debate, elicits three different responses.

Some argue that there has been a profound change in the nature of conflicts. Africa is now gripped by enormous problems: increasing poverty, population movements, exponential demographic growth, and constantly changing technology which the continent has been unable to master. The result is a new kind of conflict which eludes control by the elites. These social conflicts can be resolved only through appropriate measures.

Others maintain that current conflicts are, quite simply, intentionally provoked by a few opposing factions or even individuals who play on fears and ambitions to incite conflict in order to obtain the upper hand in power struggles.

Finally, there are those who argue that the rapid pace of change in African societies is subjecting them to intolerable strain. In this sense, the conflicts are social in

origin. However, it is also argued that certain forces are dishonestly exploiting the new dimension to Africa's problems. Meanwhile, the traditional elites seem confused by changes they are unable to control. In other words, we are dealing with a new kind of intentionally provoked conflict, which does not respond to traditional forms of resolution.

Further discussion and in-depth study of this subject are essential to finding appropriate solutions.

3.1.2 Are the usual definitions not applicable to some conflicts?

A related question concerns the impression that some conflicts appear more intractable than others. But are they? Superficially, there appear to be deep social "fissures" and hatreds, which divide peoples over the generations. Fr. G.H. Lévesque calls these the "great scourges of human history."

These conflicts can lie dormant for years and then, surprisingly, suddenly resurface with unabated virulence. Living in harmony under a single political regime and even fighting a common enemy is not enough to cement over these fissures. The advent of democracy can even contribute to re-igniting old and repressed hostilities.

The wide array of methods and remedies used in assistance programs, complemented by preventive diplomatic measures, is often sufficient to resolve differences before they degenerate into armed conflict. However, such means are inadequate for dealing with these "social pathologies."

Recent history offers tragic evidence of this fact, e.g., in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. We can also point to great historical phenomena such as the lasting hatred which pitted Greeks and Turks against each other for centuries. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Greek and Turkish populations were repatriated to avoid further massacres and to deal with the refugee problem. This was done systematically, except in Cyprus. It is interesting to note that the two communities inhabiting this island have much difficulty living together, and that Turkey again divided the population into two separate zones in 1974. While this measure has contributed to easing tensions, it has not settled the problem.

Former Nigerian President General Obasanjo and General A.T. Touré, the former President of Mali, were called upon to serve as mediators in the Burundi conflict. At that time, General Touré observed that many of the means for conflict resolution used in West Africa are also found in that region: the involvement of venerable wise men and griots, the application of the rules of palaver, etc. But unlike most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where conflicts are more often multipolar, the Burundi conflict appeared to be bipolar. This specific feature warrants further analysis.

We must consider another hypothesis. For many decades (more precisely since the 1920s), demographic pressures in Rwanda and Burundi have resulted in sustained emigration to neighbouring countries, especially Uganda. These successive waves of emigrants were tolerated, but only rarely were they granted citizenship. Thus, Tutsi refugees from Rwanda had to prove that they had been living in Uganda well before 1926. The "Banyarwanda problem" is therefore territorial in nature and it is unlikely that any lasting solution can be found within the framework of existing borders. The land is clearly too confined for the populations of Rwanda and Burundi to live on together without conflict.

The depth of these antagonisms and our limited understanding of them compel us to caution. Although we are unsure of the effectiveness of the actions we can take or of the time it will take to find a lasting solution, we can at least apply humanitarian and peacekeeping measures without delay so as to limit the loss of life and keep vengeance from prevailing over reconciliation.

3.2 Geographic trends in African conflicts


During the first decades of independence, African conflicts were generally between states: Morocco–Algeria, Burkina Faso–Mali, etc. But recently, there seems to be a change in the nature of conflicts. Today, almost all the conflicts can be considered "domestic": this is the case in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia, and also with the so-called Tuareg conflicts, such as the ones in Niger and Mali. Although these conflicts are domestic in theory, they do extend over a region and can become international. Analysis of the Tuareg case in Mali shows that there are **four rings of countries involved in these conflicts**; these rings "overlap and cannot be disentangled, for they intermesh too closely and strongly."²

The inner ring consists of the countries directly affected by ethnic strife. Modern borders have tended to fragment traditional ethnic territories, easing the free movement of revolutionary movements and the formation of alliances and factions. Mali, Niger, Algeria and Mauritania are in this ring.

In the second ring are the countries which are indirectly affected by the conflict. They may be saddled with the consequences of the deteriorating situation — e.g., the flight of refugees to Burkina Faso — or they may shelter rebel groups, as do not only Senegal and the Ivory Coast but also Ghana, Togo and Benin.

The third ring consists of more distant states, which disseminate ideas and media support, and provide technical and military resources; Libya, Morocco and a number of Islamic Arabic countries, including Iraq, belong to this group.

THE SPATIAL EVOLUTION OF AFRICAN CONFLICTS



From the White Book, "Le problème du nord,"
Government of Mali, December 1994, p. 17

The fourth ring consists of still more distant countries, which however have political and sometimes hegemonic interests in the development of the situation; these include, among others, France and other European countries, where the rebel forces find media conduits.

This group of remote players also includes major international institutions (the UN, the OAU, etc.), which influence the outcome of negotiations by their intervention or non-intervention. (These bodies might in fact be considered a fifth ring.)

All these players perform a role in transforming a crisis into a conflict and also in resolving it. Most often, this role is shadowy and is denied or kept secret. **National sovereignty is used as a convenient argument to rebuff questions from states seeking a de-escalation of the conflict, thus blocking the operation of solidarity among peoples.** International institutions are also captive to this argument and can intervene only with the agreement of the parties to the conflict. They are especially hamstrung during the first phases of a conflict. For the moment, these obstacles are insurmountable and are seriously undermining the effectiveness of preventive actions. Most significantly, they are preventing African governments from playing a more active role in early warning systems.

4. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

4.1 First, new relationships must be established

Only the recipients of our aid can make the structural changes which are now needed. These changes are, after all, critical conditions for their development. Structural change demands greater awareness, mobilization, new ways of thinking and empowerment, which can come only from Africans.

For our part, we can change the way we do things and adapt our products to the existing situation in Africa.

4.1.1 Forge different relations with the recipients of our aid³

Africa's development is in the hands of the continent's peoples and their governments. We must encourage and respect this leadership. We must stop carrying out development in place of the local population. Each society must make its own choices, define its own strategies and select the means and methods which it considers best suited to its needs.

The empowerment of African states and peoples represents a break with old habits which are deeply rooted here and on the African continent. But our task must be

to support Africa's communities in the great undertaking of development, without rushing or forcing them.

The West has tried many times to transplant institutions to Africa. Many models were proposed, sometimes without ulterior motives and sometimes as an unequivocal conditionality. African societies, governments and institutions all tried what was suggested. But as the respected Africanist, J. Giri, has observed, these transplants from without did not take because they clashed with African realities and values (see note 3). African social systems, values and beliefs are deeply rooted; they were fashioned over centuries of isolation with no technological revolution. Contrary to what some observers still claim, the colonial period had only a superficial impact on most African societies.

It is always surprising to see how little effort is made to adapt Western and even Asian models to African circumstances. Some observers have noted that certain countries quickly introduced one or another Western electoral model or multi-party system. Donor countries are urging them to adopt practices which are similar to our own. This haste may lead to other transplants which will also be rejected. It would be better to export certain fundamental values (the constitutional state, the rule of law, respect for basic rights, freedom of expression, etc.) How these are instituted should be left to African nations to decide. In the West, these took shape gradually as the fundamental values we have mentioned blended into each nation's specific historical and cultural development.

Acting on the pretext of seeking to conciliate or de-escalate conflicts, this hasty and superficial approach can only do further damage to an already fragile social fabric. The upshot is unfortunate arrangements which may well spawn more serious crises with more uncertain outcomes.

In short, knowledge combined with humility are essential elements for any initiative of this type.

4.2 Embrace a "multi-international" approach

Alone we can do little, given the scope and complexity of the issues. Donors and beneficiaries must work together.

Through political channels, multilateral actions, and international fora (the Global Coalition for Africa, the Club du Sahel, PSA/SPA, the 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen), it is possible to exert moderate but sustained influence over the development of national and regional policies designed to promote the gradual achievement of these great transformations.

The approach taken by the Global Coalition for Africa and the Club du Sahel clears the way. But the gradual and very long-term effect of these policy fora is not

enough. It seems a new process will have to be invented to deal with crises and full-blown conflicts.

Initiatives will have to be undertaken in a new spirit, which we have chosen to call the "multi-international dynamic."

After five decades of application, the concept of multilateralism has taken on a very specific meaning. It is bound by a myriad of written conventions and unwritten rules, which define in advance what can be done and what simply cannot be done. Therefore, it is no longer possible to use the word "multilateral" in a vague way to refer to new ideas.

In recent years, "aid co-ordination" has been touted as a panacea for the contradictions and ineffectiveness which have marred some operations. Unfortunately, this co-ordination is at times planned and executed outside the recipient country and, most importantly, without the participation of local non-governmental bodies and civil society (whose freely given support for any agreement concluded is, as we know, absolutely vital in conflict situations).

The commonly used terms have therefore become too precise and, most importantly, too narrow to describe the disparate group of parties which must engage in an open dialogue to achieve the delicate task of negotiating an end to conflicts present and future. The list will vary according to the specific situation; at one point or another, all of the parties identified using the four-ring analysis of the geographic scope of the conflict will be involved. Each player has the ability to wreck the efforts of all the others. With a few exceptions, it is illusory to think that a crisis can be resolved without their active participation.

To express a new way of thinking, it seemed appropriate to coin a new term. We must also invent a new spirit of dialogue. The things unspoken, the clichés, the refusal to acknowledge problems are at the root of the conflicts and there is no hope of applying appropriate remedies if they persist.

Many things will have to be done before we can look forward to a lasting peace in Africa. Some can be done by the community of donors, others by multilateral institutions; most importantly, African authorities will have to lay the foundations. A new social fabric must be woven and associations, NGOs and civil institutions must emerge. To secure their development and survival, these organizations will probably seek alliances with sister institutions in the North.

But in the meantime, a responsible agency must work to prevent the worst excesses, such as the ones seen in Rwanda. We want to ensure that a tragedy of this magnitude and horror does not happen again, as it would certainly perpetuate further vendettas and tribal hostilities.

4.3 Set emergency assistance into today's context

4.3.1 Its share of ODA increases year after year

Emergency humanitarian assistance is not neutral. Even under the best circumstances, it favours certain groups over others, it institutionalizes and perpetuates the appropriation of resources by displaced populations or refugees, it makes choices and, in so doing, legitimizes certain parties. In short, through many subtle biases, it fuels or dampens the crises of the future.

Last year 9% of CIDA's budget was spent on emergency aid. The OECD has recently reported that donor aid going to emergencies has nearly tripled since 1990 to over 8% of total bilateral ODA. The organization worries that stagnant aid budgets will provide inadequate resources to address effectively the issues of sustainable development while complex emergencies proliferate, further diminishing resources available for longer-term development efforts.

The nature of humanitarian crises has changed since the end of the Cold War. Interstate war has given way to intra-state conflict, which often has deep ethnic or religious roots. The new conflicts are lasting longer, affecting more people with greater severity and are more difficult to resolve. It is estimated that some 40 million people worldwide — three quarters of them in sub-Saharan Africa — will depend on humanitarian assistance for their survival in 1995.

Despite rising needs, well advertised by the media, CIDA is now spending about 2% more of its total aid budget on humanitarian assistance than a decade ago. In 1994-95, the humanitarian budget reached \$105 million from a base of \$83 million. Its base for the next year has been set at \$74, million or 4% of CIDA's budget. Since the mid-1980s, the balance of CIDA's food aid program has been substantively altered by the growth in emergency food aid, largely at the expense of development food aid. The emergency share has risen from about 25% of the total food aid budget in the mid-1980s to 49% in 1994-95. It appears this level will continue.

Some argue that limits should be set on our humanitarianism, that budget cuts call for some sort of social triage of conflict victims for development to continue unimpeded. Before endorsing this conclusion, one needs to explore the issue. Perhaps the competition for resources between development and humanitarian assistance is not at the root of the problem. It could be that the real problem is that traditional programming functions in aid agencies have not entirely kept pace with a changing world.

4.3.2 It's not quite development, but ...

Polls in recent years show that Canadian public opinion favours emergency assistance and peacekeeping over development assistance. Last autumn, a poll on

Rwanda found that 74% of Canadians supported humanitarian assistance, 70% supported military participation in the UN peacekeeping force, and 69% supported technical and financial aid to help rebuild Rwanda. The general level of support for the Canadian aid program at that time measured 59%.

CIDA's humanitarian aid is not being used primarily as an instrument of foreign policy but rather as a means of expressing Canadian values. CIDA's approach has been victim-centred, not supply-driven. Canadian content has been provided by the domestic sourcing of emergency food aid and by the 12–16% of humanitarian project funding channelled through Canadian NGOs in recent years (\$12.7 million in 1994–95). The Agency has not invested resources in supporting domestic procurement or stockpiling of relief supplies because it has never judged it to be cost-effective. Some Canadian NGOs are involved in emergency food aid delivery as executing agents for CIDA and multilateral agencies.

The untied nature and multilateral focus of the Agency's humanitarian assistance has permitted flexible and very rapid response in comparison with some other donors, and indeed with some of CIDA's other programming mechanisms and channels. However, our altruism has been less successful in portraying a "Canadian face" or in linking to the potential domestic supply base. Canadian companies are now seeking economic opportunities in what seems to be the boundless market offered by the needs of millions of refugees. Other government departments are seeking roles for themselves, and CIDA funding, in this sphere of activities.

Emergency assistance is an enormous expenditure. Effectiveness is clearly of paramount concern. Results depend directly on delivering the right relief at the right time. Ultimately, the value of this huge investment (in what is sometimes called the preservation of social capital) depends on how successfully post-conflict societies move along the **continuum** from emergency to development. External support is often needed for social and physical **rehabilitation and reconstruction**. Is CIDA paying adequate attention to and providing a satisfactory response to these basic requirements?

4.3.3 The evolution of crises and their outcome

The term **continuum** entered the humanitarian lexicon a few years ago. Its purpose was to raise awareness of the post-emergency needs of a war-torn society, but the linear nature of the concept has limited its usefulness. First, post-conflict societies have tended not to emerge with steady predictability from their crises but rather to teeter back and forth on the brink of chaos. More problematic is the continuum's portrayal of the emergency as the starting point of the process. This deflects attention from the **root causes** of the conflict — be they historical, socio-political, developmental, demographic or other — and the need to address these as part of the solution.

It is difficult to dissect how decades of development aid failed to avert today's catastrophes. Improved understanding of the dynamics of peace, conflict and

development is needed to avoid repeating past errors when development co-operation resumes in a conflict's aftermath. **The choice before us seems to be between approaches which essentially follow one of two scenarios:**

a) decay the cost of emergencies, try to set limits on relief expenditures and focus on resuming traditional approaches to long-term development as soon as possible; or

b) strive for a better understanding of the root causes of conflict; try new ways of making aid relevant to support the transition from emergency to development in countries where Canada has substantial ongoing interests.

There is ample evidence of the failure of the first approach. One example of the need to change is the rigidity of World Bank regulations, which allow the Bank to provide emergency grants to UNICEF or UNHCR for Rwanda, but prevent it from allocating the same sum toward clearing Rwanda's arrears. Stakeholders in the Bank, like Canada, should see to it that action is taken so that such anomalies are corrected. A more optimistic note is sounded by the **growing attention paid to the horrendous problem of land mines as an impediment to reconstruction** and, therefore, development. Few aid agencies have figured out which part of their aid apparatus should take on this task. CIDA needs to do so.

Research in progress may help donors understand what programming approaches are most beneficial to the transition from emergency to development assistance. However, it will not answer the key question concerning the locus of responsibility and funding for post-conflict **rehabilitation and reconstruction (R&R)**. The sums needed are enormous and clearly exceed both the mandate and resources allocated to emergency programming.

4.3.4 A new role for aid agencies?

Somalia was a sobering lesson, but successes can also be celebrated: Mozambique, Cambodia, Namibia. Even so, complex emergencies are justly named, and the lessons of one situation cannot be applied like a cookie-cutter to the next crisis.

What humanitarian agencies are starting to perceive is that conflict prevention and R&R programming lead into alien fields and time frames, where the immediate rather than the long-term is all-important. The work is messy, ill-defined and sometimes unpalatable: demobilization of combatants, international war crimes tribunals, human rights monitors, police training, de-mining, social services for child soldiers and traumatized war orphans. This kind of programming escapes standard donor policy grids and does not conform to familiar supply bases. It is hard to reconcile with "results-based management" — how to prove that a conflict has been averted, an upheaval avoided, a rise in lawlessness prevented, or peace built?

Partly in reaction to the high cost of humanitarian aid (not to mention peacekeeping), some policy makers are investigating possible **conflict prevention** mechanisms. Potential action ranges from high-level **preventive diplomacy** to grass-roots efforts to build community reconciliation skills. **What seems to be lacking is the knowledge base that would show us what kinds of interventions work under what conditions.** In DFAIT, Global Issues have the responsibility for this question. In CIDA, there is a wide range of programming interventions but no central repository of knowledge.

Important issues have been raised about the role of aid in complex emergencies:

a) When does humanitarian assistance become part of the problem rather than the solution?

b) How can donors discourage dependence on "international welfare"?

c) How can we prevent emergency aid from prolonging conflicts and thus the suffering of the victims?

5. WHAT CAN WE DO?

5.1 A number of initiatives are already under way

The Agency has not stood by as crises have developed in Africa. Many things have been done. Considerable effort has already been poured into promoting democracy, human rights and justice.⁴

These activities constitute an impressive array in terms of volume and diversity. Yet it is hard to fit such projects into our current sustainable development strategy.

In South Africa alone, the program generated over 84 projects between 1990 and 1994, ranging in size from \$10,000 to \$1.7 million. These projects are remarkably varied and include a wide range of activities — from anti-racist and anti-sexist education to support for community radio and election monitoring. Over 16 AIDIS projects are currently under way in sub-Saharan Africa. These projects are equally varied and cover security, demilitarization, human rights, the legal system, etc.; they range between \$50,000 and \$6 million. The preliminary lessons which Prof. Bush draws from these initiatives (pp. 33–34; see note 4) confirm and reinforce our own hypotheses.

Africa and the Middle-East Branch has studied military expenditures in Africa in relation to country military threat assessments in order to develop a balanced perspective on the relative size of military and development expenditures. One unexpected finding

was that armies sometimes contribute to national development objectives by, for example, building roads and bridges.

Throughout CIDA, creativity is at work. The International Humanitarian Assistance Program (IHA) is supporting activities in new areas such as the diffusion of international humanitarian law, land mine clearance and rehabilitation of war-traumatized children. In time, IHA intends to focus more attention on prevention and preparedness. The Food Aid Centre and the Horn of Africa Program are jointly promoting famine mitigation. The Haiti Program is working with NGOs and with the RCMP to support the post-emergency transition.

NGO Division is animating a Peacebuilding Contact Group, which regularly brings together key actors on the Canadian peacebuilding scene, including DFAIT, DND, IDRC, other NGOs, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the Parliamentary Centre.

AMEB is seeking new ways to support human rights and help rebuild the justice system in Rwanda. In the Middle East, the peace process is a prerequisite for development, and that is inextricably bound up with the Palestinian refugee problem, which is being addressed collaboratively by CIDA, DFAIT, IDRC and other NGOs, as well as by the academic community.

CIDA multilateral and bilateral programs are concerned with the emerging military/humanitarian nexus. IHA and DND have collaborated on the airlift of NGO relief supplies to Central Africa and a UN-sponsored initiative related to de-mining in Cambodia. In Sri Lanka, the bilateral program is covering the cost of a Canadian peace observer who chairs one of the four regional peace commissions. Americas Branch is involved in the promotion of international humanitarian principles with the military forces of 12 Latin American countries.

5.2 Emergency assistance to Rwanda is being evaluated by donors

It must be stressed that Africa's past is very complex and virtually impossible to fully comprehend and decipher. The continent requires methods of conflict resolution based on knowledge and should never depend on improvisation.

Following Denmark's suggestion to the DAC, a group of donors is now assessing the emergency assistance provided to Rwanda during the recent crisis. This aid totalled over US\$840 million during the first nine months of 1994. The conclusions of this assessment could enhance the appropriateness and effectiveness of the agencies' actions when other operations of this type are necessary. CIDA is taking part in this international project in order to learn as much from it as possible. The conclusions of the study will be available in late 1995.

5.3 Proposal for an early warning system

5.3.1 The challenges of early warning

Early warning systems pose a number of challenges. The first and apparently most difficult is the precise and accurate identification of incipient conflicts, which allows the necessary resources to be deployed early enough to prevent escalation. **However, we know from experience that by itself knowledge is far from sufficient to prompt preventive action.** There have been unmistakable signs prior to virtually all major catastrophes in history — signs which could be read and were read — but the "authorities" were either unwilling or felt unable to take concrete preventive measures.

However valid it may be, the speculative knowledge produced by experts (we shall refer to it as "coded technical knowledge") must first be decoded and then transformed into common wisdom. It is really only at this stage that decision makers can take political action. Decisions that call for large expenditures on the part of democratic societies can be made only on this basis. There are many examples of this process; this is essentially the role played by major summits (Rio, Jomtien, Beijing, Copenhagen). Unfortunately, this approach is too protracted to be effective in dealing with crises in Africa, which can develop very quickly; two or three critical stages can unfold in a matter of a few months or even weeks.

Another difficulty is that policy makers are usually preoccupied by crises in progress. **In December 1993, although the question of Rwanda was already on the agenda and there were clear signs of a major disaster on the horizon, the Security Council spent all its time discussing one of many phases of the Bosnian conflict.** In retrospect, it can be argued that preventive deployment of duly mandated UN peacekeeping troops in Rwanda might have prevented genocide. Furthermore, societies are blinded by the last conflict: Somalia casts a shadow over Rwanda; and in turn, Rwanda obscures our perception of, let us say, the Tuareg question.

The media have the ability to translate an obscure event (technically coded knowledge) into common wisdom almost instantly. It is enough for CNN to cover an event for policy makers to deem action warranted. But the media play by their own rules. Many events compete for their attention, and they typically focus on whatever is likely to arouse the most public interest.

In short, for the media too, an actual conflict is worth more than a potential conflict. Thus, the media cannot really be relied upon to bridge the gap between technical knowledge and common knowledge. **For all these reasons, early warning and conflict prevention must be based on three platforms, forming links in a chain.** Fact-finding units are the first link in the chain; they gather, process and analyse information, drawing pertinent conclusions. The second link entails decoding the information and analyses, translating them into social and political consequences, in light of the general political environment, and drawing conclusions. This is the role of the

early warning group. Finally, the information is developed and once again translated into ordinary language. **Common wisdom must be produced to provide policy makers with a basis for action that will be viewed as legitimate by citizens.** This is the role of the Club. (See figures: The Process; The Club.)

The latter group should be made up of government officials and representatives of interest groups. It should also include a good number of influential individuals who can set the tone and whose positions on major issues can exert influence. This select group must have direct access to the early warning network. It must be given enough time to hear out all the arguments of the experts and choose those which can serve as a basis for action for decision makers. It must also be given the time to update its contacts with power brokers on a case-by-case basis.

Two basic criteria should be added. First, it is important to empower African organizations. It will not do to set up a brilliant early warning working group at Harvard or some other prestigious institution in the North. It is imperative that Africans themselves be equipped with the tools they need for their own development. To begin with, they have a better understanding of the situation in their own countries. Moreover, no initiatives from the North can succeed where African good will is lacking. We must therefore create parallel institutions: institutions in Africa staffed by Africans and institutions in the North, which will be kept modest and will serve as antennae and provide technical assistance to the institutions in the South.

Too often, in an effort to save a little money, a single institution has been created to represent the interests of both North and South. For a host of reasons, this marriage of styles always proves unworkable; it is best to separate them. There are many well-educated Africans seeking employment. It would be more advantageous to put them to work at home on solving their own problems. For their part, the antennae in the North can access many well-organized and highly effective networks; they certainly do not need overly developed structures.

Secondly, multilateral agreements have reached the limits of their own logic. We need to develop a new logic more consistent with contemporary attitudes. A Foundation could be set up to develop this system of organizations. It would be responsible for building the various required components, in response to demand, and maintaining a constant balance between supply and demand. As in a corporation, the Foundation's various components would have to justify their existence by providing appropriate quality services to the community. Apart from seed money, the Foundation and its components could not seek funding except by selling their services to various interest groups. The service centres would function as profit centres, while the Foundation would simply be responsible for auditing their operations. A central bureaucracy must not be allowed to take root and become a growing centre of power at the expense of the needs of the periphery, as has unfortunately occurred in some large multilateral institutions.

A network is an appealing concept. But it is by no means clear that everyone understands it in the same way. The relations between the official and informal spheres can vary greatly from one organization to another, depending on the particular institutional culture. Creating networks between organizations from the North and South can produce countless problems and misunderstandings. The Club du Sahel, however, could serve as a model for the creation of a new kind of institution.

The Club du Sahel's success is attributable to a combination of specific factors:

- First, as it is organized on an informal basis, it has been able to break out of the strait-jacket of things unspoken at the highest levels of Sahel and donor country organizations.
- Secondly, it has been determined to avoid any form of bureaucratization and to avoid politicizing or publicizing its initiatives. This has enabled it to modify its work plan on an ongoing basis. Both the Club and, to a great extent, the CILSS have thus been able to monitor and address the real problems of development in the region, without falling prey to the inertia and internal power struggles to which bureaucracies are prone. Moreover, since 1986, their work has been supported by prospective studies and a network of individuals and institutions, so as to stimulate reflection and provide guidance for action.
- Thirdly, the existence of a group of Africans determined to engage in dialogue with the donors has also been an essential ingredient for success. In this undertaking they have relied on one of their own institutions, the CILSS, which has provided advice and support.

The figures on pages 97-98 provide a broad outline of the project.

5.3.2 The current evolution of IGADD offers an opportunity for innovation

Is it better to start by creating a continental crisis management module or to start at the grass roots? Opinions are divided. It is clear, however, that it is desirable to undertake simultaneous and complementary actions at the base and at the top. Hopes for a lasting solution must rest on a subtle interplay of coherent actions working from the top down and the bottom up. In some cases, it would be appropriate to get more involved in a regional entity and make it an instrument of conflict reduction.

IGADD (for Inter-governmental Authority on Drought and Development, including Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda) has adopted a new mandate, and is considering ways and means to associate more closely a donor group to its work. Food security is the basis for peacebuilding in the region. Following the model of the Food Crisis Prevention Network for the Sahel, this network of voluntary bodies could meet informally. Its objectives would be to improve understanding of the origin and nature of crises, improve crisis forecasting and take immediate action on

problems. This network could produce development initiatives designed to lessen social problems. It could also serve as a vehicle for frank and open dialogue between donors and their partners.

5.4 Some thoughts on a technique for demilitarization

Renewal of ODA objectives demands that we reflect on subjects which have been unexplored until recently. In particular, it is important to consider the army's mission in a nascent democracy with a developing economy. This important process will serve as the basis for finding concrete actions which can serve to further demobilization or orderly demilitarization in many problem cases.

Revolutionary movements and dictatorships alike have helped swell the ranks of armed forces and individuals, which perform no productive role in society. How can this state of affairs be remedied? How can essentially unproductive citizens be transformed into effective producers? These are questions which must be addressed in the interests of future peace on the African continent. The most recent experiences, although limited in number, have demonstrated the complexity of demobilization. These demanded greater time and resources than were at first expected.

In 1981, Mali asked donors to pool their resources and co-ordinate their efforts in order to transform grain production and markets, which it is generally agreed were completely distorted by the implementation of "planned economy" policies over two decades. The initiative came to be known as the PRMC (Programme de restructuration des marchés céréalières).

After mounting and sustained financial assistance, and a change in policy and support for farmers and consumers, the dysfunctional features of grain production in Mali were eliminated. Today, Mali exports agricultural surpluses and can pride itself on having a price structure based on the laws of a market economy. This is a striking example of an African success story.

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



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
(4) * Common wisdom is then available to decision makers. /
Le savoir-commun devient alors disponible aux décideurs.



(3) * The transformation of technical knowledge into common wisdom, the output of the Club / La conversion du savoir technique en savoir-commun, le produit du Club

(2) * Technical knowledge deciphered, the output of the early warning group / Le savoir technique décodé, le produit du groupe d'alerte précoce

(1) * Technical knowledge (encoded), the output of data collecting units / Le savoir technique (codé), le produit des unités de collecte de données.



It is also, and most importantly, an example of how a proven method can be used to solve a complex problem. Applying this method to a problem such as the demobilization of soldiers could yield a new crisis resolution and prevention instrument.

5.4.1 Mali's Grain Market Restructuring Program (PRMC): an experiment in co-ordination among donors

In 1980, after a period of price-setting policies, Mali found itself in a disastrous economic position. In an essentially agricultural country, production of cash crops (cotton and livestock) and staples (millet, sorghum, rice) was plummeting.

In 1981, the Malian government appealed to the main donors (Canada, USA, FRG, France, EU, WFP, the World Bank, FAO, the Netherlands and Belgium) and they proposed a grain market restructuring program. This program was based on a clear vision of the future of agricultural production, and included 250,000 tons of food aid over five years and a co-managed common fund to finance restructuring measures. Four bodies steered the project to restructure the entire grain production and distribution system:

- The technical committee: composed of the donors' technicians. Its function was to monitor everything related to the grain production and distribution system and brief the management committee.
- The management committee: composed of donors' aid mission heads. It maintained official contacts with the government, decided on the use of counterpart funds, and guided the work of the technical committee.
- The PRMC secretariat: headed by the WFP representative, who spoke on behalf of the donors and managed the common fund.
- The co-ordinating and steering committee (Comité d'orientation et de coordination / COC): a Malian body chaired by the Minister of Finance. All departments, agencies and institutions with an interest in the food system, as well as the private sector (merchants and producers) were represented on the COC.

Results

- The PRMC has helped dismantle SOMIEX (the Mali import, export and distribution company) and OPAM (Mali's agricultural products bureau) has been restructured.
- The grain production and distribution system has been fully liberalized, without a food crisis.

- The banks have become more willing to extend credit for marketing purposes.
- Prices have been stabilized: since 1989-90, the fluctuation in prices between the harvest low (December) and the pre-harvest high (August) was reduced from 15-20/100-120 CFA francs/kg to 35-40/80-95 CFA francs/kg.
- Rice production rose from 150,000 tons in 1987 to 450,000 tons in 1994.
- There has been significant synergy with other production-oriented projects.
- Village stockpiles have been replenished and producers are more interested in the market.
- A national security stockpile (SNS) has been established.
- The negative effects of food aid have been reduced.

Under what conditions could the PRMC be reproduced?

The model's characteristics include the following:

- The project's scope is limited from the outset and the boundaries must be clearly drawn with the consent of all.
- No funding agency is powerful enough to permanently impose its view on the others; each partner can exercise leadership if its competence to do so is recognized. The donors occasionally agreed to serve as scapegoats to lessen the domestic political price.
- Each partner brings its own philosophy and models: differences must be overcome, to the benefit of the Malian producers who are affected by the decisions.
- The funding agencies are there by choice. Their commitments are made under an agreement based on honour, with no formal memorandum of agreement; the document is called "Plate-forme."
- The donors' offices are in Bamako; the donors' representatives live in the country permanently and most of them have acquired a good knowledge of the situation.
- These representatives' responsibilities in Mali put them at the centre of information networks and give them access to well-connected people, involved primarily in bilateral projects.

- This said, it must be recognized that the donors also have different interests, leaving room for the Malian government to influence the interplay of forces.
- The tolerance and openness to differences which are a part of Malian culture played an important role in the trust which the donors and their representatives enjoyed.
- While basing themselves on a clear long-range vision, the decision-making bodies managed the situation without neglecting immediate circumstances. For example, in 1989 they agreed to let the government use two billion CFA francs from the common fund to meet structural adjustment program conditions for unblocking credits from that program.
- Last but not least, the project has now been in operation for 14 years, after 4–5 years of pre-start-up trials and fine-tuning.⁵

ANNEX: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED

Consultations with officials of Policy Branch, Multilateral Branch, AMEB, and DFAIT yielded many improvements to this document. We have also included the ideas on the subject of CIDA's International Humanitarian Assistance Program.

Ms. J. Pelletier's research on a conceptual framework for the proposed Foundation for Peace in Africa provided us with important concepts and information.

- E. Pisani, Director of the Institut du monde arabe in Paris, France's former Head of Co-operation, and Head of Aid at the EU
- Amadou Toumani Touré, former Commander-in-Chief of the Mali armed forces and former President of the transitional government
- O. Makalou, former IMF official. Retired to Mali, he chairs CEDRES, an NGO dedicated to promoting democracy and human rights.
- M. Touré, former Secretary-General of the Presidency, former Minister of Finance and Transport, Mali
- M. Sow, jurist and notary, architect of the new Malian constitution and former Prime Minister
- D. Beaudoin of the Canadian Embassy in Mali
- Mahamane Brah, former Minister of Rural Development and Planning in Niger, former Executive Secretary of the CILSS, Head of the African Development Bank's CINERGIE unit
- A. de Lattre, founder and former Director of the Club du Sahel at the OECD
- L. Traoré, former Secretary-General of the Presidency, Mali
- Keita R. N'diaye, Executive Assistant to President Konaré of Mali
- Sherif Seye, journalist, Head of the Groupe Sud in Senegal
- S. Ka, Minister of the Interior, Senegal
- Sherif Diaby, former Executive Assistant to the Minister of Defence of Mali
- Howard Adelman of York University, expert on questions related to refugees and currently working on an assessment of humanitarian assistance to Rwanda for the DAC
- Yvon Lemoal, UNDP, New York, formerly of the Rwanda Program in Kigali

NOTES

1. WALTPS study by the African Development Bank's CINERGIE unit and the OECD's Sahel Club, 1994.
2. See Mali's White Paper, "Le Problème du Nord," December 1994, p. 17.
3. "Westerners ... think they are dealing with states that operate by Western rules. Of course, they can see that these states are not working well, that corruption is rampant, that illogical decisions are being made, that there is strong resistance to making good decisions, and that this whole state apparatus either paralyzes civil society or is without influence over entire segments of society, for society has no way out but to go underground. But they also think that these dysfunctional features can be remedied and all will go well. They fail to realize that what they see is a facade of laws, regulations, Western-style organization, and behind the facade are social relationships, a different logic, an entire reality of which they know nothing and which governs the workings of society. If Westerners understood the reality behind the facade, would they have spent so much money on remodelling the facade, building new institutions, strengthening or reorganizing the ones which already exist?" Giri, J., *Le secteur privé : moteur du futur développement du Sahel*. Paris: Club du Sahel, 1989.
4. See "Development Work as Peace Work: CIDA Programming and Project Initiatives," by Kenneth D. Bush, April 12, 1995.
5. This summary was prepared by D. Henri, a former official with the Canadian Aid Office in Bamako.

ANNEX III:

Written Contributions

The Commonwealth Secretariat

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE COMMONWEALTH EXPERIENCE

Introduction

This paper deals with Commonwealth experience of mediation and conflict resolution in South Africa and Lesotho between 1993 and 1994. In the case of South Africa, the Commonwealth's role was part of a wider international effort aimed at containing the violence that threatened the constitutional negotiations then in progress. In the case of Lesotho, it was an instance of helping put an end to factional fighting within the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF), which could have spilled over into the civilian community and endangered the newly established democracy.

South Africa

In October 1992, the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa (COMSA) arrived in South Africa to help stem the violence alongside other observer missions from the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the European Union. On arrival in the country, the Commonwealth Mission was split into two; one part was based in Johannesburg and the other in Durban, with responsibility for the entire Natal Province. This paper deals with the work of the Durban Mission.

The Security Council Resolution (SCR 772, dated August 17, 1992) that mandated the sending of international observer groups to South Africa required them to work in close co-operation with the structures set up under the National Peace Accord (NPA). The NPA was signed on September 14, 1991, by leaders of the major political parties, representatives of the business community, the Churches and other non-governmental organizations to put an end to violence and enable the constitutional negotiations to proceed; and for its implementation a number of mechanisms were set up. At the apex was the National Peace Committee (NPC), chaired by a senior business leader and providing overall guidance for the implementation of the Accord. Next came the National Peace Secretariat (NPS), the executive arm of the NPC, headed by a senior advocate. Regional Peace Committees were appointed to see to the establishment of Local Peace Committees (LPC) in their respective regions. COMSA and the other international observer groups were expected to work with these various structures.

Natal

At the time of COMSA's arrival in the province, the general perception was that Natal was sliding toward an all-out civil war, and that the violence had gathered a momentum no longer easy to stop. Natal already had the highest incidence of political

violence in the country, and parts of it were to be declared "unrest areas" at the beginning of November 1992. The designation indicated that the level of violence in the affected locality was such as to warrant the introduction of troops and other special security measures; most of the unrest areas were in fact in Natal. The violence had also resulted in thousands of refugees and displaced people. Many had fled from rural areas into the towns, where they were shifting for themselves as best they could; others sought shelter in sugar cane fields.

When the Commonwealth team arrived in Natal in October 1992, only 6 of the planned 26 Local Peace Committees had been formed, and of these only 2 appeared to be functioning within any degree of effectiveness. In other words, the mechanisms to combat the violence were not yet in place in the province. There were several reasons for this state of affairs.

For the Peace Accord to work in Natal, close and effective co-operation was required between Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) and Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) — yet these were the two parties at war in the province. But the most conspicuous absence, which was to detract from the effectiveness of the mechanisms of the Peace Accord, was that of the traditional authorities. The Chiefs of South Africa as a body had not been a party to the Accord. In the Cape, the Transvaal and other parts of the country, this did not matter much but in Natal it made all the difference.

In that province, the traditional authorities had not only survived the many changes of South African history but had done so with a marked vigour. The Chiefs (*amakhosi*), the elders (*indunas*) and the military formations of youths (*amabutho*), all of which go back to the days of King Shaka at the beginning of the 19th century, were by no means merely ceremonial vestiges. They remained vital components of Zulu culture and, partly as a result of apartheid, exercised considerable power and authority. In the rural communities of Natal, much depended on the traditional authorities in general and the Chiefs in particular. Yet not only had they not been signatories to the National Peace Accord; as it turned out, they did not even know much about it. Where the Chiefs appeared to know something about the Accord, they regarded it with ill-concealed hostility.

Initially, the Local Peace Committees were called Local Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRC). The choice of name aroused the suspicions of the Chiefs because traditionally, a central role of the chiefly class was the settlement of disputes in the community. The Chiefs therefore perceived the Local Peace Committees as institutions taking on functions that properly belonged to them, and consequently they held back from promoting the LPCs in their respective "tribal authorities," to use the official administrative term.

There were other reasons accounting for the lukewarm attitude of some Chiefs toward the peace mechanism. For some time, relations between the Chiefs and youth

had been tense. The divisions first became apparent in 1983–84, when the apartheid regime installed the tricameral system providing separate legislatures for whites, coloureds and Indians but pointedly excluding the African majority. The opposition to the tricameral system was largely led and dominated by youth under the leadership of the United Democratic Front (UDF), and they tended to regard the traditional authorities — Chiefs and indunas in particular — as little more than accomplices of the apartheid system. Many a Chief reacted by trying to prevent the establishment of local branches of the UDF in his domain, thus leading to conflicts with youth.

The unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 brought about heightened political activism in rural Natal. The ANC-supporting youth were triumphalist in their celebrations, and in some communities indunas with long-standing reputations for extortion and high-handedness were killed. Instances of youths taking the law into their hands in this manner were very few. Nevertheless, they served to confirm the Chiefs in their fears and suspicions of the new changes. In the event, helping to establish the Peace Committees meant not only bringing the ANC and the IFP into a reasonably harmonious working relationship; it also meant enlisting the support and co-operation of the traditional authorities. Most important, perhaps, it meant adapting the peace structures to bring them into harmony with the traditional order of things. This was what the COMSA team in Natal endeavoured to do in the Natal South Coast between November 1992 and May 1993.

COMSA in the Natal South Coast

Most of COMSA's mediation and peacemaking took place in the rural communities of the Natal South Coast; in the spring of 1992, these were among the areas most stricken by the violence. In many of these communities, it was not uncommon for the local leaders of the ANC and IFP never to have met. Where this was the case, COMSA's first act was to bring the leaders of the two parties together and, over a period, to help build a reasonably good working relationship between them. This was important because the political violence in the province stemmed essentially from the rivalry between the two parties. But often the failure of the peace mechanisms to make headway had to do with the attitude of the traditional authorities. Consequently, making the traditional authorities a central element of the local peace mechanisms became the dominant aspect of COMSA's work in Natal.

This usually began with trying to establish the "grievances" of the Chiefs, on the one side, and those of the ANC supporters on the other. Naturally, the reasons for the Chiefs' remaining aloof differed from case to case but common threads could be discerned. For instance, they all expressed some resentment of what they regarded as the ANC youth's lack of reverence for tradition, and their attempts to set up what the Chiefs saw as parallel authorities in the communities. They also accused the ANC of fomenting disaffection. The ANC and its youth, on the other hand, claimed that they had nothing against traditional authorities in principle. They were at odds only with

those traditional leaders (Chiefs and indunas) who indulged in extortion and undemocratic practices. In particular, they were opposed to those Chiefs and indunas who resisted the formation of ANC branches in their localities.

Once shuttle diplomacy had defined and narrowed down the differences between the Chiefs and the ANC, the next step was to secure a clear commitment from the two sides to work together to promote peace in their areas. This entailed a further set of commitments. The Chiefs undertook to be father figures to all members of their communities irrespective of party affiliation. This was crucial. Chiefs who were politically active were almost invariably supporters of the IFP. Not only were they party members, they were also usually party leaders in their areas, exploiting their traditional positions where possible to prevent competition from the ANC. This partisanship made such Chiefs appear to their ANC subjects as no more than faction leaders when tradition demanded that the Chief be above all partisanship. Getting the Chiefs to proclaim their political impartiality and to do so in public was an important breakthrough. The ANC supporters, for their part, were required to pledge allegiance to their respective traditional authorities, to inform the Chiefs concerned of any intentions to establish branches of the party in their localities and to apprise them well in advance of any political rallies. These commitments and counter-commitments effectively established the playing field and the broad rules of the political game. The detailed negotiations leading to these undertakings were usually carried out in the presence of a representative of the Local Peace Committee.

Once COMSA was satisfied that the basis existed for a reasonable working relationship between the Chiefs and the IFP on the one side and the ANC on the other, the next step was to help form a peace committee based on the chiefdom and with the Chief of the area as the chair. These local committees were usually designated Resettlement and Development Committees (RDCs) and were in effect an adaptation of the LPCs (which were usually urban-based) to meet and reflect the conditions of rural communities living under traditional authorities. Membership in the RDCs was generally open to all. Included were the Chief, who was usually the chair; all his indunas; representatives of the local clergy; the South African Police (SAP); the South African Defence Force (SADF), if they were in the area; a representative of the Local Peace Committee; and a representative of the amabutho.

The RDCs usually met once a week in the Chief's kraal. At those meetings, it fell to each induna to report on the security situation in his ward in the preceding week. The representatives of the political parties used the opportunity to raise matters which either militated against peace in the community or inhibited free political activity. But no less important, it was also at these meetings that the rebuilding of houses destroyed in the violence was discussed. As part of the confidence-building measures within the community, the practice was to appoint a representative from each of the two political parties (ANC and IFP) to visit the tribal authority together and to make a list of all the houses that needed rebuilding or repairs. The sight of the two political antagonists working together in the interest of the whole community made a tremendous

contribution to peace and reconciliation. Other issues occupying the RDCs included the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, the reopening of schools and roads closed by the violence, and community development in general.

In the context of eradicating the violence, the RDCs had certain clear advantages over the Local Peace Committees set up under the National Peace Accord. In the first place, they were truly local and represented the entire spectrum of interests in the community. They had an incomparably better feel for the local situation than the LPCs, and were better placed for monitoring the local situation. They were untrammelled by bureaucracy. Above all, by addressing the issues of immediate concern to the community, they united it against violence and for development.

Lesotho

On January 19, 1994, factional fighting broke out within the Royal Lesotho Defence Force. The Government of Lesotho appealed to the Commonwealth Secretary-General for help in putting an end to the fighting. The Secretary-General appointed two envoys, who arrived in Lesotho on January 24. Their immediate objectives were to bring about an end to the fighting and to persuade the soldiers to return their weapons to the armouries. Their long-term objectives were to strengthen the corporate unity of the RLDF, reinforce its loyalty to the government and the institutions of state, and help it work out a long-term role for itself in the changing environment of southern Africa.

The arrival of the envoys from the Commonwealth Secretariat led to a de facto ceasefire, and that lull enabled them to begin the task of disengaging the combatants. The army had split into two groups. On one side was the Headquarters group. By all accounts, it was the elite unit of the RLDF; it was the best equipped and it also contained the air squadron. On the other side was what one might call the Makoanyane group, composed largely of infantry units. The Headquarters group numbered some 200 troops, while Makoanyane had well over 600. To make for effective negotiations, the envoys requested each side to appoint a representative committee with no more than 12 members. It was with these two committees that the negotiations began.

Given the level of suspicion that existed, the envoys decided that they would begin by negotiating with each committee in its own barracks. After a week of intensive negotiations, the factions agreed to stand down their men from their hilltop positions and to return their weapons to the armouries. From the point of view of the ultimate objective of the mission, it was important to publicize this permanent cessation of hostilities. It was therefore agreed that in addition to television coverage, there would also be Commonwealth diplomatic representatives on hand to supervise the disengagement. To reassure the civilian population that peace had finally been restored, the truck convoy ferrying the men back to their barracks was routed through the city centre, to the acclamation of the public. Having ended the fighting, the envoys then proceeded to meet with the committees in order to establish the causes of the conflict.

In part, these had to do with the origin of the RLDF. Up to 1970, Lesotho had no army but only the Royal Lesotho Mounted Police (RLMP), a paramilitary force. The RLDF came into being later, mainly to fight the insurgency mounted by the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), which had been cheated out of victory in the 1970 elections by the then Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan. In other words, unlike most armies, the RLDF had come into being to defend the government of one party against the claims of another party. And because of the circumstances that had necessitated its creation, the early recruits into the RLDF tended to be drawn from supporters of the then ruling Basotho National Party (BNP). The BCP, which assumed power in March 1993, came to see the RLDF as a BNP army rather than a national force. It is significant that in their discussions with the Commonwealth envoys, the two committees separately and independently admitted that there had been political interference in the army in the period leading to the elections in March 1993 and after.

The immediate causes of the fighting, however, had more to do with rivalries and jealousies within the RLDF. The Makoanyane group saw the Headquarters group as unduly privileged. Not only did they have the best weapons, it was also alleged that they were the beneficiaries of allowances not available to the Makoanyane group. Alleged irregularities in the matter of promotions were another major source of grievance.

From the separate meetings with the two committees, it was quite clear to the envoys that more united the army than divided it. This was evident not only to the envoys but, more important, to the soldiers themselves. On the basis of the mood of the committees and the tenor of the discussions, the envoys decided that it was time to bring the two committees together to form a united RLDF Committee. This joint committee was formed on February 17. With the help of the envoys, it proceeded to set out what it saw as the future role of the RLDF against the background of the end of the BCP insurgency and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. Among other things, the joint committee saw the role of the RLDF as including:

- fighting international crime, especially drug trafficking, as the drug barons appeared to be trying to use Lesotho as a transit point for entry into the South African market;
- helping to fight soil erosion (a major problem in Lesotho) through tree planting;
- defending the democratically elected government of the day and the institutions of state; and
- contributing to peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity.

These points were then embodied in a submission to the Government. Since then there has been no conflict within the army. Even more noteworthy, when the Royal

Lesotho Mounted Police went on strike in June 1994, the joint army committee helped the police draft a similar document for submission to the Government.

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September 1995

