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CANADA AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE REFORM DECADE:

A STRATEGIC CHECKLIST

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Policy Planning Staff Papers are written to stimulate discussion within the foreign policy community of international trends and specific issues. The views expressed in Policy Planning Staff Papers do not necessarily represent those of the Government of Canada.

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
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In preparing this policy study, which considers the various ways by which the United Nations could be strengthened, why this is so important to our embattled planet, and what the Canadian Government should do to further the process, I am fortunate to have had the advice and cooperation of a number of well-qualified individuals. Sir Brian Urquhart, Erskine Childers and Maurice Strong, all of whom know the system well from long years of service in the UN's senior echelons and who are vigorously promoting its reform, were generous with their time in discussing issues on a number of occasions, as were our former Ambassador to the UN, William Barton, Geoffrey Pearson, past Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, and Professor Maxwell Cohen.

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During my stay in New York, the staff of our Permanent Mission to the UN efficiently arranged appointments and allotted time from their own demanding schedules to answer questions and put me in the picture on current developments. My greatest thanks, however, must go to all the members of the International Organizations Bureau at External Affairs and International Trade, with whom I have engaged in an ongoing dialogue over the past year. A busy team often working under considerable pressure, their patience and helpfulness in the face of my continuing requests for telegrams, background information and views on emerging problems has been impressive. Officials from other branches of EAITC, and Government Departments and Agencies involved in some aspect of the UN's work have also offered useful advice.

Conferences organized over the past months by the Centre for Global Security, the CIIA, the Group of 77 and the UN Association, all made a special contribution to the very lively debate on UN reform by putting forward the ideas of concerned private citizens to whom the future of the UN is a matter of considerable importance.

Finally, although the study attempts to bring together some of the best reform ideas now in play from a variety of sources, their choice and arrangement remain the author's responsibility.



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International Organizations
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CANADA AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE REFORM DECADE

SUMMARY

Never has the United Nations, since its establishment in 1945, had to deal with such daunting challenges as those facing it today. It is not simply a question of trying to develop an effective new international peace and security system to cope with the fragmentation and chaos left in the wake of the collapse of communism. The years and decades ahead also threaten world-wide nuclear and environmental disasters if global mechanisms that work are not in place to contain them. The struggle to assist developing countries overcome poverty and disease, and to adopt human rights and democratic institutions will become increasingly urgent in the light of rising population levels, migratory pressures and ethnic tensions.

There is no substitute for the UN - nothing else can do its job. Yet ironically, now that the end of the Cold War has set it free to realize its full potential after more than 40 years of paralyzing vetoes, the United Nations' structures, operations and financing have, in many particulars, been found wanting, and this at a time of great change and turmoil with formidable demands ahead.

What is required is a modernizing and updating of its key structures such as the Security Council (geared to 1945 realities) and in some cases the introduction of entirely new machinery to deal with changing times. On the other hand, there are institutions which should go, and considerable paring down must take place, along with a more efficient and less baronial style of management on the part of the Agencies. Greatly improved internal coordination will be essential to strengthen performance and avoid waste. Not least, a firmer hand and more energetic forms of fund raising are needed to give the UN - perpetually on the edge of insolvency - some basic financial stability.

The role for Canada in this process of renewal is clear. Canadians have been reformers and innovators at the UN since its inception, a tradition that has much to do with geopolitical imperatives: multilateralism has offered both an invaluable counterweight to the superpower next door and an opportunity to pursue an agenda of Canadian priorities on the international stage, within a global system: peacekeeping, disarmament, and human rights, among others. In short, the UN has long been, and remains a key element of Canadian foreign policy.

Beyond this, there is the matter of performance and privileged access. Canada is one of the few countries that pays dues fully and on time. Through its membership not only in NATO, OECD and the CSCE but also in the Commonwealth, Francophonie and regional associations like APEC and ASEAN, Canada has both strong credentials in the industrialized world and a special "family" relationship with the great majority of Third World nations, a unique position. This will be an enormous potential advantage in efforts to achieve consensus in bringing about fundamental change at the UN.

It therefore falls logically, and perhaps historically, to Canada to play a leadership role in the doubtless long and arduous efforts to achieve a reinvigorated UN, remaining at the centre of a North/South reform core group, and nudging it forward whenever it threatens to stall.

LE CANADA AUX NATIONS UNIES DANS LA DÉCENNIE DE LA RÉFORME

RÉSUMÉ

Depuis sa création en 1945, l'ONU n'a jamais fait face à des défis aussi considérables que ceux d'aujourd'hui. Il ne s'agit pas simplement de tenter d'établir un nouveau système efficace pour la paix et la sécurité internationale afin de combattre la fragmentation et le chaos engendrés par l'effondrement du communisme. Dans les années et décennies à venir, des catastrophes nucléaires et environnementales mondiales risquent de se produire si des mécanismes mondiaux efficaces ne sont pas mis en place pour les éviter. La lutte pour aider les pays en développement à vaincre la pauvreté et la maladie ainsi qu'à respecter les droits de l'homme et à adopter les institutions démocratiques deviendra de plus en plus urgente étant donné l'accroissement des populations, les pressions migratoires et les tensions ethniques.

Rien ne peut remplacer l'ONU; aucune autre organisation ne peut faire son travail. Or, paradoxalement, maintenant que la fin de la guerre froide lui permet de donner toute sa mesure, après 40 ans de vetos qui la paralysaient, les structures, opérations et le financement de l'Organisation laissent à désirer à de nombreux égards, et ce alors que de grands changements et remous posent des défis considérables.

Ce qu'il faut, c'est moderniser ses structures clés comme le Conseil de sécurité (fondé sur les réalités de 1945) et, dans certains cas, mettre sur pied des mécanismes entièrement nouveaux et adaptés au nouveau contexte mondial. Par ailleurs, il faudrait que certaines institutions soient abolies, que des économies considérables soient instaurées et que les organes de l'ONU adoptent un style de gestion moins autocratique. Une coordination interne améliorée sera essentielle pour accroître la performance et éviter le gaspillage. Enfin, plus d'autorité et un financement plus énergique devraient accorder aux Nations Unies - perpétuellement au bord de l'insolvabilité - une certaine stabilité financière.

Le Canada a un rôle à jouer dans ce renouvellement de l'ONU. Depuis la création des Nations Unies, les Canadiens y ont fait preuve de réformateurs et d'innovateurs, une tradition qui a beaucoup à voir avec les impératifs géopolitiques : le multilatéralisme sert à la fois de contrepoids inestimable à la superpuissance voisine et offre une occasion de poursuivre, sur la scène internationale, des objectifs prioritaires canadiens dans un système mondial, soit le maintien de la paix, le désarmement et les droits de l'homme, entre autres. Bref, les Nations Unies sont depuis longtemps et demeurent un élément essentiel de la politique étrangère canadienne.

Il y a aussi la question de la performance et de l'accès privilégié. Le Canada est un des rares pays qui paient à temps et entièrement ses contributions. Membre non seulement de l'OTAN, de l'OCDE et de la CSCE, mais aussi du Commonwealth, de la

Francophonie et d'associations régionales comme l'APEC et l'ASEAN, le Canada a à la fois une excellente réputation dans le monde industrialisé et une relation «familiale» spéciale avec une majorité des pays du tiers monde, une position unique. Ceci constituera un avantage énorme dans la recherche d'un consensus pour un changement fondamental à l'ONU.

Il revient donc logiquement, et peut-être historiquement, au Canada d'être un chef de file dans les efforts, certainement longs et ardues, pour revivifier les Nations Unies, en demeurant au coeur d'un groupe réformiste Nord-Sud et en aiguillonnant l'Organisation chaque fois qu'elle risque de piétiner.

CANADA AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE REFORM DECADE

A STRATEGIC CHECKLIST

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RÉSUMÉ DES PRINCIPALES RECOMMANDATIONS

Part One: THE SETTING - HISTORIC MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY

THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

New World Disorder

Hopes were high in 1989-90 that the collapse of communism in East Europe would mean the dawn of a new world order based on international law and the UN Charter, that we had a clean slate: Who can forget the euphoria of those first months after the dismantling of the Berlin Wall? There was, briefly, a sense that we were living in a time fundamentally different from the benighted past: the present enlightened, the future boundless.

It hasn't turned out quite that way and in fact history shows us that we have been here before and have known other false dawns. (The Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations and UN Charter were, in their own time, believed to be ushering in a new era for all peoples.) The early excitement and optimism in East Europe has been replaced by disappointment and the cold realization of what hardships must be endured - what Václav Havel called "the tunnel at the end of the light" - as inefficient command economies are transformed slowly and painfully to the free market, and democratic pluralism becomes, uneasily, the order of the day.

Further, ancient ethnic hatreds submerged by 45 years of totalitarian rule have been violently unleashed in what was once Yugoslavia and in Central Asia, creating widespread instability throughout the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, confounding the world's hopes for a peace dividend. Chaos and fragmentation, warlordism and banditry: there are those who have even become nostalgic for the Cold War.

In fact, the sudden end of our familiar, relatively stable bipolar world has been disorienting and what will replace it is still unclear. The landscape of international relations has changed dramatically in the past four years, and whether or not what emerges from the present state of flux is a more complex multipolar configuration based on regional groupings and alliances - as seems possible - it is likely to prove far from simple. At the same time we are witnessing unprecedented global threats and challenges: rapid environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation and dangers from unsafe reactor systems, growing poverty and overpopulation leading to civil strife and mass migrations, and epidemics of drug addiction, AIDS, and new strains of malaria and tuberculosis.

Bipolar Breakdown Can Lead to Multilateralism

Yet it is within this uncertain and frightening context that the United Nations has an historical opportunity to come into its own and realize its potential after decades of being hamstrung by East/West confrontation. Since no one nation can any longer cope with these crises alone the world is ripe for a more fully developed multilateralism. By showing strong leadership now the UN can help to place international relations on a sounder footing and indeed begin to shape that elusive new world order. The stakes are high, nothing less than the survival of the planet. Great expectations are now centred on the United Nations which in the 1980's was derided or ignored, but now in virtually every emergency of the human condition is expected not only to "do something" but to be a kind of miracle worker.

But if, as can be safely assumed, the UN has had numerous successes in the past it has seen many failures, and today suffers from serious shortcomings which in its present state will leave it unable to reach its potential and worse, hopelessly unfit for the struggles that lie ahead in this decade and beyond. Among them: a chronically unstable, almost tragic financial situation, redundancy and excessive layering in the Secretariat, a widespread lack of coordination which leads to waste and missed priorities, a proliferation of institutions (often a substitute for problem-solving) and the lack of preparedness of some of the UN's major organs - such as the Security Council - to face the future because they reflect outdated political realities. After nearly half a century, it would be extraordinary if this were not the case.

Empowering the UN

Yet there is no substitute for the UN - nothing else can do its job. What is urgently needed is a leaner, more efficient, financially sounder organization, but beyond that some basic changes are called for to enable it to face problems never dreamed of at San Francisco in 1945. In brief, there must be a willingness not only to do away with what is no longer useful, but also in some cases to establish entirely new structures in place of the old. Both are difficult concepts and resistance can be expected.

UN reform is on everyone's lips these days. Universities, think tanks and groups of eminent persons are hard at work on this and most seem to be aiming at 1995, the UN's 50th anniversary - a useful destination. The hope is that all these efforts could culminate in a celebratory conference which would "ratify" the best new ideas worked out in the previous three years by various preparatory committees. For example, the former Wilensky team of UN Ambassadors that worked on Secretariat reform in 1990-91 might form a core-group to carry the process forward across a wider front.

Any attempt to re-open and re-negotiate the UN Charter in toto, however, could call forth a horrendous scenario and should be resolutely avoided. The Charter is an excellent one that has withstood the passage of time in most respects. What it needs is some modernization to adapt it to the realities of our own day, something which can be accomplished through a number of amendments using the simpler procedure set out in Article 108. In fact, much needed reform can take place completely outside any Charter context.

This paper will examine those changes necessary to achieve a reinvigorated United Nations and the role that Canada, uniquely equipped for the task, should play in an evolving UN reform process. With a high stake in the outcome, Canadians should not hesitate to be in the vanguard of those few who will lead the way.

CANADA'S MULTILATERAL VOCATION

I. MULTILATERALISM - WHY WE NEED IT

With the neat order of a bipolar world gone the 1990's will be confused. The creation of new states, the redesigning of security arrangements, the trend toward regionalism - all mean that Canada will be active and probably creative. But will we be as relevant in international politics as our influence in Europe wanes, and our foreign policy comes more and more to resemble that of the United States?

Canada's membership in the G 7 will remain a key entrée to international influence as long as our economy can meet the entrance requirements. But NATO, traditionally a pillar of our diplomacy, is moving increasingly toward European institutions and regional issues, diminishing the counterweight it provided against what was seen as Canada's isolation in North America with the US. As the EC bloc becomes more exclusive, the Canadian economy will be tied even more closely to NAFTA and any intermediary role between the US and Europe is likely to become increasingly vestigial. The CSCE, East Europe and the former USSR may offer more scope for Canadian foreign policy, especially in the Ukraine and Baltic States because of the sizeable immigrant diaspora, but overall Canada's assistance (and influence) is likely to be modest.

Possibilities appear to exist in the Asia/Pacific region through ASEAN and North Pacific security arrangements, where Canada's trade has for some time been more important than with the Atlantic area. But the fact is that in Canada there is a drift to continentalism and Americanization, like it or not, stimulated by the almost overwhelming media blitz washing over the country every day from the south via TV, books and magazines and confirmed by the NAFTA accord. In seeking foreign policy lines distinct from the US not much more than Cuba remains, though Canada's early diplomatic pioneering in the USSR and China in 1969-71 demonstrated how valuable an independent line could be.

1. The Other Option

If there is a danger of marginalization implicit in all this, Canada still has an option which springs from its own foreign policy roots, and that is the path of multilateralism, specifically in the United Nations and its agencies, renewed and adapted for the decade ahead. (a) Through these channels Canada can also pursue its own priorities, using well-chosen strategic alliances with others. (b) At the same time multilateralism has perhaps never been so important in our long history of attempting to survive next to a giant neighbour and in differentiating our policies from theirs.

2. Pursuing Our Own Agenda at the UN

The UN provides Canada with the ideal forum for its traditional mediating role, especially as a leading peacekeeper, and for its other priorities: greater efforts to control nuclear proliferation and transparency in disarmament; influencing the development of environmental control systems; continuing as leaders in the international human rights area (including concerns of women and aboriginal peoples); being actively involved in economic and social programs and the whole issue of refugees and migratory movements; and finally, not least, in the current efforts to reform the UN itself. It is the multilateral arena that will allow Canada to have a major impact in these areas.

3. Our Privileged Access: A Key Advantage

Our background and qualifications for this UN role - particularly the current campaign for reform - could hardly be better, since there are few if any countries that can match Canada's multilateral connections. Along with the G7, being a member of NATO, OECD, and the CSCE has established our credentials in Western security and economic affairs, and our membership in key groupings such as the Commonwealth, Francophonie and the OAS (added to participation in regional associations like APEC and ASEAN) has given us a special "family" relationship with the great majority of Third World nations.

This is an enormous potential advantage, of which Canada must be fully aware in order to make effective use of it on a day-to-day basis in United Nations fora, something which has not always been done in the past. It does involve time, hard work and determination to cultivate sometimes difficult colleagues holding other points of view, but the often-heard complaint that we are "losing our privileged access" because of changing aid policies (for example) simply means that efforts need to be redoubled and enough staff must be in place to do it. Without this we cannot hope to bring about the reform we seek; with it, it is a tool for change beyond price.

4. The Historical Tradition

It has been said that for Canadians, multilateralism is both an instinct and a vocation. At the League of Nations Canada was there testing the waters as a future independent nation, and at San Francisco, delegates like Lester Pearson, Norman Robertson, Charles Ritchie, and Escott Reid influenced key decisions such as those on the Security Council and ECOSOC. Since 1945 active involvement in the United Nations system has been a given of Canadian foreign policy. The eighth largest contributor (out of a total now of 180 nations) and a prompt payer of dues, Canada has held a seat on the Security Council at least once a decade, served as Vice-President of the General Assembly and in virtually all UN peacekeeping operations. For Canadians it has been a mix of geopolitical self-interest and an altruistic search for a more just, equitable and peaceful world.

5. Hanging In

The 1980's were a time of crisis for the UN. International confidence in the organization had fallen to a dangerous low, along with its financial resources. US policy in those years was to downgrade multilateralism, and in particular to constantly criticize the UN, leaving some of its agencies or remaining half-heartedly without paying dues, while at the same time demanding management reforms as a condition of payment or a possible return. It was a confrontational method that did much damage to UN finances without seriously tackling the problems. In spite of the blandishments of emissaries from Washington and from much of the Canadian media to follow this line, Canada stood fast in its commitment to the UN and its agencies. This is not to say the need for reform was not recognized, but rather that the Canadian choice, after a careful examination of all the alternatives, was to work for reform from within. Superpowers may assume the luxury of unilateral action, but for smaller and middle powers the need for an effective global system is obvious.

II. CANADA AND UN REFORM

Innovation and Growth - 1945-1980

From the start Canada's approach has been "reformist": Pearson was one of the first to advocate a revisionary conference ten years after San Francisco. This did not take place but another of his initiatives, the idea of a UN force following the Suez fiasco, was a major innovation for a security system paralysed by superpower rivalry. The breakthrough engineered by Paul Martin in 1955 that allowed the admission of 16 new member states is regarded as a major reform success (it profoundly changed the UN) and was motivated not only by principles of multilateralism and universality, but by a recognition of the advantages of admitting more middle powers with a point of view similar to Canada's own.

During the 1978 session, when the General Assembly virtually ground to a halt, and the need for streamlining its work became particularly pressing, Canadian Ambassador William Barton, sceptical of the promised review, convened an 18-country group which carried out the job with despatch; the new rules they put forward were implemented at the 1979 session. It was an initiative that presaged the next phase of Canada's reform activity at the UN.

Process Reform - 1980's

Dissatisfaction and disappointment with the UN's performance and its chronic financial troubles mounted in the 1970's, culminating in the post-1983 period when US actions seemed to threaten the fundamentals of the UN system itself. In response, Canada defended "process reform" based on existing structures rather than radical transformation. For example, in UNESCO and the FAO Canada campaigned for improved management and budgetary practices with some success, though without concrete proposals for fundamental change.

In those years Canada helped build consensus around the concept of "zero real growth" (i.e. status quo plus inflation) and sponsored the "Blue Book" proposals prepared in External Affairs, which set out schemes to standardize budget accounting, establish a more realistic co-relation between the UN's programs and the money actually available for them, greater built-in adaptability to changing conditions, and the idea of reward for early payment of dues. Never a best-seller at the UN because of its highly technical and detailed format, some of its better suggestions have nevertheless emerged in useful ways throughout the system.

In 1987 a special commission launched an exercise to put some backbone into ECOSOC, which had fallen far short of the mandate set out for it in the Charter. Canada and other middle powers were active in this exercise which in the end did not succeed. Here something a bit beyond process tinkering was contemplated, but consensus could not be reached. (There were even doubts among some Canadian officials about what the effects of a stronger ECOSOC might be.) More successful were Canada's efforts to promote the advancement of women in the 80's and at the World Conference on Women at Nairobi in 1988 its representatives pressed successfully to have the "forward-looking strategies" incorporated across the board into all UN programs.

Canada's Reform Style: The Old

Thus Canada has been engaged from the beginning one way or another in attempts to make the UN work better, but apart from the major innovations of 1955-56, has done so in evolutionary and non-dramatic ways, acting in concert with like-minded countries like the Nordics, Australia and New Zealand and as many members of the WEOG and the more progressive East Europeans as possible. The time did not seem right for major restructuring, so Canada's approach has remained until recently fairly conservative, that of the helpful fixer.

The New

Now, however, is the moment for Canada to push for more radical reform in the UN system. The changed political climate has provided the opportunity, but there is a danger that the historic moment may be lost if there is not early action. And looking to the 50th anniversary, there are little more than two years to get it underway. Though obviously not able to do this alone, buoyed by its long UN tradition and a clear assessment of its interests as well as its unique advantages, Canada should form strategic alliances, not only with the more familiar allies, but also with important members of what used to be the G 77, many of whom will need to be persuaded and reassured. This is a far from easy task, but without them any reform agenda will be doomed.

Canada, as possibly no other country, has the acceptability, the access and the opportunity. It follows, therefore, that we also have the moral responsibility.

Part Two: THE URGENT PRIORITIES OF THE NINETIES

I. PEACE AND SECURITY

Peace and security concerns in the broadest sense are certain to remain the UN Security Council's top priority throughout the 90's in spite of the post Cold-War euphoria that seemed to usher in a new age. However, it is not just the ethnic strife and civil wars which continue to confound and appall the world that must be addressed at the highest level. To these are now added major threats to the environment and nuclear safety, which though unforeseen by the planners at San Francisco, pose no less a threat to human survival than the devastation of war.

In these circumstances, the Security Council has the great advantage that it is now free for the first time to deploy all the instruments placed at its disposal by Charter but denied it for over 40 years by the vetoes (250 in all) of the Permanent Five in the throes of bloc rivalry. The atmosphere has become one of collegiality, and indeed the Council is functioning efficiently for the first time. Unfortunately for a body which must face growing and unfamiliar challenges, the Security Council's outdated structure is a reflection of the wartime alliance of 1945 rather than today's realities, and is patently unfitted for the tasks that lie ahead. Unless it becomes more representative it will soon begin to lose its credibility and authority, at very high cost to the UN and the hopes for its renewal.

A. REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. THE ENLARGEMENT QUESTION

In fact, there is already a growing sense that sometime in the foreseeable future the Security Council should be expanded beyond the present Permanent Five, and a certain momentum is already discernible. The most likely candidates are Japan and Germany, both of which have become economic giants in their own right and top contributors to the UN's finances at Nos. 2 and 3 respectively: seen in this light their absence is somewhat paradoxical. But there are other claimants as well. Less focused but growing are the demands of the South for a fairer regional representation - India, Brazil and Nigeria are among the candidates most frequently mentioned.

Germany's Case

Bonn claims to be in no hurry about permanent membership, but the signs are otherwise, including their current efforts to find a constitutional formula that would allow Germany to participate in out-of-area peacekeeping. Further, it seems unlikely that the Germans would stand aside if Japan were elevated.' (PM Mulroney has in any case publicly declared Canadian support for both.) The difficult question here is the imbalance this would produce on the Security Council in favour of West Europe.

While there is talk of an "all-Europe" seat into which Britain, France and the FRG would ultimately be subsumed, delays on the Maastricht front indicate that it may well be some time before European foreign policy is sufficiently unified to make this a reality.

*A Special Issue
of the Nineties*

JAPAN AT THE UN: THE RISING SUN

Japan is already campaigning openly and has also passed legislation recently enabling it to shoulder peacekeeping responsibilities: not a written requirement but understood to be a minimum peace and security undertaking for P5 membership. It has even begun modest peacekeeping services in Cambodia. Certainly, its emergence as a leading world economic power must have consequences for the UN system. Since its wartime role excluded Japan (and Germany) in 1945 from membership in the elite group of post-war allies, the Japanese have concentrated intensively and with brilliant success on technology and economic growth. Encouraged and emboldened by the talk of reform, its own growing international prestige, prominence in international development assistance (it recently pledged 20% of total IDA replenishment) and the knowledge that it has graduated from being the UN's third contributor to its second, Japan is now firmly committed to more political activism and an SC seat.

Already the Japanese have begun tentatively but unmistakably to cut a new figure in UN agencies after years of passively sitting back, and this has met with mixed reviews. As evidenced by an early performance at UNESCO's Executive Council in the spring of 1992 when aggressiveness rather than constructive interventionism characterized their new style, this may not endear them to still-wary Asian neighbours and others. Even less attractive was their rough campaign in January 1993 to have their candidate re-elected at almost any price for a second term as head of the WHO, in spite of widespread criticism of his record. They may need, in other words, some help in the art of managing power gracefully.

Several aspects of this situation offer opportunities. Firstly, it is an unfortunate fact that Japan routinely delays its payments to the UN budget until late in the year - rather than the beginning, as required, since UN operations are planned by calendar year - and this, added to the massive US arrears, has been highly damaging to many programs. Fiscal year differences are cited, but of course any country, including Canada, could earn interest on their UN contribution by holding it back for a few months. The opportunity then is this: it should be made clear to the Japanese that support for a permanent Security Council seat would be contingent on unfailing fiscal responsibility i.e. payment of dues on time, along with peacekeeping duties.

Secondly, Canada could be helpful in assisting the Japanese toward a more palatable, less heavy-handed style of UN diplomacy. They can speak to few others without the heavy burden of history intruding in some way, but our important economic relations have produced a certain atmosphere of confidence. This places Canada in a good position to help them assume a leadership role at the UN and win due respect for their significant financial contribution.

RECOMMENDATION

- *Canada should support the Japanese wish for a Permanent Security Council seat, but only given their firm prior commitment to fiscal responsibility; further, tactful advice from Canadian colleagues could assist them in moderating their aggressive new UN style.*

*A Special Issue
of the Nineties*

NORTH-SOUTH TENSIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

A disturbing new factor of growing importance must also be taken into account. The East/West struggles of the past forty years have been replaced by a North/South divide. There is growing uneasiness among Third World members of the UN about the Security Council's new decisiveness and its emergence as a kind of world directorate led by the Permanent Five, which leaves them, as they see it, pretty well out of peace and security decision-making. For many years they had their say in the General Assembly, which they dominated by sheer force of numbers during crises whenever the Council was paralyzed (as in 1956, when the initiative on peacekeeping came into being through a GA resolution) but these heroic days seem over for the Assembly and feelings of frustration and powerlessness are building.

This was made abundantly clear at a summit meeting of the 108-nation non-aligned movement in Jakarta in September, 1992, when in speech after speech delegates called for UN reform in these terms: increased representation for the NAM on the Security Council, curtailing of veto powers and strengthening of the Assembly, and more economic and social programs. Given that to the North "reform" means at least partly curbing growth and eliminating waste, what looks ominously like a major ideological struggle may be shaping up at the United Nations.

Brian Urquhart, a former Undersecretary, regards this split as the "major hazard for the United Nations now". And because it could sabotage the reform efforts so urgently needed right across the UN system, Canada has a special role to play in helping to bridge the gap and find compromise solutions. Equipped as possibly no other country for such a demanding task, as noted earlier, Canada has a foot in both

camps with its Western (or Northern) credentials firmly established in the G7, NATO and OECD and its family links with countries from the Commonwealth, Francophonie and the OAS giving it a direct line to the South.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Though this unique access to the South has not been fully utilized in the past, Canada should now develop it much more actively at the UN to:

- *make a special effort to discuss with Southern colleagues the latest developments in the peace and security field and other areas being handled so decisively in the Security Council day by day. It is the sense of being left out on issues basic to the world community that must be addressed to avoid the build-up of resentment.*
- *by persuading and reassuring, to lubricate the reform process which many, if not most developing UN members are going to see as a threat, bringing the likelihood of loss of some sort. Here is an important role as interlocuteur valable for Canada if there is to be any hope for change in the UN system. Without the South's support - even lukewarm - the whole process could be derailed.*
- *take full advantage of the fact that traditional UN blocs are evolving, becoming more fluid and less prone to rigid voting along ideological lines. As the G77 fragments, the Latin American and Asian groups, for example, are acting more independently and more moderately. Canada's influence could be considerable if it played this card adeptly, fanning out beyond WEOG to liaise with other groups on a more pragmatic basis.*
- *recognize and adapt Canadian policies to the fact that in the current situation, the question of expanding the Security Council's permanent membership to reflect new political realities has taken on greater urgency and must be faced squarely as an essential means of securing global support for the UN's work. Even an informal commitment by a number of major Northern players that this would happen some time in the future could clear the air.*

POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL SCENARIOS

(Current membership: 5 Permanent, 10 Rotating)

- Japan and Germany as principal donors join in the next 3-5 years; France and the UK will fight to retain their seats, (the last vestige of their Great Power status) so the total would be P 7 with Europe temporarily top heavy.
- Later in the nineties France, UK and Germany are subsumed in a European Community seat.
- Also in the late nineties Brazil, India and Nigeria join, (representing regional power centres) possibly timed to coincide with the EC seat; an indication in the near future that this was a likely scenario this decade could have a salutary effect on their performance in the interim: regularly paid up UN dues and peacekeeping support would be minimum conditions of membership. Permanent membership would then total 8.
- One alternative might be to set up a second tier of members without a veto, although this could be seen as "second-class" status; or to abolish the veto altogether.
- Numbers: Enlarging the Security Council has its own risks although it has been done before, in 1963. The key will be to balance the political pressures for new members, both permanent and rotating, against what are the outer limits of SC workability - this is probably between 20 and 25. Should the EC not move toward union in the 90's the Council could total P 10 at some point, but with an addition of no more than 3/5 new rotating members would number 23/25, still a manageable group for the direct communication and interaction that must go on.

RECOMMENDATIONS

■ Canada has served the Security Council well on five occasions since 1945 as a non-permanent member but could hardly justify a bid for a permanent seat using normal criteria. At the same time, the increasing number of UN members makes our usual pattern of assuming a rotational seat every 10 years even more difficult to maintain. Yet Canada's exemplary UN record deserves better. One possibility would be to create a separate rotating pool of 2 or 3 seats for members with high budgetary and peacekeeping contributions, and who might serve more extended terms. Italy and Canada are No. 7 and No. 8 donors respectively, right after P5 members France and

the UK. Our support for Security Council expansion could be contingent on some such arrangement. In the meantime, we should insist on more use of Article 44 (i.e. participating in Council discussions when our peacekeepers are involved).

■ Canada should take an active part in the debate on Security Council reform to ensure that our interests are fully taken into account, and should do what it can in the G 7 and other Western fora to encourage colleagues who are P 5 members to accept the fact that gradually opening the doors (with conditions as outlined above) would be in the best interests of the UN and that continued exclusivity is bound to be self-defeating.

THE UN'S MAJOR DONORS

<u>The Top Eight</u>	<u>%</u>
U.S.A.	25.00%
Japan	12.45%
Germany	8.93%
Russia	6.71%
France	6.00%
United Kingdom	5.02%
Italy	4.29%
Canada	3.11%

Over 1%

Spain	1.98%
Ukraine	1.87%
Brazil	1.59%
Australia	1.51%
Netherlands	1.50%
Sweden	1.11%
Belgium	1.06%

2. A MORE EFFECTIVE SECURITY COUNCIL

Expanding the Security Council's membership may be a lengthy process, but more immediately other steps can be taken to maximize its effectiveness and make it not only better able to deal quickly with the fast-breaking crises now so characteristic of the international scene, but to foresee and even prevent them.

(i) A Joint Intelligence Committee

The Security Council's global watch and early warning system must be radically upgraded to strengthen its capacity to take preventive or anticipatory action. By pooling the best information from the leading intelligence services - US, British and French (possibly with the Russian and Chinese in due course) a joint intelligence group could ensure that at least the permanent members of the Council and the Secretary General would have at their disposal on a daily basis what they needed for rational and prescient decision-making.

(ii) Informal Retreats, High-Level Discussions

There is another fundamental problem. Leading experts and experienced hands have referred to the "extraordinary lack of intellectual input" at the UN, debate that is "incredibly arid" and the difficulty there is in getting a discussion going on basic subjects. Particularly in the Security Council, the urgent press of daily business has precluded what should be an essential function of that powerful body - that of sitting back from time to time to discuss world problems from a longer-term point of view. Lurching from crisis to crisis on an ad hoc basis is not a sufficient guarantee for the international system.

The introduction of periodic retreats for "state of the world" discussions in an informal setting away from UN headquarters and freed for a few hours from burning issues and crises - a technique pioneered successfully by the Commonwealth Heads of Government - would greatly enhance the quality of the Council's work and its level of preparedness by focusing on upcoming trouble spots soon enough to do something about them. At the same time it would bring about a personal rapport among members that nothing else could match in terms of stimulating a cooperative impulse.

The Security Council's first Heads of State and Government meeting in January 1992 was a milestone event marking a turning point in the UN's history, setting out guidelines for a new post-Cold War era. For the future, more high-level meetings should be envisaged to maintain the UN's authority, sustain momentum and generate ideas. Boutros-Ghali has suggested a Summit once every two years. In the same vein, why not have an occasional annual retreat of Foreign Ministers during the autumn session?

(iii) Streamlining Procedures

With a larger Security Council it will become even more important to update procedures to allow for faster action in emergencies: a better committee system, shorter interventions, and limited speaking privileges for non-members, for example.

RECOMMENDATION

- Canada should support these measures to strengthen the Security Council for its central role in the nineties and take the lead whenever forces for the status quo appear to be prevailing. And although earlier attempts by Canadian Ambassadors to introduce the concept of longer-term discussions of global problems met with little enthusiasm, changed circumstances could mean that this is an idea whose time has come.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING: NEW SECURITY DEFINITIONS

The UN Summit of world leaders in declaring in January 1992 that "the world now has the best chance of achieving international peace and security since the foundation of the United Nations" recognized this as a time of momentous change, and an opportunity to return to the basic principles of collective security enunciated in the Charter - or rather to develop the drafters' original concepts for what amounted to the first time. The Charter's articles 42 to 46 which demonstrated genuine muscle had never been realized, but had now begun to look relevant and necessary in the light of the violent ethnic strife which seemed beyond the powers of traditional peacekeeping to contain.

The Second Chance

The Summit Declaration concluded by requesting the Secretary-General to prepare specific recommendations for strengthening the UN's capacity, within the framework of the Charter, for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking (including peace enforcement) and peacekeeping. In setting out quite firm guidelines for him, special emphasis was placed on prevention, a relatively new and untried area of operations for the Security Council but one seen as having increasing importance and urgency. Boutros-Ghali's response offered a comprehensive blueprint for a global conflict management system, adding an additional category, that of peace building.

The result of ideas and contributions from a number of sources and countries, including Canada, it explores uncharted and potentially hazardous waters, but as a package it also shows creative and far-sighted thinking and is probably the best chance for a real renewal of the international security system. Some aspects are controversial and governments may hope they will never have to face the difficult choices involved. But as Boutros-Ghali noted "We have been given a second chance to create the world of our Charter that they (the League of Nations) were denied". Canada, as a veteran in the annals of peacekeeping, is well placed to help realize the best of these proposals and others meant to strengthen and revivify the UN.

AN AGENDA FOR PEACE

1. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

Few are likely to oppose the idea of using all possible means at the earliest stage to prevent conflict from breaking out, an area in which the Security Council has hardly excelled over the past decades. Among these, more use of regional confidence-building measures among parties to potential or current disputes, such as

those being pioneered by the CSCE; and UN Secretariat missions or special envoys sent to capitals, where their presence alone might help to defuse a budding dispute or at least buy time.

Great emphasis is placed, with reason, on what is currently one of the UN's major shortcomings: the lack of a viable early warning system and the need for an operational fact-finding network that could provide advance information on traditional threats to peace and security; as well as potentially dangerous social and economic trends. In the decade ahead, catastrophes that may be building in the environmental, nuclear and population/migration fields all point to the urgent need for the sort of advance information that the UN can have access to through better use of its own agencies, and in the field from the introduction of "UN Embassies" which would group all UN activities in a given country under a single Resident Representative.

Not mentioned in the "Agenda", but an essential tool of preventive diplomacy would be daily access by the Security Council and the Secretary-General to the best information that P5 intelligence services could provide through the establishment of a joint intelligence committee, as outlined in the previous chapter. It is at least arguable that had this quality of information been available to the Council, combined with the resolve it now displays to use preventive measures and mediatory management, Iraq's march into Kuwait, the civil strife in the former Yugoslavia and the anarchy in Somalia might have been avoided or reduced in impact. Even the possibility that this might have been the case makes the whole question of advance information a high priority.

Preventive deployment, a new concept, would offer another form of deterrence if confidence-building mechanisms fail. This could involve the presence of UN troops along a frontier at the request of a government in a national crisis, to discourage cross-border attacks, or even to deter conflict within that country. Might such a deployment have stopped Iraq? In any event, it is now being tried in Macedonia (formerly part of Yugoslavia) where UN peacekeepers, including Canadians, have been assigned in the hope of preventing, by their presence, a further spread of conflict in the Balkans. Demilitarized zones, normally marking the end of a conflict, could also be utilized as a preventive option.

Whether through preventive diplomacy both World Wars of this century could have been avoided is a speculation that makes such instruments of inestimable value for the future.

2. PEACEMAKING

The pacific settlement of disputes is provided for in Chapter 6 of the Charter with a wide range of techniques to choose from, including mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement. The Council's lacklustre record in the past has been due to the absence of political will, but a more active use is already being made of special missions and observer teams sent to areas of unrest. To this should be added more

use of the personal good offices of the Secretary-General. Even UN agencies and programs would be asked to do their bit in seeking the peaceful resolution of disputes.

The Secretary-General, who realizes only too well that the UN cannot afford to deal with every dispute on the planet, makes it clear that he intends to call on regional organizations to do more to settle their own area disputes. While closer investigation reveals that many of them are too short of resources themselves to do much about it, there are some important exceptions. NATO is one, now looking for some formula to allow it to continue its success story of the past 40 years in some new context. Similarly the CSCE, an effective force in building East/West bridges in the 70's and 80's, wishes to remain relevant with peace-keeping forces of its own, possibly in conjunction with NATO. (The CSCE has recently organized a civilian mission in Kosovo, where fears of potential conflict are high.) In the nineties there is likely to be enough work for all.

A Revived International Court

Boutros-Ghali pleads in the "Agenda" for greater use of the International Court of Justice as a resource for dispute settlement - the Security Council does have the right under the Charter to recommend this course of action to states. Would governments, he asks, reconsider their reservations about its jurisdiction? Although the principal reason the Court has such a limited clientele has had much to do with political will and the reluctance of the P5 to submit their litigation to any international body, another of the Court's disadvantages may have to do with the length of the judges' incumbency: following a full nine-year term a judge may be (and often is) re-elected for a total term of 18 years. This has tended to give the Court an aura of staleness and stagnation.

To avoid this, some Canadian experts believe the mandate should be limited to a single, non-renewable term of seven years. A roster of younger judges in predictable rotation and more in tune with the rapidly changing times would do much to attract disputing parties seeking settlements, as would greater use of a quicker system of rendering judgements, through the Chamber system and the "summary procedure mechanism" provided for in the Charter. This could result in increased business and an enhanced reputation for the Court. At the same time an advisory group or a committee of the General Assembly might be set up to take advantage of the expertise and experience of former justices who still wished to be involved with the UN after the expiry of their terms.

Should Canada's candidate win a seat on the ICJ we would be well positioned to help bring about some of this necessary updating.

Sanctions

More effective use of sanctions through greater fine-tuning is a further recommendation of the Secretary-General. Unfortunately, there is no unit in the Secretariat to provide follow-through for the decisions of the Council's sanctions committee, but if this is to be a meaningful instrument of peacemaking, some form of permanent machinery is essential to allow for the administering of effective verification procedures. A more professional approach is needed as well: a scale of phased sanctions should be drawn up; and reports should be prepared on the import/export situation of the country against whom sanctions are to be imposed to identify the areas of greatest vulnerability, studies which could also be used to modify the negative effects on the civilian population involved. Thus prepared, mediation and good offices could be better linked with sanctions at an early stage.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT is the area of peacemaking where the UN of the future would be embarking on untried territory, that of the Charter's Chapter 7. While Canada would have little difficulty in going along with the Secretary-General's blueprint up to this point, (and in fact has strongly supported preventive or anticipatory actions) his proposal to activate the long-moribund Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter which call for the use of force should all peaceful means fail, and a standing army, is enough to give any Canadian government pause. Force in Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990-91 under US leadership was "authorized" by the Security Council in circumstances that can only be considered exceptional: Article 42 was not invoked at that time. Thus, doing so now would be a radically new departure for the United Nations. Boutros-Ghali clearly believes acceptance of this reality to be the essence of the concept of collective security.

In fact, events are moving far more rapidly than theories or concepts - to say nothing of policies - are being developed. There is rarely even time for debate. By early 1992 it was evident that humanitarian aid was the thin edge of the wedge - it was "legitimizing" intervention. The urgent need for food and medical supplies for the suffering populations of ex-Yugoslavia and Somalia dictated that UN peacekeepers should, firstly, go in regardless of invitation and secondly, go in under fire if necessary (though still to shoot only in self-defence). These two revolutionary departures from the norm - in UN terms - have not been fully debated or resolved in any way, other than by emergency decisions of the Security Council responding to crisis situations.

The rest is a matter of degree. The next step, enforcement action to disarm the warring factions in Somalia so that food supplies could be safeguarded and delivered, was almost inevitable, and in fact was taken in the first week of December 1992. Although this initiative was taken by American rather than UN troops, it marks another milestone, another step in the continuum, and thus without agreement on Article 42 per se the UN is moving slowly, perhaps inexorably, toward it.

What are the Outer Limits of Article 42?

In the meantime, however, the UN and the peacekeepers stand in the midst of a frustrating and tragic dilemma in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their humanitarian convoys faced with defiant armed militia intent on keeping them from carrying out their food deliveries to thousands of starving civilians. The Security Council, and in fact national governments (in spite of the urging of their editorialists and TV commentators) are not yet willing to risk bloodshed and the lives of their nationals in an all-out UN enforcement action. Sticking it out in the hope that the peace process will finally bear fruit and bring the carnage to an end (and gambling that this will happen before it spreads further to engulf the Balkans) may mean that activating Article 42 in its fullest sense can be postponed to another day, or perhaps indefinitely.

War Crimes

A very recent development in the same continuum is the move toward an International War Crimes Tribunal as a new form of peace enforcement - both as a deterrent and as retribution for the atrocities and organized crimes against civilians in the former Yugoslavia. There "ethnic cleansing" has become a form of genocide and the rules of the Geneva Convention have been flouted repeatedly by warring factions.

A Canadian legal expert is serving on the five-member UN Commission which is preparing what would be the first international legal vehicle for the prosecution of "outrages against humanity". (Nuremberg tried defendants for crimes against nations.) Without precedent, it faces many legal hurdles, but is being urged forward by international public opinion.

*A Special Issue
of the Nineties*

IS SOVEREIGNTY AN OUTDATED CONCEPT?

What all the debate on enforcement implies is of the greatest significance for our decade because it brings the UN and the world - especially activist member countries like Canada - face to face with some hard choices not only about personal risk but also about national sovereignty. In a speech to Stanford University in September 1991 the Prime Minister described Canada as being in favour of re-thinking the limits of sovereignty in a world where problems respect no borders. In fact the trend toward a more intrusive international order is a reality of our time and although the phrase "loss of sovereignty" can arouse fear and apprehension, the process has been going on quietly for some time under various guises.

In practice national sovereignty in its pure form has been eroded over the past 42 years through various agreements entered into by many countries, including Canada, in NATO, GATT, CSCE, and the new environmental protocols, among others; through the growth of multinational corporations and supranational organizations like

the European Community; and through greater transparency in human rights and arms control issues which inevitably means more intrusiveness. All these significant changes have been accepted gradually over time and without panic.

Many of the UN's G77 members, however, do fear what increasing interventionism might mean in a Chapter 7 sense and several UN declarations show them holding fast to the Charter's Article 2 which affirms territorial integrity and sovereign rights. Therefore, while Canada does not need to fear the tide of history so long as it is balanced with the ability to safeguard certain key areas of national interest, it should be prepared for resistance from within the UN membership. It should also be prepared for a leadership role in sponsoring the acceptance of these new realities.

3. PEACEKEEPING

Canada's Contribution to 20th Century Politics

If the UN's security mechanisms are in a state of rapid evolution and development, traditional peacekeeping itself has changed out of all recognition in recent years and its new versatility is going to bring it into even greater demand in the future. Accelerating requests for peacekeepers in the last four years alone have outstripped those for all the years since the concept was first developed.

For Canada this highly successful UN mechanism is bound up with Lester Pearson's far-sighted idea of a UN emergency force meant to deal with the 1956 Suez crisis - to prevent a Middle East conflagration and at the same time help extricate two close allies from a mess of their own devising. It has since become one of the world community's most valued peace and security instruments and a source of both pride and commitment for Canadians, about 87,000 of whom have served on virtually all 40 peacekeeping operations since the beginning. Eighty-seven have lost their lives. More than 4,000 Canadians are currently serving abroad in 15 UN peacekeeping missions - every 10th peacekeeper around the world is Canadian. It is a record without equal.

The New Peacekeepers

Traditional peacekeeping meant guarding a boundary line between protagonists that had been brokered but was still too fragile to stand alone. Dramatic changes began in Namibia in 1989 when UNTAG became a mixed military/civilian operation that assisted at the birth of an infant democracy. A nation-building exercise, it pointed the way of the future for peacekeeping which now, as the "Agenda" points out, encompasses everything from election and human rights monitoring to police training programs, humanitarian aid, relocation of refugees and other social support services. In future it may even include standby forces to cope with environmental disasters. The civilian component, now a key element, might

come from agencies like FAO or the Red Cross, but often the troops themselves perform these new tasks as part of their expanding mandate. Each assignment has been different, but the beauty of the format is its flexibility, a quality that will ensure its survival in the years ahead.

Peacekeeping reaches its outer limits when there is no peace to keep and the UN force is caught in a hot war between protagonists, as in Bosnia. This is not true peacekeeping, but treading the hazardous edge between two worlds with a different set of rules entirely.

4. PEACE-BUILDING

Boutros-Ghali has devised a new category as the ultimate stage in the new peace and security equation, that of post-conflict peace-building or rehabilitation. With preventive diplomacy, they are meant together to be the instruments of choice for the nineties, the enforcement option being used as seldom as possible. Indeed, with the development and refinement of the UN's early warning system and preventive/peacemaking measures, there is hope for a more stable and better ordered international system in future. Hope also that the need for expensive military operations will gradually diminish.

The Cambodian Experiment

While Namibia was the UN's first experience of helping a newly independent nation evolve over a period of months toward democracy, it was child's play compared to the enormous peace-building task it has assumed in Cambodia: nothing less than the reconstruction of a country destroyed by decades of war and upheaval. Never has the UN tried anything so ambitious, and never has it required such an astronomically high budget - \$1.7 billion with 22,000 military and civilian personnel.

UNTAC has had success in preparing for elections, but is decidedly not without its problems, quite apart from the refusal to cooperate of the Khmer Rouge, still waging a guerilla war. For many Cambodians whose per capita income is about \$150 a year, the main impact of the operation so far with the invasion (albeit peaceful) of thousands of troops, civilian police and officials has been soaring inflation, with people paying two to five times more for food, fuel and rent than they did before the UN arrived. Such unreachable prices are also creating resettlement problems for refugees returning from camps in Thailand. In the get-rich-quick atmosphere corruption has grown up among local officials, along with, inevitably, a flourishing black market.

For the Next Time

It seems probable that peace-building is going to be a growth industry in future (with Somalia a likely candidate), and although expensive, it is still a great deal cheaper than prolonged armed conflict and anarchy. There are lessons to be learned

from the first two experiences which could result not only in a better outcome but in appreciable savings, an element of urgent importance given the UN's serious funding problems.

(a) A recent Washington Post survey of the situation concluded that the UN's forces and official staff in Cambodia were living much more luxuriously than they needed to, even in contrast to the foreign civilian volunteers, and that very little attention was being paid to the auditing of costs.

(b) According to the same source, a great deal more care should have been taken to assess local conditions before 19,500 troops and police and 1,020 international UN staff were permitted to sweep in and unwittingly destabilize the economic and social system.

(c) When the peace building project in Namibia was completed, the UN apparently left behind for the new government (i.e. local officials) equipment worth nearly \$26 million, instead of keeping it for re-use in future operations. In its present situation the UN cannot afford to buy new equipment every time it sets up an operation.

A UNITED NATIONS MULTINATIONAL FORCE*

The Secretary-General has called for a UN standing army, but a more likely formula is what Article 43 of the Charter sets out: members should make available forces to be on call.

Now that the UN's chief peace and security roles are becoming more clearly defined-peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding - the forces needed to realize them should logically be combined for the nineties in a single, rapid reaction multinational force that would also be multi-purpose.

Countries would designate forces to be on standby for these duties, a practice already established (for peacekeeping) by Canada, the Nordics and France. Special courses would be required for the different types of military duty, and for this peacekeeping training centres might be set up, (as the Swedes have already done) but the basic requirement would still be that of the professional soldier, able to act in all foreseeable circumstances.

The main difference would be that a UN Multinational Force would exercise together at intervals, though they would continue to be nationally based. A useful model for this exists already in NATO's Ace Mobile Force which brings together several countries' rapid response units for regular manoeuvres.

* The idea for such a Force was put forward in a policy paper prepared in 1991 for the Department of National Defence by Brigadier-General I.C. Douglas, who kindly agreed to its use here.

An Operations and Command Centre

Another key and essential difference would be the strengthening and enlargement of the peacekeeping unit at UN Headquarters to include a professional military component and command structure. The UN does need cutbacks, but this is not the area for them. In spite of the number of operations world-wide and the constant crises erupting, the unit is currently operated by a handful of individuals working 9 to 5 and unable to cope with urgent calls made out of different time zones around the clock, a situation that can lead to disaster. A 24-hour operations centre is a minimum requirement for today's U.N.

FINANCING PEACEKEEPING

(i) The Case of Cyprus

After twenty-eight years of peacekeeping and several failed attempts by past Secretaries-General at conciliating the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides, many in Canada have wondered if the UN peacekeepers themselves had become part of the problem, freezing it into an immobility which saved the protagonists the trouble of having to work out a compromise.

Canadian authorities have understandably been losing patience - along with Denmark and Sweden who have already withdrawn - and warned both sides in 1992 that Canada would pull out within the next months if there were no signs of progress. For a time it had looked as though the end of the Cold War would have a peace dividend after all, in Cyprus. With no more Soviet mischief-making in the Mediterranean, it was thought that Greek/Turkish enmity, one of the root causes of the problem, would now give way to rapprochement because of new preoccupations in the Balkans and Central Asia, where each, respectively, has vital interests. But it was not to be. At the parallel negotiations sponsored by the UN in the summer of 1992 to look at a plan for a bizonal and bicomunal federal state, the old posturing took over, ending any hope for a solution.

Reaction has been swift. In December Canada announced the withdrawal of its 575 troops, UNFICYP's largest contingent, by June, 1993. Combined with cutbacks by the British and Austrians this will leave less than 1000 on the ground, and it seems unlikely that any other country could be persuaded to take up the slack at this stage. But since the recent Presidential election in Cyprus brought a candidate to power who is in favour of at least parts of the peace plan, it may mean that negotiations will begin in earnest, now that he is faced with the reality of mass troop departures.

Object Lessons from UNFICYP

1. Peacekeeping should not be open-ended, but generous notice should be given for (ideally) phased withdrawals.
2. Funding - Canada should not, in principle, undertake future peacekeeping roles for which it has to shoulder virtually all the costs, as in Cyprus. Since 1964, very little of the expenses involved in supporting the 25,000 Canadians who have served there have been recovered from the U.N. Other peacekeeping operations are funded through generally assessed U.N. contributions, but UNFICYP's financing has been unique, an example not to be followed. A recent assignment in Bosnia (UNPROFOR II) looked to be heading in that direction on an "emergency" basis but Canada should continue to be wary of such arrangements.

(ii) General Financing

The financing of UN peacekeeping (used here generically to cover all security-related operations, including peace-building) is often a cliff-hanging affair because of mounting crises and demands, combined with the failure of a number of countries to pay their peacekeeping assessments, or to pay them on time. The most striking examples concern three of peacekeeping's main contributors: the USA, with huge arrears, pays late when it does pay; Japan, also a late payer and Russia, which currently can barely afford to pay anything.

In an attempt to deal with this situation, the Secretary-General has put forward the (a) idea of a revolving peacekeeping reserve fund of \$50 million to meet initial expenses; instead the General Assembly approved in December '92 an extension to the UN's Working Capital Fund for the same purpose and (b) a UN Peace Endowment Fund with an initial target of \$1 billion to come from the private sector and individuals as well as governments, the proceeds from the investment of which would be used to finance peacekeeping.

The Ford Foundation's report of February 1993 recommended a larger reserve fund of \$400 million and suggested that because peacekeeping is an investment in security, governments should finance it from their national defence budgets.

■ Canada has long favoured the idea of a reserve fund for peacekeeping and should continue to support all the UN's efforts to put peacekeeping financing on a sounder footing, including such measures as setting up reserve stocks of equipment which could be recycled through a number of operations.

*A Special Issue
of the Nineties*

Hope for Change in US Policy at the United Nations

The United States has been a difficult UN partner over the past twelve years. Only reluctant multilateralists, the Americans have preferred the unilateral approach to world problems, resolutely refusing to put their forces under United Nations command - i.e. no UN peacekeepers. The conduct of the Gulf War was a primary example of this mind-set and the US military's humanitarian/enforcement operation in Somalia was in conjunction with but not part of the UN operation. The Pentagon's 1992 strategy with its commitment to a constant build-up of military might perpetuated the image of the last superpower - a "globocop" for the world. Pax Americana was the watchword in Washington.

Worse from the UN's point of view was the US refusal, even while dominating the Security Council, to pay its full share of dues throughout the 80's, resulting in a staggering backlog of \$700 million, a missing amount which has severely handicapped the UN while having the effect of encouraging some other donors to do the same thing: make excuses about their inability to pay when it is of course a matter of political will and priorities. American foot-dragging on the environment at the UN's Rio Conference in June 1992 threatened to, but in the end did not scuttle some of the major initiatives undertaken there, but an important leadership opportunity was missed.

With the new Clinton administration, however, there are strong indications of a sea change in American United Nations policy, which should make it much easier for Canada, as a convinced UN supporter, to work there in harmony with our closest neighbour.

The signs are positive: most importantly, the new Secretary of State Warren Christopher has gone on record as saying they wish to clear up the financial backlog owing the UN, and the President himself - in what could be a major departure - has said that he favours a more multilateral approach to UN security matters ("We can't be the world's policeman"). Environmental questions have been given a new high profile in American policy as a direct result of the Vice-President's personal interest and involvement, and there is every likelihood that this emphasis will be reflected at the UN. With time this new approach could have an impact on a wide range of urgent problems that require global solutions. Without expecting miracles, if the Organization were looking for a 50th birthday present, it could hardly have asked for better than this.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- *Canada should support the main lines of the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace" as the best option for an effective international security system; and work to modernize the International Court of Justice and the UN's sanctions mechanisms.*
- *The UN needs a rapid-reaction UN Multinational Force, to be backed up by an expanded peacekeeping unit and a fully staffed 24-hour operations centre at UN headquarters in New York.*
- *The recent appointment of a senior Canadian military officer as advisor to the Secretary-General on peacekeeping provides an opening for Canada to help bring about some changes.*
- *Canada could help to ensure that the next peace-building exercise is set up on more economical lines than those prevailing in the Cambodian exercise and includes the recycling of equipment.*

C. EMERGENCY COORDINATION

Events of recent years have shown us that what Urquhart and Childers have called the 'continuous humanitarian emergency' is going to be a dominant feature of the 90's, with significant impact on the future of international peace and security.

A Rising Toll of Natural and Man-made Disasters

Cyclones, floods, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions - the number of natural disasters is rising at an alarming rate, now at about eight a year compared with two in the 1960's. Though unavoidable, their impact has been exacerbated by deforestation, overfarming and the rise of megacities, and they are causing widespread suffering and displacements of people. Technological accidents like Chernobyl, though still less common, are no less devastating in human terms as is war, the ultimate catastrophe.

Population Pressures

World population growth is almost becoming a natural disaster in itself, currently at 5.4 billion and rising rapidly by 97 million a year, particularly in developing countries. Combined with poverty and pressures on the environment in the search for food (a direct cause of desertification) it is leading to civil strife and ultimately to mass movements of population: there are believed to be about 17 million refugees on the move.

Likely to have a significant impact on the developed world, perhaps sooner than we imagine, as millions seek a better life in the North, this population/environment/migration linkage has not yet been seriously faced at top political levels like the G 7, but the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development promises to give these issues more immediacy and the hope of handling the coming pressures in a way that is both orderly and fair. Fortunately, the period of U.S. abdication on population issues appears to be ending.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COORDINATOR

Convinced of the need for a new and more effective United Nations instrument to come to terms with an increasingly dangerous environment, and mindful of the chaotic relief effort that followed the Gulf War, Canada worked actively with other countries for a UN resolution establishing the office of a high level emergency coordinator. In early 1992 Ambassador Jan Eliasson of Sweden was appointed to direct the new Department of Humanitarian Affairs at the rank of Under-Secretary. An experienced diplomat with a strong track record as chief negotiator of the successful Iran/Iraq peace talks, his mandate was to coordinate the UN's somewhat disorganized humanitarian relief work and promote the smooth transition to

reconstruction and long-term development with the cooperation of other UN organs, the Red Cross and the various voluntary agencies. All this was to assume a greatly strengthened early warning capacity.

A Difficult Beginning

The Coordinator has had a rocky start in conditions that could hardly be more inauspicious, made more difficult by turf battles. The war in the former Yugoslavia was several months old, with the UNHCR already in charge of humanitarian relief there, making coordination efforts by a new authority virtually impossible. The daunting challenge in Somalia therefore became the Coordinator's first real test case, with a revolving fund of \$50 million as start-up.

Problems and Prospects

There are other problems. The DHA is still not satisfactorily established with sufficient budget and resources to carry out a professional operation, even as it must wrestle with crises in many parts of the world. Eliasson is also experiencing difficulties because the too-weak language of the UNGA resolution setting up the DHA does not give him enough power to direct the other UN agencies in the humanitarian field. Although he has attempted to do this collegially, he has to contend with strong personalities like UNHCR Commissioner Sadako Ogata, who do not wish to be coordinated. In ex-Yugoslavia, for example, many tasks are beyond the purview of the refugee agency and would greatly benefit from more team effort on the part of the UN.

One of the most serious handicaps has been, surprisingly, the Secretary-General himself, who has failed to give the DHA and Eliasson the support and credibility with donors that they need for success. Boutros-Ghali's habit of appointing his own special representatives to deal with humanitarian-related crises while bypassing the DHA and without consulting the Coordinator will defeat the purposes of the new department and demoralize the staff if it is allowed to continue.

Even so, and given its present imperfections, the DHA is clearly an advance on the confused ad hocery which preceded it, and its consolidated appeals have been a major success. Following his own credo, to "be innovative or become irrelevant" the Coordinator is determined to do what he can to establish his own authority. Applying his recognized inter-personal skills and with strong support from member states (which would help to bring the Secretary-General on side) there is every possibility that he could have emergency coordination operating much more smoothly in time. What is certain is that there will be no shortage of emergencies of all kinds requiring the DHA's services in the decade ahead.

Toward Humanitarian Interventionism

Meanwhile the DHA is creating precedents in the political/security area. As the debates have continued at the UN and in capitals over the last months on how far to carry out enforcement action in peacemaking, "humanitarian interventionism" has moved ahead in Somalia. It is here that events have most noticeably forced the pace of evolution as peacekeeping/peacemaking and humanitarian missions become more closely intertwined. Like so much in today's UN, policy still lags behind the action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Canada as one of the initiators has an important stake in the DHA's ability to deliver enhanced emergency coordination and should give it and the Coordinator strong support. From the Chair of the donors' working group in Geneva, Canada is well placed to urge other members to extend a similar vote of confidence and to convey the message to the Secretary-General that the DHA is a priority which deserves his full cooperation.

- A key element for future success will be rapid access to advance information on threatened emergencies. The DHA should have a "global watch" office and all the UN's best early warning resources (including certain information made available to the Security Council) should be at the disposal of the Coordinator. At some time in the future it is not too much to hope that the UN will have satellite reconnaissance capabilities as part of this system.

II. THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Safety in the Balance of Terror

In retrospect it is possible to admit that the bipolar structure of the last 40 years played a key role in preventing nuclear proliferation, particularly as the two superpowers offered guarantees to their allies. But the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite system has put a dramatic end to this neat arrangement. Now the probability is that nuclear catastrophe could originate anywhere, even in some small country - by accident or by design - having only a modest nuclear arsenal. There are other dangerous possibilities and in fact for many the risk of nuclear proliferation is now seen as the greatest single threat to world peace and security.

The Nuclear Bazaar

Political breakdown in Central Europe has left a dangerous legacy: an outflow of nuclear components, expertise and technology which could fuel the nascent nuclear programs and bomb-developing capacities of certain countries, particularly in the Middle East, and be a possible source of weapons for terrorist groups.

- ◀ **Soviet scientists, and weapons designers suddenly jobless or free to look for better-paying work elsewhere, have been vulnerable to lucrative bids from countries with nascent nuclear programs like Iran, Syria, Libya, Algeria and North Korea. (None of these has signed the NPT.) Others have become entrepreneurs in founding "Chetek", a firm which has sold nuclear reactors over the past two years to Pakistan, India and Argentina, all of whom refuse to abide by international safeguards.**
- ◀ **Shortage of hard currency in the FSU states means that the same countries are likely to be an important arms market (along with those like India who already have an investment in Soviet arms). Selling plutonium and old armaments to help pay for military conversion is now actually official policy, and there appears to be weak enforcement of export controls.**
- ◀ **As hundreds of warheads are dismantled in Russia and the other republics, a surge of nuclear material will become available, along with severe problems in keeping track of it. Authorities apparently have great difficulty even now in controlling the material in civilian reactors.**
- ◀ **Predictably a lethal mix of such materials is now finding its way into the shadowy world of smuggling and the black market. Police reports of the past months have given ample evidence of individual entrepreneurship: arrests in Vienna of persons attempting to sell several pounds of weapons-grade uranium to a middleman; the discovery in Romania of a uranium**

smuggling ring involving people who worked for the nuclear industry; Russians arrested in Munich for attempting to sell enriched uranium; even the pendulums of clocks in a Hungarian village were used to conceal enriched uranium pellets. Such discoveries have probably only scratched the surface and indicate that the situation may be reaching serious proportions.

- ◀ Further, former East block arms industries are capable of making key nuclear weapons components and there are fears old channels to terrorist groups could become part of the black market.

Nuclear Time Bombs

- ◀ Of the antiquated nuclear reactors in Russia, the FSU and East Europe, at least 26 have "serious" safety deficiencies according to the IAEA, and 14 are regarded as considerably flawed. All are dangerous. In the spring of 1992 a leak at the Leningradskaya plant near St. Petersburg registered 3. (The worst nuclear accident on record at Chernobyl registered 7).
- ◀ It was Chernobyl that provided the ultimate nightmare of what can go wrong with poorly-designed and haphazardly-run installations. Recently started up again after pleas that energy was essential for the winter, it is still regarded as fundamentally unsafe and with the departure of many Russians, is now being operated by inadequately trained and paid Ukrainians. There are about 19 more badly designed reactors like Chernobyl in the FSU.
- ◀ For more than 30 years the Soviets have been dumping huge quantities of radioactive waste into the sea along the Arctic coast where currents can carry contaminants to the northern coast of Canada. At least 8 marine reactors have been scuttled around Novaya Zemlya and 4 (known) Soviet submarines, their reactors filled with nuclear fuel, have sunk accidentally-including "Komsomolets"-off the coast of Norway where it is leaking cesium-137, a carcinogenic isotope. It carried two nuclear torpedoes and experts have warned that plutonium could spill into the water and contaminate vast areas of the ocean as early as 1994.

I SHORT-TERM APPROACHES

(a) A very high priority must be given by Western governments to assisting in the overhaul of the FSU/East Bloc nuclear system, an issue given high profile at the G7 Munich Summit. Canadian experts are well placed to play a prominent role in fitting the Chernobyl-type RBMK reactors with modern safety features (pending their eventual replacement by more acceptable models) since there are a few operational features similar to those of the CANDU. If this is to mean anything, training and supervision of local technicians must be included.

(b) more creative policies are needed to help ex-Soviet officials find safe jobs such as the establishment of the International Science and Technology Centres in Russia and Ukraine (in which Canada is involved with the US, Japan and Sweden) and the Canada-Russia Nuclear Safety and Engineering Centre. The former also provides a channel for the continued pressure that will be required to encourage Ukraine to live up to its commitments to become non-nuclear.

(c) The "open city" in illegal nuclear materials should be dealt with on an emergency basis as a crime wave of a magnitude hitherto unknown. Organizations such as the UN's Crime Commission and Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, and INTERPOL (now headed by a Canadian) could be enlisted, and whether or not it is carried out under UN auspices a special international conference should be called as part of a global effort to avoid a major nuclear catastrophe whether it be through accident, terrorism, or regional conflict.

II PROLIFERATION ISSUES OF THE 1990'S: OLD AND NEW

Apart from the new problems of nuclear control arising out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union noted above, there are traditional concerns that have become more acute.

(i) The Long Road to Arms Control

Since 1959 the UN has done some landmark work in this area, but too many loopholes remain. Over the years a number of arms control agreements have slowly and tortuously been put in place, including nuclear-free zones in the Antarctic, Latin America, South Pacific and the sea-bed. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (underground testing still being permitted) and the 1969 Non-Proliferation Treaty were major milestones, though they lacked a certain sense of urgency because of what amounted to a security net provided by the bloc structure.

Little was done about monitoring, so correspondingly little was known about the extent to which their provisions were being flouted. In any event, the arms race continued and in the 1970's the UN called for a Disarmament Decade: its special sessions led to agreement on "revitalized" machinery. What emerged was the

Disarmament Commission as a committee of the General Assembly, and the Conference on Disarmament, a negotiating forum with 40 members based in Geneva.

The 1980's Second Disarmament Decade fared less well, neither of its special sessions being able to reach agreement on basic agenda items or a substantive document, even with the USA/USSR weapons reduction treaties of that period. Never easy at best, disarmament efforts tend to be stonewalled when they go beyond the abstract and touch on national self-interest. While the superpowers' nuclear deterrent kept the process in some form of balance the rest of the world believed it could safely quibble and equivocate. With the security net gone, it can no longer afford that luxury.

(ii) Non-Proliferation Treaty

In spite of the shadow hanging over the NPT because of the way Iraq, a signatory, has cynically flouted it, it remains the only global instrument through which states can make a formal commitment to the Treaty (and to its link with the IAEA safeguards system) and is thus an indispensable element of international security. Its membership now stands at 144, including all nuclear weapons states (France and China being latecomers in 1991).

Traditional concerns have been that NPT states with non-weapon nuclear capacity, i.e. Japan and South Korea, might divert material to military uses; or, more likely, that non-safeguarded nuclear facilities (India, Pakistan, Israel) might attempt to develop weapons systems. Newer concerns include NPT parties with undeclared nuclear programs who lie and attempt to conceal, like Iraq or North Korea, which has plutonium producing reactors and reprocessing facilities, and whose trustworthiness remains suspect; and Middle Eastern countries like Iran, which are openly attempting to obtain nuclear weapons. Urgent questions of responsibility for the approximately 27,000 nuclear warheads spread over the territory of the new independent republics of the FSU greatly compounds the difficulty of guaranteeing non-proliferation policies, in spite of declarations by, e.g., the Ukraine, that they wish to be nuclear free.

The NPT is due to be extended in 1995 and there will now be pressure on the rest to join before that particular anniversary. Some of the ways to make membership attractive (and discourage the temptation to acquire nuclear weapons) would be to (a) offer incentives such as international security guarantees, particularly to East European and CIS/FSU countries where the disappearance of the old alliance system has left a vacuum; and (b) to link non-proliferation commitments to economic assistance which could involve a series of multilateral aid packages as encouragement.

(iii) Nuclear-Free Weapons Zones

More NFZ's could provide a valuable safety net should the NPT fall short. The signs are favourable in Latin America and South Africa's recent accession to the NPT could be the catalyst for a zone in Southern Africa and perhaps ultimately the whole

continent. A Central European NFZ might be constructed from the core of the former DDR, which was required by the unification agreement to create a nuclear-weapons free zone in its Eastern laender. The Middle East and Asia are more complex and difficult, but exploratory discussions might identify converging security interests in at least some areas and could be in themselves a form of confidence-building.

(iv) Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

An end to nuclear testing and the abolition of all nuclear weapons are longer term goals, and the political conditions for a world consensus are more favourable now than for many years. The Americans will be the key, and the extent to which they will be willing to maintain their testing moratorium past 1993. Here, as elsewhere, the more multilateral approach of the new team in Washington may well be reflected in movement.

(v) Manhattan II

A proposal for a Manhattan II project to "undo the Doomsday machine" and reverse what happened when the 1942 original produced the first atomic bomb delivered at Hiroshima three years later, suggests that 1995 would be an apt deadline for some real progress on a comprehensive package that, along with universal NPT adherence, would require nuclear states to agree to the end of testing and to a comprehensive test ban; commitment to reduce strategic warheads to a basic deterrence level of 100 or less by the year 2000; and agreement to end the production of weapons-grade fissile material, placing all production facilities and materials recovered in the disarmament process under strengthened IAEA safeguards. Although unlikely of realization in such a short time-span, working toward such a comprehensive regime as a goal would appear to be the only alternative to nuclear chaos.

(vi) A U.N. Space Agency

At some time in the future, prospects seem good for the conversion of existing advanced rocket technology (primarily U.S. and Russian) to a cooperative exploration of space, eventually depoliticized and placed under United Nations authority.

III THE LONGER TERM: DEALING WITH THE FUTURE

How does the UN system propose to meet some of the most pressing global challenges of the decade? Looked at in the cold light of reality its current machinery appears sadly inadequate.

The IAEA Has No Teeth

In 1956 the IAEA was set up in Vienna to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy, set standards for nuclear safety and offer technical assistance. A key function was to apply safeguards to prevent diversion of material and equipment to military purposes. Unfortunately, it has no teeth, or it refuses to use them: though actually empowered by the Charter to complain to the Security Council about nuclear violations, it has done so only once in over 40 years.

The Conference on Disarmament is Not Up To It

By all accounts, the CD is in no shape to meet the demands of rapid change and movement. Characterized as 'unproductive and impotent' by those Canadians closest to its inner workings, they point to such failings as its out-of-date agenda, the requirement for consensus on every detail (which means major decisions can be blocked by one or two members) the lack of technical expertise among its membership, and a tendency to perpetuate outmoded blocs. It is hard to imagine that this is a body capable of grappling with today's urgent nuclear realities, or of leading on new approaches in the name of developing a stronger international order.

The CD has just, after long travail, produced the Convention on Chemical Weapons - clearly a valuable contribution, but the process was far too leisurely. The UN cannot afford to be limping along with handicapped mechanisms in this area: already the G7, NATO and the OECD are beginning to deal with proliferation questions in their own separate ways, manoeuvring around and excluding the UN, and this will increasingly be the case until it is capable of assuming its leadership role. The CD negotiating forum needs a quite different approach if it is going to be effective.

To give more immediacy and thrust to what should be a key negotiating forum, the CD's agenda and procedures should be updated to better reflect current realities. Completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be a logical project on which to concentrate its efforts. At the same time, consideration should be given to amalgamating the UN Disarmament Commission with the CD in Geneva at some time in the future, a step which would eliminate duplication, while focusing the work by relating discussion more closely to specific disarmament agreements under negotiation. The need for a global body to identify priorities and to build consensus and momentum is adequately provided for by the GA's First Committee.

The CD clearly needs to broaden its membership base beyond the present 40 if it is to have relevance in future. To this end, the twenty countries now applying for

admission could be accommodated through a rotating roster (in the manner of the non-permanent members of the Security Council) so that the CD's membership would not be too unwieldy for useful discussion - say about 50 at any given time.

A STRENGTHENED IAEA AS TOP PRIORITY

To enable the UN to play its part, which should be a key one, in administering an anti-proliferation regime and dealing with nuclear emergencies, it must have an expanded organization with a greatly enhanced capacity for intelligence gathering, monitoring, verifying and penalizing, and one more closely linked to the Security Council. The IAEA in its present enfeebled state does not have the authority to assume this all-important task.

A new, fortified IAEA will need:

- **A much-broadened safeguards inspections mandate to include facilities as well as materials, uranium concentrates and even mining operations with more concentration on high-risk countries.**
- **A strong mandate to monitor fissile material storage, especially as nuclear warheads are dismantled and transferred to non-military stockpiles or disposal, operations which should take place under IAEA supervision**
- **A capacity for more intrusive monitoring of research facilities in order to detect clandestine programs before their production phase**
- **An ability to offer technical assistance to those in charge of the unsafe "Eastinghouse" reactors of East Europe and help to ex-Soviet scientists in finding new jobs (augmenting national efforts in both spheres)**
- **The establishment of a multilateral verification regime and mechanism to service disarmament agreements such as the NPT and new Chemical Weapons Convention; whether this is set up within or outside the IAEA, ensuring compliance is crucial since an increasing number of countries have weapons and technology; surveillance technology, however, is improving.**
- **An upgrading of the quality of intelligence - although the option of a UN satellite capability may be far in the future it should not be ruled out; in the meantime a collation centre for data from national sources should be established which would supply information to the IAEA on suspect facilities. (In dealing with Iraq, the IAEA was given material from national satellites and other intelligence information which it 'would not normally have', but this is exactly what it should have normally and routinely).**

- A mandate and resources to supervise nuclear cleanup in the FSU and Arctic Ocean areas

**ESSENTIAL TO A FORTIFIED IAEA: CLOSE LINKS WITH THE
SECURITY COUNCIL**

Key to the success of any new measures to give the IAEA real clout will be their development and approval by the Security Council; the Iraq emergency brought the IAEA into close cooperation with the Council for the first time, an experience which provides a format for the years ahead. This has implications not only for more frequent reporting to the SC of violations but the whole question of penalties. The IAEA needs not just more resources but teeth, and involving the SC gives the Agency the possibility of access to a coercive instrument in extreme cases - not excluding various forms of sanctions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Canada has a long and active history in the disarmament and arms control process, most recently through its successful United Nations initiative leading to the establishment of a global arms register, and work on the new CWC. In this tradition, Canadians should take a lead in efforts to considerably expand both the IAEA's mandate and its resources, (this is not the place for zero real growth) and to ensure it is up to the demanding tasks of the next years. There are fewer more important priorities than this, both in terms of human survival and the UN's future credibility.
- It will be important to take care that the new regime rests on a partnership between the developed and developing world, a difficult proposition that will be made easier when the Security Council's membership reflects the real world.
- Canada should also use its special access with the Third World and other hold-outs to work for universal adherence to the NPT and its indefinite extension beyond 1995; and with other colleagues for the Manhattan II approach to a comprehensive regime.
- To enable the Conference on Disarmament to more effectively fulfill its key role as the lead negotiating forum, it should be amalgamated with the UNDC, its membership base broadened, and its agendas and procedures updated.

III. THE ENVIRONMENT

Because of the urgency of what is happening to the world's environment and what it means for all the earth's inhabitants, this issue must be one of the UN's top priorities in the 90's and beyond. Ozone depletion, global warming, pollution of the lakes and oceans and the loss of species have all brought the planet to a state that could threaten humanity's survival in the next generation.

The implications of a major environmental catastrophe are so far-reaching and the consequences so horrendous that it is not an exaggeration to regard this as a peace and security issue, no less than containing armed conflict or controlling nuclear proliferation. But since such disasters are going to be unavoidable if current trends continue, a determined international effort is called for and only the universality of the United Nations can provide the leadership to deal globally with the everyday crises and major accidents that lie ahead. Indeed, much of what progress has been made thus far has been under its aegis.

1. EARLY WARNINGS: LIMITS TO GROWTH

General awareness of the trouble we are in is a fairly new phenomenon. The UN Charter was silent on the environment and why should it have been otherwise? In the forties, it was simply there, immutable, taken for granted. With the debris of war cleared away, all would be as before.

Few thought seriously in terms of the environment's fragility, though there were isolated voices like Rachel Carson's in "Silent Spring" and marine biologist Jacques Cousteau's warning about dying oceans. When the Club of Rome issued its chilling report in the early 1970's which concluded that if current trends continued unchecked the limits to growth on this planet would be reached within a century - it was to a small, elite audience and caused only a minor stir. The Thames was being cleaned up through the wonders of technology, and it looked as if this was going to be the answer.

2. STOCKHOLM AND THE YEAR OF AWAKENING

It took the first UN Conference on the Environment in Stockholm in 1972, a watershed in consciousness-raising, to sound the alarm and to galvanize the world community for the first time into some form of action. Its final Declaration was the first international acknowledgment of the need for new standards of behaviour and responsibility.

The conference was led by Maurice Strong, an early and determined pioneer of the global approach to environmental management, whose experience at the External Aid office in Ottawa helped him to understand the developing South's view that they should be reimbursed for the losses they would suffer in slowing down their

rate of industrialization. Admitting this symbiotic interaction between environment and development was the basis for the consensus that finally emerged at Stockholm. It was also the forerunner of what was to become the dominant theme at Rio two decades later.

3. THE BRUNDTLAND REPORT AND THE ROAD TO RIO

In the slow progress toward a global management system this was a key milestone in human awareness and apprehension about the environment. "Our Common Future" (1987) declared that

"Most of today's decision-makers will be dead before the planet suffers the full consequences of acid rain, global warming, ozone depletion, widespread desertification and species loss; most of today's young voters will be alive."

Concluding that many aspects of human progress were no longer ecologically or economically viable, they called for what they termed "sustainable development" - meeting the needs of the present without compromising the future. At the same time they acknowledged that there had been some movement in the 15 years since Stockholm - conventions like the Montreal Protocol, national Green Plans, the advent of recycling and new technologies - and no less importantly, the greening of public consciousness.

4. "BEYOND THE LIMITS" - CLUB OF ROME PART 2

In parallel, though, it seemed that wear and tear on the planet was proceeding at a far greater pace. On the eve of UNCED came news of a further rent in the ozone layer posing new hazards to human health, revelations on the catastrophic state of post-communist East Europe (a casebook of all that could go wrong) and bad news for Canada about the Arctic: evidence that the Soviets had been using it as an industrial dumping ground, with probably irreversible consequences for the whole Arctic ecosystem; and the threat to the existence of Island states everywhere from global warming.

Just weeks before Rio a systems analysis appeared from the authors of the original 1972 Club of Rome report with the bleak warning of its subtitle, "Confronting Global Collapse." The use of computerized projections and the most complete data ever assembled produced a stark prognosis: future life on the planet cannot be viable without severe limits on population, pollution, soil erosion and energy output. Since according to this evidence the present level of consumption is dangerously unsustainable, there must be what the authors term wide-scale "drawing back, gearing down and contracting" by both governments and individuals.

This has, of course, real implications for life-style, and is a daunting prospect, both politically and psychologically, for a generation raised on the promise of perpetual material growth. Yet "Beyond the Limits" points to the new horizons which could open up if the concepts of limits and sustainability were to be seen less as threats than as blueprints for the future. However, this research shows that if present trends remain unchanged we face the virtually certain prospect of a global economic collapse in the next century.

UNCED - THE EARTH SUMMIT AT RIO, JUNE 1992

A. ITS ACHIEVEMENTS

Whether all delegates heard the clock ticking at Rio to the same degree, the Conference - again under Strong's energetic leadership - took place amidst great fanfare and elaborate media coverage, with an unprecedented number of heads of state and government present. This massive effort on behalf of the environment, the enormous publicity and information flows in the weeks before its opening, were not lost on world public opinion and have broadened the consensus that serious corrective action is required. Just importantly, it created a momentum for change. If acted upon by leaders these could be Rio's most enduring legacies. At the same time, there was disappointment that much more was not accomplished and that over-population, for example, one of the greatest of all ecological threats, was barely mentioned. For its successes, UNCED owes much to the international community of NGO's who sounded the alarm, educated the public, and at Rio, kept up the pressure on leaders to take action.

AGREEMENTS REACHED

- (a) Of the two major conventions signed, on Global Warming and Biodiversity, it was the Canadian Prime Minister who gave the lead on the latter, and encouraged many who were hesitating to join in, in spite of the discouraging US stance at that time.
- (b) Agenda 21, a blueprint and specific plan of action on which national governments will be expected to act.
- (c) From the North/South divergence of views on environment vs development (less confrontational than had been feared) came a better understanding of the other side's position, some financial assistance and promises of environmentally friendly technologies.
- (d) The beginnings of awareness by the business community that they must be part of the environmental equation in the future and that in fact this is in their long-term economic interests.

B. ITS MACHINERY

- **The Global Environment Fund** under the aegis of the IBRD/IMF, to be the banker for new environmental/ compensation schemes for Third World economies. Given the Bank and Fund's past record, however, it will be up to countries like Canada to exercise vigilance to ensure that its future policies are more eco-sensitive.
- **The Commission on Sustainable Development**, a new UN body reporting to ECOSOC which will monitor countries' progress on Agenda 21 and the Conventions. Here Canada is well placed to take a lead in helping the CSD develop the necessary authority and clout by: opening its own books early on Agenda 21 implementation and setting an example for others to do the same; by working for Ministerial involvement at regular intervals; by supporting greater participation by NGO's; by assisting in setting up objective measuring systems for the Commission's all-important monitoring work developed by reputable organizations like the OECD.
- **UNEP**, the UN Environment Program meanwhile continues its work, the institution that emerged from Stockholm in the 70's. It was a hopeful beginning, although its remote location in Nairobi has had the effect of reducing its impact and ability to liaise with other parts of the system. Nevertheless it has done important work in the areas of environmental monitoring and assessment, and on special programs such as desertification.

A TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

Looking to the future, however, it seems likely that all this will not be enough to deal with large-scale ecological crises, with major violations of international standards of behaviour (viz. Iraq and the oil wells of Kuwait) or with the refusal of nations to make the difficult changes necessary to sustain life on this planet through the next century.

The follow-up to UNCED has been disappointing and the UN's report on the state of the environment issued at the end of 1992 was pessimistic about the political will of governments, described as 'faltering in their efforts and losing the momentum they built up during the Earth Summit.' Hard times prompt leaders to think of shorter-term priorities. Regional conflicts and instability have distracted the world's attention away from the issues of Rio, even though some of those conflicts are environmentally based and threaten to be even more so in the future - overpopulation pressures and resources such as land and water, for example.

Meanwhile, as the same report points out, degradation of the ozone layer is accelerating much faster than expected and spreading to all latitudes, while the loss of tropical forests, animal and plant species and topsoil, along with contamination of water sources, continues at an alarming rate. In other words because all available data point to the fact that time is running out, global environmental control must be seen as a major security issue.

Unfortunately, the new Sustainable Development Commission and UNEP - while both will do good and necessary work - have neither the clout nor the authority to deal with major ecological crises or even to enforce their recommendations, and are likely to be seriously handicapped because of it. What will be needed not too far down the road is something like a Trusteeship Council for the Environment, a Security Council-like body which would have at its disposal an early-warning intelligence system and the ability to:

- (i) impose sanctions of varying levels of severity against those who use the environment as an instrument of war
- (ii) ensure rapid reaction to environmental crises
- (iii) have the authority to impose penalties on those not prepared to honour the Conventions and Protocols designed to preserve the integrity of the planet.

The present Trusteeship Council, set up in 1945 to assist in the decolonization process post-WWII, has to all intents and purposes fulfilled its mandate and its distinguished Chamber sits ready in New York for a new assignment. The idea of such a transformation, first mooted during the months of UNCED preparations, has

caught the interest of Boutros-Ghali who is said to favour it in some form. It seems altogether likely that it is an idea whose time, forced by circumstances, will come at some point in the 1990's.

CANADA'S POSITION

Although Canada has its own environmental problems and its record has been mixed in some areas (extremely high energy consumption and serious lake and river pollution, for example) it has become a respected activist on the international scene and has been exercising leadership, at UNCED and elsewhere, since the 1987 Montreal Protocol on the control of ozone-depleting CFC's. And at a time when the resolutions of UNCED appear to have lost momentum Canada has shown resolve in announcing increases of 30% in its Green Plan expenditures for 1993, in promoting coordination on environmental questions among government agencies, and in its determination to achieve sustainable development in practice - a balance between industrial growth and environmental quality.

By reassuring the business community that experience elsewhere (Germany and Japan) has shown that environmental regulation actually promotes competitiveness by pushing industries to be more innovative in their products and processes, the Government can help to allay their fears.

RECOMMENDATIONS

■ To maintain this leading edge Canada should not only make a point of living up to its international commitments but should also hold fast to its domestic environmental priorities and action plans for reducing waste, controlling toxic substances, and cleaning polluted lakes and rivers, in spite of government austerity cut-backs. Saving the environment is no frill.

■ Canada should work to ensure that the Sustainable Development Commission becomes the effective monitoring and coordinating instrument it was intended to be; the ability to influence others by example should not be underestimated.

Because U.S. environmental policy now promises to become more proactive, American support for this and other international initiatives should make a major difference in moving things forward.

■ Sustained and reliable funding for the GEF from Canada will be an essential part of the effort to incorporate the Third World successfully into the environmental equation.

■ Because overpopulation is one of the world's greatest threats to the environment Canada should give strong support to the UN's programs dealing with this issue.

■ UNEP's new Canadian Executive Director provides an opportunity for Canada to help strengthen an organization somewhat hampered by its remoteness - particularly in its ability to liaise with other parts of the UN system. A branch office in Geneva, for example, could enhance its effectiveness.

■ Because of the likelihood that these organisms alone will not be up to the major environmental challenges and crises ahead, Canada should support the creation of a high-level Trusteeship Council later in the 1990's which would have the power and authority, possibly in conjunction with a revitalized International Court of Justice, to maintain an effective international regime for the environment.

*A Special Issue
of the Nineties*

THE RISE OF THE NGO'S

Democratization of Foreign Policy?

One of the emerging trends of the 90's is the increased visibility and importance of non-governmental organizations (NGO's). After years of labouring in the trenches at the UN, the major impact they had on developments surrounding the Earth Summit at Rio has led to a kind of breakthrough which will almost certainly benefit NGO's advancing other causes as well - disarmament and human rights, for example. In effect what is taking place more or less imperceptibly, is a gradual democratization of foreign policy through input and pressure from large groups of concerned and organized private citizens. A unique phenomenon of the late 20th century, and obviously most pronounced in the democracies, Canadians have been familiar with it since activist ethnic groups began to have a policy impact early in the postwar period.

"We the peoples of the United Nations" are the opening words of the Charter. Although the people are never mentioned again, it is clear that Article 71, by providing a consultative role in the UN system for NGO's, meant them to assume that mantle - to bring to the deliberations of the UN a cross-section of world opinion, and in fact to be a major experiment. The League of Nations had made cautious moves in this direction, though not too happily, but there were NGO's at San Francisco to ensure that the idea survived.

Being There, But Being Marginal

ECOSOC was to be the body with which NGO's, both national and international, were to set up consultative arrangements; its NGO Committee early on determined that they were to function as (a) conduits of public opinion and (b) providers of expert advice. They were allowed to submit written statements and to sit at meetings as observers. Battles were fought over the right to place items on the agendas of ECOSOC or its agencies, and even in special cases to make oral interventions. At all times elaborate care was taken to ensure that they were never accorded the same privileges as Member States.

They did not escape the tensions of the Cold War, and the Soviets were active in blocking the participation of a good many in UN affairs. After a major scuffle in 1967 which arose from disclosures that the CIA was financing certain NGO's, while others were revealed to be fronting communist groups, ECOSOC undertook a thorough investigation of each NGO to ensure that they were free from the taint of governmental pressure or patronage. Some were subsequently dropped or downgraded. Today about 1000 are registered at the UN.

Moving Up: From Willing Helpmeet to Political Force

Gradually expanding their role through the 70's they played an important part in implementing UN decisions and programs, particularly in the development field; studies, reports, and technical surveys were another major area of contribution, which remained functional in nature. NGO's were still essentially adjuncts in a subservient role, with little impact on UN decision-making.

As time went on, however, they began to speak out more boldly, adopting political and moral positions, often successfully lobbying their national parliamentarians and conference delegates for increases in foreign aid or greater attention to some other cause. As they became stronger in a national context (e.g. in Latin America where they were contributing centrally to social and political change) this was reflected within the UN system, where they were building up new relationships with many of the Specialized Agencies. And at UN conferences - where the rules were more flexible than at regular committee or executive meetings - they found they could participate more freely, even publishing special conference newspapers that were not without impact.

It was when they began, at the Geneva Human Rights Commission, to assume the role of critics of certain governments' performances, complaining of violations and abuses, that there were flareups, threats of suspension, and visible signs of outer limits to their policy role.

The Limitations

In spite of all the progress, these are very real. (a) The very concept of NGO's (private entities acting as checks on governments) is Western, and anathema to authoritarian regimes; the UN's great Southern majority does not like them, and NGO's have therefore had to fight hard for survival as UN membership grew. (b) To the extent that they are such useful implementors of economic and social programs they are continually under pressure to abandon the proselytizing and crusading aspects of their work. (c) They have to face the discouraging fact that few delegates actually read NGO submissions and handouts. (d) Finally, their access will always be limited compared to that of full UN members.

The New Wave of The Future

(a) Environment

Yet in two special areas opportunities seem to be opening up to the UN's NGO's, most strikingly in the field of environment where they have convincingly earned their stripes. In the months leading up to the UNCED Conference the NGO's proved to be among the best informed on a complex subject, and were a primary

driving force educating and mobilizing public opinion through continuous press and media coverage. At Rio, their presence on delegations and at the vast parallel conference had the effect of pushing forward policy decisions.

Now they seek their due on the new Sustainable Development Commission, and finding ways of integrating them into its work with their expertise, enthusiasm and direct lines to public opinion should be an important priority for Canada and others establishing the SDC's mandate. In this area they have come of age as contributors to policy formulation, and can look forward to growing influence as environmental issues become more urgent in this decade.

(b) Human Rights

This is the other area in which the NGO's have scored highly. In spite of resistance from numbers of Third World countries they have persevered with their investigations and revelations of human rights abuses, publicizing them in the world media and at the Human Rights Commission, where they have helped to formulate the present set of procedures for dealing with them. Encouraged by their success, they are now asking for access to the General Assembly's Second Committee, firm places on HRC delegations, and in Ottawa more frequent briefings beyond the annual session now organized at External Affairs and International Trade.

In spite of the obstacles NGO's continue to face, the trend is clear: their influence will grow in the 1990's. As through mobilizing public opinion and the media to influence domestic decision-making they are becoming essential elements of the democratic process of nation states, so will they be increasingly at the UN. The momentum is there, a kind of democratization of international relations where "we the peoples" have an impact that really counts for something.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- ***Strong support by Canada for NGO participation in the Sustainable Development Commission and other UN agencies will help ensure the viability and relevance of those bodies.***

- ***To respond adequately to these new realities and challenges, EAITC should appoint a full-time officer in the UN Bureau to deal with NGO liaison and coordination. This would provide a direct line to public opinion and enable the Department to benefit both from the NGO's specialized knowledge and their sense of commitment.***

Part Three: STRENGTHENING THE UN'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ARM

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONTINUING PRIORITY FOR CANADA

Good Governance

Long an area of high priority for Canada at the UN, it was Professor John Humphrey of McGill University who was asked in 1946 to set up the first Human Rights Division in the Secretariat, and who subsequently became the chief drafter of the original Declaration of Human Rights. As far as the Covenant of the League of Nations was concerned the subject hardly existed, but in 1945 in the wake of the traumatic experience of war and the shock of Nazi concentration camp revelations, the founders at San Francisco saw to it that references to human rights appeared throughout the UN Charter from the first paragraphs of the preamble.

In our own decade the emphasis has been expanded from the classical definition of "universal respect for an observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction" to the more all-embracing and certainly more demanding concept of "good governance". This encompasses, beyond human rights, elements like an independent judiciary and free elections, along with further criteria such as the commitment to market-based economics and the amount governments spend on defence and social programs. When the Prime Minister announced at the Harare CHOGM in 1991 that Canada had decided there should be a direct link between good governance and aid eligibility, audience reaction was predictably far from positive. A concept like this also has trade implications sometimes difficult to reconcile. Nevertheless some "performance funding" has already begun, and the idea of a democratic culture is gaining ground at the United Nations in such new departures as conferences on electoral assistance and democratic education.

A. UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

At the same time, the everyday human rights reality is that horrifying abuses still continue worldwide with Myanmar, Iraq, and China being among the worst offenders, more recently joined in this dubious company by warring factions in the former Yugoslavia. At least 300,000 known political prisoners are detained without trial in 60 countries and it is estimated that government security forces or semi-official death squads killed political opponents in 45 countries last year.

At the same time some observers believe that judging by the increasing number of countries voting for resolutions at the 43-member Commission (established in 1946) there is also a kind of rising tide - or at least a trend - in favour of human rights. Certainly they have more prominence in the press and as an accepted component of international relations. Countries whose rulers would not have dreamed

of paying lip service to human rights ten years ago are speaking out for them, whether through real commitment or to preserve their reputations in the new climate.

Some of this change for the better is the direct result of the Commission's work. For years it has been hearing complaints, (often the result of investigations by NGO's like Amnesty International who play a pro-active role in this area) voting on resolutions condemning abuses, carrying out studies on violators, and appointing rapporteurs to look into allegations of torture. While its annual six-week session lasts there is a burst of activity, with revelations in the media momentarily focusing the world's shocked attention, but its role needs to be considerably bolstered and strengthened. As things stand, the Commission is unable to deliver on its resolutions.

Secretary-General's Warning on Fragmentation

Boutros-Ghali in September 1992 pointed out the real possibility that the world could fragment into scores of new mini-states based on ethnic and tribal self-determination. To avoid such chaos he has called urgently for stronger human rights machinery to provide guarantees that would make minority groups feel secure, before demands for secession begin to multiply. He hinted that this might mean Security Council involvement.

Looking to the World Conference on Human Rights, June 1993

Preparations for the WCHR in Vienna have proved difficult and even achieving an agenda was an arduous process in the face of attempts by some countries to sabotage it. But now that it is in place the Conference will provide excellent opportunities for Canada (and like-minded reformers) to play a lead role in advancing both human rights and its machinery, though the end result is likely to be more along the lines of direction-setting than decision-making.

By working patiently to encourage developing countries to improve their human rights records (there were some positive signs during the preparatory meetings of people trying to move ahead on this), by supporting creative initiatives like the parallel conference to be held in Vienna of National Human Rights Commissioners and Ombudsmen (the few that exist) which may inspire others to establish similar mechanisms at home, and by helping to facilitate a satellite hook-up for maximum media coverage - Canada can make a difference. In addition, there are a number of specific directions in which Canada should work to strengthen the Human Rights Commission over the longer term.

How To Give the Commission Clout

- World-wide publicity is what human rights offenders fear most, particularly if aid cuts are going to result, so there should be more emphasis on revelations through UN releases and coverage by responsible journalists on

an ongoing basis, not just a surge during March, followed by a year of discreet silence. The idea is to publicly embarrass.

- Though the Commission is the only world forum on human rights, a major drawback is that it sits for only one 6-week session a year and its potential is diminished accordingly. To increase its impact it or one of its major committees should meet more often, or at least be brought into emergency session to deal with crises in human rights as they occur.
- In extreme cases, such as the abuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Security Council may need to be involved in punitive action in some future regime set up to deal with war crimes.
- A UN Human Rights Commissioner who would speak out is essential to focus the Commission's work and give it profile, impact and continuity. Naturally, many CHR members will not like the idea but it is well worth pressing ahead with it for that very reason. Canada's experience could be helpful in pursuing this outcome.
- The Commission's work would also be more powerful if our Posts abroad and those of our reformist colleagues were instructed to follow up with local authorities on resolutions at least twice yearly to prevent good (or half-hearted) intentions from withering away or languishing forgotten, and to stimulate ongoing thinking and ideas. In the present set-up it is too easy to think of human rights obligations as a once-a-year phenomenon.
- The role of human rights NGO's at the Commission will continue to grow and it is in Canadian interests to regard them as partners - rather than a necessary evil - in order to have the benefits of their extensive information network.

Other Improvements

- There are now so many human rights conventions and monitoring bodies that most developing countries can't keep up with the reporting requirements, and even the Canadian provinces have complained. A consolidation of these bodies and their reporting burden should be a target to aim for.
- Human rights as an area of development cooperation is a new approach to which Canada could contribute significantly by making available expertise from federal and provincial Human Rights Commissions, Ombudsmen, and Privacy and Access to Information Commissioners.

RECOMMENDATION

- Canada has a great deal at stake in the human rights field and should campaign actively for such measures to both strengthen and extend the UN's human rights programs and its machinery. As the Secretary-General has suggested, this could be a key to avoiding ethnic strife in future. Nevertheless, paradoxically, human rights tends to be the UN's stepchild, always in danger of becoming marginalized and under-resourced. Canada should be vigilant in ensuring that its work is adequately funded and highlighted.

B. WOMEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The UN did not begin to focus on women's issues until the mid-1970's, but Canada has been a leader in that movement from the beginning, and while it has had support variously from the US, Australia, New Zealand and the Nordics, Canadians have often had to do the running. The UK has been actively obstructionist (a surprise to some), the other Europeans and Japan conservative, and the Arab/Islamic group generally negative. Since no critical mass yet exists, the small corps of movers remains crucial.

Even though Canada's own progress rate at home is relatively good - in what other country did its political leaders debate women's issues on TV during an election campaign? - it has to be admitted that it was a detail like the still-sizeable wage gap between men and women (who earn 69.6%) that prevented Canada from fully qualifying for its title of "best country to live in" in the UN's 1992 Human Development Index, effectively lowering it to No. 8. It is out in the wider world that Canada has shone particularly in pressing women's issues.

Steps Forward

Movement began with the World Conference on Women in Mexico in 1975, and the UN's first Decade of Women, culminating in the 1985 Nairobi Conference and its "Forward-looking Strategies". In 1995 and 2000 further meetings will register the decade's success in implementing those strategies. During this first phase - when Canadian delegations were among the most active - modest though tangible headway has been made, both nationally with new machinery for women's advancement, and in the UN system itself. All agencies have now appointed an official to integrate women's concerns into their programs.

One of the most striking achievements of this movement, however, has been the way it has drawn international attention to the appalling situation of the majority of women across the globe (the fortunate minority who live in certain industrialized countries excepted). Statistically, women perform 2/3 of the work for 1/10 of the income, owning only 1/100 of the world's property.

Three Steps Back

On the negative side of the coin, at least three trends have already clearly disadvantaged women in this decade: (a) the recession, and the fallout from the radical economic restructuring demanded of many developing countries by the IMF, during which women's jobs and opportunities have often been the first to go; (b) the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the attempt to dodge human rights by appealing to "cultural differences" (c) the increase in violence against women, partly a backlash against their perceived empowerment, and partly a function of a more open society, ready to reveal what had previously been hidden.

Tactics for the 90's: Making the UN Work for Women

To deal with and counteract these regressive trends, the best way forward globally and in a UN context would be for Canada, as an acknowledged leader in this field, to work to:

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ensure, since human rights are rarely "gender neutral", that the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna looks at how individual items apply to women. On economic grounds alone there is a strong case, since UN figures show that economic growth is fastest in those areas where women have higher status.
- Strengthen the thinly-staffed UN Women's Bureau in Vienna which suffered cutbacks in the 1987 retrenchment. The tasks facing its 12 officers will only increase, not diminish in the years ahead. Two smaller agencies devoted to assisting the integration of LDC women into mainstream economic development (UNIFEM and INSTRAW, the latter in the Dominican Republic) should be amalgamated in New York to avoid duplication.
- Persevere with the question of senior women in the UN Secretariat. The first to object to the lack of such appointments in the Secretary-General's first round in February 1992, Canada and other UN movers will need to exert continued pressure to reach the not unreasonable goal of 25% by 1995 at the senior levels and 35% of the professional grades. Of course, governments must be convinced to come forward with top candidates.
- Make the fullest use of the machinery now established - or being created - for women's issues in the Commonwealth, Francophonie and the OAS. These organizations cover a wide spectrum of developing countries where women's rights along with human rights generally are often ignored, and Canada's privileged relationships with them should be pursued in the UN context as well.

C. ABORIGINAL QUESTIONS

1993 is an International Year for the world's indigenous populations, and it is no exaggeration to say that the aboriginal item on the human rights agenda is the result of determined initiatives from Canada's native people to have their domestic grievances placed before the international forum provided by the Commission on Human Rights. This pressure exerted on Canada in the public eye has had the effect of moving matters forward to some degree at home, but more than that, Canadian aboriginal delegations became convinced that they should also help their colleagues elsewhere, and so in effect launched an international movement.

Canada now has a somewhat unusual - certainly innovative - relationship with its indigenous peoples within the UN system and the new partnership evolving at home (seen most vividly in the negotiations leading to the constitutional agreement of August 1992) owes much to the Human Rights Commission as a catalyst. At the same time, the 'aboriginal factor' has now become part of program thinking in UNICEF, UNCED, and other UN agencies. Another Canadian UN "first", even if unanticipated.

When it looked as though the constitutional problem might be on its way to a solution, Canada could have expected its aboriginal activists to turn their attention at the UN to environmental issues, but now, in light of the Referendum's "No" vote, their leadership has made it clear that it is 'back to the barricades' and a continuation of pressure in Geneva and elsewhere in the UN system to make up politically what was not won on October 26, 1992. Stepped-up efforts to have the UN recognize the inherent right of aboriginals to self-determination can therefore be expected.

RECOMMENDATION

- This new turn of events will require an active watching brief and timely policy responses, both in Ottawa and at the Commission, to avoid lasting damage to Canada's credibility, not only in the human rights area.

*A Special Issue
of the Nineties*

THE EMERGENCE OF THE EC BLOC

The European Community 12 have begun to operate more and more as a bloc at the UN, presaging a trend that is likely to become more pronounced throughout the UN system in future years. What is happening is that the 12 are increasingly presenting their fellow WEOG members (Western European and Others Group which includes Canada, the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) with a common position, in effect a fait accompli, and are not prepared to countenance any further refinement of what they regard as a hard-won consensus.

While the growing habit of close foreign policy coordination among EC Political Directors may be regarded as a triumph of European integration, it is producing problems at the UN as the Community forges ahead on resolutions in the name of WEOG without giving the others time to participate or object. This is leading to a marginalization of non-EC members and to a distortion of actual WEOG policy. During the 1992 session of the Commission for Human Rights for example, this insouciant attitude led to some blow-ups in WEOG circles when it became known that some NGO's were informed of a resolution by the EC group before it was discussed with their colleagues in the non-EC WEOG.

These seemingly irritating incidents really signal what may be the end of WEOG as a viable group - or as we know it. If the EC is coming to see its participation in WEOG as duplication and are becoming openly restive about it, when Austria, Sweden and Finland join the Community, (possibly as soon as the mid-nineties) this will only serve to worsen the situation, sidelining the 10 non-EC remaining.

Dealing With It

Helpful moves would be (a) increased consultations among the "others" (non-EC) group to allow for coordination of positions with EC members prior to sessions of the Commission on Human Rights or other UN executive bodies; and (b) better teamwork during sessions among the OG who could meet whenever the EC does. Canada could take a lead in urging such a plan of action, which would help to preserve a measure of WEOG's viability.

More fundamentally though, we are probably looking at a basic realignment of traditional blocs at the UN in the post-Cold War period when the dynamic tensions that were the motive force behind the bloc system have virtually disappeared, leaving more volatile, inchoate groups of countries with less well-defined allegiances. Canada should not hesitate to take advantage of this situation to reach out more openly and oftener to the former G77 group (less and less a monolithic voting bloc) in order to

forge new alliances across old barriers that will both strengthen the UN's effectiveness and further our own policy goals. Thus Canada might become more linked to the Americas group, Australia and New Zealand to the Asian. And Canada's "privileged access" to a wide cross section of the UN's membership (a greatly underused asset discussed elsewhere) should be utilized much more fully than it ever has been in the past.

These new informal arrangements could be significant, but for the foreseeable future Canada's interest will always be well served by maintaining strong links with the European group, even if it becomes more difficult and frustrating to deal with. It should simply not be the only recourse.

A Community Seat

In a further development, the EC has now succeeded in obtaining, after arduous negotiations, a separate seat at the FAO. This is a precedent for the United Nations, and based on the criterion of what lies within the Community's competence (as agriculture undoubtedly does) the practice may well spread to other agencies as well. One condition is that the Community's vote on any issue must never exceed 12, i.e. the "extra" seat will not mean an additional vote for that group of member countries.

Although this will inevitably lead to an even more intense process of Europeanization in the EC/WEOG group, Canada has undertaken, for long-term political reasons and as part of its commitments under the Trans-Atlantic Declaration, to support the Community's efforts to affirm its international identity. However, since the result may be an aggravation of WEOG's problems, it will need to be dealt with along the lines suggested above.

V. ECOSOC AND THE AGENCIES-NEW CHALLENGES, OLD HABITS

A. THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

ECOSOC'S Failed Mission

George Davidson, one of the most senior UN officials ever fielded by Canada, called the labyrinth of Specialized Agencies a 'jungle'. Certainly of the UN's many problems this is one of its most intractable and enduring. Though by the Charter's Article 63 ECOSOC was to coordinate the widely various economic and social activities of the Agencies, this was never realized.

It began to unravel early on with the ILO (predating the others with a history going back to the Treaty of Versailles) which insisted that it was in a class by itself and so resisted coordination. ECOSOC never had enough authority to insist, so others soon followed. The result has been that over the years the Agencies have gone their separate ways, resulting in duplication, competition for funds, and management practices leaving much to be desired. In this somewhat chaotic situation it is surprising that the UN has been able to accomplish as much as it has - and there have been many successes - but it could have done much more with a better use of its resources, and in view of what is ahead it must find a way to do just that.

Daunting Challenges of the 90's

The demanding years ahead faced by all the UN's Agencies are unlike anything that could have been imagined by the founders of 1945. At the very least it is going to require of them a very high level of physical fitness. What can be foreseen are massive food shortages and famine caused by war, drought and environmental crises such as we have witnessed in Somalia and the Sudan; widespread poverty and a growing gap between rich and poor; and overpopulation pressures and the mass migrations that will result.

Emerging diseases are causing serious dilemmas for the WHO at a time of turmoil in that organization: AIDS and new strains of old killers threaten to cause worldwide epidemics: one million people die of malaria yearly, a disease that the UN's programs of the 1950's were supposed to have eliminated. Now back in force it is only one of several scourges that have suddenly reappeared such as a new drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis. Narcotics trafficking has achieved a high degree of globalization and dynamism that calls for new strategies if there is to be any hope of control.

Unfortunately there is good reason to doubt that the Agencies in their present state are well equipped to face these difficult challenges.

Problems of the Barons

Some of the Directors-General of these bodies have over the years taken upon themselves the authority and demeanour of feudal barons, (Boutros-Ghali's own term for them) acting on their own, a condition not amenable to give-and-take with other Agency peers, even when many of their activities - from humanitarian relief to the environment - clearly demanded lateral cross-agency cooperation. Opportunities have been lost in the process, funds wasted in duplication, and potential not fully realized.

In the realm of management and financial affairs the record of the barons has not always been reassuring, and was one of the main reasons (along with the rejection of multilateralism that dominated US foreign policy at the time) for the crisis at UNESCO in the mid-eighties that led to the withdrawal of both the US and Britain, along with their sizeable contributions. There have been improvements since then, but in some agencies lack of fiscal responsibility is being demonstrated by the damaging practice of borrowing on the commercial market at high rates of interest to meet budget shortfalls caused by late- or non-payers. Claiming that their Executive Boards had approved programs which then had to be carried out regardless, they have chosen this easy route rather than take tough but sound management decisions based on actual resources on hand or soon to be forthcoming: ie. cutbacks. Whatever the rationale, this type of borrowing mortgages the UN's future for years ahead.

REFORM PROSPECTS

(a) From Within

The ITU is an example of an Agency which undertook to reform itself, largely through a Canadian initiative. Both UNESCO and FAO (while each still suffers from the commercial debt syndrome described above to some degree) have made substantial progress in recent years in rectifying other management and accounting shortcomings, under pressure from Canada and other donors.

Some, of course, are better than others. The IAEA is regarded as a generally well-managed agency, as are a number of other technical bodies such as the IMO and ICAO. The WHO's reputation was a positive one (its first Director-General was a Canadian, Dr. Brock Chisholm) until the much-criticized performance of the current DG and a somewhat suspect re-election campaign.

UNIDO has been a disappointment to many donor countries and Canada is due to quit the organization in 1993: this departure will make a point, but it is a gesture that should not be repeated anywhere else in the system if Canada hopes to retain the respect and credibility it needs to be in the vanguard of the UN reform movement.

(b) Canadian Leadership at UNESCO

Canada's current position in the chair of UNESCO's Executive Council provides an ideal opportunity for a leadership role. Convincing Council members to restrain programming during periods when funds are short and conveying this as a firm instruction to the DG could help end the outside borrowing and send an important message to other parts of the UN system as well.

(c) The Geneva Group as Monitor

A restricted number of donor countries (those paying over 1% of the UN's budget) which meets regularly to provide general management - and increasingly, policy-guidance - to the UN, have begun to rate the Specialized Agencies using an agreed set of criteria ("good and bad practices"). Though this innovation has understandably received a mixed reception, the new transparency it offers could be salutary, and Canada as a member of the Group should continue to support it fully. In future it should play a more pro-active role in insisting on reforms in the Agencies. Expanding the GG's membership somewhat would give its policy recommendations greater credibility and impact.

(d) Ottawa's Interdepartmental Committee on Specialized Agencies
(ICSA)

A committee which regularly brings together all Canadian government departments and commissions dealing with UN affairs under the chairmanship of EAITC to coordinate policies, it is an ideal instrument also for the regular working out of reform strategies in the various agencies. A highly successful coordination model: Canada should encourage other UN members to adopt similar mechanisms.

B. THE DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

The UN's development and humanitarian assistance wing, which includes the UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP and UNEP, is of special importance because it dispenses such a high proportion of the UN's cash outflow. (Unlike the Specialized Agencies, which due to their semi-autonomous character were only to be coordinated by ECOSOC, a Charter provision which, as already pointed out, has not been a success, the Development Agencies have a more symbiotic relationship, reporting directly to the Economic and Social Council.) Concern has mounted among donors in recent years, therefore, because their performance has not been up to expectations. An exception that should be noted is the World Food Program, which has benefitted from Canadian-led reforms in recent years.

Competition with the IFI's

Apart from the management and coordination problems common to all the others, several of the Development Agencies face growing marginalization at the hands of the World Bank. What has been happening is that the IBRD, whose normal development role has been the strengthening of institutions, has been gradually moving into the more traditional UN areas of humanitarian, human rights and environmental assistance, simply because it has more money and resources. For example, they now have more people working on food aid than the development agencies.

The trouble with this is that if the trend continues and the agencies appear to be sidelined or losing ground, it will almost certainly result in a lack of donor confidence and decreased funding for its programs. Yet apart from the danger of a breakdown anywhere in the UN system, the fact is that the UNDP and others are usually more acceptable to developing countries than the often less sensitive IFI's.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- What is needed in this situation is a division of labour which concentrates on their areas of competitive advantage, and a formal understanding about how to divide their mandates in order to avoid duplication and encroaching on each other's territory. Once having clarified this there should be closer cooperation, ie, the Bretton Woods institutions should become more involved with the rest of the UN system as was the intent of the San Francisco founders, a solution Canada as a principal donor is well placed to promote. Now heavily weighted in favour of donor countries and emphasized by G7 caucusing, the Bank and Fund need to find ways to give developing countries a greater sense of involvement.
- Since resources are likely to remain scarce for some time, Canada will need to be more selective about the money it gives to the many small UN development entities and concentrate more on the major aid agencies. Serious thought should also be given to rationalizing some of these smaller organizations through integration or phasing out. Performance funding using 'good governance' criteria has become a new element in the equation.

C. REFORMING ECOSOC - ONE MORE TIME

More than three-quarters of the UN's activities are in the economic and social spheres. Yet throughout its existence ECOSOC has been a weak reed, unable to give coherence and form to the work of the Agencies. Nor have member countries, particularly those paying most of the bills, had any real overview of what was going on in the sprawling fragmented system which has proliferated over the decades, not through any well-designed plan but simply as the need arose. ("If you can't solve a problem, set up a new institution" has seemed to be the accepted modus operandi.)

The Nordic Project: Rescue at Hand?

Beginning in the 1950's there have been several attempts at reforming ECOSOC, all of which foundered, but now there seems to be an opportunity for some real progress. The momentum for change is in the air, the exasperation level is high, and there is the Nordic Project as a locomotive. In 1991 officials from the four Nordic countries (tasked by Ministers who were motivated initially by a wish to ease the heavy 30% UN aid burden they now carry) came up with a well-researched scheme designed to put life back into ECOSOC and give it the organizational structure necessary to coordinate the work of the UNDP and the other developmental organizations.

Their Ideas

They recommended (i) a Ministerial Development Council to provide policy guidance and set out priorities since nothing of the kind existed at senior levels. (ii) a system of smaller governing bodies to provide a more executive form of governance on a continuing day-to-day basis (iii) avoiding duplication by merging the General Assembly's 2nd and 3rd committees, and dividing the agenda so that ECOSOC and the GA would not be repeating each other's debates. (iv) a Resident Coordinator under whose umbrella all UN programs in a given country would be consolidated. (v) a revised financing system.

ECOSOC JULY 1992

The UN's principal donors expressed doubts about these suggestions for over a year, but they had considerable appeal for Canada, and by the time of the ECOSOC meeting in 1992 majority thinking had moved forward. There was a general sense that this was indeed the moment for renewal of the UN's economic and social machinery to meet the coming demands on it. If not the letter, the essence of the Nordic proposals emerged in the agreement to create an annual "high-level policy segment" attended by Ministers who would discuss major economic or social policy themes.

Difficult negotiations at meetings since have advanced matters several steps further, with agreement on coordinating and operational segments meant to achieve the harmonization of policies on a UN system-wide basis; and on the introduction of smaller governing bodies (executive boards) to play an ongoing supervisory role. The concept of the Resident Coordinator has been accepted and expanded to include the notion of a Country Strategy paper, to be drawn up jointly by the RC and the recipient country. All these are changes which should allow ECOSOC, after 40 years, to play the central monitoring and coordinating role long envisaged for it.

RECOMMENDATION

- Canada has supported these reforms and worked hard to bring sometimes reluctant colleagues on board. Still only on paper, the changes will require a good deal of determination and stamina on the part of Canada's and other delegations to see them through to realization. However, now that the decision has been made that ECOSOC is to be reinvigorated and not given up on (which was also an option) the changes can only be of enormous benefit to the UN's economic and social system with the promise of restoring its efficiency and prestige.

Strengthening the UN's Agencies to Cope with the Future

Toward a Leaner, More Dynamic UN

Along with the structural reform process going on in ECOSOC there are other changes that should be made in the day-to-day operations of all the Agencies, specialized or developmental, and other autonomous bodies wherever they are in the system, to bring them up to speed.

- More rational recruitment of senior staff, using public ads and impartial search committees. Single terms of seven years should be the rule for Directors General: long enough for tangible accomplishment, it would help curb some of the worst excesses of the barons.
- Stricter budget control by governing or executive boards since it has been shifting to the management level - a key factor in determining whether agencies do what their donors wish them to do. For example, it could bring to an end commercial borrowing through firmer directives to the DG's.
- Less paper, fewer committees - reports to be shortened and in many cases eliminated altogether; committees which are now less relevant to be retired (admittedly difficult); meetings to be tightened up by not carrying items forward from one agenda to the next.

- More analytical work to provide a genuine basis for selecting the right priorities, and more concentration on global issues: if they deal exclusively with Third World preoccupations they will lose funding.
- A more effective global watch and information system to provide quick and accurate data on everything from migratory movements and crop outlooks to the spread of epidemics.
- Much more liaison with other agencies to avoid duplication.

RECOMMENDATION

- Canada should be active in helping to rationalize and strengthen the Specialized and Development Agencies as described above, to prepare them for the difficult years ahead. The Geneva Group could provide an effective base for this operation.

Part Four: PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES - GEARING UP, PARING DOWN

VI. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Technocrat

Given the haphazard way UN Secretaries-General have been chosen in the past, it is remarkable that they and the Organization they serve have not fared far worse over the decades. Described in the Charter only in vague terms as the "chief administrative officer", the conventional wisdom which gradually evolved about the job description tended to criteria such as prestige and competence in the field of diplomacy, a nationality not that of any P 5 member country, and, eventually, geographical alternation. In essence, the ideal candidate came to mean a technocrat who would not make waves.

Beyond these simple guidelines the selection process has been surprisingly ad hoc, featuring compromise candidates with minimal scrutiny of their background. (In the case of Waldheim, this was to cause trouble and embarrassment for the UN). There was ambivalence, too, about what the P5 - who always made the choice - were really looking for. There was wariness of too much empowerment for the office, but a willingness nevertheless to saddle the Secretary-General with heavy responsibilities during sudden crises and to expect their casually-chosen candidate to perform at a high level of competence. Seen this way, the UN has probably done better than it deserved.

The Accidental Visionary

When Dag Hammarskjold's name was put forward at the last moment by the French, who had been impressed with his work on the Marshall Plan, no one dreamed that he was anything more than an able non-political technocrat. He was that, but along with it they got a brilliant and courageous visionary, whose dynamic tenure has become legendary, an experiment that was not repeated. He made many uncomfortable; those who followed were in the more familiar mould.

New Leadership for a New Era

This is no longer good enough. At a time of great turmoil and change on the international scene and the constant calls on the UN's services to deal with it, the risks inherent in this haphazard selection system are much too great. In this situation, the question of UN leadership has become of acute importance. Urquhart and Childers, both of whom spent their professional lifetimes in senior Secretariat positions, believe that the whole definition of what the job is has changed, and have

outlined those qualities that they believe the Secretary-General must have in order to meet today's extraordinary challenges. It is, to say the least, a formidable list.

Managing the Global Agenda

He, or she (they make a point of insisting that the job must be open to women) should be a dynamic organizer and manager, a communicator, educator and a motivator of people; at the same time a visionary who can inspire confidence in the UN and its goals; possessed of well-honed diplomatic and analytical abilities; courageous, without fear of standing up to the Security Council or of embarrassing governments into paying their dues, and a practical fundraiser with strong public relations skills to help put the UN (at last) on a sound financial footing. Not least, what is needed is a great coordinator, the UN being a vast organization partly running out of control. Is it too much to hope for balance and a sense of humour? Physical stamina goes without saying.

A Better Way

All this is asking a good deal, but in order to come even close to it, there is growing recognition that the selection process must be more rational and less open to chance. This would require:

- (a) **An independent search committee to vet candidates well in advance without the usual last-minute "round-up of suspects" that tends to result in lowest-common denominator choices. Running for the job like a politician should not be a feature of the job, as it has been since the 1970's.**
- (b) **Less emphasis on geographical rotation - in any case all the main regions have now had a turn as Secretary-General - and more on personal qualifications. P5 candidates should not be ruled out.**
- (c) **A single term of seven years which would avoid the temptation to campaign and curry favour during the first five-year incumbency in hopes of a second. Experience has also shown that two terms can lead to exhaustion and staleness.**

Boutros-Ghali: More than a Transitional Figure

In Boutros-Ghali, the Egyptian diplomat and politician who was one of the leading negotiators of the Camp David agreement, the UN seems to have struck it lucky. Product of the old ad hoc selection system though he may be, after only a year and a half on the job he has begun to look something like the definition of a new-age Secretary-General - decisive, reform-minded, visionary and courageous.

With this has gone criticism from some quarters about methods deemed "authoritarian", but he is clearly in a hurry to make as many improvements to the UN system as he can in the single 5-year term to which he has limited himself. Deciding not to seek re-election has freed him to be more outspoken, and to be unpopular. It is unlikely that any Secretary-General committed to fundamental change would ever be universally loved, but he might be well advised to call on his diplomatic skills a bit oftener.* This aside, he appears to be just what the UN needs at this stage in its history.

At 70, few expected him to have the energy or endurance he has shown in his efforts to ensure that the United Nations plays a prominent role in the post-Cold War new world order, putting forward a comprehensive plan for an international peace and security system, and being more assertive than his predecessors in urging the Security Council to take action. He has also plunged in with a basic reform program to rationalize and restructure the Secretariat, has openly reprimanded late-payers in public speeches, and has refused to be discouraged by even the most stubborn cases such as ECOSOC or the "barons" of the Specialized Agencies. This is not a bad beginning for someone of whom very little was expected.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Canada should work for a sounder and more effective selection process for the UN's Secretary-General, who is currently chosen with much less care and attention than companies and universities give to their canvas for leaders. Search committees, a broader talent pool and a single, non-renewable seven-year term should be part of the reform package.
- In the meantime, full support should be given to the reform efforts of Boutros-Ghali, who has surprised everyone by being the most dynamic Secretary General since Hammarskjold, and at a time of even greater international crisis.

* "Boutros-Ghali tackles his job the way a boy with a stick tackles a nest of slumbering wasps. The down side is that many have been stung. The up side is that everyone is now awake." *Globe & Mail*, September, 1992

*A Special Issue
of the Nineties*

COORDINATION IN THE UN SYSTEM

By general agreement lack of coordination is one of the major ills of the UN, its very all-pervasiveness no doubt the reason why past Secretaries-General have shied away from this particular Pandora's box. Acknowledgement by some of them that there was a problem was not followed by any serious attempt to face it head on. Indeed, the vastness of the UN's operations - so many component parts, so dispersed around the globe - meant that even contemplating the idea of coordination was enough to discourage the most intrepid, and did, for decades.

However, after having seen at close quarters the extent of the duplication, waste, dubious management on the one hand, and the failure on the other to optimize what the UN was actually capable of if its agencies worked in harmony, Boutros-Ghali has evidently become convinced that firm action is necessary.

Roots of the Problem - the Diagnosis

(i)

The founders of 1945 did not make the task easier. The system they founded was a polycentric one, or put another way, the UN was created plural and has become even more so. Cooperation rather than centralization was what was decided at San Francisco, a system to be managed by diplomacy among legal equals rather than by hierarchy. Few, one supposes, would wish it any other way, but it does create an important difficulty, namely that of trying to get agreement on basic priorities from 180 member countries without any push from a central authority.

(ii)

This situation in turn is aggravated by the fact that most member states are uncoordinated in their UN policies at home, and bring this scattered approach to the governing bodies of the various UN agencies. Consistent policies are therefore hard to come by among groups of countries or even within a single country.

(iii)

Without strong directional guidance from ECOSOC or any other source (as noted earlier) the agencies and other UN entities have gone their own way. In spite of a certain amount of grass-roots coordination among them, their separate constitutions and budgets, (attempts to introduce a consolidated budget scheme always failed) different membership structures and voting systems have led them down separate paths. This also encouraged the development of a number of prima donna Directors-General who in spite of poor performance often campaigned successfully for multiple extensions of their term, to the UN's cost.

Is it Curable?

Now with the status of a chronic ailment, the coordination problem is at last being tackled at the highest level. In his efforts, however, the Secretary-General is going to have to depend partly on the help of member states themselves.

1. His first step has been to reactivate the ACC, the Administrative Coordinating Committee, a body grown somewhat moribund from infrequent meetings and agendas too overloaded to be acted upon. Boutros-Ghali clearly wishes to use the ACC to coordinate the agency heads, hoping to galvanize cooperation and a more disciplinary approach through strong leadership and the sheer force of his own personality. Membership includes the heads of GATT and the IFI's.

The Jackson Report in 1969 regretted that the UN had no central "brain"; decades later Urquhart and Childers are still deploring the lack of a cabinet. This is something the ACC, properly rejuvenated, focused and run, might come close to achieving, while at the same time enhancing the Secretary-General's own authority.

2. New efforts to revive ECOSOC's long-lost coordinating function may help, but past experience shows that expectations should be modest.
3. UN coordination begins at home. Canada, as discussed in an earlier chapter, has a successfully working model, the Inter-Departmental Committee on Specialized Agencies (ICSA) which meets monthly to coordinate Canadian positions among the many departments and agencies involved in UN affairs. If something like this were to be adopted by other UN members, they would be able to develop and apply consistent policies throughout the UN system and thus play a more forceful role in guiding governing bodies toward effective priority setting and greater harmonization among the agencies. This would deal with a significant part of the coordination problem and the UN could only benefit.
4. Beyond this, experienced UN hands, including former Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, musing on retirement about what he wished he had had time to do, have pointed to other ways in which the UN's top official could coordinate ideas and policies by becoming a figure plugged into wider networks.
 - By setting up a "conseil des sages", a group of advisors representing the world's best qualified authorities in several fields, including science and the arts, for periodic discussions on global

trends. (The roundtable of Nobel prize winners held each year the day after the ceremonies in Stockholm provides an interesting example.)

- *By recognizing and responding to the second half of the UN's 2-tier constituency: on the one hand there are the governments, and on the other the peoples of the world. Since only the support of these domestic constituencies can assure the necessary follow-up for official policies, the Secretary-General needs to form a workable partnership with a network of NGO's who can contribute to the UN's relevance. Sensing this, Boutros-Ghali has already called for what he calls, in a recent Foreign Affairs article, the "empowerment of people in civil society and a hearing for their voices."*
- *Through a concerted PR effort of communication, education and persuasion, appealing to potential supporters worldwide. Past SG's have not been particularly strong in this department.*
- *By being a catalyst of ideas for the Security Council, setting out agendas for discussions of world problems; in short, exerting more intellectual leadership.*

RECOMMENDATION

■ *It has been said that nothing short of heroic measures on the part of the Secretary-General can achieve genuine coordination in the UN system, and that his risks are both great and inescapable. Canada, by promoting the advantages of the ICOSA model with other UN colleagues, can do much to advance this goal. Some of the other less orthodox suggestions are also worth considering.*

VII. THE SECRETARIAT

Wilenski Group and Early Reforms

Boutros-Ghali had not been in office for more than a few weeks in early 1992 when the Secretariat was, in the name of efficiency, radically culled and restructured in its senior echelons. Fourteen Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General posts were dropped and several departments were amalgamated.

A catalyst for this bold move was the reform program of the group made up of various UN Ambassadors led by the Australian Peter Wilenski (strongly supported by his Canadian colleague) though not all their suggestions were followed.

In those changes early emphasis was placed on peace and security priorities (not surprisingly given the number of international conflicts) at some apparent cost to the economic side. Top appointments strongly favoured Europeans, P5 nationals and Japan, revealing the Secretary-General's obvious concern to win the confidence of the Security Council's permanent members and other main donors like Japan as a bedrock foundation for the future. In this he demonstrated that he could be an astute strategist and a tough decision-maker in the UN's larger interests. A second round of restructuring later in the year redressed the balance by strengthening those sections of the Secretariat dealing with economic, social and human rights affairs. Another area that lost ground in the first phase was women's representation, and although Boutros-Ghali included two appointments in the second group, they were not at the most prestigious levels. Canada should continue to be active in insisting on 25% of senior posts going to women by 1995.

The Bargain of the Century

While the UN is able to shed some old responsibilities, there are in fact constant new calls on its services. In future, therefore, while there is likely to be ongoing rationalization of Secretariat staff and structures in an effort to reduce duplication and "layering", there probably won't be more major cuts in the medium term. In fact, although it is sometimes described as "bloated" by the media the UN is actually one of the great bargains of our time - required to work in six languages, to employ citizens of 180 nationalities, and charged with responsibility for virtually every facet of the human condition from offices dispersed around the globe - all this with a total staff no larger than the civil service of a medium sized European city such as Stockholm.

The Longer Term

Those who think in terms of future trends have suggested a somewhat different concept for the Secretariat, the idea of "core staffing" combined with contracting out. This would involve a considerably pared down organization relying on the addition of term employees for special projects such as major conferences and specific peacekeeping assignments. More economical, this idea would nevertheless sacrifice something in terms of national involvement and support for the UN if Secretariat jobs became too scarce.

Trouble in the "Common System"

An ongoing problem which has become more acute concerns dissatisfaction with the UN's system of salaries and pensions. It was based on the so-called Noblemaire principle, the intent of which was to enable the UN to recruit the best and most qualified staff: the level of remuneration was to be commensurate with that of the highest-paid national civil service. For years it has been the US standard but this has become eroded over the years, (particularly given the weakness of the dollar vis-à-vis European currencies) to the point where UN salaries are no longer competitive. The World Bank and IMF, for example, have set up their own systems and now pay up to twice as much as the UN proper for comparable assignments.

Secretariat officials based in high-cost Europe feel the strain particularly, believing that the system favours those employed in New York, and two agencies in Geneva (ITU and ILO) have gone so far as to defy the common system and raise salaries on their own. The move was roundly condemned by the General Assembly in 1991 which pointed out that this type of unilateral action could lead to a costly breakdown in the universal salary structure. Unfortunately the errant agencies were supported by certain WEOG delegations, apparently including Canada, leading to the conclusion that more efficient coordination is needed at the national level on this question.

The reforms the common system clearly requires need to be reviewed on a concerted action basis by donors with the agencies that exist to deal with it, such as the Staff Pension Board and the International Civil Services Commission. Canada should take a lead in ensuring that the system is revised to reflect comparability and competitiveness to the extent feasible within the UN's budget. If there is not much leeway on salaries, other elements of a package could do much to improve its attractiveness: a more unified personnel management structure (now very piecemeal and saddled with rigid sets of guidelines) to include a rational system of career development, better conditions of work abroad such as improved annual and home leave, opportunities for spousal employment, and more generous allowances for housing, education and social security.

A High-Risk Service

Growing bitterness over benefits does not produce the kind of courage UN staff are often required to demonstrate nowadays. How many in the general public know that **163 UN staff are currently held prisoner or hostage, perhaps under torture, in countries from Afghanistan to Zambia?** Or that in the past year at least **14** have been killed in the line of duty as the UN's growing humanitarian involvement has increased the dangers?

These are the forgotten people of the UN. Even though each year the Secretary-General reports on the matter to the Fifth Committee, that body, while deploring the situation, has never acted. A somewhat desperate Staff Council talks of taking the issue to Amnesty International. But why not the UN's own Commission for Human Rights? Pursuing this matter there as well as suggesting some special UN honour for those who have given their lives would be entirely appropriate. Raising the matter in Canadian statements to the General Assembly and other public pronouncements could help to get movement going.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Canada should continue to press for a better ratio of women in the UN's top echelons, and will need to remain alert to ensure that Canadians have their rightful share of senior secretariat jobs overall. Success here is dependent on putting forward good candidates soon enough to win.**
- **The common system badly needs revamping and Canada should be active in helping to develop an improved and expanded package.**
- **The world has overlooked those UN staff who are being held prisoner or hostage, and even those who have given their lives. The Secretary-General in reporting on this to the Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Affairs) may not have chosen the right body for maximum impact. Canada could help to bring these sad realities to public attention.**

VIII. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ITS COMMITTEES

The General Assembly may assume greater importance for the UN's South majority in the years immediately ahead as a counterweight to the predominantly "peace and security" and as they see it Western (or Northern) agenda of the Security Council, particularly since it may be some years before its permanent membership is expanded to allow for Third World members. More than ever, the Assembly will be a forum for the preoccupations and complaints of what used to be called the G77 and a good deal of windy rhetoric can be expected until they feel they are more properly represented at the UN's most powerful table. Weighted voting may become an issue at some time in the future.

Much could be done to streamline the General Assembly's work and procedures to make it more effective, (doing away with expensive verbatim records of its proceedings which no-one has time to read, for example) and though attempts so far have not been notably successful, there is one area in which some serious cutting could go a long way toward achieving that goal, namely the formal abolition of those of its committees whose work is essentially complete, but which linger on in a kind of afterlife.

Committees To Go

Over the years a vast array of committees has grown up around the General Assembly on a wide range of subjects, which apparently are rarely ever disbanded, a curious UN custom. Even those that have outlived their usefulness and therefore should now be defunct continue to use offices and staff, and to churn out reports of doubtful or no utility in hundreds of copies. Amid this dense growth there is surely deadwood that should be vigorously pruned: the UN will be taking on new responsibilities in the 90's and will not be able to afford to waste money and resources on committees whose existence is no longer viable.

The continued operation of the following should be questioned:

- Decolonization - The UN's mandate is completed
 - Fourth Committee - Trusteeship
 - Special Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonization
- South Africa: Apartheid is being dismantled
 - Special Committee Against Apartheid
 - Commission Against Apartheid in Sports

- Committee on the UN Educational & Training Program for SA
- Committee of Trustees of the UN Trust Fund for SA
- Oil Embargo Committee

- **UN Fund for Namibia - Fund soon to be wound up**

- **Middle East: Ongoing political negotiations mean that some of these committees will be redundant within the foreseeable future; others could be amalgamated**

- UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine
- Working Group on the Financing of the UN Relief Committee and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
- Committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the Human Rights of the Palestine People and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories
- Working Group on the Financing of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
- Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestine People

- **UNCED: No longer required now that the Rio Conference is over**

- Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on the Environment
- Negotiating Committee for the Preparation of a Framework Convention on Climate Change
- Negotiating Committee for a Convention on Biological Diversity

- **Indian Ocean: No movement since 1979**

- Committee on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

- **RECOMMENDATIONS**

■ In the name of a leaner and more efficient UN, countries like Canada should take a lead in initiating a vigorous review of UN committees to determine whether some of them have become obsolescent. Those deemed to be in this category should be disbanded.

■ Such a review might be an annual or biennial exercise which would relate committee work to evolving international developments (such as progress on the Middle East peace talks) to ensure continuing relevance.

IX. ORGANIZATIONS IN QUESTION

At a time when the United Nations is being called upon to reform or adapt, it is inevitable that some of its major organizations should be scrutinized to see whether they are still relevant. Those found wanting should be eliminated or adapted to new functions, in spite of the UN's well-known resistance to change.

Those that may have outlined their usefulness

1. TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

A key UN organization established by Charter article 86, it was active during the Post-war period of rapid decolonisation but the work has gradually wound down as trusteeship territories achieved independence. Currently, it administers only the small Pacific Island of Palau, not sufficient justification for the continuance of such a complex mechanism. In its present form it can hardly expect to survive, but adapting it to the needs of an international regime for the environment (see Chapter III) could give it new life and purpose.

2. Regional Economic Commissions

Although the General Assembly in April 1992 agreed that the five Commissions should be strengthened, in fact their activities have become marginal over the years. The Economic Commission for Europe, for example, which served as a unique meeting ground for East and West Europe during the Cold War period, no longer has any real raison d'être, but plods on with make-work projects designed to justify its continued existence.

Informed observers of the UN scene believe that the Commissions should be abolished and their work sent to other UN bodies or outside regional organizations (with whom much of their work already overlaps), which might then be given something like special status at the UN.

3. UNCTAD

Until several months ago UNCTAD, widely criticized for ineffectiveness and its strident North/South rhetoric, was a possible target for dismantling. However, at Cartagena in 1992 it was given a new lease on life, and Canada is committed to supporting the new reform program of this potentially useful organization. UNCTAD is now on probation.

4. World Food Council

Many believe the Council's activities could be performed by the FAO, though Canada's attitude has been ambivalent because the WFC Director was until recently a Canadian. With his departure a more clearly defined policy in favour of amalgamation can be pursued.

5. International Trade Centre

Its directorship has recently been downgraded by the Secretary-General, which raises the question of whether its work could not be combined with that of one of its co-sponsors, UNCTAD, rather than have it continue as a separate body with its own bureaucracy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Canada should not hesitate to encourage examination of some of the Organization's major organs if their continued usefulness has begun to be questioned.

X. THE UN'S FINANCIAL QUAGMIRE

If the United Nations could be said to be truly in crisis anywhere, it is in the realm of finances that the description becomes particularly apt. As striking as the UN's new popularity is its financial insecurity.

Throughout the 1980's the UN lurched from one near-catastrophe to the next, veering on the edge of insolvency and borrowing from one part of the organization to keep another afloat until the next payment, even borrowing on the commercial market - a spectacle hardly worthy of a world body and both embarrassing and demeaning for its Secretary-General, cast as a beggar pleading for money. There are good reasons for this.

(i)

The Problem of the US

The UN's regular budget is funded by assessments based on GNP. (Voluntary funding for humanitarian and economic work is not dealt with here since its contributions are not mandatory.) This meant that the US carried the lion's share at 25% until the mid-eighties when Washington's hostility toward the UN during that period, and in particular what they saw as the domination of Third World issues in the specialized agencies, resulted in the American departure from UNESCO (followed by the UK) and two pieces of tough legislation from Congress: the Kassebaum Amendment which cut their share to 20% and the Gramm-Rudman Act allowing non-payment of their dues anytime for domestic budgetary reasons. Although they are no longer in use the damage to the UN was incalculable at the time, not least as a bad example to others. Their effect has been that the US is about \$700 million in arrears through accumulated back debts added to late current payments. This represents nearly one half of the UN's internal indebtedness.

(ii)

Late Payers

Contributing greatly to the chronic financial crisis is the practice of some important member countries of paying months after their assessments are due. Legally obligated to pay in January, few countries routinely do so, not including two of the UN's main contributors, Japan and the US, who together account for 37.45% of the UN's total budget. (Both claim that their appropriation cycles make it impossible to meet their obligations, though it is altogether likely that the purpose of these cycles is to achieve budgetary savings.) The problems caused by receiving dues from Japan in June, and worse, from the US in October can only be imagined for an organization trying to operate on a calendar year: it has made systematic management almost impossible.

(iii)

Former Payers

Russia and the states which formerly made up the USSR found themselves in financial difficulties immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union and have been able to pay little since. This is an important group (11% of the budget) with a good past record, and although the situation is presumably temporary it has only added to the UN's woes.

(iv)

Non-Payers

It may come as a surprise to some that many UN member do not pay their dues or remit small token sums from time to time, allowing large backlogs of money owed the UN to accumulate over the years. While this may be understandable in the case of poorer developing countries, UN members like Brazil, Argentina and Egypt racking up years of unpaid arrears raises questions of commitment and responsibility.

Current Situation

In spite of the General Assembly's unanimous resolutions calling for payment of assessments in full and on time by member states, and regular appeals from the Secretary-General, there has been little improvement. This year (1993) only 18 out of 180 countries had paid up by January 31 (last year it was 15) providing a modest 16% of the budget. Although most of the others had followed suit by the end of the year in some form, 88 of them still owed \$500 million in past arrears, not including sums owed for peacekeeping, which are even larger. Whereas in the past the UN could finance its cash shortfall from existing reserves, these have been exhausted since the middle of 1991.

Though it is astonishing what the UN is able to do through sleight of hand to survive from day to day through internal borrowing and other emergency devices, as long as it must live from hand to mouth its budgeting will continue to earn descriptions like "almost surreal" (from former US Attorney General Richard Thornburgh after a year in the Secretariat, a comment not without irony given the predominant US role in helping to creating this state of affairs) and it will not be able live up to the hopes invested in it by the world community.

Even with a change of heart in Washington and an apparent intent to speed up their debt repayment, the problem for the UN membership at large remains one of **political will**, along with motivation and leadership.

A. PENALTIES AND REWARDS

To stimulate these qualities, there needs to be a clearly defined system of incentives to help put the UN's finances on a sound basis once and for all. Because Canada has, in the best tradition of good household management, made a point of paying its share of the regular UN budget in January and its voluntary contributions on the first day they are due, it is in a good position to use its strategic alliances to urge formal adoption throughout the system of solutions like the following, for example:

- (1) As suggested in the "Blue Book" prepared in the Department's UN Bureau in 1987, countries who pay on time should be rewarded through some type of incentive scheme. Several UN agencies have already adopted the practice.
- (2) Conversely, interest should be charged on those assessments not paid on time, monies to be deposited in the Working Capital Fund.
- (3) Countries which have fiscal years that conflict with the UN's should be pressed either to bring about legislative changes to allow for an exception to be made on UN payments; or to appropriate the necessary funds the previous year.
- (4) Those countries two years in arrears and hence in breach of Article 19 should lose voting rights in the General Assembly.
- (5) Public posting and circulation of the names of those countries more than a year behind with their dues or arrears.

Private Sector Funding

Some of the points raised above appear in a recent Ford Foundation report on UN Financing. A number of them have been around for some time, but this does not make them any less relevant - on the contrary, the time is especially propitious to follow through on them now. Although identifying new sources of funding is an urgent issue, and the report recommends that the Working Capital Fund should be increased from \$100 to \$200 million as a more reliable reserve, one of its few surprises was that it tended to dismiss the idea of funding from private sources. However, this could form a valuable and badly-needed contribution to the UN's finances, provided it was never used to excuse members from meeting their regular obligations. For example:

- (6) Securing a generous tax exemption for contributions made to the UN by foundations, businesses and individuals could open up a valuable new channel of private funding.
- (7) Other less orthodox suggestions could be looked at over the next years: the Secretary-General himself has suggested a levy on arms sales that could be related to the Arms Register, for example. Whatever the proposal, if it is new it is almost certain to meet with resistance initially.
- (8) The Secretary-General needs to take a more pro-active role personally as a fund raiser and proselytiser to heighten public awareness. The UN's upcoming fiftieth anniversary would provide an ideal format.

B. IN-HOUSE REFORM

At a time of such financial stringency it is crucial that the UN should make the best possible use of the money it does have. Two UN bodies, suitably strengthened, are capable of accelerating reform of the budgetary and administrative systems as a whole.

(1) Geneva Group Monitoring

This group of leading donor countries (described earlier) has established itself informally as a budgetary and administrative watchdog at senior policy levels, meeting regularly in Geneva with a "branch" in New York and is potentially one of the best instruments for improving the UN's management performance. The recommendations of the above-noted Ford Foundation report could have the effect of forcing financial reform to the top of the agenda and creating a better atmosphere for progress. Canada can plan a key role here.

(2) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ)

Set up in 1946 to examine the program budget and accounts of the UN and its agencies, the ACABQ itself is not without flaw, which often prevents it from being the authoritative ginger group it should be. Its chairman has been in the job for 17 years - too long for any incumbent - and is paid the salary of an Undersecretary while apparently being exempt from the Secretariat regulations he and the Committee are supposed to be monitoring.

An expensive trip in 1992 which took all 18 members with staff to Geneva (including side trips to other countries) was criticized as an unnecessary extravagance at a time of financial crisis at the UN. A priority should be to appoint a new chairman

and get the ACABQ operating more stringently. Canada is not currently on the committee but should use its influence with those who are to urge the necessary changes.

C. NEED FOR AN INSPECTOR GENERAL AND A CHIEF AUDITOR?

Given that both the GG and ACABQ are limited to an advisory capacity and that the Joint Inspection Unit is little more than a sinecure for former Ambassadors who are not financial experts, the time may have come for the UN to acquire both an Inspector General and a Chief Auditor, individuals of reputation who would have the authority to do regular and close examinations of the UN's operations (Secretariat and agencies) in New York, Geneva and Vienna, to a rigorous set of standards.

Working closely with the Geneva Group and ACABQ and taking advantage of their unique contacts and ideas as essential leads, the Inspector and Auditor would be empowered to go a step further by publishing their findings and recommending changes or penalties directly to the Secretary-General and General Assembly. Transparency would be an essential key.

While the levels of waste and misuse of funds within the UN system may have been exaggerated in the Washington Post survey of September 1992, Boutros-Ghali himself admits these problems do exist and is committed to doing something about them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Because of the UN's precarious financial situation, Canada should work to achieve a clearly-defined system of penalties and rewards to encourage prompt and full payment of UN dues. New, even unorthodox sources of financing should be investigated, particularly from the private sector.
- Better use should be made of the Geneva Group and the ACABQ in monitoring the UN's financial and administrative practices, and Canada could play a key role in this endeavour, especially in the GG. Somewhat broadened membership could be an advantage.
- The time has come when the UN needs both an Inspector-General and a Chief Auditor, who would have the authority to do close examinations of UN operations and make recommendations for change directly to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly.

ANNEX

Status of payment of assessments to the
regular budget as at 30 april 1992

(15 Countries pay 84.14% of the budget)
(165 others pay the remaining 15.86%)

Member States that have paid in full within 30 days (by end of
January 1992). The "Honour Roll"

Australia	Ireland
Botswana	Kuwait
Canada	Liechtenstein
Denmark	Netherlands
France	Norway
Ghana	Sweden
Iceland	

Member States that have paid in full by April 30 (three months
late)

Austria	Malaysia
Bahrain	Malta
Belgium	Micronesia (Federated States of)
Brunei Darussalem	Myanmar
Colombia	Namibia
Cyprus	Portugal
Czechoslovakia	Singapore
Ethiopia	Spain
Fiji	Sri Lanka
Greece	United Arab Emirates
Jordan	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Luxembourg	

Member States that have paid something (not all) toward the current
year's assessment by April 30

Afghanistan	Pakistan
Bulgaria	Papua New Guinea
China	Paraguay
Dominica	Poland
Gabon	Saint Lucia
Germany	Samoa
Hungary	Saudi Arabia
India	Swaziland
Indonesia	Trinidad and Tobago
Japan	Tunisia
Mexico	Venezuela
Morocco	Zaire
Oman	Zimbabwe

Total: 62

Delinquents: 118

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS

CANADA SHOULD:

- Be in the vanguard of United Nations reform, given its long multilateral tradition and excellent UN record, and utilizing its unique and privileged access to both Western and Third World countries in strategic alliances, be instrumental in bringing about consensus for change.
- Help to establish a core-group of UN members to carry forward the reform process, setting 1995 as the goal for some concrete results.

SECURITY COUNCIL

- Take an active part in efforts to achieve a phased enlargement of the Security Council to make it more representative and better able to respond to the challenges of the 90's.
- Support measures to strengthen the Security Council through improved intelligence and early warning systems, periodic retreats for discussion of longer-term issues, regular high-level meetings and streamlined procedures.

EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING

- Back the main lines of the Secretary-General's "Agenda for Peace" as the best option for an effective international security system.
- Work to modernize the International Court of Justice and the UN's sanctions mechanisms.
- Assist with Canadian expertise in establishing a rapid-reaction UN Multinational Force, to be backed up by an expanded peacekeeping unit and a fully staffed 24-hour operations centre at UN headquarters in New York.
- Help to ensure that the next peacebuilding exercise is set up on more economical lines than those prevailing in the Cambodian exercise.

EMERGENCY COORDINATION

- Lend needed support to the work of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, now experiencing growing pains, and urge the Secretary-General to give it and the Coordinator fuller cooperation and backing.

THE NUCLEAR THREAT

- Give top priority to creating a meaningful non-proliferation regime through a major expansion of the IAEA's mandate and resources, to enable it also to play a role in overseeing the dismantling/overhaul of the dangerous FSU nuclear weapons arsenal and reactor system. The Agency should be linked more closely to the Security Council so that serious violations can be apprehended and met with penalties.
- Work to update the machinery of the Conference on Disarmament (including amalgamation with the UNCD) to enable it to deal successfully with the negotiating challenges of the future such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
- Consider support for an international conference involving the UN and INTERPOL to deal with illegal trafficking in nuclear materials.

ENVIRONMENT

- Maintain its leading edge in the environmental field by making good its domestic action plans, thereby enhancing its credibility and role in building the UN's new Sustainable Development Commission.
- Give priority to regular and reliable GEF funding to assist the Third World with environmentally friendly technologies, making them part of the global effort to save the environment for future generations.
- Recognize that in the years ahead, with rapidly deteriorating conditions something like a high-level Trusteeship Council will likely be necessary to deal with large-scale crises and to maintain and enforce the more difficult aspects of an international regime for the environment.

NGO'S

- Support stronger NGO participation in the Sustainable Development commission and other UN agencies.
- Anticipating the increasing activity and influence of NGO's in this decade, appoint a part-time (if not a full-time) officer in EAITC's UN bureau to deal with NGO liaison and coordination.

HUMAN RIGHTS

- Work for appreciably stronger machinery and more resolute follow-up at the Human Rights Commission, which the Secretary-General has warned is essential to reassure minorities and help prevent the further breakup of states based on ethnic and tribal self-determination.
- Maintain the momentum in the Commission and Agencies on women's rights, which are rarely "gender neutral".
- Be vigilant to see that human rights work does not remain the UN's stepchild, perennially in danger of becoming marginalized and under-resourced.
- Maintain an active watching brief, combined with timely policy responses, as Canada's aboriginal activists press the issues on their domestic agenda at the international forum provided by the Geneva Commission.

ECOSOC AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

- Support the current efforts to streamline and revivify ECOSOC, based on some of the best ideas promoted by the Nordic Project, in the hope of bringing about (after many false starts) a more rational and coordinated approach to the work of the UN's many agencies.
- To help the specialized and developmental agencies better face the daunting challenges that await them in this decade (and without waiting for ECOSOC's hoped-for transformation) work for reforms that will bring about stricter budget control, more professional management, recruitment of genuinely qualified staff and greatly increased inter-agency liaison. Advance the idea that more stringent Geneva Group monitoring should be part of this process.
- Introduce other countries to the Canadian model for government coordination of national UN policy, Ottawa's Interdepartmental Committee on Specialized Agencies, a successful mechanism that if more widely adopted could have a remarkable effect on the overall performance of the UN.

SECRETARY-GENERAL

- Work for a better selection process for the UN's top job, to replace the current last-minute "round-up"; and a single non-renewable term of seven years.

SECRETARIAT

- Continue to press for a better ratio of women in the UN's top echelons.
- Assist in revising the Common System of salaries and benefits, which is no longer able to keep the UN competitive.
- Help to draw attention to the fact that large numbers of UN staff are being held prisoner or hostage, and that others give their lives on duty without due recognition.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

- Take a lead in initiating an early review of UN committees to determine which have become obsolescent, and ensuring that those in this category (likely to be numerous) are quickly disbanded.

ORGANIZATIONS IN QUESTION

- Not hesitate to encourage examination of some of the Organization's major bodies, with a view to eliminating them if they have outlived their usefulness.

THE UN'S FINANCIAL QUAGMIRE

- Attempt to achieve, in view of the UN's precarious financial situation, a clearly-defined and recognized system of penalties and rewards to encourage prompt and full payment of UN dues.
- Encourage better use of - and a more rigorous approach by - the Geneva Group and the ACABQ in monitoring the UN's financial and administrative practices.
- Join others in promoting the appointment of both an Inspector-General and a Chief Auditor for the UN, who should be individuals of repute and experts in their respective fields.

RÉSUMÉ DES PRINCIPALES RECOMMANDATIONS

LE CANADA DEVRAIT :

- Être à l'avant-garde de la réforme des Nations Unies, étant donné sa longue tradition de multilatéralisme et ses excellents états de service à l'ONU, et utiliser son accès unique et privilégié auprès des pays de l'Ouest et du Tiers Monde dans le cadre d'alliances stratégiques pour aider à susciter un consensus en faveur du changement.
- Aider à constituer un noyau de membres de l'ONU pour faire avancer la réforme, fixant à 1995 l'échéance pour l'obtention de résultats concrets.

CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ

- Participer activement à l'élargissement progressif du Conseil de sécurité, le rendant plus représentatif et capable de relever les défis des années 90.
- Appuyer les mesures visant à renforcer le Conseil par des services améliorés de renseignement et de détection avancée, des colloques périodiques pour l'examen de questions à long terme, des rencontres régulières de haut niveau, et une simplification des procédures.

ÉVOLUTION DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX

- Appuyer les grandes lignes de l'«Agenda pour la paix» du Secrétaire général, la meilleure option pour l'instauration d'un système efficace de sécurité internationale.
- Travailler à la modernisation de la Cour internationale de justice et des mécanismes de sanctions des Nations Unies.
- Offrir le savoir-faire canadien pour l'établissement d'une force multinationale d'action rapide de l'ONU, appuyée par une unité de maintien de la paix élargie et par un centre des opérations fonctionnant, 24 heures sur 24, au siège des Nations Unies à New York.
- Aider à une organisation, moins coûteuse que l'opération au Cambodge, des prochaines opérations de consolidation de la paix.

COORDINATION D'URGENCE

- Fournir l'appui nécessaire au département des Affaires humanitaires qui éprouve actuellement des difficultés de croissance, et presser le Secrétaire général d'accorder au Département et à son Coordonnateur une plus grande coopération et un meilleur appui.

LA MENACE NUCLÉAIRE

- Accorder la priorité à la création d'un régime de non-prolifération efficace, par un élargissement majeur du mandat et des ressources de l'AIEA, pour lui permettre de jouer un rôle dans la surveillance du démantèlement ou de la réfection des dangereux réacteurs et armes nucléaires de l'ex-URSS. L'Agence devrait avoir des liens plus étroits avec le Conseil de sécurité pour que les violations sérieuses puissent être décelées et punies.
- Travailler à la mise à jour des mécanismes de la Conférence sur le désarmement (notamment par sa fusion avec la CNUD) pour lui permettre de rencontrer avec succès les nouveaux défis de négociation, comme ceux de Traité sur l'élimination totale des essais nucléaires.
- Envisager d'appuyer une conférence internationale de l'ONU et d'INTERPOL concernant le trafic illégal de matières nucléaires.

ENVIRONNEMENT

- Maintenir sa place de premier plan dans le domaine environnemental en appliquant chez lui ses propres plans d'action, améliorant ainsi sa crédibilité et son rôle dans l'établissement de la nouvelle Commission du développement durable des Nations Unies.
- Accorder une priorité au financement régulier et fiable du FPE pour aider le tiers monde à acquérir des technologies non nuisibles à l'environnement facilitant ainsi leur participation aux efforts mondiaux de préservation de l'environnement pour les générations futures.
- Reconnaître que dans les années à venir, étant donné la détérioration rapide de la situation, il faudra probablement créer un organisme de haut niveau, comme un Conseil de tutelle, qui s'occupera des crises d'envergure et qui appliquera et fera respecter les éléments les plus difficiles d'un régime international pour l'environnement.

ONG

- Appuyer une plus grande participation des ONG à la Commission du développement durable et aux autres organes des Nations Unies.
- Prévoir une activité et une influence accrues des ONG dans cette décennie, et nommer un agent à temps partiel (sinon à temps plein) au sein du secteur de l'ONU, d'AECEC, pour la liaison et la coordination avec les ONG.

DROITS DE L'HOMME

- Travailler à un renforcement significatif des mécanismes et activités de suivi à la Commission des droits de l'homme, dont le Secrétaire général a dit qu'elle est essentielle pour rassurer les minorités et aider à prévenir d'autres démembrements d'États sur la base de l'autodétermination ethnique et tribale.
- Maintenir à la Commission et dans les agences spécialisées, le momentum acquis quant aux droits des femmes, car les droits de la personne échappent rarement aux distinctions de sexe.
- Veiller à ce que les travaux relatifs aux droits de l'homme ne demeurent pas le parent pauvre des Nations Unies alors qu'ils risquent toujours d'être marginalisés et sous-financés.
- Maintenir une surveillance active, alliée à des réponses opportunes, dans un contexte où les autochtones du Canada exercent des pressions pour faire valoir leur propre cause dans les tribunes internationales fournies par la Commission de Genève.

L'ECOSOC ET LES ORGANISMES SPÉCIALISÉS

- Appuyer les efforts actuels pour simplifier et revivifier l'ECOSOC, en se fondant sur certaines des meilleures idées avancées par le Projet nordique, dans l'espoir de susciter (malgré plusieurs faux départs) une approche plus rationnelle et mieux coordonnée des travaux des nombreux organes des Nations Unies.
- Aider les agences spécialisées et du développement à mieux confronter les énormes défis qui les attendent dans la présente décennie (et ce sans attendre la réforme souhaitée de l'ECOSOC) et à travailler à des réformes qui aboutiront à des contrôles budgétaires plus stricts, à une gestion plus professionnelle, au recrutement d'employés vraiment qualifiés et à une

meilleure liaison entre elles. Promouvoir une surveillance plus rigoureuse par le Groupe de Genève comme partie de ce processus.

- Faire connaître aux autres pays le modèle canadien de coordination gouvernementale de la politique nationale sur l'ONU, le Comité interministériel d'Ottawa sur les agences spécialisées, mécanisme efficace qui, s'il était adopté par d'autres pays, pourrait avoir un effet remarquable sur la performance générale de l'ONU.

SECRETAIRE GENERAL

- Travailler à l'amélioration du processus de sélection pour le poste le plus élevé de l'ONU afin de remplacer l'actuel «rassemblement» de dernière minute et d'instaurer le mandat non renouvelable de sept ans.

SECRETARIAT

- Continuer d'exercer des pressions pour une meilleure représentation féminine aux échelons supérieurs de l'ONU.
- Aider à la révision du Système commun de traitements et prestations, qui ne peut plus maintenir la compétitivité de l'ONU.
- Aider à attirer l'attention sur le grand nombre d'employés de l'ONU, emprisonnés ou en otages, et à assurer une reconnaissance à ceux qui ont donné leur vie dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions.

ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

- Prendre l'initiative d'un examen rapide des comités des Nations Unies pour identifier ceux devenus désuets, et veiller à ce que ceux-ci (probablement nombreux) soient rapidement dissous.

ORGANISATIONS EN QUESTION


- Ne pas hésiter à encourager l'examen de certains des principaux organes de l'Organisation, en vue de les éliminer s'ils ne sont plus utiles.

LE BOURBIER FINANCIER DE L'ONU

- Étant donné la situation financière précaire de l'ONU, tenter de créer un système clair et reconnu de pénalités et de récompenses pour encourager le règlement rapide et intégral des contributions à l'ONU.

- **Encourager une meilleure utilisation du Groupe de Genève et du CCQAB pour la surveillance des pratiques financières et administratives de l'ONU, et encourager ces deux groupes à adopter une meilleure approche.**
- **Se joindre à d'autres pour promouvoir la nomination d'un inspecteur général et d'un vérificateur général pour l'ONU, qui seraient des personnes réputées et expertes dans leurs domaines respectifs.**

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