



# STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

CANADA

INFORMATION DIVISION

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA - CANADA

## No. 68/11: CANADA AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Excerpts from a Statement by Lieutenant-General  
E.L.M. Burns, Permanent Representative of Canada  
to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee,  
Geneva, March 13, 1968.

The Canadian delegation welcomes the latest revisions included in the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty which was submitted on Monday March 11. These revisions constitute a further step in the elaboration of a Treaty which should be both effective and widely acceptable. Anyone who has followed the course of negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee during the past two years and studied the successive draft treaties should be convinced of the constructive results obtained through the efforts of all delegations.

We shall very soon be moving on to the United Nations General Assembly for what will probably be the last round of negotiations, in which the Treaty will take on its final form. The Canadian delegation would respectfully suggest that all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have a responsibility to do all in their power to make the General Assembly debate as constructive, relevant and informed as possible....

The Canadian Government is in general agreement with the provisions of the Treaty in its latest revision and welcomes the last changes which have been incorporated.

We find the content and phrasing of the preamble satisfactory, and in particular we ascribe importance to the provisions that assert support for research on and development of the instrumented means of carrying out safeguards procedures in the IAEA system, to the provisions that affirm the principle that states not possessing nuclear weapons should receive the benefits of all peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including the uses of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, and to those provisions which refer to steps to halt the arms race and lead to nuclear disarmament. We are pleased to see the inclusion in the present draft of the paragraph suggested by the delegation of Sweden reaffirming the determination expressed in the Moscow limited test-ban treaty to achieve a cessation of all nuclear weapon testing.

As I mentioned in earlier statements, Canada finds that Articles I and II of the Treaty, often referred to as its core, adequately provide for preventing states other than the existing nuclear powers from acquiring nuclear weapons. That, of course, is the main purpose of the Treaty. In that connection, we have

welcomed the recent assurances by the Co-chairmen, in response to points raised by some delegations, that they consider Articles I and II to contain no loopholes to proliferation of practical significance.

Turning to Article III, while Canada would have preferred an equitable safeguards article, which would apply safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of all parties to the Treaty, we consider the formulation of Article III, submitted on January 18 by the United States and the Soviet Union, to be an acceptable compromise arising out of lengthy and difficult negotiations. As a non-nuclear-weapon state, Canada has been greatly assisted in coming to a decision to support this formulation by the public undertakings of the United States and the United Kingdom last December to accept safeguards on their own non-military nuclear activities. We earnestly appeal to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to give a similar undertaking.

We would urge other members of this Committee also to support the latest formulation of Article III. This article is, in our view, essential to the credibility and working of the Treaty, because it would provide effective means of ensuring that the terms of the Treaty were being respected by the parties. As we have often stated in this Committee, Canada considers provision for effective verification to be fundamental to realistic and durable measures of arms control, not least to invest them with the vital element of international credibility. Article III would, we are sure, accord the Treaty the necessary credibility and instil in parties the confidence necessary to ensure that the Treaty would be effective in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and enhancing the security of the community of nations.

We would remind members of the Committee that the intent of the article is to apply safeguards in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system. This safeguards system has been sanctioned by the General Conference of the Agency, which claims the membership of every country represented in this Committee. It has, moreover, attracted wide international support and has stood the test of time and experience. Article III envisages not the imposition of a new untried concept and set of procedures, not a departure from established norms and practices, but rather the logical, and, we trust, progressive, extension of an effective, unobtrusive and generally acceptable set of controls against the diversion of nuclear energy to weapon purposes.

What is required at this juncture is merely some general indication of support for the principles and intent of the article, particularly from those members of the Committee with active peaceful nuclear programmes. No member can be expected to make a final judgment on or commitment to the article until the Treaty is in final form. All members will have opportunity to review and assess the viability of all provisions of the Treaty before they sign and ratify it. Even as parties, they will have the opportunity to review the actual functioning of the treaty and the extent to which all parties are living up to its terms and spirit....

There has been much discussion in this Committee of the need for the Treaty to provide for an acceptable balance of mutual obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. In the view of the Canadian delegation, Article IV of the Treaty goes some way towards establishing such a balance, as it expresses an obligation of states with advanced nuclear programmes to assist those in less favoured circumstances. Furthermore, my delegation considers it most important that Article IV guarantees the rights of parties to the Treaty to the unrestricted development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to the co-operation to that end of other states and international organizations.

Article V of the Treaty deals with a subject which has at times provoked a lively debate in the Committee. I refer, of course, to the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. We support the wording of the present Article V, which, we feel, contains advantages for non-nuclear countries which offset the prohibitions contained in Articles I and II. During our debate, I have many times stated Canada's position on the regulation of peaceful nuclear expositions under a treaty of non-proliferation. For the present, I shall merely repeat what I said at our meeting on February 21, which reflects our desire to see the elaboration of an effective non-proliferation treaty without any loopholes:

"... we support the prohibitive provision in Articles I and II; and the fundamental reason for this is that we believe that military and civil nuclear explosive technologies are indistinguishable. The ability to produce any kind of nuclear explosive device is the same as the ability to produce a nuclear weapon"

Canada considers that the provisions of Article V are particularly advantageous, as they assure states without nuclear weapons that they will be able to secure nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes when these have been developed by the nuclear powers, but without any charges for research and development. Such arrangements would spare non-nuclear-weapon states the high costs in both financial and human terms and the delays of many years which would be involved in developing nuclear explosive devices with their own resources.

My delegation, among others, has raised questions concerning the provision for bilateral arrangements for peaceful nuclear explosive services. We have welcomed the oral assurances on this point which have been given by the Co-chairmen, particularly that bilateral arrangements would be arrived at and implemented in strict accordance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. As stated by the representative of the United States, any bilateral arrangements would be subject to international observation.

We have noted also statements by the Co-chairmen that it will be necessary, in due course, when more is known about the economic and technical feasibility of employing nuclear explosions for engineering or other developmental purposes, to draw up a convention or international agreement on the modes of carrying out and controlling the arrangements foreseen under the provisions of Article V. The Canadian delegation suggested an outline of what such a convention should contain in its intervention on September 12, 1967.

Canada is in agreement with the provisions of Article VIII, as now revised. We welcome the inclusion of language which makes possible periodic review of how the objects of both the Treaty and the preamble are being achieved.

As we have said before, we consider that, in Article IX, 40 ratifications is about the number which should be required to bring the Treaty into force. In view of the importance of this Treaty, the Canadian Government hopes that it will come into effect with the minimum of delay.

The provisions of Article X are completely acceptable to my delegation.

Turning now from the Treaty itself, I should like to comment briefly on an equally important and closely-related subject. We have from time to time voiced a concern that the question of security assurances has not yet been dealt with in our Committee's negotiations. We have, of course, appreciated the complexities and the difficulties of reaching an agreement of this kind. Therefore we greatly welcome the recent tripartite agreement on this issue. We have long been convinced that the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty have a legitimate claim to be protected against nuclear intimidation and attack, in return for their renunciation of the right to acquire nuclear weapons.

The Canadian Government believes that the agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, as expressed in statements by the representatives of those powers at our meeting on March 7, advances very considerably the possibilities of general acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty - which it regards as so fundamentally necessary at this time. The proposed resolution and accompanying declarations, furthermore, would constitute an obligation of the nuclear powers, thus giving further recognition to the principle that there should be an appropriate balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities in and relating to a Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In conclusion, I would say that it appears to the Canadian delegation that the draft Treaty now before us approaches the optimum reconciliation of the varying interests and concerns of the nations in the world today in regard to this problem. The governments we represent must take their decisions in the light of the dangers and tensions of the present and, more importantly, in the light of the greater tensions and dangers which will certainly develop if they do nothing to check the spread of nuclear weapons and, following that, to halt the nuclear arms race.

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