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
**AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY
AND THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL:
CONFRONTING THE FUTURE WITH
THE LEGACY OF THE PAST**

-Draft-

March 1998

Jim George





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Australian Foreign Policy and the Westphalian Model: Confronting the Future with the Past

Summary

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Paper Presented for the 34th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA
17-21 March, 1998

Panel: Thursday A-12 19 March

'The Westphalian Legacy: Facing the New Millennium on the Periphery of the Traditional State System'

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**Australian Foreign Policy and the Westphalian Model: Confronting the Future
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AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WESTPHALIAN MODEL: CONFRONTING THE FUTURE WITH THE LEGACIES OF THE PAST

Introduction

These are difficult times for International Relations (IR) communities around the world. Policy making sectors struggle to adjust to a volatile global arena in which ideological commitments and alliances are hastily reformulated, territorial boundaries redrawn and new symbols of identity constructed and resurrected. Analytical sectors, meanwhile, struggle to find an adequate lexicon of understanding for a world which, in the wake of the Cold War and with the onrush of globalisation, has rendered problematic many of the ideas, concepts and frameworks of meaning which for so long seemed enduring and fundamental components of international reality. Indeed for some the end of the great struggle between the post WW2 superpowers and the accelerated influence of extraterritorial actors in global affairs represents the end of post-Westphalian state system in its traditional form and the beginning of a new global order resonant with the uncertainty, danger and opportunity of a revolutionary age.

This is a theme integral to societies on the global periphery such as Australia where processes of readjustment to, and reassessment of, traditional modes of thought and behaviour have become important factors in the attempt to redefine Australian identity on the eve of a new globalised millennium. In this context the question arises of whether a Governmental and intellectual elite for so long committed to the systemic and conceptual premises of an orthodox (post-Westphalian) image of the world, can adopt with conviction an Australian identity defined increasingly in terms of an Asia-Pacific community and articulated as an independent, contemporary approach to regional security and cooperative multilateralism.

This paper argues that while there is much to be positive and optimistic about on this front, there is a great deal of hard thinking and prudent decision making still to take place as Australia shuffles hesitatingly from under its conceptual and geo-strategic security blankets to confront the future with the legacy of the past. It argues, in particular, that the Australian IR community must begin to critically reflect upon the influences of the Westphalian model of modern global reality if it is to develop the nuanced, coherent and flexible perspectives demanded of it in the 21st century.

Until very recently, I suggest, these influences have been rarely considered in the critically reflective manner their significance warrants. Instead, the Australian intellectual and policy communities have been engaged in a long term analytical 'me-

tooism' whereby ideas and policy perspectives derived from traditional (i.e. European and Anglo-American) sources have been accorded taken-for-granted status and faithfully reconstituted in quite different (Antipodean, Asia-Pacific) circumstances. In policy terms, traditionally, this has resulted in an (ironic) disregard for geo-political context, and an often desperate pursuit of security within the strategic confines of far-off protectors.

On the rare occasions when these themes have been addressed in terms of their location within a broad theoretical tradition emphasis has been placed upon the superficial nature of a realist-rationalist divide in Australian IR thinking which, it is contended, has produced a narrowly constituted 'English School' of realism in scholarly circles but, ultimately, no adequate basis for analysing international relations from an *Australian* perspective.¹

Since the 1970s, however, and since the debacle in Vietnam in particular, an increasing minority of Australian commentators, from across the ideological spectrum, have voiced their concerns about these policy and intellectual commitments. Most, in this regard, have expressed concerns about the tendency, associated with traditional theory and practice, towards engagement in 'other peoples wars'. Many have urged a more nuanced appreciation of Australia's location as an independent multicultural actor in the coming 'Asian century'. All have emphasised the necessity for something other than traditional political fealties and grand-theorised simplicity regarding Australia's role as the furthest Western outpost in an anarchical global arena.²

For all this there have been indications in the last decade or so that the traditional policy and analytical commitments are now acknowledged as, at least, problematic by many within the mainstream IR community, and that a more nuanced and more comprehensive foreign policy agenda is now in place. Indeed it has been from this quarter that proclamations of 'new thinking' on foreign policy and security issues have emanated in the 1990s, alongside claims for new policy initiatives suggesting a reformulation of traditional geo-strategic premises in favour of neo-liberal approaches to 'cooperative security' and 'economic realism'.³

¹ See M. Indyk, "The Australian Study of International Relations" in Surveys of Australian Political Science ed. D. Aitken (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985)

² For a recent overview of these concerns see G. Cheeseman and R. Bruce eds. Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997)

³ See in particular, G. Evans, Cooperating For Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993)

It is in regard to these claims, in particular, that the debate over Australia's global perspectives in the new millennium has intersected with that larger, multifaceted debate on the Westphalian legacy in the age of accelerating globalisation. More precisely it is in regard to this larger debate over globalisation and future world orders that Australian analysts and policy practitioners have (largely implicitly) begun to reassess their Westphalian based frames of reference and readjust their traditional policy settings.

I seek in this paper to make a positive and constructive contribution to this process of readjustment and reflection, one which retains a genuine sensitivity to the difficulties faced by policy and analytical communities in the current era. In this regard I readily acknowledge that Australia's current policy agenda, centred on strategies of 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism', is more sensitive to the complex issues of regional life than the globalist format which preceded it for so many years, based on an obsession with external (often Asian) 'threat', and the necessity for (Western, great power) protection. ⁴ Acknowledged also is the fact that, at all levels, much has been achieved by people of substance and good will in the Australian quest to engage the limitations of its cultural Eurocentricism, its sense of itself as 'the misplaced continent' and its fear of regional Others in its pursuit of a new global self.

I remain concerned, nevertheless, that amid proclamations of new mind-sets and new policy directions, Australia's global and regional agenda is still dominated by some older, deeply embedded tendencies and inclinations - eg toward Western conceptual and institutional dominance of the new globalised world order and toward support for, at best, autocratic ruling elites (eg the Suharto regime in Indonesia) This, I suggest, could well have paradoxical and dangerous consequences for Australian foreign policy, which instead of contributing to future security, stability and prosperity is perhaps more likely to promote the kind of authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-democratic processes which are clearly not in our best interests, however one might choose to interpret the term.

I argue in this paper that Australian foreign policy runs the risk of involvement in a scenario such as this because it lacks an important critical dimension in its current quest for a new global and regional identity. This missing dimension, I suggest, is intrinsic to the questions raised by the debate over the Westphalian model in the era of globalisation. Or, more precisely, it centres on questions rarely if ever asked by Australian policy makers and scholars in this context. In particular this missing

⁴The obsession and threat themes are developed in T. Mathews and J. Ravenhill, "ANZUS, the American Alliance and External Threats" in *Australian Outlook* 41(3) pp. 161-172

dimension is starkly evident in mainstream perspectives on Australia's future role and relationships in the Asia-Pacific region - the keystone issue in our 'new' foreign policy. Here, for example, questions of class, of religion, of poverty, of environmental devastation, of gender, of ethnicity, of non-western, non-Christian, non-elite, non-capitalist views of everyday reality are ignored and/or rendered silent in Australia's efforts to enhance our politico-strategic and economic position in that region.⁵

The consequences of this have, to a large extent, been overshadowed by the drama of the economic 'melt-down' in some of Australia's most important neighbours since late 1997. This phenomenon has elicited a good deal of anxiety in some quarters and more than a little smugness in others, with the Howard Government in particular infusing all official analysis with the proposition that we (Australia) at least have our fiscal fundamentals right. This kind of response, I suggest, only reinforces the need for a broader more comprehensive approach to future regional relations, one that goes beyond (neo-liberal) boundaries of understanding concerning the nature of 'fundamentals'. Indeed as the spectre of widespread social and political unrest grows amid a region once celebrated in terms of economic miracles, it becomes clearer that Australia's 'fundamentals' in this regard need to go far beyond the notion of having our hands on the right economic levers.

This, significantly, is a conclusion supported by the findings of arguably the most illustrious of the recent inquiries into contemporary and future world orders, The Commission on Global Governance (1995). This grouping of major global figures, policymakers, intellectuals and political leaders is regarded by Richard Falk as "the last of the great liberal Commissions".⁶ Its conclusions are entirely prescient to the Australian situation, indeed they might have been reached with the Australian context and its missing dimension in mind. In short the Commission concluded that the very issues left out of contemporary mainstream Australian policy analysis are precisely those integral to any realistic policy evaluation of future security risks and economic development in regions like the Asia/Pacific.

It proposed, moreover, that future instability and threats in regions such as Australia's are less likely to follow traditional patterns of inter-state conflict but are much more likely to be triggered by tensions associated with policies of global economic rationalism regarded as the 'fundamental' element of neo-liberal Government such as

⁵On these omissions see the commentaries on Gareth Evans Cooperating for Peace in S. Lawson ed. The New Agenda for Peace: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995)

⁶Cited in A. McGrew ed. The Transformation of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997) p. 244; The fuller citation for the Report is, The Commission for Global Governance: Our Global Neighbourhood (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)

Australia's. Just as significantly the Commission concluded that solutions to future problems are not necessarily to be found within the boundaries of either (neo-Realist) balance-of-power logic, and/or updated 'forward defence' perspectives as some still insist nor in (neo-liberal) processes of institutionalised Westernisation prescribed by many official and semi-official analysts. What is crucial, the Commission suggested, are nuanced understandings of empirical realities within different states and societies and broader preventative strategies which, "remove or alleviate the factors that cause people, groups, and governments to resort to violence".⁷

Which begs the question of why in the new age of Australia's foreign policy are such 'realistic' issues ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. The question is begged also of what, in this case, a more critically nuanced realism might look like in the contemporary Australian context. This latter question I will explore in a rudimentary fashion at the end of the paper. For now in regard to the former question the views of another illustrious figure are worth pondering. In this case, Stephen Krasner, in his recent contribution to the debate over the Westphalian model and its influences at the core of contemporary IR theory which usefully, if unwittingly, indicates why there are so many silences on crucial policy themes in the Australian context.

The value of Krasner's insight in this regard lies in his acknowledgement that a discernible Westphalian model exists and that, indeed, it remains:

a basic concept for the major theoretical approaches to international relations, including neo-realism and neo-liberal internationalism for both of which it is an analytical assumption, as well as for the international society [English School] perspectives, for which it is an empirical regularity.⁸

More will be added on the detail of this model later. At this point three dimensions of Krasner's argument are particularly pertinent. The first is its recognition of the fundamental linkage between neo-realism and neo-liberalism as variants of a post-Westphalian orthodoxy. The second, its refreshing refusal to represent the English School approach (and therefore its Antipodean offshoot) as fundamentally distinct

⁷ See the Report, op. cit. 1995, pp. 95-98. The rekindling of balance of power themes are to be found in many official and semi-official statements of recent times. See, for example, P. Dibb Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia Adelphi Paper no. 295, Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford University Press, 1995) The resurgent 'forward defence' inclination is that of the current Defence Minister Ian McLachlan. See transcript of interview with Network 10 "Meet the Press" Sunday, April 27, 1997. For the neo-liberal institutionalist perspectives see Evans, op. cit. 1995; and A. Mack and J. Ravenhill eds. Building Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994)

⁸ See S. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia" in International Security 20 (3) Winter, 1995: p. 119. The terms English School approach and International Society approach will be used synonymously in this paper in line with Krasner's use of them.

from this neo-neo linkage. The third, its value in highlighting, in these terms, the inherent limitations of the Australian debate set, as it undoubtedly is, within the narrow confines of neo-realist and neo-liberal images of the world.⁹

These limitations have been usefully analysed by Steve Smith who has confirmed the 'neo-neo' debate as an updated variation on a Westphalian state-centred theme but with two more important contemporary characteristics. The first, the tendency "to restrict debate to the prosperous nations of the West and take for granted... many features of this globalised world". The second, the tendency to "support US interests".¹⁰ These are traits traditionally very evident within the Australian foreign policy perspective. They remain very evident in the 1990s at a time when, as indicated above, they could well have dangerous and paradoxical consequences for Australia's future if their utility is not critically reviewed in the context of a Westphalian model which, for all its silenced dimensions, continues to provide a "simple, arresting and elegant" image of the world which "orders the minds of policymakers".¹¹

The first section of this paper is concerned to provide a critical framework for such a review by acknowledging, at least briefly, the influence of this Westphalian legacy in terms utilised by K.J. Holsti in 1985, in his commentary on the breakdown of the "three-centuries-long intellectual consensus which organized philosophical speculation [and] guided empirical research" for the great majority of IR specialists in the contemporary era.¹² The consensus Holsti speaks of here is that derived from the events at Westphalia in 1648 (or a particular representation of them) which by the mid-1980s was under a variety of challenges aimed, principally, at the most powerful articulation of the Westphalian model, power politics realism.

A decade or so later these challenges have proliferated and become more focused with the onrush of globalisation and the increasingly obvious anomalies now associated with realist perspectives on IR. My concern at this point is less with these anomalies per se but more with the process by which consensus was reached on a model of international life in the first instance. It is in regard to this process, I suggest, that many of the traditional and contemporary problems of orthodox IR

⁹For a discussion of Australian foreign policy in this context, see M. Sullivan, "Australia's Regional Peacekeeping Discourse: Policing the Asia-Pacific" in G. Cheeseman and R. Bruce eds, Discourses of Danger op. cit. 1997; and J. George, "Australia's Global Perspectives in the 1990s: A Case of Old Realist Wine in New (neo-liberal) Bottles?" in R. Leaver and D. Cox eds. Middling, Meddling and Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997)

¹⁰See S. Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory" in J. Baylis and S. Smith eds. The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p.171

¹¹See S. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia", op. cit., p.115

¹²See K. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, op. cit. 1985 p.1

theory and practice are to found because here is to be found the minimalist 'art of the possible' associated with post-Westphalian realism which effectively excludes certain questions, themes and issues from serious analytical and strategic consideration to the present day.

More immediately I seek here to indicate the dangers of a post-Westphalian consensus which, from its very beginnings, left out of its analysis some of the crucial ambiguities and complexities of the late Mediaeval/early modern period in favour of a particularly narrow representation of the modern inter-state system. This reductionist process, I suggest, is a major legacy of the Westphalian model in the current era, one which continues to influence the new foreign policy debate in Australia.

Framing The Westphalian Model and its Contemporary Legacy

The end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 and the treaty signed at Westphalia in that year is commonly represented as a historical point of origin for the modern state system. It represents in this sense the moment when Res Publica Christiana, the world of the Holy Roman Empire, of Papal decree and the moral and legal unity of the Mediaeval age, gives way to a recognisably modern age of state sovereignty, moral and legal independence and religious tolerance and diversity. It saw the universalist conception of political and moral community established under Church and Emperor displaced by a new world order centred on autonomy, fragmentation and the rule of sovereign princes established in territorial and secular-legal terms. More precisely, the shift from ancient to modern associated with the Treaty of Westphalia saw the political religious and cultural architecture of the Mediaeval era superseded by a new framework of principles ideas and structural norms representative of an emerging world of states.

The point, however, is that this model of Westphalia is hardly an accurate representation of the empirical complexity of the emerging world of states in the 17th century. In historical terms, for example, the peace treaty signed at Westphalia represents the point at which a long-term systemic evolution was consolidated and formalised rather than an absolute point of modern origin marking the beginning of the state-system. Similarly, while sovereign statehood was accorded legitimacy after Westphalia, since the early 16th century, major powers such as Britain and France and relatively small powers such as Sweden were already effectively autonomous, independent modern state-actors. After Westphalia too the right and authority to wage war and seek alliances was formally invested in the sovereign ruler as an instrument of state policy, but this again was more the consolidation of already existing practice in many regions of Europe rather than a dramatic reformulation of

political reality. And while Westphalia rightly is understood as a crucial moment in the modern separation of religion and politics in the inter-state system, even here the post-Westphalia dictates of the 17th century represented the codification of developments sparked off during the Reformation and initially verified in the Treaty of Augsburg (1555).¹³

On the other side of the modelled coin, as it were, a range of anomalies and discontinuities are also evident. Thus, while Papal power was certainly curtailed after Westphalia the Holy Roman Empire still retained great authority in many areas of the European Continent, and for all its formalised status the notion of religious freedom was a restricted and fragile one in practice. Likewise, for all the talk of religious and political independence suggested by the Westphalian model it is worth remembering that the resultant sovereignty was restricted to European states (i.e. excluding the peoples of the Ottoman Empire) and that the fundamental prerequisite for freedom in Europe remained that of Christianity.

There is another anomalous dimension of the Westphalian model that is also worthy of note in the present context. It is that the template of state-centric analysis and policy prescription was, from its beginnings, invested with the kind of economic dimensions now associated with the process of (neo-liberal) globalisation. Or, more precisely, from its beginnings International Relations (represented in terms of post-Westphalian statist principles) was always International Political Economy.

The general point, to reiterate it, is that after 1648 there was never a single universally experienced reality within European borders. In particular the post-Westphalian reality for the peoples in the East of the Continent was distinctly different from that of those in its West and along its Atlantic seaboard. In the East, dominated by Russia, Austria and increasingly Prussia the post-1648 experience was essentially that of the pre-Westphalian period. Feudal power relations were the (often brutal) order of the day and, to one degree or another, the traditional structures of monarchical hierarchy, landlord and serf and mediaeval religion continued to characterise the everyday lives of the modern age of International Relations.

In the West, and without for a moment underestimating the absolutist tendencies within some of its territories (eg France) the freedoms of Westphalia served their modern purpose, primarily for those states now energised by bourgeois ambition, growing industrial workforces and a new source of power, centred on naval expansion

¹³For useful discussions of this period and its complexities see, T. Knudson A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) part 2; D. Philpott, "Sovereignty: an Introduction and Brief History", in Journal of International Affairs 48 (2) Winter, 1995: 353-368; and J. Hehir, "Expanding Military Intervention" in Social Research 62 (1) Spring, 1995: 41-52

and the principles of mercantilism. Integral, therefore, to the new world of sovereign states, in Western Europe at least, was an acceleration of an extra-territorial 'economic' policy designed to enhance and extend the political power of the state.

There is, of course, nothing terribly original about any of this. Historians and mediaeval scholars generally are well aware of the themes outlined above and, as such, of the problematic nature of any single consensual model of the post-Westphalian world which does not take into account the complexities, paradoxes and ambiguities of it. The IR community has, nevertheless, traditionally favoured just such a model, one which divorced the 'political' from the 'economic', the 'internal' experience of states from their 'external' interaction and, most paradoxically, one which effectively ignored the many instances of difference integral to a realist world of states (ostensibly the defining feature of a post-Westphalian world order) in favour of a universalised systemic sameness (ostensibly the defining feature of a pre-Westphalian order).

A detailed examination of why this has been the case is beyond the scope of this paper as is a broad inquiry into the implications of reductionism and universalism in orthodox IR per se.¹⁴ For now I seek only to pursue elements of this issue which directly connect the question of the Westphalian model to contemporary global theory and practice and to Australian images of the real world and its role within it.

Accordingly, it's worth pausing briefly to consider another dimension of the process by which the Westphalian Model became the template for IR in the contemporary era. This concerns some of the ideas and philosophical principles which surrounded the Westphalian Treaty and which subsequently became formalised into the "simple and elegant image" of contemporary global reality. One sees more clearly here not so much a 'politics of forgetting' associated with the early framing process as a particular kind of remembering - one designed to ascribe point-of-origin status to a particular interpretation of the Westphalia story. One powerful enough to "order the minds" of Western policymakers, in particular, three centuries later.

Here, we necessarily enter a space of passionate debate and prolonged struggle for dominance over the early modern mind. The space, in personified terms, between Aquinas and Machiavelli, between Augustine and Martin Luther and more generally, between religion and reason, universalism and modern individualism. In this space theologians, jurists and modern philosophers devised a lexicon of modern meaning

¹⁴For more comprehensive commentaries on this issue, see R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); J. Der Derian, *On Diplomacy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); and J. George, *Discourse of Global Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994)

and regulatory principle for the central issues of the day - issues of war and peace, of religion and politics, of power and wealth, of ethics, and of systemic order.

Above all of order. Order was the prerequisite for the more 'liberal' states as they sought the optimum conditions for trade within Europe and increasingly in the new worlds beyond European borders. More immediately order was the primary concern of those seeking to make systemic sense of a fragmenting European continent in the wake of years of religious and geo-political enmity. Predictably in this new age the order question was asked most directly and profoundly in relation to the modern individual - modern rational man. But the question was asked within a decidedly pre-modern context - of man and god - or, more precisely, of man released from the strictures of god and mediaeval religion.

In this context most major 17th century voices were raised in favour of the freedom of religion, but with an extremely brutal war of religion still firmly in mind the question of individual freedom became intrinsically linked to the question of the implications of freedom for broader social order. Accordingly, familiar tensions emerged on issues of human rationality and its limits and questions of the democratic art of the possible. More precisely it was the question of the threat to social order of *too much freedom* that focused the minds of thinkers such as Spinoza and Hobbes who now confronted another question of immediate familiarity to contemporary analysts - the question of sovereignty and democracy.

For Spinoza, for example, this relationship was one underscored by Augustinian perspectives on the inner-struggle of fallen man to balance an inherent capacity for rationality with the tendency toward passion and egoistic behaviour. The paradox of the modern age for Spinoza was that the more freedom humans enjoyed, the more their behaviour tended toward self-aggrandising egoism and the extreme sovereignty of the 'state of nature'. Recognising this the more enlightened of modern peoples support the rule of law and defend order of the state and its rulers. The resulting order does not fundamentally alter the self-interested nature of citizens within a state but it connects reason to passion in a particular way - a way which naturalises self-interested egoism and locates it as the foundational regulatory principle of the modern sovereign state and its hierarchical structure. In this sense an order based on the modern sovereign state corresponds with the rational desire to follow individual self-interest while restricting the egoistic excesses of those whose passions might otherwise destroy that order.

In the emerging inter-state arena there was no such sanction upon these excesses. Thus, for Spinoza, as for others of similar inclination in this period, the inter-state

arena was inevitably characterised by the unfettered passions of the modern free 'individual' with all its anarchic consequences. Thus, a modern 'art of the possible' set within severely restricted cognitive and strategic parameters and an ethos of self-preservation as the foundation of systemic security.

Spinoza's theologically founded logic drew, of course, upon the most famous 17th century articulation of the Westphalian model for contemporary analysis, that of Thomas Hobbes. Writing amid the violence and chaos of Civil War and religious war Hobbes answered the question of order, sovereignty and modern individualism by recourse to scientific and historical (Thucididean) axioms and a solipsistic ontology which framed humankind as naturally and necessarily self-interested and egoistic. In orthodox 'Hobbsean' terms, accordingly, state sovereignty becomes the necessary and rational sanction upon the individual pursuit of power. The power of an absolute sovereign (Leviathan) becomes thus a countervailing force upon the "perpetual and restless desire for Power after Power that ceaseth only in Death."¹⁵

From this perspective the international realm, devoid of such countervailing forces, becomes the natural but tragic site of power politics in the post-Westphalian world. For Hobbes the site of a political law analogous to those in the new physics of the age - the natural law of endemic anarchy - of the struggle for survival among modern autonomous individual states driven by self-interest and the relentless search for security. For all this there was in Hobbes' commentary on the modern world of states a sense, however minimal, of the human capacity for reason-as-self-interest as the basis for something other than a war of all against all at the international level. A capacity articulated most profoundly in the forging of alliances between sovereigns to balance prevailing power equations.

Even on the basis of the crude and superficial representation of them here one can quite plausibly connect the perspectives of Hobbes and Spinoza (and others of their ilk) to earlier figures such as Bodin and Machiavelli, the great theorist of sovereignty in the modern world and of the exemplar modern sovereign, the Prince, blessed with an ability to recognise and adapt to the human and structural determinants of a modern inter-state system. Just as plausibly, and even on this flimsy basis, one could do what a generation of IR scholars have done, and connect these figures and the views associated with them to that contemporary lexicon of meaning associated with global reality described by Krasner as the Westphalian model.

At the core of the model is the 'consensus' about global reality that Holsti referred to. A consensus predicated upon assumption about human nature (as self-interested

¹⁵From Leviathan, cited in Knudson, A History of International Relations Theory op. cit. p. 88

egoism) and of structural anarchy. Around this core are a series of regulative principles and taken-for-granted premises which have remained fundamentally unchanged since their crystallisation in the aftermath of Westphalia in the 17th century. Consequently, in the contemporary period, a world of sovereign states engaged in the struggle for power and wealth remains the dominant image of the Westphalian model of global existence (albeit now in neo-realist competition with other actors). National security based on state interest remains the goal of a realistic policy framework and, in this context, self-help themes defined either in terms of traditional utilitarian behaviour (balance of power alliance systems) or other forms of utility maximisation (via market structures or regime maintenance) remain the most realistic options for survival and prosperity in the modern world.

During the early years of the Cold War this model was, for some, reinvested with its theological dimension, becoming the 'catechism' of the Western powers in their alliance struggle against the Soviet Union, with realists such as Neibuhr and Morgenthau outdoing Hobbes in reference to the lustful, egoistic nature of man as the fundamental cause of international anarchy.¹⁶ For others, less explicitly committed to human nature themes, the wisdom of Thucydides, (via Rousseau) infused the Cold War with modelled insights into the contemporary security dilemma.¹⁷ And by the 1960s and 1970s, in the new age of nuclear deterrence and systems theory, the fundamental assumptions of this Westphalian model formed the basis of a paradigm of power politics so strong that even the most sophisticated of behaviouralist challenges could not alter its hold on the modern IR consciousness.

At this time, as John Vasquez affirmed, four updated themes characterised the inner fundamental core of the model. First, that modern international relations is an unrelenting struggle for power; second, that in this struggle sovereign states are the major and indeed only really significant actors (because they have power and their power status can only be limited or changed by other states); third, that the anarchical nature of this inter-state arena makes it fundamentally different to the domestic arena (where issues of justice, ethics and democratic governance are relevant themes under the rule of government and judiciary); and fourth, that minimal regimes of peace and security are possible in the anarchical system if states follow traditional patterns of utilitarian behaviour, centred primarily on alliance building and balance of power strategies.¹⁸

¹⁶The 'catechism' theme is developed by R. Rothstein in "On the Costs of Realism" in Political Science Quarterly 87(3) 1972.

¹⁷For example, Kenneth Waltz, in Man, The State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)

¹⁸See J. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (London: Frances Pinter, 1983) pp.15-40

In the 1980s, even in the face of global economic anomalies too profound to ignore the Westphalian model retained its status and power within the IR mainstream, albeit in the reformulated genre of the age of IPE, regime theory and the neo-neo debate. Indeed, at the core of the neo-neo agenda its legacies are encountered in the most forthright fashion. Robert Keohane, for example, made it plain enough, that for all the ostensible shift in emphasis from the traditional equation, a neo-liberal approach "does not call into question the core of the realist model of anarchy" even though it may "challenge some of the implications of anarchy for state behaviour". Arthur Stein, meanwhile, insisted that "the same forces of calculating self-interest that lie at the root of the anarchic international system also lay the foundations for international regimes".¹⁹

And this is where Krasner's commentary on the Westphalian model acts to affirm the retention of the "three-hundred year consensus" in IR in the space beyond the Cold War and on the eve of the twenty-first century. Thus, he explains, the Westphalian model provides for neo-Realists, in the 1990s, an "ontological given" - the post-Westphalian state - understood as a "unitary rational actor operating in an anarchic setting and striving to enhance its well being and security". For neo-liberal institutionalists, similarly, "the actors are [still] assumed to be Westphalian states, unified rational autonomous entities striving to maximise their utility in the face of constraints that emanate from an anarchic though interdependent international environment".²⁰

The difference between these neo-neo positions resides in the judgements they make about the primary systemic problem facing the world of states in the current era. For neo-liberals the problem is one of market failure. The solution: the proliferation of Western political and economic institutions/regimes and global 'market' values (individualist, free-trade etc.) For neo-Realists the problem remains more traditionally prescribed, as security and distributional conflict. The solution: old world balance of power structures and the strengthening of contemporary politico-economic institutions of market order (IMF, World Bank, G7 etc.)

Consequently, two fundamental assumptions remain embedded at the core of Westphalian model in its neo-neo articulation. The first, echoing security dilemma perspectives from Hobbes to Morgenthau to Waltz, is that global life is all about an anarchical world of sovereign states seeking to maximise their interest and power.

¹⁹See these views in R. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes" p. 11 in S. Krasner ed. *International Regimes* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1983); and A. Stein "Coordination and Cooperation: Regimes in an Anarchic World" in the same volume, p. 132

²⁰See S. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia" (1997) op. cit. pp.119-120

The second, echoing market place logic from Adam Smith to Charles Kindleberger, is that the fundamental determinant of global behaviour is, and always was, egoistic self interest. In other words the keystone of the Westphalian model in the 1990s is precisely that which characterised it in the 1940s and 1950s - and in embryo form in the mid-17th century - an egoism-anarchy thematic which defines global reality in entirely predictable (power politics) fashion.

The question remains as to the place of an English School/International Society approach in all of this and I'll say something more specifically on this issue shortly, at least as it pertains to its influence upon Australian IR thinking. Suffice it at this point to say that while there might appear to be fundamental differences with the positions outlined above (e.g. on the history v structure and contingency v universalism issues) these differences become less striking if the International Society perspective is addressed in an uncritical manner, as it generally has been in Australia. Suffice it also to say that when uncritically applied it lends itself to a variety of positions across the Westphalian spectrum, all of which are evident in Australia's foreign policy perspectives. These range from a rigid hierarchical conservatism via a faith in the (Wightian) tendency toward "recurrence and repetition" in world affairs, to the rather vague posturing of a rationalist pragmatism, to the optimistic convergence perspectives of the current neo-liberal institutionalism. Suffice it, finally, to say that, intellectually, the treatment of the International Society approach in Australia has been pretty ordinary. Most commonly, it has been reduced to a 'great man' narrative of (essentialised) 'history' centred on the great deeds of the 19th century Concert system and the Western diplomatic elite, with the whole story represented as one great realist chain of being. ²¹

This is actually a significant tendency in the present context because it highlights something very profound about the question of how and why the Westphalian model has been transferred, in all its fundamentals, from its initial representation in the mid-17th century to the present - the fact that is a representation - a particular way of framing world order and modern identity. More precisely the Westphalian model is part of a much larger historical, political and intellectual process of framing the modern period which intersects, at crucial points, with the tensions surrounding the development of modern (social) scientific rationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries.

In particular it intersects with that moment in the early 20th century when Anglo-American logical positivism begins to (re) categorise the great modern social

²¹On the 'great man' theme see S. George, "The Reconciliation of the 'Classical' and 'Scientific' Approaches to International Relations" in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 3 (5) 1975:28-40

dilemmas into those which might engender 'real' knowledge in a verifiable sense and those which, by their nature, could not. And it intersects with a particular kind of reconciliation of certain of these dilemmas (of history and structure; the modern individual and the state; the universal and the contingent; and of ethics in a modern political world) proffered most profoundly by Max Weber and, during the Cold War in the U.S., by Karl Popper.

The result is an orthodox model of the contemporary global arena which, to one degree or another, acknowledges the complexity, ambiguity, contingency and contestability of all human thought and behaviour but which then, logically and rationally, reduces that thought and behaviour to a particular representation of it. In ontological terms it reduces human intent to basic egoism, and human capacity to minimal societal interaction based on egoistic imperative. In epistemological terms it reduces the 'known' to a world of independent, tangible, observable objects, and 'knowledge' effectively to that which is disclosed to us by sensory perception of an objectified world (and/or that which can be verified by testing procedures) In terms of practical politico-ethical concerns it reduces the 'art of the possible' to a world of (anarchical) essences, (power politics) fundamentals, and historical recurrences which are ultimately resistant to human purpose or altruistic inclination.

In short it reduces the world to a representation of it to be found in some of the great early modern texts touched on above (e.g. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes) and to the great contemporary rearticulations of their eternal wisdom (EH Carr, Morgenthau, Waltz and Bull) As such the Westphalian Model is the location of a crucial site of *preference* in modern Western theory and practice. Intellectually, it represents a preference for Hobbes' pessimism about the human condition over say, Cruce's sense that the modern individual is capable of and inclined towards a fuller exposition of the human capacity. More significantly it represents a preference for the whole philosophy of the egoistic and anarchical imperative over say, the Kantian perspective on the ethical imperative and its associated inclinations towards a democratic world order.

It represents in this sense a preference for asking certain questions, in certain ways and referring other options to a very powerful language and logic of exclusion (e.g. as utopian, idealist, ideological, irrational, normative) And it represents a preference for a particular kind of reading regimen which reduces the history and experiences of the post-Westphalian period to a few regulative principles and a few points of ideational connection by which to discern and interpret what is, and remains fundamentally real, in a complex and volatile world.

In the broader context of this paper and in regard to the influences of the Westphalian model on Australian foreign policy in the 1990s it is the political site of preference which is of more immediate concern. Here, put simply, the Westphalian tradition represents a preference for a particular kind of world order and a particular kind of individual and global identity. This preferred order and identity serves, in turn, a particular kind of interest, the interest it has in effect served since the 17th century that, primarily, of the Western states and those sectors within them most advantaged by capitalist modes of production and exchange.

More specifically the Westphalian model is a representation of the world which both describes and prescribes traditional modes of hierarchical order and which naturalises market relations in its own (ethnocentric/ideological) terms. Since the late 1970s there has been a pragmatic acknowledgement of the need for power sharing and burden sharing strategies within Westphalian parameters while, in the 1990s, the model is perhaps most potently articulated via 'globalisation from above' strategies which see traditional alliance logic reformulated to include a global spectrum of indigenous 'socialised elites'.²²

In this sense, of course, it is unsurprising that the two major analytical initiatives in the period since the 1970s (the neo-neo initiatives) should overlap so significantly in terms of the questions they prefer to ask, and the way in which they ask them. Neo-realism is, after all, a post-Vietnam hybrid constructed (initially) to insulate U.S. power politics theory and practice from its many critics and (subsequently) to re-invoke a traditional power hierarchy based on U.S. hegemony as the keystone of world order and stability. Neo-liberalism is, after all, the "ideology" of globalisation which legitimates and rationalises the behaviour of the most powerful actors in the global market-place.²³

In *combination* they underpin the policy practice of the major global actors in the current era. In this context neo-liberal concerns for individual freedom in the post-Cold War era are predicated upon a particular kind of global order being structurally in place. The emphasis here is on free-trade in particular, but free trade is deemed possible only within a neo-realist framework of hegemonic order, underwritten by the

²²The 'Globalisation From Above' theme is that of Richard Falk in "The Making of Global Citizenship" in J. Brecher et al eds. Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993); The commentary on "socialised elites" (a more critical interpretation of the epistemic community theme) is to be found in R. Kothari, "The Yawning Vacuum: A World Without Alternatives" in Alternatives 18, 1993: 119-139

²³On neo-liberalism as ideology see R. Tooze "International Political Economy in the age of Globalization" in J. Baylis and S. Smith, eds. The Globalization of World Politics op.cit., p. 227

power and influence of (Western dominated) liberal institutions (eg G7, IMF, World Bank, WTO and a malleable UN)

This is not suggest that the Westphalian model in the 1990s is entirely bereft of insight or value. On the contrary, it has important insights to offer about how the world is viewed from the perspective of the most powerful and most privileged. Its problem, magnified in the contemporary period, is that it not concerned with, nor does it speak to, the many realities outside that of the global elite. This renders it not only inadequate analytically but dangerous politically in terms of its inability to comprehend and/or prevent the implications of its global theory as practice.

These implications have been a central concern of a variety of works in recent years. The most fascinating insight in many ways has emanated from Samuel Huntington, always the most candid of realists, who understands the contemporary Westphalian model, in global practice, for what it is - an updated and reformulated modernisation project. And, like its 1960s predecessor, Huntington understands that this current project has much less to do with liberal emancipation via market freedom and much more to do with a greater control of the global arena by 'Western' market actors in conjunction with indigenous elites and their governmental and military forces. Hence, his reiteration in the 1990s of the need for those at the apex of global power to acknowledge that the status and privilege of 'Western' civilisation depends upon a particular kind of (post-Westphalian) order being in place. Hence, his (Hobbsean induced) warning of the dangers of a breakdown of that order brought on by *too much freedom* - e.g. by the enhanced expectations of other 'civilisations'. Hence, his appeal for a strong, traditional (alliance) response to the coming 'clash of civilisations'.²⁴

The contemporary global scenario is viewed from distinctly different perspectives by others. Richard Falk, for example, sees in essence what Huntington sees, but in terms of the increasing clashes between an elite-dominated project of 'globalisation from above' and a democratically inspired resistance invoking 'globalisation from below' strategies. For now he protests at a global scenario which aims at reproducing "the world as a homogenising supermarket for those with purchasing power" while those without it "are excluded and to the extent required, suppressed by police, paramilitary, and military means".²⁵ This is a scenario lamented also by a former UN official from Sudan who speaks of the current politico-economic global order as responsible for "humanitarian disasters" throughout the Third World. Similarly, a high-ranking Latin

²⁴See S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996)

²⁵See Falk's comments in the "Introduction" to J. Brecher et al eds. Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order

American diplomat suggests that the strategy of the global elite is producing, in the 1990s, greater polarisation between rich and poor than has ever existed before.²⁶

On this general issue, but from another angle, Robison and Goodman have warned the Australian policy community of the dangers of myopic thinking and policy planning in this regard. In a recent book on developments in nine SEAsian states they emphasise the dangers of interpreting global reality through Western-elite images of it. They focus in particular on a "fatal flaw" in traditional perspectives - the desire for and commitment to political and cultural "convergence". Embedded at the core of modern Western thought, they suggest, this convergence theme results in a particular way of framing the reality of others as an externalised, idealised image of (Western, elite-male, Christian, capitalist) self. The result: the reduction of a heterogeneous complex world to one great "monolithic category" of modern identity.²⁷ In the neo-neo context this leads to certain presumptions concerning the responses of others to the universally valid inclinations of the self. In the SEAsian context it has led the Australian foreign policy community to the presumption that political support for ruling elites and for neo-liberal forms of market economics will enhance the prospects of 'them' becoming more like 'us', thus serving the Australian national interest, in the present and in the future. Robison and Goodman's empirical analysis renders this presumption problematic at best.

There is some evidence, they suggest, that in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand there has been a liberalising influence of sorts associated with the new bourgeois elite, in business, the arts and the academy. On the other hand, they conclude, there is widespread evidence from states throughout Asia that any convergence notion "embodying universal interests which will create an Asia more like the liberal stereotypes: more rational, individualistic, democratic, secular and concerned with human rights" is substantially misplaced. Moreover, and quite contrary to such a presumption their analysis concludes that "the rise of industrial capitalism has hardly been accompanied by the encouragement of free markets. [Rather] protectionism, tariffs, dumping, corruption and cartels have been central elements in the [development] process". And in relation to any inherent democratising tendencies associated with the Western convergence notions, they conclude that the new Asian elites "appear as likely to embrace authoritarian rule, xenophobic nationalism [and]

²⁶Cited in Ibid.

²⁷See R. Robison and D. Goodman eds. The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phone, McDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 3

religious fundamentalism...as to support democracy, internationalism, secularism and free markets".²⁸

These were views expressed before the impact of the economic meltdown in SEAsia, which if anything, threatens to increase tensions, social unrest and unpredictability within those societies at the heart of Australia's 'open regionalism and 'cooperative security' policy framework. Which is why, as I indicated at the beginning of this paper, there are many, within Australia and elsewhere around the world, fearful that this new/old Westphalian scenario, in any of its guises, is destined not to produce greater liberty, prosperity and choice in the post-Cold War era, but instead greater dichotomies of wealth and impoverishment, power and disenfranchisement, greater global misery and increasing global (and regional) conflict. It is why, for concerned Australians in particular, the dangers of confronting the future with the legacies of a Westphalian past are immediate and stark and paradoxical.

This is not for a moment to suggest that Australia should abandon its broader project of regional integration nor its stated commitment to the proliferation of liberal and democratic ideals globally. It can never be a simple either/or consideration. But like others around the world in the volatile space beyond the Cold War it must surely question the *meaning* of terms such as 'liberalism' and 'democracy' in the context of Australian foreign policy in the 1990s. In this context it is essential that the Australian IR community question its presumptions about self and others in the world more profoundly than it has even done before. More precisely, in acknowledging and accepting the general benefits to be gained by regional integration processes we must recognise the costs of doing so in terms of 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism' policies based on neo-realist and neo-liberal globalisation premises. This critical, self-reflective process is a particularly difficult one in the Australian context principally because of the influences upon its IR community of a Westphalian model which via its essentialist, universalist and convergence tendencies, renders fundamental self-critique effectively unnecessary and indeed counter-productive in the pursuit of the order imperative.

To illustrate more directly how and why this is so I want to return to an earlier theme introduced by Krasner, which identifies the English School/International Society perspective - undoubtedly dominant in Australian IR circles - as still directed by the major assumptions of the Westphalian model. In particular I want to emphasise the

²⁸Ibid pp. 2-3

unfulfilled analytical and political potential of this perspective in an uncritical Antipodean context.²⁹

The Westphalian Model and Australia (1) Some Thoughts on an Unfulfilled Critical Potential

The Westphalian model, maintains Krasner, provides a 'behavioural regularity' for the English School perspective on the inter-state system, albeit one based on intersubjective understanding rather than any explicit structural imperative. More precisely, the Westphalian model provides for the English School its "core concept" concerning the contemporary state system, which is that "all participants in international society - public officials, diplomats, statesmen, political leaders - hold the same fundamental views about the nature of the system". From this assumption is derived the view that while the system is anarchical in the traditional sense, the consequences of anarchy are "socially constructed".³⁰

Within the highly restricted confines of orthodox IR thinking the acknowledgement of a 'social' dimension to anarchy has undoubtedly provided a potential for something other than the structurally determined security dilemma-cum-market anarchy format of much realism-cum-neo-realism. In particular, and put simply, there exists a much greater potential for acknowledging, understanding and responding to *change* if systemic, structural and institutional relations are recognised as socially constructed. Indeed, the recognition of a socially created global order allows, potentially at least, for images of the real-world which include not just its obvious and ever present constraints, but its contingency, historical specificity, and cultural and sociological complexity. In this sense the International Society approach allows, potentially at least, for a flexible, intellectually open approach to power relations and the global 'art of the possible' with the capacity to explain and politically engage with precisely the kind of unpredictable and radical change of the current era.

It was in this conceptual and political space that English School icons such as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull (e.g. in the Anarchical Society 1977) developed the view that, in following their rational self-interest, modern states and their diplomatic elites in particular, articulate a shared social value in preserving and developing the systemic status quo. The institutional interactions and diplomatic culture associated with the

²⁹On this theme see M. Indyk, "The Australian Study of International Relations" op. cit. 1985; J. George, "Some Thoughts on the Givenness of Everyday Life in Australian International Relations" in Australian Journal of Political Science, 27: 31-45; and J. Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations: The Tyranny of Ahistorical Culturalism" in Australian Outlook 41 (1) 1987. On the English connection more generally, see also K. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, Winchester, Mass: Allen and Unwin, 1985) Ch. 5.

³⁰See Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia" (1997) op. cit. p.120;

workings of the state system thus provide intersubjective norms and rules and regulative principles as an effective basis for order, rather than the more explicit (structural) manifestations of the security dilemma. In this context the reality of global life can be conceived of in terms of the historical application of norms and rules and voluntarist rational activity among states, rather than in terms of unchangeable anarchical structures.

This is the kernel of the International Society perspective bequeathed to the Anglophile mainstream in Australian IR and there is obvious potential within it for a more nuanced, contemporary understanding of global life in the 1990s. The point, however, is that it was only ever a kernel, only ever a potential in the works of Wight and Bull which were still overwhelmingly imbued with the more orthodox preferences of the Westphalian model. The problem in the Australian context is that instead of building upon this potential and developing this kernel, the tendency has been to luxuriate in the slipstream of the realist 'great minds' rather than rigorously confront their analytical and political insights as the basis of a critically incisive realism for the 21st century.

This is clear enough at one level in the lack of critical attention paid to Wight's highly problematic 'historical' approach that even Bull acknowledged was embedded in a deep (religiously generated) essentialism and the assumption that there was "a rhythm or pattern in the history of ideas which is there waiting to be discovered".³¹ More specifically what was 'there' waiting to be discovered by Wight was the structural condition of global anarchy that has been there for realists of all ilk following the dictates of the Westphalian model. In Wight's terms, what was 'there' at the essential heart of IR was a pattern of "recurrence and repetition" associated with inter-state conflict which, by its very nature, determined that particular power politics solutions (e.g. balance of power) must be applied to the eternal questions of order and peace.

The silence on this 'anomaly' was evident on another, this time concerning Bull's influential but superficial rebuttal of U.S. scientism in the 1960s. The most obvious significance of the "The Case for the Classical Approach"(1966) in this regard was that it effectively defined the intellectual and research parameters of Australian scholars for generations in a way that rendered 'irrelevant' the many important questions raised by the behaviouralists in this period (on sociology, economics and psychology for example). In so doing, as Indyk noted, Bull unwittingly aided and abetted the broader inclination to avoid theoretical engagement altogether, as

³¹See H. Bull, p. 111, "Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations" in British Journal of International Studies 2 (2): 101-116

Australian analysts pragmatically accepted Bull's rejection of the US orthodoxy, "breath[ed] a sigh of relief and got back to what they were doing" rather than seriously engaging in a debate over the meaning of what they were doing in the period of the Vietnam War.³²

Even more significantly, perhaps, in accepting without question Bull's critique of the scientific IR approach it allowed Australian realists to avoid thinking seriously about the major weaknesses in their own, and Bull's, approach to theory and practice. If Australian analysts had been a little more rigorous in this regard they might have acknowledged the paradox of an attack on the scientific pretensions of the behaviouralists from a position firmly entrenched within positivist metatheoretical parameters. They might, in this context, have questioned Bull's commitment on the one hand to a strict (Andersonian) ontology, centred on a world of atomised, contingent entities and, on the other, to an intersubjective realm of social meaning (i.e. the Hobbsean/Solipsism dilemma)³³

They might also have inquired into Bull's commitment to the logical independence of all 'things' in relation to his study of order and justice in The Anarchical Society and, therefore, to his conclusions regarding the politico-ethical art of the possible in the state system. The point here is that if 'order' and 'justice' are framed ontologically as part of a universe of 'things-in-themselves' in the same way that states and individuals are - and if order is prioritised in the world of states and individuals - then any study of justice must presumably be already framed in negative terms - while the pursuit of justice by the global community must presumably be already framed in utopian terms?. One does not have to take a 'global justice' position here to comprehend the significance of not questioning Bull's rejection of it, particularly in a context where The Anarchical Society is regarded with such reverence, and where

³²See M. Indyk, "The Australian Study of International Relations" op. cit. 1985: 276

³³John Anderson taught Bull philosophy before he studied IR at all. It was to Anderson that Bull paid the major intellectual tribute in his magnum opus The Anarchical Society (1977). Anderson's approach, sought to finesse the inductivist/solipsist problem at the core of post-Humeian positivist thought in line with a particular (one sided) reading of Kant. This involved rejecting entirely one half of the Kantian dualism (i.e. that the general categories of existence are produced by the mind) in favour of an approach that concentrated attention on the other half (i.e. that there exists 'things in themselves' independent of the 'known' world). In seeking to overcome all vestiges of philosophical idealism, Anderson followed the lead of British anti-idealists such as Russell and Moore in constructing an image of reality made up totally of "things in themselves"; of atomised, contingent entities in which no fundamental distinction was acknowledged between the physical and social spheres of existence. Everything, in this sense, including Kant's apriori "mind" categories of space, time, difference, particularity, universality and causality, were reconstituted as interwoven, qualitatively equal elements of "reality". In reorganising the Kantian format in this way, Anderson was able to propound a "common sense" notion of realism based on a direct relationship between individual 'real' things (including individual objects and minds). He could, on this basis proclaim a single method (empiricism) by which the 'real' objects of the world were to be understood free of mind dependent and *intersubjective* elements.

issues of justice and democratic change are still regarded as 'naturally' and/or 'logically' beyond the range of the possible for Australian realists.

Lamenting the uncritical nature of the mainstream IR community, in this regard, one of its disillusioned souls has pondered the part played by a broader social environment characterised by "conservatism, cynicism and pragmatism".³⁴ My own view is that the problem is a more precise one centred on the all encompassing preference regime which is the Westphalian model. On the other hand, it might be a trait integral to the English School per se, given John Vincent's proposition that realists in Britain generally have 'flattered Hobbes by imitating him' in their contemporary IR analysis.³⁵

Whatever the reason, this tendency to flatter by imitation has, I suggest, been detrimental to Australian IR scholarship and to the process of foreign policy training and planning down the years. It is also detrimental to the memory of two fine scholars, in Wight and Bull, whose conservative erudition deserves more than reification and imitative flattery. Above all what their contributions deserves is an acknowledgement that imitation is not the sincerest form of flattery at all - but that criticism is. Or, more pertinently, as Terrence Ball once pointed out, to expose the contribution of scholars who have given us insight and understanding to serious and critical analysis is to pay it the highest compliment - the Socratic compliment.³⁶

No such compliment has been paid to the major thinkers of the English School by their Australian imitators. Instead, any critical potential an International Society approach might have for Australian realists has floundered on the back of a shallow and static reading of its 'great texts'. The end result is an English School legacy centred on an objectified 'anarchy' premise, a commitment to systemic elitism and more latterly to the Western convergence theme. This legacy is most often articulated as a-society-of-states approach with rationalist overtones which (following Wight and Bull) places emphasis on the great powers and the rules and norms of traditional diplomatic procedures. It follows the lead of Wight and Bull also in framing its concerns about systemic change in orthodox Westphalian terms i.e. as only possible if it is in the interests of the great powers. John Fitzpatrick has had some interesting things to say on this issue in pointing to the dangers of an Australian IR perspective which simply follows the "restricted[Eurocentric] categories" of Wight and Bull, in

³⁴See M. Indyk, *The Australian Study of International Relations* op. cit. 1985: 300

³⁵Cited in T. Dunne, "Realism" in J. Baylis and S. Smith eds. *The Globalization of World Politics* op. cit. p. 113

³⁶See Ball's comments in *Idioms of Inquiry: Critique and Renewal in Political Science* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1987) p. 4

reducing the issues of stratification and systemic change to a "simple distinction between the great powers and the rest".³⁷

In his later works Bull, in particular, did begin to shift this focus a little concentrating, for example, on the conduct of the major powers in their dealings with Third World societies. But even here he continued to invoke a 19th century Concert of Europe model as integral to any solution to the North/South problem, on the basis that it was under the auspices of the European great powers that an international society was developed which begat a "state of progressive development" globally, centred on concerns for human rights, liberal individualism and the rule of international law.³⁸

Bull clearly did not intend to be insensitive or narrowly ethnocentric in this early articulation of the realism-as liberal -institutionalism theme. But the problem was not one of intent anyway. It was one of a Westphalian based framing regime which, as Fitzpatrick noted, sought to transform a historical particular - the European state system - into a universal 'good' while transposing the elitist perspectives of the European great powers into a positive and necessary model of rules and norms for all global history and society, including that in the Antipodes.³⁹

In Robison and Goodman's terms, of course, this is an exemplary articulation of the Western convergence thesis which they warned of in the context of Australian foreign policy and our future engagements with the Asia/Pacific region. In the broader context of this paper the focus on convergence, on ruling state elites, systemic voluntarism, and 'globalisation from above', represents one of the more obvious legacies of the Westphalian tradition in contemporary IR thinking. In Australia, it is one of the more problematic legacies of an uncritical English School orthodoxy.

Which brings me back to my original concern about the Australian foreign policy debate in the 1990s - which is that there is no genuine debate. Or, rather, that what debate there is reflects one dimension or another of a Westphalian model which, for all its updated promise, continues to effectively restrict the range and nature of the Australian policy agenda to the conceptual and political preferences of a three-centuries long Western power hierarchy. As a framework for understanding and successfully engaging with the Asia/Pacific region in the 1990s, I suggest, this creates

³⁷See, J. Fitzpatrick, "The Anglo-American School of International Relations: The Tyranny of Ahistorical Culturalism" in *Australian Outlook* 41 (1) 1987:46

³⁸See H. Bull and A. Watson eds. *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p. 125

³⁹See J. Fitzpatrick "The Anglo-American School of International Relations" op. cit. 1987: 47

substantial limitations, particularly concerning the questions left unasked in our 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism' policy perspectives.

I want to turn now to two dimensions of Australia's new policy agenda with this theme in mind. The first centres on the contribution of Gareth Evans, the former Foreign Minister in the Keating government, in many ways the architect of the 'cooperative security' perspective and someone who deserves great credit for the intellectual energy he brought to the Foreign Affairs portfolio. Evan's more immediate significance is that his major analytical work Cooperating For Peace (1995) represents the most intellectually worked-out statement of the new foreign policy approach to 'cooperative security' in the 1990s. The second dimension I explore here concerns the major focus of Australia's current foreign policy - the Asia/Pacific region - but it concentrates on the silenced other side of the 'open regionalism' policy and some of the themes and issues left out of official and mainstream representations of that policy and its goals. In regard to both of these foreign policy dimensions I argue that Australia is forsaking the opportunity for more innovative and less dangerous approaches to the world, primarily because its claims for new world insight remain firmly embedded in old world (Westphalian) mind-sets.

The Westphalian Model and Australia (2) The Convergence Thesis and 'Cooperating For Peace'

The nature and significance of the 'cooperative security' policy and Evans' contribution to it is best appreciated in the context of Australia's more traditional approach to global affairs. Here, the linkages to the Westphalian model sketched out in the first section of the paper and to the English School articulation of it are most explicit. Australia's traditional foreign policy perspective is familiar enough in this regard. The defining feature of modern global life is taken to be the classical security dilemma, brought on by the actions of states existing in an anarchical environment and following their national interest defined as power. Australia's security dilemma is even starker in this regard - as an isolated and vulnerable Western society in constant danger from alien forces and unable to defend itself. Australia's national interest is best served, therefore, by recourse to the major strategy of traditional power politics - alliance balancing - and the protection of a great and powerful friend. Until WW2 this protector was Great Britain, the 'old country' for the Anglophile majority and the cultural heartland of Government and intellectual elites.

Since 1942, when it became clear that Britain was neither able nor willing to defend Australia should the Japanese continue their southward surge, the USA has been the

protector and the American Alliance the keystone of security and defence. The dominant logic of the alliance strategy down the years has been that of the insurance policy - the notion that if Australia faithfully pays its dues to its great power ally - it will someday reap the protective dividends. The strategic principle integral to this logic has been 'forward defence' - the notion that Australian security and sovereignty is best maintained by involving ourselves in offshore military conflict in order to support the protector and/or preempt direct attack on the Australian continent. In this context the 'dues' have for the most part been paid by young Australians in far-off wars as Australia has time after time leapt enthusiastically to the bugle call of its protector.⁴⁰

The (ostensible) end of the traditional era came in the wake of the Vietnam War as Australia began to confront the implications of the US strategic withdrawal from the SEAsian region. Importantly, this shift in orientation was not prompted by a critical reassessment of Australian policy even after the Vietnam debacle. Rather, the decision was effectively forced upon Australian policy planners by changes in US policy attitudes outlined in the Guam Doctrine (1969). In this game of 'follow my leader' changes were, nevertheless, discernible by the late 1970s and early 1980s as challenges to US global hegemony on the economic front, the British decision to turn towards the EC and the emergence of new dynamic actors in Asia (e.g. Japan) acted as further catalysts for foreign policy reassessment.

The end of twenty-three years of Conservative Government in 1972 also gave impetus to the notion that the 'art of the possible' might include a more flexible and independent approach to world affairs and during the brief and turbulent years of the Whitlam ALP Administration (1972-75) a broader more cosmopolitan sense of Australia's global and regional identity began to develop, albeit with the American Alliance insurance policy still firmly in place. Since the 1980s Australian foreign policy has resonated with the tensions between the post-Whitlam liberalised perspective on the world and traditional perspectives more obviously rooted in Westphalian principles.

Characteristic of this new age has been the ongoing attempt to synthesise these 'liberal' and realist tendencies as, for example, in the underlying policy goal of

⁴⁰Dues were paid, for example, in the 19th century on behalf the British Empire in wars against the Maoris in NZ, the Boxers in China and the Boers in South Africa. During WW1, 300,000 Australians out of a total population of some five million volunteered for the carnage in France and Belgium, and nearly 60,000 died there, and in 1939 when Britain declared war on Germany, Australia was also, automatically, at war. In the post-WW2 period, Australians have continued to leave their country for foreign battlefields, to assist either the British, e.g. in the Malaysia/Indonesian Konfrontasi and the United States in Korea, in Vietnam and in the Gulf Wars.

Independence in (US) Alliance. In the 1990s, this goal has been retained as Australia reformulates the globalist stances it advanced during the Cold War in favour of an enhanced focus on cooperative security via regional integration, the power of market forces, and the persuasive influences of Westernised epistemic communities.

In Governmental terms the 1980s and 1990s has seen a period of policy dynamism unmatched in Australia's otherwise cautious and 'frightened' political history.⁴¹ In particular during the Hawke and Keating ALP governments, between 1983 and 1996, the new synthetic approach was most evident in Australian enthusiasm for the APEC grouping, and in increasing mainstream support for a new security agenda based less on traditional (e.g. deterrence) premises but on trade-based processes and the liberalisation of regional and global relations. This is where Evans, as Foreign Minister in the Keating Government made, an important contribution to the policy debate. More specifically, and to his credit, Evans now acknowledged that if a genuine shift was to occur in Australian policy practice a shift was necessary also in the mind-sets of the Australian IR community. Consequently, the issue of old-mind sets is very much to the fore in Evan's Cooperating for Peace (1995). Indeed, the criteria he establishes for producing a mature, independent Australian foreign policy for the future rests on the attempt to construct a "new [liberal-realist] mind-set in the conduct of international relations ...one which endeavours to move beyond [orthodox] power politics".⁴²

The problem with this endeavour is not its intent but the theoretical unselfconsciousness at its (Westphalian) core. Accordingly, in the attempt to change traditional mind sets Evans replicates a traditional mind-setting strategy in framing the issue of 'international relations' in precisely the same (positivist) terms as the power politics perspective it seeks to overcome. Consequently, the basic question addressed by Evan's new Australian approach to the world in the 1990s is: "what should be the response of the international community to the international security problems of the world as we now find it in the 1990s."⁴³

At first glance this appears a rather unremarkable expression of a concern shared by all in a volatile era, but it actually represents a traditional way of closing off debate rather than a genuine attempt to open it. This is because the basic question asked by Evans is already framed in such a way as to effectively disqualify certain ways of

⁴¹For a view of Australia as the 'frightened' country see the aptly titled The Frightened Country by A. Renouf (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979)

⁴²See Evans, Cooperating For Peace, op. cit. 1993 p. 58

⁴³Ibid. 1993 p. 3

answering it. More specifically, by framing the question as a process in which (an essentialised) international community merely responds to the "security problems of the world as we now find it", Evans reduces the parameters of the debate to a traditional epistemological equation, one which reformulates the spectator theory of knowledge in terms of a new rational subject (the homogenised "international community") confronting an objectified, independently existing "world as we now find it", whose vicissitudes *we* (the international community) can only respond to.

From this (meta)theoretical foundation Evans responds predictably enough to the world 'out there' in representing it in the axiomatic liberal-realist terms of the neo-neo debate. Thus, the world is now characterised by an "unprecedented level of complex interdependence between states" and a "shift in national agendas whereby economic well being now supersedes preparation against military threat".⁴⁴ Policy prescriptions naturally follow from this, in particular a 'cooperative security' perspective centred on the premise that security problems in the future have their solutions in the proliferation and influence of liberal regimes and institutions. More precisely, the antidote to Cold War realpolitik for Evans (as it was for Bull and Wight) is the accelerated development of a cultural homogeneity within the international community, based on a global convergence toward Western institutional structures and values and capitalist economic logic. For Evans, moreover, this convergence process is entirely consistent with the flow of (post-Cold War) global history and the inexorable shift towards Western forms of political and economic governance. A process already very evident as:

across national borders things are being done more alike, and...institutions, practices and outlooks are becoming more alike-as a result of which countries, cultures and peoples are becoming less alien to each other ...[and] they are *beginning to learn* that their best interests are advanced not by a culture of conflict, but by a culture of cooperation.⁴⁵ (my emphasis)

There are a number of questions left begging by this observation at the core of the 'cooperative security' perspective. The most important for now is whether it represents a substantial enough conceptual or empirical basis for Australia's new global and regional agenda in the 21st century. I maintain that it does not, that neither in intellectual nor policy terms is it very substantial at all. In intellectual terms, I suggest, it follows a long tradition of representing the world as it *ought to be*, in terms of the way it *is*. In this sense it intersects with the perspectives of Woodrow Wilson,

⁴⁴Ibid. 1993 p.183

⁴⁵Ibid

and others, in the 1920s and 1930s, who sought to intervene in old world conflicts on behalf of liberal-rationality and the universalising logic of global capitalism. There is a more than a hint here also of the (broadly) Hegelian progressivism intrinsic to Fukuyama's post-Cold War celebration of the victory of the 'West' - a victory proclaimed in the name of an increasingly homogenised world order. (Fukuyama, 1992)

This is not to suggest that Evans' perspective is 'idealist' in the traditional sense of the term in IR - i.e. as the dichotomised opposite of realism. Rather, the perspective outlined in Cooperating for Peace is idealist in the way that *realism always was*. It is ontologically idealist in the way it frames its metaphysical subjects and objects. It is analytically and politically idealist in the same way that realism has been since the late 1930s when it, paradoxically, proclaimed itself the successor to Wilsonian utopianism. This paradox of course is startlingly clear in another influential work of the English School in Australia, E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years Crisis (1964) which attacked interwar idealism on the basis that its particularistic interpretation of global reality blinded its advocates to the fact that it was an interpretation - primarily a US interpretation - that did not necessarily describe the reality of a world in which the interests of huge numbers of people were not served by Western, liberal-rationalist and market centred logic.⁴⁶

One need not reject Carr's insightful critique of the Wilsonian position to recognise the paradox of it, and of realism generally, in its promotion of the same particularistic-cum-universalistic scenario since the end of WW2. And while circumstances dictated that the realist universalist pursuit be represented in less utopian terms than that of its great modern rival (global Socialism-as-reality) it is no great surprise that the 1990s has seen a more explicit assertion of realist concerns for a Western led convergence in world affairs. And this is precisely the new/old context in which Evans frames Australia's new security perspectives in Cooperating For Peace. But this is where the problems of a new/old mind-set begins to bite in policy terms, particularly on the issue of how the process of global convergence, integral to Australia's security agenda, *actually works* in everyday practice.

Is it, in this context, really just a matter of states and other actors "beginning to learn" that their best interests are advanced not by a culture of conflict, but by a culture of cooperation." as Evans suggests?. Is the post-Cold War global arena really awash with rational-actors celebrating a "culture of cooperation" based upon liberal-

⁴⁶See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan 1964) Chs. 3-4

capitalist values and philosophical principles?; Is this really what is happening in the old Soviet Union?; Is Africa really engaged in the voluntaristic surge toward Westernisation after so many tragic attempts to impose it?; Are the peoples of China, outside the sliver of capitalist opulence on the east coast, really committed to the Western way?; Are the great majority of peoples on earth really looking to the UN, the IMF, World Bank and the new WTO as the fount of future cooperation, wisdom and security?; Are these exemplar liberal institutions really seen as constitutive of fairer, more responsible forums of prosperity for the increasingly impoverished of the planet?

I suggest not. For many, on the contrary, this whole scenario is just another "fairy-tale" invoked by those in the wealthiest societies who celebrate the positives of a market-driven global economy while effectively ignoring its devastating impact upon the global losers - i.e. the 1.3 billion people designated by the World Bank in 1993 as the absolute poor; and/or the 2 billion people who daily do not have access to clean water; and/or the 1 billion people worldwide who are chronically malnourished; and/or the estimated 55 million child labourers in India working to produce goods and services at the lowest possible costs. From this perspective then this is a fairy tale, like many others, with a sinister dimension, one that, for example, speaks the language of gross national product, gross profit and per-capita income etc., but which leaves silent questions of structural impoverishment, environmental devastation, the destruction of identity, the promotion of landlessness and refugee flight, and the continuing tragic story of the failure of "trickle-down" logic.

This, moreover, is a fairy-tale which promises a happy ending centred on a restructured new world order but which ignores or glosses over the evidence that things are likely to get worse for those left out of the convergence-based success story. Evidence that in the period between 1982 and 1990 there has been a net transfer of capital from the Third World to the industrialised countries of some \$418 Billion US dollars; and/or that of a recent OECD/World Bank study which indicates that the new WTO structure is set to intensify the gap between rich and poor by channelling at least 70% of the profits of increased global trade to the major industrialised states. ⁴⁷

⁴⁷The "fairy tale" theme comes from Jeremy Brecher's "Introduction" to Brecher, et al eds. *Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993) p3; The figures cited come from The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 21; M. Gurtov *Global Politics in the Human Interest 2nd Edition* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991) p. 4; and J. Brecher and T. Costello, *Global Village or Global Pillage* (Boston: South End Press, 1994) p. 24 and p. 60; The child-labourer figures and many like them in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh come from a report in the *Sydney Morning Herald* April 22, 1995: 4;

Further, at the very moment when Australian foreign policy is celebrating a resurgence of a homogenised value-system globally, there is a great deal of empirical evidence suggesting that precisely the opposite phenomenon is most characteristic of the global arena in the 1990s. As one commentator has recently concluded, in terms entirely prescient to the Westphalian context, the likelihood is that Western perspectives and political structures will struggle to survive in the 21st century as, around the world:

there is a growing recognition that the universal authority which Western societies have claimed for their institutions and values are based on nothing more substantial than the global power western states exercised during their brief period of hegemony from the 16th century to the present.⁴⁸

Thus, while in the traditional heartland of Westphalian realist concern, the elite forums of North America and Western Europe (and the odd Pacific middle-power) the convergence case might well be plausibly (if problematically) made, its essentialist and universalist perspective begins to pale rather rapidly beyond these parameters. The reason for this goes beyond any new/old acknowledgement of "uneven development" to be found in works such as Cooperating for Peace. It goes to the conceptual weaknesses at the core of a Westphalian model which frames the world from the perspective of ruling elites and the homogenising experiences to be found within this milieu.

Pointing more directly to the dangers of this conceptual weakness in its Australian foreign policy context, Peter Lawler has proposed that the 'cooperative security' policy might well "facilitate dialogue at the elite level between states, producing significant gains for global security in the narrow sense". But it cannot assume that this kind of elite dialogue will necessarily facilitate a consensus throughout the global community. Rather, "in some aspects it may have precisely the reverse effect".⁴⁹ This "reverse effect" issue is one I want to explore shortly in relation to Australia's 'open regionalism' policy. The point for now is that on the basis of the only developed argument for the 'cooperative security' theme in Australian foreign policy there is room for real doubt as to its conceptual and operational adequacy. This fact

and the capital transfer figures from Susan George, The Debt Boomerang (Boulder, Colorado: Pluto Press, 1992) p. xv

⁴⁸See J. Gray "The West no Longer Calling the Shots" in The Canberra Times, February 11, 1997

⁴⁹See P. Lawler, The Core Assumptions and Presumptions of 'Cooperating For Peace' in S. Lawson ed. The New Agenda for Peace: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995) pp. 56-57

has not been lost on some of those who have been its strongest advocates. Hence, their recent efforts to clarify what the policy actually stands for.

One of Evan's chief advisors on the Cooperating For Peace project has, for example, offered a Huntington type corrective to the 'cooperative security' debate, emphasising that 'cooperation' in this regard is dependent not so much upon any benign conversion among the self-interested masses, globally or regionally, but on the major Western states (and their middle-power partners) increasing their support for ruling elites in "less secure" regions of the world. The actual nature of the policy of 'cooperative security' is on this basis an exemplary neo-Realist one, which seeks the enhancement of "dominant economic processes" in regions where problems of diversity and difference might hinder the homogenisation/convergence project. This, it is acknowledged, might "generate internal injustice and regional disparities", but regrettable as this might be the fact remains that "politicians and private decision makers are more likely to be persuaded by common security arguments if they are seen as good for business".⁵⁰ Whatever else might be said of these candid observations, they illustrate, as Michael Sullivan has noted, that stripped of its new age rhetoric the 'cooperative security' perspective outlined in Cooperating for Peace and articulated at the forefront of Australian foreign policy in the 1990s, actually "differs little from traditional realist discourse on the national security state" primarily because it is interested above all in "state security" via capitalist elite control rather than "people security".⁵¹

Affirmation of the narrowness of the new policy agenda is provided from another, broader angle in a recent survey of attitudes towards security matters in Australia carried out by another academic adviser on Cooperating For Peace.⁵² The most striking characteristic of this survey is its quite extraordinary disinterest in security issues that elsewhere are now regarded as absolutely crucial to an understanding of the contemporary conditions for conflict and its prevention. Most disturbing in this regard is the criteria constructed to establish what are to be regarded as 'real' security issues in the 1990s and what are not. In the former context the judgement is that "potential or actual threats of armed inter-and intrastate conflict" can be the only legitimate criteria. In the latter context, consequently, the view is taken that "there are no good analytic, policy or moral reasons for conflating such widely disparate

⁵⁰Kevin Clements, cited in M. Sullivan, "Australia's Regional Peacekeeping Discourse" op. cit. 1996:226

⁵¹See M. Sullivan, Ibid

⁵²The advisor was Andrew Mack and the 'survey' is P. Kerr and A. Mack, "The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Australia" in P. Evans ed. Studying Asia-Pacific Security (Toronto: York University Press, 1993)

phenomena as environmental degradation, AIDS, poverty and war under the common rubric of insecurity...[because] to do so will simply lead to confusion".⁵³

This is a particularly acute and rather sad reflection of a 'new' Australian security mind-set ostensibly designed to engage Australia with an Asia/Pacific region characterised, undoubtedly, by positive economic and social factors in recent years but riddled also with the implications of 'environmental degradation, AIDS, poverty and war' and massive, unavoidable' confusion'. It indicates once again that for all the lip-service paid to new mind-sets Australian security perspectives remain embedded within the traditional Westphalian mind-set, in which security still means state-security and state-security remains effectively detached from the everyday struggles and tensions of 'internal' society.

The inadequacy of this traditional perspective is evident enough in the observations of other, less constrained commentaries on the nature of daily life in the Asia/Pacific region.⁵⁴ This inadequacy is magnified in the report of The Commission on Global Governance which, in its inquiries into the tragedies in places such Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, found that social breakdown and conflict were intrinsically connected to the very issues regarded as "too confusing" by the mainstream security sector in Australia, the prime advocates of the 'cooperative security' policy.⁵⁵ The commission thus concluded that in other vulnerable regions of the world a new kind of preventative security regimen is required which:

must first focus on the underlying political, social, economic and environmental causes of conflict. [Because] over the long run, easing these is the most effective way to prevent conflict. Such a basic approach is also likely to cost less than action taken after conflicts have erupted.⁵⁶

This is a highly pertinent warning in the context of an Australian foreign policy committed to long-term integration within an increasingly vulnerable Asia/Pacific region. It is particularly so in terms of a 'cooperative security' perspective based on an essentially traditional Westphalian model which, stripped of its liberal rhetoric, is committed to a 'globalisation from above' strategy centred on support for regional ruling elites and what is euphemistically referred to as "dominant economic processes".

⁵³Ibid p. 34

⁵⁴See, for example, Haunani-Kay Trask, "Malama 'Aina: Take Care of the Land" in J. Brecher et al eds. op. cit. (1993)

⁵⁵The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood op. cit. p.95

⁵⁶Ibid, p. 93

In the final section of the paper I want to touch briefly on what this can mean, in practice, and what its implications might be for Australia in the medium to long term. Here, in particular, I return to an earlier theme, concerning the questions and issues left out of Australia's 'open regionalism' policy. Here, more specifically, I touch on what I consider to be perhaps the most dangerous and most silenced aspect of the Westphalian model in its Antipodean representation - its intrinsic connection to global and regional forces engaged in precisely the kind of authoritarian, anti-liberal and anti-democratic processes Australian foreign policy ostensibly seeks to counter.

The Westphalian Model and Australia (3) Towards 'Open Regionalism' or Repressive Closure?

My argument in this section of the paper is that Australia's 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism' policy perspectives are neither conceptually nor empirically as adequate as they might be because of at least three assumptions they make in relation to an enhanced engagement with the Asia/Pacific region. The first, that an adequate understanding of the strategic and/or political culture of the peoples of the Asia/Pacific region can be gained by aggregating the views of the upper echelons of their military and Governmental sectors. The second that, in the post-Cold War era, notions of a global movement towards liberal-democracy and cultural homogenisation can be evaluated via the perspectives of state-sponsored epistemic communities and/or the narrowly conceived institutionalism of regional 'socialised' elites. The third, that patterns of global life embedded for three centuries or more in Western ideas, cultural norms and politico-economic structures will remain dominant in global society in the foreseeable future.

Any doubt that these are the prevailing assumptions within Governmental sectors is easily enough overcome by reference to almost any official pronouncement of recent years invoking Australia's new relationships with the region, or more precisely with the governing elites of the region, represented all too often as *the voice, the face, the enduring presence of the region*.⁵⁷ Similarly, and in relation to the neo-liberal orthodoxy among contributions to the debate over Australia and the International Political Economy (IPE) these are assumptions clearly evident in the analysis-cum-advocacy of those who invoke either an explicit free-trade line on Australia's global/regional future or who, more cautiously, place their faith in institutionalised

⁵⁷This is particularly so in Australia's relations with Indonesia. For this see G. Barker, "Australia Needs Tougher Line on Succession" in The Australian Financial Review August 6, 1996: and the discussion of Prime Minister Howard's speech at the opening of the Australia/Asia Centre on May 8, 1997, in P. Kelly, "The Asian Imperative" The Weekend Australian, May 10, 1997.

forums of elite power and influence (e.g. as exemplified in the 'second track' CSCAP grouping on Asia/Pacific security)

The problem again concerns what is left out, ignored and rendered silent in Australia's 'open regionalism' policy, which compliments its cooperative security counterpart in placing more specific emphasis on the convergence thesis and the homogenising role of a range of multilateral institutions committed to the goals of the liberalisation of global and regional markets (e.g. APEC) As indicated above it is simple enough to take issue with this convergence theme in the larger global context, particularly in regard to great masses of the world's population (in Africa, the former Soviet Empire and the vast hinterland of China, for example) for whom notions of cultural homogenisation and capitalist-based liberalism represent something other than everyday reality. But even in Australia's immediate region where (recent hiccups aside) celebrations of the 'Asia/Pacific century' are already underway there is an effectively silenced other side to this story that we must begin to take account of if optimism and celebration are not to turn to acrimony and long-term policy heartache.

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On this other side, as a number of NGOs have pointed out, are some of the major losers in the globalisation-cum-modernisation project (e.g. the poor agricultural masses of the region, the rural landless and wage labourers) and an everyday reality (e.g. of impoverished women, of forced migration and of a destroyed environment) with the potential to do substantial damage to Australia's future ambitions in the Asia/Pacific region.⁵⁹ In particular Australia's multilateral market-led foreign policy might, in this context, be effectively detaching our policy perspectives from the everyday realities of regional life in which latent anger might well be converted into serious unrest.

The implications of the agenda promoted by APEC, for example, are likely to be devastating for the poor of the region, particularly poor farmers. Here, the push for agricultural trade liberalisation, if successful, will have far-reaching effects for the millions of small-scale, subsistence farmers throughout Asia who in a 'free' market would be unable to compete with the large-scale, capital intensive and highly

⁵⁸On this theme and in regard to this section of the paper generally I am indebted to Rodd McGibbon, particularly in relation to the Indonesian language material. Some of the material in this section is drawn from J. George and R. McGibbon, "Dangerous Liaisons: Neo-Liberal Foreign Policy and Australia's Regional Engagement" in *The Australian Journal of Political Science* (Forthcoming)

⁵⁹ This point has been made by NGOs across the region. See for instance "APEC: Statement from the NGO Forum on APEC" *Ampo: Japan-Asia Quarterly* 1996. 26 (4):17; "Slow Down the APEC Process, say NGOs" in *Third World Resurgence*. 1995. 64:18-19; *Community Aid Abroad Report: APEC. Its Effect on the Poor* (Melbourne: Polliewatch, 1995)

mechanised farming operations of the advanced economies. As one NGO report has put it, the consequences will be "the undermining of entire rural communities and their way of life with disastrous social consequences and greatly increased disruption and unrest in the region".⁶⁰

Another dysfunctional consequence might arise from issues concerning the 'women question' in the region, an issue effectively excluded from Australian analysis, but one which now includes, in Spivak's terms "the urban sub-proletarian female... the [new] paradigmatic subject of the current international division of labour".⁶¹ Under any criteria this is a major silence in any realistic analysis of the Asia/Pacific region when one considers that we are speaking here of around 80% of the workforce in South Korea's export industries, and approximately 85% of the total workforce in Taiwan's free-trade export zones, with similar figures appropriate to the workforces in the Philippines, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh and Indonesia.⁶²

The great attraction of young female labourers in these countries is that, for the present at least, they are easily exploitable. In Malaysia, for example, which has neither minimum wage legislation nor unionisation on the grounds that it would be a "disincentive to foreign investment" young women work in the electronics industry for 45 (US) cents per hour. In Indonesia the starting wage for a female process worker is set at \$US 1.35 per day, and sadly, if not surprisingly, a recent ILO survey reported that 88% of Indonesian women who work for this wage were found to be suffering from malnourishment.⁶³

Attempts to change conditions in favour of these women and workers generally has resulted in the violent repression of trade unions and only recently the arrest and six-year jail sentence of a prominent union official in Indonesia.⁶⁴ Even more recently, one sees reports of riots involving 400 workers at a Nike factory in Indonesia (which led to the hospitalisation of two female workers) and similar incidents in Vietnam where workers organised and protested against the conditions of their sweat-shop

⁶⁰Community Aid Abroad Report (1995) op. cit. p. 4

⁶¹See G. Spivak, *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics* (New York: Methuen, 1987) p. 218

⁶²For these figures see M. Gurtov, *Global Politics in the Human Interest* 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992) p. 113; see also W. Bello, *Perils and Possibilities: The Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era* (San Francisco: The Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1992) p. 40

⁶³On Malaysia generally and this issue specifically, see R. Palat, "The Making and Remaking of the Asia-Pacific" in R. Palat ed. *Asia-Pacific and the Future of the World System*; see also A. Ong, *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1987); The 'disincentive' theme and the wage-rate information from R. Rothstein, p. 52 "The Global Hiring Hall" in *The American Prospect*, No. 17, 1995: 52-61

⁶⁴See, G. Aditjondro "Human Rights and State Wrongs in Indonesia" in *The Sydney Morning Herald*, August 13, 1996 p. 13

labour.⁶⁵ In Malaysia, meanwhile, there is evidence that the treatment of women workers, and of many more men and women wrenched from their families and their rural homes, is promoting significant movements of political resistance.⁶⁶ And well before the present 'economic' crisis in Indonesia, this kind of exploitation on the part of indigenous and corporate elites, and deeper frustrations over political and economic disparities, were motivating forces behind the unparalleled rioting of August, 1996.⁶⁷

Beyond Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia, elites throughout the Asia-Pacific are facing similar problems, where movement of dissent and resistance are becoming increasingly militant, as impoverished women workers join the more general calls for labour rights, as students demand greater democracy, as slum dwellers demand the right to housing and as the urban poor express their discontent with the conditions of daily life. All of these groupings, in their different ways, reflect a growing disenchantment with the elitist, undemocratic and highly inequitable modes of development and governance across the region and the globe.

Another area of disenchantment, with an increasing potential for disorder and instability, concerns the huge upsurge in worker migration that has accompanied the breakdown of traditional rural life and the rise of a new urban industrial revolution throughout most of the region. In 1995 it was estimated that there were some 2.6 million migrants currently working throughout the Asia/Pacific region. In the construction industry, in particular, foreign workers are playing an increasingly important role in a context in which the proliferation of massive public works projects and serious labour shortages in many of Asia's booming economies are fuelling an ever growing need for the importation of foreign labour. In Malaysia's construction industry alone 80 % of the labour force consists of foreign workers.⁶⁸

The speed and complexity of these migrant flows has largely escaped the static cartographies of conventional analysis. Nevertheless, the daily reality is that thousands of Indonesian workers labour in Singapore, Malaysia and Japan, and Hong Kong is inundated with mainland Chinese workers. Meanwhile thousands of Thai construction workers have moved into Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Japan and Brunei, as Thailand itself has imported illegal labour from Burma. In similar fashion,

⁶⁵Reported in the Canberra Times July, 1997

⁶⁶On this issue see A. Ong, Spirits of Resistance op. cit. 1987

⁶⁷See I. Mackenzie, "Frustration Helps Fuel Jakarta Riots" in Reuters News Service, July 31, 1996

⁶⁸On the Worker Migration issue see M. Hiebert, "Building Asia: Give and Take" in Far Eastern Economic Review, No. 25, May 1995: 54; and J. Karp, "Migrant Workers: A New Kind of Hero" in Far Eastern Economic Review, No. 20, March 1995: 43

the Philippines has recently had to import welders for construction projects following shortages caused by the export of Filipino welders to Japan and Taiwan. In some cases whole regions are being integrated into international labour circuits as the traditional frameworks of life and work are broken down.⁶⁹

The structural dynamic at the core of this phenomenon - the unevenness of capitalist development throughout the region - has, in itself, created significant tensions within and across the its major states as indigenous elites and workers confront the growing diasporas of labouring migrants. This has increased specific tensions on issues of ethnicity, religion and national identity, issues that have proved so volatile and dangerous in other areas of the world and have the potential to do so in a rapidly changing Asia/Pacific. The disaster wrought by the economic melt-down in the region, has enhanced the probability of large-scale violence in this context as host countries and immigrant populations clash over fundamental issues of identity and security in areas vital to our regional foreign policy.⁷⁰

Tensions of another kind have arisen over the ecological disaster that has accompanied the dispersion and dislocation of peoples and societies in the Asia/Pacific. In this context the top-down models of high-speed, export-led industrialisation which have made possible rapid rates of economic growth, have also brought large-scale pesticide poisonings, air pollution, falling water tables, unregulated waste disposal, depletion of forest and oceanic resources and land degradation. In South Korea the sulphur dioxide content in Seoul's air is the worst in the world, causing close to 70% of the rain falling on the city to be so acidic as to pose a hazard to human beings. In urban Thailand, the problems are equally disturbing with the dangerous levels of air pollution impacting most severely upon children in Bangkok who now have among the world's highest levels of lead in their blood.⁷¹ In China, a relatively late-comer to export-led industrialisation, the problems of rapid industrialisation are becoming all too visible. And while one could detail a litany of the devastating effects of high-growth, export-oriented strategies of industrialisation from Seoul to Bangkok to Jakarta, it is Taiwan which has represented arguably the worst example of environmental degradation, to the extent that one estimate has 30% of Taiwan's rice crop now tainted with heavy metals due to

⁶⁹See Karp, *Ibid.* 1995: 43

⁷⁰Most recently in Thailand involving Burmese workers, but see also J. Lie, "The Problem of Foreign Workers in Contemporary Japan" in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 26; and D. Chew, "Illegal Workers Face KL Fury" in *The Jakarta Post* April 27, 1996: 1(3) 1994: 3-11

⁷¹See W. Bello, *Perils and Possibilities: The Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era* op. cit. 1992 p. 56

unregulated dumping of industrial and toxic waste which has also polluted rivers, damaged coastal systems and poisoned aquifers.⁷²

While industrial waste has become a serious problem across the Pacific, arguably the most alarming environmental issue has been the rapid loss of SEAsia's rainforests. Estimates of the amount of Indonesian rainforest deforested per annum ranges from 600,000 to 1.2 million hectares, while Indonesia now has the longest list of species threatened with extinction of any country in the world, serious soil erosion, flash-flooding, mudslides, and river systems that have serious siltation problems.⁷³ The political consequence of this for a Suharto regime already facing rebellion and resistance to its rule East Timor, Aceh and West Kalimantan, is an increasingly unstable situation in West Papua, where the multinational Freeport mining operation has come under physical attack by local communities angered at the resulting environmental destruction, and the dislocative effects that thousands of Javanese trans-migrants are having on the province.⁷⁴

In responding to these destabilising forces, governing elites in Indonesia and across the region have deployed all-too-familiar tactics in order to keep a lid on simmering social tensions. This has led to a spiral of violence and instability which has seen the human rights records of, for example, Burma, Cambodia, China and Indonesia actually worsen since 1996.⁷⁵ It is in this context, in particular, that some serious questions need to be asked of Australia's foreign policy commitments to these ruling elites and to the convergence propositions underlying this commitment.

In Burma, for example, Australian policy-makers have steadfastly rejected calls for action against the SLORC, arguably the world's most repressive regime, in favour of an ostensibly even-handed position on trade. Beyond its explicit trade interests, Australian policy on Burma has also been driven by its broader goal of engagement with the ASEAN states who, rather than condemning the SLORC regime in Burma, are likely to welcome it as a permanent member of ASEAN. Here, of course, the convergence rhetoric is handy, as in Deputy PM Tim Fischer's reminder to Australia's critics that "*officially* Burma is headed towards democracy". (my

⁷²Ibid, p. 55)

⁷³See C. Hamilton, "Third World Defoliation" in *Arena*, August-September, 1994: 10; and P. Dauvergne, "The Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia" p. 508 in *Pacific Affairs* 66 (4) 1993:497-518

⁷⁴ See J. McBeth, "Investment: What's Yours is Mine" in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 28:1996

⁷⁵ This was reported in "Repression on the Rise in Asian States" *The Australian* December 5, 1996.

emphasis) ⁷⁶For those closer to the everyday reality of life under SLORC this is at best a cynical piece of official double-speak. At worst it represents a policy of complicity in the thoroughly documented evidence of SLORC repression, torture, martial law, arbitrary arrest and extensive use of child and slave labour in its development and infrastructural projects, aimed primarily at attracting multinational capital and tourism from countries like Australia. ⁷⁷

It is against this sort of background that the recent rekindling of the Cold War 'forward defence' policy by the Howard Government becomes even more significant, particularly given Defence Minister McLachlan's statements on the need for closer ties with military forces in the region and the possibility of Australia becoming engaged in the "internal problems" that our "friends" in the region might have. ⁷⁸ The problem here is not engagement per se with regional forces. The value, in general, of confidence building measures with important military neighbours is undoubtedly a sensible option in the larger foreign policy context.

The problem, as this section of the paper has sought to illustrate, is that there are some fairly obvious dangers associated with becoming militarily engaged in a region where many of our ruling elite 'friends' are likely to be the targets of violent conflict in the foreseeable future. Nowhere are these dangers of more concern than in relation to the internal situation of the Suharto regime and where the ever-closer politico-strategic links between Australia and Indonesia might just require a traditional (e.g. military) example of our 'friendship'.

The Indonesia Connection: A Time for Reassessment?

The most visible feature of Indonesia's political landscape today are signs of increasing unrest throughout the archipelago. While struggles for self-determination continue in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh, the dreadful spectacle of ethnic cleansing in West Kalimantan has added to the already considerable levels of political violence in Indonesia. This discontent has not been limited to Indonesia's underclass's. As the economic melt-down has begun to undermine the life-styles of

⁷⁶See I. McPhedran, "Pilgered on Burma: Fischer Opts for Pre-emptive Strike" in The Canberra Times, June 6, 1996:2

⁷⁷On this theme see J. Pilger, "Burma: A Cry for Freedom" in The New Internationalist, 28, June 1996: 7-30

⁷⁸See I. McLachlan. Transcript of Interview with Network 10 "Meet the Press" op. cit. 1997: 12

the urban middle-classes, intra-elite conflict has erupted, sometimes within Suharto's ruling clique.⁷⁹

This is not quite the spontaneous phenomenon it has been portrayed as in much of the Western media, nor is the conflict generated entirely by the recent economic crisis. For many in Indonesia the nepotism and corruption of Indonesia's ruling elite has been a factor of great distress and anger for years. In recent times, significantly, this has led influential Muslim leaders and many others across the political, ethnic and religious spectrum to condemn the avarice of the Suharto family in particular, and just as significantly to condemn the prevailing 'Western' development policies pursued by the Indonesian government.⁸⁰

In one sense, of course, the behaviour of the Indonesian ruling elite is not surprising, given that a recent Asian intelligence report rated Indonesia "the most corrupt country in Asia" even in a situation where corruption "is increasing in almost every country in the region".⁸¹ Nor should it be surprising in the larger historical context if one recalls that a CIA study carried out in 1968 concluded that the Suharto regime came to power on the back of "one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century" which saw the wholesale slaughter of opposition groups in the mid-1960s.⁸² In this context too, as reports from East Timor have starkly illustrated, old and murderous habits die hard.

So too, it seems, does Australia's response to the murderous behaviour of our new regional 'great and powerful friend'. The point here, of course, is that unless one views the Whitlam era (1972-1975) in exceedingly rosy terms it is clear that even at this time, amid the first great flowering of Australia's new liberal internationalism, the fundamental principles of the Westphalian model were as dominant as ever. So much so that in 1975 when faced with a crucial policy question provoked by the appeals of the East Timorese people for democratic self-determination, the ALP government chose the traditional answer - the Westphalian answer - an answer underscored by the centuries long fear of *too much freedom* and the order imperative.

Thus, intoned Whitlam, with the Portuguese withdrawal from its former colony there was a power vacuum in the region which might be exploited by 'leftist' forces, albeit

⁷⁹ See A. Aspinall "Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto Period" in *Indonesia*, 59 1995: 21-44

⁸⁰ See A. Aspinall "The Broadening Base of Political Opposition in Indonesia" in G. Rodan ed. *Political Opposition in Industrialising Asia* (London: Routledge, 1996)

⁸¹ See R. Pastor, "Report Rates Indonesia Most Corrupt Country in Asia" in *The Canberra Times*, March 31: 6

⁸² See N. Abjorenson, "Few Listen as Indonesia Fuse Hisses" in *The Canberra Times* April 26, 1997: C5

of indigenous origin. Consequently, it was in Australia's national interests (and the interests of the free-world) to support the regional great power, Indonesia, in its brutal but necessary repression of East Timorese independence.⁸³ We are still to see precisely what the implications of this decision will be for Australian foreign policy. Suffice to say that any future problems in relations with the Suharto regime (or any similar successor) emanate from a choice made by an ALP government, two-decades before the 'melt-down' crisis, to reject a claim for democratic self-determination in favour of a three-centuries old model of (European) power politics reality.

In the current period of 'economic' crisis the Australian foreign policy establishment continues to cling to the most corrupt government in Asia in a quite extraordinary way. So extraordinary that Deputy PM Fischer recently invoked Suharto as "perhaps the world's greatest figure in the latter half of the 20th Century".⁸⁴ But this kind of judgement is by no means the exclusive preserve of the current Conservative government. Former ALP leader Paul Keating was an enthusiastic supporter of the Suharto regime and over the past decade or so Australia's 'open regionalism' perspective has been characterised by the desire to place all its "diplomatic and strategic eggs into the Suharto basket".⁸⁵

Whatever else all this might mean in the longer term it surely suggests that a number of crucial questions need addressing on Australia's seemingly unequivocal relationship with a regime founded on brutal and increasingly fragile foundations. And while one might not endorse entirely the view that Indonesia is "a time-bomb slowly ticking away" above Australia's northern coastline it is evident enough that Suharto's regime is essentially unaccountable and repressive and detached from the everyday needs of the great majority of Indonesians, particularly at a time of social dislocation and crisis.⁸⁶

In this situation Australian policy-makers run the risk of becoming detached from the forces of change that are becoming increasingly insistent in Indonesia, as they reject and ignore any other reality than that of the governing clique and military elite. More generally if our policies of 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism' have no place for other than ruling state elites they will effectively silence those seeking a

⁸³See J. Dunn, *Timor: A Country Betrayed* (Queensland: Jacaranda Press, 1983)

⁸⁴See G. Barker, "Australia Needs Tougher Line on Succession" in *The Australian Financial Review* August 6, 1996:10; and D. Lague "The Looming Crisis With Jakarta" in *The Sydney Morning Herald* August 3, 1996:15

⁸⁵See P. Hartcher, "Howard's Discomfort over Jakarta" in *Australian Financial Review* July, 29 1996:

14

⁸⁶See N. Abjorenson, "Few Listen as Indonesia Fuse Hisses" op. cit. 1997

more pluralistic form of governance in a post-Suharto Indonesia as the basis for long-term stability and prosperity. Indeed, for long-time commentator on the region, Peter Hartcher, this is already the "towering silence" of Australian foreign policy.⁸⁷

At this point it is worth recording that the concerns outlined above are given short shrift by official and/or mainstream commentators, who insist that Australia's policy preferences in the region add up to prudent realism. From this perspective Australia's relations with the region's ruling elites, and its restricted frame of policy reference, represents an updated concern to retain and enhance traditional kinds of security guarantees (with major powers) while gradually engaging in a new uncertain integrationist procedures. From this perspective, moreover, it is the systemic constraints upon a small or middle-power such as Australia which are regarded as the paramount factor in the decision process, not any preference for a particular regime or a particular mode of maintaining order. From this perspective, in short, the Westphalian model 'art of the possible' remains a severely restricted one.⁸⁸

I have been critical of this kind of response throughout this paper. There is, however, nothing of analytical value to be gained by condemnation in this context. There is salience too in the argument that as a middle-power with only limited capacity to compete in the global market-place Australia is, by definition, working under 'constraint'. I have argued, nevertheless, that we need to think more acutely about what the parameters of policy constraint actually are in Australia's present situation, rather than simply assuming into policy reality a (Westphalian) grand-theory of constraint. Or, as the earlier sections of the paper sought to explain, we need to think more acutely about how a grand-theory of constraint became so embedded within the Australian IR consciousness that any counter-questioning of it is simply deemed inappropriate, irrelevant and/or 'unreal'.⁸⁹ This has been an issue underlying this final section of the paper which, in a variety of ways, has sought to illustrate that there are very real reasons for a critical counter-questioning of the dominant foreign policy perspectives in Australia, where a contemporary variation on the Westphalian theme continues to orient foreign policy thinking and practice in ways that could well be detrimental to Australia's regional future and to future global relations more generally.

⁸⁷ See P. Hartcher, "Australia and the Crackdown: do as Little as Possible" in Australian Financial Review, August 7, 1996:12

⁸⁸For an exemplar of this argument see P. Dibb, "Whither Strategic and Defence Studies?" in D. Ball and D. Horner eds. Strategic Studies in a Changing World (ANU, Canberra: SDSC, 1992)

⁸⁹Ibid, p. 412

At the very least it is clear that there are major problems on the horizon if greater attention is not paid to the (empirical) detail and (politico-cultural) specifics of our general engagements with the region, and if we fail to think seriously enough about the opportunities as well as the dangers inherent in our present situation. There can be no any easy answers for the Australian policy community in this regard, nor do I have any simple answers to offer to the questions they must now ask of the global arena. But as I have stressed throughout this paper my concern is that many, within the policy sector and within the mainstream analytical community, continue to seek easy (modelled) answers and adopt simple (modelled) preferences at a moment in Australia's history when we have little margin for error in our judgements about what are the most adequate and least dangerous conceptual and strategic directions for the 21st century. In the brief concluding section of the paper I indicate, in very rudimentary terms, what might be done about this situation in the pursuit of a more adequate critical realism in this context.

Beyond Westphalia: Towards a Critical Realism in Australian Foreign Policy

On the basis of what has gone before a reorientation of theory and practice would seem sensible and necessary in the Australian foreign policy context. In the short term this reorientation need not be terribly radical and it should not undermine the best efforts of those who have already genuinely sought to reorient our perspectives on ourselves and the once threatening Others in the Asia/Pacific region. In particular it is vital that we remain engaged in the Asia/Pacific region and that we maintain good relations with societies such as Indonesia. It is important too that a cooperative approach to security remain central to policy planning and that the general principles of openness and flexibility be applied to our global and regional relations.

On the Indonesia issue, nevertheless, there is room for manoeuvre beyond the parameters of the present policy 'art of the possible', involving in the first instance some judicious shifting of policy eggs from the Suharto basket. This might mean an uncomfortable period when walking on policy eggshells cannot be avoided but the risks of closer engagement with such a regime are increasingly obvious as Suharto and his clique struggle to control an archipelago-wide surge for change. The point, to reiterate it, is that Australia's narrowly conceived support for the Indonesian ruling elite is effectively precluding Australian policy-makers from engaging in the broader and more creative efforts of many around the world to resolve complex politico-ethical problems (e.g. East Timor) and create a more stable politico-strategic and economic environment for the region.

Moreover, in the Indonesian context, there are alternative recipients of our policy attention who, via their pluralist inclinations, could perhaps salve our policy conscience while providing a longer-term basis for a regional 'special relationship'. In recent years, for example, a range of dissenting groups have emerged made up of NGO activists, students, Islamic leaders, disaffected former government figures and increasing numbers of workers and Labour activists. The establishment of *Forum Demokrasi*, bringing together religious and community leaders has also provided impetus to a growing opposition movement in Indonesia, while the emergence of Megawati Sukarnoputri and Amien Rais have provided important figureheads for the urban middle classes and the moderate Islamic community more generally.

None of this suggests that Indonesia is on the verge of transition to (Western-style) democratic government. It suggests, rather, that the Suharto led government is increasingly unable to contain pluralistic forces within Indonesian society and that Australia needs to be strategically astute as to the future implications of any changes that might eventuate. Unfortunately, Australian foreign policy appears effectively blind to this situation while others, in particular the United States, pursue a "two boats" approach to Indonesia which includes an expansion of links with opposition groups and an active engagement with other than the ruling state hierarchy. Meanwhile, Australia's ambassador to Indonesia explicitly rejects such a course of action in favour of a rigid status-quo doctrine based on the order imperative and support for traditional elites.⁹⁰

The short-term practical reorientation of policy sketched out above is based on a flexible, pragmatic approach to contemporary circumstance which, I suggest, is more consistent with a notion of critical realism in Australian foreign policy than is the wobbly synthesis of traditional and 'new' thinking which has effectively embedded in place the Westphalian model into the 1990s. It is also more consistent with the English School/International Society perspective touched on earlier which, for all its lingering Westphalian preferences, offers most to an Australian realist community seeking to understand and engage with a changing world. A change of analytical and political attitude is required if this perspective is to begin to fulfil its potential in the Australian IR context, but in such changed attitudinal circumstances at least two critically constructive themes might be added to the current lexicon of reality. The first, that the global 'art of the possible' can never be a static nor immutable category. The second, that historical contingency, as a global fact of life, provides the

⁹⁰See L. Williams, "Australia Stands by Suharto, Says Envoy" in *Sydney Morning Herald* April 18, 1997:8

conceptual and strategic space for a more secure integration into the Asia/Pacific region.

What I have in mind here, in relation to the Indonesian example above, is a subtle but crucial shift in focus, which in no way ignores the incidence of 'external' conflict among the global elite states, but which places much more significance upon the everyday realities of life inside those societies most significant to our regional future. Special attention might then be paid to the often subtle indicators of change taking place in what to a great extent remain alien 'black-boxes' for most Australians. As some pioneering works of this kind have illustrated such inquiries can reveal a not so endearing reality.⁹¹ On the other hand, as even the sketch of the Indonesia situation above indicates, there is evidence not only of embedded corruption and repression but also of increasing space for a more participatory political arena, where the influences of a globalised economy and world order might be managed in favour of the great majority of Indonesia's peoples rather than just its ruling clique.

This is a space beginning to emerge in other areas of the Asia/Pacific to the extent that the IR mainstream in Australia (including its neo-liberal offshoot) can no longer assume a static "recurrence and repetition" as the (Westphalian) foundation of their foreign policy planning. It is an important space for Australian society also, because it is in this space that Australia's sense of its future self and its relationship with the region more generally might indeed prosper and develop. In the current Australian context this might allow the IR elite, and the general community, to contemplate more seriously official rhetoric about our future as part of Asia, and to just as seriously ponder the implications of a recent proposition that, in the next millennium, the 'West', or more specifically the United States "will not be calling the shots".⁹²

This, of course, is where even a moderately critical realism verges on the heretical in the Australian context - when the question is raised of whether it is actually in our interests to continue to cling to the global coat tails of the USA, of whether we actually need a US protector, of whether the costs outweigh the benefits of the ANZUS alliance. These, nevertheless, are crucial and timely questions for Australian society to ask in the late 1990s as it confronts, at last, an identity beyond the British Monarchy.

⁹¹As in the work of Robison and Goodman, *The New Rich in Asia* op. cit. 1996; and G. Rodan, *Political Opposition in Industrialising Asia* op. cit. 1996

⁹²See J. Gray "The West no Longer Calling the Shots" op. cit. 1997; and in more general terms see S. Fitzgerald, *Is Australia an Asian Country?* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997)

The SAP finds at least three major problems with this agenda which, it must be remembered, is an integral feature of the purported 'new mind-set' of the 1990s. The first, is that it requires the procurement of (mainly US) weapons systems designed for long-range strike and inderdictive strategies (e.g. F111's, missile carrying frigates and long-range submarines) which, because of their cost, limits the numbers we can buy and constrains the overall effectivity of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) in carrying out their designated tasks. The second, that with the focus still effectively on traditional security concerns and traditional horizons, the capacity of the ADF to deal with the much more likely threats to Australia's sovereign territory (smuggling, drugs, illegal immigration) is seriously impaired. The third, and perhaps most obvious in the context of this section of the paper, is that Australia's defence and security agenda can look menacing and provocative from the perspective of our regional neighbours, who hear much about cooperation and integration but who see Australia continuing to spend approximately as much on defence as all of the ASEAN states combined, and continuing to arm itself with weapons derived, primarily, from the US global arsenal.

The SAP response is designed to enhance strategies of cooperation and integration while enhancing Australian security in the post-Cold War era. This it seeks to do by rejecting the traditional 'expeditionary force mentality' in favour of a smaller, more precisely trained ADF, concerned with the defence of Australia and its immediate maritime surrounds, and a reliance on non-military projects of cooperation and integration within the Asia/Pacific region. This, it suggests, will allow for a cheaper, yet more coherent approach to security and defence, less reliant on US weaponry and geopolitical intent and more conducive to confidence-building measures in our immediate neighbourhood.

The difference between this format and those represented by the 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism' policies is as much a difference of conceptual horizons as strategic ones. In particular the SAP perspective emphasises an inclusive approach to security and defence and to global politics in general, rather than one which excludes so much, even while invoking notions of 'new mind-sets'. In this regard the question of security is re-formulated in order that Australians might consider not only traditional state-centric conflict but other contemporary issues (of global ecology, gender, ethnicity and poverty) which simply cannot be reduced to the parameters of the Westphalian model. With its concern also for the destabilising and

interest" encompassing nearly 10% of the globe. Now it is the language of the "air-sea gap". The principle remains the same.

For all the pronouncements of a new independent, more mature foreign policy perspective in Australia in recent years there is little evidence that these questions have penetrated the consciousness of the IR mainstream where, it seems, faith in the redemptive powers of the U.S. cavalry remains a source of solace in a changing world.⁹³ But if they are allowed to penetrate, as I believe they must if Australia is to grow and prosper in the Asia/Pacific region, then a receding U.S. presence in theory and practice might be the catalyst for a more substantial understanding of the peoples, histories, cultures, languages and realities of those who inhabit this region (including ourselves).

For those who would counter such a suggestion with the proposition that this scenario would leave Australia even more vulnerable and defenceless than ever, another heretical suggestion is apposite. It is that there is already an alternative security and defence strategy designed to protect Australia from attack, which does not necessitate US involvement and which, by design, is much more consistent with a 'cooperative' approach to global and regional security than is the current policy format. Developed in the late 1980s by a range of strategic analysts and concerned citizens, the Secure Australia Project (SAP) has led a chequered existence since and it clearly is not without its problems.⁹⁴ But as a basis for reimagining an independent Australian security agenda it has much to commend it, particularly at a moment in the late 1990s with 'forward defence' themes again prominent in Government thinking.

I can only touch on one element of the SAP here to illustrate this reimagining potential. It concerns the innovative extra-dimensions it offers to the current security and defence format. On the defence theme, for example, while it retains a commitment to a conventional military force structure, it questions the validity and viability of the present agenda of 'defence-in-depth' (aka the 'air-sea gap' strategy) which, consistent with old assumptions and fears, still identifies Australia's area of potential threat as an area stretching 1,500 nautical miles from the Australian coastline and encompassing about 10% of the globe.⁹⁵

⁹³As in Defence Minister's Robert Ray's offer in 1995 to the US to extend its use of their strategic bases on Australian soil in order once again to entrench a US military presence in the region. See P. Clarke and D. Lague, "Australia Offers US More Use of Bases" in Sydney Morning Herald, April 21, 1995

⁹⁴See G. Cheeseman and St. John Kettle eds. The New Australian Militarism (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1990) and G. Smith and St. John Kettle, eds. Threats Without Enemies: Rethinking Australia's Security (Sydney: Pluto, 1992) For an interesting commentary on the SAP see S. Dalby "Continent Adrift?: Dissident Security Discourse and the Australian Geographical Imagination" in Australian Journal of International Affairs 50 (1) April 1996: 65-75

⁹⁵See G. Cheeseman, "An Effective and Affordable Defence for Australia" in G. Smith and St. John Kettle, eds. Threats Without Enemies op. cit. 1992, p. 295 The language has changed over the past decade. In the Defence White Paper of 1987 the strategy was articulated in terms of a "direct military

potentially catastrophic impact of a neo-liberal economic agenda the SAP considers the North/South divide, and processes of 'globalisation from below', as issues intrinsic to Australian security and to its broader national and global interests.

At this point the SAP initiative remains stalled. To a large extent its major features having been appropriated by the official policy community and integrated within the liberal-realist format of 'cooperative security' and 'open regionalism', albeit without the deep democratic commitments intrinsic to the SAP. There should be no real surprise about this. To a very large extent the democratic preference has always been a missing critical dimension in the Westphalian tradition. Indeed, from its inception in the mid-17th century, the issue of democracy has appeared in the Westphalian lexicon as a signifier of danger - the danger of *too much freedom*.. The danger that Spinoza and Hobbes warned of and which the modern state-system, dominated by the great Western powers, has always kept in check, either militarily or via a model of the real world in which the democratic impulse remains a factor beyond the 'art of the possible'.⁹⁶

In the late 1990s, nevertheless, Australians are now having to reassess the boundaries of this Westphalian 'art of the possible' more seriously than most, principally because the luck has run out for the 'lucky country'. Where once a white skin and Anglo-Celtic heritage was a passport to privilege, it is now more likely to be a burden to be borne in a harsh future environment where others will increasingly demand the social and economic opportunities we have taken for granted. In this regard any critical realist of Australian foreign policy will have to understand that we can no longer merely meander along in the slipstream of the post-Westphalian grand-theory of global order which for so long served our political and cultural interests. That, instead, issues of grinding, relentless poverty, environmental degradation, migration flows, land rights for indigenous people, gender disparities and the destruction of community life, among many other 'peripheral' issues, must now be regarded as first-order factors in Australian foreign policy. A critical realism must recognise that this is the case not because of some idealistic (and patronising) concern for the downtrodden, but because, as the Commission on Global Governance report starkly illustrates, the fate of Australians in the future is inexorably bound up with the fate of all of the peoples of the Asia/Pacific and the world, not just its technocrats of globalisation, nor its present ruling elites.

⁹⁶On the question of democracy and the Westphalian tradition in a globalising world, see A. Mgrew ed. The Transformation of Democracy (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 1997); see also E. Dagnino, "An Alternative World Order and the Meaning of Democracy" in J. Brecher, et al eds. op. cit. (1993)

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