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






Friendship.

Marcus Tullius Cicero

Essay on Friendship

(Lælius De Amicitia)

Translated from the Latin with Notes

by

Alexander J. Inglis

WILLIAM BRIGGS
TORONTO

Friendship

Preface

Of all the numerous essays written upon subject of Friendship, the "Lælius" of Cicero holds the foremost rank, not only because of the nobility of the theme itself, but also because of the author's sincerity of purpose and the fineness of the sentiment from which the essay is developed. Before Cicero's time, several Greek writers had treated the same theme, but for the most part coldly, analytically, and from the standpoint of the philosopher only. The Lælius, however, was written not by Cicero the philosopher, but by Cicero the man, the Roman, the friend, "as one good friend addressing another." It was dedicated to Titus Pomponius Atticus, Cicero's constant friend and adviser in prosperity and adversity, and many of the sentiments expressed are to be looked upon not as purely logical statements of theory, but as the personal feelings of Cicero, the warmest of friends; not as the unattainable ideals of the philosopher, but as principles of universal application in the practical, everyday life of man.

It is this universality of application and of appeal which has made Cicero's essay

on Friendship the cherished heritage of all ages, as valuable to us to-day as it was to the Roman of two thousand years ago.

Its bright optimism is always uplifting. Its political morality and wisdom are even more applicable to the conditions of modern life than to their Roman setting.

Since its publication, no one has written on the theme of Friendship who has not drawn inspiration from Cicero's essay, and no friendship has become known to the world that does not bear witness to the truth of the principles laid down by Cicero.

ALEXANDER J. INGLIS.

New York, Oct. 1, 1908.

Introduction

Addressed to Titus Pomponius Atticus

I. Quintus Mucius,[1] the Augur, used to relate in a very pleasant manner many particulars which he well remembered concerning his father-in-law, Gaius Lælius,[2] whom he never hesitated in all his conversation to call "The Wise." Moreover, as soon as I had assumed the garb of manhood, I was placed by my father under the tuition of Scævola,[3] with the intention that as long as I was able and he permitted me to remain, I should never leave the old man's side. In consequence of this privilege many of his wise discussions, many also of his concise and pithy remarks I committed to memory, and I endeavored through his wisdom to improve my own knowledge. After his death I attached myself to Scævola,[4] the Pontifex Maximus, by far the most eminent man of our state, I venture to say, both in intellectual accomplishments and in uprightness of character. But of this man I shall speak on some other occasion; for the present I shall return to the Augur.

I can remember hearing him ofttimes

speak on divers subjects, but especially do I recall one day, when, seated as was his custom in the hemicyclium [5] of his home, in the presence of myself and a few other intimate friends, he chanced to speak of a matter which was about that time a general topic of conversation. For you cannot but remember, Atticus,[6] especially since you were intimately acquainted with Publius Sulpicius,[7] how surprised and concerned men were, when Sulpicius quarreled in deadly hatred with Quintus Pompeius [8] then consul, a man with whom he had previously lived on terms of the closest friendship. In that connection, since he had chanced to touch on that particular incident, Scævola [9] took occasion to relate to us the remarks on friendship made by Lælius to himself and the other son-in-law of Lælius, Gaius Fannius,[10] a few days after the death of Africanus.[11] The opinions expressed in that discussion I have kept in mind, and these I have set forth in the following essay in my own fashion. For, in order to avoid the too frequent repetition of "said I" and "said he," I have introduced the characters speaking in person, at it were, so that the reader may feel that he is listening to the speakers themselves.

For you have frequently urged me to write something on the subject of friendship and it has seemed to me to be a topic which is worthy of the consideration of all men,

and particularly befitting the intimacy which exists between you and me. Therefore I have been not unwilling to undertake this task, inasmuch as it affords me the opportunity of benefitting others at the same time that I comply with your request.

As in the "Cato Major,[12] my essay "On Old Age," which was dedicated to you, I introduced Cato[13] carrying on the discussion in the character of an old man, since no personage seemed better fitted to speak on old age than a man who was himself so advanced in years and who had retained his powers and prominence beyond other men; so, as we have learned from our fathers of the unusually noteworthy friendship which existed between Gaius Lælius[14] and Publius Scipio, the character of Lælius seemed to me to be a suitable one to discuss the sentiments which Scævola informs us he expressed with regard to friendship. Moreover discussions of this sort, when resting on the authority of illustrious men of earlier times, seem, somehow or other, to possess greater weight. Wherefore, as I myself read over my essay "On Old Age," I sometimes find myself imagining that it is Cato, not I, who is speaking. But, as in that essay I wrote as one old man to another on old age, so in this treatise I have written as one close friend addressing another on friendship. In the former the speaker was Cato, a man who was older

than most of his contemporaries and who possessed greater wisdom than any. Now, when we are discussing the subject of friendship, the speaker is to be Lælius, a man both wise — for so he was considered — and eminent in all the noble qualities of friendship. Pray turn your attention, then, from me for a while, and imagine that it is Lælius himself who is speaking.

Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius are visiting their father-in-law after the death of Africanus. The conversation is opened by them, Lælius replies, his whole discourse treating of friendship, and in reading it you will find your own character portrayed.

II. FANNIUS. What you say is true, Lælius. For there never was a better man than Africanus, nor one more illustrious. But you should realize that the eyes of all men are now centered on you, whom they both call and esteem a wise man. Lately that title was bestowed on Marcus Cato,[15] and we know that Acilius [16] was called a wise man by our fathers. But both deserved that title for reasons somewhat different from those for which you are so called: Acilius, because he was considered well skilled in civil law; Cato, because of the variety of his attainments: and many instances are cited, where, both in the senate and in the forum, he displayed either shrewd foresight, steadfast conduct, or keen repartee, as a result of which in his old age he acquired as a sort of surname the appellation of "The Wise." But in your case men apply the term "wise" with a somewhat different meaning, not only for your natural endowments and character but also for your zeal in the acquisition of knowledge and for your attainments. You are wise, not in the sense in which the vulgar crowd employ that term, but in the

sense in which the truly learned employ it: wise in the sense in which that term was accepted when it was said that in all Greece there was no man wise, except that one man [17] of Athens who we are told was judged wisest by the oracle of Apollo.[18] For those who are commonly called the "Seven Wise Men" [19] are not considered in the number of truly wise by those [20] who think with greater profoundness. Such wisdom as this, people believe you to possess; a wisdom which teaches you to find the source of all happiness in yourself and to consider all the haps and mishaps of life as of little importance in comparison with virtue. And so they ask me, and, I have no doubt, Scævola here also, how you bear the death of Africanus; all the more because, on the Nones [21] just past, when we assembled as usual for deliberation in the gardens of Decimus Brutus,[22] the Augur, you were absent, you who had always been very careful in the keeping of that day and in the performance of your official duties.

SCÆVOLA. Many do indeed ask that question, Lælius, as Fannius has said, but I reply that, so far as I have observed, the sorrow which you feel at the death of a very illustrious man and very dear friend, you bear with equanimity, though it was impossible for you not to be affected by this loss, nor was such an action consistent

with your kind disposition. And further I tell them that it was ill health, not grief, that was the cause of your absence at the meeting of the augurs on the Nones of the month.

LÆLIUS. You answered quite rightly, Scævola, and truly. For it would not have been right for me, because of any personal unhappiness, to neglect a duty which I have always attended to when in good health. Nor do I think that any man of steadfast character, because of any personal misfortune, should permit himself in any contingency to be remiss in the performance of his duty.

You also, Fannius, speak with friendly intent, when you say that wisdom is attributed to me, more wisdom than I myself can recognize as a right or lay claim to. But it seems to me that you do not judge rightly of Cato. For either there never has been any wise man in the true sense of that term (as I myself am inclined to believe), or, if there ever has existed such a one, Cato was a wise man. Not to mention other instances, how bravely he bore the death of his son![23] I remembered Paulus[24] under like circumstances, and I had seen Gallus[25] suffer a similar loss. But these men lost their sons when they were but boys, while Cato's son had attained the maturity of a tried manhood. Therefore do not prefer to Cato even that

man whom, as you say, Apollo judged the wisest of men. For Cato is praised for his deeds, Socrates for his noble words.

III. As concerns myself, however, that I may now address you both, consider this. If I were to deny that I felt deeply the loss of Scipio, how right I should be in doing this it is for the philosophers [20] to determine, but I should surely not be telling the truth. For I am grieved at the loss of such a friend, one whose like I believe no man will ever have hereafter, and, I am willing to assert, certainly no man has ever had heretofore. But for this I need no external remedy, for I am able to alleviate my sorrow myself, especially with the consoling thought that I am free from that mistake which most men make in suffering anguish at the death of their friends. That any evil has befallen Scipio I cannot believe; if there be any evil in his death it is upon me that it has fallen. But to be unduly distressed at one's own misfortunes is an act of one who loves not his friend but himself. As for Scipio, who would deny that his lot has been a glorious one? For unless he wished to attain immortality — which he was the last man to desire — what that it is right for man to aspire to did he fail to attain? For in his early manhood by his extraordinary virtues he fulfilled the great expectations which his fellow citizens had already formed of him

in boyhood. Though he never sought the consulship,[27] twice was he made consul — the first time before he had reached the legal age, and again at a time propitious for him but well nigh too late for the republic. By destroying the two cities[28] most hostile to this empire he put an end to all wars from those quarters, not merely for the time being but for all the future. What shall I say of his genial manners, of his affectionate treatment of his mother, of his generosity toward his sisters, of his goodness toward his relatives, of his justice toward all men? These are well known to you both. How dearly also he was loved by his fellow citizens was made manifest by the grief which they showed at his funeral. How then could a few years more of life have profited him? For granting that old age is no burden in itself, as I remember that Cato maintained in a conversation with Scipio and myself a year before he died, still it does impair somewhat the vigor and vitality which Scipio possessed up to the time of his death. Such then was the course of his life that neither in fortune nor in fame could anything be added to it, and even death was robbed of its pain by the suddenness of his taking off. By what manner of death he died it is difficult to say[29] but you know what suspicions are abroad. This, however, we may truly say, that of all

the brilliant and happy days which Publius Scipio enjoyed in life, the day before he departed this life was the most glorious, when, in the evening, after the senate had adjourned, he was escorted home by the senators, the Roman people, the Latins and other allies of Rome, so that he seems to have ascended from the supreme heights of human honor to the gods, rather than to have descended to the shades.

IV. For I do not agree with those[30] who of late have begun to promulgate this doctrine — that the soul perishes with the dissolution of the body and that all our being is extinguished in death. Of more weight with me is that belief which has the authority of the ancients and of our ancestors, who ordained sacred rites for the dead — something which they surely would never have done, had they believed the dead to have no concern in them; the belief of those who formerly lived in this land, and who by their schools and learning made famous that Magna Græcia,[31] which is now, to be sure, utterly in decay but which in those days was a flourishing land; the belief of that man who was adjudged by Apollo the wisest of men, who on this subject did not think now this, now that, as he did on most subjects, but always clung to this same faith, that the soul of man is divine and that when the soul leaves the body there opens out to it a return to

heaven which is easily accessible to the soul of each good and just man in proportion to his goodness and justice. This was also the belief of Scipio, who, as if he had a glimpse of the future, a few days before his death, in the presence of Philus [32] and Manilius [33] and several others — and you, too, Scævola, for you had come with me — on three successive days talked on affairs of state, and toward the end of that discussion he mentioned in regard to the immortality of the soul certain things which he said he had heard from Africanus in a dream.[34] If this is true, then, that for each man in proportion to his merit the soul finds in death an easy escape from the confining prison of the body, for whom shall we say this escape to the gods has been easier than for Scipio? Therefore to lament his fate, I fear, would have more the appearance of envy than of friendship. If, on the other hand, the contrary belief be true, that the end of the soul and body be one, and no consciousness remains after death, as there can be no good in death, so certainly there is no evil. For if Scipio has lost all consciousness, it is the same as if he had never been born at all. Yet we rejoice that he was born and the state will always rejoice as long as it exists. Therefore, as I have said before, with him everything has happened for the best, but with me quite the opposite. For as I preceded

him in entering the world so it would have been right to expect that I should leave it before him. Nevertheless I take so much satisfaction in reflecting on the friendship which existed between us that I cannot but think that I have lived a happy life, since I have lived with Scipio. For we were closely united in public and private affairs, at home and in our military campaigns, and in that which forms the closest bond of friendship, harmony of desires, pursuits, and ideas. And so I do not take as much pleasure in that reputation for wisdom which Fannius mentioned a while ago — especially since that reputation is not well founded — as I do in the hope that the memory of our friendship will never die, a consummation that is all the more dear to my heart because in all the ages of the past scarcely three or four pairs of friends [35] have become famous, and in this group I hope that the friendship of Scipio and Lælius will be renowned in the generations to come.

FANNIUS. Of that there surely can be no doubt, Lælius. But, since you have mentioned the subject of friendship and since we have the leisure, you will do a great favor to me — and likewise to Scævola, I hope — if, as you are accustomed to do in other matters, when you are asked, you will talk with us on friendship, telling us what your opinions are on that subject,

what the character of friendship is, and what principles you would lay down in regard to it.

SCÆVOLA. I also should be very glad to hear you speak on that subject, and in fact I was about to broach that very question to you when Fannius anticipated me. Therefore you will do us both a very great favor by complying.

V. LÆLIUS. I should indeed be not at all loath to gratify your desire, if I thought myself equal to the task, for the subject is a noble one and we are, as Fannius has said, at leisure. But who am I that I should discourse on this subject? Or what ability have I to treat it? To discuss what is set before one at a moment's notice is a custom of the philosophers [36] and especially of the Greeks, but that is a difficult art and one which requires no little practice. Therefore I should suggest that you seek to learn what can be said about friendship from those who profess a knowledge of such subjects. As for myself this much I can urge you, to prefer friendship to all else in life. For nothing is so well suited to nature or so valuable either in prosperity or adversity. But this I conceive to be the fundamental principle — that there can be no friendship except between good men. Nor would I draw fine distinctions in the interpretation of that term, as do those [37] who are accustomed to

discuss such matters, subtly and correctly, perhaps, but with little advantage to society. For they say that no one can be a good man except a wise one. This we may indeed grant to be true, but they understand wisdom to be a thing which no mortal being has ever yet attained, while we ought to hope for that which may be found in the experience of everyday life, not those things which are mere products of the imagination or ideals of aspiration. For though our ancestors judged them wise men, I should never call Gaius Fabricius,[38] Manius Curius,[39] or Tiberius Coruncanius[40] wise according to the standard set up by those philosophers. Therefore let them keep for themselves that pretentious and unintelligible name of "wisdom," provided that they admit that good men actually have been found. But not even this far will they go, for they say that this term cannot be applied to any one except a wise man.

Let us appeal, then, to common sense, so to speak. Those who so act and so live as to prove their honesty, uprightness, justice, and generosity, and are free from covetousness, licentiousness, and unscrupulousness, showing themselves men of steadfast character, as did those men whom I have just named; such men as these, as they have always been considered good men, so we should think they ought to be called, since,

so far as man can, they follow nature, the best guide of a virtuous life.

For it seems evident to me that our nature is such that there must be a certain fellowship between all men, and that this fellowship is the more perfect the nearer each individual unites himself with his fellows. So our fellow citizens have a greater claim to our affections than foreigners, and relatives than strangers. For among relatives nature herself has begotten friendship, though this friendship is of no great strength. Friendship has this advantage over mere relationship — that goodwill may be removed from the latter but never from friendship. For if goodwill be taken away, the very name of friendship is destroyed while relationship remains. Moreover how great the power of friendship is you can best learn from the fact that in all the infinite society of the human race, which nature herself has established, so limited and contracted is friendship that all affection is found either between two or among few individuals.

VI. For friendship is nothing else than a harmony of opinion on all things human and divine, together with goodwill and mutual affection, and — unless we except wisdom — I am inclined to think that no better gift has ever been granted to mankind by the immortal gods. Some men prefer wealth, some good health, some

power, some public honors, and many also sensual pleasures; but the last is, surely, worthy only of beasts, and the others are fleeting and uncertain, dependent not so much on our own planning as on the caprice of fortune. Some [41] there are also who find the highest good in virtue, and this belief is a noble one. Yet it is this very virtue which produces and fosters friendship, nor is it in any way possible for friendship to exist without virtue.

To proceed in our discussion let us define virtue in the terms of ordinary life and speech, without measuring it off in grandiloquent terms as certain philosophers [42] do, and let us consider as good men those who are usually so esteemed, men like Paulus,[43] Cato, Scipio and Philus. For ordinary life is content with such men as these, and we may disregard those ideal beings who are nowhere found in actual life.

Now friendship such as exists between men of this sort has greater merits than I can mention. In the first place, how can that life be true life, as Ennius [44] calls it, which does not find the restful pleasure that proceeds from the mutual affection of friends? What can be sweeter than to have a friend to whom one may venture to confide all things as to one's self? What enjoyment would there be in success unless one had a friend to rejoice in that success even as himself? Adversity too would be

hard to bear without someone to endure that adversity with even greater sorrow than one's self. And finally all other objects of human endeavor are suited only to particular ends; wealth for use, power to acquire prestige, pleasures to enjoy, good health that one may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. But friendship, on the other hand, combines many advantages. Whichever way you turn, it is an ever present aid; from no place is it barred; never is it unseasonable; never a cause of annoyance. And so, to compare it with what are commonly termed the necessities of life, we find friendship of more general advantage than water and fire. But I speak now, not of friendship of the common ordinary sort — which in itself, however, affords great pleasure and is of great benefit — but of that true and perfect kind, such as existed between those few men whose friendship has made them famous. For such friendship renders prosperity more delightful and lightens adversity by dividing and sharing our sorrows.

VII. Not only does friendship combine many great advantages, but it is preeminently valuable in this, that it throws forward into the future a bright ray of hope and does not permit the spirit to weaken or become depressed. Moreover he who gazes into the face of a true friend, sees, as it were, a duplicate of himself.

Therefore, though absent, our friends are ever at our side; though in want, they are blessed with riches; though weak, they are strong; and, to employ an even bolder figure, though dead, yet do they live; with such regard, with such tender recollections and affection are they attended by their friends. Thus the death of those who depart seems blessed, and the life of those who remain, worthy of praise.

But if you remove the bond of good feeling from nature, no house can stand, no city endure, nor even the cultivation of the fields continue. If this seems doubtful, how great the power of friendship and unanimity is can be seen from the results of strife and discord. For what house is so well founded, what state so firmly established, that it cannot be completely overthrown by animosity and schisms? From this it can be judged what advantage is to be found in friendship. They say that a certain philosopher [45] of Agrigentum once set forth in inspired strains of Greek verse that throughout the universe all such things as stand united are drawn together by friendship, while those that move apart are separated by discord; a principle which all men understand and prove by their conduct. And so if at any time a service is rendered by a friend in incurring or sharing danger, who is there who would not extol that act with the highest praise?

What shouts filled the entire theatre lately at the presentation of a new play of my friend and guest, Marcus Pacuvius,[46] when, the king not knowing which was the true Orestes, Pylades asserted that he was Orestes, that he might die in his friend's stead; while Orestes persisted in the claim that he was the real Orestes, as in fact he was! The spectators rose to their feet and applauded this fictitious incident! What then do we imagine that they would have done had it been a reality? Nature herself displayed her power when men approved in another that which they themselves could not accomplish.

So far I think that I have stated my views on friendship as well as I could. If there is anything more that you desire — and I believe that there are many phases of the subject to be discussed — inquire, if you think best, of those who are accustomed to discourse on such topics.

FANNIUS. We should rather listen to you. Though I have often questioned those philosophers and have willingly listened to their views, the style of your discourse is somewhat different.

SCÆVOLA. You would say that the more readily, Fannius, if you had been present recently in the gardens of Scipio when the subject of government was discussed. What an advocate of justice

Lælius showed himself in answering the studied discourse of Philus![47]

FANNIUS. It was an easy task for a man, himself the most just of men, to defend justice.

SCÆVOLA. And why not friendship? Would not he discuss that subject easily who has himself received the highest praise for maintaining it with the utmost loyalty, constancy, and justice?

VIII. LÆLIUS. But this is employing force! For what matters it how you compel me, since compelling me you surely are? It is not easy, nay more, it is not even right, for one to disappoint the eager requests of one's sons-in-law, especially in so worthy a matter.

Well then, to continue in our discussion, the more I reflect on friendship, the more I think that this is a question worthy of the profoundest consideration: whether friendship is to be desired because of weakness and want, that by a mutual interchange of good services each man may receive from another what he cannot gain through his own efforts, and again render the same aid in return; or, whether this is merely a property, not the essence, of friendship and there is another more fundamental and more noble cause, one more deeply seated in our very nature. For love, from which our word for friendship is derived,[48] is the chief motive in joining

men together in mutual goodwill. Profit is, to be sure, ofttimes gained from those who are honored under a pretence of friendship and who are courted for interested motives. But in true friendship there is no deceit, no pretence, and whatever is found in it proceeds from a genuine and disinterested affection.

Therefore friendship seems to me to find its source in our very nature rather than in the need of another's aid, in a propensity of the soul together with what I may call an actual sensation of affection, more than in the consideration of how much advantage it is likely to bring. What the nature of this principle is can be observed even in certain beasts, which for a certain time show such an affection for their offspring that their natural instincts can easily be observed. But in man this same principle is much more in evidence; first in that natural affection which exists between parents and children, which cannot be destroyed except by a horrible crime; and again when a feeling of love akin to this arises within our hearts, when we find some one whose character and tastes are in harmony with ours and in whom we believe we discern, as it were, some bright example of integrity and virtue. For there is nothing more lovable than virtue and nothing more conducive to affection, as is clearly seen from the fact that, because of their

virtue and integrity, we frequently acquire, in a certain sense, an affection for men whom we have never seen. Who is there who does not dwell with a certain loving affection on the memory of Gaius Fabricius [49] and Manius Curius, though he has never seen them? On the other hand, who is there who does not loathe Tarquinius Superbus,[50] Spurius Cassius,[51] and Spurius Mælius?[52] Twice have we had to fight in Italy for the very existence of our state, once with Pyrrhus [53] and once with Hannibal.[54] Because of his integrity we entertain a feeling of regard for Pyrrhus but this state will always hold Hannibal in detestation for his cruelty.

IX. But if the power of integrity is so great that we delight in it when we find it even in those whom we have never seen, or, what is more striking, in an enemy, what wonder is it that the emotions of men are stirred, when they think that they see virtue and goodness in those with whom they are intimate in actual intercourse?

Though a natural feeling of love is the necessary element in all friendship, that affection is strengthened by the receipt of a kindness, by perceiving an affection for us in another, and by the growth of intimacy; and when these elements are added to the initial feeling of love in the soul, then a wonderfully strong feeling of affection is kindled within our hearts. And if

any think that this has its origin in a feeling of weakness, that each man may have someone through whom he may attain his desires, they surely assign to friendship a mean, and, if I may employ the term, ignoble origin, since they maintain that it is born of need and want. For if this conception of its origin were true, then the fewer resources a man thought he possessed, the better fitted he would be for friendship. But this is surely far from being true; for the more a man can rely upon himself, and the better fortified he is by virtue and wisdom, so that he needs no one to aid him and regards all his fortunes as depending on himself alone, the more justified he is in seeking, and the more fitted he is to cherish friendship. Can anyone suppose that Africanus stood in need of me? No, by Hercules! And no more did I stand in need of him. But I loved him because I saw in him virtue to be admired, while he in turn entertained an affection for me, because of an opinion, perhaps not altogether unfavorable, which he held of my character, and this goodwill was only strengthened by our increasing intimacy. But although the advantages which were attached to our mutual affection were many and great, still it was not from the expectation of these that our affection sprung. For, as we are kind and generous in action, not that we may demand a return — for we do not put kindness out

at interest, but are by nature inclined to generosity — so we believe that friendships are to be sought, not from the hope of reward, but for the enjoyment which is found in love itself.

Those [55] who, like beasts, refer everything to sensual pleasure, dissent from these opinions. Nor is it strange, since those who have degraded all their thoughts to an end so low and so despicable, cannot raise them to that which is exalted, noble, and divine. Therefore let us dismiss such teachers at any rate from our discussion and for ourselves let us assume it as granted that, as soon as we recognize moral worth, the emotion of love and affection springs up as a result of nature, that those who seek this affection are drawn nearer to each other and devote themselves to the enjoyment of the society and character of the objects of their new born affection. And so their love is equal in extent and depth and they are more eager to confer favors on each other than to demand them, so that there is an honorable rivalry between them. Thus will the greatest advantages be derived from friendship; and its origin, being from nature rather than from a feeling of weakness, will be more noble and more real. For if it were expediency that cemented friendships, a change of interest would in turn destroy them; but since

nature is unchanging, therefore true friendships are everlasting.

Here then you see the origin of friendship, unless, perhaps, there is some comment which you would like to make on my statements.

FANNIUS. Nay, pray continue, Lælius. For since Scævola here is the younger, I shall reply for us both, as is my privilege.

SCÆVOLA. And you are indeed right. Therefore let us listen further.

X. LÆLIUS. Listen then, best of men, to the points which were frequently mentioned in the discussions which Scipio and I used to have on the subject of friendship. On many questions we did not agree. For he used to say that nothing was more difficult than for friendship to endure up to the last day of life. For, he said, it often happens that interests alter or that friends disagree on political questions; that men's dispositions frequently change, sometimes through adversity and sometimes with the growing burden of years. And as an illustration of this he would cite an example from boyhood, because the great affection which boys sometimes have for each other is frequently laid aside at the same time that they discard the garb of boyhood. If it does persist until early manhood, still, he said, it is sometimes destroyed by rivalry for marriage or in the

struggle for some other advantage which both cannot obtain. But if any continue longer to be friends, still friendship is ruined if they chance to become rivals for some public office. For nc hing is more destructive to friendship than the desire for wealth in most men and the rivalry for honor and fame in all our best men; since from this, great enmity often arises between the best of friends. Even violent separations, generally justifiable, spring up when something wrong is asked of a friend: for instance the gratification of lust, or assistance in a crime. For if he refuse, though he do so for honor's sake, still he will be charged with betraying his friendship by him with whose desires he is unwilling to comply. Moreover those who would venture to ask anything and everything from a friend, by that very demand show that they would be willing to do everything and anything for a friend, and by the continual complaining of such men not only are friendships frequently destroyed but even eternal enmity is often engendered. Thus there are so many vicissitudes which threaten friendships that Scipio said that he believed that the escape from them depended not merely on wisdom but also on good luck.

XI. Let us consider then, if you will, first, how far love ought to lead us in our friendship. If Coriolanus[56] had friends,

can anyone imagine that they ought to have borne arms with him against their native land? Is it conceivable that the friends of Vescellinus [57] or of Mælius [58] were under obligations to aid them in their attempts to establish a royal power? During the whole of his seditious action against the state we saw how Tiberius Gracchus [59] was entirely deserted by Quintus Tubero [60] and those of his contemporaries who were his friends. Yet when Gaius Blossius [61] of Cumæ, a guest friend of your family, Scævola, came to me to plead for pardon, because I usually sat in council as one of the advisors of Lænas [62] and Rupilius,[63] the consuls, he assigned as a reason for my pardoning him that he had thought so much of Tiberius Gracchus that he felt that he ought to do whatever Gracchus wished. Then I asked him "Even if he wished you to apply torches to the Capitol?" "He surely would never have wished that," said he, "but if he had I should have complied." You see how dangerous such an argument may be! And by Hercules! he would have done that or even more. For he was not a man who merely obediently followed the rash policy of Tiberius Gracchus but he took a leading part in it, and he showed himself not merely a sharer in the madness of Gracchus but one of its prime movers. And so when, in this mad state, he became

frightened by the newly established court of inquiry, he went over to our enemy and paid the severe and deserved punishment due the state.[64]

It is, therefore, no valid defense for a crime that one may have committed it for the sake of a friend. For since the belief of another in one's virtue has been made the ruling principle in friendship, it is not easy for friendship to remain if one plays false to virtue. But if we decide that it is right either to grant to our friends whatever they may wish or to obtain from them whatever we may wish, such a practice would lead to no wrong, provided we were persons of perfect wisdom. But the friends of whom we are now speaking are those whom we have right before our eyes or those of whom we have heard; men whom we know of in our everyday life. It is from this class that our illustrations must be taken, and especially from those who have attained the nearest approach to wisdom. Æmilius Papus [65] we know was the intimate friend of Luscinus [66] — for so we have learned from our fathers. Twice were they consuls together and they were colleagues in the censorship. And again the records that have been handed down tell us that Manius Curius [67] and Tiberius Coruncanius [68] were close friends of these men and of each other. We cannot, then, suspect, much less believe, that any one of

these men ever sought anything from his friends which was contrary to any pledge, opposed to his oath of office, or detrimental to the public interest. For what need is there to say that, in the case of such men as they were, such a request as that, if we can imagine it to have been made by any of them, would never have been granted? Moreover, since they were all men of the highest honor and purity, it would have been equally wrong to grant any such request and to ask it. Yet it is true that the cause of Tiberius Gracchus was espoused by Gaius Carbo,[69] Gaius Cato,[70] and by Gaius,[71] the brother of Tiberius, who was, to be sure, at that time not a very enthusiastic supporter of his brother's cause but who now is his most zealous successor.

XII. Let this law, then, be laid down with regard to friendship: that we neither request of our friends, nor do at their request anything dishonorable. For that manner of defending one's self is disgraceful and not at all to be allowed, not only in other crimes but especially when one acknowledges that he has committed a crime against the state for the sake of a friend. For the present situation in which our state finds itself, Fannius and Scævola, is such that we ought to look far ahead and foresee the dangers which threaten the republic, inasmuch as we have already deviated somewhat from the scope of action and the

political course prescribed by the customs of our ancestors. Tiberius Gracchus attempted to make himself king, or, rather, he actually was king for a few months. Surely the Roman people had never heard of or seen a thing like that before. What his friends and relatives who supported him even after his death, did in the case of Publius Scipio,[72] I cannot mention without tears. For, as best we could, we have endured Carbo[73] because of the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus. But what I anticipate from the tribuneship of Gaius Gracchus I do not care to say in advance of the event. Moreover there is another evil which is gaining ground among us by imperceptible degrees and which, having once taken a start, will have a tendency with ever increasing momentum to carry us down the path of ruin. You see in the matter of the ballot what degeneracy has already been developed, first in the Gabinian Law,[74] and two years later in the Cassian Law.[75] Already it seems to me that the people have been alienated from the senate, and the most important affairs of state are decided according to the caprice of the mob. For more men will learn how these revolutionary movements may be started than will learn how they may be checked. In what does this concern our discussion, you ask? In that no one attempts anything of this sort with-

out associates and therefore good citizens should be warned that if they may unwittingly have formed such friendships by some chance, they should not consider themselves so bound by them that they cannot abandon friends who are in the wrong in some important public matter. Moreover some punishment must be set for unprincipled men and no less punishment for those who have espoused the cause of another than for those who are themselves the prime movers in treasonable practises. Who in Greece was more famous than Themistocles?[76] Who more powerful? And yet, in spite of the fact that, as commander in the Persian War, he had freed Greece from slavery, when he was driven into exile through unpopularity, he did not endure as he should have the wrong which his ungrateful country had done him, but did what Coriolanus[77] had done in Rome twenty years before. Neither of these men found anyone to aid him in his designs against his native land, and so both committed suicide. Therefore such complicity with evil men is not to be condoned on the plea of friendship, but is rather to be punished with all severity, that no one may think it permissible to support a friend even to the point of bringing war on his country. Yet as things have begun to go I am inclined to think that such a state of affairs is bound to result sometime with us, and for my part,

I am as anxious for the welfare of the state after my death as I am for it in the present.

XIII. This, then, is the first law of friendship to be laid down: that we should ask only that which is honorable of our friends, and that we do only that which is honorable for our friends' sake. Nor should we wait until we are asked, but with all eagerness and with no hesitation we should always dare to give our true advice with candor. For in friendship the influence of friends who give good advice should be of the utmost value. Such advice should, on the one hand, be given not only frankly, but even sharply if occasion demands, and, on the other hand, when so given, it should be obeyed. This statement I make because certain philosophers,[78] who, I hear, have been considered wise in Greece, have favored, I understand, some rather strange views — for there is nothing which they do not discuss with great subtlety: some of them holding that too intimate friendships are to be avoided, so that it may not be necessary for one man to be filled with anxiety for others than himself, that each man has enough to do and more than enough, to attend to his own affairs, and that it is troublesome to be too much implicated in the affairs of others. And they say that it is best to hold the freest possible reins on

friendship, so that one may tighten or loosen them at will. For, they say, the chief principle of happiness is freedom from care and this the soul cannot enjoy if one is, so to speak, in travail for others. Others are said to hold a view even more unworthy of man — a point which I touched upon briefly a moment ago — that it is for self-protection and aid that friendships are to be sought, not for any feeling of kindness or affection. And so they say that the less self-confidence and strength a man possesses, the more likely he is to desire friends. Hence it is that women, being as they are but frail creatures, more eagerly seek the protection of friends than men, the poor more eagerly than the rich, and those who have suffered some reverse of fortune more than those who are considered fortunate. O wondrous wisdom! For those who rob life of friendship, the best and sweetest gift of the gods, must be considered as robbing the universe of the sun. For what is that freedom from care of which they prate? Seductive in appearance it is to be sure, but in reality for many reasons a contemptible aim, since it is not becoming to refuse to support a noble cause or an honorable course of action, merely to save one's self anxiety. But if we strive to avoid care, we must also sacrifice virtue, since virtue must needs with considerable care spurn and detest its

opposite; just as goodness spurns and detests wickedness; continency, lust; and courage, cowardice. And so you may see just men most deeply distressed by injustice, brave men by cowardice, and law abiding citizens by crime. Hence it is characteristic of a well ordered mind to rejoice in good and to grieve at evil. Therefore if grief can fall to the lot of a wise man, as it surely does at times, unless we believe that the milk of human kindness has been drained from his soul, why should we entirely banish friendship from our lives, in the fear that through it we may suffer some annoyances? For if we eliminate the emotions of the soul, what difference is there, I shall not say between man and beast, but between man and stocks and stones, or anything of like character? For we must not listen to those philosophers [79] who maintain that virtue is something hard and, as it were, like steel, admitting no impression. For in many respects, and particularly on the side of friendship, it is tender and open to the touch of sympathy, so that it may be, as it were, expanded to suit the good fortune of a friend, or contracted to meet his griefs. Therefore that suffering which must ofttimes be endured for a friend is not of sufficient importance to make us banish friendship from our lives any more than virtues should be spurned because they entail occasional cares and troubles.

XIV. Moreover, since friendship is cemented, as I have said before, when some bright gleam of virtue shines forth, to which a kindred spirit can attach and devote itself, when this happens, then love must needs spring into being. For what can be so absurd as for us to delight in many intrinsically worthless things, such as public offices, fame, fine houses, and the clothing and adornments of the body, and to be little charmed by a living sentient being endowed with virtues, one who can love us and return our love? Nothing is sweeter than a reciprocal feeling of goodwill and an interchange of personal affection and kind offices. Nay more, if we add to this, as we rightly may, that there is nothing which so allures and attracts other things to itself, as likeness of character does in friendship, it will certainly be admitted as a fact that the good love the good, and join them to themselves as though they were united by a natural relationship. For nothing is more desirous of its like nor quicker to grasp it than nature.

Therefore this much at any rate, Fannius and Scævola, I think we may consider as settled: that between the good there is an almost necessary goodwill which has been established by nature as the source of all friendship. But that goodness of which I speak applies to all mankind. For virtue is not a quality which exempts a man

from his duty to mankind and to the state, nor is it disdainful and overbearing, since it is accustomed to protect entire peoples and to guard their interest with its best wisdom, which it certainly would never do, if it shrunk from the affection of mankind in general. And further, those who falsely suppose that friendships are formed for the sake of personal interest, in my opinion, remove the most admirable bond of friendship. For it is not so much the benefits which we derive from a friend that delight us as it is our friend's love itself, and that which is done for us by a friend is pleasing to us only when it proceeds from a motive of affection. In fact so far is it from being true that friendships are cultivated from a need of aid, that the most generous and ready to do kind offices are those who because of their wealth and resources, and especially virtue — in which the greatest safeguard is found — have the least need of another's aid. And yet I am inclined to think that it would not be advantageous for friends never to lack anything at all. For wherein could my affection have proved its strength if Scipio had never required my advice or aid either at home or in the field? Wherefore it is not friendship that depends on personal interest but personal advantages that result from friendship.

XV. Therefore men who are enervated by pleasures, ought not be listened to, if

at any time they talk on friendship, of which they have neither a practical nor a theoretical knowledge. For, by the faith of gods and men! who is there, who would be willing to live in the midst of abundance, surrounded by all the good things of life, on the condition that he love no one and himself be loved by no one? That is the sort of a life which tyrants lead, a life, I mean, in which there can be no confidence, no affection, no belief in permanent goodwill; where all is ever suspicion and anxiety, and there is no place for friendship. For who can love a man whom he fears or one by whom he considers himself feared? Yet tyrants are treated with a pretence of regard so long as it suits the aims of their flatterers, but if perchance they fall, as is usually the case, then it becomes manifest how destitute they have been of friends. Thus Tarquin [80] is reported to have said in his exile, that [illegible] when he was no longer able to [illegible] either, that he learned which of the friends that he had had were true and which were false. And yet when we think of his notorious pride and insolence, I am surprised that he was able to hold anyone at all as his friend. And as the disposition and character of Tarquin made it impossible for him to have true friends, so the wealth of many men, I mean of the very powerful, precludes true friendship. For not only is Fortune herself blind

but she usually renders blind those whom she embraces. And so they are usually carried away with pride and insolence and nothing can be more intolerable than a fool favored by fortune. And this also may be observed that those who formerly were men of affable manners, are radically changed by the attainment of power and office and by success, scorn their former friendships, and become absorbed in new ones. But what can be more foolish than for men who are influential because of their riches, resources, and power, to seek other things which can be acquired for money — horses, servants, fine tapestries, and costly vases — and neglect the making of friends, who are so to speak, the choicest furniture of life. All the more so since, when they buy those other things, they know not for whom they buy them nor for whose sake they toil. For everything of that sort may be the property of him who is the stronger, while each man's friendships remain his fixed and sure possession, so that even if those things which are the gifts of fortune abide, still a life unadorned and devoid of friends cannot be pleasant. But enough on this topic.

XVI. We must now decide what are the boundaries of friendship, and, as it were, the limits of its application. On this point I find that three opinions are usually proposed, none of which meets with my approval. The first theory [81] is that we are

disposed toward a friend exactly as we are toward ourselves; the second, that our goodwill toward our friends should correspond exactly in amount and quality to their goodwill toward us; and the third, that a man should be valued by his friends at whatever value he rates himself. With no one of these three theories can I entirely agree. The first view, that each man should feel toward a friend as he does toward himself, is not the true one. For how many things we do for the sake of our friends that we would never do for our own sakes! In behalf of our friends we will beg and implore a favor from those whom we despise, and even attack someone bitterly and assail him with violence; acts which, when done in our own interests, are of doubtful honor, but which are most honorable when done in the interests of our friends. So there are many ways in which good men diminish their own comforts and allow them to be diminished, that their friends may take enjoyment from them rather than themselves.

The second view is that which restricts friendships to an equality of good offices and feelings. This is indeed to reduce friendship too minutely and meanly to a cold calculation, so that the accounts of receipts and disbursements may balance. But true friendship is, in my opinion, too rich and too generous to watch closely that it may not render back more than it has received.

For in filling the measure of friendship there should be no fear lest some portion may fall or leak out upon the ground, or that more than due measure should be given.

But meanest of all is the third view — that each man should be valued by his friends at the value which he sets upon himself. For often we find men who are too easily depressed in spirit or whose hopes for improving their fortunes are too easily crushed. It is not for that reason the duty of a friend to act toward such a man as he acts toward himself, but rather to strive to arouse the drooping spirits of his friend and to inspire in him brighter hopes and more pleasant thoughts. We must, then, determine some different boundaries for true friendship. But first let me tell you what Scipio used to censure most of all. He used to affirm that nothing could have been found more destructive to friendship than the saying of him who claimed that a man ought to love as if at some time or other he were going to hate. Nor could he be brought to believe that, as was commonly supposed, this was a saying of Bias,[82] who was considered one of the Seven Wise Men. But he said that it was the view of some base minded or ambitious person or of some one who would make everything serve his own ends. For how, pray, can any one be a friend to a man whose

enemy he thinks he may later become? Nay, more, on the basis of such a theory it must necessarily follow that one should desire and hope that his friend may be at fault as often as possible, that the more handles, as it were, may be offered him for reproach, and again, on the other hand, that one should feel pain, sorrow, and resentment whenever a friend has acted rightly and obligingly. This maxim, therefore, whosesoever it may be, is one, which, if put into practice, would destroy friendship. The following should rather have been given: that we use such care in forming friendships that we may never begin to love a man against whom we can at any time incur hatred. Nay more, Scipio believed that, if we ever are unfortunate in choosing friends, it is better to put up with our misfortune than to entertain the thought of a time coming when enmity may spring up.

XVII. These, then, are what I think should be the bounds of friendship, with this limitation: that when the character of friends is free from all faults, then without qualification there results a complete community in all interests, plans, and desires; and with the further provision, that if by any chance it happens that the less honorable desires of our friends are to be advanced, for instance when life or reputation is at stake, we should deviate somewhat

from the straight path provided there result no very great dishonor. For there is a certain point up to which allowance may be made on the ground of friendship. Yet one's reputation should not be disregarded nor should we consider the goodwill of our fellow citizens as an unimportant instrument in the conduct of affairs, though it is base to acquire this by flattery and complaisance. For virtue on which affection rests is by no means to be spurned. But Scipio — for I frequently refer to him from whom this whole discussion of friendship proceeds — used to complain that men were more careful in all other things than in their friendships. Any man, he said, can tell you how many goats and sheep he has, but he cannot tell the number of his friends. And again, in acquiring their goats and sheep men employ care, while they use little discrimination in choosing their friends, and have, as it were, no signs and marks by which they can judge who may prove suitable men for their friendship. We should then choose as our friends men who are firm, steadfast, and unchangeable in their dispositions. Men of this sort are few and far between and it is clearly difficult to judge whether a man can be such a friend or not until he has been tried, a test which must be made in actual friendship. Thus friendship forestalls the judgment and precludes the possibility of a fair test. It is

therefore the part of wisdom to hold in check the impulse of goodwill just as we would the speed of a chariot, so that we may use our friendship, as it were, like a well-tried team, after we have to some extent tested the character of our friends. The worthlessness of some men often appears in matters involving a small amount of money, while others who cannot be affected by a small matter, are revealed in their true light when the amount involved is great. But if indeed some be found who consider it ignoble to esteem money before friendship, where shall we find men who do not prefer public honors, civic positions, military offices, positions of authority, or power to friendship; so that when these objects of ambition are placed on the one side of the balance, and just claims of friendship on the other, they would not much prefer the former? For human nature is too weak to despise power, and even if it is at the expense of friendship that men attain power, they think that their treason will be overlooked, since it was not without weighty reason that they betrayed friendship. Hence it is very difficult to find true friendship among those who are engaged in public office and in public life. For where would you find a man who would prefer the advancement of his friend in public office to his own? What more need be said? To pass over the consideration

of this adverse influence of rivalry, how burdensome and how difficult the association in the misfortunes of others seems to be to most men! And yet Ennius [83] has rightly said:

The true friend is revealed in the hour of adversity.

Nevertheless by one of these two faults are most men convicted of fickleness and weakness; either in the time of their own prosperity they despise their friends, or, when their friends are in need they desert them. Therefore if any man shows himself worthy, consistent, and steadfast in friendship in both of these respects, we ought to consider him as belonging to a very rare and almost divine class of men.

XVIII. But the fundamental element of that constancy and consistency which we seek, is faithfulness. For nothing which lacks that quality is stable. Moreover we should choose as a friend one who is sincere, unselfish, and sympathetic, that is one who is actuated by the same motives as ourselves; for all these qualities are essential to faithfulness, since a nature which is fickle and wily cannot at the same time be faithful, nor can one who is not moved by the same motives and is by nature unsympathetic be faithful and steadfast. To this it should be added that we should not take delight in preferring charges against a friend nor believe any charges which may

be brought against him, for all this is essential to that steadfastness of which I have been speaking now for some time. Thus that is shown to be true which I stated at the beginning of this discussion: that there can be no friendship except between good men. For it is the duty of a good man, and we may also call him a wise man, to cling to these two principles in friendship: first, to avoid all falsity and pretence, since it is more worthy of an honest man to hate openly than to conceal his feelings by friendly appearances; and secondly, not only to repel all accusations which any one may bring against his friend, but not even to be suspicious himself and always imagining that his friend has done something to injure him. In addition to this there should be a certain sweetness of conversation and manners, no unimportant flavoring in friendship. For melancholy and habitual austerity in all things do, to be sure, lend dignity, but friendship should be more unrestrained, more genial, and better disposed to promote good fellowship and good feeling.

XIX. But on this point there arises a question of some little difficulty: whether at any time new friends who may be worthy of our friendship should be preferred to old ones, as we are wont to prefer young to old and worn out horses. How unworthy of a human being is such a doubt! For

there ought to be no surfeit of friendship as there is of other things, and like those wines which improve with age, the older our friendships are the sweeter they should become. For the proverb is a true one, that many a measure of salt must be eaten together before the duties of friendship are fully performed. New friendships, if, like plants which never fail in their fruition, they give promise of future fruit are not, of course, to be rejected, though old friends should retain their place in our affections, since the greatest power of friendship is the result of long continued association. Nay more, even in the case of the horse of which I made mention a moment ago, there is no one who would not, if there be no other defect, prefer to use a horse to which he had become accustomed than a strange and unbroken one. Nor is this true only in the case of animate beings, for association plays a great part even in the case of inanimate objects, since we find pleasure in the scenery of those places where we have dwelt for any considerable time, wild and rugged though they may be with mountains and forests.

But it is of the greatest importance in friendships to conduct one's self as an equal with a friend who may be an inferior, for it often happens in a group of friends that some possess certain points of superiority, as did Scipio in our set, if I may use

that term. Yet he never displayed any assumption of superiority over Philus,[84] or Rupilius,[85] or Mummius,[86] or his other friends of lesser rank. Indeed, because he was the elder, he always treated as his superior his brother, Quintus Maximus,[87] an excellent man, to be sure, but by no means the equal of Scipio, and he wished all his friends to attain greater power and influence through him. In this all men should imitate Scipio and, if they have attained pre-eminence in virtue or fortune, they should confer a part and share of this on those to whom they are most closely related. And if they are men born of humble parents with relatives who are less enterprising in spirit or more humble in fortune they should increase the means of those relatives and bestow on them honors and dignity. So in legends[88] and plays, men who, through ignorance of their birth and descent have lived for some time as menials, when they have been found out and discovered to be the sons of gods or kings, still retain affection for the shepherds whom they had considered their fathers. In the case of true and recognized parents there is, of course, all the more obligation to show this affection. For the fruits of talent, of virtue and of every kind of excellence are harvested most fully when they are bestowed on our nearest and dearest friends.

XX. Therefore, as those who in the relation of friendship and kindred possess superiority ought to place themselves on an equality with their inferiors, so the latter ought not to be distressed at the fact that they are excelled by their friends in talent, in fortune, or in rank. Yet most men of this class are continually finding some ground for complaint or even for reproach, especially if they think that they can point to some service which they may have performed, with some effort on their part, through a sense of duty and friendship. Surely that is a most offensive class of people who are always casting in your teeth the favors which they have done you, services which the recipient ought to remember but which the doer should never mention. In friendship, as those who possess superiority should themselves condescend, so also they ought to strive, as far as they can, to elevate their inferiors. For there are certain men who find friendship a source of annoyance when they think that they are themselves slighted. This could scarcely ever happen, except in the case of those who think that they deserve to be slighted, and these should be freed from this impression not only by words but also by deeds. However the amount of aid which should be rendered should be judged; first, by what you yourself can do, and, secondly, by the capacity which the friend whom you

love and would aid may have for appropriating such aid. For, however much you may be possessed of unusual power, you cannot raise all of your friends to the highest honors. Scipio, for instance, was able to bring about the election of Publius Rupilius [80] as consul, but he was unable to do the same for Publius's brother, Lucius.[80] But even if you should have the power to bestow any honor you wish on another, still you must consider what his capacity is. As a general rule, we should form our judgments concerning friendships only after the character has been strengthened and settled by maturer age, nor need we think that we must hold as fast friends those who in the days of our youth were enthusiastic companions in hunting and in games of ball, and to whom we were attached at that time because they were inspired with a liking for the same things as ourselves. For on that principle those who were our nurses and attendants would, on the ground of long intimacy, demand the greatest affection. Not indeed that they should be neglected, but they should hold a somewhat different place in our regard. On any other basis friendship cannot remain stable, for unlike characters are the result of unlike tastes, a dissimilarity which destroys friendships. And it is for no other reason that the good cannot be friends of the bad, except that the diversity of their characters and tastes

is the greatest that by any possibility can exist. We can also rightly lay down this principle in friendship; that what we may call an ill controlled affection should not, as is frequently the case, be allowed to stand in the way of any great service which our friends may perform. For, to borrow another illustration from legends, Neoptolemus [91] would never have been able to take Troy, had he been willing to listen to Lycomedes,[92] in whose home he had been brought up, when with many tears, he tried to prevent him from going to Troy. Often occasions of great moment arise which make necessary a temporary separation of friends, and a man who desires to prevent this on the ground that he cannot endure the grief caused by the absence of his friend, is not only weak and sentimental, but also, for that very reason, an imperfect friend. And so in every case one should consider both what he may demand of a friend and what he will allow a friend to obtain from him.

XXI. In the breaking off of friendships there is a certain danger of disaster which sometimes cannot be avoided. For now our discussion leads us away from the fellowship of the wise to the consideration of friendships found in the ordinary walks of life. Ofttimes the faults of friends break out, sometimes directly on their intimates, sometimes on strangers, though the

disgrace through the latter sometimes spreads to their friends. Therefore such friendships should be allowed to fade out by the lessening of familiar intercourse, and, as I have been told Cato used to say, they should be ended gradually and gently, rather than by a violent separation, unless some very intolerable injury should flame forth so that the only course consistent with rectitude and honor, in fact the only course possible, is an instant break and separation. But if, on the other hand, some change in character or in tastes occurs, as is frequently the case, or if friendship is interrupted by a difference of opinion on a question of political parties — for I am speaking now, as I have said before, not of such friendships as exist between wise men, but of the friendships of men of the ordinary sort — care must be observed that it may not appear that enmity has been engendered in addition to friendships being sundered. For nothing can be more disgraceful than to become the enemy of one with whom you have formerly lived on terms of intimacy. Scipio, as you know, on my account gave up his friendly relations with Quintus Pompeius, [93] and again was estranged from Metellus, [94] my colleague, because of a difference of opinion in politics. In both cases, however, he acted with dignity, and without employing his influence in any embittered display of offence or resentment.

Therefore we should first of all endeavor to prevent the possible estrangement of friends, and if such a thing does occur, to let it appear that the friendships have died out rather than been destroyed by violence. And we must beware also lest our friendships be transformed into bitter enmities, from which arise quarrels, abuse, and actual insults. Yet these should be endured whenever possible and this honorable tribute should be paid to the friendship that has been lost: that he who inflicts the injury, not he who suffers it, shall be considered at fault.

Looking at the matter as a whole, there is only one method of avoiding and of guarding against those faults and misfortunes which I have mentioned, and that is to avoid haste in forming one's friendships and not to choose as friends those who are unworthy. Moreover those are worthy of our friendship in whose very nature there are grounds for love. But how rare such men are! How rare indeed are all the noble things of life! For nothing is more difficult than to find a thing which is in every respect perfect of its kind. But most men recognize nothing in human affairs as good, unless it brings them some return, and, just as they choose their cattle, so in preference to all others, they choose as their friends those from whom they hope to secure the greatest return. Thus they

deprive themselves of that finest and most natural friendship which is desirable in and for itself, and never learn from experience the beautiful and lofty meaning of friendship. For each man loves himself, not that he may exact from himself some return for his affection, but because it is his nature. And unless this same feeling is transferred to friendship no true friend will ever be found, since such a friend is, as it were, a second self. But if we find in animals which lack reason, in the birds of the air, in the fish of the sea, and in the beasts of the field, both tame and wild, first, that they love themselves — for the instinct of self love is coincident with the birth of every living thing — and again that they desire and seek out others of their kind as objects of their attachment, and do this with a yearning and with a sort of instinct which seems to correspond to love in human beings, how much more is this the result of a natural impulse in man, who both loves himself and seeks anxiously for another whose soul he may so blend with his own that the two may almost become one.

XXII. Yet most men perversely, not to say shamelessly, wish to find in a friend, such a man as they themselves cannot be, and they demand from their friends what they themselves cannot give. Now it is the fair thing, first, for a man himself to be a good man, and then to seek another

like unto himself. And it is in such men that that stability of friendship, which we have now been discussing at some length, can be perfected, when men who are united in mutual goodwill, in the first place, will make themselves masters of those passions of which others are the slaves. Then they will delight in uprightness and justice, each will undertake any task for the other, and neither will ever ask anything from the other except what is honorable and right. They will not only cherish and love but respect each other, for whoever robs friendship of its mutual respect robs it of its choicest ornament.

Wherefore those who think that through friendship the doors are opened up for the unrestrained indulgence in lust and vice, commit a most pernicious error. Nature has given us friendship not as an accomplice in vice but as the handmaid of virtue, so that the virtue of one man when united and allied with the virtue of a friend may reach that highest point of attainment which alone and unaided it could never gain. And if this kind of fellowship now exists between any friends, or ever has, or ever shall be found, it should be regarded as the best and happiest companionship possible as regards the highest good of life. This is the kind of fellowship, I say, in which are to be found all those things which men consider worth seeking, honorable

character, fame, and peace and cheerfulness of mind, to such a degree, that, when these are present, there is happiness, and when these are lacking, happiness is impossible. And, since this is the best and greatest joy in life, if we wish to attain it, we must take pains to cultivate virtue, without which we can attain neither friendship, nor any other thing which is worth the seeking. Those who believe that they can neglect virtue and yet have friends soon realize their mistake, when some serious emergency forces them to put their friends to the test. Therefore — for this advice cannot too often be repeated — we should form our friendships after we have formed our judgments, and not our judgments after our friendships. We suffer for our carelessness in many things, but especially in the choosing and cultivation of our friends, since we adopt plans in which the proper order of action is reversed, and we act too late, in disobedience of the old proverb. For after we have become closely attached by daily intercourse or through kindly offices, suddenly, in the midst of its course, some occasion for offence arises and our friendship is broken off.

XXIII. Accordingly so great negligence is even the more open to censure in a matter of such necessity, for friendship is the one thing in human affairs of whose advantages all men are in unanimous agree-

ment. Even virtue is esteemed of little worth by many men and is said to be, as it were, a matter of exaggerated pretence and false show. Many also scorn riches and, content with little, are happy in plain fare and simple living. Of public offices, by which the eager desires of some men are aroused, how many there are who value them so little that they consider nothing more worthless or trifling. Likewise with other things, which seem admirable to some men, there are plenty of people who consider them as valueless. But concerning friendship all men without exception are in agreement; those who have devoted themselves to public life, those who delight in learning and the consideration of the problems of the universe, those who in private station are engaged in business, and finally, those who have become entirely absorbed in the pursuit of pleasure. All these, I say, agree that life is nothing without friendship, provided one wishes to live a life in any degree befitting a free man. For somehow or other friendship insinuates itself into our lives, and permits no manner of passing life to be without a share in its influence. Nay more, even if there be any man of so unsympathetic and misanthropic a nature that he avoids and shuns the society of his fellows, such a man as we learn that Timon [95] of Athens was (if there ever really was a Timon), still he would not be

able to refrain from searching on all sides to find some one on whom to vent the venom of his spleen. And the truth of it would be placed beyond all doubt if such a thing as this could happen: that some god should remove us from the society of man and place us somewhere in solitude, supplying us there with an abundance and plenty of all the things that human nature craves but depriving us altogether of the opportunity of looking on the face of a fellow man. Who could have such a heart of steel that he could endure such a life and that solitude would not rob him of the enjoyment of such pleasures? Therefore, there is truth in that saying which, I have been told, the older men of our generation, who had heard it from their predecessors, used to tell as a customary saying of Archytas [96] of Tarentum (I believe it was he): that if any one were to ascend into the heavens and see clearly into the nature of the universe, all those wonderful sights would give him no pleasure; but if he had someone to describe those things to, such a vision would be most delightful. So nature has no love for anything that is solitary but always leans, as it were, on some support — a relation which is sweetest in proportion to the dearness of a friend.

XXIV. But while this same nature in so many ways makes clear her wishes, desires, and yearnings, still, somehow or

other, we grow deaf to her desires and do not obey her admonitions. For the intercourse which arises in friendships is various and intricate, and many occasions for arousing suspicions and for giving offence present themselves. These a wise man will sometimes avoid, sometimes ignore, sometimes endure. But there is one possibility of giving offence to which we must submit in order to retain the advantages and confidence of friendship. For ofttimes friends should be admonished and censured, and, when they are kindly given, these censures and admonitions should be received in a friendly spirit. Yet somehow that is true which my friend Terence [97] says in the Andria:[98]

> Complaisance begets us friends
> While truth is the mother of hate.

Truth is indeed troublesome, if it is in fact, the mother of hate, for that is the poison of friendship. But complaisance is a much more troublesome factor, for by yielding to his faults it allows a friend to be swept headlong to his ruin. The greatest fault, however, is his who disregards the truth and is led on into self-deceit and ruin by the flattery of his friends. Therefore, in this entire matter we must have consideration, first that our admonitions may be free from harshness, and secondly, that our censure be free from offence.

Moreover in complaisance — for I take pleasure in employing the term which I quoted from Terence — let us employ courtesy, but avoid servility, which is the handmaid of vice and which is not only unseemly in a friend but not even worthy of a freeborn man. For it is one thing to live with a tyrant and another to live with a friend. Moreover for a man whose ears are closed to the truth so that he cannot bring himself to hear it from a friend, there can be no hope of salvation. For it is a neat saying (as many of his sayings are), that familiar one of Cato's, that some men owe more to their bitterest enemies than to those who seem to be dear friends, for the former often speak the truth, the latter never. And it is absurd for those who receive admonition not to be troubled by that which ought to trouble them or to be irritated by that which ought to give them no annoyance. For that they have committed some fault does not distress them; it is the reproof that they find hard to bear: whereas on the contrary they ought to grieve at their faults and rejoice at the correction of them.

XXV. Therefore, as it is an essential of true friendship to give and receive admonition, to perform the one office freely and without harshness and the other with patience and without resentment, so we must consider that there is nothing more

ruinous to friendships than sycophancy, flattery and complaisance. For under as many names as possible ought we to brand this vice of those unprincipled and unreliable creatures who in all that they say, without regard for the truth, aim to gratify the desires of the victims of their deceit. Moreover, while every form of hypocrisy is vicious, in that it vitiates the truth and destroys our ability to judge it, it is especially antagonistic to friendship, since it destroys that truth without which the name of friendship loses its significance. For, since the power of friendship lies in the fact that, through it, as it were, many souls are made one, how can this happen, if not even in each separate person is there always one unchanging soul, but a soul, variable, changeable, and made up of conflicting elements? What can be so inconsistent, so variable, as the mind of a man who changes his views not only to conform to the feeling and desires of another but even at a look or a nod?

"If any one says 'No,' I say 'No'; if any one says 'Yes,' I say 'Yes': In short, my rule is to assent to everything."

So says Terence,[99] but he speaks in the character of Gnatho, the sort of a friend whom it is downright folly to have. But since there are many men who are the counterparts of Gnatho in character but possessed of superiority in point of birth,

fortune or reputation, the servility of such men is dangerous, since to their insincerity is added the prestige of position. But if due care is taken the flattering friend can be distinguished from a true friend as easily as all that is counterfeit and deceitful can be distinguished from the real and genuine. The public assembly, though it is made up of the most ignorant of persons, still usually can distinguish the difference between the demagogue, that is a citizen who flatters and cajoles them, and a man who is steadfast, impartial, and dignified. With what flattering speeches Gaius Papirius [100] lately tried to flood the ears of the assembly, when he was proposing a law for the re-election of tribunes! I myself spoke against that law, but I should rather speak of Scipio and say nothing of myself. Ye immortal gods! What dignity, what majesty he displayed in that speech! so that one would easily imagine him a leader of the Roman people rather than merely one of them. But you were present and his speech is in everybody's hands. And so that law which was but the scheme of a demagogue was rejected by the votes of the people. To return to myself you remember, in the consulship of Quintus Maximus,[101] Scipio's brother, and Lucius Mancinus,[102] how clearly the scheme of a demagogue was that law of Gaius Licinius Crassus [103] regarding the priests, a law by which an attempt was

made to place at the disposal of the people the power of filling vacancies in the sacredotal colleges. And it was Crassus who first introduced the custom of turning toward the forum and addressing the people.[104] Yet when I arose in its defence the reverence for the immortal gods easily overcame his plausible speech. And it must be noted, too, that this happened when I was only prætor, five years before I became consul, so that the cause was defended more on its merit than by the official influence which I could have exerted had I been consul.

XXVI. But if, even on the stage of life, that is in the public assembly, where there is the greatest opportunity for falsehoods and half truths, truth is of great power, provided it be made clear and manifest, what ought to be its effect in friendship which depends entirely for its existence on truth? For in friendship, unless, to use a common expression, you see clearly into the open heart of a friend and reveal your own to him, you can find nothing in which to place your trust or of which you can be sure, not even your own love and its return, since you cannot know how sincerely that love is shown. And yet that flattery, dangerous though it may be, can harm no one except a man who welcomes it and delights in it. Thus it happens that he who flatters himself and takes the most delight in

himself is the man who lends the most willing ears to flatterers. To be sure, virtue loves itself, for it is best acquainted with itself and realizes how lovable it is, but I am speaking now, not of real virtue, but of a virtue which some men imagine they possess. For the men who desire to have the appearance of real virtue are more numerous than those who desire actually to be possessed of it. Such men delight in flattery, and when lying words, formed to suit their wishes, are addressed to them, they believe that those false speeches bear witness to their merits. But this cannot be friendship at all, when the one is unwilling to hear the truth and the other is ready to deceive. Nor in comedies would the flatterers appear amusing to us if there were no such things as braggadocios.[105]

"Did Thais then heartily thank me?" asks Thraso in the Eunuch of Terence.[106] "Yes, heartily," would have been sufficient reply, but the parasite says, "Tremendously." For the flatterer always exaggerates that which the one to whose desires he caters wishes to be great. And so while that sort of flattering deceit has weight with those who themselves invite it and who fish for compliments, yet men of even more sober and steadfast character should be warned to be on their guard and not to be taken in by some shrewdly applied

flattery. For every one can recognize the open flatterer, except a man who is extremely obtuse, but we must exercise great care to prevent the shrewd and sly flatterer from worming his way into our confidence. For it is by no means easy to recognize him, especially since he even sometimes agrees while seeming to oppose, flatters while pretending to dispute, and finally throws up his hands and allows himself to be defeated, in order that the man whom he is deluding may imagine that he has proved his clearer insight. But what is more shameful than to be made game of in this manner? Therefore all the greater care must be taken that this may not happen to make you say with the character in the play:[107]

"How you will have twisted me around your finger today and made game of me most beautifully, more than all the silly old men in the play!"

For the most foolish character represented in the comedies is that of unsuspecting and credulous old men. But somehow or other our discourse has drifted from the friendships of perfect men, that is of wise men — I am speaking now of that wisdom which seems to fall within the grasp of mankind — to those which deserve little consideration. Therefore let us return to that first principle which I laid down and let us bring even that to a conclusion at last.

XXVII. It is virtue, I say, Gaius

Fannius and you, Quintus Mucius, and virtue that first engenders and then ... ships. For in it is to be ... harmony ... all things, stability and ..., and when virtue raises itself aloft ... abroad its beams of light, and ... recognizes in another that same ... draws near to it, and receives in return what the other can impart; and from this union is kindled love or friendship — call it what you will; for both terms are derived from our word for loving.[48] Moreover love is nothing else than affection for the person whom you love for his own sake, without regard to any need which he may relieve, and without seeking for any benefit which he may confer. Yet such benefits, however little you may have sought them, will blossom forth from the flower of friendship. It was with such affection that in the days of my youth I loved those older men, Lucius Paulus,[108] Marcus Cato,[109] Gallus,[110] Publius Nasica,[111] and Tiberius Gracchus,[112] the father-in-law of my friend Scipio. But with even greater splendor does this affection gleam when found between those of equal age, as between myself and Scipio, Lucius Furius,[113] Publius Rupilius,[114] and Spurius Mummius.[115] And again in the repose of old age I take pleasure in the affection of young men, as with you and Quintus Tubero,[116] and I find delight also

in the attachment of very young men like Publius Rutilius [117] and Aulus Verginius.[118] And since the course of our life and nature is so arranged that a new generation is ever taking the place of a former one, it should indeed be your hope, that you may be able, as the saying is, to reach the goal with those of your own age with whom, so to speak, you started in the course of life. But since man holds all his possessions by a very precarious and uncertain tenure, we should always seek out some friends whom we may love and by whom we may be loved. For if affection and kindness be taken away, all the joy of living is lost. For me indeed Scipio yet lives and always will live, torn from me though he was by sudden death. For it was the virtue of that noble man that endeared him to my heart and his virtue can never die. And not for me alone, who always had it before me, will his image remain, but even in the ages to come will it stand out radiant and illustrious. For no one will ever undertake any achievement with courage and hope, without thinking that the memory and character of that man should be set before him. For myself, of all the gifts that fortune or nature have bestowed on me, there is nothing that I have that I can compare with the friendship of Scipio, for in this man I found sympathy in public affairs, wise counsel in

private concerns, and a repose full of joy. Never, at least so far as I could perceive, did I offend him even in the slightest thing and not a word did he utter that I was unwilling to hear. We had one home, one table and that in common, and we were together not only in our military campaigns but even on our journeys and vacations into the country. Need I speak of our desire and pursuit of knowledge and instruction in which, apart from the public eye, we spent all our leisure hours? If the memory of these things and the power to recall them had died with him, I could not in any way endure my yearning for that dearest and most loving of friends. However they have not perished but they rather gain in strength and are increased by my memory and reflections, and even if I were wholly bereft of them still would my age afford me great consolation, for I cannot much longer remain in this state of desolation, and all sorrows, however intense they may be, ought to be endurable when they are brief.

Such are the considerations which I have to offer on friendship. But do you, I beg, give so high a place in your esteem to virtue without which friendship cannot exist, that with the exception of virtue, you consider nothing preferable to friendship.

Notes

The Lælius was written in the year 44 B.C.; somewhat more than a year before Cicero's death.

1. QUINTUS MUCIUS SCÆVOLA, the son-in-law of Gaius Lælius (Cf. note 2), was an eminent Roman jurist and statesman. He was consul in 117 B. C. and died not later than 86 B. C. He was commonly called the Augur to distinguish him from his relative (perhaps a nephew), Quintus Mucius Scævola, the Pontifex Maximus mentioned below (Cf. note 4).

2. GAIUS LÆLIUS the younger, surnamed Sapiens ("The Wise") born about 186 B. C.; consul 140 B. C. He was a prominent statesman and a distinguished patron of learning. His friendship with Scipio the younger lasted until the death of the latter and forms the basis of the "Essay on Friendship" in which Cicero introduces him as the chief speaker.

3. SCÆVOLA — QUINTUS MUCIUS SCÆVOLA, the Augur. Cf. note 1.

4. QUINTUS MUCIUS SCÆVOLA, the Pontifex Maximus, an older relative of the Augur Scævola (Cf. note 1.). He was a famous jurist and statesman, and was consul in 95 B. C. He was proscribed and killed by the Marian party in 82 B. C.

5. HEMICYCLIUM: this was a semicircular room or alcove in which seats were arranged for the purpose of conversation. The term was sometimes applied to a semicircular settee.

6. TITUS POMPONIUS ATTICUS: a very intimate friend of Cicero, born 109 B. C. and died 32 B. C. He was a distinguished scholar and patron of learning and it is to him that the opening letter of the Essay is addressed.

7. PUBLIUS SULPICIUS RUFUS, born 124 B. C.; died 88 B. C. He was originally on the side of the aristocracy but in 88 B. C. he became tribune of the people and sided with Marius. His former friend Pompeius (Cf. note 8), a supporter of Sulla, was then consul and became estranged from him for his actions. In a fight the son of Pompeius was slain, and Sulpicius was killed when Sulla entered Rome.

8. QUINTUS POMPEIUS RUFUS: consul with Sulla in 88 B. C. The quarrel of Sulpicius and Pompeius resulted from a difference in political affiliations. Cf. note 7.

9. SCÆVOLA — QUINTUS MUCIUS SCÆVOLA, the Augur. Cf. note 1.

10. GAIUS FANNIUS STRABO, son of Marcus Fannius and a son-in-law of Lælius (Cf. note 2), one of the speakers in the Essay.

11. PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO AMELIANUS AFRICANUS MINOR: a famous general, and statesman, born 185 B. C.; died 129 B. C. He was the son of the Lucius Amelius Paulus Macedonicus mentioned in Chapter II (Cf. note 24) but was adopted by his cousin, Publius Scipio, a

son of Scipio Africanus Major, the conqueror of Hannibal. Though not a candidate he was elected consul for the year 147 B. C. in spite of the fact that he was only 37 years of age (the legal age was 40). In 146 B. C. he captured Carthage (Cf. note 28), and again, without being a candidate he was elected consul for the year 134 B. C. to put an end to the Numantine War which had lasted nearly ten years and in which the Romans had suffered many disasters (Cf. note 28). In 133 B. C. he captured Numantia and as the result of this received the additional cognomen "Numantinus." On the day before his death in 129 B. C. he delivered a speech in the senate in which he supported a land law favorable to the Latins and other Italian allies and opposed to the agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus (Cf. note 59). In this he was opposed by Carbo (Cf. note 69). After the adjournment of the senate on that day he was escorted to his home by the senators and the Italian allies (Cf. Chapter II, end). The next morning he was found dead in his bed and Carbo was suspected of having had him murdered. He was the intimate friend of Gaius Lælius and is frequently mentioned throughout this Essay.

12. CATO MAJOR: this was the title given by Cicero to his "De Senectute" (Essay on Old Age), written in April, 44 B. C., in which the Cato mentioned in this passage is the chief speaker. Cf. note 13.

13. MARCUS PORCIUS CATO: born about 235 B. C.; died 149 B. C. He was commonly called

"Major" (the Elder) and sometimes also "Censorius" because of the severity with which he performed the duties of the Censor in 184 B. C. By his wife Licinia he had one son whose death is alluded to toward the end of Chapter II (Cf. note 23). In the "Cato Major" he is the chief speaker. Cf. note 12.

14. GAIUS LÆLIUS and PUBLIUS SCIPIO: Cf. notes 2 and 11.

15. MARCUS CATO: Cf. note 13.

16. LUCIUS ACILIUS: a jurist who flourished about 200 B. C., the author of a commentary on the Twelve Tables and the first Roman to be given the appellation "Sapiens" (The Wise).

17. SOCRATES.

18. The Oracle of Apollo at Delphi.

19. The Seven Wise Men: The names of the Seven Wise Men of Greece are variously given, but all agree on Solon, Thales, Pittacus, and Bias (Cf. note 82). Other names given are: Cleobulus, Myson, Chilon, and Periander.

20. The Stoics.

21. The Nones of the month fell on the fifth day of most months, but on the seventh of March, May, July, and October.

22. DECIMUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, surnamed Gallaicus: consul 138 B. C. He was the grandfather of Cæsar's assassin.

23. MARCUS PORTIUS CATO LICINIANUS, the son of Marcus Porcius Cato Major (Cf. note 13). He was Prætor elect when he died about 152 B. C.

24. LUCIUS ÆMILIUS PAULUS MACEDON-

ICUS: born about 229 B. C.; died 160 B. C. He conquered King Perseus of Macedonia in 168 B. C. Hence his cognomen. He had four sons, two of whom were adopted into the family of the Scipios (Cf. note 11) and two died in boyhood, one at the age of twelve years a few days before Paulus's victory over Perseus, the other a few days after his triumph at the age of fourteen.

25. GAIUS SULPICIUS GALLUS, consul 166 B. C.: an astronomer and a man of letters.

26. The Stoics.

27. Cf. note 11.

28. Carthage and Numantia. Cf. note 11.

29. Cf. note 11.

30. The Epicureans and some of the Peripatetics.

31. MAGNA GRÆCIA: the lower part of Italy possessed by Greek colonies. Among the philosophical schools which had their homes there were the Pythagoreans, who believed in the immortality of the soul.

32. LUCIUS FURIUS PHILUS: consul 136 B. C. He was noted for his uprightness and for his love of Greek literature.

33. MANIUS MANILIUS: consul 149 B. C. He was a jurist of eminence and was a Roman commander in the Third Punic War.

34. "The Dream of Scipio" (Somnium Scipionis), in which the immortality of the soul is discussed, is found in the sixth book of Cicero's "De Re Publica" (written 54 B. C.).

35. Cicero mentions these by name in another

place (De Finibus I, 20), giving: Theseus and Pirithous; Achilles and Patroclus; Orestes and Pylades (Cf. note 46); Damon and Pythias.

36. The Sophists and later the philosophers of the New Academy.

37. The Stoics, who split hairs in their definition of virtue.

38. GAIUS FABRICIUS LUSCINUS: consul in 282 and in 278 B. C. He was a man of distinguished uprightness of character, famous for his conflict with Pyrrhus, and is perhaps best known by his action in sending back to Pyrrhus the traitor who had offered to poison that king.

39. MANIUS CURIUS DENTATUS: consul 290, 275, and 274 B. C. Type of the old fashioned, frugal Roman. He was famous for his victory over the Samnites and Sabines, and over Pyrrhus.

40. TIBERIUS CORUNCANIUS: consul 280 B. C. He was famous as a jurist and teacher of law. Fabricius, Curius, and Cornuncanius were frequently mentioned by Cicero as intimate friends of each other.

41. The Stoics.

42. Philosophers of the Academy, whose theories Cicero usually followed in the main.

43. PAULUS, CATO, GALLUS, SCIPIO, PHILUS: Cf. notes 24, 13, 25, 11, 32.

44. QUINTUS ENNIUS: born at Rudiæ, 239 B. C.; died 169–168 B. C. He was a dramatist and epic poet whom Cato is said to have brought to Rome. His chief work was the "Annales," a history of Rome.

45. EMPEDOCLES: a Greek philosopher of Agrigentum who flourished about the first half of the fifth century B. C. In his work "On Nature" he maintained that friendship was the associating force of the universe and discord the disturbing element.

46. MARCUS PACUVIUS: born 220 B. C.; died 132 B. C. He was a nephew of Ennius (Cf. note 44) and was called by Cicero the greatest Latin tragic poet. The play here referred to is the "Dulorestes," a play modeled on the "Iphigenia in Tauris" of Euripides. The incident alluded to is as follows: Orestes and his friend Pylades go to the Tauric Chersonese to carry off the image of Artemis. They are discovered and Thoas, the king, frees Pylades but condemns Orestes to death. Since he does not know which of the two is Orestes the generous rivalry indicated in this passage arises.

47. PHILUS. Cf. note 32.

48. *Amor* is the Latin word for love: *Amicitia* the word for friendship: *Amare* the verb "to love."

49. GAIUS FABRICIUS and MANIUS CURIUS: Cf. notes 38–40.

50. LUCIUS TARQUINIUS SUPERBUS: Tarquin the Proud, seventh and last king of Rome. The overthrow of the kingdom and the establishment of the Roman Republic resulted from his tyrannical rule, and more directly from the rape of Lucretia by his son Sextus. Cf. Shakespere's "Rape of Lucrece."

51. SPURIUS CASSIUS VESCELLINUS: consul

502, 493, 486 B. C. He was put to death on the charge of seeking to make himself king, though this charge was probably false.

52. SPURIUS MÆLIUS: a rich plebeian who gained the hatred of the aristocracy by distributing corn to the populace in a time of scarcity. For this he was killed in 439 B. C. by Ahala on the false charge that he aspired to become king.

53. PYRRHUS: king of Epirus, born about 318; died about 272. At the request of the people of Tarentum he came to Italy and at first waged war with considerable success against the Romans. He was finally defeated at Beneventum by Lucius Curius (Cf. note 39). His conduct in returning Roman prisoners without a ransom gained him the good reputation to which Cicero here refers.

54. HANNIBAL: the famous Carthaginian general, born about 247 B. C., died about 183 B. C. He was made general in Spain in 221 B. C., crossed the Alps with his army in 218 B. C., and invaded Italy. There he conquered the Romans in a number of battles and struck terror into their hearts. In 203 he was recalled to defend Carthage against Scipio, the Elder, and was defeated by the latter in 202 at Zama. There is no evidence to show that Hannibal was cruel beyond the standard of his times or that he ever failed to keep his word, but the Romans could never forgive the man who had almost destroyed the power and armies of Rome.

55. The Epicureans.

56. GAIUS MARCIUS CORIOLANUS. About

the year 493 he defeated the Corioli: Hence his cognomen. Later he was condemned for treason for resisting the power of the Tribunes. He fled to the Volcians and advanced on Rome as their general but was deterred from this by the entreaties of his mother. Cf. Shakespere's "Coriolanus."

57. VESCELLINUS: Cf. note 51.

58. MÆLIUS: Cf. note 52.

59. TIBERIUS SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS: born about 169 B. C.; died 133 B. C. He was the son of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (Cf. note 112), the elder brother of Gaius Sempronius Gracchus (Cf. note 71), and the grandson of Scipio Africanus Major. He was a famous political reformer and leader of the common people. As tribune of the people in 133 B. C. he proposed and had passed the famous law for dividing the public land among the poorer citizens and Italians. Inasmuch as this land had been, for the most part, absorbed by the large estates of the rich he incurred their enmity, and through their machinations he was killed in 133 when attempting to be re-elected Tribune. Notwithstanding Cicero's attitude, all the evidence goes to show that the motives of Tiberius Gracchus were of the purest, and that he suffered the punishment of the reformer who was in advance of his times.

60. QUINTUS ÆLIUS TUBERO: the colleague of Tiberius Gracchus as Tribune in 133 B. C. He was a strict Stoic and opposed to the measures of Gracchus.

61. GAIUS BLOSSIUS: a Greek from Cumæ.



After the death of Gracchus, Blossius fled to Aristonicus of Pergamus who was at that time trying to wrest Pergamus from the Romans. On the defeat of Aristonicus, Blossius committed suicide.

62. PUBLIUS POPILIUS LÆNAS: consul 132 B. C. With his colleague Rupilius he instituted an investigation concerning the riot in which Tiberius Gracchus had been killed. When Gaius Gracchus, the brother of Tiberius, succeeded in getting a law passed that those magistrates should be prosecuted who had put citizens to death without a trial, Lænas went into exile and was outlawed. He returned in 120 B. C.

63. PUBLIUS RUPILIUS. Cf. note 62.

64. Cf. note 59.

65. QUINTUS ÆMILIUS PAPUS: consul 282 and 278 B. C.; censor 275. Gaius Fabricius Luscinus was his colleague on all three occasions.

66. LUSCINUS. Cf. note 38.

67. MANIUS CURIUS. Cf. note 39.

68. TIBERIUS CORUNCANIUS. Cf. note 40.

69. CAIUS PAPIRIUS CARBO: born about 164; died 119 B. C. He was a strong partisan of Tiberius Gracchus and was one of his commissioners for carrying out the agrarian law. He was suspected of bringing about the death of Scipio. Cf. note 11.

70. GAIUS PORCIUS CATO: son of Cato Licinianus (Cf. note 23) and grandson of Cato the Censor (Cf. note 13). He was a man of poor reputation who served as consul in 114 B. C.

71. GAIUS SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS: the younger brother of Tiberius Gracchus (Cf. note 59) and the son of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (Cf. note 112). He was elected Tribune in 123 B. C. and during his term of office he had passed several laws which even surpassed the measures of Tiberius in their democratic spirit. He was re-elected to the Tribuneship in 122 but was defeated in 121 and shortly after was killed by his slave at his own orders.

72. PUBLIUS CORNELIUS SCIPIO NASICA SERAPIO: grandson of Scipio Africanus, the Elder, and a cousin of the Gracchi. He was a leader of the aristocracy which murdered Tiberius Gracchus and so became such an object of hatred to the plebs that he was sent on a mission to Pergamus where he died.

73. CARBO: Cf. note 69.

74. The Gabinian Law was a law passed in 139 B. C. Its author was Aulus Gabinus, the Tribune in that year and it authorized the ballot in voting for magistrates.

75. The Cassian Law was a measure carried by Lucius Cassius Longinus Ravilla, Tribune in 137 B. C., which extended the use of the ballot to the juries in criminal courts.

76. THEMISTOCLES: the famous Athenian stateman and general. To him was mainly due the victory of the Greek fleet over that of Xerxes, King of Persia, at Salamis in 480 B. C. In 471 B. C. he was ostracized and eventually made his way to Persia. He was welcomed there by the king whom he promised to aid against the Greeks.

When called upon to fulfil his promise he is said to have committed suicide.

77. Cf. note 56.

78. The Epicureans.

79. The Stoics.

80. Cf. note 50.

81. The theory of Epicurus.

82. BIAS: a Greek philosopher of Priene in Ionia. He flourished about the sixth century B. C. and was accounted one of the "Seven Wise Men." Cf. note 19.

83. ENNIUS: Cf. note 44.

84. PHILUS: Cf. note 32.

85. PUBLIUS RUPILIUS: consul with Lænas (Cf. note 62) in 132 B. C. These two held the commission to try the followers of Tiberius Gracchus.

86. SPURIUS MUMMIUS: brother of Lucius Mummius Achaicus, the destroyer of Corinth (146 B. C.).

87. QUINTUS FABIUS MAXIMUS ÆMILIANUS: consul 145 B. C. He was the oldest son of Paulus Æmilius Macedonicus (Cf. note 24) and thus the older brother of Scipio Africanus Minor (Cf. note 11). He was adopted by Quintus Fabius Maximus.

88. For instance, the story of Romulus and Remus.

89. RUPILIUS: Cf. note 85.

90. LUCIUS RUPILIUS: younger brother of Publius Rupilius (Cf. note 85). Little is known of him.

91. NEOPTOLEMUS: also called Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles by Deidamia, the daughter of Lycomedes, King of Scyros. Neoptolemus was summoned to Troy in consequence of an oracle

which had declared that Troy could not be taken unless one of the descendents of Æacus, the grandfather of Achilles, was present. At that time Neoptolemus was living with his grandfather, Lycomedes, who tried to dissuade him from going to Troy.

92. Cf. note 91.

93. QUINTUS POMPEIUS: consul 141 B. C. He is said to have promised Scipio to aid the candidacy of Lælius for the consulship but broke his promise and secured his own election.

94. QUINTUS CÆCILIUS METELLUS MACEDONICUS: consul 143 B. C. He was a distinguished orator and general. He was a political opponent of Scipio but their rivalry was in general friendly. Lælius calls him his "colleague" because he was one of the College of Augurs to which Lælius belonged.

95. TIMON: an Athenian, a contemporary of Socrates. He was a typical example of the misanthrope. Cf. Shakespere's "Timon of Athens."

96. ARCHYTAS: a Pythagorean philosopher and mathematician of Tarentum. He flourished about 400 B. C.

97. PUBLIUS TERENTIUS AFER: a comic poet who flourished during the first half of the second century B. C. He came to Rome as a slave but was freed by Publius Terentius Lucanus. He wrote six plays and is said to have been aided by his friends, Scipio and Lælius.

98. The Andria: a play of Terence (Cf. note 97). It was first presented about 166 B. C. and was an adaptation of a Greek play of the same name by Menander. The line quoted here is line 68 (Act I, Scene 1, line 41) of the play.

99. Cf. note 97. The quotation given here is

from lines 252–253 (Act II, Scene 2, lines 21–22) of the "Eunuchus" of Terence, in which Gnatho is the flattering parasite.

100. Cf. note 69. In 130 B. C. Carbo proposed a law providing that the number of times that a man could be elected Tribune be unlimited. The law failed to pass.

101. Cf. note 87.

102. LUCIUS HOSTILIUS MANCINUS: consul 145 B. C. with Quintus Fabius Maximus Æmilianus. Cf. note 87.

103. GAIUS LICINIUS CRASSUS: Tribune 145 B. C. During his Tribuneship he proposed a law providing that vacancies in the Colleges of Priests be filled by the votes of the people instead of those bodies being self perpetuating. The law was defeated at that time but a similar law was passed 104 B. C.

104. The Rostra from which the public orators spoke stood between the Comitium, which was the meeting place of the senate, and the Forum in which the plebeians met. It was customary for speakers, even the Tribunes of the People, to face the Comitium and address the patricians, and it was therefore a considerable breach of custom for Crassus to turn his back on the senators and address the people in the Forum. Plutarch says that Gaius Gracchus was the first to do this.

105. Braggadocios, that is "Braggart Soldiers" (Milites Gloriosi). These were favorite characters in the old comedy just as the parasite was a stock character. "The Braggart Soldier" (Miles Gloriosus) was the title of a comedy of Plautus but the quotation below is from a play of Terence.

106. The quotation is from a play of Terence, "Eunuchus," line 391 (Act III, Scene 1, line 1) and is a question put by the "braggart soldier" Thraso to the parasite, Gnatho, to learn how Thraso's mistress, Thais, has received a present which he has sent by Gnatho.

107. A quotation from the "Epiclercus" (The Heiress), a play of Cæcilius Statius. One of the stock characters of old comedies was the credulous old man.

108. PAULUS: Cf. note 24.

109. CATO: Cf. note 13.

110. GALLUS: Cf. note 25.

111. NASICA: Cf. note 72.

112. TIBERIUS SEMPRONIUS GRACCHUS: son-in-law of Scipio the Elder; father-in-law of Scipio the Younger (Cf. note 11); father of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus (Cf. notes 59 and 71).

113. FURIUS: Cf. note 32.

114. RUPILIUS: Cf. note 85.

115. MUMMIUS: Cf. note 86.

116. TUBERO: Cf. note 60.

117. PUBLIUS RUTILIUS RUFUS: consul 105 B. C. He studied law with Aulus Verginius (Cf. note 118) under Publius Mucius Scævola.

118. AULUS VERGINIUS: a fellow student of Rutilius under Scævola. Nothing further is known of him.