



IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)





Photographic Sciences Corporation

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

Cana

CIHM/ICMH
Microfiche
Series.

CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.

Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions

Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques

1980

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below.

- [x] Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur
- [ ] Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagée
- [ ] Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaurée et/ou pelliculée
- [ ] Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque
- [ ] Coloured maps/ Cartes géographiques en couleur
- [ ] Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)
- [ ] Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur
- [ ] Bound with other material/ Relié avec d'autres documents
- [ ] Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ La reliure serrée peut causer de l'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge intérieure
- [ ] Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ Il se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutées lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela était possible, ces pages n'ont pas été filmées.
- [ ] Additional comments:/ Commentaires supplémentaires:

L'Institut a microfilmé le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a été possible de se procurer. Les détails de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-être uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la méthode normale de filmage sont indiqués ci-dessous.

- [ ] Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur
- [ ] Pages damaged/ Pages endommagées
- [ ] Pages restored and/or laminated/ Pages restaurées et/ou pelliculées
- [x] Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages décolorées, tachetées ou piquées
- [ ] Pages detached/ Pages détachées
- [x] Showthrough/ Transparence
- [ ] Quality of print varies/ Qualité inégale de l'impression
- [ ] Includes supplementary material/ Comprend du matériel supplémentaire
- [ ] Only edition available/ Seule édition disponible
- [ ] Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont été filmées à nouveau de façon à obtenir la meilleure image possible.

- [x] This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est filmé au taux de réduction indiqué ci-dessous.

10X	12X	14X	16X	18X	20X	22X	24X	26X	28X	30X	32X
					✓						

The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of:

National Library of Canada

The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impression, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol → (meaning "CONTINUED"), or the symbol ▽ (meaning "END"), whichever applies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method:

L'exemplaire filmé fut reproduit grâce à la générosité de:

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Les images suivantes ont été reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la netteté de l'exemplaire filmé, et en conformité avec les conditions du contrat de filmage.

Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimée sont filmés en commençant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernière page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmés en commençant par la première page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernière page qui comporte une telle empreinte.

Un des symboles suivants apparaîtra sur la dernière image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole → signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole ▽ signifie "FIN".

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent être filmés à des taux de réduction différents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour être reproduit en un seul cliché, il est filmé à partir de l'angle supérieur gauche, de gauche à droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images nécessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la méthode.



Case 736.
CAN
PAM
H

Hume, James G.

Bibliothèque du Parlement
CLASSIFICATION
170.7
CANADA

The Value

—OF A—

Study of Ethics.

AN

Inaugural Lecture

—BY

JAMES GIBSON HUME, M.A., Ph.D.,

Professor of Ethics and the History of Philosophy in the University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.

TORONTO:
THE J. E. BRYANT COMPANY (LIMITED)
1891.

T

The Value

—OF A—

Study of Ethics.

AN

Inaugural Lecture

—BY—

JAMES GIBSON HUME, M.A., Ph. D.,

Professor of Ethics and the History of Philosophy in the University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.

TORONTO:
THE J. E. BRYANT COMPANY (LIMITED)
1891.

THE VALUE OF A STUDY OF ETHICS.

On entering upon my duties as a Professor of Ethics and History of Philosophy in this University, according to the time-honored custom I am allowed the privilege of presenting to you some of the claims of the department to which I belong.

We are living in a practical age. Very few, then, will be surprised to hear the question asked, "What is the value of a study of Ethics? What is contributed by a rational and critical examination of man's moral convictions, moral actions, and moral relations?"

I should be presumptuous indeed if I fancied that I could answer this question in a short inaugural lecture. All that I can hope to do is to present briefly some of the chief contributions that a critical study of Ethics is fitted to make.

Moral principles approved.

There is a very general agreement that it is well for a man to have moral convictions and moral principles. It is by possessing a moral character that a man becomes worthy of the high praise of the poet:

"An honest man 's the noblest work of God."

Investigation of them distrusted.

There is, however, no such general consensus of opinion that it is well to critically study these principles and philosophically consider their meaning and validity. It is often supposed that to consider their validity is to question their validity; to critically examine moral principles is to doubt those principles; to philosophically enquire what are those principles, and what is their meaning, is to distrust their existence and importance. In short, it may be held that we must regard moral principles, moral conduct, and moral character as having the highest significance, but that a critical study will lead to a mistrust of those principles and an unsettlement of character.

An alternative.

As so often happens, what we have to do here is to decide between alternatives. Let us suppose, then, that a critical and systematic study of Ethics is avoided, with the belief that to explain is, necessarily, to explain away; that whatever we may do in other departments of thought, in Ethics, at least, we shall rely entirely upon authority and depend upon the dogmatic method. In discussing this supposition we must consider the effects of other influences that bear upon the education of our young men and young women.

Avoidance of investigation attempted.

Other influences not thereby excluded.

Do we not all know that there is a period in the life of most young people, when they become aware of possessing powers and capabilities, and wish to exercise them? "The glory of young men is their strength"; and just as in youth the physical activity seeks exercise and delights in athletic exploits, so with the consciousness of his mental powers the young man desires to have the pleasure of solving problems for himself. It may be that very correct answers are given at the end of the book, but he wishes to work out the solution independently. Quoting authority to him at this period of his life is like offering him crutches. I am not concerned just now to maintain that this state of mind is desirable or undesirable; I simply call attention to the fact of its existence and its effect. One thing is certain, it will not tend to produce adherence to authority nor respect for the dogmatic method. There is one word that always fires the enthusiasm of a young man: "Liberty"; and at first it is the negative element in liberty, viz., freedom from external constraint, that is most welcome.

Natural tendency to question.

We are living in a time of great literary activity. If we carefully examine this literature we shall find that a very large proportion of it is of a controversial character. To use the language of Biology, that has now become so familiar through the discussion of the theory of Evolution, there is now a great "struggle for existence" in the realm of opinions and ideas. In our newspapers, monthlies, and theological journals, one view is strenuously opposed by another, and young men and young women, if they read at all, are almost compelled to think for themselves, and form opinions of their own, for it is needless to point out that to decide in one's own mind between conflicting views is practically to form an opinion or adopt an independent position.

Controversial literature.

Then, as everyone knows, the spirit of our age is scientific. The characteristic of Science is patient, thorough, systematic enquiry. Science needs no apology for its existence. It has established itself by doing its work, thus enforcing a lesson on the value of acting out our convictions if we wish others to believe in them. The influence of scientific thought and literature is felt by the student before he enters the university, and no one can take a university training without becoming more or less familiar with scientific methods. Since Bacon wrote his "Instauration of the Sciences" and exposed the various "*idols*" that hinder the attainment of truth, authority has been discredited in science. One of the first things a student of science learns to do is to mistrust his previous opinions. In many enquiries they appear to him as mere prejudices, preventing him from seeing the truth and giving an impartial decision.

Science.

We started with the assumption that we were to exclude all critical investigation of Ethics, and employ only the dogmatic method. But, as we have seen, the other influences that we have enumerated all concur in destroying the student's respect for the dogmatic method.

From the student's natural desire to exercise his own critical faculties and judge for himself; from the influence of critical and controversial literature; and from the more exact criticism employed by science, he is led to treat the dogmatic method with less and less respect. Mere authority becomes less and less trusted. Opinions that are supported only by authority, and shrink from critical examination, become suspected. The presumption is that they will not bear the light of investigation; that those who profess these principles, suspecting their weakness, are afraid of having them examined, thus proving that they themselves do not really believe in them. So reasons the young man. I do not ask you to take my word for it—that would be to employ the dogmatic method—but I think that if you carefully consider the matter you will reach the conclusion that those who employ the dogmatic method, with the very best intentions, nevertheless fail to reach the results they aim at, and instead of establishing anything or conserving it, lead to a distrust of the very principles that they consider too sacred for investigation.

Summary.

Results.

The dogmatic method of teaching is not, properly speaking, teaching at all, nor is learning in the dogmatic way, "study." It is

simply a kind of absorption, as a sponge sucks up water. Such information so obtained is not really acquired at all. It fails just when needed. It cannot stand the test. It oozes away at the least pressure.

Granting that the critical method which says, "prove all things," has its place in Science, is it necessary to extend it to Ethics, which says, "hold fast that which is good"? Will our results be satisfactory if we completely divorce the study of what *is* from the consideration of what *ought to be?*

Is science sufficient without Ethics?

Let us examine Science a little more narrowly to see if there are any inadequacies in its method which Ethics is fitted to supply. Science deals with the existent and its laws. It examines what *is* and what *has been* and thus discovers what *may be.* Its aim, however, is not to modify or reconstruct, but simply to understand the facts of the existent. Its goal is knowledge. In its methods Science goes beyond our ordinary experience of matters of fact. Its observations are not casual, but systematic and purposeful. The first advance that Science makes upon ordinary unsystematic experience, is to make classifications of objects. Its aim is to be exact; hence, as far as possible, it applies quantitative measurements and gives statistical tables. After thus dealing with the constitution of what is, neglecting the time element, it next proceeds to the investigation of what has been. That is, it desires to trace the history in time of objects and events and their groups. Thus Science is at first descriptive and historical. Its next problem is to determine the definite and permanent relations of objects and groups of objects, and the uniform laws of occurrences. Here Science becomes explicative, or explanatory. In discovering the laws and rules of what *is* and *has been* it arrives at a knowledge of what *may be.*

Method of Science.

According to the character of the objects and our standpoint, Science breaks up into a number of special sciences. Then again we have sciences whose work is to find the laws of correlation between one special science and another special science, *e.g.*, psycho-physics; and lastly, we have the more ambitious attempt to formulate a "Science of the sciences," *i.e.*, a more general consideration of the relations and laws of the various special sciences, with the purpose of relating and connecting these in one harmonious system. However difficult this great enterprise may seem, it is still the goal of the sciences. Each

scientist in his special department works with the purpose and hope of contributing to this general result.

Science deals with facts. Has it nothing to do with theories? I think we shall find that it has just as much to do with theories as with facts. Fact, itself, is a term which is not entirely unambiguous. We may mean by it that something is now occurring or something has occurred, or, what is very different, that something is what we suppose it to be.

Now it is the very work of science not to be satisfied with the "fact" in the first sense. It wishes to classify and arrange these facts, that is, these occurrences, appearances, or manifestations, according to their mutual connections; it wishes to go still further beyond the fact —the mere appearance—to discover the rules of connection which explain the fact.

And yet every explanation is a theory, so that it would seem to be the very work of science to theorize. To ordinary observation the sun appears without doubt to go around the stationary earth, but scientific theory says that the earth turns on its axis. No one ever saw the earth turn on its axis. It is simply a theory to explain the facts or appearances. We are now convinced that it is a true theory.

Theory in Science.

But are not theories liable to be erroneous? Certainly. Many scientific theories held by one generation have been discovered to be false by scientists of the succeeding generations, and a historian would not consider it very extravagant to predict that many of our present scientific theories will be regarded as false by scientists in the future. No one is better aware of this than the scientists themselves. Part of the work of the scientist is to re-organise the material of unrelated facts or appearances in accordance with theories which he supposes to be established; part of his work is by careful experiment and laborious reasoning to determine whether certain theories are to be admitted or rejected.

Error possible.

We should not regard the activity of the mind as the source merely of falsehood. If the constructive activity of thought has produced false theories, it has also given us true ones, and if it is only through thinking that falsehood arises, it is just as true that only for an intelligent mind can there be truth, and still further it is only by an exercise of the critical activities of mind that we can decide what is true and what is false.

Truth discoverable.

The suspicion that attaches to the activity of mind is chiefly due to a dogmatic theory as to the nature of reality and mental action and their relation to one another.

The fundamental reality, according to this theory, is altogether unknowable, and we can therefore make no valid statement in regard to it. Then, with naïve inconsequence, it is stated with great certainty that the mind is one of the appearances of that of which we can say nothing. The mind itself is an appearance, and all its activities are appearances of this appearance. All that mind does in the way of constructive activity is a fictitious and self-deceiving addition.

Dogmatic scepticism a suicidal theory.

This theory is properly to be called pure dogmatism, because it unsparingly condemns all theories without being aware that it is itself a theory. It does not see that its sweeping denunciation of all theories is sawing off the limb on which it sits. For if all that the mind does is erroneous and fictitious, then this theory concerning the character of the mind and the unknowable and their relation, being itself a thought construction, is also fictitious and erroneous. It is as though a lawyer, after presenting his side of the case, should say to the jury: "Now, gentlemen, you must not listen to one word that the opposing counsel may say, for I can assure you that all lawyers are liars."

This pure dogmatism about the unknowable reality and the deceitful mind (the knowable unreality) leads to a complete scepticism in knowledge, and indifference and fatalism in conduct. It says Plato was simply deluded when he declared: "To think what is true, to feel what is beautiful, to will what is good, in this the spirit acknowledges the end of the life of reason."

Because in argument men make errors in logic this does not say that all argument is useless, nor does it prevent us from detecting the inconsistencies when we give attention to the argument. The very fact that we can say that many men reason illogically and act irrationally presupposes that we can distinguish the rational from the irrational. We are also convinced that the men who act irrationally are not those who have most intelligence and think most, but those who think least. Truly enough, "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing." We must then conclude that we have not an alternative, but that we must deal with the constructions of thought or do nothing. These constructions may be true or false, therefore we need a critical consideration of the activities of mind and its pro-

Need of theoretical philosophy.

ductions; we need, in Locke's words, "An Inquiry into the Human Understanding."

The systematic and thorough criticism of consciousness and the constructions of thought is the special work of philosophy.

Philosophy.

Just as science is simply an advance upon ordinary observation, making it systematic and exact and applying more thorough tests, so philosophy is merely an attempt to systematize and more fully apply the critical activity that we all possess and exercise to a greater or less extent, for every man who reflects is to that extent a philosopher. Kant well expressed the problem of philosophy in the question, "What are the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience?" Such a question certainly assumes that we have experience; it asks what is implied in the experience we have. In fact, it has been objected to Kant's starting-point that he begins with an assumption, viz., that we have or may have knowledge. It is quite true that Kant makes this assumption, and, it may be replied, that anyone who questions his assumption must do so by building upon the very same assumption. No one can give a reason why we should prefer what is reasonable to what is unreasonable. To advance a reason is to rest upon the assumption that the reasonable is better then the irrational. We must assume that reason is reasonable or we cannot reason, nor object to reasoning.

The philosophical enquiry then begins by admitting that we have experience and knowledge, and the question is, What is implied in this experience and knowledge? Experience, taken in its widest sense, means the sum of all the knowledge that we possess, gained from whatever sources and by whatever method. It therefore includes the results of the most rigid scientific investigations. With philosophy, our activities of thought become critical and reflective.

Philosophy is the self-consciousness of science.

Theoretical and Practical.

Philosophy naturally falls into two classes corresponding to the experiences it is considering. These are designated theoretical and practical philosophy respectively. The first deals with knowledge, the second with conduct. The first considers conscious activity as exercised in knowing; the second *intentional* conscious activity, *i.e.*, conscious activity as exercised in choosing, in acting with reference to ends.

We have seen that science needs to be supplemented by philosophy.

It is incomplete and inadequate without a critical examination of the mental activities and thought constructions. Some who admit this would limit philosophical reflection to the consideration of knowledge. They would deny the need of a consideration of intentional conduct or the selection of ends in accordance with ideals. Is not this an arbitrary limitation? Is theoretical philosophy sufficient?

Is theoretical philosophy sufficient without practical philosophy?

Let us examine the results reached by the reflection upon our knowledge to see if any insufficiencies appear.

In answering the question, what are the necessary conditions of knowledge, what is implied in our knowledge of the external world, Kant demonstrates that we must declare certain principles to be universal and necessary; that these principles are native to intelligence; that they are necessary to constitute experience and to apprehend the objects of experience; and that it is absurd to attempt to derive these from anything but intelligence itself. Kant expresses this in very abstruse and difficult language. He says that the various "categories" or conceptions involved in knowledge must be referred to a "primitive unity of apperception," and his proof that these "categories" are constitutive of the objects of experience is termed the "deduction of the categories." We may express the central idea more intelligibly by saying that the objects of experience are relative to a subject, and that the laws of those objects are laws of thought. That is, subject and object are correlative. The objects that exist involve a reference to the subject to which they are related. The laws that apply to objects constituting and explaining them are also for intelligence. It is because the laws of the existent are intelligible that the scientist is capable of discovering them by an exercise of his intelligence.

What theoretical philosophy accomplishes.

Science deals with the knowable. Now, though theoretical philosophy has demonstrated this, and maintained the validity of knowledge against the attacks of scepticism, it is nevertheless liable to lose the results it has so laboriously gained.

The previous scepticism was based on the dogmatic assumption of the non-mental as the ultimately real and the source of the activities of thought.

Theoretical philosophy, reflecting upon the facts of experience, concludes that there are certain universal and necessary laws of thought

which cannot be based upon anything but intelligence. Now, because these laws of thought are universal and necessary, and not the peculiarity or private property of any individual thinker, it seems to be a very natural mistake to suppose that because they are not dependent upon this or that finite thinker they therefore exist independently of thinking altogether. Thus we have a new abstraction set up, the hypostatizing of logic, as if laws of thought, by being called "laws" and "universal and necessary," could be self-subsistent and exist in independent reality apart from all thinking; as if there might be knowledge apart from a knower.

Wherein it fails.

We are continually setting up abstractions as more worthy than the concrete reality. Why are we so apt to worship abstractions? Surely something has been so far neglected. Let us endeavor to discover what it is. What is it that makes us dissatisfied with the previous results? Is it not that in each case something of the greatest importance has altogether disappeared? In the first place, the non-mental is set up as the ultimate reality. In the next case, universal and necessary laws of logic take the place of the unknowable somewhat. In both cases personality seems to drop out of consideration, and finally out of existence. The part is made greater than the whole. Just here a philosophical study of Ethics is much needed. Theoretical philosophy did well to point out the dependence of ideas upon a unity of consciousness. It did not do well to forget the primacy of consciousness. In the sense of existing only for a consciousness, it did well to show the relativity of ideas. Practical philosophy is needed to call attention to the efficiency of ideas, and the reality of the active self-consciousness to which ideas and ideals are relative, in which and for which ideas and ideals exist. If theoretical philosophy has done well to establish the universality, necessity, and validity of the laws of thought, the practical philosophy is required to emphasize the fact that thought and laws of thought are mere abstractions, if supposed to exist apart from a conscious thinker. A man may see quite well without knowing that he has eyes, just as with an excellent digestion he is unaware that he has a stomach; but if his ignorance leads him to conduct that tends to destroy his eyes, it may be well for him to know more about the connection of sight with the organs of

Abstraction.

Neglecting Personality.

Need of a practical philosophy.

Its work.

vision. We have considered the connections and relations of objects and the constructions of thought. It is well to discover that the construction of objects is capable of being known because the relations can be reconstructed by thought; we need to go further with our reflection, and remember that constructions of thought involve the activity of a constructive thinker.

In our previous preference of abstractions to the concrete reality, we were making a judgment of estimation or preference. We were virtually saying, this abstraction is of more worth. Now all judgments of worth are moral judgments. Do we not, then, need to have a reflective consideration of our moral judgments and standards of worth, that we may decide if we have been correct in setting up abstractions as more worthy than living personality?

While science is investigating the existent and discovering the relations and laws of the existent, and theoretical philosophy critically and reflectively examines our knowledge of the existent and its implications, practical philosophy or Ethics, as we said at the outset, deals with what ought to be. We may now add another word to our definition, and say that Ethics deals with what ought to be *done;* that is, it is not primarily and specially concerned with the knowledge of the static, the constitution of the existent, but with *action*, conduct. Not with *being*, but with *doing*. It estimates conduct. It wishes to decide what *ought to be done*. In saying that something ought to be done, we refer to the intentional conscious activity of a rational agent, capable of making distinctions of better and worse in accordance with ideals or standards of worth. As it is sometimes expressed, Ethics deals with ideals or normative standards. Now it must be admitted that Ethics is not entirely independent of the sciences. The general rules which have been discovered by the sciences tell us what may be done, and so set limits to the possibility of doing. But a mere knowledge of the various possibilities, however indispensable for effective action, is very different from the estimation of different possibilities, the selection among possibilities, the determination of possibilities. Ethics deals with the selection of ends. Science finds the means to gain ends. Now because Ethics deals with all intentional conscious activity, and all our science and all our theoretical philosophy are forms of intentional activity, they, too, cannot escape ethical consideration. When we ask

The choosing subject.

Ideals.

what ought to be done, we have passed beyond the scientific point of view. Science says, if you do this, then that will happen; if you employ these means, you will get such a result; it does not add, and this is a better result than that. Pure science has no place for a judgment of better and worse. Such a decision is an ethical judgment of approval or disapproval, which indicates how the result is estimated by a moral subject. In passing a judgment of estimation or appreciation, of approval or censure, the conscious subject is employing ideals or standards by which he measures the action. Thus it comes that Ethics cannot avoid the consideration of ideals. An objection on this ground has often been made against Ethics. It is said, what we want is the *facts;* science has no use for ideals.

Worth of Science decided by Ethical standards.

An objection.

It is perfectly true that it is not the special work of the sciences to make moral decisions in accordance with ideals. Scientists themselves, however, are rarely found urging this objection against Ethics, because the scientists have thoroughly learnt the principle of the division of labor. Each special science is a more or less arbitrary limitation of the whole field of enquiry. One scientist never dreams of saying that the work of another scientist is useless because it does not deal with his department. Hence most scientists would at once admit that science, as a whole, is a limited field, unless, indeed, we begin by defining science in such a way as to include everything; but then Ethics would be included as the science of ideals. I think, however, that this unlimited application of the term science is likely to lead to misconception and to slur important distinctions. Hence I have used the term in a more limited signification, which, I believe, corresponds more nearly with popular usage. It is not quite true, however, that science, even in this stricter sense, has *nothing* whatever to do with ideals. It does not and cannot entirely dispense with all ideals. Its existence depends upon an ideal. It cannot take a single step without this ideal, which is directive of all its activities. This ideal is a complete knowledge of the relations and laws of the existent. For Ethics this ideal is simply one among others, and must be considered in its relation to others.

Ideals necessary to Science.

Because Ethics is concerned with the ideals that direct conduct, that is, with intentional conscious activity, when it reflects upon what is implied, it is compelled to recognize and maintain personality—the choosing subject—a person being "a con-

Personality.

scious subject, who can distinguish himself from the objects he knows and the ends he chooses."* An attempt to unfold all that is signified by the term personality would lead us deep into the problems of Ethics. We must content ourselves with a rude sketch. It is sometimes forgotten that the conception of something that ought to be done, the recognition of duty and responsibility, even the conception of a better, has neither existence nor meaning except in reference to a moral being, a person who is capable of directing his conduct in accordance with regulative ideals which he is capable of recognizing and adopting.

Aspects of personality.

At one time it was usual to speak of a person as having various faculties. These were sharply separated from one another. We are now convinced that these are so implicated and connected that no absolute separation is possible. We may, however, call attention to the following aspects that have been distinguished in the conscious life: feeling—knowing—willing. In feeling we call attention to the particular elements that may be distinguished in an experience. Now even in feeling we may distinguish a subjective and an objective side. Sometimes the word sensation is employed to designate the objective reference; but it must never be forgotten that there can be no objective reference without an accompanying and inseparably connected subjective reference. Sometimes the word feeling is employed to designate the subjective side of this complex. Feeling, in this latter sense, is that in the experience which is peculiarly private. The possessor or subject of it has it and he alone, though he may speak about it to another conscious subject, who may recognize from the description that he also has had a similar experience. When we speak about anything, when we try to convey information, we are using and appealing to the faculty of knowing. While the peculiarity of feeling is its incommunicably private character, the characteristic of knowledge is its communicable and universal character. Knowledge no one thinks of calling his own. Even when a man discovers what appears to him, and what may appear to others, as a new truth, yet he does not think of laying claim to the truth as simply his private insight. If it were merely his, if no one else could possibly know it, he would suspect that it was not a truth of much

Feeling.

Knowing.

* Professor George Paxton Young.

value; it would simply rank with his feeling. Rather, if it be a truth that he has discovered, and for the discovery of which he may claim and may deserve recognition, he still regards it as a revelation of his previous ignorance. In short, in knowledge the objective existence of the fact is emphasized, its universal character, its existence for others also and not for me alone. If we could use chemical terms without leading to misapprehension, we might say that the simplest element in the conscious life is always a molecule, never an atom. But because feeling and knowing emphasize different aspects in the consciousness, it becomes easy to think of these abstractly, that is, out of connection with reality, apart from the process in which alone they exist. On the one hand, in considering feeling we may forget that every subjective feeling is part of a sensation which reveals objective existence, saying not only "I am," but also "it is." Again, in knowledge, subject knowing and object known are always correlative and inseparable, yet the universal character of knowledge is apt to lead to the impression that knowledge may exist apart from all knowing consciousness. There is another aspect, however, of the conscious life that does not so easily lend itself to abstraction, viz., willing, or volition. The reason of this is that it is in its essential nature an organizing, uniting, synthesizing activity. It cannot be considered as a product, but only as a process. Its work is to bring together the particular in feeling and the universal in knowledge into a common focus, into unity and co-ordination. In the acquisition of knowledge, the Will is that activity which, on being convinced that there is a communicable, sharable knowledge, a system of knowable relations that are in a sense, and to a certain degree, as yet foreign to the individual consciousness, at least not yet fully included in it, sets the whole consciousness at work to secure and include this knowledge. The Will may again be recognized as acting in a different direction. Noticing that the consciousness has in its own private possession certain wishes or ideals that are not yet realized, as we say, that is, are still merely the private possession of the individual consciousness, the Will in this case sets the whole consciousness at work to give these wishes and ideals a more permanent and universal character. It wishes to actualize them, that they may exist for others also. In both cases, in the acquisition of knowledge and in the realization of ideals, Will is that in the consciousness which, upon noticing a deficiency, strives to remedy

Willing.

it. It desires to effect a union and reconciliation, so that what appears to the individual consciousness as universal or existing for others may become private also, that is, exist in the possession of the individual consciousness; and, on the other hand, that what appears as existing for the individual consciousness alone may exist for others also as well as for the individual, that is, become actualized, realized. We thus see that the Will is the active, conciliating, unifying, living, organizing, constitutive principle in the conscious process. It is, in fact, the consciousness expressing itself. It is the vital element (though it is incorrect to use the term *element*) in consciousness. It is the fundamental principle in personality.

In Will we recognize the self-activity and self-expression of consciousness. In perception we distinguish this self-activity, as attention. As gathering together the forces of consciousness, it is called concentration of attention. As directing the forces of consciousness, that is, excluding what is irrelevant, including what is relevant, it is called selective attention. The latter aspect is what is usually regarded as distinctive of Will when it is termed volition. Volition is that self-expression of consciousness which is intentionally selective, in accordance with ends or ideals of action. Will is therefore essential and constitutive in personality. By its exercise the person distinguishes differences of worth, makes judgments of preference or estimation, recognizes ideals and strives to attain to them.

Ideals measured by personality.

In every correct recognition of an ideal and admission of the validity of its claims, the person declares that more conscious existence is better than less conscious existence, that more personality is better than less personality. It discerns that "life is true and truth is good." Thus, in every proper choice in accordance with ideals, the conscious life is loyal to the including ideal of a perfect personality. In the ideal of Perfect Personality all others must be harmonized. We have tried to indicate that personality is not an abstraction, but a very complex, concrete, living reality.

Complete personality implies other persons.

But there is one aspect of complete personality that we have not yet noticed. The ideal of a perfect person includes in it, as an essential constituent, a reference and relation to other persons. This is almost self-evident the moment we consider what are universally regarded as virtues which a person should include in his character: justice, truthfulness, benevo-

lence, love, which is called the fulfilling of the law. The moral person cannot be a solipsist. Duties involve a reference to others. Even when a person accuses himself, he does so by setting up in his own consciousness a plaintiff, a defendant, and a judge.

The inter-relativity of persons is peculiarly emphasized in the moral consideration. Yet even from the strictly scientific standpoint, the social factor cannot be altogether excluded. If we distinguish the reference to ideals and the implication of other persons as distinctively moral elements, then science and theoretical philosophy cannot altogether exclude a moral element. In science which seeks knowledge, and theoretical philosophy which critically and reflectively enquires into the implications of knowledge, an ideal is assumed, viz., true knowledge and correct thinking. This is adopted as the goal of effort and the measure of attainment. There is implied a judgment of worth, *i.e.*, a moral judgment, viz., that knowledge is better than ignorance, that the truth is to be preferred to falsehood, that it is more excellent to think correctly than incorrectly. In reality we set up an ideal of a normal or correct thinker, possessing complete knowledge. It is common to smile at Aristotle's oft-repeated reference to the "wise man" as the one who could settle moral perplexities satisfactorily; but this reference is not entirely excluded from science. The snakes seen by the drunkard in *delirium tremens* have an existence for him; but because he does not then think as a normal thinker, we say that he has hallucinations. The distinction between the real and the apparent comes to consciousness when a comparison is instituted between the results gained by different thinkers. Both in its contents and its form we distinguish the merely individual from the universal, and ascribe to the latter more importance. An experience which is peculiar to the individual, which he cannot repeat at will or cannot share with others, such as his dreams, is not considered to have the same worth as those which can be communicated and corroborated by others. Also in its form, we pass judgment on the results of the individual's thinking. We measure it by a standard which we regard as normal. In this sense the laws of logic become like ethical prescriptions to thinking. They say to each individual, Thus oughtest thou to think. If you disregard these rules, other individuals will properly disregard your conclusions.

Science and Logic appeal to normal thinking.

In moral considerations, we cannot avoid the reference to other

persons. An action which we regard as right must be such as we would approve if done by another person in the like circumstances. In moral relations, we must not be oblivious of the existence of other persons. We must regard and treat other persons, not as things, but as persons. As Kant expressed it, not as mere means to something else, but as *ends*. We are not true to the ideal of personality, we are false to our own personality, when we fail to regard and respect the personality of others. Now we have a very well understood word to describe such conduct. We say a person should not act selfishly, but unselfishly. By this we do not mean that he should abandon the claims of personality. We mean the contrary. To act selfishly is to pervert the ideal of personality. It is to give one element a predominance beyond its due; on the other side, it means that the other elements in personality are being neglected. The part is declared to be more than the whole. It is unfortunate that many writers are falling into the habit of describing unselfish and generous conduct as "impersonal." Even such a careful writer as Professor Henry Drummond does not always avoid this inaccuracy. If we were to speak of a falling stone as acting, we might say that it acted impersonally. When a man sneezes, he acts impersonally. What those writers mean is, probably, that a man in his actions should recognize that he, as an individual, does not and cannot exist as a person in isolation from his fellow-men. That he should remember that he is a member of the social life. That he should treat other persons as also persons. That the individual should endeavor to include all those relations to his fellow-men which tend to the completeness of humanity in self and others. But this is not the renouncing of personality. It is simply recognizing the true character and significance of personality. The citadel which Ethics must defend is personality. The only defence required, however, is elucidation. It simply needs to be recognized and understood to be appreciated; and a study of Ethics is of the highest value, because it helps us to understand personality. In a critical and philosophical study of Ethics, we must endeavor to understand, systematize, and harmonize the various ideals that are acknowledged and sought by humanity. Perfect personality is the ideal of ideals. All our moral dissatisfaction arises from the recognition that we are not what we ought to be, as measured

Maintaining personality not selfishness.

Unselfishness not "Impersonal."

Ethics unfolds the significance of Personality.

Ideal of ideals.

by this standard. Moral actions are guided by moral judgments. We make such a moral judgment when some end or proposed action is regarded by the mind as "fitted to yield satisfaction to the choosing subject."* The only ends that can really satisfy the choosing subject are those by the attainment of which the choosing subject becomes more complete, and tends to make others more complete, approaches more nearly to the ideal of perfect personality, and assists other persons to approach to perfect personality or ideal humanity. Loyalty to this ideal, efforts to attain it and conserve it, is the very essence of morality. In this duty all the duties are included.

University training a preparation for work.

The study of Ethics brings us very close to life. All our university training is a preparation for the duties of life. The day that we go forth from the halls of our "alma mater" is very appropriately called "Commencement Day." Whatever may be the special work of each one in life, there is one work which is no man's specialty, but the common work of humanity, or, rather, we should say, it is every one's specialty—to live the moral life, to contribute to the development of an ideal personality in self and in others. Immediately on leaving the college halls, if we have not before settled the question, we are confronted with a deeply serious moral problem, "What shall I do?" "What profession or life work shall I adopt?" Would it not sometimes help in the solution of this momentous question if we were more fully aware that it is a moral question? That we should propose to ourselves the question: In what way can I best contribute to the more perfect development of personality? How can I best employ the special gifts I have in the service of humanity? Having chosen our profession, we are met in each one with its peculiar cases of moral perplexity. What serious moral questions must be decided each week by the physician in the exercise of his profession! Shall he acquaint the patient with the critical state of his illness or remain silent? The responsibility of deciding delicate moral questions confronts the lawyer very frequently. If any one above all others would seem to need a special training in ethical principles, it is the minister of the Gospel. I do not mean simply that we are accustomed to look to him for a pattern of moral conduct. Is he not in a peculiar sense a teacher of morals; and is he not often consulted upon

* Professor G. P. Young.

moral questions? Does not his decision determine in many cases the course of conduct that will be pursued by others? Then it is superfluous to add that there is the closest connection between morality and religion. Is not a theory of religion or theology as much concerned in the defence of a Perfect Personality as a theory of morals? Though it may be perfectly true that the being of our personality must depend on the being of God, yet for our knowledge of the Divine personality we must rest on our knowledge of our own personalities. We are aware that the Founder of the Christian religion did not separate morality from religion. Was He not the greatest moral teacher that the world has seen? Did He not first elevate morality above mere legality? Did He not say, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect," and, "If ye love me, keep my commandments"? But as we have said, the consideration of complex moral problems cannot be the specialty of any profession. To decide moral questions, to apply moral principles, is the work of humanity. What are the problems that press most heavily upon modern civilization? They are such as charity, temperance, divorce, socialism. The latter is sometimes called the "social problem," as a wider term than socialism. Each one of these is a moral problem of great significance. A consideration of these shows the complex and difficult character of many moral problems. Now we must deal with these questions. They press upon our civilization. Surely our university graduates, who must stand in the front rank and guide and form public opinion and direct public action, need to make a special and careful study of them. But it may be replied, "That altogether belongs to the field of political economy." It is quite true that they partly belong to the field of political economy, but they also belong to the field of Ethics. A moment's consideration will make this plain, and help to indicate the relation of science in general to Ethics.* In an excellent little treatise on "The Character and Logical Method of Political Economy," Professor Cairnes says:—"Neither mental nor physical nature forms the subject-matter of political economy. The economist considers, it is true, physical phenomena as he also considers mental phenomena; but in neither case as phenomena which it belongs to his

Living the moral life the work of humanity.

Relation of Ethics to Sociology.

* See my Essay, "Political Economy and Ethics." The J. E. Bryant Co. (Limited), 1891.

science to explain. The subject-matter of that science is wealth; and though wealth consists in natural objects, it is not wealth in virtue of those objects being material, but in virtue of their possessing a quality attributed to them by the mind." Does not this expressly state that wealth is wealth because it is desired by human beings? Must not this desire be considered in its relation to other desires? Let us notice the error that arises if the ethical consideration is excluded. Cairnes says:—"The subject-matter of political economy is thus neither purely physical nor purely mental, but possesses a complex character, equally derived from both departments of nature, and the laws of which are neither mental nor physical laws, though they are dependent, and, as I maintain, equally dependent on the laws of matter and those of mind." Thus the political economist "will consider, as being included amongst the paramount mental principles to which I have alluded, the general desire for physical well-being and for wealth as the means of obtaining it, the intellectual power of judging of the efficiency of means to an end, along with the inclination to reach our ends by the easiest and shortest means, mental facts from which results the desire to obtain wealth at the least possible sacrifice." Now by those who have neglected or expressly excluded the ethical element, this statement has been made the cloak for a tremendous fallacy—a fallacy widespread, injurious. It leads many to fancy that morality has no place in business transactions. When we admit man's capability of judging of means to accomplish his end, and the inclination to reach it "at the least possible sacrifice," we first think of him as dealing with the powers of nature, and we approve of his action. Here we call the man who can make use of these powers to the best advantage ingenious, clever, inventive, etc. The Hollander, in constructing his windmill, tries to catch the most breeze with the least machinery. We do not regard the wishes of the wind, we do not consult its interests, we do not desire its good, simply because it has no wishes, interests, or good to be consulted. But the moment we come to exchange our manufactured article with another person who has also produced an article by using machinery as advantageously and economically as possible, we have a quite different consideration. It is now one person dealing with another person. It is only in this latter case that we can make sacrifices or be truly generous. If, in employing a laborer, the employer regard him as he would the powers of external nature, try to get all he

can from him, give as little as possible to him, do we commend his cleverness, approve his ingenuity admire his sharpness? We never speak of a man cheating nature, taking a mean advantage of nature; but when a man seeks his advantage or happiness at too great an expenditure on the part of the person who supplies him with the means of gratification, we say, "You as a person, as a man, were not justified in so using your fellow-man." We cannot divorce political economy entirely from Ethics. Political economy as a science, like every other scientific study, must limit its field of inquiry. Like every other science, it strives to reach general rules of what may be done. Political economy does not tell the politician or philanthropist what ought to be done, but simply how certain ends may be gained. To determine which ends should be sought, the politician and philanthropist must consider the comparative worth of various ends. This latter is the special work of Ethics. We may say, then, that the following inquiries must be made by the philanthropist:—(1) He must study general or theoretical or scientific political economy. (2) He must make an ethical examination of the ends men ought to prefer when alternatives have to be decided. His work is to make an application of the results gained by the above considerations. That is, he must endeavor to select the most suitable and effective means to attain ends that are not merely desired, but that should be desired.

Philanthropy, Scientific and Ethical elements

Now what we have outlined for the politician and practical philanthropist applies to every man according to his opportunities of action. We are all, or at least ought to be, philanthropists to a greater or less extent. No one lives for himself alone, no one acts for himself alone. No greater moral delusion exists than to suppose that some of our actions are our own private possession, and affect no one else. Directly or indirectly, every moral act goes beyond the actor, and nearly or remotely affects other persons for good or ill. But if the full apprehension of this thought brings with it at first a sense of awe, a second thought brings gladness and joy to each soul that is in love with the good, who desires the progress of the human race, the conquest and supremacy of the higher life. It teaches that each one of us may use his or her influence to the highest advantage, each one of us may be a teacher of righteousness. Is not this the work in which each moral being wishes to share, not only to know and do the right, but also to be a teacher of the right and good?

The Teacher's mission.

The teacher's work, seen in this universal aspect, assumes its appropriate importance and nobility.

Reference to Professor Young.

I am sure that when I thus speak of the grandeur of the teacher's mission, the nobility of the teacher's work, the thought of every one here will at once turn to the noble teacher whose memory will always be sacredly cherished by those who had the privilege of knowing him—Professor George Paxton Young.

What was the secret of his wonderful power and influence as a teacher? Many would answer, "His remarkable personality"; and this would be a fitting reply, if we remember that the personality is not one element in the character. The personality is the man himself, the whole character. Professor Young had a mighty influence because he was a great man. Throughout his whole life, he bent all his energies upon one aim—the development of the highest personality, the truest, purest character in himself and in others. Few have had so clear a conception of the ethical ideal, few have striven so earnestly to attain it, few have been so successful in realizing the moral ideal, few, indeed, have succeeded to such an extent in influencing the lives of others for good.

With a many-sided training that exemplified the Grecian idea of education, the symmetrical development of all the powers, with a wide experience of life with its very real joys and deepest sorrows, with a profound theoretical philosophy, he concentrated all upon the statement, solution, and application of ethical problems.

The results he reached were so nearly in accord with those gained by the late Professor T. H. Green that, upon the appearance of the latter's work, the "Prolegomena to Ethics," he seems to have abandoned all intention of publication. This, to his students, has been a matter of deep regret. This regret is not lessened when we recollect that Professor Green's valuable book is written in a heavy and difficult style, while Professor Young's exposition was marked with the lucidity that comes from long experience in teaching and thorough mastery of the subject.

The shorthand notes left by him are chiefly resumés of standard works in Psychology, Logic, Philosophy, and Ethics, with criticisms interspersed, various outlines of arguments, no doubt intended to arrange the exposition that he intended to present to his class. He never wrote out his lectures. Whether a work can be compiled con-

taining some of the results of his teaching and thinking is still an unsettled question.

But though Professor Young left so little in the way of publication, his work and influence can never be lost. Each pupil who sat under him, and came in contact with him, will carry throughout his life deep influence for good, won from the inspiration of his beloved teacher. In my own case, it would be impossible for me to estimate how much I owe, not only in the way of direct guidance and teaching in the lecture-room, but also in the way of counsel and encouragement beyond it.

"Love is cheap that can be told." In endeavoring to fulfil the responsible duties that devolve upon me as a teacher in this University, I shall aim to emulate the example of a noble predecessor.