

doc  
CA1  
EA752  
2001C97  
ENG

Canadian Centre  
For Foreign Policy  
Development



Centre canadien  
pour le développement  
de la politique étrangère

125 promenade Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1R 0G2  
Telephone/Téléphone : 613.944.0278 www.cfp-pec.gc.ca Fax/Télocopieur : 613.944.0687

**CYPRUS: SHARING THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE OF  
LIVING TOGETHER**

Marketa Geislerova  
Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development

Banff, Alberta, Canada (March 28-30, 2001),  
Larnaka, Cyprus (June 15-16, 2001)

**7005.2E & 7005.3E**

ISBN: E2-414/2001-1E  
0-662-30924-3  
ISBN: E2-414/2001-2E  
0-662-30925-1



Department of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade

Ministère des Affaires étrangères  
et du Commerce international

**Canada**





**RIDEAU HALL**

Dept. of Foreign Affairs  
Min. des Affaires étrangères  
MAY 21 2002  
Return to Departmental Library  
Retourner à la bibliothèque du Ministère

October 1, 2001

Excellency.

On behalf of all Canadians, I am pleased to convey my best wishes for happiness and prosperity to your Excellency and the people of Cyprus on the occasion of the National Day of the Republic.

Canada wishes to reaffirm its commitment to a resolution to the Cyprus question and its support for the ongoing efforts of the UN Secretary-General and his representatives to facilitate a negotiated settlement between the two Cypriot communities.

Canada also continues to support efforts to resolve this long-standing question by building cooperative inter-communal links. In this regard in June, as part of a series, Canada organized a seminar in Cyprus to share our multi-dimensional experiences of living together with a cross section of Cypriots.

Canadians and Cypriots will continue to work together to promote a prosperous and peaceful future for Cyprus and deepen the cooperation between our two nations built on the historic ties that we have shared through our Commonwealth heritage.

Adrienne Clarkson

His Excellency Glafkos Clerides  
President of the Republic of Cyprus  
Nicosia

63769609



## Cyprus – Time to Break the Deadlock

The brutal division of Cyprus comes at a high cost. The immediate human costs include communities separated by barbed wire and mines where trade and human relations have come to an end, where even phone calls and internet connections are problematic. A new generation of Cypriots has reached adulthood without contact among ethnic Greeks and ethnic Turks. Old animosities are reinforced and passed on to the next generation, today's youth, who carry real and imagined grievances, who are choked at the moment of intellectual formation by suspicion and hatred of others. Those in civil society and in politics who seek a way out of this dead end are ridiculed, isolated and denounced as traitors.

The economic costs are devastating. Though relatively prosperous, Southern Cyprus is harmed in its development. Northern Cyprus is in tragic economic decline, including losing a population of native Cypriots to be replaced by desperately poor immigrant Turks.

The international costs include more than 3 decades of United Nations Peacekeeping operations, (including Canadian participation for 29 years), tension in the already tense Eastern Mediterranean, a challenge to NATO relations, a looming crisis in EU enlargement, and, for students of the Huntington school, a potential point of conflict between religions and civilizations.

The United Nations, the Commonwealth, the U.S. and Europeans have all been unsuccessful in solving the Cyprus problem. There can be no doubt that it is the Cypriots themselves, and only the Cypriots, who can ultimately find a lasting, negotiated solution to the division of the island.

The present human costs, economic decline, and threat to international peace and security are unsustainable. Cyprus and Turkey are both aspirants to EU membership. The Economist has concluded (September 6, 2001) that "the growing prospect of the EU letting in the Greek-run Republic of Cyprus may actually provoke a conflict... perhaps even a war... A crisis looms." The need for a Cyprus solution has never been more urgent. The EU, especially, must urgently address this looming crisis.

Canadian Forces Peacekeepers and other Canadians have long been involved in seeking an end to the Cyprus conflict, promoting reconciliation, and offering assistance to Cypriots who seek a settlement of their divisions. Foreign Ministers, diplomats, academic experts, specialists in many fields, and the (former) Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, have all been engaged.

Drawing on this Canadian experience, expertise and long-standing commitment to Cyprus, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (at the Department of Foreign Affairs) has undertaken three discussions from February 2000 to June 2001 to help encourage a Cypriot settlement of the Cyprus situation.

In February 2000 we assembled a large group of Canadians interested in Cyprus, and other experts in various fields that might be relevant to a Cyprus solution (including conflict resolution, diplomacy, social sciences, community relations, education, federalism) along with members of the House of Commons and Senate, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and foreign affairs officials charged with Canada's relations with Cyprus. After reviewing the history of Canada's interests in Cyprus and current events at that time, we encouraged participants to think about the necessary aspects of "living together." The results include a snap shot of how the two Cypriot communities (and their supporters in Canada) view key issues. The meeting concluded with a general sense that Canada and Canadians have experiences and perspectives on "living together" that could be of value to the communities in Cyprus. In particular, Canadian experience with flexible federalism, multicultures and a human security approach to problem solving could be useful for Cypriots seeking a settlement.

From this discussion and our earlier work exploring possible international applications of the Canadian experience with federalism (*Living Together: International Aspects of Federal Systems*, W. Kymlicka and J.R. Raviot) and with managing diversity (*Managing Diversity in Plural Societies*, Magda Opalski editor), we undertook two follow-up meetings, with participants from each of the two Cypriot communities: Turkish Cypriots in Banff and Greek Cypriots in Larnaca. The goal of these parallel meetings was to test the interest in Canadian experience with "living together" (especially federalism and majority-minority relations), mutual learning for both Canadian and Cypriot participants, and the promotion of a solution in Cyprus through inter-communal contact, dialogue and confidence building. Participants included several figures close to the two political leaders on the island (Ergun Olgun and Kypros Chrystostomides), leading academics, figures in business, politics and civil society from Cyprus and well known Canadian experts, foremost among them federalism expert, Professor (and former Queen's University Principal) Ron Watts. Several foreign affairs officials including Bob Hage, Director for South Europe, participated and three Canadian Ambassadors (for Cyprus, Turkey and Greece) sat in on the Larnaca meeting.

The results of these two meetings are not encouraging but offer some hope.

While Cypriot participants at the Banff meeting showed a sincere interest in overcoming the "tyranny of terminology" around federalism and signs of thinking out of the box, neither side of the aging political leadership seems prepared to engage in any real negotiations toward a settlement. Both sides appear unwilling to give up their preconditions to negotiations. For the Turkish Cypriot leadership this means a continuing presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus, increasing reliance on Turkey and pre-negotiations recognition of a separate and equal political status of Northern Cyprus. For the Greek Cypriot leadership this means continual reference to international law and various resolutions passed at the United Nations General Assembly and a determination to recreate the failed 1960s federal arrangements of majority rule which (they must know) the Turkish Cypriots will never accept a second time.

The Banff and Larnaca discussions do provide two points worth further consideration by people

of goodwill in Cyprus who wish to promote a negotiated settlement: escaping the unnecessary debate about federation and confederation, and the need for a bold step to break the long-standing deadlock.

Professor Watts presented in great detail, at both meetings, the variations, hybrids and complexities of various federal arrangements in the world (and in history). Do not, he urged, get hung up in the false debates about “federation” and “confederation”, the “tyranny of terminology”. As Canadians well know, federal arrangements of “living together” are the tools to implement the political will and public desire to accommodate diversity in society.

That accommodation must include majority-minority relations that are based on a majority’s willingness to recognize minority claims as reasonable, even when those claims are not in the interests of the majority. This is key to understanding the success of diverse societies like Canada (where, for example, the federal Prime Minister has come from Quebec, with 24 per cent of the population, for 32 of the past 34 years and where there are times when nearly all of the highest posts of state are occupied by “minority” French-speaking Canadians: Governor General, Prime Minister, Speakers of Parliament, Chief of Defence Staff, Justices of the Supreme Court). The leadership of the Greek majority in Cyprus must, at some point, recognize the inherent reasonableness of the Turkish Cypriot view that they, as a minority, cannot accept a solution that would leave them trapped in a permanent minority situation in all affairs, all the time. Whether called “federation”, “confederation” or “chopped liver”, a settlement must include majority accommodation of some minority needs. Recycling references to international law about the 1974 invasion does nothing to address this. The leaders of Northern Cyprus must also accommodate the insecurities of Greek Cypriots (who view themselves as a minority “in the region”) by signalling their willingness to end their formal attachment and dependence upon Turkey starting with reduction of the Turkish military presence. Movement by the Turkish Cypriots in favour of withdrawal of the Turkish army and an end to immigration from Turkey would help address Greek Cypriot insecurities (even if Turkey itself didn’t respond cooperatively right away). Harking back to the 1974 coup and attempted annexation to Greece does nothing to move into the future as a united island. Accommodation of insecurities is needed by both sides if either side is to move toward a made-in-Cyprus settlement.

Finally, in Banff and Larnaca, Professor Watts and others explored the idea of a step that would shift the environment for negotiations and create a new climate and circumstances. This could be a symbolic gesture: Willy Brandt as German Chancellor kneeling in the Warsaw Ghetto in December 1970 to the memory of the victims of German fascism. This could be a substantive move: Nixon to China, Anwar Sadat to Tel Aviv. Or it could be a step that actually creates the conditions for change and a settlement: President F.W. De Clerk’s freeing of Nelson Mandela from South African prison. There is a challenge to present and future leaders and civil society in both communities in Cyprus to take a step that would change the climate and conditions.

I would like to thank all those who participated in these discussions. All of the discussions were valuable learning experiences for everyone. I am especially grateful to Tariq Ismael at the

University of Calgary and Costas Melakopides at the University of Cyprus for your friendship, faith and tireless efforts in hosting the Banff and Larnaca meetings.

From the point of view of developing Canadian foreign policy, this has been a very useful application and test of one of the three pillars of Canadian foreign policy, "promoting Canadian culture and values abroad."

We hope we have contributed to understanding, dialogue, lasting friendships and an opportunity to think ahead.

Steve Lee  
Executive Director

September 2001  
Ottawa

#### **Related Reports from the CCFPD:**

"Report on Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century Roundtable/Rapport de la table ronde Chypre: Vivre Ensemble au XXIe siècle" Marketa Geislerova, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. February 14, 2000. (7005.1E/F)

"Living Together: International Aspects of Federal Systems." Will Kymlicka, University of Ottawa; Jean-Robert Raviot, College universitaire française (Russia). Fall 1997. (1012.1E)

*Managing Diversity in Plural Societies: Minorities, Migration and Nation-Building in Post-Communist Europe.* Ed. Magda Opalski, Nepean: Forum Eastern Europe. 1998. (1012.3E)

www.nytimes.com

**The New York Times**  
ON THE WEB

January 16, 2002

## Aging Cypriot Rivals to Begin Talks to End Ethnic Dispute

By DOUGLAS FRANTZ

**N**ICOSIA, Cyprus, Jan. 15 — Two aging political leaders will sit down across a table from each other Wednesday to begin negotiations that will most likely decide their places in history and the future of the divided island they uneasily share.

President Glafcos Clerides, 82, the leader of the Greek Cypriots, and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Rauf Denktash, 77, have been rivals for half a century, locked in an ethnic dispute with reverberations far beyond this island in the eastern Mediterranean.

Over time, the two men who were once friends have come to represent the stubborn animosities that have divided Cyprus since 1974, when Turkish troops invaded the northern third of the island after a brief Greek-inspired coup.

But finally, after four years of silence, a round of "dinner diplomacy" has opened the door for what observers think is a real chance to resolve the issues that have kept the two sides eyeball to eyeball across the cease-fire line that splits the island and makes Nicosia the world's last divided capital.

Time is running out in many ways. There is a looming deadline for joining the European Union. Greece, a member of the grouping, has threatened to block the admission of any new countries unless Cyprus is allowed in. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit of Turkey, for his part, has threatened to "annex" northern Cyprus if the island joins without reunification.

Then there is the question of the Cypriot leaders' advancing years. Mr. Clerides has said he will not seek re-election in 2003, and there have been persistent reports that Mr. Denktash is in poor health. But no other leader on either side is believed to have enough public support to persuade their people to support a reunification agreement, which must be ratified by referendums in both communities. "I don't know whether it is now or never," a Western diplomat said, "but it is now or wait a very long time."

One who feels that the time may be ripe is Álvaro de Soto, the United Nations special representative in Cyprus, who will be host to the talks Wednesday at the organization's sprawling hilltop compound here. A seasoned negotiator not prone to overstatement, he said in an interview today that he saw "grounds for

Advertisement

**TECHNOSCOUT**  
Your search ends here  
**TECHNOLOGY UPDATES**

How to make your car  
invisible to radar and  
laser

Natural de-icer means  
you'll have to shovel  
less this winter

Carry 20 GB of data in  
your shirt pocket

A floor lamp that  
spreads sunshine all  
over a room

Easily change from TV  
to VCR to DVD to  
Video Games with the  
touch of a button

Digital camera,  
webcam and  
camcorder all in the  
size of a pen

It's time to put all of  
your photos onto your  
computer

Time zone to time zone  
never set your watch  
again

**Click for the complete story**  
Advertisement

hope and even optimism about prospects for reunification."

If the leaders succeeded, the impact would be widespread. A major obstacle to the improving relations between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, would be removed at a time when the United States is relying on both in this strategic region.

Further, a unified Cyprus would clear the way for the planned expansion of the European Union and would smooth Turkey's bumpy path to joining Europe later.

As head of the recognized government, made up of Greek Cypriots, Mr. Clerides is negotiating for the island to join the union. A decision is due late this year or early next.

European diplomats say Cyprus will very likely join, with or without a settlement. But its admission without one would cause new problems.

Turkey's own candidacy would be probably be stopped dead if it took action against Cyprus. Plus, diplomats said, Turkey's prospects would suffer a severe blow if Cyprus joined without a partnership with the Turkish Cypriots.

Frameworks for settlements have been discussed at past negotiations. The Turkish Cypriots want a confederation that would recognize them as sovereign equals with the Greek Cypriots, something Mr. Denktash calls a "new partnership."

In exchange for giving ground on sovereignty, Mr. Clerides would need a territorial adjustment that would allow a substantial number of Greek Cypriots to return to homes they lost when the Turks invaded nearly 30 years ago.

The Turkish Cypriots have 18 percent of the population but hold 37 percent of the land, including some villages that have been fenced off since 1974. The Greek Cypriots control 59 percent of the land, and the remaining 4 percent forms a 112-mile buffer zone between the communities that is patrolled by the United Nations.

Still, enough time and change have occurred that, as one Western diplomat put it, "I don't think there is any single problem out there that cannot be cracked."

# CYPRUS: SHARING THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE OF LIVING TOGETHER<sup>1</sup>

by Marketa Geislerova

## REPORT FROM THE ROUNDTABLE - LIVING TOGETHER: SHARING THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (Banff, Alberta - March 28-30, 2001)

*On March 28-30, 2001, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD) brought together a group of experts to explore the Canadian experience with "Living Together" and possible applications of this experience to problems in Cyprus. The roundtable was a follow-up to work undertaken by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) on Cyprus in the late 1980's and an earlier CCFPD Roundtable "Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century" (February, 2001)<sup>2</sup>. Participants included Ergün Olgun (Undersecretary to Rauf Denktash), Altay Nevzat (Eastern Mediterranean University), Özdil Nami (Erdil and Sons Ltd.), Ozay Mehmet (Eastern Mediterranean University), Ronald Keith (University of Calgary), Ron Watts (Queens' University), and Kate White (Black & White Communications). Tareq Ismael (University of Calgary) and Steven Lee (Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development) co-chaired the meeting.*

*A final roundtable, on June 15-16, 2001 (Larnaca, Cyprus), engaged Canadian experts and Greek Cypriots.*

### **Key recommendations for Canada include:**

- Canadian (funding) agencies could promote joint Canadian-Cypriot activities by:
  - sponsoring exchange programmes for university students and faculty
  - giving grants to joint research teams
  - helping to organise citizen engagement roundtables
- Priority areas for research include: federalism studies, water resources cooperation, culture studies, civil society organisations, the role of EU in the Cyprus settlement.
- Canada could use several foreign policy levers, including quiet diplomacy, to achieve the resumption of UN-sponsored negotiations.
- Political initiatives could include:
  - work on terminology for the upcoming UN Resolution
  - attempts to influence EU members to enhance their relations with Northern Cyprus.
- Canada could help breaking the "isolation pressure" applied by the Greek Cypriots and the EU on all aspects of the Turkish Cypriot life.
- Helping to organise co-operative nonpolitical events, such as art exhibitions or sport activities, would be useful and may not be perceived as too controversial.

---

<sup>1</sup>This report is a result of two CCFPD roundtables held in Banff, Alberta, Canada (March 28-30, 2001), and Larnaka, Cyprus (June 15-16, 2001).

<sup>2</sup>CCFPD, *Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century* (February 2001), 7005.1E/F.

- Canada could become involved in Northern Cyprus through the Canada Council, for instance, which helps developing countries preserve their cultures. Protecting the Northern Cypriot heritage through UNESCO could also open space for Canada's engagement.

## INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

Ronald Keith (Head, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary) welcomed all the participants to Alberta and to the roundtable. In his opening remarks, he emphasised the important role universities play in addressing issues deemed intractable or "too sensitive" at the political level. One of the central advantages of scholars and researchers is that "universities are not hostage to politics," he said. Instead, their resources may be used in the service of civil societies.

Tareq Ismael (Co-chair, University of Calgary) expressed his appreciation for individuals who take responsibility and contribute to the development of Canada's public policy. He commended the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD) for organising events such as this roundtable - they contribute not only to better policy, but a vibrant civil society. Ozay Mehmet (Eastern Mediterranean University) added that this is the first event in Canada casting light on Northern Cyprus. He extended his warm welcome to Ergün Olgun (Undersecretary to Rauf Denktash), Altay Nevzat (Eastern Mediterranean University) and Özdil Nami (Erdil and Sons Ltd.) who came from Cyprus to join the roundtable.

Steve Lee (Co-chair, CCFPD) expressed his appreciation to the participants for their commitment to the development of Canada's foreign policy. He drew attention to the links and partnerships the CCFPD has build with the academic community in fulfilling its mandate.

He set two goals for the roundtable: 1) to share information and perspectives and 2) to assess the needs for foreign policy development. The participants bring together diverse experiences and perspectives that have both, global and local focus. The outcome of this interdisciplinary discussion is to better understand each other and our societies. We may then apply this understanding to our needs, including the development of Canada's foreign policy, Steve Lee said.

He drew attention to two previous initiatives. The first was led by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIPPS) between 1988-89 (CIPPS, March 1990), the second by the CCFPD.(CCFPD 2001) The CCFPD-led discussion came to surprisingly similar conclusions as the former, including:

- an emphasis on bottom-up approaches
- the importance of education
- Canadian role in helping with water and other functionally based "peacebuilding" projects
- the value of sharing (exposing) the Canadian experience with governance and "living

together."

This final point is the starting point for today's discussion. There are two key elements of the Canadian experience to keep in mind. First, manifested by shifts in loyalty or in approaches to the minority-majority relationship, Canada has consciously and continually altered its identity over time. This was achieved through instruments including: political discourse, institutions, and symbols. **"Identity change is possible and, perhaps, necessary for diverse societies to live together,"** Steve Lee said. Second, Canada has used federalism as a flexible tool in the service of this change: accommodating overarching national identities *as well as* geographic size and differences. Today, federalism's two objectives have to be further adapted in the context of Indigenous Peoples, their land claims and other modern governance-related issues.

## GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

### **Confederation : The Last Chance for Establishing a New Partnership in Cyprus**

Ergün Olgun (Undersecretary to Rauf Denktaş) started his presentation by addressing two points raised in the opening remarks. First, he expressed his scepticism about any likely success in developing a common political identity in Cyprus in the near future. A shift toward a common identity may be problematic because the ethnic conflict on the island is rooted in a defence against an identity threat. Instead, an institutional approach to common interests is required, with the view that some common elements may grow in time. Second, appeals to future-focussed solutions are misguided: Justice can only be served by addressing past injustice.

He pointed out that despite the equal status of the two peoples in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots have been trying to take full control of the island in order to turn it into a Hellenic Republic, with the complicity of the international community. The right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriots stems primarily from three sources:

- the British Parliament (which has acknowledged twice the right of the Turkish Cypriots for self determination, in 1956 and 1958)
- the 1960 Constitution (enshrining the equality of the two communities)
- international recognition and precedent (as an equal party and a subject of international law, the Turkish Cypriots, together with the Greek Cypriots, were a signatory to all the international treaties of 1960, which created the Republic).

According to Ergün Olgun, despite this clearly established right of the Turkish Cypriots to self-determination, the Greek Cypriots unilaterally changed the "equal partnership provisions" of the 1960 Constitution and ejected Turkish Cypriots from all the organs of the state in the wake of the 1963 coup. Since then, the Turkish Cypriots fought for and defended their status and rights without much international support (with the exception of Turkey). At the backdrop of intermittent violence and upheavals, two "sovereign" states developed on the island (each with a fully functioning democratic institutions, territory and distinct political, legal and economic systems). The struggle catalysed in 1974, when troops supporting the Greek junta invaded Cyprus, provoking a Turkish intervention - sanctioned by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Twenty years after the dissolution of the founding partnership, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983. In spite of these developments, the Greek Cypriots continue to claim to

represent the whole island in international fora under the guise of the "government of Cyprus." Moreover, the Greek Cypriots have prevented the North from developing by imposing a crippling embargo. The embargo contributes to deepening polarisation between North and South and widens the confidence gap between the two sides.

Multilateral initiatives, including the UN process, have largely failed to bring a resolution. EU enlargement has been playing an ever increasing role. The Greek Cypriots refuse to recognise the sovereignty of the state as emanating from the two founding peoples in all these initiatives. In respect to the EU, they see their membership as a first step toward the union of the island with Greece "through the back door."

The central objectives of the Turkish Cypriots include:

- developing a self-sustaining economy without reliance on the South
- becoming a source of cooperation rather than rivalry between Turkey and Greece
- functioning as a bridge between Islam and Christianity
- playing a role in protecting (guaranteeing) Eastern civilisation on its "Western frontier"
- a united Cyprus could function as a pillar of stability and peace in the East Mediterranean (maintaining a balance of power)
- becoming empowered by using diversity as a tool to resolve tensions (rather than seeing diversity as a threat)
- cooperating with the Greek Cypriots, while retaining sovereignty
- preserving national identity and existence
- supporting and building institutions and mechanisms which would enable such cooperation and preserve national identity.

Ergün Olgun expressed the view that a confederation would address the objectives and needs of the Turkish Cypriots best. It may be the case that, as in former Yugoslavia, federal institutions would be incapable of functioning in Cyprus, he said. Confederations enable Peoples to preserve their separate national identities and political sovereignties while allowing them to build cooperative relationships based on the joint exercise of certain agreed powers and functions. Moreover, confederations may offer solutions to some globalization related challenges. In this context, a confederate Cyprus may serve well EU (and global) integration. According to Professor Daniel J. Elazar:

Confederation and confederal arrangements are being revived as the postmodern form of federalism that seems to be particularly useful in connecting politically sovereign states that must accommodate themselves to the realities of new times. These include the growing interdependence among states deemed politically sovereign, the desire for linkage among states and peoples that will not require them to merge into new nations but enable them to preserve their separate national identities and existence, and recognition of the realities of ethnic distinctiveness and, at times, conflict. (Elazar 1998:40)

Ergün Olgun drew attention to cases where confederations led to the establishment of federal unions. For instance, the federal union of modern Switzerland was preceded by a confederation of Swiss cantons. Germany's modern federal arrangements may be traced to the German confederation of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The federal constitution of the U.S. is the successor to the Articles of Confederation.

### **Sharing the Canadian Experience of Living Together**

Ronald Watts (Queens' University) emphasised that by living together he means not integration or absorption but living side by side as distinct groups to achieve common goals. He focussed on 5 basic lessons of living together from the Canadian experience and the experience of other federations and confederations:

1. the value and limits of experiences of other countries
2. the danger of oversimplifying - perceiving federations and confederations as two different alternatives
3. special problems of bi-communal situations
4. the importance of a supportive civil society and political culture underpinning formal structures
5. other relevant experiences with processes to break deadlock and impasses.

There is value in the experiences of other countries with federal and confederal systems for three main reasons:

1. to draw attention to possibilities
2. to point to unintended consequences from certain institutional arrangements
3. to provide positive and negative lessons - no example is useless

There are also important limitations:

- no pure models of federation or confederation are applicable everywhere - there is a need to adapt to local conditions
- applications operate differently in different conditions
- models can not be picked off the shelf.

The value of the Canadian experience includes two centuries of trying to reconcile different and distinct communities. Canadians have considered and tried various approaches (unitary, centralised and decentralised federation) and debated over federation *versus* confederation. **The value of our experience stems less from precise structures employed and contemplated, than from processes we have developed over time to reflect the need for tolerance, compromise and adjustment. Key issues have not been resolved once and for all, yet we continue trying. "Federalism in Canada is not a fixed ideal, but a process of evolution and change."**

The second point - danger of oversimplification - is particularly pertinent for Cyprus. **We must be wary of the "tyranny of terminology" or "lunacy over labels."** Terminology and labels detested by each side should be avoided. **As the debate over federation *versus* confederation in Cyprus and elsewhere demonstrates, use of terms that effectively reduce**

**an issue to "either-or" prevents resolution.** Resolution is possible only when practical arrangements are addressed.

*Both*, federation and confederation combine shared-rule for common purposes with self-rule of component units for other purposes. The essential difference lies in the character of institutions for common purposes: in federations it is based on the citizens, in confederations on the constituent governments. There are enormous variations within each category of which Ronald Watts cited numerous examples. In some cases, federations may be more decentralised than confederations or contain some confederal elements.. There also exist many hybrids. For instance, the constitutional structures in 1867 Canada combined both, federal and some unitary elements. Other combinations include, for instance: confederal and federal elements (EU governing structures) or confederal and unitary elements (the original U.S. federal constitution). Despite Ergün Olgun's proposition, there are currently few examples of successful "pure" confederations in practice, he said.

Canada has a considerable experience in addressing constitutional issues in the context of a bi-communal situation. Lessons can be learned from 1840-1867 Act of Union, from the rejection of a two-unit federation in 1867, and more recently from the mega-constitutional debates 1960-2000 (which included discussion of concepts such as *status quo* federalism, renewed federalism and sovereignty-association or partnership). Like the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, French Quebecers in Canada account for about 24% of the total population. Canada has, however, important features which distinguish it from Cyprus including 10 provinces rather than 2 units, a multicultural element and a growing voice of Aboriginal Peoples. Federation with some confederal features is likely to evolve in Canada, rather than a sovereignty-association.

There are no existing two-unit confederations. Literature suggests that all two-unit federations are or have been troubled and relatively unstable. Some of the reasons include:

- insistence on unanimity in all matters has usually tended to produce impasses and deadlocks
- there is no opportunity for shifting alliances and coalitions that enable multi-unit federations to resolve stand-offs
- challenges are often reduced to a zero-sum game (every issue is seen in terms of a winner and a loser)

**A possible solution is to convert into a multi-unit federation. Where not possible, federalism could be combined with confederal elements (i.e., unanimity on some agreed fundamental matters). Canada has implemented both solutions in the past.**

Ronald Watts drew attention to the importance of supportive civil societies. He said that creating federal or confederal structures is not a panacea. **The experience of Canada and other federations and confederations indicates that even more important than their formal structures has been public acceptance of basic values and processes required for their operation.** Multiple identities within an overarching sense of shared purposes and objectives

have to be explicitly recognised and accommodated. Essential for Canada and others has been the acceptance of diversity, tolerance, compromise and a sense of trust. The question is how to achieve these conditions when they do not exist. Undoubtedly, creating them would be a long term, step by step process. When there are conditions lacking, other solutions, including a separation, may have to be considered.

Conditions for conflict resolution do not seem to exist presently in Cyprus. Nonetheless, there are some relevant examples from around the world where deadlock was broken, including the unification of South Africa and even European integration. These cases demonstrate several important lessons:

- the value of a grand gesture to transform attitudes
- the importance of a concession from the majority, but also from the other side
- the need for each side to think not just of its own interests and needs but also of the interests and needs of the other side
- unless each side sees gains, an acceptable solution is unlikely to be found.

In Cyprus, the issues of EU membership and of Greece-Turkey relations may contribute to breaking the impasse. There may be room for a watershed gesture (action) in this context.

### **Comment and Discussion**

Reservations were expressed about the confederal proposal suggested by Ergün Olgun. Many agreed with Ronald Watts' caution against the tyranny of terminology. On the one hand, bi-communal societies have perennial problems in reconciling differences. On the other hand, the bedrock of trust for sustaining a federal arrangement is non-existent. For both parties a confederal or a federal state is the second best solution. In reality, the number one solution for the Greek Cypriots is a unitary state. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots desire an independent sovereign state. The European Commission worries that a confederation would actually enable the Turkish Cypriots to develop an ultimately independent state.

Two independent states may be the least worst solution for Cyprus. For this to happen, the Turkish Cypriot side has to be much more willing to make territorial concessions. Although it is not "politically correct" for the Greek Cypriots to say so, they would be willing to have a separate state if concessions are given.

A point was raised that the focus on state-based activities may be misdirected. Understanding on the island could perhaps be reached through people-to-people contacts outside of the formal political framework. Common grass-roots interests could thus be developed across the divide. Two key problems were outlined regarding this scenario:

1. Inter-personal links, including marriages and business partnerships, are quite rare for historical and institutional reasons (for instance, the Orthodox Church does not allow inter-marriages between its members and Muslims).

2. The Greek Cypriot side prevents people-to-people interaction through a comprehensive embargo of the TRNC and the policy of "recognition by implication." The embargo is so wide-ranging that "the Turkish Cypriots can not even sell fish to their counterparts in the South." The ban on contacts, formal or informal, with the TRNC and its citizens seeks to avoid recognition of an illegal state. This policy touches all aspects of Turkish Cypriot life including sports, cultural activities and academic research. For instance, the Greek lobby in the U.S. mounted pressure against the involvement of a Professor from the Central Connecticut University in a conference held by the East Mediterranean University (EMU) in the TRNC.<sup>3</sup> In a similar vein, an Internet message was sent out discouraging scholars to attend an EMU archaeological conference on the basis that it is sponsored by an illegal entity.

In order to build inter-personal relationships, distrust and fear will have to be eliminated. **The situation on the island begs the question – how to identify benefits for Greek Cypriots from any change in their current approach?** What are the incentives for the Greek Cypriots to build trust, to allow exchange, to give concessions, in other words, to move beyond the current stand-off?

It was argued that the questions of incentives does not take stock of historical facts. Creating incentives for the Greek Cypriots would amount to the "robbed person asking the thief how much would she want in exchange for her loot." Moreover, identifying incentives for the Greek Cypriots may be increasingly difficult within the EU context. **Unilateral admission of Southern Cyprus into the EU would likely wipe out any incentives there are to find a resolution with the North.** The fact that such a move could preclude economic ties with Turkey does not seem to be a sufficient motivator for the Greek Cypriot side.

It was noted that the incentives may rest with civil society. Just like Canadians in British Columbia who wish to resolve their relationship (including territorial) with the Indigenous Peoples, Greek Cypriots surely would prefer to live free of the stigma related to their relationship with the Turkish Cypriots. In this context, civil society may be a tool in pushing for a resolution.

Others doubted the viability of this course: for a civil society to function properly, democracy is required. The Greek Cypriot understanding of "Cyprus" is inherently undemocratic: the Greek Cypriot leadership claims sovereignty over the entire island without the sanction of the Turkish Cypriot side, the TRNC has been subjected to embargoes which effectively prevent the North from development. How can the UN (and the international community) tolerate such an abrogation of democracy by their own member? Democracy is one of the criteria for EU membership. It is difficult to understand how the EU can accept the Greek Cypriot side as the sole representative of the island without violating its own democratic principles. Civil society can be used as a tool to undermine resolution, rather than promote it,

---

<sup>3</sup> On this incident, see an article by Christopher Vasilopoulos in *Turkish Daily News* (March 3, 2001).

some suggested that this is precisely what is happening in Cyprus today.

## COMMON FUNCTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

### The Economics of Living Together or Side by Side in Cyprus?

Ozay Mehmet (Carleton University and Eastern Mediterranean University) said the cost of settlement is perhaps too high for both parties today. Factors contributing to this situation include demographic and political changes. North Cyprus has experienced a remarkable population growth due to a relatively high birth rate and a pull-effect of the labour market. The latter causes the inflow of workers from southern Turkey, who now amount to about 18.4% of the population.

While the South has achieved rapid economic growth, the North has grown at a slower rate. The agricultural sector in the North is twice as large as in the South, while the secondary and tertiary sectors are comparable. Tourism and off-shore banking are especially active in the South. The government sector in the North is considerably more top-heavy than in the South.

The embargos make Northern Cyprus financially dependent on Turkey. Unwittingly, this fiscal dependency is pushing the integration of the TRNC with the mainland. Turkey is the biggest source of imports for the TRNC. Deficits are covered by fiscal transfers, also from Turkey. There has been growth in illegal trade between North and South Cyprus in the recent past. Official and quasi-legal trade is small. Illegal trade exacts heavy penalties. Financial flows between the two parts are quite small and are intermediated through three banks. They also include illegal payments from smuggling and illegal money laundering.

The EU could be a relevant model for Cyprus when it is ready to formalise economic power-sharing arrangements. The approach will have to be gradual and conditions accepted by both sides. There would likely be 4 distinct stages:

1. Confidence building - in this stage the quasi-legal economic relations would be formalised.
2. Living side by side
3. Stability - during this stage efforts to achieve economic harmonisation between the two parts would be initiated. Here, the Cypriots could learn much from Canada's experience with fiscal federalism. Crucial and controversial questions will have to be addressed at this stage including who is going to pay and how. There is a considerable gap in incomes between the South and the North, making income-equalisation efforts challenging.
4. Economic union

Ozay Mehmet raised the possibility of promoting reconciliation through common water management projects. Both sides face a critical water shortage. **Irrigation technologies in the East Mediterranean may be an area for North-South coordination, especially when it comes to importing fresh water from Turkey.** With good will and help from countries like

Canada there may be space for cooperation.<sup>4</sup> "Even enemies need water," he concluded.

### Comments and Discussion

It was pointed out that equalisation of incomes is not the goal of fiscal federalism in Canada. Equalisation schemes in Canada are aimed at "equalising public finances" among provinces so that they can offer comparable services. Confederations make equalisation efforts very difficult because approval depends on the unanimous support of the constituent units. Moreover, it was noted, that equalisation payments characterise federations because they presuppose the existence of a political nation (community). The same reasoning goes for economic integration. It is difficult to envisage two institutionally and politically separate communities which are economically integrated. (The economic unification of the European Union does not occur in a vacuum either. It is accompanied by extensive political and institutional adjustments on the national and supranational levels.) Others said that equal opportunity is more important for the Turkish Cypriots than equal income. Lifting the embargo and integration with the rest of the world would likely benefit the North to such a degree that equalisation of payments would not be required.

A water crisis can present real challenges, but it can also present opportunities. While a possibility of a gain is motivating, it is the possibility of a loss that drives people. In this context, water presents the ideal opportunity for cooperation because both parties are bound to lose if they do not address the water-shortage. The case of Canada-U.S. cooperation on water issues could be instructive here. The cooperation of technicians and scientists from both sides of the conflict may eventually lead to trust building.

Scepticism was expressed about joint water projects for two main reasons:

1. **The Greek Cypriots have nothing to lose by not cooperating with the Turkish Cypriots on water.** The Greek Cypriots have no interest in importing water from Turkey because they do not wish to develop a water dependency. Moreover, they have enough resources to build desalination plants (in fact they are already using this method).
2. Water can not play a role in the reconciliation process precisely because it is so essential. Each side fears that interdependence would be used against them. In this context, the Turkish Cypriots opposed an island-wide water study for fear that information in the hands of the Greek Cypriots could be misused.

There is an important role for research in conflict resolution. **Universities in the region could mobilise the exchange of unbiased expertise and promote research opportunities across borders on issues related to human growth and development.** Barriers could be slowly broken down by these "stateless" activities. Canada and others could help by funding conferences, exchange programmes, and collaborative research. Possible areas to explore include: a study of themes for the proximity talks, a hydrological study, etc. A dynamic already

---

<sup>4</sup> Canadian assistance includes, for instance, an IDRC funded EMU Third Regional Conference on Water.

exists at the EMU conducive to this approach. With its network of universities, Northern Cyprus has a real potential to lead in this field.

## THE IMPACTS OF EMBARGOES

### Embargoes Facing Turkish Cypriot Businesses

Özdil Nami (Erdil and Sons Ltd.) said that since 1963, the Turkish Cypriots have not had a normal economic life. The embargo did not begin in 1973, but as soon as the inter-communal violence began in 1963. The embargo spans all aspects of life including art, music, sports and education. Any interaction is seen as an indirect recognition of TRNC. The goal of the embargo is to make Turkish Cypriots accept the Greek regime in the South as the legitimate "government" of the island.

The embargo is one-sided: the Greek Cypriots can transact goods and services from the Turkish Cypriots but not *vice versa*. The Greek Cypriots do not accept Turkish Cypriot documents including: customs documents, health certificates, land registrations, bank guarantees and travelling documents. Ports have been declared as illegal and aircraft and boats are prevented from embarking. Professional associations, sports federations and NGOs are not recognised.

So far, the embargo has had no political impact. In economic terms, there have been several consequences:

- increased dependency of the Turkish Cypriots on Turkey for markets, capital and labour (an outcome that the Greek Cypriot side certainly did not want)
- lack of Foreign Direct Investment
- increased cost base
- brain drain

The social impacts of the embargo include:

- a growing animosity and distrust towards Greek Cypriots, the EU and the U.S.
- re-alignment with Turkey (people are exhausted from trying to deal with their southern neighbours).

In conclusion Özdil Nami said that the Turkish Cypriots are relatively weak and isolated. They wish to integrate with the world without endangering their sovereignty. Unfortunately, the EU factor has been wasted. EU membership was perceived by many as the only vision the parties in Cyprus and their motherlands share. Today, the prospect of sole Greek Cypriot accession is seen as one of the biggest obstacles to reconciliation. Nonetheless, businesses in the North are adapting to the environment by using new technologies. Soon, technological development may make embargoes obsolete. If the two sides of the island are allowed to compete under fair rules, interdependencies will form and cooperation will evolve.

## Comments and Discussion

The way Cyprus is functioning now amounts to a *de facto* secession. There are enormous obstacles to an integrated peaceful solution. Each side "suffers" and there is "too much history, too close to the surface." Both parties use the term "right" in their discourses (i.e., right to security, right to property) – a tendency which contributes to intractability. The proposals made today for reconciliation are identical to those made in 1974. Many of the same people are also involved. There seems to be no better alternative than the *status quo*, besides the preferred options (outlined in earlier remarks).

A catalyst is needed to move the stalemate. Possibilities include:

1. A change of regime in the North (left-wing parties are more amenable to resolution).
2. An increased economic burden on the TRNC (which would pressure Turkey to increase its commitments).
3. South Cyprus could enter the EU alone.
4. South Cyprus could decide to separate or "bolt." While this may sound improbable, one could recall the peaceful separation of former Czechoslovakia.
5. South Cyprus could recognise the TRNC.

There are two scenarios the Greek Cypriot side is pursuing:

1. Due to harsh economic conditions, the Turkish Cypriots will elect leaders who are more amenable to concessions.
2. The growing economic and financial burden Northern Cyprus imposes on Turkey will lead to a shift in the approach of Turkey towards the Greek Cypriot position (*vis a vis* EU membership, etc.)

## CULTURES AND IDENTITIES

### The Turkish Cypriot Identity

Altay Nevzat (Eastern Mediterranean University) said that with the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, toward the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, two main groups came to occupy the island: Orthodox Greeks and Muslim Turks. For close to four centuries these groups interacted relatively peacefully and cooperatively, but never integrated into a single people. Though religious identity was initially the main dividing line between the two groups, it was not the source of any major social friction.

By the 19<sup>th</sup> century the two communities began to develop competing national identities that failed to coexist with the same ease that their religious, cultural and linguistic identities had done in the past. Mass education during the British period served to strengthen the divergent and conflicting aspects of the two identities. The British allowed both sides to develop separate educational systems, with many teachers and textbooks brought in from Greece and Turkey.

The growth of two national identities in Cyprus was due to several factors including:  
-- the spread of nationalism to the Ottoman Empire

- the Greek War of Independence and the adoption of the Megali Idea (the dream of a Greater Greece)
- the growth of Turkish nationalism.

During the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries the Greeks and Turks on the island began to develop mutually exclusive nationalist sentiments and political aspirations. The Greeks identified with Greece and viewed the full Hellenization of Cyprus through ENOSIS (Union of Cyprus with Greece) as the only acceptable political outcome. Meanwhile, the Turks began to react by identifying first, with the Ottoman Empire and later, with the new Republic of Turkey. Initially, they began to call for the island to revert to Turkish rule once the British left. By 1950's they stood for the division of the island between Greece and Turkey.

**Neither side, then, saw itself as part of a common Cypriot nation with shared political aspirations and goals, but rather as integral parts of the Greek and Turkish nations respectively. This one highly relevant fact, the lack of any common national identity, still holds true to this day.**

Some argue that the establishment of the 1960 bi-communal partnership Republic could have been a positive turning point. The Constitution provided for each side to regulate its own cultural, educational and religious affairs, made Greek and Turkish both official languages, and provided legal mechanisms for preserving a virtual equality between the two sides. The overwhelming majority of Turkish Cypriots were satisfied with this compromise. However, for the Greek Cypriot leadership, under Archbishop Makarios, the 1960 Republic was never perceived in good faith. Instead, it was viewed as a "means to an end," a stepping stone for the achievement of ENOSIS and the final Hellenization of the island. The onslaught directed by the Greeks against the Turks from December 1963 onwards changed Turkish Cypriot identity. Any residual trust in the Greek Cypriot good faith disappeared and was replaced by the fear of the "other."

Thereafter, according to Altay Nevzat, the Turkish Cypriots were trying to preserve not so much their identity as their very existence on the island. The Turks were physically attacked, forced into enclaves and encouraged to leave the island. The situation became so grave that Turkish Cypriots would conduct conversation amongst themselves in subdued tones so that they would not be overheard and identified as Turks. The 1974 coup gave Turkey the opportunity to intervene and provided a secure environment for the Turkish Cypriots. Without it, the Turkish Cypriot identity would likely have disappeared.

Today, any attempt to construct a political and constitutional framework must take account of the needs of the Turkish Cypriots: the preservation of their identity and security. Repeating history, particularly the continuation of pre-1974 Greek Cypriot attitudes, must be avoided. Altay Nevzat said:

The experiences of the past show us that we cannot afford to disassociate the

protection and preservation of our identity as Turkish Cypriots from the political and constitutional structure of a settlement in Cyprus.

He disagreed with the proponents of a federal solution. Federation would not, as some argue, provide the Turkish Cypriots with sufficient safeguards. He was sceptical of Professor Eric Neisser's proposition that a federation can safeguard the rights of communities through individual rights provisions. (Neisser proposes that the success of the black community in the U.S. in defending its rights through federal courts may be instructive for Cyprus.) This proposition presupposes that 1) the federal judiciary is reliable and credible and 2) enforcement of judicial decisions is effective and fair. Both presuppositions are highly unrealistic at the present. **Therefore, the individual rights of the Turkish Cypriot people can be guaranteed within a confederation, where as Professor Elazar notes, "it is the task of the constituent polities to protect individual liberty."**

### Comments and Discussion

A participant drew attention to the *World Values Survey* conducted by a Yale University Professor Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues during the 1980's and early 1990's.<sup>5</sup> This comprehensive survey, conducted in reference to a representative sample of 43 countries, aimed at determining whether there had been a shift from so called modern values to post-modern values. Two major conclusions came out:

1. The findings demonstrated a trend, beginning during the late 1970's, in which attention shifted from material values to cultural values. The notion that governments should provide public goods shifted to the idea that governments should be engaged in addressing or redressing fundamental philosophical issues (such as guaranteeing rights or resolving issues pertaining to cultural identities). Issues pertaining to economic distribution are divisive but are relatively amendable to compromise. On the other hand, issues pertaining to rights and culture are perceived as questions of good *versus* evil, on which compromise is hard to achieve.
2. Another trend identified by Inglehart was a shift from overwhelming trust in government to overwhelming distrust and cynicism across most societies. A trend of contempt and disdain for government had emerged, accompanied by a perception that politicians are generally self-interested and corrupt. Despite this finding, the historical record suggests, that government corruption has not increased in the last generation. On the contrary, it has likely diminished. There are two possible reasons for this contradiction: first, the public is evaluating their leaders and institutions by more demanding standards than in the past. (However, it is not clear that this is the case for all societies.) Second, the cultural issues governments are asked to address may contribute to the low confidence

---

<sup>5</sup>See: <http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/>

levels. Cultural issues are not only less amendable to compromise, they are not necessarily amendable to solution. The means by which they were resolved in the past, such as elite accommodation, have been discredited and rejected today.

**Federalism, as a tool of change, has been used most effectively in Canada, and likely elsewhere, when the public perceives that it is an active participant. Accordingly, one must not just search for institutional accommodation (i.e., federation versus confederation) but rather for a popular or participatory framework.** "A constitution is not worth the paper it is written on unless it involves a will to make it work. The will can be generated by popular participation."

There has been a proliferation of literature in the last decade on the shape of the world to come. According to Samuel Huntington, it will not be defined by economic issues, but by cultural identities. Authors disagree to which degree the world has become culturally homogenous - we were also treated to Benjamin Barber's thesis in mid-1990's which posits that the world is and will be divided roughly into two forces: Jihad versus McWorld. Many miss Barber's central point which is that the cultural war can be avoided by ensuring citizen participation.

Drawing on Barber's point, it was suggested that **difficult cultural issues and citizen disengagement may be redressed by creating models that invite citizen participation or that empower people.** As Peter Jay pointed out in his book the *Wealth of Man*, all economic change has been managed by governments. **Cultural change or accommodation must likewise be so managed through a certain citizen democracy.** It would seem that the chances of developing such a participatory framework in Cyprus are quite low, especially given the Greek Cypriot unilateral approach. International pressure and support are required for any model to work. This begs the question - what has the international contribution to reconciliation on the island really amounted to?

One participant suggested that it is impossible to separate political, social, economic and other aspects of one's identity. Identity should be perceived in a more integrated way instead. She also pointed out that the overwhelming pessimism around the table is misplaced. By the virtue of being here - exchanging and articulating views and possible solutions, we are *de facto* "negotiating." "We are here because we agree that conflicts can be resolved."

The value of polling was noted. Mapping out what communities are really made of could expose a large middle ground amendable to negotiation that does not deny history. This would be especially valuable because the media only notes the extremes. Common symbols, such as geography, do exist. Work of artists, creators, volunteers and academics that overcomes the identity boundary deserves support.

It was pointed out that not one person in Cyprus is prepared to die for the Cypriot flag. The reality is that there are two distinct peoples living on the island. Imposing solutions from the

outside will not work. The infusion of Turkish settlers to Northern Cyprus alters the identity of Northern Cypriots and makes the situation even more difficult. The new settlers tend to vote for more nationalistic parties and push for better ties with Turkey. The situation of Cyprus is especially complex because of exogenous factors including external strategic interests in oil, EU interests, the interests of the U.S. and the British, and so on. **It is clear that these interests would be served best by a settlement. However, an endogenous need for mutual cooperation between the two sides does not exist.** In this context, it was argued, the Cyprus "problem" is constituted externally (internationally) rather than internally.

## REFLECTIONS AND CLOSING

In the closing session three themes dominated the discussion including the role of the EU, what is necessary internally and externally for change, and what the role for Canada might be.

### Role of the EU

EU members will be asked to ratify accession of new candidates. It is unlikely that countries like Germany, Holland, Italy and France would support a move which would effectively locate the Cyprus problem in their backyard. Instead, they would prefer a solution prior to accession. Moreover, EU members are aware that there is a security risk involved with isolating Turkey. The prediction that Turkish Cypriots will succumb to economic pressure and will become more accommodating is suspect. It underestimates the viability of the Turkish Cypriot resistance at the expense of long-term security of the region. It is likely that when the crunch comes some EU members (Parliaments) will oppose accession without prior resolution.

A point was also made that Greece may block the accession of Eastern European candidates (strongly desired by Germany), if resolution prior to accession is required. This may work in the Greek Cypriots' favour.

The signals coming from the EU are ambiguous. The Greek Cypriots seem to believe that a resolution is not required prior to accession, while Ankara seems to think the contrary.

Leaving the North out would enhance the possibility that the island remains split. Moreover, this scenario has serious consequences not only for northern Cyprus, but for regional stability:

- The Turkish Cypriots would have to develop a strategy whereby staying outside of the EU would be beneficial to them (like Monaco, for instance).
- It is difficult to predict how Turkey would react. Despite the fact that Ankara refrained from projecting its power in the region since the intervention of 1974, a threat of possible war should not be dismissed.

Some suggested that any threat by Turkey would not motivate Canadian assistance and would trouble UN members. Others said that the threat posed by isolating Turkey (Turkish Cypriots) needs to be addressed. The possibility of war between Greece and Turkey should not

be entirely ignored. Conditions in Turkey may be amendable to military intervention, while a psychology of despair prevails in northern Cyprus.

The EU is clearly biased toward the Greek Cypriot side, by the virtue of Greek membership (in the EU). However, there may be derogations which could provide the Turkish Cypriots with safeguards (against the richer Greek Cypriots sweeping the three freedoms) and ensure that the TRNC is not further isolated in case the EU accepts only the Greek Cypriot side as a member.

### **What is necessary (internally and externally) for change**

- Due regard must be accorded to vital interests of both sides. Otherwise, there is a danger of "balkanisation" in the region.
- Hostile activities must stop in order for the two sides to cooperate. You can not claim you are pursuing peaceful negotiations and militarise at the same time. Similarly, you can not speak of partnership while you impose embargoes and act unilaterally.
- Addressing the constitutional agenda while pursuing confidence building may be a mistake as long as the two sides live in isolation.
- There is a need for a transforming gesture (moment). The prospects for this gesture seem to be pinned on EU membership.
- A better understanding of the Turkish Cypriot position is needed within the EU and around the world. Scholars from EU countries and Turkey could be brought together to address the role of the EU in Cyprus.
- An island-wide census could be conducted, involving scholars from both sides, to reveal and understand better civil society attitudes. Through the census, people who are amendable to negotiation or feel abandoned could be identified and empowered to rise above the ethnically predetermined positions and to make a difference.

### **Role of Canada and Recommendations**

Among the main reasons why Canada continues to be involved in Cyprus are:

- 29 years of peacekeeping duties, during which 27 Canadians died
- common membership in the Commonwealth
- common institutional traditions, such as the parliamentary and the legal systems.

Canada's experience with federalism may be instructive for the Cypriots. Moreover, the fact that Canada does not have vested interests in the Cyprus solution, to the same degree as the EU, the U.S., Greece or Turkey, may also be useful.

Canadian foreign policy toward Cyprus is largely determined by membership in the UN. While UN resolutions regarding Cyprus are a reality the UN members have to live with, there are ways of creating new realities. This has not been easy on the diplomatic level. However, research may well develop a basis for a shift.

Canada could play an important role in Cyprus for two main reasons. First, Canada's

interests differ from those of the U.S., in that they are more outward-looking and humanistic. Second, enhancing relations with Canada would diversify Cyprus' international relations.

Specific recommendations for Canadian engagement include:

- Canadian (funding) agencies, including the CCFPD and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, could promote joint Canadian-Cypriot (both Greek and Turkish) activities:
  - sponsor university students and faculty exchange programmes
  - provide grants to research teams
  - sponsor roundtables with citizen engagement.

Priority areas for research include: federalism studies, water resources cooperation, culture studies, civil society organisations, the role of EU in the Cyprus settlement.

- Canada could use several foreign policy levers, including quiet diplomacy at the multilateral and bilateral levels, to achieve the resumption of UN-sponsored negotiations (which are now suspended).
- Political initiatives would require an enhanced Canada-TRNC relationship and consultation. They could include:
  - work on terminology for the upcoming UN Resolution
  - attempts to influence EU members (in particular the U.K. and France bilaterally) to enhance their relations with the TRNC.
- Canada could help breaking the "isolation pressure" applied by the Greek Cypriots and the EU. Helping to organise co-operative nonpolitical events, including art exhibitions or sport activities, would be useful and may not be perceived as too controversial.
- Canada could become involved in Northern Cyprus through the Canada Council, for instance, which helps developing countries preserve their culture. Protecting the Northern Cypriot heritage through UNESCO could also open space for Canadian engagement.

## List of Participants

March 28-30, 2001

Banff, Alberta

### **Tareq Ismael**

Professor  
Department of Political Science  
University of Calgary

### **Ronald Keith**

Professor and Head of Political Science  
University of Calgary

### **M. Ergun Olgun**

Undersecretary to Rauf Denktash

### **Altay Nevzat**

Lecturer in International Relations  
Eastern Mediterranean University

### **Özdil Nami**

Director  
Erdil and Sons Ltd. (North Cyprus)

### **Ozay Mehmet**

Professor of International Affairs  
Carleton University  
Visiting Professor of Economics  
Eastern Mediterranean University

### **Jaqueline Ismael**

Professor of Social Work  
University of Calgary

### **Tozun Bahcheli**

Professor  
University of Western Ontario

### **Ron Watts**

Professor  
Institute of Intergovernmental Studies  
Queen's University

### **Robert Young**

Professor  
School of Policy Studies  
Queen's University

### **Patrick Smith**

Professor  
Simon Fraser University

### **Robert Anderson**

Professor  
Simon Fraser University

### **Andrew Johnson**

Dean of Social Sciences  
Bishop's University

### **Owen Saunders**

Canadian Institute of Resources Law  
University of Calgary

### **Sujit Choudhry**

Professor  
University of Toronto

### **Les MacDonald**

Assistant Director  
Research and Dissemination Grants Program  
Social Sciences and Humanities Research  
Council

### **Kate White**

Conflict Mediation Specialist

### **Brian Grover**

Consultant  
Water Can Board Member

**Robert Hage**  
Director  
Southern Europe Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs and  
International Trade

**Steven Lee**  
Executive Director  
Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy  
Development (CCFPD)

**Marketa Geisler**  
Rapporteur  
CCFPD

**Julie Rechel**  
Events Organizer  
CCFPD

## **REPORT FROM THE ROUNDTABLE - LIVING TOGETHER: SHARING THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (Larnaca, Cyprus - June 15-17, 2001)**

*On June 15-17, 2001, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD) brought together a group of experts to explore the Canadian experience with "Living Together" and possible applications of this experience to problems in Cyprus. The roundtable was a follow-up to work undertaken by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) on Cyprus in the late 1980's and an earlier CCFPD Roundtable "Cyprus Living Together in the New Century" (February, 2001). Participants included: Costas Melakopides (University of Cyprus), Yiannis Laouris (Cyber Kids), Kypros Chrysostomides (legal expert), Eleni Mavrou (AKEL), Ronald Watts (Queen's University), Kate White (Black & White Communications), and Robert Hage (DFAIT). Franco Pillarella (Canada's High Commissioner for Cyprus), Jean-Marc Duval (Canada's Ambassador to Turkey) and David Hutton (Canada's Ambassador to Greece) attended the roundtable as observers. Steven Lee (The Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development) chaired the meeting.*

*A previous roundtable, which took place on March 28-30, 2001 (Banff, Alberta, Canada), engaged Canadian experts and Turkish Cypriots.*

### **FRAMING THE DISCUSSION**

Three speakers outlined the framework for the discussion. First, Steven Lee (Chair) explained the roots of CCFPD's work on Cyprus and offered a brief overview of those elements of the "Canadian experience" which may be relevant to Cyprus. Second, Costas Melakopides (University of Cyprus) sketched the international framework for solution of the Cyprus problem. The last speaker, Eleni Mavrou (AKEL, M.P., Nicosia) highlighted the external causes of the conflict and elaborated on the benefits of the rapprochement movement between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

**Steven Lee** (Chair) said that the Larnaca Roundtable stems from two parallel tracks. The first reflects the long-term Canadian interest and commitment to Cyprus, including 30 years of peacekeeping, and the past work of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS). (CIIPS 1990) Last year, the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD) hosted a roundtable *Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century* (February 2001), marking the 10<sup>th</sup> year anniversary of the CIIPS work. That roundtable brought together experts, academics, members of the Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot, Turkish and Greek communities living in Canada, M.P.s, and government officials. Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy also attended. Many participants appreciated the value of sharing the "Canadian experience" and called for follow-up activities (CCFPD 2001). Responding to these calls, the CCFPD organised a roundtable in Banff (March 28-30, 2001), with Turkish Cypriots and in Larnaka (June 15-17, 2001) with Greek Cypriots.

The second track flows from CCFPD's work on federalism. In October 1996, the CCFPD

organised a two part discussion on the international aspects of federal systems. The results included a widely published paper by Will Kymlicka and Jean-Robert Raviot (Kymlicka and Raviot 1997), impetus for the creation of the Forum of Federations and the 1999 Mont Tremblant International Federalism Conference.

The Larnaka Roundtable offers an opportunity to bring the two tracks together. The Roundtable has three key goals:

1. To share knowledge and insights.
2. To see whether the Canadian experience, including federalism, could be valuable.
3. To explore elements of living together at a moment when many countries are attempting to accommodate diversity.

Steve Lee drew attention to three themes that define the Canadian experience:

**1. History and historiography.** He reminded participants that Canadian history is marked by conquest, occupation, fear of another country, deep connection to the mother country and fear of minorities. Two dominant narratives, in conflict with each other, have developed in Canada: "Brittanic" and "Catastrophic." While the former perceives Canada as an extension of British civilisation, the later interprets history as a struggle for survival against English culture, beginning with the fall of New France to the British. These contradictory narratives have persisted in Canada until today.

**2. Federalism.** Federalism in Canada is seen as a tool, not a solution, for living together. It serves two main purposes: accommodation of national groups and managing decentralisation of governance. Elements of Canadian federalism include: concession, self-governance, moderation (through isolation of extremes), participation (of minorities) and multiple identities. A sense has developed in Canada that majorities have an obligation to listen, understand and concede to the minorities (to recognise minority claims as reasonable). Today, we can see this in a broad willingness to address the grievances and concerns of Aboriginal Peoples (who account for about 1% of the population).

**3. Symbols and identity.** Manifested by shifts in loyalty or in approaches to the minority-majority relationship, Canada has consciously and continually altered its identity over time. This was achieved through various instruments including: political discourse, changes in institutions and symbols (i.e., flags, street names, etc.) and other responses to identity adaptation.

The Chair then outlined the basic rules of discussion and reporting.

**Costas Melakopides** (Host, University of Cyprus) suggested that the solution to the Cyprus problem lies within the framework outlined by the international community, which according to him, "speaks with all but one voice." He drew attention to three points on which there is international agreement:

1. **"The Cyprus Question is a classic case of clear violation of International Law and International Morality"** – based on the interpretation of 50 relevant United Nations resolutions; decisions of the European Court of Human Rights; declarations, warnings, requests and decisions of the European Union; and the work of independent specialists, analysts and scholars.
2. These repeated, consistent, independent and official decisions and pronouncements must be respected because they offer the criteria for answering the question of what is to be done.
3. **The judgements and decisions mentioned above call for a bizonal, bi-communal federation, with a single sovereignty.** Moreover, many of them encourage the accession of such a federation into the European Union (EU). According to Costas Melakopides, EU accession would provide the best of all possible worlds to all Cypriots (i.e., security, material well-being, psychological support, respect for human rights and freedoms).

**Eleni Mavrou** (AKEL, M.P., Nicosia) attributed the current situation in Cyprus to a violation of international law by Turkey rather than a confrontation between the two ethnic communities. She drew attention to Security Council Resolutions which offer a federal solution and to two High Level Agreements (1977 and 1979) between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities which adopted the Security Council framework. According to Eleni Mavrou, a federation would ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots are respected and safeguarded along with political equality of the two communities. Despite the ready made solution, the long deadlock has led to the consolidation of the *fait accomplis* and have brought a potential partition nearer.

**She encouraged exerting pressure on Ankara to achieve compliance with the UN Resolutions and the High Level Agreements. "Injustice and the violation of International Law cannot constitute a firm foundation on which to build a viable solution..."** She expressed her conviction that the accession of Cyprus into the EU and (re)orientation of Turkey toward Europe could help create a just and mutually accepted solution. She asked whether Cyprus should be left hostage to Turkey and challenged the EU to push through on its policy declarations.

She drew attention to the difficult living conditions of the Turkish Cypriots, including high unemployment, which contribute to emigration and resettlement by settlers from continental Turkey. **According to Eleni Mavrou, the biggest problem is the gradual integration of the Turkish Cypriot community by Turkey, which finds expression in the economic, political and social spheres.** Despite these trends, there are still forces in the Turkish Cypriot community who "insist on a federal solution – rejecting confederation, fight against the policy of integration of the occupied areas by Turkey, and wish for the reunion of Cyprus..."

**Rapprochement, as opposed to nationalism, contributes to unification.** AKEL – the

political party which Eleni Mavrou represents, has played a key role in establishing the rapprochement movement through meetings with Turkish Cypriot political parties and organisations, exchanges of cultural groups in mass events, seminars, publications and other initiatives. These contacts strengthen the feelings of unity and reverse pro-separatist tendencies.

She said:

It is imperative that both communities are convinced that the solution we are searching for is a solution for the whole of Cyprus and for all Cypriots; that as much as we are both defending our national identity, our language and traditions, we should defend even stronger our common identity as Cypriots, our common traditions and common history.

The years between 1990 and 1997 saw a rapid growth of the rapprochement movement. At the end of 1997, Mr. Denktash imposed procedures for bi-communal contacts which effectively resulted in their termination for some time. Despite these difficulties, the rapprochement continues. AKEL struggled for rapprochement to become a part of government policy and to be adopted by the political leadership and the majority of the people.

## **GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES**

### **Sharing the Canadian Experience of Living Together**

**Ronald Watts** (Queen's University) focussed on federalism as a tool for living together, attempting to reconcile linguistic duality as well as geographical and regional differences. He emphasised that by living together he means not integration or absorption but living side by side as distinct groups to achieve common goals. He focussed on 5 basic lessons of living together from the Canadian experience and the experience of other federations and confederations:

1. the value and limits of experiences of other countries
2. the danger of oversimplifying - perceiving federations and confederations as two different alternatives
3. special problems of bi-communal situations
4. the importance of a supportive civil society and political culture underpinning formal structures
5. other relevant experiences with processes to break deadlock and impasses.

There is value in the experiences of other countries with federal and confederal systems for three main reasons:

1. to draw attention to possibilities
2. to point to unintended consequences from certain institutional arrangements
3. to provide positive and negative lessons - no example is useless

There are also important limitations:

- no pure models of federation or confederation exist or are applicable everywhere - there is

a need to adapt to local conditions

- applications operate differently in different conditions
- models can not be picked off the shelf.

The value of the Canadian experience includes two centuries of trying to reconcile different and distinct communities. Canadians have considered and tried various approaches (unitary, centralised and decentralised federation) and debated over federation *versus* confederation. **The value of our experience stems less from precise structures employed and contemplated, than from processes we have developed over time to reflect the need for tolerance, compromise and adjustment. Key issues have not been resolved once and for all, yet we continue trying. "Federalism in Canada is not a fixed ideal, but a process of evolution and change."**

The second point - danger of oversimplification - is particularly pertinent for Cyprus. **We must be wary of the "tyranny of terminology" or "lunacy over labels."** Terminology and labels detested by each side should be avoided. **As the debate over federation *versus* confederation in Cyprus and elsewhere demonstrates, use of terms that effectively reduce an issue to "either-or" prevents resolution.** Resolution is possible only when practical arrangements are addressed.

*Both*, federation and confederation combine shared-rule for common purposes with self-rule of component units for other purposes. The essential difference lies in the character of institutions for common purposes: in federations institutions are citizen-based, in confederations common institutions are based on the constituent governments. There are enormous variations within each category of which Ronald Watts cited numerous examples. In some cases, federations may be more decentralised than confederations or contain some confederal elements. There also exist many hybrids. For instance, the constitutional structures in 1867 Canada combined both, federal and some unitary elements. Other combinations include, for instance: confederal and federal elements (EU governing structures) or confederal and unitary elements (the original U.S. federal constitution). There are currently few examples of successful "pure" confederations in practice, he said.

Canada has considerable experience in addressing constitutional issues in the context of a bi-communal situation. Lessons can be learned from the 1840-1867 Act of Union, from the rejection of a two-unit federation in 1867, and more recently from the mega-constitutional debates 1960-2000 (which included discussion of concepts such as *status quo* federalism, renewed federalism and sovereignty-association or partnership). Like the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, French Quebecers in Canada account for about 24% of the total population. Canada has, however, important features which distinguish it from Cyprus including 10 provinces rather than 2 units, a multicultural element and a growing voice of Aboriginal Peoples. Federation with some confederal features is likely to evolve in Canada, rather than a sovereignty-association.

There are no existing two-unit confederations. Literature suggests that all two-unit federations are or have been troubled and relatively unstable. Some of the reasons include:

- insistence on unanimity in all matters has usually tended to produce impasses and deadlocks
- there is no opportunity for shifting alliances and coalitions that enable multi-unit federations to resolve stand-offs
- challenges are often reduced to a zero-sum game (every issue is seen in terms of a winner and a loser)

**A possible solution is to convert two unit entities into multi-unit federations. Where not possible, federalism could be combined with confederal elements (i.e., unanimity on some agreed fundamental matters). Canada has implemented both solutions in the past.**

Ronald Watts drew attention to the importance of supportive civil societies. He said that creating federal or confederal structures is not a panacea. **The experience of Canada and other federations and confederations indicates that even more important than their formal structures has been public acceptance of basic values and processes required for their operation.** Multiple identities within an overarching sense of shared purposes and objectives have to be explicitly recognised and accommodated. Essential for Canada and others has been the acceptance of diversity, tolerance, compromise and a sense of trust. The question is how to achieve these conditions when they do not exist. Undoubtedly, creating them would be a long term, step by step process. When conditions lack, other solutions, including a separation, may have to be considered.

Conditions for conflict resolution do not seem to exist presently in Cyprus. Nonetheless, there are some relevant examples from around the world where deadlock was broken, including the unification of South Africa and even European integration. These cases demonstrate several important lessons:

- the value of a grand gesture to transform attitudes
- the importance of a concession from the majority, but also from the other side
- the need for each side to think not just of its own interests and needs but also of the interests and needs of the other side
- unless each side sees gains, an acceptable solution is unlikely to be found.

In Cyprus, the issues of EU membership and of Greece-Turkey relations may contribute to breaking the impasse. There may be room for a watershed gesture (action) in this context.

### **Federation or Confederation?**

**Toumazos Tselepis** (Committee of the National Council) expressed his strong support for a federal solution. He suggested that a federation is a mean between centripetal and centrifugal forces because it averts partition, on the one hand, and offers each community broad autonomy, on the other. Moreover, according to Toumazos Tselepis, a federation would:

- respect both, the communities as well as human rights and fundamental freedoms,
- contribute to a harmonious coexistence of the two communities,
- contribute to normalisations of Greek-Turkish relations,

- strengthen peace in the region.

He said that a partition would lead to revisionism, would be anachronistic in the context of globalization, and may set a dangerous precedent. The federal solution was agreed on in 1977 and has since been supported by numerous UN Security Council resolutions. Despite this, the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish side have turned toward confederation in August 1998. He argued that the international community did not deal decisively enough with this turn and drew attention to statements made by the UN Secretary General, as well as European and American officials, that the Cyprus problem has become overlain with legalistic abstractions and artificial labels that pose barriers to addressing the real issues. Nevertheless, he expressed his view that a confederation is "not even a state," and is tantamount to a partition. Therefore, a federation is the only viable solution.

He gave the example of Switzerland, where the label "confederation" does not correspond to the content. Due to historical reasons, Switzerland continues to be labelled as a confederation, while, in fact, it is a classic type of a federation. According to Toumasoz Tselepis, Mr. Denktash isolates the Swiss labels of confederation and sovereignty of the cantons from their real content and wishes to use them to achieve a separate state.

He drew attention to the UN-led proximity talks and said that proposals submitted by Mr. Denktash were rejected by the former Secretary General because they were too vague and did not correspond to the framework set out by previous UN resolutions. This attitude shifted and Mr. Denktash's proposals were admitted last year. Moreover, the tone of the current Secretary General has changed. During the fourth round of inter-communal talks in New York (September 2000), the framework set by previous UN resolution was effectively removed from the Secretary General's opening statements. In particular, he referred to the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots as two "politically equal parties." This raised questions about what the Secretary General meant by political equality and by using the term "parties," as opposed to communities – terminology used since 1960 until recently. (While a community does not have a right of self-determination, a party is a term used in international law to mean states.) Moreover, the Greek Cypriots were concerned that the opening statement constituted a recognition of the "pseudo-state." According to Toumasoz Tselepis, the Greek Cypriot concerns were not adequately addressed by the Security General. Nonetheless, during the fifth round of talks in Geneva (November 2000), a new statement was produced. While it did not fully restore the framework defined previously it came closer. As a result, Mr. Denktash withdrew from the talks and has been refusing to return.

In conclusion Toumasoz Tselepis said that altering the agreed basis for negotiations will not bring a solution closer. On the contrary, Mr. Denktash is encouraged that his objective is feasible. **He appealed to the international community to respect the framework which it itself set up, more specifically "to take a clear and straightforward position in favour of federation and reject confederation."** "The solution of the Cyprus problem will certainly arise through a mutually acceptable compromise, but there is no compromise in this issue, no half way."

## **Political Equality: a Tool or a Hindrance for a Bicomunal Cyprus Federation?**

**Kypros Chrysostomides** (Political Grouping for the Reconstruction of the Centre) examined the method of creating a potential federation in Cyprus. He said there do not exist two *pare jure* entities in Cyprus, vested with separate sovereignty, which would cede powers to a federal structure. He went on to say that there was no distinct regional separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots prior to 1974. The separation was brought about by an illegal foreign intervention, the displacement of almost 200 000 Greek Cypriots from the north, and the relocation of Turkish Cypriots from the south to the north. "There continues to be military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and a massive demographic change has taken place by the importation of settlers, nationals of the occupying power." Resettlement of the north constitutes a "war crime." Meanwhile the displacement of Greek Cypriots has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in recent decisions, declaring the right to return and the right of ownership of occupied private property as inalienable. The unilateral declaration of independence aimed at creating the TRNC is illegal and void according to the Security Council and termed by the ECHR as a "subordinate administration."

**He said that in an attempt to preserve "negative peace," the UN has adopted wording that is perhaps diplomatic, but in many respects hazy, contradictory and evasive.** He demonstrated this trend with the term "political equality," citing excerpts from UN Resolutions, speeches and non-papers by the Security General. He suggested that these inconsistencies occur in an attempt to appease the inflexible stance of the Turkish [Cypriot] side. Moreover, they lead to different interpretations by each side of what the solution entails. The Turkish Cypriot side has interpreted political equality to mean that the legal basis of the federation would be two federated sovereign states. The federation would be established by two politically equal constituent entities which would devolve some of their sovereignty to the federation. According to this view, the federation would be created through "aggregation." The Greek Cypriot side proposes that the federation is established by an internal constitutional reform or through "disaggregation."

A related question is whether the proposed federation would be a continuation of the Republic of Cyprus or a new state. The Turkish Cypriot position is that the federation should be a new state. Once again, UN statements are ambiguous on the issue. Kypros Chrysostomides suggested that creating a new state would affect:

- international relations and commitments,
- membership in international organisations,
- nationality issues, namely the position of settlers from Turkey and the possibility that they automatically acquire the nationality of the new state – a development "in no way acceptable to the Greek Cypriot side,"
- citizens residing abroad, who may be prevented from acquiring the citizenship of the new state.

Kypros Chrysostomides maintained that neither community in Cyprus has a separate right of self-determination. He cited Ronald Watts who wrote that constitutional provisions

prohibiting unilateral secession by member units of federations have seldom prevented alienated groups from taking matters into their own hands and act unconstitutionally. Kypros Chrysostomides suggested that the international community perceives the right of secession of federated states differently. While self-determination applies to the peoples of member states, it does not apply to minorities or communities within a member state. Moreover, the Badinter Commission states that the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence except where the states concerned agree otherwise.

He suggested that the statement by the Secretary General, intimating that the Cyprus problem has become overlain with legalistic abstractions and artificial labels that are removed from the actual needs of both communities, ignores some important questions:

Is it legalistic to expect that the presence of Turkish troops on the island should end and that the settlers can not stay? It is legalistic to expect that the State of Cyprus must maintain its continuity in international law only by being internally restructured into a federal one...? ... [I]s it legalistic to argue that the TRNC should not be granted sovereignty or recognition since it is only a product of aggression?

In a similar vein, the G-8 terminology, adopted by the Security Council Resolution 1250, that comprehensive negotiations should recommence with "no preconditions, all issues on the table," also calls for clarification, said Kypros Chrysostomides. Do the preconditions which ought to be abandoned include the Charter of the UN, the Resolutions of the Security Council, state practice and respect for human rights? Would the parties be allowed to put on the table issues that contravene basic rules of international law?

The aim is to establish a workable federation by devolution with:

- both, territorial and personal jurisdiction
- a fair balance between independence and interdependence of constituent governments
- shared federal institution
- exclusive but also concurrent federal powers
- the residual powers remaining with the federal government
- fair allocation of resources
- a co-operative and co-ordinating intergovernmental spirit
- democratic accountability
- least asymmetries
- an increased role for local governments
- the EU as an umbrella supra-federation
- no separate international personalities
- no right of secession
- the Constitution as the supreme law of the country
- federated Constitutions to derive their legally binding force only from the national Constitution
- the Supreme Constitutional Court as a guarantor of human rights and fundamental

freedoms.

**The international community can assist Cypriots with clear cut positions and by being fair – balancing principles with interests.**

### **Comment and Discussion**

Some participants expressed scepticism about the rapprochement movement outlined by Eleni Mavrou. The barriers to coexistence arose as a result of a military intervention rather than inter-communal strife. Therefore, they can only be dismantled within the political context (i.e., resorting to international law and restoring constitutional law). Before talks can begin, the occupation has to end. Others suggested that while rapprochement will not likely lead to resolution by itself, it is useful, even essential, for several reasons:

- Without rapprochement cooperation between the two sides would be difficult to envision after a political agreement has been made. Many young people, on both sides, know very little about each other.
- No political solution can be viable if it is not accepted by the society. Rapprochement could be seen as preparing civil society to accept an agreement made at the political level.
- At the present, suspicion, distrust and lack of information persist on each side. Rapprochement could diffuse tensions and make the two sides understand better each other (i.e., "catch up with history").
- It is beneficial to support moderate, progressive groups and parties in the TRNC.
- Rapprochement contradicts the propaganda of Mr. Denktash that Greek and Turkish Cypriots can not live together. Mass rallies, political meetings, and other gatherings demonstrate that the two groups can, in fact, live with each other.

Constitutional solutions were also addressed during the discussion. A suggestion was made that 3 key elements should be incorporated into any constitutional framework in Cyprus:

1. protection of human right (applies to the three freedoms)
2. a relatively strong central government, able to protect and enforce the constitutional framework
3. removal of Turkey as one of the guarantor states.

**A point was raised that Constitutional and other proposals submitted by the Greek Cypriot side may be based on assumptions that are entirely different from the assumptions made by the Turkish Cypriot side – making a common solution unlikely.** Moreover, if the assumptions made by the Greek Cypriots (regarding the negative role of Turkey and Mr. Denktash, the denial of rights for Turkish settlers, the return of Greek Cypriots to their former homes in the north, etc.) are wrong, then their prescriptions are wrong as well. Perhaps, some thought should be given to how the Turkish Cypriots might feel about these prescriptions and how they might react to them, especially if they are antagonised?

It was said that "to distinguish federation from confederation on the basis of a secession is wrong-headed." In Canada, no province has a unilateral right of secession. However, if a

referendum posing a clear question demonstrates the will of a province to separate, then secession must be negotiated. **It may prove exceedingly difficult to keep Turkish Cypriots in a marriage against their will.**

Three other points were made regarding the position of the Greek Cypriot side:

1. The parameters which exist now are unacceptable.
2. The current position of the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government put forward during the inter-communal talks makes the prospect of a solution very bleak.
3. Accession of Cyprus into the EU, whatever the result of the inter-communal talks, should be perceived as enhancing security.

## COMMON FUNCTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

### Sharing Water

**Jamil Al-Alawi** (World Water Council) compared the situation in Cyprus to that of his native Bahrain. He said that water shortages may provide an impetus for cooperation. Dividing up utilities, such as water desalination plants, is not economical. Moreover, importing water from Turkey is more expensive than building desalination plants. There is a space, therefore, to work together on sharing water resources on the island.

He expressed his opinion that the search of a solution in Cyprus is driven by the political leadership rather than the society and encouraged more public participation.

### The Role of Technologies in Bridging Divides

**Yannis Laouris** (Cyber Kids) said that it is not difficult to argue with the legal side of the Cyprus problem. A true injustice has been committed and the two parts of the island have been isolated from each other. Phone lines were disconnected and internet connections were slow to develop. He drew attention to the asymmetry of power between the two sides. While the Greek Cypriots seem to hold all the cards, they have lost the war. Rapprochement helps people create potential solutions outside of the political framework.

He suggested that many politicians neglect the role of psychological factors in the conflict. He related a story of a Greek Cypriot woman, who lost a house in northern Cyprus, coming face to face with the current Turkish Cypriot owners. Upon seeing her sorrow, the owners promised to return her house once an agreement was reached between the two sides. **He asked "how much power would the politicians have over the solution, if people were allowed to move freely around the island?"** Inter-communal meetings are important because they allow the two communities to:

- express their grievances (bring their feelings out in the open),
- listen to each other,
- appreciate each other better,
- help change deeply held positions.

Inter-communal workshops have an interactive management approach. The workshops first define an interactive vision of the future. In a brainstorming session the participants think about the benefits of a common future. This increases the willingness and desire for this goal. Second, obstacles preventing a common future are identified and ranked. Politicians would be wise to heed the results of these workshops, he said.

While the inter-communal talks, led by the UN, bring the leaders of the two communities together for a short while during the negotiation, they do not sustain the contact. After the negotiations are concluded, the leaders move away. Among the highest ranking obstacles identified by the participants of inter-communal workshops led by Yannis Laouris has been communication. **People should have the right to speak to each other any time they wish. Canada and other countries may be able to assist the Cypriots to meet each other on a sustained basis. Personal connections and friendships are much harder to break.**

Technology is an excellent tool in bridging the divide. The Internet is used to exchange and disseminate information about people on both sides engaged in inter-communal meetings. The result of meetings should be also widely publicised.

In conclusion, Yannis Laouris drew attention to the changing nature of governance due to technology and increasingly liberalised economic systems world wide. Civil society can be empowered through the use of technology to make decisions for itself. Governance is no longer the domain of isolated elites.

Cyberspace and Internet provide an efficient, fast, traceable, confidential, organised, time and space independent means of communication. As individuals and organizations throughout the world continue to have conflicts, the Internet can overcome the challenge posed by physical separation, whether due to geographic, political, or other reasons, by effectively moving discourse into cyberspace.

*Technology for Peace*

### Comment and Discussion

A point was made that water and technology could be used as both, a unifying and a dividing force. It is impossible to discuss these elements in a vacuum, disassociating them from the legal and the political framework. An opinion was expressed that it is unlikely that water or technology could achieve anything in and of themselves.

Others said that in order to use technology for rapprochement, there has to be a reason to communicate, which currently does not exist.

Still, a plea was made for disseminating the positive stories from the past, when Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived together. The need to show the young people, especially, that there is another story. Civil society in Cyprus requires encouragement and empowerment to be able to continue inter-communal contacts. Until very recently those who wished to reach out to the other side were labelled as traitors.

## CULTURES AND IDENTITIES

### The Relationship between National Identity and the State

**Margaret Moore** (University of Waterloo) said that since 1989, political theorists have attempted to move beyond standard human rights (individual rights to liberty), rule of law, and democratic rights, toward considering questions related to national identity and the relationship between cultural identity and the state. They have considered the aspirations of different cultural groups and the relationship between culture and identity to the political and institutional structure of the society.

It has become generally accepted that minorities face a number of disadvantages *vis-a-vis* the majority. For instance, minorities often face disadvantages in the reproduction of their culture and identity. Therefore, they are entitled to group-specific rights designed to ensure equal treatment. These rights are mainly designed to ensure three principles:

1. Collective security of these groups
2. An inclusive public character of the state
3. The state's responsibility to address legitimate insecurities expressed by minorities.

There are 3 types of groups in Canada which are typically thought to be entitled to group-specific rights:

- **Cultural groups.** A product of immigration, these groups are entitled to rights enabling them to overcome any disadvantages they may face in Canada and to rights that ensure inclusive public structures.
- **National minority groups** (i.e., territorially concentrated groups on their historic homeland, or at least the only territory they have).
- **Indigenous groups.**

These rights to collective self-government by national minorities are typically thought to have two bases:

1. **Normative**, which purports that aspirations of national minorities can not be ignored or denied in a liberal or democratic society, if the overwhelming majority of citizens feel that the national minorities (either wholly or practically) belong to a particular political community.
2. **Practical**, which follows from the idea that self-governing powers might be helpful to manage and accommodate cultural diversity within a state. Self-governing powers also give more expression to "nested forms" of identity. Canada is a good example. It is a bi-national or multi-national federal country, and although it has had constant constitutional frictions and difficulties, it has survived nearly 140 years. This means that although Canada is a home to a very young civilization (especially in comparison to the civilization here in Cyprus) it is, relatively speaking, quite an old country.

Margarete Moore concluded by talking about one of the main difficulties related to the

institutional recognition of self-government rights within a state – the character of the federal state. (The problem we have experienced tends not to be concerned with devolved powers or with decentralization – even if there are different first-preferences, like federation or confederation.) Minority national groups are aware of their minority status (i.e., of the lack of security that stems from being a minority) and have typically demanded some kind of political equality with national groups at the centre. This has been a demand of Quebec, which typically rejects the majoritarian vision of equal Canadian citizens or equal Canadian provinces and conceptualizes Canada as constituted from two founding peoples – French and English – and seeks constitutional recognition of this historiography. Perhaps, some version of these questions may arise in Cyprus – about what kind of institutional mechanisms at the centre can reflect the bi-cultural character of Cyprus in those aspects for which the federal government is responsible.

### **Symbols and the New Generation**

**Giorgos Kentas** (University of Cyprus) said that the Republic of Cyprus was created to maintain the balance of power among Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. The will of the people in Cyprus was ignored in the process. Therefore, one may understand the foundation of the Republic as an act of external powers rather than a result of self-determination. As a result [Greek Cypriot] “generations came to experience the consciousness of inequity.” This sense arose most importantly from the equal status accorded by the 1960 Constitution to the Greek and Turkish communities, despite large numerical differences in the population of each (80% of Greek Cypriots, 18% of Turkish Cypriots).

According to Giorgos Kentas, prior to 1960, the two communities lived together, accepting their religious, linguistic, and historical diversity. The educational systems and symbols of each community were different. The communities began to live separately when in December 1963, President Makarios proposed “13 points to make the Constitution more functional” and the Turkish government in Ankara rejected his proposal. He went on to say that “in July 1974, Turkey took the advantage of the coup d’etat against the President of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally invaded the country...” He repeated Costas Melakopides’ point that the Cyprus Question is a classic case of clear violation of “international law and international morality.” He reiterated points made by other speakers about the illegal status of the TRNC founded in 1983 and the need for Cyprus to become a part of the EU.

Turning to education, Giorgos Kentas said that “the primary role of education, not only in Cyprus but all over the civilised world, is to study correctly...the case of the Cyprus Problem...” He expressed his dismay at the continued separation of Cyprus in the context of growing European integration.

He insisted that the future of Cyprus is not in the hands of young people, instead politicians hold the key. He drew attention to the “bi-communal, bi-zonal federation” solution discussed in more detail by Toumazos Tselepis and Kypros Chrysostomides.

## Comment and Discussion

Several participants supported the idea of mediation efforts during the discussion. There are other elements that bring people together besides the rule of law. "Rule of law only gives us security." **Others supported the claim that the legalistic approach is not sufficient to resolve the Cyprus problem.** Education plays a large part in the negative way the two communities perceive each other. Teaching history in each community is especially instructive, with different historical events celebrated by each side, with very different interpretations. We should find ways to share common themes. Indeed, the presentation by Giorgos Kentas and comments of other young people around the table indicate how well they are versed solely in the discourse of the "Greek Cypriot side."

There are common links in Cyprus. One common cultural heritage stems from "being island dwellers," another from the food people eat. Sharing a rich, ancient history may also bring people together. There is a global culture emerging that may be unifying. For young people, swapping music on Napster may be a way to come together outside of the context of the bi-communal hostilities.

A point was made that in Cyprus, symbols are used for two main reasons: first, to strengthen one's identity and second, to be politically correct. **Both communities in Cyprus are insecure about their identities.** For example, just a few years ago, the Greek Cypriots stopped referring to Turkish coffee as Turkish, even though they have called it that for hundreds of years. Patriotism, through discourse and symbols, has also been a norm. Expressions and actions outside of the "politically correct" boundaries may be misunderstood as unpatriotic.

A reminder was made that the two communities were characterised as Greek and Muslim until only quite recently, replacing identification by religious affiliation: Christians and Muslims. Only late in 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, national identities emerged on Cyprus. Similarly to Canada, Cyprus has attempted to change or create its national symbols, including creating a new flag to reflect unity of the island.

A point was raised that both the analysis and prescriptions for the Cyprus problem have been presented during this roundtable as primarily external. In this vein a comparison was made between the Berlin Wall and the Green Line separating the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was suggested that perhaps a better analogy would be the British partition of Ireland, with the consent of people in Northern Ireland. Some Northern Irish have always argued that the partition was external until they recognised that a community in Northern Ireland identified with Britain and not with the Irish. Perhaps, the same recognition should occur in the Greek community in Cyprus.

Others said that the Cyprus problem is a function of both, internal and external forces. While there was a foreign intervention, problems within the two communities existed before. There were extremes within each community: nationalistic forces for ENOSIS (Union of Cyprus with Greece) within the Greek community and separatist forces within the Turkish community.

A suggestion was made that the conflict before 1974 could be perceived as stemming largely from internal factors. After 1974 the conflict has acquired an international dimension when international law was violated by Turkey. In this context, "the mediation approach is useless." Neither politicians nor youth can move toward a solution without a change in position of the Turkish government in Ankara.

The comparison of the Green Line with the Berlin Wall was elaborated upon. Some argued that there could be no such comparison, in Cyprus the population was moved and the Greek Cypriots ethnically cleansed and resettled. Equating Communists with the Turks, others suggested that just like the Berlin Wall, the Green Line was imposed by an outside force. Once the Turks leave, the Green Line will disappear.

**Ronald Watts** responded to two questions directed to him:

1. Is non-territorial federalism possible?

In literature on federalism, non-territorial federalism is referred to as "personal federalism." In Canada, experiments were made with non-territorial federalism in respect to Aboriginal People who live in cities outside of their territories. Belgium is a county with some non-territorial federalism, accommodating three territorial units and three linguistic communities.

2. What role should minorities play in central institutions?

It is difficult to perceive how central institutions can function if the only aim of a federation is to provide two state units. There must be a glue: nearly all federations are bicameral and some have special minority representation in the second chamber. In the executive, minorities should also be somehow represented. In Canada, for instance, the Prime Minister has most often been a Quebecker – a practice which is not a Constitutional prerequisite, but a reality of Canada nonetheless.

Three other points were made during the discussion:

- A plea was made that the Turkish Cypriots should not be continuously perceived as "guests." While they may have come as conquerors, they are now an integral part of the island.
- A suggestion was made that the future is in the hands of the youth, not the politicians. **"As individuals, we make decisions every day." Citizens can become more active in their own destinies.**
- Ignoring grievances of national minorities could damage a country's reputation world-wide. Meanwhile, addressing them could diminish the risk of separation.

## CLOSING AND REFLECTIONS

At the outset of the closing session, the Chair summarised key points and reiterated the goal of the Roundtable. He reminded the participants that the goal is not to change Canadian foreign policy toward Cyprus. Instead, it is to share possible applications of the Canadian experience in "living together." During the first part of the roundtable, the Canadian experiences with federalism and trying to accommodate minorities within state structures were highlighted by Ronald Watts, Margarete Moore and Steven Lee, among other participants. Attention was drawn to:

- The persistence of longstanding contradictory narratives in Canada.
- Canada's efforts to consciously and continually alter its identity over time to reflect shifts in loyalty and identity.
- Use of federalism in Canada as a tool (accommodation of national groups and decentralisation of governance), rather than a solution for "living together."
- Federalism in Canada as a "process" of evolution and change, rather than a fixed ideal.
- The danger of oversimplification or the "tyranny of terminology" when searching for constitutional solutions.
- The importance of public acceptance of basic values and processes required for the operation of federations and confederations.
- A sense, which has developed in Canada, that majorities have an obligation to listen, understand and concede to the minorities (to recognise minority claims as reasonable).
- The necessity, in diverse liberal democracies, to provide minorities with group-specific rights. These rights should provide collective security and ensure that governing structures are inclusive.
- The responsibility of the state to address insecurities expressed by minorities. The challenge is to recognise self-government rights institutionally. For Cyprus, this will mean finding an institutional mechanism at the state level, which can reflect the bi-cultural character of the island.
- From the experience of other countries, the legalistic approach will not be sufficient to resolve the conflict in Cyprus. Law is simply not enough. Resolution will require understanding and compromise on both sides, but especially the majority side. Workable federations and confederations require a glue to hold units together – political equality for the two communities will somehow have to be incorporated into the central governing mechanism of the country.

The Chair also drew attention to key issues discussed during the Banff Roundtable with Turkish Cypriots. Many points corresponded to the summary presented above. For instance, the danger of oversimplification or the "tyranny of terminology" when searching for constitutional solutions was discussed at length. Other issues included:

- Feelings of abandonment and isolation on the part of the Turkish Cypriot community (due to factors such as the Greek Cypriot and Greek "blockade," the unilateral efforts of the Greek Cypriots aimed at accession of Cyprus into the EU without prior solution to the dispute or even a dialogue with the Turkish Cypriots, etc. ).

- Real security and cultural threats faced by the Turkish Cypriot community on a Greek Cypriot dominated island (rooted in not so distant history - ENOSIS, unilateral actions of the Greek Cypriots who claim to represent the entire island, etc.)

Four themes dominated the closing discussion in Larnaka: the role of Turkey, EU accession, possible next steps, and the role of the international community and Canada in a solution of the Cyprus problem.

### **The Role of Turkey**

Some participants suggested that the key to solution of the Cyprus problem is currently in the hands of the Turkish government in Ankara. The firm position Mr. Denktash has adopted is supported by the Turkish government, which backs the Turkish Cypriot side with a large army. A point was made that it is, in fact, the Turkish government which holds the strings in northern Cyprus, rather than Mr. Denktash and his followers. Moreover, some argued that while the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus is justified on the grounds of protecting the Turkish Cypriot minority, it is in Turkey's national interest as well.

#### **Political initiatives should be directed towards Ankara and the Turkish people.**

Especially effective would be efforts made to promote democracy in Turkey and Turkey's accession to the EU. The international community should support liberal, progressive and pro-European elements of the Turkish society. Once Turkey becomes a solid liberal democracy and a part of Europe, its government will cease destabilising the region and acting in a unilateral way. Undoubtedly, joining Europe will require the Turkish government to change its policy toward Cyprus as well. There can be no movement on the Cyprus issue without creating a cost to Turkey. UN Resolutions and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights should be enforced.

However, the question on "which door to knock" in order to influence Turkish position was raised. There are many actors in Ankara who wish to maintain the status quo and do not wish to move on either Cyprus policy or EU accession. "The carrot of the EU" is by no means a certainty.

### **EU Accession**

According to one participant, the Turkish Cypriot fear of the Greek majority is a phobia, since it is not rooted in reality. She argued that all insecurities of the Turkish Cypriots have been addressed by the Greek side. Moreover, "the Greek Cypriots would not jeopardise their accession to the EU by mistreating the Turkish Cypriot minority." One should also think about "the fear 600 000 Greeks may feel facing 60 million Turks." Some added that the psychological factors inherent within the Cyprus problem, including the insecurity of the Turkish Cypriot minority, would be effectively resolved by EU accession.

Others pointed out that EU accession would not dismiss the fears of Turkish Cypriots.

Both, legalistic approach and EU accession are insufficient. Neither goes far enough. Instead of conciliation, these approaches are driving the Turkish Cypriots towards Turkey. **It may be dangerous to assume that accession of the Greek Cypriot side to the EU, prior to a solution, would bear no negative consequences. It may well create a dividing line between East and West running through the island.**

### **Possible Next Steps**

Some participants, namely the Canadians, suggested that a grand gesture toward the Turkish Cypriots may bring Mr. Denktash back to the negotiating table and move the negotiations further. Grand gestures could entail:

- granting equal status to the two community leaders in negotiations
- making provisions for effective self governance (i.e., the creation of two regions with wide powers)
- opening the border between the south and the north
- removing military presence
- providing a substantive financial contribution to the Turkish Cypriots (transfers could be modelled on the transfer of finances from West to East Germany).

Building a climate for common cause will require that realities are recognised. Perceptions of minorities should be addressed, since such "psychological" factors often influence political decisions. The double sense of insecurity (i.e., the Greek Cypriot fear about potential domination of the region by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot concern about safeguards) has to be removed, otherwise the conditions for creating a viable federation simply do not exist.

The atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots at the outset of the conflict were acknowledged. However, entire generations of Greek Cypriots should not be punished for the actions of few extremists. Others argued that both sides committed unlawful acts. Today, a climate should be build to create a common cause: unity, relief from intervention, and the creation of democracy based on the rule of law.

A point was made that rapprochement should be part of any strategy.

### **Role of the International Community and Canada**

Key recommendations for the international community and Canada included:

- The international community, including Canada, should balance interests with principles of "international law and morality." It should stand by and enforce the numerous United Nations Resolutions, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, and declarations of the European Union, condemning the occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey.
- The international community should pressure the Turkish government to change its policy towards Cyprus. The accession of Turkey into the EU could be used as a key negotiating tool.

- The international community, including Canada, should adhere to the federal framework for Cyprus it itself adopted in the past (in United Nations Resolutions, for instance).
- Canada could help with creating guidelines on how to structure a Cyprus federation. Especially pertinent would be devising mechanisms in case of deadlocks (i.e., through a clause whereby the UN would guarantee the unity of the state). Cooperation between Canada and Cyprus could grow once concrete elements of the Cyprus Federation are on the table. Assistance of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and Ronald Watts (Queen's University) might be welcome at that point.

## REFERENCES

- Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (CCFPD) (2001). *Report form the Roundtable Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century*, no. 7005.2E. February.
- Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIPPS) (1990). *Cyprus - Visions for the Future: A Summary of Conferences and Workshop Proceedings*, Working Paper no. 21. March.
- Elazar, Daniel J. (1998). *Constitutionalising Globalisation, the Revival of Confederal Arrangements*. (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.). 40.; quoted by Ergün Olgun, "Confederation: the Last Chance for Establishing a New Partnership in Cyprus," *Perceptions* VI, no. 1 (March-May 2001): 26.
- Kymlicka, Will, and Jean-Robert Raviot (1997). "Living Together: International Aspects of Federal Systems." *Canadian Foreign Policy* vol. 5, no. 1 (Fall).

## List of Participants

June 15-17, 2001

Larnaka, Cyprus

### **Costas Melakopides (Host)**

Professor of International Relations

University of Cyprus

President of KIMEDE (Cyprus Institute for  
Mediterranean, European and International  
Studies)

### **Steven Lee (Chair)**

Executive Director

Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy  
Development

### **Marketa Geislerova**

Rapporteur

Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy  
Development

### **Ronald Watts**

Professor

Institute of Intergovernmental Studies  
Queen's University

### **Kate White**

Conflict Mediation Specialist

### **Margaret Moore**

Professor

Department of Political Science  
University of Waterloo

### **John McGarry**

Professor

Department of Political Science  
University of Waterloo

### **Jamil Al-Alawi**

Executive Director

World Water Council

### **Michele Kambas**

Reuters

### **Yiannis Laouris**

CEO of Cyber Kids

Founder of TFP (Technology for Peace)

### **Andreas Antoniou**

Economist and IR Analyst

Professor

Philips College

### **Kypros Chrysostomides**

Legal Expert on Cyprus problem

Author of many books/articles

### **Toumazos Tselepis**

Advisor to the Secretary General of AKEL

### **Eleni Mavrou**

Member of Parliament (Cyprus)

### **Stavros Epaminondas**

Ambassador

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nicosia)

### **Yiorgos Kolokasides**

Lawyer/Political Analyst

### **Yiorgos Kentas**

University of Cyprus Graduate

### **Simos A. Angelides**

Post-Graduate of Law

### **Anastasia Lykidou**

Student

University of Cyprus

**Victor Kountouris**  
Student  
University of Cyprus

**Stella Charalambides**  
Student  
University of Cyprus

**Robert Hage**  
Director  
Southern Europe Division  
Department of Foreign Affairs and  
International Trade (Canada)

**Julie Rechel**  
Events Organizer  
Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy  
Development

**Observers:**

**Franco Pillarella**  
Canada's High Commissioner for Cyprus

**Marina Laker**  
Counsellor (Political)  
Canadian High Commission for Cyprus

**Jean-Marc Duval**  
Canada's Ambassador to Turkey

**David Hutton**  
Canada's Ambassador to Greece



125 promenade Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2  
Telephone/Téléphone : 613.944.8278 www.cfp-pec.gc.ca Fax/Télécopieur : 613.944.0687

## SELECTED CCFPD REPORTS FROM 2000-2001

### ***Terrorism***

Report from the Roundtable: The New Face of Terrorism. CCFPD. October 26, 2001.

Summary Report from the Roundtable: The Impact of September 11 on International Relations and Canada's Foreign Policy. CCFPD. November 27, 2001.

### ***New Diplomacy***

Report from the Conference on New Diplomacy: The Development of International Law. CCFPD. April 5-7, 2001.

The New Diplomacy: The Global Compact and United Nations Institutions. CCFPD. July 14-15, 2000.

Report from the Conference on 'New Diplomacy': The United Nations, Like-minded Countries and Non-Governmental Organizations. CCFPD. September 28, 1999.

Report from the Roundtable on Just War and Genocide. CCFPD. December 8-9, 2000.

Report from the Ottawa Roundtable for the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). CCFPD. January 15, 2001.

### ***Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding***

Summary Report from the Roundtable on Afghanistan: Governance Scenarios and Canadian Policy Options. CCFPD. October 12, 2001.

Nile Waters Management and Links to Conflict Management and Food Security in the Horn of Africa. Tag El Khazin, Sub Sahara Center. July 3, 2001.

Report from the Roundtable: Judges and Peace Operations. CCFPD. March 9, 2001.

Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate a UN Standing Emergency Capability. Peter Langille, Global Human Security Ideas and Initiatives. Fall 2000.

Report from the Roundtable on Expert Deployment to International Peace Operations. CCFPD. September 12, 2000.

Canadian Peacebuilding in the Middle East: Case Study of the Canada Fund in Israel/Palestine and Jordan. Tami Amanda Jacoby, University of Manitoba. Fall 2000.

Les entreprises canadiennes et la consolidation de la paix. Jean-Francois Rioux, Francisco-José Valiente, and Christian Geiser, Université du Québec à Montréal. Le 31 octobre 2000.

### ***New Directions in US Foreign Policy***

Report from the Denver Roundtable: New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy. CCFPD. November 2, 2001.

Summary of Key Point From Presentations and Discussions: Foreign Policy Trends in the U.S. Roundtable. CCFPD and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California at San Diego, California, United States. March 20, 2001.



Summary of Key Points from Presentations and Discussions: The Washington D.C. Roundtable on Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy. CCFPD and the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington DC. April 2, 2001.

Summary of Key Points from Brief Presentations and Discussions: Foreign Policy Trends in the U.S. Roundtable. CCFPD and University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. April 12, 2001.

Summary of Key Points from Presentations and Discussions: The Toronto Roundtable on the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy - Challenges and Implications for Canada. CCFPD and the Munk Centre, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. May 18, 2001.

Halifax Roundtable on US Foreign Policy. CCFPD and Saint Mary's University, Halifax, N.S.. June 15, 2001.

### ***Nuclear Weapons and Small Arms***

UN 2001 Conference on Illicit Trade of Small Arms in All its Aspects: Briefing and Discussion. Wendy Cukier, Coalition for Gun Control. December 19, 2000.

The Ottawa Group Report on Small Arms, Light Weapons (SALW) and Non-State Actors. CCFPD and Centre for Defence Studies. November 7-8, 2000.

Ballistic Missiles Foreign Experts Roundtable Report. Ernie Regehr, Project Ploughshares and CCFPD. March 30, 2000.

NATO-Nuclear Weapons Roundtable Report. CCFPD. August 24-25, 2000.

Small Arms and the OAS Roundtable Report. CCFPD. April 28, 2000.

Examen des récentes initiatives gouvernementales et d'ONG concernant les armes légères et évaluation de leur efficacité: proposition pour un indice de sécurité individuelle (ISI). Frances Gaudreault et al. été 2000.

Globalization and Firearms: A Public Health Perspective. Wendy Cukier et al. Fall 2000.

### ***Borders***

Perspectives on the Borderless World: Issues for Canada. Heather Nicol and Ian Townsend-Gault. Fall 2000.

### ***Technology***

Privacy, Sovereignty and Technology Roundtable Report. Marketa Geislerova, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development. March 23, 2001.

### ***Children's Rights***

Children and Violent Conflict: Meeting the Challenge of Diversity. Erin Baines, Dalhousie University; Barry Burciul, University of Toronto. Summer 2000.

### ***Business and Labour***

Canadian Corporate Contributions to Democratic Development and Citizen Participation in Developing Countries: Recommendations on Identifying and Supporting Corporate Efforts through Canadian Foreign Policy. Darin Rovere, Centre for Innovation in Corporate Responsibility. September 26, 2000.

Canadian Firms, Canadian Values. Canadian Business for Social Responsibility. May 2000.

### ***Law***

Canadian Council on International Law 29<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference - Policy Options Paper. Kim Carter et. al. December 2000.

### *Africa*

Summary Report from the Roundtable on Good Governance and Africa. CCFPD. 25 October 2001.

Rebirth of the Somali State: Policy Options and Programme Opportunities for Canada. Partnership Africa-Canada, Som-Can Institute for Research & Development. November 3-4, 2000.

Sudan Civil Society Symposium. Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group. June 5-6, 2000

Report from the Ottawa Nigeria Roundtable. CCFPD. March 20, 2000.

### *Asia-Pacific*

Report from the Roundtable: Good Governance and the Philippines. CCFPD. March 16, 2001.

Decentralization and Challenges to Unity: Report on the Indonesia Roundtable 2001. Centre for Dialogue, Simon Fraser University. April 19-21, 2001.

Democracy and Identity Conflicts in Asia: Identifying the Issues for Canada and Multilateral Institutions. University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies. March 2001.

Report from the North Korea Roundtable. CCFPD. January 22, 2001.

Report from the Burma and Drugs Roundtable. CCFPD. May 15, 2000.

### *Europe*

Report on Cyprus: Living Together in the New Century Roundtable. CCFPD. February 14, 2000.

### *Americas*

Workshop Report: Canadian Media Coverage of the Americas. FOCAL. March 2, 2001

Canada, Indigenous Peoples and the Hemisphere Roundtable Report. CCFPD. March 23, 2000.

Canadian Voices: The Americas. CCFPD. Fall 2001.

Threats to Democracy in America. Max Cameron, FOCAL. March 3-4, 2000.

Report from the Roundtable on Canada-Cuba Relations. CCFPD. January 18, 2000.

### *Culture*

Commerce international et diversité culturelle: à la recherche d'un difficile équilibre. Ivan Bernier, Université Laval and Dave Atkinson. 2000.

### *Circumpolar Issues*

Roundtable on Northern Foreign Policy: Feedback and Look Ahead. CCFPD. February 5, 2001.

### *Foreign Policy Research*

Gendered Discourses, Gendered Practices: Feminists (Re)Write Canadian Foreign Policy. Claire Turenne Sjolander, University of Ottawa; Heather Smith, University of Northern British Columbia; Deborah Stienstra, University of Winnipeg. May and July 2000.

LIBRARY E A / BIBLIOTHÈQUE A E



8 069886010 6305 3

DOCS

CA1 EA752 2001C97 ENG

Geislerova, Marketa

Cyprus : sharing the Canadian  
experience of living together

60696609



