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## VIEWS OF CANADA ON MATTERS BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

(Adapted from a memorandum  
prepared July, 1948)

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VIEWS OF CANADA ON MATTERS BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

I. GENERAL CANADIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Canada's policy towards the United Nations is, perhaps, most concisely stated in an extract from a speech delivered by the former Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Rt. Hon. L.S. St. Laurent, in Toronto on January 13, 1947: "The growth in this country of a sense of political responsibility on an international scale has perhaps been less rapid than some of us would like. It has nevertheless been a perceptible growth; and again and again on the major questions of participation in international organization, both in peace and war, we have taken our decision to be present. If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international organization." Canada's policy is thus one of full support for the United Nations.
2. The Canadian Government is however fully aware of the inadequacy of the United Nations at the present time in providing the nations of the world with the security which they require. The realities of this situation and the policy of the Canadian Government in respect of it were summarized briefly in a statement by Mr. St. Laurent in the House of Commons on April 20, 1948.
3. Mr. St. Laurent then stated that the Canadian Government is opposed to encouraging or fostering any activity which might, at the moment, provide any state with a legitimate excuse for withdrawing from the United Nations. On the other hand, he said that Canada would not refrain from any action which it knew to be right merely because it displeased certain other member states. Canada would continue to give every assistance to constructive efforts to make the United Nations into the instrument for security and co-operation which it was originally designed to be; and in the meantime would utilize its present possibilities to the fullest extent.
4. Canada intends to oppose demands on the United Nations which at the moment are too heavy for its resources. The Canadian belief is, for example, that the United Nations should not attempt to undertake administrative responsibilities and police activities in various parts of the world before it has been given the means which may be required for carrying out these responsibilities.
5. The Canadian Government also recognizes that the effectiveness of the United Nations is at present greatly reduced by the divisions which have grown up between the countries of Eastern Europe and the countries of the rest of the world. Until, therefore, there has been some measure of settlement of the issues that divide the world, too much should not be expected from the United Nations in its present form and organization. No one, for instance, should expect that the machinery of



the United Nations will produce a solution to problems on which the two most powerful nations of the world may have diametrically opposed views, which cannot be reconciled.

6. During the last two years, Canadian faith in the United Nations, as an effective organization for peace and security, has been shaken. What is unshaken is the Canadian determination to make of it, or within it, an effective organization for these purposes. Unshaken, also, is the Canadian faith that this can be achieved. It is therefore important that the United Nations be kept in existence and that every possible use be made of the very high degree of vitality which it has shown, particularly in those disputes which are not directly within the area of conflict between the Eastern European states and the rest of the world.

7. Canada's willingness to stand for, and its ability to obtain, election to the Security Council last autumn was an earnest of the Canadian desire to play its full part in the United Nations. Yet it should be pointed out that the position of a power of the middle rank on the Security Council is a difficult one. A small power is, in a sense, by its very smallness relieved from much of the responsibility which participation in decisions involves, and which the implementation of such decisions requires. At the other extreme the Great Powers can protect their positions with the veto. However a "middle power", such as Canada, is in a different position. Its economic strength and political influence are of importance, and the moral and material contribution which it can make to collective action, as the last two World Wars have shown, is very significant. The judgments which the Canadian Government makes on United Nations matters must therefore be made with care and a sense of responsibility, particularly because Canada is a country which has the reputation of conscientiously carrying out the commitments into which it has entered. Yet it is not always easy for Canada to obtain credit for independence and honesty of argument and decision. Canada will nevertheless continue to make decisions objectively, in the light of its obligations to its own people and their interest in the welfare of the international community.

8. This, therefore, is the underlying policy of the Canadian Government towards the United Nations. An analysis of Canada's role in the United Nations to date will possibly reveal that this policy has shown a consistent pattern and has had a generally constructive, though not spectacular, effect. Such an examination of Canada's policy might also reveal that a basis has been well laid for an even more important and exacting role to be played by Canada in the future.

## II. COLLECTIVE SECURITY

### (a) The International Control of Atomic Energy

9. One of the most important issues which have come before the United Nations in its short existence concerns the attempt to set up a universally acceptable method for the international control of atomic energy. The General Assembly established an Atomic Energy Commission for this purpose two and a half years ago and yet no such generally acceptable agreement has so far been reached. The Atomic Energy Commission made three reports which were discussed in the Security Council. Again no agreement was reached in the Council and the Atomic Energy Commission's Reports were merely transmitted for consideration at the present Session of the General Assembly in Paris.



10. The views of the Canadian Government on this subject and the Canadian understanding of the reasons for the impasse which has developed were expressed by Mr. St. Laurent on instructions from his Government, at a meeting of the Security Council on June 11, 1948. It has been a matter of profound disappointment to Canada that the Atomic Energy Commission, after two years of sincere effort to fulfill its mandate, must now report failure to reach agreement. The reason for this lack of agreement is set out clearly in the various reports of the Atomic Energy Commission. In the Canadian view, the situation revealed in these Reports does not call for mutual recriminations but rather for a serious effort to face up to realities; for no one can fail to realize the dangers resulting from international rivalry in the field of atomic energy and, in particular, from competitive efforts to obtain atomic weapons. This dangerous condition will confront the world so long as a universally acceptable and enforceable agreement for control does not exist.

11. The divergence of view, which months of patient discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission failed to bridge, arose in consequence of the insistence of the Soviet Union that a convention outlawing atomic weapons, and providing for their destruction, must precede any agreement for the establishment of a system of international control. On the other hand, the majority of the Commission, including Canada, held the view that such a convention, unless accompanied by effective safeguards, would offer no protection to the nations of the world.

12. Throughout all the efforts of the Commission the Canadian delegation devoted itself to the search for a method of control which would give security to all nations. The Canadian representatives were willing to examine with an open mind any and all proposals put before them, including those which were advanced by the Soviet delegation.

13. The Canadian representatives hoped that technological and scientific facts, as revealed in the discussions of the Scientific and Technical Committee, and through the testimony of experts, would point the way to what was necessary for effective control and thereby provide a basis for agreement. If these efforts have not proved successful, this should not be regarded as an acceptance of defeat.

14. The majority of the members of the Commission have clearly been convinced that the proposals evolved in these three Reports do provide the essential basis for the establishment of an effective system of international control of atomic energy. In the Canadian view it is appropriate that those who have been associated with developing these proposals through months of work should now submit the results of their efforts to the test of world opinion in a wider forum - namely in the General Assembly itself.

15. If the work of the Atomic Energy Commission is now to be suspended, there still remains the challenge to the peoples of the world to find a solution to the problem of the control of this force, potentially so destructive to mankind if left uncontrolled. The essential facts of atomic energy are set out clearly in the various reports of the Commission. The great majority of the states represented on the Commission have been able to draw the same conclusions from these facts. The Canadian Government earnestly hopes that those who now disagree with these states may yet come to share their view.

conclusion of the special agreements with individual members required to implement Articles 43 and those following of the Charter, and thus make aimed to 4/4 other facilities available to the Security Council.



(b) The Question of Disarmament

16. Perhaps the most widely discussed resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its session in the autumn of 1946 related to the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Few delegations to that session of the Assembly were possibly more active in the drafting of this resolution than was the Canadian delegation. As a result of this resolution, the Security Council, on February 13, 1947, passed a resolution setting up a Commission for Conventional Armaments which was to be a parallel body to the Atomic Energy Commission and to the Military Staff Committee.

17. However, the terms of reference of this Commission did not concern weapons of mass destruction, as in the case of the Atomic Energy Commission, but "conventional" armaments and also the reduction of national armed forces. As in the case of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission for Conventional Armaments has so far reached no agreement on the subjects which lie within its mandate. The disagreements which developed between the Soviet Union and the western world in the Atomic Energy Commission are reflected in similar disagreements in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. On the questions of drawing up essential safeguards necessary to ensure that the regulation of armaments is universally observed, and of establishing preliminary conditions of international confidence necessary to disarmament, the same disagreements between the Soviet Union and the West have constantly repeated themselves in the C.C.A. The position of the Canadian Government on these matters, as expressed in the C.C.A. on March 8, 1948, is that no agreement on the reduction of armaments and armed forces is likely to develop until conditions can be established which will make it unnecessary for nations to depend on national armaments solely for their security. Thus the Canadian view is that the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter - in regard to the establishment of international armed forces - is an essential step which must first be taken if an effective system for the regulation and reduction of national armaments and armed forces is to be reached.

(c) The Implementation of Article 43 of the Charter

18. By Article 43 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations are obligated to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with special agreements, armed forces "necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". Article 47 of the Charter calls for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on this matter. The Military Staff Committee, under the terms of Article 47 (2) is to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, or of their representatives.

19. The Military Staff Committee has been meeting now for over two years and as yet has made no progress in the formulation of general agreements for the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter. The position of the Canadian Government on this failure of the Military Staff Committee to make progress was stated nearly two years ago by the Chairman of the Canadian delegation, Mr. St. Laurent, in his opening speech in the General Assembly, on October 29, 1946: "We are particularly concerned that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee have so far failed to make substantial progress towards a conclusion of the special agreements with individual members required to implement Articles 43 and those following of the Charter, and thus make armed forces and other facilities available to the Security Council.



We are all of us bound under the Charter to refrain from using armed forces except as provided for by the Charter. The Government and people of Canada are anxious to know what armed forces, in common with other members of the United Nations, Canada should maintain as our share of the burden of putting world force behind world law. It is only when the special agreements with the Council have been concluded that we will be able to determine how large a proportion of the total annual production of our country can properly be devoted to improving the living conditions of the Canadian people. Canada therefore urges that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee go ahead with all possible steps in the constructive work of negotiating the special agreements and of organizing the military and economic measures of enforcement."

20. Although this statement was made nearly two years ago, the Military Staff Committee has made no further progress. Canada is not a member of the Military Staff Committee (as the latter consists only of the five permanent members of the Security Council) and so does not have first-hand information of the disagreements which have led to the present deadlock. However, it is common knowledge that these disagreements largely concern the size and composition of the United Nations forces, the contributions which should be made by each state, particularly the "Big Five," the location of the United Nations forces and their right of access to the military bases of member nations. It is evident that four of the five permanent members have for some time reached general agreement between themselves on the fundamental principles in this field; and that the failure of the Military Staff Committee to progress in its work is due very largely to the fact that the Soviet Union has consistently disagreed with the position taken by the other four permanent members.

(d) Regional Pacts for Collective Self-Defence under Article 51 of the Charter

21. To sum up, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission for Conventional Armaments and the Military Staff Committee have not reached any final agreement on the subjects within their respective mandates. In view of this disagreement, it is not surprising that now, three years after the San Francisco Conference, member nations are exploring other methods by which they might achieve mutual collective security. Canada's position regarding Article 51 of the Charter which begins with the words "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" follows.

22. The position of the Canadian Government on this matter was made clear by the Prime Minister on March 17, 1948, when he commented on the Brussels Five-Power Treaty. He then said: "This pact is far more than an alliance of the old kind. It is a partial realization of the idea of collective security by an arrangement made under the Charter of the United Nations. As such, it is a step towards peace, which may well be followed by other similar steps until there is built up an association of all free states which are willing to accept responsibilities of mutual assistance to prevent aggression and preserve peace.... The Canadian Government has been closely following recent developments in the international sphere. The peoples of all free countries may be assured that Canada will play her full part in every movement to give substance to the conception of an effective system of collective security by the development of regional pacts under the Charter of the United Nations."



23. At last year's General Assembly, one possible line of development in this field was referred to by Mr. St. Laurent. He then stated that it was not necessary to contemplate the break-up of the United Nations in order to build up a stronger security system within the United Nations. Without sacrificing the universality of the United Nations it would be possible for the free nations of the world to form their own close association for collective self-defence under Article 51. Such an association could be created within the United Nations by those free states which are willing to accept more specific and onerous obligations than those contained in the Charter, in return for greater national security than the United Nations can now give its members.

24. On April 29, 1948, in a speech in the Canadian House of Commons, Mr. St. Laurent said: "Canada and the United States need the assistance of the western European democracies just as they need ours. The spread of aggressive Communist despotism over western Europe would ultimately almost certainly mean for us war, and war on most unfavourable terms. It is in our national interest to see to it that the flood of Communist expansion is held back. Our foreign policy today must, therefore, I suggest, be based on a recognition of the fact that totalitarian Communist aggression endangers the freedom and peace of every democratic country, including Canada. On this basis and pending the strengthening of the United Nations, we should be willing to associate ourselves with other free states in any appropriate collective security arrangements which may be worked out under Articles 51 or 52 of the Charter. In the circumstances of the present, the organization of collective defence in this way is the most effective guarantee of peace. The pursuit of this course, steadfastly, unprovocatively and constructively, is our best hope for disproving the gloomy predictions of inevitable war".

### III. POLITICAL QUESTIONS

#### (a) Palestine

25. Probably no issue which has come before the United Nations has aroused the keen controversy and wide public interest which has been caused by the United Nations discussions of the Palestine question. A year ago the General Assembly called a special session on Palestine, at the request of the United Kingdom Government, to make recommendations for the future Government of Palestine. This Special Assembly established a Committee which went to Palestine, investigated the situation and reported to the next regular session of the Assembly which met in September of 1947.

26. The majority of the members of this Special Committee, including a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Justice Rand, recommended a plan of partition with economic union. Mr. Justice Rand was sent no instructions whatever by the Canadian Government and reached his own conclusions independently. When this plan was recommended by the majority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, they did not generally assume that the United Kingdom Government intended to withdraw from Palestine in the immediate future. Therefore, the plan recommended by the majority included, as an important feature, a suggestion that the mandatory power should continue to administer the territory during a two year transitional period. When this subject came up for discussion at the General Assembly, however, the Assembly had before it a statement from the Government of the United Kingdom that it planned to terminate the mandate and withdraw from Palestine at the earliest possible date.



27. After prolonged discussion, which was given very great publicity, the General Assembly recommended, by more than a two-thirds majority, that a plan based on the proposal of the majority of the Special Committee for partition with economic union should be adopted. This resolution of the General Assembly put the responsibility for implementing that recommendation on the Security Council, if the two parties were unable to agree on it. Canada voted with the majority in favour of a plan of partition with economic union, since the Canadian Government regarded it, in the words of the Canadian representative on November 26, 1947, "as the best of four unattractive and difficult alternatives". These four alternatives were partition, a unitary state, a federal state and no United Nations recommendation at all. In the discussions in the General Assembly, the Canadian delegation had urged that any study of the partition plan should include an examination of methods for implementation and enforcement. The Canadian representatives also urged that the responsibility for the maintenance of order in Palestine should devolve as quickly as possible on the people themselves. Above all, the Canadian delegation tried to ensure that there should be some provision for implementation included in the resolution of the General Assembly. It was, and still is, the Canadian position that the United Nations should not make recommendations in regard to Palestine without taking into account the problem of whether their acceptance can be secured. This position was recently reiterated by Mr. St. Laurent in his speech of April 29 in the Canadian House of Commons.

28. Shortly after the majority of the General Assembly had voted in favour of the plan of partition with economic union, it became apparent that the peaceful implementation of this plan was not practicable. On March 19, 1948, the United States representative drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that, if the Assembly plan were not put into effect by May 15, the United Nations would have no administrative responsibility in Palestine after the mandate ended. In order that this responsibility might be definitely assumed, the United States proposed formally on March 30 that a second special session of the General Assembly should be summoned. The Canadian Government supported this proposal. It had in mind the desirability of enabling the General Assembly to consider whether, in the new and changed circumstances, alternative plans should be made for Palestine, particularly as there was hope that by these means processes of mediation and conciliation might be initiated and peace restored.

29. Accordingly, a special session of the General Assembly took place at Lake Success on the Palestine question. The results of this special Assembly were only meagre but, by means of the resolution establishing a Mediator, and by endorsement of the Security Council's efforts to bring about a truce, a basis, at least, was laid for possible conciliation of this very bitter dispute. The Canadian Government supported the appointment of a Mediator and also strongly supported in the Security Council the efforts to bring about a truce and, later, to continue the truce. Renewed hostilities broke out after the termination of the Mandate and a truce was gradually brought about by the efforts of the Security Council and, in particular, those of the Mediator, the late Count Bernadotte.

30. The Palestine question has now become one of the most explosive issues in contemporary international affairs. The attitude of the Canadian Government has consistently been, and still is, to support any constructive proposal which might lead to a practicable and equitable solution of this question by pacific methods. The overwhelming concern of Canada in this matter is to see peace return again to Palestine.



(b) Threats to the Political Independence of Greece

31. On December 3, 1946, Greece brought before the Security Council the problem of guerrilla warfare along its northern borders and alleged that assistance was being given to the guerrillas by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In the ensuing debate, these states denied the Greek charges and blamed the disturbances on a "reactionary Greek administration", the presence of foreign troops in Greece and the struggle for liberty which, they stated, was being waged by free Greeks. The Security Council therefore set up a Commission of Investigation, consisting of representatives of all members of the Council plus the four states concerned. The report of this Commission was presented to the Council in May 1947. The majority of the members of the Commission concluded that Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria, had supported the guerrilla warfare. The Soviet Union and Poland defended the three accused states in the Security Council and argued that the evidence supplied was untrustworthy. As no proposal could be agreed on in the Security Council, the matter was placed on the agenda of the second regular session of the General Assembly.

32. In the discussions of this matter in the General Assembly in the autumn of 1947, the majority of Members supported the findings of the majority group in the Commission. By a vote of 40 to 6, with 11 abstentions, the Assembly created a Special Balkan Committee consisting of 11 members. The Committee, with headquarters in Salonika, was set up to maintain a watch on Greece's northern borders, and to observe the compliance of the states concerned with the Assembly's recommendation that they co-operate in the peaceful settlement of their disputes. The Soviet Union, and the other Eastern European states which voted against the establishment of the Committee, announced that they would not participate in it.

33. The Canadian position on this matter was to vote in favour of the resolution setting up the Special Committee on the Balkans. The Canadian position was stated by the Canadian representative in the Political Committee of the Assembly on October 6, 1947: "In view of the serious situation which has been shown to exist in the Balkan Peninsula, the Canadian delegation considers that the Assembly should take action immediately towards the maintenance of peace and security in that area .... We have come to the conclusion, therefore, that we should support the operative parts of the United States resolution and especially the proposal to establish a special committee." A Canadian proposal, presented by its representative on October 10, 1947, resolved the problem of the composition of the Special Committee. This proposal provided for Great Power membership on the Special Committee, and its adoption ruled out the possibility that the Committee might be composed only of representatives of the smaller states. Places on the Committee were also, by this proposal, held open for the Soviet Union and Poland. The Canadian view was that a committee on which the Great Powers were not represented might not enjoy sufficient prestige to enable it to perform its duties adequately in the troubled area of the Balkans. Canada is not a member of the Special Committee on the Balkans established by the Assembly resolution and therefore has not participated actively in this question since the discussions in the General Assembly last autumn.

(c) The India-Pakistan Question

34. When the India Independence Act was passed last year and the two new independent states of India and Pakistan were established, the final steps were taken in the transfer to the Indian people of the right of self-government which had begun many years ago. History can possibly afford no parallel of an imperial power abdicating its sovereignty so generously and so speedily as Britain has done in India. Yet the rapid



withdrawal of British paramountcy left the two new states with long-standing and bitter problems whose solution will require the highest type of statesmanship. Examples of these problems were the serious friction which has developed between India and Pakistan over certain territorial areas, and also, of course, the dreadful communal rioting which has troubled both countries in the last year. While these problems have not been given the publicity, for example, that has been given to the United Nations discussions of the Palestine question, their seriousness cannot be exaggerated in view of the vast numbers of people who are affected, directly or indirectly.

35. In January of this year both India and Pakistan referred their dispute over Kashmir to the Security Council. Subsequently Pakistan submitted to the Council several other complaints against India which were probably of a less fundamentally serious nature than was the Kashmir dispute. After several months of discussions, the Security Council adopted a course of action by which it is hoped that the Kashmir dispute may be settled. A Mediation Commission was established, of a somewhat similar character to the United Nations Committee of Good Offices established for the Indonesian question. Suggestions have also been made by the Council in regard to the withdrawal of troops from Kashmir, the establishment of a representative coalition government in the State, and the holding of an impartial plebiscite to determine the accession of Kashmir to either India or to Pakistan. Yet the success or failure of this Mediation Commission, and of the Security Council's proposals, depend very largely on the determination of the Governments of both India and Pakistan to reach a settlement of their dispute.

36. The Canadian representative on the Security Council had some part in the preparation of the Council's resolution on this matter, in association with four other members of the Council, in whose names the joint resolution was finally presented and adopted. However the positions taken by India and Pakistan, after months of discussion, were found to be so far apart that in spite of repeated efforts, it was not possible to prepare a recommendation that would be entirely acceptable to both parties. The members of the Council who prepared the resolution endeavoured therefore to recommend a settlement by which the essential interests of both India and Pakistan, as well as those of Kashmir itself, could be protected. In voting for this recommendation, the Canadian delegation did not attempt to express a judgment on the circumstances which have led to the present dispute in Kashmir but merely assisted in formulating an impartial opinion as to the means by which the Kashmir situation might be settled.

37. The Canadian Government hopes that both India and Pakistan, even though they do not consider that the resolution fully meets their requirements, will nevertheless give weight to the procedure suggested and will understand and appreciate the attitude of those states which participated in preparing the resolution. Again, in this dispute, as well as in many of the other political disputes which have come before the United Nations, the only interest of the Canadian Government has been to help any constructive effort to reach a generally acceptable peaceful settlement in a spirit of compromise and mutual understanding.

(d) The Czechoslovak Question

38. By a letter dated March 12, 1948, the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations (Dr. Santa Cruz) requested that, in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, the Security Council "investigate the evidence reported by the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Jan Papanek, which constitutes a threat to international peace and



security". The letter of Dr. Papanek, to which the Chilean note referred, stated that the political independence of Czechoslovakia had been violated by the threat of the use of force by the Soviet Union. Dr. Papanek's letter went on to say that a minority in his country, encouraged and given promise of help by the Soviet Union, had usurped power by eliminating the constitutional system of government in Czechoslovakia, and had trampled under the civil liberties established by the Constitution. Dr. Papanek's letter stated that the coup in Czechoslovakia, by which this minority had seized power, had been successful only through the official participation of representatives of the Soviet Union and by the threat of the use of military force by the U.S.S.R. on the northwest boundaries of Czechoslovakia.

39. By a vote of 9 in favour and 2 against, the Security Council agreed to place the Czechoslovak situation on its agenda and then subsequently agreed, by the same vote, to hear Dr. Papanek state his case. After discussion had taken place in the Council, during the course of several meetings, the Chilean representative introduced a draft resolution proposing that a sub-committee of the Council be appointed to hear statements and testimony relevant to this question and to submit a report thereon to the Security Council as soon as possible. While the majority of the Council favoured this Chilean proposal for a sub-committee, it was not adopted in view of the veto exercised by the Soviet representative.

40. The position of the Canadian Government on this very serious question was stated in the Security Council on March 31, 1948. The Canadian representative then said that the events in Czechoslovakia paralleled early developments in other European states too closely to be dismissed as pure coincidence. He added that in view of the seriousness of the allegations it was essential that the facts in the situation be ascertained. If it was true that a minority group, linked with an outside power, was able to overthrow its political opponents and deprive the majority of the people of their political liberties, this was not only dangerous to democracy but also created a threat to international peace. In the Canadian view it was essential that the Council should press forward its enquiries into the Czechoslovak situation and that to this end it should receive testimony from first-hand witnesses to these events.

41. At a later stage, when the Chilean proposal for a sub-committee came up for discussion in the Council, the Canadian delegation supported this proposal on the ground that it was essential for the Council to have access to all relevant facts; and that the establishment of such a sub-committee did not prejudice the Council's decision in this matter but merely gave the Council an opportunity to obtain the facts necessary for taking such a decision. The majority of members of the Council expressed a similar point of view and the Chilean proposal received 9 votes in favour and 2 against. The proposal was not adopted due to the veto of the Soviet representative, although the majority of members of the Council, including Canada, had held that this was a purely procedural question and hence not subject to the veto. The President of the Council upheld the right of the Soviet representative to exercise his double veto in this matter (i.e. to veto the preliminary question as to whether the Chilean proposal was procedural or substantive). Accordingly the Security Council has been placed in the strange position of being unable to establish a sub-committee to hear evidence concerning very serious allegations made against the Soviet Union, due to the fact that the representative of the very state against which these allegations were



made, the Soviet Union, has been allowed to exercise his double veto to block the establishment of such a sub-committee. Since that time the Council has been meeting on other matters and there have been no substantial developments with regard to its consideration of the Czechoslovak question.

(e) The Indonesian Situation

42. In a letter of July 30, 1947, the Government of India drew the attention of the Security Council, under Article 35 (1), to the situation in Indonesia, stating that in its opinion this situation endangered the maintenance of international peace and security. The Indian Government accordingly asked the Council to take the necessary measures provided for in the Charter. In a letter of the same date, the Australian Government, which was at that time a member of the Security Council, also brought the existence of hostilities in Java and Sumatra to the attention of the Council, stating that these hostilities were a breach of the peace under Article 39. The Council placed the Indonesian situation on its agenda on July 31, 1947, and has held many meetings on it during the past year. On August 1, 1947, the Council passed its "cease-fire" resolution, calling on the two parties to cease hostilities forthwith. On August 25, 1947, the Council established its Committee of Good Offices "to assist in the pacific settlement of the Indonesian dispute". This Committee of Good Offices was later formed to include three members - Australia (selected by the Republic of Indonesia), Belgium (selected by the Netherlands) and the United States (selected by the other two members). On November 1, 1947, the Council adopted another resolution calling on the two parties to consult with each other in order to give effect to the cease-fire resolution; and asking the Committee of Good Offices to assist the two parties in reaching an agreement.

43. On January 17, 1948, a Truce Agreement was signed between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia aboard the U.S.S. Renville. At the same time as they accepted the Truce Agreement the two parties accepted twelve principles on which were to be based discussions for the future political settlement of Indonesia. Six additional principles of a similar nature were also accepted by the two parties two days later. On February 28 the Security Council adopted a Canadian resolution noting with approval the efforts made by the Committee of Good Offices in assisting the two parties to reach a truce in Indonesia, and requesting both parties and the Committee of Good Offices to keep the Council directly informed about the progress of the political settlement. The Council also passed a resolution asking the Committee of Good Offices to report particularly on the developments which had recently taken place in West Java and Madura. The Committee of Good Offices has now made several reports on these matters and these reports have recently been considered in the Council.

44. The attitude of the Canadian Government on the dispute in Indonesia is to support any practicable policy of justice, moderation and conciliation, which looks to the settlement of the dispute in a way that would be most acceptable both to the Indonesians and the Dutch and, therefore, of a lasting character. For this reason, during the discussion of this subject in the Security Council, Canada has strongly supported the efforts so far made by the Committee of Good Offices in the negotiations to date; and its representatives also believe that the Truce Agreement signed aboard the Renville on January 17, 1948, together with the eighteen political principles, should provide the basis for an acceptable political settlement. For the same reason the Canadian representatives, have felt that the Security Council's intervention in



this matter can most effectively be made through the Committee of Good Offices, rather than by having the Council act as a sort of court of justice in deciding between the charges and counter-charges of the two parties. The success or failure of these negotiations depends very largely on what takes place in Indonesia and the efforts of the Committee of Good Offices established there. This does not mean that the Canadian Government is of the opinion that the Council should not consider very seriously any charges made against the good faith of either party in carrying out the Renville Agreement. The Security Council has now a serious moral responsibility with regard to the solution of the Indonesian question and it cannot adopt a policy of indifference if such charges are made. Briefly, then, the position of the Canadian Government in this matter is to press for a policy by which the Council will give the full weight of its moral support to the Committee of Good Offices in its efforts to help the parties achieve a political settlement in Indonesia.

(f) The Independence of Korea

45. Korea was originally promised its freedom and independence at the Cairo Conference in December, 1943, by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and China. This promise was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July, 1945, and subscribed to by the Soviet Union when it entered the war against Japan.

46. A declaration concerning the independence of Korea was made at the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States and this was later endorsed by the Government of China. As a first step, it was there agreed to establish a joint United States - Soviet Commission which was to consult with the Korean people and to decide on methods for establishing a provisional Korean Government. It was planned to establish a four-power trusteeship for Korea for a period of up to five years before absolute independence was granted.

47. As is well known, the objective of the Moscow Agreement was never achieved due to the inability of the United States and Soviet representatives to co-operate. As a result, Korea was temporarily divided at the 38th parallel, with the Soviet authorities administering the north and the United States authorities the south. The joint commission established by the Moscow Agreement met only a few times and failed to agree on any question of importance.

48. In view of the failure of the joint commission to make any progress, the United States next proposed the convening of a four-power conference to discuss the problem of the independence of Korea. The Soviet Union did not accept this invitation and the United States brought the whole problem to the attention of the United Nations at its second regular session in September, 1947. The United States representative at that time stated that his Government did not wish to have the inability of the two powers to reach agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to independence.

49. In the General Assembly, the Soviet representative proposed the withdrawal of all Soviet and other occupation troops in Korea at the beginning of 1948 so that the Korean people might establish a national government without foreign interference. This proposal was not acceptable to a great majority of the members of the United Nations. On the other hand, the United States representative introduced a resolution proposing to set up a United Nations temporary commission to observe national elections and to consult with the elected representatives regarding the prompt attainment of independence by the Korean people.



Other provisions of the United States proposal, which was eventually adopted by the General Assembly on November 14, 1947, recommended that the national assembly which would be formed by these elected representatives should convene and form a national government as soon as possible after the elections. It was further provided that this government, once established, should constitute its own national security forces, take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of north and south Korea, and arrange with the occupying powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and, if possible, within ninety days. The Commission was instructed to facilitate and expedite the fulfillment of the foregoing provisions, taking into account its observations and consultations in Korea. It was also instructed to report with its conclusions to the General Assembly and authorized to consult with the Interim Committee as it saw fit with respect to the application of this resolution in the light of developments.

50. During the discussion which took place in the General Assembly after the defeat of the Soviet proposal mentioned above, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European states announced that they would take no part in the United Nations Temporary Commission and they refused to participate in the voting. The membership of the Temporary Commission on Korea, as proposed in the original United States resolution and finally adopted, consists of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria and the Ukraine. The Ukraine subsequently refused to participate in the work of the Commission.

51. Accordingly, the Temporary Commission went to Korea and, after trying to enlist the co-operation of the Soviet authorities in the northern sector without any success, passed a resolution on February 6, 1948, to consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly in the light of these developments. The Soviet authorities in north Korea refused to recognize the legality of the Temporary Commission or to co-operate with it in any way whatsoever.

52. The Interim Committee met in a series of meetings beginning on February 19 of this year to consider a report presented by the Chairman of the Temporary Commission. The specific questions which the Chairman of the Temporary Commission put to the Interim Committee were as follows:

- 1) Is it open to, or incumbent upon, the Commission, under the terms of the General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947, to implement the program as outlined in the resolution in that part of Korea which is occupied by the armed forces of the United States?
- 2) If not,
  - (a) Should the Commission observe the election of Korean representatives provided that it has determined that elections can be held in a free atmosphere? and
  - (b) Should the Commission consider such other measures as may be possible and advisable with a view to the attainment of its objectives?

53. On February 26, 1948, the Interim Committee adopted a resolution, which was opposed by the representative of Canada, resolving that it was incumbent upon the Temporary Commission to implement the program outlined in the General Assembly resolution in such parts of Korea as were accessible to it.



54. Since then the Temporary Commission has satisfied itself, as a result of extensive field observation in various key districts of south Korea, that a free atmosphere did exist wherein the democratic rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly were recognized and respected. It then confirmed that it would observe the elections announced by the Commanding General of the United States forces in Korea to be held on May 10, 1948. The elections were duly held on that date and were observed by several observation groups of the Temporary Commission. Since then it has been preparing its final report to the General Assembly and has passed a resolution to notify the elected representatives of the Korean people that the Commission is now ready for such consultation as they may request. On June 25 the Commission resolved unanimously to record the opinion that the results of the election of May 10 represented a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea accessible to the Commission, whose inhabitants constitute approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea.

55. During the discussion of the Korean problem in the General Assembly in 1947, the Canadian representative supported the United States approach rather than the proposal of the Soviet Union. He pointed out that a premature withdrawal of occupation forces would serve only to precipitate chaos and disunity, especially in view of the political and economic division which had been imposed upon Korea during the occupation. He said that the purpose of a United Nations Commission would be to provide observers to ensure that the Korean people could, in fact, establish their own government by free elections without foreign interference.

56. As noted above, Canada was appointed as one of the members of the Temporary Commission on Korea. Dr. G. S. Patterson was appointed by the Canadian Government to fill this position. During the discussion in the Interim Committee, the Canadian representative, Mr. L.B. Pearson, the present Secretary of State for External Affairs, stated the opinion of the Canadian Government that, in view of the non-co-operation of the Soviet authorities in north Korea, the Temporary Commission was not in a position to carry out its mandate in Korea. He pointed out that the responsibility for this situation rested squarely on the Soviet Union "which, by its non-co-operative and obstructive attitude, has prevented the facilitation and observation by the United Nations of elections for the whole of Korea for the purpose of setting up a national democratic government chosen by the people of Korea themselves". The Canadian representative said that it would be unwise to ask the Temporary Commission in Korea to do things that it has not, under its terms of reference, the power to do. The Canadian position was that the Temporary Commission was not authorized, under the resolutions of the General Assembly of November 14, 1947, to act in, or for, south Korea alone. In taking this position Canada was in the minority and the resolution mentioned above was passed by 31 to 2 (including Canada) with 11 abstentions. The Korean Commission was accordingly advised to implement its program "in such parts of Korea as are accessible to it". The Canadian representative also stressed the fact that whatever the Interim Committee decided should be considered as advice only and that the Temporary Commission should decide whether or not to accept this advice.

57. The Canadian representative on the Korean Commission has since made every effort to ensure that the Temporary Commission has operated in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947. However, as Mr. Pearson stated in the Interim Committee on February 26: "There is one point on which we have no differences. We are unanimous on the necessity of establishing at the earliest possible date a free, united and democratic Korea".



(g) Spain

58. The position of the United Nations in regard to the Franco regime in Spain has been the subject of considerable discussion both at the San Francisco Conference and in subsequent sessions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. At the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly a resolution was adopted which barred Spain from the international specialized agencies and from conferences arranged by the United Nations; which asked members to recall diplomatic representatives from Madrid; and which recommended that, unless a more democratic government were formed in Spain, the Security Council should consider measures to be taken to remedy the situation. Since the Franco regime continued in power and the request for the recall of Heads of Missions was not fully implemented, the question of Spain was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly again at its Second Regular Session in the autumn of 1947. In its discussions in 1947 the General Assembly adopted a resolution expressing confidence that the Security Council would exercise its responsibilities as soon as it considered that the situation in Spain so required. A paragraph in the General Assembly resolution, re-affirming its resolution of 1946 that members recall their Heads of Missions from Franco Spain, failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority and it was therefore defeated.

59. Canada has no diplomatic relations with the Franco Government in Spain and so it was not directly affected by the Assembly resolution requesting that the Heads of Missions be recalled. The position of the Canadian Government on the general question of the Franco regime was clearly given in a statement by the Canadian representative in the Political Committee of the General Assembly on December 3, 1946. He then said: "We abhor the record and the present policies of the Franco dictatorship. We earnestly hope that the Spanish people will be able to rid themselves of Franco by peaceful means and establish a democratic, responsible and enlightened administration. We are not prepared to support at this time outside intervention in Spain which might impede European recovery or revive in Spain the horrors of civil war". In accordance with this general policy the Canadian delegation to the 1947 Session of the General Assembly opposed a Polish resolution (which was not adopted) calling for the imposition of sanctions against Spain under Article 41 of the Charter. The position of the Canadian delegation on this point was that such action should not be taken except by the Security Council after it had been established that the Spanish situation constituted a threat to international peace. The Canadian representative also expressed the view that intervention of this type might strengthen rather than weaken the Franco regime. The Canadian delegation also considered that it would be unwise to re-affirm certain of the provisions of the 1946 resolution on Spain, particularly those which excluded Spain from membership in the various specialized agencies of the United Nations. The Canadian delegation did not feel that any useful purpose could be served by limiting the scope or weakening the effectiveness of the specialized agencies by debarring the Franco Government from the obligations of membership in them. Canada therefore voted against the paragraph in the final resolution which re-affirmed the 1946 decision of the General Assembly. As this section of the resolution was deleted in the Plenary Session, the Canadian representative voted in favour of the amended resolution, which was adopted by the General Assembly.

60. In accordance with the General Assembly resolution of 1947, the Security Council recently devoted a meeting to the Spanish situation. The majority of members of the Council (including Canada) took the position that the present situation in Spain did not constitute a threat to international peace and security and that there was, therefore, no present action required by the Security Council on this subject. The 1947



resolution of the Assembly had merely expressed confidence that the Council would take up the Spanish situation again if the situation so required. Accordingly the majority of the Council agreed that the question of Spain should not be included on its agenda at the present time. In supporting this view the Canadian delegation pointed out that if the situation in Spain did become a threat to international peace, there was nothing to prevent any member of the United Nations from placing the matter again on the agenda of the Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.

(h) War Propaganda

61. In his opening speech to the General Assembly at its 1947 Session, and on several later occasions, Mr. Vyshinsky, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, made a number of allegations to the effect that efforts were being made in the United States and the United Kingdom to incite a new war. He named individuals who, he said, were guilty of "warmongering" and charged that a deliberate attempt was being made in the press of the western democracies to provoke an attack on the Soviet Union. Accordingly the Soviet delegation introduced a proposal asking that "warmongering" be made a criminal offence and specifying that the United States, Turkey and Greece were the principal offenders. This was quite unacceptable to most delegations, although it was felt that some more general resolution on this subject might profitably be adopted. A joint Australian, Canadian and French resolution was finally adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. It called on member nations to take steps to promote friendly relations and to encourage the dissemination of all information designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all people for peace. It condemned all forms of propaganda designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace or any act of aggression.

62. The position of the Canadian Government on this subject was that no useful purpose would be accomplished by outright rejection of the Soviet resolution on war propaganda (as some countries wished), since it could then be argued with some plausibility that the western democracies had rejected a proposal that propaganda inciting to war should be condemned. So the Canadian delegation on October 23, 1947, proposed a short resolution which dealt with the positive side of this question and urged members to promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available, friendly relations between nations on the basis of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The joint Australian, Canadian and French resolution, which was finally adopted by the Assembly, was based very largely on this original Canadian proposal.

(i) The Treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa

63. During the second part of the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946, the Government of India accused the Union of South Africa of discriminatory treatment in South Africa of Asiatics in general, and Indian nationals in particular, on the grounds of their race. The discussions in the Assembly on this subject in 1946 were so bitter and acrimonious that friendly relations between the two states were impaired. A resolution was finally adopted by the Assembly stating that "the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two Governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter"; and requesting the two Governments to report to the next Session of the Assembly on the measures adopted to give this effect. The situation had not materially changed when the matter was discussed again in the 1947 Session of the Assembly. At that Session, the Indian delegation introduced a resolution calling on India, Pakistan and South Africa to hold round-table discussions on the basis of the 1946 resolution. This failed to obtain



the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and was defeated. As no other proposal on this subject secured the required two-thirds majority the General Assembly took no action on this matter in 1947.

64. The policy of the Canadian Government on this subject, as stated by the Canadian representative in the joint Legal and Political Committees of the Assembly on November 25, 1946, was to encourage a friendly settlement of the dispute between the two parties. It was the Canadian view that any resolution passed by the Assembly should not contain a judgment against either party since neither the facts, nor the legal position in the dispute, had been established by an impartial tribunal. What was obviously required, in the Canadian view, was "a proper determination of the facts, an authoritative exposition of the law, and a judicial application of the law to the facts so determined". Accordingly in 1946 Canada had supported the reference of this question, specifically the question of the jurisdiction of the General Assembly to deal with the substance of India's complaint, to the International Court of Justice. For the same reason the Canadian delegation in 1947 voted against the Indian resolution which implied that a judgment had already been taken against South Africa. On the other hand, Canada supported another proposal which called upon the two Governments and Pakistan to continue their efforts to reach an agreement and, in the event that no agreement was reached, to submit the question to the International Court. This resolution was however defeated.

65. The General Assembly's consideration of this subject showed, in the Canadian opinion, the great difficulty of discussing an issue of this nature in a political body such as the General Assembly without first obtaining an impartial legal opinion. The Indian Government had argued that racial discrimination had taken place against their nationals in the Union of South Africa, and the Union Government had replied by saying that this was, in any case, a matter within their domestic jurisdiction. Before the Assembly could take action in this matter it was essential that a legal ruling should be given as to whether this matter was entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union Government or whether it came within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly. The obvious body to give such a legal ruling was the International Court of Justice. In the absence of such a legal ruling the Assembly has debated this subject at length at two Sessions of the General Assembly and has still not taken any remedial action which would lead to a solution of the dispute in question.

#### IV. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS

##### (a) The Economic and Social Council

66. Under Article 55 of the Charter, the United Nations has an obligation to promote: (a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; (b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

67. The responsibility for carrying out this vast field of activity is vested under the authority of the General Assembly in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Council consists of eighteen states elected by the Assembly for three-year terms. Canada was elected to the Economic and Social Council at the First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly and its term of office expires on December 31, 1948.



68. The creation of the Economic and Social Council as a principal organ of the United Nations to deal with economic and social problems is a reflection of the growing importance of international co-operation in such matters and of the realization that overlapping and possibly conflicting policies on the part of the operating agencies can be avoided only if there is a consultative body to facilitate co-ordination.

69. In order to carry out the enormous obligations vested in it by the Charter, the Economic and Social Council has established a large number of Commissions in various fields which have, in turn, set up a number of Sub-commissions. Canada has served as a member on five of these Commissions: the Economic and Employment Commission, the Narcotic Drugs Commission, Population Commission, Social Commission, and the Statistical Commission. These bodies meet periodically and report to the Economic and Social Council on the matters within their mandate. It is only in this way that it would be possible for the United Nations to make any progress in the very broad field which comes under the general jurisdiction of ECOSOC.

70. Another major function of ECOSOC is to act as a liaison between the United Nations and the specialized functional agencies to which large areas of international collaboration have been entrusted. There are eleven of these agencies at the present time, either formed or in the process of formation, and their names indicate the special economic or social program with which they are concerned: the International Labour Organization; the Food and Agriculture Organization; the International Monetary Fund; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the Universal Postal Union; the International Telecommunications Union; the International Civil Aviation Organization; the World Health Organization; the International Refugee Organization; the International Trade Organization; and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Canada is a member of all these specialized agencies. In carrying out its functions it is the task of ECOSOC to bring these agencies and their policies and activities into co-ordination as much as possible. This is not meant to be done by giving the Council overriding authority but rather by the exchange of information, by reciprocal representation and by special consultations. ECOSOC is also charged under Articles 63 and 57 of the Charter with the conclusion of agreements, on behalf of the United Nations with each of these specialized agencies, to bring them into relationship with the United Nations. Already a considerable number of these agreements have been concluded between ECOSOC and the specialized agencies and approved by the General Assembly.

71. It is quite impossible here to give more than a very brief outline of Canada's general policy towards the Economic and Social Council. Perhaps this policy was most concisely stated on October 6, 1947, by the Canadian representative in the Economic Committee of the General Assembly: "The Canadian Government believes that if the Economic and Social Council effectively discharges its obligations it will come to be regarded more and more as the most constructive single organ of the United Nations (with the exception, of course, of the General Assembly itself). While we in no sense under-estimate the supreme importance of the tasks for which the Security Council is responsible, these tasks are preventive rather than constructive - to prevent aggression and threats to the peace. The tasks of the Economic and Social Council, on the other hand, are essentially positive and constructive - to promote human well-being, high standards of living, and human progress generally.... No lasting progress can be made towards bettering the lot of mankind if it is to be plagued with constantly recurring threats of an even more dreadful and cruel war. But if a basis



of lasting and unquestioned peace can be established steady progress becomes possible. The Economic and Social Council has been given the function of pointing the way towards that progress, of helping mankind to move forward to a fuller and richer life and toward the attainment of those larger human freedoms to which we all pledged ourselves in our Charter ....When we examine the activities of the Economic and Social Council, we see a picture of work and progress. Admittedly there have been instances of disappointing and costly, if sometimes inevitable, delay; but happily there has been no suggestion of frustration or stalemate. While there has as yet been little in the way of completed achievement, a careful examination of the work in progress reveals developments that may prove profoundly significant in the gradual establishment of a truly successful international organization. Because much of the Council's work thus far has necessarily been concerned with the preliminary problems of organization, progress has been slower than many hoped or expected. While this organizational period has not yet been completed, during the past year particularly, real progress in problems of substance has admittedly been made." In this statement, as well as by full participation in the sessions of ECOSOC and those of its various commissions, the Canadian Government has shown its strong belief in the importance of the work which, under the Charter, the Economic and Social Council has been assigned.

(b) The Problem of Refugees

72. During 1946 the General Assembly debated at great length the question of giving aid to people who had been displaced as a result of the war and who had refused to return to their places of origin. The political issues which emerged during these debates revealed clearly the extent to which the refugee question was a cause of international misunderstanding and distrust. The states of origin of the refugees (i.e. the Eastern European States) insisted that the majority of people in the displaced persons' camps would willingly accept repatriation if they were genuinely free to do so. If they persisted in choosing exile it was, according to these states, because they were being wilfully misinformed about conditions at home or because they were being subjected to force to make them accept resettlement. The response of the western democracies, including Canada, was based primarily on the principles which had been set forth in the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly on this subject - namely that innocent political refugees (i.e. other than war criminals and traitors) should be assured the right of asylum. From this it followed that no innocent refugee should be forced against his will to accept repatriation to his place of origin.

73. After nearly a year of debate the General Assembly drafted in the autumn of 1946 a constitution for the International Refugee Organization (I.R.O.) and called on member states to sign and ratify this constitution. While recognizing that the task of repatriation was a major function of the proposed I.R.O., the draft constitution, as approved by the Assembly, contained provisions for the re-settlement overseas of political dissidents who did not wish to return to their countries of origin. This draft constitution of the I.R.O. was bitterly opposed by the Soviet Union and the other states of Eastern Europe.

74. Canada had taken an active part in the discussions leading to the drafting of the I.R.O. Constitution and, on August 7, 1947, following approval by its Parliament, Canada ratified the I.R.O. Constitution, thus becoming one of the first major states to accept membership in the I.R.O.



75. The policy of the Canadian Government on this subject was clearly set forth in a statement of December 15, 1946, in the General Assembly, by the Canadian representative, the Hon. Paul Martin. In calling for support of the I.R.O. Constitution he said: "What it is proposed to do in this constitution is nothing more than to meet the immediate problem of giving relief to a million men and women in the world who have the right to ask of an international assembly that their plight should not be overlooked." The Canadian representative emphasized our view that the problem of refugees should be dealt with as early as possible and on an international basis. He added that "beyond everything, we want to emphasize the necessity of making this organization (the I.R.O.) a reality and not merely a legal fiction. Here is one way of dealing with a grave international problem under the auspices of an international organization. It seems to me, for this Assembly, a great test and I trust that we shall meet it."

76. Since these discussions in the General Assembly in 1946, the actions of the Canadian Government have given concrete evidence of its determination to help in the solution of the refugee problem. For example, from June 6, 1947 to April 22, 1948 the Canadian Government has authorized the group movements of 30,000 displaced persons into Canada. In addition applications for admission into Canada may be made by a resident of Canada for certain categories of close relatives, providing the applicant is in a position to receive and care for such relatives. Under the provisions of this scheme concerning the admission of close relatives of Canadian residents, up to June 25, 1948, 27,179 applications had been approved by the Canadian Government. Canada's record in the solution of this problem thus compares very favourably with that of any country in the Western Hemisphere.

(c) The Question of International Relief Following the Termination of UNRRA

77. In the autumn of 1946 the General Assembly was faced with the fact that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) would cease to operate towards the beginning of 1947 and that some of the states which had been receiving relief from UNRRA would continue to need help in 1947. In the discussions of this problem in the 1946 Assembly, it soon became apparent that while the majority of the delegations favoured some international relief plan, the two largest contributors to UNRRA (the United Kingdom and the United States) were not prepared to accept the idea of continuing to deal with international relief through the medium of an agency similar to UNRRA. It was evident that no relief plan could in fact be truly international if the United States and the United Kingdom did not participate in it.

78. Canada had been the third largest contributor to UNRRA, both in its share of costs and as a supplier of goods. Canada's attitude to the establishment of an international relief scheme under the United Nations was made clear in a statement in the Economic Committee of the Assembly by the Canadian representative on November 16, 1946. He then said: "If a concrete United Nations plan for meeting genuine relief needs in 1947 is adopted by this Assembly, and is in fact international in its form and scope, Canada, to the extent that prevailing conditions permit, will participate in its implementation". The late Mr. F.H. LaGuardia, the retiring Director-General of UNRRA, in an effort to find a solution which would be generally acceptable, then said that he was prepared to accept "sight unseen" any plan which Canada might put forward.



79. In reply to this, the Canadian delegation submitted proposals calling for the establishment of a special technical committee of experts to study the minimum import requirements of the basic essentials of life for countries which might be in need of relief; and to report on the amount of financial assistance required by each of these countries. This proposal was adopted by the General Assembly and a special committee, consisting of ten members, was established by the General Assembly for this purpose.

80. The findings of this special committee were completed in January 1947, and, after inconclusive discussion in the Economic and Social Council, this matter was placed again on the agenda of the General Assembly for its Session in the autumn of 1947. In the Assembly debates which ensued, the Eastern European states strongly attacked the United States' post-UNRRA relief policy on the grounds that relief had been granted for political reasons rather than on the basis of need. In reply to the contentions of the Eastern European representatives the United States and other countries which had granted post-UNRRA relief gave details of the aid granted by them during this period. It soon became apparent that it would not be possible for the Economic Committee or for the General Assembly to adopt a generally acceptable resolution on this subject in view of the sharp political controversy which has been aroused. Hence no recommendation was adopted on this subject at the 1947 Assembly.

81. At the 1946 Assembly the Canadian delegation had strongly urged that the continuing problem of relief in war devastated areas should be accepted as an international responsibility. Canada, therefore, participated in the activities of the technical committee which was established, on the basis of a Canadian proposal, to determine the extent to which relief was needed. Also, on July 31, 1947, contributions were made available by the Canadian Government for European relief to the amount of \$17,900,000. Of this sum, \$5,000,000 was made available for the International Children's Emergency Fund (I.C.E.F.), thus making Canada one of the major contributors to the I.C.E.F. Again, under the authority of the Export Credits Insurance Act, Canada had, up to June 12, 1948, advanced credits to eight different countries to the amount of \$508,077,328.10 (out of a total of authorized credits of \$594,500,000). Canada has also agreed to subscribe \$325,000,000 to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the purpose of helping to finance the rebuilding of devastated areas; and in March of 1946, as is well known, the Canadian Government granted a loan of \$1,250,000,000 to the United Kingdom. As mentioned earlier, Canada became a member of the International Refugee Organization in the summer of 1947 and the Canadian contribution to the I.R.O. amounted to approximately \$5,500,000 in 1947. Finally, independent Canadian groups, working on a voluntary basis, have made shipments of supplies and cash transfers to people living in war devastated areas to the amount of \$17,992,404.59 from January of 1947 to April of 1948 inclusive. From September of 1939 to the present date, Canadian voluntary overseas relief totals more than \$100,000,000. These are actions which demonstrate the contribution which both the people and the Government of Canada have made in this field.



V. PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE FORM AND ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

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(a) The Question of the Veto

82. At the San Francisco Conference and since that time the problem of voting procedure in the Security Council has been one of the most controversial issues in the United Nations. This debate has arisen from the wording of Article 27 of the Charter which states that "decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of any seven members". Decisions on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of any seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members - provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI of the Charter, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

83. The Charter contains few clear indications as to what matters shall be considered procedural and what matters shall not be so considered. In other words, there is no clear delineation as to which matters shall be subject to the veto (or the unanimity of the permanent members, as it is sometimes called) and which matters shall be decided by the vote of any seven members of the Council. At the San Francisco Conference the smaller powers submitted a large number of questions to the four sponsoring powers at that Conference (China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union). These questions were aimed at a clarification of the vagueness so evident in the portion of the draft Charter which dealt with voting procedure in the Security Council. On June 7, 1945, the four sponsoring powers issued a joint Statement in reply, and this Statement was immediately agreed to by France. In the Statement, these Governments pledged that: "It is not to be assumed, however, that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their 'veto' power wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council". (This reference to the veto power of the non-permanent members arises from the fact that it would be possible for any five of the six non-permanent members voting together to block almost any action by the Security Council). It was on this assurance that the smaller powers reluctantly accepted the formula on voting procedure in the Security Council now contained in Article 27 of the Charter.

84. The last paragraph of this joint Statement at San Francisco contains a clause which has provoked some of the most bitter discussion in the United Nations. Because the Charter is not clear as to what subjects are to be considered procedural and what are to be considered non-procedural, the smaller powers at San Francisco addressed the following question to the four sponsoring powers: "In case a decision has to be taken as to whether a certain point is a procedural matter, is that preliminary question to be considered itself as a procedural matter, or is the veto applicable to such preliminary question?" The answer of the sponsoring powers was: "The decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not such a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members". In other words, this paragraph of the joint Statement was to the effect that the preliminary question, as to whether or not a matter was procedural, was itself subject to the veto. The interpretation of this statement by some of the permanent members in the Security Council has given rise to the procedure known as the "double veto". In the San Francisco Statement, the sponsoring powers declared that the Charter itself contained "an indication of the application of the voting procedures to the various functions of the Council" and that it was unlikely that any matters would arise in the future when a decision would have to be taken as to whether a procedural vote would apply.



85. The record of the Security Council since the San Francisco Conference is common knowledge and there is no need to repeat the statements which have so often been made concerning the misuse of the veto power by one of the five permanent members - namely the Soviet Union. Despite the assurances given in the San Francisco Statement that the veto power would not be used "wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council", the Soviet Union has used its right of veto many times to block the admission of new members to the United Nations, and to frustrate the Security Council from forming subordinate bodies to receive and hear evidence on particular disputes. Neither of these subjects are considered by the great majority of the United Nations as matters in which the veto power of the permanent members should be properly employed. The result has been that considerable bitterness has developed and many suggestions have been made, either for the abolition of the veto or for having its use restricted to matters arising from Chapter VII of the Charter - i.e. actions in respect of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression.

86. During the 1946 Session of the General Assembly a proposal was made by Cuba that a general conference of the United Nations should be held, under Article 109 of the Charter, for the purpose both of reviewing the clauses relating to the voting procedure in the Council, and of recommending alterations. As the majority of the members of the Assembly felt that it was premature at that time to call such a general conference, this proposal was defeated by 7 in favour, 27 against (including Canada) and 8 abstentions. After long discussion in the Assembly, an alternative resolution was adopted, requesting the permanent members of the Security Council to make every effort to ensure that "the use of the special voting privilege of its permanent members does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly". The Assembly resolution also recommended to the Security Council "the early adoption of practices and procedures, consistent with the Charter, to assist in reducing the difficulties in the operation of Article 27". On December 13, 1946, the Canadian representative in the General Assembly, speaking in support of this resolution, said: "It clearly means, however, that we, the members of the Assembly, believe that the Security Council has yet to demonstrate that it is capable of doing the job the United Nations has a right to expect of it and which is expected of it by the peoples of the world."

87. In the course of the first eight months of 1947, it became apparent that this resolution of the General Assembly had had very little effect on the continued use of the veto power in the Security Council by the Soviet Union. So the General Assembly in its 1947 Session considered an Argentine proposal (similar to the one previously made by Cuba) that a general conference of the United Nations be called under Article 109 of the Charter to consider the abolition of the veto. An alternative approach to the problem of voting procedure in the Security Council was made by the United States delegation. In his opening speech before the General Assembly on September 17, 1947, the Chairman of the United States delegation, General Marshall, announced that the United States would waive its right of veto on all subjects in the Security Council, except on those which came under Chapter VII of the Charter. When the subject was discussed in the Political Committee of the Assembly, the United States delegation proposed that this whole problem of voting procedure in the Security Council should be referred for detailed study to the Interim Committee (whose establishment was being debated at that time). The United States proposal also requested the permanent members of the Security



Council consult together to obtain agreement on the proposal. After discussion, the United States proposal was adopted by 38 votes in favour (including Canada), 6 against and 11 abstentions. The problem was thus referred to the Interim Committee.

88. Subsequently the Interim Committee was formed and a Sub-committee was appointed to consider this problem. Canada was appointed as a member of this Sub-committee. In the course of its meetings, the Sub-committee examined in great detail over ninety possible decisions which the Security Council might make and made recommendations in regard to the vast majority of these possible decisions. These recommendations, which have now been adopted by the Interim Committee would set out in great detail those decisions of the Security Council which should be considered procedural; and those decisions which, whether procedural or not, should be subject to a decision by the affirmative vote of any seven members of the Council. Canada strongly supported these recommendations of the Sub-committee. If given final approval, they will go far to limit the application of the veto to matters arising out of Chapter VII of the Charter. This would be in accordance with the views of the great majority of the members of the United Nations. The Sub-committee also considered and rejected another Argentine proposal that a general conference be called under Article 109 of the Charter to consider amendment of the Charter. This proposal was later adopted in a modified form by the Interim Committee. In opposing this proposal in the Sub-committee, the Canadian representative stated his country's view that it would be best, first of all, to continue to make every effort to liberalize voting procedure in the Council by voluntary agreement. If such efforts proved fruitless, the question of a general conference could then be considered again.

89. The Canadian view on this whole question of voting procedure in the Council as it relates to pacific settlement was set forth in a memorandum submitted by the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly on November 30, 1946. This memorandum reads in part as follows: "The special voting position in the Security Council of its permanent members imposes on each of them special responsibilities, since failure by any one of them to agree with certain decisions supported by the requisite number of other members of the Council might prevent the Council from exercising its functions as the supreme agency of international conciliation. In view of these special responsibilities, each permanent member is under an obligation to all the other members of the United Nations not to use its special voting position to obstruct the work of the Council .... Under the proviso to paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter, a party to a dispute is required to abstain from voting in decisions under Chapter VI. This proviso would be rendered of no effect if a permanent member of the Security Council could veto a decision that a dispute exists or that it is, itself, a party to a dispute. Therefore, the Security Council should work out agreed procedures to ensure that no State is judge in its own cause."

90. The view of the Canadian Government in regard to the San Francisco Statement was given in the Security Council on May 21 of this year when the Czechoslovak question was being considered. The Canadian representative then said: "In the view of the Canadian delegation, this document was of importance for the purpose of clarifying the views of the sponsoring governments at the San Francisco Conference. In fact, as has been pointed out a number of times, it was on the clear undertaking on the part of the sponsoring governments that they would not use their veto 'wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council', that the other members of the United Nations acquiesced in the voting procedure proposed, which, otherwise, would have been far from satisfactory to them." He



gave his Government's opinion that this clause in the San Francisco Statement had been more honoured in the breach than in the observance by one of the permanent members of the Council and said that "where one portion of this Statement has been violated, as this portion has so frequently been, the validity of the document as a whole is certainly brought into question". He added that the San Francisco Statement was not a part of the Charter, nor in any sense an annex to it, and that fifty-three of the fifty-eight members of the United Nations were thus not bound by its terms. The Canadian Government, for example, certainly does not consider itself bound by this Statement.

91. The studies and recommendations on the problem of voting procedure which have taken place in Sub-committee 3 of the Interim Committee, and which have recently been considered in the Interim Committee itself, are, in the view of the Canadian Government, of great importance to the future of the United Nations. In matters such as the admission of new members, the establishment of sub-committees and commissions of enquiry, and in other actions relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, the great majority of the members of the United Nations quite obviously believe that the veto power should not apply, and that to use it in matters such as this is to frustrate any useful action which the United Nations can undertake in the conciliation of international disputes. This point of view is reflected in the recommendations of this Sub-committee -- recommendations which the Canadian Government supports. These recommendations, together with other proposals on this subject, come up for discussion again at the present Session of the General Assembly. There is no doubt that this problem of the veto will be one of the most controversial issues on the agenda of this Session of the Assembly.

(b) The Establishment of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly

92. In his opening speech at the Second Session of the General Assembly in 1947, the Chairman of the United States delegation (General Marshall) said that his delegation would introduce a resolution proposing the creation of a standing committee of the Assembly, consisting of all members of the United Nations, for the purpose of dealing with situations and disputes under Articles 11 and 14 of the Charter. Because of the extensive use of the veto in the Security Council by the Soviet Union during the previous eighteen months that body had frequently been unable to act even in matters of seemingly minor importance and of a procedural character. Also, the agenda of each succeeding General Assembly Session was becoming heavier and it was increasingly difficult to cover all matters in the period allotted to ordinary sessions. Many delegations therefore agreed that some standing committee could well take on duties which might facilitate and expedite the work of the United Nations in general and make the General Assembly a more efficient working body.

93. The main discussion of this United States proposal, when it was submitted to the Political Committee of the Assembly, centered around the powers to be allotted to the proposed committee and the matters which it should be permitted to discuss. Various delegations warned against giving the proposed committee powers that properly belonged either to the Security Council or to the General Assembly. The United States delegation made it clear that, according to its proposal, the committee would be a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and would in no way infringe upon the powers of the Security Council. The delegation of the Soviet Union objected to the proposal on the grounds that it was a violation of the Charter and a deliberate attempt to circumvent the Security Council. Other eastern European states made similar objections,



Yugoslavia, for instance, claiming that this proposal was a disguised attack on the rule of unanimity amongst the permanent members of the Security Council.

94. Amendments to the United States proposal were put forward by various delegations. These included a Canadian amendment which would have added to the functions of the proposed committee by giving it the task both of considering the extent to which resolutions of the General Assembly had been put into effect and also of initiating preliminary consideration of provisional items on the Assembly's agenda.

95. Eventually a Sub-committee was established, under the Chairmanship of the Canadian representative, to consider these various amendments and to prepare a composite resolution. After discussion, the Sub-committee agreed on a joint resolution and this was adopted both by the Political Committee and by the General Assembly - in the latter case by 41 votes in favour, 6 against and 6 abstentions. Canada voted in favour of the joint resolution. The Soviet Union and the other eastern European states, which had bitterly opposed the establishment of this Interim Committee, announced their decision not to participate in it and reiterated their view that its establishment was a breach of the Charter.

96. On October 18, 1947, in the General Assembly, the Canadian representative made known his country's view on the proposed establishment of the Interim Committee. He said that the failure of the United Nations to achieve success was largely due to the failure of the Security Council to agree within itself. One way of escape from this dilemma lay in expanding and strengthening the functions of the General Assembly, and it was in this light that Canada saw the value of the Interim Committee. In the Canadian view there was no doubt that the Interim Committee was constitutional under the Charter. The Canadian delegation felt that this Interim Committee should not be given wide powers at its inception, but should be allowed to take up all matters relating to peace and security which were within the competence of the General Assembly. The Canadian representative concluded by saying: "If the experiment which we are contemplating will have the effect of making the organization more effective, and that is our only purpose in supporting it, it will repay a thousandfold the effort which we shall expend upon it. The Canadian delegation will gladly co-operate in making the experiment in the hope that the instrument which we are creating may help speedily to remove the circumstances which make it necessary."

97. The Interim Committee held its first meetings in January of this year and ultimately agreed to establish three main Sub-committees to deal with: (a) proposals and recommendations dealing with the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security (Sub-committee 2); (b) the problem of voting procedure in the Security Council (Sub-committee 3, of which Canada is a member); (c) recommendations concerning the establishment of a permanent committee of the General Assembly (Sub-committee 4). These three Sub-committees have held numerous meetings and their recommendations have been considered by the Interim Committee itself. It is likely that all three of these subjects will come up for extensive discussion at the present session of the General Assembly in Paris.



98. While it is still too early to make a general assessment of the work achieved by the Interim Committee to date, there can be no doubt that the various proposals considered and recommended by its three Sub-committees are of enormous importance in regard to the future form and organization of the United Nations.

(c) The Admission of New Members

99. Another matter which has caused great controversy in the United Nations concerns the election of new members to the organization. The relevant Article of the Charter on this subject is Article 4, which lays down five conditions for membership in the United Nations. According to Article 4, paragraph 1, the applicant must (a) be a state; (b) be peace-loving; (c) accept the obligations of the Charter; (d) be able to carry out these obligations; and (e) be willing to do so. The second paragraph of Article 4 states that the admission of any such state for membership in the United Nations will be effected "by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

100. Despite the clear wording of Article 4, a number of applications for membership in the United Nations have been vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council on such grounds as, for example, that the applicant state did not enjoy diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In the view of the Canadian Government, such a criterion is completely irrelevant and the sole point at issue is whether or not the applicant state fulfils the requirements of Article 4. The Canadian position on this subject was stated clearly by the Canadian representative in the Political Committee of the General Assembly on November 7, 1947: "The attitude of the Canadian delegation towards admission of new members to the United Nations is based on Article 4 of the Charter. Applicants should be considered on their merits. Their qualifications should be judged on the principles defined in the Charter. The applicant must be a peace-loving state, it must accept the obligations of the Charter and it must be able and willing to carry out these obligations. This basis of judgment was approved by the General Assembly itself in a resolution of November 19, 1946, which states that each application must be examined on its merits 'as measured by the yardstick of the Charter in accordance with Article 4'. We therefore reject any considerations extraneous to the Charter, such as whether or not the applicant state is in diplomatic relations with certain members of the United Nations."

101. On May 28, 1948, the majority of the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion on the question as to whether the conditions in Article 4, paragraph 1, were exhaustive or whether other considerations should be taken into account in determining the admission of new members. The opinion of the majority of the Court was, briefly, that considerations other than those given in Article 4 were extraneous and irrelevant to the question of membership. The opinion of the Canadian Government is in accordance with this advisory opinion of the majority of the International Court. To summarize, the Canadian Government believes that, if the applicant state fulfils the requirements enumerated in Article 4, its application for membership in the United Nations should be approved by the Security Council and by the General Assembly.

(d) Rules of Procedure and the Election of Officers

102. Anyone who has been to an international conference will recognize the real importance of having good rules of procedure. Without unambiguous and well-considered rules, an international conference may well become embroiled in long and fruitless debates on procedure, which



frustrate its real tasks. For example, at the San Francisco Conference nearly half the time of the conference was taken up with procedural discussions - debates not on what the conference should decide, but on how it should go about making a decision.

103. It is probably no exaggeration to say that Canada has played as active a role as any other state in the development of rules of procedure for the General Assembly and in the attempt to secure the adoption of more effective rules of procedure for the Security Council in regard to the pacific settlement of disputes. For example, on September 8, 1947, a Committee on Procedures and Organization of the General Assembly met under the Chairmanship of the Canadian representative, Mr. Escott Reid. This Committee held fifteen meetings and presented a report to the General Assembly suggesting a considerable number of changes designed to improve the Assembly's rules of procedure. These suggestions were largely approved by the Legal Committee of the Assembly and were eventually adopted on November 17, 1947, by the General Assembly itself, to take effect as from January 1, 1948. It is only by good rules of procedure that the General Assembly can use the time available for its sessions to the best possible advantage. Progress in this field is therefore very important because, if men of high ability and prominence in their own countries believe that a good deal of the time of the Assembly is being wasted, members of the United Nations will find it increasing difficult to send first-rate delegations.

104. On the same general principle of saving time and of improving efficiency, Canadian delegations have repeatedly insisted on the use of clear and direct language in the resolutions and conventions adopted by the United Nations. If resolutions are adopted which are ambiguous and confusing, they will certainly lead to a great waste of time in the future and may even lead to charges of bad faith and serious international resentment. Moreover, if the decisions of the United Nations are to be comprehensible to the general public and are to gain their support, they must be embodied in simple and forceful language appropriate to the importance of the decision.

105. With the same goal of improving efficiency, Canadian delegations have consistently placed emphasis on personal competence in the election of officers in the United Nations, as opposed to any other considerations. One of the recurrent themes of controversy in the Assembly has been the relevant importance to be attached to "efficiency" and to "adequate geographic representation". This theme runs through innumerable debates on the Secretariat, on the Chairmanship of the Assembly Committees, and on the membership of these Committees and of the various Councils. Canada has consistently stressed the maximum efficiency, although recognizing that a completely unbalanced geographic representation would be harmful.

106. For the same reason, the Canadian Government has refused to nominate Canadians for positions on the Secretariat. Canada's view has been that the Secretary-General cannot carry out his obligations if national governments press him to appoint their nationals. Canada has also insisted that any Canadians who are appointed to the Secretariat of the United Nations or of an international specialized agency are in no sense responsible to the Canadian Government for their activities as members of such a secretariat.



107. By urging practices and policies of this nature the Canadian Government has made a considerable effort in the direction of trying to make the internal organization of the United Nations operate with maximum efficiency. This is in accordance with the statement by Mr. St. Laurent on April 29, 1948, quoted earlier, concerning Canada's determination to utilize the present possibilities of the United Nations "to the fullest extent".

## VI. CONCLUSION

108. This has been an outline of the general policy of the Canadian Government towards the United Nations with illustrations of how this policy has been practised in regard to specific issues. Now certain basic principles might be mentioned which govern Canada's policy in external affairs and which reflect themselves in the Canadian participation in the United Nations.

109. In the first place, Canada is forced, of course, to recognize the limitations imposed upon a secondary power. To quote again from the Gray lecture delivered by the former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs in Toronto on January 13, 1947: "No society of nations can prosper if it does not have the support of those who hold a major share of the world's military and economic power. There is little point in a country of our stature recommending international action if those who must carry the major burden of whatever action is taken are not in sympathy." Although Canada must realistically recognize that its role in the United Nations is not a paramount one, it would be even less realistic to pretend that Canada has no influence. Canada has both the capacity and independence to press vigorously for the principles in which Canadians believe. Nor will Canada be casually dismissed. This has already been proven many times, as this outline has endeavoured to show.

110. Secondly, Canada's Government, like all democratic governments, must so frame its policy that it achieves general support from all sections of its people and not merely from special groups or interests. To quote once more from the Gray lecture: "A policy of world affairs, to be truly effective, must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad support of large groups of the population .... No policy can be regarded as wise which divides the people whose effort and resources must put it into effect". National unity must, therefore, be a major concern of Canada's external policy - again as in the case of all other democratic states.

111. The third principle which has been reflected in Canadian policy is the Canadian conception of political liberty. Canadians are all conscious of the danger to their own political institutions when freedom is attacked in other parts of the world. Consistently they have sought and found their friends among those of similar political traditions of liberty. This concern with political freedom leads inevitably to another fundamental principle of Canada's external policy - the rule of law in international affairs. In the Canadian political system the supremacy of law is so familiar that Canadians are in danger of taking it for granted. Internationally, Canada has in recent times witnessed a degree of lawlessness perhaps never equalled before. Yet, if Canadians really believe in the principles of their own society, they must be governed by these principles in their international relations. If their experience tells them that the only healthy society is one in which



the people give their consent to the laws by which they are governed, then they must work unceasingly for the acceptance of this rule of law in the international sphere. The Canadian Government has constantly followed this principle.

112. These are some of the broad principles which underlie Canadian external policy and which reflect themselves in Canadian participation in the United Nations. This outline has shown how the Canadian Government has endeavoured to develop these principles into action.

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