





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


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
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THE
Present Measures
Proved to be the
ONLY MEANS
Of Securing the
Balance of Power in *Europe*,
As well as the
LIBERTY and INDEPENDENCY
OF
GREAT-BRITAIN.


With OBSERVATIONS on that Chimerical
Insinuation, *That more Regard is had to
the Welfare of Hanover, than to the
Interest of these Kingdoms.*

Being REMARKS on a Pamphlet, intituled,
*An Impartial Review of the present Troubles in
Germany, &c.*

To which is prefix'd,
A LETTER from a MEMBER OF PARLIA-
MENT, relating to the Behaviour of the Pretended
PATRIOTS.

L O N D O N :
Printed for J. ROBERTS, in *Warwick-Lane.* 1743.

(Price One Shilling.)





DEAR SIR,

DAILY Experience but too plainly shews, that this Nation abounds in Men, who under the specious Veil of *Patriotism* spare no pains, and avail themselves of every Delusive Art to render the Prince on the Throne, and all those employed under him, odious to the People; setting their Conduct in a false and malicious Light, with the sole View of stirring up Confusion,

A 2

and

and bringing Things to a melancholy Crisis, that they may advance their private Interest, which they know entirely depends on the Distraction of the State; like that of Incendiaries, who set Houses on fire, that they may rob and plunder unobserved, in the Tumult and Confusion that such Accidents naturally occasion.

WHAT a pity it is, that this Island should harbour such ravenous Vultures, to prey upon her Vitals! But since it is her unhappy Lot, I think it the Duty of every honest Man, lest the Venom should spread, to set things in a fair and clear Light to his Fellow-Subjects, that they may judge for themselves; (and the People
of

of *England* always judge right, when rightly informed.) And as I now perceive, among the many villanous and diabolical Schemes, forg'd and made use of to inflame the People, and alienate their Affections from their Sovereign, the chimerical and black Insinuation, That our Prince has a greater Regard for his *German* than his *British* Dominions, and that *these* are subjected to the Measures of *those*: I thought the proving that Assertion to be false and groundless, would be of the utmost Consequence towards quieting the Minds of Mankind, and cementing an happy Union between the King, the States, and the People; and it is for that Reason I undertook to answer the Author of the *Review of Germany*,
 whose

whose whole Pamphlet is built upon the foregoing Insinuation, and is an Eccho to the *Case of the Hanover Troops*.

WHEN I advise my Country-men not to be seduced by crafty Incendiaries, and not precipitate themselves into a Sea of apparent Misfortunes; I would not be understood by any, (by you I am sure I shall not) to be a greater Friend to the Crown than the People: for if ever any Competition should arise, no Man in *Britain* would more zealously espouse the Cause of Liberty; which you, my Friend, know to be true, from being an Eye-witness of my opposing both the last and present Ministry, when in the wrong: and I can
 promise

promise you, as long as I live, I will follow that Maxim inviolably.

WHAT Approbation I meet with from any Party, I am careless of, as I am sure I shall have yours; and likewise the Satisfaction of Voting as you do, which will confirm me that I am in the right. I would advise the People to be circumspect, and not jealous: An honest careful Attention to their Interest is absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Happy and Free Constitution; but Jealousy can tend to nothing but to inflame, divide, and weaken the whole Body; the Consequence of which must be, that wicked and ill-designing Men will avail themselves of such

Oppor-

Opportunities, and both Crown and
People must suffer.

I WILL finish my Letter with a
Remark of a favourite Author of
yours :

— *Si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti; si non, his utere
mecum.*

Your humble Servant.

York, Sept. 30.
1743.





R E M A R K S

Upon a PAMPHLET, entitled,

*An impartial Review of the
present Troubles of Ger-
many, &c.*

CONSIDERING how modestly the Author of the *Impartial Review of the Troubles in Germany* pretends to think of his own Abilities at first setting out, in the Sequel he is exceeding bold, not to say rash, in giving his Opinion ; which, I presume, he does, to shew he is no lukewarm Jacobite, or Friend to the Pretender, whatever risk he may put his Judgment and Integrity to, as a Politician.

B

BUT

BUT as the fairest and surest way of exposing an Author, is by shewing how weak, contradictory, and groundless his Propositions, Arguments, and Assertions are, I shall rather take that course, than follow his own Example of vilifying and calumniating by harsh and boorish Invectives. I shall calmly, and as concisely as possible, endeavour to answer every malicious and false Asseveration contained in the numerous and bitter-turn'd Paragraphs of the Pamphlet: And tho' I will not take upon me the teasing Drudgery of answering Paragraph by Paragraph, many of them being only the Ecchoes to one another, having the same Matter in them; but only a different Jingle of Words and Rolling of Periods, to stun one into a co-inciding of Opinion, as the ancient *Bacchanalians* by the jingling of their Instruments and their confused Cries and Clamours, made those they met as mad as themselves: But tho', I say, I will not take so great a Drudgery upon me, I will however,

as a proper Antidote against the Poifon, confute every material Argument and Affertion.

HE begins with pretending to give us the Sense and Opinion of all the foreign Ministers at *Ratifbon*, which must be as ridiculous, as it is false; for at *Ratifbon*, where then were met foreign Ministers from all the different Princes in *Europe*, and no two Princes having the same Interest in, and consequently not the same manner of judging of the Affairs of *Europe*, how is it possible that all the Ministers should be of the same way of thinking with our Author? For tho' Truth is but one, and there is but one right way of judging of Things, yet so are Men and Bodies of Men hurried away by Views of Interest, that scarce two private Persons, or two Princes, look upon the same Thing in the same Light, each endeavouring to turn it to his own Advantage. The *Germanick* Body is certainly a very great and powerful Body collectively, nor shall any thing the Reviewer has said make me change or lessen my Opinion of it; nor does the Pro-

perty of some particular Territories passing from one Prince to another, both belonging to that Body, any ways weaken the Body itself. Did not *England*, after the Civil War was ended, nay, before that was quite extinguished, when the Property of the whole Nation almost had changed Hands, and the Seat of Power totally changed ; nay, the very Effence of our Constitution, the Parliament, the *Englisch* Diet, was annihilated ; I say, did not this Country then make as great a Figure, and shew its Power, with regard to all outward Operations and Tranfactions, as much as ever it did since it was a Nation ? And it is only with regard to its outward Operations, that the Power or Impotence of the *Germanick* Body is, or can be, of the least Consequence to an *Englishman*.

HANOVER, he says, should have been kept in its original Subordination. I don't know what some People may idly and wantonly imagine ; but in my opinion, as an *Englishman*, and an *Englishman* that thinks
well,

well, and wishes most heartily well to my King and Country, *Hanover* now is under the best Subordination; nay, under the only Subordination it ought to be to *England*, and to *English* Measures and Maxims. Before the Act of Succession pass'd, it was always under the Influence of *France*; but ever since that Act pass'd, it has exerted itself as much and more steadily in the Support of the House of *Austria*, than any of the other Electorates, tho' they were more able to do it.

SUCH is the Malignity of our Jacobite Author, that to asperse the present Family upon the Throne, even the sacred Ashes of that Great Prince, General and Statesman, King *William*, must be rak'd up by the fœtid Malice of his venomous Pen; and the most consummate sound Maxims of Policy confounded, to support wicked Hypotheses, as scandalous Assertions and false Interpretation. But here, and here only, the Gentleman seems to have some regard for his own Character, by not insisting long on this
Topick,

Topick, remembering the Fable of the Viper and the File, and fearing to discover himself too much. But tho' he does not directly calumniate that Prince, yet he endeavours to vilify every Action of his Reign ; the Partition-Treaty is trump'd up, and laid as a Crime to the Charge of that Prince, and as a Slur upon his Memory. But any one, that can remember what was doing at that time of day, must know, that the Partition-Treaty was forc'd upon him ; I will not say, by whom ; by the not supporting him in Measures he was encourag'd by his Parliament to undertake. For if ever there was a Prince that had a thorough Aversion to the Tyranny of the *French* King, and a hearty Zeal for the common Cause, it was King *William* ; and whenever he did not succeed, the Fault will easily and clearly be found to be in his Want of Support from those who were most interested in the Success of his Undertakings : but those, who acting the Part of Friends to *France*, hinder'd him from being supported, were the first to lay the blame wrongfully upon him.

THE

THE next Fault laid to that Monarch's Charge, is his having establish'd this Family on the Throne of *England*; tho' there seems to be a double-edg'd Malice in this Accusation: yet, upon mature Consideration, it is the fairest Paragraph in the whole Pamphlet, as it shews the Author's Intentions plainly and undeniably, the whole Party-man stands confess'd, by this he declares himself a Jacobite, and sets a Mark upon himself and his Writings; *Hic niger est, hunc tu Romane caveto.*

THE next Paragraph is a sort of Self-cherisher, and Compliment to his own extraordinary Abilities and Judgment, hinting at something none but himself can comprehend, that would better have brought about King *William's* Designs than what he and his Council, nay, the whole Nation, after mature Consideration, could find out. The Objection rais'd by our Author, against the Family, was so far from being an Objection with our Ancestors, that

that it was a principal Inducement to court them to accept of this Crown; I mean, the acquiring of an additional Strength in the Empire. And therefore if our acquiring, by this happy and easy Means, an additional Strength in the Empire, was so desirable; surely the more the Electorate increases in Riches and Power, the greater Benefit must accrue to us of course, from that Increase. And it is notorious, that this has never been attempted out of the Spoils of the House of *Austria*, at the Expence of which one Elector has attempted it, and succeeded; another attempted, but miscarried; and miscarried, why? through the means of the King of *England*, and Elector of *Hanover*, conjointly: for if they had not been both one and the same, the last hinted-at Elector would have succeeded as well as the first. As to the raising a Spirit of Jealousy in the Empire, every powerful Prince will be jealous of a powerful Neighbour; and all Princes, great or small, whether in *Germany* or out of *Germany*, will pursue their Interest closely, well or ill understood.

LEWIS the Fourteenth comes next upon the Carpet, and it becomes necessary to falsify and misrepresent his Conduct, in order to bring our Author's System to bear. (I am sure our Author is no *French-man*, or else *l'honneur du Roy* would not have permitted him to have done that, nay, he durst not have attempted it.) But I should be glad to know, how *Lewis* came to take so much Pains to induce our Ministers to accept of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, in a secret (though now well-known) Article of which, he stipulates and agrees to furnish Men and Money, and if necessary, *totis viribus*, to assist the Pretender to mount the Throne of *England*, after the Queen's Death: I say, I should be glad to know how came *Lewis* to enter heartily into this Engagement, if he knew the *Hanoverian* Succession would turn out so much more to his Advantage? But as a Proof of his not thinking so as long as he lived, he did all that lay in his power to accomplish his *Roman Catholick* Engagement; and had he

lived much longer, I doubt whether the present Family would have preserved their lawful Possession of this Crown ; so many Jacobites there then were in *England*, and *Lewis* so inveterate to this Family, so enthusiastic a Bigot, and so great a Tool to the Priests.

WHAT might happen after the coming of this Family, I don't believe the wisest Man could have foretold ; in such a lamentable Situation did our Author's Jacobite Friends put us, and all the World, by the never to be forgotten, nor forgiven, Treaty of *Utrecht* : nay, had our double-sighted politick Juggler been as great a Statesman then as he is now, I defy him to have guess'd.

THE next Fault he is pleas'd to find with this Government is, our having acted in Concert with *France*, during the Regency of the late Duke of *Orleans* ; which is as maliciously interpreted as every thing he has undertaken to criticise upon. It is a bold Word to say, but I will aver, *France* was not *France*
for

for that Time ; it was not then following its wonted *Routine* of Politicks, in oppressing the Liberty, and confounding the Property of Mankind, nor aggrandizing itself, and every Branch of the *Bourbon* Family, at the Expence of the House of *Austria*, and the rest of *Europe* : No, it was, consonant to Treaties, and, beyond Expectation, supporting the *Orleans* Branch against the House of *Spain*. What could be more natural, nay, more necessary, than for *England* to join in Measures so well calculated for the Preservation of the Liberties of *Europe*, and to prevent the Uniting and Junction of which two Branches, so much Blood and Treasure had been spilt ? nay, on our supporting the *Orleans* Branch, depended the keeping this Family on the Throne.

NOR did we, in this Conjunction, neglect our own private Interest, for we seiz'd on this Opportunity to destroy the *Spanish* Fleet ; which has never been able to give us the least Umbrage since. But before I finish my

Answer to this Part of the Reviewer's Argument, I beg leave to know whether this Family had any Hand in that infamous Treachery, the Treaty of *Utrecht* ; whether it was not made by the same Set of Men who hinder'd King *William* from bringing (at half the Expence) the *French* as low as they were before that Treaty ; which left them very little weaker, nay, I believe I may say, stronger than at his Death. Surely, the obstructing the Fall, and the propping up and assisting the Recovery of the Power of *France*, is of a piece ; and by the Work, the Workmen may be known.

THE next Paragraph bursts forth, big with Venom, and pouring out the genuine Offspring of our Inflamer's pestilential Principles ; at the Head of which stalks that Hackney Lye, the Parliament's not having govern'd itself according to the Sense of the Nation, since the Expulsion, or rather cowardly Abdication of the worst Prince, of the worst Race of Princes, that ever harras'd a Nation.

A great Compliment this to both Houses of Parliament, and likewise to the People in general, for their repeated and considerate Choice of their Representatives!

Now comes on a most arduous Task, the endeavouring to give the same Turn to our Politicks, from the Queen's Death to this Time. As all his Knowledge and Subtilty cannot help him to account for them in his own way, he makes use of an enchanted Key, to unlock all the Cabinets of all the Princes in *Europe*; out of which he extracts this Maxim, (borrow'd from a late Pamphlet, famous for the Truth of its Predictions) That *Hanover* has guided the Councils of *England*, since the Accession: and to prove this Maxim, he has turn'd an old Mortgage, the Electors of *Hanover* had on *Bremen* and *Verden*, into a Purchase made with *English* Money: This every one, who is thoroughly acquainted with the Affairs of *Germany*, can testify. But the Insinuation is one of the most artful; for when two Countries are under one Prince,

Prince, and their Interests become the same, it is in the power of any Man to say, this takes the Lead, or that, though in effect neither; both being guided by the common Good: and, I believe, nobody can now deny but that they both exert themselves for the Honour of their King, and the common good Cause of all *Europe*; and consequently their own.

IT next is alledg'd as a Fault, the late King's not having a more particular personal Regard for the late Emperor, the proudest, most ungrateful Prince in the World; who always used his best Friends worst, when he no longer stood in need of them; of which we ourselves are a home Example.

I THINK it would have been most surprising, if the King had had any more Respect for him than Policy forced him to, after the good Offices the Emperor had done that Monarch, at the Court of *Berlin*, by his Minister Count *Sinzendorff*, which, in its Consequence,

sequence, has been the most fatal Stroke the Protestant Interest has felt these many Years; and I believe I may add, the common Cause: it having been, in a great measure, the Occasion that it has not been in the power of this Elector of *Hanover* to assist the Queen of *Hungary* so soon, and so effectually as he earnestly wish'd.

I SHALL not trouble the Reader with any more than the two following Reasons for *England's* not declaring War against *France*, and assisting the Emperor in the last War: *First*, That the *Dutch* (without whom we ought never to engage in a Land-War) had signed a Neutrality with *France*, before any Measures could be taken here; which any one that knows the Constitution of our Government, must acknowledge, can't be executed as soon as projected. The next Reason is, that we are not oblig'd to be the House of *Austria's* Hectors, and make every Quarrel they are wicked or foolish enough to draw upon themselves, our own; especially, as we

and all the World knew, that the Ministers and Governors of that Court were then under the Influence of *France*, and the poorer Prince fold to the richer.

BUT now a new Scene presents itself. We are now acting vigorously, according to our Treaties and Obligations, which must likewise be deem'd a Fault; and what is most strange, a Fault of the same kind as our Inactivity. This Remark at first made me think the Author was a *Frenchman*; but upon mature Consideration, and finding his Words and Sentiments to be literally the same with those used by the Jacobites against the Act of Succession, and his particular Hatred not only to the present King, but all his Family, convinces me he is an *English* Jacobite. For a *Frenchman*, that believes the Remarks in the Pamphlet, and the Inferences from those Remarks to be just and true, would never have tried to raise a Spirit (which is the Author's Intention) in *England*, either among the weak or un-

found,

found, that might any ways obstruct Measures, which he concludes hurtful to *England*; and of consequence, of the greatest Advantage to *France*.

I SAY, this Pamphlet is wrote to raise a Spirit, I may say a Flame in the Nation, and to deceive Mankind, and cover the black lurking Design by artful Accusations on our Ministers, and fair Professions of Patriotism. The worst Cause, by Men of Parts and Cunning, may be set in a light to dazzle the weak Eyes of many, and by being finely spun out, and drawn off from its plain and obvious Tendency, may assume a fictitious Shape, even pleasing and enticing; but when stripped of its Plumes by Men of Penetration and Judgment, its real and natural Deformity stands confess'd.

CATILINE, and his Associates, in the blackest Conspiracy that ever threatned a State, veil'd the horrid and bloody Enterprize with this artful and popular Pretext,

D *Vindicamus*

Vindicamus in Libertatem ; and many swallowed the ensnaring Bait. But even *Catiline* acted more openly and fairly than those who now follow his Example ; he own'd, he was entic'd to perpetrate this wicked Deed, by the Lust of Power and the Hopes of Plunder ; (*Divitiæ, Gloria, Decus, in Oculis sita sunt.*) I wish our *Catilines* would be as candid, and own the Truth. Nay, if any thing can palliate Parricide, he had distressed Circumstances to plead in Alleviation of his Crime, *Inopia domi, foris Æs alienum* : But what Excuse can they plead, who out of meer Wantonness would rend in pieces the Bowels of their Mother, their Country ?

IT is now evident, we are acting vigorously ; which, like the rest, that our Ministers and Prince may be render'd disagreeable to the People, is represented as solely for the private Advantage of the Electorate ; which is under a Neutrality, and has nothing to fear, and nothing to gain, as it has no Pretensions on the Territories of other Princes.

I say, nothing to fear ; *first*, from its Neutrality ; and *secondly*, from its Possessions being well guaranteed by its powerful Neighbour and near Relation, the King of *Prussia*. It is for the Electorate our Troops, conjointly with our Allies and Mercenaries, for such I look upon sixteen thousand of the *Hanoverians* ; as for the other seven, they are the free Gift of his Majesty to the common Cause : A much greater and more beneficial Gift, than the so much and so often boasted one of a former Monarch ; the one coming out of another Country to the Assistance of *England*, the other rais'd and carried out of *England* : It is, I say, represented to be for the Electorate, that we were all led to the *Main* ; and the Reason given, is one of the most curious of the sort— That the *Dutch* might not have a War drawn upon their Backs in *Flanders*. A mighty good one, to shew that the Electorate is at the bottom of all this ! If the *Hanoverian* Mercenaries had remained quietly and inactively in Garrison, there might have been some Shadow of Pre-

tence to have insinuated, they had taken *English* Money for nothing. But since their Pay was less this Year, in proportion to their Number of Horse, than the *Hessians*, and consequently less than any Troops *England* could get, and almost *half as cheap as National Troops*; besides the free Gift of Seven Thousand, with compleat Artillery—— I repeat again, since they went to the *Main*, fought bravely, and even risqu'd, according to our Author's Opinion, the whole Electorate, without the Prospect of gaining one Inch more of Territory, the whole Argument is glaringly absurd.

BUT, before I close my Answer to this Head, I would be glad to be inform'd why the *Dutch* should be uneasy at our staying in *Flanders*, and desirous we should pass the *Rhine*. I am sure of the contrary. By all the Steps the States have taken, they have shewn a great Backwardness to a War with *France*; and nothing but the utmost Necessity has made them take Measures the least conducive

cive to one ; and as they were most desirous of keeping out of one, nothing could more have coincided with their Desire, than our Troops remaining quietly in *Flanders* ; where they were in no danger of being attack'd by the *French*, the *French* being as unwilling to draw *Holland* conjointly with *England* upon themselves, as the *Dutch* were them.

THE only way to induce the *Dutch* to act vigorously in Support of their Treaties and Guaranties, was that we took ; the going to the *Main*, and giving that remarkable Check to the Arms and Power of *France*, at *Dettingen* ; which is chiefly, if not wholly to be ascribed to his Majesty's personal Bravery and Conduct. A Check, with which *France* is visibly affected and dispirited, as she has not felt the like these thirty Years, tho' she has been frequently within that Period engaged in War. I say, it was his Majesty's personal Behaviour, he acting the Part of a brave Soldier, and experienc'd General, that gave that happy Turn to the

to the Affairs of *Europe* ; notwithstanding the little, low, malicious Arts and Insinuations the Reviewer has made use of, to sully his Majesty's Glory ; and to prevent, if possible, his reaping the just Harvest of his Valour, the People of *England's* Love and Affection for his Person, and Zeal for his Family. But I can (thank God, to the Jacobites great Mortification) knowingly assert, that never has a King of *England* more thoroughly won the Hearts of his Subjects ; which can never fail him, as he means what he acts, and confirms his Intentions by the risque of his Life, to raise the *British* Nation to the highest pitch of Glory. I should be glad to know, if any one of the four Monarchs of the *Stuart-Race* ever hazarded their Persons in a Battle, fought for the Honour and Interest of these Kingdoms, and in Support of the Liberties of Mankind ; whatever they may have done against Liberty, and to enslave a free Nation. —————

THE Argument the Pamphleteer brings forth, to take off the Lustre of the late Victory, is a Master-piece of its kind— That we fought the *French*, not to find them; and that the beating them, so that they never have dared to look us in the Face again, but have ever since fled before us, was Mis-conduct and Confusion.— Fortunate Blunder! Lucky Incident!—The *French* would have been very glad to have as happily miscondacted themselves. But almost ashamed of this, so great is his Modesty! he immediately sinks to the Examination of our Magazines: which, as there was no Occasion for our going further up the *Main*, were not provided and furnish'd, as if we were to have gone into *Bavaria*, as he supposes we ought. And gone, for what?— To have left an Enemy behind us, obstructed Prince *Charles's* coming down to the *Rhine*; and carried our Troops where they could have been of no Use, as the *Austrians* had done the Business long before.

I SHALL not enter into every minute Circumstance with the Author about the Battle of *Dettingen* ; but leaving that to those who are more skill'd in military Affairs, shall only endeavour to vindicate the Measures now pursuing, and to prove to the World, that they are calculated for the Good of these Kingdoms, and these Kingdoms only ; which, when I have level'd the Opposer's Objections, I shall think, I have sufficiently done.

THE next unhappy Error *Hanover*, according to our Author, drove our Ministers into, was, the with-holding the Power and Resentment of *England*, when the ambitious Intentions of *Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, France* and *Spain* were made manifest. Good God! how eager must a Man be to fulfil the Measure of his Stupidity, and shoot the Bolt of his Folly! I will appeal to the Sense and Breast of every understanding Man in *Europe*, whether he would not have thought *England*, more than *Don-Quixot*-mad, to have undertook

undertook the supporting the Queen of *Hungary* against the above-mentioned Five combin'd Powers, at the same time that we ourselves had a most expensive *Spanish War*, by Sea, upon our Hands. I think, if there was any room to find fault, it was at the raising a great Number of Forces in the Electorate, in order, if possible, to support the House of *Austria*; which, with the fatal Obstinacy of the Court of *Vienna*, so irritated the King of *Prussia*, that it made it more difficult to bring him to any Terms at last. I affirm, that instead of that Augmentation of Forces, with the declared View of attacking the Enemies of the Queen, it would have been better, to have first tried to have brought the King of *Prussia* to reasonable Terms. And in order to have done that more effectually, instead of buoying up the Queen with Hopes of Impossibilities, we ought previously to have made it the express Condition of our Assistance, her satisfying the King of *Prussia*; who would, I am certain, at first, have been contented with less than half he now has got:

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nay,

may, would then have even engaged to have supported her against her other Enemies. This would have been the best Expedient ; temporizing, though never so disagreeable, was absolutely necessary ; and this Expedient is in a great measure justified by the Event : for as soon as we took this Road, the Posture of Affairs immediately chang'd for the better.

As to the Elector of *Hanover's* giving his Vote for this Emperor, every body knows it was compulsory ; and his being willing, consonant with the Desires and Interest of *England*, to fulfil his Engagements, was the Reason of that Compulsion : which, if the above-mention'd Measures had been taken, would never have happen'd. The King's having promised to give that Vote, before *Maillebois's* March into the Empire, is, and must be, intirely false ; as the very March of that Marshal plainly shews : for if that Point had been settled, he would never have taken that Rout to assist the Elector of *Bavaria*, and divided his Master's Troops. The Consequence

quence of which has been, their being cut to pieces, and drove out of the Empire.

BEFORE I quit this Topick, I beg leave to throw in an Opinion of my own: I know it disagrees with the common Notions of Mankind; yet, I flatter myself, it deserves some Attention; and though I may not be entirely in the right, I am sure, I am not entirely in the wrong. For although it is of the utmost Consequence to keep the House of *Austria* in possession of as much of her Territories as we can, nay, of all, if possible; yet I don't see, that it is absolutely necessary, that the Head of that House should be Emperor: for, let us consider, what makes *England* so anxious to maintain the Power of the House of *Austria*? It is having a Third join'd with us and the *Dutch*, to prevent the aggrandizing of the House of *Bourbon*. This, I think, can as well, if not better, be done when the Head of that House is not Emperor: For so great a Power, join'd with the Imperial Dignity, naturally raises Envy and Jealousy in

the inferior Electors and Princes in *Germany*, with which that collective Body abounds : and that Envy and Jealousy will of course prevent their uniting against the common Foe ; nay, it will rather induce them to seize the Opportunity, when the Head is engaged in a War, to make good Claims, whether just or unjust, which they imagine would not be granted them in time of profound Tranquillity. But the Imperial Dignity being now divided from that great Power, all Occasions of intestine Quarrel will now cease and be at an end, and the *Germanick* Corps will more cordially and easily unite. Our King's giving his Vote, therefore, (compulsive as it was) to a Prince naturally so weak, will be attended with less ill Consequences than is imagined. And perhaps, though the keeping together of the Queen of *Hungary's* Dominions should be brought about ; yet, the attempting to make a new Emperor, would be a new Subject of Expence and Danger to *England*, though the King, as Elector, should exert his Power to the utmost, and risk every

every Thing to assist us in that Design. But if the whole *Germanick* Body thought it necessary, there don't want a Pretext for a new Election.

THE wise Insinuation, That had the Emperor been strong enough to have succeeded in his Pretensions, then the Electorate had been in danger, stands forth next to expose itself. Had the Emperor been so strong, the Elector had never attempted Impossibilities—And as a plain Proof of the King's having undertaken Possibilities,—the *French* are driven out of *Germany*—this Great Emperor stripped of every Foot of Land he had,—turn'd a Wanderer—living upon the Benevolence and Charity of some Princes, his Friends.

As for the *French* seeming to take away all Excuse from the Allies carrying on the War, by their returning home—It is the smoothest Turn that can be given for their flying before a provok'd Enemy they can no longer

longer resist.—But, before I proceed, I can't help taking notice of the calling our assisting the Queen of *Hungary* to defend her just Rights, making War against the Emperor.

IT is no such thing. We have nothing to do with the Emperor, as Emperor; but only as a Branch of the House of *Austria*, unjustly laying claim to the Possessions of another Branch of that House; to whom we, *France*, *Prussia*, *Saxony*, and the *Dutch*, have, by solemn Treaties, guarantied and promis'd to secure them: What a wicked and delusive Interpretation of our Conduct is this? As a Proof of what I assert, let *France* give up the Emperor to the Empire, and likewise a Security to the Empire, that she will not return.—This is all that is demanded at present. And should the War be transferred to *Flanders*, *France* must be the Attacker and Aggressor, for we shall not, without the —*Proximus ardet*— attack her. And should she be hardy enough to do this, such a Step will awaken all the Powers of *Europe*;

and as to the Consequence then, no Man, God alone can foretel : But the Probability, that the Forces, that on such an occasion would be brought into the Field, might succeed, is very great.

THE Conclusion, drawn from Mr. *de Noailles's* Conduct in attacking us, that he must have been inform'd of an offensive Alliance, (by offensive, I mean one resolv'd at all Events to attack *France*) is answer'd by the Author's own Argument : For, says he, Mr. *Noailles* must have known his Master's Intentions of evacuating *Bavaria*, and removing the main Obstacle to a Peace between the Emperor and the Queen of *Hungary*. If *Noailles* had been sure of the two above-asserted Facts, (one of which he could not, it not existing) he would never have attack'd the Allies. That would have been demonstrably contrary to his Master's Intentions, as laid down by the Author ; for then it would have been openly and singly declaring War against *England*, and the Queen of *Hungary* ;

gary; and, of course, forcing the *Dutch*, *Prussia*, and *Russia* to declare themselves for us. For *Prussia* and *Russia* both, are, by their defensive Alliances, oblig'd to assist us, if War is declar'd against us, as well as the *Dutch*: And it was for fear of this, that *France* has not openly dared to declare War; and to prevent which, every body knows, they have left no Stone unturned. This Conclusion therefore is of no weight, and absurd. No, Marshal *Noailles's* Intention was plainly to strike a bold Stroke, and force his Way, if possible, into *Bavaria*, to defend and support *Bre.ii's* tatter'd Remains of an Army; which, had he beat us, he would have been able to have done; and likewise would have given such a Check to the Measures of the Allies, as might have discouraged the *Dutch* from coming into them.

As many subsequent Paragraphs are calculated only to diminish the Glory of the Victory at *Dettingen*, I shall, as I said before, leave it to the Officers there present; who are

more

more nearly concern'd to vindicate the Conduct of that Day: Tho' Victory is generally allowed to be a good Justifier of a General's Actions. But Malice itself can't deny, that his Majesty behav'd with the utmost Calmness and Intrepidity; commanding the Right Wing in general, and not at the Head of any particular Regiment, or Corps: And that the *French*, that attack'd, were greatly superior in Number to the Allies, actually engaged. As to our Author's Number of slain and wounded, it is more extraordinary than that set forth in the *Paris A-la-main*, printed presently after the Battle; and every one can plainly see, the Advantage is intirely on the Side of the *French*; since they quit their Ally, the Cause of the War, in the midst of his Enemies; and retire quietly home, after having miserably failed in their Scheme; having spent Five Hundred Millions of Livres, and lost above an Hundred Thousand Men, in trying to perpetrate their Designs.———But before I quit this Topick of the *French's* Victory at *Dettingen*, I can't help taking notice,

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how contradictory our Author's Opinion is to itself, of Marshal *Noailles's* Conduct. He first says, every Part was conducted with the utmost Prudence and Judgment ; and then, that he might have destroy'd the whole Army of the Allies, if he had pleas'd.—How nicely do the Elogium and Accufation agree ?

THE modest Offers *France* are now to be extoll'd ; her Moderation and peaceable Inclinations to be blazon'd in pompous Colours, and *England* and *Holland* (I am glad he has join'd us) to be vilify'd for not advising as Mediators, closing with and coming into as Accessaries, such kind Offers ; which would have been the most fatal Blow, the Liberties of *Europe* ever felt. Let a Man but look back to the Time, and reflect on the Circumstances of Things, when a Peace was offer'd, according to the *uti possidetis*, only calculated to save by Stratagem a perishing *French* Army, *et il lui sautera aux yeux*, that the Balance of Power in *Europe* would
have

have been destroyed by it. After praising the Offers of *France*, and condemning *England* and *Holland*, *pour n'avoir pas donnez dans le Panneau*, one can be surpriz'd at nothing: otherwise I should, at the accusing the Queen of *Hungary* of a devouring Ambition; who is forced to spend her inmost Treasure, and make use of every Friend, to defend her lawful Possessions; while *France*, to obtain Universal Monarchy, has set the World on fire, and brought into every Country Devastation and Ruin; and has wantonly spilt the Blood of Millions: And, tho' failing in her Projects, even now meditates the Means again, to spread Defolation and Slaughter throughout all *Europe*. What Powers may join to oppose such diabolical Schemes, I am not Politician enough to know; but I am sure it will be *pro Aris & Focis*: And whatever Hopes *England* may flatter herself with, of supporting herself singly, when the rest of the World is subdued; I will venture to prophesy, that her Fate will be the same with the rest in a few Years, if not in a few

Months. For at the bottom, we and the *Dutch* are the Mark the *French* aim at. It is our enriching Trade and Wealth they most desire. Extent of Territory they want not : But as they can't attack us directly, by our Situation so well defended, they are forced to take round-about ways, to divide, weaken, or conquer the rest of *Europe* ; which, when done, we must fall an easy Prey to their superior Force. I would have them, notwithstanding the great Confidence they have in their Strength, remember ; that the vain-glorious *Trojans*, with all the rich Princes of the East their Allies, were conquered, and totally destroyed by a Confederacy of the little Princes in *Greece*, when their Perfidy was known, and their wicked Arts grown manifest. I call it the Confederacy of little Princes, because each was a little Prince, in comparison of those they attack'd, and likewise little in comparison of those by whom a Confederacy might be fram'd, against a Nation more perfidious, treacherous and inhuman, than the *Trojans* were.

THE Absurdity of attempting to support the Queen of *Hungary*, till *Prussia* was drawn from the Alliance made against her, I have before exposed : but shall it be said, though we cannot preserve all her Dominions whole and intire, that we should give up all? I will not pretend to say, it is meerly out of Good-Nature, that *England* is for keeping the House of *Austria* as powerful as she can; but likewise out of the Regard they have to their own and *Holland's* Security and Interest, in preserving *Flanders* in the Hands: it is in. And had we not assisted the Queen of *Hungary*, she must have complied with the Terms of *France*; and to preserve her more profitable and nearer Possessions, have given up Part of *Flanders*: the supporting of which, cost her as much or more than the Revenue of that Country— *Hic latet anguis in herba* —Here centred all the Views of *France*— Hence all the Affection to the House of *Bavaria*— Hence come the co-inciding with *Prussia*— As long as the Schemes of these Princes

Princes tallied with those of *France*, so long she assisted them, and no longer. *Prussia* has made her Peace; the Emperor can no longer keep up the War in the Empire, and therefore no longer useful to *France*. And as a Mark of their Fidelity in keeping their Treaties, they leave him to himself (surrounded by an Army of Enemies) with the greatest Part of the Empire not very well disposed to him as Elector, whatever they may be as Emperor.

OUR Author, determin'd to find fault right or wrong, supposes, that we shall draw a *French* War upon ourselves, at all Events, (which, it is apparent to the whole World, we have endeavour'd to avoid as much as possible, consistent with our fulfilling our Treaties;) and then proceeds to give Reasons, why no Prince or Potentate will assist us, in case Necessity should force us into such a War; though the same Necessity must drive other Princes into one as well as us, they being as much, if not more nearly concern'd.

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THE first Prince he pretends to answer for, is the King of *Prussia* ; and his Reason is, that that King would not wish the Queen of *Hungary* should be powerful again : But I believe if, by entering into a grand Alliance, he could increase his Dominions, in a greater proportion than the Queen could hers, that so political and ambitious a Prince would not let slip such a favourable Opportunity of Advantage to himself, out of Jealousy or Envy to her. But besides, let us reflect on what is founded the Desire of Extent of Territories, (which is this Monarch's darling Vice ;) is it not to become more powerful, and be of more consequence ? If that is true, I will be bold to say, that should *Prussia* let *France* dictate to the rest of the World, and succeed in her Schemes, get the better of us and the *Dutch*, and seize *Flanders*, the King of *Prussia* will soon find himself of less Consequence, than before he acquired *Silesia* and Part of *Bohemia*. The *Dutch* are now our declared Friends, and assist the Queen of *Hungary*,

Hungary, both with Men and Money ; they garrison her Towns for her, that she may use her Troops elsewhere ; give her a voluntary Subsidy, and Seventeen Thousand of their Troops have march'd to join the Allies. My Friend may give as many Reasons as he pleases, for the other Powers entering, or not entering, with us ; I can assure him, we should desire no more than the King of *Prussia*, Queen of *Hungary*, the *Dutch*, and the King of *Sardinia* for Allies, should *France* push the Joke so far. I believe we five could give a very good Account of *Monsieur*, all being thoroughly in earnest. The King of *Sardinia* I look upon as the most hearty in the Cause, he fearing nothing so much as being coop'd up with the House of *Bourbon* on each Side of him, without Hopes of increasing his Possession, and almost a Certainty of being a Sacrifice to each of the Branches of that Family, alternately.

THE mutual Guaranty and definitive Alliance between the Kings of *England* and
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Prussia,

Prussia, near Relations, and the two greatest Protestant Powers, is made a Crime to the Electorate : Good God ! that a mutual Harmony between these two Princes should be found fault with ! Was ever any Objection so wild ? and the Reason alledg'd for that Objection is much more so, *viz.* That such Alliance can be of no use to *England*, because the King of *Prussia* is not a Maritime Power. If I understand what is meant by the Maritime Powers, it is *England* and *Holland*, and of late *France* has some pretence of being entitled to that Denomination. So, according to this way of Reasoning, we ought to have no Allies, but the *Dutch* or the *French* ; the latter the only People that are, or dare, be our Enemies, and as they are so, all our Schemes and Alliances must tend to the making and keeping them as weak as possible : The first are, and must be our Allies ; therefore this Argument proves a strange Solecism in Politics, that we ought to have but one Ally in the World. I remember its being objected

to the late Minister, that we had no Ally but the *Dutch*; and a Person remarkable for his Wit, said at that time, they were our Allies in spite of our teeth, or else we should not have had even them. But let us consider of what consequence this defensive Alliance is to us, as the *Dutch* can't be our Enemies, we fear nobody by Sea; therefore all we want is to have Allies on the Continent, that if, in consequence of our endeavouring to obstruct the Aggrandizing of the House of *Bourbon*, War should be declar'd against us, we might be able to succeed in our Endeavours, and be supported. And every body must own, that at this time the King of *Prussia* is one of the most powerful Princes in *Europe*; and consequently greatly able to assist and support us in such necessary Measures: I need not repeat my Opinion on the Necessity of them, having already given it in the fullest manner.

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How great a Compliment soever our Politician may think he pays their High Mightinesses, every Step they have lately taken is a flat Contradiction to his chimerical Suppositions and Reasonings; for the Views of *France* are as well known to their High-Mightinesses, as they have been long since to *England*. They have often experienced the Equivocations, ensnaring Professions, and false Protestations the *French* use to lull Powers asleep with, when they have some great and wicked Design on the Carpet. The *Dutch*, by our Author's Confession, don't seem so peaceably inclined as they were; and the Reason is manifest, they would not be for undertaking Impossibilities no more than we: but now they see they can save the remaining Part of the *Austrian* Dominions, and their chief Care, *Flanders*, they are wisely taking every Step that may bring about that great and desirable Effect. But to leave our Juggler to wander alone through his Labyrinth of wild Hypotheses, I say, I will again affirm, That if

France will leave the Emperor to the free Empire, and not assist Don *Philip* in his unwarrantable Pretensions in *Italy*, there will be no *French* War. But if *France* will pretend to dispose of the Possessions of the House of *Austria* to whom she pleases, and by every Act declare she aims at Universal Monarchy, the *Dutch* will be alarm'd as much as we can be, and will be as jealous of *France*, as any one Potentate in *Europe*: Little private Views of small present Advantages in Trade will never divert that great and wise Body from keeping a Balance of Power; the attempting to persuade *English-men*, let their Debts be never so great, that they should tamely look on, and permit *France* to become powerful enough, hereafter, to enslave them, is as foolish as it is wicked; *English-men* are the last People in the World to imbibe such a Doctrine, who prefer Liberty to all other Blessings of Life, and even Life itself. No false Suggestions, That *Hanover* may reap some Advantages from a War (which she cannot)

will

will divert an *English-man* from spending the last Drop of his Blood, to put it out of the Power of *France* to enslave, and make a Province of their native Country, the finest and richest Island under Heaven; and, thank God, as yet, one of the most powerful Kingdoms in the World.

MOST of the remaining Paragraphs are Panegyrics on the *French*, and the *French* Emperor of *Germany*, and Elogiums of their Honesty, Candidness, and Justice; to which every *English-man* must infallibly subscribe, they having been, for a whole Century, so remarkably the Promoters of Harmony and Tranquillity in *Europe*, Blood-shed and Rapine their avow'd Detestation.

TOWARDS the Close of the Work, it is with great Pleasure that I find our Author himself feels his Arguments too weak to draw over his sensible Readers to his way of thinking; and is therefore obliged to have Recourse

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to personal Calumny and Slander, which every genteel Writer, if he has one Argument in the World to produce, in support of his Plan, will scorn to stoop to: I say, it is with the utmost Satisfaction I see our Author drove to the Necessity of sheltering himself under the Banner of Scandal, and borrowing his Style from *Billingsgate*, where Abuse is Wit, and bare-faced Lying undeniable Evidence.

As he is got into such good Company, I shall beg to take my leave of him, and conclude with the following Assertions, the Truth of which is apparent to every one that will see with their own Eyes: That we have drove the *French* out of the Empire, after their having lost above an Hundred Thousand Men: That we have ruin'd their Interest in the North, to establish which, how many Millions have they not spent! That we have brought the *Dutch* to act openly and boldly, in Support of the House of *Austria*: That we have shut and bolted the Door of *Italy* against the *Spaniards*,

Spaniards, by our timely supporting the King of *Sardinia*, and making a Defensive and an Offensive Alliance with him. The Consequence of which must be, in my Opinion, that the *Spaniards*, to save their Troops, now coop'd up in *Italy*, from perishing like the *French* in *Germany*, must submit to a Peace, upon advantageous Terms to *England*, and drop their Pretensions on the Queen of *Hungary's Italian* Dominions, lest a worse thing befall them.

F I N I S.

