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OF CANADA

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CANADA'S FIRST CENTURIES

MUCH is heard, in these days, about French Canadian claims of pioneering precedence in Canada. French Canadian statesmen and writers are continually asserting the priority of the settlements made by their ancestors, as if the fact of such priority were disputed. During the session of parliament in 1906 this was notably the case, and it became evident that these expressions of racial sentiment were prompted by undercurrents of feeling, approaching resentment. It is true, unfortunately, that there is a tendency among certain English speakers and writers to ignore these claims. Yet we all know, or perhaps it would be better to say, most well-informed English-speaking people of Canadian birth or those who have been for any considerable period in the Dominion are acquainted with the fact, that the French were the pioneers of Canada south of Hudson Bay. Even the school histories of the English-speaking Canadian children teach that the first colonists in Canada were French, and that the ancestors of the French Canadian population made good their footing at a great cost of suffering and of life.

There are, indeed, probably few children who have not learned by heart the story of French colonization in Canada, of the early Indian wars and massacres, the tragic famines and horrible privations, and the heroism of those first days on the banks of the St. Lawrence and in Acadia. Such impressions sink deep into the mind, and to the average English-speaking native-born Canadian, therefore, it is an elementary truth that the foundations of the heritage of the Canadian people south of Hudson Bay were laid by the hands and cemented by the blood of the men and women

of the French nation from whom the French Canadians of to-day are descended.

But of late years thousands of English-speaking people have come in and made their homes amongst us, to whom the sacrifice and achievements of the French pioneers are a complete blank. Even we who know—I write as a Canadian of British descent and English birth, who landed at Montreal more than a quarter of a century back—are too absorbed in the present problems of our common country to give much thought to the past and to the debt which we all owe to the French Canadian race. It is the object of this paper to rekindle interest in the subject, as a factor in promoting racial friendship and harmony. The ablest men at the head of Canadian affairs have always preached national unity and everything that could contribute towards it, and are still doing so; yet something is still lacking at times in cordiality or mutual appreciation between the races.

Lord Aberdeen would hardly have expressed a hope for "a new era, to be characterized by generous treatment of one another, mutual concessions, and reciprocal good will," unless there was cause for it. Yet those words were used in the Speech from the Throne at the second session of the parliament of 1897. And Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in the debate on the address in reply to this speech, pointed out in effect the necessity of unity and the importance of our people, French-speaking and English-speaking alike, getting to know more of each other and of each other's history. "As day after day passes," he said, "it becomes more evident that, as the facts are better understood, the conviction will take possession of every heart, that, if we are ever to make a nation of Canada, if we are ever to solve successfully any of these difficulties that may arise, we can only solve them in the way expressed in the speech from the throne, by mutual concession and reciprocal good will."

More recently, at Sherbrooke, to recall one of the many occasions in which he gives expression to similar views,

Sir Wilfrid said, "In any case, when I am in the grave, it can be inscribed on my tomb, 'Here lies a man who desired to make the Canadian family a united family under the same flag.'" Mr. Rodolphe Lemieux, speaking at Berlin, said, "We are proud of our forefathers, and every citizen of this country who reads history should be grateful to the French pioneers, missionaries, and *coureurs des bois* for their early struggles. Remember that in those days the Jesuits, the Recollets and other orders traversed the land, undaunted by trackless forests, terrible privations, merciless foes, and appalling loneliness, pushing the work of evangelization wherever human beings were to be found or souls to be saved." And a voice from the other side in politics may be quoted. Mr. R. L. Borden, leader of the Opposition in parliament, speaking at Toronto on September 22nd., 1903, said, "We, throughout Canada, should not only know our own country, but know our own people. There is a motto which was described by men of old as having come from Heaven, 'Know thyself,' and I would say to Canadians that a good proverb for Canada and one that would make for national unity and harmony is 'Know each other.'" Mr. Lemieux's words bring us back to the days of the French pioneers in the first centuries of Canada.

The French occupation of Canada began, continued, and ended in disaster. From the year Cartier first wintered on Canadian soil until the French occupation for all practical purposes ceased, after the battle of the Plains of Abraham, on September 13th., 1759, the story is one of an almost continual series of losses, mistakes, and mishaps. Many perished from exposure, hunger, and disease in the first attempts to plant colonizing settlements and trading posts. More perished by the tomahawk, scalping knife, and torch of the Indians. The country was rarely free later on, either from war with the Iroquois or other tribes, or invasion from the English colonies, or internal dissensions, maladministration, and pillaging by high officers. Plagues, pestilences, and famines often reduced the scanty population to the

most desperate straits, and in the days of their greatest need for succour from the mother country the supplies of the colonists were repeatedly cut off by the English at sea, and the King's vessels were sunk or captured.

It is impossible to look at the records of the time without the deepest commiseration for the distress endured, and respect for the strength and fortitude displayed by those gallant French people under the most arduous and pitiful conditions. And yet, it must not be supposed the French in Canada yielded at any time without striking a blow in return at their enemies. Blows they struck in return, and in plenty, blows that sent their assailants staggering back to nurse their wounds and bury their dead, that reduced the surrounding Indian hostiles in the end to submission, and came very near at one breathless moment to snatching victory out of the very arms of defeat on that fateful thirteenth of September. If the English colonists carried destruction and death, over and over again, into the French territory and reduced whole settlements to smoking ruins, the French did the same on the English side of the borders and gave if anything more than they received.

Historical details to be found in every publication on the discovery of Canada need not be recapitulated here. It will be sufficient to look at results without dwelling at length on widely known incidents. Cartier's first attempt to winter on Canadian soil in 1535-36 was disastrous. It will be remembered that his expedition was not suitably equipped for below-zero conditions. Scurvy appeared and forty men of the ship's companies were down at one time between life and death; twenty-five perished outright, and of the remaining forty-five those who still retained their energies and faculties could be numbered on the fingers of one hand. They were forced to abandon one of the three small vessels in which they had made the voyage out, and in the spring the survivors retraced their way to France. Cartier's next expedition, in 1541, when he wintered at Cap Rouge, was equally unfortunate. The Indians, at first friendly, became hostile and withheld supplies. In the face of impending starvation,

constant attacks, exposure, and hardship, he abandoned the fort he had built and sailed back to St. Malo. M. de Roberval who had been appointed "Viceroy and Lieutenant General" of Newfoundland, Labrador, and Canada, with Cartier as his "Captain General," and was to have commanded the expedition but failed to complete his arrangements in time, sailed the following spring and occupied Cartier's abandoned quarters. The Indians were sullen and withheld supplies. Men sent to search for gold and silver were tomahawked and scalped in the forests; mutiny broke out and executions had to be resorted to; Roberval gave up the fort and reached France with a loss of 25 per cent. of his command. In 1549 Roberval started from France with another expedition, but his vessel was wrecked and all on board went to the bottom, and for nearly half a century colonizing expeditions were discontinued.

The fate of the expedition undertaken by the Marquis de la Roche, the next Viceroy, is too familiar to call for more than the briefest mention. He sailed to take possession of his government in 1598. On his way out he landed forty convicts who formed part of his expedition at Sable Island, to await his return from an exploration of the coast of the mainland; but storms forced him back to the French coast, and when a vessel was sent out to rescue the marooned men twelve of them were found to have perished from famine, exposure, and violence. In the meantime individual adventurers had been finding their way up the St. Lawrence and were gradually establishing a trade with the Indians, exchanging European goods for furs. The French king, in order to control this growing traffic, granted a charter with exclusive rights to M. Pontegravé and M. Chauvin, who established a post at Tadousac, at the mouth of the Saguenay, and stationed a party of men there for the winter of 1599-1600. The following spring most of the poor fellows were found by Chauvin to have fallen a sacrifice to hunger and hardships, the survivors being in a most pitiable condition. Chauvin himself lost his life at sea soon afterwards.

Samuel Champlain joined the new company formed after Chauvin's death, and in 1603 ascended the St. Lawrence to Hochelaga and returned : and in November of that year M. De Monts was appointed Lieutenant General of the French possessions in North America between latitude 40 and 46 N., with exclusive trading and other powers. In this commission is said to be found the first mention of Acadie, a name derived from an Indian word signifying "abundance." Mr. Brymner, in the Dominion Archives report for 1894, mentioned that the first real settlement made by the French within the limits indicated by the above charter was in 1604 on an island in Passamaquoddy Bay. So great, however, was the mortality from hardships and exposure during the winter, that another place had to be sought for, and Port Royal, now Annapolis, was selected in the following year. This settlement was several times abandoned and reoccupied, and in 1613 was utterly destroyed by Captain Argall, an English colonial sailor, on an expedition which was characterized as piratical.

Fugitives made their way to other points in the same region, whose numbers were gradually increased by accessions from France, and thus Acadie, far famed in story, came into existence. Champlain, who had a higher opinion of the St. Lawrence than of Acadie as a field for the extension of French influence and trade, finally interested De Monts in his views and was sent with Pontegravé to trade and explore. Pontegravé landed at Tadousac to traffic with the Indians, and Champlain went on up the river towards Cape Diamond and on July 3rd. 1608, selected a site for a trading post. The defensive works, storehouses and other buildings erected there have long ago disappeared but in their place the Quebec of to-day began to come into existence. Of the party who wintered there, thirty all told, only eight were left alive in the spring of 1609. Pontegravé, who had been to France for men and supplies, had returned and from him Champlain procured assistance. The Algonquin and Huron Indians, on the Canadian side of the St. Lawrence, were at the time at war with the Iroquois who occupied the south shore of Lake Ontario,

and Champlain engaged to fight on the side of the former in return for help in exploring the upper country and furs for trading. The first encounter between the hostile tribes in which Champlain assisted took place on July 30th. 1609, when the smoke, fire and detonations of the French firearms spread confusion and dismay among the Iroquois warriors. In the campaign of the following year, 1610, the Iroquois were again overcome, but Champlain himself was wounded as well as some fifty of his allies. The allies had reserved fifteen Iroquois braves who had been taken captive, for the torture. Champlain had earnestly remonstrated against the customary ill-treatment of prisoners on the occasion of his first experience of the atrocities practised, but was unable to save them from the vengeance of their savage foes. Afterwards, describing the scene, Champlain said that the captives were subjected to every cruelty known to the Indian mind and their still living bodies then exposed to fire and slowly hacked to pieces, with the exception of a few reserved for the entertainment of the Huron women. He added that the female savages, converted into veritable fiends on such occasions, excelled the men in ingenuity and in the dexterity with which they applied the various modes of torture.

It is unnecessary to follow the ever widening sphere of Champlain's activities, in establishing a trading post near the site of the Montreal of to-day, in promoting colonization generally, in explorations of the upper country and in many other directions. But it may be noted that Charles de Bourbon, Count de Soissons, on succeeding De Monts as the head of the chartered company, made Champlain his Lieutenant and agent, and after the death of Charles, the Prince of Condé who was created Viceroy of New France, also appointed Champlain his Lieutenant, by commission dated October 15th., 1612, which date frequently appears in the lists of official functionaries as that of the appointment of the first Governor, Champlain. In 1615, Champlain joined his allies in a third expedition against the Iroquois, and the invaders were

defeated and compelled to retreat, Champlain being twice wounded. The population of Quebec then consisted of about 60 persons, and Champlain, seeing the urgent need of men, food, and clothing, sailed for France to solicit help. After much disheartening opposition he gathered a party of colonists, with arms, ammunition, provisions, and other stores and landed them at Quebec, after a difficult and dangerous voyage, late in 1617. He found the people in extreme distress from famine and disease. The situation was gloomy and almost desperate; the maintenance of the colony appeared well-nigh hopeless, and a further appeal to France for succour became absolutely imperative. He crossed the ocean once more and with great effort collected a cargo of supplies, which he forwarded, remaining himself behind to arouse interest in the colony. The following winter at Quebec proved to be one of renewed alarm and peril.

Quarrels broke out between the French and Indians, and the latter formed a plot to massacre the entire colony. The plot was fortunately discovered in time to frustrate it. From that year until 1624, when a temporary peace was patched up, the scattered posts and settlements were continually threatened with ruin by the incursions of the Iroquois and their relentless wars against the Indian allies of the French. Through it all Champlain laboured incessantly to improve the defences of the settlements and the condition of the colonists. In 1625 he received the King's Commission as Governor, with the powers of a Viceroy. The winter of 1627–28 was one of great scarcity and severity, and in 1628 the chartered company's vessels failed to reach Quebec with supplies, having been intercepted by English vessels of marque under Sir David Kirke and his two brothers. France and England were at war, and Tadousac, Cape Breton, and Port Royal, Acadia, were in English hands. The following year, the small body of colonists being destitute of every resource, Champlain surrendered Quebec and the other French posts and was carried to England, and made his way to France with such of the colonists as desired to go. Thus, after all these years

of sacrifice and struggle to establish and maintain French colonies in Acadia and on the St. Lawrence, French domination for a time ceased and the English flag floated over the forts and buildings. For three years longer, until July, 1632, English occupation continued, when by the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye possession was restored to France, and Champlain, with a fleet sent out by the Company of the Hundred Associates, reoccupied Quebec as Governor, and vigorously resumed the construction of defensive works, the establishment of trading posts in the upper country and the extension of French influence. He was stricken with paralysis October 10th. and died on Christmas Day, 1635, the first year of a second century of French occupation.

It will have been seen from this rapid sketch of conditions in the colony up to the beginning of the second century of French occupation, and the death of Champlain, that from the very commencement the stations occupied by the French were for the great part held in face of fighting and privation, exposure and other hardships, and in peril from the tomahawk, and the scalping knife, and torch of ruthless savages. But through it all, step by step, the French accomplished their destiny as the founders of Canada, eventually made good their defence, penetrated the surrounding regions, explored the upper country and established trade and the Christian religion. Canada's second century saw a more rapid development, the colony increasing steadily in numbers and strength, but it was ushered in with flames and massacres, which continued at intervals for many years. The French, not only in the settlements on the St. Lawrence but at the distant and widely scattered trading posts in the upper country, were, in common with their Indian allies, reduced frequently to a state of indescribable suffering. A new settlement was discovered by the Iroquois in 1643 and stragglers were killed or captured and tortured. Another settlement, founded at Sillery, was fired by the Iroquois and destroyed, every person being tomahawked and scalped or otherwise done to death. An attack was made by the Iroquois on the trading

post of Three Rivers, where the Commandant and a number of his men were massacred. Missionaries, women and children, wherever found, were relentlessly slain. The men who ventured beyond their enclosures to cultivate the soil were obliged to labour with their arms within reach. One of the records of those days of terror states that "from Tadousac to Quebec, thence to Three Rivers and all the way to Ville Marie there was nothing but traces of bloodshed and havoc."

The accounts given of the tortures inflicted by the Iroquois on their prisoners are heart-rending. A detailed narrative of the revolting treatment of Father Jean de Brebœuf, the noted Jesuit missionary, in 1649, was given in the Dominion Archives for the year 1894. Although most English-speaking people of Canadian birth or lengthened residence in the country are familiar with the story, possibly many who have recently come into Canada are not, and for their benefit a brief extract from a shorter version in common use may be usefully given here as illustrating the horrors the colonists of the period of the Indian wars were liable at any moment to undergo. The final scene is described in these words: "While the fiends danced around him, slicing off his flesh to devour it before his eyes or cauterising the wounds with heated stones and hatchets, a cauldron of water was placed on the fire. When it was heated, they tore off his scalp, and thrice, in derision of baptism, poured it over his head. . . Hacking off his feet, they clove open his chest, took out his noble heart and devoured it."

The extermination of the French and their Indian allies had been determined on by the Iroquois. In the spring of 1660, twelve hundred warriors were to descend the St. Lawrence to Quebec, and, when most of the inhabitants were in the fields, ploughing and seeding, destroy the settlement and kill or capture all the people, repeating the same thing at the surrounding settlements as well as at Three Rivers and Montreal. But in the meantime events happened which interfered with the project. Near the close of the winter of 1659-60, a party of Hurons who had wintered at

Quebec started on the warpath to dislodge the Iroquois who had occupied their hunting grounds on the banks of the Ottawa. At Three Rivers their force was strengthened by some Algonquins, and at Montreal M. Dollard with 16 Frenchmen joined them, making about 60 men in all. After they reached the Ottawa, 200 Iroquois warriors attacked them but were forced to retreat. The fugitives returned, with 500 more warriors, and the French and Hurons were surrounded. For ten days the assailing savages were repulsed and then, their numbers reduced and faint with fatigue, hunger, and wounds, they succumbed, Dollard and all his companions, except five Frenchmen and four Hurons who were reserved for torture, being killed. The manner in which this mere handful of Frenchmen with the little band of Huron warriors had resisted them, with other circumstances, led the Iroquois to relinquish their plans for the spring. The intended massacre did not occur and the colony was saved from this particular danger, although the Iroquois were said to be still virtually masters of the country.

The hostile Indians had several tribal wars on their hands at the time besides that with the Hurons. The Ottawas and Chippewas in the west defeated the Mohawks, and Oneidas; and the Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas, attacking the Andastes, were forced to withdraw. But in 1689 a body of 1,400 Iroquois descended towards the island of Montreal and massacred several hundred settlers on the borders of the Sault St. Louis, committing horrible barbarities. It is chronicled that in less than one hour two hundred persons were savagely slaughtered, an equal number being seized and carried off to be tortured. A force of 100 French soldiers and friendly Indians was surprised and killed. Finally the invasions of the hostile Indians involved the English colonies to the south, who were charged with instigating and aiding the Iroquois; and when means permitted, plans for attacking New York and Virginia were approved by the King of France and his ministers but temporarily given up.

In the winter of 1689-90, war having been declared between France and England, the English and Dutch settlments were invaded by three divisions of French Canadians and Indian allies, and a number of persons were killed and taken captive, their villages being destroyed by fire. The New England colonists prepared two retaliatory expeditions against Canada, one by land and the other by sea, and both failed. Some of the French posts in Acadia were captured by the English, but, on the other hand, the French under M. d'Iberville gained a series of remarkable successes on the coasts of Newfoundland and in Hudson Bay. Peace was concluded in 1697, but it was of short duration, and war broke out again in 1703, followed by the long succession of grim experiences that, lasting all through the second century of French occupation and well into the third century, ended in the battle of the Plains of Abraham, in 1759, and the loss of Canada by France.

During all the miserable years from the death of Champlain to that of Montcalm on the fateful thirteenth of September, 1759, the French colonists were the helpless victims of invasion from without and of perfidy, extortion, ill-doing and neglect on the part of their rulers within, a fact that is likely to be more generally and fully recognized now that the state records of the first two centuries of Canada's existence are being unearthed and systematically arranged and translated into the English language, and made accessible to all who desire to consult them. It will be seen from this epitome that in many respects the whole of the second century of the French occupation, and of the third up to the cession was, in regard to the difficulties and disasters of the colony, even more interesting than the first: but the available space is exhausted. In conclusion, it is hoped that this compilation may, by arousing renewed interest among English-speaking Canadians in the sacrifices and services of the early French colonists, contribute to that good understanding between the two races which so many Canadian statesmen have declared to be essential to the welfare of the country.

M. O. Scott

WHAT CAN CANADA DO

THOSE of us who are in the habit of writing have come to the conclusion that, if we do not write, something will happen. The same remark is applicable to talkers also. We have all seen a beaver in a zoological garden sedulously collecting such material as he may command for the building of a dam. The assiduous beast is firmly convinced that, if he does not build, the Ottawa river will overflow its banks or some other dreadful calamity happen. That is our predicament. By writing and talking we keep the Empire together. We prevent an outburst of the national stream into unaccustomed channels. The beaver, who in reality is effective, spends his time erecting for himself and his family a comfortable home, protecting them from danger, and providing them with suitable food. He is the one who best serves the cause of beaverdom. This thing is a parable.

We Canadians who are not writers and talkers did not think that we were doing anything unusual, these two centuries past, making a living as best we might, defending our little clearings against wild beasts, our homes against savages, and our little towns against marauders from the United States. Our forefathers did as much against Spaniard, French, or Dane; indeed, against English, Scotch, or Irish. We did all that lay at our hands in the most innocent way in the world. We dug harbours, built lighthouses, laid down railways, excavated canals. We have policed our waters and prevented strangers from stealing our fish. We have kept good order over a territory as large as the half of Europe and made life and property fourteen hundred miles from Edmonton as safe as it is in Trafalgar Square, and much safer than in Whitechapel Road.

Canada is no new thing, although it has been discovered anew. Before the battle of the Plains of Abraham, and ever since, we in Quebec have been diligently cultivating our "few acres of snow and ice," living a useful, happy life, increasing our population of 60,000 alien peasants to three millions of citizens, and never dreaming that we were doing anything of especial interest. There is nearly a century and a half since a body of Englishmen came streaming across the border, choosing to dwell in the wilderness rather than be sharers in the rebellion of their fellow Englishmen who occupied the thirteen colonies. Ever since Culloden, Scotland has been sending out her hardiest sons, men who found the conditions at home hopeless and intolerable; and Ireland also has given of her best. We have done here precisely what we used to do in our old homes.

When we reflected upon the matter at all, we thought we were doing pretty well for a part of the empire at least, and it was with pained surprise we learned that we were doing nothing for the Empire. We were told that we were pensioners upon the bounty of the English shires and towns, that the taxpayers of Midlothian were overburdened with our defence, and that we were like members of a club who did not pay their dues. We in Canada are honest people. We like to pay our way, as the saying is, especially as we have the money in our pockets to pay it with. We are not conscious that we require charity. We are much more disposed to give than to receive. We have no desire to meddle with other people's internal affairs. We are satisfied that no one desires to interfere in ours. That leaves us free to speak with our friends in the house and with our enemies in the gate.

Out of this laudable sentiment has arisen the desire to set ourselves right, not exactly right, but more than right; because one who does only what is exactly right is essentially a mean man. We are asking of ourselves and in every quarter from which we might get a sensible reply: What should Canada do? It is quite true that we have ready at hand a considerable bulk of advice, at least it has the appearance of

being considerable, as Carlyle said about his morning porridge. Some say that our obligations will be discharged if we give yearly a battleship to the British navy: others, that the debt will be paid if England gives to our goods a preference in the English markets. The one implies that we owe England: the other, that England is our debtor. Both statements cannot be true. Both may be false. To ascertain the fact we must first enquire what Canada has done, before we can find an answer to the question: What should Canada do?

Whatever we have has not come easily. Our mothers have told us of these things. To-day they are passing the evening of their life in comfortable farm houses whose little rooms are embellished with scriptural texts, enlarged photographs of departed faces, and other pictures of sentiment. We may also hear the story, though more secretly, in town house, where portraits replace the earlier adornments. It has taken five generations to raise the mortgage from the place, and it is only now that we can send our sons to the University without sacrificing the lives of those who remain at home. We have had our own bitterness and sorrow. It is in these that values are reckoned, in broken hearts, in bowed backs, and knotted hands.

In those days England was far away and we were alone. Twenty weeks it took to make a journey there and back. News was scanty, Yet, in some way, we heard of Trafalgar, of Waterloo, of the Crimea, and of the Indian Mutiny. We had pictures on our walls of "The Death of Nelson;" of "Napoleon on board the Bellerophon;" of "The Roll Call" after the battle; of the fierce vengeance which was taken upon Nana Sahib's fellow murderers. As works of art these pictures were not very good, but they had a meaning. They conveyed the impression that England ruled, instead of going about the world asking how she should rule.

What perplexes us most is the saying in everybody's mouth, that, unless we do something—give a battleship or a preference, or send Sir Wilfrid Laurier to a conference in

London—the Empire will go to pieces. The Empire has always been going to pieces, even from a time which is far beyond the memory of any man now living. The Venetian ambassador in 1557 heard the same complaint in London, at a time when, as he notes, "hammers were beating in one place, tubs hooping in another, and pots clinking in a third;" when the artisans were so rich that "they made good cheer in a tavern oftener than every day with rabbits, hares, and all sorts of viands."

When one Englishman meets another his first comment is upon the beastliness of the weather, even if the place be Surrey and the day the rarest in June; his second is upon the doom which is impending over their country. This is merely a form of humour, that of overstatement. There is another form of humour, that of understatement, which is as freely employed. An Englishman whose ancestors have served the nation for twenty generations in her councils and her wars, whose grandfathers were post-captains at twenty-five, who himself is a sharer in the glory of her achievement, will remark as the utmost of his admission when put to the question—that is if he says anything at all—"Oh, England is not half bad." That is his way of saying, "The best in the world", just as a rich Scotchman describes his fortune as the few shillings which he has saved out of his poor earnings. All humour is dangerous: this "not half bad" misleads us as it misled the late Mr. Krüger and his friends.

In our simplicity of mind we cannot understand that we and our doings have become proper matter of comment amongst the other communities of the Empire. We understand perfectly that an apparently casual remark made by the Premier in Toronto is intended to be heard in some constituency in Quebec. But we forget that there are cables and newspapers which convey that utterance to Australia, to South Africa, to India, and Japan. These outland peoples cannot know that the member who represents the constituency for which the remark is intended is clamouring for a place, and that his successor must be chosen.

The business of the leader of a party is to keep his party in power. The duty of a statesman may urge him upon the path which leads to defeat. When it was a question of sending men to South Africa, it was quite proper for the leader of a party to consider the effect which his decision might have upon the minds of an important section of his constituents. It is also his duty as a politician to estimate the value there may be in creating the impression that Canada could manage her diplomatic affairs better than they had been managed heretofore. An outrage upon our allies and our fellow-subjects can well be turned to political advantage by doing something or even by doing nothing.

That was a fine saying of Mr. Kipling's at Ottawa: "Now there are certain things which a man cannot, must not, do merely because it is quite possible for him to do them—there are certain things which a man must do precisely because it appears impossible that he should do them." We in Canada have been doing what seemed good in our eyes, and in the main it is good. It is possible now for us to make mischief in the spirit of an overgrown and undisciplined child by inconsiderateness of speech and rashness of conduct. It is possible for us to be boastful, self-assertive, truculent, wayward, and I do not know that there is anyone sufficiently interested to undertake the business of correcting us. For these vices there is, however, the usual punishment of vice, the deterioration of national character, and—what is more to the point—the pained look of surprise on the face of a community which has been taught by centuries of experience to value correct opinions and urbanity of conduct. There are many things which are lawful but not all things are expedient. It is quite natural that Sir Wilfrid Laurier with his immense sympathy should arrive at a full apprehension of the many excellences of Mr. Botha. I cannot but think it unfortunate that the names of Laurier and Botha should have become so inseparably linked in the minds of people too ignorant, too suspicious, to appreciate to the full the excellences of either.

Yet it will appear to some minds that a man whom Laurier trusts deserves to be trusted.

Imaginative persons propose that Canada should give a battleship every year for the defence of the Empire. I am not insensible to the splendour of such an achievement, but not all Canadians are imaginative: certainly, the British Admiralty is not. There are circumstances under which a man is entirely justified in looking a gift horse in the mouth. When his life is at stake that is no time for complacent acquiescence; and it is easy to imagine the scrutinizing face with which Sir John Fisher would view such a transaction, or even Lord Charles Beresford, if he could abstract his mind for sufficient length of time from his journalistic and financial peregrinations. Our warlike contrivance, no matter how humble on the day of its launching, would grow in one year to a *Dreadnought*; and in five it would tower over the whole British navy. Ontario would probably insist that it should be commanded by an Orangeman. We in Quebec should certainly expect that the corporation of pilots, whose headquarters are at Batiscan, should have the privilege of putting it on the rocks, according to the immemorial rights of their *tour de role*. It would be intolerable to us if a Scotchman from Glasgow were put in charge of the engines, or Irish breath should sound the boatswain's whistle. We should require that her guns should fire a salute upon the Fête Dieu, and that the whole fleet should manœuvre in the St. Lawrence when there was a by-election in Bellechasse. No battleship would be tolerable to us, which could not safely navigate the Lachine Canal on its way to share in the festivities attendant upon the opening of the Toronto Exhibition.

Another method of paying old debts is by means of a "preference." There are two views on this subject also. The one view is that Canada should admit English goods at a lower rate of duty than that which is levied upon goods from other countries. Some rudiments of this principle have already been established; but there is no evidence that it has been received with much enthusiasm in England, or that

the benefits which flow from it are very material to that country. Clearly it is of benefit to the English manufacturer, but it is a naïve assumption that the interests of the manufacturers are identical with those of the country as a whole. Indeed the main benefit is to us in Canada, at least to those of us who are not manufacturers but professors with salaries which have been fixed these twenty years, physicians with established fees, clerks with immovable incomes, and farmers depending upon a soil whose fertility is in no wise affected by political device. We have tasted of cheaper and better books, cheaper and better clothing, cheaper and better house furnishings than those to which we were accustomed, and the taste is good. For thirty years we have been fairly docile in face of rising prices. We have imputed to ourselves the richness of the rich, and deluded ourselves into the belief that we too were sharing in their prosperity. This preference has opened our eyes, and we are beginning to wonder if we could not get goods cheaper still by a more radical measure. When we labourers are convinced that we can have relief by the simple process of seizing upon it, then England will have all the preference which she desires, that is freedom of opportunity. If blight should come upon any Canadian industry which has grown up under an artificial protection, we may console ourselves with the reflection that for thirty years we have been nourishing it, and if now it only cumbers the ground, the ax had better be laid to its roots.

It was never intended by the protected industries in Canada that this preference should give to us any relief or to England any real benefit. The following resolution is on the books of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association: "That, while the Canadian tariff should be primarily framed for Canadian interests, it should, nevertheless, give substantial preference to the mother country, recognizing always that the minimum tariff must afford adequate protection to all Canadian producers." In an official document it is written: "The Canadian government has been attacked by Canadian manufacturers on the ground that the preference is seriously

interfering with their trade. The woollen manufacturers have been foremost in this attack, and they have made very bitter complaints to the effect that their industry is being threatened with ruin through the severe competition from Britain, brought about by the preference."

Indeed there is grave evidence that this preference, however valuable to us, is of little value to England. Mr. Chamberlain, speaking before the assembled premiers in 1902, said: "While I cannot but gratefully acknowledge the intention of this proposal and its sentimental value as a proof of good-will and affection, yet its substantial results have been altogether disappointing to us. The total increase of the trade of Canada with foreigners during the period named was 69 per cent., while the total increase of British trade was only 48 per cent."

There is another and more curious form of preference which is put forward as a method by which England shall be recompensed for her labour in our behalf. Not satisfied with free entry into her markets, it is proposed that she shall tax all goods but ours. There are certain forms of humour to which the English mind is insensible, but it may be trusted to see the point of this jest.

The fiction that England is growing poorer and requires help arises from this eccentricity of mind of which I have spoken. Let us put it to the test. From 1871 to 1902 the exports of manufactured articles rose steadily decade by decade from 201 million to 227 million pounds sterling. In 1891 income tax was paid upon a revenue of 295 million pounds; in 1901 it rose to 354 millions. In 1891 the money on deposit in savings banks was 75 millions; in 1901 it reached the sum of 140 millions, and the number of depositors increased from five millions to nearly nine millions. During that period life insurance premiums increased by 12 million pounds, equal to 60 per cent. The provident societies in 1887 had invested 31 million pounds, and in 1901 the sum of 77 million pounds. Lastly, the heightened standard of comfort in living is indicated by the increased consumption

of corn, meat, tea, tobacco, and beer. In face of these six proofs we may not dissent from Mr. Balfour's judgement that, "by all available tests both the total wealth and the diffused well-being of the country are greater than they have ever been." It is well that these things be known, lest we fall into the error into which Mr. Krüger fell. Let us remember that the fable of the sick lion is after all only a fable.

We shall now enquire what Canada has done. We have not been idle in our business nor penurious with the public service, and—I imagine the statement will cause some surprise—we are paying more per head of population for the general good than England pays. This matter will bear some investigation.

Our contention is that a man who tends his cattle in Alberta, or farms his land in Saskatchewan, watches his sheep on the Australian uplands, or grows apples in Nova Scotia or New Zealand, is serving the Empire as well as if he carried on those operations in Kent. He must in addition take upon himself the ordinary duties of a member of a civilized community. He must assist in making life and property safe, in providing good means of communication with his neighbours. In some communities this is more difficult than in others. In new countries the work has to be done *ab initio*; but we must not complain of that. The man in Kent has had these things done for him from time immemorial. Our fathers helped in the doing of them, and when they went out into the wilderness they left all behind them to be enjoyed by those who remained at home.

A man who lives in London and spends a yearly income of a thousand pounds pays in taxes £128. 14s, according to a calculation which Professor Mavor prepared for me. His income tax amounts to £50; the inhabited house duty upon a dwelling renting at £120 is £4. 10s; the local taxation upon the same rating is £45. The duty upon spirits and wines is estimated at £24 and upon other dutiable goods £5. 4s. There are certain minor amounts like those exacted for servants, carriages, and armorial bearings. The local rate, of

course, varies with the locality. In St. Clement Danes it is 5s. 11d. In Poplar it is 12s. but the average for all London is 7s. 6d, according to "London Statistics," Vol. 16, pp. 424-26. The entire amount which the Londoner pays works out to something under 13 per cent. of his income. A man in Montreal who spends an income which is the equivalent of a thousand pounds in London pays in local rates on similar housing £55 or 5½ per cent. of his income, which leaves only 7½ per cent. for general purposes if the scale were the same here as in London. Our taxation is so indirect that it is impossible to calculate exactly how much we really do pay, but I appeal to any professor in a University and ask if he would not be glad to be let off with double that amount. The average of our custom imports alone is 15.66 per cent., and we pay probably as much more for the "protection" of our industries against ourselves.

Out of twelve hundred millions of capital invested in railways we have contributed 20 per cent. from the public funds. Those twenty-five thousand miles of railway we regard as a substantial asset of the Empire. We have incurred a debt of 365 million dollars, equal to 65 dollars per head of population, and the amount has been expended chiefly upon public works. Yet we have 500 millions upon deposit in banks, and our revenue would suffice to pay the debt in four years.

We in Canada must not complain because we contribute more towards the community life than the people of England do for theirs. Our needs are greater. This year we shall tax ourselves to the extent of 120 million dollars and we shall spend it all. There is much to be done. We must make ourselves safe. We have a frontier of 3500 miles to defend. Canada to-day is all frontier. When the new railway is constructed north of Abitibi and our population extends well down the Peace river, we shall not so readily be cut in twain. Our next business is to see that no foreign power can obtain a lodgement on the Pacific coast. That is the lesson of Port Arthur. We must make secure against sudden raids

Victoria, Vancouver, Esquimault, and Prince Rupert—that place with the detestable name. The western mountains serve us well, and on the East the ice and fog are a help. Also the tides of the Bay of Fundy have their uses. It might as well be understood that whatever Canada does will be done because Canada's interests will be primarily served thereby: and this because, by serving her own interests first, she serves the Empire best.

Canada to-day lies like a saw-log, to employ Mr. E. W. Thomson's phrase. You cannot hurt it much by driving an ax into the ends. Along its course lies the United States alone, and has lain for over a century without doing us much harm. Their people are like ourselves. They are not a wanton people, and their exploit in the Philippines will last them for a century more. Any cataclysm may occur: Canada may sink into the sea again, but in the meantime we may await with some equanimity any signs of subsidence. If we make our coasts secure —and that is not an impossible undertaking —we shall be doing something towards the Empire. By putting ourselves in a posture of defence we help to defend the whole. Not less than this may we do. The statesmen who control England's affairs to-day need not worry about us. We shall not trouble them to take upon themselves the labour of defending us, or to repeat on our behalf the performance in South Africa.

But there is something further which Canada can do. We can help ourselves and England at the same time. We need men, and England needs to be rid of a large part of her population. The trouble with the England of to-day is that the people—at least twelve millions of them—are half-employed, half-paid, and half-fed. This does not mean that they are idle, penniless, or starving. A Canadian who comes across the Channel up to the Dover pier, will see a company of a hundred stalwart men who had remained idle all the day waiting for the arrival of the steamer and the chance of earning a few pence by carrying luggage ashore. At the hotel in London he will find a tumult of porters and door-keepers

who are not even half employed, because they spend most of their time waiting for stray bits of silver. If the traveller have occasion to get his hair cut he will have the service of a large man in a "frock coat," who would be more usefully employed in the harvest-field. We could employ these millions profitably, but such an exodus would necessitate some alteration in the habits of the people who remain at home.

An Englishman loves to believe that he can do nothing for himself—when he is in England. No man in the world can do more when he is abroad. He pretends that he is the most helpless person in the world, that he cannot carry his bag, open the door of his cab, find an address in the directory, or use a telephone. He loves to believe that he is living in the eighteenth century. When he travels he thinks he is making the journey in a stage-coach. He carries a bundle of rugs lest the coach may be mired and himself compelled to spend the night in the open. He imagines that he may be attacked by foot-pads, so he carries a bludgeon for protection; in every city which he visits he buys a new one, and comes home laden down with a bundle of faggots. He expects that his luggage may be stolen, so he places it by his side or above his head in the railway carriage. He thinks that rain is universal, so he carries an umbrella even to the Sahara or to Los Angeles; and, knowing that it may be stolen, he carries two. The late Dr. Routh of Magdalen, who died not so very long ago, believed to the end of his days that students still came up to Oxford in a stage-coach; and if a student were a few days late in entering he excused him on the ground that the roads were bad, and that he had made the stupendous journey from Bath at an unseasonable time of year. If England got rid of her half-employed, Englishmen would be obliged to alter somewhat their domestic and social arrangements, to do for themselves what is now done for them by big footmen and other indolent servants.

One person out of ten in England is partially or wholly a pauper. They do not work because they are not obliged to. Neither would we. It is much more comfortable for a lazy

man to loaf on the pier, enjoying the cool breezes which come up the Channel, or watching the sunshine fall upon the green fields and "the dear white cliffs of Dover," than to labour in the hot harvest fields of Saskatchewan. He knows that in the end there will be a commodious poor-house wherein he may spend his declining years, and perhaps a pension as a reward for his life-long laziness. These are the people we want. We will make men of them or demonstrate that there is nothing in them of which men can be made. We have no poor-houses here. If a man will not work, neither shall he eat. January will attend to the rest. We are a ruthless people against all but undeserved misery.

A man who will not fight for his food will not fight for his king. That is a wise saying. The spirit of England is not dead in those big bodies; it is only sleeping and starving. The men who have always saved England were strong eaters, hard drinkers and good workers, fond of tangible comforts and resolute that these should not be filched away. They "fared commonlie as well as the king." They were a prosperous and cheerful people: "Even our condemned persons doe goe cheerfullie to their deths, for our nature is free, stout, hautie, prodigal of life and bloud." If only these strong idle men could be compelled to come upon our plains, their bodies and their spirits would be rejuvenated. True, they would miss the allurements of London, but their reflections on life would be more accurate than those which come to them in the gas-lit streets or the sixpenny restaurants.

Above all, there is one thing more which we must do: keep our spirit right and our heart from rotting with luxury or with poverty. In this we are not without assistance. "Happily," says a writer in the October number of an English Monthly, "the British spirit is at war with the American spirit for the possession of Canada's soul." And this is the sort of stuff for which we pay eighty thousand dollars a year for freighting over the North Atlantic, along with much other pot-house talk in which one of our ministers is assailed in the language of those publications—English-

pink and American-yellow—which should be denied the privilege of our mails. We will attend to our ministers who require attention in good season.

I think now that I have made it clear that we do not cost England anything at the present moment. If England "cut the painter," as the saying is, she would not save a penny. She would require the same number of battleships to defend her shores and convoy her food. Otherwise she would starve in six weeks. We are not insensible to the sacrifices which England has made in the past on our behalf; but those were inseparable from her career of greatness, and we were making sacrifices too.

We have certain internal affairs which we propose to manage for ourselves, We will buy our goods where we like and pay two prices for them, as we are now doing, if that foolish procedure pleases us best. We shall determine the relations which are to exist between the Provinces and the Dominion. We shall starve the Provinces and allow to the Dominion a life of extravagance so long as the Provinces acquiesce. If England choose to indulge in similar follies we shall not dissent. But England in its larger affairs is our England too. Edward is our King. Is it nothing to us that the House of Commons at Westminster can at a stroke determine to its own satisfaction our status in respect of our King? Some of its members, we think, are open traitors; and one member, at least, during the present century which is yet comparatively young was convicted of high treason. Our political existence is bound up with the British constitution, and the theorists who are striving to make it of none effect would do well to remember that their performance may conceivably be of some interest to persons who do not enjoy the ineffable privilege of living within the hearing of their jangling voices. This is not the first occasion on which persons over seas—in Holland, to be specific—have taken an interest in what was going on in London.

It becomes us in Canada to take thought for our future which is indissolubly bound up with the future of England.

At this distance there is much to perplex us. We do not know what these new political forces in England mean or what their leaders intend to do. We see Mr. Keir Hardie in India doing his best to stir up strife, and the Prime Minister in Scotland casting doubt upon the omniscience of the House of Lords. We have seen one government engage in a war of whose righteousness we were not entirely convinced; and a succeeding government hand over the prize of war to an enemy whose youths in their schools yet boast of the number of our people whom they have slain. But that may be the mere boastfulness of youth, and at times we ourselves are boastful. We have erected monuments to our dead, and Englishmen of official position come over and tell us that we were fools for our pains. We have heard Mr. Botha say: "We trust England and desire to deserve her trust in us." Yet we remember that this is not the first occasion upon which England has been trusted by a one-time enemy and the mutual trust deserved. We remember even that England was obliged to protect the French Canadians against the Canadian "patriots" after the events of 1837. It has taken us a hundred years to get upon good terms with each other: it may take a shorter time in South Africa.

The existing House of Commons may not be to our liking; but it will not endure forever. We are not enamoured of some of its members. Our affection is to the spirit of the Empire. Our loyalty is to the King who holds headship over our race, and to its ancient tradition of "truth, pitie, freedom, and hardiness." The genius of England in political affairs has been little more than the capacity to exercise patience. The time has come for us all—in England, South Africa, Australia, and Canada—to learn the lesson and be patient, to become vitally interested in one another, to abstain from giving offence, to speak the truth in love. So, in time, we shall develop a mutual trust and affection, which must precede any final constructive policy, either economic or constitutional.

ANDREW MACPHAIL

BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND CANADA

II. THE ALASKA BOUNDARY AWARD.

IN 1799, the Russian-American Company was granted, for the term of twenty years, exclusive trading privileges on the American coast north of the 65th. degree of north latitude, as well as on the Russian islands in the Pacific Ocean and in Behring Sea. American traders soon established an extensive commerce with the natives, in which, much to the annoyance of the Russians, fire-arms and ammunition became staple articles of exchange. Successive attempts were made by the Russian government to have this trade declared illegal. Finally, a remedy was provided by a Ukase of September 4th, 1821, by which exclusive sovereignty was claimed by Russia "on all islands, posts and gulfs, including the whole of the north-west coast of America beginning from Behring Straits to the 51° of northern latitude." All foreign vessels were prohibited, under the penalty of confiscation, to approach within 100 Italian miles of Russian dominion. The assumption of such authority evoked prompt protests alike from the government of Great Britain and of the United States, with the result that Russia abandoned the claim to exclusive maritime jurisdiction.

The territorial claims of Russia still remained an open question. In September, 1822, Britain was invited to formulate her claims to territory on the north-west coast of America. In January, 1823, it was agreed, in a letter from Count Lieven to George Canning, " that the question of strict right be temporarily set aside on the part of both, and that, all the differences to which the regulation in question has given rise be adjusted by an amicable arrangement founded

on the sole principle of mutual expediency, to be negotiated at St. Petersburg." Accordingly, Sir Charles Bagot, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, was instructed to open negotiations with the Russian Minister. After continued negotiations, in which the British interests were later represented by Mr. Stratford Canning, an agreement was reached, and on February 16th, 1825, the treaty defining the boundary of Russian America was signed. The sections relating to the boundary are as follows:

III. "The line of demarcation between the possessions of the High Contracting Parties, upon the coast of the continent, and the islands of America to the north-west, shall be drawn in the manner following:

"Commencing from the southernmost point of the island called Prince of Wales Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54 degrees 40 minutes north latitude, and between the 131st. and 133rd. degree of west longitude (meridian of Greenwich), the said line shall ascend to the North, along the channel called Portland Channel, as far as the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th. degree of north latitude; from this last-mentioned point the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast as far as the point of intersection of the 141st. degree of west longitude (of the same meridian); and, finally, from the said point of intersection, the said meridian line of the 141st. degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean, shall form the limit between the Russian and British possessions on the continent of America to the north-west.

IV. "With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the preceding Article it is understood:

1st. "That the island called Prince of Wales Island shall belong wholly to Russia.

2nd. "That whenever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast, from the 56th. degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st. degree of west longitude, shall prove to be at the distance of more than 10 marine leagues from the ocean, the limit between the British possessions and the line *(lisière)* of coast which is to belong to Russia, as above mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the windings *(sinuosités)* of the coast, and which shall never exceed the distance of 10 marine leagues therefrom

V. "It is moreover agreed that no establishment shall be formed by either of the two parties within the limits assigned by the two preceding Articles to the possessions of the other; consequently, British

subjects shall not form any establishment either upon the coast, or upon the border of the continent comprised within the limits of the Russian possessions as designated in the two preceding Articles; and, in like manner, no establishment shall be formed by Russian subjects beyond the said limits.

VI. "It is understood that the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, from whatever quarter they may arrive, whether from the ocean, or from the interior of the continent, shall forever enjoy the right of navigating freely, and without any hindrance whatever, all the rivers and streams which, in their course towards the Pacific Ocean, may cross the line described in Article III. of the present Convention.

VII. "It is also understood, that, for the space of 10 years from the signature of the present Convention, the vessels of the two Powers, or those belonging to their respective subjects, shall mutually be at liberty to frequent, without any hindrance whatever, all the inland seas, the gulfs, havens, and creeks on the coast mentioned in Article III. for the purposes of fishing and of trading with the natives."

By a treaty between Russia and the United States, concluded March 30th, 1867, the United States secured possession of all Russian territory in North America. Article I. of this treaty, in defining the boundary, embodies Articles III. and IV. of the Convention of 1825.

With the admission of British Columbia into the Dominion, in 1871, began Canadian interest in the Alaska boundary question. In 1872, on the initiative of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Great Britain pointed out the necessity of having the boundary line definitely ascertained. Although the proposition received the support of President Grant in his Message to Congress, no action was taken. In 1884, Mr. Dall, of the United States Survey raised the point that, since, as he alleged, there was no continuous range of mountains parallel to the coast, the United States would contend for the line following the sinuosities of the coast at distance of 10 marine leagues. In 1887-88 an informal conference was held between Mr. Dall and Dr. Dawson, Director of the Geological Survey of Canada, for the purpose of agreeing on certain conventional lines. In the report of this conference Dr. Dawson claimed that the boundary line


MAP ILLUSTRATING
ALASKA BOUNDARY AWARD
Boundary claimed by Great Britain.
Boundary claimed by the United States
Boundary as Awarded.
—University Magazine.
Lewes River
Pelly River
Teslin River
Dyea
Skagway
Cape Fairweather
Cape Spencer
Cross Sound
ICY STRAIT
CHICHAGOF ISLAND
BARANOF ISLAND
CHATHAM STRAIT
ADMIRALTY I.
FREDERICK SOUND
KUPREANOF ISLAND
KUIU ISLAND
Cape Edgecombe
Cape Ommaney
Christiana Sound
IPHIGENIA BAY
PRINCE OF WALES ISLAND
CLARENCE STRAIT
REVILLA GIGEDO ISLAND
PORTLAND CANAL
Stikine River
DIXON ENTRANCE
Cape Muzon
QUEEN CHARLOTTE IS.
Pt. Simpson
Dease River
Taku River



MAP ILLUSTRATING
PORTLAND CHANNEL

×—×—×—×—×—× Boundary claimed by Great Britain.
—·—·—·—·— Boundary claimed by the United States.
———— – – – Boundary as Awarded.

—*University Magazine.*

should cross the inlets of the coast. Under a convention of 1892, a joint survey of the district adjacent to the boundary line was made by Dr. King and General Duffield. The discovery of gold in the Yukon in 1897 emphasized the necessity of reaching some agreement respecting the boundary. The watershed at the summit of the passage at the head of Lynn Canal was accepted as a provisional boundary, on the understanding that such an agreement should not prejudice the treaty rights of either party.

The Joint High Commission of 1898 endeavoured to reach an agreement as the basis for the definition of the boundary line. The British commissioners proposed a reference to a tribunal of three jurists, one nominated by each party, and the third by the two so selected, or, in case of disagreement, by a friendly power. The rules laid down by the Venezuela Treaty were to apply to this arbitration. This was agreeable to the United States only if—a condition impossible to Britain—the third arbitrator should be appointed by one of the independent States of South America. Britain proposed the submission of the question to the Hague tribunal but this was rejected by the United States. The United States commissioners suggested a tribunal of six impartial jurists of repute, three to be chosen by each nation. To this Britain objected that it gave no assurance of a final settlement. Thus, the Joint High Commission was unable to reach a definite agreement.

Negotiations, however, were continued, and in January, 1903, a draft Convention, based on the proposal of the United States before the Joint High Commission, was approved by the Canadian government. The Convention was signed in Washington, January 24th, and the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged March 3rd, 1903. To a tribunal of six impartial jurors were submitted, for a judicial consideration, seven questions based on Articles III., IV. and V. of the treaty of 1825. Any actions of the several governments, prior or subsequent to the treaty, were to be considered in so far as they revealed the purpose of the original parties.

In accordance with this Convention a tribunal, consisting of Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England; Sir Louis Jetté, Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec; and Mr. A. B. Aylesworth, K.C., representing Great Britain; and of the Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War of the United States; the Hon. Senator Lodge of Massachusetts; and the Hon. Senator Turner of Washington, representing the United States, assembled in London, on September 3rd, 1903. On October 20th, its award was handed out.

Much attention has been directed to the composition or the tribunal. But, it is submitted, a criticism of its personnel serves only to obscure the issue and to prejudice an impartial view of the award. In accepting the convention and agreeing to the tribunal Canada became a party to the award. If its decision is not satisfactory, to attack the court or to attribute to its members ulterior motives is not a dignified attitude. If the award is to be condemned let it be condemned on its merits and on its merits alone.

First Question: What is intended as the point of commencement of the line? Both parties agreed that the most southerly point of Prince of Wales Island was Cape Muzon; and that from this point, according to the treaty, the boundary line should begin.

Second Question: What channel is the Portland Channel? The British contention was that "it is the channel which Vancouver named Portland Canal, and which enters the ocean between Tongass Island and Kannaghunut Island, leaving Sitklan, Wales, and Pearse Islands on the South and East, and extending northerly eighty-two miles to its head."

By the United States it was maintained that Portland Channel is "the same body of water now commonly known and described as Portland Canal, which, passing from the north between Ramsden Point on the mainland and Pearse Island, and thence southward of said island and Wales Island, enters Dixson Entrance between the island last mentioned and Compton Island."

The question to be decided is: what passage was intended as Portland Channel by the negotiators of the Treaty of 1825. Portland Channel was explored, charted, and named by Vancouver, during his voyage in 1798. From Vancouver's narrative, published first in 1798, and in a second edition, of which there was a French translation, in 1801, his course may be followed in detail. The narrative must be admitted as evidence, because, apart from the fact that reference is made to it in the negotiations, it seems incredible that the negotiators would not be familiar with the only description of the territories then in dispute. What is Vancouver's testimony?

After having followed the continental shore north past Point Maskelyne, he left his ships near Salmon Cove, and in smaller boats explored the head of Portland Inlet and of Observatory Inlet. His attention was next occupied with the exploration of the channel to the North and West of Pearse and Wales Islands. "In the morning of the 2nd. (August) we sat out early, and passed through a labyrinth of small islets and rocks, along the continental shore; this, taking now a winding course to the South-West and West, showed the South Eastern side of the canal to be much broken, through which was a passage leading SSE. towards the ocean (Tongass Passage). We passed this in the hope of finding a more northern and westerly communication, in which we were not disappointed, as the channel we were then pursuing was soon found to communicate with the sea; making the land to the south of us one or more islands." These were, doubtless, Sitklan and Kannaghunut Islands.

The third of August was occupied in exploring Nakat Inlet, while the night was spent in a cove near Cape Fox. During the next ten days he explored Revilla Gigedo and adjacent islands; "before dark, however, (on the 14th) we reached the cove which had afforded us shelter under similar circumstances on the evening of the 3rd; here we rested for the night........and early on the following morning we again bent our way towards the vessels. In the forenoon we

reached that arm of the sea whose examination had occupied our time from the 27th. of the preceding to the 2nd. of this month. The distance from its entrance to its source is about 70 miles, which, in honour of the noble family of Bentinck, I named Portland's Canal." The channel entering the ocean at Point Maskelyne and extending north-eastward to Salmon Cove he later named Observatory Inlet.

Doubt exists as to whether Vancouver in returning to his vessels followed the channel to the north or to the south of all the four islands. Both of these he had traversed during the previous month. At daybreak he left Cape Fox and in the forenoon reached the outlet of Portland's Canal. Considering that the voyage occupied several hours the more distant passage seems to correspond better with the narrative. Moreover, as his supplies were nearly exhausted he would naturally select the less difficult route. This he must have known to have been the southern channel. This indicates that, after leaving Cape Fox, he went south of Tongass Passage, through which he had looked on the 2nd. of August, and now, observing through it the northern channel, named it Portland's Canal. But, "the arm of the sea" which he had previously examined, includes the passage north of Sitklan and Kannaghunut Islands. This northern passage is part of Portland Channel.

Vancouver's narrative establishes that the Portland Channel named by him extended north of Pearse and Wales Islands and entered the Pacific through two channels, the one to the west of Wales Island, the other to the north of Sitklan Island. It proves that the Observatory Inlet named by him reached from Point Maskelyne to Salmon Cove.

To decide what was the negotiators' Portland Channel the maps known to have been consulted must be examined. These are Vancouver's charts, a Russian map of 1802, the Arrowsmith maps, and Faden's map. These show that, while the name Observatory Inlet is not applied to the passage south of Point Ramsden, Portland Channel extended to the north of Pearse and Wales Islands. On the only map on

which the two small islands, Sitklan and Kannaghunut appear, they are combined and show a much broader channel to the East than to the North. Further, from the position of the islands, the eastern passage is a direct extension of the channel above Wales Island and does not involve a change in direction as in the case of the northern channel. By the negotiators seeking an international boundary of the two channels, the broader and more direct would most probably be selected.

A review of the evidence indicates that the Portland Channel of the negotiators was that channel to the north of Pearse and Wales Islands and entering the Pacific through the modern Tongass Passage. This conclusion conforms with the award of the tribunal.

The decision in this question is responsible for the furor raised against Lord Alverstone. The " perfidious sacrifice of Canadian interests " by the Lord Chief Justice of England was the sacrifice of the two barren rocks, Sitklan and Kannaghunut. Yet a careful and impartial examination of the facts of the case compels the conclusion that Lord Alverstone's decision best expresses the intention of the negotiators. An honest doubt could have existed as to which of the two channels should be followed. The balance of the evidence favoured one and this the tribunal adopted.

Third Question: What course should the line take from the point of commencement to the entrance to Portland Channel? Having decided that Cape Muzon is the point of commencement of the line and having fixed a point in the entrance of Portland Channel the boundary will follow a straight line joining those points.

Fourth Question: To what point in the 56th. parallel is the line to be drawn from the head of the Portland Channel, and what course should it follow between these points? The point is where the summit of the mountains nearest the Portland Channel crosses the 56th. parallel. The shortest distance between this point and the head of the channel will form the boundary line.

Fifth Question: In extending the line of demarcation northward from said point on the parallel of the 56th. degree of north latitude, following the crest of the mountains situated parallel to the coast until its intersection with the 141st. degree of longitude west of Greenwich, subject to the conditions that if such a line should anywhere exceed the distance of 10 marine leagues from the ocean, then the boundary between the British and the Russian territory should be formed by a line parallel to the sinuosities of the coast and distant therefrom not more than 10 marine leagues, was it the intention and meaning of the said Convention of 1825 that there should remain in the exclusive possession of Russia a continuous fringe, or strip, of coast on the mainland not exceeding 10 marine leagues in width, separating the British possessions from the bays, ports, inlets, havens, and waters of the ocean, and extending from the said point on the 56th. degree of latitude north to a point where such line of demarcation should intersect the 141st. degree of longitude west of the meridian of Greenwich?

This practical question is as to the ownership of the heads of the inlets. Should the boundary go around the inlets, leaving the heads United States territory, or should it cut the inlets, leaving them British territory? The issues at stake here are infinitely more important than any others raised in the arbitration. Compared with this the Portland Canal dispute is insignificant.

From the purpose of the negotiation, from the accepted meaning of the terms of the treaty, revealed in the correspondence of parties concerned, in maps, or by official action of either government, the particular intention of the negotiators may be discovered. The interests of each nation on the north-west coast of America were represented by trading companies. Britain's concern was the advantage of the Hudson's Bay and North-West Companies; Russia's, of the Russian-American Company. In the words of the Russian plenipotentiaries "the motive which caused the adoption of the principle of mutual expediency to be pro-

posed,......is to prevent the respective establishments on the north-west coast from injuring each other and entering into collision."

Accordingly, Russia proposed as a boundary, in general, the 55th. degree, Portland Channel and from its head the chain of mountains bordering the coast to the 139th. degree of longitude. In their counter draft they urged that "the principal motive which constrains Russia to insist upon sovereignty over the above-indicated *lisière* (strip of country) upon the mainland (*terre ferme*),......is that, deprived of this territory, the Russian-American Company would have no means of sustaining its establishments, which would therefore be without any support (*point d'appui*) and could have no solidity.'' They insisted that "without a *lisière* upon the continental coast, starting from Portland Channel, the Russian establishments on the islands would have no support; that they would be at the mercy of the establishments which strangers might form upon the mainland, and that any such arrangement, far from being founded upon the principle of mutual accommodation, would but offer dangers for one of the parties and exclusive advantages for the other."

What were the British claims? A memorandum was presented to the British government by Mr. Pelly, the agent of the Hudson's Bay Company, and on this memorial were based the instructions sent to Sir Charles Bagot. In these Mr. Canning says: "if your Excellency can obtain the strait which separates the islands from the mainland as the boundary, the prolongation of the line drawn through that strait would strike the mainland near Mount Elias—the lowest point of unquestioned Russian discovery. But if that were too much to insist upon, the 135. degree of longitude, as suggested by your Excellency, northward from the head of Lynn's Harbor, might suffice. It would, however, in that case be expedient to assign, with respect to the mainland southward of that point, a limit, say, of 50 or 100 miles from the coast, beyond which the Russian posts should not be extended to

the eastward. We must not on any account admit the Russian territory to extend at any point to the Rocky Mountains."

Again, in reply to the observations of the Russian plenipotentiaries, Sir Charles Bagot said, "any argument founded on the consideration of the practical advantage of Russia could not fail to have the greatest weight, and the plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty did not hesitate to give up the line of demarcation which he had first proposed,.... and to offer another which would secure to Russia, not only a strip on the continent, opposite the southernmost establishment which she possesses on the islands, but also the possession of all the islands and waters in its vicinity or which are situated between that establishment and the mainland; in short, possession of all that could in future be of any service either to its stability or its prosperity."

It is clear, then, that Russia's purpose was to obtain, as a protection for her trading posts, an unbroken strip of the continent and that Britain was not inclined to refuse her request.

Moreover, references made to the *lisière* confirm the opinion that it was understood as passing around the heads of inlets.

In reply to the second Russian proposal, Sir Charles Bagot observed that it "would deprive His Britannic Majesty of sovereignty over all the inlets and small bays lying between latitudes 56° and 54°, 45′, whereof several (as there is every reason to believe) communicate directly with the establishments of the Hudson's Bay Company and are, consequently, of essential importance to its commerce." Then he proposed a line parallel with the sinuosities of the coast and at a distance of 10 marine leagues from the shore, "to insure to Russia the exclusive sovereignty of these waters, (between King George's Island and the mainland) as well as all the islands and coasts where there are really Russian establishments." This proposal was made in February, 1824, and in May, Mr. Pelly, in a letter to Mr. Canning,

stated that he was at a loss to understand why Great Britain should cede to Russia the exclusive right to the islands and the coast from lat. 54° 40' northward to Mount Elias. That Russia regarded the line as passing around the heads of inlets is manifest from their reply to the British request for the right of navigating the waters of the *lisière:* "They can, under no circumstances, and by no supposed correspondent advantages, be induced to grant to any Power the privilege to navigate and trade in perpetuity within a country the full sovereignty of which was to belong to Russia." It is obvious, then, that both parties to the agreement considered the *lisière* as extending around the heads of inlets.

It has been urged, however, that the reciprocal rights of navigation, granted by Article VII. of the treaty, apply exclusively to the coast of the *lisière* and thus indicate that the heads of inlets must have belonged to Britain. As compensation for the recognition of Russian sovereignty over the inlets, Britain claimed the perpetual right to navigate freely the inlets and the rivers entering them. Russia made no claim to rights of navigation on the coast of the *lisière* because she considered her right already established by the sovereignty of the territory bordering the coast. In Article III. of Mr. Canning's draft convention, section 2 gave Britain the perpetual right of navigation of the coast of the *lisière* while section 3 gave the same right respecting the rivers. Article V. of the draft provided for the reciprocal rights of navigation for a term of years, as they existed between Russia and the United States, "on the other parts of the coast." To the claim in section 3, Russia agreed and the section was embodied as Article VI. of the treaty. The right claimed in section 2 she could admit only for a term of years. Hence, by making Article V. of the draft perfectly general, an agreement was reached, satisfactory to both parties. Thus, by Article VII. of the treaty Russia conceded to Britain the right of navigating the waters of the *lisière*, while Britain acknowledged Russia's right to navigate the coast south

of the *lisière*. Article VII. is general in its application and supports the contention that the strip of coast was to run around the inlets.

In determining this question a reference to the early maps is of particular value because repeated reference was made by the negotiators to the position of the mountains on the maps. On Vancouver's charts, on which the mountains are marked more distinctly than on any other, a continuous range is shown, at a short distance from the shore, following the windings of the coast. It extends unbroken around the heads of all the inlets. The same is true of the Russian map of 1802. On the Faden and Arrowsmith maps, while the mountains are at different distances from the coast, they are in each case represented as going around the heads of the inlets.

Likewise, official maps, British, Russian, and American, subsequent to the treaty, have, until the point was raised by Canadian officials, uniformly regarded the boundary as going behind the inlets. This manifests the meaning universally accepted at the time of the treaty.

One other point deserves consideration. In 1839, the Russian-American Company, with the ratification both of the Russian and of the British governments, leased to the Hudson's Bay Company, for the term of five years, its possessions on the continent from Cape Spencer to Portland Channel. This lease was renewed for successive periods of five years up to the time of the American acquisition. In an investigation, subsequent to the Crimean War, of the relations between the two companies on the north-west coast of America, Sir George Simpson produced before the House of Commons a map representing the territory which his Company had acquired by lease. This map includes within the territory leased substantially what was claimed by the United States. The fact that it was not contested by the British government is tantamount to an official recognition of the justice of the United States' contention.

A review of the evidence submitted establishes that the intention of the Convention of 1825 was, " that there should

remain in the exclusive possession of Russia a continuous fringe, or strip, of coast on the mainland not exceeding 10 marine leagues in width, separating the British possessions from the bays, ports, inlets, havens, and waters of the ocean." The sixth question, being dependent on a negative answer to the fifth, need not be referred to.

Seventh Question: What, if any exist, are the mountains referred to as situated parallel to the coast, which mountains, when within 10 marine leagues from the coast, are declared to form the eastern boundary? Britain contended that such mountains did exist. The United States claimed that they did not and that the boundary must then be at the uniform distance of 10 marine leagues from the coast. The British contention was supported by the tribunal and, as far as a knowledge of them permitted, the mountains referred to were marked.

Has justice been done by the award of the tribunal? Canada did not receive the full extent of her claim; nor did the United States. An examination of the facts of the case leads to the conclusion that the original purpose of the Convention of 1825 has been carried out. Nothing has been taken from Canada to which she could establish a clear and positive right. Justice has been done.

In its broader relations, the Alaska Boundary Award has been the source of great advantage to Canada. A definite boundary has been fixed. One of the most troublesome of our international problems has been removed. A dispute which has carried with it the possibilities of bloodshed has been settled finally. If Canada has not received as much as she desired the fault rests, not with the Boundary Tribunal, but with the negotiators of the treaty of 1825. And let it be remembered that then Canada consisted of the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec.

The reception which the award met with at the hands of the Canadian public suggests problems of more than passing interest. A tendency was revealed to distrust British statesmanship and British diplomacy wherever Canadian

interests were involved. Justice demands that Canadians should know the facts connected with the cases and consider broadly all the questions involved before questioning the fidelity of Britain to Canadian interests. The ardent vigour of a young nation writhes under restraint, and cries for greater freedom. If an extension of the treaty-making power is desirable, it is not because our interests have been sacrificed in the past, but because, in our national development, we have reached that stage in which complete control of our domestic affairs demands greater freedom in our international relations. Not the least important of the benefits to be derived from the treaty-making power will be a more real appreciation of the significance of nationality which experience in the actual conflicts of diplomacy will give. Fortunate it is that such an experiment can be made under the aegis of British connexion.

One other point raised by the Alaska Boundary Arbitration is important. The work of our agents in the preparation of the British case, considering the difficulties under which they laboured, was most creditable. Yet it must be admitted that the preparation of the American case revealed more extensive and more accurate research and a firmer grasp of the various questions involved. More independence in international affairs brings added responsibility. Canada must justify her claim to greater treaty-making powers by, at least, giving promises of the ability to employ them. Since 1903 we have travelled far in securing greater freedom in our international relations. Have we adjusted our system of government so that it may perform creditably these new national functions ? The necessity of securing a thorough command of all questions involved in our international relations is the message of the Alaska Boundary Arbitration to the Canada of to-day.

D. A. MacArthur.

GOVERNMENT BY PARTY

POLITICAL THEORIES—Ancient and Mediaeval—by Wm. Archibald Dunning, Ph.D., New York ; The MacMillan Co., 1902.

POLITICAL THEORIES—From Luther to Montesquieu—by the same, 1905.

A MODERN SYMPOSIUM—by A. Lowes Dickinson, London ; Brimley Johnson and Ince, 1905.

IMPERIALISM—by J. A. Hobson, Westminster ; Archibald Constable & Co., 1902.

WAR AND LABOUR—by M. Anitchkow, Westminster ; Archibald Constable & Co., 1900.

ANARCHISM—by E. V. Zenker, London ; Methuen & Co., 1898.

A HISTORY OF SOCIALISM—by Thomas Kirkup, London ; Adam and Charles Black, 1900.

IT SEEMS impossible that anyone can examine the subject matter of the books brought together at the head of this article without convincing himself that all the various prescriptions recommended for the treatment of nations and societies divide themselves into two main doctrines of the relations between the State and the individual; that these doctrines in their present form are the result of a natural and steady growth from the earliest times of civilization, as especially exemplified in the history of Europe; and that, in their widening conflict ever more clearly defining each other, the gradual victory of one of them and the gradual defeat of its opponent are the necessary instruments of the evolution to which we in our generation and country contribute. It matters little what names we may give to them: at different stages they have emphasized different elements in their lines of advance; and in the same age have shown extremes in their own ranks, which did not always seem to the careless mind compatible. But the first is roughly the doctrine of manage-

ment, for which the term conservatism is as good as any other; and the second is the doctrine of liberty. If we glance even hastily at the history of these two principles we shall perhaps arrive at some idea of their meaning which may have more than passing value.

The beginnings of authentic history in Greece, from which point Dr. Dunning sets out, disclose an indefinite condition of conservatism, as absolute as it was unconscious. The kingly rule of earlier times had ramified into various small oligarchies, in each of which in time some one man stronger than the rest had seized the supreme control. The tyrants, however, in their turn were expelled by temporary coalitions between the ancient nobles and the whole mass of subjects. And the ensuing struggle between the two groups which so asserted themselves became the conflict between the oligarchic and the democratic principles, the various solutions of which determined the characters of the Grecian states. Of these, the systems of Sparta and Athens offer the most interesting contrast.

In Sparta the idea of management, of the supreme importance of the State, maintained itself in a socialistic direction. The control of the State over every part of the individual's life, the public discipline, the public mess, the discouragement of family life and of intercourse with foreigners, made up a whole of ideal consistency. The sole freedom attained was the equal right on the part of an ever decreasing aristocracy to share in the administration of the system.

Athens, on the other hand, steadily progressed towards a conscious democracy. In the outcome, every citizen had his share in the government; and the interference of the State in private life was of small importance compared with the Spartan *régime*. And yet it must be remembered that this democracy limited its citizenship to include but a small number of those who walked the streets of Athens. It was grounded on the rights not of men but of Athenians. As such it must forfeit the claim to the full meaning of its title. The

distinction, however, between its individualism and the socialism of Sparta was well recognized by Greek thinkers; and the adherence in the main to the chief features of the one set of conditions as opposed to the other is the fundamental difference between the theories of Aristotle and those of his master, Plato.

It is only another evidence of the universality of Plato's mind that he has perhaps persuaded more men to Liberalism than any other man ever persuaded to Conservatism, and yet that few political philosophies are more conservative than his. That the government of his ideal Republic had a benevolent purpose does not alter its character as a system of control from without, of State discipline administered by an aristocracy, and leaving but the smallest range to private will. The guardians of his community formed a self-regulating class. Nothing could be farther from their motives than tyranny, and yet under their sway the individual was to be emptied of all personality. The communism to which in their training they had to subject themselves was to be imposed by them upon all the components of the State. There must be no private joys, or griefs, or gains; no private property; no family love. An uniform public education would go hand in hand with conscription; and men would be brought to conform to an ideal standard of virtue irrespective of their consent. That these policies were considerably modified in Plato's later work, "The Laws," does not in the least affect their theoretical significance. The only remarkable distinction between his Republic and the government of Lacedæmon was that the former aimed at the subordination of all its citizens to an abstract good, the latter considered simply the conservation of the State.

Very different is the basis of the doctrines of Aristotle. His principle that the chief good lay in the full development and activity of all the powers latent in men led him necessarily to emphasize the value of personality. That these powers could not be properly worked out, save by complete intercourse between persons, was for Aristotle but another

side of the truth of the unity of diversities. The sense of personal possession of family and of property is for him a real need. The end of the State consists not so much in managing its people as in giving room for high living and for noble actions. The administration should be conducted to the taste of the greatest number of the citizens who have to live under it. While some are more fitted than others to compose the executive, the ultimate sovereignty as a critical force must lie in the whole body of free men. Authority must be subordinate to laws which all may know. And the exercise of dominion for dominion's sake should be deprecated as much with respect to the State's actions beyond its borders as in regard to those within them. The military preparations of the people should be made not for conquest, but for defence.

Such a conception of liberty seems astonishing in its breadth to those who call to mind the laborious struggles of later ages to achieve just such principles. And so indeed it is when compared with the general trend of ancient thought. There is but one flaw in its fairness, and that is seen in the extent of the meaning of citizenship. For not only does this term eliminate the whole body of slaves, but all who have to work in order to live are unworthy of the Aristotelian franchise. The first essential of a citizen is capacity to rule and to be ruled. The cultivation of this double faculty cannot take place, according to Aristotle, save among gentlemen. And although this narrow definition was not universal in Greece, the salient point yet stands out that men as men were never politically considered in even the highest efforts of Hellenic civilization before it had to yield to the superior force of Rome.

If when we now turn to Rome we see a strange dearth and incompetence of political theory, we yet find a practical assertion and development of the opposing ideas no less pronounced than in Greece, but with a general prevalence of victory on the conservative side. Perhaps the main difference between the historical processes of the two countries lay in

the broader field of action which spread out before the Romans, and in the gradual complication of their struggle by imperialistic elements which the defensive character of Grecian civilization avoided. We see the distinction between the managers and the managed consciously formulating itself at an early period. The endeavour of the latter party to abolish the distinction and to identify itself with the former swings after all the rhythm of party warfare to a well defined success. But no sooner had the Plebeians attained that freedom which simply gave them an equal share in the control of Roman destinies, than the struggle reasserted itself as one between enfranchised Romans and their unenfranchised Italian allies. War alone brought about the end of this difference; when a larger Rome immediately set itself in turn to the management of less successful peoples.

The military dictators whom, in rapid succession, this imperialism created brought about again an opposition between sovereignty and the populace in Rome itself, which became ever more extreme and continuous until it was crowned in the person of Augustus. In his triumph we discover no great revolution, no extraordinary apostacy from the spirit of that other nobler Rome, which hardly existed outside the minds of Brutus and his like. The freedom, great as it was, in the name of which they killed Cæsar, and for the sake of which in their turn they died, had never purged itself of that itch for dominion that by a fine irony was the cause of its own suppression. The principle that politics and rulership were the same thing did not come from beyond the Rubicon. Philippi was not its baptism but its confirmation. The sum of the matter is simply that an autocracy concentrated the idea of the management of one set of human beings by another which a whole people had not scrupled to act upon in its dealings with the rest of mankind; and which, with varying proportions at different stages between the numbers of the managers and of the managed, was the prime feature of Roman history. Roman citizenship did not become universally possible until the colossal power of one man over

three continents made it but the mockery of what it might have been.

At this precise moment there came into the world an Idea, the lack of which was the chief explanation of Grecian insecurity, and of the Roman collapse; and the presence of which, as soon as it began to be realized, was to change so utterly the development of European politics. It was no accident that, when the decree went forth from the first of all Emperors, that all the world should be taxed, there was born in the humblest spot of his dominions, a Spirit which, though heir to the whole preparation of humanity, was assuredly begotten by no human father. The peculiar concourse of events which made Bethlehem rather than Athens the birthplace of this Spirit is too well understood to need reference here. Our main interest lies in watching the progress of the Christian idea in its political meaning against an opposition that concentrated its resistance in various forms throughout the succeeding centuries. The insistence upon the personal worth of every soul alive, the faith that character alone can solve the puzzles of the world, the simple doctrine of the Golden Rule, and its philosophical expression in the idea of the perfect law of liberty, are but different phases of one thought, the tremendous import of which was hardly perceived by the most ardent of its early supporters, but which was to sink deep into the human mind and make there its slow but steady appeal. Crushed by persecutions, betrayed by prosperity, cynically set aside by its custodians in the endeavour to maintain themselves in the turmoil of the Middle Ages by copying the policies of their adversaries, and utterly shamed and outcast in the temporary triumph of that endeavour, we may observe the vicissitudes of this freedom, offering itself to men as men, until it began once more to lift up its head in the vigour of the Reformation.

The opposite principle owed its long continuance in power to the martial spirit to which Europe was so long to be doomed. The Empire had no sooner consolidated itself than it was forced to act upon the defensive. And every fresh in-

cursion of the barbarians from the North and the East had hardly become established before in its turn it succumbed. The various nations which this chaos produced achieved their identity by striving to exterminate each other. The exigencies of a state of war developed the feudal system and a sovereign power in the custody of privileged men. The imperialism of Rome was answered and repeated after its death by the absolutism of the rest of the kingdoms of Europe. Well might such a man as St. Augustine despair of any earthly politics, and transport his hopes for freedom into a heaven that worked its immortal compensations in a harmony immeasurably removed from the afflictions of this world.

The State was the supreme principle of the Middle Ages. To its purposes the lives of all its subjects were devoted. The control which it symbolized was justified in itself and for its own sake. Any method, any means which would ensure its stability, were proper policies to pursue. Nowhere is this doctrine more logically expressed than in that much misunderstood work "The Prince," which may be taken as an exposition of political theory applicable to a much larger period of history than the days with which particularly it dealt. Macaulay indeed makes the theories of Machiavelli depend upon the unique character of Italian civilization. But the sole difference between Machiavellianism and the statesmanship of the rest of Europe in those days, and even in more recent times, lay in the fact that the Italian knew what he believed. It was the ignorance and hypocrisy of his critics that kept them from recognizing in his maxims the whole tenor of their practice. There was never a clearer or more consistent expression of the mood of government, pure and simple. "I treat," says Machiavelli, "of the means of governing and conserving States." Force and authority are his constant phrases. The State is so self-sufficient that it is almost a pity that it should have the trouble of persons to govern. The best way to maintain sovereignty over a conquered city is to raze it. Short of so ideal a policy, plenty of expedients will commend themselves to the wise

ruler. There unfortunately appears in every State a class of persons who do not wish to be managed. To keep these from interfering with the serene system of statehood as an efficient force, any means are proper for the sensible Prince. If the maintenance of the State be the chief good, then whatever brings about that result is praiseworthy; whatever seeming virtue interferes with it is a vice of weakness. The highest ideal of politics was to maintain one's own State in that independence of external control which every healthy organization should deny to its neighbours.

In the meantime a series of doctrines had been growing up which was to open the way to a very different view of the relations between the governing power and the governed. These doctrines had their rise in the conflict between the ecclesiastical and the secular powers. The steady spread of Christianity received State recognition at the very moment when the seat of government was removed from Rome to Constantinople. No longer overshadowed by a Court, the heads of the official faith in the ancient capital enjoyed a prestige that not only survived, but even solidified itself by the fall of the Western Empire. Karl Martel presented the Papacy with the beginnings of its temporal power. His grandson Charlemagne received his coronation from Leo III.; and the struggle between ecclesiastical authority and the Holy Roman Empire started out with an advantage in favour of the Church which the competence to grant and the actual acceptance of such a title might be held to imply. Two centuries later we have a Pope, whose ideal was a Church which should control the whole of human destiny, excommunicating the Emperor and absolving his subjects from their allegiance in order to bring him to a sense of his inferior position. The desire to justify this attitude led to the elaboration of two ideas upon either side of the principle of monarchy: the one being an idea of popular sovereignty, upon which the king's authority was based; the other an idea of a superior spiritual law to which he was obliged to conform. Needless to say the value of these principles to the Roman hierarchy

was that it could interpret the second in appealing to the first; and could oppose by a right still more divine the Imperial assumptions of the divine right of kings and of the independence of states.

While these two powers thus fought for supremacy, Freedom was slowly realizing certain features favourable to its own cause in both sides of the argument. In the fourteenth century, Marsiglio of Padua went so far as to revive, in extension of the contemporary principle of popular sovereignty, the Grecian idea of an assembly of citizens having power to legislate, and to punish the executive if that body should transgress the law by which it acted. He also, turning to the Church, declared for the participation in Church management of all believers, through the medium of Church Councils. This policy was again striven for by those who sought for that reformation in the management of Catholicism which was provoked by the need to combat the doctrines of Wycliffe and Huss. The Council of Constance implied a limitation of the power of the Pope, the reasons for which its promoters realized to be quite as applicable to political affairs; and the appeal to "necessity" in the interests of "general welfare," in the one case, was not far removed from the appeal to abstract justice in the interests of popular sovereignty, in the other. The two absolutisms of the Middle Ages thus supplied by their antagonism most of the metaphysical weapons that were to be used against them by the reawakened spirit of democracy.

The first political effect of the Protestant Reformation was, of course, to enhance authority more than ever before. The reasons are obvious. Luther in combating Rome naturally strengthened as best he could the secular power which in its enmity to ecclesiastical arrogance lay so ready to his hand. Calvin had the double duty of warding off the aggression of Savoy from the State, and of Rome from the Church of Geneva. But where the religion of the subject was not that of the State a very different theory arose. The Huguenot author of "Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos" appropriated to a very different purpose the two doctrines advanced by Papal

strategy. With him the conception of two covenants, the first between the King and his people on the one hand, and their God on the other, by which the former engaged themselves to promote the divine glory, and the second between the King and his people alone, by which the latter promised obedience should the former maintain justice and the common welfare, gave the people two holds over their ruler: should he break either they were equally absolved from allegiance. The same notion of contracts and the consequent subordination of the monarch to justice and law filled the work which the Presbyterian Buchanan dedicated to his pupil James VI. The same notions of popular sovereignty and popular welfare inspired the Protestant Dutch Republic then freeing itself from Spain. And lastly, Spain too contributed to this doctrine of a monarchism hedged in by the estates of the realm through no less a person than the Jesuit, Mariana.

And when absolutism realized the use made against it of its own elaborations of doctrine, it simply answered by new modifications of the old features. In the person of the Frenchman Bodin, of the court of Henry III., we have indeed a partial exception to this statement; for he founded the kingly power upon conquest, not consent; and went quite as far as Machiavelli in the unhampered statement that "sovereignty is the supreme power over citizens and subjects, unrestrained by the laws." But even he, in providing against a tyranny which was no part of his system, fell back upon the old conception of the authority, superior to the King, of that abstract justice which was beginning to appropriate the title of the Law of Nature. And the great Spaniard, Suarez, repeated this latter conception in the familiar guise of an universally binding power into which the Papacy had a peculiar insight; and when met by the formula of popular sovereignty, triumphantly surmounted the difficulty by supposing the prerogative to have been transferred consensually, but beyond redemption, by the people to their King.

As a last illustration of this tendency on the Continent to theorize by the modification of abstract phrases to suit the

standpoint of the particular thinker, we need only instance Grotius, who so brilliantly extended the academic scope of the Jus Naturale in a cosmopolitan direction as a rational instinct shared in by all men in virtue of their humanity. There could be no sharper contrast between the catholic and abstract meaning attached by the old thinkers to the Law of Nature, and the protestant, humanitarian, individualistic implications so given to the phrase by Grotius. From the strongest bulwark of authority, the conception became, however little Grotius himself may have recognized it, the very vindication of personal freedom.

But there was wanting for the solid nourishing of liberty, a more practical earnestness and effort, and a people who would find in its constitutionl principles no fantastic impediments, but rather a natural welcome to the new spirit in Europe. Such was the solitary people of England, whose insistence upon law as a growth of precedent and custom, and not as an abstract fountain of statutes, made so greatly for the cultivation of personal independence. The Magna Charta, the maxims that every Englishman's house was his castle, that there should be no taxation save by consent of all the freemen of England, and that no one should be in peril of losing life, liberty or property, save by process of law, came at an early stage in English political history, and promoted the development of a real aggregation of individuals in contrast to the indefinite idea of a popular mass, beyond which continental theory had not progressed. Notions so antagonistic to authority were of course not easily secured. The Tudors used for their own purposes the English struggle against external interference in Church and in State. The success of that struggle bred a spirit of Imperialism, which in enjoying license beyond the realm of England forgot the maintenance of liberty within it. James I. and VI. paid little heed to the teachings of his tutor. Divine right was more to his taste. On the other hand the alliance between ecclesiastical and secular authority made British Protestantism the consistent opponent of both. The assertion of religious freedom moved uncon-

sciously, as Dr. Dunning points out, from its foundation upon the rights of Englishmen to the natural and universal rights of all men. The clearness of the conflict brought about by Charles I., as one between management and men, carried universal principles, for the first time in human history, to a practical and immediate discussion. Never was an assertion of absolutism more " thorough " than that made by Charles, Strafford, and Laud. Never before had the counter forces of personal freedom established themselves on so broad and comprehensive a basis. When the Civil War began in England, the two great ideas that inspire all politics hung at a nicety of balance that no other moment of history had achieved. From this time forward the doctrine of control has steadily weakened, and the idea of personal freedom has begun an ever-broadening career.

The Royalist point of view found its ablest though not its most fashionable apologist in Hobbes. His " Leviathan," for bold adroitness, has no equal among political works. He begins by describing an abstract state of nature in which every man's hand is against his neighbour continually. In such a state there can be neither right nor wrong, of which the only criterion is control. To escape this anarchy every man must give up his natural right and make his contribution to that natural law which is the negation of freedom. To keep men to this bargain there must be a power set up of which individuals would stand in awe, whose commands to relinquish freedom in the interests of each all must obey. Thus we get a social contract creating a sovereign power, in a person or an assembly, to control it. This sovereignty, once in force, can never be resisted, since to resist would be, on the part of the subject, the breach of a covenant in which every man is both debtor and creditor. More than that, since the sovereign was not and could not be a party to the contract, but was the result of it, he is bound to nothing, can violate nothing, and can forfeit nothing. Whatever he may do, his acts are the acts of those from whom he derives his authority. To accuse him, to judge him, or to punish him, would be, for

the people, to accuse, judge, and punish themselves. In this ingenious fashion an absolutism that owes no account to any man plausibly announces its sanction in the free will and self-interest of the very persons who might most object to its yoke.

How different from these subtle abstractions was that actual "Solemn League and Covenant" of 1643, which the "Noblemen, Barons, Knights, Gentlemen, Citizens, Burgesses, Ministers of the Gospel and Commons of all sorts in the kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland," with a lamentable ignorance of Hobbesian logic, signed together against their king! How different was that "Agreement of the People" of 1647, which, had it come into force, was to have been signed by every man in the nation, and which asserted the people's right to resist any government which violated principles fundamental to the common right, liberty, and safety! How different was the uncompromising fervour of Milton, proclaiming the divine right of liberty in every sphere of life, and the unreserved faith in the outcome of the greatest possible measure of rational freedom!

Many practical circumstances combined to prevent the proper realization of such hopes in the time of Cromwell. On the theoretical side, not even Milton himself had attained the belief in universal suffrage which consistency demanded. But all that was inevitably to lead to that consistency was latent in the thought of the time. What distinguishes it so absolutely from the highest political achievements of Greece or of Rome was that this period emphasized freedom from Government still more than freedom to share in it,—the restriction of its sphere still more than the broadening of its base. Liberty was to be the chief care of political action: a liberty that would be as jealous for others as for itself. "A commonwealth is nothing else but the national conscience," says Milton's contemporary, Harrington; and the first mark of a nation's fitness for freedom is that it should work equally for the freedom of mankind. He can

conceive of no loftier motto for the constitutional sovereign of his ideal commonwealth than this:

> "Who setting the Kingdoms of Earth at Liberty,
> Took the Kingdom of the Heavens by Violence."

The new conception of freedom thus began, in the Parliament over which it claimed superiority, that practical career of self-development which was to have so much influence upon the rest of Europe. The conflict which had formerly been confined either to the ineffectual region of ideas, or to the unmeaning hazard of war and force, was now about to work out its destinies through the more human, more immediate logic of party debate. If the Civil War discovered the Whigs, the Restoration established the Tories. By the Great Revolution the latter were for a while shaken from their solidity as supporters of irresponsible control, but the policies of William III. had room for a faith that was altogether too fundamental to disappear with the Stuarts. The Court party strengthened its support by every means at its command, until in the reign of George III. authority almost recovered the ancient measure of its fulness. It even appealed to the people for help against the great Whig families which, in seeking to maintain their power to guard the liberties of Parliament, sometimes, though never lastingly, forgot the true principles of their being. One may well note in passing, what so many modern Liberals so strangely ignore, how much freedom England owes to the House of Lords, not only in this but also in a later day. And one may well ask whether a hasty resentment of a condition, which any thinker capable of considering a longer period of history than the last forty years knows to be temporary, may not deprive Liberalism itself of what may yet again become one of its most valuable bulwarks.

The group of statesmen, so largely aristocratic, who changed the cabinet from an instrument of the King to a parliamentary committee, also took up the cause of the American colonists,

taxed without representation. They relieved Englishmen of innumerable interferences of the State with individual liberty. They went beyond their island to combat the slave trade. In the face of Imperialism they espoused the cause of the oppressed in India. Not all of them confused the methods and immediate results of the French Revolution with its true necessity and spirit. Fox was quick to realize its real relationship with all that Britons had set themselves to vindicate, and its tremendous rebuke to the shortcomings of their effort. Such men as he were not carried so far by the indignation of Burke that they could not realize how great a part England herself had played in awaking against the ideas of Bossuet, the clear criticism of Montesquieu and Voltaire; how well it behoved her continually to refresh herself in that sense of common fellowship preached by Rousseau, and to remember with him, while aiming at a profounder liberty than that which he conceived, that a people can acquire this liberty, but can recover it never. A certain number of the Whigs yielded to the panic and joined their adversaries in the making of a party whose conservatism was interpreted by its members to be the maintenance of things as they are. But the rest, with a renewed faith that made many great converts in the opposite ranks, broadened out into the Liberalism that from the Reform Bill marched on to the innumerable acts, attempts, and influences for freedom so momentous to the last few generations in England. The Conservatives have ever since been seeking to be rid of the negative character so needlessly imposed on their policy.

It is not pretended that the two parties have yet awakened to a clear sense of their opposition all along the line. In some respects their programmes are logical and coherent; in others they are clothed with a strange motley of unreasoned and inconsistent associations. This will be realized by a glance at their attitudes towards the more important political antitheses of to-day, the chief of which are Imperialism and Self Government, Protection and Free Trade, Socialism and Anarchism.

Mr. Hobson has treated the first subject very exhaustively. He distinguishes between a right and a wrong Imperialism: the latter consisting in the control by one people of another, which is a strictly conservative state of affairs, and the former in a union of democracies founded upon free consent. The one is seen in the mutual relations of the self-governing portions of the British Empire, and of the States of the American Union; the other in the connexion between Great Britain and India, between the United States and the Philippines. He notes a growing tendency to confuse the two, and to bolster up the one by a spurious enthusiasm inspired by the success of the other: to exploit helpless races in the name of a liberty that is sternly withheld. "We are obliged in practice," says Mr. Hobson, speaking of Britain's part in this movement, "to make a choice between good order and justice administered autocratically in accordance with British standards, on the one hand, and delicate, costly, doubtful and disorderly experiments in self-government on British lines upon the other, and we have practically everywhere decided to adopt the former alternative. In a single word the new Imperialism has increased the area of British despotism. It has not made for the spread of British liberty." (pp. 128-130).

No one who read Mr. Morley's recent speech on the Indian question can deny the general truth of these statements. Not that Mr. Hobson sees much else to choose, save in the manner and spirit of conducting this tutelage. But he protests against the selfishness and competition of dominant races, with all that these imply of militarism and protection, setting up themselves, rather than the interests of world-wide progress and of the people under control, as the true motives of their policy. He shows clearly the relations between such aims and the conscription so dear to the heart of Lord Roberts, and his account of the influence of Protectionism upon the whole movement is especially interesting in view of the agitation begun by Mr. Chamberlain almost simultaneously with the publication of Mr. Hobson's book.

It was presumably the Irish question that first made Mr. Chamberlain aware of that mental process which was to lead him in so short a time from three acres and a cow to the Lion of Empire and the illimitable veldt. It was Imperialism that brought him to declare that propaganda which is now playing directly into the hands of Protectionism. The two, in their desire to regulate, and to impose external and arbitrary conditions ; in their encouragement of racial barriers ; in their denial to foreign bodies of those very trade favours which they on their own part are always seeking to obtain, have long flourished in fellowship. In the dark ages protectionists cast the Jews into the Mediterranean for failure to pay the poll tax. In these more enlightened days we allow our friends from India, China, and Japan to keep their heads above the waters of the Pacific if only they will use that highway for return.

M. Anitchkow admirably points out the influence of this spirit, and of the whole system of the custom house, in the direction of war. We are introduced in his pages to the sometimes comic, sometimes tragic spectacle of the financial heads of two nations solemnly engaged in endeavouring to wrest from each other the concessions which each exhorts his own countrymen never to grant. He shows how much might be done for peace if each would rather persuade his own fellow-citizens to allow that freedom of trade, labour, and intercourse which treaties of commerce so seldom attain. The tariff, which after having hindered private freedom and international exchange, makes a second tax necessary to pay for military insurance against the possible outbreaks of a resentment so artificially created, is criticized by M. Anitchkow as well as by Mr. Hobson; and the inestimable gain in private wealth and comfort, if this double impost were left to the individual's free expenditure, is clearly pointed out. But, following Adam Smith, Cobden, and Bastiat, M. Anitchkow esteems free trade still more for what it may do for international harmony than for its economical aspect.

On these questions there has been some give and take between the two parties in England. Never once since the Great Revolution have gains in freedom been afterwards disturbed by the party from which they were won. And English Conservatives to-day are still loath to revive the principle so thoroughly repudiated sixty years ago, even though the visionary hopes of Cobden have not yet been fulfilled. On the other hand, the Liberals have found in the responsibilities of Imperialism a sad impediment to the logic of their creed.

Socialism and the cult of Anarchy are still beyond the pale of respectable politics in Great Britain. Their alienation from party patronage has been still more the cause than the effect of the long existing confusion with regard to them in the minds of their adherents, no less than of their enemies. Not a few clever men in the last century have striven to unite, in a single fervour, portions of two doctrines diametrically opposed. In a work on Socialism these men have to be considered as partly Socialists; in one on Anarchism, as the fathers of anarchy. Nevertheless the ideal contrast between their theories is so extreme as to extend on either side beyond the stretch of the Liberal and Conservative debate. On the other hand, the same lack of precision has kept men from recognizing their respective affinities to the orthodox parties. And yet if Anarchy as an immediate ideal is Liberalism run mad, Socialism is nothing but a larger Conservatism turned benevolent. The fact that the interests of the people are its chief concern must not blind us to its character as the most absolute system of management conceivable.

The Socialistic basis of Plato's Republic has already been noticed. The mediæval Campanella, in his "City of the Sun," and More in his "Utopia" developed still further the negation of individual property and initiative, and the interference of the State into every detail of private life. In every age men have longed to throw upon a system the responsibility which seemed too heavy for mortal arms to bear. Fourier and Louis Blanc, however they might boast

of freedom, put their trust in arbitrary schemes of hard and fast control. The imaginary communities of Robert Owen were not less communistic because they were many and small. The insistence of Lasalle upon universal suffrage only brings into greater relief his exaltation of the State, and of its management of capital, labour, and the results of production. Marx concentrates the whole of politics upon the management of industrial processes. In the dreams of most of our Mayday enthusiasts there is nothing left to the individual but to merge his personality in the machine. He is to be docketed and ticketed and bracketed and apportioned and disciplined into a happiness which he will no longer have the character or the freedom to appreciate and retain. What is all this absorption of private energy into one public and impersonal order but the extreme of Conservatism? And yet in England, despite the denials of Mr. Asquith, we have the ridiculous spectacle of a Liberal government saved from Socialism only by the most strenuous warnings of Conservatives, who blandly congratulate themselves upon their own utter separation from such pernicious doctrine.

Against these principles the extravagances of anarchism will be seen to have value. However fantastic and impossible may be the ideas of those who would free the individual from all government, they must not be confounded with the Nihilism which is the peculiar product of Russian conditions—an exclamation, not a theory. Stirner, the typical anarchist, was the mildest of thinkers and of men. Anarchy with him was a prophecy rather than a propaganda, a prophecy of the time which the whole of human evolution is needed to attain, when the supreme value of personality will receive its due in a perfect world. Liberalism need show no shame in acknowledging its indebtedness to the heart of this idea; an indebtedness which the present government in England certainly shows no signs of exaggerating.

But if England has not yet achieved a complete antithesis in action of policies which are nevertheless inherently opposed, no more have other constitutional countries realized

the true meaning and relationship of the same ideas in every part of their own political life. In the United States the Republican party has indeed recognized its functions as a conservative, imperialist and protectionist body, while the Democrats have in the main been faithful to the opposite principles. But the same want of clearness is observable there as in England with regard to Socialism, and we witness the vain attempts of Democratic leaders to combine into an effective programme the unsolvable discords of Liberal and Socialistic beliefs.

France, on the other hand, is the one country in which Liberals have discerned the absolute nature of the contrast between these two, which has been brought out again and again in the debates between the present Premier and M. Jaurès. Yet on nearly all other questions in that country, such as militarism, imperialism, and protection, party allegiance, owing to the exigencies of a continental position, is lamentably at variance with the true reason of its being.

In Germany we have the harmonious compound of an extreme militarist, imperialist, and protective conservatism in control. But the main opposition, calling itself Social Democracy, is a helpless mixture of contradictory ideals only held together by the irresponsible nature of the party. It asks for a blessing in a voice that cannot be disguised: its deception cannot last for ever, although it may imitate the manlier hands of freedom. But German Liberalism for the present wanders upon a profitless hunt, having sold its birthright for a mess of pottage.

Yet, if the ideal distinctions which criticism can draw have not yet been so neatly exposed in practical politics, surely enough has been said to show that just as there is a world-wide principle of Conservatism, so there is a contrary theory steadily developing, which when applying itself to political affairs clearly relates or separates the various questions by a natural and inevitable logic. The Liberal whose creed includes all of Liberalism, and nothing besides, has not yet appeared. He is indeed as far from us as the perfection

which his humbler brethren hope to prepare for. But if they will acknowledge, with Stirner, that the men of the future will fight their way to many a liberty that we do not even miss, they will also declare that it is not the shame but the glory of Liberalism that the ideal which it follows is greater in every age than the reality which it attains. In the meantime the Liberal emphasizes as best he can, in a world too prone to forget it, the supreme importance to humanity of personality, character, wisdom, and will. Without formulating any elaborate abstractions as to the relation between the State and the individual, he demands that the latter be left to the utmost practical extent to develop himself in freedom for the good of the whole. He asks that for the good and wise man there should be no law but his own will; and for all men, that there should be the least possible interference with those private powers which above all things help to develop goodness and wisdom. He does not, however, narrow Liberalism down to an insistence upon the separation of *meum* and *tuum*. On the contrary, no one more strongly believes in the common consciousness to which all should contribute and from which each should receive. It is in the development of that common consciousness and will that the individual has his sole life and value.

But the Liberal will never admit that Government is a sufficient expression of this unity, or an adequate means to its accomplishment. When men insist on defining as the State all that is not the individual, he reminds us of that common life of intercourse, religion, philosophy, science and art, which refuses a title; and of that still greater humanity from whose tremendous spiritual mood, immeasurably larger than any system, we get so seldom, and only in some great personal moment, an illumination and prophecy. He preaches that to come nearer to that life, in the realization of which alone we can rest, freedom is the only road. Just as the individual by himself does not exist but is an airy impersonal nothing, which the world cannot know, so it is with freedom. It requires an universe of free men to make one man free; and no

man can take the blessing of liberty unless he has first of all given it to a world of neighbours; and has acted in such a way that if he should suddenly take the place of any one of them, from China to Peru, he would find himself equally free. This is the golden rule, in which alone there can be any stability and comfort among men. It is no miserable doctrine of *laissez-faire*, but a wisdom that takes little joy in denying its passionate impatience when it realizes that human happiness cannot be won by any sudden system, any brilliant agreement, any rule from without ; or by anything less than the perfection in goodness and in knowledge of all the persons whose intercourse makes up the world. The greatest possible freedom of labour, ownership, intercourse, and expression, thus becomes the end of Liberal effort. Its bearing upon Imperialism, Socialism, Protection and the rest, is obvious.

But to realize the historical trend in favour of Liberalism will not lead us to overlook the value of its opponent. The latter began as the primeval actuality, the former as an abstraction. The course of civilization seems to be gradually reversing the two positions. But that course is carried on by the very strife which it will finally abolish, and requires the full criticism of both principles into the whole breadth and depth of human progress. How much has yet to be revealed we may faintly judge by the extent of the development which has gone before us: and the philosophic mind will not be turned from realizing the equal value of both parties in taking men slowly and wisely to the final completeness in which all may hope to share.

What then is the point of all these remarks? It is this : that if there be really a natural logic of partyism, then the sooner we discover it and make it part of ourselves, the better for ourselves and for civilization. Instead of being blindly carried by this law, or suspended in its quiescence, let us work it with our eyes open, and gain the advantages which always follow rational energy. We in this country have lived in a vague indifference far too long. Time and again in discussing our political shortcomings, we lay the blame upon

an extreme observance of the party system. Surely what we suffer from is not too much partyism, but too little! The last thing that our politicians present to us is a creed. Any bond unites them except the one sensible link of a common belief applied to all public questions. Any hash of unrelated policies is deemed good enough for us if it will gain votes. In fact, the more variegated it is, the better. The present Opposition rejoices to call itself the great Liberal-Conservative party. The inanity of the title is well fitted to the chaos which it covers. Its one reasonable doctrine heretofore has been Protection, and that was an accident. Since that was taken up the only harmonious addition has been the proposal to nationalize telegraphs and telephones, and that was filched from the Liberals before they had time to protest. Latterly, indeed, the chief efforts of the Liberal-Conservative party in Canada have consisted in anxiously spying out the intentions of a popular government, and either forestalling its policies by pirated editions, or else, if too late, outdoing them by going yet farther in the same direction.

The Government is in no better case. It has flourished for years upon the happy discovery of its predecessor, for which it exchanged its more strenuous belief; and it has been giving up one by one most of the distinctive elements of its being. The one logical man of recent times in the Canadian Parliament has been M. Bourassa, and he is no longer there. However distasteful some of his views may be to many of us, we cannot but admit that he was the chief hope of true partyism in the House. No one will deny this more strongly than he. Yet it is only by the union of men who act upon principle that living parties can be made and continually refreshed. If there be any truth in the considerations outlined in this paper, it tells us that as soon as men seek to base their politics upon principle they unfailingly divide into a natural party opposition which clarifies itself, and is of political service in exact proportion to the earnestness of the respective sides. If a party is not ready to die for its beliefs, it has no business to live. What then shall we say of parties which seem to have no beliefs whatever?

WARWICK FIELDING CHIPMAN

AD UNIVERSITATEM

PRINCIPAL PETERSON, most learned fellow Doctors, and You discreet and well conducted Students of our University: According to the ancient and laudable custom of the schools, I, as one of your wandering scholars returned, have been instructed to speak to you. The only penalty youth must pay for its enviable privileges is that of listening to people known, alas, to be older and alleged to be wiser. On such occasions youth feigns an air of polite interest and reverence, while age tries to look virtuous. Which pretences sit uneasily on both of them.

On such occasions very little truth is spoken. I will try not to depart from the convention. I will not tell you how the sins of youth are due very largely to its virtues; how its arrogance is very often the result of its innate shyness; how its brutality is the outcome of its natural virginity of spirit. These things are true, but your preceptors might object to such texts without the proper notes and emendations. But I can try to speak to you more or less truthfully on certain matters to which you may give the attention and belief proper to your years.

When, to use a detestable phrase, you go out into the battle of life you will be confronted by an organized conspiracy which will try to make you believe that the world is governed by the idea of wealth for wealth's sake, and that all means which lead to the acquisition of that wealth are, if not laudable, at least expedient. Those of you who have fitly imbibed the spirit of our University—and it was not a materialistic university which trained a scholar to take both the Craven and the Ireland in England—will violently resent that thought, but you will live and eat and move and have your being in a

[From the author's manuscript of an address delivered before the students of McGill University, Montreal, October 17th, 1907.]

world dominated by that thought. Some of you will probably succumb to the poison of it.

Now, I do not ask you not to be carried away by the first rush of the great game of life. That is expecting you to be more than human. But I do ask you, after the first heat of the game, that you draw breath and watch your fellows for a while. Sooner or later you will see some man to whom the idea of wealth as mere wealth does not appeal, whom the methods of amassing that wealth do not interest, and who will not accept money if you offer it to him at a certain price. At first you will be inclined to laugh at this man and to think that he is not smart in his ideas. I suggest that you watch him closely, for he will presently demonstrate to you that money dominates everybody except the man who does not want money. You may meet that man on your farm, in your village, or in your legislature. But be sure that, whenever or wherever you meet him, as soon as it comes to a direct issue between you, his little finger will be thicker than your loins. You will go in fear of him: he will not go in fear of you. You will do what he wants: he will not do what you want. You will find that you have no weapon in your armoury with which you can attack him; no argument with which you can appeal to him. Whatever you gain, he will gain more.

I would like you to study that man. I would like you better to be that man, because from the lower point of view it doesn't pay to be obsessed by the desire of wealth for wealth's sake. If more wealth is necessary to you, for purposes not your own, use your left hand to acquire it, but keep your right for your proper work in life. If you employ both arms in that game you will be in danger of stooping; in danger also of losing your soul. But in spite of everything you may succeed, you may be successful, you may acquire enormous wealth. In which case I warn you that you stand in grave danger of being spoken and written of and pointed out as a smart man. And that is one of the most terrible calamities that can overtake a sane, civilized, white man in our Empire to-day.

They say youth is the season of hope, ambition, and uplift —that the last word youth needs is an exhortation to be cheerful. Some of you here know, and I remember, that youth can be a season of great depression, despondencies, doubts, and waverings, the worse because they seem to be peculiar to ourselves and incommunicable to our fellows. There is a certain darkness into which the soul of the young man some time descends—a horror of desolation, abandonment, and realized worthlessness, which is one of the most real of the hells in which we are compelled to walk.

I know of what I speak. This is due to a variety of causes, the chief of which is the egotism of the human animal itself. But I can tell you for your comfort that the chief cure for it is to interest yourself, to lose yourself, in some issue not personal to yourself—in another man's trouble, or, preferably, another man's joy. But if the dark hour does not vanish, as sometimes it doesn't; if the black cloud will not lift, as sometimes it will not; let me tell you again for your comfort that there are many liars in the world, but there are no liars like our own sensations. The despair and the horror mean nothing, because there is for you nothing irremediable, nothing ineffaceable, nothing irrecoverable in anything you may have said or thought or done. If for any reason you cannot believe or have not been taught to believe in the infinite mercy of Heaven which has made us all and will take care we do not go far astray, at least believe that you are not yet sufficiently important to be taken too seriously by the powers above us or beneath us. In other words take anything and everything seriously except yourselves.

I regret that I noticed certain signs of irreverent laughter when I alluded to the word "smartness." I have no message to deliver, but if I had a message to deliver to a University which I love, to the young men who have the future of their country to mould, I would say with all the force at my command: Do not be smart. If I were not a Doctor of this University with a deep interest in its discipline, and if I did not hold the strongest views on that reprehensible form of

amusement known as "rushing," I would say that whenever and wherever you find one of your dear little playmates showing signs of smartness in his work, his talk, or his play, take him tenderly by the hand, by both hands, by the back of the neck if necessary, and lovingly, playfully but firmly, lead him to a knowledge of higher and more interesting things.

RUDYARD KIPLING

THE WARRIOR

He wrought in poverty, the dull grey days,
  But with the night his little, lamp-lit room
Was bright with battle flame, or through a haze
  Of smoke that stung his eyes he heard the boom
Of Blücher's guns: he shared Almeida's scars,
  And from the close-packed deck, about to die,
Looked up and saw the Birkenhead's tall spars
  Weave wavering lines across the Southern sky:
Or in the stifling 'tween-decks, row on row
  At Aboukir, saw how the dead men lay:
  Charged with the fiercest in Busaco's strife.
Brave dreams are his—the flick'ring lamp burns low—
  Yet couraged for the battles of the day
  He goes to stand full face to face with life.

JOHN MCCRAE

THE MYSTERY OF HAMLET

"HAMLET" is surely the greatest of Shakespeare's plays. It has more than any other of his works interested minds of the most varied calibre, and tastes of the most different order. It has exercised its fascination alike over the philosophic thinker, the learned student, the fastidious connoisseur, the general reader, the mere play-goer. It holds the largest place in Shakespeare literature. From the days of Burbage to those of Henry Irving, it has furnished the favourite rôle for all great actors. It has, in short, always been the most popular of Shakespeare's dramas as well on the boards as in the closet. If, as Dr. Johnson asserted, it is the first object of a work of art to please, where shall we find anything of similar compass in English literature which has given so much high and permanent pleasure to so varied a constituency? Yet the bench of critics are scarcely disposed to award it first place amongst its author's writings. The election would probably fall upon "Lear" as the most tragic of the plays, or perhaps upon "Othello" as less open to criticism. Even "Macbeth," notwithstanding manifest defects, seems to possess in a higher degree than "Hamlet" those qualities which specifically belong to the drama, and which are therefore, one might suppose, the most essential to a really great tragedy. The critics plausibly urge that "Hamlet" is lacking in unity; that the action drags; that many passages and even whole scenes are not essential to the development and are of the nature of brilliant padding; finally, that, as the present paper will serve to emphasize, a cloud of obscurity and difficulty—scarcely compatible with perfect art—hangs over the whole play.

Yet surely, even if these allegations can be made good, the facts in favour of "Hamlet" already adduced, would

dispose common-sense to conclude that here, as so often, not the absence of defects, but the presence of excellences is essential to the interest and vitality of a work of art; that the categories of criticism are, after all, superficial tests incompetent to decide on the real greatness of an imaginative creation. Not the qualities which can be formulated by the intellect, but a living charm, too subtle for analysis, is the source of power. A work of imaginative genius is not primarily a skilfully planned intellectual product, but a growth—an organism, whose vital principle eludes dissection. Does it ever, as a fact, occur to the spectator of "Hamlet" at the theatre, or to him who reads simply to enjoy, that the action drags, that the scenes are desultory, that the thread of interest is broken, or the unity of impression wanting? It is only when we approach in an analytic, not in a receptive frame of mind that such defects appear.

It must, however, be admitted that "Hamlet" endures this critical scrutiny which the intellect enforces, less successfully than the other great tragedies of its author; that "Hamlet" is in many respects a peculiar play. The present paper proposes to examine these peculiarities, to link them together, and show that they are part and parcel of the subject itself. This examination has been suggested by the publication during the present year of a volume entitled, "The Heart of Hamlet's Mystery," a translation of a much discussed exposition of the play, by Professor Karl Werder.

It is now some forty years since Mr. Howard Furness, in his invaluable edition of "Hamlet," drew the attention of the English-speaking world to Professor Werder's theory as to the hero's character. Although similar views have been originated independently of Professor Werder, his discussion was, and still remains, the fullest exposition of a very revolutionary conception of "Hamlet." It has now, at length, been made fully accessible to the merely English reader in the translation by Miss Elizabeth Wilder, with an introduction by the well-known Shakespeare scholar, Mr. W. J. Rolfe. This late-won honour of translation is, according to Mr. Rolfe,

fully justified by the growing acceptance with which the Klein-Werder theory, as it is called, has met. Among those who have adopted it, Mr. Rolfe mentions the names of three prominent American Shakespeare scholars: Furness, Hudson, and Corson; to these may be added that of Mr. Rolfe himself. No English writer of eminence, however, is cited as a supporter; and the weightiest book of Shakespeare criticism that has appeared in England for many years, Professor A. C. Bradley's "Shakespearean Tragedy" (1904), wholly rejects it. This, it may be maintained, is merely an indication of the conservative tendencies of English scholarship; for the new interpretation is radically subversive of the orthodox and currently accepted conception of Hamlet's character. "It sweeps aside," says Mr. Furness, "every vestige of Goethe's explanation with all theories akin to it. It affirms Hamlet to be a man of action, never at a loss, never wavering, taking in at once the position of affairs, adjusting himself thereto with admirable sagacity, and instantly acting with consummate tact as occasions require."

A paragraph from Professor Werder, as rendered by Miss Wilder (pp. 48-9), will serve to put the theory before us:

> "What is Hamlet to do? What is his actual task? A sharply defined duty, but a very different one from that which critics have imposed upon him. It is not to crush the King at once—he could commit no greater blunder—but to bring him to confession, to unmask and convict him. That is Hamlet's task, his first, nearest, inevitable duty. As things stand, truth and justice can come to light only from one mouth, that of the crowned criminal, and if he or someone connected with him does not speak, then the truth will be forever hidden. That is the situation. Herein lie the terrors of this tragedy. This is the source of Hamlet's enigmatical horror and the bitterness of his misery. The secret of the encoffined and unprovable crime is the unfathomable source out of which flows its power to awaken fear and pity. This single humanly natural fact has never been perceived for more than a century. And yet the fact is so convincing that when it has once been comprehended it must remain for ever clear."

In short, the obstacle to Hamlet's executing vengeance upon his uncle is at once external and valid. It is an *objec-*

tive difficulty; whereas, according to the generally accepted view, it is *subjective*, arising from some weakness or flaw in the hero's character.

The question as to the cause of Hamlet's delay does not arise with the critics; it is suggested in the play itself. Hamlet is repeatedly represented as puzzled to account for his own inactivity; especially in Act III, sc. 4, does he debate the matter at length, without arriving at any satisfactory solution. One naturally asks then, if any *external* obstacle such as that indicated by Werder be the real impediment, how comes it that Hamlet is not conscious of this obstacle; why, with such adequate excuse, should he be so full of self-reproach? No such justification for delay does he allege when he neglects the opportunity afforded in his uncle's chamber (Act III, sc. 3), after the scene in the court theatre; on the contrary, he resorts to what seems to most readers a farfetched subterfuge:

> . . . . "and am I then revenged,
> To take him in the purging of his soul,
> When he is fit and season'd for the passage?"

Of the motive which is regarded as the effective one by the Klein-Werder theory, there is no hint until the final scene where the dying Hamlet exclaims to his friend:

> "O good Horatio, what a wounded name,
> Things standing thus unknown, shall live behind me!
> If thou did'st ever hold me in thy heart,
> Absent thee from felicity a while,
> And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain,
> To tell my story."

In another passage, the soliloquy in which Hamlet proposes to test the King by a play (Act II, end), where he comes nearest to seizing on this excuse, he, in fact, expresses a desire for proof that shall satisfy *himself*, not the public. So the conversation with Horatio immediately before the theatre-scene (Act III, sc. 2) shows that what he hopes from his device, is that the King shall betray his guilt by indi-

cations sufficient for Horatio and himself, who are already in the secret,—not that the guilty man sitting at the play shall proclaim his malefaction to the court at large. Accordingly, at the exit of the King, there is no expression of dissatisfaction, on Hamlet's part, at the failure of his device,—on the contrary, an irrepressible expression of exultation at its success. It is not wonderful then that the reason for Hamlet's delay alleged by Professor Werder never enters into the head of the unsophisticated play-goer or reader.

Against any "objective" explanations of Hamlet's conduct, similar arguments might be brought. If, indeed (as has been maintained), the ground of the hero's inaction were scruples as to the rightness of taking vengeance into his own hands,—scruples arising from Hamlet's being ethically in advance of the age and community to which he belongs—there might conceivably be an inner repugnance to the deed, which he might be unable fully to justify to himself. But it is noteworthy that the dramatist has so managed it, that the audience naturally and unconsciously accept the propriety of Hamlet's killing his uncle; this, too, in the face of the fact that such an act is repugnant to their own habits and moral convictions. Surely it is true that no spectator at the theatre ever dreams (unless at the suggestion of some over-subtle commentator) of boggling at the propriety of the hero's inflicting the ultimate penalty. What, then, if any one of these novel theories be true, are we to think of Shakespeare's skill as a dramatic artist? Of all forms of literature, the true drama—the drama designed primarily for the stage, not for the reader—is the most popular in its nature. Its appeal is immediate, and to the average man. Unless a play can be appreciated in its main outlines and purpose by the ordinary spectator while it is being enacted before him on the boards, it fails of its essential aim. In the case of any play which attains this aim, the work of the sane commentator deepens and clarifies,—does not negative—the original vague impression of the audience. The student is in a position to see more profoundly into the play than the

mere spectator; he should apprehend more fully both the whole outcome and the purpose of the details; but the fundamental ideas and emotions of the drama must be felt, although they need not be consciously formulated, in the theatre. "Hamlet," if Werder's contention be admitted, so far fails of this, that its central motive has been misapprehended by generations of play-goers, and even by Goethe, because forsooth the latter wrote his criticism when being a young man, he did not understand its meaning.

It is not proposed to take up, in the following pages, the arguments of Werder in detail. They are met in Professor Bradley's volume already mentioned; nor do they appear more plausible in the full text of the translation, than in the excerpts contained in Dr. Furness's volume. The sophistical character of the reasoning and the unquestionable misinterpretations of Shakespeare's text are only rendered more manifest through the inclusion of the weaker portions of the exposition. The stress laid, in these later days, upon originality of research is a constant temptation in the older and well-trodden provinces of criticism towards novelty rather than sanity. There is, further, a state of mind which gives rise to such theories as we have been talking of,—the disposition (itself often a proof of the artist's success in giving life and reality to his theme) to regard the personages and events of a work of imagination as actualities having an independent existence. The situation comes thus to be viewed not at all as the artist presents it, who for his own ends stresses certain details and omits, or lightly touches others which in real life might possibly have been of the first importance. The critic who unconsciously falls into such a state of mind, looks upon his material in the fashion of an historian, who strives to disentangle and supplement facts *accidentally* preserved. But sound literary interpretation does not thus go outside of a drama; it gives the same relative weight to various elements as does the dramatist himself, recognizing that it is but proper to assume that every detail is part of a carefully planned design. Of course, it is another matter if

we are prepared to admit that Shakespeare is a bungler, or "Hamlet," notwithstanding all its fascination, a crude and ill-constructed sketch. We cannot, until the actual examination of the play forces it, accept such an hypothesis.

Let us turn now to the "subjective" theory, which in varying forms has been long accepted by the great body of critical opinion, and which—a weightier fact—is in accord with those vaguer notions of the play existing in the consciousness of the fairly intelligent spectator as he watches a performance or of the ordinarily cultivated reader as he turns the pages for his own delight. It may be said that this attitude of the onlooker in the theatre is itself the result of the filtering downwards of accepted learned opinion; it is just as likely that the current interpretations of "Hamlet" on the stage originated at a time when the author himself instructed the "Globe" company in the proper rendering of his *dramatis personæ.*

The most authoritative explanations from the "subjective" point of view have been furnished by the two greatest critics who have discussed the problem of "Hamlet," Goethe and Coleridge. Their views are different but not inconsistent, and may be sufficiently indicated by brief quotations. Goethe says:

> "To me it is clear that Shakespeare sought to depict a great deed laid upon a soul unequal to the performance of it. . . . . . A beautiful, pure, noble and most moral nature, without the strength which makes the hero, sinks beneath a burden which it can neither bear nor throw off; every duty is holy to him; this is too hard. The impossible is required of him—not the impossible in itself, but the impossible to him. How he winds, turns, agonizes, advances and recoils, ever reminded, ever reminding himself, and at last almost loses his purpose from his thoughts, without ever regaining his peace of mind."

Coleridge is more definite:

> "Man is distinguished from the brute animals in proportion as thought prevails over sense; but in the healthy processes of the mind a balance is constantly maintained between the impressions from

outward objects and the inward operations of the intellect; for if there be an overbalance in the contemplative faculty, man thereby becomes the creature of mere meditation, and loses his natural power of action. . . . . In Hamlet, Shakespeare seems to have wished to exemplify the moral necessity of a due balance between our attention to the objects of our senses and our meditation on the working of our minds—an *equilibrium* between the real and imaginary worlds. In Hamlet this balance is disturbed; his thoughts and the images of his fancy are far more vivid than his actual perceptions, and his very perceptions, instantly passing through the *medium* of his contemplations, acquire, as they pass, a form and colour not naturally their own. Hence we see a great, an almost enormous intellectual activity, and a proportionate aversion to real action consequent upon it, with all its symptoms and accompanying qualities. This character Shakespeare places in circumstances under which it is obliged to act on the spur of the moment; Hamlet is brave and careless of death; but he vacillates from sensibility, and procrastinates from thought, and loses the power of action in the energy of resolve. Thus it is that this tragedy presents a direct contrast to that of "Macbeth;" the one proceeds with the utmost slowness, the other with a crowded and breathless activity."

These two explanations agree in finding—while not denying the existence of external difficulties—the effective cause of Hamlet's inaction in Hamlet himself, and in regarding his conduct as blameworthy and indicative of weakness in the man himself. Coleridge's solution is the more specific, fixing upon a single tendency as the essential flaw; Goethe's is broader and vaguer,—and on that account, to the natural man, who prefers definiteness, less satisfactory.

Coleridge's view claims acceptance, in the first place, because it is the explanation to which Hamlet himself tends. Read, for instance, the soliloquy of Act IV, sc. 4:

> "Now, whether it be
> Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple
> Of thinking too precisely on the event,—
> A thought which, quarter'd, hath but one part wisdom
> And ever three parts coward,—I do not know
> Why yet I live to say 'this thing's to do.'"

Further, this dominance of the intellectual and reflective tendency,—this thinking too precisely on the event,—is the characteristic which is chiefly emphasized throughout the play; if a play is artistically constructed, whatever is most enforced ought to be (as here it is) the most potent factor in the whole development. The thought of the paralyzing effects of intellectual activity seems to lie in the background of Hamlet's mind and emerges, not merely when he is thinking of his own case, but as a conclusion to the generalizations of the "To be or not to be" soliloquy:

> "And thus the native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
> And enterprises of great pith and moment
> With this regard their currents turn awry,
> And lose the name of action."

But perhaps the strongest confirmation of Coleridge's theory is given at the very turning-point of the play—the scene in the King's chamber (Act III, sc. 3). The doubts which Hamlet professed to feel have now been cleared away by the success of his test; the King is in his power; all things, as he himself says at the close of the preceding scene, are favourable to such a deed. Yet he does nothing. A few moments later Hamlet does, to all intents and purposes, put the King to death; he kills Polonius, thinking him to be the King. These scenes are placed side by side, we may be sure, not without reason. What constitutes the difference which accounts for Hamlet's doing on the second occasion what he deliberately neglects to do on the first? Hiding himself in his wife's chamber is scarcely one of those actions which Hamlet had enumerated as likely to make Claudius' "heels kick at heaven." Does any such thought occur to Hamlet's mind at this particular moment? Surely the impression given is that Hamlet, without thought, under the impulse of sudden rage quickened by this second case of treacherous espial, slays, as he thinks, the King. The difference between the two occasions lies in the fact that the cir-

cumstances of the first favour reflection; that in the second Hamlet does not think at all. The contrast between these scenes is a crucial point; and the "subjective" theories alone account for it.

This influence of his suggestive and subtle mental activity is repeatedly exhibited. On first hearing the message of the Ghost, Hamlet is full of resolution; he will "sweep to his revenge with wings as swift as meditation or the thoughts of love."* On the next occasion which admits us to his inner thoughts, we hear of nothing but hesitation and delay. Has anything happened in the interval to cause this? Nothing whatever; Hamlet has had time to think. Even before the conclusion of the scene in which the Ghost appears, we see the brief opportunity for reflection already begetting this mood. Again, when Hamlet does finally accomplish his task, the occasion gives no time for precisely thinking on the event; the opportunity is unplanned and unexpected; the deed is done under a sudden impulse of rage at his adversary's treachery, and with the conviction that it must be now or never.

Notwithstanding all this, it does not escape us that Hamlet himself grasps this explanation as a make-shift,—a conjecture which does not wholly satisfy him. Nor does the solution usually seem completely adequate even to those critics who are disposed to follow Coleridge. There is an almost universal disposition to qualify or add; Dr. Bradley, for instance, emphasizes the paralyzing influence of melancholy, and of Hamlet's loss of faith in the world. And so we fall back on Goethe's more comprehensive and complex explanation. The cause of Hamlet's inaction is his character; the task required of him is an impossible one,—not in itself, but impossible for such a man.

This view puts into our hands the key to many of the difficulties of the play, which the other theories leave unsolved. We are, for instance, able to comprehend why Hamlet is

* Somebody has noted that this comparison itself is eminently characteristic of the speaker; the sphere to which his mind naturally turns is not the external world,—not the swiftness of the lightning or of the eagle; but to the inner world of thought and feeling.

puzzled to account for his own conduct. No person can, in his own case, rest satisfied with the statement, "I cannot act because I am I,—because of my own character." We naturally feel we can do what we please; we naturally seek some more simple and definite reason than our own character, for inability, on any particular occasion, to do what we wish. Now Hamlet well knows—what some of the critics deny—that he has "cause and will [*i.e.* wish] and strength and means to do it." The conscious search for the impediment leads only to a vague suggestion of a culpable indifference, of some tendency to lose action in thought, which he feels after all is not an adequate solution. Unconsciously, however, he, at least, negatives any "objective" explanation. That self-reproach, that remorseful dissatisfaction with his own conduct which is so constantly present and gives a tragic tone to the whole play (a state of mind which none of the "objective" theories can adequately motive), abundantly shows that the difficulty lies not in outside circumstances which he cannot control, but in himself. The difficulty springs from the whole complex of his character,—not merely from one tendency which might be overcome. It is not merely because conditions favour reflection that Hamlet does not slay his uncle in the chamber scene. Does not the dramatist make us feel that such a deed of violence perpetrated in cold blood is something altogether repugnant to the sensitive, refined, cultivated Hamlet? This hero requires an access of passion, such as we see at the grave of Ophelia, at the death of Polonius, or in the final scene, to spur him to activity. And how is this feeling with regard to Hamlet's character produced? By those very scenes which from the point of view of mere plot-structure are most open to cavil. Whence comes this impression of a delicate, sensitive, reflective spirit but from such passages as the seemingly needless talk concerning the gross habits of the Danes, just before the entrance of the Ghost, or the advice with regard to acting before the play-scene? In the latter case, it is to be noted that Hamlet's precepts are particularly ill designed for the

practical purpose which he may be supposed, at the moment, to have in view,—the bringing home the sense of guilt with the utmost force to the coarse-grained King. But they are the involuntary expression of the speaker's innate feeling, of his critical fastidiousness,—the sentiments of one who would prefer to err in under-doing rather than in over-doing.

Hamlet's character is of a type which (like so many characters in the imaginative work of the 19th century) manifests itself rather in sentiment and reflection than in action. We gain a better insight into the real Hamlet through the "To be or not to be" soliloquy than through the murder of Polonius, through the talk in the churchyard, than through the forging of the death warrant of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. It is less in his actions than in his inaction that we have the real man. The main incidents in "Macbeth" are the outcome of Macbeth's deliberate intention; the incidents of "Hamlet" are either not due to the hero at all, or are the result not of his design but of his impulse. This is true, as has already been noted, even of his final fulfilment of his task.

Left to his own tendencies Hamlet is rather a spectator of the world than an actor in it. He is intellectual, imaginative, introspective. He has a temperament such as is often found among literary men. How easily one might imagine an Addison or a Stevenson dominated by Hamlet's mood and uttering his sentiments in the talk with the grave-digger and Horatio at the churchyard! No scene probably exhibits more accurately (apart from an added touch of melancholy arising from his situation) the natural Hamlet, as he might have been, had the events of his life followed a more ordinary tenor. Hamlet is a man of culture, isolated, by his very superiority, from the age and society in which he lives; and for this he pays the penalty. He lacks the sympathy and comprehension of his fellows, which gives support. He is a student of books and of men; the very breadth of his interests tends to dissipate his energy in any given direction. He easily forgets his task and his

troubles: *e.g.* in his curiosity in regard to what is going on in the theatrical world (Act II, sc. 2). It is true that in this passage, Shakespeare, to a degree very unusual in his dramas, gives scope to his own interest and that of the audience at the "Globe" in actual contemporary events; but this talk has none the less its function in the play and is illuminative of and appropriate to the character of the speaker. And so the talk with Osric just before the closing scene affords not merely a touch of comedy for purposes of relief and contrast, but manifests the ease with which Hamlet's mind is diverted from serious and practical thoughts. And everywhere,—in the imaginative or aphoristic style of his utterance, in the wit and irony of the apparent incoherencies of his assumed madness,—the activity, fertility and subtlety of intellect and imagination are displayed. The multiplicity of his interests and ideas serves to dissipate his practical impulses. It is a phenomenon of a similar character when the poet of "In Memoriam" describes the impact of grief as being mitigated by the intellectual activities which it sets in motion:

> "Likewise the imaginative woe,
> That loved to handle spiritual strife,
> Diffused the shock thro' all my life,
> But in the present broke the blow."

We have now the key to the secret of that alleged lack of unity, of that desultoriness and defect in dramatic action of which the critics complain. The motive force on which the action (or rather the inaction) depends is character, and character of unusual subtlety and intricacy. Shakespeare is not forgetting his theme, or violating the principles of his art when he lets his hero display himself in thought and in talk on this subject and on that. It is not our dramatist's way needlessly to develop a scene or personage that he may give vent to some flow of genial inspiration, or display his aptitude for some particular sort of artistic creation. He is a severe economist in his art; he does not lavish effects without good reason. The detail and masterliness with which

Iago is delineated, is needful to render Othello's conduct credible and in some measure excusable. The magic combination of varied and almost incompatible qualities in Falstaff and Cleopatra is required by the necessities of the action; in one case to make us understand,—nay, sympathize with—the predilection of a noble prince for the sordid life of thieves and tavern-brawlers; in the other, to account, without excessive degradation of Antony, for the transformation of the triple pillar of the world into a strumpet's fool. In like manner, if the character of Hamlet is displayed with a fulness and detail unparalleled among the protagonists of Shakespearean tragedy, it is because in this subtle complexity lies the source of the development and of the *dénouement*.

It may not be amiss to draw the reader's attention to what has been, in these last pages, assumed as a matter of course,—that in a properly constructed work of art nothing is accidental, every part is properly assumed to be intended to produce that impression which it naturally does produce. Where the possibilities are so absolutely limited as they are in a drama, by the exigencies of time and other considerations that belong to the stage, the artist is bound to choose out of such scenes and incidents as might occur in actual life only those which shall best further his dramatic purpose. It might be a matter of no special import that, in real life, an actual Hamlet, between the planning and the carrying out of his device to test the King through the play, should fall into the philosophical reflections of the "To be or not to be" soliloquy; or, in the perilous and pressing situation in which he finds himself on the return from his English voyage, should spend some leisure moments in exchanging repartees with a grave-digger or in moralizing with Horatio. But in a play such scenes are factors in the impression on the audience, and must be regarded as of the essence of the speaker's character. And, doubtless, that Hamlet was a man who thought and acted in this way, serves not merely to manifest, but to explain, his delay.

It is, of course, obvious that in every tragedy worthy of the name, the character of the hero counts for much in the development of the plot; but in "Hamlet" this development depends so exclusively on character—there is so little of direct external influence either of persons or events in the direction of retarding Hamlet's fulfilment of his mission,—so many elements of character come into play and these in so complex a fashion that a concise and comprehensive generalization (except in such vague terms as those of Goethe) of the central force is impossible. But in addition to all this, there is another reason for obscurity, which does not exist in other plays; we have here a tragedy not of action, but of inaction. Contrast "Hamlet" in this respect with "Macbeth." In the latter play, the tragic atmosphere and tragic outcome arise from the hero's entering on a series of actions directly designed to attain a desired end; in the latter the hero does not act towards an end, he shirks what he feels to be a duty, and by a series of evasions gives an opportunity for conditions to arise which lead him into deeds which he does not really desire to commit and which culminate in widespread disaster. This negative character of the play is exemplified in the negative character of the central scene,—the scene in the King's chamber when the hero refrains from action. Whereas in the normal type of tragedy, the central scene (the "catastrophe," as the Greeks called it,—literally, the "turning point") to which all that precedes leads up and out of which all that follows develops, contains the pregnant and crucial deed of the play, the slaying of Duncan or of Julius Cæsar, the yielding of Othello to the insinuations of Iago. Now, when something positive happens we easily satisfy ourselves with the assignment of a cause, although, in fact, the causes of any event are legion. In general we arbitrarily select as *the* cause, the new factor which sets the whole complex of causes in action—as the spark from the engine is regarded as the cause of the forest-fire. The other more or less stable factors, we call the conditions: the existence of combustible materials, the dryness of the weather, etc. But

if the forest does *not burn* even though the spark fall, it is less easy to specify a cause which shall seem adequately to account for the non-occurrence of any manifest result. If things remain *in statu quo* the cause seems to be, not one and simple, but manifold and complex. Here, one may conjecture is another source of dissatisfaction with any solution of the "Hamlet" problem.

Are the suggestions contained in this paper brought forward as affording the basis for a complete explanation? Does the writer absurdly suppose that he has solved a puzzle where so many incomparably more competent have failed? Is the reader at the heart of "Hamlet's" mystery? Even if the reader accept what has been here advanced, does he feel that there is nothing to add, that the secret has been explored, that "Hamlet" has been analyzed, ticketed, and assigned to its pigeon-hole? Certainly not; the better the reader knows the play, the less likely he is to feel that the last word has been said by any critic. Is there, then, after all some flaw in structure, some want of imaginative perfection? Quite the contrary; this mystery, this resistance to exhaustive analysis, is a quality which "Hamlet" shares with life itself. It is a testimony to its greatness as a work of art,—to the fact that "Hamlet" is an organism,—a growth, not a piece of conscious intellectual manufacture.

Sometimes an imaginative artist sets out with a generalized statement; he is interested in an abstract idea—the effects of heredity, the relations of capital and labour, or the paralysis of action by introspection; he produces a concrete illustration—a drama, a story,—of one of these. In giving his ideas concrete embodiment, he of necessity includes a wealth of detail—traits of character, touches of description, etc.,—that have no direct bearing upon the truth exemplified. Yet the reader who from the concrete picture thus produced, works back to the general proposition which is its germ will rightly feel that he has attained a satisfactory explanation of the work before him. And so when the nucleus of a character is a simple quality,

or a definite number of qualities, or the desire to exemplify a generalization (*e.g.* introspection is unfavourable to action), the reader who grasps, from the concrete delineation, these qualities or this idea, will feel that he holds the secret of the personality which the author conceived. But the purely artistic genius—a Shakespeare or a Scott—is primarily interested in the concrete; his impulse to create comes from the concrete, he thinks in the concrete, and in the concrete he ends. He begins by conceiving the man; the individual qualities evolve from the first more or less hazy conception; just as in real life we gradually apprehend the characteristics of a new acquaintance. The progress of the most unalloyed and therefore highest artistic work is not from the abstract to the concrete, but from the vague to the definite.

This, the history of art seems to show. A Phidias sets out from an embodiment of Zeus or Athene familiar to him from childhood, wrought out by a long series of artists; he simply gives it perfection. He has not been under the necessity of constructing directly from the abstract qualities ascribed to a divinity, a concrete conception to correspond. In delineating the scenes and personages of Christianity the great Italian masters of painting worked under similar conditions.

Everything goes to show that this, too, was Shakespeare's method. Unless in one or two cases, there is absolute proof that his plays were based upon a concrete original. He reads a novel, a poem, a bit of history. As he reads, the characters and events take shape in his mind. His creative imagination is not set in motion, because his subject illustrates any abstract truth. He is interested in story and persons for their own sake. The whole situation develops before his inner eye. From the picture in his mind he selects such parts as will suit the stage, and we have "As You Like It," or "Romeo and Juliet," or "Antony and Cleopatra."

That a concrete original was before him in the case of "Hamlet," we know. Almost certainly, this was a play

which we do not now possess; but we do possess the old story of Saxo Grammaticus; and different as Shakespeare's work is, the fundamental outlines are clearly traceable in the elder version. No generalization can satisfactorily cover a work thus constructed; because no such generalization entered into it at any stage of its production. To the present writer it is incredible that Shakespeare ever asked himself what type of character did Hamlet exemplify, or why did Hamlet not immediately carry out the Ghost's injunction. Shakespeare simply saw the sort of person who would act as, in the story, Hamlet acts.

The synthetic processes by which the intellect clothes an abstract idea with concrete form can always be followed backward by a sufficiently acute analytic mind; and when this has been done, it is felt that the work is explained and, in a large measure at least, exhausted. But in the highest imaginative work, the conscious intellect only comes in at the latest stage in order to arrange, to prune, to amend a conception which has already taken bodily form. R. L. Stevenson, although he falls far short of the wholly inspired unconscious artist, was yet, in his own experience, fully aware of the essential importance of this process. "I used to write slow as judgment," he says in one of his letters, "now I write rather fast; but I am still 'a slow study,' and sit a long while silent on my eggs. Unconscious thought, there is the only method; macerate your subject, let it boil slow, then take the lid off and look in—and there your stuff is, good or bad. But the journalist's method is the way to manufacture lies; it is will-worship—if you know that luminous Quaker phrase; and the will is only to be brought into the field for study, and again for revision. The essential part of the work is not an act, but a state." Hence the ancient, and indeed the modern, idea of poetic inspiration. The great artist does not possess his subject, the subject possesses him.

So, no great work of the imagination can be condensed into a formula; none of the greatest personalities created by the imagination can be comprehended in a phrase. This is

true of any one of Shakespeare's plays and their *dramatis personæ* ; if the attempt is specially abortive in the case of Hamlet this is due to the peculiarities of the theme, already pointed out in this paper, and to the surpassing excellence of the play. "Je incommensurabler," says Goethe, "und für den Verstand unfässlicher eine poetische Produktion, desto besser."

The various views advanced by the "subjective" critics as elements in Hamlet's character which determine his inaction have, perhaps all of them, something of truth; they are only erroneous in as far as undue stress is laid upon each factor by its special advocate. They all help to enrich our conception of this infinitely suggestive creation. Even the points urged by the "objective" critics (far astray as these critics seem to be), one is ready to admit, may have been in Hamlet's mind. Why not? Was he not more ingenious and subtle than any critic who ever wrote about him? Shakespeare endowed him with his own intellect. But Hamlet certainly does not think about these external difficulties as much as the "objective" critic does; some of them never, some of them only for a moment, occupy his mind,—at least, when we are admitted to its secret counsels. And doubtless there yet remain elements of character to be emphasized by future commentators, and new obstacles to be pointed out. But the heart of Hamlet's mystery will never be reached; he is too marvellously wrought for that, —the greatest even of Shakespeare's creations. Professor Tolman closes his interesting essay with a felicitous touch; he imagines Hamlet himself as protesting to his commentators: "Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make of me! You would play upon me; you would seem to know my stops; you would pluck out the heart of my mystery; you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my compass. . . . 'Sblood, do you think I am easier to be played upon than a pipe?"

W. J. ALEXANDER

THE CENTENARY OF WHITTIER

IT IS one of the ironies of fate that the world bows down in reverence to a poet on the hundreth anniversary of his birth. It suggests an earnest attempt by humanity to atone for its ancestors' indifference. One generation neglects and the next generation worships. One century slays the prophet and the next century builds his sepulchre. These are seldom broken laws in our unintelligible life. Contemporaries continue to be largely unappreciative and it usually remains for posterity to pay tribute to our greatest benefactors. Man is by nature, too, a lover and admirer of the past. Most of us prefer in memory the dawn to the noonday. Like Hardcastle, we " love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wine." It is inevitable that old literature, which has passed unscathed through the cleansing fires of time, should push the untried new aside, and that the world should look back to the writers of former years as the Meistersingers of a golden age. Yet they are hopeful and pleasing tendencies of the present—these centenary celebrations. In the rush of modern life with its wide-spread commercialism, its ostentation, and its chasing after shadows, it is well to hark back, if only for a short period, to those who preached a purer gospel and sang of the higher joys of life.

These celebrations are gradually becoming universal. The centenary of Longfellow in February last was not an expression of mere local admiration in Cambridge,—the admiration which a small town or province pays to its distinguished son. It was national in it's observance, and throughout the entire United States, magazines, and schools, and colleges, and cities celebrated the hundredth birthday of the gentle poet. The centenary of Whittier on the 17th of the present month will

be marked by equal enthusiasm. Not only in Haverhill where he was born, but throughout the entire Union, school children will on that day recite his "Barefoot Boy," his "Snowbound," or his poems of reminiscence, and men and women in all walks of life will fittingly do honour to his memory. We in Canada also shall feel a deep interest in the day and what it represents. For Whittier is the Burns of our great western continent. He is the poet, not only of the plain New England people, but the poet of pioneer days and struggles, the poet of the home life and its old-fashioned, simple joys.

It is little wonder that Whittier is dear to New England and to men and women of New England birth. It is little wonder, too, that he is loved by Americans and Canadians,—by all, indeed, who have felt the romance and the hope of life in a young land, who retain tender memories of the early fireside, or who still keep in an age of affectations and shams an unsophisticated way of looking at the world. Whittier was a distinct product of this new country. His ancestors were pioneers who did their work quietly and courageously in the early days of the country's history; they played their part in the making of the nation, felling forest and clearing rocky hillside to build a home; they shared the hardships and dangers of those troubled times, and they performed those deeds of simple heroism and duty which benefit a people but bring their doers little fame. The first ancestor, Thomas Whittier, came from Southampton, England, to the valley of the Merrimac in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. His son was the great-grandfather of the poet. The early Whittiers were Quakers, lovers of peace, haters of violence, strong in religious conviction. The frugal sympathetic ways of the poet were ancestral traits,—in fact, the only heritage he received.

Whittier was indebted but little to circumstances, at least to financial or educational aid. Few poets have achieved fame on so small an opportunity as he. He had little to help him but the gifts of a song writer—neither power, nor posi-

tion, nor education, nor wealth. Scientific analysis does not explain genius. The transition from log cabin to White House has been proved not impossible in the American world of politics; and in the world of letters, from bare farm house to Hall of Fame,—and, better, to men's and women's hearts. If Whittier owed little to external fortune, he owed much that is unpurchaseable to the circumstances of his birth and breeding. The poverty of his early years, the necessity of toiling on the farm, the shrewdness and integrity of his ancestors, the mysticism and influence of Quaker traditions, the fervent religious convictions of the home, the keen boyish insight into the significance of simple nature either in rural scenes or in humble men and women,—all these, although perhaps they were not conducive to a liberal education, nevertheless contributed to make him, like Burns, the interpreter of common life, the poet of the heart rather than of the intellect.

The home life of the boy was typical of the period and of the country. "At an early age," the poet himself records, "I was set to work on the farm and doing errands for my mother who, in addition to her ordinary house duties, was busy in spinning and weaving the linen and woollen cloth needed for the family." He was not permitted by circumstances "to enter the House of Life through the library door." Few American poets had smaller chances of education in boyhood. His parents although refined by nature were unlettered; his youthful reading was from the Bible, from a few religious books, the "Farmers' Almanac" and the country newspapers; his university was the district school, attended irregularly in the winter months when the farm did not need his services. Later, when William Lloyd Garrison discovered his talent, he attended for two sessions the Haverhill Academy. But other influences gradually worked to fashion the future poet. "When I was fourteen years old," he writes, "my first schoolmaster brought with him to our home a volume of Burns's poems from which he read, greatly to my delight. I begged him to leave the book with

me, and I set myself at once to the task of mastering the glossary of the Scottish dialect at its close. This was about the first poetry I had ever read and it had a lasting influence on me. I began to make rhymes myself and to imagine stories and adventures." Thus the boy was peculiarly moulded by home surroundings to be the Burns of America, and to paint a picture of American home life, "Snowbound," equal in many respects to "The Cottar's Saturday Night."

In other ways Whittier's early years were those of the normal boy. Although he was "innocent of books"—to quote his own phrase—he found companionship in the hills, and woods, and streams around him, "the ancient teachers never dumb of Nature's unhoused lyceum." All these to him were enchanted ground. He entered eagerly into the many joys of a country boy's life,—the feats of pond and river, of rod and gun; the shooting of teal and loon; the seeking for woodchucks, or muskrats, or eagles' eggs; the sleigh rides and the summer sails; the following of the mowers along the swaths of the low green meadows; the moonlit skaters' keen delight; the hake-broil on driftwood coals; the clam-bake on the gray sand beach to the music of the mysterious ocean; the kite-flying, and the nutting in the autumn woods; and above all the wistful watching of the sunset beyond the hills with the wonder it always brings to the thinking boy. Then in the more immediate home life he enjoyed the tending of the cattle in the huge hay-scented barn; the nightly chores about the farm house; the corn-husking and the apple-bees; the innocent rustic party with its blind man's buff and its forfeits; the carding and the weaving and the holding the skeins of winding yarn; the wonderful stories of Indian raids and of witchcraft, told on winter nights around the blazing hearth. All these delights were his, and all played their part to round out that conception of nature and that insight into simple human life, which are so peculiarly characteristic of his work. He is described in his later youth as a distinguished-looking young man, with remarkably beautiful eyes, a tall slim straight figure, bashful and diffident but not awkward,

reserved but never uncongenial, self-confident but never forward, and filled with the quiet dreams and the "long thoughts" of youth.

Whittier's long literary career, from the publication of his first poem by William Lloyd Garrison in 1856, to his death in 1892, was strangely uninfluenced by external incidents. Although he was busy and active all his days he lived a life of quiet retirement almost pathetic in its loneliness. He suffered much from frail health; he sacrificed much to duty. At the age of thirty he moved with his mother, his aunt, and his sister to a little cottage at Amesbury near the old homestead, and there he spent the remainder of his days, interested always in public affairs, contributing on questions of the hour to newspapers and magazines, but yet surrounded by the typical Quaker quiet. Some of his biographers believe they have discovered the identity of the subject of his poem "Memories," and the real explanation of his lonely life. But the "beautiful and happy girl" of his youth remains hidden, although the memory and influence of his early romance remained with him to the end. His proud and diffident spirit guarded the incident well; he trod alone his most sacred paths of thought, and he kept their secrets to himself, and apart from these few verses suggestive of Wordsworth's poems to Lucy he threw no light upon the mystery. Even of "Memories" he said, "I love it too; but I hardly know whether to publish it, it is so personal and near my heart."

His intimacy with the great men and minds of his day was beautiful in its sincerity and unity of hopes and ideals. But even in this he paid the penalty, as he himself records, of living to be old and losing the friends of his manhood. Emerson and Longfellow died before him, and he and Holmes alone remained "the last leaves upon the tree." Yet in Whittier's nature, strength and tenderness, as they always are, were not far apart; he had a buoyant, hopeful spirit, and he uttered no complaints. "Circumstances," he wrote to a friend, "the care of an aged mother and the duty owed to a sister in delicate health for

many years must be the excuse for leading the lonely life which has called out thy pity. I know there has something very sweet and beautiful been missed, but I have no reason to complain." Few poets, however, have received such recognition during their lifetime and few have lived to see such a rich harvest from the seed they themselves have sown. He saw realized his fondest dream, the abolition of slavery; he helped with his pen to fight and win the battle, and he saw in his last years a nation of peace and growing strength, which gave him its love and honour. Like his own "Namesake,"

> "He saw the old time's groves and shrines
> In the long distance fair and dim;
> And heard, like sound of far-off pines,
> The century's mellowed hymn."

The poetry of Whittier covers a wide range of subjects. He is known first of all as the poet of rural tales and idyls filled with pastoral scenes and pictures of humble life. They are simple alike in subject and in style. In these poems, with their suggestions of hearth and quiet country, he has a charm for the masses that the poems of greater culture can never possess, and by these he will continue to make his appeal. From first to last he is concerned with the life of his countrymen. He beautifies in a picturesque way the human associations that cluster about the labours and the labourers of the world—shipbuilders and fishermen, huskers and weavers, lumbermen and tillers of the soil. He never lost his sympathy with these humble people, and he wrote not of their drudgery but of the underlying dignity of their work. His "Songs of Labour" were written not as a literary exercise but as the natural expression of his own feelings, in homely word and homespun phrase, effortless and unadorned. Yet they carried him to the hearts of the people. This is possible only to the born singer, endowed with the vision and the divine faculty, who sees and has the natural power to express the beauty of common things. "Whittier," Holmes has written, "reached

the hearts of his fellow countrymen, especially of New Englanders, paralyzed by the teachings of Edwards, as Burns kindled the souls of Scotchmen palsied by the dogmas of Thomas Boston and his fellow sectaries. . . I thank God that He has given you the thoughts and feelings which sing themselves as naturally as the woodthrush rings his silver bell."

Apart from these pastoral poems, he wrote widely on subjects connected with New England history, witchcraft, and tradition. He revelled, like Hawthorne, in the hall of colonial romance, and his ballads have classed him as the greatest American ballad writer. One who knew well the conditions of Whittier's time believed that if every other record of the early history and life of New England were lost, the story could be constructed again from the papers of the poet. "Traits, habits, facts, traditions, incidents—he holds a torch to the dark places and illumines them every one."

But it was given to Whittier to appeal to the national as well as the individual conscience. His path for a time lay through the field of political poetry. A love for freedom and the rights of men of whatever station in life was deep-rooted in his nature. It was but natural that he should use his pen against the most gigantic evil of his day and that he should become the poet of the abolitionist movement. In his "Songs of Freedom" he appealed with a pathetic but ringing zeal, fervent and earnest, to the hearts of his countrymen in behalf of the Southern slave. He threw himself into the fight with all the ardour and power of his nature, and he saw realized his dream of unity, and liberty, and equal rights to all.

Fifteen years have passed since Whittier's death, and during that brief period his work has steadily grown in the estimation of his countrymen. There are learned readers who declare that Whittier was not a poet, and that measured by high standards his poetry fails. Society folk, very likely, sometimes find him dull, and old-fashioned, and even com-

mon, and too religiously earnest in his call. To them he wears a homespun dress strangely out of place in fashionable circles that assume over their teacups an intellectual air. By these he will, perhaps, be thought worthy only of neglect. But, in the pointed phrasing of so high an authority as Professor Bliss Perry, "to find the true audience of a poet" you are not to look in the social register. You must seek out the shy boy and girl who live on side streets and hill roads,—no matter where, so long as the road to dreamland leads to their gate; you must seek the working girls and shopkeepers, the school teachers and country ministers; you must make a census of the lonely uncounted souls who possess the treasures of the humble." Among such a gathering of readers, Whittier holds, and will continue to hold, a high place. Moreover, the greatest and truest critics of his own day believed that he was a true poet. Tennyson declared that his "Playmates" was a perfect poem, and that in some of his descriptions of scenery and wild flowers he would rank with Wordsworth. Holmes said that "In School Days" was the most beautiful schoolboy poem in the English language; and Matthew Arnold pronounced it one of the perfect poems which must live.

But in view of Whittier's own attitude towards his work, it is useless to measure it by any theory of poetics. He himself would be the first to renounce any claim to what is usually termed Art in his verse. He did not write for mere æsthetic beauty. He felt always the sense of moral responsibility, and it was this sense that produced the majority of his poems. His opinion of his own work is summed up in the proem of the first edition of his verse:

> "The rigour of a frozen clime,
> The harshness of an untaught ear,
> The jarring words of one whose rhyme
> Beat often Labour's hurried time,
> Or Duty's rugged march through storm and strife are here."

He desired that every line he wrote should serve a moral end rather than be an example of mere literary excellence.

His "Mogg Megone" he thought was liable to the grave objection that it was not calculated to do good. In his writing he did not strive for correctness or charm. He made no effort to avoid colloquialisms, and he never in any of his work consciously sought alliteration. In a letter to his publisher, he said he had left one bad rhyme in the poem he was submitting, to preserve his well-known character in that respect; and he could see no harm in two words as common and insignificant as "well" in the same verse. His own desire was that a stanza in his "Namesake" could be applied with truth to his ideals:

> "The words he spake, the thoughts he penned,
> Are mortal as his hand and brain,
> But, if they served the Master's end,
> He has not lived in vain."

Before such an attitude, principles of versification fail and literary criticism is dumb.

Canadians of the present and the future will never, perhaps, feel the same bond of sympathy with Whittier and his work as our ancestors felt a generation ago. To them, he was the sympathetic spokesman of their fondest hopes and longings. He wrote of a simple pioneer age and interpreted with exactness its varied life. To the present generation the reminiscences of those days are already becoming shadowy, and we no longer feel their wonder and romance. Nor will Whittier ever appeal so strongly to us as to men and women of New England birth. The troubled period of anti-slavery agitation has no thrills for us to-day, and politically his "Songs of Freedom" have for us little charm. The changes of time and place have, therefore, removed him from us. But men's and women's hearts remain the same.

By those who believe in liberty and justice and love; by those who realize the possibilities of this great new land, and who feel the dignity and beauty of humble duteous toil—his poems will always be held in reverence. To those of us, too, who amid the din of cities still retain impressions of the old-

fashioned country life; to those of us who still look back in ourselves like Stevenson for the "lad that's gone," Whittier must always remain a magician with golden keys that unlock for us the storehouse of boyish memories. We need care little for the criticism of childishness that is directed by some maturer people at such a choice, and is said to mark a Whittier appreciation. This same childishness and simplicity of heart and spirit is after all the first step in human wisdom; it is, indeed, the first law of the Kingdom of Heaven. There is little doubt that despite criticism and all the changes in literary taste, "Snowbound," "In School Days," "Maud Muller," "Prayer Seeker," and "Barbara Frietchie," will continue to be read wherever the English language is known. But apart from his work, Whittier's personality will always demand respect, and men will revere the gentle, human heart behind the poems. It is recorded that at the simple Quaker burial service of the poet the tributes related not to Whittier as a literary artist but to the manner of his life. His character was in keeping with his labours and ideals. And when during the present month his centenary is celebrated throughout the land, those who know his work best, while they think of him as Whittier the poet, will think of him, perhaps more tenderly as Whittier the Man. For, as Carlyle said of Scott, when he departed, he took a Man's life along with him.

C. Macmillan

GEORGE ELIOT'S WOMEN

FINITE capabilities forever struggling with infinite possibilities; passionate desire for earthly happiness and equally passionate desire for moral perfection; transcendent aspiration, ignoble failure—and there you have Maggie Tulliver, the realest woman of all fiction.

Maggie Tulliver is the embodiment of youth and of youthful idealism. Her hopes and fears, her motives and desires are the hopes and fears, the motives and desires of humanity; her mistakes, her illusions are the mistakes, the illusions of unthinking youth. Loyal, loving, unswervingly faithful to what she believes to be right, she dies at twenty, a disgrace to her friends and family, having betrayed her dearest friend, deserted her lover, and broken the heart of the one being to whom she was essential. Yet one cannot call Maggie Tulliver a failure; though such a nature as hers is almost predestined to failure.

Judged by ordinary standards, however, Maggie fails miserably. In fact, "The Mill on the Floss" may almost be called a study in failure. Maggie fails in everything she attempts so utterly, so hopelessly, so tragically, that her early death comes as a relief to the reader. Her father fails: dies with his longings for revenge unsated: perishes with the sorrowful conviction that "life has been one too many for him." Tom fails, fails in his love, fails in his career—lives and dies in the unexpressed but bitter knowledge that a life of rectitude has not saved him from heartbreak and loneliness. Stephen Guest fails—fails to win the woman he loves, fails to remain faithful to the woman who loves him. Little Lucy fails—kind, gentle soul that all must love and reverence. She fails perhaps more sadly than does Maggie;

for she lives to marry Stephen Guest, and to know, as she stands by the grave of her cousin, that all the best of her husband lies buried there.

What was the "pleasant vice" for which poor Maggie suffered so bitterly? Not the inability to distinguish right from wrong; not the inability to follow right when right showed clearly to her mental vision. In the last analysis we find that Maggie's weakness lay in her inability to see more than one side of a question at one time.

If Maggie had been a consistent idealist she would have refused to listen to Stephen Guest; if she had been a consistent egotist she would have married him at once before anything interposed to prevent so desirable a consummation; if she had been a reasonable woman she would have outraged no propriety, violated no social code, been false to no ideal of friendship; she would have gone to her cousin, told her the whole truth and waited for her to release the unwilling lover, which Lucy would undoubtedly have done. Maggie could then have married Stephen Guest without one qualm of conscience, although with bitter regret that her happiness and that of Stephen should have been bound up with the misery of her dearest friend.

But Maggie is never idealist, egotist, or reasonable woman for more than a limited space of time. Her aspiration, though ardent, is fleeting; her love of love, her longing to "drink life to the lees," is ever with her; in short, she is no ideal abstraction, no placid negation; she is a very human woman, as capable of joy as of sorrow, as capable of passionate selfishness as of passionate renunciation. She sways ever from one thing to the other; at one time right seems the only necessary thing; at another, happiness. At the last, being neither strong enough for consistent abnegation nor weak enough for absolute surrender, she loses everything even to her good name. Life, instead of a triumph, becomes a deadly pain, a loathsome burden, impossible to bear. How pathetic is the end,

when, having lost all else, she regains that which she most prized in the dead days of childhood—her brother's love! How wonderful is that last glimpse of the brother and sister —Maggie with eyes of intense life, looking out from a weary beaten face—Tom pale, with a certain awe and humiliation: "The boat reappeared—but brother and sister had gone down in an embrace never to be parted; living through again in one supreme moment the days when they had clasped their hands in love and roamed the daisied fields together." It is here in this ending of "The Mill on the Floss" that George Eliot, for the first and only time, shows herself a sentimentalist, rather than a seer.

This is not a fair solution of the problem, this early and heroic death. Death does not come at the behest of the weary and hopeless. Life, not death, should have solved this problem. George Eliot should have shown us Maggie Tulliver, old, tired, shorn of her youthful charms, bereft of her young enthusiasms, dragging out a dull existence amidst the jeers of the heartless, the contempt of the conventional. Or she should have shown us Maggie as the wife of Stephen, a Maggie who has learned the lesson that one must pay for one's exalted stupidities as severely as for one's crimes; that for her who offends against social usages there is but one apology; that it is often necessary either to suffer unmerited and lifelong punishment, or else to sacrifice ideals which bring trouble and perplexity not only upon us but upon all connected with us.

Maggie Tulliver's act in refusing to marry Stephen after eloping with him was the act of a fanatic. To the Moloch of loyalty which she set up she sacrificed not only her own happiness which she had perhaps a right to dispose of, but the happiness of everyone whom she loved on earth. She sacrificed the happiness of Stephen, whom she would have died to please; she sacrificed the happiness of the brother whom she adored, and who suffered fiercely in her disgrace; she sacrificed the happiness of Philip, who would have felt less pain, it may

be surmised, in seeing her the wife of another man than in seeing her a byword among the vulgar and heartless; she sacrificed the happiness of her mother, of her relatives, even of the poor Lucy whom she most tried to help; for her elopement was the real grief to Lucy, a grief which the marriage of the recalcitrant lover could hardly have augmented. In short, Maggie deliberately threw away her reputation, ruined her life, and spoilt the lives of countless others for the sake of making a useless atonement. The reproach of Celia to the supernal Dorothea was beyond doubt partly justified: "It is better to hear what people say. You see what mistakes you make in taking up notions. You always see what no one else sees: it is impossible to satisfy you: yet you never see what is quite plain."

Celia, who may be termed the consummation of all that is commonplace and satisfactory, is indeed an excellent companion for the wilder and more daring Dorothea; and the latter is fortunate indeed to have the admonitions of a Celia always at hand. As George Eliot says, "Who can tell what just judgements Murr the Cat may be passing on us beings of wider vision?" Society, as represented by Murr the Cat, has a valuable word or two for us, concerning Maggie Tulliver's life: That one may break every commandment, trifle with every moral law, but that one must not break the commands of Society nor trifle with her statutes. Society lays down certain rules for the game of life: if one departs from these rules, one is anathema. One's virtues, one's vices are one's own affair; one's conduct is the affair of Society. And barbarous and unjust as this appears at first sight, it is not so in reality. Society frames certain laws for its own preservation, uprears certain bulwarks for the protection of the weak. No social unit has the right to break these laws, or tear down these bulwarks. They are the laborious work of centuries: imperfect and weak in the main, yet needful and even laudable: "You have disgraced us all. You have disgraced our father's name. You have been a curse to

your best friends. You have been base—deceitful: no motives are strong enough to restrain you." So speaks Murr in the person of Tom Tulliver, Maggie's idolized brother. And does not Murr speak truth of a kind? Maggie was a fool—but a divine fool. Her folly had its roots in all that is best and finest in human nature.

Leaving poor aspiring Maggie in the early grave which her author has pityingly allotted to her, let us turn to two of the most interesting feminine character studies in literature, the contrasted characters in "Middlemarch," of Dorothea Brooke and Rosamond Vincy. Celia, we may dismiss with a word—"pink and white nullifidian" seems to express her perfectly. Dorothea and Rosamond, however, are worthy of all the attention that one may feel disposed to bestow upon them. Read the following brief descriptions: "Here and there is born a Saint Theresa, foundress of nothing, whose loving heart-beats and sobs after an unattained goodness tremble off and are dispersed among hindrances." "She was admitted to be the flower of Mrs. Lemon's school, the chief school in the county, where the teaching included all that was demanded in the accomplished female. Mrs. Lemon, herself, had always held up Miss Vincy as a model."

Now mark how dexterously George Eliot discriminates in outlining the externals of these two women; how delicately she intimates the royal, spiritual graces of the one, the limited decorous beauties of the other: "Miss Brooke had that kind of beauty which seems to be thrown into relief by poor dress. Her hand and wrist were finely formed; and her profile as well as her stature and bearing seemed to gain more dignity from her plain garments which, by the side of provincial fashion, gave her the impressiveness of a fine quotation from the Bible in a paragraph of to-day's newspaper. . . Let those who know tell us what it was that Dorothea wore in these days of mild autumn—that thin, white woollen stuff, soft to the touch and soft to the eye. It always seemed to have been lately washed and to smell of the green hedges—was

always in the shape of a pelisse with sleeves hanging all out of the fashion. Yet if she had appeared before a still audience as Imogen or Cato's daughter her dress might have seemed right enough: the grace and dignity were in her limbs and neck; and about her simply-parted hair and candid eyes the large round poke which was then the fate of women seemed no more odd as a head dress than the gold trencher we call a halo."

Now note these fleeting glimpses of Rosamond: "Hair of infantine fairness, neither flaxen nor yellow; eyes of heavenly blue, deep enough to hold the most exquisite meanings an ingenious beholder could put into them and deep enough to hide the meanings of the owner, if these should happen to be less exquisite. . . Rosamond was always that combination of correct sentiments, music, drawing, dancing, elegant note-writing, private album for extracted verse, and perfect blonde loveliness which made the irresistible woman for the doomed man of that date. . . They were both tall and their eyes were on a level; but imagine Rosamond's infantile blondness and wondrous crown of hairplaits, with her pale blue dress of a fit and finish so perfect that no dressmaker could look on it without emotion; a large embroidered collar which it was to be hoped that all beholders would know the price of; her small hands duly set off with rings, and that controlled self-consciousness of manner which is the expensive substitute for simplicity."

If "The Mill on the Floss" is a study in failure, "Middlemarch" is a study in marital selfishness. Mr. Casaubon, an elderly clergyman, rich, studious and retiring, has devoted his life to perfecting a work in which he strives to elucidate the source of all mythologies. Mr. Lydgate, a young doctor, well-born, poor and ambitious, wishes to devote his life to "piercing the obscurity of those minute processes which prepare human misery and joy." Both marry, and both regard their wives as adjuncts to their ambitions; as bits of property to be sacrificed at a moment's notice, should science or litera-

ture demand; as altogether secondary considerations in their schemes of life.

The impression gained from a cursory reading of "Middlemarch" is that Casaubon was worthless and selfish; that Dorothea drew a blank; that Lydgate was a disappointed and cruelly treated man; that Rosamond was blessed beyond her deserts in marrying him; and that she deserves censure for spoiling his career. Yet what are the facts?

Both men marry of their own free will because they believe that they will be happier married to the respective women of their choice than apart from them. Casaubon is rich. He provides Dorothea with a handsome home and allows her to do a little secretarial work for him. He refuses, however, to let her really enter into his work or be of perceptible use to him. Dorothea feels this keenly as she believes his work to be immensely important and has hoped that, in marrying him, she will be fulfilling her ambition of "helping some one who was doing valuable work for the world." Gradually, however, she comes to the conclusion that Casaubon's life ambition is impracticable; and, on his death, she decides, contrary to his express desire, that she will not go on with his work.

Lydgate is poor. He tells Rosamond nothing of his prospects or ambitions when he marries her, being too much occupied with the really important matter of "piercing the obscurity of those minute processes which prepare human misery and joy" to consider whether he can afford to marry or not. Rosamond thinks no more of such things than he does, having been accustomed to unlimited means all her life. After a year or two the crash comes: they are obliged to move into a small house, sell their plate and valuables, and generally retrench.

Rosamond is not very much pleased with all this. It represents "coming down in the world" to "the flower of Mrs. Lemon's school," who cares nothing whatever about "piercing the obscurity of the minute processes," but cares very much

about wearing suitable clothes. Lydgate is much disappointed in her, but tries to control his just resentment and be patient. Naturally the man of science is appalled by the thought that his wife is not willing to sacrifice all that she has been brought up to believe necessary to the possible discovery of the "primitive tissue of the body." He is merely peremptory, not unkind, when insisting that she should do so. He has yet to realize the worst, however. Rosamond, it seems, regards the augmentation of his practice as the thing which he ought to bend his energies to accomplishing, rather than the perfection of the discovery which he has, apparently, not got within hailing distance of. This mundane soul actually resents his sacrificing his practice—and, incidentally, her dinners—to the glorious cause of science. In the end, she actually persuades him to employ his undoubted talents in the ordinary work of a practising physician. He becomes rich, writes a treatise on gout which has a good sale; and dies at fifty, a disappointed and embittered man. His widow marries a wealthy physician, who takes kindly to her four children. She sometimes speaks of her second marriage as a reward—"she did not say for what, but probably she meant that it was a reward for her patience with Tertius."

Earlier in the book we are told that "Lydgate had accepted his narrowed lot with sad resignation. He had chosen this fragile creature and had taken the burden of her life in his arms. He must walk as he could, carrying that burden, pitifully." Now suppose this paragraph written from Rosamond's standpoint: "Rosamond had taken up the burden of the hopeless dreamer and had bravely struggled on, persuading him not to throw away his practice for the sake of a phantom idea, insisting, not ill-temperedly, but firmly, that he should not condemn her and their children to a life of perpetual hard work and poverty."

Which was the selfish person? Is not Rosamond's argument reasonable from the standpoint of the average man and

woman? Is it not forbearing of Rosamond to refrain from recriminations and reproaches when her husband, instead of thanking her for "keeping him up to the mark," calls her his "basil plant?" And is not a readable treatise on the gout a better thing than a book on the "more intimate relations of human structure," which no one would read until Rosamond had sunk into an early grave, worn out with the struggle. No one can afford to heap obloquy on such a character as Rosamond's until he has viewed life from her standpoint. If he does so fairly he will, in all probability, find that it will accord remarkably with his own.

If undue stress has been laid on his matter of marital selfishness it is because Rosamond is generally accepted as the most perfect type of conventional selfishness in literature. I confess to a sympathy with Rosamond. She was somewhat stupid, somewhat commonplace, somewhat lacking in all that makes Dorothea so dear and so desirable. She had no very high ideals, no very worthy ambitions. Still one cannot get away from the idea that she has been hardly treated. She is a very nice ordinary girl, beautiful, accomplished, and good-tempered. She has been educated to marry some average man and to make him happy: it seems a pity that she does not, at once, fulfil her obvious destiny.

Here in "Middlemarch," as elsewhere, George Eliot, limns life exactly as it is; shows us the wrong people mating and proceeding to make each other wretched; whilst, just around the corner, dwells the consort exactly suited to the temperament and aims of each.

Casaubon wants a pretty, intelligent young wife who will admire him, ornament his home, and care for his declining years. He does not really wish for an intellectual companion; and, in fact, is somewhat annoyed when Dorothea perceives his mistakes and inaccuracies. Lydgate, on the other hand, wants some one who will be indifferent to material things, who will enter heart and soul into his ambitions, and aims, and studies, and will be content to spend her life in shielding

him from trouble and annoyance. Rosamond would have made Casaubon perfectly happy: Dorothea would have removed every weight from the life of Lydgate. Therefore Casaubon marries Dorothea and Lydgate marries Rosamond.

Rosamond is interesting as a type; but Dorothea is interesting as a soul. She is far removed from Rosamond. She lives in another world, a world of supernal aims, of aching aspirations, of strenuous endeavours. She is not a firm believer in her own capabilities. She humbly says that "it always seemed to me that the use I should like to make of my own life would be to help some one who did great works that his burden might be lighter." This is not a grasping ambition; yet it was one fated never to be realized.

It almost seems as if some one great deed, some one worthy accomplishment should have been the outcome of so much patient endeavour, so much praiseworthy zeal. Here again, however, George Eliot shows herself the truth-teller, rather than the romanticist. Nothing in particular comes of Dorothea's life; a little kindness here; a little needful help given there—that is all. If, on the one hand, she inspires a rather lazy young man to earn the bread he eats, on the other, she worries, however unintentionally, the excellent old creature whom she insists on marrying. Dorothea does not realize the ambitions of her youth, easy of attainment though they apparently are.

How often do we see a heroic patience and energy serving merely to pamper the self-indulgence and vanity of some relative or friend; while, not a stone's throw away dwell beings to whom this patience and energy could bring untold-of relief! No doubt there were on all sides calls for the sympathy and loving kindness which Dorothea was so ready to bestow: accordingly she marries a rich old man who can well afford to pay some needy secretary for the little work which he requires from her. It was rather a sad use for a young vigorous life, rather a useless sacrifice of so much that was fine and noble.

From Middlemarch to Florence is a long step: from Dorothea to Romola, a longer still. Yet the "Florentine lily" resembles her English sister in more than one respect; the most notable being her breadth of mental outlook. Romola, to many George Eliot devotees, stands for all that is noble in womanhood. Here let us stop and chronicle an interesting fact. All authors show a marked tendency to glorify one physical type, to endow the dark or the fair woman, as the case may be, with all the moral nobilities, all the mental graces. George Eliot, however, is unique in her attitude toward the beauty of woman. Here is Romola, whose hair of a reddish gold colour is frequently referred to. Then Maggie who, one cannot help feeling, has more of George Eliot's soul and mind than any of her other heroines, is black-haired, broad-chested and brown of arm and cheek. Dorothea, on the other hand, has grey eyes and brown hair. And so on throughout all her books. She appears to have no favourite type; and, as one becomes acquainted with each of her characters in turn, one cannot help feeling that any other exterior than that which she has allotted to them would not be in keeping. We cannot imagine Maggie fair or Romola dark. This is worth noting; for the greatest authors and poets almost invariably show a predilection for one especial type.

Romola is a distinct type, standing at the beginning of the book rather for integrity than for charity, rather for justice than for mercy. We leave her with all her original virtues unchanged and with all that is merciful and kind added to her nature. As with most of George Eliot's women her marriage is somewhat disastrous. She marries a soft-eyed, beautiful, weak traitor who, in spite of his awe of her and of what she represents to him, cannot refrain from adding meanness to meanness and treachery to treachery until meanness and treachery find a fitting end.

The most beautiful thing in "Romola" is the development of its heroine's character. She emerges triumphantly

from disgusts and disillusionments that would have cowed a weaker woman and soured a less healthy one; and on Tito's death she performs an act of mercy, almost impossible of belief, taking his children and their silly little peasant mother into her own home and caring for them until the day of her death. Her condemnation of her wretched husband does not blind her to the fact that his poor little inamorata and her black-eyed, soft-voiced offspring must either starve or live in misery unless she comes to the rescue; and she takes them to her great heart, realizing, as only such a woman could, how entirely the blame rests with Melema. In performing this great act of pity and kindness Romola's own bruised life is healed; and in caring for the children of the dead she almost comes in time to forget her own injuries.

The women of "Adam Bede" can hardly be discussed at length; for "Adam Bede" is, to me, a thing of such horror that discussion of it is difficult, if not impossible. There are many tragedies in life; but the tragedies that befall the strong, such as Romola and Maggie Tulliver, are tragedies that one can bear to contemplate, knowing that the strong soul "creates circumstances" and cannot be absolutely vanquished, whatever the odds against it. But there are other tragedies too ghastly to name; cruelties inflicted on helpless animals and children; nameless torments borne in silence by weak and terrified souls. Of such is "Adam Bede." The tragedy of it is almost intolerable; even the vision of that "sweet saint," Dinah Morris, can scarcely mitigate its gloom and despair. Let us leave "Adam Bede," therefore, with the passing remark that George Eliot never conceived a nobler ideal than that of the "Methody preacher," whose yearning compassion and sympathy alone serve to lighten the grim tragedy in which she figures.

FRANCES DE WOLFE FENWICK

ARMOREL

When within the rippling tide
Shakes the silver-pointed moon,
When the rainbow flies of noon
  All have died,
When the bats go wheeling far,
And the mournful owl has cried
Twice or thrice adown the glen
Gray with gathering shade, and when
Gates o' dream are held ajar,
From the alders in the dell,
From the bracken fronds astir,
Elfin voices call to her,—
    "Armorel!"

She shall glide the garden down,
Treading softly, treading slow,
And with silent feet shall go
Past the Mary-lilies white,
Past the pansies gold and brown,
Grown for her delight.
One white moth her guide shall be.
She shall follow where he flies
Patiently, with dreamlit eyes,
Past the thyme and savoury,
Past the mystic asphodel;
For the voices in her ear
Call her softly, call her clear,—
    "Armorel!"

Into valleys strange and dim,
All unseen and all unknown,
Fleetly shall she follow him,
  Fairy-led, alone.
She shall hear within the brake
Elfin crickets pipe and sing,
While the elfin spiders make
Sendal for her furnishing
Red as pimpernel.
She shall see the dreams go by,
Silver-pinioned through the sky.
Where she wanders none may tell;
But the voices come and go,
Calling sweetly, calling low,—
    "Armorel!"

MARJORIE L. C. PICKTHALL

FORESTRY AND THE SCIENCES

THE ESTABLISHMENT of a new Faculty in a University may well excite the curiosity of those who have the educational interests of the University at heart, and court an inquiry into the nature of this young profession.

I do not propose here to increase the number of popular disquisitions on the need of the application of forestry to our timber resources, but will take it for granted that every reader is familiar with the arguments. In discussing, instead, the sciences which underlie the art of forestry, I believe two good purposes will be subserved, in securing on the part of the general reader a clearer understanding of the contents of the art, and, on the part of those from other faculties who are called upon to give instruction in the fundamental subjects, a conception of what is desired of them. Such discussion will also justify the extension of the curriculum in the new Faculty to a four year course.

Forestry is an art which, like agriculture, is concerned in the use of the soil for crop production. Just as the agriculturist is engaged in the production of food crops, so the forester is engaged in the production of wood crops. Finally, both practise their art for the same practical purpose, namely, for revenue. The art is carried on as a business in which naturally the money result is the ultimate aim.

All arts have a scientific basis, are applications of science proper or of parts of various sciences. The knowledge of these may have been acquired either systematically or empirically, and may be possessed in different degrees; but even the commonest arts are based upon more or less systematized knowledge.

The butcher, the surgeon, the sculptor, all rely upon a knowledge of anatomy; although, according to the different object, their knowledge is of a different degree and acquired in a different manner. Similarly, the botanist, the horticulturist, the forester need knowledge of botany, each in a different manner.

Success and improvement in the practice of the technical arts depends finally upon the volume of applicable knowledge of sciences. Volume, however, is a product of area and depth. And as even the specialist possesses depth only in certain parts of his field or his area of knowledge, so the practitioner, though he may have to survey a broad field of science, needs depth only in portions so that his bottom of scientific knowledge may exhibit a rather undulating surface of uneven depths. In other words, the thoroughness with which the different sciences and parts of sciences underlying his art must be known by him is variable according to his necessities in their application.

Yet, as the true artist needs genius to produce a master work, so the practitioner in a technical art needs more than the merely technical contents of the professional branches and parts of sciences, the practical details of which may be learned outside of Universities. He needs judgement and business instinct ; he needs a degree of general education which contributes towards forming breadth and depth of judgement; he needs thorough familiarity with the principles underlying facts, and the capacity for applying knowledge, and inventing new combinations. Hence the most efficient practitioner requires not only more knowledge than the mere modicum of applicable science but also other branches of education, which do not appear in the professional curriculum.

From the dual character of forestry, namely, as a technical art and a business, its fundamental basis is found in two different sets of portions of science. The technical side, to which we give the name of silviculture in the broadest sense or forest crop production, necessarily relies upon natural

sciences, while the business side, which we comprise under the name of forest economy, relies mainly upon mathematics, and political economy, and practical knowledge of industries, markets, and other business concerns.

While in all other branches of production human labour is the most important factor—even in agriculture and horticulture—in forestry the factor of nature plays the most prominent part: the materials and forces of nature are the source of the mighty processes of organic life, which find expression in forest growth; and during the long period of accumulation of annual product in the growing tree, there is but limited chance to interfere and influence the result. Yet some knowledge of natural history can be brought to bear to direct nature's forces into more useful production than its unguided activity would secure for us. Nature, taking no count of space, or time, or the needs of man, must be improved upon to secure economic results.

The field of natural sciences which the forester must survey is quite extensive, but the different parts are of very unlike relative importance, and hence, since he does not study the sciences for their own sake, he must exercise a wise limitation, whereby the depths of his knowledge, as has been intimated, will be very uneven, to be sure, but located in the right places.

This does not exclude occasional expansion and deepening in certain portions beyond the immediate necessities, and such expansion has led foresters usefully to specialize and develop science in the direction most interesting to them. Thus economic entomology and economic and physiological botany, and especially ecology, have experienced considerable advances by foresters who make a specialty of them.

Inherent disposition and exterior conditions combine to produce the results of growth; all measures which the forester employs to secure the largest, most useful, and most valuable crop are based upon the knowledge of these two biological factors, just as in agriculture. Hence, he being engaged in plant production, botany, geology, meteorology,

with physics and chemistry as hand-maidens, and zoology to a degree require attention.

That portion of botany which may be segregated as dendrology, the botany of trees, forms naturally the main basis. In this connexion let me point out that the arborescent vegetation is to some extent *sui generis*. Their persistence through centuries, the long period of life, and their elevation above the rest of vegetation, which exposes them to the seasonal changes and hence subjects them to the climatic factors throughout the whole year, make trees exceptional organisms, and render their life history more varied and of greater interest than that of the annually deciduous plants or those half-woody plants which winter under the protection of the snow.

But to study such segregated portion of the large field of botanical science presupposes a certain amount of general botanical knowledge. In order to know, recognize, and classify his crop materials, the methods of classification, the general anatomy, histology, and physiology must be familiar to the forester. Soon, however, specialization becomes necessary, and his botanical studies must concentrate themselves upon the botany of trees, and this does not mean mere descriptive, systematic dendrology, the mere knowledge of the species, their classification and geographical distribution, but physiological and ecological or biological dendrology, the life history of the tree in the individual and in communities, a very special study, to which few botanists have as yet given much attention.

The knowledge of the species, the plant material, is a necessary equipment, but the knowledge of the laws of tree-growth and of the life-history of the limited number of species at least which have forestal importance is infinitely more necessary. Only a few species comparatively form the basis of forest production in a given region: out of the 500 species of which this continent boasts, hardly more than 100 are of economic significance. The life-history and development of these under varying conditions needs to be known fully; here depth is needed.

It is only within very recent times that botanists have developed systematically in the direction of ecologic studies, in studying the relation of plants and plant communities to their surroundings and to each other, a study which to the forester has been for a century of greatest necessity, and which he has carried on empirically and unsystematically with more or less success. He has discovered and applied his knowledge of the fact that different species are not only more or less adaptive to varying soil conditions but that their requirement for light is variable, and that trees as well as other plants can be divided into groups, according to this relative requirement, into light-needing and shade-enduring ones, and finally this one factor of light influence for the development of the crop has become so prominent, that one could define the art of the silviculturist as the art of managing light conditions in the growing forest so as to secure best results. Nor is the forester satisfied to know the general broad features of the biology of the species, their development from seed to maturity, their requirements regarding soil, and light conditions, and their general relations to surroundings; but, as he is a producer of materials, he is most emphatically interested in the amount of production and the rate at which this production takes place. For, different from the agriculturist's crop, his is not an annual one, but requires many years of accumulation, and as each year's waiting increases the cost of production by tying up the capital invested, it is of importance not only to know the likely progress of the crop but also how its progress may be influenced.

Here is a phase of biological dendrology, the mathematics of accretion, which to most botanists is probably an unknown depth, and as far as our own species are concerned largely an unexplored area even. Foresters almost exclusively have developed this portion of botanical science. The laws of accretion have through many years of measurement, especially by German foresters, been recognized, and form a most fascinating study. As in man's development the infantile, juvenile, adolescent, virile, and senile stages

are recognized, so in tree life these stages appear, and the dependence of tree growth on its environment—" the factors of site "—is even more pronounced and readily recognizable than in the animal which can change its " site."

Besides the more intimate knowledge of trees and tree life, some knowledge of the lower vegetation especially in its ecologic relations is of service. Weeds are enemies to be overcome; but they also are indicators of soil conditions and of light conditions, and hence the study of what the Germans call *Standortsgewächse*—plants indicative of the character of the site—forms a special branch. Again, fungi are destructive to the young crop and others deteriorate the old crop, calling for knowledge not merely of their names, but of the conditions which favour their development and the means of preventing it. It will be observed, then, that botanical studies form a prominent part through three years of the curriculum.

As must have become apparent from the reference to the rate of growth as influenced by the factors of site, the knowledge of these factors, soil and climate, general and local, and their relation to plant life is indispensable. The study of geology and meteorology as far as they explain this relationship, as far as they teach the chemico-physical basis for wood production, and form a criterion for the adaptation of species to various conditions is required.

The Germans have segregated the portions of these sciences which contribute towards an understanding of these relationships as a special branch called "*Standortslehre*," or a "knowledge of site" (soil and climate).

Especially the subject of soil physics, only lately developed into a science, furnishes much useful information to the forest grower. It is now a well substantiated fact that wood growth is much less dependent on the mineral constituents of the soil than other vegetable growth, and especially the agricultural food and fruit crops; that trees live and thrive literally on air, and from the soil derive mainly the necessary water; hence the physical conditions of the soil which in-

fluence the water conditions are of much more moment than the chemical composition; hence also manures are not required, and conservation of favourable water conditions is the main concern of the forest grower.

Since limitation is wisdom, it is wise to confine the geological and mineralogical studies to such small portions as are necessary for a general understanding of how and what soils are formed from different rocks, and secure depth of knowledge only regarding soil physics. A more elaborate introduction to the geological history and dynamic geology may be of general educational interest, but it is not required by the practitioner who is concerned only with what has relation to tree life.

There is one other branch of natural sciences which has concern with tree life, namely, zoology. Animals feed on plants, hence become enemies to the forester's business. Especially does he find a limited number of insects which can become troublesome and call for protective measures. He should know them and their life history as well as that of his friends who help him to keep down the pests. Forest entomology, the knowledge of the insects preying on forest growth and the means of combating them, is, therefore, a well developed branch of general entomology. Nevertheless a mere modicum of knowledge will suffice, by no means comparable with the requirement in the branches mentioned before.

Since, however, forests are the harbourers of game and forest waters of fishes, a knowledge of game and fish and their life habits may become not only of natural interest but of practical utility and hence claim some attention.

Finally, it may be proper to point out that the aim in the study of natural history by the forester should be to secure a general intelligence of nature in its relationship rather than a mere agglomerated knowledge of unrelated facts and forms.

Now, turning to the other side of forestry, namely, the business side, there are two branches which contribute towards building up the subject of forest economy or " forest regula-

tion," namely, mathematics and political economy. There is needed a certain amount of mathematical instinct, if not elaborate knowledge, to understand the relationships of the laws of accretion.

To measure the quantity of production, which must form the basis of business calculations, a more elaborate use of, and familiarity with, mathematical operations is necessary: forest mensuration has, therefore, developed into a special branch of mathematics, and many methods have been developed by which not only the volume of the single tree, but the volume and rate of growth of whole stands or acres of trees can be more or less accurately determined.

One of the most important mathematical problems for the forester to settle is, when his crop is ripe. This is not as with agricultural crops and fruits determined by a natural period, but by the judgement of the harvester based upon mathematical calculations. There are various principles which may be followed in determining the maturity of a stand or in determining what is technically called the notation, that is, the time within which a forest managed as a unit shall be cut over and reproduced. Either the largest average volume production, or the largest average value production, the largest " forest rent," or the largest " soil rent," may be the aim.

In either case complicated measurement and calculations are required to form the basis. If we follow the principle of highest volume production it is only necessary that actual volumes produced in different periods of time be known, in order to choose that time when volume divided by years of its production be at its maximum, that is, when the average annual accretion culminates, and this we know occurs by an interesting mathematical law when it has become equal to the current accretion. If we express these relations in percentage, we find the interesting formula for the current accretion per cent. $\frac{400}{nd}$, in which d is the average diameter of a representative number of trees, and n the number of annual rings for one inch which these trees have formed on the

average during the period of growth just finished. We have also the remarkable mathematical discovery that average accretion per cent. culminates when it is equal to $\frac{100}{a}$, in which a is the age of the stand. And as this culmination occurs when it is equal to the current accretion, we have the equation $\frac{400}{nd} = \frac{100}{a}$, from which we determine a, the age of maximum forest production $= \frac{nd}{4}$.

If maximum value production is looked for, matters become more complicated, for with change in the size of logs, which make up the volume, their value changes because more useful material can be cut from them, the percentage of waste being reduced.

Finally, if we begin to calculate on the capital of soil and standing timber, which is involved in accumulating volume and in the production of values, and try to secure an adequate interest return—compounding, of course, since neither these capitals, especially the wood capital, nor the wood interest can be withdrawn until the long distant harvest time—we come into forest finance calculation, a mathematical branch which has been more highly developed than such calculations in any other business excepting perhaps life insurance with formulas which are unfamiliar to the average mathematician.

The long time element in forestry is unique and involves most elaborate planning and calculation in order to enable the forest grower to carry on a continuous "sustained yield" management profitably.

With the discussion of what an adequate rate of interest is, with which to charge this business with its long time production, we come upon the field of national economy as one of the fundamental sciences for forestry.

Moreover, the aims and objects of forest management are to a large extent of national economic character. The claimed influence of forests on climate and water flow seems to impose upon State governments the duty to supervise, regulate, or undertake the management of forest areas; and, since other considerations of State besides the cultural interests of forest areas, involved in the peculiarities of the forestry business,

indicate that State management of forest areas will eventually become universal, it is desirable, if not essential, for the practice of technical forestry, that the fully educated forester should have clear conceptions of the principles underlying such duties of the State. Not only are, therefore, those branches of economics which concern themselves with the development of business principles to be thoroughly mastered, but a knowledge of the functions of the State, of state politics, are to the forester even more needful than to the generally educated man, for his business is in closer relation to the State.

In addition to the fundamental sciences, forestry must borrow from other arts and professions. The manager of an isolated property must have varied knowledge—accessories to his art. He must have enough familiarity with the principles of business law to avoid pitfalls; he may have to be his own architect, surveyor, and engineer. There is especially a considerable amount of engineering knowledge needed by him in providing methods and means of economic harvesting and transportation of his bulky crop.

The forester is really in the same business as the logger or lumberman, namely, to supply wood materials to the community with only the added obligation of continuing in the business after the first harvest. He must, therefore, be a competent logger, and all the engineering knowledge of the logger and somewhat more is his need. Forest surveys, especially, will for a time be the occupation of the first foresters, and hence surveying is an essential accessory, including road building, locating of railways, and cruder engineering works.

So many portions of science have to be segregated and combined towards the one end which the forester seeks to accomplish, and so much has he added to it, that perhaps he may be entitled to dignify that organized sum of human knowledge which is taught in the purely forestal courses of a professional forestry school as the Science of Forestry, and thus justify the claim of this youngest accession to the University of Toronto as a science in itself.

B. E. Fernow

THE CIVIL SERVANT

UNTIL Confederation the Civil Service of Canada was more or less disorganized. With the bringing together of the four Provinces which comprised the union of 1867, and the establishment of the seat of Government at Ottawa, the need for something like a systematic treatment of public employés was felt. This need was met by the Civil Service Act of 1868, which was, perhaps unavoidably, a crude and tentative measure. It served the purpose, however, of affording a basis for the classification of Civil Servants and the regulation of their salaries for the time being, and fourteen years later the Civil Service Act of 1882 took its place. This was an elaborate and comprehensive enactment, founded to a large extent on Imperial practice—for, anomalous as it may appear, there is nothing in the nature of a Civil Service Act in England—and aimed to place the public service on a permanent and thoroughly organized footing. From time to time it has been amended; but never radically, and to-day it is in all essential respects the same as it was a quarter of a century ago.

Under the Act of 1882 a pyramidal system was adopted in the gradation of Civil Servants. At the bottom were the third class clerks, above them those of the second class, next the first class clerks, then the chief clerks, and at the apex the Deputy Minister. These made up the permanent staff of the Inside Service. Over all was the Minister, the political head, whose tenure might be uncertain but whose authority was paramount. Although the Act itself did not so direct in specific terms, in the fitting of it to the Service a so-called "theoretical organization" of Departments was adopted, under which a more or less definite ratio was observed in the numerical relationship of the several classes. Beginning

at the top, it was assumed that the order would approximately be: one chief clerk, two first class clerks, four second class clerks and eight third class clerks. In practice, however, the number of third class clerks was not limited—out of which fact has grown one of the most serious difficulties at present calling for adjustment. While the lower stratum of this administrative pyramid has been widened and deepened, the upper courses have been maintained so as not seriously to disturb the original geometrical form.

Twenty-five years of experience has demonstrated the practical defects of this plan. The third class clerk, beginning at $400 per annum, was given a yearly increase of $50 until he reached $1000, which was the fixed maximum of his class. There he remained, subject to two conditions—the passing of the prescribed promotion examination, and a vacancy in the next class above. Having reached the second class he could, by steps of $50 annually, pass up to $1400, when he again encountered the obstacles which met him at the top of the third class. To reach the maximum of the second class, it will be seen that he would have consumed twenty years of time in the journey; so that, if he began at twenty, he would then be forty years of age. From the second to the maximum of the first class, at which point he would be entitled to a salary of $1800, another eight years would be taken up. Ten years later, or at the age of fifty-eight, he might be in receipt of $2300. But he would, in the very nature of things, not enjoy an uninterrupted progress. At one or more of the promotion stages he would find the class above complete in the sense of the theoretical organization. In some of the Departments this would be inevitable. As an illustration, the Post Office Department has 103 third class clerks, 129 junior second class clerks, 42 senior second class clerks, 19 first class clerks and 10 chief clerks. In this instance, nothing short of the chief clerks being stricken by paralysis every three or four years could create any hope for the scores who are submerged in the lower classes. As a matter of fact there are in the public service at Ottawa a very large number

of capable men who are being held down to small salaries and subordinate rank by the restrictions just referred to.

Perhaps the chief element of novelty in the Civil Service Act of 1882 was the provision with respect to entrance examinations. It was enacted that each candidate, unless he were a University graduate, should pass an examination prescribed by a Board—the preliminary, if he wished to take rank as a messenger or a porter, and the qualifying, if he desired a clerkship. These examinations were not made competitive, nor have they ever been severe. In standard they are below the matriculation test of our Universities, and in character are academic rather than practical. Nevertheless, they have probably served a useful winnowing purpose, and it has not been suggested in any quarter that they should be modified, much less abolished. Having passed the preliminary or qualifying examination, the candidate is now eligible for appointment. The Minister at the head of any Department alone can give him this, and there the only political consideration with respect to the Civil Service arises.

It is perhaps fitting, indeed it cannot be avoided, that this political aspect should be clearly and candidly presented. The would-be entrant must look to the Minister for his appointment, and in the exercise of this prerogative he could not be expected to prefer an opponent to a friend. Such favours form an important part of the patronage which is inseparable from party government. Until the Civil Service of Canada is placed wholly in the hands of an independent and enlightened Commission—if such a group of men could be found—the partisan factor cannot be eliminated. Unless the right men could be had—fearless, capable and just—control by Commission, having regard to existing conditions in the Dominion, would, in my judgement, not be free from drawbacks. The fundamental objection which will always be urged against the prevailing system of making appointments is that, as between two candidates, the inferior in fitness may be chosen. Once, however, that stage has been passed all political considerations disappear. The novitiate must

thenceforward paddle his own canoe, and in a stream where the order of starting represents a tremendous advantage, owing to the rule with respect to seniority.

At this juncture a few personal observations may be pardoned. One hears and reads a great deal about "political pull" in the Civil Service. No credence should be attached thereto. It was my privilege for nearly a score of years to serve as private secretary to Ministers of the Crown at Ottawa, under the late Conservative and the present Liberal Administration. In that capacity I was often behind the scenes, and I say in all sincerity and frankness that I never knew of an instance in which the political sympathies of a Civil Servant counted either for or against him. My experience applied to six Ministers at the head of Departments, three connected with the Conservative *régime* and three with the present Liberal Government, and at all times there was a disposition to recognize capacity rather than partisan claims. Whatever may be said with respect to appointments—and a heavy discount should be placed on campaign comment—it remains absolutely true that the Civil Service at Ottawa is free from the reproach of partisanship, either on the part of Civil Servants themselves or of those who are at the head of affairs.

An anomalous situation has been created by the rapid expansion of the Dominion during the past twenty years. At the present time there are about 2,800 Government employés at Ottawa. Of these 600 are workingmen, of one sort or another, almost wholly attached to the Public Works Department. They are not regarded as Civil Servants in the strict meaning of the term. Of the remaining 2,200 only half appear in the official Civil Service List. The others are "temporaries." They work side by side with the "permanents;" but they are not eligible for annual increases of salary beyond a certain limit, nor do they come within the privileges of the Civil Service Act with respect to sick leave, superannuation, insurance, promotion and so on. They are not even accorded uniform treatment. In the Public Works Department, for example, they are subject to a schedule which is unique. In

the Post Office Department they are not allowed either holidays or the limited sick leave recognized in other Departments. There is neither a definite minimum nor maximum rate of compensation applicable to all Departments. They are not " temporaries " at all, in the sense that their tenure is to meet a passing emergency. They form a fixed and indispensable part of the staff. These conditions call urgently for regulation.

In this relation the status of young women in the Civil Service arises. Twenty-two years ago there was less than a score of female clerks in all the Departments. To-day there are seven hundred, of whom a vast majority take rank in the temporary class just alluded to. They have come to stay. There are cogent reasons why they should not be placed on precisely the same footing as men; but the presence of such an army of women in the Service suggests the need for something better than the present system. They have amply demonstrated their usefulness; they are not overpaid; they might at least be given a separate class, having a liberal maximum, and be brought within the scope of the privileges open to male Civil Servants on the permanent list.

What attractions does the Civil Service present as a career? If this question were asked in Ottawa it would probably be answered: None; but that would not dispose of the matter. Something is to be said in favour of the positive aspect. In the first place, it seems assured that improved conditions as to salaries, classification, promotion, and superannuation will be brought about as the result of the investigations of the Royal Commission, which have been in progress since June, 1907. This will remove some of the objections which now exist. Perhaps the two strongest inducements held out by the Government service are the certainty of a fair income and some provision for old age. We are happily free in Canada from the spoils system. The better classes of work are often interesting, and afford scope for literary and administrative capacity. In the service at Ottawa are many men of conspicuous ability, thoroughly

educated, refined and fitted for large responsibilities. While there is a growing disposition to recognize them by a liberal interpretation of the Civil Service Act, it is nevertheless true that many intelligent young men are not receiving half the salaries paid for corresponding capabilities in professional and commercial walks of life. The proportion such men bear to the whole number of Civil Servants is steadily growing, and the signs for the future are all encouraging. It was made possible by Parliamentary enactment a few years ago to give a junior second class clerkship to an entrant, and the maximum of a chief clerkship was at the same time raised to $2,800.

On the other hand, the rigidity of the present system, the block to progress which may be created by incompetents who have only seniority on their side, and the routine character of much of the work during the primary years of service stand as disadvantages. There are other objections; but I think it may be assumed these will be removed on the recommendation of the Commission previously alluded to. Among them is the low scale of salaries. For the first time since 1867, Civil Servants at Ottawa came together in May last, for the consideration of their common interests. To the Royal Commission they have presented a memorial which must be influential because of its moderation, dignified tone and forceful arguments in favour of reform. The claim for a better scale of remuneration is based on altered economic conditions since 1882. It is incontrovertible that, since 1896 in particular, the cost of living has advanced over forty per cent, and that the reduced purchasing power of a dollar thus created falls with special severity on the salaried classes.

The Civil Servant unquestionably occupies a unique position. He practically gives up his life to the service of his country. While those who are employed in commercial and other fields have unlimited possibilities before them, the Civil Servant has absolutely nothing but his salary to look forward to. That is to say, while the dry-goods clerk, for example, may be a merchant to-morrow, the public employé can never get beyond certain fixed limitations. His very work

unfits him for other employment. He cannot take his credentials and go to other governments in search of better conditions. He is a prisoner, unless he resolves to face the world afresh. By no system of economies can he grow rich. He gives a useful and indispensable service to a Government whose transactions approximate $100,000,000 a year, and in return it may fairly be asked that his life be at least freed from the pinch and circumscriptions entailed by his lot under the Civil Service Act of 1882.

In conclusion, I venture to point out that the reforms needed in the Civil Service to-day are:—

1. Greater elasticity in respect of promotions, whereby a merited premium would be placed on special skill and industry, and a discount on incompetence and indolence.

2. The absolute removal of classification obstacles to regular salary increases to worthy and zealous clerks.

3. The correction of the anomalous situation created by the presence of a great body of so-called "temporary clerks."

4. Satisfactory regulations with respect to female clerks.

5. A higher status for Deputy Ministers and the creation of a liberal range of offices above the rank of a Chief Clerkship to which men of marked ability and usefulness may properly aspire.

6. A scale of salaries commensurate with the economic conditions which have grown up since 1882.

7. A comprehensive superannuation system, rather than the existing Retirement Fund, under which an adequate annuity will be given to the Civil Servant in old age, or provision be made for his dependents in the event of his death.

8. Broadly, changes which will make the Civil Service more attractive as a career to men of special capacity.

J. L. Payne

LIBERAL THEOLOGY

LIBERAL theologians are subjected, from time to time, to severe criticism from the side of both orthodoxy and agnosticism. To the conservative theologian with his hard grip on the "traditions of the elders," whether Catholic or Calvinistic, liberal theology appears destructive and dishonest. To the agnostic it presents itself as a feeble compromise with rationalism, a compromise which must inevitably be swept away by the rising tide of science and historical criticism.

The object of this article is to endeavour to set forth, as the writer understands it, the position of liberal theology, and in doing so to shew that liberal theologians have a reason for the faith that is in them, and merit neither the distrust of the traditionalist nor the contempt of the agnostic.

Liberal theology in its modern form owes its origin to the results of modern science and modern criticism. Modern science has rendered the old ideas of creation and the Divine relation to the material world impossible. Modern historical criticism presents to us a view of the composition of the various books of the Bible which is incompatible with the popular views of the mode of revelation. Liberal theologians, accepting in a general way the broad results of modern science and of historical criticism, cannot avoid the further conclusion that theology needs restatement in terms more congruous with modern thought. When it is urged that concession to modern thought is weakness, we reply that change is a mark of life rather than of death, and that as a matter of historical fact the theology of Christianity has undergone continuous change under the influence of changing environment from the time of St. Paul to the present day.

Liberal theologians since Charles Kingsley's time, who, if I remember rightly, called Darwin his "dear and honoured master," have accepted the scientific idea of evolution and have sought to interpret Christianity in its light. Only it is to be remembered that the application of theories of development to religion antedates the publication of Darwin's works. Hegel's "Philosophy of Religion" and Newman's "Doctrine of Development" are older than Darwin's "Origin of Species."

Liberal theology starts with the conviction that man is a religious creature, and assumes that religion is an essential constituent of the normal human nature. This is an assumption that may be called in question. It may be contended—as for example by Comte—that religion is only a temporary phenomenon of human history. But our reply is that it is not unscientific to assume that religion is a permanent element in human nature, because such an assumption is based on a vast collection of facts regarding religion at all periods of the world's history.

Liberal theology does not conceive of religion as something foreign to human nature and added to it by some external revelation, or as imposed upon mankind by subtle priestcraft; but it thinks of it as having its seat in human nature itself. This is what it understands by the old saying that man was made in the image of God. That there is a real community of nature between God and man is the only way in which liberal theology can account for the fact of religion. Auguste Sabatier thus puts it: "Why am I religious? Because I cannot help it: it is a moral necessity of my being. They tell me it is a matter of heredity, of education, of temperament. I have often said so myself. But that explanation simply puts the problem further back; it does not solve it. . . Religion is inherent in man and could only be torn from his heart by separating man from himself, if I may so say, and by destroying that which constitutes humanity in him. I am religious, I repeat, because I am a man, and neither have the wish nor the power to separate myself from my kind."

Liberal theologians, therefore, look with sympathy upon all manifestations of the religious spirit. They cannot with the older theologians divide all religions into the two categories of true and false. Every religion possesses some elements of truth, and a good Buddhist is better than a bad Christian. Religions other than the Christian are not forthwith to be denounced but to be studied—hence the origin and growth of the science of Comparative Religion, which is destined to have far-reaching effects upon the mutual relations of all living faiths. In this position there is nothing foreign to the spirit of Christ, who repeatedly drew attention to the superior faith of Romans, Heathen, and Samaritans to the formalism of His own people.

Religion, then, is rooted in human nature. It has manifested itself in innumerable forms, and therefore it has a history. The history of religion is the history of the development of an innate power or possession of man. It is at this point that liberal theology makes use of the conception of evolution. Religions have been classified by many writers, but the greatest modern masters of the subject, such as the late Professor Tiele of Holland, and Dr. E. Caird, are agreed that religion is subject to laws of evolution, even though those laws may not as yet be perfectly understood. Thus in his Gifford Lectures Tiele says: "What do we mean when we speak of development? Development is growth. From the green bud bursts forth the flower as from its sheath, and reveals the wealth and brilliance of its colours. From the tiny acorn springs up the mighty oak in all its majesty. The man in the prime of his strength, the woman in the summer of her beauty, have once been helpless children, and we know that their growth began even before their birth. These are instances of what we call development. But the term is not applied to physical life alone. We use it also in speaking of mental endowments, of artistic skill, of individual character, and generally of civilization, art, science, and humanity. We therefore think that in view of what the anthropological-historical investigation of re-

ligion has brought to light, we are fully entitled to apply the term to religion also."

Liberal theology admits the necessity for the purpose of study of placing Christianity beside and along with other faiths as one of the religions of the world. And yet the Christian theologian, whether liberal or traditional, cannot deny that Christianity from the very first presented itself as in some sense the Absolute or Universal religion. From the beginning Christ was presented as the Light and Saviour of the world.

Can the liberal theologian then, having abandoned the old classification of religions as true and false, and having admitted the principle of development, continue to present Christianity as the Absolute Religion? In his restatement of theology will Christ still appear as the Light and Saviour of the world? The unprejudiced results of the studies of Dr. Caird and Professor Tiele justify an affirmative answer to this question. In his lectures on the Evolution of Religion, Dr. Caird divides the higher faiths of the world into objective and subjective religions. But he shows most interestingly how Christianity combines the distinctive features of both the objective and the subjective religions. It is the higher unity which includes the antinomies of objective and subjective faith, and is therefore the final and absolute form of religion.

Professor Tiele's statement of a similar position is so interesting and valuable that I may be pardoned for stating it at some length and mostly in his own words. He divides the higher religions into two classes, one of which he calls the theanthropic and the other the theocratic religions. The first lays stress upon the divine in man. It is worth noting how this is related to the fundamental doctrine of the so-called "New Theology," *viz.* Divine Immanence. The other class of religions lays stress upon the supremacy of the Divine over the world of both man and nature. The Aryan religions were theanthropic. They call their gods by the name of Father and Mother. In the Rig-Veda, the oldest

religious document of the Aryan family, some ten of the highest gods are thus called. The Greeks called Zeus the Father of gods and men. In the theanthropic religions it is the intimate relation between God and man that comes into the foreground. Creation is conceived of as an emanation; the whole world of phenomena emanates from the Deity Himself, and "in an endless rise and fall of worlds is exhaled and inhaled by Him."

In the theocratic religions, of which the religion of the Old Testament is the best example, things are very differently represented. God is throned above the world of nature and men in awful majesty. When He would create,

> "He speaks, and it is done;
> He commands, and it stands fast."

The names of the Gods in the Semitic group of religions, Hebrew, Canaanite, Syrian, Arabian, express kingship or strength. "El," the Hebrew name of God, indicates strength or supremacy. Baal means Lord. Malik means King. The worshipper describes himself as a slave, or at most a favourite. For man to see God would be to die. "Woe is me," cried the youthful Isaiah, "for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts." To theocratic religions the idea that God can become man is abhorrent. In theanthropic religions the idea of incarnation is familiar. "In the theanthropic religions which are wholly swayed by the conception of the theanthropos, the god-man, this incarnation is the goal towards which they strive with all their might." In later times when external influences were brought to bear upon the Jews, some theanthropic elements were mingled with the theocratic doctrines of pre-captivity Hebraism.

Now in Christianity these two streams of religious development, the theocratic and the theanthropic, unite. "While Buddhism has reached the extreme limit in the theanthropic direction, and all the divine unites in the illuminated, but soon again to degenerate into a complex

mythology and abject superstition; and while Islam in its almost fatalistic monotheism represents the extremest theocracy, Christianity unites the two opposite doctrines of transcendency and immanency by its ethical conception of the Fatherhood of God, which embraces both the exaltation of God above man, and man's relationship to God. Christianity is the most many sided of all religions and families of religion, and it thus possesses an adaptability, or elasticity as it has been called, which explains its great wealth and variety of forms. In more than one respect, and more than any other creed, it is the religion of reconciliation; and in this sense also that it combines those apparently irreconcilable elements of religious life which are separately represented and simply developed in other religions and in other periods of greater or less duration. . . . . From the purely scientific and impartial point of view, and as the result of historic and philosophic investigation, I maintain that the appearance of Christianity inaugurated an entirely new epoch in the development of religion; that all the streams of the religious life of man, once separate, unite in it, and that religious development will henceforth consist in an ever higher realization of the principles of that religion."

Evolution, properly understood, does not imply the necessity of continuous and unending development in one line. No law of evolution compels us to suppose that greater sculptors than those of ancient Greece, or that greater dramatists than Shakespeare will arise. There are in the development of animals and men what may be called terminal buds. There is no necessity therefore to suppose that any greater or more fertile founder of a religion will arise than Jesus. There is nothing in any principles of evolution that forbids us to subscribe to St. John's declaration, that "He was the true Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world," or that compels us to deny that His glory "was as the glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." The Saviour was as it were the terminal bud of the long religious development of the Hebrew people. The

tree of religion at this point branches. A new line of development begins—the development of the Christian religion itself. And this consideration introduces us to the important question of the attitude of liberal theology to dogma.

Preaching on an important occasion, a dignitary of the Anglican communion compared the Christian faith to an iron casting. There was a mould, and into it the gospel had been poured like molten iron, and shaped "once for all," clearly outlined, firmly articulated, every dogma of an intricate system precisely expressed. No doubt there is something attractive to a certain class of mind, not perhaps of the highest or strongest kind, in this presentation. In an age such as this, when men tremble at their own thoughts, there are sure to be many people who feel the need of such positive assertion. It has, however, this drawback for thoughtful people, that it does not accord with the truth. Even a superficial acquaintance with the history of our creeds is sufficient to shew this. The figure of the mould and the fluid metal bears no kind of similitude to the actual process by which these creeds were formed.

Christian doctrine, far from being a cast-iron system, is a continuous growth. This fact does not involve contempt for the old creeds and systems. The twentieth century evolutionist will regard creeds with a far more sympathetic consideration than the eighteenth century rationalist. Creeds indicate the continuous life and energy of the Christian faith, as it expresses itself in varying forms from age to age. The old creeds are like the trunk of a tree, composed as it is of successive annual layers of wood. The theological thinking of to-day is like the present crop of leaves and blossoms, to be in its turn succeeded by others, yet all the product of the same tree. The history of Christian doctrine is the record of the endeavours of many generations to give theological expression to the Christian religion. The exact form assumed by Christian dogmas at any given time is largely due to the intellectual environment of the period. The late Dr. Hatch

and Professor Harnack have familiarized students of church history with this fact. For example, the form taken by the Christian creed in the first formative period of Christian doctrine was largely due to the fact that it was moulded by men of the Greek mind and education. In like manner theologians recognized the fact that the great contribution made by the Apostle Paul to Christian theology owes much of its form to the Rabbinical training of the Apostle.

It is obvious that the " cast-iron " theory of the Christian creed utterly breaks down in the light of the facts. Christian theology to-day is reshaping itself under the influence of its modern environment of science and criticism. The process is actually under way in every communion, and the protest of some Ontario bishops against a scientific statement in an Ontario school text book was as futile as the sounding brass and clanging cymbals of Dr. Torrey, when he summons all the world to see him demolish the Higher Criticism. The Ontario text book is not changed and the Higher Criticism remains undisturbed.

Liberal theologians, then, distinguish between the essence and the form of the Christian faith. Every one would, I suppose, admit that there is some element of adoration common to the Roman Catholic, prostrate before the altar, and the Hornerite with his groans and shouts. Yet how vastly different are the forms under which they apprehend the same eternal God! I once heard an eloquent preacher use the following striking metaphor in illustration of this point. The light, he said, coming through a stained glass window is truly light, but it falls upon the floor as red, or blue, or yellow, according to the colour of the medium through which it passes. Just so with Christian doctrine: it is never complete, never perfect, it comes through minds of various capacities, the medium is coloured, but on the whole it finds in every age such expression as is suited to its environment.

Liberal theologians, therefore, do not despise or assail dogma *per se*. Dogma (meaning thereby, logically deter-

mined doctrine) we must and always shall have. But what we protest against is the imposition of any set of dogmas as a final complete and finished statement of the Christian faith. It is further contended that dogma will come—I might say, has come—to hold a less important place in the Christian church than heretofore, and that a man will be judged by the church and society to which he belongs less by the formulæ to which he assents than by the spirit and motive of his life.

The liberal theologian does not wage war against any of the great historic terms of Christian doctrine, although here too he holds that the forms in which they have been stated in the past are not adequate to express modern modes of apprehending them. Trinity, incarnation, redemption, justification, church, eternal life—these by the very fact of their passing through so many centuries of continuous development commend themselves as words that stand for realities. He believes not only that they will survive the tests of modern thought, but that they will come forth from the melting pot of science and criticism simpler and stronger than ever. Having this faith in him he can regard with some measure of equanimity the charges of disloyalty that are so energetically hurled at his head. He knows that in every age it has been so. The pioneers of new thoughts and of new movements have always been condemned because they are always misunderstood. If the prophets of one generation are stoned, the next generation erects monuments to their memory. It is a striking illustration of this fact that Aberdeen University, from which in 1881 its most distinguished scholar had been thrust out, erected a stained glass window in memory of him a few years later.

By the necessities of the case, liberal theologians have been largely on the defensive in by-gone years. It would appear that those necessities are passing away. Men are beginning to understand and to appreciate their position. They are at least beginning to be recognized as men with a distinctively Christian message for their age. Their message is

principally for those who have read and thought upon some of the many problems suggested by the extraordinary progress of knowledge. They are perhaps more numerous than most of us realize. To adopt a rigorous attitude towards them, as the Church of Rome has done, is to divide the country into the camps of the traditionalist and the atheist as in France, often with the injurious consequence that the best man is found in the atheist's camp.

I am convinced that it will not be so in Canada, but that the liberal theologian will be acknowledged not indeed as the only possible type of a Christian, but as one of many types, each in its own way accomplishing its regenerating work amongst men. His task is, negatively, to prevent Christianity—the broad generous Christianity of Christ—from degenerating into sectarian bigotry, or Pharisaic traditionalism; and, positively, to present in liberal terms the elevating conviction that the whole universe is dominated and penetrated by a Divine meaning, whose "supreme moral and spiritual expression is seen in the historic personality of Jesus, who draws all men into communion with Him through the inspiration of His Spirit."

H. SYMONDS