CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE — WORKING PAPERS (WP)

1962-1984

WP

COMPILED BY:

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OTTAWA, CANADA

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PREFACE

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT - 1985 SESSION

This book is the result of a survey of the working papers submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and its predecessors from 1962 to 1984, relating to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It has been compiled to facilitate research on the issue of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and is a compendium of the more significant material made available to the CD.

INDEX

WORKING PAPERS

THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (ENDC)

1962

REFERENCE	NATION	REFERENCE	DATE
ENDC/17	Canada	Statement by the Hon. Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, March 27/62	28.03.62

1963

ENDC/98	Mexico	Working paper on an outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons	21.06.63
ENDC/100	USSR/United Kingdom/USA	Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater	30.07.63

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)

1973

CCD/394	Mexico	Letter dated 20 February 1973 from the leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary General to the CCD (transmitting UNGA A/C.1/1026 containing the text of a treaty between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems	20.02.73

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

1979

CD/9	Italy	Additional protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space	26.03.79

1982

CD/272	Mongolia	Working paper on "The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	05.04.82
CD/274	USSR	Letter dated 6 April 1982 from the Representative of the USSR addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space submitted to the 36th session of the General Assembly	07.04.82
CD/320 and Corrigendum	Canada	Arms Control and Outer Space	26.08.82
CD/322	USSR	Message of greetings from L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Second UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space	01.09.82

CD/329	Group of 21	Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Working Group on Item 7 of the Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	13.09.82
		1983	
CD/375	France	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	14.04.83
CD/410	Mongolia	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	09.08.83
CD/413	Group of Western States	Draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Working Group on Item 7 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	17.08.83
CD/418	Group of 21	Statement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space	23.08.83
CD/420	USSR	Letter dated 23 August 1983 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting an excerpt from the TASS Communiqué concerning the meeting of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr./Y.V. Andropov, with a group of American Senators	23.08.83
	CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD		
		1984	
CD/427	USSR	Letter dated 30 January 1984 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the replies given by Y.V.	31.01.84

		Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions from the newspaper PRAVDA, published on 25 January 1984	
CD/434	Group of Socialist States	Organizational Matters of the Work of the Conference on Disarmament: Memorandum of a group of socialist States	17.02.84
CD/329 Rev. 1	Group of 21	Draft Mandate for an Ad Hoc [Subsidiary body] on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".	29.2.84
CD/476	USSR	Letter dated 20 March 1984 addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, transmitting the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth	20.03.84
CD/497	USSR	Letter dated 11 April 1984 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the answers of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K.U. Chernenko, to questions of the newspaper PRAVDA	11.04.84

CD/501	Hungary	Letter dated 25 April 1984 from the Head of the Hungarian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984	26.04.84
CD/510	USSR	Letter dated 16 June 1984 from the Representative of the USSR addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the answers by Mr. K.U. Chernenko, General-Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions by a United States journalist, Mr. J. Kingsbury-Smith	18.06.84
CD/513	Group of 21	Statement of the Group of 21	29.06.84
CD/329 Rev. 2	Group of 21	Draft Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race In Outer Space"	20.07.84
CD/527	Group of Western States	Draft Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	30.07.84
CD/529*	Group of Socialist States	Draft Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament	02.08.84

CD/501	Working paper dated 23 April 1984	26.04.84
	Proposal for a Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Space"	17.02.84
CD/510	Working paper dated 16 June 1984 from the Representative of the USSR addressed to the Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament concerning the statement of the answer by Mr. K.U. Chernenko, General-Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to questions by a correspondent of Pravda, "Concerning the Kingsbury-Smith Proposal"	18.06.84
	Proposal for a Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	29.2.84
CD/513	Statement of the Group of Socialist Countries	28.06.84
CD/329 Rev. 2	Proposal for a Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	20.07.84
	Proposal for a Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	11.04.84
CD/527	Proposal for a Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"	20.07.84
CD/529	Proposal for a Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament	02.08.84

1962

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Private

ENDC/17
28 March 1962

Original: ENGLISH

CANADA

Statement by the Honourable Howard Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, in the 18-Member Disarmament Conference, Geneva, March 27, 1962*

In my statement of March 19 I referred to seven areas in which there are elements common to both the United States and Soviet disarmament proposals. I suggested that this Conference should try to achieve early agreement on concrete measures in these fields.

Certain of the seven points which I mentioned, such as nuclear vehicles and conventional armaments, should properly be dealt with in the context of general disarmament. However, measures such as those dealing with outer space and surprise attack should be dealt with in the special committee which has been set up to discuss collateral or initial measures.

Several initial or collateral measures have been referred to by representatives around this table. In the opinion of my delegation it would be useful to begin with the question of outer space. I suggest this area as a point of departure for two reasons. First, all governments are agreed that it is of overriding importance to ensure that the rapid development of science in this field will not be used for destructive purposes. Second, there are clear provisions common to both the United States and Soviet plans which should enable us to reach agreement on a measure which would help to achieve this goal.

In Article 14 of the Soviet draft treaty it is provided that the orbiting or stationing in outer space of special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited. The United States plan contains similar proposals in Section E of Stage 1. In the same section of the United States plan, provision is also made for advance notification of launchings of space vehicles and missiles. The USSR draft treaty contains an almost identical proposal in Article 14. My delegation considers that it would be of great significance to give formal recognition to the large measure of agreement which already exists on these two points in the United States and Soviet disarmament plans.

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* Circulated as an official document of the Conference at the request of the Delegation of Canada.

In our opinion, it would be desirable to set out these two requirements in the form of a declaration by all members of this Conference to which other states could later subscribe. What we have in mind might be expressed along the lines of the following draft declaration:

"The Governments of Brazil, The People's Republic of Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, The People's Republic of Poland, The People's Republic of Romania, Sweden, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The United Arab Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Desiring to facilitate the achievement of an international agreement to ensure that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only,

Solemnly declare that henceforth

(a) the orbiting or stationing in outer space of devices for delivering weapons of mass destruction shall be prohibited;

(b) they will give advance notification of launchings of space vehicles and missiles to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and, upon its establishment, to the International Disarmament Organization."

I am aware that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is now meeting in New York. It is a source of encouragement to us all that the Soviet Union and the United States have made a good start on cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space, both bilaterally and through the U.N. Committee. But, as the title of the Committee itself indicates, its activities are specifically restricted to cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

It is not our purpose here to set down in full the requirements for cooperation in outer space. It is rather to achieve two specific ends: first, that outer space will not be used for the stationing or orbiting of mass destruction weapons; and second that the fear of the illegitimate use of space vehicles and missiles will be greatly reduced through the advance notification to an international authority of

any proposed launchings. These two measures provide for early action which would improve the climate of international confidence necessary to ensure full cooperation in outer space. The acceptance of the proposed draft declaration would be a major advance towards a rule of peace and law in outer space.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation has put forward the specific language of a proposed draft declaration only as a suggestion. In order to permit a prompt and full discussion of this question, I would propose that the Committee on collateral measures should meet at the earliest opportunity, not later than tomorrow morning, and that the subject of outer space should be its first item of business.

1963

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/98
21 June 1963

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

MEXICO

Working paper for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

Outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons

The Governments of .....

Recognizing that it is the common interest of mankind that outer space should be used at all times for peaceful purposes and should not be, and should not become, the theatre or subject of international discord;

Recognizing that the utilization and exploitation of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind;

Recognizing that outer space and the celestial bodies are the patrimony of all mankind and that no State or groups of States may exercise any right of ownership, dominion or sovereignty, or any other right whatsoever, with respect to them;

Acknowledging that among States, irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development, there should prevail the principle of free and equal use of outer space for the purpose of scientific progress or for the purpose of scientific research;

Realizing that, in order that the said progress may be achieved and that the said research may be carried on fruitfully, outer space and the celestial bodies must be free of any connexion with other activities, especially those of a military nature, capable of hampering them;

Convinced that a treaty ensuring the peaceful utilization and exploitation of outer space and the celestial bodies and the maintenance of international harmony in these respects will promote the Purposes and Principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations;

Have agreed as follows:

cdc.63-971

ARTICLE I

1. Outer space and the celestial bodies shall be utilized exclusively for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, every military measure, among others, such as the placing in orbit and the stationing in space of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction or of vehicles capable of delivering such weapons, is prohibited. Tests of the said weapons of destruction, or of any other warlike device for military purposes, are likewise prohibited, as is also the stationing or placing in orbit of bases for launching weapons of any type whatsoever.

2. Nothing in this treaty shall prevent the employment of military personnel or equipment, provided that they are used exclusively for scientific research or for some other peaceful purpose.

ARTICLE II

1. No impediment shall be placed in the way of the freedom of scientific research in outer space or on celestial bodies, or of their utilization or exploitation. International co-operation in these respects shall be regulated among States by bilateral or multilateral treaty, but in no case in any manner contrary to the stipulations of this treaty, and in consonance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the international law applicable.

2. The performance of the obligations specified in this treaty shall not prevent the Contracting Parties from promoting to the utmost the establishment of co-operative working relations with those specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations which have a scientific or technical interest in the peaceful utilization or exploitation of outer space and the celestial bodies.

ARTICLE III

1. So long as this Treaty remains in force, the Contracting Parties and any Parties which accede to this Treaty shall be bound to report to each of the other Parties, through the United Nations, any act or activity carried out for the purpose of the peaceful utilization and exploitation of outer space, and likewise the launching of any device, and the specifications of that device.

2. The Contracting Parties shall similarly be bound to report on the direct participation of human beings in programmes of research, utilization or exploitation relating to outer space or to celestial bodies.

3. The Contracting Parties shall similarly be bound to report on all of their installations, equipment or devices which are temporarily or permanently situated in outer space or on celestial bodies at the time of the entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE IV

The United Nations shall be authorized to keep a record of all the information submitted to it by the Contracting Parties pursuant to this Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to make appropriate efforts, compatible with the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure that no one shall carry out in outer space or on celestial bodies any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of this Treaty.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of ensuring that outer space and the celestial bodies are used solely for peaceful purposes and are not subject to any measure of a military character, as referred to in Article I of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree, to the fullest possible extent,

(a) to exchange information concerning their scientific programmes in outer space and on celestial bodies with a view to ensuring the utmost economy and efficiency in the operations;

(b) to exchange scientific personnel; and

(c) to exchange scientific observations and findings.

ARTICLE VII

In the event of any disagreement with respect to the implementation of this Treaty, the Contracting Parties shall consult with each other immediately with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution, and shall settle any dispute solely by peaceful means.

ARTICLE VIII

The representatives of the Contracting Parties shall meet at appropriate intervals and in appropriate places for the purpose of exchanging information or consulting with one another in order to recommend measures which may be adopted by the Governments to ensure that outer space and the celestial bodies are used solely for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be open for accession to every Member of the United Nations interested in scientific research for the purpose of the peaceful use of outer space and of the celestial bodies. Any other State not a Member of the United Nations may, with the consent of all the Contracting Parties, likewise be invited to become a Party to this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

1. Ratification of or accession to this Treaty shall be effected by each State in conformity with its constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the United Nations.

2. The United Nations shall inform each of the signatory and acceding States of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and of the entry into force of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

When all the signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification, this Treaty shall enter into force with respect to the said States and with respect to the States which have deposited their instruments of accession. Thereafter, the Treaty shall enter into force with respect to each acceding State as soon as that State has deposited its instrument of accession.

ARTICLE XII

This Treaty may be modified or amended at any time with the unanimous consent of the Contracting Parties. The modification or amendment shall enter into force when the United Nations has been notified by all the said Contracting Parties that they have ratified the modification or amendment.

ENDC/100
30 July 1963
ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

CONFERENCE OF THE TEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater

PREAMBLE

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "original parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations, which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all tests explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

a. In the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

b. In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in

this connexion that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusions of which, as the parties have stated in the preamble to this treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to in paragraph I of this article.

ARTICLE II

1. Any party may propose amendments to this treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary governments which shall circulate it to all parties to this treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the parties, the depositary governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all parties to this treaty, including the votes of all of the original parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the original parties.

ARTICLE III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all states for signature. Any state which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the governments of the original Parties — the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — which are hereby designated the depositary governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification of accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary governments to the governments of the signatory and acceding states.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at Moscow, this ____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

* * * * * *

1973

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/394
20 February 1973

Original: ENGLISH/SPANISH

MEXICO

Letter dated 20 February 1973 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

My delegation considers that the contents of United Nations General Assembly document A/C.1/1026 of 3 November 1972 are of direct interest to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I therefore request you to be so kind as to have it reproduced as a Conference document.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Alfonso García Robles
Leader of the delegation of Mexico
to the Committee on Disarmament

GE.73-42392

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Letter dated 3 November 1972 from the Chairman of the delegation of Mexico to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly addressed to the Secretary-General

In view of the launching of negotiations between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems, the General Assembly, on 16 December 1969, adopted resolution 2602 A (XXIV), the last paragraph of which is worded as follows:

> "Appeals to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems."

Subsequently, during the twenty-fifth session, the Assembly recommended, in resolution 2661 C (XXV), that the comprehensive programme of disarmament reproduced in document A/8191 should be taken into account in future work and negotiations on disarmament.

Lastly, it should be remembered that the comprehensive programme of disarmament draws attention in its introduction to the need to establish effective procedures to ensure that the General Assembly be kept informed on the progress of "all negotiations and other acts on this matter, in whatever forum and form they may take place".

Taking into consideration the facts summarized above, as well as the frequent references made during the discussions in the First Committee to the results of the bilateral negotiations carried out between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are generally referred to as SALT I, the Mexican delegation feels that it is highly advisable for the General Assembly to include among its documents the official texts of the three instruments signed in Moscow, on 26 May 1972, by the aforementioned States.

It was for that reason that, on 23 October last, when the debate on the disarmament items began in the First Committee, after referring to the SALT I negotiations, I added that "we believe the Assembly has a right to be officially informed of their results, at the present session, by the participating States".

This is why, since that statement has not had the desired effect, I would request you to circulate the three bilateral instruments whose titles are given below as a General Assembly document under item 30 of the agenda for the twenty-seventh session. I have the honour to enclose with this note the texts of the instruments as reproduced in the relevant official publication of the Government of the United States of America:

(a) Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems;

(b) Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms;

(c) Protocol to the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

(Signed) Alfonso GARCIA ROBLES
Chairman of the delegation of Mexico to the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems, would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

ARTICLE II

1. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing testing;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

(e) mothballed.

ARTICLE III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and have a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

ARTICLE IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

ARTICLE V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

ARTICLE VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

ARTICLE VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

ARTICLE VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

ARTICLE IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

ARTICLE XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

ARTICLE XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON,
President of the United States of America.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

ARTICLE II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

ARTICLE IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

ARTICLE V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of veritifcation at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

ARTICLE VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related

to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON,
President of the United States of America.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The U.S. may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned levels, in the U.S. - over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R. - over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

DONE at Moscow this 26th day of May, 1972.

FOR the United States of America:

Richard NIXON,
President of the United States of America.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

1979

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/9
26 March 1979
Original: ENGLISH

ITALY

Additional Protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" with a view to Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space.

MEMORANDUM

I. Paragraph 80 of the "Programme of Action" contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament states:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which is of particular importance to the pursuit of peace and disarmament, provides that:

"States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited".

The obligation assumed in conformity with the first paragraph of Article IV by States Parties to the Treaty is in the common interest of mankind and, in particular, represents a common defence against nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, it establishes a link with the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which was signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963.

GE.79-60712

The second paragraph of Article IV clarifies the scope of the words "exclusively for peaceful purposes". It establishes a dual legal régime: the first one provides for complete demilitarization of celestial bodies (without prejudice to peaceful uses), the second one imposes a ban, limited only to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, on military activities in orbits around the earth and in outer space, although it could be argued that the combined provisions of Articles I and IV imply a commitment to the total ban of an arms race in outer space. Furthermore, the text of the Treaty does not state clearly that the moon is a celestial body.

II. The 1967 Treaty explicitly calls for international co-operation and scientific exploration of outer space. Indeed, its main purpose is to promote the exclusively peaceful use of outer space in the common interest of all mankind. For more than a decade the implementation of the Treaty has contributed to prevent the introduction in outer space of nuclear arms race. Recent developments in space technology, in particular the development of interceptor/destructor satellites, and the possible use in outer space of weapons not specifically prohibited by Article IV suggest the need to supplement the existing legal system with specific provisions. Indeed, it seems advisable, in the interest of international security, to impose a total ban on military activities, other than peaceful, in outer space because of the danger of the development of offensive outer space weapons, such as the so-called hunter-killer satellites, which would add a new, more serious dimension to the arms race. Needless to say, the use of reconnaissance, surveillance and communicatioms satellites, and indeed, of any space system which would reinforce the strategic stability by ensuring, inter alia, the verification of disarmament and other arms limitation agreements will not be prejudiced. Therefore it would be advisable to review, even on a limited basis, the régime established by the Treaty of 1967 in order to prohibit, inter alia, the development and use of earth or space-based systems designed to damage, destroy or interfere with the operations of other States' satellites. Such a ban could be embodied in an Additional Protocol to the Treaty of 1967, extending the prohibition contained in Article IV thereof explicitly to the launching and the stationing in orbit or elsewhere in outer space of all weapons, and not merely of nuclear and mass destruction weapons. Were this not to be done, the protection accorded to all space systems could, paradoxically, permit the introduction of offensive space devices other than those prohibited by Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.

At the same time we should strengthen existing technical means of verification and lay the basis for a wider involvement of the international community in such verification. A first step was taken in this direction at the Thirty-third Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by the adoption of a proposal, introduced by France and which Italy was happy to co-sponsor, for the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency.

In the view of the Italian Government the problem of military uses and of the prevention of the arms race in outer space falls within the competence of the negotiating multilateral disarmament forum established in Geneva. Such a problem should therefore be dealt with by the Committee on Disarmament at the earliest appropriate time.

The danger of an arms race in outer space and the importance of satellites for the verification of arms control agreements justify its consideration under the terms of reference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

III. Italy has always been in favour of the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Since 9 September 1968, the Italian delegation proposed to the United Nations to review Article IV of the Treaty of 1967 (doc. A/7221). On 1 February 1978, both in New York and Geneva, Italy proposed the adoption of further measures to prevent the extension of the arms race (Working Paper A/AC.187/97). This suggestion is reflected in paragraph 80 of the Programme of Action of the Final Act of the Special Session on Disarmament.

The Italian Government, in submitting this Memorandum to the Committee on Disarmamant, hopes that it will be favourably received and make an effective contribution to the elaboration, at an appropriate stage, of timely measures to ensure the practical application of paragraph 80.

In supplementing the rules of the 1967 Treaty, pertinent provisions of the Convention on the prohibition of military and any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques should - in the view of the Italian delegation - be also kept in mind.

Attached to this Memorandum is a draft Additional Protocol to the Outer Space Treaty which Italy has elaborated with the aim to provide a concrete basis of discussion in the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament.

ANNEX I

Additional Protocol to the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

The high contracting Parties

- recalling the need to facilitate, in the interest of all mankind, the exploration and use of Outer Space for exclusively peaceful purposes;
- considering the urgent need of adopting further effective measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space;
- noting the necessity to supplement the provisions of the Treaty on principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 27 January 1967;
- stressing the importance of the latest technological developments for the effective implementation of the principles mentioned in article 1 of the Treaty;
- convinced of the opportunity to prevent any development that might jeopardize the achievement of the aims of the Treaty;
- taking note of paragraph 80 of the Final Document adopted by consensus at the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament;

have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

1. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be used for peaceful purposes only. States Parties to this Protocol undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in any measures of a military or other hostile nature, such as the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the stationing of devices having the same effect, the launching into earth orbit or beyond of objects carrying weapons of mass destruction or any other types of devices designed for offensive purposes, the conduct of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.

2. The provisions of this Protocol shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes as well as the use of such personnel or equipment for the purpose of participating in any control system to be established in order to ensure compliance with disarmament and security agreements.

ARTICLE II

Each State Party to this Protocol undertakes to adopt any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the provisions of the Protocol anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE III

1. Any State Party to this Protocol which has reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Protocol may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant informations as well as all possible evidence supporting its validity.

2. Each State Party to this Protocol undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the result of the investigation.

3. Each State Party to this Protocol undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

This Protocol shall be of unlimited duration.

ARTICLE V

1. This Protocol shall be open for signature to all the Parties of the Treaty on principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Any State which does not sign it before its entry into force may accede to it at any time;

2. This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in their capacity of Depositaries of the Treaty;

3. This Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by ..... Governments;

4. For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession;

5. The Depositaries shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Protocol, as well as of the receipt of other notices;

6. This Protocol shall be registered by the Depositaries in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

This Protocol of which the English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

1982

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/272
5 April 1982
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

WORKING PAPER ON THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

The consideration at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly of the proposal to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space and the adoption of a resolution on the subject have demonstrated the international community's desire not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of strained relations between States.

In its resolution 36/99, the United Nations General Assembly, referring to the existing draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, requests the Committee on Disarmament to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty.

Furthermore, the General Assembly has also adopted resolution 36/97 C, which includes, inter alia, a request to the Committee on Disarmament that it consider the question of conducting negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and, in particular, the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

Taking into account those recommendations of the General Assembly and the desire of the international community for the adoption of effective measures aimed at providing a comprehensive solution to the problem of preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space, the Committee on Disarmament has decided to include in the agenda of its 1982 session a new item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic deems it necessary for the Committee on Disarmament to embark immediately, in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly, on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of an appropriate international treaty.

In Working Paper CD/241, a group of socialist countries has already expressed its willingness to support the establishment, within the framework of the Committee, of ad hoc working groups on various questions, including the question of prohibiting the deployment in outer space of weapons of any type.

GE.82-61936

The Mongolian delegation proposes that an ad hoc working group should be established on that question for the second half of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

In an effort to facilitate the speedy establishment of such an ad hoc working group, the Mongolian delegation submits for the consideration of the Committee the following draft terms of reference for the group:

"The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the second half of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group for the purposes of conducting negotiations on item 7 of the agenda, 'Prohibition of an arms race in outer space', and agreeing on a text for a corresponding international treaty, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives in that respect.

The ad hoc working group shall submit a report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament before the completion of the second half of the Committee's 1982 session".

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/274
7 April 1982
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Letter dated 6 April 1982 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly

I transmit herewith the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space that was introduced by the USSR delegation at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this draft as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. ISSRAELYAN

GE.82-61999

Draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space

The States Parties to this treaty,

Guided by the goals of strengthening peace and international security,

Proceeding on the basis of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,

Desiring not to allow outer space to become an arena for the arms race and a source of aggravating relations between States,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

1. States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States Parties may develop in the future.

2. Each State Party to this treaty undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 2

States Parties shall use space objects in strict accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.

Article 3

Each State Party undertakes not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States Parties, if such objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of this treaty.

Article 4

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each State Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

3. In order to promote the objectives and provisions of this treaty, the States Parties shall, when necessary, consult each other, make inquiries and provide information in connection with such inquiries.

Article 5

1. Any State Party to this treaty may propose amendments to this treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.

2. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Treaty which has accepted it, upon the deposit with the depositary of instruments of acceptance by the majority of States Parties. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for each remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 6

This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 7

Each State Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice to the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the decision adopted six months before withdrawing from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events which the notifying State Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article 8

1. This treaty shall be open to all States for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This treaty shall enter into force between the States which have deposited instruments of ratification upon the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and accession, the date of entry into force of this treaty as well as other notices.

Article 9

This treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/320
26 August 1982

Original: ENGLISH

CANADA

Arms Control and Outer Space

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GE.82-66157

ARMS CONTROL AND OUTER SPACE

1. INTRODUCTION

Rational discussion of arms control is often impeded by imprecise, ambiguous, or even misleading terminology. If we attempt to categorize various types of activities or systems, the antonyms "offensive" and "defensive" are as ambiguous in application as "peaceful" and "warlike". It may be possible to identify certain weapons which in specific circumstances or locations can only be used to oppose an attack. Examples could be coastal defences, or passive measures to defend population against bombardment. But most of the weapons associated with defence can also be used for offence, although this may require their transportation to another location.

An example of current interest is "peaceful uses of outer space". It is easy to be in favour of peace. But if we are all in favour of peace, what exactly are we against? Is it war, defence, deterrence, resistance to aggression? Is a satellite whose powers of observation allows verification of an arms control agreement peaceful? The same powers of observation could surely be used to plan an attack. What about a satellite which makes possible instant communication between world leaders in time of crisis? It could also be the means of issuing the orders to commence military operations.

In a search for policies in arms control that promise to be useful and practical, it is important to identify criteria which are objective, logical, and free of the subjective characteristics often introduced into the discussions by advocates motivated more by idealism, opportunism, or cynicism than by a desire to analyse the problems on a rational basis.

The thrust of this paper is to suggest as a prime criterion for arms control that a measure should contribute to the stability of international relations, and in particular to the stability of strategic deterrence of aggression and war. Unfortunately, as will be shown, when this criterion is applied to questions of control of military space systems, it appears that very few systems can be categorized as either completely stabilizing or completely destabilizing. This is disappointing for those who seek simple answers. But in arms control, as in so many other arenas, close objective study shows that few aspects are in truth simple.

2. STABLE AND UNSTABLE DETERRENCE

The concept of stability is well grounded in several fields of science. Mental stability is associated with the ability of a person to withstand psychological stress without losing control or behaving in an irrational manner. Chemical stability also represents ability to absorb stresses (such as physical shock or high temperature) without decomposition. Dynamite is useful because it is stable against accidental stresses, and therefore safe to handle although for its ultimate application it must be unstable so that it detonates violently when exposed to the extreme stress of the blasting cap.

Stability is particularly well defined in the world of mechanics, where it can be described in precise mathematical terms. A good example is offered by the hydrostatic equilibrium of a ship, when subjected to the stress of waves or wind which tend to roll it over on its side. A well designed vessel, with its cargo properly disposed, will roll through a considerable angle, but the combined forces of gravity and buoyancy will produce a "righting moment" which will reverse the roll and restore the ship to the position of equilibrium. However, the disposition of weight can be

ltered, possibly by removing ballast, or by accumulation of ice on the superstructure, to the extent that the ship becomes unstable. In this event, a heavy wave or strong wind on the beam could start a roll which will no longer be opposed by a righting moment, and the ship will capsize.

In all three examples, the systems that are stable against small stresses may not be stable if the stress exceeds a certain large threshold.

To apply the concept of stability to strategic deterrence, we use the same idea of a system responding to a stress. A stable system absorbs the stress and responds in such a way as to restore equilibrium. An unstable system is affected by the stress in a catastrophic and irreversible manner (analogous to the dynamite exploding or the ship capsizing) and the original equilibrium is not restored.

For the case of strategic deterrence it is useful to consider two different types of stability. One refers to behaviour during a short time period of crisis, the other to behaviour over a long period in which new armaments may be deployed.

In a time of crisis, if the strategic situation provides one or both adversaries with a rational motive to strike first, or to reply to a minor provocation with a major counterblow, then the situation could be described as crisis-unstable. An example would be provided by a country (A) dependent for strategic deterrence on weapons which were vulnerable to a first strike by an opponent (B). In a time of crisis, fearing the first strike, the owner of the vulnerable weapons, A, would have a rational motive to adopt a policy of "Launch on Warning", that is to fire his weapons at a very early stage in a confrontation, possibly on the basis of information that could be a false larm, or he could even decide to conduct a pre-emptive first strike himself. A second example could be a situation in which B had barely enough weapons to withstand a first strike and still be able to deliver a retaliatory blow judged adequate to deter his opponent (A). Then, in the event that intelligence (whether true or false) were received by A, suggesting that some major unserviceability would render a substantial proportion of B's weapons inoperable until repairs had been effected, A would have a rational motive to attack B quickly.

It is clear that crisis stability can be enhanced by changing certain characteristics of the weapon systems. One means is to make the retaliatory weapons less vulnerable to a surprise first strike; another is to have a sufficient number of them to increase the probability that a substantial number will survive any attack. A further aid to crisis stability is a reliable warning system, one that will not fail to report the beginning of an attack, but is not subject to false alarms.

The test of crisis stability is whether either side has a rational motive to strike first, or quickly, in a crisis. Arms control stability, which operates over a period measured by the length of time to procure and deploy a weapons system, is tested by the existence of rational motives to react to the current situation by deploying new weapons. An example of a move which is destabilizing from the point of view of arms control is the deployment of very accurate multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) on ICBMs or SLBMs. These can place at risk retaliatory weapons such as ICBMs, giving the opponent a rational motive to build more of them, make them mobile, or defend them with an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system. nother example of development destabilizing for arms control would be the nstallation of ballistic missile defence around major cities. To restore his capability for assured destruction, the opponent would have a rational motive to build more retaliatory weapons, or perhaps improve them by adding MIRV, a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle, or penetration aids for his missiles.

Arms control stability can be improved by good agreements, with adequate verification. Co-operative measures and collateral constraints as employed in the SALT negotiations can contribute to stability. Good intelligence improves stability, reducing the motivation to prepare for a situation worse than what is really coming. And of course a sure route to arms control instability is the deployment of weapons which impel the adversary to build offsetting weapons.

3. DESIRABLE OBJECTIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL

Given the present situation in the world, and the negligible probability that the nature of man is going to be altered in the next few years, practical progress in arms control should be sought on the basis of gradual measures to establish equitable limits on systems of the types presently deployed, and to prohibit new systems not yet deployed whose presence would be clearly destabilizing from the point of view of crises or of arms control.

A blind urge to reduce all military equipment, as a move towards the utopian objective of "General and Complete Disarmament", could be destabilizing, as could be an attempt to prevent modernization of all weapon systems. As an extreme example, unilateral disarmament could remove mutual deterrence entirely.

Slightly more feasible would be the objective of reducing "offensive" weapons while permitting "defensive" ones. But the difficulties of distinguishing them are formidable.

The most practical criterion is that of stability.

4. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF SPACE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES

Almost as soon as satellites were put into orbit, important military applications were found for them. In most cases these offered possibilities not realisable by any other means.

As soon as ballistic missiles achieved intercontinental range, prodigious efforts were made to provide rapid and reliable warning of their approach. Several types of ground-based radar can observe missiles in flight. However, the most effective systems depend on satellites able to detect heat from the launching rocket, and to provide a rough estimate of the direction of flight and probable area of impact. Three geostationary satellites can cover nearly all of the earth's area, including detection of sea-launched missiles and missiles fired from test ranges.

Photo-reconnaissance satellites provide the most effective means of verifying arms control agreements, today, and of observing military deployments and operations. Coupled with electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites, monitoring can be carried out on missile and other tests of equipment under development.

The accuracy with which inertially guided SLBMs can be delivered depends on precise knowledge of the submarine's location at the moment of launching. SSBNs use the signals from navigation satellites to establish their positions.

For a number of years, these and other space programmes have had great significance for strategic deterrence. However, more recently there have been new important advances in the military use of space which ensures for it an even more vital role in the future.

Tests have been reported of anti-satellite satellites, in which a satellite launched into a low earth orbit is followed a few days later by one or sometimes two other satellites which pass very close to the first.

Another recent development which could have great indirect significance for the military use of space is the threat to land-based ICBM silos posed by accurate MIRV warheads. This threat, combined with progress in the development of ballistic missile defence (BMD) technology, will be a significant factor in the review of the ABM Treaty, in case there is consideration of the option to protect missiles by BMD. As will be explained later, there are many close interactions between ABM and anti-satellite technology.

The space shuttle represents a very important step forward in capability to launch, assemble, and recover space vehicles. For example, it could be used to inspect satellites for purposes for arms control, although limitations in propellant would prevent a series of co-orbital interceptions in the course of one mission.

Research and development is promising satellite-borne equipment able to detect and track aircraft in flight, which offers the possibility of an early warning system free of many of the limitations of ground radar. This may, however, require the assembly in space of large structures, an operation that is likely to depend on the space shuttle.

A Global Positioning System such as the American NAVSTAR will provide information which can be used for the precise navigation of manned or unmanned vehicles. This could make a siginificant improvement to the accuracy of cruise or ballistic missiles and could make sea and air-launched missiles as accurate as those launched from fixed sites on land.

Two new technologies which may have great potentital for strategic weaponry, especially in space, can be combined under the heading of Directed Energy Weapons. One form, the most advanced and probably with the most potential, is the High Energy Laser. A laser projects a tightly focussed beam of electromagnetic energy, usually at a wavelength at or close to that of visible light. If the energy at the source is adequate and the focussing and direction good enough, energy can be

delivered to a target to damage or destroy it, possibly at a great distance. However, the atmosphere can absorb or scatter the energy, so that a laser weapon may be more effective in space than close to the ground.

The other type of Directed Energy Weapon is the Particle Beam. This depends on a stream of charged particles (protons, electrons, or ions) accelerated to high energy and projected toward a target. With adequate energy, close focussing, and accurate direction, it should be possible to damage or destroy a distant target. As in the case of the laser, transmission through the atmosphere poses difficulties. And a problem not shared by the laser is that the magnetic field of the earth will deflect charged particles and make accurate direction of the beam correspondingly more difficult. It is possible that this problem could be overcome by stripping the particles of their electrical charge after they have been accelerated.

Both of these Directed Energy Weapons have potential use for defence against ballistic missile as well as for the destruction of satellites, and in both cases the weapon could be mounted in a space vehicle or on the surface of the earth. However, major technical problems would need to be overcome before such applications could be realized in practice.

In general, many military as well as civilian functions are coming to depend more and more on earth satellites for their operations. This is particularly evident for the function of long-distance communications. And in view of the recent developments just mentioned, there is every reason to suppose that an ever increasing number of important activities will be carried out by systems in space.

5. THE PRESENT STATE OF ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE

The Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963 and subsequently ratified or acceded to by 108 countries, prohibits nuclear test explosions (or any other nuclear explosion) in the atmosphere or beyond its limits, including outer space.

The Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967 and subsequently ratified or acceded to by 76 countries prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the Earth. It also extends the provisions of international law and the United Nations Charter to the use of outer space, and specifies that objects projected into space remain the property of the launching State.

Neither these nor any other provision forbid the many uses of space for military purposes of the types described above, nor do they prevent the development or deployment of anti-satellite weapons as long as these do not carry nuclear explosives.

The ABM Treaty of 1972, operating between the United States of America and the USSR permits each party to have one limited ABM system with no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 ABM launchers at each permitted site. In addition, the ABM treaty allows the developing and testing of fixed land-based ABM systems at agreed test ranges, but prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems or components. It also forbids the modification of other systems (such as anti-aircraft weapons) to acquire an ABM capability. Another provision prohibits the use of deliberate concealment measures or interference with national technical means of verification, of which the most familiar examples are satellites for photo-reconnaissance and electronic intelligence.

6. THE STABILIZING AND DESTABILIZING CHARACTERISTICS OF SATELLITE SYSTEMS

To the extent possible, the various types of space systems will now be described as stabilizing or destabilizing, from the points of view of crises and of arms control. Although the discussions are usually focussed on the satellites, these are no more than the orbiting segments of larger systems. In most cases it would be misleading to label a system as "categorically stabilizing" or "categorically destabilizing". There will be aspects that are clearly stabilizing or destabilizing, but the over-all effect will depend on a host of factors such as the nature of the military balance between the nations in question, the international setting, the military strategies of the opposing nations, and the ground stations by which the satellites are treated.

Photo-Reconnaissance

Whether for verifying arms control agreements or simply monitoring the weapons deployed by the adversary, photographic reconnaissance satellites must be listed as stabilizing for arms control. If the other side is keeping within agreed limits, or not deploying destabilizing weapons, photo-recce satellites can confirm the fact. If they are contemplating a build-up (whether or not in defiance of agreement) the probability of early detection could be a deterrent.

It is not so clear where to list reconnaissance satellites for crisis stability. They are unlikely to provide much evidence as to whether strategic weapons are being prepared for a surprise strike. They could warn of movements of surface ships, aircraft, and ground forces. They certainly would be useful for an aggressor planning a surprise attack, whether at the strategic or tactical level.

Electronic intelligence

ELINT satellites are very similar to photo-recce satellites from the point of view of stability. They are particularly valuable for monitoring the characteristics of radar and for observing missile tests, and certainly contribute to arms control stability. In a crisis they might give warning of preparations for attack, but would also be of considerable value to the side planning a surprise attack. They could, for example, provide information regarding strengths and weaknesses of radar cover, including vulnerability to electronic countermeasures.

Communication

During a crisis, stable behaviour is likely to be encouraged by good communications. False alarms, or the absence of information can lead to dangerous reactions, possibly without central authorization. Rational assessment of the significance of apparently threatening activity in one part of the world requires up-to-the-minute reliable knowledge of what is (or is not) happening elsewhere. Communications satellites contribute to crisis stability. For arms control stability, which operates on a longer time scale, do not appear to be either stabilizing or destabilizing.

Missile detection

A system able to detect the launching of missiles from distant territory should be stabilizing in a crisis, since it makes an attack less likely to achieve complete surprise. However, the combination of a vulnerable retaliatory force, a Launch on Warning policy, and a missile warning system subject to false alarms, would be unstable. A reliable warning system with worldwide coverage should provide crisis stability in the event of an accidental launch of a missile, or explosion of a nuclear weapon, since it would be realized that no more missiles were on the way. In such a situation, crisis stability would also be enhanced by reliable worldwide communication between adversaries.

A missile detection system can also have a part to play in stabilizing arms control, especially in conjunction with ELINT and photo recce satellites and suitably located ground radars, as a means of monitoring missile tests.

Detection of nuclear explosions

Although the capability to report nuclear explosions on a worldwide basis would aid in the assessment of the success of an attack and in the efficient assignment of follow-up weapons, on balance it would seem to be a stabilizing factor in a crisis and also for arms control. Awareness that an attack was under way would be heightened, making retaliation more probable. International control of a conflict not involving NATO or the WP, but in which a nuclear weapon was employed, could be expedited. Testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere by any country would be detected.

Navigation

Navigation satellites enable submarines to fix their positions well enough to offset errors accumulating in the inertial navigation systems. The resulting accuracy with which SLBMs can be delivered would seem to be quite adequate to provide a stabilizing retaliatory capability against population targets, without the need for weapons of very high yield. However, the potential accuracy of future missiles which correct their in-flight positional errors by use of a satellite navigation system may be so high as to give them a counterforce capability against hardened point targets.

It could be concluded that navigation satellites can be stabilizing or destabilizing, depending on the accuracy which they can provide for strategic weapons.

Highly accurate navigational satellites could also be considered to be destabilizing for arms control, since their contribution to a counterforce capability could provide a rational motivation for an opponent to defend his retaliatory weapons by BMD, make them mobile, or increase their numbers.

Meteorological

Meteorological satellites could be of use for the planning of offensive air and naval operations, and are therefore likely to be of more help to an attacker than a defender. They would be an aid in the avoidance of detection. It would seem that they should be listed as destabilizing in a crisis. From the point of view of arms control they are also mildly destabilizing, since if A can forecast cloud cover and use it to conceal the movements of his ships or other activities from B's photographic satellites, B has an incentive to equip himself with other surveillance systems able to operate in spite of clouds. On the other hand, the worldwide exchange of meteorological data in peacetime has a positive effect for international co-operation.

Scientific, geodetic, earth resources

Many types of satellites are used to make observations and measurements of various features of the earth and of space in the vicinity of the earth. The information so obtained may be employed for all sorts of purposes, some of which may be military. In particular, geodetic data regarding the precise shape of the earth, the position of geographic features on the surface, and the gravitational field which controls the paths of ballistic missiles are needed for accurate delivery of missiles to distant targets. Likewise, the guidance of terrain-following cruise missiles will be dependent on accurate maps of surface contours, probably best obtained by satellite observations. However, no one can foretell the use which may be made of knowledge not yet acquired, and it does not seem possible to categorize these types of satellites as either stabilizing or destabilizing.

Manned

For most of the roles already described, the instruments of unmanned satellites perform the functions better than could men. The presence of men in a satellite poses restrictions on its operations, in addition to demanding a major part of the payload, to say nothing about the cost, in order to sustain life with a very high degree of reliability. However, there are certain functions that can be only, or best, performed by human astronauts. One of these is the assembly of large structures in space, something that may be required for several purposes. Another is the inspection of satellites already in orbit, diagnosis of faults, and repair. And, even if the proper instruments might have been able to perform some particular function better than a human operator, it may be possible to instruct the operator to carry out the function in an adequate manner, perhaps on short notice and in response to unforeseen circumstances.

It does not seem profitable to try to categorize manned satellites as either stabilizing or destabilizing.

Anti-satellite systems

From the foregoing remarks it can be seen that it is not possible to categorize all satellites as either stabilizing or as destabilizing, whether for crisis or for

arms control. However, on balance it would seem that they are more stabilizing than destabilizing, especially for arms control.

As a consequence, anti-satellite systems can be described as, on balance, destabilizing, especially for arms control. Anti-satellite measures are sure to generate counter counter-measures to protect the threatened satellites, a classic feature of arms competition.

7. ANTI-SATELLITE DESTRUCTION MECHANISMS

As will be explained below, some potential anti-satellite systems depend on satellites, some are ground based, and some may be carried by aircraft. Moreover, a system designed to destroy ballistic missiles in flight is very likely to have an anti-satellite capability. For both reasons, our discussion of anti-satellite systems should not be confined to anti-satellite satellites, but should encompass all potential anti-satellite systems.

Satellites can be attacked by at least five types of destruction mechanisms, each of which has military applications against other types of target systems. It is instructive to discuss the destruction mechanisms one by one, and to consider their possible effectiveness against missiles as well as satellites.

Nuclear warhead

A nuclear explosion can radiate a large amount of energy, which can damage a satellite by thermal shock, and by interaction of electromagnetic fields, gamma radiation, or neutrons with electrical components. The high vacuum of outer space, which prevents the transmission of energy in the form of blast, allows unimpeded transmission of radiation.

Nuclear warheads are also one of the kill mechanisms for ballistic missile defence. The trajectories of intercontinental ballistic missiles do not reach as high as satellite altitudes. Because they must re-enter the earth's atmosphere before reaching their targets, ballistic missiles are built more solidly than satellites, and require heavy shielding material to protect them against the heat generated on re-entry. Because they contain a nuclear weapon themselves, they are vulnerable to damage by neutrons (which are able to penetrate the heat shield and initiate an incomplete nuclear reaction). Both of the interception missiles for the American Safeguard ABM system used nuclear warheads. The Spartan antimissile missile, intended to intercept at high altitude, used a large nuclear warhead, and relied on kill by thermal shock transmitted by X-rays. The Sprint antimissile missile, intercepting at low altitude within the atmosphere, had a small nuclear warhead (to minimize damage on the ground) and destroyed the warhead of the ICBM by neutrons.

High explosive warhead

Because blast cannot be transmitted through a vacuum, a high explosive warhead would need to damage an orbiting satellite by driving metal fragments into its structure.

The vulnerability of ballistic missiles to high explosive is reduced by the presence of the heat shield.

Mechanical collision

When a collision occurs between two objects, the damage done depends on the kinetic energy represented by their mass and relative motion. Since an orbiting satellite is moving at high speed relative to the earth, (roughly 17,000 statute miles per hour in the case of a low circular orbit), the release of quite small fragments of metal in its path can represent a serious hazard. Thus, a small interceptor launched from the ground, distributing many small hard fragments in the path of the satellite, would use the high velocity of the satellite to wreck itself when it collided with some of the fragments. Alternatively, a small homing vehicle could destroy the satellite by a head-on collision.

The same principles apply to destruction of a ballistic missile, although its re-entry shield will make it a tougher target than a satellite.

LASER beam

A laser beam delivers its energy in the form of electromagnetic radiation. This could be absorbed in the outer surface of the target and converted into heat, with consequent structural damage if sufficient energy were delivered. However, some satellites with sensitive components such as infra-red detectors or solar cells could be incapacitated by comparatively low intensities of laser energy.

The heat shield on a ballistic missile should afford considerable protection against laser energy, and there will be no sensitive mechanisms exposed.

Particle beam

The effects of a particle beam on a satellite will be to deposit energy more deeply and more uniformly than for a laser. The intensity would need to be quite high in order to inflict significant damage unless particularly sensitive components were exposed. A ballistic missile will be a tougher target than a satellite, except that its nuclear warhead could be incapacitated by neutrons.

Countermeasures to ASAT

A number of countermeasures are available to reduce the vulnerability of satellites to ASAT attack.

Decoys could be deployed, to attract the interceptor or Directed Energy Beam. A highly reflecting surface might turn back a laser beam. Electronic components can be "hardened" against the damaging effects or radiation. An interceptor could be outmanoeuvred. Active countermeasures could take the form of a "booby trap" mine, set to explode if approached by another space vehicle, or to irradiate it with a laser weapon.

Another type of countermeasure to ASAT would be to keep a number of satellite launching vehicles ready to replace any that were lost.

8. THE RELATIONSHIP FOR ARMS CONTROL OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS TO BMD

All of the mechanisms described above which were capable of destroying ballistic missiles in flight were also able to attack satellites. It is also true that the systems designed to detect ICBMs in mid-course will probably be able to detect satellites in low earth orbit.

Current research and development suggests that a modern ABM system may require sensors in space and on the ground to detect and track the missiles and discriminate targets from decoys. In addition there may be a need for two types of interceptor missiles, one to attack the ballistic missiles at high altitude, while still beyond the dense atmosphere, and the other to intercept after re-entry. Because an ABM system must be able to go into action on very short notice, it is necessary to base the interceptor missiles on the ground in a high state of readiness. The terminal defence interceptors would be propelled by rockets with high acceleration but short range, located very close to the assets they were defending, probably hardened missile sites, and might require small nuclear warheads. The high-altitude interceptors would need long range rockets. If adequate guidance and homing can be provided, they might be effective without the need for a nuclear warhead.

The technical problems faced by the high altitude ABM systems are more difficult than those for interception of a low orbit satellite. The ICBM is a tougher target to damage, it arrives with far less warning time or opportunity to predict its trajectory, and it offers no second or later opportunities on subsequent orbital passages. In fact, one anti-satellite project plans to launch the interception vehicle from a fighter-type aircraft, which would allow a comparatively small rocket to project a very small homing vehicle up into the path of the satellite.

Should laser or particle beam weapons, whether ground-based or space-based, attain the capability to destroy ballistic missiles in mid-course, there is little doubt that they would find low-orbit satellites an easier target.

Satellites in very high orbits, or following very elliptical orbits, are more difficult targets, both to detect and to intercept. The problems of interception will be eased if it is deemed acceptable to wait for a few hours or a few days until the motion of the earth and of the satellite brings the target into favourable position.

9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A good test of the value of various proposals for arms control in space or elsewhere is the degree to which their implementation would contribute to strategic deterrence, from the point of view of crisis stability as well as arms control.

When the various military uses or satellites are examined for their influence on stability, it becomes evident that some enhance crisis stability in an important way (communication, missile detection, and nuclear explosion detection) and some clearly enhance arms control stability (photo-reconnaissance and electronic intelligence, nuclear explosion detection). On the other hand, it can be argued that crisis stability is adversely affected by several applications (navigation, meteorological, and to some extent photo-reconnaissance and electronic intelligence), and arms control stability by some applications of navigation satellites.

Consequently, with this mixed categorization, it would be unrealistic to label all military uses of space as uniformly either stabilizing or destabilizing. On balance, there seems to be more that are stabilizing than destabilizing, especially from the point of view of arms control.

In view of the judgement that military satellites tend on balance to stabilize deterrence, it follows that anti-satellite measures tend to be destabilizing. Anti-satellite weapons would be particularly destabilizing for arms control, in part

because the functions performed by military satellites are stabilizing, and in part because anti-satellite measures will generate counter countermeasures to defend the satellites.

These judgements regarding the stabilizing or destabilizing influence of various types of satellites are indicated in the Table. They are by no means categorical, and represent tendencies rather than absolute characterizations.

Destruction mechanisms capable of attacking ballistic missiles in mid-course are likely to be even more effective against satellites. Most of the vehicles or projectors able to inflict destruction on an ICBM would also be able to attack a satellite, unless it was in a very high orbit.

Consequently, it would appear that abrogation of the ABM Treaty would probably put an end to any prospect of control of anti-satellite weapons.

In summary, and speaking only in principle, prevention of anti-satellite measures would seem desirable for the preservation of stable deterrence. However, when practical considerations such as verification are taken into account, the complications and difficulties in the way of a workable agreement are formidable. Should the ABM Treaty be abrogated, the prospects for arms control in space will be greatly reduced.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/320/Corr.1
3 September 1982

Original: ENGLISH

CANADA

Arms Control and Outer Space

Corrigendum

Page 13, delete paragraph beginning "These judgements ..." and ending "... absolute characterizations."

GE.82-66286

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/322
1 September 1982

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

Message of greetings from L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

I warmly greet the participants in the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

Your conference has assembled on the eve of an important date -- the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the space era that was started by the launching in the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957 of the first artificial earth satellite. This great victory of human genius ranks with the most outstanding events of world history.

Mankind can rightfully take pride in what has been accomplished during these 25 years. The mastery of outer space is taking place virtually with cosmic speed: from the first artificial earth satellite, from the first revolution around our planet accomplished by Yuri Gagarin, to large orbital complexes and months-long manned flights, to super-long-distance expeditions to the Moon, Mars and Venus.

Today the science of outer space is contributing also in the most direct way to the carrying out of wholly terrestrial, economic tasks. It has become a reliable assistant of the geologist and the sailor, the agronomist and the meteorologist, the communications specialist and the doctor, the cartographer and the forestry worker.

If we look into the near future we shall see being placed on the agenda the question of creating in outer space permanent laboratories on the basis of ever larger orbital complexes with replaceable crews. The creative possibilities of man who is daringly storming the vastness of space are truly boundless!

The successful development of international co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space is a cause for satisfaction, and in this the United Nations has played a considerable part. This co-operation is diverse in form and extremely rich in content.

It is particularly gratifying that the first international crews, for whom the trail into outer space was blazed by the "Intercosmos" programme being implemented by the socialist countries, have already been in a near-earth orbit. Citizens of ten countries have made jointly with our cosmonauts space flights in Soviet spaceships and stations. We are ready to contribute further to international flights in outer space.

GE.82-66248

Co-operation in outer space should unite people and develop an awareness of the fact that we all live on the same planet and that peace and prosperity on earth depend on all of us.

The Soviet Union consistently declares that outer space should remain an arena of peaceful co-operation, that the infinite expanses of outer space should remain free from weapons of any type. The attainment of this great humanitarian objective by joint efforts is not only feasible but is also a vital need for the sake of the future of all mankind.

I wish all participants in the Conference great success in their work and express the hope that its results will serve the cause of the strengthening of peace, mutual understanding and co-oepration and contribute to further progress in space exploration for the benefit of all the peoples of our planet.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/329
13 September 1982
Original: ENGLISH

GROUP OF 21

Draft Mandate for Ad Hoc Working Group on Item 7 of the Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled

"PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE"

Reaffirming the principle that outer space -- the common heritage of mankind -- should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extension of an arms race to outer space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes; the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement/ or agreements -- as appropriate -- to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The Ad Hoc Working Group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament.

GE.82-66524

1983

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/375
14 April 1983

ENGLISH
Original: FRENCH

FRANCE

PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

The Committee on Disarmament has affirmed its competence in the matter of the prevention of an arms race in outer space by making this subject a specific item on its agenda since 1982.

This competence is, moreover, recognized in various resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (36/99, 37/83, 36/97 C and 37/99 D). Lastly, the consensus reached at the United Nations "UNISPACE" conference resolved the problem of competence that might have arisen as between the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

The settlement of this problem reflected a recognition of the growing and complex part which outer space is bound to play in matters connected with international security. It can be deduced from this fact that questions relating to an arms race in outer space are no longer today of concern only to the two principal space powers, even though, by reason of their actual or potential military capabilities, they clearly have a special and direct responsibility in this connection.

The problems posed by the prevention of an arms race in outer space derive particularly from the following facts:

The inadequacy of existing legal instruments with respect to foreseeable developments in technology;

The ambiguity surrounding the idea of the immunity of space objects;

The constraints resulting from the long-standing and now irreversible overlapping of civilian and military uses of outer space.

I. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The technological developments likely in the next 10 or 20 years are to a fairly large extent foreseeable, for space programmes proceed as much in response to their own internal logic, which is determined by the size of the technical and financial investments put into them, as to political promptings.

For more than a quarter of a century now, outer space has provided support for military observation and communications systems.

In the near future, even if it is not certain that it will be possible to develop new, operationally effective systems of laser or directed energy weapons at an acceptable cost, it is probable that the concept of the orbital platform, either manned or automatic, capable of use for both civilian and military purposes, will become a reality. Both the orbital rendezvous techniques which the USSR has been practising for some years and the capacities of the United States space shuttle point in this direction.

Thus the essential problem up to now has been, as it still is, that of the immunity of the space segment of a land-based weapon system to possible pre-emptive attacks by the adversary. Certainly, this space segment is confined to a specific function (for example, communications, data transmission, analysis of the environment in which troop-movements are taking place, the locating of positions). But it is functionally indissociable from a land-based communications network and control system. Furthermore, it has no meaning except as part of a complex military organization.

The moment outer space can itself become the scene of specific military activities, and whether these are directed against other space objects (enemy satellites) or against activities conducted from the surface of the earth (the launching of ballistic missiles, for example), the problem of the arms race in outer space changes dimensions.

What we need to consider is the role we intend to reserve for outer space among the various roles which it is possible to assign to it:

(1) That of a demilitarized "sanctuary", like those that it has been possible to establish for the Antartic and the moon;

(2) That of a "support area" for land-based civilian and military activities, to be used in accordance with its specific characteristics and advantages;

(3) That of a specific new "battlefield" in which space-based systems endeavour to destroy or paralyse each other, very probably as a prelude to -- the more optimistic would say as a substitute for -- confrontations on earth.

The first concept, that of absolute sanctuarization or demilitarization, is something that is no longer possible. It is therefore unrealistic to try to revert to such a situation.

The second concept, that of outer space as a support area for mixed civilian and military activities, represents the present situation and ought therefore to be taken as the basis for our work.

The third concept, that of outer space serving as the base for specific confrontations, remains a possibility. It is for us to decide if it is desirable.

Some may offer the following arguments:

That it is in any case preferable to transfer to outer space a rivalry that could lead to incalculable damage on the surface of the earth;

That it offers a possibility for reducing dependence on nuclear ballistic missiles;

That the competition between defensive systems (anti-ballistic missile systems on orbital platforms) in outer space would in any event be preferable to the present situation in which the balance between offensive weapons has constantly to be re-established as one side or the other becomes vulnerable.

These apparently convincing arguments do not take account of the facts. On the one hand, even if the new space technologies become operational, it is unlikely that they will be sufficiently reliable to justify reducing dependence on land-based systems; thus a space-based anti-missile system would in all probability constitute only a first line of defence.

On the other hand, it is doubtful whether, in such a competition for the military domination of outer space, one of the Superpowers would tolerate the superiority of the other for any length of time. That being so, the very vulnerability of the systems stationed in outer space would offer a considerable inducement to a preventive attack.

It is not enough, therefore, to say that weapons systems deployed in outer space would not threaten the earth and that in any case these prospects are too remote and uncertain to merit consideration now.

The efforts of the international community as regards the problems of an arms race in outer space ought to be aimed at two things:

Not to allow outer space to become a base for military actions;

To protect space vehicles and in particular to ensure the immunity of satellites.

In fact the first objective, which concerns the technologies of the future, can be attained only if the second, which concerns innumerable vehicles at present in orbit, is ensured.

Hence the importance of ensuring the immunity of satellites.

II. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

It has to be admitted that the existing legal instruments in the matter are inadequate and do not meet the needs of the present situation.

The following instruments may be mentioned in this connection:

The 1963 Treaty on the Partial suspension of nuclear tests, in the atmosphere and "beyond its limits, including outer space";

The bilateral Soviet-American Treaty of 1972 on the limitation of anti-ballistic missle systems, which bars the deployment of ABM systems in outer space (article V, para. 1) and enunciates the principle of non-interference with national technical means of verification (article 12);

The SALT I Agreement (article V), which also provides for non-interference with "national technical means of verification"; these include satellites, according to the formal declaration of President Carter of 1 October 1978, a declaration for which there is no counterpart on the Soviet Union side;

The 1967 Treaty on the principles governing the use of outer space.

The other international agreements and conventions relating to outer space, which concern the helping of astronauts (1968), possible damage caused by space objects (1973), the activities of States on the moon (1979) and the registration of objects launched into outer space (1976), are of only marginal interest as regards the subject under consideration.

It may be noted that:

(1) First of all, the 1967 Treaty on outer space deals very inadequately with the problems posed by the arms race in outer space. The only limitation placed on military activity in outer space is the prohibition, in the first paragraph of article IV of the Treaty, of the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

The Treaty thus, on the contrary, authorizes other military uses of outer space. Moreover this is clear both from the statements made at the time by the Soviet representative (A/AC.105/C.2/SR.66, p. 6) and from the positions adopted by the United States (Hearings on the Outer Space Treaty, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 90th Congress, 1st session 1976, p. 76).

Furthermore, from the point of view of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Treaty has a very limited value in so far as the use of nuclear weapons in orbit is of doubtful military effectiveness. In fact, in trying by that means to cripple or destroy the enemy's satellites, a country would be likely to damage its own satellites.

(2) In the second place, the lack of any recognized immunity for satellites is likely to detract from the positive role of some of them in the matter of international verification, a role nevertheless attributed to them as "national means of verification".

III. THE IMMUNITY OF SPACE VEHICLES

The 1967 Treaty on outer space states in its article I that outer space should be used in accordance with international law. Article III further specifies that such use should be in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and in the interest of international peace and security.

Thus the question of the immunity of military observation satellites is closely linked with the recognition of the international legitimacy of the role they play.

The declaration of President Carter of 1 October 1978 establishes a link between military observation satellites and national means of verification, the legitimate use of which is recognized by the international instruments in force.

The position of the Soviet Union is more ambiguous and requires clarification on the following three points:

Does the international protection afforded "national technical means of verification" specifically include satellites? This would seem to be obvious, but it would be useful if it could be unequivocally recognized.

Is such immunity subject to any limitative interpretations concerning the scope of acceptable verifications, or is any observation capability considered legitimate?

Is the non-interference clause appearing in the bilateral Soviet-American instruments valid for third countries or international organizations?

These questions would not arise if the draft treaty put forward by the Soviet Union (document A/36/192, 11 August 1981) did not appear to leave the door open to every sort of possibility. The juxtaposition of article 1 of the draft treaty, which prohibits the stationing in outer space of weapons, without specifying what that term means, and article 3 of the draft which, on the other hand, legitimizes the destruction of satellites that might appear to any one of the signatories to have a purpose contrary to article 1, to which I have just referred, justifies the most serious concern.

Not only would article 3 have the effect of authorizing States to take the law into their own hands in outer space on the basis of their suspicions, thus creating mistrust and insecurity for all, but it would in addition legitimize the deployment of anti-satellite systems.

The terms of article 2 likewise give rise to many doubts: the moment a satellite or space platform is considered, in the unilateral and subjective interpretation of one of the parties, as not being used in strict conformity "with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding", is it to be concluded that it would be legitimate to interfere with its functioning?

It is worthwhile asking this question in view of the existence of a Soviet Union proposal submitted on 10 August 1972 with respect to television satellites. That proposal stated that a State was entitled to use against programmes it deemed "illegal" "the means at its disposal, not only on its territory but also in outer space or situated outside its national jurisdiction".

IV. POSSIBLE MEASURES

The difficulties encountered the moment an attempt is made to distinguish between satellites for military purposes and satellites for civilian purposes, or to use such ill-defined notions as that of a "weapon", should lead us to contemplate specific measures rather than a general prohibition on the placing of weapons in orbit. Such measures might include the following:

(1) The immunity of satellites. Bilateral agreements have given these a certain degree of protection. This immunity should be made more specific and should be broadened and extended beyond the scope of bilateral arrangements concerning non-interference with "national means of verification" to apply to all existing satellites, if they are equipped only with passive means of defence.

(2) Measures taking into account the entire weapon system in each case and not merely its space component. It should be recognized that when that component is integrated into a weapon system of which it is merely the part in orbit, it is the whole of the system that should, if necessary, form the subject of measures of

limitation, as in fact was done in the bilateral treaty on anti-ballistic missile systems. The central problem is still that of the arms race, including its increased use of outer space, and not that of the "militarization of outer space".

(3) The adoption of measures designed to strengthen confidence in the immunity of systems whose stabilizing value derives principally from the fact of their availability in times of crisis. For example, notification of the characteristics of space objects and the adoption of "co-operative" measures in order to remove any suspicions that might be aroused by certain manoeuvres on the part of a space vehicle.

(4) Recognition of the usefulness of a human presence in outer space because of the capacity for initiative and judgement thereby introduced into the conduct of a space mission. In that connection, the specific mention of reusable manned space vehicles, which means the United States space shuttle, in article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty casts an unwarranted suspicion on that type of craft.

(5) Lastly, the giving of higher priority to the consideration of ways of promoting international co-operation with a view to using earth observation systems for the verification of compliance with arms limitation agreements and for purposes of crisis control. The proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency is worth recalling in this connection (see report of the Secretary General entitled "Study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency" - document A/AC.206/14; resolution 37/78 K).

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/410
9 August 1983
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

MONGOLIA

PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

The struggle to preserve a peaceful outer space is at the present time one of the principal aspects of over-all efforts to ensure world peace and international security. The maintenance of peace and security in outer space has enormous significance for the preservation of peace on earth. Consequently, the prevention of the militarization of outer space is one of the foremost problems confronting mankind, and man's future depends on whether he manages to resolve that problem.

The socialist countries have consistently opposed and they continue to oppose the conversion of outer space into a theatre for the arms race. With their direct participation, a number of international treaties and agreements now in force were concluded, with the aim of ensuring that outer space would be used solely for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind. Under the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in three environments (1963), outer space was closed to nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies contained an important international legal undertaking not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. The conclusion in 1977 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques constituted a useful measure towards the limitation of the military use of outer space.

Important provisions, substantially reducing the possibility of the use of outer space for military purposes, are contained in the bilateral Soviet-United States agreements concluded in the 1970s. Under the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, supplemented by the Protocol of 1974, the parties undertook "not to develop, test or deploy" space-based ABM systems or components. The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1972 placed definite limits on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The progress achieved towards the demilitarization of outer space would be even greater if the United States had ratified the SALT II Treaty signed at Vienna on 18 June 1979, which provides not only for quantitative but also for qualitative limitations on such weapons. It contains provisions limiting the possibilities for the development of systems for placing nuclear weapons into earth orbit, and also of fractional orbital systems.

Thus, important international legal instruments have been elaborated and are in force, limiting the use of outer space for military purposes. However, all these agreements do not exclude the possibility of the deployment in outer space of types of weapons which do not fall within the definition of weapons of mass destruction.

GE.83-63580

It was for that reason that a proposal was put forward at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly with the object of preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space and the prevention of the conversion of outer space into a source of aggravation of the relations between States. To that end, a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (document CD/274 of 7 April 1982) was put before the Committee; it contains a provision whereby States parties would undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States parties might develop in the future.

In its resolutions 36/99 and 37/83 the United Nations General Assembly suggested that the Committee on Disarmament should elaborate an international agreement on this subject. Prompted by these resolutions, the delegations of the socialist countries in the Committee have already for two years now been advocating the establishment of an ad hoc working group to draft an agreement or agreements on the basis of existing and future proposals.

The Mongolian delegation notes that, in spite of the fact that a number of proposals have been put forward and that the majority of delegations are in favour of the immediate starting of negotiations on item 7 of the agenda, the Committee has been unable to reach a consensus on the mandate of the ad hoc working group. The deadlock in the negotiations on this question are a cause of concern in view of the implementation of military space programmes and the development, within the framework of those programmes, of weapons systems for the carrying out of strikes in and from outer space and of space weapons aimed at targets in outer space, in air space and on earth. The deployment of such weapons will increase mistrust in the relations between States, make co-operation in the sphere of the peaceful use of outer space more difficult and lead to a disruption of the existing strategic balance and thus to an increase in the danger of the outbreak of war.

A subject of particular concern and alarm in the international community is the decision of the United States administration to begin developing a large-scale anti-missile defence system. The implementation of this decision in practice could jeopardize not only the prevention of a further arms race in outer space but also the existing agreements and treaties.

The Mongolian delegation, sharing the concern of the overwhelming majority of delegations at the danger of the extension of the arms race to outer space, urges the speedy settlement of the procedural and organizational problems which are hampering agreement on the mandate of an ad hoc working group. Such a mandate ought to provide for the possibility of the conduct of negotiations aimed at the conclusion of an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

In the view of the Mongolian delegation the ad hoc working group could, during the initial phase of its negotiations, identify those questions that are of immediate concern to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In view of the importance and urgency of the task of resolving the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Mongolian delegation appeals to the Committee on Disarmament to make renewed efforts to achieve progress on item 7 of its agenda. It is firmly convinced that, given the political will and readiness to achieve mutually acceptable solutions, there is no problem on which an appropriate agreement could not be reached.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/413
17 August 1983

Original: ENGLISH

AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, FRANCE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, ITALY, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Mandate for Ad Hoc Working Group on Item 7 of the Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament Entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"

In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 7 of its agenda entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The Committee requests the ad hoc working group to identify, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament.

GE.83-53778

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/418
23 August 1983
Original: ENGLISH

Statement by the Group of 21

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

The Group of 21 wishes to state its views regarding the question of the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on item 7, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".

Throughout the 1982 and 1983 sessions, the Group has consistently maintained that the establishment of such an Ad Hoc Working Group, with an appropriate mandate offers the only practical course for the Committee to fulfil its responsibility under this item. It was in this spirit that the Group of 21 proposed during the 1982 session the following draft mandate for the proposed Ad Hoc Working Group, as contained in CD/329:

"Reaffirming the principle that Outer Space -- the common heritage of mankind -- should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extension of an Arms Race to Outer Space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes; the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement/or agreements -- as appropriate -- to prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its aspects. The Ad Hoc Working Group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament".

In its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority resolutions 37/83 and 37/98 in which the Assembly specifically requested the Committee to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group to negotiate an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

It may be observed from the pattern of voting in the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session, that no Member State voted against the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group with such a mandate. This was in consonance with the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, which stated in paragraph 80 that:

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies".

During the 1983 Session of the Committee, consultations were held under the auspices of the Chairman with a view to reaching a consensus on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group. In these consultations the Group of 21 was confronted by

position consistently held by members of the Western Group, which sought to restrict the mandate of the proposed Ad Hoc Working Group to identifying "through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". While the Group of 21 expressed its readiness to accept such a task, as a necessary initial stage in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group it maintained that the mandate should spell out the ultimate objective of the Ad Hoc Working Group, namely to reach an agreement or agreements aimed at Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space, as specifically requested by the General Assembly. The Group of 21 still displayed flexibility and showed willingness to accommodate the States in question.

To this end, it submitted various alternative drafts and proposed amendments to the draft mandates submitted during the informal consultations. For example, on 1 August 1983, it proposed the following draft mandate:

"In discharging its responsibilities as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group under item 7 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space'.

In carrying out its task, the Ad Hoc Working Group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and -- in the first instance -- identify, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the conclusion of an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space, and report on the progress of its work to the Committee on Disarmament".

In the last round of consultations, the draft mandate contained in document CD/413 was submitted by its authors for consideration. The Group of 21, in a further attempt to reach an agreed mandate, proposed to amend the second paragraph of the proposed mandate so as to read as follows:

"The Committee requests the Ad Hoc Working Group to identify, in the first part of 1984 session */, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".

Such a formula would have, if accepted, led to the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group, and allowed it to carry out the task of identifying issues relevant to an arms race in Outer Space during the first half of the session. Following this, the Committee would be in a position to review the situation and hopefully be able to agree on the substantive mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group. To the deep regret of the Group of 21 this proposal, moderate as it is, was not accepted by the authors of CD/413, who have proceeded with the formal introduction of their proposal as a draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group.

The Group of 21 feels it necessary to put on record these developments with regard to which it wishes to express its deep disappointment. The Group of 21 considers the mandate contained in CD/413 as inadequate, since it failed to spell out the objective to be reached by the Ad Hoc Working Group, namely the negotiation of an agreement or agreements aimed at the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

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*/ The underlined words constitute the amendment proposed by the Group of 21.

The Group of 21 believes that the absence of a time limit in the mandate proposed in CD/413 may only plunge the proposed Ad Hoc Working Group into unnecessarily prolonged discussions on a number of unspecified issues.

The Group nevertheless, in view of the urgent need of initiating action in connection with the task of preventing an arms race in Outer Space, has decided not to prevent the adoption of CD/413, if all other groups are willing to accept it.

In such a case, the members of the Group of 21 would participate in the Ad Hoc Working Group to be established, with the understanding that its mandate constitute only an initial stage. The Group of 21 would, therefore, reserve its right to raise the question at any time and in any manner it deems appropriate, in the light of the course of discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group, and it would then ask the Committee on Disarmament to fulfil its responsibility in providing the Ad Hoc Working Group with an adequate mandate.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/420
23 August 1983
Original: RUSSIAN/ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 AUGUST 1983 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING AN EXCERPT FROM THE TASS COMMUNIQUE CONCERNING THE MEETING OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, MR. Y.V. ANDROPOV, WITH A GROUP OF AMERICAN SENATORS

I am sending you herewith an excerpt from the TASS communiqué concerning the meeting between Mr. Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and a group of American senators. The communiqué sets forth the position of the USSR on a number of questions which are on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

I would ask you kindly to distribute this text as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V.L. Issraelyan
Representative of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament

GE.83-63910

YURI ANDROPOV RECEIVES UNITED STATES SENATORS

On 18 August Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, received in the Kremlin the United States senators Claiborne Pell, Russell Long, Paul Sarbanes, Dale Bumpers, Patrick Leahy, James Sasser, Donald Riegle, Howard Metzenbaum and Dennis DeConcini, who arrived in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Parliamentary group of the USSR.

Talking with them, Yuri Andropov characterized the present-day state of relations between the USSR and the United States as tense virtually in every field. They have become such not because the Soviet side has chosen so. The Soviet Union would like to have with the United States a level of concord ensuring normal, stable and good relations in the mutual interests of both sides and to the great benefit of world peace.

If, nonetheless, someone hopes to attain superiority over the USSR amidst tensions, in a game without rules, this is a dangerous miscalculation.

Dwelling upon the issue of nuclear arms in Europe, Yuri Andropov emphasized that very much, including the future development of Soviet-United States relations, depended on whether a mutually acceptable solution of that issue would be found at the Geneva negotiations, whether it would be possible to stop a lethally dangerous new round of the arms race in that region. The stationing in Europe of United States "Pershing" and cruise missiles will have far-reaching consequences which will inevitably affect the United States as well. The Americans will also feel the difference between the situation which existed before deployment and that which will take shape after it.

Summing up the essence of a number of constructive proposals put forward by the Soviet Union at the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, Yuri Andropov said that if those proposals were translated into practice, the aggregate number of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe would be cut by approximately two thirds both on the Soviet Union's and on NATO's side. Moreover, NATO would only reduce its air force whereas the Soviet Union would also cut back its missiles, including a large number of modern SS-20 missiles. As a result, the Soviet Union would be left with far fewer missiles and warheads on them than it had in 1976, when no one in the West talked about the Soviet Union's superiority in weaponry of this type.

It was stressed that the success of the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe was still possible if the United States showed an interest in an honest agreement on an equal basis. However, we do not advise anyone to count on the Soviet Union's making unilateral concessions to the prejudice of its own security.

As the limitation of strategic weapons was discussed, the senators were told that it was absolutely unrealistic to try, as the United States administration was doing, to convince or compel the other side to break down the structure of its strategic forces and to reduce their basic components, while keeping for oneself a completely free hand. This question, too, can only be resolved on the basis of parity. The lack of such a solution would mean the continuation of the strategic arms race and the escalation of the threat of nuclear war. The USSR is against this.

The senators' attention was also drawn to the Soviet proposal to "freeze" the strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. We suggest, Yuri Andropov said, that not only should the number of the existing missiles not be raised but that the development and testing of new types and varieties of strategic arms should be renounced and that the modernization of the existing systems should be limited to the utmost. We would agree to an even broader option, namely, a freeze on all the components of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States. This could set an example to other countries. The freeze agreement could immediately halt the dangerous process of the runaway nuclear arms race, thus meeting the dreams of all the peoples. An entirely different political atmosphere would emerge, in which it would be easier to seek agreement on reductions in the stockpiles of such weaponry.

Yuri Andropov placed special emphasis on an issue of paramount significance, the serious and real threat of the arms race spreading to outer space. Recalling the idea he had expressed earlier concerning the prohibition of the use of force in general, both in space and from space with respect to the earth, he set forth new major initiatives of the USSR in that field.

First of all, Yuri Andropov said, the Soviet Union deems it necessary to come to terms on a complete prohibition of the testing and deployment of any space-based weapons for hitting targets on earth, in the air or in outer space.

Further, the USSR is prepared to solve radically the issue of anti-satellite weapons - to agree on the elimination of the existing anti-satellite systems and the prohibition of the development of new ones.

The Soviet Union will submit detailed proposals on that issue for consideration at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.

In addition to these proposals, Yuri Andropov said, the Soviet leadership has taken an exceptionally important decision: the USSR assumes the commitment not to be the first to put into outer space any type of anti-satellite weapon, that is, it imposes a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for the entire period during which other countries, including the United States, refrain from stationing anti-satellite weapons of any type in outer space.

That decision is a fresh concrete demonstration of the Soviet Union's goodwill and its determination to work in practice for stronger peace and security for the peoples. It is to be hoped that the United States will follow this example.

1984

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/427
31 January 1984
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 30 JANUARY 1984 ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE REPLIES GIVEN BY Y.V. ANDROPOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, TO QUESTIONS FROM THE NEWSPAPER PRAVDA, PUBLISHED ON 25 JANUARY 1984

I enclose the replies given by Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions from the newspaper Pravda, published on 25 January 1984.

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. Issraelyan

GE.84-60165

REPLIES GIVEN BY MR. Y.V. ANDROPOV TO QUESTIONS
FROM THE NEWSPAPER PRAVDA

Question: Leading circles in the United States and NATO have recently been asserting that nothing alarming is happening in the international situation and that in general at present supposedly "the world has become a safer place". Is this so?

Answer: This conclusion is groundless. The main causes of the dangerous tension in the world, of which I have already had occasion to speak, have not been eliminated. Has Europe become safer with the beginning of the deployment of American missiles? Of course not. The nuclear threat has increased. This is not our view alone. The acute anxiety of millions of people in Europe clearly points to this. Nor have the American missiles on the continent of Europe strengthened the security of the United States itself. By deciding to tilt the military balance in its favour, the United States has forced us to take measures in reply.

The appearance of the American missiles in Europe has increased not only military but also political tension. The talks aimed at the limitation and substantial reduction of nuclear weapons have been broken off. Relations between States have entered a phase of dangerous tension.

The leaders of the United States, the American administration, bear full responsibility for this turn of events, as do the governments of NATO countries which accepted American missiles on their territory against the will of their own peoples.

Has the world become a safer place because of the fact that in the Middle East American soldiers are now fighting side by side with the Israeli aggressor against the Arabs, and United States war ships and aircraft are reducing Lebanese towns and settlements to rubble?

The situation is also tense in Central America, where the United States administration is encroaching on the independence of sovereign States. Those who contend that supposedly "nothing dangerous is happening" in the world also apparently wish to erase the memory of American aggression against Grenada. Clearly, the United States wants to break the power of the people and restore by force of arms the odious dictators who are its protégés. In the White House this is customarily called a "struggle for human rights". It is impossible to imagine anything more cynical.

Imperialist brigandage is also perpetrated in other areas of the world. This is the real situation. It is acute and dangerous. It is unacceptable to display an underestimation of it.

The question therefore arises, why do the American leaders deliberately misrepresent the current world situation in their statements? First of all, in order to try to dispel the concern of the peoples, which is growing daily greater, over Washington's militaristic policy and beat back the rising tide of opposition to that policy.

The fact that people everywhere are better realizing the danger to peace, and where that danger comes from, is unquestionably of great significance. The struggle of millions of people for peace is another objective reality of our time.

Question: The President of the United States recently spoke in favour of a Soviet-American dialogue. In his speech it sounded as follows: "strength and dialogue go hand in hand". What is your attitude to this?

Answer: We do not need to be convinced of the usefulness and advisability of dialogue. That is our policy. But a dialogue must be carried out between equals, and not from a position of strength, as proposed by President Reagen And a dialogue should not exist just for the sake of dialogue. It should be aimed at achieving concrete accords. It should be conducted honestly and no attempt should be made to use it for selfish aims.

Everything indicates that the American leadership has not given up its intentions of conducting talks with us from positions of strength, from positions of threats and pressure; we firmly reject this approach. In general, attempts to use "strong-arm diplomacy" with us are doomed to failure.

This is precisely the view we take of the idea of holding talks for the sake of talks. Unfortunately, we have already encountered such an approach on the part of the present United States administration. I should like to remind you of the Geneva talks on European medium-range nuclear weapons. It is today an open secret that for almost two years the United States representatives in Geneva have been merely going through the motions, so to speak. At the same time in Washington they were preparing for the practical deployment in Western Europe of new first-strike nuclear missiles.

We had repeatedly warned what this would lead to. The American side itself broke off the Geneva negotiations and caused great damage to the dialogue between the USSR and the United States. Now the President of the United States is saying that the United States is allegedly ready to resume the talks and return to Geneva.

One may ask, is it perhaps that the American side has realized what it has done and, desiring a dialogue, is prepared to change its negative approach? No, this has not occurred. The President's speech does not contain a single new idea or any new proposals either for the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe or on other questions. Nothing of the kind can be seen in the American position.

I have already said, and I should like to repeat, that we are ready to use any genuine chance for conducting talks in order to achieve practical agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. But we will not go to talks for the sake of talks, and we will not pretend that in Western Europe there are no new missiles targetted on us and our allies. We will not play at that game.

At the same time, I wish to confirm that the Soviet Union is prepared to solve the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe only on a constructive, mutually acceptable basis. This requires only one thing: before it is too late, the United States and NATO should display readiness to return to the situation which existed prior to the commencement of the deployment of the Pershing-II and Cruise missiles. We are putting this to the United States and its NATO allies because we want to avoid yet another spiral of the arms race, this time on a new and still more dangerous level, which leads to a growth of tension and instability in Europe.

It is on the basis of practical deeds that we will judge whether the United States seriously intends to conduct a dialogue with us.

Question: What other problems could become a subject of dialogue?

Answer: The Soviet leadership is convinced that possibilities exist for a serious discussion of a number of problems, the solution of which would undoubtedly improve the situation in the world and Soviet-American relations. We have put forward a wide-ranging set of concrete proposals and initiatives directed at strengthening peace and international security. They are still on the table.

For instance, if the United States assumed the obligation, as the Soviet Union has done, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, this would already have a substantial influence on the international climate, on the atmosphere of our relations. What would this mean in practice? That the two most powerful nuclear-weapon Powers refuse to use nuclear arms against each other. This means that there will be neither a first nor subsequent nuclear strike.

If the NATO countries agreed to the proposal of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty not to use military force against each other, this too would significantly raise the degree of trust in Europe and throughout the world. In practice, this would mean that the opposing military groupings renounce the use of force for the settlement of disputes that arise. A broad vista for talks would be opened. Incidentally, a good deal could also be done in this respect by the conference that has just begun in Stockholm, the first stage of which is precisely devoted to the drafting of confidence-building measures and measures to strengthen security.

The solution of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space should not be put off. Otherwise, mankind will face a new threat whose scope is such that it is hard even to imagine now. The new weapons systems being developed in the United States make such a prospect quite real. The Soviet Union has made concrete proposals on how to avert the danger of the use of force from outer space and in outer space, and calls on the United States to start talks on this question without delay.

Given readiness on the part of the West, it is possible to set about finding a practical solution to the questions discussed at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. We have long placed our concrete proposals on this score on the negotiating table. They offer a rapid road to agreement, provided, of course, that there is a mutual effort to reach agreement.

As part of the set of measures directed at lessening the danger of war, we offer the United States as a beginning a simple and at the same time sufficiently effective step: to freeze nuclear arms. Efforts aimed at reaching agreement as rapidly as possible on substantial limitations and radical reductions of such weapons should be stepped up. The peoples have a right to expect the United States Government to display common sense and realism on these matters.

What is needed above all to reach agreement on all these questions is the desire and political will on the part of the United States and other NATO countries. This would in turn create a favourable setting for tackling other questions as well, progressing from one to the next. We see this as an earnest of success for the policy of preserving peace.

Neither by trusting in strength nor by rhetorics, but only by advancing along this road can the world we live in be made a genuinely safer place. We expect of the Government of the United States of America practical deeds and a readiness to make precisely such a choice. This will find an appropriate response from us.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/434
17 February 1984
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

Memorandum of a group of socialist States

1. A group of socialist States members of the Conference on Disarmament recalls the provision in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, according to which the Conference on Disarmament, previously designated as the Committee on Disarmament, is "a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", and also rule 1 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, which describes it as "a disarmament negotiating forum". The General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly appealed to the Committee on Disarmament to undertake negotiations. In particular, resolution 38/183 I, entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament", once again urges the Conference "to continue or undertake, during its session to be held in 1984, substantive negotiations on the priority questions of disarmament on its agenda ... and, in order to reach that goal, to provide the existing ad hoc working groups with appropriate negotiating mandates and to establish, as a matter of urgency, the ad hoc working groups on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

2. Emphasizing the character of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating forum, the group of socialist States expresses concern at the fact that this negotiating body is, in substance, failing to perform its designated function and tending to turn into yet another deliberative body in the disarmament field. The main cause of this abnormal situation, in the socialist countries' view, are attempts to convert the Conference into a forum for academic discussions and to put up a series of preliminary conditions for the holding of negotiations. Such an approach, in the socialist countries' view, runs counter both to the terms of reference provided for the Conference in the Final Document and to its own rules of procedure.

3. The group of Socialist countries proceeds from the fact that the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament, a negotiating forum, must have the possibility to conduct the appropriate negotiations. Only technical groups or groups of governmental experts, mentioned in rule 23 of the rules of procedure, may form an exception.

The question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies must be solved in a manner organically linked with the elaboration of an appropriate negotiating mandate. An artificial division between solving the question of the establishment of subsidiary bodies and reaching agreement on their mandate merely creates loopholes to conceal the unwillingness of certain States to conduct negotiations.

4. Attempts made in the past to set up subsidiary bodies having no mandate to hold negotiations have shown that, despite the hopes placed in them in certain quarters, discussions in subsidiary bodies of this kind fail to lead to any constructive development of the position adopted by the opponents of negotiations.

5. In that connection, the group of socialist States proposes that in the course of the 1984 session subsidiary bodies should be established on all substantive items on the Conference agenda with mandates providing for the holding of negotiations. The group notes with satisfaction that the mandates of subsidiary bodies on the items "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" for the period of the 1983 session already provided for the holding of appropriate negotiations, as well as the fact that in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the agenda item "Chemical weapons" a recommendation was adopted to provide the corresponding subsidiary body which might be established at the 1984 session with a mandate "to start the full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting".

With regard to the remaining substantive items of the agenda, the group of socialist States considers that it would be expedient to provide the following mandates:

(1) Subsidiary body on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body to negotiate on a Treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

(2) Subsidiary body on agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and especially to elaborate a nuclear-disarmament programme. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

(3) Subsidiary body on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body for negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking into account the documents referred to in General Assembly resolution 37/78 I as well as other existing proposals and future initiatives. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

(4) Subsidiary body on agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space, taking into account all relevant proposals, including the consideration of the proposal for a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

(5) Subsidiary body on agenda item 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1984 session, an ad hoc subsidiary body for:

(a) Negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons;

(b) Negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

(c) Negotiations with a view to solving the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, including the scope of such prohibition, taking into account all proposals submitted to the Conference to this end.

The ad hoc subsidiary body will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its negotiations in all three areas at the end of the second part of its 1984 session."

6. At the same time, the group of socialist States indicates that it takes a positive view of proposals repeatedly advanced concerning the desirability of preparing standard terms of reference for subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament, which, of course, would provide for the holding of negotiations on the appropriate issues.

7. With regard to the designation of the ad hoc subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament, the group of socialist States proceeds from the need to make full use of the provisions contained in rule 23 of the rules of procedure of the Conference. In particular, the group of socialist countries considers that it would be logical, in view of the change of name of the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament from "Committee" to "Conference", also to consider the question of appropriately changing the designation of its subsidiary bodies in accordance with the rules of procedure.

8. Providing the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament with the possibility of holding negotiations does not, of course, represent a guarantee of the successful solution of the problems facing it. There have been repeated cases of late where certain States have engaged in negotiations for the sake of negotiations, done everything to sidestep the solution of important issues, and failed to show the flexibility and political will necessary in order to reach agreement. Nevertheless, in the view of the group of socialist States, to provide the subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament with mandates to hold negotiations would render attempts to avoid serious negotiations more difficult and make them more obvious.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/329/Rev.1
29 February 1984
Original: English

GROUP OF 21

Draft Mandate for Ad Hoc [Subsidiary body] on Item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled

"PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE"

Reaffirming the principle that outer space -- the common heritage of mankind -- should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extention of an arms race to outer space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes; the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc [subsidiary body] with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. The Ad Hoc [subsidiary body] will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament.

GE.84-60543

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/476
20 March 1984

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 20 MARCH 1984 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A DRAFT TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN OUTER SPACE AND FROM SPACE AGAINST THE EARTH.

20 March 1984

In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 38/70, of 15 December 1983, I submit herewith the text of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.

I request you to circulate this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. Issraelyan

GE.84-61048

ANNEX

TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FORCE IN OUTER SPACE AND FROM SPACE AGAINST THE EARTH

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the principle whereby Members of the United Nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Seeking to avert an arms race in outer space and thus to lessen the danger to mankind of the threat of nuclear war,

Desiring to contribute towards attainment of the goal whereby the exploration and utilization of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes,

have agreed on the following:

Article 1

It is prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force in outer space and the atmosphere and on the Earth through the utilization, as instruments of destruction, of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in space in any other manner.

It is further prohibited to resort to the use or threat of force against space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner.

Article 2

In accordance with the provisions of article 1, States Parties to this Treaty undertake:

1. Not to test or deploy by placing in orbit around the Earth or stationing on celestial bodies or in any other manner any space-based weapons for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

2. Not to utilize space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner as means to destroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

3. Not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States.

4. Not to test or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems that they may already have.

5. Not to test or use manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

Article 3

The State Parties to this Treaty agree not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States, international organization or natural or legal person to engage in activities prohibited by this Treaty.

Article 4

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party shall use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 5

1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake to consult and co-operate with each other in solving any problems that may arise in connection with the objectives of the Treaty or its implementation.

2. Consultations and co-operation as provided in paragraph 1 of this article may also be undertaken by having recourse to appropriate international procedures within the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Such recourse may include utilization of the services of the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Treaty.

3. The Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the depositary within one month after the receipt of a request from any State Party to this Treaty. Any State Party may nominate a representative to serve on the Committee.

Article 6

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to adopt such internal measures as it may deem necessary to fulfil its constitutional requirements in order to prohibit or prevent the carrying out of any activity contrary to the provisions of this Treaty in any place whatever under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 7

Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of States under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 8

Any dispute which may arise in connection with the implementation of this Treaty shall be settled exclusively by peaceful means through recourse to the procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 9

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 10

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have deposited instruments of ratification upon the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the fifth instrument of ratification, provided that such instruments have been deposited by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of entry into force of this Treaty as well as other notices.

Article 11

This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/497
11 April 1984

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN/ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 APRIL 1984 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE ANSWERS OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, K.U. CHERNENKO, TO QUESTIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER "PRAVDA"

I am transmitting to you herewith the answers of K.U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to questions put by the newspaper "Pravda", published on 9 April 1984.

I should be grateful if you would distribute this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed): V. ISSRAELYAN

GE.84-61623

KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
BY THE NEWSPAPER "PRAVDA"

Following are the answers by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Konstantin Chernenko to questions by the newspaper "Pravda", which are published in today's issue of the newspaper.

"Question: What is your assessment of the situation in the world at the present moment? In particular, are there any signs of positive changes in the policy of the United States of America?

Answer: Alas, the situation in the world is not improving. It remains very dangerous. And this is explained by the US administration's continued gamble on military force, on the attainment of military superiority, on the imposition of its order of things on other peoples. This was confirmed once again by President Reagan's recent speech at Georgetown University.

Even if sometimes peaceloving rhetoric is heard from Washington it is impossible, however hard one tries, to discern behind it any signs whatsoever of readiness to back up these words with practical deeds. In other words, the introduction of new words does not mean a new policy.

Let us turn to such a cardinal problem as ending the nuclear arms race.

Maybe the people in the White House have realized the danger and prospectlessness of this race and begun to show restraint? Nothing of the sort. On the contrary, the fulfilment of ever new programmes of creating and deploying nuclear weapons is being accelerated in the United States. The deployment of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe is continuing as well. All this is being done to break one way or another the existing parity of forces.

Such actions do not tally in any way with the task of ending the arms race. And it is not at all by chance that the United States has deliberately frustrated the very process of limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and torpedoed the talks both on strategic arms and on nuclear arms in Europe.

Our contacts with the American side also show that no positive changes have taken place in the position of the United States on these cardinal questions.

While persisting in its former line that has brought about the collapse of the talks in Geneva and continuing to deploy its missiles in Western Europe Washington eagerly talks about its readiness for a resumption of the talks. But, may one ask, talks on what? On how many and specifically what missiles targeted against the Soviet Union and our allies can the United States deploy in Europe? Such talks are not for us.

There is no need to convince us about the usefulness of dialogue, the usefulness of talks. The moment the United States and the other NATO countries who are acting at one with it take measures to restore the situation that had existed before the deployment of the new American missiles in Western Europe was started, the Soviet Union will not be found wanting. Such is the real road to negotiations.

Question: How is the situation shaping up in the other fields of arms limitation and disarmament?

Answer: Advance in other questions as well is being blocked by the United States. I will dwell on two-three problems.

First of all outer space. It is not the first year that the Soviet Union is pressing for an accord directed at preventing the arms race from spreading to outer space. We constantly raise this question before the leadership of the United States. We do this because we clearly realize the formidable consequences that the militarization of outer space would have.

But meantime the American President officially informed the United States Congress a few days ago that the government is starting the fulfilment of a broad programme of the arms race in outer space and has no intention of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on preventing the militarization of space supposedly because of the difficulties of verification.

Bluntly and frankly - they do not want to reach an agreement. But as a way of mocking common sense they express readiness to talk with the sole aim of agreeing that accord on this issue is impossible. It is thus that the people in Washington treat political dialogue and talks in general.

Let us take another key issue - the prohibition of chemical weapons.

It was already in 1972 that the USSR and other socialist countries proposed at the Geneva Disarmament Committee to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It was also then that they submitted a draft of such a convention.

Subsequently we returned to this matter more than once, specifying our proposals and making them more detailed. But all these years the United States impeded the conclusion of a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. It simply engaged in obstruction.

Now they in Washington have decided to pose as champions of a ban on chemical weapons. For several months already the American leaders are promising to table in Geneva some proposals on this score. But promises are promises, besides nothing is known at all how they are going to pan out, while meantime, as it follows from the President's remarks, a programme of building up and renovating chemical weapons, which are deployed both on American territory and beyond it, is being accelerated in the United States.

Yet another example. Two Soviet-American treaties on limitations on underground nuclear explosions have not been put into effect so far. They were signed almost ten years ago and we have offered the United States many times to ratify them. But to this day it refuses to do so.

The subterfuges that are being used in this. At first it was said that the ratification of these treaties supposedly will hinder the talks on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Then, when these talks too were frustrated, references began to be made to difficulties of verification.

Of course the matter here has nothing to do with verficiation - the signed treaties contain most thoroughly worked out provisions on this score. The matter is in something else - in Washington's refusal to bind its hands with any limitations whatsoever that would impede the building up and perfection of nuclear arms.

I touched on the question of verification also because the United States makes recourse to it whenever it does not want an agreement. When there is a real desire to reach agreement on measures of arms reduction and disarmament verification has not been and cannot be an obstacle. This is borne out by past experience as well.

Incidentally, considering the policy and practice of the United States we are interested not less but probably more than the US in reliable verification, in adequate concrete measures of arms limitation and disarmament.

Question: It is said sometimes in the West that the Soviet Union purportedly does not wish to have accords with the United States because the USSR is waiting for the outcome of the presidential elections there. How would you comment on this?

Answer: I will say this. Those who circulate such ideas either do not know or, most probably, deliberately distort our policy. It is a principled policy and is not subject to transient vacillations.

Throughout the history of Soviet-American relations we have dealt with various administrations in Washington. In those cases when realism and a responsible approach to relations with the Soviet Union were shown on the part of the American leadership matters, it can be said, proceeded normally. This had a favourable effect on the general situation in the world as well. But in the absence of such a realistic approach our relations worsened accordingly.

Today as well we are for having normal, stable relations with the United States, relations based on equality, equal security and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

It appears that hints about some sort of "calculations" on our part in connection with the elections in the United States are an attempt by someone to conceal his own reluctance to reach agreements with the Soviet Union on questions that demand their solution. As to the state of affairs in this respect, an idea is provided by a comparison of the positions of the two sides if only on the questions that I have just mentioned.

Question: What in your opinion is necessary for people to stop living in a state of constant fear for the world?

Answer: First of all it is necessary for the policy of States, especially States possessing nuclear weapons, to be oriented at eliminating the war danger, at consolidating peace.

Efforts should be directed first of all at stopping and rolling back the arms race. It is time to move from generalities about the usefulness of talks to eliminating the serious obstacles that have been erected in the way of the limitation and reduction of armaments, the development of trust and mutually advantageous co-operation.

I have already mentioned a number of the Soviet Union's far-reaching proposals on concrete questions in these fields. There are also other major questions requiring the concentration of concerted efforts on them.

There is no doubt that a resolute turn for the better in the world would have been facilitated by an undertaking by all nuclear States not to be the first to use nuclear arms and also on the quantitative and qualitative freezing of nuclear arsenals. This does not require complex negotiations.

Political resolve should be displayed here. The result, no doubt, would be a weighty one in every respect. The main thing is that there would be a clear demonstration of readiness to give up attempts to achieve military superiority over others. Our country does not strive for such superiority but neither will it allow such a superiority over itself.

It is extremely important in general for certain norms pursuing aims of peace to be introduced in relations between States possessing nuclear arms. I have had occasion to speak about this in detail before.

The task to create an atmosphere of trust in international relations is an urgent one. This requires a responsible and balanced policy on the part of all States and also the adoption of relevant practical measures leading in this direction.

The combination of large-scale steps of a political and international-legal order with measures of a military-technical order, which is advocated by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, would make it possible to ensure the success of the Stockholm Conference, make its results a major contribution to the strengthening of European and international security.

The most vigorous efforts should be taken to liquidate the existing seats of tension and military conflict in various parts of the world and to prevent the appearance of new ones.

In other words, there are quite numerous possibilities for facilitating by concrete deeds the strengthening of peace and international security.

The Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate with all States in the attainment of these aims".

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/501
26 April 1984

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 25 APRIL 1984 FROM THE HEAD OF THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY, HELD IN BUDAPEST ON 19 AND 20 APRIL 1984

I have the honour to inform you that the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held a meeting in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984.

Herewith enclosed is the text of the communiqué of the meeting in the original Russian language.

I shall be grateful if you would have the text of the communiqué circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) David Meiszter
Ambassador
Head of the Hungarian delegation
to the
Conference on Disarmament

GE.84-61709

COMMUNIQUE OF THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY

The Committee of Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, held a regular meeting in Budapest on 19 and 20 April 1984.

The meeting was attended by: P. Mladenov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria; P. Varkonyi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic; O. Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic; S. Olszowski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic; S. Andrei, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania; A.A. Gromyko, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and B. Chnoupek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

1. The Ministers undertook a thorough examination of questions connected with the situation in Europe in the wider context of the general international situation.

It was noted that the assessments and conclusions concerning the dangerous development of events contained in the Prague Political Declaration of 5 January 1983 and the Moscow joint statement of 28 June 1983 are fully borne out by the recent course of events. An already tense situation became still more acute owing to the deployment of United States medium-range nuclear missiles which has begun in certain NATO countries, initiating a new and particularly dangerous stage in the nuclear-arms race on the continent of Europe. This forced the Soviet Union to undertake a number of countermeasures. Negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe were discontinued.

As a result of the escalation of the nuclear-arms race which is taking place and which is consistently opposed by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the threat of nuclear war with all its catastrophic consequences for mankind and for life on earth itself has rapidly increased. Serious damage has been done to European security. Confidence in relations between States has been undermined.

The putting forward of concepts dangerous to peace which call into question existing frontiers between European States and are aimed against their social structure and other territorial and political realities in Europe, is giving grounds for concern. Relations between States are also rendered more difficult by the introduction of discriminatory limitations on economic links and attempts at external interference in the internal affairs of States.

The increasingly dangerous course of events on the European continent and throughout the world is intensifying the alarm felt among broad strata of the population and reflected in mass anti-war campaigns and movements, as well as among political figures, scholars and doctors. They demand the cessation of the arms race and the implementation of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, co-operation between States in the interests of peace and stability, and a return to a policy of international détente. Leading statesmen from various countries are also speaking out against the policy of confrontation, for the curbing of the arms race and against its intensification.

The peoples of Europe and the whole world are protesting against imperialist policies and insisting that relations between States should be based on respect of independence and sovereignty, the non-use of force or threat of force, the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, equality of rights, and other fundamental principles of inter-State relations.

2. Emphasis was placed at the meeting on the conviction of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty that an improvement of the situation and a return to détente call for a dialogue between States on fundamental problems of the preservation and strengthening of peace - a serious and equitable dialogue permeated with a sense of responsibility.

The participants in the meeting also expressed the firm conviction that there are no questions which could not be resolved by negotiations, provided these were conducted on the basis of a constructive approach and of political will to achieve positive results, taking full account of the vital interests of peoples, the interests of peace and international security. This is also borne out by experience of international relations.

The States represented at the meeting are prepared to conduct such negotiations on all questions of ensuring peace in Europe which are of common interest. The negotiations should have as their aim the achievement of agreements based on the principle of equality and equal security.

As the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty have repeatedly said in the past, they do not seek military superiority and will not allow military superiority over themselves; they are resolutely in favour of ensuring a balance of forces at the lowest levels.

3. The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty proceed from the fact that questions pertaining to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and the search of practical ways of putting an end to the arms race and proceeding to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, should occupy the most important place in the present-day political dialogue.

Not considering the present course of events to be irreversible, they emphasize that the question of the reduction of both intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe until their complete elimination can be resolved by constructive and productive negotiations.

The vital requirement for peace and security in Europe under today's conditions is the cessation of the accumulation of new nuclear weapons on the continent. In this connection, the States represented at the meeting insist on the cessation of the deployment in Western Europe of United States intermediate-range nuclear missiles and declare that if such measures, leading to the withdrawal of missiles already deployed, are adopted, steps for the cancellation of countermeasures will be put into effect simultaneously. This will create a basis for the renewal of negotiations with the aim of reaching appropriate agreements to free Europe from nuclear weapons, both intermediate-range and tactical. Not a single possibility, not a single chance must be missed for a resumption of negotiations.

At the same time, participants in the meeting noted the great responsibility of those States in whose territory the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles has begun or is to take place - responsibility for the fate of their

own and all European peoples, for European and universal peace. It is essential that these States in particular should immediately take steps that will ensure the cessation of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in their territory and the withdrawal of those missiles.

Inasmuch as the accumulation of nuclear weapons in Europe touches upon interests of the life and existence of all European peoples, the States represented at the meeting consider it exceptionally important that all European States should consistently speak out for the removal of the threat of nuclear war and should actively assist the attainment of this goal. The way to nuclear war in Europe must be barred, and all European States must contribute towards this in some form.

In this connection, the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty address a special appeal to the States members of NATO to co-operate in the interests of stopping the deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the withdrawal of those already deployed, and the implementation of effective nuclear disarmament measures in Europe.

4. Proceeding from the fact that the cessation of the arms race and the transition to disarmament are the fundamental issues of our time, the States represented at the meeting declare their unchanging readiness to conduct negotiations on a wide range of questions which have come to maturity in connection with the curbing of the arms race and the reduction of armaments.

In this context, the participants in the meeting consider it necessary once more to draw attention to the proposal put forward in the Prague Political Declaration of 5 January 1983 for the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. They also recall the appeals addressed recently by their States to the States members of NATO concerning direct negotiations on the question of freeing Europe from chemical weapons and on the question of the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures.

The States represented at the meeting are ready to embark at any time upon a preliminary discussion with the States members of NATO on questions relating to the preparation and holding of negotiations on all these proposals. They expect a positive and, if possible, prompt reaction to these appeals from the States members of NATO.

They also stress that it has become indispensable for the nuclear-weapon Powers which have not yet done so to undertake to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. They are in favour of embarking more rapidly upon the businesslike consideration and solution of such important issues as the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; a quantitative and qualitative freeze of nuclear weapons; prohibition of the militarization of outer space and of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth; and the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons on a global scale. All the proposals and initiatives on this score put forward jointly or individually by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty remain in force. A positive response to these proposals by the NATO countries would represent a concrete manifestation of their interest in ensuring constructive relations, as stated in their Brussels Declaration of 9 December 1983.

The States represented at the meeting also reaffirmed their readiness to study attentively, in a positive spirit, proposals by other countries aimed at reducing and eliminating the threat of nuclear war, halting the arms race, proceeding to disarmament and consolidating international security, and to exchange views on such proposals with all interested States.

In examining the situation at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe, the participants in the meeting again drew attention to the new approach proposed by the socialist countries directly participating in the talks, according to which lack of agreement on the question of the present numbers of armed forces would not stand in the way of reaching agreement on their reduction. Taking due account of this approach, and provided efforts are made by all participants in the talks, agreement on a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe can and must be reached without further delay. The achievement of such agreement under present conditions would exercise a positive effect on the situation in Europe and on prospects of moving towards the curbing of the arms race and the transition to disarmament.

Considering the creation of nuclear-free zones to be a significant step forward towards freeing Europe of nuclear weapons and strengthening confidence, the participants in the meeting reaffirmed their States' position in favour of the creation of such zones in the Balkans, Northern Europe and other parts of the continent. They actively support efforts undertaken in this direction.

The conviction was expressed at the meeting that agreements of importance to international security can be reached at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva if all participants work towards this end in a persistent and purpose-oriented manner.

5. Considerable attention was devoted at the meeting to the work of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It was noted with satisfaction that the opening of the Conference, towards whose convening the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty had made a substantial contribution, had taken place at an appropriate political level commensurate with its importance.

It was further noted that at the first session of the Stockholm Conference an exchange of views was begun on the substance of the problems upon whose solution the work of the Conference should be concentrated, and that proposals and initiatives were put forward. It is important that all participants in the Conference should now make efforts to deepen mutual understanding with regard to those problems and negotiate on specific issues with the aim of reaching effective results. Political will and mutual understanding of this kind are needed if the negotiations are to be as productive as possible.

The States represented at the meeting consider that the Conference should elaborate mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures which should meet the most acute and urgent needs of present-day Europe and should be directed towards allaying the threat of war and reducing military confrontation. Guided by this, they will, in the course of the work of the Stockholm Conference and in negotiations at the Conference, assist the reaching of agreement on such measures.

They also consider that, following the completion of work on confidence- and security-building measures, the Conference, in accordance with the Final Document of the Madrid Meeting, should proceed without delay to the consideration of measures of disarmament in Europe.

6. The participants in the meeting stressed the unchanging nature of their States' principled course towards the elimination of existing centres of tension and armed conflicts throughout the world and the prevention of new such centres, towards the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means through negotiations. Solidarity was expressed once more with peoples fighting for freedom, independence and social progress, for economic development and against policies of imperialist aggression, colonialism and racism.

* * *

The meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty took place in an atmosphere of comradely mutual understanding and desire to contribute towards a turn for the better in the development of international events.

The next regular meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty will be held in November 1984 in Berlin.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/510
18 June 1984

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1984 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE ANSWERS BY MR. KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, GENERAL-SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, TO QUESTIONS BY A UNITED STATES JOURNALIST, MR. JOSEPH KINGSBURY-SMITH

I am transmitting to you herewith the answers given by Mr. K.U. Chernenko, General-Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions by a United States journalist, Mr. J. Kingsbury-Smith, and published on 12 June 1984.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this material as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) V. Issraelyan

GE.84-62399

ANSWERS BY MR. K.U. CHERNENKO, GENERAL-SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, TO QUESTIONS BY A UNITED STATES JOURNALIST, Mr. J. KINGSBURY-SMITH

Question

During the debate on the Reagan administration's military programmes, which it is planned to finance from the defence budget for fiscal 1985, the House of Representatives of the United States Congress adopted an amendment prohibiting appropriations for the testing of United States anti-satellite weapons in outer space should the USSR and other countries refrain from conducting such tests. In the light of that vote, would the USSR Government agree to freeze anti-satellite weapon tests for a further year or longer on a basis of reciprocity with the United States?

Answer

It is obvious that the vote in the House of Representatives reflects the concern of United States legislators at the possibility of the spread of the arms race to outer space. There is every reason for such disquiet. The situation as it now stands is this: either the militarization of space will be prevented, or space will be transformed into the source of a formidable danger hanging over the whole of humanity.

As regards the Soviet Union, it has consistently argued that space should remain peaceful. Striving to further the achievement of that goal, the USSR has already unilaterally assumed, last year, an obligation not to put anti-satellite weapons into outer space; in other words, it has introduced a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for as long as other States, including the United States, refrain from placing in space anti-satellite weapons of any kind. Naturally, this undertaking also covers test launching of anti-satellite weapons.

This moratorium declared by the Soviet Union is still in effect. At the same time, we consider that, for all its usefulness, the moratorium is only a first step towards the total prohibition of anti-satellite weapons, including the elimination of such systems as already exist. It is precisely for that reason that we are proposing to the United States embarking without delay on official talks for the achievement of an agreement to that effect.

The Soviet Union's concrete proposals on this question are well known, they enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations. Only the United States Government is opposed.

Question

Could a freeze on anti-satellite weapon tests be effectively verified and, if so, how?

Answer

The Soviet Union is convinced that a freeze on anti-satellite weapons can be verified, and highly reliably at that, by, first and foremost, the national technical means available to the parties. Statements by many prominent United States experts also support such a conclusion.

Effective verification of compliance by the parties with a moratorium on orbital-effect anti-satellite weapons could be assured by the means for the tracking of space objects which the parties have at their disposal. As regards sub-orbital-effect anti-satellite systems, use could be made, in addition to those already mentioned, of other United States and Soviet radio-electronic devices deployed on land, in the Pacific Ocean and in space. In unclear situations, there could be exchanges of information and consultations. If necessary, other forms can also be found.

Given a genuine interest in finding effective solutions, any related issues, including those of verification, could be successfully resolved in the course of the talks proposed by the Soviet Union, both on anti-satellite weapons and on the banning of the militarization of space in general.

I should like to emphasize yet again that agreement must be sought on these issues without delay, before space weapons have been deployed, before there is another surge of unpredictable consequences in the space arms race. Tomorrow may be too late.

Those who, invoking in advance the "impossibility" of verifying agreements limiting the arms race in space, attempt to rule out all productive talks in this field are consciously bent on having their hands free to pursue a policy of militarizing space in the hope of gaining military advantages.

I shall put it bluntly: such a policy is both hopeless and dangerous. If it leads anywhere, it will only be to a sharp increase in the threat of war. This cannot be allowed to happen. The need is for urgent and effective measures to keep space peaceful. The Soviet Union is totally in favour of that course.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/513
29 June 1984
Original: ENGLISH

Statement of the Group of 21

1. The Group of 21 is deeply concerned that the Conference on Disarmament, during the first part of its 1984 session as well, has not been able to overcome the impasse confronting it since its first session in 1979, thus, removing the Conference further from the hopes and expectations of the world generated by the Final Document of the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD I). This impasse has been particularly distressing because the Conference, lacking political will on the part of certain nuclear powers, has not to date made any significant progress in negotiating on items of utmost concern on its Agenda such as Nuclear Test Ban, Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament and Prevention of Nuclear War to which the United Nations General Assembly has accorded the highest priority. As the Group of 21 has repeatedly stated this persistent state of affairs seriously undermines the effectiveness of the Conference as the single multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament.

2. The absence of any significant progress must be viewed against the background of adverse trends in the international situation including, inter alia, an accelerated arms race, intensified re-armament programmes particularly in the nuclear field, the imminence of a major new arms race in outer space and the escalating military expenditure affecting the economic and social situation of all States especially the developing ones. These trends are viewed with deep alarm by the Group of 21 because of their possible consequences for the survival of mankind.

3. The Group of 21 deplores the fact that no consensus has been achieved so far over a negotiating mandate for the renewal of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban. The Group is firmly convinced that such a mandate should provide for the Ad hoc Committee to "initiate immediately the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests" as recommended in UNGA Resolution 38/62.

4. All nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a handful of States and the quantitative and qualitative development of such weapons directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States alike. The Group of 21 reaffirms its conviction that multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been long overdue and notes with grave concern that, the Conference on Disarmament has failed even to begin serious consideration of item 2 of its Agenda, entitled "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament".

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5. The Group of 21 is convinced that, pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, urgent measures are necessary to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, which, as rightly stated in the Final Document of SSOD I, is the most acute and pressing task of the present day. There was a clear recommendation of the General Assembly to the Conference on Disarmanent in Resolution 38/183 G adopted by an overwhelming majority of member States for urgent negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The Group of 21 has demonstrated great flexibility in order at least to get a serious discussion on this subject started in the Conference on Disarmament within an Ad hoc Committee. However, all these efforts have so far been in vain.

6. The Group of 21 is gravely concerned at the danger posed by the implications of the recent developments in regard to the arms race in outer space. Unless urgent steps are taken now to prevent the militarization of outer space, it will soon be too late to reverse the trend. Reaffirming its conviction that outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the Group of 21 stresses the urgent need to begin within the CD the negotiation of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.

7. The Group of 21 wishes to express its satisfaction that the Conference has pursued its negotiating mandate and made progress in the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Group considers that in view of recent events the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should continue the drafting of the convention with the greatest urgency and with a view to ensuring that a draft text of the convention should be submitted in the report of the Conference to the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly or as soon as possible.

8. The Group of 21 deeply regrets that negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances have reached an impasse as a result of the refusal of several nuclear-weapon States to revise their existing unilateral declarations which are partial, conditional and subjective. The Group of 21 therefore urges, once again, the concerned nuclear-weapon States to enable the Ad hoc Committee to proceed to the elaboration of a common formula or common approach acceptable to all to be included in an international instrument as called for by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

9. The Group of 21 attaches great importance to the continuation of the work of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament which it hopes will lead to a successful conclusion as envisaged in UNGA Resolution 38/183/K. It also hoped that progress will be achieved in the negotiations within the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

10. The Group of 21 appeals to all delegations to make sincere efforts to overcome the present impasse in which the Conference is placed by conducting negotiations in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD I, taking into account the positions and views of all its members. Failure to do

so will result in world public opinion placing the onus of responsibility on those delegations within the Conference who have either been reluctant to commence negotiations at all or have contributed inadequately to the negotiating process.

11. The Group of 21 pledges to continue to play an active role in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and to contribute towards fulfilling the role of the Conference as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/329/Rev.2
20 July 1984

Original: English

GROUP OF 21

Draft Mandate for AAd Hoc Committee on Item 5
of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled
"PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE"

Reaffirming the principle that outer space -- the common heritage of mankind -- should be preserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and in order to prevent the extension of an arms race to outer space, and prohibit its use for hostile purposes; the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space. The Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament.

GE.84-64094

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/527
30 July 1984
Original: ENGLISH

AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, ITALY, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Draft Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled: "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'.

The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee - in discharging that responsibility - to identify, in the first instance, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament".

GE.84-64494

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/529 */
2 August 1984

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

DRAFT MANDATE FOR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ITEM 5 OF THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, SUBMITTED BY A GROUP OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

"The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish, for the remainder of its 1984 session, an Ad Hoc Committee to conduct negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking account of all relevant proposals, including the proposal concerning a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth. The Ad Hoc Committee will submit a report on its work to the Conference on Disarmament at the end of the 1984 session."

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*/ Revised for technical reasons.

GE.84-64530