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EXPERIMENTAL RELIGION.

BY REV. DR. DEWEY.

WHAT is vital, experimental religion? Jesus Christ speaks many words of wisdom and truth, and not a few that seem to appeal to the very depths of experience—to the inmost condition of every human heart. “Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.” Laboring, heavy laden, are all men; heavy-laden, not only with cares and anxieties and sorrows, but with the burden of sin, and with the burden, too, of a conscious and infinite need. And rest for man!—is there such a thing? Rest for the laboring and struggling spirit in his bosom—*may it come here?* Oh! dreaming fancy of rest in the bowers of heaven or on the bosom of a cloud—rest may be there; but can it be any where else? Can it be *here?* And the solemn teacher says, “it is; come unto me, and I will give it to you.” And again, he says, “he that drinks of this water shall thirst again, but he that drinks of the water that I will give him shall never thirst.” Thirst!—how significant that word! How many a heart— I am speaking of no fine

sentiment now, but of sad, stern reality ; nor of any poor or humble man's need, but of the rich and great man's need as much — how many a heart is parched and fevered and panting with thirst after happiness ! Is there any fountain that can quench that painful thirst ? And there is one that says, " drink of the water that I will give, and thou shalt thirst no more." And again he speaks of one who had wandered, hungering, in a land of exile, and who says, " how many hired servants of my father have enough and to spare, and I perish with hunger. I will arise and go to my father ; and will say, father I have sinned." And he went, and " his father saw him a great way off," and met him, and bedewed with tears his returning child. Is it all figure — beautiful indeed, but only figure ! To multitudes it is no more. Few men or none, are so pure and good as to have experienced the full reality. It is figure ; but with infinite depths of meaning. How else but in figure, *could* the Saviour speak to a sinful and sensual people ? For this cause he *says*, that he spake in parables. And these parables are yet waiting for the light of other ages to clear them up. These figures, the depths of eternity only will fully open and unfold and disclose. This is no extravagance, at least with me. A fanatic if I seem to any one, yet certainly I was never more in earnest.

Let me then attempt to show you what I mean—darkly to show you what I think, is the meaning of these stupendous teachings. Let me suppose then that I could send any one of you from this house to-night, and that the moment he touched yonder threshold, a change should pass over him such as our Saviour required — that he should then and there become a perfect regenerated man ;

that all the burthens of raging passion, unholy desire, and of low, mean aims, should fall from him like a garment, and that he should be clothed anew with angelic purity and joy; that the exhausted fountains of his soul should be filled with the flooding life and light of heaven; and in fine — to specify only one distinct affection — that all hatred, envy, jealousy, and selfishness departing from him, his mind should be filled with one absorbing emotion of disinterested love — love to God, and love to men. What then would follow? Call it a miracle, but admit that the miracle were wrought. What then would follow? He would step forth into a new world. The heavens and the earth would wear a new aspect, and one brighter than the visual ray ever kindled. An ocean of goodness would be flowing around him; and infinite love would enkindle in him boundless joy. Man would be dear to his love, and to his very patience. He would have contests with him; but he would sustain them with magnanimity, candor, and gentleness. Temptations and sorrows would assail him; but seeing the love and loving purpose of God in them all, he would meet them with faith, courage and cheerfulness. Good thoughts would come fast as the moments came, and kind affections frequent as occasions called; and when nothing abroad demanded thought or affection, they would retire to the sanctuary of humility and prayer within.

It is said that this would be a miracle! Let me remind you, however, that even love in the ordinary sense — that which commonly bears this name — often works a miracle, very like to this. But I grant that this spiritual work, done in a moment, would be a miracle. Yet done in the long experience of life, it is not a miracle, but

the very thing that fulfils and interprets the teachings of the Gospel. Done effectually it would be that very satisfying of the soul's hunger, and quenching of its thirst and relief of its burthens, of which our Saviour speaks. For the Gospel offers no mysterious device for finding rest. Rest is to be found only in the moral and spiritual affections which it inculcates.

But how is this thing to be done — this regeneration to be effected? All original power is God's — all the spiritual powers within us, are his; and the special grace that is offered to help our endeavor, is his. Therefore, in an important sense, the work of our conversion is God's work. But the work, as *done by us*, is to be done by attention and effort, by meditation, by prayer, by watching and striving, by spiritual care and self-culture; and this during the whole of life. It is not to be done in a moment, but in a life. Some hearer may turn away from this, with that language of old upon his lips, "this is a hard saying — who can hear it?" "We know an easier way" — he may say. And he may go to some conference, or conventicle, or church, where he may be told that all the work — all that makes the difference between misery and happiness, between hell and heaven — may be done in a moment. I will not gainsay his experience suppose that something is done; What is done? I answer, that he has *begun* the work — begun it in unusual circumstances perhaps — in a revival as it is called — in circumstances fitted beyond all others *he* may think to move him to the undertaking. Still he has only begun. It is impossible that in one moment, he should have done more. If he thinks he has done all on which happiness and heaven depend in one moment, he is fatally deceiv-

ed. If in one moment he has only *begun* the work, then life lies before him for its accomplishment. And what is done there, let me still say, is what may be just as well done here, in this hour of calm meditation. Would that it were done. And I trust that it is done in such hours as these.

“Nay, but” — some one may say — and if you, my brethren, will excuse the freedom, I will meet the objection — for the objection is not personal but applies to a class — “nay, but you are not the preachers to do it. Your preaching is too rational to work up to the necessary conviction and distress; you do not alarm them enough to set them to work; you may interest your hearers, but you will never convert them.” God forbid that this should be true! *Is* it so, my friends? *Must* it needs be so? When I tell you and show you, that on an inward, regenerating, purifying work in your souls, all your welfare — Oh! an infinite welfare, depends; are there no secret resolves, no solemn purposes, no humble prayers, in your hearts? Are there no beginnings nor goings on of this great work in you? In those vast and vital concerns of religion, that go down to the foundations of your welfare, that touch the silent depths of your being, must there be a noise and a tumult and an agitating occasion and a visible sympathy — things upon the surface — to stir those depths within you? God forbid that this should be true!

But I must look a little more seriously and deliberately at this objection. It is an objection, however inapplicable, which is too often made to be passed over without some formal notice. It is the objection of late, I think, most in vogue — for the doctrinal questions seems to have passed by. It is constantly said, you know, of the

religion preached in our churches that it is cold and superficial ; that it is no religion for a dying hour — no religion for the poor — no religion for human nature ; that there is no regenerating, soul-saving power in it.

Now it may be well for us to consider — in order that we may do no injustice to this charge, however unjust the charge be — that an objection common as this, probably has some foundation either in facts or in appearances. I conceive that it has none in facts. What then are the appearances that lend it countenance ? I know of none but this. The language of our discourses differs somewhat from the ordinary language of the pulpit. We do not use the technical phraseology by which religion has been long set forth, so much as others. Instead of “ grace,” we often say, sanctify, purity, virtue ; instead of “ godliness,” goodness, devotion ; instead of “ change of heart,” becoming a good and pious man. The inference is, that our discourse wants the true and great meaning of the pulpit. This I utterly deny. I admit, at the same time, and really think, that we may err in this matter of language ; that if we used — not more of the technical language — I do not admit that we err in this — but that if we used more of the plain, homely, Saxon, Bible words, it would be better. We preach however, to people who understand the educated language of the time — the language of popular literature — and in this, we naturally frame our thoughts. But that in our thought and in our heart, we mean to preach and do preach, a vital, a life-giving, a soul-saving Christianity, I know, I feel to be true ; and nothing can shake this assurance. It is said that we do not preach Christ ; but I appeal to you with confidence, that no theme is oftener or more earnestly set

forth in this pulpit, than Christ the suffering, Christ the crucified. But then, it is said, that we preach so much upon life, and the plain, every-day duties of life — talk so much about the honesty and integrity and kindness and pity and candor, and the spirirual meaning and interest of life, and about the ministration of all its events to the same end, that it is no preaching and no religion. The very kernel of the Gospel, it is said, is ground down into miserable details about being upright and good, and its very essence is chilled and frozen into “a cold clatter about morality.”

Is it a *Christian* objector that says this? Or did he come from the shrine of pagan mysteries or from the school of Jewish mystics and ascetics? What more remarkably characterized the teaching of Jesus Christ, than his very direct appeal to the very situations in which his hearers stood, to the circumstances and events of their time and condition, to the duties and exposures of their daily life; and thus I may add, to the virtues and perils of all human life? The most formal and extended discourses of his, are the sermon on the Mount, and that recorded in the 25th chapter of Matthew, stating in the form of a solemn judgment the terms and conditions of acceptance with him. Read those discourses, and tell me upon what they treat. The topics of the first are, poverty of spirit, sorrowing, meekness, the desire of purity, pity, peaceableness, patient suffering; of the second, giving food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, and hospitality to the stranger — clothing to the naked, visiting the sick, comforting the prisoner.

These then are qualities of true experimental religion; and this, not by construction, not by inference only; they

held a place and a large place in the express, formal, and solemn teaching of the great Master. These are not all indeed; for he also spake of love to God, and of faith in his own interposing help, and of penitence to be felt, and forgiveness to be sought after, and of heaven to be gained.

But again; let us look at the reason of the thing. We have been speaking of natural and revealed religion. Does the latter found itself upon the former, or does it not? Does revealed religion recognise as just, our natural sense of rectitude, or does it not? To be more specific — when the Bible uses the words — good, holy, righteous, upright — does it mean by them what the natural human conscience understands, or does it mean something else? If it does mean that, then our teaching is right. If it does not mean that, then what does it mean? Some mystic secret, some dark insignia, does it propose to shadow forth, as the very condition of salvation! Then of what dreadful and fatal misleading is the Bible guilty! It tells us to be good, pure, just, righteous — gentle, compassionate, disinterested, holy — lovers of men — lovers of God; it takes these very words that were in our mouths, and gives not a hint that it uses them in any new or mysterious sense; and yet here comes a theological casuist who says that all this is no religion; that the preaching of all this, is no preaching; that nobody is to be converted with such teaching, no matter how thorough and earnest it be; that true, vital, saving godliness is altogether a different thing.

My friends, this, to me, is the most deplorable distortion of Christianity, to which it has ever been subjected. There have been theological errors, I know, many and dark, but they are all nothing to this — this tying up of

religion into a little knot of mystery, instead of contemplating it as the all-pervading light of heaven — streaming through the creation — infolding and beautifying the universe. To my thought, it divests religion of all its charm, its grandeur, its universality, its all prevailing influence.

Nor think, my brethern, this construction of the Gospel, is one of any great extent or authority in the Christian church. It is unknown to the theology of the good old English time; it is unknown to the theology of most countries — Catholic and Protestant. It is peculiarly an American error. Our religion in this country, it is to be remembered, began in dissent and was consolidated in metaphysics. Nowhere else in the world, has the pulpit been so metaphysical as in this country. And nowhere else in Christendom, has religion shot up into the growth of such a monstrous enigma, instead of being cultivated as a clear, intelligible and useful principle.

This is the true religion — an intelligible love, purity, uprightness, humility, devotion. This is the true religion, and to experience this, rationally, earnestly, daily, instantly, is to experience true religion.

(Continued from page 202.)

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT.

BY REV. JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE.

WITH Peter Lombard begins the period of Summists, or system-making Doctors. Their object was totality. They attempted to give a solution to every theological question which could be asked. Their usual course is to state the question, then adduce the arguments from Scrip-

ture and the Fathers in favor of each side, then the conclusion, in which they endeavor to find a way of reconciling the opposite views. On these great theologians, overrated once, underrated now, we would gladly dwell, did our limits permit. Bonaventura, the Seraphic Doctor, (born 1221) handles this subject with great clearness and simplicity. He almost adopts Anselm's theory, and then lets it fall by denying the absolute necessity of satisfaction. God, he says, being omnipotent, might have chosen some other way. But when the reason has seen a thing to be necessary, it is absurd to place above this necessity the abstract notion of an Omnipotence which may make it unnecessary. For in this case, the notion, really uppermost is that of the entire incomprehensibility of God, which of course overthrows every theory founded on a supposed knowledge of his attributes.

The theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor, (born 1224) is chiefly distinguished by its doctrine of "satisfactio superabundans." Christ has restored to God *more* than was taken from him by human sin. This surplus became afterward a stock of merit belonging to the church, and was the ground on which it based the right of selling indulgences. In the main Aquinas agrees with Anselm, nevertheless he also gives up the absolute necessity of satisfaction.

Opposite to St. Thomas stands Duns Scotus, (flourished 1300) the Subtle Doctor, whose view directly contradicts that of Anselm. He denies the infinite guilt of sin and the infinite merit of Christ, declaring that guilt and merit take their character from their subject not their object.

He declares that the belief of the infinite character of sin, involves Manicheism. Sin, however, though not *in-*

tensively infinite (in itself) is *extensively* so (in its results.) By this denying the infinite nature of sin, Anselm's theory is cut up by the roots. He denies the necessity of the death of Christ, and even asserts that it is possible that a mere man might have atoned for us. Anything which God chose to *accept* as an atonement would be so. In other words, God's *will* is not conditioned by any necessity, but is absolutely supreme. And here is the radical difference between the Scotists and Thomists, the one attributing to God an unconditioned will, the other a will conditioned by the laws of his nature. From this point the scholastics divided into these two parties, though the majority were Scotists. The church, however, decided for the doctrine of Thomas, as seeming most to favor church authority. It was adopted by the Bull *Unigenitus*. The idea of *acceptatio* is found, however, in a great variety of systems, from the time of Scotus down.

And now we come to the third great epoch in the history of our doctrine, which commences with the Reformation.

The peculiarity of the Protestant Reformation, as of all true reformations, consists in its being a falling back upon personal experience. Wearied with the forms of Scholasticism, men were impelled to reject every thing which was not based in a moral need, or an immediate and practical religious interest. The Reformation therefore was the great turning point, where the mind passed from the Outward to the Inward, from objectivity to subjectivity, and became conscious of its own freedom. Nothing which could not be legitimated by an inward experience was henceforth to be regarded as true. Hence the importance of Faith, or the deepest personal element in man.

The principal difference between the Lutheran theology and that of Anselm was significant of this change. Anselm's doctrine was based in the necessity of the Divine nature, Luther's in a need of human nature. Anselm asked, How shall God be satisfied? Luther, How shall man be justified?

In answering this question, the Lutheran theologians maintained the doctrine of an infinite evil in sin, but changed the *satisfaction* of Anselm into an *equivalent*. They also made the distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ, which was not known to the theory of Anselm. Their view was, that man, by disobeying the law of God, was justly exposed to punishment, but Christ is punished in his place, and he thus becomes free. Yet he is still bound to obey God and lead a life of perfect goodness, in order to be saved. Christ fulfils this obligation for him by his holy life. The suffering he ought to bear, Christ bears; the duty he ought to perform, Christ performs. The satisfaction, therefore, before confined to the death of Christ, is now extended to his life; and now first is Christ considered as being punished in the place of the sinner.* God also is now regarded as a sovereign, bound to uphold his laws, instead of a creditor,

* A strong opposition was made to the Lutheran distinction of active and passive obedience by John Piscator, a reformed theologian, at the end of the 16th century. Piscator argued, from the definition of justification in Rom. iv. 6, 7, that the imputation of forgiveness and active obedience are not two parts of Justification, but one and the same. Christ, he maintains, as a man, was bound to obey God on his own account, and his active obedience cannot therefore be credited to us. His obedience in suffering; therefore, was the only cause of our being forgiven. If his active obedience is imputed to us, God is paid twice for our sins. Again, if his active obedience is imputed to us, we are not bound to obey for ourselves. The Lutherans, in reply, argued that we could only be justified by actual obedience to God's commandments. As no one obeyed these for himself, Christ must obey for us. But Piscator replied, "The law demands punishment or obedience, not both." This controversy forms an important epoch in the history of the doctrine.

claiming his due. We see in this the beginning of the the change from the legal to the governmental view.*

We now come to Faustus Socinus and the Socinians, whose doctrine may be regarded as the great revolt from the doctrinal authority of the church, as that of Luther was a revolt from its ecclesiastical authority. Socinianism is the extreme of subjectivity. In this system the subject (man) becomes self-dependent, and his relation to the object (God) becomes an outward one. The attacks by Socinus upon the church doctrines were very acute, and have never been sufficiently met or answered.

The argument of Socinus against the church theory of satisfaction, begins by denying its foundation, the idea of Divine justice. If God cannot forgive sin without a satisfaction, he becomes subject to finite limitations. Mercy is as much an attribute with God as justice, but if we consider it as absolute, then God cannot punish sin at all. Therefore justice and mercy must both be regarded as finite conditions, not absolute qualities in God. Both are effects of his will, which is his absolute essence. Man therefore is reconciled to God, God is not reconciled to man.

With still greater emphasis does the Socinian logic at-

* Osiander ought to be mentioned here, who, about the year 1550, began in the Protestant Church the opposition to the forensic or declaratory view of the work of Christ, declaring justification to be a real act, conveying holiness to the soul, and forming Christ within us. He says a thief is not made just by being pardoned, and saved from the gallows. He calls it blasphemy to say that God declares a man just without making him so, for it is saying that God declares what is not true. Christ's justice consists neither in his action nor passion, but in his nature and being, and we are justified only by being joined to Christ by faith, and having God and Christ dwell within us. This view was afterwards taken by Swenkenfeld, Weigel, and other mystical writers in Germany, and by William Law and the Quakers in England. Though a mystical view, it is a highly valuable contribution to theology, and the germ of it is evidently to be found in John and Paul. Galvin, also, regards Christ as not only making satisfaction for sin, but also as communicating to man the essence of God.

tack the doctrine of satisfaction itself. Satisfaction and forgiveness mutually exclude each other. Satisfaction pays the debt; how then can it be forgiven? If forgiven why need it be paid? If it be said that the person who owes the debt is forgiven, because it is not demanded of him but of another; Socinus then asks, how can a debt be asked except of the one who owes it, or the one who assumes it? If *paid* by either, how can it be forgiven? Moreover, punishment is strictly a personal thing. The idea of punishment involves that of guilt. If transferred to the innocent, it ceases to be punishment. Punishment, therefore, cannot be assumed like a debt. Again, satisfaction supposes both the justice and the mercy of God in exercise. But the exercise of mercy would be a free pardon, that of justice determined punishment.

As a matter of fact, satisfaction is impossible, and could never have been made. Every sinner deserves eternal death. The substitute then should endure eternal death for every individual sinner, which is impossible. But in fact Christ did not endure it at all, for he rose from the dead in three days, and has ascended into heaven. Paul says, that "If Christ be not risen, we are yet in our sins." But if his death freed us from sin, his resurrection is unnecessary. Nor was the death of Christ a punishment, since it was the means of his exaltation and glory. If it be said, that Christ made an infinite satisfaction through the dignity of his person, Socinus, replies, that with God "there is no respect of persons." Christ could not suffer as God, and if he could have done so, this Divine suffering would have been no proper satisfaction for human sin. Nor, lastly, could God make satisfaction to himself.

Nor did it escape the acuteness of Faustus Socinus,

that active and passive obedience are contradictory to each other. The one either excludes the other, or makes it unnecessary. Christ could not make satisfaction by his active obedience, for he was bound to obey God on his own account. His obedience was rewarded by his own elevation to glory, it could not therefore have been rewarded by the salvation of others. Nor could the obedience of one have made satisfaction for that due by all. However exalted his person, he could only do, what each owes, *i.e.*, obey God perfectly.

In addition to these arguments, Socinus adduced others founded on the nature of man, which we cannot stop to insert here. This bold and profound attack was met by a sufficiently tame reply from the Protestant theologians. They merely repeated again their previous formulas, and relied mainly on the Scripture argument. But here again they were met by their skilful opponents by a mode of interpretation, which was original with Socinus, and which has never been sufficiently carried out since his time. Socinus collected all the texts referring to the death of Christ or to the forgiveness of sin, and arranged them in four classes. Placing in the first class the texts which speak of Christ's death as a ransom or redemption, he easily showed that these were to be taken figuratively. In the second class were those which spoke of Christ as dying for our sins, which he explained as meaning that he died on account of our sins, and in order that we might be freed from them. The third class of texts include those in which it is said that Christ took our sins on himself, or took them away. These either mean that he has taken them away by making us good, or borne them, as one may bear the consequences of another's sin. The

fourth class include the texts relating to Jewish types and sacrifices. Here Socinus clearly shows that the sacrifices of the Old Testament were not substitutions, either really or symbolically, but only certain conditions with which God had connected the forgiveness of sin.

Having thus demolished the church doctrine of atonement, what did Socinus put in its place? The positive side of his system is far from being as satisfactory as the negative. The sum of it is briefly this.

Man is reconciled to God when he repents. God is always placable, man alone needs to be changed. He reconciles himself by repenting. Repentance, in the system of Socinus, takes the place which faith occupies in the Protestant system. Still, subjective as this system appears, it has also an objectivity of its own. If faith has its object out of itself in the Divine love, repentance has its object out of itself in the Divine law. Socinus also teaches that it is faith in God's forgiveness which leads to repentance. Faith is necessary also, therefore, in his system. The question between Socinus and Luther is only this, Do we repent in order to be forgiven, or are we forgiven in order that we may repent?

But how is Christ a Redeemer according to Socinus? Through Christ man has God's promise to trust and God's law to obey. He is reconciled to God when he has a practical living confidence that his sins are forgiven. Christ gives him this confidence by announcing forgiveness on the condition of repentance. Christ's office, therefore as a Mediator, is prophetic rather than priestly. The death of Christ has value as an example of self-sacrifice, and as a solemn confirmation and seal of the promises of God. The death and resurrection of Christ are necessary

to man's salvation, but not because of any effect they exercise upon God, but because of their moral influence upon man.

This attack by Socinus made it necessary for the system of church orthodoxy to shift its ground, that which it had occupied having become no longer tenable. Hence the famous theory of Hugo Grotius, which has been essentially that of modern orthodoxy ever since his time. He founds the necessity of Christ's death not on the justice of God as a creditor, but as a ruler, ("justitia Dei rectoris.") For the legal view of the atonement, he substitutes a Governmental view.

The fundamental error of Socinus, says Grotius, is to consider God in the work of redemption only in the light of a creditor, who may forgive the debt if he will; or in that of an absolute monarch, who can at any time remit punishment. God is to be regarded as a Governor, and the right of forgiveness is conditioned by the good of the whole community. The object of punishment is not to satisfy the honor of the monarch only, but also to preserve the order and protect the peace of society. Atonement is an act of Jurisdiction, according to which one is punished that another may be excused; or of Dispensation, remitting the operation of the law with respect to certain persons or matters. Now, can the law of punishment be relaxed? All positive laws, says Grotius, may be relaxed. The law (Gen. ii. 17) which announces death for disobedience, may be remitted, since it is an expression, not of the Divine nature but of the Divine will. But in order that it might safely be remitted, in the case of human beings, it was necessary that some example should be made to show the evil of sin. Christ, therefore, "died for our

sins," to be an example of God's displeasure against sin. This displeasure the Scripture calls "the wrath of God." In the death of Christ, therefore God's hatred of sin, his care for his law, and his goodness to men are all manifested.*

The essence of the theory of Grotius lies in the proposition, "God could not forgive sin without an act of exemplary punishment." The necessity of Christ's death, therefore, according to this theory, is very different from its necessity in the theory of Anselm. It has reference not to the past but to the future. The guilt of past sin is abolished by an immediate act of Divine love, the example of punishment is only necessary to prevent future sin. Therefore with Grotius as with Socinus, the principal effect of the death of Christ is its *moral influence* on man. With Grotius this is negative, with Socinus positive. According to Grotius, Christ's death was necessary before man could be forgiven, but this is also the case in the theory of Socinus. In some respects Grotius is the least consequent of the two. Anselm's theory is based on the notion of Divine justice, that of Socinus on the notion of Divine goodness. Grotius, in his theory, neutralizes both. The whole of this theory has the character of a juridical proceeding, and its error consists in applying to the Divine law and government necessities which belong merely to human governments and human laws.

The essential difference between the theory of Grotius, and the church doctrine of satisfaction is very apparent. The main point of the church theory is this, that before

*According to the Jurists, says Grotius, the best kind of Relaxation of Law, is by a *commutatio* or a *compensatio*. In this way both the *dignity* of the law and its *purpose* are secured. "Proxima enim sunt idem et tantumdem."

man can be forgiven Divine Justice demands that the *full debt* be paid. Satisfaction is paying to God the very debt which man owes, and what Christ has done is identical with what man ought to do. Socinus objected to this, that it made forgiveness impossible, and that therefore satisfaction and forgiveness are contradictory. Grotius replies, that Christ's death is not "satisfactio," but "solutio;" that is to say, the debt is not paid, but something is accepted in the place of it, and this act of accepting Christ's death constitutes forgiveness. He admits that if the full and very debt was paid by the death of Christ, "remissio," or freedom from guilt, would follow at once, without any forgiveness on the part of God. The death of Christ would then be in itself "solutio," or payment, and call not for an act of "remissio," or pardon on the part of God, but of "liberatio," or requittal. He thus virtually surrenders to Socinus the theory he had undertaken to defend against him.

Crellius, the Socinian, replied to Grotius, (*Fratres Poloni*, vol. 5.) and easily showed the injustice he had done to Socinus, and the defects of his theory. These defects were also observed by his own friends, the Arminians.* Nevertheless the theory of Grotius has, on the whole, continued to be the most favorite form of modern orthodoxy down to the present time.

To be continued.

*Episcopius pointed out to him the deficiency of his theory on the objective side, in a treatise which he sent him in manuscript, asking at the same time the question. "An Christus morte sanã aliquid circa Deum effecerit?" Limborch also attempts to find a better medium between the church doctrine and that of the Socinians, by developing the idea of the death of Christ as a *sacrifice*, really offered to God.

EVIL OF SIN.

BY THE LATE REV. W. E. CHANNING, D.D.

If we look within, we find in our very nature a testimony to the doctrine, that sin is the chief of evils, a testimony which however slighted or smothered, will be recognized, I think, by every one who hears me. To understand this truth better, it may be useful to inquire into and compare the different kinds of evil. Evil has various forms, but these may all be reduced to two great divisions, called by philosophers *natural* and *moral*. By the first, is meant the pain or suffering which springs from outward condition and events, or from causes independent of the will. The latter, that is, moral evil, belongs to character and conduct, and is commonly expressed by the words sin, vice, transgression of the rule of right. Now I say, that there is no man unless he be singularly hardened and an exception to his race, who, if these two classes or divisions of evil should be clearly and fully presented to him in moments of calm and deliberate thinking would not feel, through the very constitution of his mind, that sin or vice is worse and more to be dreaded than pain. I am willing to take from among you, the individual who has studied least the great questions of morality and religion, whose mind has grown up with least discipline. If I place before such a hearer two examples in strong contrast, one of a man gaining great property by an atrocious crime, and another exposing himself to great suffering through a resolute purpose of duty, will he not tell me at once, from a deep moral sentiment, which leaves not a doubt on his mind, that the last has chosen the better part, that he is more to be envied than the first? On these

great questions, What is the chief Good? and What is the chief Evil? we are instructed by our own nature. An inward voice has told men, even in the heathen countries, that excellence of character is the supreme good, and that baseness of soul and of action involves something worse than suffering. We have all of us, at some periods of life, had the same conviction; and these have been the periods when the mind has been healthiest, clearest, least preturbed by passion. Is there any one here who does not feel, that what the divine faculty of conscience enjoins as right, has stronger claims upon him than what is recommended as merely agreeable or advantageous; that duty is something more sacred than interest or pleasure: that virtue is a good of a higher order than gratification; that crime is something worse than outward loss? What means the admiration with which we follow the conscientious and disinterested man, and which grows strong in proportion to his sacrifices to duty? Is it not the testimony of our whole souls to the truth and greatness of good he has chosen? What means the feeling of abhorrence, which we cannot repress if we would, towards him who, by abusing confidence, trampling on weakness, or hardening himself against the appeals of mercy, has grown rich or great. Do we think that such a man has made a good bargain in bartering principle for wealth? Is prosperous fortune a balance for vice? In our deliberate moments, is there not a voice which pronounces his craft folly, and his success misery?

And to come nearer home, what conviction is it, which springs up most spontaneously in our more reflecting moments, when we look back without passion on our own lives? Can vice *stand* that calm look? Is there a sin-

gle wrong act, which we would not then rejoice to expunge from the unalterable records of our deeds? Do we ever congratulate ourselves on having despised the inward monitor, or revolted against God? To what portions of our history do we return most joyfully? Are they those in which we gained the world and lost the soul, in which temptation mastered our principles, which levity and sloth made a blank, or which a selfish and unprincipled activity made worse than a blank, in our existence; or are they those in which we suffered, but were true to conscience, in which we denied ourselves for duty, and sacrificed success through unwavering rectitude? In these moments of calm recollection, do not the very transgressions at which perhaps we once mocked, and which promised unmixed joy, recur to awaken shame and remorse. And do not shame and remorse involve a consciousness that we have sunk beneath our proper good? that our highest nature, which constitutes our true self, has been sacrificed to low interests and pursuits? I make these appeals confidently. I think my questions can receive but one answer. Now, these convictions and emotions, with which we witness moral evil in others, or recollect it in ourselves, these feelings towards guilt, which mere pain and suffering never excite, and which manifest themselves with more or less distinctness in all nations and all stages of society, these inward attestations that sin, wrong-doing, is a peculiar evil, for which no outward good can give adequate compensation, surely these deserve to be regarded as the voice of nature, the voice of God. They are accompanied with a peculiar consciousness of truth. They are felt to be our ornament and defence. Thus our nature teaches the doctrine of Christian-

ity that sin, or moral evil, ought of all evils to inspire most abhorrence and fear.

FUNERAL EXPENSES.

THE following extract is from the will of the late J. B. Estlin, Esq., of Bristol, a prominent Unitarian layman :

“ Anxious to mark my disapproval of the absurd waste of money that usually takes place on the occasion of a funeral, (money which in many cases can be ill afforded to be thus squandered,) I especially direct that my funeral expenses (exclusive of any sum necessarily employed about the family vault, for a leaden coffin, or for travelling, should I die from home), shall not exceed *twenty pounds*. If respect to the dead can only be shown by black feathers and black coaches, I am willing to pass to my resting place unrespected. As, however, my object is not to save money for my estate, and as, without these directions, an additional sum of forty pounds would probably be expended in heartless show, I direct that this latter named amount of forty pounds be distributed in charity as follows, viz. :— Ten pounds to the minister of St. George’s chapel near Park-street ; ten pounds to the minister of St. Augustine’s church ; ten pounds to the minister of the parish where I was born (St. Michael’s) and ten pounds to the minister of St. Paul’s church (all in Bristol.) To be distributed by them in small sums according to their discretion, to the deserving poor in their respective parishes.”

CALVINISM AND CHRISTIANITY.— John Calvin says that “ even infants bring their damnation with them from their mothers’ womb, — that their whole nature is, as it were a seed of Sin, so that it cannot be otherwise than odious and abominable to God.”

Jesus Christ says “ Suffer little children to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven.”

THE AUTHORITY AND INFLUENCE OF THE POPE.

THE authority of the Pope has, we fear, a much wider extent than most persons commonly imagine. We are not of those who systematically suspect statistics, but we are certain that the usual tables which are presented to indicate how many millions are Catholics in the world, and how many are Protestants, would be very unsafe guides on which to rely in determining the actual extent of the Papal influence. For there are two methods by which a controlling power may be exerted, which we had almost characterised as the direct and the indirect, but found our pen checked by the reflection that that which we were going to call the indirect had usually a force as direct as the other. Shall we call them positive and negative? These terms would be unsuitable also, for that which we might style negative would show at once by its results a positive power. The Pope is a direct and positive force in Christendom, wielding an influence not only over the millions of Catholics who confess themselves bound by papal law and usage, but also over multitudes of Protestants who decry his authority. In the former case the influence comes through *obedience to papal mandate* and church practice. In the latter case the influence comes through *prejudice against papal mandate* and church practice. In either case the influence is positive and direct. The good Catholic takes fish-fare on Friday. The good Protestant of the type referred to abjures fish-fare on Friday. He cannot endure it. It is "popish." He thinks all Protestants ought to beware in such matters. A man who eats fish on one Friday may soon come to like it, and then to eat fish on every Friday. The step

from this to keeping Lent is natural and easy. And thus a way is opened for all abominations.

Quite recently we have had in this city an animated discussion concerning the use of the organ in the services of public worship. A very respectable ecclesiastical body had it formally presented to them that a congregation of their number had placed an organ in their church. This was clearly an innovation, and seemed to be a hard stroke to the feelings and prejudices of some members present. One speaker said "that whenever he went into a church and saw and heard an organ, he was completely undone. He did not think the organ could understand the music which it sends forth in praise of God. If they should have any instrument, he'd sooner have the fiddle." In this gentleman's case it is evident that the presence of an organ would be a hindrance to worship, through the effect its sight and sound would have on his sensibilities. He evidently believes that his own organs of speech are intelligent members, and transfers to the throat the functions which are usually ascribed to the brain, or some more inscrutable part. For it is on this that his main argument against the organ rests. And he prefers the fiddle because he is more used to it, which is very natural. The next speaker was better. He "lifted up his testimony against the organ, not that he disliked the organ, but its use and effects in church. He thought that where the organ was, the voices were silenced, and he quite agreed with Mr. T. respecting the fiddle." The third speaker rose to the level of common sense. "He thought the introduction of the organ would offend unnecessarily, and that at present they were not prepared for its introduction on account of the many prejudices which exist."

Now we are of those who would deal tenderly with prejudices, and should not willingly offend them, except for some clearly adequate cause. But it would be a great injustice to all concerned to accept the utterances of prejudice as the arguments of reason, or pretend to accept them as such. For this would be to rivet the prejudices tighter, whereas it is our duty to loosen them as best we can. "No innovations should be easily admitted," says yet another speaker, "for in such a case there is no saying to what extent they might be carried." This is the common cry of the Pope-dreading Protestant, and has its parallel in the fish-fare case just alluded to. But it is wholly anti-Protestant in character and principle. For Protestantism, in its whole history as such, is an innovation. Its life is to be found, not in fixity of forms, and usages, and modes of conception; but in progress and developement — in the adjustment of all forms, and usages, and modes of conception, to the existing wants of human society, so that the gospel may have free course and be glorified in every succeeding generation. We must be guided in this question "by the example of our Lord and his apostles," said one of the speakers. This is true, but not in the way he would apply it. It is true — for our Lord and his apostles adapted themselves to the circumstances of their time in their modes of worship — sometimes meeting with the Jews in the synagogue, and sometimes meeting by themselves, or with other disciples in the room of a private house. Here the Master "spake as never man spake," and when he was removed the apostles uttered their living thoughts in the most free and familiar way, sometimes in one place and sometimes in another, to convert and convince. The first disciples, as we read, continued daily with one accord in the Jewish

Temple, and breaking bread from house to house, did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart.

It is entirely false and misleading, therefore, to urge any such argument as that of the custom of Christ and his apostles either for or against any mode of worship in the present day. We are not here speaking of doctrines, which are a very different matter. If in modes of worship we were to act according to their example, and return to their "simplicity," we should not only have to discard organs, but pews and pulpits, and written sermons, and many things beside, and adopt some others which we should not regard as simple at all. We remember once when an individual, in his horror of a clergyman's gown, which he looked upon as a remnant of Popery, indignantly demanded to know if ever St. Paul preached in a black silk gown? he was quietly answered by another question, viz. :— whether St. Paul ever preached in a swallow-tail black broadcloth coat?

The climax of the anti-organ argument was reached by still another speaker, who said. "It strikes me we are bordering on a tremendous heresy. If we live to see another year, hymns will be introduced, [It must be understood here that the Psalms of David, not according to the authorised version, but according to the authorised versification, constitute their standard ritual for singing,] and as sin is progressive, in a third or fourth year we shall have an altar and image in our church if the present innovation be countenanced. What would our worthy fathers say? What would John Knox say?" What with the fear of John Knox in the past, *we* say, and the Pope in the future, it is evident that this good Protestant's Protestant right of private judgment is a considerably straitened

in the present. It was said some time ago, but since contradicted, that the British war ships entered Kertsch in the wake of a boat which carried in the Russian Governor's carriage. But just think of the Pope taking possession of a stronghold of Calvinism under cover of an organ! His Holiness would take his soundings with unsanctified hymns, and speedily laud the symbols of complete conquest. The man who has these notions must have little confidence in the Protestantism of his church, great confidence in the vigor and power of Popery, and a conviction of the strong proclivities of his sect to the abominations of Rome. He is evidently a rapid progressionist of the bugbear school. He would go from fish-eating on Friday to full Lent-keeping in a twelvemonth, and by the next year there is no telling where he would, or would not be. To be sure there are Protestant churches who have had organs and hymns for three centuries, and are no nearer Popery than when they started. But the bugbear of the Pope stands between him and the light of plain fact, and he would give his church only three or four single years to stand out against the enemy.

Such exhibitions of foolery and fear make us almost ashamed of the results of Protestantism. They demonstrate the absence of any proper faith in the Protestant principle of freedom. Have the rising generations of free born Christian men, no spiritual force in them — can they be sure of no Christian guidance from the Christian Scriptures — to keep them from being sucked into the gulf of Popery if they unsettle the tacklings of any creed or custom of their fathers? Is there no other centre of spiritual attraction than the chair of Peter, upon the earth? This is just what the Pope-fearing Protestant always as-

sumes ; and the most thorough going Romanist can claim no more. We deny it utterly. There are intellectual, and moral, and spiritual forces upon the earth far stronger than the Pope, and in them we place our faith as against him. To us he is no longer the vicar of Omnipotence, or an object of dread in any sense. He shall cast no shadow of authority or influence over our spirit either through our obedience or our prejudice. We will take fish when we please, we will use organs when we see fit, we will have our church ritual as we think best, without any reference to him whatsoever. We will not permit him to work upon us either through our love, our fear, or our hate. To us he shall neither be spiritual father, nor spiritual bugbear.

The hard, un-Christian, anti-popery prejudices cherished by some Protestants are a shame and scandal to Protestantism. Even the graces of an apostolic piety will hardly shield their possessor from vulgar mocking if the Pope has chanced to put his name in the calendar. Thomas Carlyle in his eloquent "pleadings," referring to the force of such prejudices in his native land, says, that in many a parish church the sight of a cross would fill the pious with alarm.* The affecting symbol of the Redeemer's suffering awakens only feelings of hostility. Can the force of hard and narrow prejudice farther go? We know not how far such prejudice could go, for it has no rational law either for its guide or its limit. We pray and labor for the deliverance of Protestantism from its power. Protestantism has within it the elements of spiritual growth and spiritual grandeur, but not until such prejudice and such fear as we have referred to in this article, are entirely cast out, can these receive their proper development, and

* Pleadings with my Mother: the Church of Scotland. By Thomas Carlyle. p. 96.

bear their legitimate fruits. Protestantism has a good many mistakes to rectify, into which it has been led through its dread of Popery, once reasonable enough, but now no longer reasonable. It has to become more humane, more enlarged, more Protestant in its spirit, and its methods. It must become more Protestant, and less Popish, by ceasing to put authoritative restraint upon the freedom of its individual churches and members. For this authoritative interference with individual freedom is the essence of Popery. Where shall the innovation stop? is no question for Protestantism. Protestants have solemnly, and before the world, undertaken to exercise their right of judging for themselves by the lights of reason and scripture, and innovation will always stop just where it ought to stop, *i. e.*, where the sober judgment of every existing generation of Protestants shall determine. Protestantism is not bound by tradition or custom. Every generation of Protestants stands free before God to judge according to its own light. To say otherwise is to deny the first principle of Protestantism. As we have already said, the life of Protestantism is to be found in the adjustment of all forms, usages, and modes of conception to the present and existing wants of humanity, so that the blessed doctrines of the gospel may have free course and be glorified in every present and existing generation of men. Herein it stands in contrast with the papal method, which is to fix the doctrine in a rigid form which is gradually outgrown, and through which it is deprived of its spiritual vitality and force.

Our own position is this. We do not render the Pope any special service of love, fear, or hate. We stand free of his authority in every respect, and feel that he has no

influence over us for better or worse. We should accept the doctrine of transubstantiation to-morrow, if we saw just reason to do so, without any reference to him whatsoever. The papal power committed its worst wrongs against humanity, when humanity could not defend itself, nor assert its rights. A million printing presses are now at work. In view of these we are relieved from serious fear of Pope or popery. And if all Protestants would only come to our ground in this matter, the range of the Pope's influence in the world would be speedily contracted.

INTELLIGENCE.

WESTERN UNITARIAN CONVENTION.

THIS body convened at the Unitarian church on Niagara Street, Buffalo, on Thursday morning, June 14, Rev. G. W. Hosmer, of Buffalo, in the Chair, and Rev. W. D. Haley of Alton, Ill., Secretary.

The following is a list of the Delegates present:— Detroit, 8; Louisville, 22; Chicago, 1; Quincy, 1; Peoria, 3; Austinsburgh, O., 3; Kalamazoo, 1; Rockford, 1; Marietta, 2; St. Louis, 16; Syracuse, 1; Brooklyn, 4; San Francisco, 1; Meadville, 19; Cincinnati, 10; Geneva, 4; Alton, 1; Cleveland, 5; Jackson, 1; Pittsburgh, 2; Columbus, 2; Boston, 6; New York, 7; Sandwich Islands, 1;

Previous to the opening of the Conference, the President, in an eloquent and feeling address, bade a hearty welcome to the guests, who had come from all parts of the union to join in this Annual Celebration. He referred to the time, some twenty five years since, in Boston, when it was talked of sending a missionary of the Unitarian Church, beyond the Hudson river, to the west, to see if there was in that section any opportunities for missionaries to work effectively in promoting the cause. One was sent, who after a time came back, and reported no great prospect of success. As he looked last night and this morning upon the assemblage that had come together,

he could not but be forcibly struck with the contrast exhibited.

Rev. C. A. Staples of Meadville, Pa.; Rev. Mr. Livermore of Cincinnati; Rev. Mr. Mayo of Cleveland; Rev. Mr. Moulton of Austinsburg, Ohio; Rev. Mr. Styles of Jefferson, O.; Mr. Ward of Marietta; Dr. Eels, Superintendent of the Insane Asylum at Columbus; Rev. Mr. Mumford of Detroit; Rev. D. A. Russell of Kalamazoo; Rev. R. R. Shippen of Chicago; Rev. Mr. Conant of Geneva, Ill.; Rev. Mr. McFarland of Peoria, Ill.; Rev. W. D. Haley of Alton, Ill.; Rev. J. Heywood of Louisville; S. A. Ranlett, Esq., of St. Louis; Rev. G. W. Hosmer of Buffalo; Rev. S. M. Fowler of Jackson, Michigan; Rev. J. F. Clarke of Milwaukee; Rev. Mr. Bond of Sandwich Islands and San Francisco; and Rev. Mr. May of Syracuse, occupied the forenoon and afternoon sessions in giving reports of the progress and state of Liberal Christianity in the respective localities they represented, which were of the most cheerful and encouraging description.

In the evening the Conference assembled at the American Hall, to enjoy a season of social religious communion. The ladies of Dr. Hosmer's congregation had exerted themselves to make the scene of festivity worthy of those who were to enjoy it. An elegant and bountiful repast, decorated with flowers, occupied the table; at which over four hundred persons, ladies and gentlemen, sat down. The Rev. Mr. Hayward of Louisville; Rev. Mr. Osgood of New York; Rev. Dr. Miles; Rev. Mr. Livermore of Cincinnati; Rev. Mr. Mumford of Detroit; Rev. J. F. Clarke, Rev. Dr. Lothrop; Rev. Dr. Bellows of New York; Rev. Mr. May of Syracuse; and Dr. Stebbins of Meadville were the speakers on this occasion.

The conference was continued on Friday and Saturday, and was occupied with the reading and discussion of reports and resolutions.

On Thursday, Friday, and Saturday Mornings, at 8 o'clock, meetings for prayer and Conference were held. On Friday evening there was a social reunion at Dr. Hosmer's residence. On Saturday evening there were religious service, and sermon by Rev. A. A. Livermore. On Sunday there were three services. In the afternoon Mr. McFarland was ordained as pastor of the New Society at Peoria.

The discourse in the evening was by Rev. Dr. Lothrop, after which there was administration of the Lord's Supper.