

IN ALLIANCE

An Oral History of Canadian Involvement in NATO

by Roger Hill

December 1991

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A record of Canadian involvement in NATO, and Western defence efforts and diplomacy: interviews with twelve senior public servants, diplomats and military officers.

by Roger Hill,
Senior Research Fellow,
Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security

December, 1991

To the contributors and all who worked on this study

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> A research project of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa

PREFACE

These transcripts owe a great deal to many people.

The idea of recording the experiences and views of senior Canadian public servants, diplomats and military officers involved in NATO and NATO-related affairs was developed by Geoffrey Pearson, the first Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. The work continued under his successor, Bernard Wood, the Institute's present Chief Executive Officer.

David Cox was helpful in launching the study. As the Institute's Director of Research from 1984 to 1987, he also participated in a number of the interviews.

Professors Jack Granatstein of York University and Robert Bothwell of Toronto University provided helpful advice on interview techniques and transcript preparation.

David Karsgaard of the Department of External Affairs assisted in providing access to the NATO files, for some of the preparatory background work. John Hilliker and Dacre Cole of the Historical Section were also very helpful.

The interviews themselves were conducted under contract in the summer of 1987. Nancy Pawelek, Editor, and Eleanor Fielding, Secretary, both of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign trade, actively assisted with preparatory work and interviews.

The heavy task of transcribing the interview tapes and preparing the first drafts of the transcripts was carried out by A.S.A.P. word processing service. This was done under a small additional contract, and the Institute is grateful to Lynne Anderson, President, and all her staff, for the great effort that went in to that phase of the work.

Thereafter, Doina Cioiu, Institute Research Administrator, took on the major responsibility of shepherding the transcripts through the following drafts, and in-putting most of the corrections. Her hard work and commitment to the project were invaluable. Her efforts are greatly appreciated.

Mary Taylor, Institute Editor, also contributed greatly by editing and reviewing one draft of the texts.

Other Institute staff who helped with various parts of the work include Cecile Sicard, Secretary, and John McLeod, Research Assistant.

The Contributors also participated actively in the review and revision process, by examining all texts and recommending necessary changes.

A special word of thanks is owed to Escott Reid, former Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, for a conversation about Canadian efforts to promote world peace and order in the Post-War Period and, later, to establish the North Atlantic Treaty. Published works by Mr. Reid that have provided very helpful insights include: On Duty, describing the work of establishing the United Nations, particularly in 1945 and 1946; Time of Hope and Fear: The Making of the

North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-49; and "Strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance," <u>International Perspectives</u>, November/December issue, 1985.

Thanks are also due to Charles Ritchie, former Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, for some helpful comments on his experiences of NATO.

The process was an arduous and complex one, interspersed by other work on substantive issues and administrative matters. However, the material itself contains a wealth of information and insights, which hopefully will appeal to the interested public as well as to the dedicated student of Canadian foreign policy, of NATO, and of international affairs in general.

Roger Hill
Senior Research Fellow

INTRODUCTION

World order is a critical issue on today's international agenda. Once again Canadian and other public figures and diplomats are facing a rapidly changing world and contemplating how best to manage it. They are watching the upheaval in the Soviet Union, trying to come to grips with major developments in the remainder of Europe, discussing modifications in Western defence arrangements, and considering greater reliance on the United Nations for the promotion of global stability. Many UN members sent military forces recently to the Persian Gulf to turn back Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and so participated in a major effort to uphold and strengthen the international system by firm resistance to aggression.

This is a time to consider what Canada and other UN members can now do to uphold world order and promote international peace and security. We need to take stock of Canada's position and standing in the world, and to reflect on the possibilities that lie before this country for influencing the march of events. Canada has a long-standing interest in international peace and security and well-established connections through such bodies as NATO and the United Nations. This country will surely want to play its full part in the important international endeavours that now lie ahead.

In doing so, we should not forget that Canada has been actively involved in the quest for world stability, peace and order for a good fifty years. The work on current international structures began in the thick of the Second World War in an exercise known as Post Hostilities Planning; and continued over the next few years as discussions focussed on a new United Nations system. Canada was a founding member and active supporter of the new global organization, and looked to it in the immediate Post-War period as the keystone of a new international security system.

The more ambitious hopes for the United Nations were soon disappointed owing to the rapidly growing rift between the Soviet Union and the Western world. This paralyzed the Security Council. The UN action in Korea in the early 1950s was an exception to the rule occasioned by Soviet withdrawal for a brief time from Security Council decision-making. Henceforth - until the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 - United Nations military action in attempts to uphold order or contain regional disputes was largely focussed on the new device of peacekeeping. Canada has played a full role in that endeavour, serving with the great majority of UN and similar peacekeeping missions.

With the dissipation of the original hopes for the United Nations, Canada's attention turned to alternative arrangements. Together with the United States and several West European countries, Canada participated in the establishment, in the late-1940s, of the North Atlantic Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Set up in 1949, this new system was designed to reassure Western Europe about its security; guarantee the defence of the North Atlantic area; reaffirm democratic ideals among the member states; and promote well-being and a sense of community.

The North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950, prompted fears that the Soviet Union and international Communism were becoming militantly expansionist. This not only triggered a collective military response in Korea; it also raised concerns about the security of other regions including Western Europe. Collective defence arrangements in Europe were accordingly strengthened, and over the next year a Canadian infantry brigade and twelve squadrons of aircraft were sent to Europe to join other allied forces there.

Since those early days, Canada has actively participated in the work of NATO, especially at the military and political levels. Canada has maintained forces in Germany, and also contributed other naval, land and air units to the defence of the North Atlantic and North America. This country has also played a very active role in the management of inter-allied relationships, and in the collective work of expanding diplomatic contacts with the East. In addition, in pursuit of its interest in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty - which advocates enhanced co-operation among the members at the non-military level - Canada has played its full part in NATO's work on economic issues, environmental concerns, and scientific and technological exchanges.

This forty years of work in NATO constitutes a major Canadian contribution to international peace and security. It has promoted the stability and prosperity of Western Europe, and helped to bring about the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe which now promise an entirely new future of East-West co-operation.

At the same time, participating in NATO has been beneficial for Canada. It has assured Canada's own defence - across the Atlantic and also directly for our own territory - and it has provided Canada with a pole of inter-relationships which help this country to reaffirm its own distinctness. In NATO, Canada has maintained linkages with the West European countries which have helped to counter-balance, to some degree, its very close and intense relationship with the United States.

So when we look at the future of Atlantic affairs, East-West relations, and world order, we need to recall that there is already in existence this whole body of experience and knowledge built up over almost half a century. It is important to examine the record, as well as staring into the future.

We also need to recall that this history of Canadian involvement in NATO and NATO-related issues is, above all, a human enterprise. Canadian people pursued Canadian policies - hacked out collective positions with other allied diplomats in NATO Headquarters, negotiated with their Warsaw Pact counterparts, or flew planes off aircraft carriers in the mid-Atlantic. The story of Canada's contribution to NATO is a record of great endeavour by government ministers and many dedicated and hard-working public servants, diplomats, military officers and service personnel.

Little of this story is publicly known. Some public figures and a few former ambassadors write autobiographies or comments on their work, but the vast majority of public servants and military personnel do not. They do their work and then hand over to their successors, leaving no formal record even after half a lifetime of activity.

The present transcripts aim at capturing a small part of this experience. They set out the recollections and perceptions of more than a dozen Canadians about the major events in NATO's history, and about Canada's efforts in such related fields as defence policy, East-West relations, and the pursuit of world order.

The group are all former public servants, diplomats or senior military officers. They do not include former ministers, although there were plans to do so at one stage if the work had proceeded into a second round of interviews. A second round would also have included, hopefully, a senior air force officer, the current Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, and additional senior officials involved in Canadian defence planning.

All who did participate had immensely rich and varied careers, including periods of NATO or NATO-related work where they played key roles in consultations on such issues as the modernization of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the control of conventional armed forces in Europe, events in Poland, or defence spending in Canada.

The interviews were all conducted in the summer of 1987. They were done as a set of biographies, following each person's career from one location and issue to another, and focussing most heavily on the periods of NATO or NATO-related activity. The questions were carefully prepared in advance so that the discussions focussed on critical issues as much as possible. However, the approach was not a rigid or dry one; the aim was to encourage spontaneous comment as well as careful reflection, and to bring out a true sense of affairs rather than a point-by-point debate over this or that particular document.

The transcripts are contained in the main body of this study, entitled: "The Record". They are divided into three parts, according to the main focus of each person's career in NATO and NATO-related affairs. Thus John Holmes, George Ignatieff, Geoffrey Pearson, Robert Cameron and George Grande are grouped in Part I, because their main involvement in NATO and NATO-related affairs was with the establishment of the Treaty, the years in Paris, East-West relations, or arms control negotiations. Group II were all involved directly in Canada's defence effort; and Group III were all Canadian ambassadors to the North Atlantic Council (NATO) in Brussels.

However, this division into groups should not be taken too literally. People's careers overlapped from one phase of NATO acivity to another, as they advanced through various stages and changed functions from one area of activity to another. For example, James Taylor saw NATO from a range of perspectives -

as a delegation member in Paris in the early-1960s, as a diplomat in Moscow, as Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council (NATO) in Brussels, and as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa. The other participants all had similar, broad-ranging careers.

On a personal note, the interviews were at all times a great pleasure to conduct. The participants were invariably outward-looking and forthcoming, as devoted to a truthful recounting of the record as they had been earlier to the effective performance of their duties. They represent Canadian public policy at its best - committed, skillful and imaginative, and without stridency or an absorbtion with panaceas. These practicioners were never simplistic or hawkish - they were, instead, dedicated and thoughtful.

Two participants who stood out among their generation have passed away since the interviews took place. All who knew them regret profoundly the loss of John Holmes and George Ignatieff, two great Canadians who contributed so much to the reputation of this country and to the pursuit of stability, harmony and peace in the world. This study is one further way of remembering them.

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PART III AMBASSADORS TO THE NORTH ATALTIC COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS

Ross Campbell Arthur Menzies John Halstead James Taylor

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Group I

John Holmes. National Secretary and other positions with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA), 1940-43. Department of External Affairs, 1943-60. Positions included Assistant Under-Secretary, 1953-60. Returned to CIIA in 1960. Also held professorships at the University of Toronto and York University.

George Ignatieff. Department of External Affairs, from 1940 to the early 1970s. Positions included Assistant Under-Secretary, and Ambassador to Yugoslavia, the North Atlantic Council (in Paris), the United Nations, and the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). Subsequently Provost of Trinity College, University of Toronto.

Geoffrey Pearson. Department of External Affairs, 1952-1984. Served with the Canadian Embassy in Paris during 1953-57 and with the NATO Secretariat in Paris during 1958-61. Other positions included Advisor on Arms Control and Disarmament, 1978-80; and Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1980-83. First Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1984-89.

Robert Cameron. Served with the Canadian army during World War II. Department of External Affairs, 1947-83. Positions included Assistant Under-Secretary; Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria; Ambassador to Poland; and Director General of the Bureau of Defence and Arms Control Affairs. Two terms as diplomat-in-residence, at the University of British Columbia and the University of Toronto.

George Grande. Served with the armed forces in World War II. Department of External Affairs, 1945-79. Positions included Ambassador to Norway and Iceland, 1968-72; first Canadian Ambassador to the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, Vienna, 1973-76; and Ambassador to South Africa, 1976-79. Subsequent work as columnist and editorial writer.

Group II

Robert Falls. Navy pilot during World War II. Afterwards served with the Royal Canadian Navy until 1983. Postings included command of a fighter squadron, a destroyer, and an aircraft carrier. Commander of the Atlantic Fleet. Rose to Chief of the Defence Staff, with the rank of Admiral. Chairman of the NATO Military Committee in Brussels. Since retirring from the service, has been President of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in Ottawa.

Charles Belzile. Canadian Armed Forces, 1953-86. Served in Korea, Cyprus, Germany and Canada. Commands and positions included the Second Battalion, Royal Twenty Second Regiment; Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany; Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, NATO Central Army Group, Mannheim; Canadian Forces Europe (CFE); Chief, Land Doctrine and Operations, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa; and Mobile Command in Canada. General Belzile has subsequently worked in private industry.

Charles Nixon. After studying electrical engineering, entered service with the Royal Canadian Navy in 1949, served in Korea, and then pursued a military career. Held senior positions with the Department of Industry during 1963-64 and at the Privy Council Office during 1965-75. Deputy Minister of National Defence, 1975-82. Subsequent work as consultant in Ottawa.

Group III

Ross Campbell. Naval service during World War II. Department of External Affairs, 1944-75. Positions included Assistant Under-Secretary; Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Algeria; Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, 1967-72; and Ambassador to Japan and Korea, 1972-75. President of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Has worked susequently as a consultant in Ottawa.

Arthur Menzies. Department of External Affairs, 1940-82. Service prior to 1972 included senior positions in Japan, Malaysia, Australia, and as Head of the Defence Liaison Division in Ottawa. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, 1972-76. Ambassador to China and Vietnam, 1976-80. Ambassador for Disarmament, 1980-82.

John Halstead. Service with the armed forces during World War II. Department of External Affairs, 1946-82. Served in Tokyo, New York and Paris. Head of the European Division, 1966-71. Other positions included: Assistant Under-Secretary, Deputy Under-Secretary, and Acting Under-Secretary, all between 1971 and 1975; Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1975-80; and Ambassador to the North Atlantc Council, 1980-82. Subsequent work in public affairs and teaching.

James Taylor. Department of External Affairs, 1953-present. Served in Paris in 1961-64 with the delegations to NATO and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Subsequently served with the Canadian embassy in Moscow. Then as Director General of European Affairs in Ottawa, Assistant Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretary, all between 1976 and 1982. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, 1982-85. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1985-89. Ambassador to Japan, 1989-present.

The Interviewers

Roger Hill. Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 1964-68. Political Advisor, NATO Secretariat, Brussels, 1968-73. Taught international studies at Queen's University and the Royal Military College, Kingston, 1973-75. Deputy Director, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, 1976-87. Director of Research, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1987-90; Senior Research Fellow, the Institute, 1990-present.

David Cox. Lecturer in Political Science, University of Alberta, Calgary, 1963-67. Assistant Professor and Associate Professor of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, 1967-present, specializing in teaching and research on international security and defence issues. Also Director Of Research, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1984-87.

Nancy Pawelek. Editor, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa, 1984-87. Executive Director, Watercan, Ottawa, 1987-90. Staff officer, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 1990-present.

Charles Nixon. After specified suggestions, entered service with the Royal Canadian Navy in 1949, served in Korea, and then pursued a military career, Held serior positions with the Department of Industry during 1965-75, and at the Privy Council Office during 1965-75. Departs Minister of National Industry, 1975-61. Subsequent work as consultant in Ottava_{butter}.

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PART I

WORLD ORDER, ATLANTIC AFFAIRS AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

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WORLD ORDER, ATLANTIC AFFAIRS AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

JOHN HOLMES

[HILL] Good morning. Our guest this morning is Professor John Holmes. We are very pleased indeed that you could join us today Professor Holmes and we are delighted with your readiness to participate in this project. Professor Holmes, as you know, what we are engaging in here is an oral history of Canadian policy in NATO. We are trying to examine the development of Canadian interest in NATO over time and also some of the detailed work inside the NATO organization. However, our approach is not a narrow one focusing on the drafting of this or that particular document at NATO headquarters, but rather a broader effort to look at the development of Canada's foreign policy interests, in both the immediate and long-term senses, for example as a means of pursuing the goal of general international peace and security. So we were very keen to have you with us, owing to your involvement in Canadian foreign policy and international affairs, both as a member of the Department of External Affairs and as a researcher, writer and teacher. The way we will approach this interview is to take the main phases in your career, more or less in chronological order, and to ask some questions about the principal issues which arose in each period, as you saw them at the time or as you have described or assessed them since then. We are interested not only in information and explanation, of course, but also in your reflections about the specific issues or general themes of foreign policy or world affairs.

First of all, we normally start with a little bit of biography for the sake of the reader. I note that you began your working life as English Master at Pickering College from 1933 to '38, served as Information Secretary to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs 1940 to 1941, and as National Secretary of the CIIA from 1941 to 1943. You joined External Affairs in 1943 and served first as secretary of the Working Committee on Post Hostilities Problems. There you worked on the question of post war international structures and related issues, if I am not mistaken. From 1944 to 1947 your were at the Canadian High Commission in London, from 1947 to '48 the Chargé d'Affaires at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow, and in 1949-51 head of the United Nations Division of External Affairs. In 1950 you went to the United Nations as Canada's acting permanent representative. Subsequently you served two years on the directing staff of Canada's Nation Defense College and then served as Assistant Under-Secretary of state for External Affairs in Ottawa from 1953 to 1960. Then came more than a decade as Research Director and Director General of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In 1967 you were also appointed professor of international relations at the University of Toronto, and in 1971 to a professorship of international relations at Glendon College in York University. If I may say so, this is quite a career, and I haven't even said yet what you did in any of those periods.

[HOLMES] Survived...

[HILL] I should also like to mention at the outset that I will refer on a number of occasions during the interview to one of your recent contributions to the study of international affairs, that is to say Volumes One and Two of: "The Shaping of Peace - Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957." Perhaps later on, in the second interview, we will also mention other more recent pieces dealing with Canada's relations with NATO and so on. On "The Shaping of Peace," it had, if I may say so, a lot of illuminating things to say about Canadian policy, particularly in the 1940s and 1950s, especially with respect to the establishment of the United Nations and NATO.

Interviewers: Hill, Cox, Pawelek. Interview dates: 24/3/87 and 26/4/87.

Part I - The Early Years, to 1943

[HILL] If we could turn now to the first part of the interview, which is Part One, this deals with your early years and career, which is up to 1943. Professor Holmes, you were born in London, Ontario and I believe grew up in Ontario.

[HOLMES] Yes.

[HILL] You attended the University of Western Ontario and graduated with a BA in 1932. You took an MA at the University of Toronto and then went on to teach at Pickering College in 1933, remaining there until 1938. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about those early years and particularly how they affected your outlook on the world and on international affairs especially.

[HOLMES] I suppose perhaps the most revealing thing was, I think, when I was an undergraduate at Western. I was president, I think founder, of the League of Nations Society, and I was very much caught up in that movement. When I look back on it, I realize how incredibly naive we were, but nevertheless, like I think most young people of that period, there was this enormous worry about the way the world was hurtling. I can remember holding a special assembly at the University to celebrate the Kellogg-Briand Pact. We tried to hold a mock disarmament conference. We were groping around. I was very much in that tradition of looking for world order. The influence of spending 5 years at a Quaker College too, strengthened that very great interest in international relations. Then I was at the University of London in the year before the war, and when it broke out, which was rather a strong experience. I arrived in Glasgow the day after the Munich agreement. What I recall is sitting up late at night celebrating. I had the usual ambivalence; I didn't think appeasement was a very good idea but I was exceedingly glad there wasn't going to be a war tomorrow. And we all swarmed up in the first class. One of the things I had to do that night I remember was help get a rather drunken Sir Frederick Banting to bed. He was celebrating too much. That was very much the mood, but a lot of it was simply related to the fact that we had had a rather scary trip, and we were going to land and the sun was shining and that sort of thing. That year we went through the hope and then the gradual despair.

[HILL] That was very common, was it not? People were very conscious at that time of international affairs. That sounds very trite now, but I believe there was very much a sense that things were going wrong.

[HOLMES] Yes. I think one of the errors looking back, so it seems to me, is the idea that the appeasers were all a bunch of anti-semitic pro-Nazi people, sponsored by the Cliveden set; most of the appeasers were appeasers because it was only 20 years after Passchendaele, it was really a hatred and fear of war; you'd do almost anything to put it off. That has been lost now. That isn't an argument that appeasement was the right policy. It's just an attempt to straighten out the motivation.

[HILL] In your own background you mentioned teaching at Pickering. Are you a Quaker yourself?

[HOLMES] No, I am not.

[HILL] At that time I believe there was a deep interest in, and awareness of, the world around, and in doing things about it.

[HOLMES] Of course, in that period too, the Spanish Civil War was very much for our generation like Vietnam for a later generation. You took rather strong sides and rather simple views on it. You were for or against evil. I don't think I ever was a pacifist, but anti-war and pretty mixed up. I think the best comment on that period was when Frank Underhill said, the truth was that we were all wrong. It's very difficult to pick up the people in the '30s who had a very clear idea of the future and without contradictions.

[HILL] Yes, I think you mentioned that in your book, that quote by Underhill. I was struck by it at the time. I have the impression also that the Depression was something which affected everyone, and yourself no less than everybody else.

[HOLMES] Yes. Sometimes, young people now that I talk to - one of the problems is a loss of faith in anything. I'm not sure that is an anarchical attitude, but looking back to the '30s, there was a simple solution to everything and that was Socialism. And if only we could get to that. That wasn't only people on the left, it was just so logical, so simple a solution to the problems of unemployment; if we could plan everything. And so you had that feeling that there was a way to stop wars and to stop poverty and unemployment, things like that. And the difference now is that the young people now are so much more sophisticated, because socialism has been tried in so many different forms and it isn't the answer and neither, I would hasten to say, is something called Capitalism, if that exists. So it was a simplistic time - and I'm happy that the kinds of experiences I had, particularly in the Post Hostilities Planning Group in the Department helped complicate life - complicated one's attitudes.

[HILL] What about the two years you spent in London? Did you travel? Of course, then, the war broke out, but prior to that, did you go to the Continent at all?

[Holmes] I was in rural France, the Loire Valley, I remember, when they started mobilizing. It reminded me of movies of 1914; people coming into the villages bringing their horses and whatnot and posters going up, and the first night that the lights went down in Paris, so it was a frightening time. But then of course we got back to London and everything was closed down and the University had moved to Aberystwyth and the period of the phony war was on. So eventually after a couple of months I came back to Canada. Nobody seemed to be doing anything and then I started working at the CIIA at that time; I just started the public education programme. I stayed there until I was taken on as a wartime temporary in External. At the time they were taking anybody who had flat feet or poor eyesight. They couldn't take people who were eligible for military service but I had poor eyesight and a little knowledge of international relations. I was recruited as a wartime temporary.

Part II - External Affairs, 1943-44

[HILL] Did you have any further comment on the period at the CIIA? What was your main function and what was the mood of the membership?

[HOLMES] Within the CIIA there has always been what one might call a nationalist group, - I don't like the word imperialist - although some of them probably were rather old-fashioned imperialists. Most of them were somewhat internationalist. The war had reconciled people very much. I think there weren't very many people who opposed the war effort. The nationalists, who had been opposed in principle to Canada's partly getting involved in a British war, as they pictured it, went along, pretty well. It was partly the realisation the war was on and that we were in it, so there was not much point in arguing. But also, I think, it was a move away from the naive expectation that Canada could remain outside a war. And if we are going to be in it, why we had

better do our best. It was 1941 - 1943 when I was there. Also, there were people there who were already saying that we had to have a better world afterwards, who talked about it and showed interest in it. And then there were the ones who said we've got a war to win, we can't take time off to plan the future unless we win the war. But one felt a little out of things at home and the prospect of getting involved a little more and getting abroad was interesting, especially because at that point in Ottawa they had decided that we were going to win the war. It was going to take quite a long while, but now with the Americans and Soviets and everybody in, the war would be won, and it was legitimate. The first thing I was assigned to do by Hume Wrong, who was my master and mentor, was to work a month or more on a long memorandum pulling together views from parliament, views throughout Canada, on the future of world order and Canadian attitudes towards what we were to do and that kind of thing. And then we set up this Post Hostilities Planning Committee. That was really inspired by the British, who had set up a Post Hostility Planning Committee, and sent a memorandum to Commonwealth countries and wanted some of our responses. So we had to organize to get some responses. This was a departmental committee with the armed services involved and others; and that was when we really started post-war planning. First of all we were more concerned with the peace settlement, organization for occupation, for a peace treaty and that kind of thing. Then, when the great powers started designing a new United Nations, we began to give our attention to that. I think one of the interesting things here is that, in spite of the fact that everybody kept talking of the "failure" of the League, that was their favorite phrase, I don't think that at any time anybody doubted that we would try that again. There were all sorts of arguments about the shape of it - particularly as far as we were concerned about the role of the great powers - but that there would be one was just taken for granted. I never remember having to argue it. And I don't remember people opposing it. Mackenzie King was never all that keen on the League or the UN, but I think he always realized that the public wanted it, that what's more the great powers were going to have a UN and that we would either be in it or out of it.

[HILL] I was struck by that in your book. You mentioned that there was a general sentiment of that kind. But it wasn't naive, a "going in with your eyes closed" approach: it was an expectation that one would set up structures and then they would have to be adjusted to fit situations as they developed. So it was a relatively realistic policy.

[HOLMES] I can remember that. It's something I am trying to reconstruct, my own thinking. I was so much influenced by Hume Wrong, I never know what I thought and what I just got from him. You know I was showing some of my students the other day who were doing something on the Commonwealth, a record of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in 1944. It was a time when the Australians were putting forth proposals for a Commonwealth Secretariat and there was talk of a more united Commonwealth foreign policy. Mackenzie King didn't like that at all. He made the kind of definitive statement on this in the Prime Ministers' meeting, to argue for a new kind of Commonwealth. And as I recall it, Norman Robertson came back to the Dorchester one day at lunch and said to me: "We've got to have a statement; write it". And I scrawled it out in pencil, with Norman's brilliant changes in pen. I still have it, along with Mackenzie King's, with the text as he gave it, and I was showing this to my students. A couple who were working on it were quite interested in this. And I looked at it and I said, you know, it's a very good speech, but that was spirit-writing on my part, I was so indoctrinated by Hume Wrong that I was using his phrases. I really don't claim credit for a rather good speech. He, intellectually, had a tremendous hold over me, and I think that mixture of realism and idealism that he had, I see even today. Memoranda in External seem to come out of that spirit. This is probably a diversion.

[HILL] In fact I wanted to ask you a bit about personalities. It seems to me that in that period, from about 1941 on, people were already assuming that the war was already going to be won, and

of course by 1942, although there were obvious set-backs, things like Singapore and one thing and another, the very bad years, but nonetheless the planning for the post-war period went ahead. The establishment of the United Nations became a key focus of Canadian foreign policy in that period. And this was something that came partly from the senior officials. I think you mentioned that Mackenzie King was, in a way, supportive of it, but in some degree his support was rhetoric designed for public consumption, whereas the real impulse in policy came from some of the senior officials. I wonder if you could just tell us a little bit more about people like Hume Wrong and Escott Reid.

[HOLMES] There was one point I set out before to make and then I side tracked myself, which I think was relevant. You know we were all for the UN and collective security. Universal collective security was a very logical goal, if you looked at 1914 and 1939. What we thought we had to do was what we didn't do over Abyssinia and Manchuria. I was saying this to the Japanese yesterday, and I left out Manchuria. At any rate, collective security was a nice idea but you weren't all that sure of it. And there was a feeling that war was a very tough business, war was not something to be run by a board of directors in Geneva, something we found out later, very clearly, in Korea. The United Nations, after all, began in 1942 as a union of the allied powers, long before San Francisco. This was an attempt to perpetuate an alliance against aggression. I don't think we were naive about the prospects for holding it together, but of course you didn't give up in advance, you tried to keep the Soviets and the Western powers together. In many ways we conceived it more as a perpetuation of alliance against aggression than just the kind of repetition of the League, which had been incapable. Of course, with the Americans on board, this would make all the difference. So this was a more realistic approach. I think that strain of thinking which is more Wrong than Reid--I was going to call my book, at one time, "Reid and Wrong in Foreign Policy", after Jim Eayrs' book. This strain comes out again in the support of NATO. There was this feeling that you had to have an alliance of war-capable countries.

[HILL] Could you describe the differences between Wrong's far-sighted realism as opposed to the tempered idealism of Escott Reid?

[HOLMES] I think Wrong was essentially a functionalist; he's the man who composed the functionalist theory; Mackenzie King read the speech. That was very much his approach to things. Escott Reid was more utopian. Although I tend to be more of a Wrongian than a Reidian, I think I have said, and I would still say, that they were both essential and that this dialogue between them was extraordinarily profitable and constructive. The danger of a functionalist is he gets complacent and that's my trouble. I still need those phone calls from Escott to shape me up. So I think it was highly profitable. During that period Escott was in Washington and so was Mike Pearson, during the latter part of the war. So what was coming out of Ottawa was much more Wrong, and Robertson and Wrong were both rather pragmatists. Escott in some ways was a compulsive and superb drafter and he liked institutions and he liked frameworks. The dedication to the concept of universal collective security was pretty strong there. It was also with Mike Pearson. Mike on the working level, was a great pragmatist, but on the other hand he was dedicated to collective security. Even to the end, I could never persuade him to stop calling NATO a collective security organisation or distinguishing between the concept of universal collective security and collective defence. All the things we were doing and the memoranda we were writing would go to Washington and London, and come back with comments. I think I mentioned the marvellous time when Escott, bless his heart, on 24 December, sent an entire redraft of the UN Charter back to Norman Robertson to look at during Christmas. We all loved Escott. There was something about him that was exciting, but he was much more a believer in international government, and of course this comes out with an essential difference of approach to NATO. Escott really wanted to create something like a structured North Atlantic Community. It was partly because Hume was on the spot in Washington knowing that that wasn't on. But also it was his functionalist approach - you build the institution to suit the requirements rather than starting with the philosopher's dream.

[HILL] In a sense Hume Wrong and Escott Reid were two of the main thinkers, I believe. Pearson was more of an operator, I mean in the sense of being a diplomatic practitioner, perhaps?

[HOLMES] I think also you will notice some difference. Robertson and Wrong were very definitely in charge up to the end of the war, that whole period. Then of course Wrong went to Washington. Robertson went to London, Pearson and Reid took over in Ottawa. I don't want to overemphasize that as if it was a coup. There was never any kind of feeling that they were not working in collusion, but you will find that the material coming out of Ottawa after that period was somewhat more utopian.

[COX] Could I just take you back to your comment about the attempt to hold the alliance together, the Soviets and Western states, but with a certain, perhaps not pessimism, but realistic sense that it was against the odds. Could you talk about that a little bit more, and what were the perceptions of the Soviet Union that made people feel the odds were against a co-operative relationship.

[HOLMES] This is awfully interesting stuff coming out with this new life of Churchill. I haven't vet read it but I have read the reviews and I've been having long discussions over the years with my friend David Dilks (of the University of Leeds) who has been delving into the papers. You see, one day Churchill thinks it is going to work with the Soviets, the next day he despairs. Roosevelt was somewhat the same, except Roosevelt was more confident and a little arrogant too. I think he felt he was the key to it all. And he'd be the moderator between the wicked imperial powers, the Soviets and the British, and the French, this sort of thing, but I cite that because it seems to me that that was very much the feeling. I think the revisionist scholars in the States have it all wrong with the assumption that there was this deep seated antagonism and that we were really spoiling for a fight with the Soviets. It completely fails to understand the mood of people who have been invovled in a god awful war for, in our case, six years; and for Americans - four years; but I think this is the way we went up and down. And given this feeling about the UN, as a perpetuation of the war time alliance against aggression, if that could just hold together, nobody expected it to be perfect we mustn't split apart. Again you see the lessons of 1939 are so strong. At the end of the war it seemed like an era since the beginning of the war, but in fact it was only six years, and we still had that feeling that everything had gone wrong because we hadn't held together against aggression. So you had to hope, I don't think I am atypical, but one always looked for good news, for signs that the Soviets would be co-operative afterwards. I don't know enough about it myself, but I suspect that the Soviets themselves didn't know in advance, that they were fumbling about. I am sceptical of this idea that they had a clear-cut plan right through. And of course their paranoia was so great. It was a hope you clung to more than anything else. Now there's a tendency to go back and say, well, these were the wise guys who realized all along, and these were the naive people. I think everybody had his wise days and his naive days. If it was naive, I mean I still think the wise thing was to try to get what we could. After all, we still have the United Nations.

[HILL] It has worked in a sort of way, not in the way everyone expected, but after all it is still there.

[HOLMES] Think what it would be like now if we didn't have one body in which we could all come together. Cynics, and the Heritage Foundation, may think that if you disbanded the United Nations you'd do away with problems, but we'd have them in spades.

[HILL] So, really, in that period, at the end of 1943-44, as far as Canada and Canadians were concerned, the United Nations, hopefully based on the continuance of the war time alliance, was the natural focus of Canada's foreign policy.

[HOLMES] Yes. I think so. As I was in London during that period, I didn't have a feel for Canadian opinion, but I am pretty sure of that. One thing was that Mackenzie King might well not have liked this, particularly the continuing commitment. It was just that he had no alternative. The public, I think, would have thrown him out of office.

[HILL] He did support it.

[HOLMES] Oh yes, he did. I don't mean to be cynical about that, I just think he still had his doubts about the League. Some of the things he wrote about the League make sense now. He was dead right about collective security, in many ways. He said that it wouldn't work. I think also that the old Canadian concern about being committed by somebody else really hadn't died, even though we were talking about the need for the surrender of sovereignty. That was one of the themes; sovereignty was rather a bad thing. We would surrender sovereignty to a world body but nevertheless when you come to the negotiations about the role of the Security Council, you find that we were hanging back again. We were not going to have a Security Council commit our troops. We demanded a right to be heard. Of course, we thought of ourselves as defending all the middle powers not just Canada. You get the same concern with NATO. In spite of our commitment to the Alliance, there was very great care about Article Five.

Part III - London, 1944-47

[HILL] I wonder if we could go on to the next part, Part Three, London 1944-47. I want to raise some points about world issues in that time as well as your own duties. I wondered if we could start out with the San Francisco conference. As you mentioned, functionalism was an issue. I wonder if you could describe what that was, as Canada saw it, and what did Canada look for in the San Francisco conference.

[HOLMES] We had, of course, spent a lot of our time combatting the great powers - in alliance with the Australians and the New Zealanders and, as they began to emerge on the scene, the Brazilians and some others in South America. The European countries, the small European countries, had barely begun to re-establish themselves and were not in a very strong position. But they were quite sympathetic. The Dutch, I remember, were very much interested in the functionalist concept. So a lot of our thinking about the brave new world was directed towards assuring a position for ourselves and for the smaller powers. During the war, somewhat reluctantly, we had accepted a degree of great power domination of war time policy that we were determined not to do in peace time. To win a war, and when a war's at a last effort stage, you are not going to break things. We didn't like the failure to get on to allied Boards. We thought the British and Americans neglected our interests and that kind of thing, but you put up with it, to get the war won. But it made you all the more determined that they weren't going to do it afterwards. We were very fortunate, of course, in the fact that the British in those days used to share practically all their telegrams and things with us. When I was in London, a regular Foreign Office box came around and I had a key and I read most of their telegrammes. I mention this particularly because they let us in on what was going on in the Three Power Discussions - Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin. Which meant that we were able to put our word in in advance while the whole thing was being congealed, and if one looks back at the very considerable difference in the nature of the UN as designed in San

Francisco, from what Roosevelt and some of the rest were proposing, it's quite clear that the smaller powers had considerable influence. And I think the British were more amenable than the Americans or the Soviets. The Soviets of course were the biggest problem. They just did not want us. They wanted equal status with the United States in particular, with Britain too, and they didn't want any small powers. They particularly didn't want the Poles, who at that time weren't nice docile Poles. So they were the big enemy of any attempt to share power. The British had been so battered and brow beaten over the years by the Australians and Canadians they were somewhat more understanding, especially in the Foreign Office. I found the Foreign Office very helpful on this. We were somewhat preoccupied by the struggles against great powers and getting things changed. The big issue came over UNRRA, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency, which was the first of the post-war agencies; and there we said: "This is nonsense, we are going to be the second biggest contributor to UNRRA (not because we were the second most generous but because we were in the position to be so), and you've got to make a place for us on the directing board". We fought that one very hard, and it was in this context that Wrong worked out the functionalist idea. You see, originally Roosevelt had the idea of the UN run by a "World Council". That was the phrase he used. It was quite clear that it would be run by the United States. Some co-operation with the Soviet Union and some co-operation with the British perhaps, but he was already downgrading them somewhat; and we fought this very, very hard.

I often quote a remark that King reports Roosevelt made to him. I think it's very significant. Roosevelt was actually defending the UN. And he quoted Seeley's The Expansion of England, which is of course the great explanation of England's imperial expansion, and the great things it has done for the world. Quoting that, he said: "And now the United States has become the United Nations." The great 1776 Messiah was now going to run the world. A little impatient with us, because of the sort of feeling, that you small countries have nothing to worry about now because we are involved, we will look after your interests. That didn't appeal to us very much, especially when the Americans would say: "You know we can't really find a place for you because we also have to find a place for Brazil." We would say: "Have a look at the Brazilian and the Canadian contributions to winning this war." We were hyped on that. I think this is where we got our perspectives somewhat wrong. We based all our claims on the past, particularly when we were trying to get almost a semi-permanent position on the Security Council. We were a great military power because of what we did in the war, but we hadn't have the faintest intention of continuing to be a great military power. We demobilized very quickly and you couldn't go on justifying a position of that kind on the basis of a war that was over and you hoped was damn well over. I sometimes ask the question, if somehow or other we had got a kind of semi-permanent position on the Security Council, what that would have meant to the Canadian defence budget. We would have had to maintain an enormous armed force. We were mistaken on some of those things. Functionalism, I still think, is a logical theory and a workable theory. We said we will strongly oppose a United Nations which is run by a cabinet of you guys. The "Council", of course, then started to have a different function, to be the Security Council and we had a lot to do with that. When I say we, I mean as much the Australians and those who worked with us. If it's a Security Council on functional grounds the great military powers have a right to a special position, which we never described as a veto. A veto is looking at it upside down. It was that, given our kind of concept of an alliance managing peace, you had to have the team in agreement. So you had to have agreement from the five in order to do things. We thought of this as a special responsibility, not a privilege. The great military powers could have a special place on a Security Council on security grounds, but not on an economic and social council. I think we did pretty well in San Francisco. At Dumbarton Oaks you had the great powers drawing up the Charter. Even there we had a chance; we knew what was going on in the discussions all the time and we kept telling the Brits and

the Americans what we did or didn't like. But once we got to San Francisco it was a different game. There were all the great and small powers there and it was rather difficult to ignore them.

[HILL] I think you made the point at one stage that the Latin Americans had considerable voting power at that time, and tended to vote as a bloc. So that shifted things really.

[HOLMES] That's right. We liked their support on middle powers issues, but we were getting nervous about this bloc voting, particularly when we didn't make it on the vote for the first Security Council.

[COX] How did the Soviets respond to the middle power issue?

[HOLMES] Negatively. Of course they had no middle power allies at that time. They were putting forward in earlier stages this idea that the various Soviet republics would be members. What irritated us most about that was that they compared it with membership of the British Empire. The idea that Byelorussia was comparable to Canada was not very good. It might have gone down in Minsk but not in Ottawa.

[COX] You said earlier that you thought they had emerged from the war perhaps stumbling along just like anybody else. But in the discussions about the Security Council and the structure of the UN, did a clearer picture emerge of what they wanted?

[HOLMES] I think that they wanted to be part of the management team and they didn't want interference from others. I don't think they had any illusions that they could run the world without the Americans or even the Brits at that time. They were rather slower to downgrade the British than other people were. No, I think that is very much what they wanted, and they wanted a centrally controlled UN. They were so conscious of the fact that they weren't going to have any allies. In the early days of the UN, they had, aside from the Ukraine and Byelorussia, which didn't matter very much, only Poland and Czechoslovakia. It was ten years before Hungary, Romania and others, former enemy states, came into the UN. So this is why, given their paranoia, they were clinging to the veto. We accepted the veto in the Security Council as inevitable. We knew you couldn't have the UN taking on one of the great powers. And after Hiroshima, that became all the clearer. People tend to forget that practically nobody in San Francisco knew anything about the atom bomb. The few Canadians who did weren't there. I think Norman Robertson must have known something about it, but he never said anything. In any case he couldn't acknowledge it. Whether the Soviets knew about it, we're still speculating. There's kind of a grim logic to what they wanted (i. e., the veto). I think we could see their position. We wanted to limit the veto, particularly on other questions such as getting items on the agenda. I'm talking a lot about the UN but it was dominant at the time.

[HILL] I have another question which relates to the UN, but it also relates as well to NATO. It's the question of Canada's relations with the United States. When you were in London, there was still the phrase the Atlantic Triangle; it was still alive then. I think it was buried some time afterwards. As I see it, one of the main aims at the end of the war was to keep the United States involved in world affairs, firstly in the United Nations, and then of course subsequently in NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty. Could you tell us something about Canada's policy in that respect at that time and how you see it as having evolved since.

[HOLMES] You're quite right, and I find it so hard to get students to understand that in that period, it wasn't a question of worrying about the United States dominating the world like a

colossus; it was trying to hang on to them. If NATO was a conspiracy it sure wasn't an American conspiracy. It was a conspiracy on our part to hook the US Senate; that's really what it looked like at the time, to get them committed against all their prejudices. This was dominant. For a hundred years, our policy was, well at least since 1870, to maintain the Anglo-American entente. This was the basis of our security. We were secure in a kind of Anglo-American world. One of the major reasons in our view that the Second World War had broken out, was that the Americans not only didn't stay in the League but went into isolation. During the period before the war and during the early stages of the war, the important thing, as far as we were concerned, was to draw the Americans into the war, in one way or another. Another, mistaken interpretation of history for Canadians, I think, is when they see Ogdensburg and Hyde Park as deliberate Canadian moves towards continentalism, away from the old imperialism. Ogdensburg and Hyde Park were efforts on our part (mind you, Ogdensburg was much more Roosevelt's idea, with which we agreed) to hook the Americans into our war. Because Roosevelt was really in agreement with our war, they were helpful, but it sure wasn't the Americans dragging us into their war. It was the other way around. Well, I just cite that in a sense to answer your question. There was an enormous preoccupation on our part to keep the Americans in.

We also used this argument (and I think this has something to do with NATO) to cope with ideas of a new Commonwealth defence policy that were floating around in Britain. I noticed, in going back over my dispatches from London during that period, that I spent an awful lot of time trying to calm their nerves in Ottawa. These ideas about a Commonwealth defence policy and Commonwealth foreign policy were more aberrations of the editor of the Sunday Times, and some guys in the War Office. The British were in a terribly difficult position. Whether the Empire was a good thing or not in 1945, they were stuck with it. You couldn't suddenly tell all these islands and what not to go on their own. Attlee was constantly putting it to us: "We are in a terrible state". The Americans certainly were not going to help retain colonialism. But they were not at all enamoured of the idea that the British should get rid of the outposts at this point, especially in the East, because they were already seeing them as strategically important to the United States. We kept saying to the Brits that no Commonwealth defence scheme really made much strategic sense, given the kind of resources available, unless the United States was involved. The United States was the key to any kind of world-wide system, and I do not think we had to work very hard to convince Attlee and Bevin of that. They saw that point.

When considering the weakness of Britain, it has to be realized that the British had to act in '44 and '45 without any real assurance that the Americans were going to stay involved in Europe. I have some quotations from 1944 and '45 that David Dilks has given me, letters from Churchill to Roosevelt saying: "Don't think we are going to help you with the French, they are your problem. We are not going to keep people in France. We are not going to keep any occupation forces, and don't count on us."

That is what the British felt, with the terrible problems facing them, not only in Europe but around the world. So they were rather desperate, but our view was again that the only hope was to keep the Americans involved. And that also in a sense leads to NATO, because I think that our arguments with the British, if they really were arguments, were that purely Commonwealth defence schemes do not make much sense. We know you have to do something about it, but NATO is the answer. That is why Attlee approached St. Laurent about NATO and how we got involved from the beginning.

[HILL] Concerning the immediate post war period, it seems to me that there is a popular picture a bit along these lines: there was a war-time alliance. The United Nations was built on top of this.

The alliance split apart. The UN did not function very well any more, and then people got very disillusioned with the UN, and then they went and looked for other things, and eventually NATO appeared. It seems to me that that is very much an over simplification, and in fact, it really was not very like that at all. First of there had been difficulties with the Soviets all along. It got more difficult later on but relations did not break down entirely even at the height of the Cold War. There was not the utopianism generally about the UN which some people have seen in the period, and perhaps the disillusionment afterwards with the UN was not really that massive.

[HOLMES] Yes, I think this is so. I frequently blame our rhetoric to some extent. So much was the rhetoric of world government. You know, UN police force against aggression and all that sort of thing, got people thinking more simplistically than I think the people involved, the officials and others involved, really thought about it. You did have this slow realization that the Security Council was not going to work as easily, I will not say as we expected, but as we had hoped. There was a tendency in that period, of course, to feel that the Security Council was what really mattered at the UN. I think in some ways what is significant about that is the fact that when we went on the Security Council in 1948 and 1949, for our first term, General McNaughton had been down there, in New York, in our job on the Atomic Energy Commission, and established such a reputation, and prestige, that he was asked to stay on as Ambassador to the Security Council, where he did a superb job. We really almost single handedly settled the problems between the Dutch and the Indonesians, and things like that. He was awfully good. But when we went off the Security Council in '49, in Ottawa, there were even questions as to whether we would need more than a secretary and a typewriter in New York in the mission, although we had been one of the first people to establish a mission to the League in Geneva.

So when they were trying to figure what would be required in the mission, when we were not on the Security Council, they sent me down as I was head of the UN division. They said, "Well, you go down and hold the fort until we figure it out. There is not much happening." Little did they know what was going to happen one June day when the North Koreans invaded the South Koreans.

Well, I jumped a little ahead there. You were asking about a period when I was not in Ottawa. I was abroad; and, especially in Moscow, one was pretty well isolated. You did not have visitors going through. So here I am depending more on my research. When the time came for us to try for the Security Council in '47 questions were raised in Ottawa as whether the Council was worth while. That was the session of the General Assembly when Mr. St. Laurent made his famous statement, which goes down even in the NATO histories as the beginning of the Alliance, when he said that the situation is such that maybe those countries which are prepared to do something for their own common defence will have to do something. That was the beginning, the first signal.

I can remember getting a call from General Bedell Smith, who was the American Ambassador to Moscow. I did not get a telephone call, he came around; one didn't telephone about such things. He asked if I had a copy of this speech, which he had heard a lot about. They were very excited about it in Washington, very much interested.

I had not realized the extent of the disillusionment in Ottawa until I did my research much later. You see it's interesting that Escott, who was one of the strongest of the UN people, became one of the first to begin advocating something like NATO. Hume Wrong also. I found a rather surprising memorandum in which he raised the question whether it was worth our while going on the Security Council when it did not seem to be able to do the kinds of things we had hoped for. I suspected in his case it was the sort of thing he tended to do. He put up an argument like that

and really hoped people would shoot it down. But there was a debate, and then I think it was won really by those people who said that if we did not take over from the Australians, this would be regarded as a vote against the UN and at a time when there were questions being asked about it. There was then a Commonwealth seat, not officially designated, but by gentleman's agreement.

So we went on the Council, and what happened was that we had a really spectacular time, thanks to McNaughton and the staff he had, like George Ignatieff, John Starnes and the others. That is really where Canada's mediatory role began to blossom.

So, at the same time that we were joining NATO, we were also having a renewed faith in the UN. By the time I got there, I think we had really accepted the fact that universal collective security was not going to work, but nevertheless the Security Council would be extremely valuable in doing what it did in Indonesia, doing what it was trying to do in Kashmir and Greece, various things. Then, just having shifted gears, along came Korea, posing the question of collective security. Well, I must not jump to that.

[HILL] You were in London, of course, in the immediate post-war period. It seems to me that that was a very strange period, in 1945-1946, and then up to about '48, where the world was in a very odd state. Hopes had been invested in the UN, but it clearly was not working out as originally intended. There were all kinds of problems, of course. Europe in particular was devastated, and there must have been a great sense of not knowing where the whole world was going.

[HOLMES] Very much so. Of course people in Britain were preoccupied by change in India. The imperial structures were breaking down. The Americans were beginning to realize, of course, that although it was nice to be anticolonial, the world was going to be rather different suddenly if the British Empire collapsed.

[HILL] I just want to finish up on that one. Would you say that, when NATO was set up, it provided almost a kind of psychological focus, a sense of coming home to something surer again, which people could attach themselves to.

[HOLMES] Oh, yes. It was in so many ways the answer to our problems. There had been long tensions in Canada between those who did not want Canada to be dragged in to European wars, and those who either for imperial or internationalist reasons thought we should be more involved in the war. Mind you that strong prejudice, not only among French Canadians but among other what are now called "ethnic Canadians", the strong fear that we would be drawn into British wars for sentimental reasons, had diminished. It was pretty hard to sustain that after the Americans for the second time had got drawn into the war, not exactly to save the mother country or help King George. So that at the end of the war, particularly in '45, it was awfully hard to see this as just a British war, as Gywnne Dyer still insists.

[HILL] Yes, but do you feel that there was the same sentiment in Europe towards the establishment of NATO? I mean that, by and large, here was something that they could cling onto?

[HOLMES] There is an assumption that NATO was set up for fear that the Soviets were going to march to the North Sea. It was not really that. It was the great fear for the morale of Western Europe. Countries which had been occupied, worried about being occupied again. Was Communism the wave of the future? Communist parties were very strong in Italy and France. We forget also that Germany was still in a state of almost total devastation, and one of the things that worried us the most was just the simple sort of belief that anarchy and poverty and starvation breed

Communism. Therefore the Germans themselves might opt for it and not just because the Soviets were forcing them. It's a little hard now to reconstruct that idea of Germany, but it was one of those things that worried us.

Then, of course, it was Prague '48 that really did it. So what you had to do was to restore faith, so that the West Europeans would feel that the wave from the East was not necessarily the wave of the future. You got this feeling particularly in France. You would get people to say, "Oh well, what the hell. We might as well give into it. We don't want to have another occupation." I am not saying that was necessarily a shrewd judgment of France, but that was...

[HILL] A sentiment ...

[HOLMES] Yes. Widespread.

[HILL] David, I think you had a question.

[COX] I think in a way it was almost the other side of the question you asked. I was going to ask if - you described the sense of foreboding in 1938, perhaps even earlier - was there a sense of foreboding in 1947 or '48?

[HOLMES] Comparable with '38? Well, there sure was in Moscow. It was partly isolation but I can remember that the Berlin Blockade was a pretty chilling experience. It was the uncertainty. Well, I have been through my own dispatches from Moscow. They are all out now, and they do confirm my recollection. I do not remember at any time saying that I saw any evidence that the Soviets were about to mobilize and march to the sea. I just kept saying that there was no evidence, but as you could not move very far away, you could not tell. It was this uncertainty.

You know we were again alternating between the optimists and the pessimists in our interpretations of what they were doing. Well, Prague was a blow, and then the Berlin Blockade because I know I had been rather of the school of thought that the Soviets were canny and cautious, that, in spite of everything, they would not do anything very reckless. The Berlin Blockade was pretty reckless.

[HILL] The other thing you had in that period was the economic situation, I mean, in 1947, throughout Western Europe, there was an appalling winter. Having an appalling winter in those days was a different thing from having it now. There was lack of coal. There was lack of heating. There was lack of food in many instances, I think. It was a pretty ramshackle kind of place in those days, wasn't it?

[HOLMES] I was in England for the spring of '47, the late, late winter. There was not much heat. In Britain the glow of peace was fading. There was still rationing. What was the value of victory? Mind you, it was not a time when one could say the Germans and the Japanese were doing better than we were. That had to wait a long time.

At any rate, there was a lot of disillusionment, certainly in Western Europe. One of the things that worried us, and if we get onto Article II at some point I would like to talk about it, is that the Americans and to some extent Canadians were getting worried that Europe was going to be a permanent basket case. This was well before the German miracle. The Germany I was in, when I went with Mr. Howe in 1947 visiting DP camps, was awful. Frankfurt was just awful; bodies in the street, people fainting from hunger and things like that. With the German miracle a little

later, we seem to have forgotten that. And therefore we had this feeling that we were going to have to provide aid to the Europeans indefinitely. They would never get on their feet again. That was one of the basic reasons for Article II, and it's one of the basic reasons why the Americans opposed Article II because they did not want any reference to economics.

I will not jump ahead to all that, but there was some worry in Ottawa as to how long we could go on. Wartime spirit was beginning to fade a little. When are these guys going to look after themselves? Are we going to have to keep sending food? Of course, the great forgotten event of that period was the enormous Canadian loan.

[Hill] Yes, you mentioned that. I had never really realized the extent of that. In fact, Canada virtually bankrupted itself in that period.

[HOLMES] Almost.

[HILL] Came close to it. Yes.

[HOLMES] The only man in Britain who knows about that and keeps talking about it is David Dilks. He keeps emphasizing to the British they should remember.

[HILL] Well, it is almost a forgotten event. I didn't realize its extent.

[HOLMES] It was very much appreciated in the State Department because they felt that our loan was keeping things going until Congress could pass Marshall Aid.

[HILL] I think we will now go on to the last part for this morning.

[HOLMES] There is just one thing I should have mentioned earlier and I forgot about it, was that in the '45, '46, '47 period, when I was in London, our principal preoccupation was the peace treaties. This had a lot to do with the Canadian mood. We were very angry at the way we were treated over the German settlement. That was a case where we, better than on the Security Council, could say, "Dammit all, we played a major part in the defeat of Germany."; and we would say to the Americans, "We were in it from the beginning. We had to wait quite a while for you guys." Also, we kept arguing that France should be accepted as a great power, but once they had been accepted, they were not the least bit interested in our position.

I remember our preoccupations at that time. You know, I was the one officer in Canada House who was dealing with all these things. Doug Le Pan did Economics and I did these things. That is the stage we were at. Part of the time we did not have a High Commissioner. So I was in and out of the Foreign Office all the time, and the Foreign Office were quite sympathetic on this. They were quite helpful. Of course, they all had to put up with Dr. Evatt of Australia, who was not really as polite as we were, but we fought very hard with the Council of Foreign Ministers. We had to realize that it was primarily the Soviets who opposed us. But even the Americans did not support our cause very enthusiastically. The only people we really could make representations to were the British, and they did their best but there was not much to be done.

The Americans kept saying, "Well, we can't leave out the Brazilians." The Council humiliated us in the end. We smaller powers could not even make spoken representations to the Council of Foreign Ministers. We could only make written representations to the deputies of the Council on Foreign Ministers.

[HILL] The Council of Foreign Ministers being a control agency in Germany.

[HOLMES] They were the countries which were running Germany. Yes. This is important in another way too. We had a sort of chicken and eggish dilemma. When the proposals came before the war ended, I was still on the Post Hostilities Planning Committee. I mean the proposals for some kind of occupation structure in Germany at the end of the war. Of course, we were still in our mood of fighting for a place. We did not get much of a place. Then came the pressure on us to keep troops. The British particularly needed some help, and they would have liked us to share the occupation duties. We had, of course, to keep the troops until we could get them home; so a lot of them were around in Holland and elsewhere for most of the year. That was simply a matter of transport. But we rejected an occupation role, and we had a pretty good excuse. If you are not going to give us a spot on the occupation structure, we are not going to provide troops.

This remained a kind of running sore. It keeps cropping up. You can tell it again when we made the rather extraordinary refusal to take part in the Berlin airlift. That was still part of this, "The hell with it, you guys want to run this place, you go ahead and do it." Even the South Africans and the New Zealanders helped out in the airlift, and we stayed out of it.

That dominated a lot of thinking, but fortunately it died out because there was no German peace treaty. After a while, they gave up. If there had been a peace conference as at Versailles and Paris, this would have been a much more difficult issue. We did much better on Japan but cared less. There the Americans were in control. The Soviets never had much to say about it. I just wanted to pick that up because I think it explains a lot of the Canadian mood.

Mind you, at the same time, I have said how lucky we were not to get involved in the occupation. If we'd had no real role in occupation policy, we would have just spent all our time spluttering and complaining about our position. We would have kept Canadian troops in some little corner of Germany. So I think we were very well out of it.

Part IV - Moscow, 1947-48

[HILL] We will go on now to Part IV, which was your time in Moscow, '47-'48. That must have been a fascinating period, because there were not many Westerners who got to Moscow in that time. I wonder if you could just tell us a bit about the atmosphere of the Soviet Union as you saw it, especially when dealing with the Soviet government. What was all that like at that time?

[HOLMES] I was sent there after the Gouzenko affair. We finally withdrew Wilgress. I think it's important to note that we never broke relations over the Gouzenko affair. We did not even withdraw our Ambassador. One reason was it would have been stupid to withdraw Wilgress who was such a highly respected observer. But the Soviets kept their Ambassador at home. Finally Wilgress was needed in Havana for a conference, because he was one of our leading men working on the International Trade Organization, setting up GATT.

So I had rather expected I would get frosty treatment but <u>all</u> diplomats got frosty treatment in those days, there was not any way really to distinguish. I did not have the destinction of being the most ill treated of all. They clammed up on diplomats. Our closest friends in Moscow were the Indians. Mrs. Pandit was ambassador. They did not get better treatment than we did. The Soviets were just being arbitrary and difficult, and you could not have any conversation with them. You could not talk to them, talk about policy. All you could do was guess what was going on. You

did not dare invite Russians. I never was told I must not have dealings with Soviet people anything like that. It was just too difficult to invite people to dinner and know that the next morning there would probably be a knock on their door. I never had any feeling of harassment. They were polite and all that sort of thing. The Soviets you did deal with could be friendly and pleasant, but the freeze was very much on. I blame their secrecy for the outbreak of the Cold War. They did everything possible to inspire our suspicions.

[HILL] Presumably you were more or less kept in Moscow? Were you allowed to go and travel around?

[HOLMES] You could drive as far as your gas tank would take you. That meant you could have nice picnics in the woods, things like hat, and go skiing on the grounds of a castle that Catherine the Great had half finished. You rounded the corner and suddenly there were nice terraces, and a stone nymph right in front of you. It was hard to ski wherever it was. Especially as you had any old skis that had been left around and were barely tied on your feet. It was a wonder I didn't get killed.

The whole diplomatic corps was an extraordinarily interesting one, so that life was intensely interesting but you took in each other's washing and were very much inhibited.

[COX] So were your views based mainly on, shall we say, very restricted conversations with Soviet diplomats?

[HOLMES] Very restricted; and trying to read signs. I found that the most interesting sources of information were some of the good press correspondents who had been around during the war and still had contacts. Alec Werth, of <u>The Guardian</u> was a very good friend; and there was a marvelous Scottish woman, Marjorie Shaw, who managed to be the correspondent of both the <u>New Statesman</u> and the <u>Daily Express</u>.

[HILL] Under the same name?

[HOLMES] Yes. Marjorie was great fun. She used to keep me informed about people. I met her on the boat going out but she had a lot of friends, like Prokofiev's wife and people like that. She would tell me a little about what was being said. This was the way you picked it up, on hunches. The idea that the press is controlled, it's of no value, is quite wrong. When you have disciplined and controlled press, you read it for deviation. What does that mean? One day I remember early in 1948, I think it was April (we had a Commonwealth Press Reading Series so we used to get digests of the Soviet press in English each morning); I was reading along, and I suddenly noticed "Belgrade: Yesterday was celebrated the fourth anniversary of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty". Full stop. That is funny. Usually they say on such occasion that the following speech was made, and roses were thrown and God knows what. Nothing. So we were going around saying, "Isn't that peculiar?" We watched and did not find any news of Yugoslavia for quite a while. We got quite suspicious that there was something funny, but we were not real Kremlinologists. I was not an expert on the Soviet Union. I was thrown into the breech, and I had to learn the language on the spot. We did not pretend, so we went to the real experts in the British and American Embassies, and they said, "Tut, tut, nothing". That's just typical of experts.

I remember it during the war. Anything that looks like good news, anything that looks like a weakness on the part of the enemy is to be disparaged - naive people indulging in wishful thinking. You are new people, you have only been here a short time. So they kept saying, "Tut, tut."

So, it took me a little while to report this to Ottawa. But finally I said, "Look, people do not agree, but I really think there is something funny going on in Yugoslavia." Then our people in Belgrade picked this up. They took it seriously. This was the break with Yugoslavia in June 1948.

[HILL] What were the Soviets up to? What sort of objectives did they have? Did they really have any very clear cut objectives in respect to Western Europe, Yugoslavia and so on?

[HOLMES] It seems to me looking back now, one of the points that the revisionist scholars particularly make is that the Soviet Union was so weak; it was absurd for us to fear them, they couldn't march to the sea and so on. The kind of evidence we have now is that they were pretty weak, but you had no way of knowing. You could not go into the countryside. You could not see. The streets were full of soldiers. It seems to me that the Soviets in their paranoia really believed we were waiting to pounce, so they had to pretend to be strong for defensive reasons. By pretending to be strong, they raised our suspicions. Secrecy is a terrible thing in a way. It arouses suspicions.

I can remember during the Berlin Blockade we were pretty nervous about what was happening. There were no signs around Moscow of mobilization. Another way you learned was from servant gossip: "My cousin in some place says that such and such kind of thing is happening". There again also you had to be careful of plants but I think our servants were too undisciplined. You did not get any idea of mobilization. But what did they do suddenly? I remember one Sunday night, the Americans always had a movie. People tended to gather for the movie at the American Embassy, and this day the military attachés came and said that they had all been barred from certain routes where they had previously gone. When you are in a nervous mood, this does not exactly help.

This I cannot exactly blame the Soviets for, but just to indicate our problem we only had a hand decypher, which meant that cyphering a telegram could take the entire staff a whole day. I used to keep sending messages to Escott Reid, "For God sake don't send those long telegrammes, and don't send a telegramme asking me to draft a speech for Mr. St. Laurent on the dangers of Soviet Communism because it would take us an entire week to send it."

One day at the height of the anxiety over the Blockade, in came this little message, and as we sat there undoing it, two secretaries and a couple of us, it said that the women and children in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa had just asked for visas to return home. Had we any idea what this was all about? We kept saying to ourselves, if they have got something up their sleeve, then we are not going to give it away that way. But still it was pretty nerve-racking when we found this had been happening elsewhere in Washington and other places. Then, of course, somebody discovered that the Soviet Foreign Office had just decided that all children over a certain age must be educated in the Soviet Union, and they were all coming back with their mothers.

[COX] I think they still do that.

[HOLMES] Yes. This was a change of some sort. That was of no consequence. I cannot blame the Soviets for frightening us that way, although here again if you had had an easy relationship with the Foreign Office, somebody would have told you, or it would have been explained why the people were asking for the visas.

[HILL] Were you able to detect what their attitude was towards the movement to establish NATO in this period? They must have been aware of it, of the fact that the Western countries were beginning to talk about it. The West must have been quite far along with its planning by then, I imagine.

[HOLMES] Well, I left in September, 1948. The meetings were already going on in Washington.

[HILL] Donald Maclean must have been reporting to Moscow?

[HOLMES] Yes, I have often thought that it was a very good thing he was, because if he was reporting accurately, as I presume he was, the Soviets would realize that this was very much done in a defensive mood, and it was not organizing an aggressive attack on Brest-Litovsk.

I am trying to figure out what their attitude was. I would never have got anything from officials, and all you had really was the Soviet press, which was always so extravagant. Mind you, we did not get very much information in Moscow, and we were not kept posted on the negotiations.

[HILL] As to what was happening here?

[HOLMES] We did not have anything like the facilities for safe storage that one has now. It was pretty ramshackle in a way. I did not know an awful lot about the NATO negotiations.

One period that was pretty important was September-December in Paris that year, at the UN on the Security Council. There was an exercise there that might be worth mentioning. The Security Council was meetings when the Berlin Blockade was on, and we wanted to bring this up in the Security Council. The Soviets, of course, would veto the discussion of it. We were trying to get it discussed. We were trying to mobilize a lot of opinion on the subject. There was an interesting exercise of the Argentinian Foreign Minister - Argentina was on the Security Council, and the Argentinian Foreign Minister was there, I have forgotten his name -and he organized the non-permanent members in a group of six, as we were then, to see if we could find some kind of solution. It was quite an interesting exercise. We did not find the solution, but we tried. The Soviets were making a lot of the currency problem. We brought in an economist to see if we could get a solution to the currency problem. Looking back on it I have a feeling that the exercise was not entirely wasted, because it helped us to stall until the effects of the Berlin air lift were being seen, and then eventually the Soviets gave in; but it was an interesting exercise in lesser power mediation. The Americans and the British, particularly the Americans, were a little suspicious of the whole thing. They were afraid we would come up with some compromise on the Blockade, and they kept stiffening us because they figured that we were the only ones who would resist a compromise. Well, the Belgians were part of it too at that time. At the end of it, the Argentine Foreign Minister had a celebratory lunch, mind you we had not succeeded but we had a great celebratory lunch in the Georges V, a champagne lunch, at the end of which we were each presented with gold medals from Cartier - the Palais de Chaillot in a shower of stars. I have still He kissed General got it. It was the first time I was ever kissed by a foreign minister. McNaughton on both cheeks. Charles Ritchie was there too.

Part V - Ottawa and New York, 1949-51

[HILL] Professor Holmes, from 1949 to 1951, you served as head of the United Nations Division of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. In the second of these two years you were also Canada's acting permanent representative at the UN in New York. I would like to ask one or two questions relating to your duties at that time, but also to raise some points suggested by Volume Two of The Shaping Of Peace; especially in those chapters dealing with the establishment of the Atlantic Alliance, the creation of the NATO machinery, and other NATO related issues. So, perhaps first of all, we should look at the period relating to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in April of 1949, and which Canada ratified shortly afterwards (on 29 April 1949). In fact I think that Canada was the first to ratify the treaty, which came into force on 24 August 1949. The first question is: what part did Canada play in the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty? It is often said that Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson and others played a strong role in allied councils during the establishment of the treaty. How do you see Canada's contribution in that period?

[HOLMES] One of the things that occurs to me in looking at this period is how totally divorced I was from the NATO activities in the Department. That itself may be of some significance. I was involved mostly in United Nations' affairs. I don't want to give the impression that that kind of hostility between the UN and NATO that some people perceive is responsible. I think the reason really was, it was such a busy period for the UN, I was totally preoccupied. I had spent the autumn of 1948 in Paris at the General Assembly and I got back and I had to take over the UN and I had been away a long time. I knew that these negotiations were going on about the North Atlantic Treaty, but all I can recall is that I knew that this was going on. What I have to be careful of here is recalling things that I don't really recall but found out about when I was writing the book. For that period we were on the Security Council in '49 and General McNaughton was there and so was George Ignatieff and that meant almost total preoccupation with what was going on there. I'm trying to remember through 1949, the only time I was in Ottawa really during that period, I really have almost no recollection of NATO as I said, except that I knew it was going on. I know that we were concerned and very anxious to see that NATO was justified under Article 51 of the Charter. I recall the fact that we didn't want it under Article 52, the regional one. We didn't want that. It was particularly the NATO people who didn't want that. I think we had the normal dialogue in the Department; those of us who felt a kind of responsibility for the strength of the UN. and those who felt particularly responsible for NATO. I think that was a kind of healthy dialogue that goes on in the Department. People stressing different things, rather than controversy. I was responsible in those days to Escott Reid, the Associate Under-Secretary, he was also very much involved in NATO. So up through Escott, you had the two considerations, and of course, he was a strong UN man. I think that he had a great deal to do with it. Of course wherever he was he had a lot to do with policy, because he was so vigorous. It was a time when he and Hume Wrong had rather different approaches, particularly to NATO. Then in January 1950, we went off the Security Council, General McNaughton came home, and I went down to hold the fort at the UN. just briefly until they appointed an Ambassador, but I was there until August. There was so much emphasis on the significance of the Security Council that there was a kind of feeling that when we weren't on the Security Council there wouldn't be very much to do. So I could hold the fort. Well it was pretty difficult with a staff of just three of us coping with committees and things like that. But I was so preoccupied that NATO hardly impinged at all there, and then the Korean war started in June. There was nothing else to think about but that. In August Gerry Riddell came down to take over as Ambassador and I went back for a little while and then was back all autumn at the Assembly and then Gerry died suddenly and I was back again. Then I went from there to the National Defence College. If I was not much involved in NATO during that period, it was because

of a total preoccupation with other things. I wouldn't want it to imply that between the UN side of the Department and the NATO side there was a great split.

[HILL] No, simply occupied with different files. If I might speak to you in your capacity as a writer and a historian, drawing on subsequent reading and analysis, how would you rate Canada's contribution to the establishment of NATO?

[HOLMES] I think we have a tendency to exaggerate somewhat, but I think it was critical, very important. I've frequently quoted, I'm quoting over and over again, the famous comment of Scotty Reston's: "It was the participation of Canada that turned into a community what would have otherwise been just another American scheme for aid to Europe". I think it very important, especially for Canadians, to realize that this was to a large extent our idea; not uniquely, by any means, but we had a great deal to do with formulating it. Escott says, and I think he's quite right, that the real author of NATO was Ernie Bevin. Certainly the basic authors were not Americans. I tend a little in retrospect to relate this also to the kind of debate that was going on about British defence policy, imperial defence. I was there in London up close; I saw it, and the British position was desperate. It's all very well to say that Empire is a bad thing and colonies should be liberated, but what do you do in 1945? The Americans were being extremely anti-colonial but would have been exceedingly unhappy if Britain had chosen that moment to move out. So you had these responsibilities, you had this worldwide thing, you had the terrible sterling crisis and Attlee didn't know what to do. There were people still clamouring for a new imperial defence policy. I think in Ottawa, they took that too seriously; Mackenzie King loved to frighten himself with plots, imperial plots. I noticed, in going through my dispatches from London, spending a lot of time telling Ottawa not to get so upset about ideas that were really just being spewed out by the editor of the Sunday Times. The Foreign Office in particular wasn't taking this very seriously. But still there was a kind of debate. Mackenzie King was very rigid; I remember him in one Commonwealth conference. He did not want defence on the agenda at all. Of course the Australians and the New Zealanders did. Not because they wanted to support old Churchillian ideas but because they were feeling rather isolated. We took the kind of, hear no evil, see no evil attitude, pretty silly I find; it was rather embarrassing on this. Therefore I think the sensible people in Ottawa, Pearson, etcetera, weren't attacking this idea of imperial defence as a plot, they were just saying that it doesn't really make much sense to have any kind of defence scheme that doesn't include the Americans. This shouldn't be regarded as a Canadian shift of any kind. There was no doubt that Attlee and Bevin agreed with that and I think this was of some significance in leading both British and Canadians towards NATO. The British in particular were very anxious to get the Americans involved, but naturally no-one would suggest to the Americans that they should be involved in a Commonwealth defence plan. This suited us; we didn't want to be unconstructive, we didn't want to be unhelpful; we knew that the British had a pretty tough position but we wanted to shift more toward something realistic. The Anglo-American entente had been deeply embedded in Canadian intuitive foreign and defence policy for a century. That's why it came together. First of all, the basic reason was that we, like everybody else, were worried about what the Soviets were going to do. We didn't know. Then it was just so opportune, it satisfied all our needs. Britain, France, the USA in an alliance; the old tensions we had had between the imperialists and continentalists in Canada would be solved, and of course the very wide acceptance of NATO in parliament and elsewhere was pretty impressive, even the French Canadians. There is no doubt also that there was this agonizing reappraisal in a sense. We put a lot of our emotions into the UN, into collective security through the UN, and there was a feeling that moving to collective defence could be interpreted as desertion of the UN. This is an area where I think we had a good deal to do. In none of these things would we have been decisive on our own, but we had allies in most of these things. Where we were very important was in rejecting the views of some that the thing to do was

to kick the Soviets out of the UN, or let them resign, and let the UN become a Free World agency. And we said: "No, we've got this universal body, we managed to get it through while the war was on, so, for God's sake, hang on to it because it can be useful!". There was this feeling that NATO was a regrettable necessity and we hoped it wouldn't be necessary indefinitely. I think this is very clear. Have you talked to Arnold Smith?

[HILL] No, we haven't.

[HOLMES] The reason I mention him is that Arnold was the one person in External Affairs - he was at the National Defence College at this time - who wrote a memorandum favouring the idea of getting the Soviets out of the UN. And I think his was the only voice. Arnold had been rather the hard liner out of Moscow. When Willgress went away Arnold started writing much more hard line assessments of Soviet intentions, but the interesting thing is that on the whole you would put Arnold left of centre, primarily because of his concern with the Third World and things like that; he certainly isn't a conventional right winger. That's why it was interesting, he was preoccupied with the importance of the United Nations economic job. He saw earlier than most people the role of the UN in the world economy and development. He wanted to get the Soviets out of the UN because they were obstructing that purpose; so in a sense what you have is somebody who wants to kick the Soviets out for left wing purposes. It is interesting in that way but he didn't get much of a hearing on that. So I don't think it was a major element, but it would be worthwhile hearing him.

[HILL] Yes, I think so, if we have a second round. This leads to another question. How conscious were people, during the negotiations, of Congress. Some of the Europeans had got involved in the Brussels Pact and the Western Union and they were anxious to get the Americans involved also, and to keep them involved, in Europe. Canada saw this also as a good opportunity to push its own interests. I'm just wondering what Canada did see as its own interests. There seems to be a difference between Escott Reid being interested in an Atlantic Community, and some of the others were not thinking quite in those terms. That was one question, and another one was how conscious were people of Congress in this period of the negotiation of the treaty.

[HOLMES] It is probably important to realize that that was the time when we were facing a pretty difficult economic situation. We had nearly bankrupted ourself with this enormous loan to Britain, and were really very worried about this, and that gave a certain impetus to the desire to create what might turn into a North Atlantic economy, not specifically for free trade, but designed to encourage trade and commerce. The great worry that we had through that time was that the differing economic predicaments of the North American countries and the Europeans would lead to a great gulf. This is the primary reason for Article Two, to say: "You can't have a solid alliance and have a trade war." I think in looking at our perspectives at that time this economic dimension was important. Basically I think the difference was philosophical in a way. Escott was a compulsive constitution builder and a brilliant one. I remember arguments I've had with him, on which he would agree that world federation wasn't an immediate possibility. I said that it was an immediate possibility but I had great doubts whether it was the ultimate answer. Wrong was in Washington. Wrong was very much a pragmatist; what's more Wrong saw that any idea that the United States would take part in any kind of wider community as an ordinary member, that the US Senate would resign it's sovereignty over certain issues to some North Atlantic federation, was just out of the question. Escott was much too wise and sensible to think that we could create in 1949 a federation of the North Atlantic, but for most federalists it was something to aim at. So there was a difference in direction there. Escott also was very much concerned with the moral issue. On Article Two he stressed just as much those words that spoke of our all being democratic. He was very concerned

that it not be just regarded as a military alliance of the old powers; this was a crusade for democracy. That's why he was very upset about Portugal. Portugal became a bit of an issue. Italy wasn't quite so much that, it was the feeling that once you strayed away from the Atlantic coast you were into trouble. From Italy, where would you go? They look less democratic as you move farther away. Greece and Turkey were knocking at the door. This we were quite reluctant about. Here it was not only the Reidians but the Wrongians too who wanted to keep it pretty much our crowd; the Americans, the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, and countries in our democratic tradition, fairly limited. We had to give in over Portugal. I think many people in Washington would have agreed with us, but they just said: "The importance of the Azores is such that you just have to accept it". I'm not sure that that wasn't even more important for Escott than the economic aspect. If you look at his early memoranda, the moral issue is very important. Escott was not a right wing anti-Communist. I think what's very important on the whole is that the attitude in External Affairs towards the Soviet Union was based, not on anti-Communism, it was based on liberalism. I don't think anybody seriously thought that Communism as an economic philosophy was much of a threat. There were people who got excited about it in Canada, but not seriously. There was very much the feeling that if the Soviets want to run their country that way, that's up to them. It was the Soviet threat; what the Soviets were doing in Eastern Europe, not what they were doing in the Soviet Union. Mike was being very much a liberal in standing up to the Soviets and resisting them. I think that was true with everybody. We were very careful not to be anti-Communist.

Acheson's <u>Present at the Creation</u>, when it came out, sounded a little arrogant, but I must say, looking back, we all felt that this whole period was the creation of a new world and there were the UN and NATO fitting into it. My working title for my book until I found one was <u>Also Present At The Creation</u>. I almost used it, but it was too much an in-joke. We did have that same feeling and regarded Pearson, Wrong, Robertson, Escott Reid as part of the central construction team. We weren't just Canadians pursuing Canadian ends. We were architects jointly working together. I argue some times that this is what we've lost with NATO; we no longer really feel we are part of that. Partly because we've been pushed to the sidelines. This feeling of being present at the creation accounts for the fact that I, as a UN man, don't recall strong hostility to the creation of NATO, just these concerns within the group about accommodating both.

[HILL] I was wondering if this also reflected quite strongly Canadian public opinion because you mentioned that there was very little opposition, in fact there was no actual outright opposition in parliament at all. One or two people were a little dubious perhaps about it, but there was no outright opposition to it.

[HOLMES] One of the reasons, I think, was this illusion - the government, MacKenzie King and the Cabinet at any rate had - about universal collective security in the UN, that the formula was enough. They didn't realize that collective security meant what it said and that we had to contribute forces. So we talked a lot about collective security, and the Canadian Armed Forces became almost nothing; they really were whittled down. I remember this question coming up some years ago at a conference on NATO at Carleton entitled: "Did our joining NATO make us feel that we should increase our defence budget?". And Escott said "Quite the reverse:" It goes back, in a way, to 1914-1939-'45; if only the Americans had been pledged in advance there wouldn't have been a war. Just the pledge was enough to frighten aggressors. So there was no sort of disposition to increase our forces, and of course in 1949 we had no intention of having Canadian troops in Europe. It was the shock of Korea that did it. I remember my own feelings over Korea. I think I had been arguing, and by no means alone, and this was even after the Chinese Communists took over, that we ought not to regard Communism as a monolith stretching from Vladivostock to the

Elbe. It was partly caused by the Yugoslav defection. We oughtn't to do anything to make them work more closely together. We were looking at all the signs of differences between the Chinese and the Soviets, and of course the Yugoslavs. Then this thing happened in June in Korean, and I can't pretend for a moment I expected it, and we just had to face this question: "Maybe they are all working together, maybe this is a monolithic". We knew so little about North Korea. It seemed incredible that the North Koreans would have acted without both Soviet and Chinese agreement and assistance. I think that's still one of the mysteries for historians - I don't know whether you have found very much on it -but they're still not certain. At any rate, we can be pretty sure that it wasn't the kind of monolithic agreement that we suspected at the time. So here you had this really frightening situation. Mike Pearson's first reaction over Korea was nervousness about a UN operation. For tactical reasons, he just thought it wouldn't work. What would be even worse than the UN failing, as the League had failed, would be to try a military operation and be defeated. There was a strong feeling in Ottawa and in the European countries, and I think less so in Washington, that what we had was the communist bloc doing a feint in Asia, getting our forces to Asia and then doing a strike in Berlin. That basically accounts for the fact that it was the Korean war that caused us to send forces to Europe. We really got caught, in 1950. Here you have to remember that I have the recollections of somebody who was sitting in the UN. The UN had started a crusade, so you're caught up in it. You can see way back to the famous incident with Dr. Riddell in the mid '30s over Ethiopia. And I was under considerable pressure from the Secretariat, and the Secretary General. Canada was always proclaiming itself as the strongest supporter of the UN. Where are the Canadian Forces? When it was agreed to set up a UN force we were in a very embarrassing position, because we didn't have any to send, especially because Wrong was being told (I know because he used to phone me quite a bit in New York) to go down to the State Department daily to say: "No, we want this to be a real UN operation not just one run by the Americans; and we don't want it turned against the Chinese." To which Acheson, would say, icily: "One of the best ways of course to make sure this is a UN operation would be for countries like Canada to have their forces on the ground". But we didn't have any! I think some of Acheson's displeasure with Canada dates from this period.

[HILL] I think it started off with three ships initially.

[HOLMES] Yes, somebody said it was a token and somebody in the American Embassy said, well, we'll call it three tokens. There we were stuck and the cabinet was clearly divided, the old timers against the younger - King, of course, was dying. Then Pearson had this brilliant idea. In a sense it was picking up some of the ideas we had had about collective security in the UN, whereby each country would agree to contribute so many forces. Well, that whole scheme never worked out, but that was a kind of pattern. So we would raise a special brigade for service. I think it does reflect attitudes in Ottawa that this would be for the UN and for NATO. It did not mean that we had very much to spare. Then, just after the Americans decided to send forces to Europe, apart from their occupation forces, we, acting in embarrassment, followed the Americans. What Canadians tend to forget when they talk about this history is that we were about the last of the major Western partners to get troops into Korea and they did not arrive until the fighting was nearly over. No disrespect to the men who went, but we were not a major factor in repelling the North Koreans.

[HILL] That is interesting also, what you mentioned about the move of Canadian troops to Europe, that that actually came after. The Americans had decided to transform their troops there from occupation to alliance forces and presumably to send some more.

[HOLMES] I think it was in any case being considered and being urged by some in Ottawa. My recollection should be checked with the documents, but I am pretty sure that it came a little later. We had been acutely embarrassed, we I mean me, sitting on the hot seat in New York having to rush out to Lake Success from time to time to say we were stepping up our contribution, we were going to take over so many Canadian Pacific flights to Tokyo. And there was one time when I had to say we were doing something, we were stepping up production of the ORENDA engine. Trygve Lie was not terribly impressed, he didn't know what an ORENDA engine was. Maybe it's of some interest too that the embarrassment in Ottawa during that summer was attributable to pressure of Canadian public opinion. The Americans were getting pretty exasperated. Their boys were being killed again. There were desperate battles, and there was a lot of anti-UN sentiment in the States. "What is the UN doing, nobody is helping us, we are all alone," and Canada was especially vulnerable; although I can remember one theme that I heard at that time in Ottawa from the older ones: "We waited two years in the last couple of wars for them, they can wait for us this time". On a kind of a popular emotional level there was a bit of that. Again you had that deeply held Canadian worry about conscription. The idea that you had to have conscription for the Korean Force seems pretty absurd, but the fear was there.

[HILL] Did that relate to the thinking about NATO also? Presumably it did.

[HOLMES] Yes, it did. Originally that was another reason why people had to be reassured that this was not going to mean Canadian forces conscripted to serve in Europe. The people in power then had been through not only 1944 but they had been through 1917. Mr. St. Laurent was much less traumatized by that than most French Canadians, but nevertheless knew it was a political factor, so that it had to be made pretty clear that there was no question of conscription. We did not have much trouble raising a special force, because of the particular circumstance that it was only 5 or 6 years after demobilization. There were quite a few people who by that time were thinking that life in Kapuskasing was pretty boring and nothing like those great years in the war. I think, if I am not mistaken, we had to weed out some of the quick recruits, not exactly the right types, but at any rate we did get them on the spot sooner than untrained recruits. Pearson was very good at devising this concept, which he finally sold, about raising the brigade. There was also some nervousness (it came out over NATO also) - I mean the old worries that go back before the first war and afterwards about Canada being committed by somebody else. We certainly went into Korea because it was a UN war not because it was a U.S. war.

[HILL] This links us up to a couple of other interesting questions. If I understand correctly what you are saying, Canada's interest in setting up the North Atlantic Treaty, initially, was partly for its own sake, because of the liberalism of Pearson which you mentioned and so on, but also partly to make sure that the United States was involved, as a means of persuading the U.S. to continue being involved in Europe. Having done that, then Canada was quite content with that situation whereas the Americans, having got involved, sort of went further. Certainly they sent troops immediately to Korea and then other troops to Europe and so on.

[HOLMES] The decision on Korea, and I remember this acutely as I was in New York, was made because we thought it was clear that the UN was being challenged as the League had been challenged, and as the League had failed over Manchuria, over Ethiopia. Looking back now, I think that was a pretty simplistic argument, but at any rate that was very much the feeling: if the UN did nothing, it would go the way of the League. It was such a blatant, a classical aggression. It was like Belgium and Poland in the previous two wars. Here it was. You had to meet it. But in a crisis all the beautiful ideas of a UN Force in blue and white uniforms suddenly disappear. Here is a tough invading force with tanks heading fast to the South and you do not turn them back

with a UN resolution. What do you do? The only people who could resist, aside from the South Koreans, were the Americans, because they had forces in Japan. So here we are, it is awfully difficult for Canadians, if we have any self-respect, to get up and to say that we, the UN, must resist them with tanks; because we do not have any. Only the Americans really could make that decision. The rest of us probably could have argued against intervention, but we could not argue for intervention, even if we believed that it was a good idea, because it would put us in a difficult moral position. Nevertheless it was because it was a UN affair, out of this feeling that the UN would stand or fall, that we eventually participated. The British and the French and the Turks got some forces in there pretty quickly. Contrary to a lot of Canadian opinion that the Americans put pressure on us, the Americans were rather discreet about it. It was when the Australians, New Zealanders and others, even the South Africans, were sending forces to Korea, that we felt pretty embarrassed, but we had to confront the military fact that we had no troops to spare. We only had this small group that was supposed to be defending the continent. We could not send everybody. The delay was partly a kind of resistance to getting involved again but to a considerable extent it was having to accept the fact that we could decide to send them but there was nobody to send. So you got all this tokenism throughout that summer, and it was not really until we had firmly said we were sending troops that we had a firm moral position in arguing what the UN campaign should be like. But fortunately we had troops there by the time we started taking a leading part in trying to get an armistice.

[HILL] I wanted to ask one other question that links into this. It seems to me that there was some discussion, at the time of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty, and at the time of the consultations on the steering group that was set up in the year after, about geographic responsibilities. My impression is that France and one or two others were thinking of the North Atlantic Alliance having some sort of global responsibility. There would be some group there that would look at Western strategy on a worldwide basis. But Canada always firmly resisted that and thought in terms of a purely North Atlantic focus for NATO activities.

[HOLMES] This is an interesting question and I do not have an answer, because I recall being rather puzzled during that period by the different noises coming from Ottawa, really quite contradictory in a way. There is no doubt when things got under way we wanted to have this treaty commitment limited, but if you look at the earlier statements - when we were feeling our way - and I think if you look at St. Laurent's famous speech in the General Assembly in 1947, (which incidentally you will find even in those official little pamphlets of the history of NATO), this sense of global responsibility assumes considerable importance. But it is put in these terms: given the fact that the UN is paralyzed in collective security, those countries which are willing and prepared to do something should band together. You get a little note of its not necessarily being regional but the good guys everywhere. I suspect, for instance, we had our eye on Australia and New Zealand; so that note is struck. Some of those more apocalyptic notes came more easily to Escott and to Mike Pearson who tended to talk that way. Mike was very much influenced by Escott and found his approach emotionally appealing. Nevertheless, he appreciated Wrong's caution intellectually. I have a feeling he was somewhere in between, but I think that the broader idea in the beginning appealed to him. Here I am recollecting impressions I got in my research, not recollections of the time.

[HILL] I was very struck, when going through the history of these discussions about the Steering Group or Standing Group, that there was a lot of debate about what Canada's role should be. Initially there was some thought that Canada should be one of the four or five members of the directorate. Subsequently that idea was dropped, partly because the Italians made it clear that they would want to be in too, and then the Dutch and so on. Then Canada accepted the idea that Canada

should be involved whenever there were things of keen interest to Canada. But that seemed to me a retrograde step. I mean the thrust of Canadian policy during the war had been to increase Canada's status in allied councils, and here, subsequently, was the relatively easy acceptance of what was a relatively weak position. But maybe it is more explained by this functionalism approach which you spoke of last time.

[HOLMES] I think so. It seems to me, certainly when looking at the record, that the illusions of grandeur persisted about ourselves as a military power, based on our performance during the war. We had been so insistently arguing that we were the third Western military power and we had a right to a place on this and that. We made a great deal out of it over the peace treaties with Germany. We almost took for granted that we would be a semi-permanent member of the Security Council. I think, as I may have said the last time, it was a curious illusion, because it was based on thinking of ourselves as a great military power - because of the past - while we were in fact disarming and demobilizing and clearly had no intention of remaining an important military power. I have often asked what the devil we would have done if we had got some kind of semi-permanent position on the Security Council, what it would have done to our defence budget. We would have had to keep it up. So you get this kind of illusion of our importance, and it carries over into NATO. Of course it was reinforced in NATO by the fact that we really were in at the ground Those secret tripartite discussions in Washington confirmed a view that we were pretty important, and you could see the illusion again. We knew we were not a great power, but we weren't Luxembourg. I suppose there were again those who wanted to press our position and those who were nervous of the commitments in which we would be involved. It was the old dichotomy in Canadian policy. If there had been a scheme for a kind of controlling group of five or something, we might well have argued on functionalist grounds that we belonged there, but it became clear that if we were going to have a directorate it would be tripartite.

[HILL] It never seemed to function anyway, this famous Standing Group or Steering Group. It seemed to be more or less a dead letter, as far as I can make out.

Professor Holmes, I think you would like to make one comment following on our previous discussions about the question of Canadian forces.

[HOLMES] Yes. It is this continuing theme, deeply embedded in our history - a misinterpretation, I think, of 1914, 1939 by many people - that we were committed by somebody else to send forces; it is not true. We were technically committed maybe in 1914, but the decision in fact to deploy forces in strength was entirely our own. However, this is a deep rooted worry. It was for MacKenzie King even though he really was disposed to commit forces in 1939. As a political factor everybody was worried about it; and it comes out in our debate on the role of the Security Council. There is a contradictory approach, all the way through to Article 5 of NATO. On the one hand, we feel strongly that the importance of either collective security or collective defence is in the assurance that aggression will be met by a united front against it, which really means that that assurance has to be almost an automatic commitment. But, on the other hand, when we got to the details of the Security Council, we insisted on getting something in there to the effect that Canadian forces would not be committed unless Canada had a right to be heard in the Security Council. This nervousness was there. For us the great thing about NATO was the commitment of the American Senate. But to do exactly what? When you get to the verbs you have trouble. It was a guarantee in a way, but a guarantee to do what? So you get all of this rather difficult philosophical arguing about what the commitment is. Then they hit upon the Rio Treaty formula, which was to regard an attack on one as an attack on all, a way of getting around the question of saying that the minute the Soviet Union sets one foot on West German or Norwegian soil we will all immediately declare war. Most of the worry in NATO was over a commitment of the U.S. Senate. But Canadians were not any more disposed to a clear commitment in the Article 5 debate. We would love to have the Americans come in because what would really deter the Soviets would be for the Americans to say instantly we are at war; but as we were not prepared to do that ourselves, it was a little hard to press the Americans. So I think (here I am talking from recollection of my research), I think one could only recognize this as a persistent ambiguity.

[HILL] Of course de Gaulle made a great deal of the question of not having French forces committed without France having a say in the matter. But in reality that was always anticipated, under Article 5. None of the Allies are automatically committed, really, are they?

[HOLMES] No, none of them is, and of course in recent years when you've had these doubts on the part of Europeans of the American commitment in extremis to get itself involved in the exchange of atomic weapons, it becomes quite real again. That is one of those things to which there are many answers.

[HILL] Although I suppose the fact of having forces on the ground does make them hostages, and that's another element in the equation, I think. If some of your people get shot by invading troops then that gives you all the more likelihood that you will be involved.

[HOLMES] There is that classical French statement about the First World War, about the British guarantee. It was essential to the British commitment, to have one British soldier in France, but he must be killed on the first day.

[HILL] Well, I think that was said by the French Ambassador in London at the outset of the First World War. The British asked him how many troops did he think would be enough, and he said one, and we will make sure he gets shot. Well, I wondered also if you could tell us something more about Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. You already mentioned the fact that Canada was strongly committed to it, and I found this very interesting. But I was not quite sure why Canada was so committed to Article 2, when others were not. So I wonder if you could discuss that?

[HOLMES] The French were quite supportive of Article 2. It was not so much Canada against everybody else. There has been a lot of simplified history to the effect that in order to sell a peacetime military alliance to the Canadian public, we had to pretend that it was something more than a military alliance, and for that reason we wanted to make it an economic alliance. There is certainly some truth in the feeling that we wanted to make it something more than a military alliance. I say "we" again. Who am I talking about? I guess the powerful figures in the Government and in External Affairs who were creating policy to a large extent. But it was not just for show; Pearson and Reid and company did not simply want to pretend that NATO was more than a military alliance in order to fool the public. They really believed it, they really wanted it to be something more. I think I quoted in my book somewhere that Mr. St. Laurent found that he could sell Article 2 to President Truman a little more easily by saying that it was necessary for Canadian politics. This is something Truman understood, being a politician. But St. Laurent was just being the diplomat. I think there was considerable ambiguity about what we wanted to make of the North Atlantic Community. However, there was no real doubt that everybody, Wrong as well as Reid. did want to build this idea of a Community. Article 2 was primarily intended to say: "We cannot have a strong military alliance unless we have diplomatic consultation, unless we are more or less agreed about going to war when we have to go to war". But we also said that it was equally important for a strong alliance that we not be conducting trade wars against each other. And this in a sense is a pledge not to do that. It is an old Canadian fear. I recall this particularly because

I was working for Norman Robertson in London at this critical period. He always was very far sighted and for him the great nightmare was that the North American countries and the Europeans would drift apart economically because their interests were becoming different. North Americans were anxious for freer trade and removing barriers, but the Europeans had to put this off till they got on their feet. Recognizing the fact that there were two different streams of thought, it is hard to say what Canadian policy actually was; but on the other hand I do think (I did not realize this until I traced some of the later correspondence when I was doing my research), that within that little time those actually involved in the NATO set-up came to realize that Canadian insistence on Article 2 was only annoying and irritating others, who regarded it as a kind of obsession. Escott, who could be terribly insistent, kept pressing Wrong and others to do something about it. There were some who wanted to help us out on this issue and asked what we proposed to do; in Ottawa some of the people in Finance and Trade and Commerce and others got together and asked what we were proposing. However, it was very hard to come up with any specific ideas, as to what NATO should do in this period on economic issues, and it became less and less popular in Ottawa as an idea. Then there were some memoranda and dispatches from Washington, rather impatient ones from Wrong, on the subject of Article 2. I think in Ottawa they had got themselves into the position that they were over-selling Article 2 to the Canadian public; and if they did not keep hammering at it there would be criticism.

[HILL] Which period is this you are referring to?

[HOLMES] Particularly in 1950, 1951, after NATO was in fact set up and we were still making the Article 2 speeches. There is a splendid memorandum somewhere in which Ed Ritchie (I think Jake Warren had drafted it), suggested that the OEEC provided the way out. OEEC would be the economic body we needed and with a slightly different membership on functional grounds. Pearson accepted that, and we stopped flogging Article 2, contrary to the traditional view that we went on hammering at Article 2, and that it was a failure. I do not think it was a failure at all if it is viewed as I have been viewing it. If you look at the history, particularly in the earlier period, you did have, particularly on the part of the Americans and others, a feeling that the economic interests of their allies were of interest to them and you did get restraint. It is true that there were economic differences and trade differences, but if you look at the overall picture, particularly in the light of the kind of nightmare feeling we had of a real trade war, it was not bad. And this is true to the present moment; one has a feeling that Article 2 applies even now when they actually get together. There is a kind of feeling that we cannot afford to have a break over trade.

[HILL] That fear of a trade war, was that harking back to the Depression and so on, to what happened in the pre-war period? The other thing is that in the actual negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, Canada at one stage put forward an even tougher Article 2. What actually came out as Article 2 was only a boiled-down version. I was wondering how tough was Canada in pushing for that? It is very hard to tell from the record. My impression is that there was a lot of telephoning behind the scenes, a lot of arm twisting and so on.

[HOLMES] I cannot remember the specifics of it. It is, incidentally, all in that Soward manuscript which I will be happy to show you. Take a look at his boiled-down version. I seem to recall a telegram to Wrong to go and impress the Americans again on Article 2, to which he replied that Acheson and company, and all the State Department, were strong allies in the whole business of selling it to the Senate. They were trying very hard. They were the pro- NATO people and didn't themselves have any real objections to Article 2. Their's was a great concern about anything that might turn off the Senate. Wrong reported that he had, despite his doubts, impressed on them our views, but they would not even listen. The Senators seemed to get very frightened if

there was any suggestion of continuing economic help to Europe. There were those in DEA who worked themselves into a certain fanaticism over Article 2, but increasingly in External, and with the advice coming from Wrong, we realized we were just making ourselves rather unpopular. So OEEC was a wonderful way out, it was our functionalist approach. NATO is a military alliance, the members of which are countries prepared to belong to a military alliance, but when we get to economics, we want to have Sweden and other neutral countries like Switzerland involved whether they want to belong to NATO or not. So here you get OEEC with a different membership that still has that essential NATO core in it. So it was a very good way out. I seem to recall a memorandum that said, let's not drop Article 2, just lay off.

[HILL] It is interesting that France provided some backing for Canada on this question. Was there not a bit of conflict with the European movement on Article 2?

[HOLMES] First of all on the French thing I think some of that is attributable to General Vanier who, as the Ambassador, had been close to de Gaulle and had considerable influence in Paris at that time. It couldn't have been entirely that, but I seem to recall that he did quite a good job of selling them on this. A little earlier I was going to say that in our campaign for NATO, there were in a sense two problems. One was the U.S. Senate, it had to be drawn along. The other was the Europeanists. I think Spaak was in Ottawa at one point, and Pearson tried to sell him on NATO, but he was dubious because he was so keen on European unity. This was a problem because the Americans were keen on it also. Their's was, as we used to say, a 1776 syndrome, but they forget the 1861 syndrome.

[HILL] 1861, that was....

[HOLMES] The Civil War. The idea is that if you all federate together there won't be any wars. That was disproved in 1861. But at any rate there was considerable interest in this and Spaak and company were really, and quite rightly, worried that a North Atlantic association would cut across the effort to get Western European union going. Their economic prospects were pretty dim at that time. Western Europe was in a bad state, so that the kind of conventional arguments for all getting together in unity and strength sounded fairly good, especially with a man like Spaak who was a philosophically dedicated European. So, we had to be careful with them, because I think there was some feeling in Ottawa that what they wanted to do was perfectly respectable. It was a little hard to complain about it or to tell them not to, but still that was the one thing that would hold them back from NATO. We already had some ambivalence about European union.

[HILL] I think Lester Pearson and others made speeches supporting the idea of European unity, but there were doubts in the back of people's minds about where Canada would fit in.

[HOLMES] I do not want to make too much of this, but I remember that an element of the British opposition to European union, to British involvement, was the argument that it would be contrary to the Commonwealth association and that Commonwealth countries were urging them not to become involved in it. There was a little resentment of this in Ottawa. We had never told the British not to join Europe, they had Dominion status like the rest of us. I can remember 1951 or '52, I was on a National Defence trip to Brussels, and I remember this came up at a meeting in the Belgian Foreign Office. We did not want to appear publicly as opposed to European union, but of course what we were keenest on was NATO. There is one other thing there too that's of some interest. The Americans wanted to push the Swedes into NATO. We said no, we must respect the Swedish view. I think also there was a feeling that maybe it was not such a bad thing strategically to have neutral Sweden in between the Soviet Union, as we were very worried about Finland. If

I am not mistaken Mike actually went to Stockholm; he went on a trip to Europe and talked to various people and was very anxious to maintain good relations with the Swedes and to show understanding. I remember being at a dinner party in New York, this would be in 1950, and there was an American, a State Department character there, who was getting angry with the Swedes, free ride and all that sort of thing, and denouncing neutrality as immoral. I found him extremely offensive. I am not sure that we did not have a Swedish host. At any rate, I finally could not take it any longer and I proceeded to point out that the Americans were quite recent converts against neutrality; and I recalled the lectures that we had had, in 1939 and 1941, when we were fighting "your war" and being told piously that neutrality was virtuous. It did not help the dinner party. But we very much wanted the Norwegians and the Danes although we understood that persistent fellowfeeling of Scandinavians.

[HILL] Right, I notice, in looking through the records, that there seemed to be quite a lot of concern in External about the attitudes of the Scandinavians in this whole period; perhaps more so than with the case of Turkey and Greece.

[HOLMES] This strong Canadian prejudice for the Northern Europeans over the Southern Europeans comes out here. Nobody said it. The same sort of thing you got in immigration policy.

[HILL] Yes, that is interesting. Strange, in a way.

[HOLMES] There was a very interesting remark Ian Smart made here a couple of years ago, that the division in Europe is as much North-South as East-West.

[HILL] On a couple of other questions, first of all, I think one branch of the revisionist view of the foundation of NATO is that the United States seized upon this opportunity to convert its forces in Europe from occupation forces to alliance forces, and that what you really have is a kind of Americanization of Europe. This is the kind of thing that De Gaulle feared. But how were things seen at the time, in 1949 and 1950? After the treaty was signed, there were some moves to increase military arrangements. I mean, for example, pipelines were eventually opened up, arrangements for transit routes from Bordeaux to Germany and things like that, which of course, all came to an end after '58 when De Gaulle came back. But in the early period, these things were set up. What was the attitude, as far as you could judge, of the Europeans at that time? Did they feel they were being pressured, or that the U.S. was coming as a saviour or something like that?

[HOLMES] A point I just made in a paper I am going to give at CMR next week is that one must distinguish the origins of NATO from what happened later. In other words, it is important to remember that we dragged the Americans into NATO, rather than the other way around if you want to use those terms. That is quite apart from arguments as to whether, once the Americans were in NATO, they excessively dominated policy. They did, to some extent inevitably, because of the size of their contribution. I seem to recall, up until then (maybe NATO was a turning point), we never got over the nervousness that the Americans were going to walk out, as they had before. By the time they were involved, and certainly by the time they got into the Korean War, one did not have to worry about that. And, gradually, we were beginning to realize that we had a permanent problem in American dominance, which we began to get a little more worried about. I think that in Ottawa there was always an understanding that you couldn't really have equality with the Americans, that they had to have a special position in NATO; but they started practising it without very great sensitivity. It happened in so many ways. I can remember in the '50s, proposals came from the Soviets, or the East Europeans, feelers towards some kind of detente arrangement in Europe, zones of disarmament and things like that, the Rapacki Plan and what not. The minute that

these were proposed, they were instantly rejected, on behalf of NATO, by a spokesman in the White House. This would get us very angry. Already, of course, it was a nasty time in Washington. McCarthy hysteria started fairly soon afterwards. We were parting company in outlook. We did over China; we did over an armistice with Korea. We were already beginning to drift apart from them on Indo-China. Not for a moment did we doubt that we were on the same side ultimately. Our differences were over tactics, ways of dealing with the Soviets. I think that a classical case, which I cite frequently to explain the difference, was the debate we had with the Americans over the unification of Korea. This particularly came to a head at the Geneva Conference in 1954. But we had it earlier, when the Americans wanted to declare the Chinese aggressors, and we said okay, maybe they are, but at this moment, what we are trying to do is to get an armistice in Korea and that wouldn't be helpful. The fighting had gone back and forth and we were really stalled, and we said that there was no use in trying to pursue this any further. We weren't alone in that by any means. We've got to get an armistice. The Americans said yes, but we have to declare sin is sin and has to be castigated as such. We rather lost that argument in the UN, largely because our European friends were not prepared to stand up against the Americans, although they agreed with us. At the Geneva Conference on the unification of Korea, of course, all we had to talk about was a plebiscite or free elections, which were about as absurd to think of as they were in Vietnam, but at any rate, we had to have that. The Americans insisted that they must be free elections conducted by the United Nations. We said okay we agree, but the trouble is in this particular situation the United Nations has become a belligerent. The North Koreans would not accept, nor would the Soviets or Chinese, that role from the UN in a situation where it was a belligerent. The Americans had to stand on principle. And we said okay, we'll stand on principle but you won't get anywhere. It was very much a difference because of our functionalist approach. What we were trying to press was a formula by which the United Nations would be involved in the plebiscite but wouldn't necessarily be in charge of it. Now this is just a form of words, and in any case, we didn't get anywhere with either approach, but I cite this as an example of the difference between our kind of approach to so many of these things. For example, we didn't recognize the Peking Government but we maintained contacts with them. We had trade relations. Later we did the same with Cuba. The Americans were a little more for "sin is sin" and not having anything to do with the wicked, even though they kept their embassy in Bulgaria.

[HILL] What about military arrangements in this period? I mean, what were the Americans doing at that time?

[HOLMES] Throwing their weight around, I presume is really the answer. I am not disposed to look very sympathetically upon revisionists' arguments, because they are pressed too far, but I just don't know enough about that period and the military arrangements. And again, during the mid '50s, I was up to my ears in UN activities. Even more particularly, Indo-China preoccupied us. I know that I would listen at staff meetings to what was going on. I did attend a couple of NATO Council meetings, not because I was really involved. But on our way to the Geneva Conference in 1954, there was a NATO Council meeting in Paris, and I was with Mr. Pearson. I remember going to that. The chief thing that I remember was the French Foreign Minister M. Bidault. This was shortly before Dien Bien Phu. He was chairman. Whether he was doped or drunk, I don't really know, but he sat in the chair, and he was obviously under terrible, heavy pressure. Every once in a while, he would sway far over on one side. A very distinguished Brit, a real FO type who was a sort of Under-Secretary, would give him a little tilt before he fell over onto his side. We all watched in horror at poor Bidault, and we felt sad for him. Then I can recall the session of the conference in Geneva, the day of the news of the fall of Dien Bien Phu. He was muttering out loud and behaving like a drunk, although I suspect it was drugs as much. It was a shattering experience. Everyone was watching this sad performance and he was flaying out against his staff, and throwing papers. This does not tell you much about NATO. I am trying to remember if it was at that or the other session that I went to. Dulles got up. We could see that he had a point to make. He was reconstructing history to strengthen his moral position; he had discovered that the Chinese Revolution had been much more blood thirsty than the Bolshevik Revolution and one knew that this was his way of justifying a tougher attitude towards Peking. It was the Red Chinese who were the principal enemy. They weren't exactly cozying up to the Red Russians, but still he had convinced himself of this version of history, and you knew perfectly well what it meant. He wanted allied unity against the Red Chinese. It was so characteristic of Dulles.

[HILL] Could I just ask one last question on this period? You mentioned the fact that Canada sent troops to Europe in 1951, really after the U.S. had taken the decision to upgrade its troops or keep its troops there. Could you tell us a bit more of that decision in Canada? Who was involved and how was the decision taken to send troops to Europe?

[HOLMES] I'm trying to remember, I think that I was in New York.

[HILL] It would have been 1950.

[HOLMES] I was at the UN, and then I went to Kingston. My dear mother was reported as having said to various people who asked where John was, "Oh, he is in Kingston now, but he is just going to be there for two years."

No, I really can't recall that at all. It must have been 1951, because the Korean invasion was June, 1950. I was in New York; still I should have known.

Part VI - The National Defence College, 1951-53

[HILL] We are going to move on to the next part, concerning your period at the National Defence College. First, did you travel widely in those days, I mean virtually around the world?

[HOLMES] No, we never went round the world, just to the Middle East, some of Africa and Europe, that was about it.

[HILL] But at least it gave you a chance to think about the role of NATO in world affairs and in the broader scheme of things, about where the whole world was going and so on. Of course, this was the period also of the Korean War. We have talked already about Communist China. What was the sense of where the world was going at that time and where did NATO fit in, where did Canada fit in?

[HOLMES] It was a pretty orthodox sort of NATO period, in the sense that the need to be strong, the need to beef up our defences, were obvious. Of course it was a time when we were increasing our defence expenditure quite rapidly and recruiting and that sort of thing. I think of the speakers who used to come and talk to us at NDC; I think of the discussions on our European tour in Brussels, and Paris and Rome and other places; it was very conventional. The Alliance was pretty strong. You still had the debates on Soviet intentions. Then, of course, I think it was towards the end of my stay at NDC, Stalin died. That raised all sorts of questions. We had a period; a couple of years, of freer thinking. I can remember at that time getting exasperated with the fact that every memorandum that came out of the Department of National Defence began with the same phrase, "Although we know that the Soviet long range intentions have not changed, and will not change, nevertheless..." It reminded me so much of the letters or articles I used to read in the Soviet press

which would begin with acknowledgements of Stalin as "our leader, guide in medicine, philosophy and god knows what else", and then would go on and write something fairly sensible scientifically. This was pretty conventional thinking about the Soviet threat. Not many people argued that there was not a Soviet threat, but was it immutable, was there any change? Perhaps the biggest arguments were over the question of whether the Communist world was monolithic. I was rather anti-monolith and I think it had to do with my experience in Moscow, having predicted the break with Yugoslavia, when the specialists would not hear of it.

[HILL] The predominant feature of international relationships at this time was the East-West cleavage. Of course, it was also the period when India had become independent, the Bandung Conference, and so on. I think there must have been some feeling that the world was on its way to new kinds of relationships.

[HOLMES] Oh yes, and I think you had within External Affairs hard liners and soft liners, or middle liners. We had some who were tough in their analysis of the intentions of the Soviets, now and forever more, as they were elsewhere. But, the predominant mood, and this was certainly true of the Minister, Pearson, was to look for a change, to look for opportunities, to welcome change. Then, of course, when Stalin died and there was Krushchev's speech to the Party Congress, and things like that, it certainly strengthened the argument of those people who said: "Let's watch for change, hope for change, maybe they will change." That was very much the mood in which we went to Moscow. I went with Pearson in 1955. He was the sort of person who was duly sceptical of Soviet policy, but more anxious to be pleased than displeased. There is a certain mentality on this. You can see it right now. Any signs that the Soviets might be changing for the better are rejected instantly because they rather upset right thinking.

[HILL] We have the same thing now, of course. It wasn't until six months ago that some people started to accept that Gorbachev just might conceivably make some changes. In fact, a fair number of people have argued that things have got worse since he got into power, without any thought that maybe there is a requirement to follow a process there. It was all taken as being as black as ever and maybe a bit blacker still. That sort of thing.

[HOLMES] Well, that's been a kind of persistent one. I think in External Affairs, there was more disposition to welcome change. I think Pearson's attitude in Moscow was that he wanted to hear what they had to say. He was very disappointed in Moscow, where we had to talk to Molotov, out of whom we got nothing. Pearson really wanted a frank talk. Molotov would just put us off and make speeches about how we were neighbours over the Pole, and that kind of thing. One of the reasons was that he was really on his way out. I remember the day we went for an acrossthe-table session with the Soviets at the Kremlin, an article appeared criticizing him in the Soviet press and the specialists said: "That's it; so he was not in a strong position". But then the difference was great with Khrushchev. Khrushchev and Bulganin were in the Caucasus and they invited Mike to come and visit them there. Unfortunately, I had to stay in Moscow, because we were having some difficulties over the communiqué, and I had to stay on and negotiate with the Soviets on the communiqué. George Ignatieff will tell you more about this. They were hardly off the plane when Khrushchev said: "Why don't you get out of NATO?" Mike said: "Well, I'll tell you why we don't get out of NATO." They had a good discussion. George can tell you about Khrushchev's very interesting comments on Eisenhower. He talked about the suffering of the Soviets and about the war - he had lost his son - and said what they were worried about was that the Americans hadn't had war on their own soil for a long time and they didn't really understand what it was like. But there was one American who did, and that was Eisenhower.

[HILL] Why did he say that? Because of his breadth of understanding?

[HOLMES] I think he probably met Eisenhower and Eisenhower was not a hard liner. He did hate war, there was no doubt about that. He had seen too much of it. At any rate, I illustrate this as Pearson's difficulty. He did want to talk with them, and with some of the others. It was a reasonable discussion, but not much dialogue. Nevertheless, at that time, we didn't know how things were shifting in Moscow. With all this debate about who was going to take over, and it wasn't entirely clear that Khrushchev would, so there were all sorts of reasons for speculation. I think that we had hoped for some détente developing; we were hoping always for détente. I'm trying to remember what the Soviets did shortly afterwards which spoiled the whole thing. There was a summit meeting shortly after that too.

[HILL] Of course, there was the Hungarian business, too.

[HOLMES] Of course, the Hungarian business, shortly afterwards, the next year.

Part VII - Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

[HILL] To wrap up the interview, I would like to lead on from where you were talking about the Soviet Union, and to discuss briefly that whole period from 1953 to 1960 when you were Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Then, perhaps we could also put in with that your period subsequently as Executive Director of the CIIA, because I think that I would like to just ask one basic question. Being involved in the making of foreign policy and its implementation at External, and since then thinking and writing about foreign policy and Canada's role in the world, how well do you think membership in NATO has served Canada in that time. How well do you think it is likely to serve Canada in the future? And do you see big changes coming ahead for NATO as well, as the world evolves? It is a very broad question.

[HOLMES] I have just written a long essay on this subject. I haven't had any doubt myself that we were better off in NATO than out, and that NATO, on the whole, was a good thing. The way I see it now is that we have to see NATO and the Warsaw Pact as somehow part of the structure of détente. This is what I argue with my friends who want to pull us out of NATO, in the interests of peace. What we've got is an enormous change from what we had twenty years ago. The concepts of détente and deterrence, even the concept of second strike, are revolutionary as compared to the old idea of one-up-manship, that you had to be superior, you had to be able to defeat the enemy. We may have overdone the extent to which a multilateral alliance is for us easier, because it reduces some of the tension in a bilateral alliance. But I think psychologically, it's valuable. It would seem to me that, on the whole, if we are trying to influence American grand strategy, we are more effective in NATO than just by saying, please, we are your continental allies, will you hear what we say. I don't think bilaterally you get very far unless it is specifically about the Arctic, about our own zone. Then clearly we have some clout. For the people who are worried about our being dragged along in the military alliance, I think we can argue that, we were one of the countries that pressed NATO to move towards détente. We have had, particularly with the Belgians, the Dutch, the Danes, the Norwegians, a chance for coalition diplomacy. It seems to me that our influence in NATO has more to do with our intellectual than our military contribution. Those who want us to increase our military contribution tend to argue that, unless we increase our military contribution, people won't pay any attention to what we say. I think that it would be better to argue we should increase our military contribution because we should increase our military contribution. I doubt it would make much difference in influence. I think if we decreased it, that would be another story.

[HILL] I would like to see a copy of that paper. One other point: I have been thinking about references to the Alliance supposedly "falling apart", which I think you mentioned at one point. Going through the files, I was struck to find that, already in 1950, people were talking about the Alliance falling apart.

[HOLMES] That's what it's for. If agreement among that group was automatic, taken for granted, then you probably wouldn't need much of an alliance.

[HILL] Well, I think that we have come to the end of our time. Thank you for participating in this study.

[HOLMES] It has been a pleasure.

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GEORGE IGNATIEFF

[HILL]² Good afternoon. We are pleased to have with us today Ambassador George Ignatieff, formerly Canada's Permanent Representative to NATO, to the United Nations and to the Geneva Disarmament Conference also previously Provost of Trinity College, University of Toronto and now an active participant in the public debate on international peace and security issues. Ambassador Ignatieff, we are certainly delighted that you are ready to participate in this project, an oral history of Canadian policy in NATO, and we very much look forward to hearing what you have to say.

[IGNATIEFF] I am looking forward to participating in this project, which I think is very worthwhile. In teaching international relations at the University of Toronto, I found that there were very different perspectives in approaching just what Canada's role had been. On the whole the current generation, I think, underestimates the importance of Canada's contribution not only in NATO but in the United Nations and the whole system of international institutions.

[HILL] Ambassador Ignatieff, as you know, what we are trying to do in this project is to obtain the views of those Canadians who have been most active over the years in dealing with NATO. We are trying to examine the importance of NATO membership to Canada and how well NATO has served Canada's immediate and long term foreign policy interests over the years. We are trying to look at the main policy developments and issues in our field over the past 40 years in a fairly systematic fashion and to learn what happened and how Canada and the Alliance were affected by various developments. So the focus of our discussions will be on those periods of your career when you were directly involved in NATO

affairs or NATO-related issues: for example when you were Canada's representative on the working group that set up the consultative and defence planning structure for the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization and when you were Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council more than a decade later. However, we would also like to get the real flavour of your own personal views and reflections on the world scene and on Canada's foreign policy. So we will also touch on some of the other periods of your extensive, and if I may say so, very interesting career.

different stages of intervention. One was working with Escott Reid in the negotiations of the North Atlantic Treaty itself, which was signed on 4 April 1949; I was then sent to Washington to replace Tommy Stone on the international committee which was meeting, representative of all the members that had signed the Treaty, to set up the consultative machinery provided for under the Treaty and particularly under articles 4 and 2, and then as defense liaison officer both in Washington in dealing with the Korean War, and then later as head of defense liaison in External Affairs. I was involved in developing the military aspects really related more to the Korean War. One of the factors that is sometimes overlooked is that nobody was extremely keen when we signed the Treaty to go into immediate military dispositions, deployments, and commitments. We were all in the process of demobilizing, which was one of the reasons why it seemed that there was a very direct imbalance of security in Europe, because the Soviets had not demobilized the way the Western powers had, but I should stress that back in '48 and '49 there was no great enthusiasm on the part of any of the allies to go into military commitments. It was all sparked by Korea, and then the fourth stage was when I was Ambassador to NATO, between '62 and '66, where I got involved in things such as the

² Interviewers: Hill, Pawelek Interview dates: 6/4/87 and 7/4/87.

Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin Crisis, the Greek-Turkish crisis and all the other things that went on, and then of course the whole question of nuclear weapons.

[HILL] We will look at those various periods. These interviews are built in terms of your own career, so they are done in certain phases. And we have had the pleasure of reading your autobiography, The Making of a Peacemonger. Not only was it very revealing about international affairs, but I greatly enjoyed many of your anecdotes. I think it all helps to bring international affairs alive.

Part I - Early Years, to 1939

[HILL] If I might start very briefly with what we could call part 1, which would be the early years up to 1939, in your memoirs you referred to your experiences of the Russian Civil War, your years at school in England, and then finding a new home in Canada. You lived in Montreal and Toronto, worked in the interior of B.C., studied at Jervis Collegiate and then at the University of Toronto and then subsequently won a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford. I wonder if you could just tell us a little bit about those early years and the main impressions made on you by them, I think particularly as they affected your later approaches to your diplomatic life and your thinking about international peace and security.

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, I think that the main effect on my career and my ongoing interest in peace and security really is the fact that I was in a sense a war child of World War I. That was that. My first recollections at the age of four, when one begins to have, not a very rational, but at least some impressionistic view of what is going on, was of the March revolution in 1917, and then through to the Civil War, which we encountered when the family moved down to the Caucasus to Kislovodsk - to get away from the tensions and the whole upheaval in the capital city of Petrograd, as it was then. We were in the middle of the Civil War. My father was arrested and brought before a revolutionary tribunal. He was rescued by a student who recognized him as the former Minister of Education who had brought forth a lot of reforms, and we narrowly escaped death. We were on an execution list as hostages after an attempt on the life of Lenin in Moscow, when a whole lot of the Russian aristocracy were put to death in one way or another with or without trial. Father was arrested as a hostage, charged with counter revolutionary activities - which he could not have been very active in, because he was in bed, a sick man with heart trouble, at the time - but as I say he was rescued by a student from Moscow University, recognizing him he was a member of the tribunal. He said that if father was shot he would raise hell with the teachers and the students in the town where this tribunal was sitting, and as the Bolsheviks were then at that time relying on a good many of the students and teachers, that sort of thing in the social democratic ranks rather than the Bolshevik ranks, they let him go. We then were able to get through with the help of the White Russian movement to the sea coast of the Black Sea, and were taken off the beaches of Novorossiysk by a British war ship.

So my very first recollection was of civil war, of death. And what was worse, was that I saw the end of, not only of war but the breakup of a society as a result of defeat in war, which of course many saw at the end of World War II in Germany and Austria and Japan. In Russia, what isn't perhaps generally realized, was that the terrible losses and the failure to provide for munitions and supplies to the Soviet army led to terrible defeats in which whole armies were surrounded and defeated and taken prisoner. Then that led gradually to mutiny. It was the mutiny in the Imperial army that led to the breakdown of Tzarism and that was my first experience with a breakdown in society. Trains stopped running, water wasn't safe, electricity or gas wasn't available and then food became scarcer and scarcer until you were lucky to get a crust of bread; that sort of breakdown in

society as a result of war. This was the end of a war which in the west had been celebrated as a victory. In Russia it was celebrated by terrible bloodshed and the breakdown of society. This was all between the years of four to seven and those were impressionable years. Then of course we had a time in England as refugees. I started my schooling there and found myself in the equivocal position that most children of course would regard anybody from Russia as Bolshie, although my father was persecuted by the Bolsheviks; and we tried farming - father tried farming. It was a financial disaster, and little by little my elder brothers, of which I had four, found that they had a better chance of employment in Canada. One came over as a harvester, another one came over as an engineer and another one came over as a mining engineer. I was 15 when we came to Canada with my mother, and since I was brought in on a CPR colonization scheme which was bringing in labour not intellectuals, but labourers, I was sent to a railroad construction crew, actually on the Crows Nest Pass, joining the Crows Nest Line with the Trail Smelter. I worked there as an axeman, so I did get a certain amount of initiation in Canadian life as it was lived by the bohunk as well as an intellectual; this experience and other jobs, enabled me to get to university and win several scholarships, which culminated with the Rhodes Scholarship in 1930 for Ontario, which got me to Oxford. I think the significance of that was that these were the Depression Years. Everybody in Canada, except very few fortunates, were in one way or another in financial straits. I was living, in order to take the financial burden off my parents, in a little boarding house here and trying to get whatever jobs I could in hotels, on farms and that sort of thing. But it did lead up to entering the competition for the Rhodes Scholarships and brought me to Europe in the immediate pre-war years. In fact, I remember my father who had, when he recovered his health after the Revolution, become President of the Red Cross, looking after the emigrés and the refugees and setting up clinics and that sort of thing. He was quite upset that I should be going back to Europe. He felt that we were very lucky to get away from that sort of background. The thought it was not good for me to be returning so soon to the continent which had brought so much distress to our family. But, he accepted that this was an honour and so on, although in a strange way I was plunged into the replay of the German threat, the German threat against Eastern Europe. I was in fact working on a Ph.D. in Eastern Europe in Bulgaria when the war broke out. I was working on some historical material relating to my grandfather's activities when he was dealing with the Eastern crisis in 1877/78 and here I found myself, in a way, looking back on the origins of the same sort of Eastern crisis enlarging and engulfing the whole of Europe and North America. I remember the time when I was at Oxford, I met Mike Pearson who was then Counsellor at Canada House and he brought a number of the Canadian students together, and I remember participating in a discussion which was very interesting, among the Canadian students on scholarships in Britain. Just what should Canada do? We were very divided during this period of 1939, just after the Munich crisis. I think that the majority of Canadian students felt that Canada should stay out of European wars, and I found myself in the minority arguing that even at that late stage it was not perhaps too late to try and do something to resurrect the collective security provisions of the League of Nations. This discussion I may say was before the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. I said that there was, it seemed to me, a chance of getting the Soviet Union, Britain and France to work together under the collective security provisions of the League Covenant to stop Czechoslovakia being consumed by the Germans, but if we did not do that, there was every likelihood that Germany would just move forward into Eastern Europe East as they had done before. And we would be faced with a much bigger threat in the end and Canada would have to come in.

[HILL] Just as a matter of curiosity, wasn't the alignment of Bulgaria and Romania pro-German at that time? Yugoslavia was more independent, I believe.

[IGNATIEFF] What I discovered, of course, was that the prejudices of the then King of Bulgaria, Boris, who was a German, had a great deal to do with the German orientation of the Bulgaria

sovereign? Bulgarians were fundamentally pro-Russian and would have taken whatever side the Soviets would have taken, and were very unwilling victims of the German occupation. The Hungarians, less so, because they had belonged to the Austro-Hungarian empire; but with the Yugoslavs, you're quite right, popular opinion was definitely against the Germans. And that's what Tito was able to build on. But to return to the effects of going back to Europe, as I say and, to Eastern European politics in my Ph.D. project, which I never completed, because I was warned by British Intelligence that I would be among those candidates for early internment because of the German penetration into the Bulgarian government and military circles. My grandfather had signed the Treaty which gave Bulgaria its independence as a result of the war with Russia, so I was hardly inconspicuous. I never returned, but one of the main streets in Sofia is still named after my grandfather and he is regarded as one of their patron saints.

Part II - England, 1939-43

[IGNATIEFF] So, I got back to England at the outbreak of World War I, and decided to go to Oxford to join up. I joined up with the local regiment which was the "Oxford and Bucks". It was a curious system, you went to the regimental headquarters at the Oxford and Bucks and were met by a recruiting sergeant and doctor and the preliminaries of joining the Armed Forces were quickly over. The regimental sergeant major said: "You got a queer name here". I said: "It comes from Russia". "Oh," he said: "I was in Murmansk in the First World War". He said: "We used to fish with mills bombs. We threw the mills bombs up stream and the fish came up and took everything you had". Well, that was my introduction into the Armed Forces but then you were brought before a Board which was to decide your fate as to which branch of the Armed Forces you were to serve in. And, there was an Admiral, there was a General and an Air Force Group Captain and the head of Balliol and they looked through my university record you see, and were wondering which service I was best fitted for. Somebody suggested that I might go into the cavalry. I was not a particularly keen horseman - but the head of Balliol said: "Look, you have all these languages, you're a natural for the intelligence course." So they wrote out that I was to be made a cadet, training as an officer in the Intelligence Corps and that was that and I was sent to an extraordinary place, which is quite historic and now a notorious tourist spot. That was Woburn Abbey - seat of the Duke of Bedford. At the outbreak of war in addition to the regular intelligence, MI5 and MI6 and so on, with the War Office, Sir Campbell Stuart, who was incidentially a Canadian, was asked by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, to set up a headquarters at Woburn Abbey which would combine economic and political warfare with spying in one form or another against the Germans, in neutral countries. I was assigned to that part of the operation which had to deal with the interruption of supplies to Germany from Russia and the Balkans.

But, this was in 1940. Before the war when I had come back from Bulgaria, in 1939, there were exams for admission to External Affairs and Mike Pearson urged me to write them in London. I had written and forgotten all about it and apparently I was top of the list of eligible candidates for the Third Secretary competition of those who had written in London. Doctor Skelton, who was then Under-Secretary, had sent a message to Vincent Massey who was Head of the Mission in London begging for reinforcements, because they were very short staffed with all the things that had to be done with the Canadian Armed Forces coming over, the agreements that had to be negotiated, and dealing with the evacuation of Canadian women and children from the war zones. Getting women and children out of the war zone and a whole lot of English people, I mean children, being sent to Canada. That was my first job. The staff of Canada House were an extraordinary group of people: Vincent Massey, there was Mike Pearson, there was Hume Wrong, Charles Ritchie and Léon Mayrard, and that was all there was to deal with all these war problems. So Skelton said in reply to this appeal for help, he said: "Well, George Ignatieff passed the exam and we understand that

he is somewhere in England, why don't you get him". So I was asked. I thought that that would be one way I could get into active service with the Canadian Armed Forces, instead of being in the strange menagerie at Woburn Abbey, where we were doing intelligence appreciations, and were also preparing propaganda leaflets that were thrown at the Germans about making peace, as well as conducting intelligence activities in Switzerland and in Portugal. But my reply to Mr. Pearson, who approached me, was, that if you can get me out and transfer me I am willing to come, and so that was done. I arrived at Canada House just at the time of the collapse of the Western Allies in Europe, just after Dunkirk and then without any training or preparation I pitched right into this whole business of how to get these Canadian refugees from Europe back to Canada, women and children. And then the immediate threat of invasion of Britain made the question of getting Canadians, non-combatants out of England more acute. So I was shoved right into this job alone, to organize this and put these people onto the troop ships that were going westward to bring the First Division over and that was quite an initiation into diplomacy. Particularly as the bombing started during the days as well as the nights, and became rather a complicated operation. In addition I was given the job of dealing with internment of prisoners of war and that was quite a handful, because the British saddled Canada with an unsorted collection of people they had arrested under the Alien Legislation. The Home Office and the War Office had just arrested people whether they were refugees or not; they were declared to be a threat in the event of invasion and they were shipped out to Canada and Australia. Some of them were torpedoed on the way, but we got this unsorted collection of people which included all kinds of refugees from Nazism as well as from Fascism in Italy. It took months to discover this and to set up a commission to inquire into them. We did not have their C.V.'s, we did not have any papers, nor did the British. They had simply given us lists of names. It turned out that people like Gregory Baum, the famous Catholic theologian, was among these people interned as an "enemy alien". He was of Jewish origin and had taken refuge in England and he was just shipped out with other people; lots of people were just refugees. But that took some time to sort out. But it gave me, that together with the Blitz, gave me again the impression that the civilians are increasingly the victims of war, in one way or another: When war breaks out the military take over with their priorities and everything else has to give way and that includes justice. Then there was the Blitz in England and air raid precautions. We all had to take turns, not only in duties during the day, being on the roof and watching. During the Battle of Britain period, the air raids took place during the days. If we took shelter, we never got any work done, so it was agreed that we would take turns to be on the roof and ring a bell if we saw the flag on the Air Ministry, which was within sight of Canada House, hoisted for danger. We would ring the bell and everybody would just fly down to the shelter in CMHQ which was next door. In addition to that I had to do the coding and encoding along with a couple of English staff of all the messages coming in. Some of them were top secret dealings with military operations and others were not, but there again the military had strange ideas. I remember being woken up. I had to sleep at Canada House to be available for these duties, or next door in the CMHQ bunker, and I remember once getting very annoyed at being woken up to decipher an immediate top secret telegram for operations, and this was an amendment to a telegram dealing with naval operations that I had previously deciphered. But it said: "Instead of pillows, read pillows and pillow cases".

Well then, we had of course the diplomatic and political aspects of our mission as well. One of the things that I remember well was the first war conference attended by Mr. King in 1940, and the British official who was in charge of public relations had succumbed as a result of the bombing. We had several people break down under the strain of war. I was young, so I could take it, but we had a person, who was actually the janitor of the place, who committed suicide. We had the man who was looking after the coding and encoding, he had a breakdown and the man who was in charge of our public relations had a breakdown. This happened while Mr. King arrived and as the

youngest and most junior I was sort of "pinch-hitting" in all these directions. I found myself not only attendant on Mr. Massey and briefing the Prime Minister but also being the public relations liaison. In trying to do all these jobs I remember failing to provide a photographer at the first meeting between Mr. King and Mr. Churchill. That was providential because I did satisfy Mr. Massey that I really could not be in three places at once. Somebody was borrowed from Canadian Military Headquarters, Campbell Moodie, to take on this job full-time and I was relieved of it. But even then, we had to look after Mr. King in his various capacities. He was made Freeman of the City of London because Canada was the main ally undefeated and with troops and supplies available to support the war effort based in Britain (before the USA and the USSR came into the war). The meetings between Mr. King and Mr. Churchill were extremely interesting, and very important in the sense that the priorities at that time were the supply of aircraft and tanks which Canada was given top priority to do and of course Lord Beaverbrook was another Canadian, who was put in charge of the production end in Britain and C.D. Howe was in charge of turning on the heat and producing aircraft and tanks in Canada, with American help. "Chubby" Power, the Minister of Defence for Air, was in charge of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan in Canada. The other thing was to get as much American help as possible and Canada was regarded at that time as the point of liaison. After Ogdensburg that made things much easier. And that was the beginning of our special relationship in defence. It all happened at that time when the European allies were defeated and indeed there was serious discussion as to whether the headquarters of the war effort would be moved from London to Ottawa, including the question of possibly moving the Bank and the reserves and that sort of thing.

[HILL] I think it was John Holmes who made the same point about Ogdensburg - that it was not really a strictly North American thing. It was really a device to get the United States involved, from the beginning.

[IGNATIEFF] It is difficult to see Canada and it's defence relationships unless you go back to this peculiar situation which some of us witnessed in 1940, which present day Canadians would hardly believe. When I say this sometimes I find it even difficult to believe myself. There was the situation where all the allies had been defeated. The British Army had been, the remnants of it had been rescued by every kind of boat and volunteer device at Dunkirk, but it was out of action, and into that situation the Canadian First Division arrived with Andy McNaughton. And Andy McNaughton was greeted literally as a saviour and the Canadian First Division was on duty to prevent the invasion, to defend Britain. Canadian airmen were in the Battle of Britain, and the Canadian Navy was fighting the Battle of the Atlantic, keeping Britain supplied with food as well as munitions of war.

[HILL] The Canadian Army were the only ones that had any arms in Britain at that time in any quantity.

[IGNATIEFF] They were the only ones, and some of them were of course not very adequate. There were Ross rifles and we shipped Ross rifles, we shipped Ross rifles all we could to arm the Home Guard in Britain. But we were thinking in terms of an immediate invasion at that time, and everybody was trained in some kind of defence and we all had to do air raid precautions as well as first aid and all the rest of it. So it was an incredible period to be in. You worked all day and you worked all night, and took snatches of sleep. It took the character of people like Charles Ritchie to make it sound funny, but it was not. The joke that Charles has in his memoirs you know, about his sleeping somewhere else when a bomb hit the place that he was supposed to be sleeping in and he came back the next morning to find nothing but one suit hanging above the ruins. I remember going with him to see this site, this was one of the ways in which we kept alive, we

kept dodging the bombs by going to different places at night when we could sleep. Sometimes in bunkers, sometimes in Canada House, sometimes at home. But the crux of it was that Canada at that moment was the only undefeated ally and Churchill, in spite of all of his brave words, could not see any way in which we could prevail over the Nazis and Italy, unless the United States came in. He was not reckoning on Hitler invading the Soviet Union, although interestingly enough, Churchill anticipated that possibility. It was that very immediate reaction on the part of Churchill, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, who had absolutely no hesitation in saying that we were allies. And, indeed one of the things that affected our work at Canada House was that we were engaged through Ambassador Maisky in not only supplying Britain, but Canada began to supply food and various munitions to the Soviet Union, and Canadian ships were among the escorts of the munition supply and food which went up the northern route to Murmansk. I remember one of the things that we used to do with Mr. Massey was greet our naval heroes when they came back, because it was a dickens of a run, the way they were attacked by German Stukas as well as submarines. But anyway the crux of the strategy at that time was that with the help of Canada, the United States would somehow be brought into the war or at least be brought into the war effort. It was a success of course, there were the loans of the destroyers and the provision of supplies to Canada to help the production of aircraft, and the tanks, and munitions, and of course the tremendous undertaking of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan which was done also with American help and some American volunteers. But, it was through that threat to British survival, in the war effort, in 1940, that we first became really engaged in the whole business of the Canada/U.S. special relationship in defence, in Ogdensburg. And Mr. King regarded this as his most important achievement. There was no doubt in his mind, and in Churchill's mind. The two characters were very unlike. Mr. King was one of the most un-martial characters I have ever met. I remember when I greeted him on arrival in Prestwick, he got out of a Liberator bomber, backside foremost onto the parade ground, and did not quite know what to do. When he went around inspecting the troops he was much more interested in such essentials as how they were fed and what the postal service was and so on, which was appreciated. But they booed him; and he became increasingly unpopular when he refused to introduce conscription towards the end of the war, when we were short of troops in the line, but that is another story. McNaughton and Mackenzie King had in those early meetings with Churchill, had been told that the Canadian Army's primary duty would be to stand on guard in Britain while the British Army was reorganized. There was no discussion in those early meetings about use of the Canadian Army in Europe or being under British command. The trouble that later developed over the question of reinforcements and conscription had been anticipated by McNaughton. He had been in the First World War and had noted that Canadians had been thrust by British commanders into situations such as Vimy and the Somme and so on, where the casualties were likely to be highest, and he vowed that he would not commit Canadian troops in any situation which he had not personally reconnoitred. He went to Dunkirk to see if there were any use of the Canadian forces going in. He also went to Calais and to Norway. He was also prepared to go to Russia before there would be any commitment of Canadian Forces, of which there was talk for a while. But, an argument developed, and it was largely because the Canadian Armed Forces had not been in action while British Forces were in action in the Middle East, that increasingly McNaughton lost out in my opinion.

[HILL] He also did not want them to be used piecemeal, if I understand well.

[IGNATIEFF] He did not want them to be used piecemeal, they had to remain under Canadian command in McNaughton's view and concentrate on the liberation of Europe in the main attack. He did not want them down in Italy, and when they were sent to Italy and he wanted to go and inspect them and see for himself what was happening, General Montgomery said "That he would have him arrested". I think an unprecedented relationship between generals. No, McNaughton was

a great national, I think nationalist, and it was at that time that I got to know him and it was because of that kind of background, that he asked for me when he was appointed by Mr. King in 1946 to represent Canada, first of all, in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and then at the United Nations on the Security Council, and he asked me to be his diplomatic advisor. There were various other candidates but we had got to know one another during the war, he used to come and see Mr. Massey. We were not very close friends; we were all rather frightened of the General, I might say, he was a very formidable looking character. In 1944, partly by the fact that I had shown signs of exhaustion, three people were sent from Ottawa to replace me and I was moved to Washington, D.C. to take over the work with John Holmes in Post Hostilities Planning. I was sorry to go in some ways, but I was thoroughly exhausted by this whole business of not being able to get any rest at night and working during the day, day after day.

[HILL] Well, it was a sort of theory that grew up afterwards, that the Blitz had all been great fun, but in fact when you look at it had been pretty devastating.

[IGNATIEFF] It was devastating, as I mentioned that scene one Sunday when I was on duty and Pearson came into Canada House and we both climbed on the roof, there was no water, the electricity was broken off, the mains had been broken and the Treasury building was on fire. The files of the Treasury were being blown about White Hall. Pearson said "Well, just how much can a civilization stand of this kind of thing". As I say, he was not talking about giving in, or anything of that sort. It crossed our minds that if you just keep escalating aerial warfare, it does not break morale but it breaks down society. The military reckon that this is the way to intimidate the other side into giving in. You did not think of giving up, you got so numbed, you did not want to give up. You wanted to get at those bastards. What isn't sufficiently taken into account is that you gradually reduce society to a standstill, all civilized life gradually comes to an end and under nuclear bombardment of course, this is escalated to an unacceptable degree. We were well within the margin of acceptability but even then, it just occurred to us, just how much can a city stand of the break-down of essential services. It is now coming out, people are writing the same thing about the effects of the bombing of Berlin, Dresden and Tokyo. Just how much can a city take?

Part III - Ottawa and New York, 1944-mid-1950s

[HILL] I wonder if we can go on to the next part, which is Part III, that is from 1944 to the mid 1950s. You were partly in Ottawa at that time and partly in New York, mainly working on UN affairs. I wonder if you could say a few things about what you did in that time and also what part the UN played in Canadian foreign policy.

[IGNATIEFF] Here again one goes back to the preoccupation of Mr. King. What are the circumstances which brings Canada into war? He started on that simple proposition. We found ourselves at war because Britain was at war, but Mr. King insisted on waiting for a week and having the House of Commons decide to make a separate declaration of war. But as the war came to an end, or was coming to an end, and discussions began on the question of a collective system of security, Mr. King was very much pre-occupied with preventing any kind of automatic commitment from ever happening again, certainly in his lifetime. And the other thing was that the British, through the Commonwealth Secretary, actually sent a questionnaire to Mr. King, to the Canadian Government, asking a whole lot of questions but in effect saying "In the event that Britain is at war would Canada consider itself at war". And this was in the context of considering whether there could be such a thing as an imperial defense system such as Churchill dreamed of. There had been talk of an imperial defense system. Mr. R.B. Bennett had not approved of Canadian commitments to the imperial defense system, although he spoke very eloquently about the British

Empire, and certainly Mr. King had not and it goes back to Mr. Meighen who had decided that Canada would not automatically be at war in the instance of the Carnak incident following World War I. So this was sort of the point of departure and I remember I was given the task to write an answer to these Cranbourne proposals in conjunction with National Defence. I describe in my book, how we could not come to any agreement because National Defence believed that it was inconceivable that officers of the Crown who took their commission and oath to the Crown could be at peace in Canada while other officers with regiments which were intertwined, would be at war. That one should be at peace and one should be at war was unconceivable to some brought up in the British tradition. They argued that the answer should be yes, Canada is at war, if Britain is at war. And I pointed out that Mr. King had been very careful to hold up the declaration, especially to break that continuity and that he was looking for some solution in terms of collective security through the new institution of the United Nations Security Council. Well we never did give any reply to the British, I think it could be found in the archives that there was no reply. There was a very definite reply as far as Canada's relations in defence to the USA was concerned. We worked on this to follow-up Mr. King's exchange with President Roosevelt at Ogdensburg. What would be the nature of co-operation in peacetime between the United States and Canada? We prepared a paper on this in the Post Hostilities Planning Committee, which was accepted. It was of course revised to some extent by Hume Wrong and Norman Robertson, but we proposed setting up a Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The word was permanent. The idea was that without commitment to governments, the joint staffs of one side or the other would meet and consider plans for the defence of North America, but it would not be a treaty, it was very far from NORAD. It was a continuing consultation on defence problems, and the first area that the P.J.B.D. addressed was the closing down of US bases in Canada. That was because of McNaughton's Canadian national prejudices - he was a Mel Hurtig of his day. I think he wanted to wind them up as quickly as possible. He wanted to wind up these war-time commitments with the USA. As long as he had Fiorello La Guardia as his opposite number, things went very smoothly because he was a politician, and he quite realized what kind of sensitivities Canada had on that issue. But anyway the framework of the P.J.B.D., based on Ogdensburg, was accepted, but then we turned to the series of papers that came to us, mainly through London. That is why it was agreed soon after I came back in 1944 that John Holmes would go to London. The Foreign Office were keeping us much more closely informed of the thinking in the big power circuit, that is, U.S., U.K. and to some extent France, about the preparations for the United Nations and so on. And John Holmes was sent to London to be the point of contact, and I was made Official Secretary and at the same time I was also made Secretary of the Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee and the Secretary of the Tripartite Nuclear Agreement, under the Quebec Conference arrangements of 1943, whereby Canada agreed to supply the uranium and participate in the research on the nuclear reactions (not directly, though, involved in decision-making concerning the bomb). However, Mr. King, as usual in his cautious way, agreed that we would provide the materials, we would continue the research with the help incidentally of the British and the French, who had been evacuated to Canada, and those who were not taking part in the actual bomb project or the Manhattan project or in Montreal were then in Chalk River working on our reactor project. I was Secretary of that, a tripartite arrangement as well...

[HILL] That was when you were in Ottawa, was it?

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, it was partly because of that that after the dropping of the bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Mackenzie King joined Attlee, the Prime Minister then who succeeded Churchill, and Truman, in making the declaration that the object of the three governments who had worked on this bomb project, was to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes only and to find ways of developing safeguards to ensure this. And, this was a declaration which was made by the three

governments and the very first decision at the United Nations, after San Francisco, was to set up the UN Atomic Energy Commission to work on this project. The point I think to stress is that although I was Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, as well as Secretary of the Post-Hostilities Planning Committee and Secretary of the Tripartite Committee on Uranium Supplies for Canada to the USA, I did not know a thing about the existence or the preparation of an atomic bomb. It was so secret, I would emphasize this, I have been asked just what did we know. I am sure C. D. Howe knew, and I am sure that Mr. King knew, but it was absolutely top secret and none of us knew at the official level, except Dr. C. J. Mackenzie, President of N.R.C. That had a great deal of relevance to the planning which took place, we planned without knowledge that the whole world technologically would be so tremendously affected by this new method of warfare.

[HILL] Actually, that is a point which John Holmes makes very strongly in the <u>The Shaping of Peace</u>. There is a whole section about that period and the fact that some people simply did not know about the atomic programme. Most of the people in Ottawa simply did not know what was happening in the US.

[IGNATIEFF] Well, this was, I think, looking back on it, quite deliberate on the part of Mr. King. Mr. Churchill insisted on being a partner of Roosevelt in all strategic decisions. It was never quite to his satisfaction, but you know from all the correspondence one has between Churchill and Roosevelt, one realizes that he could never have enough influence on strategic issues. And he insisted at Quebec that Britain would be consulted before the bomb was used. Whether that agreement was made between the two of them out of the presence of Mr. King, and Mr. King just did not know that they made a decision, I do not know, I was not there. That was 1943: I was not in Quebec and the whole proceedings in Quebec were not committed to paper. The only papers that I saw had to do with the supply of uranium and how it would be partitioned and what purpose and all that. But the fact was that Mr. King, I do not think wanted to be consulted, I think C.D. Howe was told both of the tests at Los Alamos and when the bomb was dropped, but I was absolutely in the dark about the bomb, I did not know anything about it at all. Although, as I say, I was concerned with the supply of uranium, I did know what uranium was being supplied and also the safeguards which were developed for it. As I understood the situation, it was for health safety, that is radiation hazards and all the rest of it. The first Atomic Energy Act related principally to the handling of uranium for purposes of health hazards, and was not related to military uses. And when we came to New York, we were confronted of course by the Baruch Plan and the very first question that arose, Mr. Baruch raised it, was (and I was present in the conversations), what would the three governments who were parties to certain shared knowledge about the atomic bomb do about sharing it with the other members of the commission and particularly the Soviet Union. I remember saying to Mr. Baruch: "Well we have been proceeding on the basis of 'need to know' and this has been interpreted pretty narrowly as far as you are concerned. Canadians have apparently not needed to know very much. I do not know a damn thing. Why don't you apply the same thing if the question is asked, why do you need to know. If you want to know how to make a bomb, why do you need to know. We are gathered here to stop making bombs, to abolish the arsenals and so on". But this was the approach that was adopted, and there was a scientific committee set up of scientists who exchanged information, that was necessary really to explain and to understand the Baruch Plan. I only learnt later that the Americans only had about five bombs in their arsenal and could have easily disposed of them instead of the 25,000 they have to dispose of now. But, the important development that I think relates to that UN Atomic Energy Commission was that on the whole, I supported the view that Mr. King and C.D. Howe - and at that time Mr. King was still Secretary of State as well as Prime Minister and then Mr. St. Laurent came in, I've forgotten which year, 1947, I think, - anyway, they all had the view that we should support the Baruch Plan in principle, so that we should not in any way strain our relations with the United

States. Strangely enough, with more prescience than myself, Escott Reid felt that the Baruch Plan was not put forward in good faith, particularly the kind of additions and amendments that Baruch added himself, namely that any breach of the agreement would not be subject to the veto which had just been agreed at Yalta as one of the basic agreements for post-war co-operation. And, we had quite a row, which was characteristic of Escott, both in his good aspects and his bad aspects. He was a missionary in spirit. He insisted that we stand up to Baruch, when he saw that the Soviets were insisting on their proposal which was that we outlaw these weapons first and then decide how to control atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the Americans were insisting the other way, that we should set up this monopoly of international agencies with control of all the nuclear activities in all countries that had nuclear capability, and this proposal was not even all that acceptable to the British. I was asked by Mr. St. Laurent to try and explain this to Ernie Bevin, and Ernie Bevin, after I finished explaining that the dual use of reactors in uranium reactions could be for military and for peaceful purposes, and you had to have control and inspection of all stages of the process if you were to prevent diversion to military use, he said: "What would have happened if, when Faraday discovered electricity in England, he had come along and said to the government of the day: "Look here, this here source of energy is so dangerous it's got to be put under international control. Where do you think that electrification in the homes of Britain would be, where would Britain stand? The ordinary homes of the working classes in Britain would still be waiting for some international inspector." And he said: "I do not buy this at all". So it was, - but they went along in the vote on principle like we did, and Escott Reid urged that we get up and say that we insist on a proper examination of all the options for international control and not just the Baruch Plan; that we insist on examining the possibilities of international inspection without all the ready made provisions of the Baruch Treaty. We argued this, and McNaughton finally appealed to Pearson, and Pearson said on the telephone: "Well, take Ignatieff's advice," advice that happened to coincide with what Ottawa instructed anyway. And we voted for the Baruch Plan in principle. I've always regretted that we did not take Escott Reid's advice more seriously, because in fact we never really recovered the ground that could have been made before proliferation of weapons began. The Tripartite Agreement broke down in 1947. We had a meeting in Washington in which the British, pleading for retention of the Quebec Agreement, said that they would not make nuclear weapons, provided there was consultation as to use. Truman, however, under pressure from Senators like Vanderberg and Hickenlooper, said they would not go along with it. The British decided then to make their own bomb. All kinds of ideas were put forward privately by Kennan and Lorry Norstad, the Air Force general, but they did not meet the British requirements; and proliferation started. And, of course, the Soviet counter-bomb followed in 1949; whether they had the bomb before, I do not know. Then of course the Gouzenko spy business broke in 1946, so that poisoned the atmosphere. Plus the rejection by the Soviets of the Baruch Plan and the Soviet advance into, or threatened advance into Iran, and Turkey, and the Communist pressure on Greece, all led to the Truman Doctrine and the begining of the Cold War. Now, whether that coincided with independent Canadian appreciation of the events leading up to the Cold War, I do not know. There were two members of the Department who had rather strong or developed views on Soviet policy. They were Arnold Smith and Escott Reid. Arnold Smith wrote me a series of letters from Moscow - they are in the archives - he started these letters because I was working on Post Hostilities Planning, and the first letter says: "It's tremendously important what you are doing, George, and I thoroughly support what you are doing and your ideas would be very interesting to me." And then, before 1946, come these letters: "Are you so sure that we can count on Soviet co-operation. I see no signs of it from Stalin. He is not carrying out even the undertakings he made in Yalta about elections in Poland; he is not going to get out of Hungary, Romania; all these countries are going to be satellites." And it was the non-co-operation that he stressed. Escott went further. Escott went in the direction of George Kennan and of "containment" -I wrote an article I think for PAFSO on this subject. I knew George Kennan well at the time. George Kennan did not stress so much the idea of military

measures against Stalin, as the need to drop illusions which were very rife in certain parts of the political machine in Washington, based on the concept of the Soviet Union as an ally and Stalin as "Uncle Joe", some sort of benevolent kind of dictator who really was not a danger in any way. Kennan and Harriman were working against the kind of optimistic appreciations of the Soviet attitude that were being put forward by Vice-President Wallace, who was quite openly sympathetic to the Soviet Union and continued to be. Truman was not, but it took quite a bit of effort on the part of people like Forrestal and Kennan, to make Truman take a tougher attitude on the subject, and the Truman Doctrine was the first sort of step in the direction of NATO. But the thing which really made all the difference, from the Canadian standpoint, was first of all the seriousness with which Mr. St. Laurent took the whole Gouzenko spy business.

Mr. St. Laurent, who had a very keen sense of justice and decency, was horrified when he was really confronted with the full evidence of the espionage that was going on, not only in the Soviet Military Attaché's Office but through the various links that were revealed in the Gouzenko trial, the links to the British nuclear scientists who were working with us, and some penetration of the Civil Service. The Canadian Civil Service was comparatively less penetrated, it turned out, than the British, but we were working very closely at that time. People like Fuchs and Nunn May this put the whole joint effort into peril and St. Laurent, anyway as a Catholic, took a strong view. He was very amenable to the kind of argument that Escott Reid advanced; that we were faced with an ideological, cultural, economic, political threat to the kind of values that Western civilization stands for. And throughout, it was argued by Escott that this could not be dealt with by a military threat. To begin with we'd gone through a war and nobody's prepared for another war, but as Escott used to say you cannot kill ideas with cannons or nuclear weapons. You have to work against them by combining the influence of nations who think alike, and out of that came this idea that Canada was the sort of linch pin of the Atlantic triangle; the United States, Britain, France. Escott Reid, who was the chief advisor to Mr. St. Laurent at the time, was not keen about having Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey in the Alliance which he thought of in terms of the "Atlantic Community". Yes, Italy, because they belong to the Atlantic area, but not Greece and Turkey, no. Greece he might have tolerated, but not Turkey.

[HILL] When you say "He", are you referring to St. Laurent?

[IGNATIEFF] No, Escott. He was thinking in terms of the Atlantic community right from the start and a community of interest, community of policies and so on. And the various versions which Article Two went through, this is a very, very boiled down version which was finally accepted grudgingly by people like Dean Acheson. There were those in the State Department who perhaps shared Escott's ideas, but Escott would have had us unite around an almost religious mystique in defence of Christian values. There were those who were willing to take this approach seriously, but others like Hume Wrong, our ambassador in Washington, who would have none of What we ended up with was "strengthening free institutions", bringing about a better understanding of the principles on which these institutions were founded. There was no mention of "Judeo/Christian civilization" - but he retainded the idea of promoting conditions of stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. Escott had a great deal of influence on the thinking of Mr. St. Laurent. Pearson was pragmatic, I do not think he was persuaded, Pearson was always pragmatic. He did not believe in all this. Hume Wrong was positively skeptical about all this high flown oratory, after all it is a regional arrangement for self-defense in view of the proven inability of the UN Security Council to work because of the attitude of the Soviet Union on issues such as Greece, Turkey and Iran and the use of the veto. He kept, in all the correspondence saying: "Let's get away from all this oratory, it is not going down at all well in Washington. Even Dean Acheson, the son of an Episcopalian Bishop, cannot buy this stuff, he wants something that he can sell to

Congress. They are not going to buy this kind of messianic language". But anyway, looking back on this, what I feel is that Escott was basically right in saying that what was required was a solidarity to prevent Soviet aggression and expansion, a solidarity among allies around policies strengthened through effective and constant consultation as against unilateral action. What's really weakened the Alliance was lack of consultation, and it started, I am afraid, in Europe, and was quickly followed by breakdown in consultation on the US side. One can never forget the fact that the most crass example of the breakdown in consultations was over the Suez. This led to the report of the Three Wise Men. I worked with Pearson on the Three Wise Men's report in 1955, in Paris. He, as one of the authors who worked with the foreign ministers of Italy and Norway, realized how tremendously important it was for Canada, that if NATO was to be the triangle which helped to resolve the continentalist pulls to which Canada was exposed, there had to be regular consultations and resolving the intra-Alliance differences and trying to unite policies. It was important this should not just be about military affairs but should be about economic policies as well. Of course the whole movement towards the European economic community ran right across it; and likewise the British and French unilateral action on Suez, and while the Wise Men's Report said everything that could be said about strengthening the consultative procedure, the fact is that it has been too often been ignored -by the USA as well as other major powers. But it should be considered that it was the non-military cooperative provisions which really made the North Atlantic Treaty acceptable to Parliament, as a departure from peace time commitments for Canada.

[HILL] You mean primarily on the economic side or the political side too?

[IGNATIEFF] Well, it started by being ignored on the economic side, then began being ignored on the political side. I mean this last - in recent times, on the Reagan business, the attack on Libya, the trade disagreements about how to deal with the Soviet Union and Poland and all the rest of it. Those are the sort of things which Canada realized was of the essence, if the Soviet Union was to face a united front. The idea that was behind the Treaty, was that the Soviets should know if they moved against anybody in Western Europe or North America that they would have to contemplate a world war. There was not going to be any chipping away as there had been by the Nazis. There was that looking back in experience. In that sense, the idea was that there should be a community which would act together and confront any adversary. This is what had been weakened. This is where the failure in 1947 on the control of the atom and the Cold War together combined, and the Korean War combined to produce a new emphasis on the one weapon which seemed to give the West superiority over the Soviet Union, and China. It started during the Korean War. My functions as Senior Counsellor of the Embassy in Washington were threefold. One was to represent Canada on the international committee working out the various bodies and institutions which would be established under the North Atlantic Treaty, the Council, the Military Defense Committees, and so on.

The only question on which there was any real, I would not say difference of opinion, the only matter of any difficulty, was whether Canada should or should not be a member of the Standing Group in NATO. We did not want to be members of the Standing Group. But what happened was that Italy, very early in the proceedings, claimed a seat on the Standing Group which was to be reserved to the United States, Britain and France - (the idea was that they would act as the main strategists of the Alliance, working out the strategic plans). I was simply told to say in the international committee that if Italy claimed a seat there was no way in which Canada would stand down, so there would have to be five members instead of three. But, I was told at the same time that we were quite happy if we weren't on it. We held to the policy of stressing the functional principle as viewed by Mr. King. Mr. St. Laurent continued the same, especially in terms of Canada's economic power; it was not in any way the assertion of Canada's military power. It was

on the basis of the functional principle that we sought the seat on the Security Council of the UN, following Australia. Mr. King let Australia have it on the grounds that he was very leery about any military commitment. The functional principle, as far as he was concerned, was that we were being asked to supply food through UNRRA, and that sort of thing. I remember being Canada's representative on the Far Eastern Economic Commission in 1947. I was given absolutely no instructions whatsoever, and we were sitting around discussing what we would do and I said "I must say, speaking for Canada, I am not entirely clear why Canada is on this commission because we are not an Asian country". Somebody said there was "no use in having a dairy without a cow and Canada is a cow. In fact, we will elect you as chairman of this commission". But we were being sought all over the place for our economic resources, what we could put forward, particularly in terms of food and supplies in one form or another: minerals that the United States wanted, food and materials for Europe and Asia. When I went to Washington there had been a report on the problem of strategic supplies, supplies of strategic material in time of war, the Paley Report, and the Americans were very alive to the dangers in the event of war; they would be cut off from supplies of certain strategic materials and they wanted to get them from Canada on some assured basis, and they offered a deal on free trade in fact. Mr. King and Mr. St. Laurent turned that down, but in terms of the functional principle, Canada was interested in its economic contribution, through the United Nations. We were interested for instance, at the beginning, in our role on the Economic and Social Council of the UN. This turned out to be rather a disappointment, because the Council never fulfilled its functions as expected, especially coordinating all these agencies that were set up. But Canada was an influential member of each one of the functional agencies, being the host to ICAO, but also in founding and establishing the Food and Agricultural Organization. The ILO, in Geneva, and the World Health Organization, under Dr. Chisholm, were also important. We were right in the forefront as the exponents of the new multi-lateral, co-operative, approach to international affairs. What we realized gradually was the fact that when we thought we would be setting up a new framework of internationalism, built around the United Nations, with a diminution of national sovereignty, the Soviet Union, quickly followed by the other big powers, each insisted on the right to unilateral action. It was anything but the cooperative approach we had hoped for. We began to feel that already, and in the fifties, over the Korean War. On the one hand, North Korea invaded South Korea with, apparently, the connivance or assistance or support of the Soviet Union. Then Communist China intervened. At the time when I was in Washington, I am not sure which Communist power was regarded as the more dangerous to security. I think, on the whole, if one looks back to the fifties, one finds that the United States felt that it was China that was the greatest threat. The fact that it was an American command or who had decided to go against the advice of India and other countries and cross the 49th parallel, that was not sufficiently taken into account. It was the war in Korea, and later the threat to the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy, that brought Canada into discussions about the possible use of nuclear weapons for the first time, and the deployment of nuclear weapons over Canada. This was what I was involved in, very much, in the defense-liaison field in Washington. That and the termination of the war with Japan, the Japanese Peace Agreement. That proceeded quite well, without any great friction with the United States, but we ran into immediate difficulties over the question of the fact that the United States was persuaded that China represented the main military threat and they began to deploy nuclear weapons into Alaska and at sea, and we were involved in over-flights. Our first reaction was that there had to be requests for each individual over-flight, with an indication of exact timing and direction of flight and all the rest of that. We had to have a flight plan, in addition; and that was the first agreement, I think. The first agreement indicated also that if we were to be involved in overflights of Canadian territory we would need to be consulted about the possible use of nuclear weapons against China, because we pointed out, if nuclear weapons were used against China, there was the Sino-Soviet military treaty at the time, in effect and we could not be sure that it would not be Soviet as well as Chinese retaliation, and at least Canada would be involved in nuclear alerts.

And it was agreed that there would be periodic meetings with officials in which I was involved; and Bob Bryce, then Secretary of the Cabinet, was to discuss under the conditions of strict secrecy the kind of conditions, the kind of circumstances, which might give rise to the declaration of a nuclear alert or a state of alert in Canada. We did recognize that it was unlikely that there could be a threat of retaliation against the United States that did not affect a state of an alert in Canada. In addition, there would be meetings with ministers, at the ministerial level at least once a year, in which the Foreign Minister, the Secretary of State in the United States, would meet with Pearson; and other senior people and the Minister of Defence would go to similar consultations about possible circumstances in which there might be a use of nuclear weapons. And that was the state in which the discussions relevant to the joint defense in North America under NORAD stood when I was sent to Yugoslavia. In other words it was Korea that first of all raised the initial question of continental defence and over-flights and deployments, but the initial agreement was on the strict basis of retention of sovereignty, in the sense that it was to be an on-going consultation about not only the clearance of each flight or deployment but also consultation about the possible consequences of these things in terms of possible use. There was one occasion when I remember that senior officials came up from Washington and met in my presence with the Prime Minister and Mr. Pearson. It was under President Eisenhower, and the question had been put to him by the Pentagon, of the possible uses of nuclear weapons over the Matsu and Quemoy crisis, and St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson were adamant that this was quite out of the question. We would never agree to the use of nuclear weapons in the defence of the offshore islands, as this would involve a risk of escalating into a nuclear war. It was right out of the question. We did have several meetings and the thing which I emphasized was that there was no automaticity, there was no blank cheque given about a declaration of alerts or deployment of nuclear weapons or anything of the sort that now exists under NORAD. We agreed to a programme of over-flights and deployments subject to consultation, so that we would not be woken up at all hours of the night. There would not be processing of every flight plan, but they would give us a schedule of flights over a period of, let us say, a month; which was the way we were operating when I was sent to Yugoslavia. Now that happened between 1956 and 1958.

[HILL] Could I just interrupt at that point. There is one point I would like to check first, that is, you were somehow involved in the work on the treaty itself, and then there was also the working group in Washington on the mechanisms that were set up afterwards. Could you distinguish between those two?

This situation has been unclear to me. Was the work on the treaty not also done in Washington?

[IGNATIEFF] It was done in Washington but at that time Tommy Stone was the representative on the international committee, which was dealing with details; but in fact the Treaty was negotiated at the Ambassadorial level, Hume Wrong really was dealing directly with that and the Assistant Secretary Hickerson. Now the international committee met to discuss various drafts of specific articles, but the main substantive of proposals were dealt with at the ambassador to foreign minister level. Escott Reid, who was Assistant Under-Secretary, was the official responsible under Pearson, who was then Under-Secretary, to prepare the various proposals and reactions and so on.

Now I was involved in the actual treaty negotiations distinct from the institutional arrangements, later, only because I was temporarily brought from New York to be head of the UN Division. This was in 1948. The meetings of the UN had been moved to Paris, and it had been decided that Gerry Riddell who was normally the head of the UN Division, would go to Paris, and I would take his place, and while I was in Ottawa, it was only for the three months, I think it was, Escott who,

knowing that I had been involved in defense matters in London, in Post Hostilities and all the rest of it, brought me into the small group that worked within, sending instructions on these North Atlantic Treaty issues. In other words I was involved in the actual negotiations in the sense of dealing with the exchange of various views, particularly on Article 2 and Article 4, whereby "the parties would consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial independence or political security of the parties is threatened". That was one of the articles which we really thrashed out there.

[HILL] You were also in Ottawa in this period?

[IGNATIEFF] I was under Escott.

[HILL] Working with him? Because there was the time you were at the UN just prior to that, in New York; and then you were back here; then you went to Washington after that, presumably.

[IGNATIEFF] Then after that I was moved to Washington in 1948, I went there in time for the signature in 1949. Tommy Stone was moved and I took his place with the rank of Counsellor on the International Committee to work out the details of what the permanent Council would be, the Defense Committee and the various bodies and so on. And there was the question of the standing group and all the rest of it.

[HILL] I think that you mentioned earlier, that the only really controversial issue in that period, is really that of the standing committee, and its responsibilities and so on.

[IGNATIEFF] There was some controversy about the question of the permanent Council. We did not move to an immediate permanent Council. Dana Wilgress was our Ambassador and at the time they used to meet as required but not regularly. But we favoured an idea of a regular meeting, but it was not until 1955 and the Report of the Three, that the full machinery for regular consultation was adopted. This provided that, first of all, the permanent Council would meet at least once a week, but before they met, the Counsellors of the Ambassadors would meet the previous day. We met, I think, on Thursdays and they met on Wednesdays, or maybe on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. But they met the previous day and went over the agenda and discussed what the difficulties were. If Canada felt very strongly on something and disagreed with something, the counsellors would report to the Ambassador that, you know, you are going to have trouble over this item on the agenda tomorrow and the position is as follows. It enabled us, also of course, to get instructions or guidance or consult other delegations to see if others could be persuaded to change their views. But the whole consultative machinery really was comparatively modest. While we worked out the main framework, it was not until the 1955 report from the Committee of Three that the consultative machinery really came into action. Also, the thing that struck me about the consultative machinery is that while it did not include economic questions for the reason that the European Common Market was being set up in Europe, you could raise any question of concern to the solidarity of the Alliance. Particularly, there was always a dialogue about arms control and the relationship between defence and arms control. That is one of the reasons why I still maintain that we should remain in the Alliance. My experience in the North Atlantic Council consultations is that the kind of discussions that take place are the very kind of discussions which those who advocate relating foreign policy to defence policy actually achieved in the North Atlantic Council. This is precisely what has happened. The smaller powers raise political issues and the political implications of military planning. My reservation and objection is that because NORAD was established in effect by agreement between the Pentagon and National Defence, in the transition from the St. Laurent to the Diefenbaker regime. There was no similar provision made for the discussion of contingency

plans under NORAD of the same kind that went on in regard to the other commands reporting to the North Atlantic Council. The military would have to come to the Council with their contingency plans and we discussed them for their political implications. How would governments react to this? But in the case of the North Atlantic Planning Group, as it was called, there was no report and no discussion. NORAD did not report to NATO and the fact is that they can declare an alert as President Kennedy did for NORAD at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, without prior consultation.

Part IV - Ottawa and Yugoslavia, in the 1950s

[HILL] That brings us up to around the end of the fifties, when you were at Defence Liaison and then Ambassador to Yugoslavia. We spoke a little of your involvement in the Report On Non-Military Co-operation, but also there was the famous visit to the Soviet Union.

[IGNATIEFF] I left Washington in 1953. I had a year at what was then called the Imperial Defence College in London, on defence planning, and then I came back to be head of Defence Liaison in 1955. Now the most important issue that came up, apart from the visit to the Soviet Union, was something which I alluded to only in passing, in my book, but it has profoundly affected my attitude to Canada/U.S. defence relations, and that was that Pearson, very much concerned about the increasing pressures on Canada from the United States, following the deployment of nuclear weapons and over-flights, wanted a statement to be prepared by the equivalent of your institution in the present days, the Parliamentary Centre, (but there was not a Parliamentary Centre in those days) for the information of parliament. What he had in mind was that the elected responsible body should be given a paper to be jointly prepared by the departments of Defence and External Affairs, and the title of it as I recollect was: "Implications For Canadian Foreign and Defence Policies Of The Advent Of Nuclear Weapons and Inter-continental Missiles". And the essence of it was that he wanted a short paper which would inform the representatives in parliament and the Canadian public of the new - consequences both on defence and foreign policy - of the new strategic geographic position of Canada, on the shortest route for missiles and long range bombers between the two superpowers who were by then in a state of confrontation. This is something that had to be, he thought, at least considered, by the House of Commons. And Mr. St. Laurent was of course in total agreement and I was told to prepare such a paper with General Foulkes, who was then Chief of the General Staff, and I said: "Well I cannot of course do so on my own authority, but if the Prime Minister writes to the Minister of National Defence, Ralph Campney, I will then contact General Foulkes and follow this up and certainly I will do as you wish. I entirely agree that is what should be done". Five letters were written as I recollect, at least two by the Prime Minister and three by Mr. Pearson to National Defence on the minister level and were not answered, on such an absolutely basic issue! And the reply given by Foulkes to me was that the information which would have to be included in such a paper for an effective discussion in parliament would compromise the special relationships which he had with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in Washington and General Bradley, the head of the US Army. National Defence's reaction was simply not to reply to the Prime Minister. Of course to press the issue would have created a cabinet crisis on an extremely important issue. The final act in this strange play which I would hardly believe ever happened if I had not been one of the players, was that I think in 1955, - it was Easter 1955 - it was agreed that Bob Bryce, as Secretary to the Cabinet, would call a meeting at which Foulkes would come and I would attend. Anyway, in the meantime I had come to Toronto for Easter to visit my mother-in-law and had a terrible automobile accident, nearly got killed. I came to this meeting on crutches and feeling extremely weak and vulnerable. I still remember that Foulkes bluntly said that there would be no joint paper. It was Foulkes who got us into NORAD under false pretences in addition to stone-walling the established elected representatives of Canada. The public would not believe it.

And that is why Mr. Diefenbaker was so unreasonable, if you like, about National Defence and its demand for nuclear war-heads. He was in a rage about the way that they had misrepresented things and brought him into this impossible position which finally ended up with the fall of his government. The trouble Mr. Diefenbaker found himself in was - if you like - a delayed reaction from the St. Laurent/Pearson failure to get National Defence under Campney to move on a report to Parliament. In this situation, as I say, when I came from hospital and I said "General Foulkes, do you not understand that we cannot in External Affairs plan rationally our relationships with the United States or the Soviet Union or with Europe, unless we have the guidance of Parliament on these crucial issues, especially on what are the consequences of our new strategic position between the two super powers in the nuclear age. What are the consequences? That we must know, and we must set them out, not necessarily in any detail about exactly who does what, but what are the essential factors and consequences of the situation". He said: "First of all, that I repeat that I will not do anything to prejudice the information that I get and which I pass on in my own way to the Prime Minister. Secondly, I do not need any "eggheads" from External Affairs to tell me how to run defence policy in Canada, and this is the final answer you get George". And that was it. Well, when I reported this to Pearson, Pearson first of all decided to tell St. Laurent, that he would not press this to a crisis in the cabinet, which was a typical Pearsonian reaction. He decided that he would pick up an invitation which he received from Molotov in a general sort of way - why don't you come and visit me in Moscow - to go and see for himself what was the danger of war. I mean, was there a danger of war from the Soviet Union in the new strategic position to which we in Canada were exposed?

[HIIL] This was in some way related to the NORAD issue?

[IGNATIEFF] It was part and parcel of the failure to get from National Defence a joint appreciation of what were the consequences. So, he said: "Well, if they will not tell me, I will go and find out from Moscow and see if they are preparing to fight a war with United States, start a nuclear war". You could not say that in public. Again, it would show that there was a crisis in the cabinet. I did not say that in my book, but this was not a joy ride in any way as far as I was concerned. And why should I have been, as Defence Liaison, brought into this journey to the Soviet Union, which I certainly did not want as an ex-Russian. I knew there was going to be trouble. I said to my wife when I left: "I am faced with an impossible situation. If I refuse, I am a coward. If I go I know there is going to be trouble, they will find some way of compromising me". So, I did not go with any blithe spirit. I kept a diary and the diary, actually from day to day, is also in the Trinity College archives. I used most of it in my book, The Making of a Peacemonger. The basic thing here was that the Soviets were themselves engaged in an argument as to whether or not they could risk a nuclear war to pursue a policy of military expansion. The successor named by Stalin, Malenkov who had been his private secretary, was dead against the use of nuclear weapons and indeed against war as a means of promoting Soviet policy. Now the importance was that he came out quite definitely in a statement at lunch at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow. There were Molotov and Kaganovitch and Voroshilov and several others who seemed to disagree with Malenkov. They argued that, particularly if they were threatened, if their interests were basically threatened, they would not hesitate to go to war. It was in those circumstances that Pearson was guite anxious to see Khrushchev, who was obviously on the rise, and about to take power as General Secretary. Khrushchev took the same view that Malenkov did; that war and nuclear war were out of the question as a means of settling international disputes. But he said, "You must understand that we do not go back in any way on our concept of competition with the capitalist world. We will do so by political and economic methods. So far as security is concerned, if you insist, as you have done just a few months before, on bringing West Germany into NATO and re-arming Germany, we will do the same with East Germany. The only circumstances in which

we will reconsider the security policies of Europe is under conditions of neutralization of the two Germanies. And that was the essence of what was said, but it is important to tie this to why Pearson went to the USSR in 1955. He was the first North Atlantic Minister to go, and he spoke a great deal about this, but nobody has related it to this stalemate in the cabinet and with National Defence. No sooner had we got back with the report, than I was sent off to Yugoslavia, as I related. I was sent off with direct instructions from Mr. St. Laurent, in effect to test out exactly what Khrushchev had said to us in his policies towards Eastern Europe. That is, were the Soviets, by invading Hungary, on the way to moving westward into Yugoslavia and possibly threatening the West?

[HILL] When you went to Yugoslavia was that actually after the Hungarian uprising?

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, just after.

[HILL] Because, there again, I had not realized that was the reason why you were sent to Yugoslavia.

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, I do not like to say that in the book, I say simply that this is the one occasion when I was sent on a mission and had the opportunity of being told directly by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister what I had been sent to do.

[HILL] That was a change.

[IGNATIEFF] Which was not the usual experience. But, in fact, when I arrived, Tito had followed up his breach with Stalin by getting aid from the United States, military aid from the United States. And while he called himself a Communist, he was already finding ways in which to complete the breach with the Communist bloc, militarily anyway. So, I had a very interesting time in Yugoslavia but as I say, the purpose of my being sent was really a follow-up on the mission to the Soviet Union and the concerns to know just where we stood in regard to the threat of nuclear war. Because what of course, Foulkes was getting, was a "worst case scenario", from the Pentagon, as one could imagine. The Soviets were said to be massing here and massing there and doing this and that with the massive capability they enjoyed.

[HILL] What were the conclusions you came to about Soviet foreign policy at that time, while you were in Yugoslavia? I remember in your book you mentioned you had at least some meetings with President Tito and at one stage you actually briefed the NATO Council on Tito's foreign policy thinking. You must have had his views on what the Soviets were up to as well.

[IGNATIEFF] Well, what I was convinced of was, that first of all the Communist threat should not be thought of in monolithic terms. There was not one great Communist threat or a combination of the Soviet Union, Communist China and the whole of the satellite world. They all had internal problems. The Soviets were still suffering very severely from the effects of World War II, and they were not in the least bit anxious for another war. They were very much obsessed about what to do about Germany and they were not inclined to push things to the point of nuclear war, but would obviously use every method short of war to expand their influence, as they eventually did in Egypt and Cuba.

[HILL] I read somewhere recently that, during the Hungarian uprising, the Soviets at some point became convinced that Czechoslovakia was about to revolt as well. That really worried them.

[IGNATIEFF] That it might spread, yes. That is so. I go into that in the 1967-1968 period because I was representing Canada on the Security Council in the Czech crisis. It was obvious to me that what the Soviets feared, was the revival of that natural economic orbit of central Europe, and that would include Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria and Hungary as well as Romania to some extent, all these countries had been within the Austrian/Hungarian/German imperial economic orbit. They prospered mightily in providing certain raw materials, having assured markets for all kinds of high quality goods instead of making Kalashnikov rifles to export to Africa which they get very little for, aspirins and such. That, I believe, is the real reason for turfing out Dubcek. Because Dubcek, as I understand, was on the point of arriving at something like a free trade agreement with West Germany. They had come very close to it and the Soviets put their foot down.

[HILL] Just before we finish off this afternoon, just one final question on Yugoslavia. I have the impression that your period there was one that you enjoyed particularly. I have the impression that you enjoyed the bilateral diplomacy. Of course you were head of an embassy for the first time yourself, and the political situation must have been very interesting.

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, it was an extremely interesting time, to begin with because, as I say, Tito was playing a very, very sophisticated game. On the one hand, he claimed that he was still a Communist; as he said to me "Once a Communist I will die a Communist". On the other hand having broken completely from the Warsaw Pact and from the COMECOW, he would not accept what he regarded as Soviet monopolistic claims over the Balkan economies, especially shipping. He would not accept that COMECOW should decide on what kind of industry would be developed in Yugoslavia. What he and Dimitrov of Bulgaria wanted was some general autonomy for the Balkans, as a minimum condition for remaining in the Communist bloc. It would be outside the direct control of central planning from Moscow, which he did not like at all. And the other thing was that he was an extremely sophisticated and astute politician. I mean of all the dictators I have ever come across, Tito had a much keener sense of keeping in touch with public opinion; and he kept away from the sort of daily routine of Belgrade by living in Brioni. But if he heard that there was some strike, or if there was even unrest in the university, he would suddenly descend on the situation and resolve it. He decided, and always in favour of the popular side, - I used to say to him: "You are the only dictator I have come across who I would really think would win an election". He would say: "I know that". I would say to him: "Why don't you go to the next step and allow an opposition". He said: "That is contrary to Communist doctrine, you cannot have an opposition, it affects our whole planning, our whole rationing system and so on, you cannot have an opposition".

But he allowed a certain tacit opposition and as I say he managed to resolve individual disputes in favour of the popular sentiment. I mean, the University of Belgrade, when they were having university trouble because they were expelling professors who were not Communists and the students were in a state of uprising and the police arrived with machine guns and all the rest of it to subdue the students, Tito comes and says, "Since when have you ever thought that you educate students with machine guns, whoever thought of such a thing, get out, all of you". So of course the students all cheered Tito, danced around him, as "our friend, our protector". He did not resolve anything, he did not put the professors back, who had been fired. He simply resolved the particular confrontation in favour of the students, and left. And likewise if there were a strike, he would come along and make some Solomon judgment and buzz off. He would not stay around and negotiate. He would say: "That is the way it is going to be, half and half". He was a very astute politician and I got into a fairly favourable position with Tito because of the Hungarian refugees. He, of course, was caught in this situation that he had broken with Stalin but was still a Communist,

and when the fighting was concluding in Budapest, the Austrians had closed the frontier and some of the last freedom fighters had absolutely nowhere to go but to Yugoslavia. And the Yugoslav police and military rounded them up and put them into concentration camps. I heard about this and asked the Foreign Affairs Minister whether this was true and was told at first that they had never heard about it. I let slip that I was not just being curious but that Canada might be able to help. Sure enough, I get a call from them - not from the Foreign Ministry because they did not like to eat their words, - but from the Ministry of the Interior, none other than the secret police - and they said: "We understand you are interested in this subject. In what way"? I said, "Well you know Canada accepted a good many refugees from Hungary, through Austria, and it occurred to me that, as I understand you have refugees, we might be able to help you." (I was a friend of Jack Pickersgill at the time, then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration). And they said: "Well if that is the case, would you like to go and see the camp". And I said: "Yes". I went there the next day and there were hundreds of them and I sent a cable to Jack Pickersgill and asked for an immediate mission to come to Yugoslavia. He sent a mission right away and we got some of the best, because the people who went to Yugoslavia were people who fought to the last. They were the most convinced freedom fighters and I have run into some of them in Toronto, I have forgotten how many we took but I would say 500 or 600, it was quite a lot. Once we took them and of course it became known that they were there, then other governments like Sweden and Norway, Britain and France took some. The whole thing was wound up in a matter of months and Tito was very grateful because if he had sent them back to Hungary they would have been shot and he would have lost American aid and if he kept them he was afraid they were really anti-communist, really tough people. There were actors, there were professors and professionals and some students and so we shipped them out. They were very grateful.

Part V - The Diefenbaker years, 1959-62

[HILL] Ambassador Ignatieff, from 1959 to 1962, you were to be Deputy High Commissioner for one year in London and then you became Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs with responsibility, I believe, to serve as Mr. Diefenbaker's personal advisor on national defence issues and nuclear affairs. I wonder if you could tell us something about those three years. This seems to me to have been a period in which there was this whole question of acceptance or not of nuclear weapons for the Canadian armed forces. And then of course this was the period of Howard Green, the beginning of his period. I wonder if you could just tell us something about how you saw the crucial issues of that period, including the relationship of Canada's policies towards NATO?

[IGNATIEFF] Well a word, perhaps on how I was catapulted from being Ambassador in Yugoslavia, appointed by Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson, into the high ranks of the Civil Service That in itself, I think, needs some explanation, because under the Conservative Administration. I was associated with Mr. Pearson and it was known that Mr. Diefenbaker regarded those who had been associated too closely with Mr. Pearson as "Pearsonalities" and was not too keen about them. Nor was Mr. Drew. It was interesting, one of those happenstances, that the first Secretary of State for External Affairs that Diefenbaker appointed was Sidney Smith, who had been the President of the University of Toronto. It so happened that my brother, to whom I was very closely attached, Nicholas, was appointed Warden of Hart House. He had been overseas and came back as a veteran to help the university cope with the influx of veterans under the policy the government financed for post- secondary education. He found himself in frequent friction and disagreement with the President who did not quite see things from the eyes of veterans who expected to be treated as adults, to say the least, and not as undergraduate children. Without going into too many details, their disagreements grew and my brother had a massive stroke and died at Hart House all of a sudden. The President was, apparently, tremendously affected by this. He sensed somehow this

might have been related to the state of tension that had developed between the two, and I did not know this as I was in Washington. However, I attended the funeral, but did not know at the time, I found out from correspondence, through mutual friends, what happened. But to my great surprise, I was summoned from Belgrade by Sidney Smith to the meeting of heads of Canadian missions in Europe, to Paris, in the presence of John Diefenbaker, in 1958, when there was a meeting of ministers at heads of government level at NATO. And I was even more surprised when we'd assembled and I had taken a very meek place at the back, expecting to be regarded with intense suspicion as a Liberal appointment, when the Minister said: "And we would like to start with an outlook on NATO which is not from within NATO. I think the first person best qualified to start the discussion would be Mr. Ignatieff". And I was totally unprepared for this and I explained that the outlook from Yugoslavia was that of a non-aligned nation which regarded both the Warsaw Pact and NATO as responsible for the militarization of Europe. They considered that the militarization on one side provoked militarization on the other and acted like a reciprocal pump, escalating the situation. The outlook from Yugoslavia therefore was one of extreme criticism of the policies of both sides. Moreover, both sides were provoking a nuclear confrontation and - instead of working out a kind of mutual accommodation or strategy of defence, - they were both subordinating strategy to nuclear weapons and this presented a very serious problem which, from the point of view of the non-aligned, was not being properly addressed, either between the alliances or in arms control negotiations. Well, again, I thought I would be knocked down for this kind of neutralist talk, but that was the attitude of Tito and Yugoslavia. George Drew intervened to say that he had not come to listen to such neutralist talk. He thought that the Conservative government was pledged to support the Alliance, and that he had expected a ringing assertion of Canadian support for NATO and what was all this business of listening to what the Yugoslavs thought. What did that matter? To my great surprise Sidney Smith intervened to say that the new government intended to look at all the options in relation to the Alliance, that we would possibly consider for instance adopting a position similar to that of Mexico or Sweden: that the government was not bound by the commitments necessarily of the Liberal government and that therefore it was very appropriate to listen to what Mr. Ignatieff had to say.

Well, then I was introduced to the Prime Minister, which I found very surprising, and the Prime Minister asked me to introduce the various heads of Canadian missions. Nothing more was said, and I returned to Belgrade and almost immediately received a telegram from Sidney Smith, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, saying that they wanted me to return to Ottawa. When I went to see the Minister he said that they were very anxious that I should accept the post of Deputy High Commissioner in London. I said to Mr. Smith "You saw how Mr. Drew reacted to my intervention over NATO in Paris, at the head of missions meeting, and it was not likely that he would take kindly to this appointment". So, Mr. Smith said "Well let's try it, and let it be for the Prime Minister to decide and he has decided you will go". I said "Well, it is putting me into a very difficult position, I really can't see how I can be of any use in London and, I am happy in Yugoslavia". Then the Minister looked at me and clutched me by both hands and said "Do this for Nick's sake", which was my brother who died.

I could not very well refuse on those grounds, and all I asked was to be given the chance to go across Canada which I did to pick up as much information as I could about current Canadian internal problems, because I knew Mr. Drew was extremely conscious of the need for diplomats to know more about Canada than about the country to which they were accredited. And after a brief trans-Canada visit including one to where I had worked on railroad construction in the Kootenay Valley, I arrived in London, and found my fears at first were more than justified. Mr. Drew regarded me with suspicion, both on the grounds that the Prime Minister had chosen to send me and because I was a "Pearsonality" as far as he was concerned. Indeed jokes went on with Prince

Philip. Prince Philip was reported to have asked Drew "How are you getting along with your Pearsonality"? Because I often filled in for Mr. Drew at functions at Buckingham Palace. There was a certain amount of leg pulling, and at first Mr. Drew announced that I was to only do those things which he specifically assigned me, that it was not to be assumed that as his deputy, I could act in his place, or make decisions in any degree. I must say that the improvement really grew from two sources. One was that my wife and Firenza Drew became great friends. She had a great influence on George Drew. She was a very remarkable woman. She was the daughter of Edward Johnson, the great Metropolitan Opera singer, and head of the Metropolitan Opera, a man of great talent, and so was she too, being brought up in Italy and so on. The other thing that happened was that the Prime Minister came over, and whether it was because I had this "bohunk" background, but he showed Mr. Drew very clearly that I was in his favour. As this was so much the exception as far as the bureaucracy was concerned, he had to take that into account. I was asked by the Prime Minister to be his sort of liaison while he visited London and this was his first visit after he had won the election, I mean the second election, and he wanted to meet all the good and the great. As I had been in London with the Masseys, I knew some of these people and arranged meetings, and took the Prime Minister around. Then he made a great speech in the Albert Hall on the Empire sponsored by Lord Beaverbrooke. He stood out a great and perhaps the last spokesman for the Empire at the time when the British were retreating from the Empire and Commonwealth in favour of the European Community.

[HILL] Actually, I attended that meeting.

[IGNATIEFF] It was an extraordinary experience. But anyway, my stay in London coincided with the effort of Diefenbaker to divert, as you probably remember, 15 percent I think it was, of trade from the United States to Britain and the drive for promotion of trade. It was a busy time, you had to go around making speeches and marketing Canadian products, and it was not too easy because Mr. Drew is a person who is intensely personal in his relations. He either liked or disliked you, and as I say he started by disliking me. Then we became fast friends and I found myself having to do more than I thought was my share particularly in social functions. Mr. Drew was a good deal of the time in Canada, and I had to fit in representing him in all kinds of functions which meant making speeches, and going to Buckingham Palace. I was there to represent Canada at the famous dinner given by the Queen for De Gaulle, in his only official visit to England, and that was the last time I saw Churchill incidentally. He was in a wheelchair and was thought to be asleep and Macmillan came up to him and said: "Did you see any change in the General"? And he looked up and said: "Yes, before he was like a bottle of hock; now he is like a bottle of burgundy". Stroke or not, he was still very much on the ball. It was also Mr. Drew's plan to move the High Commission's office from Canada House in Trafalgar Square to Grosvenot House in Grosvenor Square and by the old American Embassy, and we had to negotiate this purchase and plan to move. It was a busy time and so I was somewhat surprised that after less than two years I was asked to come back to become Assistant Under-Secretary and in the meantime of course Sidney Smith had died. So, I had rather taken for granted that perhaps my sudden elevation would stop, but nothing of the kind. His successor was Howard Green. Howard Green arrived in London and I will never forget my first meeting with him. He came into my office and exchanged a few civilities and then he said: "I would like to borrow your office tomorrow". I thought to myself, here we go, I am going to be put out, but he said "Only for tea you understand, and it will be two old ladies. Do you think you could provide just tea and biscuits, and you can come too". What happened was, this was the first official visit of the new Foreign Minister of Canada to England and instead of going to see immediately Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary or the high people in Whitehall, his first thought was that he would meet with the two nurses who had looked after him when he was first wounded in 1917 in the First World War. He invited these two old ladies who had been his nurses

and looked after him in hospital. I thought well my goodness, what a new and sincere approach. And we started to talk and then of course it turned out that while Howard Green had been educated in the University of Toronto he had been born and brought up in the Arrow Lakes which is close to the Kootenay District. He had served in the Kootenay Regiment in World War I. I knew exactly where his home was, where his mother lived and we chatted about all these things and the old paddle wheelers on Kootenay lake and the whole life in that part of the world. We became friends. Again, it was a question that he felt that I was part of, somehow or other related to, his background. I was not some smart alec bureaucrat that did not understand him. The result was that when I came to Ottawa I found myself as Assistant to Norman Robertson, who was Under-Secretary and had been appointed Under-Secretary by Sidney Smith. But the difficult situation was that while Diefenbaker could not refuse Sidney Smith's appointment of Norman Robertson, he would not warm to Norman Robertson; he found him too intellectual. He was obviously the outstanding figure in the whole of the Foreign Service. He had figured as advisor to Mackenzie King whom, incidentally, Diefenbaker admired. He patterned a great deal of his politics and strategies on Mackenzie King but he did not get on too well with Norman. The result was that, when I arrived, again to my great surprise I was summoned by the Prime Minister, and he said: "You are to feel that you can come to my office any time and I would like you to come everyday". This put me in an extremely difficult position. I could not say no to the Prime Minister, I could not. I went to see Howard Green and Norman Robertson, and told them the strange development and I said "I will do whatever you say, I do not believe in this leap-frogging system." And they said: "I think for all our sakes you'd better do what the Prime Minister wants, I think he particularly wants advice on the question of NORAD and these nuclear problems." And that did turn out to be the problem uppermost in the Prime Minister's mind. What happened was, as I described briefly in my memoirs, that the NORAD Agreement had been drawn up during the last months of the St. Laurent, Pearson regime, and came to Cabinet just before the election, and Prime Minister St. Laurent said that this was not to be decided until after the election: there were too many political issues. It was known, as Pearson reflects in his memoirs, that Pearson did not want a bilateral defence command, that he had argued with Dulles and with the State Department that he did not see why one of the commands of the Alliance should be bilateral and confined to North America, while all the others were subject to the North Atlantic Council and the consultative machinery which was involved. And of course he was faced with the adamant position that the Americans had that they would not allow any other ally to have a finger on the nuclear trigger. That was the key issue, and they were insistent that this should be therefore a separate command structure and that it would be related to NATO only nominally, being described for NATO purposes as the "North American Regional Planning Group". But in fact they did not report to NATO and did not submit any of their plans and so on. And the question of consultation with allies over the rise of nuclear weapons was therefore unresolved. I will come to that. But, the key problem from the Canadian standpoint was, that Mr. Diefenbaker in the early days of his Prime Ministership, when he was still also Secretary of State for External Affairs (before he had appointed Sidney Smith) was confronted by National Defence with making a decision. I mention that because I think Sidney Smith would have seen what was up. He was an intelligent man and would have seen the fish hook in this particular fish sticking out and would have warned the Prime Minister. But, the Prime Minister, as I said, before Smith's appointment, was not only Secretary of State but was in a very self-confident mood and General Pearkes, under the urging of General Foulkes, (they were old pals in the army), went to him and said: "This has been to Cabinet"; which you know, literally was one of these half truths. It had in fact been to Cabinet and had not been approved. But, Pearkes said: "It had been to Cabinet and it is just waiting for signature, the Americans have signed it, it is simply a joint defence arrangement for North America, you know the kind we have been working on for some time. It comes under NATO and the Liberals have been working on this for years and it just was not signed before the election". And so the Prime Minister signed it, without looking into the background and

without getting the implications and all the rest of it. And then he discovered, later, that this subordinated Canadian defence to American strategy, the nuclear strategy, and that having signed the NORAD Agreement, which was what the Americans wanted, i.e. for purposes of defence, the Canada-US frontier was down. That was one of the reasons why, when I was in Washington, we insisted that there should be detailed consultations and permission to deploy and overfly Canada in each case. I was under instruction very definitely to say that the Canadian Government would not agree that the border did not exist for the purposes of defence. We realized then that this would be the end of Canadian sovereignty, for purposes of defence. This, together with the presence of trans-nationals in the economic field, very seriously affected us. NORAD therefore represented a very major political decision regarding our sovereignty. This was not explained in any way to Mr. Diefenbaker, whose one great, I think sincere, belief was in Canadian integrity, unity and nationalism.

[HILL] If I might interject, I still think you get that sort of situation now, where there are people who would like to have a sort of "straight alliance", mainly anti-Soviet. They would brush aside the whole sovereignty business.

[IGNATIEFF] This was exactly it, and Foulkes was in on the Pentagon view, that the enemy was the Soviet Union, that they were a direct threat to North America and that for purposes of defending North America there could be no separation of authority or sovereignty. But this was not explained to Mr. Diefenbaker, and then he was told that the Arrow aircraft, which was under a British-Canadian consortium to build an all weather interceptor specially for Canadian purposes, in other words it was one case of a weapon which was constructed, planned, designed to fit Canadian needs - he was told by National Defence after he had signed NORAD, there was no need for such an aircraft, because the United States would take care of all that and they would not buy the Arrow in any shape or form; they had all kinds of aircraft and missiles and we were going into the missile age anyway. And in his fury, I think, Diefenbaker not only made the decision to scrap the Arrow, but he said that every Arrow plane, even the few models that had been made, had to be destroyed.

[HILL] They were burnt, werent they?

[IGNATIEFF] Apart from the mounting cost of the Arrow, which was given as the explanation for scrapping it, he was horrified when he found himself committed under the joint plan to the Bomarcs to be installed in Canada to defend, if you please, the heartland of the industrial empire of the United States. We were told that in NATO we had also to accept nuclear capable weapons, the 104 Starfighter converted to nuclear strike aircraft, and the Honest Johns for the Army. Suddenly Mr. Diefenbaker found himself, instead of considering a Canadian defence policy, was tied to a defence policy subordinated to a certain type of weapons, that is a nuclear weapons programme. There was no question of any Canadian defence policy. It went absolutely against all his concepts of what Canadian unity and Canadian sovereignty were all about. I was witness, because I was asked by the Prime Minister to attend some cabinet defence meetings, which was unusual for a civil servant. But Bryce and I were asked to attend, I saw the fury with which Diefenbaker attacked the representatives of National Defence. On one occasion he was so outspoken to Hugh Campbell, who was Chief of the Air Staff, he said "You have misled me, deliberately misled me, time and time again, you talk about a bomber threat then you say it is a missile threat. and that the Americans have to decide, and you face me with a fait accompli." Harkness, the Defence Minister, had to intervene to say that he could not accept such attacks, personal attacks on the chiefs of staff, when he was the minister responsible. It is difficult to understand the build-up of this crisis in the cabinet, which ended of course with the breakup of the cabinet and the defeat of the Diefenbaker government, except in the terms that Diefenbaker felt that he had been misled by National Defence, he had been tricked into accepting, as I say, a defence policy for Canada which was subordinated to a certain type of weapons programme and also to the interest of a foreign government. It affected his whole attitude in relation to the United States. I mean a lot has been said about his personal antipathy to a young President such as Kennedy. But it had this background in the defence issues, where he felt he had been cornered into a subordinate position and contrary to all his convictions. The only solution that he could see was twofold, one was to try to strengthen the ties with Britain and the Commonwealth and there he ran into, the fact that the tide was going out as far as he was concerned. The British were about to enter the Common Market. The other was to gain time by encouraging Howard Greene and his various initiatives on arms control and disarmament negotiations.

[HILL] That was the period of the European free trade area.

[IGNATIEFF] It was beginning, but he did turn on this tremendous effort to divert trade and it became almost a matter of faith, that you know you could do it and it was amazing what was in fact accomplished. I do not know if the actual diversion amounted to 15 percent or not, the Department of Finance and Trade experts always questioned Diefenbaker, that was one of the things that annoyed him and George Drew. But the fact was, that there was an extraordinary amount of things sold in England. Things I didn't expect to be sold. Furniture, costume jewelry, clothes, all kinds of things. It was a real drive, but the other thing was that he wanted to use NATO in some way or another to extract himself from this, what he felt was an isolated position, and it was when it became clear, as I had to report to him, that there was no way in which the Americans would agree to re-open NORAD or review it. In fact, the attitude of Air Marshal Miller, who succeeded Foulkes, was rather similar - there was nothing to discuss as far as I was concerned. We met several times with Bob Bryce and tried various possible options but there was nothing that they were willing to re-open. And so on that front he chose, not through I think any great conviction, to follow the path that Howard Green accepted with conviction. Howard Green having been a veteran in the First World War and wounded, and seen in his early age what a hell of a thing world war is, was a convinced pacifist and was absolutely against the nuclear commitment in any form. He was for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He would have been a leader in the peace movement if he had been given the chance. In fact, his closest friend and colleague in the House of Commons was the member for Kootenay, Mr. Herridge, who also had been a veteran and lost his arm. He was a member of the CCF. Anyway, it was the Prime Minister who decided. I advised him. And, I said: "The only sort of way that you can hold some kind of position in principle against nuclear weapons is to say: 'We are negotiating on the reduction and control of these weapons in the multilateral fora, and pending that we do not accept nuclear warheads even though we have the Bomarks and the Honest Johns and all the rest of it". This was the position that he held, and Howard Green rushed around starting with a very fertile area, which had a good deal of public support namely to stop nuclear testing in the atmosphere. Because the fallout problem was particularly serious in Western Canada when testing was being conducted in the atmosphere. There was fallout, radioactivity, as far as east as Calgary and the Prairies. But it was quite noticeable in British Columbia, coming in from the Marshall Islands and also from the Soviet tests and the Chinese tests too. So, he joined up with the Foreign Minister of Ireland, Aiken, to lead the attack on nuclear testing at the UN. He organized the monitoring of radioactivity and our Air Force did the monitoring, at a very considerable risk I may say, because they were flying through radioactive clouds and quite a number of them suffered as a result. This was the time of the Sputnik and the race for the moon with all these missiles with a greater and greater thrust, and interestingly enough, Mr. Green anticipated the danger of an arms race extending into outer space. In 1962 when we both attended a meeting of the disarmament committee in Geneva at ministerial level, without consulting the Americans and to their great annoyance, Howard Green launched his campaign for

a treaty excluding military uses of outer space. It came as a surprise both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, and the United States objected very strenuously, and said that "This has really gone beyond any tolerance that Canada should have done a thing like this, without even consulting its closest ally in NATO or anybody".

It did result in the United States and the Soviet Union, at least, having to ban the orbiting of nuclear weapons in space, because it was taken up by other Governments of the United Nations and at that time the United Nations was still more influential than it is today - the two nuclear super powers were pressured into at least signing a treaty, which excluded the orbiting of nuclear weapons into outer space and that still remains as a memorial to Howard Green's initiative. As I say, in monitoring, in the partial test ban, and in the question of peaceful uses of outer space, Canada did show some, not only initiative, but some results. We got support from other countries, and therefore Diefenbaker was able to say - it did not persuade National Defence or those who believed in the nuclear deterrent as the answer to Canadian/American security - that the jury was still out, that there was a possibility that some agreement would be reached affecting nuclear weapons which would enable Canada not to accept nuclear weapons. In addition, the NATO forum was used in addition to the UN. Mr. Diefenbaker sent me to NATO when Jules Leger had his first heart attack, to try and do whatever I could in conjunction with non-nuclear-weapon countries like Norway and Denmark to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons: particularly Norway and Denmark, which would not even allow nuclear weapons on their soil. And he said that that is the position we want to occupy, not the NORAD position. The situation gave some ground for discussion because the Europeans had raised, themselves, the question of just how you consult and control the nuclear weapons within the Alliance. There had been an agreement in 1958 that there would be stockpiles of nuclear weapons established by the Americans for the use of the Alliance. But it was clearly understood, the Americans made it very clear, that this required specific agreements with governments, both on sharing nuclear information and having access to the two-key basis to the stock piles. I mention this because that was the last fling from the Diefenbaker side to try and avoid the crisis in the cabinet, to use that particular formula. When I was in NATO we were discussing the possibility of a multilateral nuclear force based on merchant vessels being equipped with nuclear warheads, and the crews of these weapons would be drawn from all countries willing to participate.

[HILL] I wonder if we could go on to that one in the next phase, that was when you were actually Ambassador to NATO. I just wanted to ask one last question if I could, on the Diefenbaker period, which is: from what I know I have an impression that Diefenbaker and his government remained committed to, and saw NATO as, a fundamental part of Canadian policies. As you mentioned, there were all these problems with NORAD and so on - but nonetheless my impression is that they still wanted to work through NATO. And in fact didn't they launch some sort of declaration, the Canadian Government, which was agreed by the rest of the allies in this period?

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, Diefenbaker looked to NATO rather in the same way as the Liberals had previously, namely that the other allies, especially as far as Mr. Diefenbaker was concerned, would counter-balance the United States, through the consultative machinery of NATO. He attended NATO ministerial meetings with satisfaction and was impressed by the fact that NATO had this kind of provision for consultation at various levels. He thought he could see some way of getting through NATO what he was not able to get bilaterally, that is what indeed Pearson had thought, namely that the NORAD arrangement, whatever the nuclear command and control arrangements, should be subordinate to the North Atlantic Council, like other military commands. On that basis, I was sent to see what I could do. We had at that time of course not weakened the Canadian contribution; we had an air division and we had a full brigade and we had a commitment to build up to a division and we had at that time a more effective naval component. So, we were allies in

reasonably good standing. What was, of course, a growing defect was that while we had an excellent quality of personnel training, we won in all these various contests in terms of discipline and performance in maneouvres and that sort of thing, but here we had an air division equipped with nuclear-capable weapons but no agreement to have the warheads, and we had to see the 104s for instance go on alert as a symbol without any capability of actually doing anything; and our air force personnel, naturally, they were very unhappy about going through the motions of going to alert without being able to actually have access to these weapons, and likewise the army was in a similar situation that there were to be these Honest Johns, heavy howitzers, equipped with nuclear warheads, there they were. They could go through the motions for training but there were not any warheads and so that became an increasingly acute problem. Things came to a head, I am now talking about NATO. First of all, the Europeans themselves had raised the question just what was to be the answer to participation in planning and control over nuclear weapons and the Americans had tried, as I say, this multilateral force idea, which Canada did not take any part in. Diefenbaker did not want us to be in this, what he called "The Pirates of Penzance", and it was a very strange idea that this motley crew would be in a vessel armed with nuclear weapons which was supposed to be plying the oceans as a ordinary merchant vessel, and it was something that was tried in World War I, certain merchant vessels were disguised to fight the German submarine menace. But with modern methods of detection the Soviets would have quickly nailed any of these ships by the presence of the missiles on deck. And, I did not take part in these discussions, but they were seriously pursued, the key to that problem was really the relations between France and Germany. Germany had been required under the Western European Union Treaty, and under the Paris Agreements that brought Germany into NATO, to foreswear, of course, access, I mean to having their own nuclear weapons or to having direct access to nuclear weapons. They could have American nuclear weapons on their territory or allied, and the French were particularly concerned about the Germans having nuclear weapons. I have never been quite sure whether the independent deterrent set up by De Gaulle was really intended against the Germans, as much as against the Soviets. But anyway, they were very nervous about the whole idea of the Germans, and part of the MLF scheme was, if you please, to have Germans in these crews and therefore the Germans were a little more interested than some of the others to get on board these "Pirate" ships. In the end, as far as we were concerned, things came rather to a head over the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here was a state of affairs where Khrushchev attempted forcibly to bring to the attention of the Americans the threat he felt the Soviet Union was exposed to by the positioning of American missiles in Turkey right on its border, and as well as in Italy. For such reasons, I gather, Khrushchev decided to move warheads and nuclear missiles into Cuba, and these were detected by reconnaissance aircraft. Livingston Merchant, who had been the American Ambassador to Canada and was on reasonably good terms with Mr. Diefenbaker, came to see him and showed him the photographs just at the same time that Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the United States, came to NATO equipped with all kinds of photographs. And the Council met at night and we went over these photographs. I reported that the Council had accepted the evidence of these photographs as sufficient proof that indeed Soviet vessels were on the way to Cuba with nuclear missiles.

[HILL] Can I just ask a question here. You at this time were Ambassador to NATO, I believe?

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, I was already, I had gone in the summer, this was in the fall of '62. And Mr. Diefenbaker in his memoirs acknowledges the fact that he did receive my report. But Livingston Merchant having shown him the photographs, which he did, received the following reply from Diefenbaker: "Well, that is fine, but I do not accept in a matter of such seriousness - you say this is a direct nuclear threat to North America - that this should be decided unilaterally by the United States. I think that this should be put before the United Nations as a threat to the peace, and there

should be an international commission established to establish exactly what are the facts. Is there a threat or is there not a threat and that should go to the Security Council". This, in effect, was what he said. He was of course horrified when he discovered that President Kennedy had authorized the declaration of a nuclear alert under NORAD. We were still discussing in NATO what the allied response to the Soviet action should be, and what degree of alert was appropriate. The NORAD alert, declared by President Kennedy, was of the highest degree and affected North America only. The situation was that Diefenbaker, having taken the position that this had to go to the United Nations, and should be dealt with by an international commission, certainly was not in any mood to accept the implication that Canada was in a state of war readiness by the say-so of the US President. And this was done....

[HILL] Without any consultation between....

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, and for that reason Diefenbaker said that he did not accept the NORAD declaration of readiness because the President had failed to consult him. And you see that provision, the power of the USA to make a declaration of a nuclear alert by NORAD without consultation, is still the most objectionable feature of NORAD, because the reaction time now of missiles and computerized controls of these weapons has been reduced to a matter of minutes, so in any case now I should imagine it is questionable whether there can be a consultative process to declare an alert in NORAD. Anyway NATO consultations proceeded daily on exactly what the degree of danger and threat was, and one ally after another, beginning with France, declared solidarity with the USA. I was without any instructions. I think it started on Sunday, I think it was Wednesday or Thursday before Diefenbaker finally accepted a state of alert, as he says in his memoirs, based on the advice he was getting from NATO, not from NORAD. An interesting historical fact was that on Tuesday, at least two days, or a day and a half, before the final decision by the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, Harkness, concerned that there might be a state of mutiny, declared that Canadian Armed Forces were officially, as far as NORAD was concerned, in a state of alert. But this had not been authorized by the Government, until the Cabinet made the decision a day later. And this had been preceded by the fact that Canadian ships of Maritime Command in Halifax (since the threat was a maritime one and SACLANT, the commander of the naval forces of the Atlantic, was taking up precautionary battle stations), had slipped anchor and left immediately without even waiting for Harkness. Our forces in Europe did not know what to do and kept on getting in touch with me and asking me what the hell was happening, what was going on? I did not know, I got absolutely no instructions until Thursday, when the Prime Minister made his statement in the House to the effect that of course Canada could not stand idly by, as it were, in the face of a threat against the Western hemisphere, and we must declare a state of alert. But, this focused attention on just how unready, in a state of war alert, the Canadian Forces were. After the crisis had been resolved - in the way that is well known, through direct contacts between President Kennedy and Khrushchev, using both the UN and the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington as well as direct communications with Khrushchev -Kennedy, as a gesture towards the allies for showing solidarity (we were not excluded), invited the whole North Atlantic Council to Washington. I still have the little tray which he gave each one of us with our names on it. He received us in the Oval Office, thanked us for the solidarity that we had shown, and invited us to visit all the nuclear installations in the United States. This was in 1962, and so I learned what all the installations were, the silos, the Strategic Air Command, the headquarters, the various military command units, and the submarine bases. I was actually on board a nuclear submarine. Now, while I was in Washington being thanked by the President, on my own initiative, I worried about this business, particularly the role of the 104s (modified for a nuclear-strike capability because the Air Division had been well equipped for an interception role). The Air Division was regarded as one of the really important units of the Alliance, and there was no doubt about the quality of our airmen. Air

Marshal Dunlop was in command, and I used to constantly meet him. But here we faced a situation where our Air Division was equiped with nuclear-capacity aircraft, without the communication in a crisis. They were subject to possible missile attacks, because they were targeted as a nuclearcapable unit, but with no warheads. So, all they could do was to take off and get out of the way. So I went to see Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, on my own, in Washington DC, and asked him what was his advice. He was supposed to be the Chief of the Pentagon. The curious thing about it was, that he took down one of his black books, he had a whole lot of black reference books behind his desk, and looked up the 104 and said, "Yes, this is a high level interceptor, planned and built for the Korean War for the interception of the then advanced MIG types that the North Koreans had use of from the Soviets air force". Their main characteristic was manoeuvrability at high levels; they were speedy and manoeuvrable at high levels of interdiction. And I said: "How does this relate to their conversion into nuclear strike aircraft"? He said: "That should never have happened, they are totally useless. To begin with, they are not reliable at low levels, and they have to be for the role of nuclear strike aircraft, they have to fly under radar or at low levels to avoid radar and that is why there are a lot of accidents. I believe your division is luckier than the Germans, perhaps they're better fliers, they are not supposed to be flown at low levels. The other thing is that we have no need for them as carriers of nuclear weapons. We are moving into the missile era, and we will be deploying missiles to take care of that particular thing". I said: "What do we do with the 104?" He looked at me and said: "Well, if you want to keep the 104, try photography". I said: "Are you serious". He said: "Yes, it has a possible role in photography". I said: "How do we tell the Soviets that the aircraft they knew to be nuclearcapable are only good to take photographs." Well, he said "That is your business, that is for diplomats, I do not know. I would scrap them". Well, it was against that kind of background, which I reported to a meeting of NATO parliamentarians in 1965, that the 104 issue continued unresolved. I reported they really had to make a decision, either to take out and substitute another aircraft, which we could, or use them for a different role, even photography or interception. It was a deadlock in Ottawa over this. I suspect that National Defence did not want to admit they made a mistake, that it cost a very considerable sum to convert these aircraft into this role. This deadlock continued until 1965 when Hellyer came over with a delegation for the meeting of NATO parliamentarians. He went directly to the SACEUR, got from him what he could have got from me, but did not get it from me. I felt that I had to tell the opposition what my own views were on the subject. My only contribution to Canada's role in NATO, was that I did stress to Diefenbaker, and this was accepted, that if we were looking for a defence policy, moving towards a Canadian defence policy, the first responsibility and obligation of every country under the Alliance was self-defence. And I said what was striking was that most of our Forces were either doing peacekeeping functions, which I thoroughly supported, or were situated in the central area in NATO and that we had really no plans and no forces trained and committed to Canadian or northern defence and what we should look at was to train at least some of our forces for northern defence; re-open Churchill and train at least part of our forces in Arctic weather; and work out an arrangement with Norway and possibly the British, the Germans and some others of reciprocal defence commitments with our European allies to undertake a share of North American defence, as it was intended under NATO. Our European partners would share in the responsibilities of the defence of the deterrent, and we would in our turn take part in defence of Northern Norway which was mostly exposed to the nuclear concentrations of the Soviets in the Kola Peninsula. And this was tried out, indeed I went on the first manoeuvres in the Northern Arctic, and it was a success in the sense that we were better equipped and trained, even with our limited resources, than any other. There was one occasion when Canadians stood out in such matters as the least frost bitten, the most mobile, we had the ski-doos, we had all kinds of things, skiis, and impressed the Norwegians even with our mobility; and we had helicopters. This was the direction which I still feel is desirable under an alliance, that you need to have a division of labour based on specialization. The other big defect

in NATO which I worked to change, but it is not changed, is the lack of standardization of equipment, this is really a scandalous state of affairs. It is that partly sheltering under the American nuclear guarantee, but also increasingly using defence as a means of developing high tech industry, each country developed it's own weapons (I may say that, except for Canada, which, as you know, merely assumed a subsidiary role to American defence industry under the defence sharing agreement). The result was that in maneuvers and exercises in NATO, each country virtually had a motley selection of equipment even for such basic things as ammunition for quick-firing weapons. The ammunition was not standardized and therefore you were not sure if the lines of supply would even provide the basic amount required for a matter of days with the kind of rapid-firing weapons used in modern warfare. Tanks were not standardized, the carriers for troops, trucks were not standardized and this has been serious because what has happened has been that governments have sought to make deals with industries. And various firms bid for contracts, and therefore, in a way again, our strategy in NATO has been subordinated to commercialized trade in equipment.

Part VI - Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, mid-1960s

[HILL] Can I ask you another point? In 1963 there was a change in Government. The Liberal Government under Lester Pearson came in, and I believe right at the outset he took decisions on the question of nuclear equipment for the forces which resolved that irritant. Then in 1964 there was the Defence White Paper, which really looked in some other directions, I mean not outside NATO but at some degree of pull back. One could already see at that time that Canada was not perhaps going to play quite so prominent a role in the future as it had in the past. For example, Germany was already becoming very strong, France was under De Gaulle and coming up again. This was also the period of the McNamara strategy in the US, and the move towards forward defence and flexible response. Could you tell us something about the changes in allied strategy in that period, and how Canada fitted in? What part did Canada play in thinking about both the conventional side and the nuclear side?

[IGNATIEFF] Well, of course Pearson won the election by saying that "The government had not lived up to it's commitment, it had gone nuclear capable without getting the warheads". He would get the warheads and then negotiate Canada out of the nuclear role. But, I think it would be honest to say that the allies regarded this whole business as something that was peculiarly Canadian and not anything for them to interfere with. We were questioned very severely about what we were going to do in the matter of the Air Division because the 104s were taken out and the CF-5 began, but I felt that commercial considerations prevailed over defence interests. I may say that Mr. Hellyer came over and I attended the briefings about the aircraft needs but he bought an aircraft off the shelf which did not fit any of the needs which were described by the military. Again, our Armed Forces were made the victims of defence industry contracting, and again our strategies were subordinate to equipment, rather than equipment made related to stated, defined functions. It has been our main problem in defence, I have always said, it is not so much weakness of our defence expenditures in terms of GNP. I went over all this sort of thing many times in our examination every year in NATO and I was given all kinds of ingenious arguments both by Liberals and Conservatives, that we had to count in the CNR deficit and the cost of the Trans-Canada Highway and Air Canada and all kinds of things in view of the transportation needs of a big country. And they used to look at me and say, "You see we are big boys now and do not try that kind of stuff, all we want to know is what is your commitment to European defence". The only constructive new element that happened after the change of government was really this; the effort to bring some degree of specialization in Northern and Arctic defence. That did come out, I raised it under Diefenbaker, but it was approved under the Liberals and we did take part, and it did raise the morale of the Armed Forces, as I say they were shown to be tops in their defence operations in the Arctic environment. Unfortunately, the Europeans never did accept this idea that there should be reciprocity. There is training of course here, there is some use of Canadian air space for training of aircraft and gunnery and all that sort of thing, but no idea that certain countries, particularly those which have interests and contacts in the Arctic, should accept specific commitments for the defence of the Canadian North as we have accepted in support of Norway.

I would not say that by the time I left in 1965, 1966, that, - apart from the fact that in dealing with Mr. Pearson and Mr. Hellyer, NATO found that, you know, they were at least willing to put up reasonable arguments, and they had decided on certain equipment in the direction of conventional weapons, - but there was no marked shift in increasing Canada's commitment and we were, in fact, in my experience, subject to more severe questioning. Because I think it was true to say that under Mr. Diefenbaker the NATO people realized that there was not much use going after the representative of Canada in NATO because he was immobilized, but they did expect a little more from the Pearson administration. Although the brigade remained, the air division was definitely weakened in my opinion by having this CF5, which was an army support role aircraft which was not regarded as a very big contribution to strengthening the NATO alliance. As I say the only significant new element was this business of accepting the commitment to support Norway.

[HILL] In this period, while you were there, a good deal of NATO's attention was devoted to relations with France. You must have been kept very busy in that time. There was a lot of work done, in the group of 14 I think, working out the arrangements for negotiating with France. Did Canada play a particular role in this area, in helping to keep the French in the Alliance?

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, I was pretty active in this operation because, first of all, I had succeeded Jules Leger, and by this time Jules Leger was Ambassador and we were very close friends and worked very closely with the French Government, and I was also friends with a series of French Ambassadors to NATO, but particularly with Ambassador de Leusse, the representative at the time when all this came to a head. I was also chairman of the committee in NATO dealing with early warning, and this was something which even the French felt could not be easily destroyed. This system gave of course protection to France as well as to the others. Distances were all so small. My recollection was that the actual decision of France to leave the integrated command came as a great surprise. De Gaulle had his reservations about all international institutions, he called them all "machins", NATO, the UN, all the organizations, were all "machins". He really did live in the 18th Century, and thought in terms of restoring the monarchy, and one knew his prejudices and peculiarities. He hardly ever received the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Stikker. Once when he did, I remember Stikker telling me about it. I said: "Well, how did it go"? He said: "Well, he asked me two questions, one was 'Est-ce-que'il y aura une guerre (in French)'?" Stikker said: "No, because of the Alliance. I do not think there will be a war, because of the nuclear deterrent and the United States; as long as it stays with the United States there will not be a war". Then de Gaulle said: "(In French) Est-ce-que le Président des Etats-Unis est-ce-que c'est un homme responsable"? And Stikker said: "I do not discuss heads of state, I do not think I am competent to respond to that". Then the conversation ended. But the strange thing was that, as I say with all these eccentricities, it really did come as a shock. His moves often came as a surprise even to his officials, the Quai d'Orsay and to the commanders. Like the Cuban Missile affair: what happened was that he declared solidarity with Kennedy over the Cuban Missile Crisis. Then afterwards, the US naval commander, SACLANT, came over to Paris expecting to be thanked by General De Gaulle, because - de Gaulle had given Lorry Norstad, SACEUR, one of the highest orders of the Légion d'Honneur. I think that was largely because Lorry Norstad was in disagreement with President Kennedy about missiles. So Admiral Dennison, when he came over, also expected to get the Légion d'Honneur. But, to his great surprise, when he thanked the President, the President

said: "What do you mean the French fleet was under your command". Dennison said: "Well, you know it's an integrated naval command. There were the French, the British, the Canadians, some Germans, and our own". de Gaulle said: "I never heard of it". And he was very agitated; and this I heard from Robert Schuman, and he said that Dennison got no Légion d'Honneur. The General summoned the Admiral of a French Navy and said: "Was it true that the Navy was under command of an American Admiral during the Cuban Missile Crisis"? He said: "But, do you realize that France could have been plunged into nuclear war by a decision of the United States under this integrated command, nobody ever told me". This is very interesting because this is a parallel to Diefenbaker. I always feel that there is a certain parallelism, which is not sufficiently realized in Canadian reading that de Gaulle felt that he had been misled by President Kennedy by not being told that NATO Commands were integrated. He had not been briefed on the implications of an integrated command, nor had Diefenbaker, and their reaction was remarkably similar. de Gaulle flew into a rage and said, "Absolutely, we will leave as of today all integrated commands, army, navy, air force and you will learn that you will receive orders only from the President of France, he alone has the authority to declare war, and that rule will be observed from now on and I want this carried out immediately". Well, as I say, this came as a sort of a tantrum if you like, not unlike Diefenbaker's reaction, but it took some time to filter down to the French. It was not a decision in any way favoured by the Quai d'Orsay or by the French Department of Defence. They found themselves in a very difficult position because, you know, there were all the pipelines based on France, the headquarters were in France, all the military machinery was in France and this is what the French establishment favoured. And here the General said, immediately, everything had to go. And so it was that our talks with the Quai d'Orsay and with De Leusse and so on were not in the form of so-called confrontation, it was sort of hand-holding, and particularly as I had gone through something of the sort with Diefenbaker on a parallel situation of the implications of integrated command not being explained, I was able to explain or make suggestions. Anyway, we were in constant consultation, and by this time of course the Secretary of State for External Affairs was Paul Martin and he came over and had talks with Couve de Murville, and Couve explained that there was no way whatsoever that the President's mind would be changed. This was final, the only question was how to disentangle these arrangements and to what extent the French would be in support of the military integrated commands. And of course the other thing that was negotiable, and this was worked out not just between Canada and France but between all of us, was that France would remain in the North Atlantic Council; that in leaving the integrated commands, the President had not specifically mentioned leaving the Alliance, and he was persuaded that it was in his interest, particularly in relation to Germany, to remain in the Alliance.

[HILL] So, in effect, the other allies did not react in a confrontational fashion really towards the French. It was rather a matter of

[IGNATIEFF] Of trying to hold their hands. They were practically in hysterics and they did not know what to do. I was in sympathy too, and I remember Admiral Dennison coming to see me and because I had got this direct from a French Minister, he wanted to have it explained, he was absolutely non-plussed and thunderstruck at what had happened. And I explained to him in terms of my experience with the reaction of Mr. Diefenbaker, that this was irreversible and is one of the things that we have to watch, this business of decision-making under an integrated command. How exactly you take care of political sovereignty.

[HILL] I wonder if I might ask two more questions about NATO and then one final wrap-up question. Your period in NATO was also a period of detente in Europe, and NATO was working on questions to do with, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance", which eventually, I think, turned into

the Harmel Exercise. How do you see that phase? I think Canada was already keen on moving NATO in that direction. Was that the case?

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, Canada's role in this, of course, is directly tied to Pearson's role in nonmilitary or political co-operation in the Three Wise Men exercise, contained in the Report of the Committee of Three of 1956. I had been his political advisor in that exercise, and knew what was behind it. That had also been tied to his visit with Khrushchev which I had also been associated with, and since I had reported to NATO I was very much in the discussions, even during the Diefenbaker years, because Howard Green was very much for detente. There was no opposition to detente. Both Sidney Smith and Howard Green were thorough detentists and so in the political consultations about detente, one can truly say that Canada played a leading role in feeding views in, and reports about our appreciation of what was going on in Moscow in the Khrushchev period, and the other leading figures. This is something which is still important in NATO, that Canada can have special relationships with certain allies to stress the non-military obligations of the Alliance. For instance, the Dean of the North Atlantic Council was De Staercke, the Ambassador of Belgium, who has served longest on the Council and has influence. He was also a close friend of Mr. Spaak the former Prime Minister of Belgium, later Secretary General. We were in a very strong position in urging the discussion of detente. In other words, while the United States may have not been as keen about detente as the European allies at the time, we had more than our opportunity to press this in relation to dealing with the German question. I mentioned in my book that when the military came up with the business of shooting a nuclear weapon across the Soviet bows to frighten them, the Ambassadors of Norway, Belgium and myself shot that idea down so quickly that it was not raised again. The other thing, I may say, is that the quality of the representation on the North Atlantic Council had a great deal to do with it. The representative of the United States had been Secretary of Defence under Truman and I had known him in Washington and he was Tom Finletter and our relationship was very close. If I had an embarrassing situation, as I did over the Cuban Missile Crisis, I simply used to go privately to Tom and tell him what the situation was, and he never sort of put me on the spot throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, knowing that I had no instructions and knowing that indeed our two chiefs of governments were at loggerheads. But there was never an attempt to isolate me or to make me uncomfortable, and that had a great deal of importance in the North Atlantic Council. And I urged that NORAD somehow or other be like all other commands be put under the North Atlantic Council, because the North Atlantic Council representatives are of that caliber of people, they are not just passive, they ask questions, they discuss things in political, diplomatic terms, they are not just militarists and the particular trio in my days, as I say, that sort of led the detente discussions was De Staercke, the Belgian representative, Halvard Lange of Norway, and myself. And Spaak also, of course, was very keen on detente. He himself had been several times to the Soviet Union and the only difficulty that really arose in my recollection, during the Diefenbaker period over political consultations, was over the UN and its role in the Congo. Howard Green was a passionate supporter of the UN and while Spaak was all for detente with the Soviet Union, he could not help but, as a former Foreign Minister of Belgium's, take a very direct interest in trying to salvage whatever of Belgium's very considerable interests remained in the Congo, particularly the Union Minière, the supply of uranium and the whole uranium industry. He therefore wanted NATO to regard it similarly, since this was still claimed by Belgium at the time of the Congo crisis. He wanted support from the Allies, in support of Belgium. And Howard Green would not have any of this kind of militarism. He was supporting Hammarskjöld over the Congo crisis, and insisted that Belgium had to get out lot, stock and barrel; and there was to be no NATO fiddling with "volunteers". There was some talk of sending parachute troops to save the European population and that sort of thing. Well, this did really create trouble with Spaak, who, as NATO's Secretary General, threatened to resign over Howard Green's position in support of the UN exercise. This was something that I did inherit,

because most of that Congo crisis took place more under Leger, and for that reason Leger was uncompromisingly hostile to Howard Green. He said he was quite mad; he did not know what was possible and not possible because he created great friction and distress in the North Atlantic Council. By the time I arrived the Congo business had simmered down considerably, but Spaak was still agitated whenever Howard Green's name was mentioned. But, as I say, Howard Green never did anything but support the policy of detente, and the effort not only to deal with the Berlin Wall crisis, without resort to military action, but also to try and understand exactly what was possible and not possible in relation to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. That was very fully examined and discussed in my time.

[HILL] In fact that was what led on eventually to the Harmel Report.....

[IGNATIEFF] To the Harmel Report, and also to the Ostpolitik of Germany, which was encouraged by NATO.

[HILL] There was a lot of discussion about it, and a lot of work done on it while you were there.

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, I would only emphasize, as I say, that the Harmel and all those developments hinged on the Report on Political Co-operation, of the Three, that Pearson issued in 1955.

[HILL] The second question on NATO is this: NATO's way of dealing with the nuclear issue was not in the end to set up a Multilateral Nuclear Force (the MLF) or Harold Wilson's Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) - which always seemed to me to be a magnificent smokescreen - or even De Gaulle's Three Power Directorate. In the end what NATO came out with was two committees, which were the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. What was the Canadian position on this question, and what role did Canada play in finding this eventual solution?

[IGNATIEFF] I would not say that the Canadian role was very active, because we had hang-ups both in the Conservative Government and the Liberal Government. I was under instruction to have no part whatsoever in MLF or ANF. I did not attend any of the meetings. I was kept informed through the friendships I had with the British representative at the time, but we were of course in support of the nuclear planning device, the committee, as a means of hopefully trying to get some kind of agreement and consensus again on strategy. There was the shift from the massive retaliation schemes of Foster Dulles to the strategy of flexible response under McNamara, but we were never happy then, nor happy now, with really what the basic strategy of NATO is, namely the forward strategy to have a thin red line which would trigger a nuclear response. The fact that the Canadian brigade, while I was there, quite often covered the forward positions of several British divisions, which were not there, did not help. We felt attached in a way to the British Army of the Rhine, and we were substituting as I say, for several British divisions which were either one time or another somewhere else whether it was Suez, or wherever in Ireland, and we did not feel that it was a viable consensus. Also at the time that I was there, Mountbatten was the head of defence and Lord Zuckerman was his scientific advisor. One of the interesting things was that, while the Americans talked about flexible response and forward defence and triggering this kind of nuclear response, Zuckerman, both in NATO and in visits to Ottawa, was saying that it was totally unrealistic, that the use of nuclear weapons on a tactical level would create such havoc in the battlefield as well as resulting in massive casualties in the civil population in the areas in which the fighting took place, that it would not be feasible to conduct a "limited" nuclear battle. That had a very considerable effect I think. It certainly did, because in the nuclear exercises which took place from time to time, I remember I took part in them when I was at the defence college in London, Zuckerman's theories were pretty well confirmed.

Part VII - Ambassador to the United Nations and the ENDC - late 1960s and early 1970s

[HILL] Well, if I might move on to the very last question, which I will make sort of a very comprehensive, overview one. After you left NATO, you went to be Ambassador to the United Nations, and then you were Ambassador in Geneva, where amongst other things you had responsibility for Canada's role in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). Looking back on that period, and linking to that the fact that while you were at NATO that was the time in which the Cyprus crisis arose and Canada sent troops to Cyprus, could you say what value do you think NATO has to Canada, as a mechanism for promoting international peace and security, relative to the role of the United Nations, amongst other things, and the roles of groups like the disarmament conference?

[IGNATIEFF] Well, my view is that one of the mistaken assumptions is that somehow or other Canada's role in NATO is measured only in terms of the quantity or the extent of its military contribution. Because of the extraordinary lack of consensus about strategy, about the nature of the military contribution, it was my experience, that I was sort of "marked" on the number of troops that we could muster up on a certain day. What is overlooked is the fact that the quality of the volunteer forces that Canada sends to Europe is much higher than that of most of the conscript armies that the others produced, and the fact that we are there in Europe has political significance. I was told that many, many times what is important is that the representation of Canada on the North Atlantic Council should be taken very seriously. I was, I think, the first person to go to the Council that had not been Under-Secretary. I do not think that that was particularly a good precedent, I think the very highest officials in the Canadian Government should be sent to the North Atlantic Council, because you do have an opportunity to consult and be consulted, and the representation that Canada has had has been of a very high order, and I found that in dealing with the kind of crisis that you mentioned, the Cyprus one. It happened, as I said before, that my relations with both Tom Finletter and his successor were very close. I do not know what they are now, under Reagan's representation, but in those days we worked very closely with the US. Finletter would say: "George, look, do you mind taking the lead in the discussions on the Greek-Turkish crisis, you know we are committed directly to both sides and whatever I say I am going to be in terrible trouble with the others". And indeed I found that there was quite a pressure to take the lead because in fact, at one point, I remember the issue in the discussion in the Council, was that Greece had secretly sent many more troops in support of the Greek-Cypriot side than they admitted. Since Tom would not bell the cat, I had to do that in the Council and say that the information given by my friend Ambassador Palamas, who later became Foreign Minister of Greece, did not coincide with the intelligence information available to our government. Of course the intelligence information made available to our Government was given to me by Tom Finletter and the CIA. Palamas flew into a fury, and walked out of the Council chamber, and then I had to go and see him privately and urge him to check with his own government. I said: "All right, I am prepared to say that this is allied information, but you may not have had the latest information from your government. I often find myself without having the latest information from my government. Don't let's say that I'm saying you are a liar. I am simply saying that the latest information is of reinforcements and that this has to be taken account of if we are to try and resolve what is threatening, because the Turks will react to the figures which the alliance has." And we had to work on this and in the end we managed to get both sides to reduce. That was of course before they went to war, but they did not actually go to war while I was in NATO. But there was an irony, that I got involved as I say, very directly, in the Cyprus issue in NATO because of the circumstances which I mentioned, that is the United States was supporting both and did not want

to take the leading part and asked us to do so. But I found that this was on our plate when I came to be Canada's representative on the Security Council.

The three most serious crises in which I got directly involved were the Six Day War Crisis in the Middle East and working out resolution 242; the Cyprus crisis; and the crisis over North Korea and the Pueblo incident. But in each case, Canada took a very active part. In the Cyprus crisis, of course, Mr. Martin came down himself and took the initiative to set up a peace-keeping force by making personal appeals to heads of governments and prime ministers to contribute. We had to pay the money required to produce these peace-keeping forces and have had to ever since. But the fact was that, initially, it did keep the two sides from going to war, and while NATO can put pressure on both sides not to go to the point of war, the state of excitement domestically that is aroused by Greek or Turkish passions is such that it really requires both intervention in the United Nations and in NATO to keep such situations under control. One is not contradictory to the other, and the Canadian peace-keeping force, though it has been expensive and very difficult, has played a very important part in keeping the two communities from going at each other's throats. I had not realized the degree of passion which goes back to the memory of Turkish persecutions. I mean the Greeks feel about the Turks like the Armenians, they think in terms of what happened in the 19th Century and massacres and all this sort of thing, and their liberation fight and all the rest of it. So, all these historical, almost tribal, ideological passions, and religious, Christian against Moslem, are related to historical rivalries and things which now have to be dealt with on the basis of the inter-dependence of world communities, and through the United Nations and through NATO. The most serious thing that happened while I was on the Security Council of course, was the Middle East crisis, because it involved the direct confrontation between the United States supporting Israel, and the Soviet Union supporting both Egypt and Syria, which were in a state of federation at the time. And the climax came when the Israeli forces, having defeated Jordan and the Egyptians, were on the point of defeating the Syrians and that would have brought them to Damascus where the Soviet Middle East headquarters was, and all the alarm bells began to ring and immediate cease fires were negotiated and Kosygin came rushing over to see President Johnson, and most of the Soviet delegation was fired for having given poor advice about the possibilities of Egypt and Syria's scoring a diplomatic triumph over Israel, in the way they thought they might, by getting rid of UNEF. Then we got involved in negotiations, with Soviet participation, for about four months, to work out this resolution 242, which was unanimously adopted in the Council as the basis for agreement. This provided for withdrawal of Israeli forces virtually from all occupied territories. in exchange for the recognition of Israeli territory by its Arab neigbours. This would have to be negotiated by diplomacy, but apart from the peace agreement with Egypt, there have been no other agreements. We are still talking about an international peace conference based on 242, which would have to have the participation of the displaced Palestinians, which is the thing which is very difficult to accept for the Israelis. The Pueblo business was an instance where I was involved again at the request of the Americans, in personal diplomacy, quiet diplomacy. What happened there was of course, the Pueblo was an American spy ship keeping an eye on North Korean activities and was caught in North Korean waters, boarded, captured, and this was brought to the Security Council, each accusing the other of breaking territorial water rights or coastal water rights and the rest of it. We were not getting anywhere, and the Americans then asked me to see what I could do quietly to find out whether the North Koreans would negotiate the release of the crew, that was what they really worried about. The North Koreans obviously had captured the equipment. I managed to get hold (through a Hungarian contact) of the North Koreans, and establish the negotiations that took place in Panmunjom. The crew of the Pueblo was in fact released, and that particular crisis resolved. I was also asked to lead the western group in the debate over the Soviet seizure of Czechoslovakia and the expulsion of the Dubcek Government, and that was my last and only leadership role in the Security Council. That was because the Americans were changing their representative, after Goldberg, whom I worked very closely with. He was being replaced, and his replacement had not arrived, so they asked me to. This underlines the fact that while the United States can be, and is in some ways, a threat to Canadian sovereignty, we cannot in international affairs do other than work very closely with them, sharing the intelligence information and working on diplomacy. It is a state of relationship which is not unlike a marriage, and I do not see that we will ever quite get out of it. My only lesson that I learned was that, as in the case of a marriage you have to be absolutely frank and very firm. If one partner just gives in to the other, and allows itself to get into a sort of stooge relationship, the partnership does not really work. My experience was, that if I disagreed with my American partners, I said so very firmly and suggested some alternative, or some other way of doing it, or simply said no.

[HILL] So you would in effect say that continuing to participate in some kind of NATO organization is a good idea, although the form of the organization might change significantly?

[IGNATIEFF] I think so, and as I said, in NATO, what is still important is the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, which are still there, and particularly Article 4, where it says "parties will consult whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened". There is an obligation to consult, and there is the machinery to consult and Canada does not have to find itself, or assume that it will be, isolated with the United States, and particularly I advocate participation in the Alliance for the following reasons, that the alternative seems to me that we will simply, through NORAD, drift into a fortress -America situation, in which in fact all the positions will be taken without consultation, by the Pentagon. Or, the alternative is to try neutrality, which would cost Canada infinitely more, indeed be beyond our ability, because we have to assure both the Soviet Union and the United States that our territory, our air and our sea would not be used in threats or aggression against the other. So I do not see any feasible alternative; and the other factor, as I say, is that we can form our own groups within the alliance around common interests, but the interests are not always all uniform. And the other is that out of the dialogue between East and West, particularly in view of the new leadership in the Soviet Union that is seeking some kind of accommodation for internal reasons, it is only through the dialogue between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact that I see some possible new more comprehensive security arrangements being worked out, with guarantees, such as was arrived at at the Stockholm Conference on European Security, with confidence building measures, inspection and all the rest of it, and reductions of nuclear weapons. I do not see it being completely devoid of nuclear weapons, because nuclear weapons can always be re-created after they are destroyed. But they can be reduced, to a minimum deterrent, and we still need to have a strategy which is not subordinated to any one weapon system, but related to some agreed function between the allies

[HILL] Can I ask you a couple more short questions, then we are finished.

When you were Ambassador in Geneva to the Disarmament Conference there, you sometimes had to make reports to the NATO Council. In fact I attended one NATO Council myself where you were the Ambassador from Geneva. What do you think is the utility of that exercise?

[IGNATIEFF] There were two defects in it. One was that the standard of security was one thing for NATO and quite a different one for the Geneva delegation. It was a ridiculous state of affairs, that we did not in Geneva have access to information about the SALT negotiations, in any shape or form, while we were negotiating parallel things about biological weapons, chemical weapons, restraints on nuclear testing, but we did not have any information about what was happening in SALT. We had to go down to NATO to get that information.

[HILL] So, it was useful in that sense?

[IGNATIEFF] Well, it was useful in one sense but it was NATO policy to say that the standard of security governing the bilateral talks must be set on NATO's standards, and if a mission did not fulfill the standards and therefore it meant that all personnel had to be up to top secret or whatever it was, and the safes had to be this way, the safe houses and all the rest. And yet, as I pointed out, the Soviet military knew where the Americans were, the state of their nuclear balance, and so on. Who was kidding who, why should these people who were negotiating parallel things be excluded? I went down to NATO, I remember, in connection with the Seabed Treaty. The NATO Council was not tuned in to what was going on in Geneva, any more than the Geneva Conference was clued up to what was going on in NATO, because of the security situation, and therefore when you went down to report to the North Atlantic Council, as was the case in the seabed, all it required was that the American representative said we do not favour the Canadian position on this, and that was that.

[HILL] End of discussion.

[IGNATIEFF] End of discussion. You did not persuade anybody. In the case of the seabed, I pointed out that there were submarines doing the same job and how first of all did submarines relate to these things being prohibited, if at all, and how was inspection to be carried out without interfering with the rights of the coastal state to continental shelf mineral and oil resources, and so on. The Americans simply said they did not want to discuss that question, either question. I learned later, from an admiral in the Pentagon, that they thought that I was questioning something which is now under current discussion, namely the American access by submarines to our northwest passage - to the Arctic and coastal waters of Canada. I did not directly raise that question, but I said that here we were prohibiting something, creepy crawlies, which nobody seemed to think was practical, but we were not tackling in any way the restrictions of submarine operations, which were the real way of conducting underwater nuclear operations.

[HILL] So, in effect, that reporting to NATO sounds like a fairly loose liaison; and that is about as far as it got.

[IGNATIEFF] It was a loose liaison, and it was a very definite restriction, as I say, because neither side was clued in on what the others were doing.

[HILL] One last question, and it is in the period while you were at NATO and at the United Nations. This was also the period of the Vietnam War. I know that in NATO there were some consultations on this question, although for NATO this was an "out of area" problem or it was if you look at NATO in geographic terms. What was the nature of those discussions? I believe George Ball came on a number of occasions to high level meetings in NATO, and one report I heard on them was that the Americans would present their case and this was met by "embarrassed silences" for the most part. I wonder if that was how you saw it?

[IGNATIEFF] Yes, that was the case. And I may say there was an embarrassed silence when Vietnam was discussed in NATO, there were questions about the diplomacy related to trying to find a peaceful settlement, in which Canada participated to some extent, but there was no discussion about the Vietnam War as such. When I was on the Security Council, Arthur Goldberg wanted indeed he was very keen - to bring Vietnam before the UN, to try and stop the war and bring about some multilateral intervention to that end, but he was prohibited from doing so by President

Johnson, and that was one of the reasons why he nearly came to resign, he was very upset, he told me that himself. No, there was no multilateral intervention allowed over the Vietnam War. It was the classic example of unilateral action, and of course the whole background of our involvement included the fact that our advice was ignored at the time of the withdrawal of the French from Indo China. When we were asked to take part as the Western representatives on the commission, we strongly advised against military advisors and military intervention on the part of the United States to replace the French. We said, you know, that would make it almost impossible to get any kind of settlement in Indo China, as provided for under the Geneva Agreement. China and the Soviet Union both were against it. The Chinese were willing, as we discovered, when I accompanied Howard Green to meetings in Geneva on Vietnam and Laos and so on, to settle for neutralization in their area. The United States thought in terms of driving out both the North Koreans and the Chinese.

[HILL] Well, I think we have taken up a lot of your time, and I think we will close at this point. I would just like to say that I am very grateful to you for having participated in this project.

GEOFFREY PEARSON

[HILL]³ Good afternoon. Our guest this afternoon is Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, former Ambassador Pearson, the Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, which is sponsoring the present project. We are very pleased that you have agreed to participate in this work, Mr. Pearson, and to provide us with your own perspective on Canadian policy in NATO.

[PEARSON] I'm pleased also, because I don't think we've done enough work in Canada on Canadian defence and foreign policy from the point of view of the practitioners. We've done a lot on the basis of history, but we've done very little which is based on the memories of those who participated, unlike the Americans who have done a great deal. I think we need this in Canada if we're going to know our own history better. So the Institute was pleased to be able to help with this work, and we look forward to the additional work that will be done on the basis of grants we've made to York University and to others. Thank you.

[HILL] Mr. Pearson, as you know, what we're engaged in here is an oral history. We're trying to trace the development of Canadian interest in NATO over time. We are taking a look at the development of Canadian foreign and defence policies since 1945, and trying to see how NATO fitted into this framework. For example, we are trying to see how has Canada contributed to NATO. We are looking at the ways in which Canada's national interests have been served by membership in NATO and we're trying to determine how effective NATO has been as a mechanism for pursuing Canada's long term goals of international peace and security. These are the types of things we're trying to examine, as we look at the various stages of world development in the last 40 years, through the eyes of those Canadian ambassadors and senior officers and officials, some retired and some still serving, who played key roles in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy or in Canada's efforts inside the NATO organization. Mr. Pearson, the reason we're keen to have you involved in this project, is not only because of your present position as Executive Director of the Institute, but also because of your previous career in the Department of External Affairs, notably as a member of the NATO Secretariat from 1958 to 1961, then in various positions in Ottawa between 1973 and 1980, as Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1980 to 1983, as Emissary of the Prime Minister during Mr. Trudeau's peace initiative of 1983-84, and in those various other phases of your career which we will touch on as we go along. As I may have mentioned, the way we are approaching these interviews is to look at the various phases of people's careers in more or less chronological order, posing one or two questions about their reflections on Canadian foreign policy, and the wider international scene, before focusing more closely on their periods of directly NATOrelated activity. I think I should remark here that the way we will be proceeding in these two interviews, is that we will deal first with the earlier years of your own life and your career at the Department, and then we will go on to some of the later years and then subsequently return to focus more on the NATO period. I think in fact most of the NATO period will be dealt with in the second interview. I should also say that we are aiming, in these tapes, to be reasonably structured and disciplined in our approach, but without discouraging the spontenaity which I believe is essential to a good oral history. We are looking at Canadian policy in NATO in terms of political and defence issues which arose in the various phases, but we are also looking at things as a very human endeavour, which was experienced by those diplomats, officers and others who were actually carrying out Canada's policies in NATO over time.

³ Interviewers: Hill, Pawelek. Interview dates: 23/4/87 and 13/5/87.

Part I - Early years, to 1952

If we could turn now to part 1 of the interview, this I describe as "the early years up to 1952". Mr. Pearson, you were born in Toronto, and educated in Canada and in England, I believe, completing your school career at Trinity College in Port Hope, Ontario. Subsequently, you went to the University of Toronto and graduated with a B.A. in 1950. Then you obtained a B.A. from Oxford in 1952. I wonder if you could tell us a little about those early years and how they have coloured your outlook on life and on the international scene. I should remark, as a preface, of course, that your family as we all know is a diplomatic one, and I suppose you must have spent some time in Ottawa and with Canadian missions abroad, where international affairs and Canada's role in the world would have been very much part of everyday life. So I really wanted to ask how your earlier experiences have affected your perception of the world scene and especially your views on international peace and security.

[PEARSON] Well, my early life was not typical of Canadians, because I did grow up in a diplomatic family and was educated partly in England, when I was young, between the ages of about 9 and 13, quite a formative age, and I grew up as an English school boy playing cricket and suffering in the cold, in the way English school boys used to do, probably still do, and trying to adapt from being a Canadian, to being an Englishman. So I learned early some of the first rules of diplomacy, which are to do with imitating our surroundings, anyway to the point that you can understand them. At the same time of course, as a diplomat, you have to retain your own sense of identity, or else you won't be able to express your own government's or country's views. But I quickly learned how to adapt to foreign surroundings, and they were very foreign. Anyone who has lived in England and especially gone to school in England, would know that just because they speak the same language doesn't mean that they understand you or you them. I was the only foreigner, I think, foreigner, certainly in the boarding school I went to, and I quickly learned how to speak and not quite think but speak the way they did with an English accent and learned how to play their games. I won a reading prize I remember, and that was a great triumph for a Canadian; we weren't supposed to be able to speak English. But also at home, of course, I was very conscious then and afterwards of my father's work, and the fact that he was in touch with various people, and one read about them in the press and so on, like the Secretary to the Queen and the various politicians. He was not the High Commissioner, but he saw a lot of English officialdom and I came to know some of those people. I was at the Coronation of the King in 1938. That was a tremendous sort of occasion; the English were really still "top nation" and the Coronation was a tremendous celebration. I remember that vividly. And the coming of the war, we were in England then, all of that struck home to somebody living there rather than here, and Munich, I was old enough to be aware of that and be interested in it. I came home before the war, so that I spent the war years here, and my father went back to London. But that kind of background gave me an interest in, certainly in European affairs, and an interest in what happened in the war, that one wouldn't have had growing up here. Then I went back to Oxford in 1950, for two years. That was much the same, in some ways, because, although there were, of course, more overseas students than there were at school, they were a small minority and most undergraduates were English. They continued to ignore, mostly, their fellow students from other countries, especially the colonies, and thought of them mainly as good for rowing and some other sports, but not as scholars.

[HILL] Presumably by that time you'd more or less forgotten how to play cricket.

[PEARSON] I hadn't, really, because I had schooling in Ontario where I played cricket and I was good at cricket, so I quite liked going to at least watch it. My years at Toronto, where I was before I went to Oxford, were more satisfying for me. I preferred the Canadian environment and enjoyed

the usual sort of undergraduate experiences. I lived in residence at Trinity, which was a tremendous experience, much better than living in some dreary rooming house which most students seem to do now. I made a lot of friends. There was a very good history department at Toronto, then the best in the country, one of the best in the world probably, with Creighton, Underhill, and Martin. Frank Underhill in particular influenced me because of his views on the relations pertaining between London and Canada, which I knew about at first hand. I guess I was a bit of a radical then, because I didn't feel at all sympathetic to English causes.

[HILL] What about the consciousness of NATO and its emergence in this period. You must have been aware of that; it had been a fairly sizeable feature on the international scene.

[PEARSON] Well, I think the post war period largely passed me by. I was an undergraduate, and I really didn't think much about, for example, atomic weapons, although they were the great new thing. I suppose undergraduates probably accepted the war as over for good in a sense. Most people assumed that the war would not be repeated and that there couldn't be a third war to end war. So the undergraduates, more or less, accepted that this was finished and foreign affairs, therefore, was interesting but not vital. I went to Europe one summer to the World University Service Seminar in Holland. That revived my interest, I guess, in European questions, because of the German students who were there, and the Dutch students and the others who had been through the European war. Young Canadians really had so much to learn; we knew almost nothing about that; that experience helped me to sharpen my interest in foreign policy again. When I went to Oxford in 1950, NATO had just been born; again, I don't think it was a great subject for anxiety. We didn't talk very much about war. The Korean war began in 1950, but it didn't seem at the time as though it would amount to anything affecting England or Europeans. I suppose there were times when it might have expanded, but I don't remember it being anything which influenced me very much. Nor did NATO in that sense, because although Canadian troops came back to Europe in 1950, they went to Germany. There weren't any in England and we didn't have any sense of Canadians having to fight again. I hadn't decided then to join External Affairs. I was taking English literature and I was more interested in Shakespeare than in foreign policy. But I got married and so needed a job, and not having a doctorate, it would have been hard to find a job teaching English. So, I joined External Affairs after doing my exams in London in 1952. So that sort of decided things. I couldn't really change and go back to some other career after that. I have often wondered what I would have done if I had gone back to University to teach English literature. My father's career was a bit like that; he started by teaching history. Anyway, I think my real interest in diplomacy began with my posting to Paris in 1953, to the Canadian Embassy.

Part II - The Embassy in Paris, 1953-57

[HILL] I'd like to ask you about that later, in part 2 of the interview. As I understand it, you spent a year or so in Ottawa after joining the Department, and then were posted to Paris, to the Embassy.

[PEARSON] Yes. I started in Ottawa with the usual round of assignments for three to six months in various Divisions. Work in Defence Liaison Division was of interest, especially vis-à-vis the United States. We were then beginning to negotiate the bilateral agreements with the United States which have since developed into the whole panoply of North American defence co-operation. But I wasn't high enough up to develop any great knowledge of them until later. Then I went to Paris.

[HILL] You were in Paris from '53 to '57.

[PEARSON] '53 to '57; at the time, France was still a very divided country. Having had the awful experience of occupation with people from amongst the same families who had supported either Pétain or De Gaulle. It was a very sour mood, a difficult, impatient and humiliating mood. There was a very live Communist party to take advantage of it.

[HILL] It was the year also of Dien Bien Phu.

[PEARSON] And Algeria. '54 was a key year for the French, because they were defeated in Indochina, and the opening shots were fired in Algeria. These were taken to be simply the work of a few bandits who had caused trouble in some small town in Algeria. There was nothing to worry about. The "few bandits" increased to become the FLN which in turn became the government of Algeria in 1962. I was in Paris for most of that period. That was a time when NATO was truly divided. Disputes between NATO countries now are over minor questions mostly, although Greece and Turkey have major differences of opinion and conflicts of interest. But then, French policy in Indochina and in North Africa split the Alliance.

[HILL] Plus, of course, Suez.

[PEARSON] And Suez later, added to that. We forget when we talk about NATO solidarity, and so on, that there were times when there was no question of any solidarity. That had nothing to do with the Russians; it was a matter of decolonization and different views about what the right policies were, and it divided the allies at the UN on these questions. I think Canada tried to vote with France as long as we could, certainly on the Algeria question. But that was a time when the Soviet threat, as we have come to call it, was of less concern than these internal allied problems.

[HILL] So you arrived there in the year of Stalin's death and there was the whole period of de-Stalinization.

[PEARSON] That's right, and I took little interest in that, because of the greater problems the French were having just running their own country. Their governments lasted about a year on average, and the Communist party was the largest French party, with 27 or 28 percent of the vote. The Christian Democrats also got about that.

[HILL] They got to almost 30 percent, the Communists.

[PEARSON] They were very close to that, and the whole problem was how to keep them out of government. The Communist party was thought to be linked to the Soviet Union, and it was not the Soviet military threat, therefore, that people were concerned about; it was the political threat that if you had the Communist party in power in France or Italy, the Alliance would be undermined from below, so to speak. That was the main concern. The question of a Soviet invasion or Soviet use of force was less acute anyway because there was hope then for a change in Soviet policy. France was still a relatively poor country--we could only get meat about once a week in Paris. That was in '53, seven years or eight years after the War. It was still a country suffering from the effects of war, and trying, simply, to sort itself out, both politically and economically; France was then the sick man of Europe.

[HILL] What were your duties at that time?

[PEARSON] I worked on internal French politics and the domestic political scene, and went to the political party conferences.

[HILL] It must have been fascinating.

[PEARSON] I reported solemnly on all these goings on in France, but I don't think they were of much interest in Ottawa. We'd rather given up on France, as an unreliable country which didn't know how to run itself, whereas we Canadians had been electing Liberal governments for years and knew how to run things. Canadians had a double standard in regard to the world; there was no bilingualism in Ottawa to speak of (we weren't made to learn French) and France was rather on the periphery of our foreign policy, even though it was one of the two mother countries. Quebec was not active at the time in foreign policy and Ottawa paid little attention to Quebec views. It wasn't until De Gaulle came into office at the end of the decade that we sat up and began to take notice again. At the same time, of course, Lesage in Quebec was beginning to make a difference there. So the early years in Paris were strange, in retrospect, because aside from Indochina, where after 1954 we sent peacekeeping troops, we did not have any common political/military interests outside Europe. We had the air division in the north of France in Metz, and I don't recall any major problems over that at all. The only problems came when we had our differences with the French on these colonial questions.

[HILL] What about the interest in the European movement and so on? Was there much interest in Ottawa in that?

[PEARSON] Yes, there was, in the sense that German re-armament was an issue. Efforts to bring Germany into a European Defence Community were very much favoured in Ottawa, but were rejected by France in 1954. So, the whole European movement, which the French had begun to lead earlier, was set back, and Germany took its place in the Alliance under different circumstances.

[HILL] The negotiations and protocols to the treaty allowing German accession to the Western European Union were when?

[PEARSON] In '54; '54 was an important year. But on the whole defence questions were not the major ones in our relations with France at the time. It may well have been different in NATO.

[HILL] Did you have any personal connections with other Canadian diplomats serving with NATO? But then one does tend to live in rather different worlds, I think. Was that the case?

[PEARSON] Yes, we had lots of connections, but did live in quite different worlds; the people in NATO thought the embassy was unimportant. They quickly developed that superior mystique about international organizations compared to bilateral relations. We at the embassy thought what mattered was the bilateral relationship, although Ottawa showed little interest in it. Ottawa looked to international organizations as the leading edge of foreign policy, both in NATO and the UN, and in the Commonwealth. Bilateral relations suffered for that reason. Officials in External Affairs had become thoroughly multilateralized. That was the vision of the future. The embassy in Paris was never taken very seriously, because in Ottawa they preferred to do things through NATO, through the UN or some other way.

[HILL] That's a fascinating comment, because at that time I was living in England and I know everyone there, I think, took a close interest in things like Dien Bien Phu and all French politics. I remember very clearly the night the French Assembly rejected the EDC, which was a big shock to everybody. Not that the British themselves were ready to join in it. I remember the election of

M. Poujade. At that time France had seemed to become, as you said, virtually ungovernable in one way or another. Then the Algerian war broke out of course...

[PEARSON] Yes, poor France, and of course France was outvoted in the UN after the newly independent countries were admitted, the first in '58 I think--it was a very real problem for France at the time, especially over Algeria. The Algerian war was a priority for France, and it had almost nothing left for the defence of Europe. So it's helpful to keep a sense of perspective when we think today about whether we have enough troops to face this Soviet advantage in conventional weapons. In the '50s, there was nothing there, virtually nothing. The German army hadn't started yet, the French were in Algeria, the British were not doing very much; NATO thought they had no alternative but to turn to nuclear weapons.

[HILL] That was also a period of some very significant changes in East-West relations, in terms of the developments in Poland, and the Hungarian uprising, and so forth. It was a period of forward movement in a sense, but also remained touchy in other ways.

[PEARSON] Very sensitive, and difficult, especially after Suez in '56, which was the nadir in inter-alliance relations. I was in France then and our relations very rapidly deteriorated after Suez. Mr. St. Laurent was outraged by what happened and said so, and while most of the problems or the after-effects were with the British, the French were also part of the process of dispute. In fact, they were the main cause of the problem, because the Israelis had been negotiating with the French before the British. We knew that in the Embassy, partly because of rumours, partly because of evidence we had been able to discover through contacts. We knew the Israeli Defence Minister had been in France and that sort of thing, and reported that. We didn't know they were going to attack Egypt, but we knew something was going to happen. Our relations with France recovered, but as they weren't very close any way, it didn't matter all that much. It didn't affect our forces in Europe.

[HILL] Of all the crises which have faced NATO since the beginning, that one probably came closest to tearing the Alliance apart.

[PEARSON] I think it did, because of the American reactions at the same time. The telegrams addressed to Eden by St. Laurent were very tough telegrams and so were the replies. So, that was a very interesting time to be there, although I spent more time on Indochina because of our involvement from '54 onwards with that. The main source of knowledge about Indochina was Paris, and Canada had to learn everything about Indochina from the French. One of the first telegrams I got after the agreement to go into the control commissions was: "Do the French have a good map of Vietnam?" Our people had to go out there, but they didn't know where they were going. I remember going down to the Ministère de la Guerre, to ask for a map, a good detailed map.

[HILL] In this period, also, your father was involved in writing the report on improving NATO? [PEARSON] Yes.

[HILL] Did you have much contact with him then?

[PEARSON] Yes I did, because he came to Paris to write most of it, and spent time there in a hotel trying to put it together. I saw him a fair amount. That report was written mostly by Canadians and a lot of it by him personally. His main help came from Lange, the Norwegian, who

was a good personal friend of his, and also thought much like he did. The Italian, Martino, was a medical doctor, who was less interested in some of these political questions but was easy to cooperate with. But it was Lange and my father who wrote the report. Canadians had a vital interest in the whole process of consultation in NATO, and had thought much about it. It was just like writing out a script, one that you learned years before, so I don't think the report itself was all that original, at least for Canadians. It seemed to be new for Americans, and maybe some of the Europeans, but for us it was just a normal way to go about the conduct of an alliance. We put great emphasis on Article 2 again, on what NATO potentially could become. The emphasis on the non-military side of the Alliance was a helpful reminder, especially to the Americans and the British and the French, that the Alliance could break up if the smaller allies weren't treated more as equals. It is a document that is still relevant. But the problem always has been how to translate those principles into practice; and you know they haven't really settled such questions as whether you should have politicians around the NATO table, or civil servants, or whether these people should have special access to their governments at home.

[HILL] I think it smacks to me very much of good sound Canadian common sense, when you read the report. For example, the section emphasizing that the machinery may need a few adjustments but basically is satisfactory and that what really was required was proper implementation of consultative practices.

[PEARSON] Perhaps that was Canadian common sense, but we weren't prepared really, any more than anyone else, to give to the NATO Council decision-making authority about questions that we thought were vital to us. We weren't going to consult them on these bilateral arrangements with the Americans, for example, on defence questions. It looks sometimes as though Canadians are preaching without really being prepared to live up to the sermon. We have to be careful about that. But nevertheless, I think my father was realistic about these matters. He had been the Foreign Minister for eight years so he stopped short of laying down the law about consultation--the report was written in terms which were not offensive to the others. But whether you can ever expect the United States, in particular, to consult its allies about questions which it considers of vital national interest is a moot point. The Americans say: "All right, if we put these questions on the table you don't say anything, because you're afraid to commit yourselves. If we don't put them on the table, you complain to us because we're not consulting". And often that was true, Mr. Dulles would consult the Allies, and the Allies would be afraid to say anything - either they'd have to oppose it, which they didn't like to do, or if they said yes, they'd be in trouble at home. It was all very well to say, "please consult us", but then, they might have to do something.

Part III - Advisor on Arms Control and Disarmament, 1978-80

[HILL] Part III, advisor on arms control and disarmament, 1978 to 1980. We are now moving over the NATO period and some other phases in your career, and we'll return to those on the second tape. From 1978 to 1980 you were advisor to the government on arms control and disarmament: what about the reaction of the Canadian public to arms control and disarmament - how interested were they in that issue at that time?

[PEARSON] The trigger for public interest was the Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, which in fact led to my appointment. The Special Session was widely covered in the press, and was the subject of an address by Mr. Trudeau, that caught everybody's attention, when he elaborated his strategy of suffocation of the arms race. It was one of the more innovative proposals put to the Special Session, and I think was widely supported in Canada amongst the public, although not by all officials in Ottawa, some of whom thought it was too radical and utopian. I was left with

the task of following up on that speech. I was appointed right after the special session as the first advisor on arms control and disarmament since General Burns. General Burns had been given greater authority, in that he was able to report directly to the Minister, whereas I was asked to report through the departmental process. Nevertheless, it was an indication of the Government's intention to try to implement some of the ideas that had been put forward in the Special Session. There was a good deal of public support for these. We formed a consultative group with non-governmental organizations, in order to have a continuing dialogue with the public, and we created the disarmament fund which was small, in the beginning, about fifty thousand dollars, but which grew over time to closer to a million dollars. So, we had the instruments in place for consultation and for help to research and to public participation. And these, I think, were the bases for subsequent Canadian policy in terms of initiatives and work on disarmament, especially in the realm of verification, which we have done now for ten years. So, that was an important beginning after some years of inattention after General Burns left, almost ten years. Apart from being members of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we hadn't contributed all that much. The Government's attention was on other things. So this was a return to the period of initiative of the '60s. It wasn't easy, though, to follow up on Mr. Trudeau's ideas. They were difficult to implement anyway, and there was resistance inside the government. The Americans were not prepared to accept his proposals. The tragedy was, in a way, that the Carter presidency became embroiled in domestic problems over SALT, and Reagan, of course, rejected the whole outlook of Carter on relations with the Soviet Union. And our proposals therefore fell into a kind of vacuum in Washington. As a result there was decreasing interest in Ottawa. When I left in 1980, therefore, we hadn't been able to get the Allies to agree on any part of the strategy, which was a pity.

[HILL] Did you attempt to promote this through NATO consultation as well?

[PEARSON] Yes, we did. We promoted it through NATO consultations, especially the cut-off of production of fissionable materials, which was one of the four points of the strategy. We introduced resolutions in the Assembly on that subject which we asked our NATO allies to support. Some did, but the major allies abstained--the British, the French and the Americans--which meant that they weren't prepared to support it in a meaningful sense, and the idea of a cut-off gradually died. It would have meant all kinds of inspection and they weren't ready for that. The Soviets supported it in principle but nobody really believed that they were genuine about it. The Comprehensive Test Ban, which was another part of the strategy, was kept alive, but the Reagan Administration quickly abandoned that goal too. Other parts of the strategy involved a freeze on the testing of new strategic weapons and was bitterly opposed by the United States. So we didn't really stand much of a chance, and our disarmament efforts after the Second Special Session in 1982 fizzled out. We continued to work on verification of agreements but we lost the momentum that we had before. It wasn't really our fault; I think the whole climate changed.

[HILL] This was the time of the famous NATO two-track decision. Were you involved in any of that work?

[PEARSON] No, not directly. I was working more on the arms control side than on the NATO side. I was mildly opposed to the idea of introducing new weapons into Europe, new intermediate-range weapons, but, as you know, the Europeans were in favour of it, and the Americans went along. We didn't take any lead role in that; neither, at first, did the United States. So that was actually a European show, and when it comes to weapons in Europe, Canada doesn't have much reason to stand out. So I think that was a bit of a non-event for Canadians, who paid very little attention to it. We were then more interested in other subjects, questions of continental defence in particular. But I did go down to the UN every year for my two years as advisor, and apart from

our resolution on fissionable materials, we took an interest in verification questions, and in the question of military budgets. We were interested in more transparency and more publicity about what was happening in arms control, and because of our initiatives in '78, we pushed for more studies of these questions, more public involvement, on the basis that if the public knew what was happening governments would find it more difficult to increase military spending. Perhaps that was an illusion. But we did help the UN to give much more attention to these questions. The UN Disarmament Yearbook was one result of that period, and a great many UN studies which have since been done were partly a result of interest from countries like Canada. Aside from that, we generally followed the Alliance view on atomic weapons. We voted with our allies on almost all the major nuclear weapons questions. I think there were almost none that we stood out against. There were very few dissidents from the majority alliance view then, except occasionally the Danes or the Greeks. There was always tremendous pressure to vote together on major questions of security, and you had to have a good reason not to do so.

[HILL] I think that I'd like to close off this part of the interview by asking one or two further questions. It seems to me that in the mid '70s there was relatively little interest in Canada in disarmament, but then subsequently there was a great growth of interest in peace and so on. How do you rate the constancy of the Canadian public's interest in disarmament or arms control?

[PEARSON] Well, I do believe that the more information available, the more the public is going to take an interest, especially if the information is from Canadian sources. And over the last few years there has been more such information available, more money available for research, and this inevitably leads to greater public interest and a more informed, educated public. We still have a long way to go. I think we're still under-developed when it comes to knowledge of these kinds of questions, compared to the Germans, the French, the British, who have major newspapers that have full-time defence correspondents, and editorial writers who are experts in these areas. We have no Canadian correspondents still in New York, which is remarkable when you think of it. And we have only recently sent correspondents to Moscow. There is greater knowledge now than there was ten years ago, and there will be greater knowledge ten years from now. I think the long-term trend will be towards asking difficult questions about nuclear weapons, the kind of questions that McNamara and others have been asking since they retired. That's another possible stream of advice and information, the retired officials; although retired Canadian officials mostly disappear from the scene and they cultivate their gardens. But we are a lot more involved than we used to be in terms of public interest. The peace movement cannot be, and should not be, evaluated on the basis of demonstrations in the streets. That's not the point. The point is what are they learning, and Their publications are far better than they used to be. And you can see it in writing about. parliamentary committee reports, although the members of Parliament don't have the staff to do the research that they need. Senator Kennedy has more people on his staff than one-third of our M.P.s put together. We don't have to be like Senator Kennedy, but we do need to have parliamentary staffs which can feed questions into the media and into the House of Commons. We have been living off the capital of American strategic analysis now for 30 years, and it's only in the last few years that we've started to question this, and to ask whether the Canadian situation is somehow different from that of the United States or from that of Britain or Germany. This is a good sign, and should lead to more independent Canadian policies.

[HILL] Could you explain further? Is there change under way?

[PEARSON] Well, I think the public is beginning to influence policy in ways that they didn't before; but we still have quite a long way to go; you don't see in the current defence debate enough analysis, for example, of the need for things like new submarines and so on. The British Press

would have chewed that over for months or years if that had been the issue. We haven't really come to that point yet.

[HILL] Here's another question linked to your experience in the 1978-80 period: how valuable, in your view, is NATO as an instrument for the promotion of international peace and security, for example through arms control and disarmament?

[PEARSON] I still think it's very valuable. It is the only instrument available to us to promote goals of peace and security in a forum where we have shared values. (There were two original impulses for NATO. One was to shore up Western Europe which everybody thought was about to collapse, not because of a Soviet military threat, but because of the state of its morale and economic life and the power of the Communist parties; and the other was to get a hold of the United States, to keep it involved in Europe, and somehow be able to influence and change American policies). The first reason is obviously no longer valid, Western Europe no longer needs to be saved from Communism. It is now a matter of deterring any military threat from the Soviet Union. But the second motive-- of maintaining influence on United States policy--has become even more important. One can say that NATO had no influence on US policy in Vietnam for example, but in fact things would have been different if the Alliance hadn't existed. So in that sense, I think it remains extremely important. It's like any other instrument, you have to use it to keep it effective. The public, there too, tends to be left out, and I don't think knows enough about how the Alliance works or what actually happens. We don't have enough analysts, correspondents, academics and so on writing on the subject.

[HILL] We don't at this point have a correspondent in Brussels. Thanks, I think we will adjourn at this point.

Part IV - The NATO Secretariat, Paris, 1958-61

[HILL] Mr. Pearson, there are two parts of your career I'd like to cover now. The first one is when you were a member of the NATO Secretariat, from 1958 to 1961, and then the other period I'd like to touch on would be your time as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, from 1980 to 1983. If we might examine the first period, your time with the NATO Secretariat, between 1958 and 1961, that was of course in Paris, where you had just previously served with the Embassy. I wonder if you could tell us something about the main responsibilities that you had in that time and also about some of the key issues that arose as you saw them.

[PEARSON] I went there partly because I had a French friend whom I had known while I was at the Embassy who was serving on the NATO Secretariat as the Chef de Cabinet of Mr. Paul Henri Spaak, who had just assumed his duties as NATO Secretary General, and he asked me if I would be interested in working in the Political Section. So this was arranged, and I went there shortly after Mr. Spaak became Secretary General. My time there was spent working with Spaak on the political side of NATO. In fact, Spaak only stayed three years; he went back to Belgium in 1961. But his three years were a very interesting time for NATO, and indeed Spaak brought to NATO the same qualities that he brought to the construction of the European Common Market. That is, he was a strong supporter of federal institutions or common institutions for both Europe and the West, and the most interesting feature of my time there was Mr. Spaak's attempt to persuade the United States and Canada to co-operate with the Europeans on all matters of common interest, not just matters involving the Soviet threat, but also economic questions and colonial questions and indeed global questions. A factor which prompted him to resign was his disappointment at his inability to persuade the allies to dedicate themselves to a co-operative pursuit of these objectives.

There were two main reasons for that. One was the opposition of the United States, in particular, but also of others, to widening NATO political consultations to include the so-called colonial territories. This was particularly true, of course, of Algeria, where the French refused to consult anybody; Algeria was part of France; although during my time there, of course, De Gaulle was able to solve that question. The same French view applied to consultations about Tunisia and Morocco. The Belgians were also reluctant to accept any NATO interference, as they might see it, in the Congo.

The Americans, of course, took a quite different view of colonial problems than the Europeans. The Americans, especially under President Kennedy, had their eyes fixed on the global issues and were keen to disassociate themselves from the policies of their allies. They rejected Spaak's wish to have a NATO position on these questions. The same was true of Canada. Because of our relations with the new Commonwealth, and just beginning with francophone Africa, we would have nothing to do with any so-called NATO position on these matters. We knew that such a position would be closer to that of the Europeans than to our own views. Spaak himself, I think, preferred the European views. He wanted NATO to take a strong line against Communist penetration in Africa, especially in respect of the Congo, which was of course a Belgian problem. He wanted to enlist NATO's support for resistance to Lumumba, who as you know was the first Congo Prime Minister, and was thought to be a Soviet protégé to some extent. Spaak was a social-democrat but like many European social democrats, strongly anti-Soviet. He ran into difficulties with President Kennedy and with Howard Green, the Canadian Foreign Minister, who would have nothing to do with that kind of policy.

[HILL] So then the colonial issue was felt very much inside NATO headquarters?

[PEARSON] Spaak felt that the NATO allies should take a global view of security and therefore of the implications of the end of colonialism in Africa. It was of concern to NATO, in Spaak's view, because of a potential Soviet threat to Africa. He lectured NATO foreign ministers on the need to work together to prevent any Soviet penetration of Africa. And he failed; that was not the view of the Americans at the time, although it may be now. That doctrine appalled the Canadians, especially, as I say, Mr. Green, who was busy cultivating new friends at the UN. The UN was where Mr. Green felt most at home, and he went so far as to vote at the UN in ways which he justified on the grounds that we needed the support of the new countries, and if that meant a split with our Allies in Europe, too bad. Spaak couldn't understand this attitude; they couldn't have been more different, those two men, in the way they approached the value or significance of NATO.

[HILL] I believe there was a fair amount of disappointment with the progress of decolonization by '58 and by '60. But still there were differences of viewpoint as to how to proceed in this area.

[PEARSON] Yes, and there still are, as you know. The question of how NATO allies should vote at the UN on some of those issues is still a difficult one, whether it's Nicaragua or Angola or other places. In those days it was Mr. Spaak's views, and the views of some of the other Europeans, which the Americans rejected.

[HILL] It seems to me that the Americans and many others in the West were looking for rapid disentanglement from colonial empire in that period. Once that had been done, it was felt, the Allies would be able to concentrate much more on security in Europe.

[PEARSON] Yes.

[HILL] That was felt particulary about the French. Could you comment on that?

[PEARSON] One of the major issues in NATO then was the whole question of French policies in North Africa. Of course, the French refused to discuss Algeria, although it was voted upon at the UN. These votes at the UN caused major problems for the NATO allies, Canada in particular being strongly anti-colonial. Denmark and Norway more or less shared our views. The rest of the Europeans, pretty well agreed, if not to stand by the French at least not to vote against them. At NATO these issues were always under the surface. They weren't discussed openly unless the country involved wanted them discussed. Belgium wanted the question of the future of the Congo discussed after the failure of Belgium's efforts to bring about a peaceful transition of power. But Spaak pressed the Allies to agree to common policies and that proved to be impossible.

The other major issue at the time was the question of nuclear strategy, after short-range nuclear weapons were introduced into Europe in the late '50s. The NATO Council took that decision in December, 1956. Thereafter the whole question of the control of these weapons was a central policy issue, and it was never settled. The United States insisted on retaining control of any decision to use such weapons. They were American weapons. But the other allies wanted a say in their use. The military objective was obviously to have a decision-making process which was as effective and as rapid as possible, but the political issue was that there should be more than one finger on the trigger. These were contradictory requirements. The issue was of particular interest to Canada at the time because of the introduction into Canada of nuclear weapons such as the Bomarc missile. (Canada was also involved in placing nuclear weapons in Europe, such as the Lacrosse and Honest John). What should Canada do? Should Canada have a veto on their use, or should they be brought under NATO? The Canadian government agreed more or less with the other allies that there should be some form of shared control, but the United States really never could accept that. The NATO commander, General Norstad at the time, also wanted some form of shared or NATO control. The issue remains alive today. In December 1956, the Council agreed that any attack by the Soviet Union on NATO forces in Europe should be met by the use of nuclear weapons from the beginning. That meant that the question of who took the decision was vital. But it was never spelled out.

[HILL] Because this was the time when de Gaulle also called for the Three-Power Directorate.

[PEARSON] That was the third issue which emerged from the other one, because the French solution was to say, "We'll forget the rest of them and we three will decide what to do in an emergency or indeed in matters of high policies generally". But that was never feasible, and I don't think the United States was prepared to accept it. It created a lot of tension. It was never formally proposed, so it didn't lead to a NATO decision of any kind.

[HILL] Where did the discussions on these issues take place inside NATO?

[PEARSON] There were private sessions of the Council with no staff present. There was also an arrangement under which the Standing Group could discuss some of these matters, but that was in the military net and we weren't privy to any of that. We were civilians working in the political section, so we were more concerned with political consultations about these colonial questions and about any other questions that arose in Council at the time, especially Soviet policies. Khrushchev was a relatively new leader and inspired a certain amount of hope for progress. He came to Paris in 1960 for the Summit, which broke down because of the U2. I remember writing a letter to my father at the time saying what a good thing it was that it broke down because, for us, in NATO, Summits were dangerous. We couldn't be sure what would happen, or how much we would be

told. But that was the sort of thing we did - analysis of Soviet policies in Europe and elsewhere. Cuba was an issue then too, of course, after Castro took power in '59, and that was discussed.

[HILL] Was this discussed in various committees?

[PEARSON] Well, the Group of Three Report in '57 led to the establishment of the Political Committee and the Economic Committee. The Political Committee was where we discussed all of these issues and then recommended action to the Council. Political consultation was greatly increased after '56, as a result of that report, and because Spaak was very keen that it should take place. But it ran into real obstacles over colonial questions and questions of global politics. The Americans under Kennedy were not prepared to submit their global interests to Alliance scrutiny. Apart from that, I helped to write speeches and to brief the Secretary General. I was working for an Englishman who had been the head of the political section in the foreign office; we had a German who was the Deputy Head, two Frenchmen and an Italian - we were quite an international group. We worked mainly in French and English. We were in Paris then of course... beginning at the Palais de Chaillot and then at the Porte Dauphine, just outside Paris.

[HILL] So, it was a group of about ten, was it?

[PEARSON] Yes, about eight to ten people in the Political Section, of about five or six nationalities. Canada usually had a job or two on the secretariat. When I left, D'Iberville Fortier became the Canadian representative on the Secretariat. He dealt mainly with press and information. There was a lot of competition for jobs on the Secretariat, and on the whole Canadians were not conspicuous by their presence. We were very few. They were mostly Europeans, as I remember. The Americans didn't have many people there, but dominated the military structure.

[HILL] I think when I was there the Americans had only seconded people, so they were still a rather limited group, whereas, say, the British and some others, were directly hired by the Secretariat.

[PEARSON] That's right, I was seconded for three years. I must say I enjoyed it, because I learned a great deal about Alliance politics. And I became somewhat of a critic of Canadian policy, because we on the whole tended to attach more importance to the Commonwealth and to the UN, or at least so it seemed to me, than we did to Europe or NATO, and I objected to that. Mr. Green was very strong on disarmament and on the UN, and he tended to lecture his colleagues at NATO on the importance of the UN and so on, and they didn't like that. The UN then was just becoming the greatest critic of British policies, French policies, Belgian policies and especially of Portugal. Portugal was the black sheep. His views (Green's) about the importance of the UN were not reciprocated, except possibly by the Scandinavians.

[HILL] What would you say about the quality of consultation in NATO and the quality of analysis, for example on Soviet issues?

[PEARSON] We had one or two good people on Soviet issues. I'm not sure that the quality was high, though, because our bread and butter was to be anti-Soviet. That was the reason that we thought NATO existed, to act as a shield against Soviet aggression. We tended to interpret Soviet policies in a very cautious - not to say aggressive manner, we were not willing on the whole to accept evidence of Soviet good will, and Spaak certainly wasn't.

[HILL] What about analysis of Third World issues. I mean not necessarily directly related to the decolonization issue, but shall we say the state of affairs in southeast Asia. I'm just looking for some area which is other than of direct interest to NATO.

[PEARSON] We were not good at that. We had no experts on regional affairs on the Secretariat. Most of us had served in Europe, and we were not familiar with Africa or Asia. I don't remember writing a single piece on anything outside Europe; although, I did try at one time to explain to Mr. Spaak why Canada was so attached to matters of Commonwealth importance-- like our relations with India and our relations with the emerging countries of Africa. I did my best to give him some sense of the Canadian view. But I'm not sure he ever understood it, and he always thought of us as being slightly disloyal in some way; as he once said to me, a kind of North American "Yugoslavia". His successor, Stikker from Holland, was more understanding of these questions, although not much more. I think, generally speaking, NATO's Secretaries General have not being very understanding of Canadian issues and views of the world; Luns certainly wasn't.

[HILL] Were there, at this time, meetings of experts on, for example, South East Asia or Soviet policy?

[PEARSON] On Soviet policy, there were occasional meetings but they were not organized in the way they've since become as an annual matter. We'd just established a Political Committee and it dealt with all questions of this kind. The Political Committee was made up, usually, of counsellors from each NATO delegation, "the number twos", and there were only rarely visits from Ottawa or from other capitals. They'd certainly come for the meetings of the ministers, but otherwise we were pretty well on our own. So it was only afterwards that consultation developed into consultation between the officials from capitals. The Canadian delegation got their instructions from Ottawa, on each issue.

[HILL] The reason I asked that was because it does seem to me that there is very little research capability inside NATO headquarters, I mean on political issues. That's still the case. But of course one could say that to some extent there's a vehicle for that in the meetings of experts, where NATO can draw on expertise from all the allied capitals. But one really wonders how effective that is.

[PEARSON] Well, I think it helps to be able to speak directly to the experts, especially on issues of Soviet policy. You have an immense analytical establishment in Washington, for example, and somewhat less but still significant resources in London, Paris and Bonn. And when these people come, the other allies can learn a good deal. But at that time that kind of expertise wasn't available, with some exceptions e. g., Jean Laloy of France. I don't remember the Americans producing the kind of people they have since. There was no one in particular that stood out. George Kennan, I suppose, had left the State Department by then. They were more interested in the rest of the world then; Kennedy was very much a man to problem-solve, as a global statesman. And of course they were deeply anti-colonial.

[HILL] What about the Canadian contributions to NATO consultations. I mean, we are looking at it a little from the viewpoint of the Secretariat. How would you see the value of Canada's contribution? And also what did Canada get out of it?

[PEARSON] I think you have to think of that period, in particular, in terms of Howard Green; he was the Minister who dominated foreign policy after the death of Sidney Smith. And he was, as you remember, critical of the previous government's role in the Suez crisis, for deserting Britain

in its hour of need. Which was strange, because after he became Minister, Mr. Green did not take that view; he was very critical of some aspects of British policy. But, he really was Canadian policy, as far as NATO was concerned, and his over-riding goal was to make progress on disarmament, and that's where we got into trouble in the UN, for example. We voted in the UN to abolish all nuclear tests. We were one of the few countries in the Alliance who did. That was Green's priority. And the other preoccupation of Canadians, aside from the colonial issues, was North American defence--NORAD--and the whole question of introducing nuclear weapons into Canada, and that was not an issue of great interest to the other allies at the time.

[HILL] Except that it was a bit linked to the question of equipping the Canadian forces in Europe? Hadn't Canada acquired the CF104 by this time?

[PEARSON] That's true. That was not a great issue in NATO or in Canada. We were prepared to accept a nuclear role in NATO, but not in North America. At least Mr. Diefenbaker was not prepared to take the last step of stock-piling the warheads.

[HILL] Even in Europe the aircraft was not equipped with nuclear weapons, if I'm not mistaken? There was some strange arrangement whereby, to actually serve in that role, they had to go and pick up the weapons at the last minute, or something like that.

[PEARSON] I do not recall that being a big issue in NATO. I don't know why. I can't remember why.

[HILL] Canada's reluctance to follow through on equipping itself with nuclear weapons didn't poison the relationship with the other allies then, presumably?

[PEARSON] Only with the United States; and, then, of course, Norstad, the Commander, jumped into that argument with a press conference in Ottawa which was regarded as interfering in Canadian affairs. He said, "There is no point in Canada accepting nuclear missiles, if they are not prepared to accept the warheads". It's a pretty logical statement, but, that was the only direct incident I recall, in NATO's role in our nuclear troubles. But then I left NATO in '61, and that came later.

[HILL] In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, I think.

[PEARSON] Yes. I wasn't there during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which, I think, was regarded by our allies as some kind of Canadian abdication of responsibility. We refused to go on alert, and so on. I don't remember if the Europeans ever went on any alert, but we were bound by the NORAD agreement. The Canadian defence debate in the early '60s was part of the NATO debate over the control of nuclear weapons. But that developed after I left. So my main impression is, Canada was regarded as a kind of free rider, in some respects. Our military contribution was not very high, and we were not prepared to discuss any of the subjects that Spaak and others wanted discussed, and so on. It was a low period for Canada's reputation in NATO.

[HILL] At the same time, as you mentioned earlier, there was not very much comprehension of Canadian points of view on the part of the Europeans.

[PEARSON] No, there wasn't, except for the Scandinavians. We always had good relations with Norway, and those continued. The Norwegians had refused to accept nuclear weapons or, indeed, any foreign troops on their soil. We weren't completely alone, but it was not a time of Canadian leadership, certainly not in NATO. That recovered to some extent, later, in the sixties. And then,

of course, Mr. Trudeau pulled us back again with his decision to reduce our forces, so there has been, over time, a fairly constant Canadian withdrawal and return, and withdrawal and return, to NATO, as a centre for our foreign policy. If you looked at the history of our NATO policies, you would be struck by the way that the graph goes up and down. Clearly there is a tension in Canada whatever government is in power, between our NATO obligations and our sense of ourselves as having global interests, including our relations with the Commonwealth and with other countries outside NATO. In that sense, we are unique.

[HILL] Of course, it is also the fact that, in the mid-50s, Canada was still in the position of being a major military power, since Europe had not recovered yet. Whereas by the 1960s, particularly with the cancellation of the Avro Arrow, the indecision about nuclear weapons, and the change in the whole strategic equation, the situation was already changing.

[PEARSON] In the early '60s we were spending more on defence, a higher percentage of our budget and GNP than we are now. In the '50s, a good deal more. So our reputation as a contributor to NATO's military role declined after about the mid '60s and into the '70s. Before then, we were making quite a respectable contribution. And we weren't criticized for that.

[HILL] We were not criticized for the size of the military?

[PEARSON] We were thought to be making a respectable contribution. We had a division there. There was no great quarrel about that. NORAD accentuated the process of splitting our interests between Europe and North America, and the Europeans did not take much interest in North America.

[HILL] So, it's more a question of attitude, really, than of policy thrust?

[PEARSON] I think it was more a matter of attitude and a reluctance to be involved in European colonial policies, which we did not like. That was the essential difference between Canada and the rest, with, as I said, the exception of Norway and Denmark; all the others supported, more or less, European polices - Greece, Turkey, and so on. Portugal was the black sheep. Only a little blacker as far as we were concerned.

[HILL] And yet, when the Conservative government and Mr. Diefenbaker came to office in '57 or '58, they did devote some effort inside NATO to drawing up a declaration, or something of that kind, to reiterate allied solidarity and Canadian interest in NATO. But, as Mr. Green took charge of Canadian foreign policy, that impulse declined. Or is that an incorrect reading?

[PEARSON] Well, as I say, I think Canada's reputation and interests have varied over time in NATO. Mr. Trudeau took a view of NATO that was not very different from that of Mr. Green. In addition, Mr. Trudeau thought that our military contribution was redundant. Mr. Green never challenged the military contribution. What he challenged was the political interest in maintaining solidarity with many of our NATO allies. He was not the only one. There were many in the Department that agreed with him. Norman Robertson was a strong believer in disarmament, for example. So this is a Canadian phenomenon, if you like, that we back away from NATO every ten years or so, and then show new interest, as we are now. But we find it hard to maintain the kind of solidarity that the Alliance expects. So perhaps this is a pattern in Canadian policies, which is not surprising when you think about it. We are on the other side of the Atlantic. The United States is also, but has global commitments we don't have. We have global interests, but we don't have global commitments. We have to divide our time and resources between many different kinds of

interests. NATO has always been only one of the several strands involved in policy. Whereas for a country like Belgium, or Holland, or Spain, to a lesser extent Italy and maybe Turkey, it's their major concern.

[HILL] I suppose if the Europeans, in general, expect Canada to behave like the Netherlands, they are always going to be rather disappointed.

[PEARSON] I think they've given that up. We had a quid pro quo. We could say "All right, we will assist in the defence of France, but we have a large country and we have some of our own defence priorities. We would also appreciate it if you would help us from time to time"; and of course, nothing ever came of that. We are the only country in the Alliance which has a separate arrangement with the United States for air defence, for example, and this kind of continental engagement. And this is going to continue to affect policy... the current, in my view, is now running away again from Europe, even though we are reinforcing our forces there. The medium and longer term outlook is for a gradual decrease in our contribution, because of our increasing responsibilities for our own defense.

[HILL] In a way, there is never going to be any return to a sort of golden age like the early 1950s.

[PEARSON] Yes, I think if you look back, probably, it will be seen to be more of a continuity than it seems, because even in the '50s, we were still pre-occupied with our relations outside NATO. Our relations with India, for example, were more important in the '50s in some ways than our relations with France, which is extraordinary when you think of it. When I was in the Paris Embassy, our telegrams were not of nearly the same significance as the telegrams from New Delhi. So we have always had this tension, I think, between: on the one hand, our Commonwealth and NATO commitments; and, on the other hand, our aid programs and our sense of ourselves being a new country and one that is sympathetic to the problems of new countries, to problems of identity, to problems of colonialism. There are real differences between the countries of Europe and of North America, so I don't see any great break between 1956 and 1986. It was just that in the early days we were more important as a military power, and more important as a centre for political consultation. Our views were highly respected and we had a very good diplomatic service.

[HILL] What about the whole question of Article 2 and the non-military side of NATO. What did Canadians feel about the state of that issue in the period you were at NATO?

[PEARSON] We were proud of our contribution to the non-military side of NATO and to political consultations. Even though we dragged our feet on colonial issues, we otherwise contributed fully. We were one of the leaders in trying to bring the Americans to consult more often about their policies, and under Eisenhower and Kennedy we succeeded to some extent. Dulles hadn't consulted much, but later there was greater dialogue in NATO on political questions. So we were leaders in that respect, and that was all we could really do with Article 2. The only other aspect of Article 2 that made good progress was consultation on Soviet economic policies and what we could do about them. In what way should we pool our knowledge of military exports to the Soviet Union, what kind of trade relations should we have with them? But we pretty well gave up trying to convince the others that NATO should act itself as an organization for economic consultation on matters of trade and payments and so on between western countries. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) played that role and then the Common Market, so in that respect, we were never able to accomplish what we had hoped to do in the beginning, that was to make the treaty into a basis for collaboration on all aspects of western policies.

[HILL] The whole idea of an Atlantic Community had run down somewhat, in comparison with the hopes of an earlier time.

[PEARSON] It ran out of steam because the Europeans did not want it. They had their own interests.

[HILL] What about the Twin Pillars concept. It seems to me that when President Kennedy came in, or maybe slightly afterwards, he issued a call for a new effort to re-organize the Alliance, basically on a Twin Pillars basis. And of course, that had serious implications for Canada.

[PEARSON] Well, we thought it did, and naturally we were opposed to any arrangement which would imprison us in North America as one pillar, with the Europeans being the other pillar. We resisted any political directorate. This was partly a matter of Canada's history and experience. During the Second World War we were treated as a minor partner, even though we had a million men in the armed forces. So none of that would we accept. In a way, we were contradicting ourselves. We wanted a strong alliance which involved both economics and politics but we wouldn't agree to any arrangement which might lead in that direction, either a directorate or strong pillar. I think, to some extent, we showed ourselves to be ambivalent about the future of the Atlantic Community. The Atlantic Community was always our concept as long as we had a major role in its construction, but if somebody else, like the French or Americans, left us out, we did not want it.

[HILL] I have just a couple of other questions on this period. One point I have in mind is this: in doing these interviews and preparing for them, I have been struck by the fact that in the immediate post-war period, there seemed to be a group of people in External Affairs and some other government departments, who had a very strong sense of wanting to do something about the state of the world. They were not unified in their objectives, exactly; but they had a very strong sense of a need to do something. They seemed to be intellectually pretty capable people and very astute as diplomats. Did you feel, while you were at NATO, that people in External, especially the senior people there, had a strong sense of a need to do something and that they were very capable people, or how would you assess that?

[PEARSON] It's difficult for me to comment, because of my father's role in the early period, but when I was at NATO, he was out of office. I remember telling him, at the time, that he had the opportunity, now that he wasn't in office, and as an elder statesman or a former statesman, drawing on his experience, to put forward initiatives and proposals. He did to some extent. But the sense of excitement of the early '50s was lost later, and with the minority governments of the '60s, we were more concerned about our own affairs, especially with Quebec and the whole question of the future of the federation and bilingualism. Leadership in the Department changed and there was a kind of withdrawal. There wasn't in the civil service, at that time, the same spark that we had had before.

[HILL] One could categorize it as a sort of intellectual ferment, and a high level of commitment.

[PEARSON] There was. In the early period of construction of the UN and of NATO, the Commonwealth, these pieces of the post-War World were put in place. Now we are beginning to wonder whether they have served their purpose, and you could argue that now we are facing another time of reconstruction and new thinking. Canada could, once again, contribute, but not in the same way. Our relative weight has changed compared to other countries: Brazil, India, China. But now

that we have our constitution in place, we should be able to devote more time to these matters, and as one of the Summit Seven we still have influence.

[HILL] I think, also, sometimes, there is a role for intellectual input. You mentioned Brazil and China and so on. While it is true that they are very major powers these days, each in their own way, on the other hand they don't necessarily always seem to have the impact on the rest of the world that they might have. I was struck by something that Arthur Menzies said about China-and of course, he knows China very well--that part of the problem with China is simply to keep them in contact with the rest of world. They have a tendency to be off in a world of their own, and they find the rest of the world very difficult to understand.

[PEARSON] I didn't mention Japan and Germany as two of the powers of the future who can be expected to show this kind of leadership. The role is there if Canadian governments want to take it, but, until recently, we have been so concerned with our own affairs that we haven't wanted it. Now we are moving out of that phase, and I expect we might find a new generation of officials who will step into those shoes again, provided there is political leadership.

[HILL] Before we leave the NATO period, are there any thoughts, or recollections, that you would like to mention at this point?

[PEARSON] Well, later on in life, I became a member of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group which was made up of the policy/planning units of each country. We met once a year and looked at the longer term. Our reports didn't have much influence, but it was a very useful way of thinking with our allies about common problems of the future. NATO does have this familiarity, and informal capacity for the Allies to meet, in various different guises, whether it is policy/planning or regional conflicts or relations with the Soviets, which gives it a continuing vitality. We don't have that in the Commonwealth, we don't have that at the Summit meetings. There are ways of talking to each other which are hidden from the public view, but which are vital to the continuing life of the Alliance, and which are, I think, probably its most important attribute. We can exchange views at almost every level and build up contacts so that in a crisis, consultations can be held very quickly. I think one of the interesting studies which could be made is how, through this process of consultation, crises have been avoided. We tend to think about the crises that have taken place, but it would be useful to study the crises that have not taken place, because of NATO consultations and the role of the Alliance in finding compromises amongst different views. One could take the potential crises that have been dealt with, the potential crisis in the Gulf, for instance--there must have been hundreds of hours of consultations in NATO on that subject and who knows what will happen. But the point is that the Alliance provides the vehicle for undertaking this kind of consultation, and there is no substitute for it. So I think that NATO will remain essential, even if its original purposes are lost, and there is a kind of continuing détente with the Soviet Union. I imagine that these functions of consultation and cooperation will continue. There is no other way of doing that.

Part V - Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1980

[HILL] I wonder if we could go on to your period as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, which was from 1980-1983. I have one question initially which is: looked at from Moscow, what sort of role do you think Canada should play within NATO in order to deal with the Soviet Union in the best kind of way?

[PEARSON] Well, I think that we should use the NATO forum as an opportunity to put forward our own views on what is happening in the Soviet Union, partly to balance the views of others, particularly the United States, and in an attempt to come to some consensus on the future of the Soviet Union. That means that we have to have views, and we have to be willing to express them. We need to strengthen our capacity to understand the Soviet Union. We have tended to neglect that in Canada. We don't have the kind of expertise that some of our allies do. We are now beginning to develop that, but until we do, it will be hard for us to have real influence on the policy questions of how to deal with the Soviet Union. I hope that in five to ten years we will have enough people who have served there two or three times to be able to contribute in a major way to this process of analysis. It's not something that you can learn overnight. It means speaking the language, it means keeping up with the Soviet press and with the speeches of the leaders, etc. So that I think we have (a) to improve our capacity for analysis and (b) have the political will to express views which may be contrary to those of others, or at least those of our neighbour. If you confront the United States on questions of Soviet policy, you are touching a sensitive nerve, and this is particularly true over questions involving the rest of the Communist world: relations with Cuba, relations with Nicaragua, relations with Vietnam and others. Those are the questions that are most troubling and difficult, where some understanding of the relations inside the Communist world are important. At one point, we tended to assume that it was a bloc which included China, but the Chinese defection exploded that myth. But we still tend to think in terms of a kind of monolith with orders coming from Moscow, and we've got to overcome that image in order to understand what goes on. In addition, we have to understand what happens inside the Soviet empire, the land mass of the Soviet Union, and what that means for the future. And that requires understanding of Soviet Asia, the Baltic Republics, Trans-Caucasia, and the rest. The major allies: the Americans, the British, the French and the Germans, are ahead of us in terms of this analysis. Part of the reason is that our universities have not yet produced enough scholars.

[HILL] Looking at your own period in the Soviet Union, during the Brezhnev period, how would you see the long-term development of the Soviet Union, and how would you situate the years that you were there?

[PEARSON] I was there at the beginning of the end of the Brezhnev era. It was a time, therefore, of speculation about the future. People tend to think that Gorbachev is a new phenomenon, but there were signs of change when I was there as well. A key figure in that period was Andropov. He initiated the period of change but died before he could implement much of what he wanted to do. Almost any leader after Brezhnev would have had to initiate change, because, like any leader long in power, he was reluctant to face the facts of change in Soviet society—the decline in the rate of economic growth, the stagnation in agriculture, the corruption amongst the senior officials, some of whom who had been for thirty years in one place. Gromyko had been made Foreign Minister in 1957, and he was still there in '84, and he wasn't alone. There were many who had been in office almost as long. So there was almost bound to be change. It was not a sudden transition; there were signs of change even then, there had to be. So I think we tend to exaggerate the Gorbachev phenomenon. On the other hand, he has surprised everyone by the speed with which he is acting and that couldn't have been predicted.

[HILL] I think one thing I have been struck by over the last few years, has been a series of articles talking about the fact that it is not just the senior leaders who have to be replaced in the Soviet Union, it is the entire middle management throughout the whole society, because it's simply the fact that many of them have been in their present positions for nearly thirty years. So there was bound to be a generational change there. And one wonders if Gorbachev is obliged to run fast simply because otherwise the thing can get out of hand.

[PEARSON] He did not have any choice. One forgets that the people who were then in power came to office in the '50s and even in the '40s. Stalin had killed off all the older people. Gromyko became Ambassador to Washington when he was thirty-four, and other people of that generation assumed high office very young. That generation is now disappearing. There is a new cycle of younger people, but they are not as young as their predecessors were. They are in their fifties now, the new men, and in the 1940s the leadership tended to be a decade younger. What is important now is that for the first time, the leaders are able to embark on a new course. These new men owe nothing to Stalin, and have no particular loyalties to Stalin's system.

[HILL] You see quite a difference between the current situation, then, and that at the time of Khrushchev.

[PEARSON] Indeed, a completely different situation, because Khrushchev and Kosygin, and all those people, were trained by Stalin and grew up in positions of responsibility under Stalin and there was no way they could renege or disclaim responsibility-they were there. What these people now can do, and they are doing, is to de-Stalinize the system, which is a real change. Somebody has called it the Third Revolution. There was Lenin's, then Stalin's and now there is the third one. So in that sense, one can hope for permanent change. I don't see how they can go back. They are an educated élite, all of whom have been to trade schools or universities. Khrushchev never got past grade 10, if that, and Brezhnev had certainly never been to university. Now they have a generation that will not be willing and could not be brought to accept a return to the past. The only alternative is a military take-over and I don't think that is in the cards. The military are loyal party members, and are probably incapable of becoming political leaders. It is simply not in their genes. So I don't see any alternative to continuing change in the way Gorbachev is proceding, except that if he goes too fast, the others may turn against him and look for a more cautious leader. But they won't change direction. It is rather a matter of the pace of change, I think. They can't stop the young from wanting western life styles, and they can't stop communication with the outside world. So I guess it is a question of the kind of regime, whether--it is not going to be democratic in our sense--whether it will continue to tolerate opposition or not, and whether it will be prepared to make the changes in economic organization which lead to greater productivity. I think the Soviet people will support any leader who will be able to give them the kinds of things they expect, which is a standard of living that is in some sense comparable to ours. Right now, it is about half our standard of living and, given the high standards of education they have--they will not tolerate or accept the continuing lack of the most basic resources. You can't buy a decent pair of shoes in Moscow. You can't eat meat more than three or four times a week. Unless they can get their economic system to work, who knows, they might go all the way for some kind of free enterprise.

[HILL] Even if it was done in a limited degree, there is plenty of room for change there. How do you think that NATO should respond to whatever is going on in the Soviet Union?

[PEARSON] Well, I've said that we should follow a policy of constructive engagement, a term first used by the Reagan administration about South Africa. If we show ourselves willing to trade with them and to communicate and to exchange people and so on, their borders may begin to open, they will allow more innovation and they won't put people in prison for political views. Gradually, we may be able to affect the pace of change inside the Soviet Union by the policies that we follow. That means first of all turning back the arms race in some way. They have offered ideas and are certainly willing to compromise. We have to accept that they are not the enemy in the old sense, just as we've accepted this about China; to deal with them as people. New weapons systems and everything which leads to greater military competition between us and the Soviet Union will tend

to block that. I put arms control and arms agreements at the top of the list of the process of engaging them on all fronts. They are also talking about converting the ruble; they want to join the IMF, and once they convert the ruble there is no reason why they can't. We should pursue common enterprises of all kinds: space, the oceans, the Arctic, and so on. I think there is a chance of constructive co-operation in all these kinds of ways. Gorbachev says that he wants the USSR to become an exporter of wheat again. In that case, there are other kinds of things we could do in common. But all these possibilities could be blocked by political developments in Eastern Europe: if Poland or East Germany, etc. reject the system imposed on them, the opportunities for détente would disappear. There is no way, no matter what Gorbachev does or whatever the leadership is, that they will allow, in the foreseeable future, the countries of Eastern Europe to become allies of the West.

[HILL] It puts a particular onus on the West, also, to make sure that the situation in Europe as a whole is managed as well as possible. In the past, when there were explosions, the ones who suffered the most were the peoples of Eastern Europe.

[PEARSON] Well, I think they continue to fear that Eastern Europe will try to go its own way.

[HILL] I wonder if you'd like to say a brief word about Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe and towards Germany.

[PEARSON] One of the keys to change in Soviet policy is their capacity or ability to overcome their fear of a united Germany, allied to the West. I don't think there's any way they will accept that now. They have to allow a certain amount of creative freedom in Eastern Europe simply to prevent further revolt, and on our part we have to be careful not to encourage Eastern Europeans and particularly East Germans to believe that they can, in a sense, join the Western alliance, whatever form it has. The Soviet Union would then, I think, abandon all co-operation with the West, and re-arm, and we would be back where we were in 1950. The management of the process of change in Eastern Europe is the key to the future of East/West relations. We must avoid the mistake of appearing to want Eastern Europe to become part of the West, and encourage, rather a process of non-alignment, of Finlandization, that is internal freedom but external constraints. That would serve our purposes and serve their purposes. They have accepted Finland; there is no pressure on Finland in regard to its internal policies. Indeed the Communist party in Finland is losing ground rapidly. They have accepted Austria, and I see no reason why, in the long run, they couldn't accept a quite different system in Eastern Europe.

[HILL] What about the attitude of the Soviet military? Jonathan Dean, a former US ambassador to the MBFR negotiations, remarked in an article two or three years ago that an MBFR agreement could be completed in a matter of months, provided that the Russians could be reassured about the situation in Poland, or reassure themselves perhaps, and also provided that the Soviet military was willing to accept some reductions; he clearly saw the Soviet military being a major problem here. But do you think that is the case? Will Gorbachev and people like him be able to persuade the Soviet military to accept arms control deals in Eastern Europe?

[PEARSON] I think the party is willing to compromise, and the military will have to go along. They will draw the line at deep reductions in the Soviet armed forces, say a 50 percent reduction. I don't think they will accept that (I'm talking of troops, not of nuclear weapons). But anything other than that I think they could accept, provided they believe that the West was not a threat to their security, and they would have to be convinced of that. For example, if the United States withdrew its forces from Europe, and the German army was under some form of constraint in terms

of numbers, I see no reason why the Soviet military would not withdraw from Eastern Europe. They have no particular reason to be there, except in the sense that they fear attack, and would prefer to defend their country outside their borders. The big nightmare is that they would have again to defend their country inside their borders. But if they could be convinced that there was no great threat to their security--then I see no reason why they shouldn't agree to disarm up to a point.

[HILL] So, for example, just to take one instance, that of East Germany, where the Soviets have 20 divisions, if you get something comparable in the west, would the Soviets be prepared to cut their forces there, do you think?

[PEARSON] People have argued that they keep those forces in Eastern Europe to control the Eastern Europeans, but I personally think that is not the primary reason for them being there. The primary reason is for defence against attack, or forward defence. They want to prevent any attack on their homeland by defending themselves as far west as they can. And if they were satisfied that this was no longer a threat, then they would withdraw.

[HILL] How would they then control Eastern Europe?

[PEARSON] I think they are prepared to accept the Findlandization of Eastern Europe over time. Now that may be optimistic, but I think it is worth exploring.

Part VI - General

[HILL] One last question: is there any last comment you would like to make about Canadian policy in NATO, and on the role of NATO in Canadian policy?

[PEARSON] Originally, I think, our objectives were to bring the United States into an alliance with Europe so as to share up Western Europe which everybody thought was about to collapse. Obviously that has been accomplished. NATO did not develop then into an Atlantic Community, but it has developed habits of political consultation. It could become a <u>purely</u> political alliance, for purposes of consultation and co-operation, provided that relations with the Soviet Union remain relatively stable. Whether it could survive as such, I don't know. But I think we could live with that, and it would enable us to do other things, such as help the UN in its peace-making tasks, do our share of the defences of the continent, etc..

In the long run that would be our best posture. Certainly, from a military point of view, it makes little sense in my view for Canada to have forces stationed permanently in Europe; they contribute very little, they are expensive; and they distort our defence priorities. So I think we could live with a non-military NATO, though whether that is a feasible concept I don't know. I think it's something we might work towards, and if relations with the Soviet Union continue to improve, then I think it's something that might become feasible.

[HILL] Well, thank you very much indeed.

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ROBERT CAMERON

[HILL] Good morning. Our guest today is Ambassador Robert Cameron, former Assistant Under-Secretary of State, and Canada's representative to Poland and a number of other East European countries. Ambassador Cameron, we are very pleased that you can be with us this morning and that you have agreed to participate in this project.

[CAMERON] For my part I am very glad to participate. I have always been a strong supporter of NATO and I feel that it still has a very valuable role to play in terms of Canadian foreign policy.

[HILL] Ambassador Cameron, as you know, what we are engaged in at the present is an oral history of Canadian Policy in NATO. We are examining the development of Canadian foreign policy since 1945, and trying to obtain some insights into Canadian approaches to international peace and security, especially in the field of East-West relations. We are focussing on NATO and on NATO-related issues.

[CAMERON] I understand.

[HILL] Ambassador Cameron, just to make some further comments about the main thrust of this project, it is of course aimed at examining the role of NATO in Canadian foreign policy and in Canada's efforts to pursue its foreign policy goal of international peace and security. So we will be very interested in your views on issues which arose when you were working directly on NATO affairs, for example when you were head of the NATO and North American Division of the Department of External Affairs in 1969. But we are also keen to have your views on developments in areas which might be described as NATO-related. By this I mean when you were working on questions dealing with relations with Eastern Europe, for example, during the 1970's when you held a series of ambassadorial posts there. Ambassador Cameron, the way we would like to approach these two interviews is to examine your career in a series of phases. Part I will deal with the early phase up to 1947, Part II will briefly consider your early service with the Department of External Affairs from 1947-1958, Part III will deal with the years from 1958-1968 when you were serving in Ottawa, Washington and Bonn. Part IV will consider your work in the years from 1969-1974 when you were firstly head of the North American Division of the Department, and then Director General of the Bureau of Defence and Arms Control Affairs; and I believe in that same position you were the External Affairs Representative on the Permanent Joint Board of Defence.

[CAMERON] On two occasions in fact, two separate occasions.

[HILL] Part V will deal with the years when you served as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria which was in 1974-1977. In Part VI we will deal with the years from 1978-1980 when you were Ambassador to Poland and the German Democratic Republic and in Part VII we will examine your service during the years 1981-1983 when you were Assistant Under-Secretary of State with responsibility for the Bureau of International Security Policy and Arms Control Affairs. Of course I am aware of one or two other aspects of your career: for example, when you were Diplomat in Residence at the University of British Columbia from 1977-1978 and I think afterwards you had a similar posting to the University of Toronto. We will try to work some reflections from

⁴ Interviewers: Hill, Pawelek. Interview dates: 4/5/87 and 6/5/87.

those periods into the discussion as we work through the different issues in a more or less chronological order.

[CAMERON] That is fine.

Part I - Early Years, to 1947

[HILL] Ambassador Cameron, the purpose of this particular section is to give some idea of your own background.

[CAMERON] I studied law at the University of Toronto, at the School of Law which was under the direction of Professor W.P.M. Kennedy who was a noted authority on constitutional law. During the summers, to assist with the cost which my widowed mother could ill afford, I worked at a variety of jobs, deck hand on a lake boat, bell boy at a hotel, etc.. Like many of my colleagues at the time, I received my law degree on Active Service. Having served in the Officers Training Corps, I was eligible to compete for a commission as a junior officer in Her Majesty's Canadian Forces. I trained at Gordon Head, B.C. and from there I went to a number of other training camps, and for a number of reasons I ended up probably training in more branches of the Canadian Armed Forces than any other officer at the time. Eventually I ended up in the infantry and when I went overseas, I trained again at a battle drill school in Southern England, and I arrived on the continent just at the end of the war, and was posted to a regiment called the Essex Scottish which had had a very bad time at Dieppe, lost most of their men. I was with the Essex Scottish in Germany for about four months for the most part looking after surrendered German troops. Faced with the prospect of staying longer in Germany with the army of occupation, I chose the option of volunteering to join the Canadian troops being sent to fight the Japanese. We were sent back to Canada, had all our innoculations to fight in the jungle, including malaria shots and everything, and then something happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the war was over. I went back to University and I decided that I would not go into law. Having been abroad and having travelled a lot, I decided that law, sitting in one place in Toronto in the lawyer's office, was not my cup of tea, so enrolled as a M.A. student in Political Economy, under Professor Dawson. He was an exceptionally stimulating professor and I enjoyed very much working under his guidance as an instructor with one of his graduate seminars. I continued these studies until the early spring of 1947, when having passed the External Affairs entrance examination, I accepted their offer of employment at the huge sum of \$2,700 per annum!

Part II - 1947-58

[HILL] So that really leads us then to Part II, which is your early career in the Department. You joined the Department in 1947 and you served first in Ottawa like everybody else, I suppose, who joins the Department; and then you were in Havana from 1948 to 1950.

[CAMERON] There is something in there that is not mentioned in my CV and that is that my first appointment in the Department, having been there, I guess, a total of six months or maybe a year, I was sent to New York to the United Nations to be Secretary, which is a demanding job, of the Canadian delegation to the Economic and Social Council. My knowledge of the subject matter was not very great, I can assure you, but it was an introduction to the conference. I was there for three months in the summer and in those days there were no facilities like we have now. The meetings were outside the city at Lake Success, in a factory that was built during the war, with air-conditioning which was designed to cool the building when they had machines going. To survive, all the women translators were fur coats. Paul Martin was the Minister of Health and

Welfare and Head of the Delegation; George Davidson, his Deputy, was number two, and Arnold Smith was number three. We had travelled all the way out to Lake Success every day in a taxi and then sat all day in this freezing temperature. At night we went back into New York and sweltered in the hotel where there was no air conditioning. July and August, I guess it was nearly two and one-half months. That in effect was my introduction to an international conference.

[HILL] That was after you joined the Department?

[CAMERON] Yes, I had been in only four months. In those days you were trained on the job; you were given a desk and a pile of things to do all of which required action and you had to get busy. Or if you went to a conference, you knew nothing about the background at all, virtually nothing. You had to read it up when you were there and then you had to write a report.

[HILL] Well, you went from there to Havana?

[CAMERON] I learned about Havana from a guy called Mr. Mike Pearson who in addition to being our Under-Secretary played first base on our departmental soft ball team. I was one of the pitchers. I was just married and luckily had found a nice little apartment in Sandy Hill. I was going the to the East Block one morning and Mr. Pearson was on the streetcar with me. In the course of the conversation, he said "I hear you are going to Cuba". I coughed a few times and said "No sir, I really have not heard anything about that", and he said "There must be some mistake, you know there have been so many postings lately that I must be mixed up". He was the Under-Secretary. And when I got off the streetcar I immediately went to my boss Gerry Riddell and I told him about my conversation with Mr. Pearson and he said "Yes, Bob, I am sorry to tell you that that is true. We did not like to tell you because, you know, there have been so many cases of postings been announced then, at the last minute they had to change it". "So", he said, "but if you want to confirm it you can phone up the head of Personnel." So I phoned up old Terry McDermitt, who was covered with embarrassment but confirmed the decision which meant giving up our apartment and leaving for Cuba in about six weeks. That is just the way things worked in those days.

[HILL] It was a much smaller Department.

[CAMERON] It was a smaller Department and everybody knew each other I suppose, but on the other hand Administration was not its strong point and it never has been.

[CAMERON] Havana in those days was, how shall I say, a very agreeable first post. It was like very many Latin American countries, there are the haves and the have-nots, and the haves were the minority and the have-nots were the majority. But we never had the feeling that the have-nots were suffering very greatly because of the nature of the climate, and the very fertile nature of the country. It was a country which was then going through, the second so-called democratic regime of President Prio Socarras, who was the second elected President after the World War II. During World War II the man in charge was Fulgencio Batista, who was the real authoritarian strong man in traditional Latin American fashion. During the time we were there it was Prio. We had good relations with the Cubans. It was a period, I would not call it of turmoil in the political sense, but there was a certain amount of unrest among the workers, particularly the sugar workers. There was a Communist party, not a very strong one. Most of our problems were in a sense reporting general conditions in the country, bilateral relations. There was a large contingent of Canadians in Havana which was an important centre in the Caribbean for Canadian banks, insurance companies and businesses. Canadians had a very good reputation. The Cubans did not trust their own government and they did not like to put their money with the Americans so they put their money in Canadian

banks and insurance companies which did very well. There was a big Canadian colony there, bigger than the British. There also was a very large American contingent but Canadians were very well regarded. And of course the Canadian Trade Commission had been there long before we had opened the Legation. There had been trade relations with Cuba going way back before the Department of External Affairs was established. As a first post, Havana was very agreeable. It was interesting, and involved a new language. At first we used to speak what we called "Spench", which was, Quebecois French with a Spanish ending. And the Cuban's used to say, "muy bien". Talk about language training, one week in Havana was worth three months in some language school. You really had to communicate in Spanish, you could not use English. And you had to read the papers; there was no translation. We had a translator but it was a hopeless kind of translation as he did not know how to write English.

[HILL] It had nothing to do with East-West relations at that time?

[CAMERON] It was more bilateral, and in terms of the work, there was quite a bit of consular stuff. For example, some of the consular work involved looking after seamen, visiting them in jail, etc.. There was a fair amount of that. But you had to do, as you did in those days, practically everything. If the officer from Trade and Commerce was away we had to do the trade work, or if I was away he would do our work.

[HILL] From there you came back to Ottawa and you went into the European and Economic Divisions. Was any of that involved with work with NATO?

[CAMERON] Yes. The most interesting period at that time involved the question of German entry into NATO. I remember John Halstead was my equivalent in the NATO Division, and I was on the German desk, of all things, having just come from Cuba. I remember, we had to work on the resolution presented to parliament where there was a debate on German entry into NATO. We also had to prepare reports on the situation for Parliament, for committees and for the Minister's statements; there was a long process which led up to the eventual resolution endorsing the admission of Germany to NATO. Each country, including Canada, had to go through this process. There was quite a debate in the House on the issue. I was involved on the European side, but a lot of the work was done by the people in the NATO Division. We had to prepare a lot of memoranda on the German attitudes and look after all the telegrams and the documents that came in from our Embassy in Bonn.

[HILL] Well, that is a sort of very exciting period in ..

[CAMERON] It was very, very interesting. For example, there was the related, politically sensitive question of German rearmament. I did have a little bit of knowledge of the background as I had been in Germany for four months at the end of the war and I'd read a good deal about those issues. It was a very active period, with long, long hours devoted among other things to the preparation of reports for Parliament and its committees. They had more debates on foreign policy in those days than they do now in the House.

[HILL] That was the whole period of the French assembly rejecting the European Defence Community, the negotiation of the London and paris agreements, etc..

It is interesting that you mention the parliamentary aspect of this, because my impression is that there was very little dissension in Parliament about the modification of the treaties that brought Germany in. Isn't that so?

[CAMERON] Well, I think that's probably true. My recollection is not very clear, but I think that probably there was little dissension, but there was a lot of looking at it from a bureaucratic point of view and briefing the Minister. But I do not recall, having not always gone regularly to the House, how much opposition there was. I think a lot of the Members probably did not understand the issue. The document before the House was very complex and to study it carefully took a lot of time. I do not think the average Member probably had the time, and probably few of them were aware of all its implications.

[HILL] It was not very long after the war really, so the average Canadian, many of them....

[CAMERON] The CCF, as I recall, was very strongly opposed to the rearmament of Germany; but I just do not remember how much full discussion there was. We prepared a lot of material for the debate which, I think, lasted at least a day.

[HILL] Would you say that NATO served the interests of Canadian foreign policy well in that period, I mean as regards bringing Germany in and so on?

[CAMERON] To the extent that Canadian foreign policy is served by the maintenance of international stability and especially East-West stability, I think that this action was very much required at the time. Certainly the perception on this side of the Atlantic, and I think in Europe, was that the Soviet Union had not done anything in the way of reducing its huge forces which had been mobilized during the war, had done nothing to alleviate any concern about their expansionist aims; and the events of 1948 in Czechoslovakia served to reinforce these fears. I think if you look at it in retrospect, I do not think there was really any other option open to the allies. I think that the reconstruction of Germany was a remarkable event if you compare it with what happened to Germany after World War I. To my mind, it was a sign of real statesmanship that the United States was prepared to take the lead in allowing the Germans to build up their economy, and not to impose upon them the kind of sanctions that were imposed after the First World War. And the German attempt to introduce democracy, I mean in West Germany, has been successful. I do not think that would have been possible had they not been required to have their own forces. I think that the Germans were a bit ambivalent about this; I was in Bonn later and I do not think - certainly the young people were not happy about it. Your impression is probably the same Roger, they were not happy about being in the forces, you know, it is not something they look forward to at all. It was a real pain. And there is always the worry in the back of many people's minds that they might sometimes become aggressive again. My own view was that it was a positive development. There were a lot of worries at the time, I grant you that.

[HILL] But you do not think there was any prospect of pushing, for German reunification, as a neutralized country?

[CAMERON] Yes, there were, and there were a number of proposals. I remember in 1955 there was a conference in Geneva, a couple of conferences in Geneva, for German reunification on the basis of free elections and this became almost a subject that got kind of boring, because they put it forward so many times. But the Communist system does not work on the basis of free elections, and there was no way that the Soviets were going to accept a freely elected government in Germany. The experience in Poland showed that their idea of freedom, and free elections, was quite different from ours. And there were a number of proposals; I can remember preparing various proposals. Canada was not shy about putting forward proposals about Berlin and a unified Germany; there were all kinds of ideas floating around.

[HILL] And they were put forward inside NATO?

[CAMERON] Yes, inside. I am getting ahead of myself a bit but there were some put forward later on in the 50's, and I think if you talked to another person that was involved in this, Professor Peyton Lyon at Carleton University, he was doing the German desk later when I was on the NATO side. He was very active in many of these areas and there were all kinds of ideas floating around, some of them having Germany as a sort of a neutral along the lines of Austria. It would be guaranteed by the four powers, the big boys, and there would be an elected government on the basis of free elections. It seemed clear that the Soviets would never go for that but at one point they actually came very close.

[HILL] It was not from want of trying, then?

[CAMERON] No, no.

[HILL] It was not that the West approached this thing in a fossilized way?

[CAMERON] No, that was not my impression. No I think there were a lot of people that probably were kind of cynical about the proposition of a unified Germany on the basis of free elections. The problem is that the kind of system they have in Eastern Europe just does not allow for any dissent. To introduce plurality into such a system just would not work.

[HILL] It is interesting. Thinking back on that period, I remember the night that word came through that the French Assembly had rejected the European Defence Community. It was a big event.

[CAMERON] And those French fears are still alive today you know, I think.

[HILL] About the whole question of ...?

[CAMERON] Well, you have heard the old French joke about Germany. They loved the Germans so much they would like to continue to have two Germanies. And it is true. Now that may be disappearing as the young French people meet the young Germans, they travel more, and still it is way down deep inside, it is part of the French psyche, how they feel.

[HILL] A lot of things seemed to happen in that 1945-55 period, but nonetheless already by 1955 one was into a different kind of a world, somehow, from the immediate post war period. To many people in Canada, this was a kind of golden age of Canadian foreign policy and security policy. Canada was a strong member of NATO and pursued some very effective diplomacy, I think. Then in 1956 there was the Suez crisis, and Lester Pearson inventing peace-keeping. One keeps coming across this phrase: The "Golden Age of Canadian Diplomacy." How would you see it? Would you see it in those terms?

[CAMERON] Well, I would put it somewhat differently. I think to me it was a time when Canada played a very active role commensurate with our position as one of the larger, one of the bigger, participants in World War II. I mean I think it flowed from the fact that we had a very large part in it, bigger than we ever had, after World War I. We had a big part to play in things, a fairly big part for a smaller country, in the post-war settlement; and combined with that we had a number of people, Escott Reid, Lester Pearson, and Gerry Riddell was another one that you do not even hear

about anymore because he died prematurely from overwork, and St. Laurent, before this period you are talking about, who were very active. And Canada played a big role in bringing NATO into existence, a big role, and this is what makes me so mad when I hear someone like Gwynne Dyer talking about how Canada was dragged in by the Americans. The Americans were the ones who did not want to get involved in a lot of this. Anyway, no I think that there was a combination of circumstances plus a very active and able group of people who were dedicated and, not only dedicated but very competent at negotiation, at reporting a whole series of things. We were able to play at that time a much greater role than the size of our country would normally warrant. Whether you call it the Golden Age of Diplomacy, I do not know, but I think it began right at the end of the War with the people like George Ignatieff and Escott Reid and Lester Pearson. I remember Norman Robertson was another unusual person, very unusual; he had a remarkable mind. He could apply the experience on GATT, the rules of GATT, to the disarmament negotiationsthis kind of thing. Unbelievable, and he would come up with these ideas which were incredible. But he had heavy responsibilities as Under-Secretary with enormous piles of things to deal with, piled up in baskets on his desk. But he also had, we found out later, a technique for dealing with problems when he could not make up his mind. In those days they had those swivel chairs with a little pad on the seat. The story I recall about him was that he would stack the papers relating to those problems under the pad on his seat. Later, when he moved out of his office in the East Block, they found a pile of memoranda, a thick wad of really complicated problems whose importance appeared to have diminished with the passage of time. Another key player was our former Ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney, who was there when I was posted to that city. All these were exceptional people and very influential. At that time there was an unusually strong group of civil servants who have written about by Professor Granatstein in his book "The Mandarins." I do not think he coloured his account of what was going on.

[HILL] Perhaps one of the most important things that Canada did in this period was to help to keep the United States involved with the world, and not go back to isolation as in the previous periods. It is not just the bilateral relationship between Canada and US that is important.

[CAMERON] No, I agree.

[CAMERON] The role we played in Washington in that period was much greater than most people are aware of, I think, because of the influence of individuals. Of course, it was a smaller world in those days.

[HILL] The influence that Canada exerted on the United States at that time was not so much related to the bilateral relationship? [CAMERON] No.

[HILL] It was more in world affairs.

[CAMERON] That is right, and I think that was because it was reinforced by the fact that we were more of a player on the global scene than we are now in the security sense. Sure we play a lot of roles in other things, but proportionately we had a greater role to play then by virtue of our war time operations.

[HILL] One point that John Holmes brought out, which I had never really been aware of, is the fact that on the economic side, particularly in the immediate post-war period, it was Canada that helped maintain the British economy with a major loan. That has been almost forgotten these days.

[CAMERON] That is coming out in the documents which they are going through right now.

[HILL] It was Canada's help that was critical. Britain was in state of near-bankruptcy.

[CAMERON] The British economy was in great difficulty, that is right. There was a lot of help given to Britain then.

[HILL] So, that sort of thing meant that Canada had a major role in international affairs.

[CAMERON] On these kinds of issues, which are not issues that touched the headlines often, but have a lot of influence with people in charge, in positions of authority.

[HILL] Do you have any further comments on that period?

[CAMERON] I remember Robert Ford. He was the another key player. He played a very key role in those days.

[HILL] But in terms of Canada's relations with NATO in that period, are there any other comments?

[CAMERON] Well, I cannot think of anything else. I guess the event that comes to mind so sharply is the admission of Germany to NATO, and the problems involved in the German re-armament. The question of Berlin was the key question and still is, and the attitude of the allies to Germany, the admission of Germany to NATO. Those problems preoccupied us - almost every day - and the Canadian attitude towards them. There was a certain amount of opposition, and I think it was mostly in the CCF. But there were also SPD people in the German parliament, who in those days were somewhat ambivalent about German re-armament. But I think Adenauer did command substantial support even outside his own party and was able to get the proposition through, and that was by no means a simple matter, getting it through the Bundestag.

We also had in those days something that we do not have now. We used to have a daily briefing group preparing intelligence for the Chiefs of Staff in the Department of National Defence. I was the External Affairs guy on the group. There were three people from the Services, a fellow from the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB), and myself from External; we would do a short report every day on the main issues of interest. We would get into the greatest arguments with the guys in DND and they of course would have their own perspective about the world and what was happening in the world. So we got what you might call a world view from an intelligence standpoint in that job. It was interesting and I did that for about a year and one-half before I joined the European Division and became immersed in German problems.

[HILL] When you were doing intelligence work, did I understand you to say that US estimates were generally much exaggerated, or some of them were?

[CAMERON] Well, I think a lot of them were, particularly those dealing with China. The Americans used to argue that Red China was part of the Communist bloc. Like the British empire in the old days, the bloc was coloured in red and covered most of the world. We argued that China could not be regarded in those simplistic terms. China had its own aims, although clearly there was a close association with the Soviets. But they had basic problems which were a source of division. In hindsight, our position really was borne out by events. I guess we went to Washington a couple of times and used to have what they called joint estimates. We used to have long arguments on that

issue. We never got agreement. And of course I think they did not want to get agreement. The Americans regarded Communist China as being one of the bad boys like Nicaragua today. I mean, they have blinkers on and they do not want to look at them; there are no greys often, it is black or white. Reagan is a good example of that. It is nothing new with the Americans.

[HILL] Well, I know that when we did the parliamentary report on security and disarmament, one of the crucial issues there was to put in two different sets of estimates of the world military situation, because you could not simply get agreement in the committee on one set.

[CAMERON] That is right, we had two different estimates.

[HILL] And the information you take is basic, it tends to govern a lot of the rest of your thinking.

[CAMERON] And then later we had the same kind of problem on the bomber gap. You remember that.

[HILL] Yes, that is right.

[CAMERON] So it is not a new phenomenon. I just thought that would be relevant.

[HILL] I would just like to finish up with the period when, from 1955 to 1958, you were in Stockholm. That was a period when East - West relations were undergoing a great deal of change, in the sense that de-Stalinization was going further and further ahead; it had started in 1953. Then of course there were the Polish troubles, which brought Gomulka to power, and then the Hungarian crisis. And there was a continuing problem with Germany and Berlin I think, plus then there was the Suez Crisis. That of course was all somewhat to the south of where you were in Stockholm. But what was the state of the security situation in Scandinavia while you were there. Were the Scandinavians involved in thinking about NATO at that time?

[CAMERON] Not very much. Well, first of all, most Scandinavians were isolationists during World War I. Norway was not involved, they were neutral, the Swedes were out. The Swedes were not involved in the last war; the Norwegians were directly involved, but the Swedes were involved to the extent that they looked after their own interests, you know. The feeling between the Norwegians and the Swedes when we were there was very strong. Norway would not forgive the Swedes for allowing the Germans to go through their country and up into the North. There was a lot of antipathy between the two; at least that was my impression in those days and I think it still exists to this day. The feeling persists that Norwegians fought during the war and the Swedes made money and allowed the Germans to go through their country into Norway, and they sold iron ore to feed Hitler's war machines. The Swedish factories prospered. My impression of Sweden is that Sweden looks on itself and is regarded by a lot of the Norwegians in the same way as the United States is regarded by people in this part of the world. They are regarded as the wealthiest, the most prosperous, and so on. Although Stockholm is not exactly the centre of the world, the Swedes tend to look on it as such. In a way, Scandinavia is kind of a world apart. And the Swedes like to run things; and they tend to look on Finland as their protectorate. The Swedes are very proud of their history. Apparently the word "Russia" came from the Swedish word "Rus". Back in the late middle ages, the Swedes conquered most of the territory which is now the Russian Republic of the USSR. The Swedish museums are full of things that they brought back from that part of the world. So, they sort of look on themselves as the big guys in Scandinavia. As for the Soviets, they do not like them. They still look upon them as their traditional enemy. Sweden has its own little defence force which is quite remarkable for the size of the country. The whole population is about 7

million. They have prosperous and efficient industries. They build their own airplanes, and in addition to Volvos they are now selling cars in Canada that are built by the Swedish aircraft company, "SAAB". They are a remarkable people but I never got the impression that Sweden was a world player in the sense of being involved in a lot of these East - West issues. They were involved in the UN. Their big player was the Secretary General of the United Nations. That kind of role when Hammarskjöld was around in those days, was their focus. The UN was their focus. The role that they played in the humanitarian side, the role that they played through Hammarskjöld was their international focus. They were interested in, but marginally involved in, the other East-West issues. What they really liked to talk to you about was what they were doing on the UN Commission in Korea. We were on the Commission in Korea at that time so they were interested in talking about that. They would be interested, they would tell you a bit about their problems with the Soviets, you know they did not have submarines in those days, but they had problems of that kind. They had the perennial question of the Swedish diplomat that disappeared during the war -Wallenberg. They had a number of issues like that. They had a few bilateral questions with Canada that were quite important. There were a lot of Swedish investments in Canada, a lot of money in shipping and investments in pulp and paper on the West coast; that whole bilateral relationship has grown enormously since those days. There are a number of areas where we have a very considerable common interest with Sweden.

[HILL] So that was the focus of your work, you were not really working on NATO-related issues.

[CAMERON] No, not really, no. Although it was useful for me to have this background. We had as our Minister, Jean Chapdelaine, you may have known him.

[HILL] No.

[CAMERON] This was his first position as Head of Mission. His predecessor was a man called Matthews, and he left just after we arrived and I was in charge for about three or four months, and then Chapdelaine took over. He was also accredited to Finland. And the other thing about the Swedes is that they are very pre-occupied with what the Soviets do vis-à-vis Finland. Finland is part, they considered it as almost like a protectorate, and the Finns get very annoyed with this paternalistic attitude of the Swedes. Finland is a bilingual country and the traditional ruling classes in Finland are Swedes, who are a minority.

[HILL] Still about 10 per cent of the population.

[CAMERON] They used to compare it to Montreal with the French Canadians and the English, there is a similarity. But, no, I would not say that East-West relations loomed very large. We were fairly busy. Because the Minister would tootle off to Finland, I would be in charge and have to run everything, including the information program. There was one other officer who was a Commercial Secretary and I would do his work when he was away and he would do my work when I was on holidays. You had a very full platter of stuff to do, apart from being Chargé; and the Swedes, as I say, were very good to deal with in the sense that when you went down they would ask you "What do you want to talk about?". And they would give you more than what you wanted to know, more than you had time to write down. You did not send telegrams in those days. You had to write it all down, you know, and complete it with the formal ending: "I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant."

I do not know if that is very relevant, but it is kind of another world in Scandinavia. They are northern people, they have a number of problems similar to Canada, but they are very, in a sense, distant; related to US politically mostly through the UN.

Part III - Ottawa, Washington and Bonn, 1958-68

[HILL] Ambassador Cameron, in 1958 you joined the Defence Liaison Division in Ottawa and then you went to the Embassy in Washington as Counsellor for Political Affairs for a further four year period. This was a very important period in Canadian-American defence relations and also in Alliance relations, for example in respect of the problem of the control of nuclear weapons. I wonder if you could tell us something about the development of Canadian-American defence relations in this period, especially relating to NORAD and also to the question of equipping the Canadian Armed Forces with nuclear weapons. I am wondering what kind of impact did Canada's policies on the nuclear weapons issue have on its standing and influence in NATO for example. This is in the period after 1958; I think it was to about 1962.

[CAMERON] Would you like me to mention the Canada-USA side first.

[HILL] Yes, if you would like to. This period after 1958 was the period that NORAD was established, wasn't it?

[CAMERON] Yes. I am just trying to get the events in sequence. These are as they come to my mind but they may not be accurate in terms of the precise dates. I can mention a bit about the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Department of External Affairs, which I think was very germane to this whole business because, there was in 1958 as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff a man called General Charles Foulkes, who was a very, very shall we say, intelligent, influential, unusual member of the Services, very conservative in his outlook, as many members of the Forces tend to be, but also very much, as we say 'he played his cards close to his chest'. I think without doing him an injustice my recollection is that he tended to give Ministers what he thought Ministers should have, and thought that the members of the Forces, who were conscious of the security aspects, security in the sense of military aspects of various weapon systems, they should deal with that and the Ministers would have less interest in some of the different types of equipment. The actual decision on NORAD, I think, was taken just before I joined the Division. The officer who was dealing with this, if I remember, was Jim McCardle. I did the NATO side, that is the things that were going on in NATO, and I was only indirectly involved at that particular period in the arrangements concerned with North American defence. So, there was a whole series of things, there was the question of the NORAD Agreement, the question of the over-flights by SAC aircraft, the Bases Agreement, Argentia, all these issues where I think your best source would be Jim McCardle. On the NATO side, I think the issue that stands out in my mind was the equipment of the air division with the CF 104s, which was in 1959. There was very little said in any of the papers we got from National Defence about the role the aircraft would have or the kind of weapons it would use. I remember doing a memorandum for the Minister in which I brought out the fact that the aircraft was expected to have a nuclear-strike role which would have a number of important implications. While we were not involved in the Cabinet meeting I had the impression that the equipment issue was not considered very carefully or that the Ministers were aware that the aircraft would be carrying nuclear weapons. My recollection is that this aspect of the decision did not appear to weigh heavily in the minds of the people who had to make the decision and it was not widely advertised by DND. It was typical of the way the government operated in those days. The Department of National Defence ran their shop, they tended to keep all these things to themselves. They would say: "We are the airmen, and we know

best what is required." They did not provide any more information than they thought was necessary without actually hiding it.

[HILL] When the Diefenbaker government came in, I think it was initially in 1957, and then in 1958, the government was more or less presented with the NORAD Agreement and asked to sign on the dotted line, which it more or less did. And it relates a bit to the CF 104 as well, and to the Honest John in Europe. What happened then, as far as I understand it, what happened is that the government at that time took these decisions which were presented to it by DND. It did not go through a careful analysis, and what Canada wound up with was a NORAD Agreement which was not related to NATO, or at least it was in a vague sort of way but certainly without the kind of consultative procedures there are in NATO. Plus, then, Canada acquired the CF-104 with the nuclear role and also the Honest John but in fact without nuclear warheads. The Avro Arrow was scrapped in this time, and Canada got the Bomarc, but it did not acquire the warheads.

[CAMERON] Yes, there were separate agreements necessary for the warheads.

[HILL] Some people argue that this was just another case of the government's indecision.

[CAMERON] I know that there are lot of people who say NORAD should be closer to NATO and that consultations should be more in tune with the NATO side. I am aware of that, but I think you also have to accept the fact there has been too much written into the NORAD Agreement. The NORAD Agreement essentially was an attempt to integrate the North American air defence forces as a practical arrangement. The political side of it was not, in those days certainly, ever given a great deal of prominence or importance. There was at that time, the Canada-US Defence Committee which involved the Minister of Defence, the Minister of External Affairs and their counterparts in the United States. The Minister of Defence Production was also included because the defence production was an important part of our bilateral relationship. On the US side I think that was handled by the Secretary of Defense, because they did not have a Cabinet Minister responsible for defense production. Now this committee gradually, with the lack of, shall we say, rapport between the Diefenbaker crowd and the people in Washington, fell into disuse. But for a while, there were meetings held in this committee and I think that the tendency was to look on that--this is my recollection, it may be faulty--but I think there was a tendency to look on that as a kind of political consultative relationship, and NORAD was not. It was considered to be more of an integration of the air forces for the air defence of North America, which made sense, given the perception that the Soviet Union was developing a considerable bomber force which would have the capacity to attack SAC bases and other strategic points in North America, and that consequently, in fairiness to the people who were there at the time, it seemed to me there was not much thought given to the need for consultation in NORAD. But I think my own perception is, that the difficulties arose largely out of the separate worlds in which National Defence and External lived and because of the dissimilar attitudes of the officials and ministers involved. As I recall there was not much rapport or consultation between the departments. My experience in Washington was similar; the Pentagon was suspicious of the State Department--"a bunch of cookie pushers, those diplomats, what do they know about these problems. We are the guys who are on the front line." A little bit of that existed and still does today. Our defence people and senior officers are only beginning now to talk about arms control. The Americans are a long way ahead of us in this regard. A similar situation existed in the late fifties in Canada. On the ministerial side in DND you had George Pearkes who was a World War I hero who won the Victoria Cross. He was a very good soldier. He was the Minister of Defence and our Minister was Howard Green, I believe.

[CAMERON] Well, I can tell you something about Sidney. My recollection of Sidney Smith goes back to my time when I was in DLI division. The late Bruce Keith and I used to have to prepare papers for him because he was appearing before the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs which was discussing Berlin and Germany. Sidney Smith had been President of the University of Toronto and a prominent Rotarian and a very good speaker. We prepared for him a briefing paper which attempted to explain the Four-Power Agreements on Germany and Berlin. Have you ever read those documents?

[HILL] No.

[CAMERON] Well, the GATT Agreement is probably easy to comprehend compared to those very complex agreements. In any event, he went to the Committee in the House of Commons and he got absolutely hopelessly mixed up; instead of admitting his confusion to the Committee Chairman and turning the matter over to his officials, he went on and on and he got worse and worse. After the Committee was finished I remember Bruce Keith and I spent a couple of nights going over the manuscript of his remarks trying to correct it to make some sense out it. I also went to a meeting with Sidney Smith in NATO. It was my first experience at a NATO meeting and it was in Paris in the fall of 1958. Geoffrey Pearson was in the NATO Secretariat and Bill Barton was the head of our division in those days. That autumn there was a Berlin crisis, and you may recall the Soviets were threatening to prevent the American forces from having access to Berlin. John Foster Dulles was the Secretary of State and a very powerful, impressive guy. We sat up all one night practically until about three in the morning with Sidney Smith preparing a speech, because the next day was a very key NATO Council meeting. The question was that the Americans threatened to blast their way through with an armoured brigade, which would mean the fat would be in the fire. Sidney Smith looked over our draft and did not like it; he wanted to change this and that. I sat in at the Council meeting, where there was quite a heated debate about whether the Allies should use force to make sure that their rights of access to Berlin were protected.

[HILL] This was the time of the "free city", was it not?

[CAMERON] That is right. I remember that John Foster Dulles in the course of his statement. or maybe it was in the course of the discussion, implied that if the Soviets did not back down that they would maybe have to consider deploying the Strategic Air Command, the thing that everybody was trying to avoid. Sidney Smith had had a good statement prepared. He read about two paragraphs of it, pushed away his statement and in a very emotional voice said: "Mr. Chairman, Canada will not support this action that the Secretary of State is proposing. We hate nuclear weapons, Mr. Chairman, and we will not go along with this idea that John Foster Dulles is proposing". I remember his outburst very clearly. It is probably not in the record of the meeting because there was no formal record kept of this exchange. But what Dulles was saying, was part of American policy at the time. They had superiority in nuclear weapons and Dulles favoured using their superiority as a deterrent, a means of reinforcing their policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Sidney Smith, I suspect, was reflecting one aspect of the Canadian psyche which has always been anti-nuclear. I believe he interpreted Dulles' statement to mean that the USA was getting ready to start to use nuclear weapons unless the Soviets backed down. In any event, Sidney Smith was very, very emotional; I believe he died shortly afterwards. He seemed to be out of his depth and I have heard this from other people. He was a very fine man, but he just did not comprehend many of issues although he had a gut feeling about a lot of them.

[HILL] In fact then, what you had was people, like Sidney Smith in particular, and perhaps to some degree Howard Green later on, who had their own particular viewpoints. They were very worthy men, but they had difficulty dealing with some of these issues and particularly in relation to the Defence Department. The CF-104 seems to me a good example. The Air Force had very clear ideas that they wanted the CF-104.

[CAMERON] Oh sure, because as professional airmen, they wanted the best available which at the time was the CF-104. As I recall, the politician or the average Canadian did not understand that this aircraft was to take on a nuclear-strike role even though they were not designed for that kind of a role. The German Air Force had a terrible time with them. They later called it the widow-maker because of the number of crashes. But it was a high-performance aircraft, it was the Cadillac of the Air Force in those days, it really was.

[HILL] Canada had the CF-104 and the Honest John but did not have the nuclear warheads for them, and was not really able to do the nuclear role.

[CAMERON] But I think the explanation for that is very simple. Not only did you have this difference of view or attitude between the Defence people and the people in External, and the lack of personal rapport between Pearkes and Sidney Smith and between Harkness and Green, but you had Green as a champion of world disarmament. Howard Green was in World War I and like most people that have served in the forces during wartime, developed strong views about warfare. Unfortunately, he was naive when it came to the realities of disarmement. I think he was sincere but I think he was really naive. He was strongly in favour of general and complete disarmament, of everything dealing with disarmament to the point where I think his views did not reflect much sense of realism in discussions with people who were involved in the business. But I also think he saw disarmament to some extent in political terms as an issue popular among many Canadians especially on the West Coast.

[HILL] So what you have is some degree of confusion in Canada's policy towards NATO. What kind of impact did this have on Canada's role in NATO?

[CAMERON] Well, in this way. Howard Green believed that you could be sort of pure by not having anything to do with nuclear weapons. Therefore we gave serious consideration, and the Americans probably thought we were out of our minds, to an arrangement whereby the delivery systems (e.g., Bomarcs) would be stationed in Canada, but the warheads would be stored across the border and brought across the border when there was a crisis. And this included the warheads for the missiles to be installed on aircraft for air defence. I have forgotten the name, but today they have a conventional warhead which is better than the nuclear warhead in use in those days for the same purpose of shooting down bombers. In those days, the only missile they installed on an air defence aircraft was the one with a nuclear warhead. The philosophy seemed to be that if we kept the warheads down in Colorado Springs or somewhere in the US and had the missiles on the plane in Canada (it was the same with the Bomarc), we were "pure". Howard Green's position seemed to be that as soon as you brought the warheads into Canada, you became part of the nuclear club. He tended to see things in simplistic terms. On the other hand if we were really serious about it we should have told the Americans "No SAC bomber flights over Canada, no export of the uranium." Probably he did not want to annoy the Americans to that extent. To give him credit, I think that he really felt that it was getting us in the nuclear club if we had nuclear warheads in Canada, and that led to the crisis later on. I also remember that the Conservatives insisted that the US obtain approval every three weeks for overflights of Canada by SAC aircraft. A lot of people thought at the time that this lack of more generous advance authority for SAC implied a lack of confidence in SAC's role as the West's main deterrent. This was another part of the whole problem in that I do not think anybody in senior levels of the Canadian Government ever acknowledged SAC's role except possibly in the sense it was generally regarded as the "Sword" or nuclear deterrent with NATO's conventional forces being the "Shield". And as you know, the Americans did use the sword as a means of pressure on the Soviets during the period before the Soviets achieved nuclear parity. The Cuban missile crisis was the classic example of where the Soviets knew they were nuclear underdogs, and they backed down. The experience convinced the Soviets to build up then nuclear strength.

[HILL] And in your view, this ambivalence had a rather unfortunate impact on Canada, and on the perception of Canada within NATO?

[CAMERON] I do not know how it was looked on in NATO itself. It is a little difficult to just say NATO. I think some of the allies thought we were incredibly naive. I remember going to one NATO meeting and Howard Green spoke about the importance of dealing with the non-aligned and the developing world. He took up quite a bit of the time of the Council to tell them about his experience of sitting next to one of the African delegations in New York. I think it was the Cameroon delegate who impressed Howard Green very much. He then proceeded to lecture the Ministers about good will, and the importance of it in dealing with the developing countries, and using this as an example. He talked enthusiastically about his experience at the UN; many of Europeans, who regard themselves as pretty sophisticated, did not really think this was quite necessary for a Canadian Minister, who had only been in office for a year, to lecture the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, including the French Minister. I think it was the Frenchman who turned aside, and said something to the effect of, if Howard Green had been as long in Africa as he had, he would not talk that way about the Africans. In the view of many Europeans, Howard Green was seen as unsophisticated, naive, and a do-gooder. There was some puzzlement among the Europeans as to why Canada would have a Minister who was not only strong on disarmament and on peacekeeping but did not have much to say about security; indeed he seemed to be unrealistic and naive about security.

[HILL] So, between 1962 and 1966 you were in Washington? This was a crucial period in interallied relations because of the beginnings of the problem with France. You have this whole business of the MLF also. What was your impression of that period? Particularly, what was Canada's influence in Washington on NATO issues at this time?

[CAMERON] Again, it reflects the state of affairs in Ottawa. First of all we had the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, which I guess was the first big crisis. I can remember there was a real fear of nuclear war. People were stocking up on canned goods in the cellar. I do not think I have ever experienced anything like it since then. It was a real worry that the world was going to go up in flames, and you had a situation where the US government was acting in a way which kept all information in a tight little ball, restricted to two or three people in the Cabinet. The State Department did not know anything. Now maybe the Secretary of State did, but there was certainly no information around, about what was going on or what they were preparing. They knew the Soviets were putting in these missiles, because they had been watching Cuba for a long time. Soviet relations with the United States were bad; Krushchev thought Kennedy was a naive, Harvard Bostonian. He thought he could push him around because he had done that I think, in Vienna at the meeting before, and there was a very bad personal relationship between the two. At the same time, I do not think East-West relations were regarded as being at a critical point, and as a result none of the allies were informed of what was going on. This went on for two or three weeks resulting in a real build-up of tension. All kinds of people went down to try and pick up any little

bits of information, Charles Ritchie used to have lunch with various people, and everybody was trying to find out what was going on. The Ambassador, along with his NATO colleagues, was called in to the State Department an hour before Kennedy made his statement on television announcing what had happened, what they were going to do. The former US Ambassador to Canada, Livy Merchant, was sent to Ottawa as a special emissary with photographs of the deployment of the missile sites in Cuba. It all happened within hours, the whole thing, and then I guess the next thing that happened on the Canadian side was an announcement, I have forgotten exactly how it came out, but I think it has been recorded elsewhere many times, that Diefenbaker came out with a statement that said, in effect, that they ought to send the United Nations in to confirm the accuracy of these American photographs. That is what it sounded like in Washington, and of course this immediately implied that the Canadian Government did not really accept, at face value, the statement of the President of the United States, that the Soviets had deployed these missiles in Cuba. So you can imagine what kind of reaction the Americans had to that. And then related to that, was the question of them putting their air defence forces on a more advanced state of alert. You had the NORAD forces where you had the commander-in-chief of NORAD also the commander of US air defence forces. The same man wears two hats but I think I am right in saying that the US commander put their forces on what they call DEFCON 3, which is a high state of readiness, not the highest but a fairly high state, and that on the Canadian side, the Canadian Government did not take a similar decision. This is still a matter of debate; what action was taken by Canada. I was in Washington so I was not involved. The point I am making is that this was another source of more than irritation for the Americans. First, the statement by the Prime Minister of Canada which could have been read, although I do not think he necessarily meant it that way, but it could have been read as implying a certain degree of distrust or questioning of President Kennedy's decision. In fairness to the Canadian Ministers, I think it reflected more Howard Green's idea that the UN should have a role to play, and a lot of people thought the UN should have a role to play in that situation. So that event, and our reaction to that event, coloured very much the relationship between Washington and Ottawa. In addition, President Kennedy came to Ottawa and in his address to the combined House of Commons and the Senate suggested that it would really be a damn good thing if Canadians got off their fannies and joined the Organization of American States. His proposal was not well received and in addition to that he wrote a nasty note to one of his colleagues about Diefenbaker, which became public. I have forgotten exactly what it said, but it was something like: "This S.O.B. is from the backwoods." Well, all these things coloured the relationship between the two governments. And here you had a President who was very popular in Canada. Kennedy represented the new wave, the new look; his wife was popular and he seemed to bring a completely different approach to Government. The amazing thing to me is that despite catastrophes such as the Bay of Pigs--it was a real disaster run by Kennedy--his popularity remained high in Canada, a popularity which is still undiminished. However, the relationship between the governments was very poor. On the official level we all had our contacts but they could not tell us anything during the Cuban crisis. They were not allowed to and probably did not even know themselves. I have not read Bobby Kennedy's book, but you know it was a real hundred days, a really tough time and they did not allow anybody into anything. They were scared to death that the Soviets would find out what they were doing and they did not want any leaks. And, as you know, NATO is not exactly a sealed chamber.

[HILL] Did that improve significantly with the advent of the Pearson Government?

[CAMERON] Yes, I think it did improve. In 1965 I went to Germany.

[HILL] Then you have the Vietnam War.

[CAMERON] Yes, the Vietnam War started when I was in Washington. I remember very well McNamara and his whiz kids bringing all these computers in, and they professed to have the answer to everything. It was just a matter of putting it all in the computer, and figuring how many tons of bombs had to be dropped on the Viet Cong; then it would not be very long before the bad guys would stop beating the good guys.

[HILL] A very un-Canadian approach to things!

[CAMERON] The standard line in those days was that if the North would leave the South alone, everything would be all right.

[HILL] I remember some of that.

[CAMERON] One thing I do remember there is this: when Johnson came in after Kennedy was killed, that was a traumatic event. Johnson came in and-talk about Ronald Reagan being a cowboy-this guy was a cowboy, a traditional cowboy. You may have read these stories about how he treated Pearson down on the ranch. I do not think Johnson ever forgave Pearson for making that speech in which he mentioned Vietnam. For Pearson to go into his own backyard, and to tell him to stop bombing the bad guys was too much. It is in the American character, to believe in the use of force, whereas we do not. They carry guns and everybody is allowed to have one. For a Canadian to come down and tell them how to run their railroad especially in dealing with those bastards the Viet Cong was unforgiveable. I believe one of those diaries of Charles Ritchie could tell you more about the relationship. In short, I do not think that relations improved all that much with Pearson, partly because of that incident.

[HILL] But despite Vietnam, this was also true from 1962 on, as you mentioned. The Soviets were building up their forces because of Cuba. But also that time was a great period of détente as well, because you had the partial test ban, you had the movement towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That was a great phase of détente, which presumably Canada was pushing for as well.

[CAMERON] Certainly there were moves on the arms control front, they were very important, and one of the important considerations was the extent to which there was nuclear fallout, and a lot of it came down in British Columbia from the Soviets tests. You talk about acid rain, they had a high nuclear content of radioactivity to some of the rain that came down in the West Coast after the Soviets let off an enormous nuclear test, the biggest one I think they have ever exploded in the atmosphere. And there were clouds with high levels of radioactivity which drifted over Canada. During that period an agreement was reached not to test in the atmosphere. Certainly, there was a lot of movement on the arms control front, and possibly I was doing Howard Green a disservice to suggest he was naive. I think he was naive about how to get those things done. They are achieved because the countries find it in their national interest to agree to it, but not because people are going around making statements in the UN. Also there was a move towards détente, and I think there was the beginning in NATO of the concept of the twin pillars of détente and defence based on the study done by Belgium's Foreign Minister. You know from your time in NATO I am sure. It is true, détente came really after the Cuban missile crisis, and recognition by the USSR of the need for accommodation with the West.

[HILL] This was a period when NATO was moving forward to détente and also a period when France was moving off to a partly independent position. Did Canada have much influence in Washington, say in the early '60s? How would you assess Canada's influence in Washington, say under the Liberal Government, not talking about Howard Green, but after that, say pushing for

more moves on détente, towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty and also with respect to relations with France for keeping France within the Alliance?

[CAMERON] Oh, I think we played a part, I think we played a considerable part. I do not know whether you could say it was with Washington, as much as it was in the NATO forum. Our relations with France were always pretty good because of the bicultural, bilingual nature of our country, I think. I cannot remember who was our Ambassador there at the time, but I think that we did do a lot to try to ameliorate the relations with France, to try to ensure that a serious situation did not develop when they decided to pull out of the military side of NATO. As you know, I think in practice they continued to co-operate pretty well on the military side, even though their forces are no longer integrated. I think we have traditionally been more conscious of the French outlook on NATO problems, particularly when a lot of their positions are a reaction to an aggressive American attitude to a lot of things. I think it is rather difficult to distinguish between the influence we have with Washington, as opposed to the influence we might have indirectly. As I recall we did play a very active role in the NATO Council, both before and particularly after Pearson came in, on a lot of these issues.

[HILL] But rather than pushing for them bilaterally through Washington...?

[CAMERON] Well, we did what we could in Washington. But on the higher political level, all of this was coloured to some extent by the rather poor relations that we had, certainly during the Diefenbaker period.

[HILL] I wonder if we could just deal, before we break, with one last phase, which is from 1966 to 1969. You were Minister-Counsellor in Bonn, and this was certainly a very important juncture in Alliance affairs. This was the period when to some degree the Germans were caught between the French and the Americans. De Gaulle had confronted the Germans with this sort of choice, particularly over the nuclear guarantee to Germany. I do not know if that was already over by then; for a period there the Germans were really in a dilemma because they wanted to maintain the American guarantee but they did not want to alienate the French.

[CAMERON] Are you referring to his proposal for the Three-Power Directorate?

[HILL] Yes, that sort of thing.

[CAMERON] I can say from my experiences there and elsewhere that we were very concerned about the Three-Power Directorate that de Gaulle was pushing, and I guess our views were very sympathetic to the German concerns. And I think that we did all we could by putting other proposals forward. I remember there were a number of variations on the theme as it might apply to practical situations. For example, who would have control over the decision to use nuclear weapons, whether it would be all members of the NATO Council or only those who had nuclear weapons. There were a whole series of situations that were looked at, you know, in terms of how do you arrive at this horrendous decision, to allow your forces to deploy, not only to deploy, but to use nuclear weapons, given the fact that the American President had the ultimate decision on the release of the nuclear warheads. How was the Council going to be organized to deal with this; this issue is still current today. It is an extremely difficult question of consultation. As I recall throughout the time that I was dealing with NATO issues, we were probably number one in pushing for more consultation on a number of things, including the question of consultative procedures for the release of nuclear weapons.

[HILL] Yes, and this was in 1967, while you were in Bonn. The Alliance had developed the strategy of forward defence and flexible response, and I think that was the point when the Nuclear Planning Group and the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee were established. But, on the other hand, I think this was a combination of work done over quite a long time, and perhaps those issues were more or less resolved by the time you were in Bonn.

[CAMERON] I would say this is an issue that will never be resolved, in the sense that you can work out all the plans or procedures you want, but when it comes down the crunch--and I think this was shown in Cuba--it is a matter of confidence between the governments at the time whether they are willing to consult on an issue of such importance. The important thing is that they do not allow to much discretionary authority to the field commanders; because they do have procedures to deal with an emergency. The presidential authority may have to be granted in advance. That is the serious thing I think, and those above all, ought to be looked at periodically. I am not up to date on this, but I think it makes sense if you are talking about North American defence, for a commander on the West Coast to have power to use nuclear weapons to shoot down a bomber which is approaching Victoria or Vancouver or Seattle. But does it make sense to give it to a commander on the forward front in Europe? I do not think he has it now, but I mean that was the kind of issue NATO was grappling with.

[HILL] Are those the kind of things you were dealing with while you were in Bonn?

[CAMERON] No. We would not get involved in that. That sort of thing is done in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, a highly classified club. In Bonn, we had to divide our time between bilateral and international questions. If you take the international issues, there were all these issues with the French; we had to report on what the German attitude was on De Gaulle, on relations with between France and Germany, the question of French forces in Germany--they still have forces in the Rhineland--the attitude of the Germans to a whole series of issues in the UN and NATO, and disarmament, etc.. You would have to sort of plot your week as to what, depending on what you heard from Ottawa, what you thought was important to report. We covered everything. I did not do it all but I supervised most of the material; another big issue was the question of the Canadian Forces in Germany. When I was there the Forces moved from northern Germany south down to Lahr where they co-habited, as they say, for a brief period, with the French. When the French eventually left they did not leave a very tidy establishment; they were not noted for their house-keeping. But quite a bit of time was spent dealing with some of the problems related to the move. We also had losts of visitors and many ministerial visits. Bonn is a small, quiet little capital, but Germany is an important ally, so we had a lot of work. But it was a good period.

[HILL] You mentioned the move from Soest to Lahr, but when was that? Were you there when the troop cuts decision was announced?

[CAMERON] I came back. I was involved a little bit here in Ottawa. I was brought back at the end of 1968 because I knew a little bit about the German side, and I was in Ottawa when that happened.

[HILL] But they decided to move south anyway, prior to that, in other words?

[CAMERON] Oh yes, it was a move before that time. The troop cuts came later, it was with Trudeau, and Trudeau did not come in until 1969.

[HILL] And also, of course, the Canadian air wing was moved from Zweibrücken to Lahr.

[CAMERON] Yes, I remember going to a party at the Canadian base in Zweibrücken, which is a beautiful little town famous for its Rose Festival. The Canadian relations with the German population were extraordinarily good, so much better than was the case with the Americans, for a number of reasons. Anyway, the night that we went to the party, the commander had just received a telegram from Ottawa, saying that he was going to have to tell the Germans the next day that they were leaving Zweibrücken; he had all this information bottled up inside him, and he could not say anything. He had to go ahead with his speech which was full of praise for the German population, knowing that the next day he would have to tell them they were all going. We had members of our staff who dealt in more detail with specific problems. For example, we had a representative, Judge Advocate Generals' Office, that dealt with all the Status of Forces problems. There was an office that did nothing but deal with problems arising out of a special arrangement between the Canadian and German Air Forces. There was also a military attaché, and a naval attaché. We totalled eleven officers altogether in addition to the Ambassador.

[HILL] How would you assess the importance of the Canadian presence in Germany to the Germans? To the German Government?

[CAMERON] Very high. I would assess it very high, not because of the size of our Forces, but as symbolic in terms of our relationship as a North American country, our close relationship with the United States. They see it in context of the US as much as Canada. They see that if the Canadians should pull out of Germany, they would view that as an event that could either affect the United States Congressional attitude, which they watch like a hawk, or it could affect the US attitude toward their vulnerable position in the East-West context.

[HILL] Is there also the thought that in the event of a crisis, or even more in a war, that although the number of Canadians on the ground is relatively small, nonetheless there could be reinforcements which would come along? Does that have an impact on their thinking? Do they see this as being the first part of a larger Canadian presence in the event of a war?

[CAMERON] I do not know whether they would ever say that. I think they see it more as a symbol of resolve, you know, by a country that was their enemy and I think the West Germans have a high regard for Canadians and for Canada generally. There are quite a few commercial and investment links with Canada, and I think they have a fairly high regard for our position on a lot of international issues where our views, particularly in the last ten years, have been closer to the Germans than they have been to any other country in NATO. On a lot of the East-West issues, for example, we were much closer to the Germans than to other larger NATO members.

[HILL] Really the German question lies at the heart of European security; how would you assess the importance of NATO in dealing with the German question?

[CAMERON] I think it is very, very important. From my time in Eastern Europe, having been accredited to East Berlin as well as Warsaw, I do not think you can underrate the importance which NATO has in respect of that East-West issue. The existence of the two Germanys is not a confrontation in a strictly military sense, it is a confrontation in a wider political security context. Because the Soviets are so paranoid about their security, they rely on the maintenance of a cordon sanitaire which includes East Germany. Over the years, in my view, there will be a growing tendency on the part of the Germans to come together for natural human reasons, because they are all Germans. It has already started on the economic front, and I think that, it seems to me that is one of the reasons why it makes sense for Canada to continue to press for a combination of détente

and defence. It does not make any sense, to my mind, to continue this confrontation ad infinitum. To the extent that we can ameliorate the relations between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the United States and Western Europe, the better it will be for the world I think, partly because of this German problem. Until that is resolved more amicably, more in a way which will take into account Germany, and German concerns and the relations they have with their neighbours and allies, that, to my mind, will remain the raison d'être for the continuation of NATO.

Part IV - Ottawa, 1968-74

[HILL] Ambassador Cameron, in 1968 you returned to Ottawa and were then appointed Head of the NATO and North American Division of the Department of External Affairs. A year later, I believe, you were promoted to Director General of the Bureau of Defence and Arms Control Affairs. It was in that capacity, I believe, that you also served as Canada's representative on the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

[CAMERON] Yes, that is right. This was the first time that I was in the position of being the representative of the Department of External Affairs on the Board. The Department of External Affairs is represented by two officers. There is the official External Affairs member who, traditionally, has been the head of the Defense and Arms Control Bureau, and when the Chairman is absent, he is the acting Chairman of the Canadian section of the Board. A fairly interesting job. The second office is more junior in rank and acts as one of the two Secretaries in the Canadian section (the other is usually a military officer from DND).

[HILL] The chairman is a political figure normally, as I understand.

[CAMERON] Normally, the chairman of the Canadian section is appointed by the Government of the day and it has not always been political. Going back to the early days, General McNaughton had it for quite a while. More recently Arnold Heeney, when I first took over, Arnold Heeney was the chairman. He was former Secretary of the Cabinet, a distinguished public servant. So it has not always been political. John Aird later took it over and he was a political appointee in the sense that he was a Liberal member of the Senate who never ran for office in the House of Commons.

[HILL] Thank you for that clarification. I think that is helpful. On the more general plain, these were certainly very important years for Canada - I'm referring to 1968-74 - and for NATO and for the world in general. They were the years of the Trudeau foreign policy so far as Canada was concerned, when Canada carried out a series of reviews of foreign policy and defense policy and also cut its troop levels in Europe. The Armed Forces were also reduced in that period, in numbers. This was also the period of the publication of Foreign Policy for Canadians, and in 1971 the Defence White Paper was issued. It was the second main Defence White Paper, the previous one was in 1964. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about the whole review process and what your views are on that process and also on the results of the process. For example, how was it that Canada wound up cutting its Forces in 1969, and what lay behind the White Paper, and what do you think about whether, on the whole, those moves helped or hindered Canada's efforts to promote international peace and security.

[CAMERON] Well, that is a big question: a number of questions I guess. First of all, I think it is true that the period was one where Canada's foreign policy was dominated very much by the new Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who came in with his very own views about the Canadian position in the world. My own personal recollection is that he tended to think that Canada's foreign policy was influenced too much by our participation in NATO and other

international organizations and not oriented enough in terms of Canada's national interest. I think that was his thesis. Certainly he was very influential in developing the thesis, that Canadian foreign policy should be a direct projection of our national policy, our national domestic policy and the views that he held naturally were very influential. But, the same views were held by a number of his advisers who worked in the Privy Council at that time and in the PMO, and these views had a dramatic impact on the development of the various papers that were being produced. Now there were two sets of papers, as you pointed out. There was a set of papers on foreign policy which we used to refer to rather frivolously as multi-coloured booklets because there was a different colour for each area of the world. Then we had the Defense White Paper which came much later after the defence review in 1969. When I came back in 1968 the Government was in the process of "consulting" with academics and other people interested in security and foreign policy questions. I remember attending a seminar which was held over in Hull, for one or two days, where a number of prominent professors from various universities and various people who were interested in foreign policy were given a briefing, and there was a long discussion of various issues including Canadian participation in NATO. That was followed up by a series of inter-departmental discussions on the position Canada was taking in NATO and discussions regarding NATO. My recollection of the actual procedures is a little hazy. I think there are a number of articles that have been written and I am sure that they will clarify - when particular papers went to Cabinet and when they did not. From the point of this interview I think it would be more relevant just to give my impressions of the way the scene developed. As I recall, the review that was going on in National Defence took place very often in a separate compartment, away from the reviews that were going on in foreign affairs, and this was something we in the bureau were very conscious of. We did everything we could to try to bring the two together since we were the link between the two departments. The Bureau of Defence and Arms Control was essentially the link, the liaison with the Department of National Defence. Consequently, it was important that the positions that were adopted on the defence side were consistent with our position on foreign policy and vice versa. This was a very difficult task and there were a number of bureaucratic obstacles in the way. There were the usual rivalries between departments and personalities. In practice the key role was often played by the Privy Council Office, partly because of the dominant personality of the Prime Minister and partly because the views of National Defence and the views of External Affairs did not always coincide. In addition, I don't think there was as much consultation as there should have been.

[HILL] Can I ask you then one question about the origins of this whole process? My impression is that when Prime Minister Trudeau came to power, not only he himself, but also some of the people that he had around him or that he brought in, for example from the PCO or other agencies, had certain pre-conceptions about the world that they wanted to feed into Canadian foreign policy. And in fact one of these pre-conceptions was that they were not particularly impressed with the utility of NATO from Canada's own point of view; that they wanted to move more towards a foreign policy based partly on Canada's own national self interest. Another thing they did not want was, they did not like this idea which had developed of Canada as the helpful fixer in international affairs. They did not like NATO and they did not like the helpful-fixer idea very much and they wanted to move to some new kind of system. I wonder if you could comment on this.

[CAMERON] Yes, certainly. I think that my recollection is that he did come in with very definite clear-cut ideas as to what he wanted Canada's policy to be, and I think that he also thought that this policy should be less influenced by our role in the Alliance, that we should be much more independent in the sense that our policy would reflect our national interests and less the interests of our alliance. On the question of a helpful fixer, I think that may have played a part but I am not sure that it was a major element in his thinking. I think he also believed at the outset of his mandate that the role of the foreign service and the role of the diplomatic missions abroad were

much less, how shall we say, valuable in terms of informing the Government about what was going on in the world than I think he did later on. There is a good deal of evidence that he changed his point of view about foreign service, and the usefulness of embassies abroad. You may recall that shortly after he became Prime Minister he reportedly said that if you read the New York Times and the Manchester Guardian carefully you could really find all there was to know about what was going on in the world. Which is beside the point. It is not a matter of simply knowing what goes on in the world, but it is a matter of having a privileged access to what a particular government is thinking, not just what it may be doing as reported in the press. But, certainly he did come in with a different point of view and I think he was particularly strong on the question of Canadian participation in NATO. My recollection is that the question of cut-backs in the Alliance was very much on his mind. It may be at one time he wanted to remove all our forces. I do not recall having seen any evidence of an actual intention on the part of the Prime Minister to get out entirely. But certainly there were elements in the Cabinet that were sympathetic to a very large reduction and even complete withdrawal. There were also elements in the Cabinet which were very strongly opposed to a reduction, notably the Minister of Defence, Cadieux. We had to prepare papers for the Cabinet - and I can recall one instance where we were given for comment and for briefing notes a memorandum which argued that if Canada withdrew half of our forces from NATO and did this voluntarily, this would be followed by a voluntary action on the part of the Soviet Union to withdraw one-half of its forces from Czechoslovakia. In other words we would be the good boys and we would be so good that they would want to do the same thing. We had to point out that this was a rather naive view of the world and that it was very unlikely that if we cut back that you could expect any comparable parallel action by the Soviet Union. So, there were elements within the Government I think that were sympathetic to this, and it was not just a question of the Prime Minister in my view. There were other members of the Cabinet, some of whom were very influential, who felt this way. Often it would turn out that proposals which had been developed by National Defence in consultation with External Affairs would be changed at the last minute by people in the Privy Council. Among the papers that would go to the Cabinet - there might be one paper which would, say, the command support of, say, the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs but there would be another paper which would come out from the Privy Council and/or the Prime Minister's Office. The net result of all of this was, as you could imagine, a fair amount of confusion in the bureaucracy and also a great difficulty, I think, in conveying the government's views to our Ambassador in NATO, Ross Campbell.

[HILL] But, you mentioned papers produced by the PMO and PCO themselves; I mean, how far did they go? I presume they were on the other side; they were wanting to diminish Canada's input to NATO. Did they have their own papers in addition to those you mentioned where they were modifying what came from External.

[CAMERON] Yes, my recollection is that there were papers which were done separately by the PMO/PCO, putting into them suggestions for change in the role of the Canadian Forces, the size of the Canadian Forces. These were papers which came out of the PMO/PCO, without consultation with anybody else.

[HILL] Obviously, there was a vigorous debate which went on inside the Government. And this particular debate was all inside the Government as I understand it, and when I say Government, I mean the Cabinet, External Affairs, DND and PCO and so on. And it did not involve outsiders particularly at this stage.

[CAMERON] No, it was merely inside the Government.

[HILL] A vigorous debate, I mean to the point where you might say it was a fight over the question of whether or not to maintain or to cut Canadian troop levels in Europe.

[CAMERON] Yes, my recollection is there was a vigorous debate, and I mentioned, I think, that there were elements in the Government which certainly were sympathetic to cutting. There were also strong elements opposed to cutting. One argument which was used particularly by the Department of External Affairs was that one should not look at our defence contribution purely in terms of our contribution to the security of Europe, but we should also look at it in terms of our relations with the members of the European Community. The question of our trade with Europe, the question of our whole overall relationship with Britain and all our allies and so on would undoubtedly be seriously affected by any change in the level of our Forces, particularly if the nature of the consultation did not indicate that they were agreeable to the type of change that we had in mind. This view, which was borne out by facts later on, apparently did not carry much weight with the Prime Minister. He did not think that the German Government would necessarily be influenced by the fact that we were cutting back the the size of our Forces in Germany. I think Trudeau realized the relationship later on when the man that he was dealing with in the German Government as Chancellor was Schmidt who at the time of the withdrawal was Minister of Defence. I think he eventually accepted the view propounded by External Affairs which at the time was that this reduction in NATO could have a serious impact on our relations with the European Community, and with the individual members of the Community.

[HILL] I believe there was some preliminary discussion beforehand in NATO about the troop cut decision. There was some consultation of a sort. It was the decision itself, the nature of the decision itself, which was most upsetting to the others, rather than the question of consultative procedures. But what was most striking for anybody who was in Europe at the time was that this came very shortly after Czechoslovakia. The Europeans especially had not yet recovered confidence after the traumatic experience of August, 1968. But that did not impress those in Canada who were interested in Canada making cuts.

[CAMERON] Those points were made, as I recall, in the submissions that External Affairs put forward. We were not present in the Cabinet discussions, and I do not think many officials were. As I mentioned, this particular memorandum that we had to comment on was prepared by one Minister who had no responsibility for External Affairs. We were given the morning of the Cabinet meeting to comment to our Minister. The memorandum, I assume, reflected the view of that particular gentleman who thought by doing this that it would be such a positive step in terms of international relations that the Soviet Union would withdraw an equivalent amount from Czechoslovakia. I mean to us it suggested a pretty naive view of the world. So I would guess that the discussion in Cabinet did not place a great deal of weight on the fact that Czechoslovakia had just been invaded by Soviet forces. The main consideration was that we should cut back in Europe, that we should point out to the Europeans we had been there a long time, we had other heavy responsibilities in North America and we had to look after our own backyard as well as do something over there.

[HILL] I suppose also there was Mr. Trudeau's interest in the Third World, development and so on, which was as well a sort of looking out, at least intellectually, toward a broader world scene. This was partly based on his own experiences in his youth and so on, and his travels to China and all that sort of thing. Did any of that sort of thing appear in these discussions at that time?

[CAMERON] No, at that time I do not recall such points being raised. I think that undoubtedly some of these experiences shaped Trudeau's views and came out later on - but I do not recall that

having been an important factor at the time. I think that one of the rather dramatic developments was the extent to which a number, some of the allies, reportedly attempted to get us to reconsider. Certainly some of the ambassadors in NATO were very upset about it; the Belgians were particularly upset about this. According to reports we received, it was a very emotional scene for the Minister of National Defence when his Belgian colleague, with tears in his eyes, pleaded with Canada not to do this.

[HILL] That was after the decision had been announced?

[CAMERON] Pretty well, I mean Ross Campbell could tell you more about this, I am sure. There was not any suggestion that we would reconsider. It was a question that we made our decision and that was our decision.

[HILL] We were also looking towards the day when the Alliance would no longer be necessary.

[CAMERON] In other words, consistent with the idea of détente. That was nothing particularly novel, everybody was talking about the twin pillars of deterrence and détente, and détente assumed a more normal relationship between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, which at some future time might involve the gradual disappearance of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

[HILL] I think that is a point that is worth mentioning. In 1971 it was no longer the immediate aftermath of Czechoslovakia, even in Europe. Even the Europeans had moved on, and they were already talking about a European Security Conference and so on. But I wonder if you could tell us a bit about "Foreign Policy for Canadians", about that process. My impression was that that was a somewhat different kind of process. Initially, with the troop cuts issue, you had Mr. Trudeau and some of his people coming in with their pre-conceptions about the world. "Foreign Policy for Canadians", I had the impression, was a kind of academic exercise by and large; it was the high tide of functionalism in the study of international relations in the universities and this was imported into Ottawa; and you had a mix of all kinds of people involved in producing this document, which was a look at the world not in national interest terms or whatever, but some sort of broader analytical terms. How would you see "Foreign Policy for Canadians"?

[CAMERON] First of all, I would agree that there was an overdose of functionalism, a new way of looking at things incorporated in the whole approach to our review of foreign policy. It looked at the world in regions and the papers that were produced in various regions were very much in the nature of an account of what we were doing, not so much as to where we were going. There was not very much new in the way of policy in any of the papers and the multi-coloured booklets that came out were notable for the fact that there was no booklet dealing with relations with the United States - to put it mildly, a rather key area of our foreign policy. The booklets described what we were doing in Latin America, in Asia, and in Europe, but nothing about the United States. As I recall, the reason for it was that they could not get any agreement in Cabinet as to how to proceed. Because our relations with the United States are so all-pervasive and influence indirectly our relations with almost every region, especially Latin America, they represent a critical aspect of our whole approach to international affairs. So they ended by having an article, signed by Mitchell Sharp, who was Minister of External Affairs at the time. It set out our approach to relations with the United States in terms of Three Options. Mr. Sharp's choice of the Third Option, which reflected our concern about an increasing dependence on the United States economically, was misinterpreted by many as an indication that we were turning away from the United States in favour of Europe. I think a lot of misunderstanding arose as a result of the way the Third Option was treated in the press, and even the academics had a distorted notion as to what was intended. I do

not personally think it was ever intended that we should in any way change our attitude towards the United States. It was more a reflection of the philosophy of people like Walter Gordon and the Liberal thinkers who were concerned about the degree of US control of Canadian industry and US investment; there was, in a sense, a concern that we should be more multilateral in our approach to economic and trade issues and that to do so we should try to increase our trade relations with Europe. This article by Mr. Sharp was misunderstood. But to my mind it was yet another indication of the extent to which security policy, foreign policy, and economic policy were not treated as being inter-related. In the security area, we proceeded to justify a reduction of our contribution to NATO, and in the foreign trade policy area we were talking about expanding our relations with Europe.

[HILL] The article on Canada-US relations also came just after the Connally affair?

[CAMERON] I think I would agree with you that the White Paper exercise, at least the foreign policy exercise, was very much a case of fitting in with the trends of the day, of having a functional look at our foreign policy. But in fact the papers that were prepared did not contain very much in the way of policy and certainly not in the way of new policy. It was more of a world travelogue if you want to be sarcastic about it. There was not very much in it that was new.

[HILL] There was not really much in there to guide officials in the Department afterwards. There were no tracks laid down that you had to follow. It almost justified doing anything.

[CAMERON] I remember. The person you should have an interview with on that is Geoff Murray, do you know him?

[HILL] No.

[CAMERON] Well, he was the man, he had the task of writing most of the papers. He was given the raw material by various sections of the Department and old Geoff was put off in a corner of the Langevin Block and, I remember, with piles of cups of coffee. He had to grind out this stuff and turn it back to the various bureaus to see if it would wash. But he was given the raw material and he went to work on it.

[HILL] We could turn also to "Defence in the 1970s," which was published in 1971. It came out just after "Foreign Policy for Canadians," and in a way I think you can find, shall we say, the philosophic justification for it in "Foreign Policy for Canadians." But in a way, also, the origins of "Defence in the 70s" are in the 1969 troop cut decision. In a way, what happened in "Defence in the 70s" was that they stood the old order of priorities on its head i.e. NATO having originally, in the 1964 White Paper, been first, now it slipped down to third.

[CAMERON] And then former Prime Minister Pearson was very angry.

[HILL] Could you tell us something about that process, as you saw it, of the preparation of the Defence White Paper, particularly with regards to Canada's role in NATO?

[CAMERON] Well, I think it was a justification for the decisions that had been taken earlier; and it stood the priorities on their head. It was written largely by a man who is now our Ambassador to NATO, Gordon Smith, for Donald Macdonald who was the Minister of National Defence at the time. He was brought in especially from External to do the work. By and large there was a pretty good consultative process, looking at it from a bureaucratic viewpoint, and pretty good consultation

with External Affairs. Of course the policy had largely been determined by the actions that the Government had already taken, so there was not a great deal of debate about essential issues. It was more about what would we be doing to carry out priority number one, the defence of North America, or the mobile forces they had talked about in the 1969 statement, that kind of thing. As I recall, the United States were somewhat mystified too, as to what the White Paper would mean in real terms, especially with respect to North American defence. We were cutting back in Europe and said we were doing it partly because we wanted to devote more to the defence of Canada and North America. At the same time, I think the inter-departmental consultative process went reasonably well, certainly much better than at the time of the NATO force reductions. The study was prepared mainly in the Department of Defence, whereas the final version of the other paper originated principally in PCO and some of the proposals seemed to develop out of thin air. I recall some of the senior people in National Defence were almost tearing their hair out by their roots when they were faced with some of the wild ideas that emanated from the PCO at the time of the 1969 Paper.

[HILL] The White Paper did maintain the NATO commitment although it was third in the order of priority. In practice, as time went on, the NATO commitment virtually re-emerged as number one priority, because that was where the money was put.

[CAMERON] I can say this, that in terms of explaining this decision of 1969 to our allies, we had many ambassadors here in Ottawa, who would come in and say what does all this mean. We had to point out that Canada was staying in NATO Europe. We were cutting back for various reasons but we were staying in Europe. That was the important point.

[HILL] In practice the NATO commitment remained as the most prominent one in terms of practical defence objectives. Would you agree with that?

[CAMERON] There were quite a lot of new things they were buying for North American air defence, but not as a result of that decision. But there were expenses in North America that were considerable. My recollection is that there was nothing dramatically new, or new things that were acquired, to underline this new emphasis on North American defence. It was apparent, I think, in the following ten years, that the Government was not really serious about doing much about capital expenditures for defence and they let the whole defence establishment run down; and that is one of the problems the Government is facing today. It takes an enormous amount to make up the neglect during that period.

[HILL] In your position between 1968 and 1974 you were presumably going over to NATO headquarters periodically and involved in the consultations over there on behalf of Canada. I wonder what sort of reaction you felt Canada got from these changes in policy and how did it affect Canada's role in NATO?

[CAMERON] There used to be a joke going around that - it does not necessarily reflect accurately the view, but rather the atmosphere at the time - that the Canadian decision was regarded by the Allies as a little dog coming in from outside with a party going on (1969 was NATO's twentieth anniversary) and peeing on the carpet. No, it was not popular. Cut-backs are never popular in this kind of organization, but I think if you look back on it it seems to me that it was handled very badly by the Government. The Government could have done a lot more to try and ameliorate the political and economic implications of this decision. It was very much, we want to do this, this is it boys. Consultation pretty well amounted to telling them what we wanted to do and intended to do. My recollection is that the decision did have an impact on our voice in NATO and I think it was offset

to some extent by the capability and the talent of the man was on the spot, our very able ambassador, Ross Campbell. I think that offset the negative fall out to some extent, but it was bound to have an impact.

[HILL] At the same time Canada was pursuing through NATO various other objectives like, for example, attempting to promote the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the MBFR negotiations, the SALT talks and so on. Canada was trying to assist them in moving forward. Particularly in that whole phase from about 1970 up to 1973-74, when these things were moving forward in quite a remarkable way. What was your feeling about Canada's input, at that time, into Alliance consultation on détente-oriented issues?

[CAMERON] Well, I think the effectiveness of our contribution to Alliance discussions of these issues has been determined very much by the quality of what we have to say. There is a difference, in my view, between the kind of reaction that you might get when you bring something up at the ministerial level. But when you are dealing with the so-called "professionals" and discussing complex questions such as MBFR or SALT, what is important is not so much whether you recently cut back part of your Forces but whether you have done your homework, whether you have thought out new ideas, which might assist, for example, in East-West negotiations. If you take SALT as an example, I think, considering the size of our organization, and the size of the limited amount of talent available, I think we contributed quite a bit to NATO discussions. If you compare us with other countries involved, for example, with the MBFR talks in Vienna (and you probably know more about this than most people do), my recollection is that there were about three or four countries that would really do their homework. We were one of them. The rest of the delegations would often go to these meetings with very little in the way of instructions or considered advice.

[HILL] What I do recall is on some issues like CSCE, Canada was quite a strong force for pushing continually forward.

[CAMERON] ... and for getting the Americans involved.

[HILL] Well, because actually the Americans, as did the British in that period, fluctuated a great deal. As a matter of fact, the Americans were not very interested in CSCE.

[CAMERON] That is right.

[HILL] The British switched back and forth because they changed governments at that time, and I think, if I am not mistaken, I think the Labour Government was pro-CSCE, but the Conservatives were not. Whereas I think Canada continually went down one direct line. I think the constant reiteration of the Canadian position had an impact.

[CAMERON] I think it is a political impact in the sense that it affects the people at the top at the ministerial level, but I do not think it has very much impact farther down the line. When you are dealing with this kind of issue, which is much more technical, and longstanding, the officials value the contribution of the various delegations on the basis of their grasp of the issues and how many new ideas they may have. Also important is the ability to explain these ideas. I think that we continued to have an impact on issues partly because of the quality of the work that was done by the people in Ottawa and in the missions that were involved, particularly the NATO one.

[HILL] In your assessment, did membership in NATO enable Canada to pursue its goal of international peace and security? Did it provide good opportunities for Canada to pursue this objective?

[CAMERON] Oh yes, very much so I think, even though it had been changed, as you say, in the list of priorities. Yes, I think so, and I think that in addition to the work that is done through conferences such as MBFR and SALT, and discussions on SALT in NATO, and in other ways, I think the fact that we remained in the Alliance played a very important part in terms of our relations, not only with the Western European countries but also with the Eastern European countries. They are interested in talking to us because we are a member of NATO. They would not be interested very much in talking to us if we were Swedes. They would like to know more about what our views are on major East-West issues.

[HILL] You do not think there is any sense in the view - sometimes expressed - that NATO diminishes Canada's moral credibility and the impact that Canada might have in the United Nations or elsewhere, on the broader issues of international peace and security?

[CAMERON] I would say no. I would say, my experience would lead me to believe, that that point of view is not supported by the evidence. It is quite the contrary. I was interested to read a speech last night that Joe Clark made recently in Vancouver. It was quite a good speech, mostly about the Arctic, but there was a bit at the end about NATO. He was going after the NDP for arguing that we should get out of NATO, and he was saying that he had just come from a meeting in Brussels with the ministers where they discussed with George Shultz and others what is going on in Geneva at the Soviet-US disarmament negotiations. To the extent that we have any influence, here was an opportunity to make our views known. He was arguing in effect that if you want to have any impact on world peace and stability, you have a better chance of having some impact if you are able to get your views across to the people that are directly involved, than you do if you sit outside and make some pious statement about the necessity of doing this or that. I guess I would share that view. I think this idea that you somehow divorce yourself from your allies and that such a move would be in the Canadian interest, does not make sense to me. I do not think we should be a member of the Alliance just because we like to be in the Alliance. I think it is because the national interest is better served by being in than being out. That is my view.

[HILL] In your position in Ottawa in that time, you also had the responsibility, or some responsibilities, not only for NATO, but also for security issues being dealt with in the UN and for peacekeeping. I take it from what you say that you do not feel that other countries were less willing to look towards Canada, less willing to take Canadian views into account on the broader scene or in peacekeeping, for example, they were not any less willing to take Canada into account, because Canada was a member of NATO.

[CAMERON] Not at all, and I was involved a bit in the negotiations that led to the first joint arrangement we had with an Eastern European country, Poland, in the Sinai. I remember I used to have to deal with General Dextraze, the Chief of the Defence Staff, almost daily. We had a fairly tense period, that was in 1970 or 1971, I think, when they put the UN Forces in the Sinai. We had to negotiate the agreement, and the fact that we were a member of NATO certainly did not stand in the way of us participating. I think it is wishful thinking from those who favour getting out of NATO to say that that is an obstacle. I think if you look back at the time in 1956, when the Canadian Forces were asked by President Nasser to leave, Egypt, it was partly because Nasser felt that the Egyptian population would not be able to distinguish between the British uniforms and the Canadian uniforms because the Canadian uniforms were identical to the Britis who had just invaded

Egypt. But I do not think that kind of situation should be used to say, "Well, we would be better out of NATO and we would do better with UN the if we were like Sweden or Finland". The facts do not support that kind of argument.

[HILL] We will go on to a rather different field now, but still in the same period. While you were in Ottawa from 1968-1974, this was almost exactly coterminous with the Nixon Presidency in the United States. You took up your position just at the time that he was running the election campaign, and then he was elected at the end of the year, and took up his position at the beginning of 1969. Then you were there up until the Watergate period and so on. I was wondering how did the US behave towards NATO in the first Nixon presidency? This was the point in time when the US was thinking of getting disentangled from Vietnam. How would you assess the amount of interest in NATO?

[CAMERON] I think that Kissinger's view of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had a significant impact and very much affected the whole outlook of the United States and its allies at the time. As I recall, the initiatives that were taken in the early days of the Nixon presidency were very positive ones in terms of discussions on strategic weapons. You had the first SALT Agreement and the ABM Treaty in 1972. At the same time you had a deliberate US effort to involve the Soviets in discussions and negotiations not only on arms control, but in an effort to try and alleviate the problem they had in Vietnam. On the North American front it was a period when there was a change in the concept of North American defence. There was a gradual diminution or beginning of a slowdown in the worry about the bomber threat and the beginning of concern about the missile. Consequently, in terms of US and North American defence there was a good deal of uncertainty in the Canadian mind about where the United States was going in terms of air defence. I think that Canada was conscious of the United States' difficult position in Vietnam, and the extent to which it was really tearing at the guts of a lot of Americans. On the other hand there were those who felt that something could be done about it. Kissinger of course had a dramatic role in trying to bring about a final ending, which I guess really amounted to a US defeat, although it was never portrayed in that way. It certainly was a very sad ending to a chapter in their history.

[HILL] They sort of managed to save face by the troop withdrawal process and the cease fire of '73.

[CAMERON] I remember that particular period in personal terms. I had just been told that I was going to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Ambassador to Canada had a dinner for me and halfway through the dinner he said, "Do you mind if we turn the television set on", just as we got to the dessert, because Nixon was giving the announcement of his resignation.

[HILL] Well, that was in the Watergate period. So, the assessment that you make of the first Nixon Presidency, 1969 to 1972 on, in terms of dealing with Vietnam, in terms of dealing with NATO, in terms of dealing with the Soviet Union and so on, and in terms of dealing with Canada and North American defence and so on, my impression is that the assessment you would make is a positive one.

[CAMERON] That is right. I could just add to that that Kissinger was such a powerful intellect that he tended to be somewhat arrogant in his personal relations. I can recall attending a NATO ministerial meeting, and he spent most of the first part of the meeting, some of which are pretty boring, as you know, reading the newspaper; then when it got around to his time to speak he did give a brilliant tour d'horizon of US interests, and then after he had finished, he got up and left.

He did not even bother to hear what anyone else had to say. So he was not a popular Secretary of State in the sense of the friendly, jovial American. He was very, very, preoccupied with Kissinger and his own view of the world.

[HILL] If one goes then to the second Nixon presidency starting at the beginning of 1973, by then the US had largely disentangled itself from Vietnam. Now it was starting to move on promoting better East-West relations. I think there are two different interpretations I have heard of what happened in early 1973. One is that what the US was doing was laying the ground work for better relations with the Europeans and NATO as a basis for good consultations which would then lead into better relations with the Soviets. Another interpretation is that Nixon and Kissinger were off in pursuit of some New World Order, and to do this they were quite prepared to go over the heads of the other allies. I wondered if The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, for example, was seen in the latter way. There was no prior consultation whatsoever on that, it was just announced to the other allies. That is my understanding. How would you assess that?

[CAMERON] I think that Kissinger always had that sort of world view. I do not know whether you can relate it from one period to the next, but my impression is the problem was not so much in terms of consultation with all the allies, but I think it was more a problem with the Germans. I think there were a good many indications that the West Germans were very nervous that the two big boys would get together and work out some agreement which would not take into account German interests. If you followed German post-war politics you would recall it is sort of traditional for a German Chancellor to make a visit to Washington at least once a year. I think during that period the Chancellor probably went twice or three times a year. If you look at the history of NATO you will probably see this concern developing periodically in waves. The concern usually develops when the US superpower gets too cozy, has too good relations with the Soviet Union. There is then the concern that there will be a sort of "divide up the world"; the Soviets will get out of Cuba, will not help the Cubans anymore, and the United States will do something in Europe. which would not necessarily benefit the Europeans, but it will be to the benefit of their overall world view. I do not know that this ever became a major issue but I think it was always in the background, and may have been perhaps more in the background in the second period than in the first. I think if there was evidence of a deliberate US effort to improve relations with the West Europeans, it was in a sense, an attempt to ameliorate or to lessen their nervousness, particularly in the case of the Germans as to what they might be doing with the Soviets. There was always the worry that the two big guys might have similar problems with their little guys; if you look at it in simplistic terms, one big fellow may try to help the other big fellow by saying, well I have my problems with the Greeks, and you have your problems with the Romanians. You do not know that goes on, but there is always the suspicion that a little bit of it takes place when the two superpowers get together. Another initiative during the Nixon presidency was their opening to China. I think Kissinger was always talking about playing the China card. The US assumption at the time was that if one wanted to get the Soviets really worried, the most effective way would be to suggest they would be confronted by a Chinese, Japanese, North Atlantic alliance.

[HILL] So you think there was something of that about it?

[CAMERON] I think there may have been a bit of excessive nervousness on the part of some members of NATO. But I do not think I can pinpoint any one event in particular.

[HILL] At that point Kissinger called for a New Atlantic Charter and also the Year of Europe, if you remember, in early 1973.

[CAMERON] That was a big balloon.

[HILL] The US was talking in terms of a united Europe as though it already existed-- and if they could only get their act together then they would nicely fit into Kissinger's scheme of things.

[CAMERON] I do not recall that too clearly, but I do recall this Year of Europe was a grand fiasco. I do not think anything ever came of it, just a publicity stunt more than anything. I mean it sounded good, but I do not think anything ever developed.

[HILL] I am struck very much about your comment on Kissinger at the NATO Council meeting. I think this session was on the Year of Europe. I think he put this idea forward, but then nobody else really embraced it in quite the terms he wanted, so then he got fed up with it. Then, I think that Watergate was very important for US foreign policy. That started out already in the summer of '73. Was that felt in that period in Ottawa? Did you sense the impact of Watergate very early on, do you recall?

[CAMERON] Yes, to the extent that, you know, the press here and television were forever reporting on what was going on south of the border, reporting on these hearings on Watergate. There was a good deal of unease about the situation, as it affected the leader of the Western Alliance. The evidence that was coming out was pretty damaging; it confirmed a lot of suspicions, but I guess, no one thought it had really gone that far. And it undermined the Administration's credibility, inevitably.

[HILL] Was it your impression that it put a break on US policy-making? Did they get absorbed with it? Did Nixon get increasingly absorbed with it?

[CAMERON] At my level, I cannot recall it had much of an impact. There was always this sort of background concern about what was happening in the White House and what did it all mean, and how would they provide for the future if there were an impeachment, what would happen, and who would take over. The disarray in the Administration was really not unlike the feeling around here a few months ago, when things looked pretty bad in the White House and they fired all their people; there was something of the same kind of unease. But how much of an impact it had I do not recall.

[HILL] While you were in this position in Ottawa, there were the 1973 energy crisis and the Middle East War. Now, that was a pretty traumatic experience for NATO. What was your impression of allied relationships in that period? There seemed to be quite a lot of acrimony over US shipments of supplies to Israel, and so on.

[CAMERON] The one issue that took place during that period which has been the subject of some discussion recently, was the question of whether the US air defence, as well as SAC forces, were put on alert in connection with their efforts to dramatize the seriousness of the situation, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. My recollection is a little vague, but as I recall there had been some misunderstanding as to what the Americans did and to what extent it required consultation with Canada. I think they put their Strategic Air Command and their air defence forces under NORAD on a higher state of alert by way of underlining the seriousness with which they would view any Soviet move to monkey around in the Middle East at the time. If I remember well, there was an obligation on their part to consult us about that decision whereas we were just informed. But there was also some mix-up, as between informing our military branch, our Chief of Defence staff, and not informing the government; but that was not a major thing. We were also involved in negotiation of a peace-keeping arrangement for the Middle East. We worked closely with National Defence

and the UN in devising a Canadian military contribution which would work jointly with Polish forces as part of the UN force. It was the first time an Eastern European country had sent peacekeeping forces and it was a bit of an experiment. I think it worked out reasonably well. It was not only unusual for a Warsaw Pact country to provide troops for peace-keeping, it was the first time a Western country had engaged in such a joint operation. So that took up a lot of our time in terms of what we did by way of our contribution to the settlement. But those are the two things that I can recall about that period, though not as dramatic events.

[HILL] My recollection of that is that there was not much in the way of Canadian - American dissension in that period. If you compare it to the Cuban missile crisis - Canada and the United States were in a lot of trouble over that issue. But 1973 was not like that, there was much more dissension between the Europeans and the Americans.

[CAMERON] Yes, I was going to say, the other thing that it brings back to mind is the extent to which the energy crisis dramatized the heavy, extreme dependence of the Europeans on the Middle East. And also, as I recall, I cannot remember whether it took place there, or later during the hostage operation, their reluctance to get involved militarily. The British, I think, were willing to do something. I think at one point our officials gave some thought to sending one of our destroyers from the Atlantic squadrons to go down into the Gulf if we were asked to do so.

[HILL] I have another point about this early 1973 period. I wonder how many Canadians really were analyzing in depth what Kissinger was doing, what his policy was, what his thinking was. How would you assess the Canadian ability to perceive what the United States is doing?

[CAMERON] I made that point at a recent meeting. I said that we assume that we know almost everything about the United States. We have all these groups looking at the Soviet Union, but I think we should spend more time assessing developments in the United States. I was four years in Washington and the thing that always impressed me was how they ever came to any decision. Their system is so complex; there are so many pressure groups and points of view that by the time they eventually get a decision, it is almost impossible to change it. I remember going to a meeting in NATO once on consultation, which is a Canadian preoccupation; we used to bore people by saying how we need to have more consultation in NATO. And at the meeting was Dean Rusk, who was then Secretary of State. Putting his notes aside he said to his NATO colleagues: "I know a lot of you feel that we should do more in the way of consultation; and I would be the first to admit that we should consult more. Our heart is in the right place, but I tell you what I would recommend that you do. You should instruct your Ambassador in Washington to keep his officers reading everything there is in the papers about what is going on in the US, in Washington. And as soon as they see something in the Washington Post for example is of interest to your country, they should go into the State Department and make their pitch. Because if you leave it too long until it gets farther up the ladder, there is nothing we can do about changing our point of view. It becomes, as they say, 'inconcrete'." I do not think many Canadians understand how the American system works. Because we have all these reporters down there, we have all the stuff on television, we think we know all there is to know about the United States. I think we need more analysis of what they do in Washington, and how they run things, not less. Because we have so much information and because we are North Americans, we tend to think that we are well placed to act as a mediator between the US and with the Europeans. The Europeans say "Thanks, but no thanks." Canadians tend to be almost over-confident about how well we understand the Americans; nobody else knows them better. I think we mislead ourselves very often.

[HILL] And I think that is not because of altruism. It is because we need to know that, in our own self interest, precisely because we do live next door to the United States, and what they do affects us.

[CAMERON] I am not sure that we are really wise in doing what I know this present Ambassador in Washington is doing. The Government seems to support it, that is a concerted effort to influence pressure groups in Congress. If we do that it is pretty hard for us to turn around and say Americans cannot do that here in Ottawa.

[HILL] Just one quick last question on the NATO, on that period. How would you generally assess the NATO consultations on things like the CSCE, and so on. How effective do you think they were?

[CAMERON] On CSCE?

[HILL] On things like that. Whatever was going on at that period.

[CAMERON] I guess I would say it varies from time to time, depending on what stage you are at. Sometimes people get bored to tears listening to these things, and it is difficult to get senior people and ministers to focus on things like MBFR. They just say, "Take it away, there are too many figures here, it's too complex". If it comes down to a political issue, that they can understand or comprehend clearly, then I would say, yes, there is probably good consultation at the higher level on that. But the problem often with those issues, is to try to make it meaningful for the senior people, including Under-Secretaries, however well- intentioned they may be. You only have so many hours in the day to deal with things, so I guess it has varied a lot. If the member countries feel that the issues are important enough to have a real impact, there probably will be fairly good consultation. I was the Canadian representative on the special consultative group in NATO on the INF negotiations. There was really good consultation there.

Part V - Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria, 1974-77

[HILL] I think what I would like to do now is to go on to Part Five. That was when you were Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. I think that was from 1974 to 1977, except that in Romania it ended in 1976.

[CAMERON] They got a new Embassy, a new Ambassador.

[HILL] I wonder if you could tell us briefly about your main impressions of that period particularly in terms of the differences of viewpoint in those different countries? Also, how astute do you think the policies of the Western allies are towards those countries?

[CAMERON] Well, each one is completely different. Yugoslavia has its own brand of Communism, involving a degree of self-management. They also consider themselves a world leader, in the non-aligned world. Tito was one of the founders of the Non-aligned Movement, and they place tremendous importance on that. They are very proud of their independence, they have good relations with virtually all, both the Western countries and most of the Eastern countries, but not all of them. They have a very active foreign policy, designed in part to remind the world of Yugoslavia's existence. The Yugoslav Ambassador spoke to our CIIA group a few months ago. He was interesting but we could not stop him talking, to the point where several people had to leave because it was getting late. They are vocal, articulate, intelligent people of different ethnic

backgrounds and considering their size they play a pretty important role on the world scene. Romania appears as an independent actor on the foreign policy scene, but I think it is more smoke and mirrors. They have an agreement with the Soviets that they are allowed to sort of dance on the stage a little bit independently in return for keeping the toughest police state that exists in the Eastern Europe, with the exception of East Germany.

Romanians have a different outlook from most of the others. They are a Latin country, they speak a different language, they have a different background but they are very much dependent on the Communist system to keep Ceausescu's crowd in power. Romania does not allow Soviet forces to go through its territory on the way to exercises in Bulgaria. So that reinforces the impression that they are independent. Bulgaria is a classic example of the loyal ally, certainly under Zhivkov. Bulgarians are very, very pro-Russian; their language is very similar, the statue on their main square is the statue of the uncle of George Ignatieff, who was the Foreign Minister at the time they were liberated from the Turks. They are very conscious of the Russian role in liberating them from Turkish domination, which is still remembered in that part of the world as a crucial point in their history. As to how the policies of the West apply, I would say the importance we attach to the CSCE is very relevant. Countries like Yugoslavia, and to some extent Romania, look on the CSCE as an avenue through which they can parley with the Western countries. When I was going to call on the Romanians, I would go down there about once a month and include a visit to the Bulgarians; we would always have at least a quarter of a hour on problems related to CSCE. This was particularly useful from our point of view, because we could legitimately raise the sensitive issue of family reunification. In fact, I remember my farewell call on the Romanian President. I gave him a list of the families who were not allowed to leave Romania to join their relatives in Canada. He did not take offense at this, or say this is intrusion in their national affairs. Romanians accepted this as part of their responsibility under the CSCE Final Act; they did not like it but they accepted it. That was one positive feature of our relationship with those countries. In Canada's case of course our main source of interest was Yugoslavia at that time. We had a fair amount of trade and quite a few visitors from Canada. The Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Whelan, visited us in his official capacity and toured farms in Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. Western policies vary from state to state, but I think they have been intelligent in the sense that they have tried to maintain a dialogue with these countries which even in the cases of Romania or Bulgaria may help to promote a small degree of independence. Yugoslavia of course is different.

[HILL] After you finished serving in those countries, in 1977, you went to U.B.C. for a year. I just wanted to ask you one question on that period. That was between one phase of your career in Eastern Europe and the second phase. Were there any major reflections that you had in that period about that service, as you were preparing yourself for the next period.

[CAMERON] I was particularly interested in the extent to which there was a genuine effort made to produce a measure of détente and the role that was played by our embassies in those countries and their response to this effort to bring West and East together. We were pretty optimistic about what might happen on MBFR, and on CSCE and what would happen as a result of the SALT agreements and the efforts of the superpowers to get together. I think there was a general feeling of considerable optimism, almost until the imposition of martial law in 1980 in Poland.

[HILL] In some of my dealings with Eastern Europeans in the IPU, the Inter-parliamentary Union, I have detected what I believe to be some increase over time in their leeway for independent action. Would you assess that some East European countries have progressed over time in having a little bit more freedom of manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Soviet Union?

[CAMERON] Yes, but it varies from country to country. The East Germans are one example. I used to go to Berlin about once a month when I was in Warsaw. They are the most stiff of the Germans. They are the old Prussians and very regimented by nature, not just because they have this kind of régime. But I was surprised at the extent to which they never let their hair down and told you what they really thought about anything. But they had a degree of interest in a lot of these questions of arms control and so on. It varies from country to country. Such was not the case with Bulgaria partly because of the way the Bulgarians are. Any change was partly a result of a change of the Soviet Union's manner of dealing with its allies. I think that several allies are going to have a real problem with Gorbachev in the sense that if they try to incorporate some of Gorbachev's ideas in their own countries they are going to have real problems, especially if they go too far.

[HILL] I gather that Pravda has been banned in the GDR. It's too left wing.

[CAMERON] You know if you try to put yourself in their position, you cannot help sympathizing with the East Germans. In East Berlin they call it the capital of the DDR, and they all have television sets, they tried to stop them from getting television sets for a while by making it illegal but of course that did not work. Nobody watches the East German television, except maybe for the odd bit of news. It is the most boring kind of crap they put out on that, and all they need to do is switch the dial and get all the European channels through West Berlin. And they watch, sometimes it is difficult - you get these jokes in East Berlin among some of the diplomats - it was difficult to get officials to go out on Thursday night. Why? Because they were going to be watching the latest US sit com shown on West German television. So they have this problem of trying to create a society with rigid, socialist morals and standards right up against the flesh pot of Europe, West Berlin. I do not know if you have been there recently, but there are more Mercedes and Cadillacs, you name it, luxury goods in the stores in West Berlin, plus all this flood of information. The East Germans are trying to establish, a Communist state in a country just about 200 miles wide. They have a real problem. They are all the time cracking down on this and that; it is difficult for them, it is almost an impossible task they have in controlling the information flowing from West Germany.

Part VI - Ambassador to Poland and the German Democratic Republic, 1978-80

[HILL] This leads us very nicely to what is Part 6 of the interview, which is your period as Ambassador in Poland and the GDR, and I think that I would like to continue a little bit with the GDR. I was there once, I spent two weeks in a conference and prior to that I had been in West Berlin and my impression of the GDR was that fundamentally the people there remain German nationalists or Germans, and that nationalism is still an important feature there, that really the Marxist régime did not seem, to me, to have sunk really deep roots in the population. Now this may be just a surface impression, but how would you assess the development of the GDR and intra-German relations right now, or during the period when you were there?

[CAMERON] Well, my impressions for what they are worth, and again they are pretty superficial, because you do not learn all that much by being there three or four days once a month. But you learn a bit from talking to people who are there more permanently. My impression is that they are all Germans, they are very proud of the fact that they are Germans. They are also proud of the fact that they had built up their own country without any help from outside. The country was stripped by the Soviets and it has now become, they are proud of the fact that they are now, number one, not number two or number three, they are number one in the Warsaw Pact, as the most efficient, best producer of goods and services. They provide the Soviets with a lot of highly specialized items; they have the famous old German optical firms, highly technical things, they have

industrialized the country which was essentially an agricultural area before. Now it is the most polluted, the dirtiest place I have ever been in terms of air pollution. It would be like living next door to the Ohio Valley smoke stacks to be in East Germany. You hold your nose, it is just terrible. That is down where the industries are not in East Berlin, but farther south. There is a kind of ambivalence in the Germans. On the one hand they are German nationalists and therefore they see Germany as a German problem, but on the other hand there is a whole new generation that have been brought up who are East Germans. It starts in the way that they treat their athletes, from infants. Everything is organized and much attention is given to their youth. I do not think there is any sense among the younger people that the wave of the future is reunification with West Germany. My impression was, they are more proud of the fact that they have their own country. It is separated, they are Germans but separated from the other part of Germany; they have done it themselves and they have a degree of prosperity. They also believe their youth has certain kinds of benefits not available in West Germany. Evidence of the success of their youth programme is that their athletes are number one in the world. On the other side of the coin they have this repressive regime. But it is the one country in the East Bloc where the system, this Marxist/Leninist, Communist system, actually has been made to work. In addition to all the young people being brought up in the new tradition, you have a huge bureaucracy all of which have their own stake in the maintenance of the system. So I do not know. There are also more and more links between East and West Germany; they have also relaxed a lot, not with respect to travel for East Germans, but for people from the West. Commercial links between the two Germanies are very important. One of the reasons why East Germany has done so well is because it has an entry into the Common Market through West Germany; it certainly has been a big factor because a lot of the West German firms are closely tied to East German counterparts.

[HILL] We might briefly touch on your period in Poland.

[CAMERON] This is a period which I would like to have explored in great depth because of all the interesting, fascinating things going on there.

[HILL] Your period in Poland and East Germany was from 1978 to 1980. Was Solidarity being felt already at this time in Poland or did that come some other time. The great upward surge of Solidarity was the early 80s, was it not?

[CAMERON] Solidarity had not even been started and no one even heard about Walesa when we left. But there was a real mood developing on the part of the workers. You have to go back a few years; there were strikes in Poland in 1976 when the Government attempted to take action to put the economy on what you might call a more realistic footing. In Communist theology there is no such thing as inflation. They do not accept the idea of inflation. The net effect of this has been they have had, from way back, a situation where they subsidized the cost of basic commodities, bus fares, bread, milk, meat, a whole lot of things, so that, for example, the average Pole could go on the bus for the equivalent of one or two cents Canadian. Meat was equally cheap but in short supply. In 1976 they raised the price of meat I've forgotten by how much and they had strikes all over the place and they cracked down and they shot workers up in the shipyards in the north. One of the reasons there was trouble in the north was because a lot of the people up there hate the Soviets more than the rest of the Poles hate the Soviets. They are really tough characters around Gdansk. When I was leaving in 1980 I remember calling on the Speaker of their Parliament. I remember him telling me: "This summer we are going to try and introduce some economic reforms". Well the net effect of their policies was that you had an enormous proportion of the budget going into subsidies. The whole thing was cockeyed in terms of managing their economy. On top of that during the seventies, the banks were lending large amounts at low rates, including

to the Poles. So they had an enormous build-up of debts and a lot of this money going to big projects including some Canadian projects, pulp and paper for example, huge amounts of money.

[HILL] Rapid industrialization.

[CAMERON] Rapid industrialization, which again is one of the objectives of these regimes; to be industrialized, that is the wave of the future. Poland used to be the bread basket of Europe. They used to export grain. Now we have people coming from the Wheat Board in Canada and looking at this country and saying "If we could take over here, we could really make this place go". When the Speaker was talking to me, and saying that they intended that summer to institute some reforms, what he meant was that they were going to raise the prices of some of these things so that they would not have to spend so much money paying for subsidies; and he said they were going to do it differently from the way they did it in 1976, when the last riots took place. The Speaker said "We are going to do it [institute reforms] on a region-by-region basis, not all at once, and we are going to do it in the summer". They tried it out first around Lublin. Not only did they have a big outcry because the fares went up on the trams, but the tram drivers also went on strike. Anyway, there was a strike by the tram drivers in Lublin which by itself was not very serious, but on top of that it spread. Because I guess the Poles got word this was going to happen everywhere and that the prices were going to go up. So the government had a minor crisis on its hands; on top of that, Poland had a miserable summer. It rained and rained; we left about July, but the Vistula had just about overflowed its banks by then; there was flooding and dark clouds and windy weather. The Poles are a bit like the Scandinavians, they love to see a little bit of sun because they have a lousy winter. Consequently, the reforms started off badly and the government did not handle the strike very well, and it spread up to the shipyards. Solidarity grew out of that. Essentially it was a sensible effort by the Government to deal with a very basic problem. So they had this combination of unrest as a result of their attempt to bring back a degree of common sense into the management of their economy, combined with a huge burden of foreign debt, plus an overly ambitious industrialization programme which started shortly before I arrived, with projects which would be difficult to implement in Canada, let alone in Poland. I remember we were invited to visit a paper mill up in the northern part of Poland. There was a desperate shortage of paper in Poland. So plans were made to build a large mill in North West Poland and it was designed by a Canadian engineering firm. Canada put up a lot of money and made it available for this project. Well, as Ambassador I was invited to come up and see the opening, I think it was going to be at Christmas in 1978/79. The plant manager phoned up to say sorry, it was not ready. The next spring came along, no sign of it and as it came closer to the summer of 1980 when I was expected to leave, a visit was finally arranged. During the visit we found that the plant was more than two years behind schedule. The Canadians there told us the main reasons for the delay were a combination of interference by the local Communist politicians, a lack of direction from Warsaw and the local government, and general mismanagement. If you talked to Germans about this kind of situation, they would just shake their heads. They think Poles are badly organized and not very good managers. Poles will tell you themselves they are good at ideas but they are not very good at carrying them out; it's sort of their national trait. The problem today is that the people do not have an adequate balanced supply of food. One Polish joke is what is a kilometre long and eats potatoes; the answer is a Polish meat line-up. And everybody works, women work, men work and often the women take turns as to who is going down on Thursdays or whatever day it is to get a little hunk of meat. It is really sad. What is the answer? Now they are talking about becoming a member of the International Monetary Fund. The Soviets have a strangle hold over them in the sense that they provide them with a lot of their energy: their oil and gas.

[HILL] Those people that you knew, who were in charge of the Government in that time, most of those presumably have gone now.

[CAMERON] The Foreign Minister is still around, he was in East Germany then.

[HILL] I mean that was the whole Gierek period.

[CAMERON] Yes, Gierek was blamed, that is pretty well true of any society; when they kick one government out people blame the previous one. Undoubtedly there was a lot of corruption, not nearly as much as you would find in a place like Romania where you had this entrenched autocracy. I do not know what the answer is in Poland. I think that hopefully an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and between West and East might bring about amelioration in their condition; Solidarity to my mind was a natural reaction to a situation which had become unbearable. Not just in the question of being able to say anything but being able to have what they considered to be a fair standard of living. A lot of the people travel, and a lot of them come to Canada. They do not like the system, they do not think the system is much good. Their attitudes are more Western than Eastern. They do not have a great regard for the Soviets but they have a certain respect for them in the sense that the Soviets helped to liberate their country. Their attitude is one of ambivalence.

Part VII - Assistant Under-Secretary of State, 1980-83

[HILL] I wonder if we could just quickly go over the last part, Part 7, which is really the end of the interview. We turn to the point in 1980 when you came back to Ottawa. Until 1983 I think you were Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, part of that time with responsibility for the Bureau of International Security Policy and Arms Control. Well, this kind of links a bit to the previous comment, because one of the major issues in that period presumably was the whole business of Solidarity and introduction of martial law in Poland and so on. How would you assess Soviet behaviour in that crisis and also the Western responses to that situation?

[CAMERON] Well, the Soviets were in a very difficult position, because they had to deal with what was in essence not only an uprising but in a very strategic location. It is a very, very sensitive area of the world for them. They have large forces in East Germany, but the Polish lines of communication, the railways, go through Poland. There are not all that many forces in Poland, but there are a lot in East Germany. The Soviets were in a very serious, difficult situation, and my impression was that they really did not know quite what to do. I do not think that they wanted to invade Poland; I would doubt they ever intended to invade Poland if they could help it. There would have been no advantage gained in taking over Poland because the people are not sympathetic to Soviets, so it could have created an even worse situation. There might also have been some concern or nervousness about the loyalty of the Polish soldiers to the Polish Communist government. There is some evidence to support the theory that the ultimate weapon that they put to the Poles was a threat to cut off their energy supplies. They have such a strangle-hold economically, Poland is such a basket case anyway, that they could cut off their oil and gas, and they would just freeze to death in the winter time. Poland does not have any hydro electric power, just the generating stations, run on cheap coal but probably not enough to supply the country. They are dependent on the Soviets economically for so much, as well as their defence relationship. I think that the Soviet mobilization and movement on the borders was designed to impress upon the Poles, as much as upon the allies, their concern about what was going on in the country. In retrospect the imposition of martial law by the Polish Government came as a surprise to most intelligence analysts. They did not rate that highly on the list of possible developments, and the way it was handled was extremely skilful on the part of the Soviets and Polish authorities. Poles are very religious people, they go

to Church every Sunday. Martial law was instituted on a Sunday morning, about two o'clock in the morning, when all good Poles were asleep or getting up to an early mass and it was carried out with a minimum of blood shed or Nazi-type police tactics. It was done without the use of the Armed Forces. I do not think that they wanted the Armed Forces to be the ones, and probably the people in the forces themselves did not want to be the ones to round up the Solidarity activists. This was done by the secret police. So the short answer is that the Soviets were very much in a dilemma as to what they could do; they had to do something for security reasons. The other big threat to the Soviets was that if they allowed this thing to get out of hand, and they already felt that it had gone too far, this could trigger enormous difficulties for the other Eastern countries as well as for the Soviet Union. Because it was a threat, not only a security threat, but a threat to their whole political system. The idea of plurality, of democracy just does not work. The two are just diametrically opposed. There is no way you could get the two to work together. The closest you get is something like you have in Yugoslavia.

[HILL] Another major issue that runs through the period while you were in this position in Ottawa is the question of the implementation of the NATO two-track decision of December 1979, about the installation of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. How well do you think that whole affair was handled by NATO, by the NATO allies?

[CAMERON] There were mistakes made, but by and large my judgment would be that it was extremely well handled by the governments. The German government particularly, which was the most vulnerable one of all, put its future on the line and the Soviets badly miscalculated opinion in Germany. They thought the Government would not survive the vote on the introduction of missiles and they did everything they could; in fact their efforts to get involved in a propaganda war were counterproductive. There were a lot of mistakes but, by and large, there was good consultation with the allies, and a very active role was played by the Germans who had an extremely able negotiator by the name of Fred Ruth. Looking back, I would say it was a success. I do not think that Canada's attitude was particularly noteworthy; I am not very proud of it, but that is just a personal opinion.

[HILL] If you had to enumerate two or three other major developments in that period, when you were in this position, what would they be, I mean in respect to the general question of international peace and security? What stand out as key developments or achievements in that period?

[CAMERON] Well, there were the renewal of the SALT talks which were an important effort to reach an agreement on strategic weapons, and at the same time we came very close to reaching agreement with the Soviets on INF. Their "walk-in-the-woods" formula contained the seeds of an agreement. It always surprised me that the Soviets did not move in on that, and that we did not do a little bit more ourselves in trying to follow through. But the major mistake was made by the Soviets in terms of their analysis of the political situation in Germany. There has always been more political savvy involved in the Soviet negotiating position than there ever has been on the Western side; that has been a big Western weakness. We tend to look at arms controls in terms of numbers, in terms of what it is going to do in security terms. The Soviets have traditionally played as good chess players, they see it as a move ahead, they also see the political implications of all their moves, whether you call it propaganda or not.

[HILL] Well, as a last question, based on your reflections on that period, and leading up to today, how do you rate other questions?

[CAMERON] The other significant event was the follow-up to the Polish crisis and the way it was handled. I think that the imposition of martial law was a dramatic development in East-West relations. With respect to the reaction of the West, and especially the imposition of sanctions, they have had some political impact but they have been of doubtful value in terms of overall East-West relations. Another event that stands out in my mind was the discord in the Alliance over the question of the Siberian gas pipeline, and here Canada played a key role in that meeting which was held at La Sapinière, north-east of Montreal. It was the first private meeting of NATO ministers ever held. There was no agenda and very few officials were present. It dealt with the question of a threat by the United States to retaliate against their allies because of European support for this pipeline. It was a very serious Alliance crisis, and Canada played a very key role at the meeting which allowed the Americans to back down without publicity. The result was an agreement, which solved a potentially serious rift in the Alliance.

[HILL] One last question: how do you see NATO's role in Canadian foreign policy? Do you think it is a key element in Canadian foreign policy, particularly in terms of the pursuit of international peace and security? Do you remain a strong advocate of continuing membership?

[CAMERON] I remain a strong advocate of continuing membership. I believe it serves our interests. I do not think we should belong to it simply because it is a club that everybody should join. I agree with a good deal of what Joe Clark had to say recently about the advantages derived from being inside and not outside, lecturing piously to the others. Like any Alliance there are obligations and there are certain disadvantages, but in this inter-dependent world we live in nobody can really get along without closer relations with a multitude of countries. It seems to me that the important thing is that NATO should not become an alliance designed to confront forever the Soviet Union and its allies, that there should be an effort made to maintain a balance between defence and détente. If anything, the emphasis should be on negotiations with the East, on an effort to remove the divisions that exist, the political divisions which are at the heart of the arms build-up. To my mind, it is only by hard work and long negotiations and practical efforts through trade and closer relations that you are going to reduce this distrust that exists between East and West.

[HILL] Do you see NATO as being a fundamental basis for conducting those kind of discussions on an East-West basis?

[CAMERON] I would not be too rigid about that. It seems to me that you can envisage other broader types of systems. For example, I do not think you should downgrade, or I do not think that you should exaggerate either, what the CSCE has been able to accomplish. And I think you have to be fairly flexible. I think we have been fairly pragmatic ourselves, more so than some other countries, on the extent to which we are prepared to modify your negotiating procedures.

[HILL] Basically, then, for the foreseeable future, how would you assess the utility of membership in NATO for Canada.

[CAMERON] Well, it will continue to be a very important element in our approach to East-West relations and in terms of our relations with our allies. Perhaps we should do more in the way of making clear, to our European partners particularly, the extent to which we have a big country here. We have a North American security problem, the dimensions of which are changing, and could well mean a greater emphasis on our Arctic and on the North than we have in the past. It has tended to fluctuate up and down. I do not think that the Europeans are sufficiently conscious of the extent of our North American security interests. It is not a question of being Canada first, it is the

question of there being security dimensions to North America which are changing. And, it is part of the NATO Alliance after all; that is the point I would emphasize.

[HILL] We will close at this point. Thank you very much.

GEORGE GRANDE

[HILL]⁵ Good afternoon. Today we have with us Ambassador George Grande, formerly Canada's representative to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna and former Ambassador to South Africa. After serving with the RCAF and RAF in war time, Ambassador Grande joined the Department of External Affairs in 1946, and subsequently served in the Canadian Mission to the United Nations in New York, in Athens, in Berlin, with the Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, on the Directing Staff of the National Defence College in Kingston, and in various senior posts overseas. These included the following: High Commissioner to Ceylon 1964-66, Ambassador to Norway and Iceland 1968-72, Ambassador to the Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna 1973-76, and Ambassador to South Africa and High Commissioner to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 1976-79. Ambassador Grande retired from the Department of External Affairs in 1979, and is now a well known columnist and editorial writer with the Ottawa Citizen.

Ambassador Grande, as you know, what we are doing here now is part of an oral history of Canadian policy in NATO. We are trying to gather the views of Canadians who have been most active in NATO's policy-making and NATO-related affairs, so as to develop ideas on the importance of NATO to Canada. We want to know how well membership in NATO has served Canada over the years in the pursuit of its direct national interests and also those broader long term goals, so important to the future of this country, such as international peace and security. We are trying to look at the main policy developments and issues in our field over the past 40 years in a fairly systematic fashion, and to learn what happened, and how Canada and the Alliance were affected by various developments. So the focus of our discussions will be on those periods of your career when you were directly involved in NATO affairs or NATO-related issues, especially your period as MBFR Ambassador in Vienna. However, we would also like to get the flavour of your own personal views and reflections on Canada's foreign policy, and on the general evolving world scene. So we will also touch on some of the other periods in your very extensive and interesting career.

Part I - Early Years, to 1945

[HILL] Ambassador Grande, you were born in Montreal, I believe, and grew up there?

[GRANDE] That's right.

[HILL] You graduated from McGill University in 1940 in English and Economics, and then briefly attended Osgoode Hall Law School, in Toronto.

[GRANDE] Yes.

[HILL] In 1941, you joined the RCAF and a year later were commissioned as a pilot officer. Afterwards you saw service with the RAF in the UK, India and Ceylon, and were in the armed forces until 1945 when you were demobbed as a Flight Lieutenant. Could you tell us a little bit about this period and what kind of tasks you were involved in at that time, and how it came that you went to India and so on.

Interviewers: Hill, Pawelek. Interview dates: 18/3/87 and 1/4/87.

[GRANDE] Yes. I first, while still attending law school in Osgoode Hall in Toronto, tried to enter the armed forces because at that time the war hotted up, as you may recall, in '41 in particular, and I tried to enter as a recruit. My poor eyesight disqualified me for that rather quickly. I then tried for the Navy but was rejected on an interview and finally landed up with the Air Force who were at that time pushing what they called RDF (Radio Direction Finding), and the Americans called it radar and wanted people with fair educations to learn what it was all about. I did not have any background whatsoever in signals, or science for that matter of any sort, but this intrigued me, and I joined up in Montreal as an RDF mechanic, and went through preliminary basic signals training in Montreal at McGill, at my old university, but this time as an AC buff rather than a student. I transferred to Clinton, Ontario, to a very hush-hush, top secret RAF school in RDF and radar, and there we were taught everything there was to know in radar for those who did not have a scientific background. Then we were told we would be sent overseas. In fact, I was transferred down to an embarkation depot in Moncton in 1942, and to my surprise was called out, along with a few others - we had been interviewed for commissions before we left Clinton but did not think much of it - we were called out and then were told we were then pilot officers.

[HILL] That did not mean that you were flying, that meant that you were still in the radar field?

[GRANDE] Yes, in the radar field. So we went, all 20 of us, got on a boat together in Halifax, sailed over to the UK, and were transferred to various parts throughout England to radar stations, mostly ground radar stations, CH and CHL stations they called them. Mine was a CHL station right near Hastings, RAF Fairlight, as commanding officer, and with I suppose 60 or 70 people there altogether including RAF gunners to protect us. At that time, flights over from Germany were frequent.

Still as a radar officer, I was transferred from there to India in May of the following year, but in India when I arrived, I arrived before the radar equipment, and so I had to spend some time on basic signals, assisting signal's officers of various RAF squadrons at this time in the Madras area, and eventually I got transferred to a radar station in Ceylon. I spent more or less the rest of the war between Ceylon and India, and between ground stations and air stations doing radar as a radar officer, ranging from a tea estate in Ceylon, which must have been the most beautiful spot in the world to spend part of the war, to some pretty crummy accommodations near Calcutta from which we used to fly over the Bay of Bengal, and do air sea rescue and so on.

[HILL] It was mainly air/sea rescue presumably. There may have been some naval operations in the Indian Ocean, but not much at that time I guess.

[GRANDE] It was all, ours was anyway, air/sea rescue.

Part II - United Nations, 1946-52

[HILL] I think we will go on now to the United Nations period from 1946-52, and that includes not only your time at the UN in New York but also various phases in Ottawa, I believe. I wondered if you could tell us something about your main jobs in that period.

[GRANDE] I was sent down to New York, I guess it was late summer, early fall, of 1947, to be the secretary of the first permanent mission of Canada, we called it the Permanent Delegation of Canada, to the UN. We were all secretaries; third secretary, first secretary, second secretary. I was to be the secretary of the delegation as it was being established under General McNaughton, who was then our representative. General McNaughton was there waiting, as it were, for Canada to be elected to the Security Council where he was to be our first Ambassador to the Security

Council, as well as our first Permanent Representative to the UN. I was secretary of the delegation, where my work was at first largely administrative, and then when there was more time, I did a lot of the advising, if you will. We were all advisors in those days, advising the delegation on various subjects, wherever I was assigned. During the General Assembly, I was advising mostly it seemed on the, when it was established, the Ad Hoc Political Committee. It was mostly political and social. I advised Senator Cairine Wilson during one session on prostitution and a few things like that on the social committee. A dear lady. But mostly political work, but supplementary political work. There was a lot of high priced help there with me; John Starnes, Harry Carter, John Holmes from time to time, Arnold Smith and George Ignatieff; all under General McNaughton.

[HILL] You also represented Canada on the Atomic Energy Commission. I mean the delegation did. Canada was represented at that time.

[GRANDE] Yes, that is right. I am not sure of the exact date it stopped meeting. But there was not too much work involved even when I was there.

[HILL] I think at that time, if I am not mistaken, the headquarters of the UN, at least to begin with, was at Lake Success, wasn't it?

[GRABNDE] That is right.

[HILL] Which is out on Long Island somewhere.

[GRANDE] It was the old Sperry Gyroscope Company during the war, the Sperry plant, and they took that over. That is where the daily meetings were held. During General Assembly sessions, the committee meetings were held there too, and the plenary meetings were held at Flushing Meadow, the site of the World's Fair.

[HILL] So it was not until a good bit later that the UN moved to its present site.

[GRANDE] I was there at the laying of the cornerstone by Truman, of the present building.

[HILL] Yes.

[GRANDE] All the time I was there we met at Lake Success without too much success.

[HILL] I gather the Canadian delegation was housed in the old Biltmore Hotel over the Grand Central Station.

[GRANDE] For the General Assemblies, yes. Those of us who were permanently there scratched around and rented accommodation all over New York. A number of us went into a place called Parkway Village, which was a new development only for people connected with the UN, and that is where Ralph Bunche was at that time too, John Starnes, Arnold Smith, myself and other people in our delegation. They were all there at the same time in this development.

[HILL] One thing that we are trying to get an idea of in this series is the development of Canadian foreign policy with respect to international affairs, in the organization of world affairs, in the effort to pursue international peace and security. So clearly one thing that we are interested in is the thrust of Canadian policy with respect to the United Nations in the periods at the end of the war when the UN was founded, and then in the immediate post-war period when the UN was getting

itself established. Also, as you mentioned, Canada was not on the Security Council for a while, because in one of the elections Canada stood aside to allow Australia to go forward, if I am not mistaken. But then, I think it was perhaps in 1947 or '48, Canada became a member of the Security Council.

[GRANDE] We became a member on January 1, 1948, for two years. But we set up a permanent mission because we knew we were going to become a member. I think in those days you had a pretty automatic majority vote in the West, and we knew we would have enough votes to be elected. Most of my work was geared to that. I believe that was why General McNaughton was sent there in the first place, a general to head a delegation to a Security Council, I suppose, made sense.

[HILL] Could you give us some idea of how Canada's attitude towards the UN evolved over this period. I mean I suppose at one stage I had the idea that initially Canada was full of enthusiasm but this was gradually wearing down towards about '47, or '49 perhaps. But my impression, now, is that it is perhaps a little more complex than that. There seem to be more ups and downs.

[GRANDE] There was certainly a tremendous amount of enthusiasm when I went there in '47, and it seemed to a very junior officer that Canadian foreign policy revolved around the United Nations in those days. Everything we did, every decision we took, in fact most of our decisions, were UN decisions. Most of the items on which Canada was required to make a decision or to make a pronouncement had to do with subjects which were being debated at the UN, because most international events, episodes, whatever you want to call them, were being debated there. So, I found a tremendous amount of enthusiasm. Mr. Pearson, of course, was a UN man. But coupled with that enthusiasm for the UN, it was not a sort of enthusiasm to the extent that we thought that this was the solution, that there would never be a war again, that this would lead to one world and all this, not that sort of enthusiasm. It was an enthusiasm for being on the Western team, if you will, and being able to work out common positions, which we thought would make sense in order to preserve peace and promote, in many cases, the independence of nations, such as Israel and Indonesia and so on. But also we soon realized, certainly in that first Assembly in '47 when I was there, that the Cold War had set in with a vengeance. The political debates there were very full of rancour and polemics. I remember well the Vyshinski and Dulles debates. They went on for hours and hours. It was as if the two had been fighting each other in the war instead of being on the same side.

We, of course, all rallied around. I cannot remember any great division on the Western side of things in those days. We rallied round the Americans if you will, but at the same time, I do not think we particularly liked the extreme attitudes that were expressed by some American delegates, then as now.

[HILL] I think Buzz Nixon the other day made an interesting point on this. He said that most of the officers that he served with in that period were people who transferred the black and white view of the world from when they were fighting Nazi Germany. Now that was gone and now here was the new enemy. The black and white perception was simply to some degree transferred, which perhaps was quite natural. I wonder if there was a bit of that kind of ...

[GRANDE] I think there probably was, but not among thinking people, not among those who were steeped and versed in foreign affairs before that, not among people such as Mike Pearson or some of the more knowledgeable people from the State Department. You got somebody like Dulles who was single-minded, yes, and Senator Warren Austin, yes. But I think of Jack Hickerson in the State Department; he was extremely well versed and he knew all the nuances and so on. There

were many very able people on the American side of that sort, and on the British delegation as well, and the French delegation, and others, Australians, outstanding people. I do not think they viewed it in those sort of stark terms.

[HILL] Yes, but as that period proceeded, while you were involved in UN affairs, gradually as time went on perhaps, particularly in the Canadian case after Mackenzie King retired, the Canadian government and other governments launched what was in effect a rethinking process, which then turned into almost a crusade to establish something new, because they were very concerned about the way the UN was going. That led in to the whole process of thinking about setting up a new organization, which eventually became the North Atlantic Treaty system. Is that more or less how you would see things as having evolved in that time?

[GRANDE] Yes. I do not think that they viewed NATO as a substitute for the UN, and that certainly is something, because of the attitudes which evolved at the UN and elsewhere, something which was essential. One heard day after day after day sort of diatribes from the Soviet delegation and the Bielo-Russian delegation, records of what they said, and the others in Eastern Europe, all obviously orchestrated for months. I am sure that had a profound influence on Canadian, American, British and other policy makers in forming NATO. We down at the UN did not get exposed to too much of that, and certainly not at my level. I did not know what was going on. It was kept fairly hush-hush, at a very senior level, in the days before NATO.

[HILL] You mean at the outset?

[GRANDE] The preliminary thinking about NATO. I imagine in the Canadian establishment memos bounced back and forth, but only between people like Norman Robertson, Mike Pearson, Gerry Riddell and Escott Reid. They did not reach down to George Grande.

[HILL] What was it that made this change in world affairs apparent, I mean to public opinion. I mean I can remember that in that period the newspapers were full of Soviet diplomats saying, "Niet, Niet, Niet" all the time, and of course there was the fact that Eastern Europe was now blocked off from contact from most people. There was very little in the way of human contacts at that time. There was the Iron Curtain. What about Czechoslovakia, too?

[GRANDE] Very much so. The Czechoslovakia situation, yes. I forget what the date was when the gentleman was pushed out of or jumped out of the window. That had a profound impact there, and also there were individual cases like the Cardinal Mindszenty case that come to my mind. I remember writing speeches for Hugh Lapointe on that but this was taken very seriously by us all. In fact, there were very few things in which we co-operated, were able to co-operate, with the Soviets, even in those days.

[HILL] Canada, however, played quite a leading role in the establishment of NATO, at least that is the impression one has, that Mr. Pearson, Mr. St. Laurent were very active in that time. Now I am sure that other statesmen from other Western countries were very active too, but in the case of St. Laurent and Pearson, it did become, or seem to become, virtually a crusade in the end to establish this new system. What lay behind that? I mean here you had people committed to the UN at one point. Of course they saw the difficulties the UN was in. What lay behind this crusade? Was it a desire to preserve Western values, or what was it?

[GRANDE] I think basically, you stated it correctly. Yes, it was a fear that things would get worse, as they seemed to be getting at the UN, things would get worse in the world, things would

get worse between East and West. I really do not remember referring to East as East and West as West, or saying behind the Iron Curtain and outside it. That impelled it I am quite sure. The fear was that the West did not have any security. Most of us had scaled down our armed forces after the war, as I recall, without consulting anyone, to try and get back to what was thought of as normal, and thank goodness for the farsightedness of the founding fathers of NATO that something was done. I suspect the Americans would have done something anyway but I doubt if they would have done it the way it was done, because they probably would have gone into their own shell again. There was still a large element, of that for some Americans anyway.

[HILL] You made a rather interesting comment, just a minute ago, which was that the formation of NATO was largely kept secret, or shall we say it did not percolate down very far, and I read the same thing in a speech by Escott Reid given several years ago. He made exactly the same point that it was all highly secret. So I was wondering, when it eventually became apparent at the UN that this new treaty was being formed, what kind of reception did this get in the UN? I mean, of course, the Western group would know about it, but what about the others?

[GRANDE] I do not remember anything specifically in the way of comment from the other side on it. Certainly it was included, the fact and the reasons for it, were included in the sort of ministerial speeches at the opening of the General Assembly in 1950, but I cannot remember anything specific actually.

[HILL] Less than a year after NATO was formed, there was the outbreak of the Korean War, and of course the response was from a UN command. The United States played the largest part but Canada was involved, most other Western countries were involved, and also there were other countries; India for example, provided a medical team if I remember rightly. Did this, the fact that the UN was involved in this response, restore some of the UN's lost prestige? Did people feel that the UN had acquired a new purpose, or was the Soviet absence from the Security Council at that time seen very much as a fluke, which was not going to be repeated?

[GRANDE] I think the latter. I think everyone breathed a sigh of relief that there was a way of them doing this and giving it a UN label, but I do not think it was considered as a great feat for the UN as such. I am not quite sure whether Canada, for instance, would have contributed troops if there had not been a UN cover to it. Maybe with Mackenzie King out of the way we would have eventually, but certainly if he had still been around we would not have.

[HILL] When you ended up this phase of your career in late '52, you went back to Ottawa, I believe, to the UN or the Legal Division.

[GRANDE] I might mention one thing, a great deal of time was spent in those days in compiling a book called "Canada and the United Nations" each year, 1947, '48, '49 and '50, each year, and fairly senior persons were put in charge of it. I had that honour, I think the year after I came back from the United Nations to Ottawa, and Basil Robinson did it, I think the year before me, and there was a tremendous amount of effort put into this book. I do not know if it still exists or not, but in those days this was a major project. It seemed to be very important to the powers that be in the Canadian government that we record in great detail everything we did at the United Nations, and all the divisions were hard at work for quite a while preparing their various bits and pieces and chapters to this publication, which was an indication of the seriousness with which we took the UN in those days.

[HILL] How did you perceive the UN yourself at that time, the time that you left this particular phase of your career? Do you remember how you saw the UN going on from there?

[GRANDE] I think we were certainly not optimistic, we were pessimistic about how it would go or continue to go. I think we had higher hopes for its achievements in the economic and social fields than in the political or certainly the military field. The idea of an international force had long since disappeared; of having a truly international force under the UN Security Council, for which provision is there, as you know, in the Charter. But it never got off the ground. But useful work certainly, those were the heydays of the Children's Fund, and then even when I was still in New York, the Point Four Program, the beginnings of technical assistance, the beginnings of international aid, came into being.

[HILL] So already by '52 the focus of Canadian policy with regard to international security and peace had in fact shifted to NATO.

[GRANDE] Yes.

Part III - Athens, 1952-54

[HILL] Well, we will go on then to part III, which was your period in Athens from 1952-54. In that time, you served as First Secretary in the Canadian Embassy in Athens. This was shortly after Greece had joined NATO. It was also not many years after the very bitter Greek Civil War. I think it's hard to realize now just how bitter that was, and how many people were involved in it, also perhaps the poverty in which many people had lived as a result of the miseries of the Second World War and then the Civil War and so on. So Greece was not just a Mediterranean resort at that time, by any means. At any rate, it was certainly not a wealthy country. So I just wondered if you could tell us something of the condition of Greece while you were there. What sort of state was in it and also what were the politics like?

[GRANDE] Yes, the government was headed by Marshall Papagos, the military touch if you will when I was there. The Foreign Minister was Stephanopolous, the king was on his throne, with Queen Frederika directing affairs from behind him, and Greece was a very poor country. You could see poverty even around Athens. At the same time, my feeling was that they were greatly encouraged by the Truman Doctrine. That had a profound effect on the Greek people. They were getting substantial aid and had prospects of getting even more if they used their aid wisely. There was a continual flow of American and international bankers it seemed, aid officials and so on, coming in and out of the country, but in particular there was a huge American mission permanently established there whose sole job was to administer economic aid.

On the military side, the Greek forces were being built up slowly. I remember Canada played a role in that. I happened to be Chargé d'Affaires at the time, and we donated a bunch of our old aircraft when we replaced them. I forget the type of aircraft they were. They were the ones we had been using in Europe, and then we replaced them with a later model.

[HILL] The Sabre jets probably.

[GRANDE] Yes. We turned them over, some to Greece and some to Turkey, trying to preserve the balance even in those days. This was received with great cheers by the Greek establishment. They thought this was great.

The Balkan Pact came into being while I was in Athens. Relations between Greece and Turkey were pretty good, and between Greece and Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia and Turkey, the three of them, the original members of the Balkan Pact. This was greeted with great enthusiasm by all three countries. I remember Marshall Tito paid a state visit, I guess it was, to Athens when I was there. Even in those days, he was cheered by the Greeks as one of the "Free World's" great people. In those days, they had great plans for the Balkan Pact. They thought this was going to be the end of the animosity between these countries, certainly between Greece and Turkey. This was going to be the means of having a modus vivendi which would last between these two countries. How wrong they were.

[HILL] Didn't they think it might draw in Bulgaria and Romania as well?

[GRANDE] Yes.

[HILL] But nothing ever came of that.

[GRANDE] No. But that was certainly being discussed in those formative days.

[HILL] Were there negotiations going on at this time over US bases, I mean to put them in there at that time, not to take them out presumably? And what was the role of the Sixth Fleet in the area?

[GRANDE] I do not remember anything specific about that. Certainly there was a continual stream of naval visits. I remember Admiral Mountbatten visited Greece when I was there, when I was Chargé d'Affaires. He called on me because I was the senior Commonwealth guy there, and Canada was the senior Commonwealth nation. He then was, I guess, in charge of the Mediterranean fleet for the British. There were a number of American visits too and they were always great occasions for us.

Certainly no Soviet naval visits. I presume the negotiations were going on there. The American bases had not been established.

[HILL] No? That is what I wondered about.

[GRANDE] They must have been discussing it, negotiating it for them. But somebody, maybe it was you, mentioned this and I would agree that there was not any specific role for Greece that I can remember in those days, a military role. I mean it was not envisaged that NATO forces from the central front would be moved down to Greece or anything of that sort. I think the role of Greece was just evolving, the military role.

[HILL] You mentioned you were Chargé d'Affaires. How many people were there in the Canadian Embassy and what were your own duties during most of that time?

[GRANDE] In addition to the Ambassador, we had a First Secretary, Third Secretary, Commercial Secretary, an Immigration Officer and team, Security Office, RCMP, and there were two Trade and Commerce officers. The Immigration Office in those days was separate from the Embassy.

[HILL] What was the nature of Canadian-Greek relations at that time? Were most of the issues to do with immigration and trade, or were there many political issues as well?

[GRANDE] It was mostly keeping a watching brief I think on developments, reporting on them. There was quite a bit of reporting on the Balkan Pact, for instance, on the economic situation. We did not have any economic aid program in those days but we were contributing through the UN, and so they were interested in having reports on it. Immigration was a big part of our program. There was very high immigration from Greece to Canada in those days. Distressed Canadians abroad also, consular work, that sort of thing. Dual nationals going back and being snatched by the Greek government and put in military service, that sort of thing.

[HILL] What about the problem of Enosis in Cyprus? Was this already bubbling up and was this beginning to have any effect on Greek-Turkish relations or Greece's relations with the rest of NATO or was this still dormant at this time?

[GRANDE] It was fairly dormant when I was there, but it had bubbled up even before I arrived, and bubbled up certainly after I left. It went in waves. The British were prepared. They barricaded themselves in their embassy. Their embassy is just across the street from ours but nothing much happened when I was there on that front.

[HILL] One last point I would like to explore a little bit further is the thought that on the Southern flank NATO is quite a different kind of animal, really, from what it is on the central front in the north. On the central front in Northern Europe you have a really integrated, multinational kind of complex. The armed forces are integrated and so on. Whereas on the southern flank in the southern region, what you have mainly is a collection of countries which are geographically quite divided one from another. Their main support comes from outside, i.e., through bilateral support largely from the United States. Also, of course, in the case of Greece and Turkey, their armies now to some degree are facing each other. These are just some thoughts, and I wonder if you would care to comment on them?

[GRANDE] I do not know whether there is a battle plan for Greece right now. I presume there are some NATO plans but I am quite sure there were not any in those days. There was still some communist influence in Greece, and there certainly was not a very good feeling between Athens and Moscow, although towards the end of my stay, this seemed to get a little better, an Ambassador arrived and so on.

I think that Greece certainly entered NATO for its own security. It wanted to belong to the club. It did not want to go it alone. I think NATO took Greece in, obviously because it wanted to protect its flanks or its under belly or whatever you want to call Greece. But the state of the Greek armed forces was such in those days that they could not play a significant military role. I am quite sure they could not even have defended themselves under direct attack. This was before there was any Soviet bomb to worry about, any nuclear blackmail or anything of that sort.

I think that having Greece in NATO then was good for us, if you will, as well as good for Greece. From that evolved a Greece that became accustomed to cooperating with the Western world, the rest of the Western world. I mention with the Western world because there were signs even when I was there in Greece down at the Port of Piraeus saying boats to Europe leave on Mondays or Tuesdays. Greece was not quite European. They did not consider themselves quite Western. They considered themselves Middle Eastern.

The basic focus was on the economic side of things, not on the military side.

[HILL] You mean as far as relations with NATO were concerned or as far as the Canadian Embassy and its operations?

[GRANDE] As far as Greece was concerned, their top priority was to have economic assistance, to get back on their feet after the Civil War, and they thought that by going into NATO, and sort of looking as if they were doing their bit for Western defence, they would get more aid. I think it worked out that way too.

[HILL] Did you ever see the movie Elena?

[GRANDE] No.

[Hill] Well, it's about the Greek Civil War period, which has almost been totally forgotten somehow. But that whole business about thousands of Greek children being taken into Yugoslavia, and then packed off to Hungary at one point, was a dreadful affair.

[GRANDE] There was still a latent anti-German feeling there, also. They were still proud of having resisted the Italians too. They did it at the beginning of the war, you remember. They pointed to signs which you could still see chalked up on some cliffs there: "OXI", meaning "No." "No, we will not let the Italians in." But the Germans got in later. They still feel that sort of thing. But because the Balkan Pact was being formed, any sort of anticommunist feeling was kept subdued in the latter part of my stay.

[HILL] I think one of the most interesting things you mentioned was that, at that time, relations with Turkey were on the whole quite good. It seems to be really the Cyprus problem which has by and large aroused old animosities. Of course, there are other things now like the Aegean Sea, but it seems to me that Cyprus was obviously crucial.

[GRANDE] Oh yes, the crucial factor. Still is. There were no signs of it being settled.

Part IV - Berlin, 1957-60

[HILL] Well, I think we will move on now to the next period which is part IV, the years in Berlin from 1957 to '60. Ambassador Grande, in 1957, you were appointed Canadian Consul in West Berlin. You also served as First Secretary and then Counsellor of the Canadian Military Mission in Berlin, if I am not mistaken. I wonder if you could just tell us something about your duties at that time, and in particular what did consular work involve, and what was the work of the Canadian Military Mission? Before giving you a chance to speak, I will just mention that I believe the Berlin Wall had not gone up at that time. In fact, it was not until the summer of 1960.

[GRANDE] '61.

[HILL] '61.

[GRANDE] That is right. All those titles are rolled into one really, it's really just the one body there. I did have some help, sort of a locally employed former British military officer, Dick O'Hagen, not the Prime Minister's O'Hagen, who was there also with me, and eventually I was successful in getting a junior officer towards the end of my stay to act as sort of administrative officer and consular officer, but the military mission was military in name only. It was set up because we had the right to set it up. We thought we should not lose the chance, the right as one of the victorious powers that supplied troops, and so on. We were given the chance of having a military mission that was funded out of the German budget, and it may still be, for all I know. It was funded insofar as we wanted it to be funded from the German budget, the Berlin budget, and

that meant that we got free accommodation, both living and office, and all our local staffs, all the local German staff whom we hired, or British, if there was anyone who lived locally, their salaries were paid out of the budget as well, and everything, typewriters, you name it. We saw a chance of setting up an interesting listening-post mission, which was what it was, on the cheap. It was called a military mission because we were supposed to be a military mission, whatever that meant. Each of the Western military missions was in a particular sector, ours was in the British sector, and we were sort of under the sponsorship of the British. Others were under the sponsorship of the French, the Belgians for instance, or the Americans.

The work there was fascinating, actually. It was largely political. It was really to tap the British, French and Americans, and get as much intelligence from them as possible, and to pass it on, in foreign dispatches to Ottawa. There was a wealth of material there; some of which you could get officially, and some which you could get unofficially. It was a crossroads of intrigue -- still is. When Krushchev issued his famous ultimatum in November, 1958, I guess it was, saying he was, in effect, going to take over West Berlin, that was the indication. Then all the world came to our doors, we had business from everyone under the sun. We had visits from all kinds of prominent Canadians who wanted to be on the spot. George Drew dashed over from London for instance. Willy Brandt must have spent half his time briefing visitors, I think.

[HILL] He was mayor, I think?

[GRANDE] He was Burgermeister and a damn good one too. I think it was his finest hour. The other phenomenon which was going on, which eventually resulted in the raising of the Berlin Wall. was the tremendous flow of refugees from East Berlin to West Berlin, and some from other parts of East Germany to West Germany. But these were coming over in increasingly great numbers daily, and I think it came up to 1,000 or more a day, once, before the Wall was built. All of these people were screened by the Allies in West Berlin, by the British, by the Americans, by the French, depending on where they came over, and indeed which sector. From these briefings came a tremendous amount of intelligence on what was going on in East Germany, and what the Soviets were doing and so on. In addition, we had direct contacts. We made a point of having direct contacts with the Soviets but not with the East Germans. We did not recognize the East German régime in those days, and we refused to accept the GDR visa but we acknowledged the Soviet occupation, if you will, even though they did not want us to later on. I remember I called on the Commander in Chief of the Soviet forces within East Berlin, and there was a Soviet Protocol Officer who was very active in and out of West Berlin, a great contact, and we invited them socially, and they came. So there was this sort of opportunity to tap them directly. They did not say very much but you could tell from the way they reacted and so on how they felt. They were obviously trying to maintain a low profile after the GDR was set up, to stay out of the way. We also had contact with the military exchange missions, like "BRIXMIS". The British, American and French exchange missions in East Germany were headquartered in West Berlin but also had their headquarters in East Germany in Potsdam.

[HILL] What did they consist of?

[GRANDE] They were missions. I remember there was an incident just a few years ago which brought them into the limelight. They were seldom heard of otherwise. They had the right to travel throughout East Germany and all areas that are not banned, and likewise there are Soviet forces in West Germany which have the same right. The British, French and Americans also have the right to do this. We have Canadians attached to these. We did in my day. They dash in high powered cars all over East Germany, and they pick up as much intelligence as they can, mostly

about troop dispositions and that sort of thing, and then pass it back. Every now and then, there used to be an incident. We had access to their reports too. So there was almost too much information. There was certainly too much for one person to handle there, and I must say the British were very forthcoming, as were the Americans, the French a bit less so, but they gave us access to what they considered we should know.

[HILL] So the main function was really collecting intelligence to report back to Ottawa, so the Canadian government could keep informed on the evolving situation in Berlin, and also in the GDR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

[GRANDE] That is right. That is how I conceived it. There was a flag waving function too. I was Mr. Canada there and I did attend the bilateral functions. We had a bilateral relationship with the city of Berlin, West Berlin, but it was mostly flag waving. The Germans in Bonn wanted us to stay there of course, and when we had a retrenchement drive people thought we would shut down in Berlin and get credit for closing a mission. But West Germans would not hear of it. They were willing to pay everything, even what was not already paid, our salaries.

[HILL] But it was closed eventually, was is not? Much later on.

[GRANDE] Yes, very stupidly, and then it was reopened. It's open now. In those days, our offices were right in the Olympic Stadium, which was the British military headquarters.

[HILL] Was there any function in terms of representing Canada? Was there any common allied council in West Berlin or any coordinating group or anything?

[GRANDE] Nothing in which Canada had a seat but we maintained contact. There was still a four-power command thing going, and they did meet occasionally and we got reports on their meetings. There was the Spandau prison of course, which had its own régime. There was the Berlin Air Safety Centre. We kept in touch with them, and then of course, there were all kinds of immigration opportunities there, although the security clearance side was pretty tricky. There was a Canadian immigration mission there as well, separate from our mission.

[HILL] If I remember rightly, what happened in the case of Mr. Khrushchev's ultimatum was, he decided he wanted West Berlin to become a "Free City," or perhaps it was the whole of Berlin he wanted to be a "Free City." I cannot remember which. In any event, this was just going to mean they would be an independent or separate entity and presumably not connected to West Germany or perhaps to the allied control system. If I remember rightly he also put on a six month deadline.

[GRANDE] There was a deadline definitely, and it was later withdrawn but it was a real worry because everyone knew, and the Allies did not make any pretense about it, that they could not defend West Berlin. It still could not be defended. It could be taken over in 24 hours. The Allies have token troops there, but that is all they are. So there was a real worry, not about losing Berlin so much, although that would have been very bad symbolically, but that, if the Soviets were willing to do that, then this could certainly spark off a much bigger fight and bring the NATO forces into play, and this would be it. The balloon would be up. We were worried for a period, I think almost a year. The other thing that we watched closely were the various incidents that took place between the Allies and Soviets or the East Germans on the Autobahn. We as Canadian officials, refusing to accept GDR visas, could not use the Autobahn, but we kept closely in touch with the British, French and Americans about all the incidents that occurred, and all of them got a lot of publicity. They were used deliberately by the Soviets and the East Germans to turn on the heat, to put on the

squeeze. They created these incidents because there were cars going back and forth and trains going back and forth all the time between West Germany and West Berlin; and also planes. They did not touch the planes. We had to fly in and out.

[HILL] In the period you were there, it was about the last few years of the Eisenhower administration in the US, and this was also the period of the aborted Paris Summit, the U-2 incident and so on. This was a pretty jittery period in East-West relations in many respects. I was wondering how you felt, sitting in West Berlin, about how NATO and how the Allies in general responded to that kind of situation in those years? Did you feel that their policies were fairly well developed or that they were all over the map, so to speak?

[GRANDE] On the whole, I think we felt they were right. The U-2 incident occurred just when I was leaving. I remember Willy Brandt gave me a farewell lunch, and I mentioned this being a summit for certain people in Paris but it was my own personal summit being his guest.

This is before the Paris Summit which, of course, never took place. Khrushchev circled Paris and then did not go. Back to your question. There certainly was a feeling of solidarity there. There was a great feeling of tension of course all the time in Berlin, but it was excitement; there was not too much fear. There was a feeling of excitement, of Western solidarity, and of being in the last bastion of freedom surrounded by the bad guys. Demonstrations were purposely put on, and military parades, bands and so on, very often by British, French and Americans, partly to boost the morale of the West Berliners, but also to keep up their own spirits I think, and to fly the flag and to show the world; and it was highly publicized. I think the general feeling was that NATO was on the right track.

[HILL] You must have watched the negotiation of the Berlin Agreements in the early '70s with a great deal of interest. I think it was just before you were in Defence Relations in Ottawa. You were probably still Ambassador in Norway at that time. But anyway, I suppose you must have watched them with a good deal of interest, given your previous experience. Do you think that they have made a radical change in that situation? I mean there has not been a Berlin crisis since those negotiations.

[GRANDE] Yes. I do not think there will be another Berlin crisis, partly because of the agreements I suppose, but mostly because I do not think the political will can be there. I do not think that is a good place for either side to have a crisis anymore. I think there are many other places where it is more likely. We must also note the growing maturity of the GDR. They no longer want to be considered Soviet stooges, even though they are probably closer in many ways to the Soviet Union than any other Eastern European country. They are flexing their independence muscles a lot these days, and I do not think they would want to be associated with a crisis provoked from their territory.

[HILL] That is interesting. Did you travel around the GDR much while you were there?

[GRANDE] We could only travel as much as we could on a Soviet permit, and the first year I was there in '57, I was able to get a Soviet visa to travel to the Leipzig Fair. That was the last year that they issued Soviet permits. After that they said, "Sure you could go. I urge you to go but please just go across the border and get a visa from the East Germans." Which we could not do. We did not recognize them, so we did not go. So far as travelling in East Germany was concerned, there was that one visit to Leipzig, which was very interesting. We were also invited by the British, French and Americans to their exchange missions, as I mentioned. They had one

of their headquarters in East Germany near Potsdam, not too far from the West Berlin border, and we could go there, and we did whenever we had an opportunity to. Also we had opportunity to rub shoulders with the Soviets because they were always invited too on these social occasions. Otherwise, no.

[HILL] I went to Berlin at the invitation of the German government in 1968 on a visit which lasted a week, and I found it absolutely fascinating the way in which the various allied powers still had their own presence. It's a very unique kind of situation. At that time, I did not go into the GDR at all, but several years afterwards, with a parliamentary delegation, I went to a conference there where I spent two weeks in East Berlin, on the other side of the Wall, which was equally fascinating.

[GRANDE] I should qualify what I said. I did go into East Berlin often, but not to East Germany. We considered we had the right to go in to East Berlin, and we made it a point of going there quite frequently with the Canadian flag flying, or sneaking across at nighttime and attending the opera, which was much better there than in West Berlin in those days.

[HILL] Very interesting.

[GRANDE] Or going to the museums, which are very good in East Berlin. Otherwise there really was not much to see in those days, just a facade of shops and broken down buildings and poor conditions elsewhere. I have since been back like you. I went last year and stayed for nearly a week in East Berlin.

[HILL] It's still a bit stark in the downtown area, but it's perhaps not as stark as it was at that time.

Part V - Ambassador to Norway and Iceland, 1968-72

[HILL] Ambassador Grande, from 1968 to 1972, you served as Canada's Ambassador to Norway and Iceland. This also must have been a very interesting period in your career since there were a number of important issues involving Canada, Norway and Iceland in that time; several of them related to the relations among these three countries as allies in NATO. Moreover, one thing that is of great interest to people in Canada, still to this day, in terms of relations with Norway, is of course the question of the CAST commitment. I believe that had been set up just before you became Ambassador to Norway.

[GRANDE] Yes.

[HILL] I wonder if you could tell us what you know about how that was established and why?

[GRANDE] I was not in on the establishment of it. The decision was taken I think in '67, just the year before I arrived in Norway. At that time, I was not involved in that question. I think you are going to see Ross Campbell. He knows exactly how it came into being and he would give you the truth on that. I understood from him later, much, much later that it did not make much military sense in those days to a lot of people but it was sort of forced upon Canada at a time when we were reducing our military contribution to NATO.

[HILL] Of course it was not directly connected with the '69 troop cuts in Germany. That came a good bit later.

[GRANDE] We knew then that this was going to come. We already were in the midst of a great departmental review, I remember, just at the time I went to Norway in '68. And I think we had a pretty good idea that out of this would come some kind of retrenchment of the Canadian Forces. I arrived in Norway in '68, towards the end of '68, and only then really did I become conversant with what this commitment entailed, and how important it was politically, in terms of Canada's relations with Norway. It was on that that I concentrated, and it gave me an entree to the thoughts of the Norwegians in a way that nothing else would have. It helped me in my work a lot. We were also at that time sending military officers over from time to time. I remember Admiral Collins for instance in the logistics side going over to flesh out the bones of this commitment, and to start talking about prepositioning equipment, and those things, and going through the logistics of where the Canadian troops would be preparing for exercises and so on. Norway then, and still now I am convinced, thought this was tremendously important to them to have a Canadian commitment there, and even though they were aware how quickly we could come to their rescue in times of need and other questions.

That was, I thought, a very happy beginning to my stay, realizing this commitment was there and that we in those days intended to fill it, and it helped me a lot.

[HILL] Of course, Canada also had another commitment to Norway, as well, which was through the Ace Mobile Force, and I guess that was in existence before the CAST commitment?

[GRANDE] Yes. The Ace Mobile Force used to visit every now and then when they exercised, and the units in various countries used to visit us.

The other thing which I found of interest was that there were Canadians on the staff of NATO Northern Headquarters, which is in Kolsaas just outside Oslo, and the commander there at that time was General Walker, but whoever was there would have done the same, I am sure. He used to call us in occasionally and brief us, and take us to his bunker.

[HILL] The ACE Mobile commitment is to the whole of Norway, whereas the CAST one is to the North of Norway. Is there any possibility in a crisis that ACE Mobile might be deployed in Southern Norway? I suppose they could be sent absolutely anywhere.

[GRANDE] I think they can be sent anywhere. You know it would be deployed in a crisis as distinct from a war situation. That's its main value. But there are certainly some worthwhile targets in the south.

[HILL] Did you travel up through the whole of Norway while you were there? I suppose you did.

[GRANDE] Yes. I made a point of doing both when the troops were there exercising. We had a visit from Defense Minister Macdonald in those days. I went with him. I also went with my military attaché on other occasions, and on my own with some of my colleagues. I took a coastal steamer up to Svalbard one time. Right up to pack ice.

[HILL] You got up to Spitzbergen?

[GRANDE] Yes. That's it. We were the first ambassadors to do that, to set foot on it, to exert our rights because we were all parties to the Treaty, to the Svalbard Treaty.

[HILL] Oh, Canada is too? I see. Along with the Soviet Union and ...

[GRANDE] The Soviet Union, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The Finnish ambassador and I went up there, and the Swedish ambassador, and the American ambassador and the British ambassador, and we invited the Soviet ambassador. He first said yes, and then later declined. All went up together.

[HILL] I see.

[GRANDE] A memorable occasion to see what it was like primarily, but also to assert our rights.

[HILL] Did you also visit the areas where Canadian troops would probably be deployed in north Norway?

[GRANDE] Yes.

[HILL] Could I ask what you think of that as a commitment these days?

[GRANDE] I have been writing in favour of our maintaining our commitment there, almost like a voice crying in the wilderness. I am told that the decision has almost been made, if it has not indeed been made, that we will withdraw from that commitment but we will probably do so gradually. You know, in accordance with established NATO procedures, it should take several years to really get out of it entirely. And I think that it's to be regretted. The Norwegian Defense Minister, Johan Holst, was just here a couple of weeks ago pleading the case, but they are in a difficult position. They find it difficult to argue with Canada if we say we are making our commitment in Central Europe and we have to withdraw from the Northern commitment; we cannot do both. They want a strong NATO everywhere. I think its incompatible with our Arctic policy, with our emphasis on the North. In many respects we get more credit for that commitment than we do for the one in Germany, because its hard to imagine what the Canadian Forces are going to do there, they're so small. I agree we would have to put some more credibility into our commitment to north Norway if we kept it. We must be able to get there quicker.

[HILL] Well, I think in recent years there have been moves in that direction. That would simply be a matter of spending somewhat more money on it.

[GRANDE] I gather that General Rogers is in favour of our maintaining our Norwegian commitment.

[HILL] Well, we'll wait and see what comes out of the White Paper on that one.

Turning now a little bit to Iceland; you were also Ambassador to Iceland at that time. If I am not mistaken, this was also a period of these periodic Icelandic fishery problem. Well, I suppose one should not call them Icelandic fisheries problem. Its a problem of fisheries between Iceland and other people who fish in Icelandic waters, and also this was a very active period in the Law of Sea negotiations, the international, multilateral Law of the Sea negotiations under the UN. What sort of relations did Canada have with Iceland and also with Norway over fisheries and other maritime questions in this period?

[GRANDE] On the Law of the Sea question, we had very, very close relations with Norway, particularly between the two principals, Alan Beesley on our side and Jens Evansen the Norwegian

legal expert on theirs. They used to meet at their international conferences all over the world, and when they were at home they were constantly sending each others telexes which all went through me. It was refreshing. I mean they both saw eye to eye on most things, and they were both operators, both high powered, both full of energy and full of knowledge, and very able. They were two of the three or four leading lights in this Law of the Sea movement, in the international legal fraternity. So that this was very helpful to the Norway relationship. On sealing, we are also both criminals together if you will. Norway and we used to consult on how we would combat these terrible anti-sealing types, who were saying such nasty things about us when all that our sealers were doing was to continue doing what they had been doing for years, if not centuries, and how could they be so mean. So we were partners in crime. We worked together from that point of view.

Iceland in those days had a fishing dispute with Britain, and if anything we were sympathetic to the Icelanders. Also another interesting development then was that Iceland damn near withdrew from NATO when I was there. As a result of an election, they went very far Left. In fact, they had several Communist members in parliament, members of government, members of the Cabinet. The Foreign Minister was not Communist. I got to know him well, and we kept in very close touch with him, to persuade him to continue to use his influence to keep Iceland in NATO, on solid ground. They heard us, and eventually, in the next election, they swung the other way.

[HILL] Of course they had had Communists in parliament right from prior to being in NATO, and then being in NATO was always to some degree controversial in Iceland, at least among certain segments of the population. In fact, right at the beginning of NATO, there were in fact public demonstrations by the Communists and so on against membership in NATO, and then afterwards there was a good deal of concern about the impact of the US presence in Keflavik, particularly on Icelandic ...

[GRANDE] ...women.

[HILL] Women! I was going to say language and culture.

[GRANDE] But they kept the boys, certainly in my stage, in their own camp. They did not wear uniforms if they went into Reykjavik, and they were allowed out sparingly. Basically, Icelandic policy is controlled by very few families. To talk about public opinion, insofar as there is public opinion there, they are in favor of belonging to the Alliance providing they do not have to contribute any troops, just contribute a bit of geography, and they are probably more like the Swedes than they are like the Norwegians in terms of viewing themselves as part of the Western world. They know they are Western but they do not think of themselves as American or British stooges. Nor do they want to be. They are as close to Canada as to any other country, even closer than to Denmark in many respects. They speak of the Icelandic community here in Canada as Western Iceland.

[HILL] It was a bit of a lesson for NATO in one or two ways. For one thing, you mentioned Canadian sympathy for the Icelanders in the dispute with the British, and I know there was a lot of sympathy in Scandinavia for the Icelanders, and possibly among some others too. But also there was the lesson that however small a country might be, it does have equality in a very real sense, in that, if it really wants to, it can always pull out of the Alliance if need be. I think that was something that was brought out very forcibly, in that period, inside NATO.

[GRANDE] That is right. There was some fear that NATO's secrets would be filtered through the Communist International or something but I do not think they had great access to military

secrets. It's on a need-to-know basis, this information, and the Iceland Government did not really have that much need for military information; as distinct from political.

[HILL] Well, I think that was the beginning of this question of what happens if you have Communist ministers in government, which was to come up later again with the Portuguese. There was speculation about that in the '70s about France, and Italy too. But in a way it seemed to have been handled without too much difficulty.

[GRANDE] Yes, I think so.

[HILL] I mean the question of access to information and so on. It seemed to be the case that they found ways round it. There seemed to be more upset in the press about these things than there ever was inside NATO headquarters or in allied capitals. I am not sure if that is misreading the situation.

[GRANDE] I know that the Icelandic Prime Minister who has never been a Communist to my knowledge, was well aware of the problems as presented to the Alliance. He always had a, you know a pro-NATO, if you will, Foreign Minister, and between the two of them, if need be, they would control access to any information as far the rest of the members of the Cabinet were concerned. So they were conscious of this, at the same time they had to bow to public opinion such as it was at that time, as a result of the election, and have these left wing members of the government in certain positions like fisheries, I think.

[HILL] I have a couple of other questions on this period if we have time for them today, or we might leave them till later. From time to time the Soviet Union has mounted diplomatic campaigns aimed at the Scandinavian members of NATO, designed, I think, to raise thoughts that being in NATO is provocative and perhaps they ought to move in the direction of Sweden. There is that whole period of the Bulganin letters, I think, around 1954-1955 perhaps, which was quite a major issue at the time. People watched fairly carefully to see how the Norwegian and other Scandinavian governments would respond. I was wondering whether there was anything of that kind while you were in Scandinavia?

[GRANDE] I don't recall anything like that really, in the period of '68-72. Do you have in mind something?

[HILL] No, I don't have anything specific. I was just wondering if there was that kind of concern in that period. There may not have been as far as I know.

[GRANDE] No, I don't think so.

[HILL] No.

[GRANDE] Norway, when I was there, was concerned about developments in human rights. They are great human rights promoters, the Norwegians, and they are often holier than thou, but they were very concerned about what was going on in Greece for instance. Intra-NATO problems.

[HILL] Right.

[GRANDE] When the Colonels were in power in Athens, and the Norwegians were very much opposed to this. And in fact, through the Council of Europe they were involved in some

proceedings against the Colonels. Norway was prominent in this. They were also very prominent in the developing world, of course, and followed very closely the Biafra war and the atrocities that you have heard of in Biafra in those days. As far as the Alliance was concerned they took their responsibilities very seriously. They at that time were thinking in terms of joining the Common Market, towards the latter part of my stay, and a lot of their resources were devoted to that, government resources, to developing their position and trying to get sympathy. But that didn't detract from their NATO role. They were conscious of how closely they had co-operated with Canada in the days of Halvard Lange and Lester Pearson, two of the Three Wise Men. They wanted to continue the so-called Ottawa-Oslo axis. We both paid lip service to it, but to be frank we didn't get that much encouragement in those days, I didn't from Ottawa, to develop this into anything meaningful. I mean it takes more than cocktail parties and so on to develop a firm axis and we weren't given much meat from Ottawa in those days to help us in that path. But personal relationships were very good.

[HILL] It always seemed to me that the Canadian view on Europe is focused on central Europe to a very large extent, I mean I am not just referring to NATO, but in general; and there seems to be very little attention to Scandinavian affairs and certainly to the role of, say, Norway in NATO, even though we have the CAST force at the moment. Still it is not focused in that direction. You obviously felt that there wasn't much interest.

[GRANDE] Well, there used to be a lot of visits and social events, but not high profile projects.

[HILL] Right.

[GRANDE] So they tended to be forgotten. Even today, I was reading the other day you know, there are all kinds of visits going on between Canada and Norway and relationships, scientific co-operation, all kinds of co-operation in various fields, but they don't get much publicity. As far as the two governments are concerned, and the big things, you are right, Ottawa thinks in terms of Central Europe, and of Britain occasionally, rather than Northern or Southern Europe.

[HILL] Right.

What about relations with Iceland? Are they very important?

[GRANDE] I doubt it. There is probably one corner of one desk in External Affairs that deals with Iceland.

I think they are lovely people, trusting people and very intelligent, very high literacy rate there, the highest in the world. Every postman has written at least ten books, they say.

[HILL] Written them or read them. What about the referendum in Norway while you were there, on membership in the European Community. Obviously that was a big issue. How much attention was paid to it at that time, on the part of the Canadian government? How much of your time was involved in following it, and also why didn't it go through? Why was the result not positive?

[GRANDE] A fair amount of attention was devoted by us to it, because we at that time were thinking in terms of concluding a contractual agreement. It turned out to be a contractual agreement with the Common Market. So we were very interested to see whether Norway was going to be involved in becoming a member of the Common Market, and I remember making representations

to the Norwegians before the vote on Norwegian membership in the Common Market asking them, if they did become members of the Common Market, would they please take this, this, and this into account in considering Canada's position and Canada's desire to have a relationship with the Common Market. The Norwegian government misjudged the mood of the people. All the diplomats including yours truly misjudged the mood of the Norwegian people and we all unto a man prophesied that Norway would join, the vote would be close, but that it would be in favour of membership, Norway would become a member of the Common Market; and we were all wrong, including the government of the day. Basically, the Norwegians were not prepared to go into Europe. There is still a certain distrust of the Germans, of the French, and of the big powers. And yet you can ask me quickly why did they join NATO then. Well they joined NATO in earlier days, they joined NATO right after the beginning of NATO. And security concerns were foremost in their minds in those days. They never regret that. I am quite sure that they will stay in NATO for as long as we will. But they weren't prepared to get completely enmeshed in this movement of a United Europe, they weren't sure they wanted to be in the United Europe. They might go back, they might join. I think there is still a better than 50/50 chance that Norway will join the Common Market for its own economic reasons but not political reasons.

[HILL] Were there certain economic interests which were opposed to membership?

[GRANDE] The Nordic community was divided of course. Denmark in the event did join, Sweden did not. EFTA was in full swing in those days still, with Finland, Sweden, and Norway, Denmark and the UK.

[HILL] Yes, that's right, Austria and Switzerland as well.

[GRANDE] If the Common Market had been a Nordic thing, Norway would have joined overwhelmingly. Their first loyalty, their first priority, is Nordic co-operation.

[HILL] But I mean, were there some particular segments like the farmers that that were opposed to membership?

[GRANDE] Very much. Oh very much. Don't ask me why, the intricacies escape me, I mean sure the farmers have benefitted more than anyone in the membership of the Common Market, but the Norwegian farmers are against it and their fishermen, the rural people are definitely against it; and the business people, by and large, are for it, but they are outnumbered by the non-business people in the country.

[HILL] Just one final question: was there any concern on the part of the Allies that rejecting membership might have had implications for Norwegian membership in NATO?

[GRANDE] Not concern, no. Maybe among the European Allies. I don't know. Certainly not in Canada. Canada didn't have that concern. I don't think so.

[HILL] Well, thank you very much.

Part VI - MBFR Ambassador, 1973-76

[HILL] Ambassador Grande, this part of our interview will deal with your work as Canada's representative at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. In fact, you were, I believe, the first Canadian Ambassador to those talks and you were there in Vienna at what seems to me in retrospect to have

been one of the most crucial stages so far in those negotiations. I think it is useful to devote some time to the MBFR negotiations in our present excercise for a number of reasons. Firstly, I think the recent Reykjavik Summit emphasized the importance of conventional force reductions or at least the conventional force balance in Europe, because it is now clear--the West Europeans Allies have made it clear--that they will not be all that happy with very large reductions in nuclear forces unless there is something done to address the question of the conventional balance. Second thing, I think, is that the MBFR negotiations are linked directly to NATO, in a way that many of the other arms control negotiations are not, e.g., it is a much more direct linkage to NATO than, for example, is the case for the CSCE.

[GRANDE] Yes, indeed.

[HILL] And thirdly, I think MBFR is an interesting case from the perspective of Canadian foreign policy, of Canada working through NATO and related mechanisms for what you might call, say, the general good, that is to say the pursuit of international peace and security, even though the direct interests of this country are in many ways rather limited in that case, I mean in terms of the relatively limited size of the Canadian force in Europe as compared to that of some of the other Allies. And an MBFR agreement might have less of a direct impact on Canada than some of the other Allies, but it is something which Canada has been taking great interest in; of course Canada is a direct participant in the negotiations. Do you have any comment on those points?

[GRANDE] I would agree with what you say. In fact the negotiations started after Canada had cut its forces, if you recall, in Europe. The inclination of all of us professionals was to keep the Canadian forces at least at their existing strength or to increase them rather than reduce them. My mandate of course was to contribute to a reduction agreement. So that reinforces really what you say, and it is the only negotiation where arms control or arms reduction are involved which is really being controlled by NATO. I mean as compared with Geneva or something like that, where there is some linkage but not to the same degree.

[HILL] The first part that I want to look at here is at the MBFR exploratory talks, and surrounding issues, and then to go on to the actual MBFR negotiations, which started later in '73 and have in fact continued to this day. So, then, we will start with the exploratory talks which began on the 31st January 1973 and lasted till 28th June. I wonder, at the beginning, if you could describe a little bit how the talks started. What I am thinking of here is that MBFR, the movement towards MBFR, was quite closely linked to the movement towards CSCE. These were things which arose when Dr. Kissinger went to Moscow with President Nixon, in I think it was June of 1972, to deal with the SALT I Treaty, and so on. Among other things, there was a deal done on the movement towards those two negotiations, which essentially amounted to the dates being set for the multilateral preparatory talks on CSCE, the MBFR exploratory talks, then the full CSCE negotiations, and then the full MBFR negotiations. So, one of the crucial aspects in this was to respect those dates in order to make the agreement stick, so that the movement forward could take place in these two sets of negotiations. But it seems, as I recall it, that this was not an easy period in terms of this forward movement; it didn't take place all that smoothly and easily and in fact, if I am not mistaken, with regard to the MBFR talks, most of the NATO allies expected to go to Geneva until about the last minute, and then they were switched to Vienna. In fact the key thing was that it actually took place on the 31st of January. That was in the Hofberg Palace in Vienna, but that is about all they did at that time. And I wonder if you could tell us something about that period.

[GRANDE] Yes. I wasn't directly involved in the preparations leading up to the MBFR exploratory talks but I was there right from the beginning of them. It seems to me though that there

was a conscious effort made by NATO and by the other member countries to keep the CSCE, which you mention, and the MBFR, definitely linked together; and, in fact, as I recall, the NATO countries insisted that the Soviets agree to MBFR before they would agree to CSCE continuing. So they made a conscious effort to link these two. Also, we had a kind of friendly rivalry with them to make progress. Now of course they have won in a sense by concluding an agreement and we are still waiting to conclude one. But we were summoned to Brussels in January 1973, the representatives of each of the proposed participants in the MBFR negotiations. At that time we still hadn't had a definite agreement, from the Soviet side, to a firm date and place. Nevertheless we decided to assemble in Brussels at NATO headquarters and to try and do some preparatory work if there was any to be done and to mark time. We did assemble and had a meeting in Brussels and we set up what is known as the Ad Hoc Group of NATO. The representatives on this Ad Hoc Group were those who had been especially designated by their governments to represent them at the exploratory talks. I was the Canadian earmarked for that. I remember at the very first meeting when we sat down there, we didn't have a chairman, we didn't have any agenda, so they went alphabetically. Somebody, I guess somebody in the secretariat, maybe you Roger, said let's start with Belgium, how about Belgium being the chairman but the Belgian hadn't turned up yet, so they went to CA, Canada, so the finger was pointed at me and I became the first Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group. I know that at that stage the American, Jock Dean, was very impatient--we hadn't heard from the Soviets--and he was all set I think to pack his bag and go back to Washington and I had to restrain him and tell him that it would be much better for us to stay there and have a meeting or two and then try and form some kind of a plan of action.

[HILL] You said you were designated as the first Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group. What did that entail?

[GRANDE] I was trying to get a bunch of assorted representatives to at least agree to sit down together and to decide what they wanted to talk about. We had to peer into the future and decide what we would say to the Warsaw Pact side once we met them at the preparatory talks. But mostly it was an administrative thing. But even at that stage, and it shows how eager the Americans were for progress in those days, the Americans came to the meeting in Brussels armed with three or four position papers in their briefcases which they had worked out in Washington, after consultation with a few countries including Canada.

[HILL] There was of course also a NATO negotiating mandate already at that point, which I recall had been worked out the previous summer and which still stood in its broad terms. However, maybe there had been some developments since.

[GRANDE] Well, throughout the negotiation--starting at the very beginning--we realized that our mandate was really a tactical one, as distinct from a strategic one.

[HILL] The mandate worked out in Brussels the previous summer was a strategic one.

[GRANDE] Sometimes that line became blurred. But at any rate, we went back to Brussels and we finally did get a reply from the Soviets saying, "Okay, we will meet you on the 31st of January 1973, but we won't meet in Geneva. We suggest we meet in Vienna". So there was a hurried consultation again between capitals and ourselves in NATO and the Council too, I guess, and we quickly agreed to the date and place. We had to cancel everything in Geneva and arouse our ambassadors in Vienna and tell them we were going to descend upon them. And so we did pack our bags and go to Vienna for the opening meeting. We didn't know where we were going to meet; we didn't know what the format would be or anything. We just knew that we were going to meet

somehow or other with the Warsaw Pact representatives in the city of Vienna. Do you want me to go on?

[HILL] I wonder if you would tell us a little bit about that first meeting. The story is always fascinating.

[GRANDE] I don't remember all about it. I do know we tried to make some contacts. We, as an Ad Hoc Group, met in Vienna as soon as we all had arrived. The meeting place, of historic interest, was the American Embassy Conference Room to begin with. And later on we occasionally went to the German Embassy or the British Embassy, but we usually ended up in the American Embassy. Later on during the remaining talks the Ad Hoc Group got its own accommodation and you remember we had our own conference room and so on which was run by the secretariat representatives. Well, we did make some preliminary contacts, through the Embassies, with the Soviets; and it was agreed with our Austrian hosts that we would meet in a huge room in the Hofburg Palace. Not the one where they now meet, a much older and less glamorous room as I recall. And we agreed to a time - say 2:30 - and a place, so we had that. Before the appointed hour we all drove up and the Austrians were there at the entrance with laissez passers which they were handing out right, left, and centre-- they didn't know us from a hole in the ground and we didn't know them. Anyway, the Austrians were in control, and we marched into the room because we didn't know what the format would be before we got there; and it was a horse shoe shaped thing with I suppose 15 or so rows of chairs going up to the front of the horse-shoe. So, as we arrived we dashed to the nearest row of chairs that were still vacant and made no attempt to go in alphabetical order or anything else, except that the Soviets had grabbed the last row, they wanted the last row I suppose, and the Americans grabbed the one next to them. I guess we were up in the first 3 or 4 delegations I think, if that makes sense for Canada, CA. So I found myself I think next to the Bulgarian on one side and I think Hungary, I forget, maybe Hungary. These were all the potential participants; both what later became the indirect and direct participants were there. And so after everyone seemed to be seated there wasn't any chairman; there was a microphone out there but there wasn't anyone there. We hadn't agreed to anyone being chairman, so the first person in the row on the left hand side started to speak and said I represent the delegation of whatever it is. My memory recalls that this guy was a Bulgarian, but I might be wrong. And he spoke out, I think, in his own language. We didn't have translation at that time. I was about the third, I think, and I said I was with the Canadian delegation and I was happy to be here, and we have a mandate to make this conference succeed and insist on these things being fulfilled, all this sort of baloney without any prepared text or anything because we didn't know that we were going to speak. So it went, right around the table and the last one said it looks like I am the last one I think, the American, no the Soviet, and we will meet again some time. That was it really.

[HILL] What about the question of the Austrian Foreign Minister who came in?

[GRANDE] Yes, that's true. But this was in a different room, an ante-room. We were alerted that he was going to come in and welcome us. But he didn't stay and he was quite right not to stay. He just welcomed us to his city. Again there wasn't any translation so I am not sure what he said.

[HILL] So then you adjourned after this first meeting for quite a while, I think, and then you really went to work for sometime in the Ad Hoc Group, in other words preparing for the next meetings and making informal contacts and so forth.

[GRANDE] That's right. The informal contacts took place. We decided who would try to make contacts; it was obvious the Americans should be there and one other usually in contacts with the Soviets. I made contacts with the Czechs and somebody else would make contacts with the Poles and so on. But what we had to decide was what our programme would be and how often we would meet together and what we would discuss and so on. Because the purpose of these meetings, preparatory meetings, exploratory meetings was to try and decide on a mandate for our formal talks, for formal negotiations, force reduction negotiations. Eventually we got agreement—it wasn't with too much difficulty—an agreement to having meetings, I think preliminary meetings the same as now, I guess, once a week, and to having informal meetings of two or three members on each side, to take place in between the preliminary meetings. These were to be rotated, East-West, and as it turned out these took place in peoples' homes. At that time most of us were in hotels, so we used our hotel rooms or our respective embassies.

[HILL] With regards to the actual exploratory talks between East and West, as you mentioned, one of the objectives was to work out a mandate for the eventual complete, full negotiations. This meant working out how the meetings would take place, where they were to take place, and so on. But you mentioned also the question of direct and indirect participants. What about this issue of participation?

[GRANDE] Well, I don't know exactly when it was decided, on the NATO side, but everyone seemed prepared to accept the fact that only those with troops stationed in the reduction area - the reduction area had still to be defined and agreed, the controversial point being whether or not Hungary was to be included in it -- that those with troops in the agreed reduction area, whatever that came to be, should be direct participants, full time direct participants, because they have every right to be fully involved in matters which would affect their troops or their territory in their reduction area. Those with troops and those with territory in the proposed reduction area would be direct participants. Other members of both alliances would also be present at the meetings and were called indirect participants. You will recall that France decided not to participate although they were invited to do so, and Iceland of course didn't, they did not have troops and so don't. Portugal came and went, depending on the domestic situation in their country, during the talks, during the negotiations. The Warsaw Pact side went through the same sort of procedure. At the plenary meetings, the indirect participants had the right to speak just as much as the direct participants. We never had any voting, so it didn't come down to a the question of who had a vote and who didn't. It was the same in the Ad Hoc Group. The indirect participants spoke just as much and I suspect more and more often than the direct participants. So the distinction was there, but it didn't mean that much.

[HILL] I think Portugal actually didn't attend the plenaries, the actual conference, but it did attend the Ad Hoc Group, if I am not mistaken.

[GRANDE] Yes, they did attend the Ad Hoc Group except when they had their problems at home. At those times, they left, as you may recall, and then it was a very ticklish matter with NATO. However, the ambassador there was very understanding. He knew that the other allies didn't want the left wing members of the Portuguese government to have access to all of our secrets. We kept the ambassador informed and he didn't ask questions he shouldn't have asked.

[HILL] I wonder if we could just look briefly a little bit further at the negotiating machinery, because I think this is quite interesting in terms of the linkage between MBFR and NATO. As I recall it, I think it was a case that you had the plenary sessions in Vienna which were attended by the participants, then you had the Ad Hoc Group as their caucus. The Ad Hoc Group got broad

instructions from the NATO Council, but it also got instructions directly from capitals on the tactics. I think you already mentioned that there were some kind of basic principles, but was there sometimes a conflict between tactics and strategy?

[GRANDE] Well, in fact there weren't that many instructions sent on tactics. As it evolved, they had a lot of high priced help in Vienna on the Ad Hoc Group. Particularly the Americans had an ambassador, plus Jock Dean, plus the Secretary of the Army Stan Resor. Others had equally high priced delegations there. So we in the end decided our own tactics. If we felt that they needed the blessing of governments' or the NATO council we would seek it. Policy instructions did come from government, through the NATO Council, but also direct from home. Maybe some delegations got different instructions directly from their own governments, as compared to those they received through the NATO Council. But we didn't often have any problems in that regard.

[HILL] In fact, the detailed tactics of dealing with the Warsaw Pact on a day-to-day basis, were presumably then worked out in the Ad Hoc Group.

[GRANDE] Yes, they were worked out in great detail in the Ad Hoc Group. We decided there who would speak in the next plenary session, on behalf of NATO. One always spoke on behalf of NATO as well as for his own government. I should have mentioned that these plenary meetings were public. That was the purpose of them. They were the only meetings in which a formal record Following them, we had press conferences. Each side had a designated press was kept. spokesman. In our case it was traditionally the Dutch. But in the Ad Hoc Group we decided who would speak and what he would say. In some cases, if I knew I was going to have to speak, I would maybe present a draft to the Ad Hoc Group and they would go over it with a fine tooth comb. If we had time we might send it back to our governments for approval, or we might not. And also, and more importantly, I suppose, the Ad Hoc Group decided on the tactics of the informal negotiating sessions with the Warsaw Pact. This was in great detail again, deciding exactly how far they would go. We used to have drafts of what we would call "talking points", and went through these with a fine tooth comb. Different delegations drafted them initially, but then they were worked on, and agreed to, before these informal negotiating sessions took place. Then we would also decide who would attend the negotiating sessions, the informal negotiating sessions, which were the real nitty gritty of the conference. In our case, the Americans, we recognized, had to be present at all of them, and they were. The British and Germans were present very often; the Canadians, Dutch and Belgians less often; and so a sort of format developed - it wasn't a formal format, we could change it and we did often. The indirect participants never did participate in the informal negotiations.

[HILL] There were also, in the Ad Hoc Group, representatives of the NATO civil and military authorities.

[GRANDE] Yes, that is interesting. I am not quite sure how it was worked out with the Austrian government, to protect their neutrality. Actually I don't think they came formally, as NATO representatives; they used their own passports, I guess. The Austrians knew they were there, obviously.

[HILL] They were on the diplomatic lists of the different countries. What I recall is that in the early stages there was no diplomatic protection or anything, they simply turned up there. These really were alliance-to-alliance, or bloc-to-bloc, negotiations, which is presumably why the French did not want to join them.

[GRANDE] Yes, very much so, although we did keep the French informed. If they didn't like what was going on they quickly let us know somehow or other.

[COX] Did you have any deviants? Did the footnote countries add footnotes as it were?

[GRANDE] Not that I recall, not in those early days. Not really, David.

[COX] I was thinking of other individual countries getting restless and deciding to strike out on their own and perhaps taking their own initiative.

[GRANDE] We had a deviant, in the person of the Belgian ambassador at one time, but I don't think it was a government deviance. I think it was just the man, you know he was in effect being told what to do from time to time. We had that sort of fellow but it wasn't a governmental thing.

[HILL] I think the point there is that, that was the function of the NATO Council. When there were people who had different ideas, they put their ideas into the hopper in the NATO Council. And that is where the basic negotiating mandates were hammered out. So there was an immense amount of consultation that had gone on prior to this, to the start of negotiations, over a period of about a year. And, of course, that continued to go on and has done ever since, I guess, both in the NATO Council and in the various political and military committees in NATO.

[GRANDE] As you say, the NATO Council was where our Governments worked things out before they reached us. We tried to maintain--and I think we were very successful in doing so-an atmosphere of unity and alliance cohesion.

[COX] So, did you feel that this was a procedurally sound way of approaching the negotiation?

[GRANDE] Yes, it isn't easy, and the fact that there hasn't been an agreement may or may not justify it in retrospect. But I don't know what else they could have done, and it worked out very well in those early days. I don't know later on whether it did or not. We did of course visit Brussels every so often. There was a procedure developed where the Council was briefed about once a month, I think, more often if anything was happening, not quite so frequently if nothing much had happened. But the Council agreed to the specific dates and we always sent a little team there, and we divided that task between us; two or three of us used to go and represent us and so on. We worked out what we were going to say in the Ad Hoc Group before we left for Brussels, and briefed the Council in person there, and this was felt to be useful, certainly by us, and I think by the Council and by the Secretary General who could see who Grande was, and who Bill was, and so on, and ask questions. We had question and answer sessions after the briefing of the Council. You must have been at some of those.

[HILL] I was at the Council meetings but of course being in the Secretariat, I didn't report to it. We sent telegrammes directly to the Secretary General, that was our means of communication.

[GRANDE] And yet another aspect of these informal negotations was the bilaterals and these weren't very formally structured. If I wanted to see the Czech ambassador I would phone him direct and arrange to take him out for lunch or something; and the same thing happened several times with other delegations often on the same day and so on. When we gathered in the Ad Hoc Group one of the first things we did was to report on our bilaterals. The Chairman would say, anything to report on your bilaterals, so we would say we had lunch with so and so and he said so and so about this or that item on the agenda or I think he meant this or he tried to tell me something

and so on. This was useful. I don't think I have mentioned yet, but I think you did, that the military representatives were there on each delegation too, and they had bi- lateral contacts with their opposite numbers. This was the first time ever, I think, that it had been done on a regular basis between the two alliances. It is still the only place where they meet regularly, which is quite remarkable.

[HILL] So, on the whole, you feel that the machinery worked fairly well.

[COX] I don't want to get ahead of you, so stop me if you wish. I wondered if you could say a bit more about the Soviet and the East European approach. Could you categorize their approach in terms of, not necessarily substance, but how you saw the negotiating stance. Was it completely wooden for example?

[GRANDE] It was pretty rigid. But right from the very beginning they objected, as you will recall, to the phrase "mutual and balanced force reductions", and they didn't agree at all to what they thought we meant by balance - and they were quite right, that is what we did mean. We meant by balanced reductions that they would reduce more than we would, because they would be starting off from a higher, a much higher level. So they never agreed to that, they reject that till this day. Whenever I meet them, and I still meet some of them, which is interesting in itself, they refuse to call it MBFR.

[HILL] Of course the official title of the talks is still not MBFR. It is Negotiations on Conventional Force Reductions in Europe, and Associated Measures, or something like that. No one can ever remember it.

[GRANDE] Mutual imbalance, no? Reduction of forces and arms in Central Europe and associated measures.

[HILL] Something like that.

[GRANDE] I didn't see any evidence of flexibility, except there was a general desire in the early days to succeed. I think we detected this on the Eastern side as well as on our own. I guess this reflected the general East-West atmosphere at that time, which was pretty good, hopeful in the early days. They went out of their way, I think, on a personal level, to be friendly and so on. For the first time I suppose many of them were allowed loose, as it were, individually, on us Westerners, and we had some very very interesting talks with them. We really didn't detect any more of a flexible position on the periphery than at the centre. The Hungarians were always very forthcoming—they wouldn't say anything, I suppose Moscow didn't want them to—but they were less inclined to stone wall. My opposite number, and this often happens in Canadian diplomacy, I am not sure why, was the Czech. Czechoslovakia is in their mind often compared to Canada, I think, and I have noticed this throughout my diplomatic career. I became really friendly with the Czech ambassador, the first one anyway, and I have maintained my contact up to right now. He is now the Deputy Head of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee. He is in the big leagues now back home. He was here just a few days ago and I saw him.

[HILL] It's maybe because both countries begin with C.

[GRANDE] At the United Nations in the old days we were palsy walsy with the Bielo-Russians for the same reason.

[HILL] Well, once in the Inter-Parliamentary Union, I got extremely friendly with Comoros. But no sooner had we made good contacts with them, than a new member came in. Cap Verde was stuck in between us, so all that work went down the drain. Not quite, because the contact remained.

[GRANDE] Cambodia is another case.

[HILL] I am glad you put that question about differences of attitudes of the Eastern groups, David, because I would like to go on and ask a few questions about varying perceptions or policies in the Western group in this period of the exploratory talks. I have the impression that by and large you felt the NATO group succeeded in working out fairly reasonable, well-constructed, common positions with which they could deal with the East. But then, nonetheless, there were differences of perception. I mean if one took for example Turkey's radically different strategic position, as compared with Canada's, there are bound to be differences of perception and policy. So I wondered if we could look at one or two of the main differences, at different countries and their particular policies, starting with the United States, which is obviously, as you mentioned, a key factor in this whole process. Was it your impression that at the beginning of the exploratory talks, including the run up period to them in the last part of 1972, and then in the early part of 1973, that the US was keen to move quickly?

[GRANDE] Yes, it definitely was. They showed evidence of this by coming very well prepared with position papers already worked out on a number of subjects. They drove us hard, as it were, in Vienna. We had meetings at all hours of the night and day if they were required, and although there were happy social occasions, even these were used for substantive purposes. They were flooded with instructions, they had a huge delegation at one stage, the Americans, they had all the government agencies right there on the spot, so they could almost make their own policy there; they had arms control and disarmament agency representatives right there, they had the CIA right there, they had all kinds of people from the State Department, both on the bilateral side, and even those on the economic side occasionally; and so they were sparing no effort. They used to fly back on special occasions to Washington in a special plane provided to them by the U.S. government, a U.S. military plane, fly back to Washington for special consultations when necessary. Later on in the exercise, a couple of years later on, they weren't able to get their special plane. Which is just one example of how much they counted in the bigger picture. At that stage they counted very much.

[HILL] Why was there this sense of urgency on their part, in your view?

[GRANDE] Well, I don't know. The exploratory talks were just before Watergate, weren't they?

[HILL] Yes, before Watergate started.

[GRANDE] And it was after SALT I, in fact there was a big plaque up about this in the American Embassy conference room. I guess they just wanted to keep rolling, they wanted to build up the détente. It was the prevailing mood. I don't think anyone in NATO disagreed.

[HILL] There is a theory that, in fact ...

[GRANDE] You know, there is the theory they wanted to run the world bilaterally with the Soviet Union, there is that theory of which there was some evidence, I guess, because it seems to me, if I recall, the Americans did negotiate some treaty secretly with the Soviet Union on nuclear war prevention, without consulting NATO.

[HILL] That was essentially what I was driving at, because there is a book by James Chace, who used to be the editor of Foreign Affairs, who has the argument that the U.S. was following what he referred to as "the new American foreign policy", which was to establish close links with the Soviets and then form some kind of pentagonal world structure with a united Europe, Japan and China. That all went by the board subsequently because of Watergate, but it is always very hard to pin down if it was more imagination on somebody's part or not.

[GRANDE] Well, in very general terms from that perspective in Vienna, the Americans went all out to try and make this thing succeed. They spent a terrific amount of energy and time and personnel resources and so on, to tell their allies as well as their opponents that they were the ones who counted. They did establish a very good relationship with the Soviet delegation in Vienna. Very convenient. Whether that was because of the personalities or because of other things, I don't know.

[HILL] You mentioned personalities.

[GRANDE] Jock Dean had this special relationship with the Soviets from the negotiations he did in Berlin.

[HILL] Right, was that with Khlestov?

[GRANDE] Yes, so they knew each other. Khlestov was the Soviet ambassador.

[HILL] And had Khlestov been in Berlin for the Berlin negotiations?

[GRANDE] I think he was involved in them.

[HILL] As an ambassador on the spot, did you get any assessments from Ottawa of where US policy was going at that time? I am sure you got assessments of where Soviet policy was going, but I wondered about US policy. Clearly Dr. Kissinger was a major force in world affairs, as was President Nixon. So, did the policy people in the department do analyses on what the US was on about at this time?

[GRANDE] I don't remember receiving any. We did go back when our good government would afford it and we did come back to Ottawa occasionally, but not often enough. That gave us some opportunity for us to pick people's brains.

[COX] You didn't have special planes to come back home?

[GRANDE] No, Sir.

[HILL] But, I mean, the main mode of figuring out what was going on as far as the US was concerned, was really one's own judgement and conversations with US and other allied colleagues.

[GRANDE] Yes, there was a lot of that. I mean, inevitably you formed your own friendships and you might line up the German ambassador who is here now in Ottawa. He wasn't at the preliminary talks, but he was there later, Ambassador Behrends. So the Germans always have views on the Americans, Canadians listened to them and chipped in whatever they thought. It was the same with the British of course. We were close to them.

[HILL] One last question on the Americans. Prior to 1971, I think, there had been the Mansfield Amendment, and this question of unilateral reductions in US forces. The Mansfield Amendment was defeated, but certainly there was a great feeling of pressure from the Mansfield Amendment on the MBFR process; and right from the beginning people were very conscious of that. Then a new Mansfield Amendment came up in the middle of '73, which was again defeated. But was there any feeling of that during the exploratory talks? Did you get any sense that that was what was driving the US delegation?

[GRANDE] Yes, certainly it was one of the things that was driving it, and they didn't try and hide it. We all read our New York Herald Tribunes regularly and it was all in the front pages. But the Soviets were equally, of course, acquainted with that, and you knew they weren't making any concessions at all because of that. Nor were we, except that we were in high gear in those early days trying to get a quick agreement. I don't know how important this was.

[HILL] What about the policies of the west Europeans in this period, I mean in general. I don't want to explore every single west European country, but what about the Germans, say, and the Dutch? How keen were they to get agreements, or did they want to slow things down a bit?

[GRANDE] There is no evidence right at that sharp end there of any country trying to slow it down. Sometimes the Italians, who were indirect participants, argued at great length over what seemed to us to be unimportant points, but I mean that was their whole raison d'être, to worry about the flanks. And they had instructions, so their government canvassed us very carefully. I remember long long harangues from the Italians but we were all very patient and just heard them out. The Belgians didn't seem to have any specific instructions; I think they were given a pretty free hand. The Belgian ambassador got to be a bit of a nuisance sometimes. The Dutch had a very interesting guy who subsequently died; Bryan Quarles. He was their First Ambassador. He helped considerably. He was very good. He helped our team to get agreement on the mandate of the talks. He did quite a remarkable piece of work there along with Jock Dean. The British, I think, weren't too enthusiastic in the early days, but this is British reserve. It had its place to play in these negotiations and they had lots of experience to throw into the exercise. The Germans were hard working as always, and viewed themselves very seriously, and had very good people there, and played their full part, I think, as they should have, considering the considerable territory and troops that were involved.

[HILL] There was this keenness to get movement, but nonetheless the exploratory talks went on for five months. What about the linkage to the negotiations going on in Helsinki at that time, the CSCE multilaterals there? Was it the case that the MBFR exploratory talks couldn't wind up before the Helsinki talks wound up?

[GRANDE] I wasn't conscious of that. History books might prove me wrong, but I don't recall any sort of deliberate waiting for them.

[COX] Were you very much in touch with the CSCE negotiators?

[GRANDE] No, we sometimes bumped into each other in the halls of NATO, but we worked in direct contact with the Ad Hoc Group. However, we used to repeat our External Affairs telegrams to them and they repeated their telegrammes to us. In that sense, we knew what was going on.

[HILL] Did you feel that the talks went along fairly smoothly? Did you achieve what you wanted to do, more or less within a reasonable time frame?

[GRANDE] Well, in the exploratory talks, we had no idea we were going to have to stay there 5 months. Everyone expected to stay for 6-8 weeks, something like that perhaps. Certainly it came as a great surprise that it lasted that long. We were all pretty well exhausted after that because we had all just made temporary arrangements for accommodation and so on -- no families. Regarding the main conference, once again no one knew how long it would last. But by then, after the five-month exploratory talks, those who went to the beginning of the main conference were prepared for a long road. They were certainly right.

[HILL] Well, now I would like to move on a bit to the actual MBFR negotiations, that is from the exploratory talks to the full-scale negotiations which began on 30th October 1973. Ambassador Grande, you were associated with them until 1976, and in that time both East and West made a number of specific reduction proposals. There were initial Western and Eastern proposals in 1973, one again for each side in the winter of 1975-1976, and eventually two more, one from each side, in '78 and '79. Gradually, the two sides moved towards acceptance of what is called a manpower common ceiling of 900,000 personnel on each side including 700,000 ground troops and up to 200,000 air personnel. In fact, the two sides did at one stage agree on this, but they have remained apart on such issues as data and verification. This is all described in John Keliher's book: The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: the Search for Arms Control in Central Europe. On pages 81 and 87 he lists the proposals in tabular form. What I would like to get at here are not the details but some of the underlying issues of the negotations, how they were affected by general trends in East-West relations and so on. For example, it seems to me that the stagnation or the slow down in the negotiations from the middle of 1973 was not so much because of the negotiations themselves, or the issues themselves, but rather because of surrounding political circumstances. There was of course the Watergate affair, which had already broken out in the middle of '73, then the Middle East War at the end of '73. How would you assess the developments of that period in terms of the rate of negotiations?

[GRANDE] Watergate certainly affected things. I guess it affected everything. It certainly affected the Americans, as I recall, and this was perhaps more so in early '74 than in the fall of '73. They seemed to lack the type of instructions that they wanted on the spot there. They had the impression that the people back home just didn't have the authority to provide them. That was very evident. I can just presume that this all stemmed from Watergate; other things were on their minds. Priority given at the very beginning, which was obvious, to MBFR, came to dissipate, was no longer there in Washington. Survival was uppermost in the mind of their President.

[COX] Then there was the change in administration.

[HILL] Right.

[GRANDE] That's right.

[HILL] President Ford came in.

[GRANDE] But the change in administration didn't really affect the American delegation. It kept the same Ambassador (Resor). Resor stayed on and Jock Dean of course was there throughout it all. If I were to give a sort of generalization, there was nothing, no obvious, too obvious effect on Vienna of outside events, and I suppose that was because we weren't getting very far anyway.

There weren't any decisions to be taken or even concessions, obvious concessions to be made in Vienna at that time. It turned out to be a very tough, slow slogging match when you open the record. There wasn't any possibility, it soon turned out, of getting a quick agreement.

[GRANDE] I didn't notice any difference in the Soviet side. Again, they had the same people. They had Khlestov, who was a very dynamic, very bright guy and apparently held in high regard in Moscow. He was their legal advisor; he was a very skilful guy; he remained pretty well consistent in his attitude throughout the four years I was there. He left the same time as I did, so he was there the same length of time I was.

[HILL] Relating back to CSCE, in 1975, while you were in Vienna, there was the Helsinki Final Act and of course that contains some elements of military security, such as the CBMs and so on. Did the fact that they were able to arrive at an agreement in Helsinki have any impact on MBFR?

[GRANDE] Well, we periodically raised CBMs, that's what we meant by Associated Measures in the title. The conference raised the issue and it reminded them of it. I think we could have probably had an agreement on Associated Measures if there was supposed to be an agreement on anything, among the very first agreements, and particularly after the CSCE Helsinki agreement. We used that as a lever to try and get one on Associated Measures. In Vienna it was never clear how the two would mesh, who would supervise it and so on, and the Soviets in Vienna didn't seem very enthusiastic about pursuing the Associated Measures. It was something which the West was pushing in their minds and therefore there was something wrong with it from their point of view, i.e., they would have had to open up more than they wanted to.

[COX] I wonder if you could just pursue that a little bit. Were there indications the Soviets would not allow on-site verification?

[GRANDE] Yes, from the time I was there there was no question, there was certainly no authoritative statement made by the Soviets at all, considering inspections as anything more than an espionage operation by the West.

[HILL] And would on-site inspection have been indispensable from the point of view of the West?

[GRANDE] It depends on what we are talking about you know; if it were a token agreement between the Americans and the Soviets, then probably not. But if it were a comprehensive East-West agreement, yes. I don't know when national technical means came into its own. They didn't talk about it that much in those days.

[COX] I don't think that national technical means of '74-'75 would have done the job as far as troop reductions were concerned. You might have been able to, at that time, reduce tanks, but even then it would have been I think a very tricky operation.

[GRANDE] Well, my feeling confirms that I guess. We certainly felt in the Western side that we absolutely had to have that on-site inspection. We never reached that stage. We didn't have an agreement to worry about inspecting or verifying.

[HILL] The impression I get is that while you were in Vienna working away on the technical aspects, the steam had gone out a little bit of the forward movement which had been there earlier. I mean, maybe you all felt that eventually there would be another burst of forward movement or was that not the case?

There was always that hope when we broke up for a recess. You know, the format was that you had, what was it, three rounds of talks a year or maybe four, but I think it was three, and a fairly lengthy recess in between each round. There was always the hope as we broke up that each side would come back with new instructions, better instructions. I mean we urged the Soviets to go back and re-think and we usually tried to plan a proposal of some consequence, to be made just before a break-up so that they could then take it back to Moscow and hopefully come back in agreement. They never did. It didn't work out that way but there was always that hope. Likewise we among ourselves hoped we would get more forward-looking instructions out of our capitals which we could use in advancing the negotiations for the next round, for the round to follow. But it didn't work out that way.

[COX] So you started to see it as a long slog. How did you as a diplomat deal with that? I mean, when there is not much political impetus from capitals, there must be a tendency to go into low gear, perhaps to become less watchful than one might be in times of a sense of great movement and so on. Can you stay optimistic, can you keep people alert and fully involved in those things?

[GRANDE] I don't know. This is the first time this has happened this way, I think. No, I think we remained as watchful as ever. I think in the early days we felt that this exercise was in itself worthwhile whether or not we ever reached an agreement, to have for the first time representatives en masse of both alliances meeting daily and in daily contact with each other at all levels, all levels of the diplomatic rank structure and right up to ambassadors, including also the military. I guess we viewed this as a kind of confidence building measure, and I think it was. It has since often been suggested that this should be the basis for a crisis control centre, East-West crisis control centre. There was such an amazing amount of information gathered through bilateral contacts as well as the multilateral ones in Vienna over the years. So I think we felt that we did something to prevent an increase in tension and confrontation, if not outright warfare. So we felt that the exercise was worthwhile in itself even if we never reached an agreement. The purpose of the conference was that we reach an agreement, so we kept on trying to have an agreement of some sort. In later years much more emphasis went into trying to have a token agreement than to begin with. Still, what they are working on now as far as I know is an initial, token agreement.

[HILL] What about this data and verification question? It seems to have been a major stumbling block. Now we are coming to questions of substance. Reflecting back on that, do you think there are prospects of an MBFR agreement still?

[GRANDE] I think, peering into the future, as I understand it from my unclassified position for the last seven years, the big emphasis now is on these Atlantic-to-the-Urals talks which the Soviets have proposed, and which the NATO Council has picked up and expanded on. NATO is now trying to negotiate on the mandate for these with the Soviet side in Vienna at the CSCE or in the corridors of CSCE. If a mandate is agreed for these talks, which would embrace all the countries of East and West Europe, not just those with troops who are stationed there, then I cannot see MBFR continuing separately from these other talks. I do not think there is work for both of them to do or the will, thank God. The format that I could envisage is in effect MBFR continuing more or less as it is under the new name. The Americans are adamant in wanting the new talks to take place only between those countries that have troops which will be affected. Under no circumstances will they accept neutral, non-alliance countries having a say in determining what is to be done with U.S. forces in Europe.

[GRANDE] Yes, a two-tiered negotiation. CSCE for everyone, and then new negotiations on conventional arms control for the members of the two alliances.

[COX] The Soviets have expressed some preference, at least informally, for having the NNAs in the negotiations.

[GRANDE] Yes, that is true. That is what the Americans do not want. I do not know what the Canadian view is. About halfway ...

[COX] ... half way towards the neutral position.

[GRANDE] If these are going to be really meaningful negotiations, if in fact they are forced to have them under the larger umbrella, in the larger context at a Stockholm-type conference, then the real negotiations are going to go on bilaterally between the Americans and the Soviets, which I do not think we want. There will still be a certain amount of that, but the MBFR situation is much more manageable than the Stockholm one.

[COX] These are interesting comments in the light of your earlier comments about the way in which the MBFR negotiations developed structurally and procedurally. I suppose that one could say that in the situation that you described, bloc to bloc, as Roger put it, that there might be a role for, if not a third party, at least a facilitator. And I think the most charitable view of the idea of putting it into the CCSBNDE, is that the neutrals might play some facilitative role, rather than a mischievous role.

Would you attach any credibility to the notion that perhaps one of the limitations of the MBFR structure was the lack of a facilitator?

[GRANDE] A facilitator being a prodder, someone trying to get things going? I do not know who facilitated whom at Stockholm. I think that the West, including the Americans, found the neutral and non-allied countries very helpful in the Stockholm context.

[COX] The Soviets say so as well.

[GRANDE] So maybe. There's something to what you say, but I do not think that Congress in its toughest sense could put up with Sweden and Switzerland negotiating American security. I really cannot see it, realistically. Some way could be devised to give them a say; they could have their say in this umbrella group, or by attaching them as observers or something to the real negotiations. I never heard that mentioned. It just occurred to me this minute, but I think that might be acceptable, and certainly keeping them fully informed and so on.

[HILL] What about the more fundamental problem of MBFR, which NATO so frequently mentions in communiqués, this geographic disparity problem? I mean, can that be got over? It's a difficult one. I mean, the fact is that the Soviets are closer to the central front than the Americans are, and then you have this basic problem of reinforcement rates and times being different. That obviously has been addressed by NATO. Do you think that sort of issue can be handled?

[GRANDE] In the days when I was there, we tried to make a lot of this, on NATO's side, and then the Soviets poo-poohed it, and gave their standard line as to why this is really not important. Interestingly enough, in the context of nuclear weapons and Euromissiles, the same thing exists in

reverse as it were. The Soviets are threatened by Euromissiles, the Americans are not. So, there's some kind of a reverse connection there. How many American troops are here in Europe now? 200,000?

[HILL] Ground troops?

[GRANDE] I mean they are there. They are not across the Atlantic.

[HILL] I presume then, that there is a limit to how much you can ask.

[GRANDE] I think there is.

[HILL] What you want is some sort of balance, between the two sides.

What about these data and verification problems that have been made so much of at times; are they resolvable?

[GRANDE] I do not think you'll ever get a complete agreement on data. Do you? Certainly you have to have a hell of a lot more trust and confidence and cooperation, and when you reach the stage when you have that, then you do not need an agreement on data.

[HILL] That may be.

I think Jonathan Dean in an article about two or three years ago suggested that, if there was political will there, then those things could be resolved, and verification also could be resolved. I mean, providing the Soviets are willing to accept some degree of on site inspection and so on.

I mean if the two sides want to, they can sort out these problems, but the more fundamental problems are the geographical ones, and so on. But he was suggesting that the basic problem three years ago was the attitude of the Soviet military, and particularly the Soviet need to keep control in Eastern Europe, and the general distaste of the Soviet military for any kind of reductions.

[GRANDE] I would not disagree with that, but maybe they were forced to the negotiating table. But I do not know, we could not judge that from the record.

[HILL] No.

[GRANDE] Well, you see the military did not participate in plenary meetings and so on. They said whatever they wanted bilaterally to their opposite numbers, but they did not have a direct contribution which is discernible.

[COX] Let's say that there were, not just disagreements about how to count the actual disparities, roughly of the kind of magnitude that had been discussed, but that there really were significant differences. Lets say from a military point of view. Was there a view that one could live with those disparities?

[GRANDE] Well, I suppose it depends on the type of agreement you are talking about. Certainly you do not need any agreement, or you can disregard the disparities for any initial token agreement. We did talk at great length about that, you know, saying, "We realize your cooks are in uniform, and ours aren't," and all this sort of thing, but that was not too important. My short answer to your

question is, yes, I think we could live with the disparities, but whether you could convince the Pentagon I do not know.

I am not one of those who agrees that there is at present a <u>de facto</u> parity between East and West in the conventional field. There are those, aren't there, who argue that things are balanced now in the conventional field, and say, "Leave it alone".

[COX] Did Ottawa express impatience, or want you to try and persuade the others to get on with it?

[GRANDE] Never.

[COX] No?

[HILL] That leads on to another question which I have concerning the exploratory talks. I asked your views on the policies of the United States and on the policies of the Europeans. I deliberately did not ask about Canadian perceptions so far. How would you assess the MBFR negotiations? What is the importance of the MBFR negotiations to Canada?

[GRANDE] As I mentioned earlier on this afternoon, we had just reduced our forces before these MBFR talks started, and in that new situation, I know those in External Affairs here, including myself, were anxious not to give NATO any reason to think that we had lost interest in the organization or in Western security. Canada was playing a role in Western security arrangements, therefore by the same token, in NATO, we were anxious to let all the Europeans know that we would go all out with whatever knowledge and expertise we had to promote the success of this MBFR conference. So we did co-operate closely on occasion with the Germans, for instance, and sometimes with the British and others in preparing position papers, and preparing talking points and so on. This was helped by the team back in Ottawa who came to life occasionally and sent us reasoned pieces of paper.

I think in general Alliance terms, particularly as we had let the Alliance down a few years before when Trudeau had his big sweep up, we were anxious to play our full role in it. I was not so anxious to have our troops reduced. We had worked out roughly with the military what we would do if there were a 5% cut or whatever percent cut. What would that mean in Canadian terms? We had our positions clear, and we were willing to do whatever we had to do.

[HILL] So it was in effect partly to demonstrate an interest in the Alliance, taking an interest in what the Alliance was doing in this field.

[GRANDE] A political thing.

[HILL] It was also a means for Canada to contribute to general international peace and security.

[GRANDE] Yes, but I think that was true of all the NATO allies. Certainly it was the Canadian position.

[HILL] These negotiations were to some degree promoted initially by NATO, as an organization, with the allies behind it, of course. And as this was done through NATO, then presumably being in NATO was a very valuable way of contributing to this particular aspect of international affairs.

[GRANDE] Yes, that is right. If we were not in NATO, we could not have done it, and we were very anxious to continue to show that we thought being in NATO was a good thing, knowing there were forces in Ottawa who would like to take us out if they had a chance. As far as MBFR was concerned, the idea of having these two alliances closer together could contribute something, we were not quite sure how, but could contribute something to promoting détente.

[COX] I know it's a difficult question. Did you feel that your position was, well, if not compromised, made more awkward, by the reductions which had previously taken place in the Canadian Forces? And perhaps the other side of that: would you have felt that there was leverage, potentially, if the contribution had remained the same?

[GRANDE] In practical terms, I think it would not have made any difference. But how can you measure these things, because we have a few thousand less troops out of a very small number anyway in Europe? What you are asking is whether this gave me less importance, less leverage, whatever, as a Canadian diplomat, ambassador in Vienna at the conference, with my allies, with the other side, than if we had retained the same strength. I do not think it made any difference. I think a lot has to do with the personality you have got. I mean I could take a ribbing about our paltry force in Europe and I did.

[COX] So would you say that the ...

[GRANDE] Maybe in the NATO Council what you're saying was reflected more. I do not know, you should ask John Halstead, well, not Halstead, Menzies, Arthur Menzies.

[HILL] Ross Campbell of course was the one there when the cuts were actually made. I think one of the interesting things about his reaction to that was to redouble Canada's diplomatic efforts, that is to say keep the delegation going around the clock to make up for the military cuts. So maybe in some ways it even had the reverse effect. Who knows.

[COX] Would it be fair to say that your position would be that the pros and cons of an increased or reduced contribution should not be linked to diplomatic presence. In other words, one cannot make this kind of linkage. We cannot see any more influence, therefore there is no point in increasing the number of forces. We cannot see any influence, therefore there is no reason not to decrease them. Am I correct in thinking you would just simply not agree with that form of reasoning?

[GRANDE] I would not agree with the form of reasoning you just espoused? I would not agree with it, no. I do not agree, and that was not what I was trying to say. What I was trying to say was that by the fact that we had withdrawn whatever it was - how many men did we withdraw from Europe?

[HILL] About 2,500, I think.

[GRANDE] Withdrawing 2,500 men from Europe didn't make the slightest bit of difference to my power or lack of it in negotiations in Vienna. That is all I said. Certainly, if we did not have any forces in Europe, I think our political punch at NATO it would be reduced tremendously. This has never been tested, of course, but I believe that very strongly.

[COX] I guess I was just trying to get at this: people use this argument a great deal and try to find evidence for it but perhaps it's the wrong way of thinking.

[GRANDE] I think its the wrong way of looking at it. I do not think it should be used either way. I do not think it should be used as justification for having troops in Europe. I think the justification is there on its own if the allies in Europe want us to be there. We have a role, but the way it works in practical terms is dependent as much on the quality of the people there, and on having a sizeable delegation and a quality delegation, as it is on the military side. But you have to have military, I hasten to add, otherwise you have no raison d'être. It's a military alliance essentially, even though we try to give it the economic dimension of Article II. It's still essentially a military alliance. We're discussing essentially security issues.

The political cooperation side of NATO, I think, is going to become increasingly important to Canada, if to no one else, because of the way political cooperation discussions are developing in the Common Market. I advocate that we should somehow or other try to get an observer status in them but we are excluded from them right now, which leaves us out in left field with the Americans, and that is not the way we want it.

[HILL] I think that was the point that Gordon Smith was quoted as making recently about the comparison between being at NATO now as compared with when he was there in the '60s. Now, much more is decided among the Europeans before it's put into the NATO Council, and this makes it much more difficult for Canada, if I quote him correctly.

[GRANDE] Well, it is. I know there are a lot of countries like the Dutch, the Belgians and so on, and the Danes, who are very conscious of the Canadian position. They do not want us excluded from the Common Market decisions but we are in many cases excluded from them, so that presents problems and makes it all the more important that the political discussions in the NATO Council be meaningful. We have a role to play in them, and that is the only place we have that role to play, unlike all the other countries.

[HILL] Just to finish off this bit, how would you assess the work of MBFR over time? You did touch on this already, talking about crisis management and so on, or crisis control, if you like. What about the educational process and things like that?

[GRANDE] I think that is very important in the longer term. We, I think as individuals, as well as governments, based on what we reported to them, became much more knowledgeable about the thinking of the Warsaw Pact, the individual members, the thing as a whole, individual member countries and the individual members of delegations. That is almost a sociological experience, certainly a psychological one. I think that has helped us in dealing with these countries. Certainly for all those who participated in the negotiations, if I am any example, and I do not think I was unique. It has enabled us to make a number of lasting friendships stretching across the so-called Iron Curtain, which last to this day. And I think if you multiply that by the number of people who participated in Vienna, you get some tremendous permutations and combinations which have a cumulative effect on this East-West question, by lowering tension, creating more understanding and so on. I think it's one of the intangibles, one of the good effects of these negotiations. If we had had some concrete agreements, we would not perhaps have had to stretch as far as to point to this sort of thing as an accomplishment; but it is, and it still is, to me, an amazing thing that these two mighty military alliances are meeting together daily, and have been for the last 13-14 years or more. I think it's a marvelous safety valve.

[HILL] One has the impression that the NATO system, the NATO military, have also learned a hell of lot about the military balance themselves, through the MBFR process in the last 15 years.

[GRANDE] Yes.

[HILL] And all the analyses that have gone into the thing. I think one always has the impression that the NATO military and Warsaw Pact, too, probably know at any given moment everything about their forces, but I think, in fact, they have to find out what is happening. There has been a lot of work in that respect.

[GRANDE] Yes, a lot of work since the conference began that was not done before.

[COX] Could you tell us a little bit about your comment that you had on several occasions made proposals for MBFR as becoming the basis for an international crisis control centre ...?

[GRANDE] This is in my present capacity as a journalist.

[COX] What kind of responses have you had?

[GRANDE] There is some genuine interest in this whole idea. As you know, this is one of the items mentioned in the first Geneva Summit, the American and Soviet Summit. They appointed people to meet together and they have met two or three times to discuss crisis control centres. I forget the exact words what they call them. And they have got somewhere, and they are continuing to discuss the concept. But no one has promoted the idea of making it in Vienna. I think the present agreement between them is they are establishing crisis control centres in Washington and Moscow. That is fine, but I think there should be one right where they are eyeball to eyeball. I mean there's where you ...

[COX] I think they are mainly talking about nuclear confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, strategic nuclear confrontations, whereas I get the sense that what you are talking about is a centre which would be able to consider local confrontations which were dangerous in terms what might happen one week hence.

[GRANDE] Yes, exactly.

[COX] It's a conventional crisis control centre if you like.

[GRANDE] Yes, I mean it could be as simple or as concrete as you wanted to make it. But I think that the expertise is constantly there, right in Vienna, and the friendship is there too. It is already a safety valve, but I think it could play a greater role in that area. I have not worked out the details but I think somebody who has looked into it more than I have is Jock Dean. He has written about it. Maybe you should follow it up. I suggest that you speak to him. I am interested in working more on it but once again there are those intangibles.

I do not suppose for a moment this is one of the purposes of the conference now convening, but that is ...

[COX] But it would not be the first time that it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good.

[HILL] Maybe MBFR will be fed into a larger, broader conference; but say that does not happen. I have the impression you feel it's been very a useful exercise up until now, and probably should be continued in some form or other unless it's somehow submerged into something else.

[GRANDE] I think it should be, and I think this is sound to have this as the Canadian view. I have often, for a long time, promoted the idea, and I think our minister took it up at one stage but did not get very far, of having periodic NATO-Warsaw Pact ministerial meetings, and the obvious basis for them is the MBFR Conference. Some of our bigger brothers did not like the idea.

Part VII - Southern Africa, 1976-79

[HILL] I would just like to go on, if you have the time, say for another 10 minutes, to look at the South African period, and this would be Part VIII of this interview. You were Ambassador to South Africa and High Commissioner to Botswana and Lesotho for 1976-79. I think the element to look at here is the out-of-area question, always a big thing in NATO, in that I think probably the worst crises that NATO has ever been through have been usually had to do with the Middle East. One comes back to the Suez Crisis and to '73. Those were very difficult things for NATO. Southern Africa is a problem area, too, but not on quite the same dimensions, though difficult enough I think. Also the Namibia question. I believe you were Canada's representative on the Western Contact Group for a while, were you not? On the Namibia issue?

[GRANDE] Yes, I was the first, right at the beginning. I was the Canadian rep in situ on the spot. There were five countries who were members of the Security Council at the time, the five Western countries who had not only members on the Security Council but who had diplomatic missions in Pretoria who formed the Contact Group, and so it was Germany and Canada, the non-permanent members on the Council at the time, plus the Americans, the British and the French.

[HILL] Could you say something about the management of out-of--area issues as far as NATO is concerned. I mean there have been periodic cries by various people that NATO extend its out-of-area of responsibility into the Southern Atlantic, but that never gets anywhere. But what is more to the point perhaps is that here you have different NATO countries associated in dealing with or facing up to the whole Southern African issue including the Namibia question. How much of a problem do you think that is for NATO, that whole area, and where do you see it going, and how can NATO best deal with it?

[GRANDE] I do not think this is tackled as a NATO problem or a NATO question. As far as I know, it was never even discussed in NATO. Maybe it was occasionally, but the origins were not at NATO. It was not conceived by NATO or in a NATO context. It was conceived in the United Nations context and set up as a Contact Group with a general desire to solve the Namibian problem at long last and to get it out of the way. If we could not solve the South African problem, you could at least solve this subsidiary problem up there, which was a hangover from the last war, and do some good, and maybe that in turn could have a good effect on South Africa and the South African government situation. That was the reasoning, and I am quite sure it was dreamed up in New York rather than in Brussels.

[HILL] But I mean it was a Western group anyway?

[GRANDE] Oh, yes. It made it easier to do.

[HILL] It has an impact on NATO for that reason in that you have NATO members involved, at least.

[GRANDE] The French, for instance, were cooperating fully at that time, which they were not doing in Brussels. I think what you are asking, among other things, is did we as NATO members consider the threat to South Africa, the so-called Soviet threat to Southern Africa and South Africa, as a real one.

That's another question and one which we might come back to.

[HILL] I was thinking rather that it seemed to me there are different perspectives among different Western countries on some of these issues. Certainly the US has different views from others at various times. If the South African situation gets more difficult, then these differences in the West may become greater, and of course the Namibian question is not resolved yet either. That may become a greater source of difficulties. I mean, I suppose what I am asking is what do you think should be done to manage these things among the Western group? What should Canada try to do to help manage the responses to this problem in Southern Africa?

[GRANDE] Well, I do not know whether my views are very valuable in the context of what the Canadian government is doing. I, for one thing, am opposed to economic sanctions for many reasons. I do not think they work, and I think they hurt the people you are trying to help, and sometimes help the people you are trying to hurt and there are take-overs, desperate operations which are certainly not going to hurt rich South Africans, the whites. My plan, I have not got any answers for South Africa, is to indulge in a cooperative full scale maximum pressure operation with the South African government, to force them into an operation to develop a meaningful plan to turn, not to turn power over to the blacks, but to involve black people in power sharing. Its as simple as that. There are all kinds of possibilities for helping them get power. We in our wisdom, or lack of it, decided not to go that route. We came close to it, I thought, when we sent the Commonwealth Emminent Persons group to Pretoria and Capetown; but unfortunately, for reasons best known to them, the South African government either deliberately or otherwise sabotaged these operations by carrying out military attacks on Zimbabwe. I think this should be revived. I think there should be much more of this sort of thing. But if we want to do it, we cannot do it and at the same time engage in a maximum punitive operation against the country.

[HILL] Where do you see the whole South African scene going, unless something is done fairly soon? And what sort of threat does that pose to Western unity, the Western position?

[GRANDE] I think the maximum point of Western disunity has passed about a year ago before the Americans, at least the American Congress, passed the measures package against the wishes of the President. But I still have not given up on there being a bloodless change-over. A lot of blood has already been shed, but avoiding the blood bath which will surely take place if there is not political accommodation and solution is essential. There still can be one, in the next five years. There is not going to be a sudden breakdown of government and law and order in South Africa. Their armed forces are far too strong. Their infrastructure is strong. They are practically independent economically, they have stockpiles. They manufacture or produce by artificial means their own petroleum now and they do all kinds of amazing things, and they are also masters at obtaining what they do not make themselves, through kinds of channels which will always exist in this world of ours.

So they are not going to break down. They are not going to give up. They are not going to all migrate. The English South Africans might, but certainly not the Afrikaner whites. They will stay right there.

[HILL] So there is nothing really much that Canada can do through NATO, as such, to deal with the South Africans, because its more of a UN issue.

[GRANDE] No. I would not mix the two.

[COX] But given the juxtaposition of your assignments, were you conscious, not just of South Africa, but of the area, as one which affected NATO security?

[GRANDE] That is what I was starting to say earlier. That is the way the South African government for years and years has been putting it, claiming that they are vital to Western security. The Cape route is kind of a memorial and some importance as a naval landmark. But no, I think they have exaggerated. In this day of nuclear missiles winging their way over continents and oceans, I do not think it's important anymore from a strategic point of view. I suppose it would be important to NATO and to the West if South Africa were a Soviet Democratic Republic but I cannot see that happening. Who knows, maybe it will happen. If the radical African National Congress remains radical and becomes the government. I cannot even see that, but if they do become the government of South Africa and they retain their links with Moscow and so on, which are very strong, South Africa eventually would become a democratic republic. Then I suppose NATO would have something to worry about. But what are they still trying to protect? In this day of nuclear weapons, I do not think that it is strategically that important.

[COX] Were you there at the time of the famous Double Flash issue?

[GRANDE] When South Africa exploded a couple of nukes? Yes, but you did not hear much about it. Certainly they have the know how, whether they keep the thing fused or not. I do not know what they would use them for? What would they use nuclear weapons for? India has at least Pakistan to threaten. But South Africa, it cannot use them up in the Caprivi Strip.

[COX] But from your vantage point there, of the Double Flash, I am sure you know the scientific panel in the United States eventually decided there was not a nuclear explosion but a kind of freak. But since then people have gone back to thinking there was a nuclear explosion. Given what you have just said, if it were a nuclear explosion, who is making the explosives?

[GRANDE] There is very close cooperation at all times between Israel and South Africa to this very day despite recent announcements that Israel is about to cut off its supplying of armaments and so on. The relationship is a very close one, and up until now considered worthwhile both ways to continue. I just do not know.

[HILL] Well, I think at this point we will close off.

[COX] Do we have just one minute?

[HILL] Okay.

[COX] I wanted to ask you, was it jarring to go from those years of detailed pursuit of conventional force reductions to the direct problem of racism?

[GRANDE] Yes, I suppose jarring is a good way to put it. I would not have gone to South Africa if I had my own choice at any time. But having gone to South Africa, I do not regret having been sent there. I think I profited and knew people better. And, in a sense, the Namibian, operation

which took up over 50% of our time at one stage, sort of threw me back I suppose into the negotiating mold, which I had been in for the previous four years in Vienna.

[COX] Did they consult with you about MBFR when you had gone to South Africa?

[GRANDE] The South Africans?

[COX] No, Ottawa.

[GRANDE] No, typical I think. You are gone and forgotten.

[COX] Isn't this extraordinary, though, you must have been the principal source of knowledge and then ...

[GRANDE] There were others ...

[HILL] Well, I think we will close off at this point, Ambassador Grande. Thank you very much indeed for coming and joining in this exercise.

[GRANDE] It's been a pleasure.

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PART II

CANADA'S DEFENCE EFFORT

8.0 miles 2.00

CANADA'S DEFENCE EFFORT

ROBERT FALLS

[HILL] Good morning, our guest this morning is Admiral Robert Hilburn Falls. We are very grateful to you for agreeing to participate in this project, Admiral Falls, and are delighted that you could join us this morning.

[FALLS] I'm pleased to be here.

[HILL] Admiral Falls, as you know what we are engaged in here is an oral history of Canadian policy in NATO. We are trying to trace the development of Canadian interest in NATO since the post-war period, and also to examine some of the detailed work inside the organization. So we were very keen to have you with us, owing to your work as a naval officer, as a military planner. and as a senior commander. The way we will approach this interview is to try to obtain some idea of your background and thinking, by touching on the various phases of your career in the Navy. and then to go on to look at your work as staff officer, Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, in more detail. We want to focus on the key questions in the last two of these periods, and to ask how you saw them at the time and how you have assessed them since. We are interested not only in information and explanations, but also in your reflections on specific issues and what they have meant to Canada, to NATO, and to international peace and security in general. First of all, I think I should spell out the main details of your career. You were born in Welland, Ontario, and educated in Southern Ontario. You enlisted in the R.C.A.F. in 1942, and trained as a pilot. You transferred to the Royal Navy and served overseas in the Fleet Air Arm. Then you returned to Canada in the Royal Canadian Navy, where you served in aircraft carriers, destroyers, a number of air groups and various staff positions. You rose to Command of BF 870, the RCN's first jet fighter squadron, and afterwards commanded H.M.C.S. Your last seagoing appointment, as Commander of Atlantic Fleet, was in 1971, when you held the rank of Commodore. At that time you were promoted Rear Admiral and went to Headquarters in Ottawa as Associate Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy. Next you were appointed Deputy Chief of Defence Staff. In 1974 you were made Vice-Admiral, and became Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff. In 1977 you were selected to be the Chief of the Defence Staff and promoted to Admiral. In 1980 you became Chairman of the NATO Military Committee in Brussels, a position you held for the next three years. Since retiring from the Navy in 1983, you've become President of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, and a member of the Board of the Atlantic Council of Canada.

Just before we get into the first phase of our discussion, perhaps it would be useful if I stressed the kind of things we are looking for in this exercise. As we examine the various events in Canadian and NATO history over the past forty years, we are posing two basic questions, as a kind of rule of thumb test of the utility of Canada's involvement in NATO. Firstly, how did Canada contribute to NATO's efforts in collective defence, East/West relations, arms control and disarmament, inter-allied relations, and consultation about third areas, by which I mean outside the NATO area, and how did this benefit this country and how did it further the general pursuit of international peace and security? The second question we are looking at is, how did Canada contribute to and benefit from, NATO's work in other areas of interest to this country. One is referring here to the kinds of things mentioned in Foreign Policy for Canadians and the recent report of the parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations, including all the

⁶ Interviewers: Hill, Cox, Pawelek. Interview dates: 1/4/87 and 2/4/87.

things that are important to Canada as a country, like the pursuit of national unity, sovereignty and independence, economic prosperity, and so on. There are also those aspects of the pursuit of international peace and security which are not directly related to the work of NATO, such as peace keeping, the containment of regional conflicts, and resistance to terrorism, although sometimes NATO does get into those things to some degree.

[FALLS] Well, those main areas are all-encompassing, and imply that I might have special opinions that evolve from my position, my career, and I think that is only partially so, in the sense that might come out as we go through the interview. In the application of these subjects to my involvement, for instance, in the Navy, it's not very large.

[HILL] Well, let's put it this way, I think that these are the issues, that these are the criteria which lie behind our approach to the whole thing. But in the way we approach them, we are trying to draw on people's experiences as a totality, so that we have some idea "where you are coming from". That's how we are approaching things. We're trying to be fairly well-disciplined but without being overly rigid.

Part I - Early Years, to 1942

[HILL] Admiral Falls, you were born in Welland, Ontario, and educated, I believe, partly in Chatham, Ontario. I wonder if you could tell us a little of those early years and how you believe they helped colour your outlook on life in general and also particularly on questions such as Canada's involvement in the world, and problems of international peace and security?

[FALLS] I'm not sure that I gave them much thought in those early years; I had a very mundane education in Chatham public and high schools. And of course during my high school years war broke out in Europe and I can only remember one rather curious thing that happened. My best friend and I were walking to school on the day that war was declared and he said "Gee, Bob, I hope this lasts long enough for us to get in it." And I thought that was a remark that I would not have made, since my mother had always said "I have not raised my boy to be a soldier". As it turned out, he carried on to University and became a doctor and is now an eminent pediatrician in London; I went on to join the forces. But I certainly didn't have in mind a military career as such, even joining the cadets was a voluntary activity, and I did not join the cadets in high school because I was discouraged from so doing by my parents. Nevertheless, during my high school years, it seemed to me that -- I guess I got itchy at that time -- that more and more of my friends were leaving to join the service. Finally I decided that I would join them and go on into the forces rather than continue with my schooling, and that I could always pick up my schooling later, because that was the plan I guess for most people. And as it turned out it happened for most of my colleagues. They came back out of the service and went on to University. I did not do that, therefore my education was somewhat truncated. That's about where we could leave it I guess for the early years unless there's anything else you want to know about that.

[HILL] You mentioned that your parents were not so keen on you going into the Armed Forces. Was there any particular reason for that?

[FALLS] No, they didn't object to my joining the Armed Forces in the sense that it was my decision and there was no pressure at all for me not to. I think there was some disappointment on my mother's part. My father was not in the First World War, he was born in 1900 and therefore was not old enough to go into the war when it ceased, so he missed the First World War. There was therefore no history of any military involvement in our family, none at all, that I'm aware of,

not in my close family anyway. So I think basically I decided to join the Air Force because I thought flying was glamorous, as did many other people, and indeed it is. And because there's that sort of feeling when there's a war going on that school is perhaps not very relevant, and I think I got less interested in school and more interested in the idea of flying. It was inevitable, in any event, that one either had to stay in school or join the forces, there was no in between, and I elected to go into the forces.

Part II - Wartime, 1942-45

[HILL] As you mentioned, you joined the R.C.A.F. and I believe flew fighter aircraft in the beginning. And then you transferred to the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm after that. I just wonder if you could tell us a bit about that period, what kind of duties you had and what kind of impressions wartime service left on you.

[FALLS] In a chronological sense, I guess I happened to have been a good pilot, mechanically that is, and I also got good ground school marks and so I graduated fairly high in the class, I think number 2. And the penalty for doing that, at that stage, was you were sent off to be an instructor. because the Air Force had in those days about as many pilots as they needed operationally in Europe. In fact there was a glut of pilots, and had I been sent overseas as some of my colleagues were, they sat out the war in camps, I've forgotten the names of them, but in effect they were just waiting, and waiting, and didn't even do any flying, let alone get into operations. So it was, I suppose, advantageous to have been sent off as an instructor, and I went to Borden and put through a couple of courses of students, graduated them as pilots. During that time, the Royal Navy was looking for experienced pilots, they could see a requirement for it. They could see that the European war would be finished fairly soon, but they were not aware I suppose of the effects of the atomic bomb at that stage, at least not officially, and therefore had to prepare for a Pacific campaign. And they needed more pilots and so they put out a call to the Canadian Forces for experienced pilots to transfer to the Fleet Air Arm. And this was an opportunity to do what we'd started to do in the first place, which was to become operational, and so I had enough flying experience by then -- I didn't really qualify, they wanted a thousand hours and I only had 700 -but in any event I got accepted. I transferred in Halifax from the light blue of the Air Force to the dark blue of the Navy and was paid in pounds, shillings and pence. We took a terrible drop in pay, which didn't seem to matter in those days because money wasn't very useful. You were being looked after with your food and clothing, food and lodging I should say. I went off to Europe, to England, initially and subsequently to Scotland, where thirty-two of us, ex-R.C.A.F., formed a fighter squadron in the R.N. on Seafires, and we started a workup in Arbroath, Scotland.

I should say that about a week after I arrived in England the European war packed up and so we continued training for the Pacific. I have forgotten the actual dates of when the bomb was dropped and when the Japanese sued for peace, but I was up in a city in Scotland, having a weekend away, one of my first holidays, when that news hit the fan. At that time, of course, peace had broken out all over and obviously behind the scenes the Canadian Navy had decided they would like to have their own major acquisition of an aircraft carrier. So as I mentioned, I was in a fighter squadron, there was an equivalent of an anti-submarine squadron, called 825 Squadron, of Canadians. And both of those squadrons were reduced significantly, we were cut in half from 32 down to 16. Essentially those who wanted to go home did, that is to say the married men, and those who were rather keen on pursuing their education. Those of us who were not married and who had no responsibilities and were having fun, decided to stay on and became the nucleus - we in 803 as the fighter squadron and 825 as the ASW squadron - of the Canadian Fleet Air Arm or Naval Aviation. So we moved to that squadron in Ireland and continued training. We upgraded

our aircraft - Seafire 3s to 15s - and carried on with our operational training to the extent of deck landing training. We qualified in deck landing on HMCS Warrior which was a Canadian carrier. Somewhere in that era, between, I guess it was, about the time we reduced from 32 to 16, we had actually made the transition from the R.N. to the R.C.N.R., become Canadians again, and then started getting paid in dollars, all of which was good stuff. So we were, in fact, in the Canadian Navy Reserve when we came back into Canada in 1946. I think the major impact of that, in terms of how I felt about things, was the enormity of the dropping of that nuclear weapon. But I'm not unique in that, I think everybody must remember, anybody who is old enough, must remember the impact. I don't think I was horrified so much as astounded at the power of the thing, it seemed to take a while before the implications ever sunk in.

[HILL] I think that's a point that John Holmes mentioned in one of his books on that period. In fact there was a consciousness that this was a new world that one was going into. And in fact there was already thinking about the impact of all this on Canadian security. He mentioned that in 1946 people were already thinking that Canada was no longer a "fire proof house", as it had been described in the pre-war years. That was no longer the case, because you could see, as a possibility, the marriage between atomic weapons and long-range bombers, and that nuclear missiles were over the horizon.

[FALLS] Yes, I'm surprised that my first reaction wasn't the fact that, as it was with some people, that surely this makes us military folk kind of irrelevant, now that war can be conducted, or the threat of war, with atomic bombs. I don't recall that happening, I'm just surprised that it didn't.

[HILL] I think that was more of a sentiment, let's say, in the late '40s, the feeling that conventional military power had gone out of the window almost. But then it became apparent that it hadn't. Nuclear power has changed the world but it hasn't ruled out some of the need for military forces to maintain stability.

[COX] Four times ten to the power of three - that was the per pound difference at Hiroshima, four thousand times larger.

[FALLS] Incredible. And that was the part that was hard for us to grasp - the enormity of that great big bang. Mind you, all we had at the time, and subsequently, were news reports.

Part III - Operational Career, 1946-71

[HILL] This covers your career in the Royal Canadian Navy from 1946 to 1971. You returned to Canada, served in the Navy and in due course received command positions, and worked your way up the ladder of command. By the end of the '60s or by 1971 you had held command of the ships that I mentioned earlier and also the first jet fighter squadron in the R.C.N. You'd commanded the Chaudière and the Bonaventure. I wonder if you could fill us in a little bit on that period and how it developed. How did the establishment of NATO affect serving officers in that period, towards the end of 1949?

[FALLS] This might be a good time to look back at these two statements, questions or ground rules if you like, that you spoke of earlier, Roger, to qualify what it meant to be a naval officer in the post-war years.

I think that, as far as I was concerned, being a Naval Officer was reasonably well prescribed in a sense that you had a job to do. One knew what, in general terms, and why you were doing

it. In other words I think that there was a certain ideology that we all believed in, and I think was reasonably valid, that there was a need to have a post-war Canadian Armed Force to ensure that the repetition of the earlier two wars didn't take place somewhere in the future. The nuclear weapons had a large and as yet undetermined place in this, but we thought there was a future and a need for Armed Forces in Canada. But I'm not sure if I thought at that time, and in fact only very gradually thereafter, about the implications for Canada and the broader aspects that you outlined here in these two sentences. Being a naval officer, or in fact I suppose, any kind of military officer, but more particularly in the Navy, you are a bit isolated if you go away from home, go out to sea. It's incredible how little information you get at sea about what's going on around the world. Despite the modernity of communications, certainly in my days at sea we had a sort of one-page summary that came over the wires that was sometimes garbled, supposedly world news. You know I'm kind of a news junky, so I really missed that as part of my daily ration. Even in command when I should have been able to do something about it, I couldn't; I mean the material just wasn't there from the other end. Anyway, there was no great tendency, unless someone had a natural interest. which I didn't, to take part in very much strategic thinking; and as a matter of interest, I never did have a staff course in all my career. I think this wasn't a question of avoiding it at all. In fact I kept thinking I'd make an effort to get one, because I felt it was a lack. Somehow I seemed to have been posted, before I could sort of apply or think about it. I was posted to jobs that were just too interesting to try and avoid and I had, in fact, one hell of an interesting, enjoyable career. And I'm not sure how I would have been able to fit the staff course into it without subtracting from that The fact is, basically, I was having too much fun, enjoyment and satisfaction doing those things which I had to do during that time. So with that background maybe I can run over what I did do.

When I came back to Canada, having been an instructor, I got back into the business of instructing again in Dartmouth, locally I should say, getting people up to the carrier stage, not basic instructional flying, but getting them from pilots to being able to fly in a carrier. That was a short period. I went back then into operational flying as a member of a squadron. I think about three years after I came back, in fact, I went off somewhat reluctantly to get a watchkeeping certificate. This was, I think, the difference primarily between the Canadian Navy and the Royal Navy. The Canadian Navy had made a deliberate policy decision to integrate the aviation component as much as possible, indeed there never was a Canadian "Fleet Air Arm". The term was not to be tolerated. If there was a generic term at all it was just "Naval Aviation". And so all pilots were expected to be, all air crew I should say, were expected to be naval officers first and pilots second.

So in 1949 I was sent off to get my watchkeeping certificate in H.M.C.S. Haida. This usually was somewhere between six and nine months, I think six months was the minimum and I think I got my watchkeeping certificate in six months, but I stayed on because, I guess, I was needed as a ship's officer. This turned out to be an eye-opening experience and a very enjoyable one. So from then on I became kind of a fan of this dual career bit. However, I didn't get back to sea again as a so-called fishead, a sailor, for a long time. I immediately went back to sea of course, as a pilot, in the carrier "Magnificent". As a member of a squadron, I was also, after a tour in Seafuries, selected to go down to the United States to become a Landing Signals Officer or Batsman. And so I went off to Pensacola for six months and came back as an L.S.O. and became a Landing Signals Officer.

I guess it was in this period of time that NATO was formed, and that I became conscious of it and of the opportunities that this might have for Canada's Navy. But I'm kind of digressing now from the chronological to the opinion.

[FALLS] I don't think the occurrence of NATO sticks in my mind as a highlight of Canadian history or certainly of my history. Except that I was conscious of it. It was in 1949 I think, and in 1949 it was when I was doing my watchkeeping, training in Haida; and I was far too busy losing sleep and trying to learn the ropes to worry too much about what went on outside the ship, and again as I mentioned, there was a lack of communication. Anyway, because we were in NATO, we started to work with other ships. I think there was also, too, a feeling of pride in all of us in what Canada had done during the war. We were left with a reasonably good Navy, in fact from my point of view it was a much better Navy because it contained an aircraft carrier which the wartime Navy didn't. We, of course, had to reduce in size after the war, down to basically what were our major ships, which were destroyers and frigates, and to get rid of most of the corvettes, and we had a few mine sweepers for awhile, but the carrier was basically my life.

I remember in fact being in Norfolk on the fifth anniversary of NATO in 1954 and that was quite a celebration. A lot of navies of NATO, all of the navies had representation in Norfolk at that time, and there was a large gathering of ships and social events and so forth, and NATO started to become prominent in my eyes.

I remember too, I think it was 1953-54 - I know I was Batsman by then and I took my Signals Officer Training in 1952 - we had an exercise called Northern Wedding which was a NATO exercise and it was a rather dramatic occurrence. I'm not sure that I should bore you with it, but it was almost a disaster, from the point of view of a sudden fog rolling in, while all our airplanes were airborne, and this was out in the middle of the North Atlantic. It was either bad weather forecasting or bad luck. Fortunately the fighters, we'd gotten them all back on board before, but the long-range airplanes were too far away. Fortunately they were also long-range and so they had lots of fuel left, but they came and they flew around overtop for a couple of hours. I know one of our guys wanted to take his flight and head straight west to get to Greenland, and they didn't know where they were going but at least it was land, so they would be over Greenland when they ran out of fuel. Then a United States submarine came up on the air and said, hey we've got a clear patch where we are, and so it happened to be -- this gang had already taken off for Greenland -- it happened to be in the same direction as the carrier and there was an American carrier with us and we all steamed off toward this submarine and he said he had a couple of hundred feet of ceiling. We got there and sure enough he did and we got these airplanes on, dusk was there, we got all of ours back, and one American A.D., which is an attack aircraft who was right down, he didn't have enough fuel to do one more pass and he came in high and fast and I cut him and he came by at a hell of a rate, and got a wire fortunately. He got very drunk in our bar that night.

But that again was the sort of feeling that NATO meant something to Canada. We were in the big leagues. We were playing with the American carriers, and the pros, and of course it gave us a sense of competition too, competition that carried right on throughout the life of naval aviation, because I think, as objectively as I can think, that we were able to out fly the Americans in terms of size. That is to say, the closest thing we can compare ourselves to was the Essex Class Carrier and we had Bonaventure. And the Essex Class was a considerably larger carrier, we would have loved to have had one, they were faster and bigger. Nevertheless we managed to fly in weather that was as bad as they did and keep as many aircraft airborne for as long as they could.

[HILL] I think there is one point here I would like to pick up on. I have the impression from what you say, that when you are at sea, and when you are a naval officer, as you say, you get on with the job at hand, and that's what you're mainly thinking about. You've got to. But I have the impression also, that in the fifties, as compared to an earlier era, you had a kind of fixed reference

for the Navy, because the Navy was now in NATO. And I guess at that point there was also the thought that there probably wouldn't be cut-backs of the forces, of the kind that might have been carried out otherwise. Presumably one of the problems with naval forces is that if you don't have some fairly established commitments and goals of that kind, then there is always the danger of being cut back. But in that period, with the NATO commitment, there was a fairly clear goal. NATO provided a fairly fixed reference. The Navy simply got on with its operations in support of fairly well-established commitments. And you as a naval officer got on with your job, without having to think too much about what was the political basis of all this. Is that a reasonable interpretation?

[FALLS] That's absolutely right. As far as I was concerned there was very little difference between, or there was no distinction I guess, between Canada's security needs and those of NATO. I think NATO just loomed very large in our thinking. It was a sort of gradual process that I didn't become very conscious of when it happened, but I think we considered that we were as much, or more, a part of NATO almost, as anything else. That was where the action was because that was where we saw ourselves, with the possible exception, I should say, of the Korean war. But again, that was a UN function - I don't suppose many of us stopped to think, about the distinctions; in other words, it was an alliance, a western type of an alliance, reaction. I didn't personally get involved, I guess we got close to it. Someone in Ottawa, in fact, was trying their damndest to get the carrier as part of our Korean commitment and I was L.S.O. at the time and I thought that this would be great.

[COX] Were the carriers mainly in the ASW role?

IFALLSI Yes, ASW was the primary role and the fighters were there basically to do that, just as a reflection of the wartime need to protect the fleet in a defensive role. But more and more the carriers became ASW oriented, to the extent that we acquired ASW helicopters, and this was an evolutionary process, but I guess the first squadron of ASW helicopters were the HO4S Sikorski. Then it became a competition, because the carrier could only handle two squadrons and we had now three, two ASW, one fixed wing, and one rotary wing, and a fighter squadron. And so more and more the fighter squadron was left back and the anti-submarine aircraft, both the helicopter and fixed wing, went along and this was, I think, one of the reasons why the Banshee was never replaced. The second reason was of course that we lost the carrier. But I don't think even if we had maintained a carrier we would have probably replaced the fighter, because it was becoming obvious that the whole job was too big for one carrier, for a carrier the size of the Bonaventure. And so we would have had to have become even more integrated in the NATO forces in terms of convoy support, resupply of Europe, that sort of thing. I think there was and there still is an argument about whether the carrier is better off in this role or a hunter killer group, when fighters might be more use than in convoy support, and indeed there's an argument about whether convoys are valid. But in any case the whole thing was just getting to be too big for one carrier, and inevitably one has to think about the major task which was anti-submarine.

[COX] Did you basically operate within the barrier role, back in the West Atlantic?

[FALLS] I don't think so, David, the only barrier operations that I can recall were submarine barriers, that, of course, had to be backed up ultimately by surface forces. We did a lot of training, quite frankly, in the convoy support role, and we did a lot of training in the support of the American ASW, or the American Attack Carrier Groups, when we would go up into the Norwegian Sea and antagonise the Soviets.

[HILL] Was it mainly anti-conventional submarines at that time? You weren't looking for Soviet Polaris-type submarines, because they didn't exist at this time, in the '50s.

[FALLS] No, not in the '50s. No, it was conventional. When did the Yankee boats first time come on the scene? They were the first as I recall.

[COX] They were the first S.S.B.N.s, but the Soviet's had S.S.N.s. in the '60s, presumably going after US carrier groups.

[FALLS] I remember, I don't think we ever actually tried to make contact with them, but we certainly trained. The Brits for instance had an exotic submarine that was propelled by hydrogen peroxide and it was fast. And that was used as kind of a training vessel. We did some runs against that, I remember, when I was in Chaudière. And it simulated the Soviet nuclear development in the sense that Soviet subs, by being fast, were very noisy.

[COX] But then the carrier was used, at least in part, as an element in a larger carrier battle group.

[FALLS] Yes. The carrier of course needed protection, by destroyers, hence the term destroyer escort, the escort meaning to escort the carrier more than convoys, I think. When we operated alone, of course, we would do whatever we could to cook up training and a lot of basic training didn't even need a scenario, one just went out, with the submarine and tried to find him and practiced tactics and so forth, and the carrier basically was just a platform from which the aircraft worked. In fact, it was very expensive to create exercises and I think if we got one major exercise a year with a naval force, we were doing well. But we went into every one that we could, obviously. I've been in literally dozens of them with American forces and it's always a useful learning process. Another job I had, in fact in 1966, was Commandant of the Maritime Warfare School and that essentially taught NATO doctrines. We used NATO publications, we trained ships' captains in tactics that were NATO tactics, we developed our own tactics and we had a procedure for getting them into NATO publications. We had a very close tie with the Norfolk ASW School and they had a trainer down there, and we conducted exercises that were quite costly, because we had to hire tie lines to connect our computers, land lines, and that was big money in those days. But every couple of years we'd conduct one of these major exercises where we would simulate convoys crossing the ocean, and the change of command and control, and it was all in the NATO context. So, as I say, gradually, during this period, that we were in NATO, the Navy became more and more NATO oriented. It was just a part of my life.

[HILL] At one point there you mentioned the Norwegian Sea. One always has the thought that by and large the Canadian Navy is a convoy protection and ASW force. But when you were associated with American forces, and going up into the Norwegian Sea, was ASW partly for protection of the battle fleet, whose task might be to deal with the Soviet surface fleet?

[FALLS] That was the unstated aim. Basically, these were exercises that were stated to be for practicing in the environment that we might find ourselves in wartime. And the Norwegian Sea was construed to be part of NATO's primary area of interest. One shouldn't be so crass as to say that you were up there to allow the Americans to pound the hell out of Murmansk with their carriers, but that in fact was part of the game, I suppose. And the Soviets kept a very good eye on us while we were doing this. But operating up in those latitudes is different you know, it's cold. In summer time there are long periods of daylight, short periods of darkness, and in the winter time it's just the opposite. And ASW conditions are different, and as I recall, not very favorable to the surface, to the anti-submarine forces. You're out of good SOSUS coverage. I guess also SOSUS at that stage was very highly classified. I don't know when the Norwegian arrays were put in -- but I don't think there was any direct feedback from that, certainly not to the fleet. But we would get

feedback from our own Shelbourne and Argentia arrays in our exercises back home. When we were up there it was always with the US carrier group, often a British carrier group. It could get to be quite a melee and good fun. And as I say the Soviets, when we were playing around like this, kept very close.

These were the days too when one could learn a lot about the Soviets by conducting exercises. I remember, to my own horror, later in my career when I was captain of the Bonaventure, so that would be in the '60s, late '60s, watching the Soviets doing a stern method of refuelling at sea. We'd given that up years ago, and yet they were still struggling along trying to pick up this floating hose in the heavy seas, pump up their ships, and we'd gone to the along-side method years ago. And they watched us too. And there was a certain amount of antagonism too. I remember, if you're looking for salty dips, one time when a Soviet cruiser insisted on sitting on my starboard bow for an hour or so, just keeping station, and whenever I had to turn, he would turn and so forth. And this was not uncommon. It happened to be the first time it happened to me, but why the starboard bow I don't know. But at one stage he made a quick dart across my bow, and it was a kind of close thing. It was the only time, in fact, I've ever had to go full astern. I think it was a mistake on his part, because he immediately turned back again, as I turned, and came up all standing. Because he left after that, I think it was probably as I say a mistake; they have never really ever tried to deliberately create a contact. But there was an awful lot of harassment in those days, and of course it led to an agreement between the US and the Soviets about conduct at sea. There was a lot to be learned from those exercises, about the Soviet Navy.

[HILL] That period in the '50s and early '60s has often been described as a kind of golden age of Canadian diplomacy. At least it's an expression that is used to some degree. People have also seen it as the golden age of Canadian military performance and stature, because the armed forces were by and large well equipped in that period, and the Navy had quite a lot of ships and Canada was quite a big player in NATO. I suppose, on the other hand, there is also a question as to whether this didn't go too far sometimes. I mean, for example, could there be a possibility of Canada creating a navy or creating an armed force which is out of proportion to the size of the country, and then to have this mainly focused on NATO at the expense, perhaps, of Canadian domestic requirements, especially if it got involved in performing roles with US carrier groups going off to the Norwegian Sea and so on. One really wonders how far Canada should go in that kind of direction?

[FALLS] I presume you are asking me to comment on that, as I saw it then, not as I see it now.

[HILL] Well, either perhaps. I think it's a question in some people's minds.

[FALLS] Well, from our point of view, at that time, I think we thought we were not overly endowed, but we were not terribly unhappy either. I had seen a succession of new airplanes, for instance. We went from having Seafires at the end of the war, to Seafuries, which were the most modern and still are the fastest propeller-driven airplane, to Banshees and then Trackers. They were brand new and very efficient and made in Canada and all that stuff. We had a series of made-in-Canada, designed-in-Canada destroyers, that was getting NATO-wide acclaim as being excellent ships. Our tails were pretty high and so we were proud, and proud of our position in NATO and proud of our contribution to NATO. We still had the hangover of World War II where the Navy had a good reputation. We came out of that war as - what's the statistic? -I think it's the third largest Navy in the world. And so I didn't much care about the air force or army in those days; in fact I didn't pay much attention to it at all, except to the effect that I guess I knew that they

were, perhaps relatively speaking, they weren't able to contribute quite as glamorously, obviously as we were to the NATO cause. The air force, I think, well I guess they did have a succession of more modern airplanes, but I don't know that they somehow kept right up to the leading edge as we did. Your question brings another aspect that I didn't really think about, Canada's national security needs, in fact, until such time as I had this Banshee squadron in 1955. And suddenly here we were on the east coast of Canada, with the only all-weather fighter airplane in Canada. I don't think the CF-100 was. When did that come onto the scene?

[COX] Mid '50s.

[FALLS] Maybe it was just on the east coast. Certainly there weren't any CF-100s. I remember dog fighting with the Sabres CF-86s. We did army co-operation, so that we always had an army liaison officer with us, but this was for an unspecified role. The army had a role in Europe of course, but they also had, I suppose, a role wherever it was required. It was that set of ideas that we would go anywhere in the world where we were needed. And there were all sorts of times when the army needed air support and so we had a role of training for that. When we got the Banshees, we became all-weather jets; and the Pinetree Line, the Pinetree Station at St. Margaret's, really hadn't had anybody to play with before. In fact we created a formal arrangement whereby we became part of that, of Canada's national defence against the bomber threat, even though we knew it wasn't very strong on the East coast. In fact that's why, I guess, all of the fighters were concentrated more in the centre.

[HILL] I wonder if you could just fill us in on your career up through the '60s? And what were your views on the decision about the Bonaventure?

[FALLS] I left you, I think, when I became Squadron Commander of 870, the jet squadron. And from there I went to Bonaventure as the Lieutenant Commander Flying, that's the guy who runs the flight operations from the control tower if you like. And from that job, I was promoted to Commander and went off to Ottawa for a desk job and came back as the commander of Chaudière. Remember I had said I had a watchkeeper certificate in 1949, and hadn't spent much time on the bridge except the occasional bit on Bonaventure and various carriers, when one was tolerated. And so I scurried around and went out for a few trips with my friends to see how destroyers worked and suddenly found myself in command. One might think that that's a funny way to do things, and I guess I thought so myself. Because the captain, there are certain things he can't delegate, and one of them is berthing the ship alongside. Nevertheless, it worked and we survived and it was an interesting part of my career. I really enjoyed that sixteen months in command of the destroyer, and it provided another perspective. Again, most of that time, or a lot of it, was spent in NATO exercises. Then back to being Commander Air, where one controls the whole of the air operation of the carrier. I guess I went then to Maritime Warfare School, as I mentioned earlier, and spent a few years there. I was promoted Captain out of that job and went to Bonaventure in command. This was right after that very expensive re-fit, the one that caused all the problems about recovering of chairs in the briefing room, and that sort of thing.

[HILL] Wasn't that specified in the '64 White Paper?

[FALLS] Well, the Bonaventure re-fit was a lengthy affair. I remember I stood by her for over six months. But just to comment on the re-fit, I think the estimates of that refit were deliberately made low, but this is a personal opinion. It's not meant to be definitive, because I haven't gone into it in order to prove it, but I suspect that the estimates were made deliberately low in order to get it approved, or in order to make it fit within a budget or something. I don't know. Because

the estimates were obviously too low to do what was needed to be done, and, of course, as soon as the ship was opened up to do some of this work they found even more work that had to be done. It was an old ship, and so obviously the thing cost more than it should have. But in any event I don't think, in retrospect, that that refit cost any more then than it would have at any other time. It was just the comparison of the cost of the refit with its estimates. The same thing happened with the National Arts Centre contract, and there wasn't nearly as much curfluffel, even though the National Arts Centre was overrun by a greater percentage even than the Bonaventure. The ship came out of that refit, in fact, in very good shape and we ran her well and hard for a couple of years. What caused the retirement of the Bonaventure was basically the reduction of funds to the Canadian Forces. This was the Trudeau time as you may recall, in 1967, when he put the screws on, and the screws went on year after year, to reduce the funds. The only real way that you can save money in this sort of caper is to get rid of people, because of the personnel budget, the cost of people. You can stop capital spending as we have done, for long periods of time, but if your budget will still not handle it, you've got to get rid of people. In fact you've got to bring everything down at the same rate because you can't go on spending money on maintaining equipment that you cannot man.

I was no longer in the Bonaventure when the decision to pay her off was made. Where the hell was I? I guess I was up in Ottawa, in the personnel business, I was a Commodore then and I went up as a Deputy Chief of Personnel, Postings and Careers. But I remember going down to Halifax on business and talking to Nibs Cogdan who was the Chief of Staff at the time. And he said, "Boy, it looks like we're going to have to get rid of Bonaventure". And he thought I would jump and scream and kick and so forth, which I felt like doing, because I loved that ship, and I loved our life with it and I loved what it represented to the Navy. But it also represented about one thousand bodies and if we hadn't disposed of the Bonaventure, it would have meant disposing of something like five destroyers, which would have cut the heart out of our fleet, more so than the Bonaventure. The other thing is, although the Bonaventure was in good shape and had just undergone the expensive refit, there was, definitely, a time when it would have had to have been replaced. That may have been in three years or five years or ten years, I'm not sure, but it was pretty obvious that that time was coming; and that there weren't any reasonable options to replace it. In other words the technology was such that the Americans were going to nuclear propulsion, bigger ships, we were not any longer able to play in this league of aircraft carriers. Most other countries found it the same. I'm not sure if there are any South American countries with carriers left or not. I think Argentina maybe has one, which is in harbour. The French of course still have a capability. Even the Brits have gone away from wires and they're using jump jets now, so it's left to the American's basically, and the French. And rumours of the Soviet Union doing it. But it was so inevitable, there was no way that I could make a rational defence of keeping the carrier, if I was asked. The reason for the decision, in my view, was the fact that they reduced the defence budget. We weren't told, the Navy wasn't told, to get rid of the carrier. It was more subtle than that. It was, here's your budget, what do you want to do with it. And the powers that be decided that the carrier had to go, despite the fact that it was in good shape, a first class ship at the time. It was just sent off to Taiwan to become razor blades, and too bad. But as I say, it was inevitable that we would lose the carrier in a few years in any event.

[COX] Could you tell us a little bit about your response to the unification debate? Of course the Navy took it very badly. Some leading Commanders voiced their disapproval, didn't they?

[FALLS] Yes, it was a very emotional time and it split the Navy rather badly into three camps, I guess: the ones who couldn't abide the idea and left, led by Admiral Landymore; the ones who thought it was a good thing and supported it, led by no one that I can think of, and they were very

few; and the remainder who thought, well, you know, if this is a ministerial decision, there really isn't much choice but to go along with it. Either you go along with it or you leave, and the choice was just that stark. And Bill Landymore, bless his heart, I've served under him and I have the greatest admiration for him, he's stubborn and he's principled, and therefore he decided, and he was the Maritime Commander at the time, that he would fight this as much as he could. But he certainly didn't encourage anyone to go along with him, and I admired him for that as well. Other senior people had similar problems, Geoffrey Brock, I think, suffered from unification, I'm not sure that he left voluntarily. It was a difficult time. Paul Hellyer, I remember, came down and spoke to the officers of the Maritime Command, in the Maritime Warfare School, after Landymore left, and O'Brien was the Maritime Commander; Scruffie O'Brien, I don't think was any more enamoured of the idea of unification than the rest of us, but was one of those who had decided to stay in, and try to make it work. When Hellyer was badly received with boos and catcalls by the officers, Scruffie got very angry and stood up, and told us to behave like gentlemen, in no uncertain terms. My own reaction was one of, I guess, the majority, that I had no brief for unification at all, but I guessed if it was going to be thrust on me I would rather stay in the forces, which I had come to enjoy, than to get out. I must say I thought about getting out, and I had come to the conclusion that the option that I was looking at was not unattractive, but nonetheless, I felt that I had a good career and I thought I was enjoying it too much to go out on a matter of principle and so I would stay. I think that I could also see some of the benefits that the minister was trying to demonstrate could come from unification. I had obviously seen some of the duplication, the problems, the infighting. I had been up in headquarters enough to see some of the grabbing that went on, for what little money there was, between the services, and the sort of things that I could tell were bugging the minister, in terms of inefficiencies, and so I was not entirely unsympathetic to his trying to resolve some of these problems. I guess, in the end, this is after a period of time, I'm sorry that unification took place, in the sense of the personal morale and the attitudes of the people involved and the definite, without a doubt, the definite lack of the esprit of belonging that is bound to take place. But I've also had a better look at other navies and organizations including our great neighbour to the south, and I think it would be impossible to think about unification in military organizations of that size. On the other hand, they could well do with something that would diminish interservice rivalry. They could well do with the benefits we achieved by unification, if in some way they could do the unifying. I find that it is very disturbing that the Americans are wasting so much time and effort fighting with each other, instead of improving their own forces. And so there were benefits that I could identify, I didn't much like the new uniform, I still don't. I would have, when I was CDS, if someone had come up with a way of going back into the three uniforms and still maintaining the principles and the benefits of unification, I would have done it a long time ago, and I'm sure others would have as well. It has now taken place by edict, by the Conservative Government, and I'm not sure they have, in fact, not lost the benefits of unification. But time will tell, and I don't think it is appropriate for me as an ex-CDS to comment on that particular aspect of unification, that is to say, the re-integration or whatever it is called. The claim is made, of course, that we are still a unified force. I think that time will tell. We still have the green uniform, we have these guys walking around in light blue and dark blue uniforms that don't look much like the old ones, but certainly they are more identifiable as sailors and airmen. I don't know what a ship looks like these days, I haven't gone aboard because it must have, still, a mishmash of uniforms. It will always; and that was what bothered me about deunification. But as I say it will take time, and I think we shall see.

[COX] Do you think that the government and the minister in particular, at the time, simply misjudged, or failed to understand, the importance to the armed forces of identification with units and other services.

[FALLS] Oh absolutely. I don't think that Hellyer had enough time in the forces to become aware of the ethic. In fact, I guess even I wasn't aware of the ethic, as it existed in the Army. Boy that's strong, this regimental identity. I had no idea how strong that is, and I respect it you know, this is what makes guys lay down their lives for their brothers in war time I think. And I think you play with that at your peril. This ethic is not so terribly important in the air force, as it fights in a much different way, basically, from afar. It's an individual sort of man-to-man kind of thing in the air, I suppose. The question of cohesion and the family identity is not nearly as important.

The air force right now, today, runs air stations in a kind of, what we used to call, a factory mode. In other words the squadrons are squadrons of pilots; they do not include the ground crew, which to a naval officer, a naval airman, is just incomprehensible. A squadron is a group of cohesive people that fly off a carrier, or they fly off some other place as a unit. The airmen have factory maintenance or base maintenance, and the squadrons consist of the airplane and air crew, not the ground crew. And that is the difference, I think, and that's why unification, why perhaps the question of, what was the word you used, David, morale and cohesion, identity, legitimately was not so important. Hellyer's background was air, and he was being advised by a fellow called Bill Lee who was also air, and I guess what they needed was a good Army type to try and explain what this was all about. I couldn't have done it, I suppose, at that time, because, although I was aware of what unit identity was to a sailor, which was much stronger than to an airman, I didn't realize that is was not nearly as strong as it is to the Army in a regimental system.

Part IV - Staff Positions, 1971-77

[HILL] I think we already have a fair idea of the positions you held in this period. Just perhaps one thing at the outset, could you just briefly describe the difference in the functions of Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.

[FALLS] Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is the guy who essentially runs the Armed Forces on a day-to-day basis. He is responsible for the total budget of the Armed Forces, for responding to all the day-to-day operational activities. If he's doing his job right the CDS can relax and do very little, I suppose except liaise. The theory is that he would liaise with the government, I suppose. But the Vice Chief is the person who, on a day-to-day basis, I think, is the focus of the activities of the Canadian Forces. And I found it I guess the hardest job in terms of the amount of time you have to put in and the effort and the spread of responsibility.

[HILL] How about Deputy Chief?

[FALLS] Deputy Chief is where the three services come together, if you like, in the headquarters. And he operates as the buffer, I suppose one could say, between the three services, and attempts to share, expenditures, or to ensure that the three are properly balanced in terms of their capital programmes. And the capital programme in fact starts, I should say it starts in the three services, but it comes together at the Deputy Chief level, and he makes recommendations to the Vice Chief. Again, the Deputy Chief tries as much as possible to absorb those things which he can on a day-to-day basis, the decisions that have to be taken, that he can do, that don't have to be kicked upstairs to the Vice Chief. It's, if you like, taking part of the load off the Vice Chief. But his liaison basically is with the three services, the three service chiefs or what have you, whereas the Vice Chief has the responsibility of personnel, finance, of materiel to the extent that it is on the military side -- I mean a lot of these things are on the civilian side, but that distinction is more and more blurred.

[HILL] I wonder if I could just ask one general question about this period of 1971-1977. This was in some ways a rather traumatic time for the Canadian Armed Forces. As you mentioned, the budgets were stagnant or in fact they were really being cut because inflation was going up and budgets remained constant; they weren't even getting an increase for inflation. Then in 1975, or so, there was a turnaround, when things started to go up again; that was the period of the Defence Structure Review and also the time when the Prime Minister went to Europe and had one or two talks with Chancellor Schmidt and other people and was convinced of the need to do more in NATO. And then we had the start of the capital re-equipment programme and so on. I just wonder if you could tell us something about the sense or the feeling in the Armed Forces in that period, how they felt about themselves, I suppose especially on the part of the Navy, but the others as well, and how they felt about what was happening to them and how this affected Canada's place in the world.

[FALLS] How do you want me to do this, Roger? Because there's another pretty interesting event, I think, that preceded those events in '71 or '72, which was the reorganization of the Headquarters, which I think in fact was probably more significant to the events that you are thinking of than unification. It sort of fits in chronologically, because I came back to Ottawa as the Headquarters was being reorganized to meld the civilian and military sides. And indeed there was an awful lot of objection to this, and again it created some more resignations. People left the service because of it. Our friend George Bell being one of them. Though I shouldn't put words in his mouth, but that is my understanding. I don't think George would deny the fact that he felt that this was not the right way to go. He left early and I think that was the reason. As far as I was concerned I was always enthusiastic about it. In fact I had to sort of agree. I was interviewed by David Kirkwood, to find out whether I would support the principle of the unification of the two, military and civilian sides, in a reorganization, before I was able to accept the job. I agreed whole heartedly. And there was an awful lot of trauma about in the Headquarters and throughout the forces, because there was a feeling that the civilians were now in control of the military and those of us who supported it were betraying once again the Armed Forces. And I guess my answer to that has always been that the military never was making its own decisions; it was always the civilians who had been making the decisions about the Armed Forces. And finally with this amalgamation the military was at least on an equal footing and were able to make their own decisions if they were sensible. The reason for saying this is, that the three services in the traditional fashion had their wish list of equipment which was, I suppose, in support of the overall policy objectives of the Armed Forces, which hopefully represented those of the government. And the wish list was always about four times, at least, what the budget allowed, even in the good times. So when hard times came upon us it was just impossible. So what was happening, in fact, was that none of the services would back off, really, except that there was I'm sure a lot of "you scratch my back I'll scratch yours" among the service chiefs. One would support this guy if he would support me and so forth. So the really important things probably got done with co-operation. But a little further down the line, as opposed to major equipment, other types of modernization or ancillary equipment, or buys such as this, kind of got lost in this great big amorphous mass of stuff that everybody said was absolutely essential. And they would not agree among themselves and so it was the ADM Materiel, a civilian, who eventually had to say: "Well there isn't enough money for this and you guys can't make up your minds. I think this is what most closely resembles, or represents, the policy or whatever". He made the decision. When the services became unified there were associates, and this Associate Assistant Deputy Minister bit. I threw that in very deliberately because that was the real title, to reflect the fact that there were civilian and military persons in each of the non-operational, that is to say non-service departments i.e. personnel, finance, policy and procurement (leaving only the three operational or service-oriented air, army and navy units under the Deputy Chief, where there was no civilian entity). I think it did marvelous things to the Armed

Forces. I think without that structure the defence review could not really have succeeded. And I'm not sure, you know, its hard to say, what the evolution of the forces would have been. I guess I was told by pretty good authority that when Pierre Trudeau froze the defence budget in 1967 for three years, that the intent was to give the Armed Forces three years to get their act together, you know to consolidate so that they could be reduced further. Well, that didn't happen for various and sundry reasons. It just was impossible and it took more than three years, in fact, to consolidate it and that was the time that caused the reduction of the armed forces in Europe, and all the political as well as military curfuffle that that caused in our relations with the Alliance. It caused the Prime Minister to listen to Helmut Schmidt, as you mentioned, and others, and it allowed, I guess, the Prime Minister to broaden his perspective in those three years from guys like Schmidt and Ivan Head and a few people like that. Of course it seems presumptuous of me to talk about the maturation of the Prime Minister, when he is such an intellectual giant I think, but nevertheless he has changed, and therefore he must have somehow learned a little about the practicalities of life, if nothing else, during that time.

[HILL] I think this leads to a question on Canada's role in NATO, with reference to the Prime Minister. My impression is that when the Prime Minister came to Ottawa as Justice Minister and then became Prime Minister, in fact his inclination was really to pull Canada out of NATO. I think that that simply reflected his own appraisal of the world as he saw it. But in time, he changed around somewhat. How would you see that?

[FALLS] Well, I think, I'm not sure that he changed fundamentally. I think that he probably appreciated more, later in his tenure, that there were certain things that he could do politically and certain things that he couldn't, both domestically and internationally, and perhaps some of them just weren't worth it. I doubt very much that he has changed his morality or his views, and in that respect I think perhaps that I've learned a lot more from Trudeau than he ever learned from me. if he ever listened to me. Because I think he was a very pragmatic person. He was not an ideologue. He would not absorb all of this propaganda that was put out by NATO and by the military particularly. I didn't see much of Trudeau quite frankly in my time as CDS and not anything of him other than that, and so there's no personal relationship whatsoever -- but certainly there was one time when he talked of submarines to me, and that allowed me to believe that he knew a hell of a lot more about the ASW aspects of the Navy than I certainly expected him to, and that he differentiated very clearly between an attack submarine and a "BOOMER," an SSBN. He was in fact using this kind of Jesuit logic, I suppose, to try and destroy what he thought was my position. Well my position wasn't that we should go after SSBNs but perhaps he thought that it was. But he was very clear that, you know, it was destabilizing to be trying to develop an ASW capability against SSBNs. I don't think perhaps he was quite as well informed about the fact that we needed ASW capabilities for other reasons, if we were in fact to maintain our NATO commitment of supporting a supply to Europe and that kind of thing, where you need a capability against the attack submarines. But you know he was very conscious of that difference then, to an extent that a lot of modern day naval officers are not.

[HILL] My impression of Mr. Trudeau is also that he really didn't change his perception of the world fundamentally. What his government said in Foreign Policy for Canadians was that, in effect, NATO is fine for the time being, but once we've sorted out these problems with East/West relations, which may well come at some point, then NATO would melt away, its function would have virtually disappeared. At least that's how I would interpret that myself, and I think in a way that comes out in the Defence White Paper of that period too, because there's a shift of the priorities there also. I wonder if you'd care to comment on that question. How would you interpret Canada's view on NATO as expressed in Foreign Policy for Canadians and in the White Paper?

[FALLS] Foreign Policy for Canadians, well wait a minute now, I think the -- which came first?

[COX] Foreign Policy for Canadians.

[FALLS] Yes, and that was where he laid out the priorities of, if you like, starting with Canada and expanding, from which the White Paper developed, the policy of sovereignty first, and then North America second, NATO third, and then peacekeeping. And I don't think that I could find any fault with that. I was in policy in 1972 and this had taken place by then, and so I just accepted it as a logical and rational piece of work. And I saw no conflict, quite frankly, in that policy with any previous policy that we'd had. The only difference was on emphasis, and the only danger as far as I could see was an over-emphasis on sovereignty, and I guess I tried, and still think, that that is a danger still today, that we haven't yet defined what we mean by sovereignty and what it means in military terms, so that we know what to do about it. But I was comfortable working within those guidelines and in fact when we got around to the defence structure review, that was the way we tackled it, starting from that White Paper, starting from those principles. I'm not sure now who negotiated this defence structure review, but you know my recollection is, and I was Vice Chief at the time, that we decided to do it. I'm not sure that we were told to do it.

[COX] I think Buzz Nixon said it was a departmental decision.

[HILL] It was also a question of fitting the budgetary situation at that time, I think. There was a certain sum of money available, and then the Government said: here is what you are going to get in the budget, more or less, and why don't you go and design something to fit within that. They tried to do that but they couldn't.

[FALLS] Well, I think that's right. Buzz was not yet in the department, I don't think, I think Cloutier was still there. And I know that prior to that I was Deputy, and this was where I had this problem of all these shopping lists, and a reducing budget, and I inherited this, a mess. It was just ridiculous. So as a start we just got the three heads together and hammered them and there was a lot of blood on the floor but we finally got the budget, a capital programme, that was pared of all of the "nice to haves" and was down to what we thought was the really, really essentials. But even then it was pretty apparent that if we tried to maintain the forces as they were, then this capital budget was not going to maintain the forces, and so I guess departmentally we decided we needed a defence structure review. I had just gone into the Vice Chief's chair at that time and I had a very good staff and we thought a lot about it and came up with this idea of a bottoms-up review (as they called it). And we used this very policy; it became useful. What is the minimum we need to do the national sovereignty, the North American defence, to make a reasonable contribution to Europe, and then peacekeeping. If you establish the minimum for national security then what more do you need to do the North American task? And so on. And if you look at it in this way, you can say, well, this is the minimum sized force, below which you cannot go and still maintain certain criteria. That is to say, Canada is a large nation, we have to have, for sovereignty purposes, our geography covered. This in fact led to a reassignment of military forces in Canada to react to aid of the civil power more regionally, because we weren't so far from the October Crisis at that stage and it was still kind of close to our minds. And the next thing of course was to sell that to the Treasury Board, once we had done all this and then costed it. I don't think it was coincidental at all that what we came up with happened to be pretty close to what we had, that is to say a bare minimum. If you're not going to fund that you know you are going to have to make some hard choices like, do you want to have only an East Coast Navy? Those are the kind of hard choices that were going to have to be made and I think that it was probably this real hard look at it from the bottoms up and

the honesty with which we tried to conduct the review, that halted the decline of the defence budgets and started the turn around.

[HILL] In other words the NATO commitment, having forces in Europe, had some cost associated with it. But in fact there is a limit to what you can cut, because you need a core organization in Canada to do the tasks here.

[FALLS] The incremental costs are not great. They're not insignificant, but the money, a lot of it, has already been spent in the infrastructure in Lahr, and of course it costs more money to keep troops in Europe than it does in Canada, because you've got dependents, schools, school teachers, allowances, that sort of thing. But if you determine your minimum requirements for sovereignty purposes and for the North American defence, and then say how have we looked after NATO in that, you don't have to add very much to do what we are doing already.

[COX] Did you ever come close to saying: "OK, scrap the army and reduce it to a militia".

[FALLS] We never got to where we said this would be our first recommendation. What we did say was that below this you cannot go. And I think the obvious thing at that stage, as I recall. was the good old one coast Navy. The other thing was too, you could reduce the air component. but then you could not pretend to have any identification capabilities. Well, you know, you don't have it anyway. The idea of the Pine Tree becoming obsolescent was upon us. God, we tried to get those politicians to close Pine Tree! I noticed they did close two stations today. Those were the ones we were trying to close ten years ago. We wasted so much money in the meantime. They have been useless for that long, but politically unclosable. One could have whittled away at the Air Force, I suppose. You could say if you didn't have a commitment in Europe, you wouldn't need the transport, but then you wouldn't have the capability of deploying peacekeeping forces in a hurry. and that would have affected our peacekeeping capabilities, which nobody wanted to touch either. And so it wasn't exactly a bottom-up study; but in other words there were a lot of "what if's" and "well you can't do that", so it did extend to the fourth priority, that is peacekeeping, in many instances. You could have regionalized, I suppose, the Army, and said: "Well, lets hope that we never have to worry about an Army's presence out West, because there's never, except in the minds of a very few Army officers, there is never any thought that anybody is going to invade Canada". There's still a lot of guys who think, well we have to worry about lodgements up in the Arctic. I'm not sure what they mean by that. The Soviets parachuting in, I can't for the life of me understand why, and why it is that they would do it and how you would go about getting them out. But there are people who try and make a case for that. They would rather make a case for defending Canada from an invasion but realise that's just too much. So the Army is flexible. What do you want an Army for? That was a hard question to answer, but we answered it on the basis of regionalization and aid of the civil power, and the contingencies for everything else. You have to have a base, a geographic base, and it couldn't go much further down than it was now without losing some of the regionality. There was no point in talking about one of the arms, that is to say the infantry, artillery or armour, although armour came very close to being put on the block - the tanks are a bit expensive, they're not usable in Canada. It was something that Trudeau felt very strongly, we should not have tanks. It wasn't until we bought them specifically for the NATO role, that he declined to approve the use of any tanks in Canada. I don't think today, there is a tank in Canada.

[HILL] In training, yes. The Leopard.

[FALLS] Perhaps, I think he collapsed on that one a little bit. So we got the wheeled vehicles instead, armoured personnel carriers. But I don't think, to answer your question David, that we ever came down to saying this would be our first choice, that we would do this or that. But these were some of our options, and I think essentially we put together an analysis that demonstrates pretty clearly that you couldn't go much below what we had and still have a three-pronged armed force. And even so the bill for the equipment was going to be substantial and that we'd better get on with it.

[COX] Who did you have to convince? You did the defence structure review. In a sense the outcome was the decision to increase the capital procurement by 12%. Who had to be persuaded and what was the process?

[FALLS] The process of persuasion, as I recall, was first with the Treasury Board, a guy called Marsden, who happened to be the guy at the time. They changed over there about every year or so. I remember long sessions with him.

[HILL] Buzz Nixon also remembers long sessions with him.

[FALLS] I guess at this stage, Buzz was DM, I think about the time we started to sell it, because I remember that when I did -- but after the Treasury Board of course -- the formal stages were to see the Priorities and Planning Committee -- well Cabinet eventually, but P.P.C. was chaired by the Prime Minister, and we went before that on several occasions. And when they examined it there was also another interdepartmental thing chaired by Pitfield, because I got to know Pitfield fairly well in those days.

[COX] Would that have been the Mirror Committee, because it was intended to be the departmental equivalent.

[FALLS] Yes, that must have been the one, because it was chaired by Pitfield and he was mighty hard on us in the sense of asking pertinent questions, and I think it was the integrity that we built up, quite frankly, from not trying to B.S. anybody during this defence structure review, that convinced Pitfield that what we said was about as factual as could be. And he realized that there was a certain seriousness to it. Pitfield had a lot of influence on other people in those days, and once we got past him it was a question of going to the Priorities and Planning Committee, and I guess that must be where Trudeau asked me questions that showed he understood. I'm not sure that he showed that much interest except spasmodically. It was approved. I can't quite remember when, but that's when we started getting our incremental improvements.

[HILL] '75, I think. What was the morale of the forces like then in that period, in 1972-73?

[FALLS] Not very good, but strangely not as bad as one would expect. I think there was a feeling that, in the first place, we were not firing people. It was all by attrition, all these reductions were by attrition. The forces was getting older unfortunately; you know they weren't able to recruit the young people and we were in that sense living off our fat. It was disrupting training, and the schools were not training; but you know individually people didn't feel threatened, they thought, well, you know I've got a career, and besides which something always happens. As it did, it did turn around, and I guess everybody thought eventually it would have to. So morale was not good, but it wasn't as bad as it should have been. Because I don't think people realized the seriousness of the problem, who were not that close to it. And those of us who were close to it were not about

to try and tell everybody inside the service, I should say, how desperate it was. I think people had enough of a grasp of it anyway to know.

[HILL] You must have had some dealings in that period with the Americans, the American service chiefs, and other NATO allied military chiefs. What about their attitude to what was going on?

[FALLS] Strangely enough, as Deputy and Vice I had very little contact with anyone outside the services and the Ottawa civilian community. The Vice Chief, and the Deputy for that matter, sit very close to home. I did a few relaxing trips like going over to Europe to inspect our troops here and there and that was mainly for my benefit to know what the hell we were doing in peacekeeping and in Europe; because you know a naval career doesn't give you a chance to know what the others are doing, and so it wasn't until I became Deputy Chief that I did my first familiarization trip to Lahr, and I'd never been to Soest. And I think that was a pretty important thing for me to do. So I did it, but that was to visit Canadians, that wasn't to visit NATO.

[HILL] That was not done as part of the meetings of the NATO Military Committee.

[FALLS] No.

Part V - Chief of the Defence Staff, 1977-80

[HILL] Admiral Falls, from 1977 to 1980 you were Chief of the Defence Staff in Ottawa. This was a time of steady re-equipment in the Canadian Armed Forces, when the LRPA programme was being completed and the Leopard tank was coming into service, the New Fighter Aircraft (NFA) was agreed on, I believe, and the first steps were taken to move towards a definition of the Canadian Patrol Frigate Programme. There were also many important developments in NATO in that time. But I guess the question I'd like to ask first of all this: how did you see the role of the Chief of the Defence Staff and what sort of part does he play in policy-making and in relations with NATO?

[FALLS] Well, strangely enough, I think that the part that the CDS plays could well be overrated in the minds of many. For instance, some of the things that you talked about here were currently under my purview, I suppose, as Chief of the Defence Staff, indeed took up a lot of my time; the LRPA programme for instance, was carried on during that period of my tenure in fact. I remember vividly Buzz Nixon and I stomping around the halls of Ottawa trying to sell the idea of refinancing and a lot of other things to people to get this programme off the ground, even after the selection was made. I know it was started in the time of J. Dex, (General Dextraze), but I think the selection was made and the idea of getting it through took a lot of my time. The tank programme, as you say, was pretty well finished and decided upon, and of course the LRPA programme, when that was out of the way, led into the fighter programme, which again, took a lot of my time and persuasion and what not, in order to get what I think was the agreed project team solution sold to the rest of the Armed Forces and to the Government. In other words, that, plus the sometime ceremonial duties, plus the fact that there are certain things the CDS cannot delegate that have to do with personnel, redress grievances and things like that, which are time consuming, take up an awful lot of the time of the CDS, and leave very little time in fact to think about or to act upon strategic and broader issues.

The fact is that the Chief makes three trips a year to Europe to the NATO forum of the Military Committee, and usually between those three periods there's very little time to give thought to the issues because they are not emerging as immediate issues requiring attention. The fact of the matter

is for myself, and I know for my predecessor, I can't speak for my successors, but in fact one did not pay much attention until a few days before the meeting when one was briefed by the staff and tried to be brought up to speed on the issues. Some of these issues may have been, seemed to be, and were, important. But in any event, in international relationships with NATO, even military ones, I found it amazing how much these are conducted by the Department of External Affairs, with input at the staff level, that is to say lower down in our organization, ADM Pol or in the Plans Organization in the DCDS area of Plans.

[HILL] Of course there is a permanent Milrep representing the Chief of Staff on the NATO Military Committee in Brussels, who's there dealing with these issues on a full-time basis.

[FALLS] That's right.

[HILL] So, there are reports and dealings going back and forth, between the Milrep, on the spot there, and the defence chiefs and senior officials in Ottawa.

[FALLS] Yes, in fact, it's important that the Milrep and the CDS have a good rapport and a good understanding, so that he can in fact work. And indeed my relationship was such that I tried to keep him in the picture on any sort of decision making-process or thought processes that I may have had. He was required to come back to Canada from time to time to sit on various meetings so that he would know me better, so that he would know how I would want to react if I were there, so that he could in fact act without constant access to Ottawa.

[HILL] I wonder if I could just follow-up with a couple of questions on this one here that occur to me. You mentioned the role of External here. Do you feel that the military side has an adequate voice then in terms of Canada's military role in NATO?

[FALLS] That's a hard question to answer yes or no. This in fact gets into a very deep discussion about the Military Committee, if you want to do that right now, and the role of the Military Committee within NATO.

[HILL] I think we should leave that for now. I was thinking about seeing it from a national perspective.

[FALLS] I think Canada sees its NATO relationship more from a political point of view than a military one. I'm not sure that this isn't correct, considering the genesis of NATO and of Pearson's thought when he was External Affairs Minister.

[HILL] How much of a role does the CDS, as the head of the military and supported by the VCDS, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff and so on, have in national policy. You obviously must be seeing the Defence Minister continually, must be dealing with him virtually on a daily basis, but what about others? What about the Prime Minister and other key figures like that?

[FALLS] I think that there again, it might be surprising, but there is relatively little direct contact between the military, that is the CDS, the Vice Chief, and Deputy, and the government beyond DND in the overall policy-making process of the government in terms of NATO. In national areas of course I would like to think that the CDS of today is involved in the preparation of the White Paper or at least gets his views on the table. But to answer your question, I never, in the time of the Conservative Government, met the Prime Minister to say hello to him, even. The major part of my time as CDS was with the Trudeau government and I guess Mr. Trudeau knew who I was.

He invited Buzz Nixon and me to lunch one day, which was the closest contact and the most intimate contact that I had with him during that time. It was very pleasant, although it came rather late, I thought, in my tenure in terms of him trying to get to know his CDS if that was indeed the exercise. And I saw him a few times in meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning. In other words there was not any kind of high level profile for the CDS, as one finds say in the U.K. or the US forces. There's a corollary to that. In other words, the CDS has a hell of a lot more authority within the forces than he does in those other two organizations, but that's not really important or relevant I think to this discussion. With respect to the comment about the Minister, yes there is a close relationship. Well, again I think that depends on the personalities. I certainly have had a very close and a good relationship with the Minister who was Minister through most of my tenure, that was Barney Danson. He sought my advice, he didn't always follow it. We had the occasional mild disagreement and one major one, but by and large, it was a good and warm relationship. I did not have nearly the same relationship with McKinnon when he came in. I think that this business of not trusting the Public Service and construing them all as being Liberals automatically, instead of assuming that both the Public Service and the Military will serve a government; this was a problem. There was immediately suspicion to start with, and despite our efforts, I say "our", meaning that I tried to get everyone who had any contact with the Minister to support him thoroughly and absolutely, despite this, the suspicion remained. I guess finally I just gave up trying and rode it out. The third minister during my time was Lamontagne; our relationship was okay, not close though. I think he was much more of a political animal perhaps than Barney is, if possible. But we got along well. But again there seemed to be, however, not the automatic acceptance of military advice as being objective and sincere that I would have hoped. So those comments try, I think, to put the relationship of the CDS with the government in its perspective.

[HILL] Perhaps if I could ask you one more final sub-question here. Obviously, in this system of government, as in the rest of the western democracies, the principle of civil authority having paramountcy is well established, there's no question about that, in the sense I mean of being over the military, and so there's no question about your wanting any sort of specialized place, shall we say, or autonomy. But did you not feel, though, that the fact that the CDS is not brought in much more to things, and did the Armed Forces not feel, that this was an inadequate situation from their point of view?

[FALLS] Yes, I think so. I was surprised. When I say I was surprised, I wasn't overly surprised, because it came gradually to me having watched from the position of Vice Chief, through an evolutionary process. I guess before that, I kind of assumed always that the CDS would have been very much in the pocket of the Prime Minister in all of these momentous decisions. But I guess that the process in Canada is much more ministerially oriented. The Prime Minister goes right to the Minister of National Defence for his military advice and he gets it from CDS through direct access to the Minister. So I was surprised. But I guess I didn't think that it is all that bad, you know. Certainly there were times, not with Barney, but with McKinnon, that I thought it was definitely important that the Prime Minister knew what the CDS's views were, because I didn't think he was getting them. And there was a lack of rapport between myself and McKinnon.

[COX] The tradition of the Cabinet Committee system is in fact to exclude civil servants by and large. My limited experience with this is that Ministers are very jealous of that forum in which they speak to each other without a large number of civil servants present. And that perhaps partly accounts for the apparent lack of access or communication. I don't think it really takes care of the problem of how the Prime Minister gets to know what you want him to know.

[FALLS] I think you are right, David. However, even in the cabinet committee system which excluded the public servants, they did certainly, and probably still do, involve the public servants when they want expertise about a particular issue at hand. And I know that Buzz and I on many occasions went up and sat in the corridors in case we were needed, and there were other occasions of course when we went in, and so I have been in enough cabinet committee meetings. The most interesting ones were in Priorities and Planning, PNP, because of the involvement of the Prime Minister, but there are others that are chaired by various ministers. But you don't stay for -- you know they don't want you hanging around for other items, and you're there to kind of respond to the question, not to give judgments. So I don't think they exclude, and thankfully they don't exclude, the expertise of the public service when they need it, experts of any sort.

[HILL] I find some of this quite surprising, in fact, because I had the impression that the CDS would be in the middle of the policy debate, somehow or other, and involved with the major issues of the day. Perhaps he is through the minister, and through the deputy minister. I mean I'm not saying that he is excluded, but, just to take an example: when you became CDS in 1977, that was a period when the Carter administration was coming in in Washington and I remember going to a number of international meetings just prior to that, at the outset of 1977, where the whole question at that time was here was a new development, a new phase in world affairs. Carter was coming in. He was going to be different from President Ford, they thought. There was a lot of talk of re-launching the international economy, perhaps re-launching détente. In practice it didn't work out that way, maybe in part because of Carter's deep interest in human rights, which obviously created some problems in dealing with the Soviets and others. But one wonders, then, what kind of a debate went on in Ottawa about some of these things at that time, and whether you as CDS were involved with this kind of discussion?

[FALLS] No, that's one of my little notes here, I was surprised almost to find the question in there, because I could not give you any particular opinion on what Canada thought about these things, because there was no forum in which I would be included. Because there was no direct involvement of the military in these issues. There was nothing that required a military opinion. because Canada could not see itself, I suppose, as responding militarily to any of these major issues in such a material way. But to kind of balance this, Roger, let me give you another couple of examples, one that took place while I was Vice and the other one while I was Chief and had to do with peacekeeping. Now there was an issue that Canada was brought into very much in an international forum. I'm thinking first of Indochina, where the Americans were pressuring us greatly to provide a peacekeeping force in order to allow them I guess to gracefully get out, as gracefully as they could. And my predecessor and I worked very closely with the Minister in the formation of that and what the rules would be. He was adamant about the way that Canada would partake in this peacekeeping force and some of the ground rules and some of the safeguards. Subsequently, we were asked to provide a large contingent of people for Lebanon after the Israeli invasion. And my advice was sought on that. Again I knew that the Prime Minister wanted to know but he didn't ask me directly, and I can't remember now whether it was through External or through the Minister, or the ministerial process. Certainly I made it quite clear that it was a no-win situation for Canada. As it turned out it was a correct decision, I think, for Canada not to get mixed up in that. And that was our advice to the government and they accepted it. But it wasn't a one-on-one, as I say the P.M. and me, by any shot. Although, of course he was involved in and interested in that decision.

[HILL] But the ADM Pol for example - as we are talking about civil servants and the CDS dealing with External as well as relating upwards to the Ministers - the ADM Pol is involved presumably in all kinds of discussions of one thing and another. How does he relate to the CDS?

[FALLS] He relates to the extent that I would hope and I think there has been -- you know I think there were gaps in this quite frankly -- but he had an open and immediate access to the CDS if he wanted to, and I think like any other head of department he had an obligation to keep the CDS informed. And in any cases where there were questions of judgement, as I say I think this may have broken down once or twice in the sense that things kind of got off in a certain direction in some cases well along the way, before the CDS got into the act and could do much about it. I guess I'm thinking of the Canadian participation in the AWACs programme, where I think it got so far down the pipe that we didn't have a choice, but it would not have been my choice to get involved.

[COX] Could you say why, not in any great detail?

[FALLS] Maybe my nose is out of joint in the sense that the decision was made before I had a chance to get involved, but we had such a terrible problem in our own forces in the capital budget that to take money out of that and to put it into an international programme, which at that time, was not agreed to by all nations -- when I'm talking about this, Belgium particularly had still not agreed. And once Canada got on the bandwagon of course Belgium was cornered like a rat, couldn't get out and had to sign. It was a terrible sort of process of consultation and agreement. And I guess I too felt that AWACs was a highly overrated thing. It's the tip of the iceberg and I don't think it will ever happen again. But I didn't want it to happen in the first place. I don't think it's proper for NATO as an organization to own hardware that will in fact wear out, you know, and somebody then is going to have to think about the replacement of it. If this sort of thing spread it would be I think disastrous for the cohesion of the Alliance. Much was made of the AWACs once we bought it and all of its capabilities, and how useful it would be, and when the Polish crisis emerged, when it appeared as if there might be an invasion, and everybody said ah ha lets bring the AWACs over. at some concern to the Atlantic Fleet Commander I might add, SACEUR took the AWACs out of Iceland and sent them to Germany, because the NATO AWACs hadn't arrived on the scene at that stage. I was very disappointed when I got in one of those airplanes for one of their operational flights, up and down the inter-German border, and found that you couldn't even see past the middle of Poland, where the action was going to be. And so I kept wondering why in the hell we bought those AWACs with all the publicity that surrounds it over there, and everybody is ohing and ahing at what wonderful airplanes they were, and indeed they are, but they were not much good for what they were supposed to be there for, as far as I could see. Anyway that's purely my judgement, purely my opinion I should say, and, as I say, once I got involved or was aware of it, Canada was too far gone really; but I think I was a bit blindsided on that one.

[COX] Admiral Falls, I find listening to you and thinking of the comments that we've made on the policy-making process, I don't mean just in DND but in matters of defence, that it's quite difficult still to understand. Part of the difficulty is in the unique structure. The military structure, you said last time, is now integrated. But clearly, to some extent, there is a tension between the civilian and military sides. What I still don't really understand is the way in which policy is generated.

[FALLS] What specific kind of policy are you speaking of?

[COX] Well, I'll take your example of the AWACs. Could one describe the normal way in which such a policy would develop in DND.

[FALLS] Well, in the first place the policy didn't start in DND, and that is the problem. The policy started with, I suspect, with Lockheed Corporation, as an American initiative to sell AWACs

to NATO. And it was something that was cut off at the lower levels and was very carefully and cunningly designed to do it this way. So that it got an enthusiastic backing within staff levels here and there, and then the idea was to sell it up the ladder. And that's the way most policies get made. They don't come from the top down, they come from the bottom up. And so it all gets to a certain level before one at the top even hears about it. There had been an awful lot of discussion and talk of cost sharing, and if we had to go in what would our negotiating position be and one had to do this in order to be able to give your bosses a reasonable kick at the cat. Well, before you know it, the policy is there, you know what it is going to cost you, you know what the offsets are -- we did in this case, I've forgotten what the offsets were but they weren't bad as I recall, in fact I think we might have sold them a trainer from CAE -- but the fact is that by the time one hears about it as CDS it's so far down the pipe that if you withdraw your support, considering that there are a lot of other reasons to contribute to the programme, for example by saying well you know we haven't got much money, that is not a very good excuse. But that's the way policy generally emerges. Well, it did in this case, bottom up. This is often the case except where there is a governmental initiative which comes down through the Minister, which is the way it should work and does from time to time. And when it comes down through the Minister you sit and you study what he wants to be studied and come back with the answers. This is the most fun in fact, from the point of view of the CDS, because he's in it from the beginning.

[COX] Could I just change the example. The object of this question is not to ask you to second guess yourself. One of the examples that's always interested me is the CF-18, and I would contrast it with the Long Range Patrol Aircraft where it seems to me you have a procurement decision which in retrospect stands up extraordinarily well. But in the case of the CF-18, I assume, obviously, that at the time when the decision was made, it was understood that the CF-18 is not an aircraft which is optimised for long range interception in the North American context. So one assumes that the decision was made to try to accommodate different roles. Would you be able to comment on that decision in terms of the policy process. The decision to get one aircraft to do several roles, is that an early on decision which is made before the main steps of procurement? Is it an issue which is open at various levels?

[FALLS] The decision, you know, the process -- in retrospect I can't find fault with it, the process of arriving at the decision on the CF-18 -- it was the same process that arrived at the Aurora decision, and it all starts with money. We had a turnaround as we talked about yesterday, when we got a real increase in our budget, and that built-in increase was to go to capital equipment. It was a bit of a fight, and it still is I presume to keep it within capital and not spend it on other things. And so one had to plan one's acquisition programme out into the future. It was kind of a tough decision. I can answer your question about how satisfied were the Canadian Armed Forces at this time, that is to say 1977, with the government's re-equipment plan. And I was going to say they were by and large very satisfied, except that the Navy were still very nervous because they hadn't seen much except a few plans about ship replacement.

Well, I was conscious of this fact -- that the first order of priority in the re-equipment was tanks, for Germany. The Centurions were falling apart, and the CDS was a land officer, General Dextraze, and therefore it made sense to everybody that we would get new tanks. Unfortunately, when a naval type got to be CDS it was assumed that the naval type would look after the Navy. Well, the obvious requirements for sheer safety, if you like, were air programmes, Aurora being the first ones, because the Argus was absolutely useless by that time, and the fighters to replace basically the 101s -- the 104s -- it wasn't anymore a safety problem than it always had been, in the sense that it was known as the widow-maker but it was still maintainable, whereas the CF-101's were getting to be hard to maintain, and I think there were structural problems that were causing

a lot of concern. And it was obvious to me and to a lot of other people that this air programme should go ahead first.

However, in that process we still maintained, or blocked out over a period of time, how much money would be spent on cleaning up the tank programme and cleaning up the Aurora programme and how much would be spent on them. It was a very complex and difficult and interesting problem, to try and programme all of your capital acquisitions so that it showed X number of bucks for the fighter programme with the long-range expenditures for the naval ship replacement programme, plus all the little programmes that have to go in there as well. These are the major ones. Now, one of the first criteria was that the programme shall not exceed X number of millions of dollars. Okay? That had to be, in order to keep the programme from falling apart, that had to be the primary goal. You buy as many airplanes as you can fit in that budget and that's supposed to maintain X number of bucks for spares, the first weapons, ground equipment, that was part of the capital programme, you know, land, test equipment, things like that; any ancillary equipment was all supposed to come within that.

So that was what the task group, what was it called, the NFA, Paul Manson's group, that was their first criterion. Secondly, and this was all done as a matter of military policy, we looked at the government's priorities and policies, and said the programme will thus have to provide an airplane that will -- well first of all we wanted one airplane rather than two or three or four, one airplane to do the air defence role, and it would have to do the European role, because that maximizes the number, and minimizes the stores, the procurement, the logistics problems. You know this is a problem when you've got a minimum, X number of bucks and we were talking -- if one wanted to go for the CF-15 you're talking 50 - 60 airplanes which would have been the total Air Force - that's not very great. So, it was obvious to everybody, and it was agreed by everybody, that one airplane would have to be chosen. It should be able to do all the roles. It shouldn't be optimised necessarily.

I'm not sure how we prioritized that. I guess Paul created a weighting kind of graph, where he allowed so much for air defence and so much for ground attack and so much for interaction in Europe and those sort of things so you could weigh each of the contenders in the various lines. The F-18 came out in a very objective judgement on the top of the heap. It was that simple. There were was an awful lot of public speculation. There were, I think, accusations of bickering and uncertainty. The only thing that I think might have biased the decision a little bit, -- in the first place I think the airmen wanted the F-15, it was the biggest and the best, and it took a little persuasion to tell them that they weren't going to get any more money and therefore if they wanted an F-15 it was going to be a 50 airplane airforce, and I think they always had that idea that well once we got started, we'd get more. So they were disabused of that. Then the question became the F-16 and the F-18 and I think I was the devil's advocate for the 16s simply to keep the objectivity of the programme.

[FALLS] In fact I was quite prepared to let the evaluators do their evaluation, and accept their judgement. The only thing that I think was an overreaction was over the one engine of the CF-16 - the single engine. There was an awful lot of emotion about it in the fact that we can't expect our boys to fly over the cold Arctic in one engine airplanes and that's very dangerous and that we have a commitment to Norway and we had to fly across the Atlantic and that one engine 'ain't on.' It's pretty hard to tell that to the Americans who do that all the time. They fly over the cold North Atlantic to Europe in F-16s, and the Norwegians have an awful lot of flights out over the Norwegian Sea and it's very cold there as well. So there was probably a little bit of emotion in that. But I think that by and large the F-18 is still the best compromise, and I was certainly content

to see that decision being arrived at. I think it was arrived at honestly, and fairly, and without any undue pressures from either industry or government.

Certainly NATO made its views clearly known that they would have preferred to see us go to F-16s because it would have been the common NATO airplane. In particular, one of my good and close colleagues, the CDS in Norway, expressed his disappointment because he was, in a previous incaration, one of the people who had negotiated the F-16 for the European consortium. However, I don't think they put undue pressure on Canada, as far as I'm aware. I think they were disappointed and that's about all. So that's my appreciation of what happened with that fighter.

[COX] It is in fact a situation where once the basic assumptions were made about government policy, then the process took place within DND, as you described it, and was step by step.

[FALLS] Where there was a problem, or could have been a problem, is if there had been a major difference in the industrial benefits. There were a lot of promises made and there were a lot of full page ads taken out in the paper and that sort of thing. Had there been enough of that to have influenced the decision against that which DND wanted, I suppose it might have been a different story. There may have been some acrimonious discussions. I suppose there might even have been some resignations. But it didn't happen that way. And that's another good reason to have a good rapport between the CDS and the Minister. The Minister can do a lot, and he's your only ally in fact, to ensure that these things which have to be taken into consideration, which are part of the political facts of life in Canada, don't take on an over riding importance.

[HILL] Could I go on to ask one last question on your period as CDS before we go onto the other period. You mentioned that your duties as CDS included a whole range of tasks. It wasn't a case of spending all your time working on or thinking about NATO. However, there were people in the Department who were of course linked to NATO. This was a period when there was thinking about a longer war in Europe and so there was more talk about mobilization plans and so on. It was also the period of the three percent decision of NATO, which Canada participated in, to increase defence spending by three percent real growth per year. It was also the period of the INF decision, the two track decision of December 1979. There were a lot of things going on. I guess the main question I'd like to ask is this. Canada participated in these decisions, but who was leading all this work? I mean, what was the reason for this shift of thinking away from the short war? Why was this three percent policy proposed? Who led the thinking about the INF decision? Was this, do you think, a necessary response to what the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were doing, or were there other reasons behind this; and what part did Canada play in all this?

[FALLS] I think it's fair to say that Canada always plays a reactive part in these decisions and these trends, as do the other minor NATO players. The Alliance is led by the United States. If the United States is not providing adequate leadership, as perhaps in the Carter years there may have been a perception, then the Alliance gets very unhappy and criticizes the Americans for not providing the leadership. And when they provide too much, as in the Reagan case, they get unhappy about the way they are led. But in fact most of the initiatives, in my judgement, in my observation, I think have come out of the American delegation or directly as American policies. Don't you agree from your time in NATO?

[HILL] Well, I think when the Americans don't provide the leadership, at least while I was there, what happens is that the Europeans tend to jockey for position, then nobody winds up leading. But that may have changed a lot because I think the Europeans are a lot more together these days than they were when I was there, because of the European Community. I've never been quite able

to understand why the short war idea went out of the window. I've never seen any reason to demonstrate that the strategic equation had changed all that much to justify this change in thinking. I had the clear impression that it was coming from the US, as you say, but I'm never quite sure why.

IFALLSI Well, I can only give you a few opinions, not from any inside information of from being Chairman or CDS, but sort of observing the scene and assuming that. The Americans have always been very sensitive to the German position, from the very early Post-War years in my view. but this has always been the case. The German question looms large in their minds in everything. I suspect that was probably the reason for this change from the short war to the long war. For instance, the short war scenario, if you like, would have been, of course, a nuclear, a trip wire, and Germany thought about this for a while and suddenly realized, my God we'd be devastated, we'd be a rubble of a country. Most of the weapons of mass destruction would have fallen, it seems to me, on German soil, and I think what they were trying to generate there, in retrospect, was to get a little less emphasis on nuclear warfare and on the trip wire concept. In other words, it was a genuine desire to have a more deterrent posture I think. But what this meant, in fact, was a new linkage between Europe and America. It was that link that Schmidt was looking for, that he spoke of in his Buchan lecture in London; more of a linkage between problems in Europe and the use of this strategic deterrent or the American nuclear deterrent. And so, I think, probably, it was in trying to respond to Germany's concern that the Americans, and I think quite rightly, decided that it was time to put more emphasis on conventional forces and therefore less reliance, not less numbers or anything else like that, heaven forbid, but less reliance on the nuclear trip wire aspects. There was never any formal, as I recall, any formal judgement as to whether it would be a long war or a short war, but what there was of course was a specific decision to go for a three percent growth. This, if my memory serves me correctly, took place at a meeting of Heads of State in London, in about 1977, when Jimmy Carter was President and he got the other NATO nations to agree to this three percent real growth for three years. In 1977 -- that was to have expired in 1980 -- and then we would have been fine. And the impression was that we would have had enough conventional weapons to have reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons. Now what that less reliance was supposed to be, I never heard. You know, would they have changed their policy? Would they have changed their no-first-use policy? I don't know.

[HILL] David, do you have a quick one on INF before we go onto the next phase?

[COX] Well, I'm just interested in this account. In fact the decision to boost conventional forces came before the two track decision on the INF?

[FALLS] I'm sure it did. The INF decision came in 1979 and it was more as a direct result of Helmut Schmidt's initiative.

[COX] It does immediately raise the question of the Canadian role in resupply. As the CDS, you would have turned your attention to convoy protection again?

[FALLS] No, I think it has always been my assumption and perhaps that of our colleagues, that if there is a short war there is no part for Canada in it. And furthermore -- I suppose the military is supposed to think that way -- but you know after all it is a game of deterrence and people I don't think, yet, always make the distinction between what is a deterrent posture and what is a war-fighting posture, despite the fact that most military people will admit that if there is a war it will be a no-win situation for both sides. So I tended to try and avoid personally any thoughts of whether it is a long or short war. There shouldn't be any war. But what is therefore the best thing

for Canada to do to prevent a war from happening? There is a very fine distinction: if you haven't got a war fighting capability, then you are not demonstrating any deterrence. But it is incredible, too, how often if you do make this distinction you will make a slightly different judgement. But in the case of Canada, as I say, if there was a short war and it was a nuclear war, we wouldn't play a part. Therefore, we assumed, at least I assumed and I think my colleagues did too, we had to assume that if we were to play any part at all it would be, unlikely as it might be that there would be a long conventional war, that we would be in the resupply business, or that we would have to demonstrate our resupply capability in times of tension, and therefore that was a proper and adequate role for Canada's forces. And I think that coloured our thinking in terms of a Norwegian commitment and it certainly coloured our thinking in terms of our commitment in the central front and in the mobile group. And indeed in the frigate replacement plan. It's all part of that philosophy I guess.

[COX] So if one sees a single thrust to it, it is to contribute to the deterrent by ensuring that, certainly within the capabilities of the country, that there would be a prolonged conventional phase in the event of a war.

[FALLS] Well, let me say that could be your judgement. But as I said before, I just feel that, if there were a long conventional phase, that is to say if there was a war at all, we have failed in what we are trying to do which is to deter war. That doesn't just apply to Canada, it applies to the whole world.

[COX] I think what I am trying to reach for here is to ask you whether you think the resupply, and contributing to maintaining the sea lines of communication, is an intrinsically invaluable Canadian contribution, not to war fighting, but to deterrence.

[FALLS] I do, I think that it is important to demonstrate that, and in this I think -- there are further questions that you had about rapid reinforcement, but I think that is fundamentally what the SACEUR of the time felt once he put this finally into the programme; that if you could demonstrate a rapid reinforcement capability then there would not be a tendency of the Soviets to think they could overrun Europe and get to the Channel in a couple of days (for what reason I'm not sure), and have the Allies too befuddled or something, or too frightened, to react to nuclear weapons. Let me reinforce the fact that I think that the resupply of Europe is a legitimate role for Canada in NATO in its primary role of deterrence.

Part VI - Chairman of the Military Committee, NATO, 1980-83

[HILL] Admiral Falls, in 1980 you were appointed Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. That made you the first Canadian to hold that position. And if I'm not mistaken that made you the senior allied military officer, since the Military Committee is the governing military body under the North Atlantic Council and sets the policies which commanders such as SACEUR then have to flesh out and implement. I have a whole series of questions in my mind about relationships here between the Chairman of the Military Committee, the members of the Committee, and the relationship between the Military Committee itself and the NATO Council and so on. I wonder if you could tell us something about the question of modalities, and how you as the Chairman of the Military Committee fitted into the hierarchy, and what dealings did you have with SACEUR, and so on? I think if we could put that all into one basic question, we'll go on to talk about more substantive issues afterwards.

[FALLS] Okay, this is something I might have a problem rambling on about. The way you posed the question is absolutely correct in terms of the position of the Chairman of the Military Committee, and the way in which NATO was formed and the structure created. The Military Committee was formed to provide military advice and it was deemed that the best military advice would come collectively from the Chiefs of Defence Staff, and their spokesman is the Chairman of the Military Committee. And the Military Committee is CDSs, not their representatives as you are aware. This is a body, however, that is meant to provide advice and counsel to the Council and has no operational authority. The operational authority is SACEUR and the other major NATO commanders, SACLANT and CINCCHAN. However, you talked about influence. The first thing you have to think of is that CDSs should not have a different view publicly than their masters. The CDS works for a minister of national defence in every country and he should be giving advice to that minister, and, therefore, in a sense the Military Committee, because of that very fact, is almost redundant. To think that you could have a meeting of the Military Committee that would come up with different recommendations or solutions to the Council of Ministers, the Defence Council, is to ask a lot from the democratic process. There's just no room for maneuver. And that indeed is the root cause, if you like, of where I see the problem of the Military Committee and its lack of prestige in NATO. I don't know how you felt about it, Roger, when you were there, but certainly I felt and was told in no uncertain terms by many people, including, very bluntly, by one of the heads of government, amongst a few provocative remarks about NATO itself, that there was absolutely no room for the Military Committee and they were a useless group. I think that view was shared in many ways in the NATO headquarters itself in Brussels. Because there was very little room for them to initiate anything or to do other than react and of course to make resounding noises about the terrible military situation in Europe. And so I, indeed, was aware before I took this job about the lack of respect if you like and influence in the Military Committee. I had been taken to Europe by my predecessor, General Dextraze, to have a look at one of these meetings and yet I suppose I thought there was a possibility of making a small and modest change to the way in which they did business. Because I think there was room for them to make a better contribution in being a bit more active, in taking a slightly more independent view perhaps. But it was not to be. The Military Committee will not change because it really can't change for the reasons I mentioned.

[HILL] I guess I didn't have quite that same impression. I guess what I see as being the utility of the Military Committee is the fact that, since in peacetime NATO is largely a planning organization, this body is one element in the planning process. And the other thing is, if you didn't have the Military Committee, then you wouldn't have any multilateral group at the head of the main commanders, all of whom, with one exception I think, are Americans. That was another question I wanted to come to: presumably as Chairman of the Military Committee, your job was to reflect the views of the collectivity of the membership of your committee, which was of course from all of the NATO countries. And what about your dealings with SACEUR, who of course is a US officer? Did you find that you, as a sort of NATO person in the sense of representing a collective viewpoint, and also being Canadian, had differences of perception from SACEUR, who is not only a NATO officer himself but is also the Commander-in-Chief of the US forces in Europe. So was there any sort of conflict? How difficult was the coordination process?

[FALLS] It could have been, and apparently was in the past, difficult, this coordination process. In my case, I arrived after Bernie Rogers had been there for I think only about six months or so, and he had decided that he would like to co-operate and get along with the Chairman of the Military Committee, whoever he might be. When I came he made an effort and I responded and we had an excellent relationship throughout the whole time. You talked about the fact that it's a planning organization, but one has to remember where most of the planning starts in the process; and the

planning starts in SHAPE. They're the ones with the massive international or multinational staff and I say massive in comparison to Brussels. They've got the talent and the intelligence and the muscle to do all the planning, and it is international because he has other nations on his staff, although lets face it it's basically an American organization. And there's no way you can compete, nor is it such that you try to compete with the system, which is that they generate the staff paper, and it comes to Brussels and we kind of massage it and then it goes up to Council and that just puts us as a link in the chain and nothing ever changes. Nothing is really ever changed by the Military Committee, or at least I can't remember anything significant, being changed by the Military Committee. So I knew that, and I said, if this is the way it is, I might as well not fight with this guy, I might as well try to get along with him and influence him if such can be done on a personal basis. As I say we got along very well, we met for lunch once a month, as a matter of routine almost but we set it up so we had some worthwhile discssions; and we protected it and achieved it. These lunches were one-on-one, no note takers, no nothing, no spies, no tape recorders running. And some of them lasted for three or four hours and so we each knew what the other was thinking, pretty well. So to that extent I guess I was able to get my views across in a private way where they counted, and I guess that's the way most organizations do business on a one-on-one basis.

[HILL] Of course SACEUR is only twenty miles down the road from Brussels and he's got plenty of high powered cars and he's got a helicopter, if he wants to get up to NATO Headquarters. But the fact was that you were on the spot, and I'm thinking in terms of talking with the Secretary General and the Ambassadors and so on, if they needed someone on the spot to advise, or for an on the spot input by the military. You were the person there, and I presume that's an important element.

[FALLS] Yes, this would be important in the event of an immediate crisis that involved NATO. Most of the crises that occurred didn't involve NATO, but world problems, and NATO jealously guards the fact that they have NATO borders, and there are Turks and Greeks and people like that who won't let them forget it. But surely the Chairman is there, and I had access to any of the Ambassadors and to the Secretary General. I used to try and meet with the Secretary General once a week. Now this didn't always occur, because we didn't often have that much to discuss. But we used to kind of try to make some excuse to have at least five minutes together somehow. But his door was open -- I never had a problem with Joe to get into his office. He never made it difficult at all for me to approach him, and I think it's fair to say that the other Ministers were the same. There was never any lack of rapport between myself and the members of the Council in Permanent Session.

[HILL] I think that one of the advantages of NATO is that it really is a rather small organization. I guess the ease of your contact with the Secretary General in NATO may have contrasted with what you said earlier about being the CDS and the difficulty to get in to see the PM.

[FALLS] I think there are two reasons. One is the fact that NATO is very much a lot of form rather than substance, and that therefore the form of the chairman being in that hierarchy is important to maintain. The second thing is that NATO is not an overworked organization, and therefore there is time for these things to happen. People do have time to sit and talk about substantive things on a one-on-one basis or to form groups. There are very seldom times when Ambassadors are over-committed.

[HILL] Let's turn now to a more substantive point. In the Polish crisis, there were differences of perception, I think, among the allies. How were your relations with SACEUR in that period. I mean SACEUR was an American officer as well as being a NATO officer. You're there as the

head of the international military organization, the military side of the organization. Were there differences of perception as to what was happening in the Polish crisis and, if so, how was that coordinated?

[FALLS] I don't think there were any differences of perception because it was hard to argue with the facts. The buildup of Soviet troops and the pressures against Poland were obvious. I think what surprised everybody was Jaruzelski declaring martial law. That was an eye-opener and a great surprise to everyone. And I don't think that there was any feeling either that there was a damn thing that the West could do about that situation in Poland, other than those sanctions that were imposed. And there was never any question of a military response to a Soviet invasion of Poland, never.

[HILL] I mean, even in terms of moving to higher states of alert?

[FALLS] Well, sure, it was obvious that that was going to happen. I mean, that is just an automatic kind of military reaction. If we don't know, then lets just go up the scale. That's just a good prudent reaction.

[HILL] Were there differences of perceptions as to whether the Soviets might go into Poland or not? I mean, why I ask this is that I happened to be in Cuba at the time and there were scare stories running around at the time that if the Soviets went into Poland the Americans would go into Cuba. Now it was hard to judge at the time, but it certainly gave one cause to think, and there was certainly a sense that the Americans were going to be tough about this thing, that they were taking a tough line on it, or wanted to. And I don't think the rest of the allies were quite so tough.

[FALLS] That's absolutely true. I think that all the initiatives came from the Americans and there were a hell of a lot of go-slow and cautionary remarks from other countries. In NATO it was always that way, the Americans wanted the action, they were always pushing the others to do this and that and this was the whole situation. It was the same in that gas pipe line problem. Well, any American problem. The Iran-Iraqi or the Iranian hostage problem. The Americans were always, of course, trying to get the allies to do more.

[HILL] But there wouldn't be any question of NATO actually sending forces into Poland or anything like that. I mean that's totally out of the question. So there isn't any actual potential requirement to use military forces in any way. So the degree of possible differences is relatively small. There's not that much room for differences of opinion, really.

[FALLS] No, I don't recall, quite frankly, if there was an increase in the official alert status, I don't think there was. Bernie Rogers has the capability, a pre-delegated capability with the air defence forces in Germany. Whether he did something with that, I don't remember. And of course there was always the feeling that we've got to do something, clear the air, the Soviet's are about to -- and yet this was not an act of war against NATO. It's nevertheless disturbing enough to be seen as some kind of a crisis, and so there's sort of this automatic demand that we've got to do something and I could see him floundering over it, you know. What could we do, what kind of sanctions, and then what could we do militarily? Well we can bring AWACs over, and this was seen as a salvation of some sort, as I mentioned before, I'm not sure why. If this had of course led to an expansion and military forces carrying on in to East Germany, if there was a lot of air activity going on, sure the AWACs would have been useful to indicate that that was the case. There would have been lots of other indications before that, however. It demonstrated that there was some action and that's what people wanted to see.

[COX] Is it possible that the issue was perhaps another one, i.e., how the Soviet action presented itself to the Western public. Some people have said, from the vantage point of Moscow, that there were many indications that the Soviets did not intend to go into Poland.

[FALLS] You are asking me to try to dig out some detail in my brain, that I doubt is there, but I do remember that the major cause of concern was movement of helicopters -- Soviet helicopters -- that put them in a position to move Soviet troops. I don't recall massive troop movements and when I say massive, I am sure there were some -- but it certainly didn't look to any of us, in looking at the intelligence, as though there was going to be a possibility of a complete Czechoslovakian type thing. Now, I don't remember how it was presented to the public, quite frankly. But that was all that was presented to the NATO Council. I think that they gave a very objective and factual assessment of what was happening. Now as to the implications of this, of course, there is always a tendency -- and it has existed since NATO was formed, and perhaps since military forces existed -- to over estimate the enemy. Hence, you have such words as massive military build-up of the Soviets, the terrible imbalance between the forces, and all that sort of thing, which on closer examination, perhaps, are over statements. But there is enough truth in all of this to generate it. I don't know. I think that NATO got the right military and intelligence briefings plus the offer of AWACs, which they accepted, because they wanted to be seen as doing something.

[HILL] On the NATO-Warsaw Treaty Organization forces balance that was published by NATO in '84, would the Military Committee have been involved in the discussion of the details of that paper?

[FALLS] Yes. That started while I was there in '83. I'm not sure if you are talking about the first or the second version. The first version was such that I threw up my hands in horror. I knew that I was leaving anyway, and I knew that I couldn't do much about it. That version didn't last very long. They were forced into a revision and came out with a revised version which was a little closer to the facts. Initially, when it was decided to respond to the Soviet publication with a NATO one, it was done in Brussels headquarters as opposed to SHAPE, to permit all military representatives to assess the military balance, and it was so badly distorted as to have been a farce. Everybody had to have their own threat. Every nation had to have a big threat in order to justify its increases in military expenditures and so forth. It was so obviously unfactual as to have to be revised later. I think that first issue, indeed, was published and retracted almost immediately; and the second, more rational, version remained. As an example, all of the Soviet reserve divisions that were just mere cadres were counted in the divisional count. It was, as I said, an exercise that was designed to satisfy every country, and it was done by military people, without too much regard for genuine analysis.

[HILL] I guess that leads on to a question that I have as well: what was your perception of trends in the period you were there?; and another thing, do you think that Canada is well served by the fact it receives perceived wisdom from NATO, which may have some flaws in it in terms of analysis and so on?

[FALLS] I think that NATO is a self-serving organization to the extent that like any organization, they want to self-perpetuate. And, therefore, it is in the interests of the organization, itself, I am talking about the NATO bureaucracy as opposed to the NATO structure and agreement -- they need a good military threat to maintain an existence. And so, there is always a natural tendency to exaggerate. What happens, of course, is to generally create a kind of one-sided picture, or to not give a complete, full story. There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviet forces are superior in

Europe. Whether they are massively superior -- these kind of adjectives keep creeping in, that don't allow a reasonable approach -- and it is very difficult to arrive at a reasonable approach as to what is the balance of power in Europe. One of the best ways to get at it, because this bothers a lot of civilians, including politicians -- and I have seen some of the senior politicians question some of the senior military people, like Rogers and some of his major subordinate commanders -- and after hearing about this terrible situation, the question is often asked: "Would you be better off if they had your forces and you had theirs?". Well, not really. I have heard responsible NATO commanders -- when they are not preaching to an audience -- so that one is getting the best iudgment possible, say that yes, they think that they are able to do their job. You don't need equivalent forces, you don't need superior forces -- you can accept inferior forces and still do your job of defence. And all of them that I have spoken to are well satisfied -- not well satisfied -- but they are satisfied that they are able to fulfill their role in protection of NATO from attack. And, usually, there is that caveat, "until reinforcements can arrive," but that doesn't always get said either. But in any event, I think to ensure that these people continue to feel the same way, this is a good reason for Canada, as well as the Americans, to demonstrate their capabilities for reinforcement. And incidently -- this is without recourse to nuclear weapons.

[HILL] How do you see NATO processing of intelligence affecting Canada's perceptions of the world?

[FALLS] I don't know. I think that the thing kind of works its way out quite naturally. The fact is that there are organizations such as the IISS who give a reasonably good appreciation of the situation -- an objective one. I think so does the Stockholm Institute. There is enough information to kind of give a reasonable picture. That is to say that there is no massive imbalance. There are areas of concern, obviously. And I think that is what the smart guys are trying to say -- the objective ones -- the ones that are trying to paint the right pictures -- that there are areas of concern, that we need a better conventional force if we want to have less dependence on nuclear weapons. But the situation is not quite as critical as has been stated over a period of time. And my concern, as Military Committee Chairman, was that our voice has lost credibility -- our voice in the military; we have been over-stating the case for so long that nobody believes us anymore.

[HILL] You mean when you say 'our' ...?

[FALLS] 'Our NATO military leaders', be they Military Committee, or SACEUR, or SACLANT, or what have you. I kind of thought that I might be able to change that, but I couldn't. It is just not in the nature of military people to admit to anything other than that they need more funds for more equipment; and indeed they do. But I think long since the politicians have made their own assessments and analysis and they will know, somehow, instinctively, when there is a need, either politically or militarily, to increase, as happened in Canada in 1974 and in NATO in 1977.

[HILL] I think that to me, there always was a problem in the structure of NATO headquarters. You get political committees and senior political committees making political assessments, which tend to be purely political because that is their sort of function and they are supposed to keep out of anything to do with military things. Security things, yes, but certainly not military ones. And you get the Military Committee and the military SACEUR making their analyses. And these two quite separate things are kind of fed into the Council which doesn't really marry them up. You just get a sort of conjunction of these two things, whereas, let's say in Washington, for example, you get the National Security Council, which when it is functioning as it is supposed to function, does a kind of assessment -- an overall assessment -- which takes segments of these two different types of things and puts them all together. But there isn't that in NATO Headquarters.

[FALLS] There should be, Roger. The whole process -- this bi-annual force development process, is supposed to work that way. It starts in SHAPE and it comes to the Military Committee and it goes up and down, and up and down to the Council, where it gets the political input, surely, before the force implementation plan is approved.

[HILL] But there isn't any collective, really joint civil-military group with a little bit of autonomy of its own, which could look at these things in an overall sense. I mean, I had some experience with this myself working on MBFR -- you write things, you put in some things, some judgments which go over a little bit into the military domain, then what happens is, you get a judgment from the military organization on those things and then one doesn't have any authority to make a response. It is simply taken that it is the military who know about military things, therefore you keep out of it, which is a sort of structural flaw in my opinion.

[FALLS] I think that you are right too.

[HILL] I guess what I was driving at really is this: do you still feel, on the whole then, that Canada is relatively well served by being in NATO? Seen in terms of what Canada is trying to do in foreign policy, defence policy and military policy, is it well served, or relatively well served, by being in NATO? Or are we being pulled, through excessive assessments of the threat and so on, in directions that Canada would probably prefer not to go?

[FALLS] No, I am very strongly of the view that Canada is being well served by her membership in NATO, but only in comparison with not being there. I think that it probably makes relatively little difference to the world as a whole whether Canada is in NATO or not, in terms of either world security or even our own security. But I think that our well being would suffer, if you like -- I'm not sure quite how to describe this or explain it -- but in our relationships, probably economically, socially and in many other ways with other nations, we would suffer if we tried to get out of NATO without offering something else in lieu. And neutrality is not what they would be looking for. So I think that perhaps Canada demands a bit too much from its NATO commitments. We seem to be forever wondering what is our influence in NATO, would it be more, lesser or greater if we were to reduce or increase our commitments, etc., etc. The answer to that is, not much. I don't think that what we do in NATO is very important because we are not very important to NATO. What we do is of interest for a few minutes and that's it. However, being in NATO, we are at least able to create and present opinions on this world leadership of the United States -- it is probably our best forum -- it is probably as good at least as the bilateral forum we have with Washington. It's a place where I think we are very well served by our Canadian Ambassadors -- the three that I saw, in any event, and I attended every meeting of the Council that I was there for, so I was able to make judgments about the various Ambassadors and how they reacted and I think Canada can hold up her head quite well. There were obviously times when I wished that we could have done more and been more independent, but I think that is the case with almost anyone. If one accepts the fact that NATO is kind of a funny organization, which perhaps isn't as important as the bureaucracy thinks -- by that I mean the SECGEN and all the hierarchy there -- is not the forum, really, to make massive changes in East-West relations, that these things will occur from a multitude of things, of which the NATO body is one of them. I think it is very valuable for Canada to maintain as much influence as we can in NATO and not to worry very much about whether it is going to increase or decrease; whether or not we have a six percent real growth or a three percent real growth. I don't think that it matters a hell of a lot. I think that we ought to stop denigrating our contributions and perhaps use some of the figures that are favourable to Canada in the way we do contribute to the Alliance, and hold our heads up a little higher. I furthermore don't think that we should deliberately do things that will antagonize our NATO allies, as we may well do in this defence review or in this white paper, depending on which way we go. I think that should be very clear in the minds of our politicians now, when they are constructing this White Paper. What is the impact on our NATO allies? It will undoubtedly be a transient impact and, whatever it is, I'm sure that NATO will get over it. But, I don't particularly think that it is a good idea to do something stupid that would antagonize them, and cause them concern. I'm thinking primarily of the Norwegian commitment.

[COX] I guess that I find that I am being pulled along by your line of reasoning. So I don't have a question, but it is more a reflection of what you are saying. From that vantage point, your position on the Military Committee, as you look back at Canada, did you come back with some strong convictions about what we should be doing, what we should not be doing?

[FALLS] You mean in the military or the political field?

[COX] In the military field.

[FALLS] The strongest conviction, as I said, is, don't rock the boat. When I came back from Europe, we were still in the process of building up the armed forces. As far as I was concerned, we were still in that climbing slope of real growth that was really going to equip our Armed Forces, and I was pretty sanguine that this would go on. That was three years ago; I am not as sanguine now. In fact, the six percent that we had is now down to about three, and it might even be less than that. In other words, there was a time when we were able to say to NATO, we are exceeding the NATO standard of 3%; and they were able to say back -- well, it is about time, because you were so low. Now we are back to where we have less than a three percent real growth. The government made kind of a futile gesture of sending some more troops to Europe, but I don't know what good it did. It was a kind of a messing about with something, with the structure, that didn't have much of an effect, either on our capabilities in Europe or on our commitment to Europe; but I think that I came back with a conviction that Canada, for her own reasons, ought to continue with the modernization of the Forces. So that what we say we have got is what we've really got. And this, unfortunately, is going to cost, still, a lot of money, primarily because, whilst we have done the air component reasonably well, there is still a lot of money to be spent in dibs and dabs on the land forces and there is a massive amount of money to be spent in the Navy, if we are not going to have a six-ship navy. I think we deserve a better navy than that. And so we've got to keep on biting the bullet. I think, as I say, I came back thinking we were doing not badly. But in the process, in the meantime, we have started to slip. And, I gather from a chit chat here and there, that Beatty is having a hell of a time with Wilson in creating this White Paper. There is never enough room for defence, unfortunately, in Canadians perceptions.

[HILL] Could I perhaps continue on that one, on a number of issues here. I think that basically what you are saying is: the optimum solution for Canada's force in NATO is to do more or less what we are doing, and not to rock the boat, as you said. My feeling is that some changes might be made in specific arrangements, if they can be properly worked out. This is not an oblique reference to CAST. What I am talking about is this: one can't accept that Canada is necessarily going to stay in its present position, just because we happen to be there now. As time goes along, things might change. But what seems to happen is that abrasive types of cuts in our NATO forces or things like that are the things that get attention. They often don't bring that much value to Canada, but they do get people in NATO a bit riled up. On the other hand, increasing Canadian forces might not have that much of a pay-off. I mean the Europeans would be almost as astonished at that as they would be upset at cuts.

[FALLS] I agree with you entirely. I didn't try to imply that by not rocking the boat, that we shouldn't make changes. What I meant to say was that we shouldn't rock the boat in the sense of antagonizing our allies about what we do. Now, if we withdraw our CAST combat group, that is obviously an option, and an option that need not necessarily antagonize our European allies, if we do something else to counteract it. But somebody is going to have to do that commitment, and I think if it is a burden to either the Americans or the English, who are the only people who can; and if we don't take on some other tasks to relieve them of their burden -- you know, it is sort of a circular thing -- then we will be seen as, once again, creating a problem for NATO. We don't need to leave our European contribution as it stands. There is a strong argument that can be made for bringing back the air component and increasing the land component, making it much more efficient in fact. It's costly, though, because there is no room in Lahr. We couldn't stay where we are. We would have to move up to take on a part of the Central Front, maybe up in Schleswig-Holstein. It is more money, but, you know, that's an option. It is an option that the airmen would not find favour with, because that's their only operational role, and for that reason I would never have supported it as CDS, and would not support it publicly, I guess, just because I don't want to antagonize all the airmen in Canada.

[COX] The argument that is frequently made is that you have to have an all arms combat force, that no matter how small it is, it has got to be all arms. Do you agree with that argument, because when you talk about moving to the north, doesn't that imply that you don't have to be all arms?

[FALLS] Yes. I don't think that when people speak of all arms, they are including the air. They talk about army, land, infantry, artillery, armour as the all-arms, and I think that that is quite true. They have to fight with the three arms in modern day warfare. And they have to be provided with air defence, be it in the low level air defence that we are in the process of purchasing or by some umbrella where they can fight without being hammered to death by airplanes. I mean, we have been in the attack role before, where there was no relationship between the role of the 104s and the role of the brigade group. And, indeed, with the acquisition of the F-18s, they would not necessarily fight with the Canadian land forces. No, in my view, there is no connection.

[HILL] So when the argument was made that NATO does not like specialized forces, that is not to be taken to mean that NATO expects us to field an air group with the land group?

[FALLS] No, I don't think so. Not, certainly, in my understanding of it. Incidently, when one asks General Rogers about these things, he just says, don't take anything away. So you don't get a good answer.

[HILL] Would it help the CAST commitment if the brigade were re-located in Schleswig-Holstein?

[FALLS] Would it help the CAST?

[HILL] Yes.

[FALLS] Yes.

[HILL] What actually would you form the CAST commitment from?

[FALLS] I think you would get a better answer from an army type. But I think that the logistics of the CAST combat group would probably be separate from the logistics of the brigade group in Schleswig-Holstein. There may be some merit in that, I don't know. I hadn't thought about it very

much. I think what bothers the army most about this CAST combat group, is that part of the commitment is in the ACE Mobile Force, and if that brigade that we have in the ACE Mobile Force is somewhere else, in Turkey or somewhere, and we send the CAST off to Norway, how do they get married up?

[HILL] They've been separated up now, actually. They were separated up about a year and a half ago.

[FALLS] Oh yes, I guess I do remember that too.

[COX] Can I go back to something drawn from what you said earlier? My impression is that there was a phase, mid '74 or something like that, when it was very visible to the NATO allies that, although Canada had a fair number of forces in Europe, the equipment was pretty redundant. The sort of tokenism that was there at one time doesn't serve its purpose after a point. And this is what I want to ask you about. Is it not very clear, to the allies, what state the Canadian Armed Forces in Europe are in? Is it well known to the others? I mean by the NATO review processes...

[FALLS] Well, I can't accept your premise for starters. And since we are speaking to history here, and not for being quoted back by the press tomorrow, let's talk about our contribution to Europe in terms of what is most important, and that is the same reason that the American troops are over there, a form of presence that one can call a hostage group, if you like, but certainly a demonstration -- a clear demonstration -- of Canada's commitment to the Central Front and to European defence. The fact that they are there and the fact that their dependents are there: I can't think of any clearer demonstration by Canada of its support of NATO, and that is the way the Germans see it, in my view, when I talk to Germans. They don't care whether they have bullets for their guns -- they do, of course, but the quality of that contribution is not as significant as the fact that they are there. Now to go back to the quality again, I don't know what people are complaining about when we have managed to demonstrate, time after time, in competitions -military competitions -- that we are second to none against the quality of our competitors. We come out near or at the top of these military competitions, that are taking place just to keep everybody on their toes -- country against country -- and we have never collapsed in that. Even with our old equipment, we managed to keep up with the best of them. And I think that there is a genuine feeling of pride in our troops in Europe, that they are good. And, certainly, I am absolutely convinced that they are worth one for two of every American over there.

[HILL] I remember being in the mess in Lahr one day. We were stuck there one day on some trip that I was on, about 1977, in that period. I got an ear-full for about three hours from an air force officer who was flying a CF-104 and telling me about all the miseries of flying those at that time. So the pressure then, in your view, is really all from the Canadian military, rather than NATO as such, to do the re-equipment?

[FALLS] Well, no, there is a mutual back-scratching here, you know. The Canadian military wants more equipment, therefore General Rogers, SACEUR, will support that. And he will make noises about the terrible state of the Canadian equipment. You know, that is automatic, and one should expect it. If you are talking about the morale of the people themselves, when you go back to those CF-104 days -- I don't know if you have ever flown in a CF-104 over there -- I had a chance to fly in one, and it is a most interesting, frightening airplane -- you know, it demanded a pretty high level of skills, and therefore these guys were pretty proud of their skills. And they did a very useful role in those airplanes. They just got kind of old. I would hesitate, yet, to say they were obsolete. For what they were designed to do, they were still pretty good at it. But the airmen

were pretty happy, I think, on the whole, especially knowing that a new plane was coming. The army was a different kettle of fish. But by the time I got to know them, in '77, the tanks were on their way. I don't know what their morale prior to that was; I assume that it may have been a bit down, because of equipment.

[HILL] We hear people say that, for example, just to take three cases: (1) where the destroyers may be old, they are still very good ASW platforms; (2) that if they were in combat, the mechanized brigade group would give a very good account of themselves; (3) and that it wouldn't be so easy at all for the Soviets to come down through northern Norway, partly because of the CAST commitment. What we hear are really two somewhat discrepant views. We are in a terrible state, but we will give a very good account of ourselves if we have to.

[FALLS] That is military pride. Gosh, you can't think otherwise, can you. I don't know, I think that it is all very subjective. The main thing is that we create a deterrent process in our armed forces. But, nevertheless, you can't help thinking, in fact one has to keep in mind, that people are in the military for purposes of fulfilling the ultimate, which is to fight. And it is unfair to ask people to be in the military unless you are going to give them the equipment and the tools to do that, and that is one of my strong points before parliamentary committees and things like that. There is an obligation of the country to ensure that the guy is not put into a position to have to do this without proper equipment. It is bad for his morale. You know that war will never take place, hopefully. But that is no excuse, really, to deprive him of the tools to do his job. But you know, as I say, it is very subjective, and you can go either way, in terms of what you think. I happen to think very highly of Canadian troops, be they sailors, or airmen, or soldiers. Not just from chauvinistic reasons, but because I have seen others. There are other troops in this world too, that I have the greatest admiration for; and the Soviets are not part of them. So that is another part of the balance that I think is so terribly important, that is ignored. If one were to invade the Soviet Union and give them a raison d'être to fight, then, my God, they would be hard to beat. But in terms of a bunch of Soviet conscripts fighting in East and West Germany, or something, you know, again, two for one would be about right.

[HILL] I just have one very last question: as Chairman of the Military Committee, you also presided over the MBFR Working Group and things like that, where you had military officers analyzing the overall balance of forces, the conventional balance and so on in Europe, and participating in the decision-making process in regard to NATO's positions on MBFR. How valuable is NATO in terms of promoting detente and arms control, and how valuable is it to Canada in that way?

[FALLS] I didn't find that the NATO Military Committee could get very exercised about MBFR or the CSCE process or any of the other arms control questions. My colleagues, that is to say the Permanent Military Representatives, didn't seem to be able to generate much interest. There was of course a staff that looked at them and they would make reports. But the only time I saw the Military Committee get exercised about anything along these lines was in the CSCE process, when one of the confidence building measures was to notify military movements from the Atlantic to the Urals. When somebody said the Atlantic, the naval types all screamed and kicked and said you can't do this because it's always been a law of the sea that you can go anywhere and seas are free and you can't tell people ahead of time - ignoring that maybe there are a few satellites up there that can do the job for you. Aside from that I don't recall anybody getting very interested in these processes.

[HILL] But speaking as a Canadian and knowing NATO in general, not necessarily in your capacity as Chairman of the Military Committee, how useful do you think is NATO in this respect, and how useful is it from Canada's point of view to be in NATO in order to promote those kinds of things.

[FALLS] I think it's important for Canada to be in NATO, not through a military process particularly, I mean not through the military voice, but because we have an Ambassador at the table who will join with others to give the Americans their views on bilateral US Soviet relations, as well as to participate in multilateral process. It is a good forum in which to have discussions about substance and to make Canada's views known.

[HILL] So you do think it's valuable to be in for that sort of reason.

[FALLS] Absolutely.

[HILL] And do you think that, in that way, one helps to promotes international peace and security.

[FALLS] I do. Very strongly.

[HILL] Well, on that note, we will conclude. We're very delighted you could come, Admiral Falls.

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IFALLS] That is military pride. Gosh, you can't think otherwise, can you. I don't know, I think that it is all very subjective. The main thing is that we create a deterroptopaleanta in a people are valuable bridges and the people are people to be in the military unless you are going to give them the equipment and the tools to do that, and that is one of my strong points before parliamentary committees and things like that. There is an obligation of the country to ensure that the guy is next more wasterioral to be this without proper equipment. It is bad for his morale. You know that war will never take place, is interested to be properly of the people of the properly of the properly of the properly of the properly of the people way, in terms of what you think. I happen to think very highly of Canadian troops, be they sailors, or airmen, or soldiers. Not just from chattymistic reasons, but because I have seen office. There are other troops in this world too, that I have the greatest admiration for; and the Soviets are not past of them. So that is another part of the balance that I think is so terribly important, that is ignified. If one were to invade the Soviet Usion and give them a raison d'être to fight, then, my God, they weak be hard to beat. But in terms of a bunch of Soviet conscripts fighting in Hast and West Germany, as something, you know, again, two for one would be about right.

[HILL] I just have one very last question; as Chairman of the statery Commince, you also presided over the MEFR Working Group and things like that, where you had military officers analyzing the overall balance of forces, the conventional balance and so on in Europe, and participating in the decision-making process in regard to NATO's positions on MEFR. How valuable is NATO in terms of promoting detents and gross control, and how valuable is it to Canada in that way?

IFALLS! I didn't find that the NATO Military Committee could get very exercised about MBFR or the CSCE process or any of the other arms control question. My colleagues, that is to say the Fermanant Military Representatives, didn't seem to be able to generate much interest. There was of course a staff that looked at them and they would make reports. But the only time I saw the Military Committee get exercised about anything along these lines was in the CSCE process, when one of the confidence building measures was to notify military movements from the Atlantic to the Urals. When somebody said the Atlantic, the most types all screamed and kicked and said you can't do this recenter if a always been a law of the sea that you can go anywhere and some are free and you can't sell people sheed of time - ignoring that maybe there are a few satellites up there that can do this because it a sheet of time - ignoring that maybe there are a few satellites up there that can do this job for you. Aside from that I shoult recall anybody getting very interested in these processes.

CHARLES BELZILE

[HILL] Good morning, our guest this morning is Lieutenant General Charles H. Belzile, former Commander of Mobile Command. We are delighted to have you with us today General Belzile and we certainly appreciate your willingness to participate in this project.

[BELZILE] Thank you very much - a pleasure to be here.

[HILL General Belzile, as you know, this project is an oral history of Canadian policy in NATO. We are trying to examine the importance of NATO membership to Canada and how well NATO has served Canadian foreign policy interests since 1949. We are trying to look at the main policy developments and issues in our field over the last forty years and to learn what happened and how Canada and the Alliance were affected by it. We are certainly very fortunate in having you with us today because of your very distinguished career in the Armed Forces and the range of experience that provided. We want to ask about the role that the Canadian forces under your command played at various times, about the impact of Canadian foreign policy on those forces, about their capabilities, and about the functioning of the NATO military system. In addition, we will be seeking your comments about the broader political context as you have seen it developing. As a graduate in Political Science from the University of Montreal, you must always have had your eye on the wider scene even when dealing with the most down-to-earth aspects of your military missions.

[BELZILE] Well, theoretically I suppose this is true, though I'm not sure it really applied like that all the time. I think I mentioned to you before, the military are not really the policy-makers, we are the ones that quite often have to live with it and pick up some of the pieces. And particularly when you're a young officer starting in a military career - the time when you may not, and in my case this was certainly true, you may not have decided at that stage to make it a life commitment - quite often I suppose we don't spend that much time thinking about the broader policy issues except truly as an observer. I'm not too sure that we do a very detailed analysis of the context in which these policies are affecting our day-to-day life. But within that context, and recognizing that limitation, I'll be quite happy to offer what I feel are my opinions.

[HILL] Well, I think we'll put the questions and see what comments you have.

Part I - The Early Period, to 1953

[HILL General Belzile, I note at the outset that you began your military career in 1951. You were commissioned in 1953, and have served in Korea, in various commands in Canada, in Canadian army units and commands in Germany, in a NATO command headquarters, in Cyprus, in National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and as the Commander of Mobile Command. I believe it would be helpful if you could tell us something about your perception of the world, and of NATO and of the Canadian Army, around the time you joined the Armed Forces. For example, could you tell us a little of what you yourself were doing in the late '40s and in 1950. Which schools did you attend in that period, where did you live and so on?

⁷ Interviewers: R. Hill, D. Cox, N. Pawelek. Interview dates: 5/3/87 and 6/3/87.

[BELZILE] Well, at the time, the sort of time period that you are talking about, I was a student, of course, like most people my age were at that stage. I came from a small town in eastern Quebec, and was not a Montrealer, although eventually we gravitated, brothers and sisters, to Montreal, and I wound up attending a variety of colleges, one of which was with the Holy Cross Fathers, Roman Catholic classical type of studies which were at that stage the norm really in Ouebec as opposed to anywhere else in the country. And when I got to Montreal, through the help of a couple of older brothers of mine, I was quite fascinated by the Jesuit approach to education, so I got myself transferred to College Saint Marie, which was an affiliate of the University of Montreal and of course came in the fold of the Jesuits. Half jokingly we used to say that the Jesuits were organized very much like an army, and they were founded by an ex-general; and though we considered them, particularly in a Roman Catholic approach to education, as being much more avant gardist than any other educators that we knew at that time, it was an interesting atmosphere there. And one of the things that existed within the college was the COTC, which was, of course, a programme that existed prior to the unification process, where university students could take a commission while they were students, similar to the United States ROTC kind of thing. And we did that usually for a job in the summer, quite honestly. So in 1951 I got into that programme because I wasn't about to graduate until 1953. But the Korean War had been on since the fall before and the recruiting, I suppose one could say, was getting a little heavy on us because, besides committing troops to NATO, permanently stationed in Germany, we were also sending a brigade to Korea. So all this called really for a quadrupling, give or take a bit, of at least the army size of the operation and certainly also the air force because they were on the NATO commitment with a full air division of about 9 or 10 squadrons at that stage. In Korea the commitment was mostly an army one, except for, if I remember correctly, 426 Squadron, which was an air transport squadron which used to do the shuttling to get us out there and bring us back and bring reinforcements and bring Canadian kind of things to the place. I wanted to go into the Regular Army in fact at that time because I felt it was a bit exciting. I had been exposed to it by then and like a lot of men of that age, about 18 - 19 years of age, I thought it was a pretty exciting life. I wanted to go into the Regular Force and go immediately to Korea, because it was being talked about among the students. If I can put the context of the population reaction at that stage, quite honestly, I don't remember any negative comments about the Canadian participation in Korea. I think basically, at least in my student circle, we were great believers in the United Nations at that stage. It was a United Nations operation. Most of the students in my time were perhaps very much as they are today, but perhaps had different objectives. Anything that smacked a little of adventure, and that we felt was reasonably righteous, was attractive to us. I wanted to go in but I was talked out of it at that stage, in 1951, because I was going to graduate with my degree in 1953 and it was recommended that if I ever decided later to become a permanent force officer, that having my degree would be much more important for a future career. Even in those days we were seeking graduates as much as possible, for the commissioned ranks. So I decided to stay and continued my training then, but as soon as it ended, as soon as I graduated in '53, I then started to insist that the only reason I joined the army was to go to Korea and I wanted to go to Korea. Of course the war was still on then, in fact it still is, it has never stopped. You know what was signed at the end of July 1953 was a cease-fire; there's no armistice in Korea. There's never been one to my understanding. Of course there was never a war declared either, so the situation is still by and large, if I understand correctly, very much like we left it in the mid '50s. But in my own personal recollection at that time I wasn't thinking of being a military officer as a career for any grandiose reasons or any patriotic reasons. I think quite honestly I was seeking a little bit of adventure, and I was qualified as an infantry officer. We were being sought after because of an expansion, and any expansion is exciting in any organization. So a lot of this was contagious, I guess, and quite a few of us just went in the system and I got to Korea after the cease-fire. I almost said "unfortunately", which would not be a very smart word to use but probably fairly close to it, because the kind of atmosphere that prevailed at

that time and the reason we wanted to go, was, of course, I think, because we honestly believed in what was being done there. We were by and large, I think, staunch, particularly with the Jesuits, we were staunch anti-communists. If there were any perceived expansion of the communist world and if we could do something about it we were quite willing to go. So by the time I got there we were in a period of cease-fire and we spent a lot of time rotating companies on the front and trying to normalize, I guess would be best choice of words, trying to normalize the life around us, (with the farmers trying to get back into the land they had been forced to leave in the area of the demarcation line, the demilitarized zone). So in order to keep the troops to a certain extent occupied we did a lot of mine-field clearance. We did a lot of work with explosives. We did a lot of work of a training nature, of an intensive training nature. We always kept the company on the front on the lookout, in case. Of course, there was a perceived danger that a Chinese attack would start again. Perhaps once a week or every two weeks we would, on a contingency basis, man the battle positions and stay in there over night, fight the rats for a few minutes and then come back out next morning. By and large, nothing happened much more than that, except for a little shelling from the Chinese that used to get fairly close to us, enough to make us nervous and make us lose sleep anyway. And that was the atmosphere that prevailed at that time; and, quite honestly, I was -- and I think this would be true of most of the young officers and the most of the student population at least where I was -- pretty enthusiastic.

[HILL] I have one or two extra questions I would like to ask about the Korean period. What about you, David? Do you have anything on the period prior to going to Korea?

[COX] No, I don't think so. I was interested in your comment on public opinion generally, that you didn't feel there was really any strong sentiment against it. That would be so even in Quebec?

[BELZILE] Yes. I think in Quebec, in fact I remember when the first unit was sent to Korea, I remember specifically standing in the post office in my village of origin and hearing a few of the guys that returned from the Second World War talking out loud and wondering if they were still fit enough to get involved again and that's even in Quebec. I am sure you realize there's a lot more people in Quebec that went to war than people normally admit, and so that's it. I remember being in the post office because it was Christmas time and my parents still lived down there and I moved from Montreal to spend the Christmas holidays with them and we had just sent troops in. We had just committed ourself to send the Second PPCLI. I'd never heard of the PPCLI, despite my association with the COTC. But I remember this being in the news and I remember my father and I remember my brothers, a couple of which were veterans, and I remember the people in the post office, the huddles, you know, what's going on right now, the news, the village tom-tom if you want, and I don't remember hearing anybody saying you know "on n'a pas d'affaire là", "we have no business there." But temper that with the fact that I'm talking about 35-36 years ago. I was pretty enthusiastic personally, and maybe my recollections are coloured somewhat. But I don't think that they are.

[HILL Do you think that the anti-communist atmosphere of that time made a difference? I mean, was Communism seen as posing a threat to the traditional values of Quebec, as well as of Canada as a whole?

[BELZILE] I think it probably was, without being identified as such. In the small villages in Quebec, particularly where many people had limited formal education, in a lot of cases they didn't know, I think, where Korea was. I remember checking a map when I first heard the news. Then, of course, there were some people in Quebec who had had families or friends involved with the Royal Rifles and the Hong Kong episode and things like that, who were a little more familiar with

the Far East. They were able to explain that this was a country that as far as they could tell had been dominated by the Japanese forever; and when the Japanese were forced out of there, "the Russians" quote-unquote, as opposed to the Communists, had moved in and refused to leave; and they had just attacked the South. And as far as everybody was concerned, it was fair enough that we should go and do our bit to stop it. That's my perception of how it went. At least in the student world, in the group that I was with, there was no compunction about it. I mean, not very many of us on a percentage basis went and joined the army during that time, but those of us that did were not looked at as weirdos. In fact there's a very interesting thing that perhaps I should mention. It's anecdotal, if you want, on the side. In the old Roman Catholic colleges in Quebec at the end, at graduation, we used to have a ceremony which was called "La prise du ruban", the taking of the ribbon, literally translated, and what this was, was when you graduated and your parents were there, you stood up and announced officially, by the wearing of a coloured ribbon, what your future intentions were. If you were going to be a lawyer and enter the Law Faculty of McGill or what have you, you had a green thing (I guess it was associated with Jurist or something). The doctors had a purple thing or maroon thing. The priests had a white thing, the virginal colour I guess. But all of these things were there. And when I said that I wanted to stand up there and say "military", and you know I wasn't in a military college, well, you know the first thing the Jesuits said was that they didn't have a ribbon for that. And I said, well, perhaps we should find one. There were about four of us in the class who graduated together and went into the army at the same time. And they said: "Well, you think of one". So I looked at what they had as a collection and gold wasn't used, so I took a gold one. This was presented to me, and it became, for the University of Montreal affiliated colleges, the symbology for a military career. And of course all this was stopped later when the university or school systems were changed. I doubt whether this kind of ceremony takes place now; but it was a ritual, which was very important to us.

Part II - Korea, 1953-55

[HILL] Could we follow up now, on what is the second phase of this series, which is your service in Korea? We have touched on it already. Were you at that time serving with the Queen's Own Rifles?

[BELZILE] That's right.

[HILL] And you did mention a little bit of the kind of activities you were involved in. Is there anything more that you could tell us about that? I mean, what did your platoon do in fact at that time?

[BELZILE] Well, as you say, I touched on that, but basically if you're standing in an official war theatre where you don't know whether it's going to start again tomorrow or tonight, it tends to be a little more tense than people realize. In some ways, we used to say, it was probably worse than for the guys that were shelled every night on a routine basis, because they came to know that between such and such a time 200 Chinese shells would fall on the position; and then it would stop. And they would do so many patrols and that sort of thing. We continued with the patrolling. We went through the DMZ constantly, and patrolled right to the demarcation line. We did a lot of mine clearance. And these operations were a little dicey in the sense that the Chinese used plastic and plastic fuses and used wooden containers for their explosives. And things like that. So the normal methods of detection such as the electronic systems and devices were useless. Dogs could be used, but only the British and the Americans had that sort of facility because they were bigger armies. We literally prodded with bayonets and with long prodders, you know every six inches of the

ground. And, when you encountered resistance, you had to sort of carefully dig around it to see if it wasn't a rock. And, when you were satisfied that it was a mine, you cleared it and it was blown right there. We would destroy it right in situ. And so we did a lot of that, and it was a long tedious process; and none of this was properly recorded, or very little of it was. Ours theoretically were recorded, our mine fields, but even so they were tangled and overgrown and you had to be extremely careful when you did that work. The occasional farmer would come in and absolutely ignore our signs that said this is a mine area, stay out; and get themselves blown-up. Then we would get blamed by the local population, even if the mine could very well have been Chinese, for all we knew, that had killed the individual. We would get blamed.

In the fall, the Canadian brigade, it was announced, would fold. That was the fall of '54 at that stage, and so they all went home except for one battalion. And the battalion that stayed was the second battalion, the Queen's Own, which was my unit. We were elected to stay there for about 13 months, and we didn't come home until the spring of '55, when we closed up shop, except for a small medical detachment that stayed after us to do a little clean-up of casualties. And what was left after that was only, as part of the U.N. Command, a major and a clerk. So that's the closing time of the Canadians in Korea.

[HILL] I am fascinated by what you say about Korea, because I was there myself just a couple of years ago and in fact went up on the DMZ, and to my mind it remains one of the touchiest spots in the world; far touchier, certainly in atmosphere, than Berlin, for example. The thing that hadn't really been clear to me before was just the state of chaos there was in Korea at the time of the war. I mean the extraordinary number of refugees and chaos in general. In fact they still have programmes to this day where they're trying to reunify families which were divided up at that time. Literally millions of people are still not able to find their relatives as a result of that whole period.

[BELZILE] Travelling through Korea in that time, even after the cease-fire, from the southern port of Pusan, was surely an experience. I got to know it, unfortunately for sad reasons, because this is where we left our dead, and so I had occasions to go there to participate in burial parties and things like this. We still had casualties; they were accidental, they weren't caused by enemy fire, but you know with all those mine fields, we had accidental casualties. We had a couple of officers killed when I was there, one of them was attached to the United States Air Force as a spotter and they crashed into a hill, so that sort of thing was still going on. So we had occasion to take those trains and travel there, and even at that time the Korean trains heading south were literally packed with people hanging on to them like grapes. Heading south to the city of Pusan; and in those days it was a quagmire, it was a corrugated iron and tarpaper shack city of probably four or five times the population that it was supposed to officially be able to hold. And these people were not making their way north very quickly. They would advance towards Taegu and eventually work their way up. But I'm not surprised that they are still trying to relocate some of these people. The city of Pusan, you literally could smell at sea from about ten miles. When one considers particularly that a lot of their waste disposal systems were right open and that sort of thing, sewers are open, and of course they use fertilizer that we don't normally use for the rice paddies and that sort of thing. I'm sure there is still some of that there. There is an atmosphere in Korea that I'll never forget. For a young fellow from Quebec that had never left the country, it was an education.

[HILL] Have you been back since?

[BELZILE] No. I almost did during Mr. Coates' time. In a way I'm glad I didn't.

[HILL] I think you'd find - despite the chaos and the problems I mentioned - I think you'd find an extraordinary change. I just mentioned that earlier. For example, Seoul is one of the most bustling cities I've ever seen. Another thing that was remarked to me by some veterans that I met, Canadian veterans who were there at the time I was there, was that at the time of the war, there were no trees anywhere. Everything was denuded and bare, blasted out, and now its right back to being forested again. Apparently it's quite a different scene.

[BELZILE] You would sit on top of a hill, like 355 where a fairly large Canadian battle was fought. When I was there 355 was still like a desert pimple. We had an OP there, an observation post, right in the DMZ, that we manned every night. And you just dug in, and used a few sand bags to build your wall. I don't think there was a shrub taller than three feet in that place, because of the intense shelling that eventually just leveled off the top of those hills (like Vimy still looks in a lot of ways).

[HILL] There must have been still the thought, the continual thought, that the war might break out again, because in a sense, as you said, there was never an armistice, only a cease-fire, and the world scene remained very touchy especially in that part of the world. So you must have been, I'll not say worried, but concerned that it might break out again?

[BELZILE] When we talk about it, like we are doing now, I guess I get flashbacks and memories talking about the difficulty in keeping the troops occupied and things like this. This was not the only time we encountered that. In places like Cyprus, during the quiet period, you were always looking for something to do, you know, of a useful nature. Unfortunately, some of this backfires, in places like Cyprus, because it is the Mediterranean and you show the guys that are learning to scuba dive. Those are the pictures that make their way to the national press. You see these guys beside some long-limbed Swedish girls, on the beach, and that is what is seen by the wives here. But none of this tends to look at the other aspect, which is the tedious boredom. I live not far from where some RCMP officers are guarding some residences here, and they sit in the car all day long. I know how they feel. We had people who actually snapped during that time. You know, one of the closest episodes of my life for almost being hit by a bullet, was by one of my own men. I was walking up to see him at night, and just the crunching of my boots on a little bit of gravel there made him so nervous that he started to shoot. He had a buddy, but he was answering a call of nature a few metres away. He shot at us; and then it was a long and tedious process to get close enough to him to calm him down, so that we could literally, physically, grab him. He never recouped. He did eventually, back in Canada, but we had to evacuate the man literally in a straight jacket. Yet he was never fired at, but he lived under this tension. The other time I remember seeing that was in the early days of Cyprus, where there were a lot of exchanges of fire. We'd take a young soldier, about 18-19 years old, and he would get off the airplane, and we'd give him 80 rounds of live ammunition, and say fill four magazines, put three in your pocket and put one on the rifle but don't bring the action back, don't cock it. The last time these kids, this is what they are really, had seen a live bullet in their rifle was on a rifle range under the supervision of a coach and an officer that is responsible to make sure the pockets are empty at the end of the day so he doesn't sneak them home and use them as hunting rifles or things like this. And God knows we know that this can happen anyway, even with the best security arrangements in the world. You know, without going through the stories of the Lorties and people like this. But I've seen these kids, they age literally two to three years at that moment. You turn them from a young recruit, from a boy soldier, literally into a man. Because finally you told them the Sergeant Major says there's 80 rounds live ammunition. If you ever have to use any of these I want to know exactly where each one has gone. We had to do some shooting of wild dogs and things like this. The soldiers learned to say, well, look, I fired two bullets at a wild dog that was bothering the village, eating chickens, things like

this; and killed it. We actually had to report all this because you know it's peacetime, you can't have bullets being fired. So all this was kept track of. The young soldier became very mature very quickly. He's harassed and bothered by either Turks or Greeks in the middle of the thing, you know. And we've had some who, physically, you know, really bothered them. You sort of expect that the other guy's got his finger on the trigger, and it takes a certain amount of discipline and a certain amount of self control not to squeeze your own trigger occasionally. So I always felt good, really, that we were able to impart that kind of training and that kind of discipline to our soldiers, even in so-called peacetime. But in a place like Korea this was particularly difficult to do. Boredom, plus the odd explosion, accidental discharges of weapons, was enough to keep people jittery. So, if you didn't keep track of your troops (this was a great school in junior leadership), you knew you'd soon have people in trouble.

[COX] Of course it's often suggested that continuing peace-keeping is a valuable training exercise.

[BELZILE] It's a great training device. You know, I could talk about Cyprus also, I'm sure we'll get to that eventually. But the main reason to me as a professional officer, militarily, to keep it, is because its the greatest training device we've got. You can not duplicate this in a training exercise. And living on the line, and watching what was going on, and being threatened and having guns pointed at you regularly, and to have all these thing going on, and keeping your cool, is a tremendous training device. And it is tremendous training for the young soldier, for the young leaders, for the young corporals, for the young NCOs, the young officers who have never done that, and are responsible for 35-40 men. But you see, during that period of sort of boredom/tenseness in Korea, we had a couple of Black Watch soldiers when I was there. A friend of mine had to take a platoon to the DMZ to pick them up after the intervention of the International Red Cross. They got bored and decided to go and see the Chinese. So they went across the valley, and of course they were snapped up pretty quickly and the Chinese held them for about 72 - 96 hours, a great propaganda device, and then sent them back with stories of how well they were treated and that sort of thing. We didn't look at them so kindly when they got back. But you know it was all sorts of stuff like that. The odd guy blinded from drinking Lucky 7. You go into the village and the local girls are there, of course, like in most of the areas where there is a lot of fighting going on, and their subsistence depends on a whole bunch of things, including of course, prostitution and what have you. So a young soldier has been on a hill for five or six months, the exposure to that, the local hooch, the local booze which can blind you just as fast as get you drunk, the exposure of course to hygienic conditions which are at best appalling; and so you have a VD rate, you have a whole bunch of outside situations that you'd rather not have. But, as a leadership training period, it is great stuff. We've got a lot of our senior officers today, and a lot of the people that got to the top, who started in those kind of circumstances. And we never forget those first couple of years as a platoon commander in places like that; we never will. If only you could create that kind of atmosphere in a training camp you'd never need to send them anywhere.

[HILL] Could you tell us something about the relations with other allied forces at that time? I mean, Canada was presumably still part of the Commonwealth Division, wasn't it?

[BELZILE] Yes, until just before Christmas '54, when the Commonwealth Division was reduced. The Australians partially went home, and the Canadians partially went home and the New Zealanders were reduced also, and we wound-up with a super brigade at that stage which was a Commonwealth brigade. And if I remember correctly, it was the 27th Commonwealth Brigade. But I could be wrong. And we got along fine, mostly with the Australians and the New Zealanders, strangely enough, and used to gang-up on the Brits. And I'm told it's not strange behaviour, from people in World War II. Also the ex-colonies and the ex-dominions had much more an affinity than

with the mother country. And so all the commanders of division were always British, the senior staff were always British, you got the odd Canadian Lieutenant Colonel in there, so if you didn't like the directives that were issued to you, it was a natural thing to say well you know only the Brits would send us to do that. But I think this is a very normal thing in armies anyway, I call it a friendly rivalry, really. So the relationship was very good across the board, but if it came to somebody ribbing the other guy, you'd probably find the Aussies and the Canadians ganging-up on the Brits.

[HILL] How about relations with the Americans?

[BELZILE] The Americans - the relationship with the Americans was a little more strained in a lot of ways. I've heard, I've never experienced any personally, but I've heard of a lot of cases where Canadian patrols coming back through American lines were shot at, and things like this. They're so big everywhere; we encountered the same thing in NATO later on. You know, they're so big everywhere that you almost feel as if you've got to align yourself with a whole bunch of their policy and their training systems and things like this, because you know you can't survive unless you do, because the machine is so big that it tends to pick up the world along with it as it moves. The Marines, who were on our left at one point in Korea, were great friends of ours, the United States Marines. I think in a lot of ways we had more faith in them than we did in the United States Army. We believed them to be much better professionals and much better fighters. We believed also, rightly or wrongly, that if the fighting was going to start again we'd rather have the Marines on our side on our left or on our right than we would have any other army really. We had a lot of respect for the Turks; for their bravery and their toughness and things like this, and I for one had to travel through their lines many times and I was always very impressed because they were physically very hard, very tough people. Their training was very tough. They didn't have a rotational system like we did; they went to Korea and if they were still there in 1954, it was because they had survived. They got reinforcements but nobody ever went home because they'd finished in a year. The French had a battalion of Foreign Legion, which we had, I think, a reasonable amount of respect for, not for what they did in Korea but for I guess for their reputation more than anything else, particularly in North Africa. And that's about the only ones I've had any personal recollections of dealing with very closely. The ROK army, though, was often looked at with a certain amount of suspicion. Which was unfortunate, because I'm sure that 95% of them were as dependable an ally as anybody else. But the language issue, they basically were under command of the Americans and they locked themselves in there, except for a company. We had about 150 men in our battalion and they were called Kat Coms, and there was another group that was called Katuses which were under the Kat Coms. The Korean army, attached to the Commonwealth Division, used an acronym called Kat Coms and Katuses. They were the same type of units that were with the United States Army or the United States forces. There were about 150 of these people in a battalion. They were soldiers, but the ROKs did not have, I guess, sufficient resources, so they came to us and they formed a company. And we armed them, we equipped them, they were dressed in Canadian uniforms and wearing a Canadian hat. There was a language issue; - you had to work through interpreters. Each unit used these people differently. We tended to keep them all in a company altogether. And we had a Canadian cadre, a Canadian NCO, and an officer cadre that ran them through interpreters and things like that. It was Major Bob Firlotte, and he got considerably frustrated at times with having to deal with them. Other units used them by scattering them all over the place. Other units literally used them as coolies. They were so fit physically, so tough and used to the hilly country that Korea was, that when you needed to carry a whole bunch of stuff you'd turn to your Koreans a lot and they'd take off with A-frames and a load about twice the body weight and run it up the hill which no Canadian could do or American. We just simply,

even the fittest of our people, we don't work like that. And so we found them extremely useful in a lot of ways. So that was the atmosphere and our relationship by and large was pretty good.

[HILL] General Belzile, there is just one broad question I would like to ask you, which is about the scene in Asia at that time. This was the period in 1954 of the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference. It was a period in which there seemed to be a great confrontation going on in the world between two different ideologies. I was wondering if you had any comments about how you had seen things at that time, being in Asia yourself at that period.

[BELZILE] Well, we saw it from afar, I guess. What goes on outside the country where you are is remote; we did not have the modern capabilities of listening to short-wave radios and getting CBC every night and things like this, so we got news relatively late. What we used to get, though, was official briefings on what else was going on, and we were aware of what was going on in Indochina at that time. And we became, I think, much more aware of it because when it became clear that the Canadians, after Dien Bien Phu, were going to start putting people into the Commission in Vietnam, a lot of us volunteered to go. And so this is why I specifically remember that. I didn't go, but I remember my company commander at that time was hustled out of Korea and sent to Vietnam. So I think some of the first Canadian contingent to go to Vietnam came from Canada, but some of them were people that were with us in Korea at the time, because it was closer. I think they were ushered down there fairly quickly. But on a day to day basis we weren't really aware what was going on in detail. We knew that the French had lost Indochina at that time, and we knew there was a commission being set up, the details of which we were not that familiar with. I remember we said goodbye to Major Ed Price when he was heading down there with the first team, with a little bit of envy in our eyes because he was going to go and do something a little more exciting whilst we were going to keep on in our tedious boredom trying to keep ourselves busy. But the details, certainly at my level, as a young platoon commander I think, I spent more time writing letters for some of my troops who couldn't write, things like that, to their girlfriends, and playing father confessor, than to worrying too much about the international situation.

[COX] I wonder if I could just ask you this: you obviously came back more experienced and wiser than when you went, but would you say that, when you came back, there was any change in your own political attitudes or assumptions. You mentioned earlier that you were a little concerned about the ROK; but more broadly than that?

[BELZILE] Yes, I think the simple answer would be yes, and I'll try and qualify that. First of all when I came back the first thing that entered my mind was the moment of decision as to whether I was going to be a permanent soldier or whether I was going to go back to Montreal and become a lawyer, which was the other thing in my craw. I wanted to, because, before I went into the Regular Army, I registered myself into the Law faculty at the University of Montreal, but I never went there, I never did go. And when I got back, I was one of those who had a short term commission which were only for two years i.e., you'd come back, and about five or six months later, you'd be demobbed. We didn't know whether the army was going to stay as big as it was. And of course NATO at about the same time was developing; we had a brigade over there in Hanover.It was an exciting period. So I remember taking the decision at that time, very clearly. I was offered a permanent commission. I didn't have to ask for it like some of my friends did. I was offered it and I accepted it on the spot. Then I had to go back to Montreal on leave, and explain to my father that I had decided to become a soldier instead of a lawyer, which was received in a relatively lukewarm fashion, I remember. My father was of the old school, you see, that soldiers should exist in war time and when it's peace you go back and do something else. This to me is too simplistic a view about the profession of arms, and how complicated it is really. You

know, you need at least a certain cadre of professionals because you don't have the time to start shaping up whole organizations or mobilizations systems, as you did in the past. And if I can think back as to why I did that, I did that I think for two reasons perhaps, to be quite honest, the most important of which was that I liked the life. There was a tremendous amount of personal satisfaction in being an officer, looking after troops, being everything from father confessor to what have you to them, and this appealed to me. It was physical and I was a physical person and I enjoyed sleeping under the stars. Contrary to common belief, I really did enjoy that. To me the rough weather and that sort of thing, I found exhilarating, not something to avoid at that stage. I'd look at it a little differently now. But most of my friends who stayed in also, you know, we spent a lot of time in the officers mess at night with a gin and tonic, I suppose, and shooting the breeze. By and large we felt that Korea had been a success, and I think by and large we felt that the situation with Indochina and with Korea was just the tip of the iceberg and that the whole domino theory, what became known as the domino theory, of course which was so much expounded on during the American time in Vietnam, was correct - that eventually, you know, if we didn't continue to take a stand like this, we'd have fortress North America in a matter of no time. And I guess most of us believed that. I think we felt that, but that's not the kind of thing that young officers express very well. I don't think we expressed it very much. We rather, in those days I think, and probably still the same today, we'd rather use the argument, oh, hell, it's a good macho life and this is why I'm in. But I think basically the macho life aspect really doesn't have enough to make you want to change your whole pattern of life for almost the rest of it. I think subconsciously anyway there are a lot more issues in there. And one of them in my case was that I think that I honestly believed in what I was doing, and I thought that this was a kind of occupation that would allow me to perhaps do a little good in this crazy world. But the one I would have explained to people in a loud voice in those days, I think, would have been the fact that that's my life. That's what I want. I'm doing what I want to do. And I would think you'd probably interview a whole bunch of young officers in those days, and they would tell you the latter instead of the former. They would tell you that they stayed because that was a real good man's life. In all these great statements that young people make with a couple of gins under their bellies, they want to die with their boots on and that sort of thing. It sounds crazy when you explain that to young people today, but there's quite a bit of that. And I think about the two ideologies confronting each other at that time. Most of us, certainly me again as a Jesuit graduate, did not believe in the other side at all, and we didn't want any part of it.

Part III - Western Canada, 1955-57

[HILL] I think we'll now go onto the mid '50s, which is Part III. That was the time when you served as a staff officer at Western Command HQ in Edmonton.

[COX] I would like to ask about your involvement in the DEW Line: if in fact you were involved? Did you have any part to play in that?

[BELZILE] No, I did not. I was a staff officer at Western Command Headquarters in Edmonton. But really my main function was to run the Northern Alberta Recruiting District. So that was a human experience that I will never forget, because you know I spent a lot of time as a travelling salesman all over Northern Alberta and the Northwest and Yukon Territories including Indian reserves and that sort of thing, so that was an educational process for me. But I was not involved in any of the deployments except to drive partially on the Alaska highway, and being situated in the same headquarters with the people and the engineers that looked after the Northwest highway system and the communications system which was set up after the War (which was mostly run by the military at that stage instead of the RCMP and a variety of other departments). In those days, I

guess the military was much more plentiful in the North, and Edmonton was the base from which they launched. That's my exposure. I never worked on the DEW Line, never even went to a DEW Line site at those times. The Northwest highway system I was quite aware of because, as I said, I'd get up to Dawson Creek at mile 0 and I'd drive up parts of it but I mostly flew up to places like Yellowknife and White Horse to speak to high schools, to recruit the odd individual to become a soldier. That's what mostly I was doing at that time.

[HILL] Was there any sense, at that time, because of the fact that the DEW Line was being developed, that in fact the world was changing very much strategically? Or did people think about that much of the time? Do you recall people reflecting upon that or seeing things in those terms at all?

[BELZILE] We were not joint headquarters per se. I know this is a roundabout way to answer your question, but this was not a joint headquarters per se. We were in fact co-located with what was then the Northwest Air Command System, Northwac was the acronym by which we called it, with the headquarters on Kingsway in Edmonton. And we lived with them, we operated with them. In my particular function I had very little to do with the air force side of the house except for sharing information and for sharing travelling when we went to school orientation days and a variety of things that I did as a recruiter in those days. But my bosses, of course, were very much involved at that time. This is when the Bomarc discussions took place, when we bought Bomarc as an air defence system, considering whether we were going to be nuclear or not. I remember that there was much less of a concern with nuclear weapons, at that stage, than I think there would be today. We believed then that nuclear weapons were still controllable. And they were, by and large, those that were being considered by the Canadian forces for arming some of their aircraft or arming the tips of some of the missiles or indeed some artillery shells which could be fractional yield nuclear weapons. We studied those things and we saw them as just another extension, if you want, of the available spectrum of weapons systems, to allow you to fight a war if you ever had to fight it. And we did not look at nuclear weapons with the same global unease that I think we all do today. And the reason for that, probably, is that the proliferation, the number of weapons and warheads, were not nearly as great as they are today. The overkill capabilities were not perceived to be nearly as bad as they are today, and the accuracy of the intercontinental systems was still considerably less than what we would consider a CEP today, a probable error. You know what I mean, a probable error of delivery and accuracy. We tended to look at nuclear weapons with a certain amount of awe, but we considered that training and planning for their use, and defending against them (on the tactical side, in the case of the army particularly), was a very logical and a very necessary extension of our training. So we tended to look at it, I think, this way. We didn't have an all-pervasive fear of nuclear weapons, in my memory, in those days.

[HILL] Your time in the West was immediately before Sputnik 57, so I guess there wasn't the sense of Canada being caught in the middle of two superpowers to quite the same extent in those days, even though the DEW Line was being installed. It was kind of a different world.

[BELZILE] Yes, but it was mostly for an air breathing threat. It was intended of course to give warnings of manned bombers, that sort of thing, and the intercontinental ballistic missile was not our major concern at that stage; which, of course, now, plus the submarine-delivered ones, put an entirely different dimension on the whole nuclear issue. I guess the military mind doesn't feel so bad about a weapon that one can control. But once you foresee a situation where it's really out of control because of A) its destructive power or B) the sheer amount of it, then you have a problem. You know that, philosophically, most of us are terribly uneasy with that, and that tends

to force you into different ways of looking at these things. All of this was not particularly in the realm of junior officers in those days. To us they were just tactical weapons, really.

[COX] Even a tactical weapon packs a tremendous punch with a nuclear device on it. Would you have been thinking about that, just in terms of purely military response, or in terms of what it meant to conventional tactics?

[BELZILE] Oh yes, we did. In fact, the first time that I was in Germany, which followed that, we were very much then training under what we called a nuclear umbrella - the fear of a nuclear umbrella, if you want. We were very much training tactically with emphasized dispersal and emphasized survivability, and we were training our officers; we were training staff officers in nuclear fire planning and damage assessment and target analysis and that sort of thing. We tended to have smaller defended localities, like strong points with large distances in-between the two, what one would cover with fire or with movement instead of with physical presence on the ground. But you would still limit the damage by your varied disposition on the ground. So we were very conscious of that, at that time particularly. And this, in my mind, in the case of the Canadians, probably had more to do with the mechanization of the army than the fact that the rest of the other armies were also mechanizing. The Central European battlefield was going to become a much more mechanized theatre, allowing much more flexibility to move from point A to point B, laterally or from reserve positions to the front, quickly, and that sort of thing. So while they were developing all those nuclear systems, the tactics to use them were developed. So we got more and more mechanized as technology was advancing, turning to vehicles which have an over-pressure system which protects you from fallout or dirty battlefield situations, dirty in a nuclear contamination sense. So that you could drive a tank through the fall-out without the crew being obliterated, 24 or 48 hours later, by the amount of radiation that they would inhale, or that they would take in in one form or another. So you would have an over-pressure system in your vehicle or tank to protect you against that. I think the two came at the same time; and in a lot of ways the need for battlefield mobility was probably triggered and pushed a lot more technologically because of the existence of tactical nuclear weapons, which of course in those early years we still considered a usable kind of weapon which limited damage. We did not necessarily, in those days, at least most of us, did not necessarily see it as automatically being linked to an escalation that would go all the way to intercontinental exchanges. Today, I think we find it very difficult to accept the idea that we could have limited use of nuclear weapons.

[COX] In retrospect, do you feel that you were well-informed about battlefield nuclear weapons i.e. well-informed about yields and battlefield effects of these weapons?

[BELZILE] In as much as the existing knowledge of those things was concerned, yes. Our staff colleges, our courses on fire planning, our target acquisition courses and training, always involved nuclear weapons studies, although as a matter of policy the Canadian government was hesitating as to whether we would have nuclear weapons for even our fighters, at one point. But I think that we always accepted, right from the start, the fact that whether we delivered nuclear weapons ourselves or not, we were going to be in the same battlefield as they would be and therefore we owed it to ourselves to know as much about them as possible. Besides, certain of us in later life got involved very much in the targeting and the fire planning systems in NATO headquarters and things like that. You don't throw the Canadian out of the room when the planning takes place because Canada is a non-nuclear power. Neither do you throw the Dane out of the room, or the German. So as a joint staff kind of activity we still need to be aware of, and have an understanding of, damage assessment and that sort of thing. Even if, politically, we have said that Canada now will never use nuclear weapons. The guy that flings them on your front doesn't have to answer to the Parliament of

Canada. So yes, we were as well informed as possible. Whether it was as good as it is today, I don't know. In a matter of degree, I think that most of the data, the analysis data on nuclear weapons, is something that has evolved considerably since the mid-1950s. But following the period of the mid-'50s, when I wound-up for the first time in the NATO army in Europe, it was very much in our mind. That's why I said immediately after that it was very much in our mind. All of our training, and everything that we did, had nuclear weapons. They were there on the side all the time, and we never forgot that in planning.

[HILL] I think also, since that period or in the mid-'50s, there was an awful lot of analysis and thinking went on about it, I mean about how you'd use these weapons. And I think that's had a useful effect, letting people know or think about how they would use them.

[BELZILE] We went as far in our battlefield deployment as saying that, in order not to completely eliminate the homogeneity of the fighting unit or the battle group or anything like that, then you could not accept more than, say, a combat team as destruction. Without getting into a long diatribe here, the combat team is a company cum tank squadron cum artillery battery. It's an all arms team. Usually, at that level, it could number some 40 to 50 vehicles and 200 or 300 men. You don't reduce below that very much if you want to have any all-arms capability. So you tend to build on these, to use the combat team as a building point. The level above is a battalion size organization. or a tank regiment with a grouping of the other arms with it that tends then to come closer to 800 to 1,000 men. There'll be about four or five of these combat teams in the battle group. Even if you get massive destruction in one of them, you'll still have a reasonably coordinated organization. Hence you would deploy each combat team at least two or three kilometers from the others. So that if one was hit the damage to the other one would be minimal. Or at worst it would be peripheral, perhaps flash injuries, if there was no warning or anything like that. You might have a few guys that were facing the wrong way, they might get a burned retina. But basically, the next organization would be a viable one, and so would the other one on the other side. And then you could still do quick manoeuvring and close the gap. If you have nuclear weapons of the yield that would take out two or three of these in one go, you are really getting into big tactical stuff. But the fractional yield weapons, this is the kind of damage they would do and we tended to deploy our troops with that in mind.

[PAWELEK] I would like to ask you one question to maybe round out this section. I was interested to hear your impressions of the general strategic scene in the mid-1950s, and I would like to ask you to give a more general assessment perhaps of Canadian defence policy at the time. The mid-1950s have been regarded as a sort of golden age for Canadian foreign and defence policy. Canada was firmly supportive of NATO, had some of the best military forces and equipment in the Alliance, and was also fairly influential on the diplomatic front, as was indicated by our role in the Suez Crisis of 1956, for example. I was wondering if you would tell us whether you agree with that assessment?

[BELZILE] Oh, absolutely. There is no question in my mind that the term "Golden Age" is well chosen, because it was a pretty exciting time. I use the word exciting because the executor benefits quite often from the implementation, I suppose, of defence policy and foreign policy. It was a buoyant period in the sense that if we needed certain equipment, we needed certain capabilities to keep ourselves up-to-date, or even slightly ahead of most of our allies, we didn't seem to have any problems getting them at that time. And so that buoyant period, of course, was a pretty exhilarating time as far as we were concerned. We were moving to Europe, I was moving to Europe in 1957, for the first time, and although we did not have yet the sort of technology that was starting to be available in the United States Army, and the British Army and others like them, we used, in lieu,

stuff to get ourselves ready for the receipt of all this new materiel. We did it with less sophisticated equipment but we tended to keep up with every other army in the world. And in Europe in the late '50s particularly, we were viewed, perhaps even more than today, although the reputation is still not bad, we were viewed as one of the finest forces in the world probably. And for professional reasons and for attitude reasons, for training, for standard of training, for standard of people, standard of staff officers, I think we were looked at almost jealously by a lot of European armies at that stage. So it is a fair assessment to say that this was a good period for us. And if it was a good period, of course, for the military, then obviously it must have been internationally for the nation.

Part IV - Germany, 1957-61 and 1966-68

[HILL] We come now to Part IV of the interview, dealing with your two periods of service in North Germany, 1957-61 and then 1966-68. I see that between 1957 and 1968 you served first with the 2nd battalion of the Queen's Own Rifles in Hamburg, and then, in the second period, as Brigade Major with the brigade group in Soest. So I was wondering, first of all, about the state of the Canadian brigade at the time you served with it, particularly first of all, in 1957-61. What was its state at that time? Was it well equipped, adequately manned, sure of its tasks and doctrines? For example, I think I've heard it said that what the brigade did at that time was that it manned a fort, or a series of forts perhaps, fairly close to the front line in Germany. I don't know whether that's a correct assessment. Perhaps you would like to tell us more about the state of the brigade, in both those periods, 1957-61 and then 1966-68?

[BELZILE] I would hope that I don't sort of balance between one and the other. As you were talking, I was starting to wonder when did this or that actually happen - was it in the first period or the second period? The first period was really the one that I started to refer to earlier, where we didn't always have the wherewithal that we should have had, despite our feeling comfortable with policy, our being quite aware of what our tasks were, and knowing exactly where we were going to have to fight the war if it ever came. And we knew exactly where to go. It was relatively close to where our garrisons were, compared to what developed later in the south, which was caused by an entirely different kind of problem. But we did not have all the wherewithal, such as the need to train within the NBC environment or under the NBC threat. That was very well established at that time; we did it, but we did it with substandard equipment. We were training with something less than what we should have had eventually as operational vehicles. For example, we were using three quarter ton trucks in lieu of APCs. They don't give you any of the protection that the APC is going to give you against shrapnel, or small arms fire or that sort of thing, which allows you relatively greater immunity in moving around the battlefield. But tactically our doctrine was evolving. We were training with that in mind, we were training with the firm belief that, within two or three years, all the more sophisticated kit was going to be in our hands. The late-'50s to early-'60s was our preparation for it, so this is the way basically we felt at that time. We were reasonably well equipped, but with something that was a phased approach, if you want. Within a few years, later, we were going to be considerably better equipped.

[HILL] Were you, in the first of those periods, moving towards getting a heavier tank or more tanks, or more artillery, things like that? It just occurs to me that in '64 one had the first Defence White Paper, which looked to a more mobile kind of force and quite a different kind of structure. I think in fact that at that time they were thinking of equipping the army with a British-built Scorpion tank, which was a light tank. And so there was obviously a shift in doctrine in that period, to some degree. But I guess the question is really this: how sure was the brigade group of its tasks by 1961, and how well was it moving along towards what it thought it should be doing?

[BELZILE] Well, at my level at that stage, if I remember that, I was a Captain to a company, 2IC, and I was very confident that we could do what was expected of us and that we knew what was expected of us. And I remember exactly when the heavier artillery came in, because I was Brigade Major at that stage, in the second period that you're talking about. As to when we actually moved to a little more mechanization with the shift in policy involved that wanted us to become a lighter organization, I don't recall this from that period. So it obviously didn't affect me personally too much. In fact I remember that much more as being a problem during the days when Jean Allard was the CDS and the force was unifying. We were looking at turning the brigade into a much lighter force in Germany and moving it south, which is the next time I was in Germany. This is the time where the tank became a policy issue. This is the time when we had to decide as to whether we'd have a tank or whether we'd have a lighter vehicle, whether we'd turn the force into a helicopter mobile kind of thing - a very mobile light force. And I know we'll talk about that later because I think it would be safe to say that there was, within the army, a certain amount of resistance to that, and I was probably part of that. Because it's all very nice to talk about light roles and things like that; but it depends where they are. If you're going to fling those light roles in the middle of a highly sophisticated and heavily equipped battlefield, I think that, perhaps for the sake of saving a few dollars, you may be putting your own people at a great disadvantage in the atmosphere that surrounds them. So, perhaps my memory doesn't serve me very well about that period, because at my level the question of changing doctrine and policy, really it was a progression. The first period of mechanization came later, and was very much completed by the time that 1966-68 came along, except for the self-propelled heavy artillery which came during that period. I remember that specifically, because we had Soviet officers photographing every gun. And I remember being on the phone hearing about this and flying there myself with a helicopter to verify it, because we were going to accuse the Soviet mission of going over their stated mandate by the fact that they were doing that. Not that it made much difference from a security point of view, but it was a matter of principle, because they were doing that openly. We wanted to protest it officially, and I wanted to be satisfied that I knew exactly what was going on. I actually flew to the spot myself and saw a Soviet colonel photographing every gun and writing the serial numbers on each one. Now what great intelligence advantage this has baffles me a bit, because I don't think it's any. However, the Soviet intelligence gathering system is a little different from ours. I've had a few experiences with them in Cyprus, too. But at that time, as I recall it, we were progressing towards greater mobilization than in the first period. We then had, as you will remember, a specific front line mission as part of the Second British Division.

[HILL] That was one of the points I wanted to get at.

[BELZILE] We were in the British Army of the Rhine as a formation, and the brigade that was there was also intended in those days to be the forerunner of a second brigade in a divisional task force. And this is what led to the construction of Base Gagetown, close to the ports of shipment. I mean, we needed a large base where we could congregate up to a division and send them off to beef-up, not only the organization that was already there, but to put another brigade beside it and eventually a divisional headquarters. That is the system that was changed after Pierre Trudeau decided to pull back; then when that didn't quite work out with the allies, to at least reduce us to a considerable extent. I see that aspect as being much later than you see it, though it may be that it's the memory of my own involvement that's getting a little sketchy here. But this was the mechanization period to me. By about 1966 and 1967, the brigade was at the strongest it's ever been.

[HILL] By '67? Wasn't that the period when General Allard was CDS, when the changes were beginning to be made in terms of implementing the first Defence White Paper of '64?.

[BELZILE] Yes, but in those days, we had a nuclear unit in the brigade. We had an SSM battery with nuclear capabilities, we had an anti-tank specialist organization and we were organized. That brigade was about 6,600 strong, plus about 1,500 behind in LOC all the way back to Belgium. This was by far the strongest, technically, training wise, and what have you - the strongest brigade we have ever fielded. And in 1957-61 the numbers were as great but the equipment and sophistication was certainly less. But the progression had started. And the doctrines and the tasks, I don't remember them evolving that much, we just became more capable of handling our part of the front. Regarding the doctrines, my perception of them at that stage was that they were leading towards more mechanization and more battlefield ability.

[COX] I wonder if I could just clarify this. Perhaps it reflects the fact that I don't know very much about armour. But some people make a distinction between an armoured, compared to a mechanized, brigade. When you're using the word mechanized here, do you actually mean that what we had there was an armoured brigade?

[BELZILE] No, it was an infantry brigade in that first period; and when I went there in 1966 it was still an infantry brigade. It became a mechanized brigade in 1967 or 1968, the exact date escapes me. The difference is that an infantry brigade can still have armour and still have tanks, but basically the infantry is the predominant arm. It was basically foot or wheeled vehicles or motorized transport, with very little protection. Its own protection was its small size and its flexibility, because nothing, literally, stops a man on foot. You know, he goes through swamps when vehicles can't do so; he can be lifted in a light helicopter when the big vehicles can't. The single man on the ground has hardly got an obstacle that he can't handle, if there's enough of him, and if he's got sufficient time. We had then a tank regiment, which was about the same size as now, probably about 60 tanks, because doctrinally that's about what we've looked at, 57-60. For most of my career, that has have been the number of tanks we've had in our tank battalions/regiments. We called them regiments, instead of battalions, and that's our British tradition. The Americans and everybody else would call them a tank battalion, but they'd be also a little smaller, usually. So our tank regiment is a little larger. We have not really changed that very much. We used to have, in the early days, Centurion tanks. They were then in their infancy and they were superb vehicles in those days and probably the best tank in the world. Later on, we went from the Centurion to a lighter tank, and a more mobile or more agile kind of tank, which was the Leopard, the German Leopard. But in numbers, by and large, we stayed about the same; we haven't moved very much on that. The heavier guns, the self-propelled guns, came in in the period '67 or so. And before that we had towed guns, like we had in Korea, basically. So this was a well manned brigade, this was a big brigade, this was a strong brigade. But it did not have the fire power, did not have the tactical mobility, that the one that we had there a few years later had.

[COX] Well, just in light of what you were saying, and again to clarify my own understanding of this, from the first period to the second period you described a situation in which there was increasing mechanization. And I guess my question is: was the drive to that mechanization a consequence of the Canadian position on the north German plain?

[BELZILE] I think it was, partially, but I think it was also driven by the perceived need on the part of military thinkers at that time to have a little more dispersal and better protection capabilities under the threat of NBC, including nuclear, biological, and chemical, but mostly nuclear.

[HILL] Could you then comment on that issue of the NATO strategy of forward defence? How did it affect the Canadian way of thinking about our own role?

[BELZILE] I don't really remember that it did very much. Of course, the strategy of forward defense and flexible response didn't come in until after 1957-61. In the second period, I was a lot more aware of the extent of the Canadian tasks, because of my job. I was the man who was keeping the maps, and I was manning and organizing and running the war room. And I was the man that used to go on the ground with the commander at that stage, and sleep with my map inside my pajamas, because there was no one else. So that was how sensitive this one was. And we had the right forward sector of the Second British Division. And we also held the inter corps boundary with the First Belgian Corps. This was our deployment area. And this was of course reasonably classified at the time and particularly the details of where the troops would be. And this leads to a question about how we dealt with the other allied armies at that time. I remember we felt very uneasy. We welcomed the additional mechanization and the quick response capabilities that we were getting, because we were very uneasy at the deployment of the Belgians, on our right, who were planning to use a different kind of defensive posture than we were - depending heavily on the coming forward of large reserves from the home country. They did not have all their troops on the ground, so they started in front and built up behind. And we could foresee the possibility they might have to pull back a little and give up a certain amount of ground, and that would have left our right flank exposed. And so we got very conscious of that, and of mechanization. I remember touching up our war plans in those days. Mechanization was a definite asset to us, to be able to react more quickly if there was a change in our right flank. And I remember at that stage feeling considerably better in the 1966-68 period, about our ability to do that, than we could have done the first time.

[HILL] How long or wide a front did the brigade have at that time, roughly?

[BELZILE] This particular one was about 12 to 15 kilometers, but it was about 30 deep. And so, by today's standards, it wasn't an overly wide territory on the front, but it was very deep. And one of the reasons it was deep was the dependence of our allies on the right on the arrival of sufficient reserves to build up to the full manning they should have had for that front. And if they didn't succeed in doing that, then we could foresee a difficulty in keeping the right flank. They might have been forced back quicker than us, exposing our flank. And, of course, that brought out, tactically, a situation where we could be enveloped from the south. My boss at the time, who was General Ned Amy, surely wasn't particularly keen on that. We spent a hell of a lot of time on the ground planning. But this to me was the progression at that stage. This strategy of flexible response, as it evolved, really wasn't, in the early days, something we were very conscious of. It didn't change anything on the ground for us.

[HILL] But in the latter period we are looking at, say '67, which was the height of the strength of the Canadian force there, what sort of tactics would you have employed if the Soviets had attacked, and, let's say, the Belgians hadn't quite gotten there on time with their reserves and so on? Was this a sort of layered defence, point by point, where there were a lot of strong points in there, or was it mainly open country?

[BELZILE] It was hilly, wooded, with a certain amount of urbanization already started. There was a plain there, which was on the right, and this was the area we were worried about. And we had, if I remember correctly, a battle group here, a battle group there, and one at the back. Three major battle groups. We expected that the first two would be committed in the early stages of the battle and we'd fight a combination of what we called then static defense and mobile defence, by holding some of the strong points that I was describing before and having the manoeuvre troops

ready to use as an anchor point and available for committing to either part of what would be threatened. One was definitely a reserve formation at that stage and another was strong in armour. It was based mostly on the Strathconas at that stage, which was the tank regiment that we had there. Then there was the RCR; and then the Vandoos; and then the PPCLI with the armour. Of course, in those days, this information was highly classified; and I'm only doing this from memory and only because things have changed. But basically, you see, the front was going like that, instead of a straight east-west thing. But having said all this, we held a key, pivotal position in Second British Division, and in fact in the British Army of the Rhine. We held a tactically very important piece of ground. So, from that point of view, as military planners, we all vie for something like that because you've got something really real to put your teeth into. So this was a very real problem and a very interesting one to plan for.

[HILL] When you say strong points, could you give us some examples of what you mean by that, right up near the front? What type of thing constitutes a strong point?

[BELZILE] Well, you would have a combat team at a defended locality which would have probably three infantry platoons dug in and perhaps up to a tank troop, some of them right in the position with them, in sniping roles. And these would be dug in with bunkers and overhead covers, so that you would not plan to move these troops during the battle. They'd stay there.

[HILL] And this was to be on a hill side or ..?

[BELZILE] Or an urbanized area, or you'd pick an area that had a lot of natural obstacles, that is difficult; and you'd cover the ground between the two by fire and observation. Artillery or direct fire and what have you. Then you'd have your tactical reserve and so on. And so that's it, basically. We have not diverted very much from that to this day, as a basic defensive tactic. Unlike the Germans, who tend to be much more linear but have a psychological reason to be so because it's their territory. You know, losing even a couple of kilometers of territory is a psychological blow for the Germans. It is not so much so for us because we want more flexibility, and this is a better way to do it as far as we're concerned. So the Canadian defensive doctrine really is a combination of static defence, which is a Maginot Line kind of philosophy, where you dig in yourself with no penetration area, and you say nobody goes past (theoretically, anyway), unless they blow right through you. So we tend to use a combination of tactical mobility in the back, and ability to react, but using strong points as an anchor. So, instead of having everybody caught up in a move when the battle starts, some formations are fairly static, and the other ones have freedom of movement to come and beat them up or to go to their flank if there is a danger of penetration.

[HILL] How close is all this to the inter-German border? Is there a sort of railroad down the front there?

[BELZILE] There was a corps covering forest terrain, about 20 kilometers. You would have hit that at about 20 kilometers from the German boundary.

[HILL] And was there a stream or river or something natural?

[BELZILE] In this particular sector, there were woods and mountains; it was mountainous in that area, not very far from Brunswick. All the way to the Czechoslovak border, and then south. The Hartz Mountains were not very far from there. So there were natural features.

[COX] Which way?

[BELZILE] They were directly east from us.

[PAWELEK] One final question, General Belzile. I was wondering if you could comment on the functioning of NATO crisis management procedures at the time you were in North Germany, specifically during the Berlin crisis in 1958 and during the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968?

[BELZILE] I'm not sure I can really usefully comment on NATO crisis management procedures. because the job that I had did not really involve me directly with NATO. In the first instance, during the Berlin crisis, all I remember is that we were CBd, confined to barracks, because there was a whole bunch of activity. It's a normal routine, you know, you pull people away from leave and keep them all in and check your equipment and have a good look at your kit, in case you need to go. So you do a lot of maintenance and things like that, and that's about the only thing I remember from it. I think that was about the time that I was becoming the adjutant of the unit. So I was the Chief Administrative Officer; I was the guy responsible to draw in the troops from leave and that sort of thing. In the 1968 crisis, I was a little more involved and I was in a more significant job in the sense that I was the Brigade Major; and I was responsible for the war room at that stage. Let me explain what the war room is. The war room wasn't much bigger than this room here. But it's a completely secured area, you know i.e. lead lined walls not secured from weapons but so that you could talk freely, so that no electronic listening devices from outside could pick you up. So the top secret kind of maps and material and your war plans were all kept in there in vaults and things like that. And when you were working on a piece of kit or on a map or on a plan that had a very high classification, you had to do it inside the war room. You never took the files out of there or the maps out of there, except when the balloon went up. Except that, when I would take one map if we went and visited the front, I would literally wear it on my chest, or inside my pajamas. Because there was no protection for it. Whether we overdid it, or not, never entered our minds quite honestly; you can argue these things today, whether we were too security conscious or not enough. As far as I'm concerned, when I was the guy responsible for the war room, I could not have been overly conscious, so I was always too conscious. What we used to do when there was a crisis like that -- and we did it specifically, I remember, in the Czechoslovak one, because I was in the DM chair there -- was to call in the intelligence staff. We would get the Canadian intelligence system that feeds us information from Canada, and we would get the allied intelligence system which is part of the crisis management that you're talking about, feeding us information on what's going on inside Czechoslovakia. You get a surprising amount of information which gets corroborated in due course by the more official channels or just from the news. You know, if vou're a reasonably well trained guy who knows what to listen for, you're getting a lot of information from them. So when we had those things, I remember being inside the vault and the brigadier and the brigade commander were coming in a couple of times a day. I would update them on what was going on in Czechoslovakia, and I would tell them that I was updating the war plans: and if there was a problem because a certain piece of kit was down I would tell them that. Because I was aware of everything that was going on, and we were literally manning the war room as if we were expecting to move to our battle position. And so, by a combination of allied intelligence summaries, by a combination of Canadian intelligence summaries, which in those days took longer to come to us from Ottawa than they would today - they're much faster today because the communications systems are that much better - and the news, we would get all the information that we needed. We had every radio tuned up there. Usually, in our intelligence staff, we had a couple of linguists, a couple of guys that understood Czech and Slovak, and would listen to some of the freedom types of radios that were beaming across trying to tell us what was going on. In certain cases, as they did in Hungary in '56, calling for help, in English in fact, so we were able to listen to that, to a large extent. So the processes inside the brigade command post, if you want, were

very much as if we were getting ready to go to war. But we were never placed on any alert status during the Czechoslovak Crisis, as I remember. We kept ourselves with the pen ready to sign a message calling people off leave and things like that, but I don't remember that we ever did do it. The upward link was also established and constantly maintained with Second British Division, with the BAOR. Information was coming to us. And the British kept us aware of what they were doing. So, at that level, the crisis management system looked pretty good.

[COX] Was there any significant discordance at the time? You said you got intelligence from Canada and from the allies, and NATO. Were they mutually reinforcing?

[BELZILE] By and large they were. The Canadian ones were usually good. The analyses that would come later, anyway. And that's still true, I think. The Canadian intelligence assessments and intelligence summaries, when they got to us in Germany, tended to put a Canadian flavour in the comment part, giving the establishment of the source, how reliable it was, and how reliable the information was. The message was usually coded in one form or another through a few key words that told us where it came from, and added a little bit to the credibility of it. Then there's always a comment, of course. The Canadian comment was always important to us and the comment usually had a Canadian flavour to it. Whereas the one of course that comes through the NATO system doesn't have the same Canadian connotation. And for a Canadian commander overseas, it is very important to get the Canadian one, because if you were the top of the totem pole there, despite the fact that there is an ambassador at NATO, and despite the fact that there is an ambassador in Germany, despite the fact that you have other channels of Canadian policy, things are being passed to you. You can foresee easily a lot of circumstances where you have to take the whole onus on your own shoulders, about what you're going to do in preparing the stages and things like that. And I guess, theoretically, we all have the attitude that you've got to be prepared to justify, that you've got to be prepared to validate later, why you've done certain actions. So I suppose we all have the tendency, a bit, of making sure that our files are up-to-date. And the Canadian one of course becomes critical because we know its coloured by the External Affairs assessment. We know that it comes colored by somebody else as opposed to just the military.

[HILL] Your remarks about crisis management at the brigade headquarters level are very interesting, as I think in NATO headquarters there was some concern about how well crisis management functioned at the time of the Czechoslovak Crisis. In fact, I think that one of the things that happened was that there was so much information in the air that they had difficulty figuring out what was going on in terms of Soviet troop movements and so on; and I think the other thing was that there were cases in which Soviet ambassadors in some of the allied capitals in fact notified the allies that they were moving into Czechoslovakia, and some of this was not in fact reported back to NATO headquarters. I think, subsequently, there was quite a lot of work done in strengthening those procedures. But it does make it all the more interesting that at the ground level, the front line level, on the whole you felt that things were relatively good.

[BELZILE] Well, we felt we had sufficient information, as I said. If my memory serves me correctly, we never instituted any stages of alert other than perhaps the very basic Canadian ones. We never did. However, when things started happening like this, we tended to use it as an exercise. When I say that I hauled the intelligence staff into the war room, they started working shifts 24 hours a day at that stage. So they were getting a crisis atmosphere, a good training session out of it, and dealing with real information instead of an exercise scenario where you paint the situation. I wasn't painting the situation; I wanted them to paint it for me; I wanted them to be as factual as they could possibly be. Of course, in our briefings to the Canadian authorities at that stage, we always qualified the information we had by its degree of reliability. But it surely helps

if it's corroborated by Canadian intelligence analysis and by German, and by American and British analysis, plus supported by somebody who's able to tune in to a radio signal from some isolated small station in the mountains in Czechoslovakia that's beaming a message, like "Come and help us", that really describes some of the activity that is going on. A lot of our people are able to extrapolate from a relatively small bit of information, figuring out the area where this is going on and that is going on. And, of course, if you're hearing about a lot of Soviet tanks moving in the area, you start developing the order of battle as best you can. And within a period of time you can probably pin down what regiment it is, what division it is, how many of them there are, and where they are.

[HILL] I'd just like to ask again, on this European period, two points of clarification. One is, you mentioned Soviet officers photographing Canadian tanks and so on. Were these the Soviet officers with the military missions in Stuttgart or wherever it is?

[BELZILE] The SACSMIS we used to call them in the north. Then there are the ones in the south around Lahr with the French. Those were the exchange missions that were established after The War, during the occupation period. In every one of the four old occupation zones, the British, the American, the French, and the Soviet zones, there are missions from the others. And they're still there. And there's a major general heading the Soviet mission with the French headquarters in Baden, for instance, which rattled my wife at one point, because they met us at the French embassy on 14 July, about two weeks after we arrived in Germany, and I was the new commander of a brigade. And a Soviet general met us at a cocktail party and headed straight for me, with an interpreter. He said: "General, welcome back to Germany". And he knew exactly where I'd been before. And then he turned to my wife and said: "And how are your two little girls". She just looked at me and said: "Let's leave". You get used to that.

[COX] I was going to ask a very general question, just in case we don't get back to it. Given the two periods that you were there, were you happy to be with the Second British Division?

[BELZILE] Yes, I suppose I'm one of those who can compare the two periods. The real reason that the Canadian army, I think, to a large extent, was perhaps happier in its Northern deployment days, was that from a purely military and planning point of view, it was much tidier. We had a portion of the front, and we knew where we were going to go. When you become a reserve formation for a central army group, as we are in the south, it is more difficult. In my years there, I had to do a lot of talking to try and narrow down the employment options of the brigade so that we could do some sensible planning. To say that you're likely to be used anywhere between Kassel and the Austrian border, it is pretty difficult to do any dumping programmes, to make any pre-deployment arrangements, to know where you're going to store some stocks forward, move some of your ammunition ahead of time, or things like that. If you don't know if you're going to be fighting near Kassel or by the Austrian border, you never know for sure how to prepare yourself. I suppose you can always say, well, if you have a very definite place, you might never get there. But if we had never gotten to that place in the old days we'd at least have been somewhere behind there. Because we were stationed there. So we knew exactly where we were going and we knew what part of the front was a Canadian responsibility. With the deployment now, we have no idea. We have some definite staging areas, some definite deployment areas that we would start from, but it's much more difficult to elaborate sound military planning, with logistics systems well keyed in to the whole system. A commander on a front field is very uncomfortable if he doesn't understand how the tail behind him is working. Its not a comfortable position at all when you don't know where you will get your ammo the next day from, or petrol for your tanks, or food for the troops.

[HILL] Just one last, small question. You mentioned that, at this stage, the Canadian forces had a tactical nuclear weapon. I think you did. Was that the Lacrosse?

[BELZILE] That was the SSM, the Honest John. We had two batteries. We had a training battery in Canada which had no weapons, and we had the active battery in Germany which had weapons; but weapons in the hands of Americans, who were co-located with us. That was the custodian system.

[COX] I suppose you had two-key systems.

[BELZILE] Yes. The Americans never gave up their weapons totally. It was the same here and the same with our air force weapons and the 104s. There was always American custodial staff for the weapons, although we did the security around the weapons sites and things like that. But there's no way a Canadian could have used a weapon on his own hook.

Part IV - Cyprus, 1965 and 1969-70

[HILL] General Belzile, you served in Cyprus on two occasions: first in 1965, and then for a while when you commanded the Second Van Doos between 1968 and 1970. Could you tell us how valuable do you think UNFICYP was in containing the Cyprus crisis in 1964? You mentioned you were there in 1965, but in fact there must have been a clear idea as to the role that force had played the previous year.

[BELZILE] Oh, very much so. In fact, in 1965 we were the third unit to go there. So it was exactly a year after the first Canadian unit went in there and they had replaced the British para-regiment in Nicosia and Kyrenia. The line was pretty well established in 1965 between the two, but the exchanges of fire between the two sides, with us being caught in the crossfire to a certain extent, were still fairly common; to the point where you would normally listen to an exchange of fire and go and investigate. We were able then to set up telephone lines to both the Greeks and the Turks and find out who was doing the shooting and go in and investigate after, so that we could report what had started it. It happened often enough that the investigation hardly went beyond that, in '65. You knew you could have as many as five or six times a day an exchange of fire between the two and you went in to check that and got them to stop; and eventually you pacified them both. And they accused each other all the time of having started it. Most of the times we knew because of the location of our troops, in reference to the direction of the bullets. You could tell, usually, where they came from. So we were able to pacify them, usually, very quickly. But there were a sufficient number of these incidents happening that, in a daily SITREP, we probably reported something like four or five exchanges of fire, between Kyrenia and Saint Hilarion Castle. An estimated 7 or 8 hundred rounds were fired by both sides. Both sides would deny any involvement in starting the thing. We'd walked around and seen no casualties, nobody hurt. No dead animals and what have you. Case closed. That was about the extent of it. In 1969, if a thing like that would have happened, it would have gone all the way to New York, because it was so rare then. It was very peaceful at that stage. There had been a bit of an incident in '68, before we got there, but by the '69 period it was very quiet. So the difference between the two was dramatic, literally! So, if I could go back to '65, I don't have any doubt from seeing the situation on the ground, at that time, that the Canadian and other United Nations contingents' presence in '64 was literally what stopped the bloodshed. Because, what was established as the green line was just the width of this room. In certain places, you could throw rocks at each other, or bottles at each other, never mind shooting. I mean, they are that close at times. And the two factions there had had incidences of things that would approach, I guess in any language and any stage of history,

massacres really. The numbers may not have been that great, but they would be massacres in the way they were performed. The feelings were so strong between the two that, if we hadn't been in there. I don't have any doubts in my mind that it would have been worse in those days. Obviously, I think the presence of the Canadians and the other contingents in '64 stabilized the situation, no doubt about it. In '65, the situation was stabilized, although there were still, as I mentioned at the beginning, a lot of exchanges of fire. What we were trying to do in '65, what we started to try to do was to try to normalize the life of a bit. So we did a lot of setting up first-aid operations in the villages. We brought in military first-aid teams; we'd run sick parades, in the enclave and in Turkish villages which were completely surrounded by the Greeks. The only way you could bring somebody who was sick or about to have a baby from a village in the Turkish enclave to a Turkish hospital in Nicosia, for instance, was to actually physically escort them with an armed vehicle in the front and an armed vehicle in the back. And we would warn the Greek police that we were going through with a pregnant lady, and take her to Nicosia and through their lines. We actually moved with machine guns in the front and machine guns in the back, hustling this young lady to the first Turkish hospital. The Greeks were trying to prevent that sort of thing, because, in their normalization process, they were hoping to convince the Turks to use the Greek hospitals; because they said that, as far as they were concerned, there was only one country and there was no need for the two communities. There is that great mixture of religion and politics there. Somebody asked me, at one point, whether I had experienced that as a youngster in Quebec. I said yes, I have, so I don't find the Greek-Turkish situation that strange to me, because it was very much like the role of Ouebec when I was a kid. The whole atmosphere in Cyprus in '65 was permeated by it. There was complete mistrust between the two sides, at least to the point where they both tried to accuse the other continually of violations. So we spent a lot of time out there doing investigations. We had to be terribly careful that, while investigating those violations, we didn't wind up working for one side or the other's intelligence systems. For instance, I remember cases where the Greek police would insist I go and meet them by Bel à Paix Abbey, so we could have a look across the pass at the Turkish positions. And they were trying to tell me: "See, that's a new bunker - a new bunker - a new bunker", knowing full well that I would have to send some troops there to go and have a look to see if things had changed since the last time we'd inspected the thing. If you came back and confirmed that it had changed, or not, you see, they'd put their maps up-to-date. So they were trying to use us. They were trying to use us to collect their intelligence and things like that. So that was the atmosphere in 1965. Total mistrust. There was no real fight between the two, other than occasional exchanges of fire. I used to feel very strongly in 1965 that we were absolutely necessary to keep them from open fighting. In '69 I felt a little differently. There were two or three exchanges of fire in the six months that I spent there. It was summer. It was hot. I became a scuba diver to pass the time away. And of course we encountered then a lot more of the same kind of problems I was talking about earlier about Korea. You had to keep the troops busy, so they didn't go to Regina Street and look for the whisky girls and spend every cent they had just to look at a female smiling at them. So the problem was a little different then; and of course the situation was stable then, I guess, in '69. In '65 it was more or less stable. So the easy answer is that there is no doubt in my mind that in '64 and '65 we helped, and probably saved a lot of lives, by being there. I would be a little more skeptical about 1969.

[HILL] At that time, the Canadian contingent, I believe, was partly on the green line in Nicosia and then also to the north and up towards Kyrenia. At that stage, the Turkish community was in what was in effect an enclave, which didn't have access to the sea at Kyrenia.

[BELZILE] Within the enclave there was the Turkish village of Temblos, in which I had a couple of incidents. There was a little enclave by Saint Hilarion Castle, and then the village of Temblos, which was almost at the coast. You had Temblos just inland, and then Kyrenia on the coast; and

then Lepitos. This is where we had to go over a mountain pass, which was very rough and very narrow. If you wanted to take some wounded or some sick people out from the village into a Turkish hospital in Nicosia, as I was describing, the only way, of course, was through the Greek lines. Through the normal highway, through the normal pass. And this is what forced us to have to go through the village to Kyrenia and having to warn the police and do the armed escort to take out a pregnant woman. But every time we pulled their people out of the hole like this, which we thought was our job, the Turkish side felt that it reduced a bit their propaganda capabilities. And so they would try and pull some stunts on us once in a while. They'd say, it takes too long when we go through the United Nations. We have a wife in the village that's about to have a child and we're not going to wait. So we're going to go up by Saint Hilarion Castle and we'll walk her. Just about kill the poor woman. But, just to prove their point, they would run her up all the way up there and bring her to the Turkish road that would start just on the other side of the Kyrenia range. They'd bring her down through Genellie and Orticoy, and take her down to a Turkish hospital. And, of course, if she died, then I was the guy to blame, because supposedly the United Nations wasn't fast enough or the Greeks weren't cooperating enough to let that woman go through. You know their line; they had no business doing that. So, one of the things they kept on wanting to do all the time was to build a road to join these two Turkish areas. There was in fact a trail, with an OP that we called trails end. And there was one at "The White House". Strange, but there was a Turkish restaurant called the White House, and Saint Hilarion Castle was just there. There were exchanges of fire quite often in that area. So they started to build that road, and, of course, in order to be able to do that they wanted to knock my post out. So I actually had to deploy my company in fighting formation once, in 1965, to prevent the Turks from going through. They were going to push our OP out of the way with bulldozers, unless I ordered it out. And of course I said I wasn't going to do that. I said, you know, if they come and try to remove it by force, they must realize they're attacking the United Nations, a United Nations position. And the United Nations would defend themselves. Now while all this was going on, the Greeks knew that they were building this road. And we didn't want the Turks to do it because that was considered provocative. While this was going on, they started to squeeze on both sides; and the Greeks started to approach with the intention of sealing off the village. So I had to establish two new posts, one on each side, to keep the Greeks at bay. And these were still in existence in '69 when I was there, because we were still in the north in those days. So we had some of these instances in '65 which came very close to fairly major shooting exchanges. But somehow we turned them around, with 5 or 10 minutes to go most of the time. They played that chicken game, the only way I could qualify it, to see how far they could push us and how far they could push things. So it's very useful to have been there, but at the same time it was very trying; especially for some of our junior leaders who were really on the spot there, because you know you don't really know when anything is going to start. So, I'd keep a unit in Cyprus regardless of our national policy, because this is the greatest training that we've got. It's the nearest thing we have to a guy being on the line where there are bullets flying and the other guy's got a gun.

[HILL] I also went down that track at that time to Temblos and you could see the sea; it was about 200 yards away but the people who lived in that village could not go to the sea at that time. That is all changed now, of course. All that area was occupied by the Turkish army in '74, and so that whole issue is now different, the whole situation has changed. Do you still feel the Canadian contingent in Cyprus is performing a valuable task at this time? I mean, the problem of keeping the two communities apart has now gone, and there are other problems. The two sides are still confronting each other, but you don't have the kinds of problems you just described - of people having to drive to hospital through hostile territory and so forth.

[BELZILE] I think you can best answer that by answering exactly the same way I did in 1974. When the Turkish invasion took place in 1974, I had just taken command of Four Brigade in Germany. The airborne regiment was in Cyprus, and when the invasion started it became obvious that they needed a little more protection. So we shipped some from Germany. We took some heavier vehicle APCs, and there are still about 11 or 12 of them on Cyprus (I was there last time. last year, about this time, and they're still there), with the intention of having a little more protection for our people as they moved about and patrolled there between the Greeks and Turks or tried to stop them. General Quinn was then commanding Canadian forces in Europe, and since I was the most recent commander in Europe that had been to Cyprus (about 5 years before) he asked me then what I thought was going to happen in Cyprus. And I said, well, in my humble opinion, the Cyprus problem is about to be solved. And I said, when the Turks move in there, the world and the United Nations may not like the way they're going to solve the problem, but they have in fact solved the problem. They have partitioned the island. And I don't see anyway out of it. And I'd be terribly surprised if, in my lifetime and the lifetime of most of the people around me right now, we saw the old arrangements again. The Turks have kept only two areas besides the main 40% of the island or so that they hold. They have kept Famagusta, and they have kept a little enclave in the south, which in my mind are two bargaining chips. They're prepared eventually to give them up, I think, for a de facto recognition. As you know, they have created their own state up there now. They use Turkish Lira as money; there are Turkish banks, everybody speaks Turkish; they changed the names, and the whole thing is Turkish. I don't think they're about to move from there. As to whether we could foresee that coming, I think the Greeks, in my personal opinion, gave them the best excuse under the sun, by trying to put Nicos Sampson in power. Nicos Sampson of course was in Eoka. It was pretty well established that he was an Eoka hit man during the British days. And the Turks simply would not accept that. But, you know, even in '65, I remember seeing bottles of pop in a Turkish restaurant that would have the word " Texen" on it. Texen, according to my best lexicon in Turkish, means separation. So, in '65, they fully intended to separate the island.

[HILL] Do you think the UN force there now still has a very useful role to play?

[BELZILE] If you accept, or partially accept, the premise that the Cyprus problem is solved, even if we don't like the way it has been solved, by the Turks, then "No". I think you could perform the same function now in a progressive way. Or, if you want, you could probably do the same thing with teams of observers, like we had in Lebanon and Jordan and places like that; as opposed to troops. However, it will probably take a while for the wounds of 1974 to stop festering. I suspect there would be some howling if we tried to pull the United Nations right out. My opinion is that we would probably need to have an evolutionary withdrawal, where we would change the nature of the force into something else. But, as a force that keeps the two sides apart, I don't think its usefulness is as great as it used to be.

[HILL] Now for the last question, about having UN forces in there. Although Turkey eventually intervened in and occupied the northern part of the island, at least Turkey and Greece did not go to war, although I think it came very close to that on a number of occasions. And even though the initial role of the U.N. forces was undermined, if you like, by the Turkish invasion, nonetheless, the fact of Canada and other U.N. forces being in Cyprus in that earlier period was really very valuable from a NATO point of view, I would say. I mean, I wonder if you care to comment on that point? Just how valuable has Canada's role in Cyprus been to NATO?

[BELZILE] Oh, I think the whole presence of the U.N. contingent in Cyprus is certainly seen by most of us, and I believe with very valid reason, as a stabilizing influence on the southern flank

of NATO. As you pointed out, the danger of Greece and Turkey going to war in 1974 was probably very great at one point, although I think that what kept it from happening, probably, was the great proximity of the Turkish forces, versus the long line that the Greek forces would have had to fly or to navigate to make any significant impact on the situation. It obviously has not helped the relationship between Greece and Turkey. And I think it does flaw, to a large extent, the security of the southern flank of NATO. But I think that the animosity that existed between the Greeks and the Turks would have been there anyway; because I think it has always been there. Cyprus is not the only point of contention between the two.

[HILL] But you do feel that Canada's role in Cyprus is well regarded by the other NATO allies, and has been seen as making a major contribution to allied relations?

[BELZILE] I think it still is, although since '74, basically, the situation has been so stable that there has not been very much involvement by the troops, except for manning the Green Line.

[HILL] But in the earlier period, for example.

[BELZILE] In the earlier period, absolutely.

[HILL] Thank you very much, General Belzile.

Part V - Canadian Years, 1968 and 1970-74

[HILL] General Belzile, aside from the second tour of duty in Cyprus, which we have just mentioned, the years between 1968 and 1974 were spent in Canada commanding the Second Van Doos at Valcartier, as a member of the career planning staff at CFHQ and as Commandant of the Combat Arms School at CFB Gagetown. These were also quite momentous years in Canada's relations with NATO. Canadian troop levels in Europe were cut in half in 1969. There was a new Defence White Paper in 1971 which put national sovereignty and defence of North America ahead of NATO and peace keeping. The Canadian Armed Forces were cut in numbers and faced static budgets which prevented them from carrying out normal re-equipment programmes. The CAST commitment to Norway was established, but in reality nothing very much was done to make it a live, functioning, military activity. At the same time, in 1970, the Armed Forces were relied upon very heavily during the FLQ crisis, which saw 10,000 service personnel deployed in Quebec. I wonder if you could tell us something of your personal experience of those years. What was the effect on the Armed Forces of the developments I've just mentioned?

[BELZILE] Well, if I may, I'd like to perhaps start with a few comments on my last few months of service in Europe prior to coming back to Canada and taking over the command which you mentioned. The first indication that there was going to be a massive cut in Europe came to us while I was still the Brigade Major and the senior operations officer in the brigade. Teams from Canada started to come in, to discuss what a brigade group of about 2,500 people would look like, situated in the south of Germany, compared to what we had. You remember, in previous conversations, I mentioned that the brigade was at its peak at Soest at the time with about 6,600 people, a nuclear unit and a tremendous amount of fire power. The commander, at that stage, using me, and his other staff as planners, indicated that we were to take a first cut at trying to design this force for southern Germany, with a few basic principles in mind. The first one, and the most critical one, was to be, that you were not going to reduce any more than possible the fire power of the organization i.e., the hitting or the fighting power of the organization. And most of your cuts should be designed at the outset as being in the administrative support and in the reduction of our

capabilities to sustain the force. You would have only a bit smaller force at the front if you ever needed to use it, but it would not have the durability, it would not have the same lasting power, as the organization that we had had in the north. So, that's the way we first looked at it, with a lot of misgivings, to be quite honest, because no commander on the front line is going to feel very comfortable unless he is comfortable with what's behind him - what the support systems are going to be. Nevertheless, I guess, in the back of our minds, we believed that nobody would leave us there as orphans and that somehow and some way, the administrative support, the logistics support, which had to be weakened, were going to catch up with us before we did get involved. So that was the context in which I got involved in this reduction in Europe: I was one of the staff officers who had some of the early cuts at designing the reduced force. Despite the statements by the commander at the time that we should try and keep as much of the fire power as possible, that turned out to be impossible to do within the parameters that were given to us regarding overall strength. Things such as the SSM Battery, the nuclear unit, disappeared at that stage. Things like the specialist anti-tank unit, which had the first sort of missile system that we used as an anti-tank system, as opposed to other tanks or guns. There was also the SS-11 French system that we had bought a few years before. That organization disappeared as a group. One of the basic battle groups that I was describing earlier, the battalion level kind of organization, disappeared, leaving us with only three battalion groups instead of the four that we continued to believe we really needed.

[HILL] What was the reaction of the army at that time?

[BELZILE] It was one of frustration. You'll also remember this was also the period of the integration process, ordered by the Minister of National Defence at that time. And integration did not bother too many people because we all recognized that in small peacetime forces you cannot afford really the flexibility of training pilots, for instance, in three different schools. Let the RCAF do it, instead of having three schools; training cooks, training drivers in three schools, depending on whether they were going to go to the navy or the air force or the army. All of us recognized that a lot of these things would provide tremendous savings if we were able to join together a lot of that kind of training. And the command and control above it would get better coordinated and better integrated.

[HILL] That of course was in the '64 White Paper. What in effect seemed to happen was that it took several years to implement. I mean I recall in '67 there were still the old uniforms. It wasn't until '68 the new one came into effect.

[BELZILE] That was true. But this was the start of it, and all of this was happening in a parallel fashion. Not only were we being cut, but our basic philosophical or fundamental underpinnings, if you want, were changing dramatically. So I'm mentioning it only perhaps to try and explain the context in which we functioned at the time. So we weren't very happy with that, because we felt we would have a less balanced force, one with no depth, one quite capable of fighting within its given strength and equipment and training status, but with no durability. So nobody felt particularly good about that and that's the reason I bring it up. Anyway, I came home at that stage, before all this in fact took place, so my involvement was in the planning, but I was able to see the uneasiness that was floating around the army, particularly, at that time. I didn't have too many contacts with the other services at that stage, because the air force was still in France and southern Germany and we didn't have that many contacts with them. When I came back to take over command of the battalion in Quebec City and in Valcartier I knew I had two very interesting years ahead of me, so a lot of the big policy aspects of the thing really didn't bother me too much. I'd just like to mention a few of the things we got involved in, too, at that stage; and you'll see why policy was the last thing on my mind, because I was too involved. When I got back I already knew that I was

going to go to Cyprus in '69, so a lot of the early days of my service there was Cyprus-oriented. I also already knew that we were going to form a new quick-reaction force in Canada, called the Canadian Airborne Regiment. And one of the roles that I had in the second battalion of the Royal Vingt Deuxième then, at that stage, was that we had the parachute role, we had the Northern Canada Reaction Force, its functions were now going to be taken over by a new organization. So that affected us in the sense that I took everything that was parachute-training oriented in my unit, and gave it all up including about 200 men, to a new organization which was forming up. So it was a period of turmoil. But a period that was particularly interesting because of the turmoil. We did Cyprus. When we came back, we thought perhaps that, with the new White Paper, things were going to start changing. The White Paper wasn't out yet. It didn't come out until '72 or so, I guess, or late '71. So, at that stage of the game, our priorities were not seen as being different. Instead of the parachute and the northern defense role, my battalion was staffed then by Mobile Command, to be more oriented towards the southern hemisphere, more oriented to reaction perhaps in tropical areas, to wherever Canada decided to send us, either for United Nations duties or other tasks. We had to have a force capable of reacting fairly quickly to whatever came up. And I was then sent with the aircraft carrier Bonaventure, as a floating base, and we went to Jamaica for about three or four months. We trained in the jungle, which was totally different for a unit that had previously been northern-oriented. We were in the bush then, learning to swim with floating rafts and things like that, across rivers, and in a particularly warm climate, and an oppressive kind of heat that we found in the cockpit country particularly, that big hole in the northern part of Jamaica where we did our training. So, at the end of all this, the brouhaha was starting to be felt on the FLQ side. The Montreal City Police were also making noises about strikes, which was a little ahead of the 1970 FLQ crisis. But in 1969 you will remember we were doing some contingency planning to go and replace the police force in the centre of Montreal. I was involved in '69 and '70 doing all the recces and things like that, ready to go into Montreal to replace the police if they ever decided to walk out. As it turned out, this was very useful, because when we had to deploy for the FLO, later, all of our recces and all of our plans to move into the city and to operate there were already in place, although they weren't originally set up for the FLO crisis. And I think that perhaps it is important to mention that, in a way; it indicates that a well trained armed force can be fairly flexible. But our original reconnaissance, original planning, to move into areas like Montreal, was mostly related to police strikes. You remember that the first signs of FLQ activity started much earlier than that, in 1963. The existence of the FLQ in Quebec was well known at that time, and we tended to try and get closer than the police, to try and get our intelligence network a little up-to-date. But we were discouraged from doing so, interestingly enough, and I don't remember who discouraged us. I guess we were simply told at that time that this was a police matter and we had no business trying to keep track of who the FLQ was and things like that. We were to leave that to the police. However, for what it's worth, I think some of us kept ourselves as aware as we could of the whole situation, because I think we could read the writing on the wall, that somewhere along the way we'd have to get involved with that situation. So anyway, in the summer of '70, I came to Ottawa, and when the FLQ crisis broke in the fall of '70, I was a staff officer in Ottawa - a frustrated one, because I would have liked to have taken my troops on this job. I had done the planning and I had done all the deployment. However, somebody else got the involvement and I was on staff here in the old headquarters in those days. When the force was also deployed in Ottawa, it was under the command of a very good friend of mine, General Rad Walters, who commanded Petawawa. And he used to come into my office. So I kept myself fairly up-to-date on what was going on then. But they were covering the sector of the National Capital Region, really, and the other side of the Ottawa River, the part of Quebec from Hull going north to Petawawa, where you'll remember some of the searches took place for either kidnapped people such as Cross or what have you. Some of the earlier searches took place up there too. And some of the mass arrests of course around Luskville and Quyon and a whole bunch of little places up there,

were not seen like the same tinderbox that Montreal or even Quebec City were. But I guess the police had enough indication that there might be trouble. We had some troops around Ottawa, not only for the protection of various embassies and VIPs, but also for reaction to anything in the part of Quebec which is just across the river from Ottawa.

[HILL] I would like to ask one or two further questions following up on what you just said. The first one is about the troop cuts in Europe which you mentioned. In other words, the brigade in Europe had an idea that these troop cuts might be coming, as I think you said, before it was announced. I was wondering, did the forces of the other allies get wind of this in advance, and what was their reaction?

[BELZILE] I'm not sure how much they really knew about it, but at the stage when I was still there, I expect they knew quite a bit. At my level, I was working fairly closely with the Belgian brigade that was also stationed in Soest, and we used to conduct some command post exercises with them occasionally. They lived right around the same area that we did, and used the facilities of our officer clubs and things like that. And I think that, at that stage, they expected that we would move. And of course they wanted all the PMQs, the family housing, and all of our schools, and our club facilities, which they eventually wound up taking over. But I don't really know the state of knowledge of this quite honestly. It was kept fairly discreet still at that stage, but I expect that NATO was well aware of it. Therefore it would have filtered down, but I don't have any precise recollection of their reaction to that.

[HILL] Do you recollect what was the attitude in the army, the Canadian army, after the troops cuts were announced? You were back in Canada at that time. What was the reaction of the army in general, and most of the officer corps?

[BELZILE] Well, I think that, generally speaking, "disastrous" would probably be the word that I would start from, and then qualify it. Regardless of what White Paper we're dealing with, and regardless of the priorities therein stated, our NATO commitment by and large has steered the professional development of the army, and that's one of the things that I think scared us the most about NATO becoming a lesser priority to a certain extent, at least in words and in print. There was the fact that we were not going to get as many people rotated through the highly sophisticated, the technological, battlefield that was contemplated for Central Europe. And I would not belittle that from a point of view of professionalism of the force. We still feel like that today, in fact. Unless you can get your army rotated, and most of your people through a place like Europe, which has the high-intensity battlefield as a likely scenario, we feel that we are missing out on the general staff training and missing out on the professional development of our own officer corps. So despite the fact we can do United Nations tasks, we can do a whole bunch of reaction actions in Canada and that sort of thing, I think we feel pretty strongly in the military that the NATO commitment is really at the base, at the core, of our professionalism. As you know, we discuss warfare on a total spectrum, from low intensity to high intensity. There is no scenario that we can think of for any war that would occur in Central Europe that is not in the high intensity spectrum. We felt then, and we continue to feel to this day, that Europe is where the high intensity battlefield is likely to be. And hence the professional training of our officers should include that. Because the better and the higher intensity the force is trained for, the easier it is to do the other jobs. While the opposite is not true. You cannot have a United Nations type of light force and throw it into the high intensity situation and expect it to function very well. So, despite the fact that in 1971 the Paper changed the priorities, in actual fact, as far as the army particularly was concerned, we still kept our eyeball mostly, from a professional point of view, on Central Europe, which we still do in all of our doctrinal studies.

[HILL] There is also a point about having a critical mass, if you like, within the Canadian army. If the European commitment had been done away with altogether, as was discussed I think at one stage, then presumably there would not have been a need for more than say a maximum of 10,000 ground troops in Canada; then with that, I mean, you would not have had, probably, a solid, coherent kind of armed force.

[BELZILE] That is a very valid point indeed. But perhaps more important in my mind is the fact that, professionally, even a smaller army would have lost considerable expertise, which takes years to rebuild, should you ever need it. If you would just allow me one example, you know at that time, also, the battle was on as to whether we were to retain tanks or not, because they were perceived as an aggressive weapons system whereas we were purely a defensive force. What do we need tanks for? Well, without getting into a lesson in tactics, you know, the tank, on the battlefield, is not only a well protected vehicle, it is a vehicle with a tremendous amount of shock power. And if you don't have that kind of shock and that kind of sustained power, you have a force which is totally unbalanced. And, as the Israelis proved, the same was true the opposite way in '73. Using tanks without infantry is suicidal also. So you need this all-arms, general combat capability. Once you start removing a segment of this, you've got an army that doesn't understand tank-infantry cooperation, doesn't understand how to use tanks in a defensive battle and how to use them also in an offensive battle. You stop understanding this. And when any emergency starts later, it is too late. It would take years to rebuild the kind of expertise which is now imbued in the officer corps. You remove one spoke of the wheel, then the wheel is weaker. And most people start saying, well, you know, you get a lesser task then; we won't ask you to do the same job. You will do more of a police job and things like that. But what you have lost is that total expertise in a certain area and the synergetic value of that expertise. You could also use the example of the Navy. How long do you think it would take our Canadian Navy to rebuild? Even if we gave them the equipment, suddenly, which they don't have, the mine warfare capabilities that a balanced navy should have, an anti-mine capability or a mine sweeping capability, which the Canadian Navy hasn't had for years, how long would it take the Navy to rebuild their expertise? I'm not a sailor, but I submit to you that it would take years of rebuilding to rebuild the expertise which has been lost. And we felt very strongly about the tank. Not only for its power, and for its weapons system. We felt very strongly that, if it was removed, we would be left with an army that would not be able to fight in a high intensity battlefield, because it would not be balanced. We would then have had to revert to much lesser roles and probably not have been able to survive very well in a high intensity battlefield. But if one ever decided to go back to a high-capability system, it would have taken years to rebuild the synergetic value that is necessary. So we sound emotional when we talk about tanks, but there is a little more than just that big iron machine. The whole professional cadre and corps of an army is involved.

[HILL] You mentioned the spoke of a wheel. I think the mechanized brigade group in Europe is seen as one spoke.But, also, a good portion of the army in Canada is in fact designed as a backup to that spoke. You have to have at least twice as many people here to provide rotational capabilities and backup in a wartime situation, if I'm not mistaken. Would you care to comment on that?

[BELZILE] You're perfectly right. We can say that, even without getting into the validity of the figures used in NATO planning for casualty rates and things like this in a high intensity battlefield. You were talking earlier about the critical mass. We talk about critical mass in a variety of fashions, but the critical mass that is the most important one in action, is the one that is required to maintain fighing capability. When you get a unit that's decimated, to about 65 to 70% of its original strength, that saps interpersonal knowledge and confidence within the group, and then what

you're really dealing with is a gaggle of people instead of an organized and well balanced force. So we have tended, in past wars, and I submit that it would not be any different now, to believe that by the time a unit formation gets to about 65%, you cannot just keep sending replacements to it and expect it to function to any capacity. So you have to pull it out of the line and replace it with another, new organization, with all the built-in collective training that they've done together, whilst you rebuild the other in the back somewhere. So, what this means is that you're looking at two types of reinforcements, two types of augmentation. You're looking at the individual one which goes in to fill a few key spots when a guy gets hurt, gets wounded or gets killed. You've got to replace him, or you lose coherence. You lose a tank, you lose a tank crew, you come in with a tank with a crew in it. You don't just arrive with a tank and give it to them. It's got to come with a gunner. with a driver, and with a crew commander. But at a certain point you can't keep doing that, you've got to literally pull the whole organization out and put a new one in there. Now, we expect in high casualty battlefields to have somewhere between 1 and 3% casualty rates on days of battle. And if 65% or 70% is considered the critical mass, that gives you 10 days at the highest rate. So it means that you have 30% decimation or attrition in that force, which starts playing very close to that critical mass and the ability of the organization to function well. So once you get below that you're really looking for another organization. That means you should have a twin organization. If your commitment calls you to stay there with that kind of force, you should really have, ready to go, a twin organization, or as close to a twin organization as could be there within 10 days. Or, if the commitment or the contact that the force is involved in is much less, put it at 1% if you want -- if the intensity is a little less-- you still have 30 days; that's 70% critical mass. So we wind up with somewhere between 10 and 30 days if we commit forces to battle in Europe; and if our commitment in Europe requires us to keep at least that level of force there without even augmenting it, then we need to be able to get another force in there of that same size within 10-30 days. In order to have it ready in Canada you should really have it here, fully manned, fully equipped, with similar equipment; and there's one of our main flaws. We don't have enough tanks, for instance, to do that now. Then we have to think also of the CAST commitment. So we've got two brigades committed to Europe, one of which is in Canada. And we need at least two to back them up, at least two. And then some sort of a system for individual augmentation or the crew augmentation and so on. And so far you have not even considered looking at expanding the force to say, perhaps, a division, and so on, which history tells us would probably happen quickly.

[HILL] Also, there's the point, I think, about rotation in peacetime. I mean, you cannot keep one force over in Germany indefinitely. You've got to be able to bring them back here again, so presumably there's that requirement as well. You have to send some people over there for three years, then bring them back again. So there's that sort of requirement. I was very interested in your comments on the critical mass on the battlefield; but also there was the question of the critical mass of the army in general in Canada. You need a certain size in order to function at all, in fact, in the kind of environment we are talking about.

[BELZILE] Now, of course, when you come back to Canada, the army need not - if we continue to use the analogy of spokes in a wheel - the army need not to be at the same intensity, the same capacity as needed on the Central Front. For operations in Canada, we don't expect a horde of tanks coming across the border, because there's no way they can come in across the border, or land on the beach in the north. But the kind of problem that you would probably have in Canada would be an internal security one, where vital points, either of a military nature or a civilian nature, water systems and what have you, could be subjected to partisan sabotage or indeed to direct infiltration by such troops as Speznatz and groups like that. It can be very demanding in terms of numbers of troops, but not necessarily with the same equipment or indeed the same standard of training as for Europe. But the ideal force for that there is one that is not necessarily available, except when the

cadre forms, in peacetime. And the ideal force for that is probably the normal citizen army that we've always had in the past. I mean our reserves, or the territorials as they would call them in Britain, our Militia and other reserve forces. But that whole complex has got to fit together. The army system cannot consist of two separate armies. Professionally, it's got to be one that can flow from one to the other, because you never know how a scenario will develop. There's a maxim here that says that: "The only thing that you're sure of when a military operation starts is that nothing will be as you planned it". So your plan is just a starting point, a launching platform. Then everything takes its course. So the more flexible the force is, the more balanced the force, and the more ready your reserves and your mobilization basis, the more secure nationally we should feel.

[COX] I wanted to ask you, regardless of the outcome, did you feel that in '69 there were fair opportunities for the professional soldier to present his views to decision makers?

[BELZILE] That's a very interesting point. I've thought about it quite a lot. When I was commander of CFE in Europe, for example, most of the policy discussion that took place in Brussels never involved me as a commander on the spot. There were always some guys from Ottawa coming over, and leaving me with a bit of an uneasy feeling that whatever arrangements they made, I'd got to live with. I think that the commander on the spot should be involved, but, generally speaking, he is not. It's perhaps too strong an accusation, but the involvement of the local commander is often very marginal.

[HILL] I had much the same thought in my mind because it occurred to me while you were speaking. When you came back from Germany, in this period, as you mentioned, your first charge was looking after the north and looking after paratroop tasks, then given other duties, then sent down to Jamaica to train for world wide responsibilities, and then involved in civil duties in Canada. It must have been a time of great confusion in many ways, seen from the perspective of the military officer, not at the highest ranks, but at the regimental levels.

[BELZILE] I was in the Citadel then, of course. It is a great peacetime garrison, but it doesn't have much storage space, so we had to have facilities in Valcartier, also, about 18 miles up the road. I had a hanger for the Arctic kit, and a hanger for the tropical kit. And I said to my company commanders: "Whatever emergency we would go on, fellows, the part of the message to tell you to execute plan A or B will also have a paragraph that will say hanger B or hanger C, whatever it is, because that's where you bring the troops to pick-up the kit". Because, if you go to the tropics or if you go to Baffin Island, you need two different sets of kits. The underwear for the north is a little warm down south. So there are all of these things to consider. And we had to keep the kit for all of these tasks, and maintain it. And that brings me back to this question of critical mass. It's a real problem when you use the same people for multiple tasks. Some of the jobs are so different, one from the other, that you literally have to reorganize and re-equip the force every time you move.

[HILL] Did the military officers at the regimental level ever have the feeling that the people at the top had taken decisions without having much idea, really, of the implications for the guys on the ground? Here you are, all of a sudden, landed with a whole bunch of different tasks. The doctrine and training for those tasks are presumably different. And you're kind of left to scramble and implement it.

[BELZILE] I think that would be a fair observation; and I used to feel that way myself then. But I believe it is fair at this stage to tell you that, as I got to be more senior myself, I think I began to understand a little better the difficulties of the senior guys, also, in this planning process. Perhaps

I would be less critical of them now. I moved to the "we," I guess, versus the "they". I would be a little less critical now because I understand the difficulties under which the senior staff operates a little better than I did then. But, by and large, except for bar talk, if you want, where you say, "Well, these so and sos don't know what the hell they're talking about", except for that, by and large, most of our people at the working level, the regimental level, don't concern themselves too much about these things. You don't have time.

[HILL] Let's talk a bit more about the CAST commitment. That was set up around the time that the troops in Germany were cut. Presumably you were over in Germany at the time those decisions were made. So you would not have been involved in any of those discussions at that time. But were the Van Doos involved at all in that period, or was that task given to other units elsewhere in the country?

[BELZILE] The CAST brigade, in its early infancy, used to be a force made up from units from right across the country, as opposed to an organization like Five Brigade which has the majority of this task right now. But that came much later. There was a battalion of Van Doos, it wasn't mine, that had a CAST role at that stage, together with a battalion from Ontario and a battalion from western Canada. That sort of CAST brigade was not a brigade on the ground in Canada, it consisted of designated units from right across the country, that would come together and go to Norway when required. We had the same kind of situation with the parachute force at one time, also. We had a parachute role in Northern defence; it was done by a collection of units from across the country. This was nstead of having an organization such as we have now, which is mainly at Petawawa, a lighter, quick-reaction force, sort of kept all together. In the early days of the parachute force, we used to use troops from all over the country. Likewise with CAST. But, in my two years in Quebec, or gallivanting between Jamaica and Cyprus, I really never gave such questions much thought. But I do remember that my sister battalion, the Third Van Doos, was involved in CAST at that time. However, it was only one of a variety of tasks.

[HILL] I think that was the point I wanted to ask.

[BELZILE] I had the north and I had the tropics. He had the north and he had Norway. So it was a multi-tasked organization. And the CAST commitment was only one of the things they had to plan for. Now, quite a few years later, a lot of us felt very uncomfortable with that kind of multiple tasking. I initiated a land forces operational effectiveness study when I was commander of Mobile Command, which led to the primary tasks assignment system that exists now in the Armed Forces. We changed that in 1984. But before that we had mostly multi-tasked units.

[HILL] David, do you have any questions on CAST?

[COX] No, except, I guess, to ask what was the logic of choosing units from across the country. It doesn't sound as if it would make military sense to do that, given where they had to go.

[BELZILE] I will have to try to put myself into the minds of some of my senior colleagues. One reason for drawing people from across the country in that way was, I think, historical. And the second was probably professional, wanting everybody to have a crack at this kind of territory and to be familiar with, and knowledgeable about, the land north of the Arctic Circle. And the same went for Norway. So, when exercises took place, you would expose more troops. The reason I think that one of these two reasons was primarily a historical one was because of the way we've always committed troops to war in Canada. It has always been the case that we were careful that the troops didn't all come from the same area of Canada, I mean in a given formation, such as a

brigade, whether it was Dieppe, or elsewhere. We always made sure that if a force was going to be committed somewhere where there was a very strong chance that they would get a very bloody nose, then the casualties would be absorbed across the country. We didn't want to see a couple of villages having all their young men wiped out. Now, I'm not sure how much validity there is to that. I'll leave that to the sociologists to worry about, except that I know that historically we've always done that. We've trained brigades that were from the same area, from the west or from Quebec or elsewhere, but we've never really committed them to action that way. The force in Germany is an example; there's always one French-speaking battalion, and there's always one that comes from the West. The second reason, without elaborating, is the one that I think has most validity. That was the interest in exposure. Get everybody to know as much as possible. Again, the small army syndrome - the development of a small army that is truly professional and endowed with maximum flexibility. So you put as many people as you can in the Norway scenario, and you put as many as you can in the Central Europe scenario. Not for the pleasure of sending them on trips, but to expose more people to the various kinds of territory, to give them knowledge of the land, and to teach them how to interact with other allied forces. So that you'd get more people in Canada familiar with working with the Norwegians, the Italians, and so on.

Part VI - Europe Again, 1974-79

[HILL] General Belzile, I believe that, between 1974 and 1979, you held a succession of senior command and staff positions in Europe, notably as CO of Four Mechanized Brigade Group in Lahr, as Assistant Chief of Staff, Ops, at Central Army HQ in Mannheim, and then as Commander of Canadian Forces Europe. These were also vital years in Canadian-NATO policy and in East-West affairs: beginning with détente and the Vladivostok Accord and ending with doubts over Salt II, NATO's two-track decision on intermediate range nuclear forces, and finally the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I wonder: how do you see this period of your career?; what do you think were the most important developments regarding Canada's NATO policy and East-West affairs?; which ones were you personally involved in?; and what comments do you have on them?

[BELZILE] Well, that's a big question. I was thinking about that a bit last night; and in fact I was wondering if the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan wasn't at the tail end of that period. In fact, I think I was back in Canada when that occurred, because I got involved in some of the NATO post-Afghanistan planning from my job here in Ottawa. But, to start with, as a very general statement, I think it would be safe to say that, except for eventually becoming the godfather, if you want, of the whole army in Canada, this was perhaps the most professionally rewarding period of my career. It was a fascinating time. And the three jobs that I had then are, of course, three jobs that a lot of people would have given their right hand for. So, I was very lucky. I am referring not only to the two periods of command in Europe, but also to that middle section there that lasted only one year. I would like to spend a little time discussing that. I am talking about the period when I was at Central Army Group Headquarters in Mannheim-Seckenheim, in the Heidelberg area in Germany. The reason that I want to discuss that period, a bit, is because that was the first time that I was really exposed to any extent to a large international headquarters and could see it functioning, with some of the national jealousies that sometimes one observes. The two years when I commanded the brigade were also significant, in two ways. First of all, this was when we won the psychological battle for the tank. And I would like to mention that I was very involved in that. I've already elaborated to a considerable extent before about this need for a balanced force, so I will spare you from getting too involved emotionally again in that issue. But I will make the point that when I was there was the time when we almost lost the tank. Had we lost that, of course, the functions and capabilities of the brigade would have been dramatically reduced, because we would have had to restrict the army's employment options to a considerable extent, and make it a much

lighter force (to be employed usefully probably only in built-up areas or in forest or mountainous areas, and so on - tasks that would have taken us out of the all-inclusive high-intensity battlefield). So that was probably the most critical point. And I like to think that we were part of the decisionmaking process at that stage - to a considerably greater extent, at least, than on a lot of other things. And that's partly because of some of the individuals involved. The chief here was a fellow that I had a lot of respect for, who believed, as an ex-commander himself, that he should involve his commanders in discussions of major issues. So I was very involved then. That was General Dextraze, who was the chief here at that time. And we also had John Halstead as our ambassador in Germany; and I had a two-way relationship with him -- both when I was at the brigade and when I was commander in chief -- that I look back upon as one of the most rewarding I've ever had. particularly so far as dealing with the External Affairs side of the house is concerned. So, that period of time was particularly good for those reasons. And, as I mentioned, Canadian policymakers decided at that time that we would retain the tank and that we would retain the more general combat capability. Whatever the exact reasons for that decision, it was a good one. The newspapers, as you'll recall, said that the Europeans, Chancellor Schmidt and others, had tied the issue to our relations with the EEC. It was tied to our ability to deal with Europe; and it was tied. I guess, to a large extent, to how much weight our comments in NATO circles would have. If we wanted to stay part of the team, we had better put some of our chips on the table. And I've heard all sorts of theories as to what eventually swung the direction of the thing around. But the direction was eventually swung round by a political decision. And, at that stage, I felt that we military commanders were kept very much involved. And another way that we became involved was through visits from parliamentary committees, which used to travel to Europe at that time and come to talk to us. And large media groups used to visit us, because it was a very topical issue in Canada. So we got a chance to put in a word at that stage, much more than I've experienced before, or, perhaps, since. So, from that point of view, it was an exciting time. One of the things we were also able to do at that stage was to take a further look at the Canadian brigade. I think I referred to that previously, about the Canadian brigade being at that time the Central Army Group reserve, and being a very small reserve for an army group. In fact, Canada has sometimes been accused of indulging in tokenism. However, that is not completely true, because this brigade is the only initial reserve force of the Central Army Group that is not already totally committed on the front. The net result of that was that our tasking was very nebulous. And so I found I couldn't plan properly. It was very difficult to plan to commit forces when the battle position was to be just "somewhere" between Kassel and the Austrian border. You're talking about three to four hundred kilometers of width. And it might be anywhere there. So you wouldn't know where you were to go, you wouldn't know where you were to dump supplies, or to put in some stocks in advance in a likely deployment area, such as munitions, other stocks, and consumables. You didn't know that. So I engaged then, as a national commander, in discussions on this issue. I had the help of General Quinn, who was commander of CFE at that time, and General McAlpine for a while. I was allowed to engage in discussions directly with General Davidson and General Blanchard, who were the commanders of Central Army Group at that time. I did it as a national commander, despite my relatively low rank, compared to the Germans and the Americans in the force, discussing the tasking of the Canadian brigade and trying to get it narrowed down to at least a part of the front: to have two or three mother organizations, if you want, instead of the whole world. And I was successful in doing that, and narrowing down our tasks to about three or four likely missions, which of course helped us then in terms of reviewing our war plans. And it also, I think, led directly to my next appointment, because I got so involved at that time in those discussions that I got access to a much higher level of planning than most officers of my rank would hope to see. So, that led directly, I think, to my getting my next job, because I was the first Canadian to go into Central Army Group at that rank; and to become the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, in fact the Chief War Planner. And as the Chief War Planner I also ran the international command post, that

was in a bunker under a mountain. Instead of being very mobile at that level, you try to hide them under a mountain, like we do in North Bay, so hopefully they can take a hit, including a relatively strong nuclear hit, and still survive. So, you're well down in the bowels of the earth. I was responsible for running the innards of this system when I was there, so one job led, literally, directly to the other. The only difference was that, when I arrived in Central Army Group, instead of having one brigade to worry about, I had thirty-six. That was the size of the Army Group. Becoming an operations officer at that level was a very valuable experience for me. General Blanchard asked for me by name. He wanted me for a couple of reasons, partly because of my inter-operability experience with the other allied forces there. The Canadian brigade always inter-operated with either a German division or American division, which a lot of German or American brigades never got to do. So inter-operability was a big NATO term at that stage. It was the "in thing", and everyone talked inter-operability, the ability to use each other's equipment, each other's services, to be able to gas your helicopter in an Italian battalion and so on. We were considered almost the experts at that because we did it all the time. So I was asked to go there because I would be involved in the inter-operability work. And, for the first time, I got involved with the French armed forces in a big way. And that was the second reason he wanted me, because of my experience in Four Brigade and the fact that I spoke French and could go and talk emergency and contingency planning with the French. I could do so in Strasbourg or in Baden, without having to work through an interpreter, which of course makes it considerably more difficult. You know, I could wax eloquent for a long time on that period, because the work we did then was considered very sensitive. This was not quite a return, of course, to the pre-de Gaulle days, when the French pulled out completely from the military command and control system of NATO. Everybody knows they remained in NATO and of course they had a military mission at Central Army Group continuously. When I arrived there, the military mission was still there, and in fact it was increasing at that time. So I did a lot of work with them and we did discuss all sorts of contingency plans for the employment of the Second French Corps, as a contingency, in Central Army Group, or indeed the whole of the First French Army, which has its headquarters in Strasbourg. Around Lahr, of course, the Canadians were very involved with the French, shopping in each other's stores and that kind of thing. We got to know most of the senior officers there. At least, I got to know them. So it facilitated that dialogue to a large extent. And I was the first Canadian to get in there. The situation is not so critical now, because a lot of these contacts are routine now. Whether the Canadian in Heidelberg speaks French or not is not so critical anymore. But it was in the early days. So that was the kind of environment I was in. And that whole review took place during the one year that I spent there, and so the whole GDP, the General Defence Plan, for the whole of the Central Army Group, which has a territory that goes from Kassel to the Austrian border, was being negotiated or re-negotiated at that time. And so were the contingency plans for the flanks, which have neutrals like Switzerland and Austria alongside them. How do you overlap with their forces and so on? We are very conscious always, in the military, of physical deployment. We always have boundaries between two organizations which we identify on the ground by saying: "This is my territory and I'm responsible for that. That is yours, you're responsible for it". So we don't shoot each other. We don't do all sorts of stupid things to one another. This is a little more difficult to do when you've got Austria and Switzerland between the two, because you don't know what the Austrians and the Swiss are going to do. Nor do you know which route the Soviets would use for an attack, whether they would respect Austrian neutrality and come through Czechoslovakia completely, or whether they would run up the Danube valley or run up the Danube flats through Austria, regardless of its neutrality and damn neutrality. But, because you don't know that, you have to be terribly concerned about it. One of my functions at that stage was also dealing with Land (South) as liaison officer, so I used to fly over the mountains and go to Verona in Italy and do all the contingency planning with them. That had all sorts of "ifs" in it: if Austria was penetrated, if Austria was not penetrated, and that sort of thing. So we had a buffer between the

two fronts. That was an extremely interesting period, because of the level of the staff work in which I was involved. I felt that I was kept really in the picture in many of the discussions on policy that took place about war alert status, national emergency measures that people would take at different stages of alert, and so on. I wasn't doing that specifically on behalf of Canada. I was doing that for Central Army Group, which had two German corps, two American corps, the Canadian brigade. the Pershing brigade of short-range nuclear weapons, and, of course, as a contingency, the back up of the First French Army. So, because of that, I found myself in fora where I'd not had the chance to participate very much before then. It was a tremendous experience, to work in this kind of setting - in a structured allied command that was mainly a collective thing but also linked, by various national intelligence and other networks, back to the various national headquarters. We did it during exercises, for example, manning the command post when reservists from both sides. American and German reservists, would come into the operation. I was the guy who had to coordinate them. And I asked General Blanchard, at one point, what made him pick a Canadian. He said a variety of reasons. He said there were a variety of reasons. First of all, he told me, I knew you; but perhaps more important is the fact that you come in here with a little less of an axe to grind than the other two. And, he said: "If I have an American general doing that job, with one star on his shoulders, he's got two or three American generals of three stars breathing down his neck; and the same with a German. With a Canadian you can shrug that off a hell of a lot easier". And he was right. The American senior commanders and the German senior commanders at the corps level, although outranking me by at least two ranks, and being to a large extent a lot more experienced, eased up to a considerable extent when I negotiated with them, versus another American or German. Eased up on their demands and were much more conciliatory, which of course was a great experience. They were much more conciliatory because, if I was able to come up with a solution, it did not have a national slant to it and it was more looked at from a global point of view. I didn't stay there for more than one year, unfortunately. Then I got a call from Canada asking me how I would feel about leaving there immediately, after one year, but being promoted and going back to Lahr to command Canadian Forces Europe. Of course, I would be there again in the same territory as the French army. I was asked by General Blanchard to continue to be chief liaison officer to the French army, on behalf of Central Army Group (although I was no longer with the international command and control system then). As Commander, Canadian Forces Europe, you're strictly a Canadian commander, and you have, theoretically, nothing to do with the French, the Germans or the Americans, except for negotiating support arrangements. But the fact remains, of course, that I knew them all. I was able to continue a little bit more of an involvement than perhaps a new commander coming from Canada at that stage. So that was roughly what went on at that stage.

[HILL] How about command and control systems and crisis management procedures in that period?

[BELZILE] There are two aspects to that which I think deserve a little discussion. One of them relates to nuclear release or chemical release. The systems there are very, very complex, which I think is a blessing, because if they weren't complex, if these things were a little too streamlined, it might be a lot easier for some senior commander to convince the system that it was time to go nuclear on a tactical basis. But because of the establishment of the NATO sixteen-nation senior civilian committees, at the ambassadorial level, and related arrangements, and of course the veto that some of these nations - though not all of them - have over certain actions, we have a very complicated release system. I had to staff an exercise scenario, for instance, for nuclear release requests, from Central Army Group all the way up to Brussels; and of course then it goes to all the sixteen national capitals. And, you know, it can take time for all of this to feed back to the right people at the right time. Which, in a lot of ways, is a blessing. If a commander, whether an American or a German, felt that the time for nuclear release had come, then, whether one liked it

or not, it would not be a very easy matter to obtain permission for it. But with such a powerful weapons system, of course, it is obviously a blessing that permission not be too easy to get. We felt, perhaps, a little bit more uneasy about the chemical weapons release procedures, because of the abhorrence that, by and large, the western nations feel for chemical weapons. This is an abhorrence that is obviously not shared on the other side of the fence. But, unfortunately, chemical weapons of one kind or another have been, and continue to be, used around the world, and are not as abhorrent to everyone as we think they are. The chemical weapons release procedures were just as complex as the nuclear ones. And this tended to frustrate us a little, because we knew that, at the divisional level, the Warsaw Pact forces could have as much as 15 to 20% of their first line of ammunition stocks as chemical, weapons. And we knew that we did not have: a) the stocks to be able to respond in kind; and b), where the stocks did exist, command procedures that would enable a commander to get release of a few shells of this material in time to make the other side think twice about continuing to use them. Those were the two things which were most significant. Then of course there were the petty jealousies that naturally existed to some extent. We didn't find them too bad; you can work with that. The intelligence gathering systems are often national, they're not all necessarily shared amongst all the nations, which tends to complicate your life. The fact is that there are direct channels, on a national basis, between the big organizations such as the Americans and the Germans; and I can assure you not so from the Canadian point of view, except for very broad policy matters. I didn't have any access to Canada except through Commander CFE. when I was at Central Army Group. Other than that, I think the only useful statement that one could make about the command and control structure is that it puts very heavy demands on the liaison staff. Much more than when you function nationally, because, say, two Canadian brigades working side by side in operations know each other, understand each other, and know each others' ways of functioning, because they are relatively the same. It's simple. You know, we tend to liaise in one direction, down, and to the left; and everybody does that; and that way you get enough coordination. But in NATO, you've got to liaise down and liaise up and liaise left and liaise right. Even among nations that speak the same language. And I found this an interesting thing, because when I was back at CFE (with my Central Army Group experience), I was asked by General Blanchard if I would coordinate a three language lexicon for Central Army Group, including French. It was German, English and French, mainly. But a lot of the problems that we had were between the Canadians and the Americans, despite the fact that we were both using mainly the same language, English. We put entirely different meanings on a lot of things. So, in any international force, this becomes, at times, a fairly major issue. What we call a contact point, what we call a fighting patrol, or what we call a liaison point, to defend a locality, is completely different from one nation to another. As a result of that, we've created these lexicons which tend to complicate life a bit among the staff officers. But they are very useful; and I was involved in developing this lexicon and enjoyed it because it was a good intellectual exercise if nothing else, so there was a lot of fun working on it. But, at times, it's also terribly frustrating. And, add to that the fact that the tactical doctrine of the German defensive posture differs from the American defensive posture, which is now based on the Air-Land Battle 2,000 concept, which advocates penetrating deep on the other side to knock out the reserves and things like that, and which advocates accepting penetrations and then using pincer movements or "killing zones", to use the vernacular, to counteract them. The Germans, of course, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is psychological and national, don't want to lose one inch of their territory. So you have this constant give-and-take in the command and control process. On an exercise, you get around that easily enough by playing with boundaries on the map, in china graph pencils and so on. In real life, I think it would cause us to have a much greater need of liaison staffs at both levels; and both left and right, as I said.

[COX] If it happened, would you in fact find that the different major armies, the German and the American, were in fact using quite different tactics.

[BELZILE] Initially, perhaps, but I think within a day or two the situation would stabilize itself. I, for one, despite the apparently overwhelming conventional capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, believe that they could be stopped, conventionally, mainly with the forces in Europe now, as long as there was a back-up relatively quickly behind and they were not left on their own too long. They would need the reinforcement capabilities from the United States, the territorials from England, and the few bits and pieces from Canada and from outside the country, and the reserves from Holland and Belgium, up at the front reasonably quickly. I'm not as pessimistic as many other analysts seem to be about the Warsaw Pact capability to roll over NATO forces very easily.

[HILL] I was fascinated by your reference to the different inputs of intelligence information, and the fact that members of that international staff had access to their own national intelligence. Does it mean that the Americans, for example, and the Germans, are running their own programmes drawing on their own perceptions of events; and then you've got other people trying to fit in the middle of all of it. I mean, despite all that, is there a coherence about force operations in general?

[BELZILE] I think there is, because there are ways around that problem. In an alliance it is inevitable. How we react to certain degrees of alertness, for instance, varies considerably between nation and nation. Most of this is classified nationally. I don't have to use specific examples, but certain nations do things differently, in a different sequence. So we don't automatically take the same action. And I guess this is a weakness of any alliance.

[COX] Could I just take you back a little, before we go on. I wanted to ask you two questions. One is: have we been able to maintain some presence in the Central Army Group headquarters?

[BELZILE] Oh yes, the same. I was the first Canadian at that level, but we are still there. [COX] Who is there now?

[BELZILE] General Jack Dangerfield.

[COX] I was going to ask, just before we leave the question of nuclear weapons release, did you and your colleagues feel, in that use-them-or-lose-them scenario, that you would ever get a political agreement, political consent, in time?

[BELZILE] That's a difficult one to answer. And I think the reason it is difficult is that there's no way that you could simulate a scenario in an exercise that really would have complete validity when the real emergency came. In a peace-time exercise scenario, some how, some way, people are always willing to go along with nuclear release because it is part of the whole exercise process. In a real life situation, there would be a lot of hesitation. But eventually it would come, if required. In real time, I would think the reluctance would be much greater than during an exercise. But I can't base that on any experience.

[COX] We don't have any.

[BELZILE] No. That's a gut feeling. I don't know how exactly, but when it came to the real thing, I think it would be very difficult. And I think that, if I was the man at the staff level who had to take the decision, I would find it very difficult.

[COX] I was going to say, in view of your very interesting comments on the ability of NATO forces to block the Warsaw Treaty Organization, this might be a good time to ask the question: do you think we should increase CFBG to 10,000 troops?; and, if so, would it be a good idea to stay in Lahr or would a move to some other area be necessary to increase the level of military effectiveness.

[BELZILE] Well, I'll take those two separately, if I may. Obviously, from everything that I said before about durability and about depth and about balance, I'm one of those who advocates that Force CFBG should be increased. But whether it is 10,000 is another matter; and I'll tell you why. It has been increased, as you know, by about 1,200 in the past two years. So it has a little more depth, it's a little more survivable, and a little more viable than it was. But even with the additional 1,200, their war time requirements, in my book, would still be probably for another 2,000 or so. Within the brigade. In other words, they're at about 70% now, which is close to that critical mass that we said should be there. But since they're all together, and all trained together, it might be possible to shift the critical mass figure somewhat. Only a commander on the ground would know whether he's starting to lose efficiency because of disorganization and so on. You can't predict that with too much accuracy. To my mind, the brigade is still lacking some of the balance it needs because it doesn't have enough infantry, and also because it needs at least a fourth manoeuvre unit which it doesn't have. I believe it is critical to have four manoeuvre units. The brigade has three now. On the other hand, when I say that I feel very strongly that they should have four, most nations don't always have four. A lot of them use three. I'm not sure if they do it by choice, doctrinal choice, or whether they do it because that's all they've got. Every army has the same kind of problems. If we could have exactly what we would like to have, you know, we would be able to be a little more philosophically pure. So, the other thing which probably constitutes a major weakness for the brigade now is reinforcement and supply. We attempted to sort this out a few years ago by the introduction of the ILOC (which is the integrated line of communications), an agreement with the United States to help us provide in common for air and sea lift from all Eastern Canadian and United States airports and sea ports and so on.

We have started, at least in skeletal form, to man this now. We may have about twenty to twenty five Canadians now working along the ILOC, as it's called, which did not exist really at the time that I arrived there. The agreement was just negotiated at that stage. I inherited a good deal of the planning function, but the work had started before I arrived there.

So, to return to the brigade, I think it should be bigger. But, what is really required, to my mind, is a better, more guaranteed third-line support system behind the brigade to replace what we lost when we moved to the south. That used to exist among the Benelux countries and Germany for the area that the Canadian troops were stationed in. We had a supply and maintenance system in those days, tacked on to a British organization. It existed in peacetime, so we did all the rebuilds ourselves of our tanks and guns. We had the heavy workshop capabilities and all those things we don't have now. Nowadays, we either would have to negotiate for capabilities with the Americans or the Germans, or to create a new system as the requirements developed. And, creating things at a time of chaos is not the best way to do it. So, obviously, most of us believe that we should have some of these capabilties in place in peacetime. So, when you start talking about 10,000 troops in the brigade group -- and I'm not sure that I would go that high -- I would probably like to see a brigade of about 6,500, plus maybe 1,500 - 2,000 in a good line of communication system. So you're getting closer, as a whole system, to 9,000 people. If you got beyond that, then I think you should be looking - and I'm sure this is one of the options being considered now - at transferring the CAST brigade from the north to the Central Front. So you would have two brigades for the Central Front at that stage, and that would mean creating a divisional headquarters and having a

light division. So you would change the nature and the context of the commitment. You increase the commitment. There is no doubt in my mind that the durability of the brigade, as it is now, is suspect (even though it certainly can fight and account for itself very well). And one of the things that would help its durability, besides additional troops, is the third line support, a better logistics system. Being integrated with the Americans is fine, but provided we have enough of a dedicated capability to make sure that our own specifically Canadian needs are looked after. You see, we use certain kits that are different from the Americans'. Certain of our weapons are different. So you can never have a totally integrated LOC, even though most of our kits are the same.

[COX] You seem to feel, though, that the die is cast really for staying in Lahr.

[BELZILE] Well, I'll tell you why I feel that way. It's because infrastructure costs are horrendous; and, of course, we've established ourselves there now and we've spent a lot of money in setting up Lahr and Baden with all of the domestic support facilities, the schools, the Canadian stores, and the Canadian community, which is about 18,000 people in Southern Germany. As a community, once you start, you know, adding the wives, the children, the school teachers, the school staff, the banks, there's a fairly large Canadian community there. If you move that somewhere else, either you change the philosophy and just leave the troops and return all the wives and all the kids home and then you have a lesser requirement for a heavy infrastructure. Or you recreate an infrastructure somewhere else which would be very costly. Unless you negotiated that with NATO so that it's a shared cost. My suspicion is that no Canadian government would ever tolerate that right now because of the cost of the move. Now, militarily, lets forget the potential costs and lets look at the military option. Militarily, there's no doubt in my mind that the two brigades would be better together, somewhere. So instead of having two lines of communication from North America, one to Norway, one to the Central Front, whichever place you put them in, one would obviously be more efficient. Even if it's a little bigger, it would be more efficient. But, if you have them both together, where should they be? Well, of course, you can argue the point based on our Nordic and Arctic experience and so forth. We should perhaps stay in Norway and get out of the Central Front. The flaw with that idea, of course, is that we'd have to have everybody back here in Canada, because the Norwegian constitution doesn't allow for the stationing of foreign troops on their soil in peacetime. Ergo, we cannot station forces. One option is, of course, to keep our forces here in Canada, if we think we can react fast enough to developments over there in Norway. I'm talking about the army, only, now. I'll bring in the air force in a minute. The other option, of course, is to put all our forces in Europe into the Lahr area. But the infrastructure that exists there now could not handle a second brigade, together with its equipment and so on. So we would have to procure additional infrastructure, which we could perhaps get from some of the French forces around there, which are being redistributed. But we certainly need at least another base in southern Germany, even if the troops weren't actually all stationed there; because we would have to have enough logistic stocks, enough equipment, to get the second brigade there reasonably quickly. Like we do now, incidentally, in Norway. There are a lot of Canadian kits up there. The troops are in Canada, but kits are up there. There are about 150 trucks. We don't have the guns and things like that, but we have ammunition stockage, we have consumables stockage. Consumables are the things you use only once, you know; the hard rations and that sort of thing. A lot of that is already out there, so that we can save on airlift. So we'd have to have the same thing in the south, if we put both capabilities together. The third option is that you put the whole thing together and somewhere else. Then, of course, we would conduct a dialogue with NATO and discuss the matter - where is the main danger spot and where would we feel we could make the greatest contribution. My own view, although it's perhaps too late to do that, is that we should take a very good look at northern Germany again and at the Baltic approaches - Zeeland and Denmark and so on, which constitute a relatively weak front right now. And I would also look

at having our air force up there, because Fifth Tactical Air Force, which is in the north, is considerably weaker than the air force which is on the Central Front (with 4ATAF and 2ATAF, which consist mostly of the RAF and the United States Air Force, both of which are big air forces). The Canadian air force commitment to the Central Front is relatively minuscule, compared to what it would be, relatively, if it was up in the north. Likewise with the army, because there are many more troop concentrations where we are now). One advantage of moving somewhere else, of course, is that that would probably bring us a little closer to the part of the front where we'd expect to fight, should it ever come to that (instead of being 400 kilometres away from the line, as we are now. So, really, I'm not advocating one or the other. I'm just pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of the three options. But, since we have a situation now with a very heavy infrastructure component, and since the costs of moving that infrastructure would be enormous, I think that that becomes, inevitably, a very important factor.

Part VIII - National Defence Headquarters and Mobile Command, 1979-86

[HILL] General Belzile, you served as Chief, Land Doctrine and Operations at National Defence Headquarters from 1979 to 1981. Then you were promoted to Lieutenant General and appointed Commander of Mobile Command, a post you held for five years. This was the time when President Reagan was in office and began a major build-up of United States forces, when East-West relations turned acrimonious and confrontational, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the United States embarked on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Canada continued, in this period, to re-equip its armed forces, but money was in short supply and the country faced problems of block obsolescence in many parts of the military structure. There were calls for increases in defence expenditures or, if this was not possible, for cuts in the number and range of Canada's military commitments. Questions were raised about CAST, in particular. A new Defence White Paper was eventually promised by the Progressive Conservative government elected in 1984. What would you see as the main achievements and problems of Mobile Command between 1981 and 1986? What shortages of equipment, manpower, training facilities, and so on, especially needed rectifying, and perhaps still need rectifying today; and how costly would it be to straighten out whatever problems there are?

[BELZILE] I would start by pointing to a couple of main achievements, and then go on to elaborate a bit. The second area, I must say, remains a major problem, despite the fact that we've progressed somewhat. I think one of the best things we've succeeded in doing has been to reassign the primary tasks of the brigades and to rationalize army tasking to some degree. That was done in 1984 as a result of a very extensive study into the main problem areas in all of our various commitments - not only the ones to NATO, but the ones to northern Canada, to defense of Canada operations, and to what we call the Canada-U.S. Land Plans, which we have'nt had a chance yet to discuss. The Canada-U.S. Land Plans, of course, are just as the title indicates. They are a bilateral agreement responsible, functionally, to the Permanent Joint Board of Defence(PJBD). And perhaps I should say a few words about that. When I first came back from Europe, I was a CLDO, as you pointed out, but one of the things I wound up doing at that time was to be the Army member of the PJBD, which is probably the oldest on-going alliance that we're still using on a routine basis. It was a bilateral agreement that was initiated by Mackenzie King and President Roosevelt in 1942. The PJBD had navy, air force and army members, and was led by either a senator or a high public figure, or a member of parliament; that is to say it was led by civilian politicians, parliamentarians usually, on both sides. During the two years that I was there, that I was CLDO, I was the army member. In fact, the Honourable George Hees, the current Minister of Veterans Affairs, was our man at the helm at that stage. We used to negotiate all of the bilateral agreements that were required between the two countries; I mean those relating to the air force, for instance, involving

NORAD; naval coordination measures that would be required in time of war; and so on. As far as the army was concerned, it included a redesignation of what we call "The Plans". We call them CANUS now, but they were called ALCANUS before Alaska became a state in its own right. We were committed to go to the defence of Alaska, at the same time as the Canadian Arctic, and vice versa. The American troops in Alaska were also committed to come and help us in the Yukon or on the Northeast side of the border. When Alaska became a State, the "AL" was dropped from this planning arrangement, and it became known simply as the Canada-U.S. Land Plans, which call for the availability of one or two brigades, almost at any time. One of these has to have a quick reaction force such as our Special Service Force at Petawawa now has (with the airborne regiment, the parachute capability, the light troops capability that can go anywhere in the north or really anywhere in the country without any difficulty at all). Well, as long as the airlift is there, there's a way to get them in there even if you can't land the aircraft. We hardly touched on that in our previous discussions, since we were focussing mostly directly on NATO. But when we talk today about the need for a couple of brigades to back up the two brigades already dedicated to NATO, we are really talking about another two or three brigades available in Canada to do what we call Defence of Canada Operations. This is a unilateral kind of capability. Then there is CANUS, Canada-U.S. Land Operations, which call for a joint force that could be utilized in Canadian territory or, technically, in American territory (although, for all practical purposes, given the size of our Armed Forces, I can't really see the Canadians getting involved in defending Alaska. I can see much more the opposite possibility i.e. maybe the Americans coming and helping us in the north).

That leads me to the two achievements I wanted to talk about. The first one, as I've already mentioned, was the reassignment of tasks, in 1984. And the second one, I think, concerned mobilization planning, and the use of the reserves, particularly to back up the Canadian and North American commitments as opposed to European ones. We are more dependent on the citizen army, for North American operations, and on the territorial army. They are raised in crisis periods to assist the normal forces of authority, be they police or fire fighting serves, or similar, especially in operations where they could take much of the responsibility for low intensity kind of operations: counter terrorism, counter-sabotage, and so on, or just general provision of security for people and facilities (either here in Canada alone, or in North America in conjunction with the United States). I think we've made a lot of progress in that last area. And I'm hoping that the next White Paper may have a few positive statements to make about how we're going to reorganize the Reserves, equip them better, and really train them better also. This would call, of course, not only for equipment, but also for more training time, and also for greater strength ceilings than we have now. And it would probably call, in due course, for different measures of legislation, that would allow us actually to call the Reserves out if we ever needed them. As it stands now, a reservist can show up if he feels like it, even if we do call them out. If he doesn't turn up, there's no legal action we can take against him, because it's a purely voluntary force. Short of the War Measures Act, the legislation doesn't exist to create it. This is a very complex issue. In times of mobilization, the government can create the "Active Force", as we call it; and the Active Force can take those reservists and put them under legal obligation to come forward. But, before the Active Force is called out, there are all sorts of levels of relatively low level emergencies that could occur for which, at present, we have no guarantee of the availability of the reserves. There are a variety of reasons for this. First of all, the reservist may not show up. Second, he may be employed with, say, Bell Canada, or with another kind of job that is considered just as important, nationally, as reserve service. So, I think we've made quite a lot of progress in that respect. At least in the acceptance of general principles. And what I, and my staff, tried very hard to do in the last little while, was to make progress towards a better structure for the Militia in Canada, so that the territorial aspect of the army presence across the country would be built on the reserves instead of the existing regular force. At the same time, that brings us to the main problem still existing in

4CMBG, which is directly linked with that: I mean the fact that there is a shortage of manpower. We are short in the Regular Force, for immediate availability. We are short of about 8,000 or 9,000 troops in Mobile Command, right now. Some of them could be replaced by reservists, provided that we had the training systems and the resources to bring them in. In order to try and alleviate that, we have in fact now tasked some of the Militia and other reserve elements with operational roles. We have, for instance, designated some reserve elements to provide reinforcements for our parachute capability. We didn't have that before. We have created some artillery batteries in the reserve that are a little readier than they used to be. So we have progressed in that way. But we have not progressed as far as we would have liked, because of a need for government involvement and legislation. But we have progressed to some degree; and I think that that's a reasonable accomplishment. The other area where we have progressed is in the re-equipping, or modernization of the equipment, of the Canadian Forces in general. The army, in particular, of course, has benefitted from acquiring the new tank. Even so, they are not in sufficient numbers, or with sufficient trained tankers here in Canada, to provide all the back-up that we require in Europe. So, to my mind, we've made again a start in the right direction, but without overcoming entirely the problems caused by the fact that we don't have enough tanks. We have some equipment now that we use in lieu of tanks, but these are not nearly as capable of sustained action as tanks are. The field force in Canada is not as well balanced as it should be.

[HILL] When you said 8,000 or 9,000 extra troops in Mobile Command as a possibility, presumably you were referring to Mobile Command in Canada? This is in addition to possible increases in CFE.

[BELZILE] That's right.

[HILL] I believe the former Associate Minister of National Defence, Mr. Harvey André, said that the government is working on developing new emergency legislation that would permit a graduated response in crisis situations. So I guess there's some hope that that will appear before long. I don't know whether you've heard anything recently on that.

[BELZILE] No, I haven't. Of course, I expect that, right now, a whole series of measures are hinging on what the White Paper is going to say. But, I tend to be a little speculative about the White Paper, because I'm no longer working on it. Nor am I aware of the discussions on it that are taking place now. I only know where they stood at the time that I removed my uniform. I don't think they've changed that much, though. I'm hopeful that there will be some pretty positive measures in there, particularly with regards to the reserves and back-up systems.

[COX] This question may not be answerable, but let me try it. What role in Europe would be most useful from the point of view of employing the reserves? What role would be most compatible with an enhanced Militia?

[BELZILE] Well, I've touched on that briefly. The full spectrum, really, depending on how long any emergency lasts. At a given stage, you've got to be able to support the NATO commitment with reserves. But the initial tasks for the reserves, would be to fill the void left by the departing Regular Forces. The second aspect would be what we call, euphemistically, regional operations, which are really security or internal security tasks, which take place in normal society and really would be a support to existing law-enforcement agencies or civil authorities of various kinds. That exists now, whenever the police get beyond their capabilities. Not that I would advocate the reserves becoming policemen. But they can do a lot of security tasks, freeing up the police forces to do what the police should do. And that does not necessarily mean manning street corners with rifles. So, the

territorial kind of functions have to be done, including security functions. And, at the same time, there are training functions to perform, in support of mobilization and aimed at eventually replacing or indeed reinforcing the committed forces. You can really see the reserves involved across the whole spectrum. But, obviously, because these reserve forces would initially have a relatively lower standard of training, many of them would be used on what I would call, really, almost on "home guard" kind of tasks. They would be a civil emergency kind of force, a regional operations force, that doesn't have to be moved across the country but deals basically with local situations, that knows the local territory. If you need to send troops to the Rocky Mountains for whatever reason, then it is better to use the troops from interior B.C. than to send Regular Forces from eastern Canada. That goes back to the territorial role which the Militia has historically developed, for a variety of reasons, around the centres of population. The Militia are best suited for that sort of thing, thereby freeing up the initial force of regulars to go and do the primary missions. But that would not last very long, and the reserves would have to get involved in a whole range of missions, including putting together brigades to replace, eventually, the ones that we're fielding overseas. There'd be no other sources of manpower at that stage.

[HILL] The primary problem here is the budget again. I mean, we've just seen a new budget in which in fact DND got very little increase. I think it was less than 1% in real terms. And I think the biggest problem for the reserves over time has been simply that they come off worse in terms of the amount of money they get; and this has been going on for a long time and there have been many many statements made over time in terms of increasing the reserves, strengthening them, giving them better roles, and all that. But until money is put into it they're not going to improve.

[BELZILE] Well, I agree with that. I, at the same time, believe that a lot of progress can be made at relatively low cost. First of all, in the reserve force organization, structure, headquarters. and command and control system. We have twenty-seven headquarters running the Militia in Canada right now. What we've advocated in Mobile Command is that they should be reduced to about twelve training brigades; that doesn't cost more money, in fact it saves money. It doesn't prepare troops better, necessarily, but it reduces the overhead and starts putting whatever money is available down where it counts. You can also, at relatively low cost, cut out some featherbedding in areas outside defence. Perhaps some of that money could also be used to increase the strength of the reserves, even with relatively light equipment such as rifles, personal equipment, and things like that. Those are the first steps to take. I calculate that we need about 50,000 to 60,000 reserves right now to do our job in a reasonably sustainable fashion. We have, in the three services combined, less than 22 - 23,000 reserves at present. You could at least double that at a relatively cheap cost, I mean in terms of personnel costs. The facilities, the armouries, the training areas, would require a little bit more equipment. You would require, you know, more kits in training centres across the country, so that they could move on to learning some of the skills. But you don't do all that you need to do just by saying that you've got a new reserve of 50,000. You've got to equip them. That's the equivalent of 8 new brigades. You need all the kits for that. It can be relatively cheap, because a reserve soldier probably costs only 1/4 to 1/3 of the cost of a Regular soldier. You can't use him to replace the Regular soldier, but he can provide necessary back-up. The reservist can be more lightly equipped, and can be trained at relatively low cost. So, I agree with you about that. There's a money problem, of course, but we could make a very definite difference to the state of the reserves in Canada with a relatively few million dollars. You know, I'm not a cost analyst, but we've gone through those figures umpteen times. I don't have them with me, but it's not that costly.

[HILL] Linked to that is the question of a mobilization plan, which you mentioned earlier. Now, this has still not been published yet, I don't think. Presumably that also will come out after the White Paper.

[BELZILE] Well, I would like to think so. I think mobilization planning has made a lot of progress in the last few years. You know, we function now with an interim mobilization plan, and I guess a mobilization plan will forever remain an interim one, that is constantly revised. But some of the things which some of us at least have advocated, focus mostly on giving the reserves a better structure and that sort of thing. These things could be implemented now, and I'm hoping that the White Paper will start providing the executive authority for some of this to take place. It's not because we haven't been trying to do it already. It's just simply because somehow other things have taken priority and we have wound up not being able to make these relatively cheap but useful moves.

[COX] I wonder if I could just try to reconstruct, in my mind really, the force structure which, in a sense, seems to have come out in your comments. Let's just say that the CAST commitment was relocated, so that no matter where it was we would have a mechanized brigade in Europe and a semi-mechanized brigade. Am I correct in thinking that if that were the case, then the actual commitment would come to something close to let's say 10,000 troops in Europe in CFE, and that one would require the two brigades back here to reinforce them? So that you'd have that as reinforcement; and your third element would be reserves to take the place of Regular forces. And they, if the emergency went on long enough, would be equipped and trained to replace some the Regulars. Is that, roughly-speaking, how the Force structure makes sense?

[BELZILE] Yes, in broad terms, it's exactly as you're describing it. You know, if we continue with a commitment of two brigades overseas, we need one in situ and one that would go wherever required. We need two back-up brigades in Canada, and ideally they should be as well equipped, or equipped the same way, as the first two. And after you literally run out of Regular troops, you'd have to depend on the reserves for follow-on echelons. If you only committed the one brigade, and used the second one as a back-up, then you'd reduce that requirement somewhat. But don't forget that you also have a requirement for a quick-reaction capability of up to about three brigades in Canada, that would not go overseas, but look after our problems on this continental land mass. These may be low intensity forces and may not be needed at the stage we are talking about, but I think that it would be wise to have a solid, sizeable force of this kind available. If not in a totally Regular force, then including the reserves. You could have a lot of forces in-being at a cadre level, maybe 15 or 20% Regulars, and the rest of them being reservists, that you could build up quickly once the other ones take off for overseas. But if you want to talk about force structure, the best way to do that is to take the Regular Force that exists now, and the reserves that exist now, and weld them all together into one structure - not have two armies, have one army. Have one army, with the Regular brigades that exist now and the Militia training brigades that have been advocated twinned together, if you want - or having a sister training brigade or two or three sister training brigades, and grouping them together on a regional basis (because an army is a territorial animal. It's not like an air force or navy which really has a function wherever they are. An army is much more territorial, and it functions best on ground where it is familiar with the territory and with the local defence problems). The reserves are ideally suited for that. At the same time, you certainly need the right structure, combining Regulars and reserves. Otherwise, on M day, which we use as the term for mobilization day, the first thing the army would have to do would be to reorganize itself. So, a lot of people like me, including some still in uniform, are fighting tooth and nail to try to reorganize the army on a loose sort of divisional cum army structure across the country, so that we could pluck out the components as they're ready for whatever commitments we have.

[HILL] I think that some members of the Militia and so on are very concerned about maintaining the coherence of their own units in the event of an emergency. Presumably that could be maintained?

[BELZILE] In fact, not only that. I think it's the only way you can protect the coherence of the force. I know they're very concerned about maintaining the integrity of their units, but there's different tasking that you can give to reserve units. One of the things that we've done in the past is to go to Militia units and pluck out their officers and NCOs. You make the unit incapable of mobilizing. You're taking away all their cadre, all their training, and all their training potential; you're taking it away. If you do that, you hurt them a lot more than if you say to them: "OK, Governor General's Footguards, your primary mission is to provide one rifle company, including one major, one captain, and three lieutenants. You know, that's not the whole unit. One rifle company that would be thrown in to 2 RCR in London, Ontario, for instance. Then, after that, your second mission would be to mobilize the battalion. We've done that in every past war. But, if you go and pluck them out as individuals, to reinforce the Regular Force immediately, what you will in fact take away from them is their cadre, and make them incapable of mobilizing. So the two are not exclusive. What I'm suggesting is not exclusive one of the other. In fact it is very complementary.

[HILL] I have a broad question that I am sort of groping at a little bit. I'll try it anyway. The period when you were Commander at Mobile Command, was in fact the period when President Reagan came to office. It was a period in which there was a large build-up of US military power. It was the period of SDI, also. And in your comments through the whole interview, from time to time, there have been comments about relations with the American forces at one time or another. Canada right now is in the process of negotiating a free trade agreement or freer trade agreement with the United States, which I think a lot of people believe could lead into a very different kind of relationship with the United States. I mean it could become a good deal closer. That's not necessarily going to happen, but it might do. And we might have a new international posture for Canada, giving priority, first of all, to this relationship with the US, that is to say as a first layer of relationships. Then with the other allies, and then with other people. How would you see that kind of thing affecting the Armed Forces? Would they be able to fit in easily with something like that, to have a sort of special, harmonious relationship with American forces in that kind of way?

IBELZILE] Well, over the years, this has been like an accordion. One would like to think that if we go to a freer trade situation, then we'd start getting a little closer to a new political relationship; not a political union, but a political easing if you want, of relationships, one with the other. In the case of the Armed Forces, and particularly the army, the relationship has always been excellent across the border anyway. We used to be able to, and we still do, except there's different pricing problems now. We used to be able to exchange training, exchange aircraft, exchange people in big groups, send our troops to train and jump out of United States aircraft, bring the Americans here and have them jump out of a Canadian aircraft using our techniques, using our parachutes, and so on. We've been able to do this for years. We have battalions who come and train with us, and we send battalions to Alaska and so on. But in the last few years, strangely enough, just as people have been discussing freer trade, we seem to have seen the opposite occurring in relation to the Armed Forces. Some people have got themselves all worked up and started to ask why Canadians should cross the border and train in US facilities for free; and they start charging us cash on the barrel, for every soldier we send across. Well, you know, I don't have to tell you that we reduced to a considerable extent our presence there. But, at the same time, our own accountants are starting to say, well, OK, if they do that every time they come to train in Canada, we will charge them too.

Whereas before, we were able to do all that on a mutually agreed basis. You'd have the National Guard from Vermont, for instance, coming to Gagetown and shooting their guns and doing all their training every year, because it's the closest camp to them. They cross the border from Vermont into New Brunswick and they're there. The closest camp in the United States is Fort Drum, just near Rochester, south of Lake Ontario, which is considerably more expensive for them to go to than to come to Gagetown. We used to be able to do that at the colonel's level. I'd get a phone call when I was in Gagetown, and I'd say: "Come on in and bring your brigade in". Now, no more, because some accountants somewhere decided that maybe we could make money with that process. and vice versa. I sent the Airborne Regiment last year to an exercise in Texas. They were airborne, getting ready to jump out in the parachutes over the training area, when we got a bill for every soldier who was going to land. And once he's airborne and he's heading down, you know, he doesn't have any choice about turning around. So, I'm a great sceptic when it comes to this freer trade thing. If it reduces the accountants getting mixed up in military training, then I'm all in favour of it. If it only complicates life, we've got enough complications as it is now with accounting systems and financial administration acts and one thing and another. The last thing we need is some more complex forms, every time you want to send a soldier on a course in the United States. And the same thing is happening with respect to the British. We used to interchange training left and right. We can't do that anymore.

[HILL] Perhaps, General Belzile, we could complete our discussion with a mixture of specific and general questions. First of all, we've noticed that in 1986 the government of France recognized your active work in the betterment of military cooperation between France and Canada by appointing you Commander of the Legion d'Honneur. Given your comments and recounting of your early life, when you were a student in Montreal and training for the army at that time, this and your own French-Canadian background, this must have been a particularly gratifying award to you. Could you tell us what lay behind it?

[BELZILE] Well, you know, I suppose I should start by explaining that, theoretically, when you receive a decoration, you're not supposed to know about it in advance. In theory, you don't know who has recommended you; everything is done very discreetly until the honour is announced. And then you try to find out who brought it up. I received the Legion d'Honneur, and I was taken a bit by surprise, a pleasant surprise of course, because, as you may know, very few have been given in Canada in recent years. There were some during The War, and so on; but I think that, as far as a military officer is concerned, mine was the first one in peacetime. And, you know, you try to find out what brought it up. I guess I got enough out of the French embassy, and a few people that I knew, to give me an idea. I was for 4 1/2 to almost 5 years the Canadian Co-President of the Franco-Canadian Military Cooperation Committee, a job which I took over for the two years I was CLDO. I did it in Ottawa here, and then carried on for the first three years that I was commanding Mobile Command. During that time, we negotiated a lot of exchanges with the French: not trying to balance what we did with the Americans and what we did with the British, but trying to increase the exchanges with the French for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was that they have a very professional army and their officer cadres are excellent. We wanted to increase our participation in some of their war schools and some of their specialist schools, such as mountain schools and skiing schools. Those were some of the things that I negotiated. Although this had existed for a while, Mr. Lamontagne, who was the Minister at the time, visited his French counterpart, Francois Hernu, and they both agreed that we should increase the military cooperation between the two armies. And by "armies", I'm talking generically, I include the navy and the air force, les armées, using the French term, plural. And I was given my marching orders by Mr. Lamontagne, saying: "Increase co-operation with the French. Get on with it, and do more with the French". The French also have very good kits, very good equipment, and some of this

equipment is now being pushed by the French to try to break into the North American market. They have just sold a tactical communications system to the Americans. And the Canadians are looking for one now; so I guess they are hoping for another order. So maybe I was lucky. I got caught up in these affairs at a time when the French were trying to be nice to Canadians. I was very involved in the situation. I used to host the French delegation every two years, here; and I used to go to France, to Paris, to a variety of schools, and so on. Other Canadians have done similar things, but I guess I was at it a little longer. Also, I was told discreetly that some of my earlier work and contingency planning with the French - mainly in Germany -was also taken into account. They summarize a guy's career. They knew I was about to retire and they had just negotiated a protocol with Canada for official approval of decorations. As you know, our own orders here prevent Canadians, usually, from receiving foreign decorations. You can accept them, but you are usually not allowed to wear them unless they have been gazetted in Canada and approved by Rideau Hall, by the Governor-General. In my case, the honour was approved ahead of time. It was then gazetted in the Canada Gazette; so I was allowed to wear it. I received a boutonnière, plus the gong. It's on my uniform; and I can wear it. Now, other Canadians such as poets have received La Legion d'Honneur, chansonniers and politicians in Quebec, but their's were not always accepted by the Canadian system. They can wear them. But military personnel do not normally have the same entitlement. So, I don't know what more I can say abou that. One of the things that surprised me was not only to receive such a decoration, but also to find that I had been appointed at a high level, as a Commander. That includes the cravatte, the decoration worn around the neck. Even during The War, people like General Allard and so on were appointed only at the officer level. I received a higher level than that. In fact, I'm probably the only Canadian who is a Commander.

[HILL] I'd like to offer our congratulations -- a bit late --but along with everyone else. Maybe I could ask you one very last question, a very broad one. Do you, after all your career, think that NATO is valuable to international peace and security?; and, also, how important is it, how useful is it to Canada?

[BELZILE] Absolutely, an unqualified "Yes", for me. Canada is a middle power. We have an incredible amount of geography; and a mutual insurance system, to me, makes so much sense that I don't even understand how anybody could consider an alternative. So, to a large extent, I look at it that way. I'm a firm believer, after all my years of exposure to NATO. I think that most NATO nations that I've had the pleasure of working with -- with the officers -- are very cooperative; and Canada has been asked to do mainly the things that we are good at. I remember, for instance, in Europe, receiving a personal call from Alexander Haig, when he was SACEUR. asking me, personally, as a national commander, to take on the training of the cadres of the first Portuguese mechanized brigade ever to exist. That was when the Portuguese pulled out of Angola. And that was a little feather in our cap. The reason he came to us Canadians was because he considered that we were the most professional mechanized force available. We would not be involved with the French in the way that we are, we would not get involved with the Germans and the Norwegians in the way that we have, unless we were participating in NATO. professionally, for the Army, and I suspect for our two other services, NATO is an absolute "must" Also it is necessary for national purposes, because there is no way we could defend Canada against a determined organization, even a relatively small one, that would work internally. The main danger of a flash point is still, of course, in Central Europe, and perhaps the need to look after our own territorial integrity is not as great a likelihood. But, having said that, if that requirement ever does come up, then we can count on the rest of the organization. Additionally, our membership in NATO has given us armed forces that would be capable of generating a range of capabilities that we might need relatively quickly. I, for one, don't see how we could do that without being part

of an alliance such as NATO. Otherwise, we would have to almost subordinate ourselves to the United States.

[HILL] Thank you, General Belzile.

CHARLES NIXON

[HILL]⁸ Good afternoon. Our guest this afternoon is Mr. Charles Nixon, former Deputy Minister of National Defence. We are very pleased that you could join us today Mr. Nixon and we are certainly appreciative of your readiness to participate in this oral history of Canadian policy in NATO.

[NIXON] I am pleased to be asked, because I do believe the recording of history is important, and particularly when it gathers together, as I understand you are trying to do, the participation and the impressions of people such as myself, who have been in rather senior positions involved with Canada's policy with NATO.

Part I - Naval Career, to 1963

[HILL] To begin with, perhaps you could tell us briefly about your own background, where you grew up, were educated and so on and why you decided to join the Navy - aside from the fact that that seems a natural thing for Prairie folks to do.

[NIXON] On that latter point, many of us from the Prairies never saw a body of water we couldn't avoid or swim across, so I joined the Navy. I was born in, and received all my preliminary education in, Shore Lake, Manitoba, a small town about 175 miles northwest of Winnipeg. practically on the Saskatchewan border. In 1943 or thereabouts, when I was still too young to join the Forces, I became aware of the Royal Canadian Naval College at Royal Roads. My father and I wrote a letter to find out about this establishment, and in due course I wrote some exams, went through interviews and such and was accepted to go to Royal Roads. As to precisely why I did that, at the time, I have to say it was because it was the easiest way and the quickest way I could figure out to maintain the momentum in my education and at the same time be ready for active service at the earliest age. A little digression - I received the name Buzz, the nickname Buzz, which I have had ever since (for everyone except my own family) because of the interview that I had for Royal Roads. The interview board consisted of several naval officers, in fact Admiral Mainguy, Dan Mainguy's father, was a Captain, Chairman of the Board, and they were talking to sixteen year old boys who all played hockey, delivered papers or worked in general stores. I was unique in the fact that I kept bees and we spent an hour talking about bee keeping. So later, when I went to Royal Roads and got on the train in Regina to go there, there was a loud voice coming through the car saying: "Did that hayseed get on here"; and I said: "Yes I got on here". And he said, "You must be Buzz Nixon", I've had the name ever since, and that individual was Adam Zimmerman, who is now the president of Noranda. Now that's, I think, why I joined the Navy; and I decided while there that I would like to be in the technical field rather than be an executive officer, and so I joined the Electrical Branch and went to the Universities of Toronto and Manitoba (while I was in the Navy, as a midshipman, and then as a sub lieutenant). I graduated from Manitoba in 1949.

[HILL] Was it in naval engineering?

⁸ Interviewers: Hill, Cox, Pawelek. Interview dates: 16/3/87 and 25/3/87.

[NIXON] No, it was electrical engineering. Then, when I finished that, I took a year of further studies, in the Navy, on the application of electrical engineering to naval requirements. I studied radar, communications, sonar, power drives, electrical generation, and so on, in ships.

[HILL] You graduated from the University of Manitoba about 1949, I believe.

[NIXON] That's right. Then, as I say, I took a year's service and studied in the Navy. Then I served in the dockyard on the West coast for a year. And then I spent a year in Korea in HMCS Cayuga.

[HILL] I wonder if you can tell us a bit more about the Korean period? Was it all entirely in that one ship?

[NIXON] All in the one ship, and our duties were on the West coast of Korea escorting American aircraft carriers which were attacking or sending off strikes into North Korea. At other times we would be on the East coast where we would be in shore bombardment. I lost my first command there, in fact. I was the officer in charge of a motor launch which we took ashore to bring off a liaison officer, and when I came back to the ship we tied the motor launch up astern, only to have the North Koreans start to shoot at us. So we went out of that harbour going full speed astern. We were firing forward and they were firing at us, so it was quite an odd situation, and my motor launch overturned. So I lost my first command. My first and only command, I should say.

[HILL] Were you involved in the Inchon landing?

[NIXON] No, that was over by the time I got there in 1951. That was in the early part of 1951, but I didn't get there until later.

[HILL] What did you feel about the contribution of the Canadian Navy to the UN Force in Korea?

[NIXON] Well, I think we should take a look at the demarcation line. I believe that the late Commander James Plomer, who died a year ago, and Admiral Brock, were both keen on maintaining the Western hold on the islands off the West coast of Korea, about half way up. And those islands, I believe, were fundamental to maintaining that demarcation line between the North and the South. The reason why the Canadians were so instrumental is we had a piece of equipment which no other navy had at that time. This was a three centimetre navigation radar which you could use to go into very narrow harbours and also could pick up the small junks and fishing boats which you couldn't do with other radars of that day. Remember that's in 1950-51. It wasn't a radar we put on board for that purpose, it was a radar which the RCN put aboard just to modernize and to add more capabilities to the ships.

[HILL] How good were the ships in those days, by and large?

[NIXON] For our purposes, then, I think they were just as good as anybody's. We're talking about the Tribal class. They were all launched in the latter part of the 1940s. They had about the best radar and fire control systems, sonar systems and communication systems that were available.

[HILL] Have you ever been back to Korea.

[NIXON] No, I have not. No, I have not been back to Japan or Korea.

[HILL] Well, I was there a couple of years ago and there was a group of Canadian veterans there while we were there. The changes were just extraordinary since the war, they said. The whole country had evidently been in chaos at that time.

[NIXON] One of the most memorable parts of my Korean time was that I had, as a shipmate, the famous doctor Joe Cyr, the phony doctor.

[HILL] You survived him as well as the North Koreans?

[NIXON] Well, actually the person who really did survive him was Commander Plomer. One time when we came into Sasebo, which was our operating base, Plomer, who was then a Commander, had a bad tooth ache and he intended to get it serviced or get it out, or filled, or what ever else was needed. But we were only able to stay in just long enough to refuel and resupply and then go back out again. So when we got out, he said, "Well I must do something with this tooth, I can't put up with this for another two weeks, I will have to get it extracted". Doctors on board in those days did extractions. The tooth was taken out that afternoon. And around 8 or 9 o'clock that evening the engineering officer and I went to visit the Captain, as we did every night, to tell him what was the state of our equipment. We would be asked specifics and we would have a chat about the ship and about war and everything else. And he said that he never had had such a painless extraction in his life. He said: "That guy Cyr, he is a doctor just without parallel." Well, the reason why he had such a painless extraction is that he was damn near killed by a massive dose of codeine that Cyr used to mask his lack of dental skills.

[HILL] Well, at least he got the right tooth. Could you tell us something about how you and your fellow officers at that time saw the state of the world. I mean this was the period of the war in Indo-China. Was this a world which was clearly divided into two competing camps?

[NIXON] I think so, for two or three reasons. The older officers who had served in "The War" were quite clear about this. But it came from the war with Germany. After The War they just shifted the focus to the Soviet Union, particularly as we came to see more and more confrontation during the latter part of the 1940s, leading up to the first western defence arrangements.

[HILL] The Western European Union?

[NIXON] The Western European Union, with Britain, France and the Benelux; and then that gave rise to NATO. I believe that so many of our officers, whether it was army or navy or air force, saw that it was far better to try to deter war than to let it happen like the last one. I think that's how they saw what was going on in Korea. Remember we are talking of the days of encirclement, containment, terms like that. There is another aspect of this that you may recall: there was an educational programme in National Defence and also I believe in External affairs, called the "Bureau of Current Affairs." Every week you had almost what we would call brain-washing or propaganda. But there was a study session on different situations in the world, and that took place not only in the ships and in the Far East but also in all of the bases in Canada. For example, I remember going to the Teacher's College for a Bureau of Current Affairs session when I first came back from Korea. The then Australian High Commissioner to Canada, who had previously been the Australian High Commissioner to Ceylon, was talking about the Colombo Plan. At that time, in 1952, we Canadians were thinking that this was one of our first real steps on the world stage as an independent country, making our own decisions, assisting Ceylon particularly in its economic development. Canada was sending locomotives, manufacturing supplies, and medical supplies to

Ceylon. And he said, that's all very well, but make sure you understand what you are doing; and he pulled out of his pocket a cake of soap, saying, when you send this cake of soap to Ceylon some mid-wife is going to wash, and as a result some mother and some child will survive, whereas without the soap either one of them or both might die in childbirth. He said make sure you think about what you are making them survive for. If you haven't solved that next question, have you really solved the problem by doing this or have you created a problem? Obviously it made quite a profound effect on me. Thirty five years later I still remember that talk.

[HILL] You mean, it raised questions about the kind of world these children would grow up in?

[NIXON] That's right. I mean to say, the Bureau of Current Affairs had, as its purpose, trying to make Canadians, including people in the Armed Forces, think a little bit more broadly than just about Canada or about what they themselves were doing. It obviously had an effect on me.

[HILL] NATO had been established just before you were in Korea. What was the reaction to the establishment and development of NATO?

[NIXON] Remember, I was a young lieutenant and some of these higher policy issues didn't penetrate that far down. But this idea of containment and deterrence was pretty well planted, and very well received. We felt we should do that. We didn't want to let war happen again. You know, the Marshall Plan had already been in operation for some time, and you could already see some of the fruits. There was certainly great hope there. But there is another aspect to this question. I think that there was a sense of purpose. Whether it was the right purpose or not, we in Korea had a sense of purpose. I think the first Army Division that Canada sent to Europe at the start of NATO had the same sense of mission. You'll find that is so if you talk to the service people of that period. Also, one-third of the whole fighter aircraft in NATO were Canadians, 300 strong I think at one time. The same is true for sailors. And so there was a real sense of purpose in the Armed Forces at that time.

[HILL] I wonder if we could just move on a little bit to the period after you were in Korea, while you were still in the Navy. I was wondering if you would tell us what positions you held in the Navy at that time.

[NIXON] Well, I returned to Canada, and went into a section in National Defence Headquarters working on the design, development, testing, acceptance and purchasing of electrical generating, transforming, switching and power equipment. It was all on the power side, there was nothing to do with radar, communications or anything else, and it was primarily for our group of minesweepers, which we still had, as training vessels on the west coast. And I guess we gave about eighteen to the Turks, as Mutual Aid. They were given to the Turks in the late 1950s, I think. I was there from 1952 to 1956. In our section we were working on the minesweepers and also on the St. Laurent class and the Restigouche class of destroyer escorts.

[HILL] Where was your office located?

[NIXON] Oh, here in Ottawa, you know in the old "C" building.

[HILL] And that lasted until?

[NIXON] Until I went to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT, in 1956. I think that was an important period as far as my own personal development was concerned. You see, that was

[NIXON] Until I went to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT, in 1956. I think that was an important period as far as my own personal development was concerned. You see, that was the period when the Nautilus, the first USN nuclear submarine, appeared. I remember the Naval Instructor Chief of the day saying: "Oh well, our great destroyer escorts would make mincemeat of the Nautilus". The fact that they could go 25 knots or 22 knots or whatever they could do at that time was irrelevant. Well, I had more than a question of doubt because when ships go fast they can't hear a thing with sonar as there is so much self-noise. So that was, you may say, the first sowing of seeds of doubt in my mind and questioning of the leadership that we had in the RCN (which I will come to subsequently).

[COX] What did you do at MIT?

[NIXON] What the Navy was doing at the time - and so were some of the other services - was to take a few of their technical officers and send them off to post-graduate work, whether in aerodynamics, in missile development, in control systems or in communications. Three officers had gone off about two years before us. It was felt that the work I had been doing in power systems was very germane, because one of the problems we had had in dealing with gun turrets and with missile systems was in moving large masses fast. To slew a turret takes a very particular type of drive. So I went down to MIT to study energy conversion systems of this type. And while I was there I saw that I had enough room in my schedules to take nuclear engineering; which I did, because I felt that before I left the Navy, we in the Canadian Navy would have to be aware of nuclear energy, nuclear reactors and nuclear propulsion. We would need to understand what it meant for ourselves, what it meant to our allies, and what it also meant to a potential enemy. So I did take some nuclear engineering.

[HILL] Which years were these?

[NIXON] From 1956 to 1958.

[HILL] After that, there was still another five years in the Navy.

[NIXON] That's right. When I came back to Canada, I was supposed to go back to sea as a Squadron Electrical Officer, but at that time the Navy was thinking seriously about nuclear submarines and they decided they needed to have a study group - which is not that different from the one that is going on right now - not as to whether the Navy should have nuclear submarines, but if it did have nuclear submarines, what would be the implications with respect to training, particularly of the technicians, and regarding the type of dockyard infrastructure that would be needed to handle nuclear submarines, as well as the type of industrial structure Canada would need to have, to produce and maintain nuclear submarines. I remember once in this process, Captain (now Rear Admiral) Davis, who was later Commandant at NDC, a man with a really good sense of humour as well as being a very confident individual, went before the Atomic Energy Control Board. And the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Control Board said to Captain Davis: "Tell me, if one of these nuclear submarines was cut in half in the Gulf of St. Lawrence by another ship, would it sink or would it float?". And Captain Davis put his head down and thought for a while and looked up and said: "Which would you prefer?" Well, he was quite right, as in some instances it could do either; which didn't stop the Atomic Energy Control Board. But you might say that's where another period of doubt set in for me, because I was primarily interested in the nuclear reactor control system, but I also had the responsibility to look into some of the operational considerations, not on the basis of whether you should have nuclear submarines, but in terms of what does this do to your operational capabilities. Although I am not an operator, I became

convinced very quickly that you really couldn't say that you were in the anti-submarine warfare field in a serious way if you didn't have hunter-killer nuclear submarines. The reason I say that is that submarines, when they are submerged and quiet, that is not moving, have tremendous passive sonar capabilities. When I say tremendous I mean a couple of hundred miles, if they are actually quiet and making no noise themselves. That's because of the odd way that sound propagates in the water. For example, look at the question of the Greenland - Iceland - UK Gap, I mean look at it as a barrier problem. If you can deal with that barrier with passive submarines as well as with SOSUS (acoustic devices laid on the bottom of the ocean to listen for submarines), then I think you can really bottle the adversaries up so they can't move without you knowing where they are. What bothered me was the impression I received that the Naval Board wasn't interested in nuclear submarines because submarines don't have much of a wardroom or a quarter deck or much of a place to hold good receptions or to "show the flag." Now I may be too hard on my superiors of the day, but as you can imagine, that impression certainly had more than a little bit of an impact on me. The operational advantages of nuclear submarines, which I felt were of paramount importance, didn't seem to enter the picture too much.

[HILL] I think the other comment that was made was the one of cost, wasn't it? I think Bob Sutherland, who was my chief for a while, I'm not sure if it was in a paper that he wrote or in the 1964 White Paper, argued that if you bought two or three nuclear submarines it would take up most of the defence funding by the time you put in the infrastructure and back-up. That's an exaggeration, I'm sure, but there was that sort of consideration.

[NIXON] There certainly was the financial consideration; but one of the things you get with submarines is that they have very small crews. At that time, I believe, the difference between the cost of a nuclear submarine and the true cost of a frigate wasn't very great. Now that you mention Sutherland, I was probably one of the individuals who caused Hellyer to ask Sutherland to do that study just after Hellyer became the Minister of National Defence in 1963.

After I moved from the nuclear submarine survey team I spent a year at Chalk River to acquire some practical experience with nuclear reactors. Then I came back, and I became in due course the Director of System Engineering - a new slot in the Directorate General of Fighting Equipment. I had the responsibility to make a total ship system out of the individual pieces of radar, sonar, communications, weaponry, guns, torpedoes. When I say that, I mean to work out the weights of them, the spaces they would need, the air conditioning they'd need, the wiring that they'd all need; and get all the wiring done. I don't mean to say for a moment that I had the responsibility for the accuracy of the radar or the appropriateness; we had radar specialists for that. Also involved in this job was putting together the total funding and working out the total estimates for fighting equipment. The way that the estimates were handled in those days, and it is not so different now, is that my boss, the Director General of Fighting Equipment, had the responsibility to go before the Estimates Committee and defend the prices and cost estimates.

What happened when they costed the Canadian General Purpose Frigate, between 1960 and 1963, was that they put the cheapest price on each piece of equipment, obtained from the US Navy data that was used as the estimate. This added up, for a GPF, to 33 million dollars per ship. And 8 of them obviously came to \$264 million -- the figure that's on the record. However, that price did not allow for any spare parts, any logistic stores, any training equipment, any Canadianization, any training of the people; and so when you put this all together, the true cost was practically double. I therefore went to my boss and I said: "Look, you are responsible for the total job that is being done here, and you have the responsibility to go forward and defend these estimates, but you can't defend these estimates without adding on all the other items". He said: "You are

absolutely right". So very quickly the price of the group of ships went from \$264 million to \$520 million, at which time Douglas Harkness, then the Minister of National Defence, wrote across the document: "Don't go any further with this until we get to the bottom of it."

You may remember, if you were working with Bob Sutherland, that what had happened during that period and the latter part of the fifties and the early part of the sixties, is that the Cold War wasn't quite as cold as it had been. The national concern for defence was not very great, compared with social programmes, and the defence budget as a percentage of the total federal budget started to slip bit by bit. I understand from Bob Bryce that when he was Secretary of the Treasury Board and when Elgin Armstrong first became Deputy Minister of National Defence, defence was about 33% of Federal Government outlays. That would be around 1958. But then it slipped and it slipped very quickly. So what Mr. Hellyer tried to do with his ideas of integration, and then unification, was to reduce duplication and reduce double functioning and so on; and to be able to put more money into capital equipment and into operations. But he wasn't successful in doing so. He may have been successful in stopping some duplication, but as far as putting more money into capital was concerned, he wasn't successful, because the defence budget kept being cut more and more.

[COX] Could you tell us more about the comparability of submarines and frigates?

[NIXON] Well, there are many factors to consider. There are many things that naturally you can't do with a submarine. On the other hand, people nowadays are suggesting: "Well, we will either buy more frigates or we will buy more submarines." I personally believe that there is kind of a minimum number of frigates that you're going to have to have. We hear people say: "Well, let's pick a cheaper, lighter ship." But if you want to have a ship that will go into the North Atlantic and face heavy sea states and carry a heavy helicopter, then it's got to be 4000 tons and it's going to cost a good deal. As soon as you put those stipulations on, that you are going to be in the North Atlantic, in sea state 5, at 27 knots or 25 knots, carrying a heavy helicopter, that defines the ship, regardless of the weapon. I think that the requirement is the same in the Pacific.

[HILL] What about the 1960s?

[NIXON] If you just talk about submarines in the anti-submarine role, and in containing Soviet submarines, and about cost effectiveness as it applied in those days, I could have made a better argument for nuclear submarines than I could for surface vessels. The problem we have had with the frigate is that it was almost duplicitous, in my judgment, for the Navy to be trying to go through with the programme for \$264 million per batch when many people such as myself realized that \$500 plus was more the real price. It reminds me of a little story about the fifties, I think it was: the Navy bought a new telephone exchange for Halifax CFB, and then they realized that they didn't have a building to put it in. They went back to Treasury Board for a building to put it in and the building was going to cost five times what the telephone exchange cost, something like that. A letter came back from Treasury Board, it was almost like the old classic letters you used to read about from the Naval Board in Britain, which would say: "My Lords of the Admiralty view with growing concern". This is what our people said: "Members of the Treasury Board do not appreciate being asked to provide a building for so many million dollars to house a telephone exchange, given that the Navy has already committed itself to a telephone exchange at about a quarter of the price. In the future make sure that the total implications of a programme are brought forward."

[NIXON] It's called a General Purpose Frigate. Another point of interest here is the weapons system, the Tartar missile system. The Tartar missile system was pretty large for that size of ship. The US Navy had them, using them as part of a total, structured, layered approach. The top of the layer was the aircraft flying off an aircraft carrier; the next layer down was the Talos, which was a very big missile with a very long range; then there was the Terrier; and finally we come to the Tartar. It formed part of a total carrier task force. But I had very great doubts as to where it fitted into the Canadian Navy, because it determined the layout of your ship, the layout of your operations room, the size of the magazines. It just became the controlling element. So I asked the question: "Under what circumstance is the Canadian Navy going to be in the situation where that type of system would be of fundamental use?" And I didn't get very good answers, because if you want to protect the ship, you use defence weapons, which are much smaller things; and you also use ECM (Electronic Counter Measures). So I actually developed the impression that this was more of a prestige thing, that it wasn't really justified; and so again I had elements of doubt. And finally I decided that the best thing I could do for my peace of mind was to leave the Navy, because I thought that there were other serious national problems to be tackled. This was the time of the Coyne Affair, and a time of real economic problems in the nation. I thought that such talent as I had could be applied as well elsewhere as it was being applied in the Navy, and I decided to leave.

[HILL] I still have one question, and I think Nancy probably has another, on your period of naval service. It's really a continuation of what we were just talking about. What I was wondering was: how close were the relations with the US Navy and its anti-submarine warfare operations at this time?

[NIXON] They were extremely close, for several reasons. Firstly, at that time, if you go and look at the tables, Canada was more than pulling its weight in its defence budget, and most of its capability was available to be used for NATO if that was required. Secondly, because of our location in the North Atlantic and the legacies, the lessons, of the Second World War, in anti-submarine tactics and in anti-submarine equipment we were as good as anyone. Thirdly, we were the ones who introduced the shipboard helicopter. The Americans thought we were absolutely mad, and so did the British, because we suggested flying rather large helicopters off these small ships.

[COX] Using the bear trap?9

[NIXON] The bear trap. That was a completely Canadian invention. So we were very highly regarded. Also keep in mind that variable depth sonar, which you drop over the stern, was again a completely Canadian invention. We had to figure out such things as how to recover it and what domes to put it in and how to keep it on the end of a wire so that it was always pointing ahead and not just twisting around. A very good friend of mine was the main inventor of that. So we were very highly regarded because we were putting our money where our mouth was, you might say, and we had some capabilities which the US Navy didn't have. So the relationship was very good. And there was an extremely good exchange of information, practically no-holds-barred, which I can't say applies today.

The "bear trap" - a device for hauling down and securing helicopters onboard small ships such as frigates or destroyers.

[HILL] In regards to the relations between the Canadian Navy and the US Navy, and ASW, in this period, were we linked into things like SOSUS and so on or did that come later on? Is the link between Canadian and US ASW operations so intensive that it would be hard to separate them one from the other?

[NIXON] I would say that we probably were in that state of affairs; but as I did not have a "need to know", I did not know at that time. I'm just saying that I believe we probably were.

[PAWELEK] I have one general question. It may be going back a bit to your comments about the budgets in the late fifties. The Fifties have been seen as sort of a "Golden Age", both in Canadian foreign policy in general and also for Canadian involvement in NATO. There was strong support for NATO, Canada had some of the best trained military forces and best equipment in the Alliance; also Canada had considerable influence on the diplomatic front. I mean, we were certainly influential in the 1956 Suez Crisis.

[NIXON] And also in the origination of NATO itself.

[PAWELEK] Do you agree with that kind of assessment, first of all? And secondly, do you think that we should try to get back to that kind of a situation again?

[NIXON] Why would we want to get back to that? If you had asked the question slightly differently, if you said, do I believe that Canada should be trying to share a proportionate load in world affairs, I'd say: "Very definitely". But circumstances have changed since the 1950s. In the 1950s Europe was destitute. For example, in Korea the British got along with unbelievably wornout equipment. That country was just as destitute as Germany was, if not more so, because they didn't have the Marshall Plan in Britain. The Germans at least had the Marshall Plan. But as Germany and the Benelux countries and France got up off their knees, obviously we couldn't play, we'd be naive to expect we'd still have to play, the same part. Keep in mind that at the end of The War we had the third largest navy in the world, and that was obviously overtaken by all kinds of events. It was the same thing at first in NATO; we had 300 Sabre aircraft over there because nobody else had them then. The Brits could not afford them. So I think that we would be out of line to think that we could ever come back into the same position we had in world affairs at that time. That doesn't imply that we shouldn't produce or contribute more in various ways, not only in the defence field, but also in terms of economic aid, for example. In the aid field we're certainly doing a hell of a lot more, per capita and per GNP, than many other countries are, so we've shifted our emphasis. My concern is that I look on the deterrence/defence contribution as a pre-requisite to achieving some of the other things. I don't think you are going to solve some of the North/South problems until you have a reasonable degree of stability in the East/West dimension.

[HILL] In other words we should be doing what is a sound role, commensurate with our size?

[NIXON] Roger, I coined this expression before Carter used it. I used to get so furious with the Treasury Board, about "guns or butter" - "Can't afford it and so on." I said: "Look, you talk about defence as though it is a free choice, you can have it or not have it."

"The most important social programme you have is the programme which allows you to have freedom of choice in social programmes. And that is your defence and deterrence." That may sound like a hard line, but that is where I come from. To put it another way, what would be the result in NATO if they all took the same attitude Canada does? Secondly, can you protect the

institutions, processes and values of free countries? Can you protect that separately? No, you have got to do it jointly. We tend to forget that occasionally.

The point here is that the first responsibility of government is the preservation of the state, and we should never forget that political science fundamental. Defence is not a free choice. In our case, faced with a deterrence/defence requirement within the Western Alliance, we do not have a free choice for ourselves. It is largely reactive to what the other countries are doing. That is what caused the formation of NATO. We were reacting to the fact that the Soviet Union did not follow through with the Yalta accord. It did not allow free elections in Eastern Europe, it overthrew what leadership or what freedom there was in Czechoslovakia. Finally we said: "Look, we have a problem on our hands".

[COX] You have made a very powerful case pointing to the relative decline of Canadian military capabilities, and perhaps this is just. But if you take that period, the early Sixties, is there some way to measure the absolute decline in, let's say, our naval capabilities, or indeed is there an absolute decline?

[NIXON] The technology and the capability of the potential opposition has moved ahead, so there is certainly a relative decline. The absolute number of ships hasn't changed. As I said publicly just last week at the University of Manitoba, even these old ships that we have, when it comes to action or anti-submarine capability, don't knock them. They may be awfully old, but there are few ships that as surface vessels will do much better in anti-submarine warfare than they will, even today. So I am really talking about very much a relative decline. But a point that is important here, referring to that period we have just talked about, is that we were, I think, going through a transition towards a new sense of being a nation. We became much more concerned about our own affairs and about our own development, for example in the economic field. I believe we gained a sense of national maturity in that period; and that came because of what we were doing in the Colombo Plan, in NATO, and in tackling the work of national development - economic development, and so on. All that started to come into play in the latter part of the Fifties, because the Cold War had cooled off a certain amount and the Soviets didn't look quite as forbidding as they had during the Berlin Crisis period. Things certainly heated up again with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, but that was a momentary blip, really, as far as public sentiment for defence was concerned. So I think that the national feeling was that we had other problems that needed to be addressed.

[COX] Am I correct in thinking that, at that time, we still had the Bonaventure?

[NIXON] Yes.

[COX] For ASW? I mean primarily convoy defence?

[NIXON] Yes.

[COX] Not so much for chasing down their SSBN submarines?

[NIXON] That's correct.

[COX] So basically it is a convoy defence. We were thinking of the lines of communication, of reinforcement.

[NIXON] That's right. There are two things here that I'd like to get on the record, in this matter of SSBNs. I am not aware that it has ever been policy, either ours or NATO's, to even think about deliberately attacking SSBNs. I mean, think if one of ours went missing, we might be tempted to say: "Well, let's use the others before they go missing too." So I think that the idea of attacking an SSBN would be absolutely folly from a stability viewpoint. That doesn't mean you don't keep track of where they are, but you do as well as you can by SOSUS and with sonobuoys, etc. (If for no other reasons than for training purposes. There is nothing better to train with than a real live object. That goes on all the time).

[COX] What about the Bonaventure in particular?

[NIXON] I am glad you mentioned the Bonaventure, another cause of disillusionment and another piece of concern on my part. That one aircraft carrier, plus the aircraft, plus the naval air schools that we had to run, was eating up something like 40% of the total naval budget. Then you had to ask yourself what were you getting for this? You weren't getting a hell of a lot of capability, and particularly when we came to the time of helicopters operating from small ships. The helicopter changed the whole role of the destroyer escort in anti-submarine warfare. The most pointed, the most effective, fighting part of a DE is the helicopter. The DE itself is now just a small aircraft carrier for that helicopter. So I didn't think it was all that disastrous when we decided to do away with the aircraft carrier. That happened after I left, though.

[COX] Has the role changed? Did we shift away from using the maritime forces to protect sea lines of communication? Have we shifted from that to some form of coastal or Canadian waters patrol?

[NIXON] I'm glad you brought me back to that, because I am a strong believer in the concept of integration. I am not sure that, originally, I would have gone to full unification, or done away with the uniforms, but having done away with them I surely wouldn't go back to them. Now, on the strategic question, I cannot see how it would be at all that likely that the Soviet Union would deliberately contemplate, and plan for, and execute, any type of attack in Europe, a conventional attack, without some confidence that they could either break the sea lines of communication or that they could overcome NATO before the sea lines of communication could come into play. And it is for that reason that I feel that Northern Norway and the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea are the most important part of NATO territory, except Germany, as far as strictly deterrent capability is concerned. If we hold those areas and can control them, then I'd say the other side would think very seriously before attacking us. So to come back to your question, what is the approach now? The approach is still to maintain the sea lines of communication; but the methods of doing so have changed, that is to say there may not be convoys, there may be sanitized corridors. It may be very much hunt and kill, because if you take the combination of barriers and SOSUS and Tartars and the long distance listening devices they are towing behind ships now - and you put them all together and then tie that in with shore patrol aircraft, with sonar buoys and the helicopters, I'm not too sure that I'd feel too comfortable being a Soviet submarine commander. In fact, you know, I think that they could run the risk of losing five to seven submarines a week. You can't do that for very long even if you've got 300 of them. So I think that the idea of protecting the sea lines of communication is still fundamental to the strategy of deterrence.

[COX] Well, I wonder, just as we finish this period, coming up to 1963, if you could look back and tell us how you felt about the Khrushchev period? Did you see it as a period of reform, as it is now being categorized?

[NIXON] I am glad you asked that question. It brings back something which is, from a personal point of view I think, important in relation to some of the things I have said, some of the attitudes I have developed over the years. As early as 1946, I can remember going to a football game in London, Ontario (when I was attending the University of Toronto for a year). And I remember talking to a group of my fellow students. You know, this was the kind of thing a bunch of engineers were talking about in 1946. We talked about the Soviet Union. I had read my first book about the nature of Soviet society and there was something in it about the NKVD. I was absolutely horrified. You know I am not a history student, so I had no perception of Soviet Russia or what historic Russia under the Czars was like. But I came to the conclusion then - and this may now sound simple, obvious, a cliché - that the longer we live with the Soviets and learn to understand them, the better we will get on in the future. That has influenced me over the years, and that is why I've always felt that the more relations we have with the Soviet Union, the better our prospects will be, providing we do it on terms and conditions which we find acceptable. It seems to me, however, that in practice we very often conduct our relations with them in a manner which is completely in their favour. Now as far as the Khrushchev period was concerned, I was not conscious of his attempt to reform the Soviet system, and I am not sure how many other people were conscious, in the West, of his attempt at reform, except those who are true Sovietologists. So I would say that it didn't have any impact on me at all at the time.

Part II - Department of Industry, 1963-1966

[HILL] Well, we are now moving on to Part Two, which is your period at the Department of Industry from 1963 to 1966. Mr. Nixon, you presumably held a number of different positions in that time. Could you tell us what they were, what your work involved, and whether you were working on defence questions, foreign affairs, NATO, any of those kinds of issues?

[NIXON] Well, when I left the Navy, I left because I had rather lost confidence, or faith, in the leadership. I had not lost my concern about deterrence and defence, but I felt that the way that they were being approached was not very productive. The country was going through a very difficult period of economic development -as I said, it was the time of the Coyne Affair and so on and I felt that I might be able to contribute more in the economic development field than I was able to do in defence. So I went to the Department of Industry and worked on the development of the electronics industry. That involved examining different proposals with various companies and trying to convince industry to do foreign marketing. For example, one of your biggest and most promising companies at the time had practically no offshore business, and we did our best to try to get them involved and to convince them they should have a strong international operation. That company has subsequently become one of Canada's greatest exporters of high-tech products. I was in the development of new products and so on. True, some of these did have a defence application.

Now, as far as the defence side in general was concerned - and this even applies to the PCO - when I left the Forces I made a very definite decision and commitment to myself that I would not be involved in anything to do with defence policy or defence matters, because I felt so seriously and so deeply about it. I seemed to have different views from those who were running it, and many of those who were still in the Navy were my friends and former cohorts, whose opinions I respected. For example, when I went to the PCO I had nothing to do with defence matters all during the debates on unification, integration, and defence budget cuts, leading up to the 1971 white paper. I had nothing to do with those whatsoever.

[HILL] I think we will come onto that shortly, but I did want to ask your own personal views on the 1964 White Paper, because that had quite a lot of implications. You already touched on it a

little bit earlier. It maintained Canada's commitments to NATO, but in fact there was already a shift going on where there was talk about buying light tanks and having greater mobility and airmobile materiel and so forth. So what was your own personal view of it?

[NIXON] I do not recall actually having read the 1964 White Paper when it came out. I did read the 1971 one.

[HILL] You didn't think enough of it to read it?

[NIXON] No, there were two things. One is that I had to make a very conscious and a very hard decision to stand clear of defence, and the second thing is that, at that point in my personal development, things like White Papers were still unreal documents. In this town you want to buy a White Paper, you've got to know where to get it. You just can't go down to any book store, you've got to ferret the thing out. Like right now: how many people in the Government of Canada know where to go to get a set of the Estimates?

[HILL] I think it is easier now than it was.

[NIXON] Sure as hell is, but at that time White Papers and even Speeches from the Throne - even now try to get the Speech from the Throne - and I am talking about the rank and file. I am not saying that it is secretive, but I am just saying that it is not just there. And, at that time, I don't think even in the Forces they made a habit of passing them around and making sure that everyone read them.

[HILL] Funilly enough, I was in Montreal at the time, just before coming to Ottawa, and I think they were almost best sellers in Montreal. You could buy them in the old government book store which they had at that time down on St. Catherine Street, and I remember people really were interested at that time.

[COX] But you indicate that this was quite a dramatic shift in your career, and you were, in effect, at least temporarily, putting behind you defence policy.

[NIXON] There were so many of my friends and colleagues who were working hard, who believed in what they were doing, and I respected their opinions, but at the same time I found myself over here, and to have peace of mind with myself, I said, well, I have to shut that out. It was quite a conscious and deliberate attempt to put it behind me, never expecting I'd end up back in defence, not for a moment.

[COX] So the problems you had with defence were not about overall policy but about specific policies?

[NIXON] That's right, about how to use resources and what is the most effective way to do various tasks. I mean, should we have a General Purpose Frigate with a missile on it, which so far as I could see would never be used, or could never be used in an active environment. Think of it, in 1960, where would the Canadian Navy use the Tartar missile, and why would you construct a ship which is completely determined in its shape, size and configuration by that one device? At the same time, having gone through hearing that nuclear submarines may be not too good because they don't have a wardroom and don't have a quarter deck in which you can have receptions. You can't show the flag. I am not kidding you, that's the type of discussion that I actually heard from senior officers. The reason we had the Tartar missile was to deal with the Soviets Bear Delta

aircraft that were going to come out to attack us after a nuclear exchange. I looked at the Commadore when he told me that, and said: "My goodness, this man is mad".

[HILL] What did you think of the MLF concept. I mean, you must have had some interest in that?

[NIXON] I had not thought enough about the question of nuclear weapons control to have had any feelings. I think that, at the time, I probably thought that this is not a bad idea. More recently, when I got to know more about the problems of control of nuclear weapons, I may have had different thoughts.

[COX] Just a last question on that issue of resources. We all have opinions; and we don't always win. But did you feel there were opportunities, for restructuring, which would have permitted a more logical process?

[NIXON] Even at that time the answer is yes. What I would have done is this: I would have looked for a way -- and keep in mind you are talking about a pretty young commander, who did not know his way around the higher echelons -- I would have put the controllers of the three services in the Deputy Minister's office. But the problem was the Army didn't have a controller yet, and the Naval Controller Office was not that well developed, in other words it was just an extension of an accountant. You see it is only in the last, say, fifteen years, that the financial managers, the accountants, have developed the ability and the willingness and the necessity to look ahead as well as back. Now that brings you into one of the things which I think is extremely important, and you might find it interesting in your work, to look at the evolution of the management of defence in Canada. Historically, you see, you didn't have a Deputy Minister; all you had was the heads of the three services, and when they first had a Deputy Minister, it was made very very clear that his only responsibility was a financial one, just bean counting. Even after the war you had the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, who did all of the policy side, and then there was the Deputy Minister's Estimates Review Committee. And the Estimates Review Committee just dealt with the appropriateness and the thoroughness of the Estimates and the requirements. It had nothing to do with the substantiation of policy; and that persisted, I would say, even up to my time. I think that I was the first Deputy Minister who really interjected himself into policy, and I did it for a variety of reasons. One is because defence policy ties the Department of National Defence, and the Canadian Forces as part of that department, to the external affairs policy. You can't develop defence policies strictly with military objectives. You have got to do it with total policy planners. And I'd say that the Forces, after some kicking and screaming, have accepted that.

Part III - Privy Council Office, 1966-75

[HILL] I think that we will now go on to Part Three, which was your period at the Privy Council Office, from 1966 to 1975. I think you have already mentioned that in that period you were working mainly outside of defence issues. But could you tell us how your work at the PCO evolved, which positions you held at that time?

[NIXON] Yes, when I first arrived in the PCO, I was seconded from the Department of Industry because Gordon Robertson and Gerry Stoner, who was Assistant Secretary, and Michael Pitfield, were working to build up a better PCO, that would be able to provide a more complete link and interface between the bureaucracy in total and the Cabinet, as well as to provide that linkage interdepartmentally. I don't think that any of those people, particularly Gordon, wanted the PCO to start

calling the tune. It was just a matter of seeing that the necessary interfaces were provided, and that, when issues came to Cabinet, they had been thoroughly looked at from all dimensions inter-departmentally. When something arrived for Ministers' consideration, they shouldn't have only the views, for example, of the Department of External Affairs, or Energy, Mines & Resources. Each had to think about other aspects and about the national, Canadian perspective.

To do this, they felt they needed people with pretty broad perceptions and not necessarily experts, in every field they could imagine. I mean sufficiently broad that they could understand and communicate with the various departments.

I was initially brought in on economic, resources issues, but then two or three things happened. At that time all of the staff officers, or whatever we were called, took their own minutes, and they were all typed up by our secretaries in our own personal format. We all put out our own personal form of the agenda for cabinet committee meetings, and we all wrote the decisions in our own particular style. I looked at this, and I said this is absolutely ludicrous, this is really antediluvian. So I went to the document section, to the individual who looked after the Orders in Council and was called Chief of Documents or something like that. So I talked to him and said: "Look now, let's establish some order for Cabinet committees"; and he said: "Well, I haven't got approval to do it". I said, "Well, let's just do it, for me". So we started doing this, and putting out the agenda for all of my committees, Cabinet committee meetings, just exactly as though they were a Cabinet meeting, but they were on blue letterhead and blue headings, not red like the Cabinet; and the same thing with the minutes, and the same thing with the decisions. Well, this went on for a few months and Gordon finally one day looked at all this, and liked what he saw, and said, "Why aren't we doing this everywhere?". And I said, "Well, that's a good question". So the direction came down to get it organized. Some of my fellow officers weren't too happy that I had kind of preempted them, but it was just that I thought the system needed a bit of order. We had had ridiculous things; for example, my secretary would have to take all of the documents for a Cabinet committee and sort them out on her desk and put them all in envelopes. Yet we had a documents section at the top on the next floor that could have done it.

The next development that came up was starting to do some analysis, for example for Mr. Pearson. Now I think he only gave one speech on economic or financial matters in all the time he was Prime Minister. And he had asked a question: "How come during my tenure as Prime Minister the budget -- you know you're going to faint when you hear this -- has risen from 6 billion to 9 billion". Think what it is today! Six billion to nine billion from 1963 to 1968. So he asked this question, and I asked the boys at Treasury Board, and to my astonishment they couldn't tell me. So I took the Estimates of the day, and you know it's not that difficult, even though they were in quite a different form from what they are now. I was able to take the differences and say, well, now this programme and this programme and so on. So I relatively quickly established an ability as an analyst, that nobody else in the PCO really had, a numerical analyst as well as a factual analyst.

A constant problem in the PCO in those days, and I don't think it's changed now, is that something will hit the newspapers or there will be a document come in to the Deputy Minister of Finance and he will want to talk to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Secretary of the Cabinet, two or three other Deputies. Or the Ministers want to talk. But they've only got one document. And I had enough background in computering to say this is really ridiculous. In this day and age there's no reason why you shouldn't just be able to put that in a machine that we now call a FAX machine, and quickly have the material propagated around town so you could then have a telephone conference, with everybody knowing what they were talking

about instead of the way they were doing it then. So some of these radical ideas came into the system, as a revelation.

When Mr. Trudeau became Prime Minister, Michael Pitfield and Marc Lalonde felt that they should have some type of analytical capability in the PCO, not to second-guess the departments, but to look at either large things that embrace many departments or for putting together alternative approaches. A second need was to try to find a new way or different way, as compared with Cabinet documents, for getting the broad picture across to ministers. I don't know how many people realize what an impossible task we throw at ministers, when you ask them to go to a meeting and you give them a pile of documents about a mile thick and you really expect them to go and talk about them. Then you think about the departments, about the effort that goes into producing those documents, when nobody is going to read them except the one who wrote them, and even he doesn't read them any more than he has to. Its just appalling. So we established a Briefing Team, with the most innocuous name we could think of; not so much a multi-disciplinary team, but a team of curious people, drawing on individuals who had shown a high degree of curiosity either in their jobs or in the variety of education they had. We would analyze such problems as the Indian problem and the wheat problem. Remember Joe Greene established a task force around about 1968, with a professor from MacDonald College.

Well, we did some of this analysis, and we were using visual presentations. We had, in the East Block, a whole wall of six view graph projectors. The screens were about 8' x 4' and there were six of them, so that the whole width was about 24' wide and about 8' high. They were stacked in two rows of three. There had obviously to be two operators, one on the upper level and one on the lower level. You put together a whole presentation using view graph slides and you wouldn't just do 1,2,3,4,5,6 and then repeat 1,2,3,4,5,6; you would interpose and not just juggle them, but you were constantly wanting each new pictorial to be looked at in the juxtaposition of all the others. Some of these would be graphs, some of them would be pictures, some of them would propositions, some of it was like -- you probably have seen some of the material Herman Kahn put out at the Hudson Institute -- some of it would be like that. But the whole approach was to try to get the audience to think about this issue more broadly.

The wheat problem is a good example. The reason why Gordon asked me to tackle this was because there's no issue which takes more Cabinet time and is more confusing than Western grains. You see, Canada only produces about 4% of the world's grain and the rest comes from other sources. That comes as a real shock to some Canadians. That fact never got through in Cabinet decisions or Cabinet discussions. From what we produce, only half do we export. The second thing is that a good week's weather in China is worth more than our whole Canadian crop. The third thing is that the Canadian crop is less than one standard deviation of the world's grain supply. Only about 10% of the world's grain is traded, and only about 10% of the grain is stored. All of this involves cost, and the problem of either glut or shortage, and that's what you've got to work against in trying to form the wheat policies. We went through many other aspects. But when we put this to the professor from Macdonald College, he saw this, and he was absolutely stunned. He said, "My God"; he said, "We've worked two years with a whole group of experts on this and we've come up with a report about a mile thick and yet you, and 64 slides, have got a picture that we just can't touch as far as comprehensiveness is concerned". However, in the end most people didn't really take to our way of dealing with things. They really love to have classic hard copy to read. You see, there are not that many people who can use graphs and who can think with graphs.

[HILL] You were head of the Briefing Team at that time? Where did you fit into the higher governmental structure?

[NIXON] Well, I was working directly for Michael Pitfield. But when it appeared for a variety of reasons that the idea of an information analysis and presentation group in the PCO wasn't going to work as well as we'd hoped, Michael made the decision to move me to what he called Coordinator of Legislation and House Planning, and Priorities and Planning, which are the two main planning committees in the Cabinet. At the same time he made Michael Butler the Coordinator of the Operational Committees. You see, at that time, he was acting as Deputy Secretary of Planning, and Michael went off to Consumer and Corporate Affairs. Gordon asked me if I would be Deputy Secretary Planning.

[HILL] Didn't Michael Pitfield come back again?

[NIXON] Yes, he did, but that was in early 1975, March maybe. He came back as Secretary of the Cabinet, when Gordon moved to Secretary of Federal-Provincial Affairs.

[HILL] So it was Gordon Robertson during the early 70s?

[NIXON] That's right. I was still working for Gordon when I went back into dealing with defence issues. But, before we turn to that, one of the things I'd like to mention is the idea of the PCO doing planning. I don't mean a partisan type of planning. What we took on was the idea of listening to what the ministers were saying and then deciding what it all added up to. We said to them: if these are all the things that you've been saying during the election, here's how you could put them together in a programme which might do what you want. So that, when the ministers wanted a Bill, or when the government wanted a Bill, they had a Bill. I just said earlier today on another occasion that the shortest resource that you have in Parliament is parliamentary time. And yet it is the one resource which is not planned. For example, if the Quebec Crisis hadn't occurred, they might have had to close down Parliament because they had no legislation to put in front of it. What you have to try to do -- it might take you two parliamentary sessions to draft a piece of legislation -- is to get the policy worked out first and then to draft the legislation to implement the policy. So if you want to have it in this session, you may have had to start two years before to do that, and that means you have got to decide about two sessions ahead, not specifically which ones you're going to have, but which ones you should be working on; and naturally, as time gets closer and closer, you say, well, put more emphasis on that one, so it becomes more urgent. You see this is why I have so much difficulty with Mr. Wilson and his tax reform. Think about the last time we had tax reform. It took them two years to rewrite the Income Tax Act, ask Don Thorson. Can anyone tell me that they're going to rewrite that whole Income Tax Act between now and June, to say nothing about all the policy considerations that they're going to have to consider on that issue? That's a digression, but to come back to the point, I do think that that was a major part of my contribution in the 1972-74 period.

[HILL] Could I interrupt for a few minutes? 1972 was the minority government, wasn't it?

[NIXON] That's right. I was Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet in that period.

[HILL] So, it was that two year period then. And there was a period when the PCO was reduced, if I'm not mistaken. But afterwards there was a period of rapid growth, wasn't there?

[NIXON] That followed after that, really. I guess from 1966 to 1968 there was a little bit of growth, and there was probably a fair amount of growth after 1968 because the PCO expanded to

acquire a pretty good capability as an economic secretariat, a legislation planning office, a House-planning secretariat, a social policy secretariat, and a priorities and planning secretariat.

[COX] And was there a foreign and defence policy secretariat?

[NIXON] Yes, there was. But it wasn't very big. I think there were only two people in that. But at the same time, while I was distancing myself, or trying to stay clear of defence, they went through the whole matter of integration, unification, and then the refocussing of defence in the latter part of the 1960s, in 1968 in particular, followed by the three year freeze in the budget, the cutting of the Forces from about 120,000 to 90,000 or 80,000 (I think the official number was about 82,000, but the actual number was about 78,000). And then the unfortunate thing is that when they started to get out of the "freeze", they were hit by inflation of unprecedented size. And an arrangement had been made with the Treasury Board that National Defence should be given 7% growth, which was supposed to give them 4% for inflation and 3% for real growth, to try and get back on the re-equipment track, because at that time the equipment portion of the budget had shrunk to about 9% of the total budget. To keep Defence going and keep replacing equipment as it wears out or becomes obsolete, you need something like about 25 or 26%. In fact, now it may be as high as 30%. Anyway, it's a long way from 9%. Unfortunately, in 1974, if you go back, inflation just took off like a rocket.

[HILL] Now that was in 1974, just after the Energy Crisis?

[NIXON] That's right. So this undertaking with the Treasury Board was just completely inadequate. In the summer of 1974, in May, just when the fiscal year had hardly started, Defence knew they were in trouble. They went back to the Treasury Board, and the Board said there was no way they'd provide more money. DND would have to go to Cabinet. That decision was made in June, just before they packed up for the summer. And so they went off for the summer holidays. And then an interesting thing happened. I had on my staff Gordon Smith, who had written the White Paper, you probably know him, he's at NATO now. I also had Bill Teske who became Deputy of DRIE, and he was at that time Assistant Secretary of Priorities and Planning, and he had on his staff Bill Snarr. Now Bill had been in the Deputy Minister's office in National Defence and I think he had been in DRB, and then in Operations Research. These three individuals came to see me, separately, though I really think there was a certain amount of collusion; I never asked them this, they're all good friends. I admire them for it and for what they did. And they said to me, words along the lines: "We know what your personal views are about National Defence and that you personally will want to steer clear of it, but you happen to be Deputy Secretary of Planning for the Cabinet, and one of the most pressing issues that the Cabinet must address in its planning next fall, when they come back, is National Defence, because of this crisis in their resources".

[HILL] This being 1974 now?

[NIXON] Yes 1974. They said: "So whether you like it or not, your obligations in your current job require that you look at this". Anyway, I think it's wonderful to have staff to tell you what your responsibilities are, and at the same time do it well. I had to agree with them. Yes, you're absolutely quite right, and as I say the three of them approached me. So I dug into this problem. And that caused me to come to Gordon Robertson with the idea that the only way to solve this problem was to have what would be known as the Defence Structure Review.

Gordon Robertson looked at what was involved. National Defence was faced with an almost catastrophic financial problem, both in the short run and more particularly in the long run. So this

question came to Cabinet that Fall, and it was proposed to do a Defence Structure Review to see if we couldn't structure defence so that DND could do the job with fewer resources, and to look at what equipment there was and what could be done about commitments. I was directed to chair this Review, along with the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Syl Cloutier. That Review went on through the winter of 1974. Then in the spring of 1975, Cloutier went off to be Deputy Minister of Transport, and I was asked if I would be Deputy Minister of National Defence. Having left the place because I had lost a certain amount of confidence in the management, I felt that if I had any backbone or integrity I would have to accept it. So that's how I became Deputy Minister of National Defence.

[COX] So you became "The Management"?

[NIXON] Exactly. If you're given the opportunity, you haven't got much personal integrity if you turn it down.

[HILL] Do you have some further comments on this period?

[NIXON] I would like to pick up on at least one other point, because there were a couple of other events that were extremely important to the discussions at that time. The first one was that it was in the summer of 1975, I believe, that the Prime Minister visited Chancellor Schmidt. I have it both impressionistically from my own assessment, from the way that the dialogue went after that, as well as from some of the people from External who were personally involved with the meeting, that indeed Schmidt did lay it on the line, not in a threatening manner, but saying: "Look, Mr. Prime Minister, my friend Trudeau, if you want to have influence in Europe, and you want Europeans to listen to you, you had better recognize that, to Europeans, NATO and security and defence are of fundamental importance, even though they might not be to Canada". Point number one. And the second point is that until that time -- and this requires an awful lot more discussion which we will pick up next time -- there had been a tendency in National Defence to look at deterrence and defence or deterrence and war-fighting as one and the same thing, and to get sucked into the argument of short war and long war. Trudeau would ask repeatedly: "Is this going to be a short war or a long war?" Immediately you respond to that question, you are lost because you accept war as being inevitable. As soon as I perceived this, when I was in the PCO, I advised the Prime Minister: "You're asking the wrong question. If we get into any war, we have failed in the most important thing, and that's to deter it. So your question should be: "What posture should we have to deter war?" And that was, I think, a real turning point.

[COX] Just a quick clarification. Was the problem that, if you said it was going to be a short war, then the answer was that in that case you don't need very much in the way of defence. If you said it's going to be a long war, then that's hopelessly unrealistic, we'll never do that.

[NIXON] That's it. It was a Catch 22 type of question. You couldn't win on that one. [HILL] I'd just like to ask one final question for today. From what you say, I have the impression that Mr. Trudeau, at the time of the FLQ crisis, saw the need for the Armed Forces in a way that perhaps he hadn't seen it before. But then after that other problems came along, like inflation and so on. Then there was the impact of Chancellor Schmidt. What was Mr. Trudeau's general attitude to the Armed Forces?

[NIXON] I think the FLQ crisis bothered him. It bothered all of us. I mean the fact that our country got to the point of having to use things like the War Measures Act, and to turn out the troops. And incidentally, based on the information which we had at the time, and information that

has come forward subsequently, if we'd had it to do again I'd say do it exactly the same way. All this hindsight, you know, about you didn't need that, you didn't need this, that may be so. But go back and look at the newspapers, and go back and listen to the radio and watch the television of the day, and then ask yourself what you would do if you'd been confronted with that situation. The major wrong-doing, or bad turn of events, was the holus-bolus arresting that was done by the Quebec Provincial Police. But the interesting thing to me is that there were no law suits. People like Pauline Julienne and Claude Lemelin -- I'm not sure about Claude Lemelin -- but Pauline Julienne, I'm certain, was taken in. None of these people launched counter suits, they never even, as far as I know, went to the Ombudsman. It's beyond me why. They may have gone to see their lawyers and their lawyers may have said: "Look, you haven't got a chance". But I would have thought they would have gone through the motions, just to go through the motions, even if it was a lost cause. That's to me the one real unanswered question. I expected there would be 400 counter suits, that the government would be paying damages for these, you know these false arrests or whatever you want to call them, or unnecessary arrests, and that people would have just launched them if only to get public sympathy. If you look at some of the books about the period, by God we sure did the right thing.

Again, its completely impressionistic, but my feeling is that Mr. Trudeau just found it anathema to use force to solve his problems. I think he wouldn't feel that way about dealing with common criminals, or common crimes. I just think that he found it kind of appalling that you had to use force at home. But what was his quote? It was: "Just watch me", something like that; and that's the way he was, we saw that repeatedly. When he saw that something had to be done, if he couldn't see any other way of doing it, then by gosh he'd do it.

[HILL] Did he lose interest again in the Armed Forces, I mean after 1971?

[NIXON] I think that I would put as much blame on the Department of National Defence and to a degree on the Minister, for not addressing this issue in a way which would appeal to, or would be understood by, Mr. Trudeau. I'm thinking of the point I have just mentioned, about short war or long war, for example. They'd get sucked into that kind of thing, and they'd argue about it. They would talk about commitments to NATO as though these were something that were thrust upon us, as though they weren't Canada's commitments, as though they weren't Canada's undertakings. Even when I got there, the Cabinet hadn't been informed that there were two Soviet Yankee-class submarines sitting between Bermuda and New York, parked there all the time, with their missiles aimed at the continental United States, and perhaps eastern Canada. There was no constant Cabinet awareness, as there is today (you see it in the newspaper), about the Soviet Bear Deltas flying down the East Coast. Some of this, in my mind, was due to very narrow-mindedness on the part of National Defence, saying to themselves: "Oh, we can't let on we have this intelligence". It's asinine to take that approach. A Bear Delta crashed off southern Newfoundland on a Friday afternoon. I got a call from my information people, saying: "Look, this thing has crashed; we want to put out a press release on it but the security and intelligence people say, 'No, don't, because we might give away the fact that we knew it was there'." And I said, "For God sakes put it out, because, if you don't, some fisherman is going to do it and then you're really going to look like idiots". So that was done. But the attitude inside the Department about public awareness is sometimes remarkable. I went down to the East Coast after that Bear Delta had crashed and went aboard one of the ships; and Admiral Boyle made a hell of a good decision --that a Canadian ship should be in the search area all the time that the Soviets were searching for that plane and trying to recover it. I went aboard one of the ships for lunch and the young officers in the wardroom were complaining about this -- it was interrupting their training sessions, and it was playing havoc with their scheduled operations. I said: "You guys have to realize that for the first time in years

you're on the front page of The Gazette and The Globe and Mail every day. It's the first time for ages that the Canadian people have had a reason to think about the Canadian Forces; and you're going to throw it away?" The same thing with search and rescue. Search and rescue has been a responsibility of National Defence for years, and yet when I first got there, all they did was bitch and complain about it; and I said: "Look, these are human interest stories here. Every time somebody goes down, make sure that's written about. You don't write it, but make it possible for the press to write it". And they started to do that. Barney Danson, in his tenure, mentioned that his people were counting, for him, the publicity that National Defence was getting; and it was raised something like three-fold during the time he was Minister. Well, that's not a hell of a lot when there was nothing to start with. But that's the type of thing that I tried to do. We also decided to do an annual defence overview, to put out an appreciation of what had happened in the past year in the field of defence and security, in deterrence, including what had happened and the trends that had been perceived. Also we wanted to say what we should be doing about such developments. If you take a look -- you probably saw it when you were in NATO -- the British do a White Paper every year, the West Germans do a White Paper every year, the Secretary of Defense in the United States makes an annual report. That's what we started gradually to build up to doing from the time Mr. Lamontagne became Minister. The press never cottoned on to it. If you go back through Lamontagne's first year as Minister, there was a statement. It was the first time there was a statement of policy made through the House of Commons Standing Committee. And the next year it was a bit more comprehensive. And finally Jean-Jacques Blais put out that little golden book which you're probably familiar with. Well, that's the first time you had some kind of a bound volume since 1957.

[COX] Which document are we discussing?

[NIXON] I'm talking about the Minister's statement to the Standing Committee. There was a little gold book which you will probably find in this library. It was by Jean-Jacques Blais. It described what had happened in NATO, in East-West relations in the past year, what Canada's forces were doing about it, and so on. That's what had been lacking. The people in Defence were sitting around as if they had a God-given right to have a certain percentage of the budget, and to get it without having to explain why. Now, when I was in the PCO, Michael Pitfield and I and two or three others worked out a scheme, which was eventually implemented, for a Multi-Year Operational Plan (MYOP) and a Strategic Overview. The strategic overview was a vehicle requiring each department to make an annual report, through the Minister, to the Cabinet committees, on what had happened to agriculture, in the past year, both in Canada and abroad, and what did that mean for the Canadian Department of Agriculture; and what should we be doing about it; and so on. I think this is a fundamental requirement for rational planning. Now this government has put it aside, but I believe that, if they're in office long enough, they'll realize they need it.

[COX] Were these private documents, or are they public documents?

[NIXON] They're Cabinet documents, so they're private in that respect. I don't know how they stand with respect to the Access to Information situation. I think they would probably remain private, being Cabinet documents.

Part IV - Deputy Minister, National Defence, 1975-82

[HILL] Mr. Nixon, in 1975 you were appointed Deputy Minister of National Defence, a position you held for the next seven years. I have the impression that this must have been a great satisfaction to you because of your previous service career and because 1975, it seems to me, was

in many ways a turning point in the country's defence affairs, when Canada put aside some of its earlier doubts and hesitations about its Alliance commitments, took a new interest in NATO and NORAD, stopped cutting the manpower of the Armed Forces, lifted the freeze on the defence budget, and began the re-equipping of the Armed Forces. That's a bit the way I, looking at it from a distance, saw the situation. I wonder if you would have any comments on that?

[NIXON] Well, I think it's kind of stretching it to say it was a great satisfaction to me to become Deputy Minister of National Defence. I'd say it was a challenge, and when I use the word challenge, I don't mean in the usual cliché manner. I mean it truly. Because, as I indicated previously. I did have some serious reservations about the management of the Navy, at the time I left the Navy. And also I wondered whether I could really bring about change, or contribute to significant change, in the defence posture of the country. Also at the time I was appointed, the decisions which you mentioned had not yet been made. There hadn't been a real decision about a turn-around in Canada's defence efforts. There hadn't been a decision to put aside earlier doubts and hesitations, and stop cutting. The only decision that had been made was to have a Defence Structure Review. We were still in the middle of the Defence Structure Review, but almost every review we've had in Canada was not set up to solve the defence problem by putting more resources into it. The purpose of government reviews is usually to find a way to spend less on the subject, and this was still the case when I became Deputy Minister in 1975. In the Defence Structure Review, it was not a question of a short war or a long war, it was deterrence, and what Canada could contribute to deterrence, and that was the primary point. The other point which started to emerge at that time is that we are not just protecting the geographic entity known as Canada, and we are not just assisting the European NATO allies to look after the geographic entity known as Europe; we are defending and protecting the values, processes, and institutions that we have as free nations, which are not at all admired, really, by the Soviet Union. And that we can't do alone; no nation can do it; no free nation can do that alone. We must do that in concert. Well, that feeling started to come through more, I think, in the 1975 era, with the Defence Structure Review; and the Defence Structure Review really came down to discussing with the allies such ideas as specialized forces, I mean just having land forces or maritime forces or air forces. And the NATO response was: "Don't change anything, just keep on doing what your doing, but do more of it". And that's essentially, I think, the response that Mr. Beatty has had from his NATO allies, until he pressed the point and came up with his White Paper and moved us out of northern Norway. Well, he's obviously convinced, because he's just told his NATO allies that it's going to happen.

[HILL] But the Defence Structure Review, was this a regular process or was this a sort of one-shot affair?

[NIXON] It was a one-shot affair. And, as I indicated, it was introduced because in 1974 inflation overtook the defence budget so dramatically that the Department of National Defence had to make some urgent moves even within the year. We closed a whole string of radar stations, and stopped the procurement programme. At that time the procurement programme only amounted to 8.9% of the total defence budget. If you look at Britain, West Germany, the United States, putting aside their nuclear weapons, their expenditures on their equipment programmes at that time were probably running in the order of about 25-26%; and they're now probably running around about 30%, because of the escalation in technology.

[HILL] But, as you indicated just now, the Defence Structure Review was initially intended as a means of finding ways of cutting costs.

INIXON] It didn't work out that way primarily because we showed that, if we were to have Forces at all, we really couldn't have less than what we had. And incidentally, when I said that, I don't mean just from a NATO point of view, I mean even from a Canadian point of view. We had just three brigades in the whole length and breath of the country, and about 24 destroyer escorts, and, I believe, about 175 first line aircraft (or it may have been as much as 225). It would have been pretty hard to propose smaller numbers. So first we established the numbers of operational units, and then the next question was to look at the capital equipment; and all of this was put to Cabinet in the response to the Defence Structure Review, as a Cabinet decision in this case: and this came after I became Deputy Minister. The decision was that the Forces would maintain their activities at the prevailing level. They were to be funded "clear of inflation." This is important, because it is a matter of the way inflation was defined. And it was also agreed that the capital equipment programme would be increased by 12% per year. Keep in mind that the capital budget was very, very small, it was only about \$300 million at that time, whereas today it is around about \$2 1/2 billion, even allowing for inflation. And so, when you put the 12% on the \$300 million in real terms, you're only talking, the first year, obviously, about \$36 million of growth. which wasn't very much.

[COX] Just to get that straight -- the formula was inflation for the other items, and 12% real on equipment.

[NIXON] That's right. Just before I arrived at National Defence, they had developed what they called an Economic Model, with a comparable thing to the "consumer basket of goods" - the "defence basket of goods". They had developed the Model to estimate it, both estimate it and also measure it retrospectively. They looked at the inflation on the defence product, and it came out to, and has consistently been, about 1.2% higher than the GNE deflator. And the way the Cabinet decision was interpreted, which is the only way it could have been interpreted, was that the defence economic model deflator was the one that you would use. And that was used for four years. Its a bit of a digression from your point, but while I'm on it let's finish it. The process that was followed because of that Cabinet decision, which came in 1975, and it was followed until 1979, was that every year we would work out the inflation for the year and that would be applied and the real growth would be allowed for, and so on. (Incidentally, this economic model was reviewed by the Treasury Board, by Stats Canada and by the Department of Finance, and they accepted it as a valid method, so it did have some credibility. So for those years I mentioned, we would do our estimates -- and the Treasury Board Secretariat, naturally would check it out). If, during the course of the year, inflation turned out to be less than what we had forecast, we would voluntarily let lapse the amount of funds difference; and equally well, if it was more, then at the end, in the Supplementary Estimates, the difference would be made up. That worked very well until 1979. And in 1979 there was a move afoot, primarily from the Department of Finance, that National Defence should not have that defence deflator, they should use the CPI or GNE deflator. A proposal to make that change was tried in 1979, but it didn't stick. Then they then came back again, after I left, and the GNE deflator has been used in recent years. So when you see the figures in the Budget or the Estimates, and the Minister of Finance saying that the real growth for National Defence will be 2%, and inflation is let's say 4% by the GNE, he really means that the real growth in the defence capability will only be 1%, because the defence deflator will in fact be 5%, that is 4 plus 1.2%. So what has happened, in my view, is a real, insidious attack on the defence budget, through this twisting of the decisions. But you get some people who will say that a decision of 1975 no longer applies. Well, maybe it doesn't apply. But don't call it real growth in the defence budget. If it's real growth in dollar terms on the GNE, yes. But is it real growth in capability? No, it's not.

[NIXON] It started, actually, I'd say in the fall of 1974, and it persisted through to about July or so 1975; and I was appointed Deputy Minister in May of 1975. It was chaired jointly by the then Deputy Minister Sylvain Cloutier, and myself, as a Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet. The type of things we got into were: should we or should we not have tanks? Now I can't pinpoint the document, but there was a position of the government, in about 1968-69, that the Canadian Forces should not be equipped with any big weapons or devices which would not be utilized in Canada for the defence of Canada or for aid to the civil power or similar. Well, as the only threat to Canada is the threat from strategic weapons, the question raised was: should we have tanks? You surely wouldn't need tanks in Canada for insurrections or anything like that, or for aid to the civil power. And the Centurions were getting very, very old. So the question arose: should we or should we not have tanks? During one of these discussions of the Defence Structure Review, someone said, in exasperation: "I don't give a damn whether we have tanks or don't have tanks, but what I want is a decision"; and my response was: "If you keep that up, then you'll probably get a reply that you won't like, and that is no tanks". But it went through this, the whole matter of tanks, and in the end it came out: "Look, with the commitments we've got, we can't really change the formations that we have"; and then it went into the number of operational units, but not extensively into costing. The Department was given the 12% real growth in the capital programme to start to overcome deficiencies. Incidentally, there were people who felt we should have had a lump sum increase to get on with tanks and the LRPA, ships, and new fighter aircraft, everything, all at once. You just can't do that, though.

[HILL] No. I guess not.

[NIXON] There is one other point about the Defence Structure Review which I neglected to make. The Cabinet, in deciding on the capital budget, also directed us to come back with a paper on the size of the Forces, on the number of personnel, because the Forces felt at that time that they were not only over-tasked, but also suffering because the units that they had were extremely lean and sparse. For example, in the air group, particularly in the technical fields, they had holes in their establishment which needed to be filled. So the Cabinet told us to come back with a personnel review, and I don't think we got back with that until 1976. But when we, the Department, looked at this question in depth, we found that, aside from holes in the operational units, there were also problems in all the support units and so on. By the time we finished, it looked as though we needed about 5,400 more people. Keep in mind that at that time there were only 78,300. So we made the case for 5,400. It was cut back to 4,700, and the decision was then made that we would increase by 400 per year. That's why, over these intervening ten years, you've seen the strength of the Forces rise from 79,300 to about 85,000. When the Conservatives came in, they increased the numbers by another 1,600 over the 85,000.

[HILL] Presumably it was mainly the policy planning staffs in DND and other government departments like Treasury Board and so on who would be involved in this review?

[NIXON] Yes, it was. On the Defence Structure Review, it was Defence, PCO, Treasury Board and External, primarily.

[HILL] I would like to go on and relate this to another point, because what I'm looking for are the factors leading to the turnaround. Obviously the Review played a significant role in it. But also there's the question of Mr. Trudeau's visit to Europe that summer, in 1975, or perhaps the spring, to see about promoting the Third Option and the Framework Agreement with the Europeans.

And then there was this famous conversation with Chancellor Schmidt, and I believe with some other people. I wonder if you could tell us something more about that?

[NIXON] Well, I only know of that from second hand, from the people that were on the scene. Yes, the conversation did take place. It certainly seems to have had an effect. As I understand it, it was along the lines that Europe's relationships with Canada have a very large military dimension to them. So, if Canada wanted to maintain good relations on the trade side, we had better think very much about the total relationship. That's simply the European reality; the military situation has been so much a part of their history, they were born with it, raised with it, educated with it, they lived with it every day. And I found, certainly to my astonishment, in 1975, when I visited Holland and especially North Holland, that the Dutch were far more aware of what the Canadians had done in the Second World War than most Canadians are.

[HILL] Well, I know that, living in Belgium for a few years, we found that too. The Second World War is still very alive there in a way that it isn't here.

[NIXON] Have you been to Bruges and seen the big buffalo, at the eastern gate to Bruges? I have to confess I haven't been there. I've seen pictures of it. There's a huge Manitoba buffalo. That's because Bruges was liberated by the 12th Manitoba Dragoons. That's where I started my military career, in the militia with the 12th Manitoba Dragoons, and their badge is this great, huge buffalo.

[HILL] When did that come, roughly, do you remember, that conversation between Schmidt and Trudeau?

[NIXON] It was either shortly before, or it could have been after, the Cabinet made these decisions.

[HILL] So it wasn't a fundamental thing in getting the Cabinet to change its thinking about where defence was going. Or was it?

[NIXON] I don't think so. But what it did do, I guess, it made the Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau, more receptive and more understanding when we came forward with individual papers, subsequently, on the LRPA, and on personnel, and so on. Because I think that the decision following the Defence Structure Review wasn't that onerous, or wasn't that monumental. What they said was: "You just keep on doing what you're doing and we'll find you the money, free of inflation. And we'll give you 12% for the equipment". And 12% on the equipment, as I had just mentioned, is only \$36 million.

Incidentally -- another little digression -- that method of handling inflation in the Canadian defence budget, in my judgment, is far superior to the way the Americans handle it, or the way the rest of the Government of Canada handles it. They didn't have things like economic models, and I believe they suffered badly and had their real capability reduced because of inflation and not having adequate provision for it. I should mention how some of these things are handled. I remember the fights that I used to have with the Treasury Board and the Secretary of the Treasury Board. They were monumental. I guess the problem I had was that I knew from my economic studies that the revenues of the Department of Finance have an elasticity greater than one, with inflation. That is, the Department of Finance is better off with inflation higher than forecast; and yet the nonsense and the hypocrisy I used to get from the Secretaries of the Treasury Board was that we couldn't afford this and we couldn't afford that, because of inflation." And I said: "That's bloody nonsense, you can more than afford it; in fact you can afford it better with inflation higher

than forecast, than you can with inflation as forecast." It's absolutely dishonest not to be compensating the departments for inflation, so that they can maintain their purchasing. But that myth got spread to the public of Canada, though it was bloody nonsense. We could afford it. If you want to reduce budgets because of expenditure restraint, that's a different matter. If you want to reduce expenditures so as to contain the forces of inflation, that's a different matter. But it's not that you can't afford it because of inflation. And that's the type of argument that I used to run into. I used to argue with the Treasury Board on this matter; whether we should use the defence deflator or the GNE deflator.

[COX] Could I just ask a supplementary question here that concerns the tank. Prior to the Trudeau trip to Germany, was that issue of whether or not to have the tank still an open one?

[NIXON] Yes. I think it was, because the decision to replace the tank wasn't taken until into 1976. That's a very interesting story. We got into this ridiculous situation where the Canadian Forces -- supposing they didn't have tanks -- could have been fighting alongside troops that have tanks, and could have been fighting against troops that have tanks. The only way you could train to work in that environment would be to have some tanks yourself, for training. So we could have gotten into the ridiculous situation of having to have tanks at Gagetown to train the Canadian Forces, but not having any tanks in Europe, which would just be ludicrous. Anti-tank weapons are a great thing --if you're going to be in a tank battle -- but one of the best antitank vehicles is another tank. One of the problems that we had here was trying to overcome this 1968-69 idea that you wouldn't have any equipment in Canada that you wouldn't have elsewhere. General Dextraze and I talked about the problem of trying to get this across to the Prime Minister. General Dextraze is a very persuasive individual and I thought he could present his case well, so I suggested to him: "Why don't you write the Prime Minister a personal letter, you're the Chief of the Defence Staff, and I think it's not a real violation of the mandate of the Minister of National Defence". And he said: "Yes, but how am I going to get it there?" I said: "I suggest to you that on Friday evening, in your staff car, you drive up to the gates of 24 Sussex Drive, and I can assure you you'll be allowed in. You get out of the car and you ring the door bell, and when the butler arrives, give him the letter and tell him you want the Prime Minister to read it". He did that; and I believe he got an acknowledgment from the Prime Minister the following week; and we subsequently acquired tanks.

[COX] Do you mind if I ask a further question on that? I recall that, around that time, I had just begun taking an interest in defence policies, talking to people who were very keen on the armoured cavalry concept in Vietnam, the helicopter troops, and so on. And I had the impression that, at least for a while, that was something that was being discussed actively within DND, at least until you tried to put a price tag on it?

[NIXON] The whole idea of armed helicopters never, to my knowledge, had any intensive examination in National Defence, which just astounds me, because I find that in 1987, not to be thinking about armed helicopters, was a bit archaic. In any of these fields there is a time when concepts play themselves out and its a particular thing with cavalry. Look at the cavalry regiments that stood at the ready all during the First World War and never had a cavalry charge as far as I know. And look at these large battleships that the Americans have just recommissioned. That is not by the will of the United States Navy, that's by the direction of Congress. And if you look at what they're doing with them, and the cost of running them, that's a hell of an expensive thing. I would also suggest that the F-15 Eagle may be the end of the big fighters. I also think that the tank, maybe, is coming to an end, partly because of the anti-tank weapons, which are precision munitions, guided munitions, laser guided, and so on. When you get to the point when you can pin-

point a tank with a laser and have munitions follow that laser beam down, then the tanks, considering the price of them, are pretty vulnerable things.

And, of course, armed helicopters can be very potent tank destroyers. Now that's a two way street, even with things like the ADATS weapons system. I'm not sure that I'd want to be piloting an armed helicopter myself, but if you could take a helicopter and put a fire control system on it, allowing you to fire CRV7 rockets, then my God you'd really have a potent thing.

[COX] Was DND shy about helicopters because they are too expensive?

[NIXON] Well, I think there were a variety of reasons. One was the problem of priorities. National Defence has trimmed procurements to the bone. I don't know whether I mentioned this the other day, but the way of procuring or allocating so much money to a system and then getting as many units as possible, whether they be aircraft or tanks, for that amount of money, has been a very beneficial thing. But what came out of this shortage of funds and shortage of tanks is the AVGP, which is the armored vehicle general purpose. We started off by allocating \$150 million to that, and expected to get around 350 vehicles; but we ended up getting 490, which was all to the good. When you say what did you do with the extra money, well, there really wasn't any extra. because the Canadian militia regiments hadn't had any tanks since the Shermans. The last time the Calgary Regiment -- which is the oldest tank regiment in Canada -- fired anything, was from Shermans in 1966. And so they were in dire straits, they just didn't have anything to train with. But in 1981 they were provided with some of these Grizzlies, which are the AVGP with the 76 millimetre gun on it, and that's the first time they had any real tank training and tank firing since 1966, almost 15 years. And the reason for the AVGP? There are a variety of reasons. One is that it costs so much less than a tank, it costs about a third of the price of a tank, and the second was that the operating costs are, equally, very, very low -- because of the tank tracks. A tank doesn't go very many miles before you need a new set of tracks. And the third reason is that many people, including General Dextraze, said that the situation in Europe had changed so profoundly in 1980. compared to the way it was in 1944. There weren't the number of hedge rows, there weren't the number of stone walls, there were far far greater numbers of roads. So that there wasn't the overall, overwhelming demand for tracks that there had been. I mean there was more place for wheeled vehicles. War had also moved to the point where you needed to have more and faster mobility, which requires wheels, and also the technology of wheeled vehicles had advanced so far. He thought that we should have a good try at wheeled vehicles, and so that's the reason why the AVGP was selected. Maybe I have stressed this a bit here because the Auditor General took a real good swipe at the AVGP in his 1983 report. But he never considered all of these factors, as to why, I think, it was a very good purchase.

[HILL] Could I go then to the equipment situation? By 1976 things had moved around. Anyway, the fact is that by then it was clear that the Armed Forces were going to be rebuilt. Now the problem was that there was a backlog of demands and the prospect of block obsolescence down the way. You were there in the Department, you had to look at the five year period, the fifteen year period and so on. Then you got into these re-equipment programmes, starting mainly with the long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA) and the Leopard tank. What I am wondering is: why did you choose these two items to start off with, and what kind of long term plans did you develop in this period?

[NIXON] The LRPA project was already under way. It was actually started, I think, around 1972. And, when I arrived as Deputy Minister, it was practically ready for going to contract. And that's when they found that they couldn't fit it in within the annual cash flow, it just couldn't be

fitted within the envelope which we had for defence equipment. Whatever we did we had to fit it in within our equipment budget envelope, and we just couldn't do that. And then we ran into all the ruckus, which you recall, of Mr. Goyer and Mr. Richardson, whether we're going to borrow money to buy the aircraft, or whether we're going to print promissory notes or whatever. Which is rather interesting, I think. Not only interesting, but extremely important with respect to where we are now, or where defence is at now. I took the position very early, in that episode of the LRPA, that if that project, which was a meritorious project, wasn't sustained, the possibility of sustaining any other one would be practically nil. We had to make the case with that one and get it established, because if the combined efforts of Treasury Board, Finance and all the counter forces could stop that, then they would stop any other one.

I also established the principle in National Defence that whatever we did, and whatever papers we wrote, we must be prepared to stand by those papers 5, 10 years later. In other words, what I was fed up with was what I'd seen in other departments, and also from National Defence, that is to say superficial arguments being used to substantiate a project, and then two weeks later people writing another paper which used almost counter-arguments to support another conclusion. And I said: "Well, look, we've got to be consistent!". And I also established a principle, which I think has certainly served me personally very well, that if we make a mistake in what we're doing, for goodness sakes don't make a second mistake by persisting in the first. And I found I made it very easy, not only for myself, but for the staff, when they realized that the people who were leading them weren't going to jump down their throats. They didn't have to defend, constantly, ridiculous positions, once they realized they were ridiculous.

But to come back to the LRPA, there are several dimensions to that fight. One was a proposal that we should not be trying to develop our own aircraft, that we should be buying the American aircraft, the P3C, update 3, which was not yet available, and that we should be buying it through foreign military sales. If you buy that equipment through foreign military sales, you go to the United States Navy and you say: "You act as our agent and you buy it from Lockheed". And they would say: "Yes, we'll do that, but if we do that you have to take all the modifications that we take and you have to take any increases in price that might come about in our negotiations with Lockheed". Because, keep in mind, the United States Navy does not order things on a multi-year basis, they order them one year at a time. We didn't particularly want the P3C, update 3. We had our own configuration which we also felt was better, and in fact I think the Americans who work in the field will say, yes, it was, and still is, better than the configuration that they have. So we were negotiating directly with Lockheed. Well, this turned out to be a little bit of a hair pulling contest between the Department of National Defence and the Treasury Board, and it was finally resolved between Michael Pitfield as Secretary to the Cabinet, Gordon Osbaldeston as Secretary to the Treasury Board, and myself, on the basis of saying: "Well, look, this is a departmental responsibility not a Treasury Board Secretariat responsibility." The Treasury Board Secretariat had made their case, the Department had shown why that case should not be followed, and so we chose the LRPA.

There was a cost-effectiveness issue here, I recall; Treasury Board argued that what we were doing wasn't the best use of funds, that the project office was biased, that it wasn't being objective, and so on. So I instituted a second review group, including a number of very competent people from the operations research group and from the operators. And they came out and said: "Hey, you're going in the right direction". I think that was tremendous, because, if I had a billion dollars to spare, as Deputy Minister I would immediately go out and buy more long range patrol aircraft. That's because of the importance of the sea lines of communication with Europe. We have to keep those secure. And two of the main contributors to maintaining those sea lines of communication,

I think, are the long range patrol aircraft and the SOSUS. Not so much now as then. Today there is the long range surveillance TACTAS detection equipment that you tow with ships. Maybe that is just as important now as the long range patrol aircraft back then, maybe a lot more important and maybe even more important than SOSUS, because SOSUS is a vulnerable system.

Anyway, that issue was solved. Then we ran into this problem of trying to go to contract, and there wasn't enough money. The issue went to Cabinet and after a lot of toing and froing they came up with the idea that, well, maybe we should get the banks to finance it. And I though this was absolutely ludicrous. I felt that, not being an economist, or a financier, the government of Canada should not go that kind of route. It should use its bonds and its treasury bills, and that's it. What they were really talking about was promissory notes, and I talked to Tommy Shoyama, who shared my feelings, as Deputy Minister of Finance, that we shouldn't do that. Anyway we did manage to get the Canadian banks involved and they looked at this situation and they decided in fact that they would be prepared to finance this acquisition. But they had one stumbling block, and that is, under the Financial Administration Act, I'm not sure exactly what the words are, but it's something along the following lines: "A contract is not deemed to exist unless it is covered by funds which have been appropriated by Parliament or is covered by an Estimate which has been presented to Parliament". Well, that would mean that any contract is not deemed to exist, has no legal status, except in the current year. The last time, and I think the only time, it has ever been invoked in Canada, was in 1929 in the Beauharnois scandal. I have argued that the Government certainly should be writing multi-year contracts. If they want to get out of one, then it should be by a negative legislative act, by actually voting in the Estimates that this contract will be discontinued, rather than the other way around i.e. that it doesn't continue unless it's covered in the Estimates. Even that is pretty woolly because none of these things, our contracts, are specifically listed in the Estimates; and I'm talking about the Estimates which form the basis of the Vote.

[HILL] Parliamentary Estimates?

[NIXON] I'm talking about the Vote wording. The Estimates placed before the House are the document I'm talking about, Part 3, which for the Defence Department is a document 1/2" thick, but there's only one page in it that is legally binding, and that's the wording of the vote. The other is only explanatory information for the parliamentarians. So this ridiculous law that we have, in the Financial Administration Act, makes it extremely difficult to deal with these things. Incidentally, that clause also connects up with the tank, which I'll discuss in a moment.

But the Chairman of all the Canadian banks met with Donald Macdonald who was Minister of Finance and Peter Troop from the Department of Justice and myself, and they made the pitch to Mr. Macdonald that they could in fact do this financing providing that this clause was moved. Peter Troop made the case along the lines that Tommy Shoyama and I had spoken about, that while it was not particularly prohibited in the law of the land, it certainly did not seem to be within the intent of the law to have this promissory note approach to government financing, in other words another quality of paper as a financier would term it. Mr. Macdonald used a word which at that time I had not encountered; he said the government must be "punctilious" in the application of the law to itself, and I admired that man at the time, and I've admired him ever since, because by God that's a principle I'd like to see applied more assiduously than it is applied. It's not really part of this question here but it is germane to the point in general. So, with Mr. Macdonald saying that, the bankers went away to think things over. I reckon at that point you might say that the Department had Mr. Macdonald's support for the fact that we had to find a way out of this situation. Anyway, after a number of hitches, we finally got the contract with Lockheed, and I feel that it's a case of

persistence paying off. And having won that, we then went forward to other ones, like the tank, and so on.

[HILL] So, in effect, having won that battle, having broken the log jam, then there were more funds coming available. Or, at least, the review having gone through, then it was easier to bring in the other projects and more a matter of scheduling than anything else, from then on?

[NIXON] Well, on the question of scheduling, you know we had to make some dreadful decisions. For example: why the tank? Well the tank came in with high priority because the Centurions were so badly used and worn out, that, whenever they went out on an exercise, the army was lucky if half of them could complete the exercise. This was constantly happening, and the options available were naturally costly. One was to rebuild the Centurions. Both the Israelis and the Swedes have done excellent jobs of rebuilding them. Or to go with something new like the Leopard. Well, the time-frame of rebuilding them would have been so protracted; and there was no one actually set up to do that type of work. We just felt that the thing to do was to go to a minimum number of Leopards. Incidentally, those first Leopards, they were leased from the Germans, and they came to the Canadian forces with all of the German markings on them. I'm talking about all the dials and gauges and all the instructions. They were in German. The first handbooks we had for the Leopards were actually Australian handbooks, because the Australians had bought Leopards and so they were available in English. So we got them from the Australian Army and not from Krauss Maffei who produced the tanks. Now again, when we went to buy those Leopards, we ran into this clause about no contract being deemed to exist, so the Germans had no insurance that we would continue with the deal. I mean no legal insurance. All they had was the word, the integrity of the Canadian Department of National Defence and the Government of Canada, that the contract would be allowed. That didn't really help Krauss Maffei to go to their bank. The bankers naturally want to have a legal document.

[HILL] Was that process changed afterwards?

[NIXON] No, it's still there.

[COX] When you bought the CF-18s, was the contract only for one year at a time?

[NIXON] No, we signed with McDonnell Douglas a multi-year contract; and McDonnell Douglas accepted it, that clause notwithstanding. They said, "Okay, Canada will honour this". You see, in McDonnell Douglas's case there may not have been a problem. They may never have got into a backlog of over-expenditure. I mean, as fast as they spent money, they claimed it from us, and we paid. So there was never a great financing requirement on their contract.

[HILL] In this period, it was not only the LRPA; you had a whole range of other things that were needed. Who decided and how did you schedule them in?

[NIXON] Let's talk about the what and then the how. The general principle that we used was to deal first with things that would not only stop functioning but could have catastrophic consequences. Tank stopping doesn't really cause any great harm, it just means that you haven't got the capability. But an aircraft stopping in mid-air tends to come down awful fast. And what we were running into with the 104s, and the Voodoos, was what we called fleet-wide faults. That is that one aircraft was found to have a problem such as a wing-flap problem (like we had on the 104s). So they found a fracture on a hinge. And, when they went and inspected four or five other aircraft, they found other fractures. And as soon as you find that, the air force has a fleet-wide

grounding until they figure out: A) how bad it is or serious it is, and B) which aircraft are affected. and C) what are they going to do about it. And, if they can't solve the problem immediately, the aircraft might be grounded for a hell of a long time. With the Voodoo, we had just seen it going from one complete grounding to another. So you've got to say: "Hey, not only are we losing our capability, but these things can be bloody dangerous if you're going to fly them". So the NFA (new Fighter Aircraft) came very high on our list of priorities, despite the fact that we knew the ships, too, were in bad shape (although, as ASW ships, they are still quite capable). But what happens to a ship if its engines stop, well it just sits in the water as an embarrassment. It doesn't sink, but you tow it home or it goes home on one engine. Everybody gets all excited because the boiler tubes are all burnt out, but you put new boiler tubes in and the ship goes back out. This is 1987, and when did we start hearing all those horrible stories about the state of the ships? About 1977. But they're still operating. I'm not suggesting that I condone their condition, but I'm saying that it has not been catastrophic. I'm talking about the principle, big things; but for every one of those there are ten minor things, lets say auxiliary power units. You may have some aircraft, but you can't run them because you haven't got any auxiliary power units; so you've got to get those. Just before I arrived in the Department, the old 1 1/4 ton trucks, the first cargo-carrying vehicle bigger than a jeep, were just absolutely beat out, and so DND made the decision to see what would happen if it just took a commercial 1 1/4 ton truck and beefed it up by putting in a bigger radiator and bigger alternators and a few things like that. And General Motors did stop their production line when they were between models one summer, and DND ran through several hundred of these trucks to see how they would pay off, because that's all they could afford. Well, it turned out that they certainly have filled a role. But it was also demonstrated that, even when you take a really good commercial product, if you start doing an awful lot of cross country work, and combat-type exercises, they don't stand up very well. They have their shortcomings.

The process is this: the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff has primary responsibility for creating, maintaining and looking after the force development plan of the Canadian Forces. That means bringing forth all of the equipment requirements and gradually putting those into an order of priority. One of the biggest problems that I had in the Department was first to get a list of the things they need and second to have some consistency in that list, so that the lists would be the same this year, next year, and the following year, except for the items that are replaced. What tends to happen is that every time a new, senior person comes on board, the list is changed, which just destroys the validity of it; and that's particularly the case with the Army. The Army has got a real problem because they have such a proliferation of equipment, except for the tanks and howitzers and a few major items (and even for those, they don't have the total programme cost as for a new fighter aircraft or a number of ships). So then the Armed Forces put down the list of requirements, and then put in there an order of priority, and then work that into a Foreseen Expenditure Envelope. Within the Army there's a combat equipment development group, that brings together the Mobile Commander in St. Hubert and the Chief of Land Doctrine and Operations here in Ottawa, and they come up with the Land list. And then there is an Air equivalent and Naval equivalent of that, although they are produced in different ways. Then the Deputy Chief takes those lists, he does his own review of them, and then he takes them to a Programme Control Board subcommittee. including not only operators but also the financial people and policy people, and also the engineering and procurement people. What they're trying to do at this stage is to establish priorities. Then the list goes to the Programme Control Board. The first thing is to get the list sorted out, and to place items within the programme, so that one can see how required equipment will be financed sometime in the foreseeable future (within the dollars that seem likely to be forthcoming). You see, that was relatively easy to do in the mid 1970s and in the early 1980s, when we knew what the forecast was going to be. But since the government has changed, things are not so clear. Some of their plans for defence expenditure seem to be pure Alice in Wonderland -- the current capital budget of \$2.5 billion is somehow or another going to shoot up to about \$4 billion within two years. You just can't do that. You have to have programmed expenditures, allowing for slippage, for programmes which don't go as fast as they should, and so on.

And after that first step, of setting up the lists, there are a lot of others, assigning personnel, developing cost estimates, fitting DND requirements within a total fiscal framework, and so on. And DND's requirements are also tailored to a Strategic Overview or a Policy Overview.

[COX] When you talk about a Strategic Overview or any kind of Policy Overview, where does that come from? How do they start to mesh?

[NIXON] They do mesh; and I'm glad you asked that question. The Strategic Overview starts from what has happened in the past year as well as from what the government has said about its policy in the relevant area. It also discusses what we should be doing in the future. You take that as your mandate and you say: "Okay, here is the perception of what's happening in the world or what's happening in our area -- what has happened in NATO and what has happened to the Warsaw Pact -- including not only the military side but also in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in the MBFR talks, and in the Stockholm conference on Confidence Building Measures." And you factor that in and say: "Okay, then, from the Canadian perspective, this is what we think that we should be doing". And that goes to the Minister. And the Minister is naturally the first person who inputs his ideas and says: "Look, that's not my perception. Go back and do it again." So what we constantly tried to do, year by year, was to point out to Ministers, what happened here, what is the situation, what are their options, and what are the consequences of the options. To be brutal, I was constantly trying to put them between a rock and a hard place. And the Minister agreed. Now, that was why, year by year, throughout all that period, the budget grew the way that it did grow in defence, and more so than in almost any other department. Mind you, if you take a look at the figures, though we started off in 1975 at about 1.8% of the GNP; we are still maybe at only 2.1%.

So, I'll just finish now on the question of the Strategic Overview. As you know, Canada's defence position is based on a 1971 White Paper. But a lot has happened since then, and as I've just outlined, every year the government looked at those developments in the Strategic Overview. True, there was not a public debate as such, but it wasn't as though they were just continuing with things as they were. The emphasis of defence policy changed over that period also. So it's not really true that our defence effort is all based on a 1971 White Paper. It isn't, it's based on a fundamental proposition, that every nation has to see to its own self-preservation: internal to the country; to the protection of its own geographic area; to the protection of its ideals and values; and to its contribution to the world's stability. Those are the four roles of the Canadian Forces and they are the four roles of any Force. They are just done differently in different countries. For example, on the international level, we do peacekeeping, the Americans do balance of power as the British once focussed on the balance of power. We see to the protection of our ideals, while in Europe the Europeans are protecting their ideals.

[HILL] Would you say the most crucial thing, in terms of Canada's military contribution to NATO, in this period, after 1976, was the fact that in that period you had a plan, a long-term plan, which you kept fighting for? As time went on, you got the resources that were necessary; and you had something coherent which went forward, in essence, in an upward direction.

[NIXON] What we haven't done is to relate the 12% real growth to the 3% NATO objective. At that particular time, when the equipment budget was growing at 12%, NATO pushed -- it started

in 1978 -- for a 3% real growth across the whole budget. Well, it just so happened that 3% across the whole budget and 12% on equiptment for Canada were almost the same. You may have noticed, if you looked at the historic record, that there was a sleight of hand, and Canada moved from 12% real growth in the capital programme to 3% growth on the whole budget. But most of it was put to capital for years. And that is why Canada had no difficulty in acceeding to the 3% real growth for NATO. Because we were already doing it. That is one contribution.

There are three others: the northern flank, the AWACS; and, in the late 1970s, the High Level Group. I'll deal with them one by one.

I'll take the northern flank one first. To the best of my knowledge and recollection, it was in 1968, when Canada made the decision to reduce its contingent in Europe by a half a division, to essentially a brigade, that Mr. Cadieux took on this obligation for a brigade to go to northern Norway (a quote unquote "paper commitment"), as well as the ACE Mobile Force. The impression that I had when I first got to the Department was that, despite the fact that NATO had a northern flank since it was formed, for many years there was no comprehensive plan for the defence of Northern Norway (and also despite the fact there is a C-in-C Northern Region). And General Dextraze worked on this question through the NATO Military Committee. He got SACEUR and CINCNOR to produce a plan for the area. And I believe that Canada's contribution to getting that plan established was a major, unsung, unrecognized, accomplishment. And even if we withdraw. at least we've done that. Look at the historic activity in Northern Norway, whether it's the Canadians, the American Brigade, the British Brigade or whatever. There has been more done on the development, and the exercise of the plan for the defence of Northern Norway, since Canada became involved, than in all the years before. I'm sure an awful lot of people will argue with that. but it certainly is the impression that I have.

[HILL] When was that launched?

[NIXON] Well, General Dextraze was CDS from 1974 until 1979. His term was extended, but he was unable to do anything until he got that Defence Structure Review out of the way. So he really started to push for the plan around about 1976, with CINCNOR and SACEUR. Until then he wasn't sure about his position in the Department.

[HILL] How do you mean?

[NIXON] Well, its often a very demoralizing position for the people at the top. Did I mention to you the importance of the task of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff? Well, from 1972 to 1979, there were nine Deputy Chiefs of the Defence Staff. So you can imagine the difficulty they had in producing a force development plan, with such a changeover of people. With that changeover of people -- in very important positions -- you are continually losing people who are only beginning to learn their jobs.

[COX] The CDS position is really end of career, isn't it?

[NIXON] Yes.

[HILL] Is that true for the Deputy CDS?

[NIXON] No. He could become either the Vice Chief or the Chief. Thériault, for example, he was DCDS, then he was VCDS, then he was CDS. Mainguy retired as VCDS. I don't know whether Mainguy had been DCDS or not? But Bill Carr went from DCDS to be Commander Air Command; then he retired. So, DCDS is not an end of the line position at all. It just depends entirely on how things turn out. Now, going back to the Norwegian question, the attention which Canada focused on northern Norway was a major contribution.

Another important thing Canada did was on the AWACS. The issue was this: how to buy it through NATO. And this surely did raise problems, because there never had been a NATO operational force with different countries involved. It raised questions such as: what country would you register the aircraft in for purposes of international law? I think they are actually registered in Luxembourg. And then the big issue was the contributions to the project, for example how to share this between the NATO nations. And then there were also the British Shackletons, an older early warning aircraft that they had. The British were not so enthusiastic about AWACs because it would mean their industry would be left out. Finally, the other point is that NATO's multi-national programmes had not really been the greatest of successes. The ones I'm particularly referring to are NADGE and NICS. One was a ground based radar station (its cost went up and up, right through the roof). The same thing was true as regards the with NICS, the NATO Integrated Communications System. There didn't seem to be any way in the multi-national operation to constrain a programme, to keep it within budget, to keep it within objectives, etc. It got loaded with people. These problems are bad enough in one country, but when you try to get many countries together they become almost impossible. However, the AWACS was needed, and work was done in the International Staff, and it transpired that NATO needed eighteen aircraft. The question came around to the issue of contributing to it. We are talking around 1977-78, remember, so keep in mind the low capital budget that we had. We made the decision to go to the Minister with our advice that the best deterrent use that we could get for our defence dollar was to be a participant -- and a substantial participant -- in this AWACS project. The principals would be the United States and Germany, but they wouldn't be carrying the whole burden. Italy was not in on the project at that time, so we came in as the third partner. We took ten percent of the project, which was far greater than our normal NATO share. On this question we went to Mr. Danson, I think he was the Minister at the time, to find out whether he also thought it was important. He talked to his NATO colleagues and he decided that it was in fact important. And so we went to the Cabinet. I believe that that had a profound effect, that Canada was there when the going got tough. A side effect of this development, in my view, was that Litton (Systems Canada Ltd.) was accepted by the United States Air Force as their second source producer of the guidance system for the Tomahawk cruise missile. I believe that that was because of Canada's contribution to AWACS. You wouldn't find that written anywhere, but I certainly have the impression that it was part of a gentleman's agreement. I'm sure you'd never find an American who would admit to that, though.

There also had to be an International Board of Directors for AWACS. When we made our commitment, we put some "barbed wire" around it, so to speak, to make sure that that was all Canada was going to have to give. We then had to put a member on the International Board of Directors, which are always dreadful things to work on. We put on John Killick, who subsequently became Assistant Deputy Minister of Materiel. But John is a pretty good project manager and he can be a really tough negotiator. When he knows what back-up he's got within the Department at the ministerial level, he can be really firm. And he went to the NATO meetings on this question knowing full well that there wasn't going to be another penny coming from Canada; and, moreover, that, if it wasn't managed well, then Canada would pull out. Through his tenacity and forcefulness, that project was the first NATO project -- and I think that he should take a great deal of credit and so should Canada -- that came in on time and on cost and with the performance it was supposed to have. No medals were given for that, but I believe that that's something Canada should really be proud of.

Now, I'd like to mention another Canadian contribution, in the NPG. Although we are not a nuclear nation, we have been a member of the Nuclear Planning Group for some time. Not all Allied nations are, but we have been. When the SS-20, the medium range nuclear missile, was introduced by the Soviets into Europe, in 1977-78, Helmut Schmidt spoke out, at a meeting in London, about the necessity of finding some type of response. He wasn't just talking about the SS-20; he was talking about the total, continuous, unrelenting build up of the Soviet forces. One response was the 3% growth rate that NATO decided on for all countries (it was initially to be for about three years, I think, but then it went on for five, and I believe it is still going on). However, the Soviets are now spending about 17% of GNP on their military, according to the latest data I have seen. Incidentally, I just saw this morning that they are spending more on the military than they are on health and education combined; whereas in our country, and in all Western countries, health and education combined are probably running five and six times what we're spending on defence; somewhere in the order of 18-19% of GNP for health and education

[HILL] Yes, quite a different set of priorities.

[NIXON] To come back to the High Level Group, when Schmidt made that decision, with the NATO leaders and the NATO Council and the Defence Ministers, to focus on the SS-20, they were also looking for a way to respond. I have the impression that our contribution to the High Level Group, primarily through George Lindsey, was to suggest, maybe along with others, the two-track approach. So what they responded with, as you know, was 108 Pershing missiles plus the cruise missiles. It was astute, because there's no way, shape or form, they could be looked on as first strike, even if you used the whole lot of them. But they do provide what I'd call a comfort blanket. You see, I look at one of the big threats from the Soviets as being not the actual aggression, but the suasion; the suasive use of force, to cajole and to make people capitulate without firing a shot. To counteract that, and make people stand up to that, you need to have, as I said, a comfort blanket. So I looked on the Pershings as the comfort blanket, but with the real deterrence being in the cruise missile. And I look on cruise missiles as being an absolutely first class deterrent, because, in my view, they have no first strike capability, because they go so slow, and people say. well, OK, they can be spotted. "Look up in the air. You can see with your own eyes. You don't need radar to see them." So I don't understand why people are getting so excited about them. As I said, they don't have any first strike abilities. And the fact that you can't verify where they are located, indeed enhances their deterrent capabilities. If you knew where they were located, then you could take them out. If you don't know where they are, then that adds another element of uncertainty. So you'd be very hesitant to move when you didn't know where anything was or where they'd be coming from. So I think that that two-track decison was an astute move. I think that Canada was a major participant in it.

Another area where we made an important contribution, I think, was in the use of Canadian bases Suffield, Shilo, and Goose Bay, for the training of NATO forces under circumstances and environments that couldn't be simulated or duplicated in Europe.

[HILL] I'd like to ask wether there are any other areas where you think that, over this period, Canada made a particular contribution to NATO? After that I would like to go on and ask: how do you see NATO, is it a good thing from Canada's point of view?

[NIXON] Another point to mention -- now this goes back several years -- was in the area of technology; also tactics, but particularly technology. You see, we were the originators of putting helicopters aboard ships; and when that was originally mooted, around 1960, the British and the Americans thought we were out of our minds, to put a large helicopter on the back of a destroyer.

Well, I guess you probably would be out of your mind unless you had also come up with a way to bring it down; and the way that this was done is called now the Beartrap. Essentially, when the aircraft comes in over the ship, there is a wire which is dropped down from the aircraft and that's put into a holder and the aircraft is just pulled down. And its pulled down under control. The aircraft is trying to lift, and in the meantime you pull him down, and get him on the ship, and then you have a mechanism to grab hold of the aircraft on a track basis. You see, now-a-days, an antisubmarine ship without a helicopter isn't a very useful weapon. Anyway, that was a Canadian contribution. And now, as you know, it's used by all anti-submarine forces. Our Coast Guard uses it, too. They use the same type of a pull-down mechanism.

Another item is the Variable Depth Sonar, the sonar that is dropped off the back of ships on a long cable - that's pretty much a Canadian development, right from the beginning. The reason for Variable Depth Sonar is that the ocean water is striated by temperature, and you have got to get down below these temperature layers in order to get good sound propagation. If you don't get down below the temperature layers the sound only propagates in the layer. But if you get down below the temperature layers, to where the submarines usually operate, then you get much better submarine detection and you also get a lot less surface noise. Background noise makes sonar extremely difficult. We worked out this whole development of the technology to get those things down and keep them down, and recover the cable, and keep the cable from breaking. You have a ball hanging on the end of a cable and you want to keep it pointing in the right direction, not spinning all the time. That's not exactly a simple thing, even when you put pins on it. That was a major Canadian contribution.

[COX] The Variable Depth Sonar means the ability to manipulate the cable to the depth that you want, and the expectation that you'll find the depth.

[NIXON] Yes, that is right. And the depth is found by putting a bathythermograph over the side, and that measures the temperatures as it is going down. So you get a temperature-versus-depth scale. So when you get the reading back, you can say that the place to put the sonar today is at one hundred feet or whatever it might be.

The other item to mention is that we developed an unusually good respirator, despite the fact we haven't got any chemical weapons in the Canadian Forces. The canister on it is going to have wide use throughout NATO. And still another one is the command and control systems, which are now universal. You see all these pictures of operators looking at screens. Canada pioneered that work in 1952 and it's now universally accepted. I had a fascinating job in about 1960. I replaced the head of the group that developed this system that we called DATAR; and when they demonstrated it in a 1953 demonstration where two minesweepers were fitted out with all of this computery, senior officers from all over the NATO nations came to see this. Every one of them was asked to comment on it after they had seen it. The comments went all the way from: "I've never seen such a load of stupid hardware in all my life and there's no practical application in an operational military theatre"; to the other extreme, that: "It is impossible to consider going forth with any type of operational units in the highly mobile war of the future without having this type of command and control system". Incidentally, the second type of comment was in the minority at the time. But that certainly turned out to be the truth.

Well, I think that that covers some of the major contributions that we have made to NATO and some of the major impacts that we have had. Then, when you ask, how has this served our purposes, well, this is where I come back again to: "What are we trying to do? - "We are not only trying to protect the security of the geographic entity known as Canada, but -- and this is why we

are in NATO -- we are trying to protect and provide and maintain and secure the processes. institutions and values of free nations. And NATO certainly has done that. And another contribution that we have made is to be "the other" overseas country. When we talk about the deployment of troops, occasionally they say that there are five NATO nations that have troops outside their borders. The Dutch, the British and the Belgians have them in Germany, but that is not the real issue -- the real issue is who has them across the water. Well, the British do, but I don't look at the English Channel as being "across the water" in that sense. It is we and the Americans. We are going to see, we have seen in the past, American isolationism, American protectionism, that's what was behind the Mansfield Amendment. The Europeans are going to have to do more for themselves. Well, American withdrawal would be much easier if Canada wasn't there. If we actually withdrew our troops, all of them, from Europe, I think it would make it much easier for the Americans themselves to do so. For the Europeans, that is a major Canadian contribution. And another major Canadian contribution is that the troops that we have there in Europe, whether they are land or air, are fully trained when they go there. A German brigade commander would tell you that he spends something like about 75% of his time dealing with the elementary, or the basic, training of his conscripts. He doesn't very often have time to spend on advanced training, and therefore he particularly enjoys being able to work with Canadians who have had a much higher degree of training. The same thing applies on the air side, too. That is, we serve as an exemplar, if nothing else, even if our numbers are small. Coming back to what we need from NATO, I would say the most important thing is protection. We have also, I think, maintained a greater channel of communication with the Europeans, and this goes back to the Schmidt-Trudeau factor. I think our voice is heard more (though there is no question that we are constantly being told to put our money where our mouth is, to increase our contribution a certain amount, and so on). The other side of the equation is that being in NATO and Europe gives Canadians a much greater world perspective. I tend to be a world federalist in a broader sense -- I don't mean that there should be an organization called that -- but I just happen to feel that we have got to live together in the world, and it is essential to be part of it. When you think of the number of Canadians, and I am just talking about the Forces first, and their dependents, who have been through Lahr and gained a much broader appreciation of Europe than they otherwise would have. I think it has broadened the horizons of Canadians greatly. And then look at what it has done for our industry, the aerospace industry which I may have mentioned to you before, which was one that I relate to. They are doing about 5 billion dollars worth of business, 75% of it export, and they are doing that with a very, very small bit of seed-money from our Department of Regional Industrial Expansion and from the Department of National Defence. You know, it is minuscule compared to what the American industry gets, but Canadian aerospace people are abroad, exporting, and a lot of that comes because of our connection with NATO and with the United States under things like the Defence Production Sharing Programme. I would say that there is a whole unit in the Department of External Affairs, formerly in Industry, Trade and Commerce, working on militaryrelated trade. There is also the NATO Industrial Advisory Group. As the name implies, this is a group of industrialists from all NATO nations who get together two or three times a year or so. I think the Canadian membership is around about twelve. These are either presidents or general managers or CEOs of Canadian industrial firms. They rotate, so it isn't always the same group. In the total length and breadth of Canadian industry, we probably have right now about 150 senior industrialists who have had a fair exposure to NATO and to their industrial colleagues from the other allied nations. So I think that that is also a major gain by Canada from its NATO association.

[HILL] Do you see NATO as being a crucial contributor to international peace and security at this time?

[NIXON] Absolutely. You see, you should go back to what caused NATO to be created, and ask yourself: has the fundamental concept changed? As I may have mentioned, to me the origin of NATO was firstly the breach of the Yalta agreement, followed by the absolute demonstration in 1948 in Czechoslovakia that the Soviets weren't going to allow any free elections in Eastern Europe. Then the fact that they didn't go through any disarmament after the Second World War, as did the Western countries, was another clear indicator. So we had that threat, and the Soviets have demonstrated that, the United Nations Charter notwithstanding, they are prepared to be the first to use force, despite the fact that the Charter says you will not use force in settling international disputes. If we consider Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Poland as separate countries, then the Soviets certainly have used force in two of them. They have also used it in Afghanistan, and they completely submerged the Baltic countries -- they have just disappeared -- and I don't see anything that has indicated that that has changed. And then you compound that fact with the Breshnev Doctrine, where they reserved their right to intrude in the affairs of the countries on their borders. I don't see anything that has changed that. Somewhere today I saw that one should judge people not by what they say but by what they do. Mr. Gorbachev is saying all the right things, but if Mr. Gorbachev really intends what he is saying -- that he wants to disarm or wants to reduce his military expenditures so as to direct resources to the economy -- the place that he can do that most effectively is not in nuclear weapons but in conventional arms. Despite consumption and so on. Soviet expenditures on nuclear weapons are probably only 20% of what they are spending on conventional arms, which is about 17% of the GNP. He can make a unilateral decision to reduce these without any negotiation, and without imperilling his security.

[HILL] Of course he has made an offer to negotiate on that level, I mean to cut about half-a-million troups on each side, although it remains to be seen whether he will follow through on it.

[NIXON] That's what I am saying. He does not have to negotiate; he can make a unilateral cut; if he really wants to reduce his expenditures, he can do that unilaterally. When I became Deputy Minister, the German Minister of Defence, Otto Lamsdorff, I think, said that whenever he was talking to his Soviet counterparts, he pointed out to them that it is very expensive for them to do what they are now doing because every time they build three tanks Germany only has to build one, being on the defensive. What I am really saying is that if the Soviets therefore decide that they only want to be defensive, they just have to cut their forces by a full one third and they would still have us outdone two to one. And that could be a unilateral decision. What I am astounded at is the fact that neither the public nor the press picked that up. None of them have thrown that at them. That is what I am going to do when I stop doing what I am doing now.

[COX] I have a couple of questions. The first one will take you back to the CAST commitment. The view you presented of it as a major Canadian contribution to planning the defence of northern Norway is a very interesting one, because I would have thought it would be fair to say that, initially, DND itself was not keen on the CAST commitment. Would that be a fair perception?

[NIXON] I'd say they would never be over-enthusiastic about it for a variety of reasons. One is that they don't have stationed forces. And this means that the only way you can get any training is to go over there for it. And the second is the question about the actual move, getting them there. The whole idea of the CAST commitment is that the force will be deployed before hostilities, during escalation, during a build up of tension. Well, the problems with that are about three-fold, particularly for Canada. One is, people are going to say: "My God, here we go into Hong Kong again". And the second question in sending CAST over there is whether it will act as a provocation or as a deterrent. I think it will act as a deterrent. And so you're going to get an equivocation around the House of Commons, unless the Government of the day happens to have a really strong

back-bone. Incidentally, it is one of the reasons why I think our system of government is a hell of a lot stronger than the American one, because when our government does decide to rule, as we all know, they can introduce legislation in the morning and have the their policies set in law by night time. There is also the problem of the logistic chain, that Mr. Beatty is concentrating on. But, I think it is important to differentiate between a commitment as a deterrent and a commitment that you are going to deploy during hostilities. I think that our commitment there as a deterrent is very, very important for all the reasons that I have cited before. But if you said that we were actually going into hostilities right now and you said where should we put anyone, I would say don't send the brigade to North Norway, send it to a different area. But then the response to me is: "Well, look, a force which is not intended to fight is no deterrent". And I say: "No, I mean that force will fight if it has to". I am a little bit like Mr. Pearson who one time, when he was confronted with one of these situations, said: "Well, I will jump off that bridge when I come to it". When you are doing some of these deterrent things, I think that you have to work a little bit on that basis. And I also believe that, if you really wanted to do so, you could make that commitment work. But it does take resources. It does take commitment.

[COX] That's a powerful argument for not giving it up. My second question is this: I was struck by your account of the LRPA decision, because it seems to me that here is a decision which is shrouded in confusion on the financing side, but which is actually probably the least controversial decision of any procurement decision. It seems to me to be a spectacular success, the LRPA programme. Is that true?

[NIXON] Well, I am glad to hear you say that. I agree with you. But I have to ask: what do you mean by success?

[COX] Well, looking at it again from the outside, the task is there, the LRPA aircraft is the right platform for it, and it appears to have worked out very successfully from an operational point of view. All of those things seem to say, here is a decision which is a great procurement decision.

[NIXON] Well, that was largely because of a method developed in National Defence, in the early 1970s, for handling major procurements. I helped them with it though I came to the Department later. It was eventually accepted by the government as a whole, although only after a lot of hard fights. It mainly involved the establishment of sound project management for large programmes. I could talk about it for hours, but I won't go into all the details here.

[HILL] OK. Are there any other points you would like to make before we close?

[NIXON] Well, there is the question of public awareness of defence. When Barney Danson was Minister, he had some of the staff look into this. I think I mentioned the problem that the Director General of Information had when I arrived. He couldn't even tell the troops what we were trying to do. And I think I may have mentioned the problem that we had with Search and Rescue, that they were not utilizing them for public awareness of defence activities. Well, we decided to do everything that we could to make it possible for interested journalists, writers, etc., to write what they wanted about defence. And so we constantly were taking groups of press people over to SHAPE, and to the SHAPE exercises in NATO, and letting them interview members of the Canadian delegation to NATO, and visit the Canadian forces in Lahr, and go down to Cyprus, and wherever the Canadian forces were, and go to Canadian bases all across the country, and so on. And gradually this approach, I think, started to pay off. Barnie Danson said that his people keeping track of the minute count on the electronic media, a number count, and the column count in the paper, felt that it increased something like about 30 times while he was there (but that was easy,

since there was practically nothing when he started). But then we tried to prepare, as I mentioned, the annual defence statements. We started this with Mr. Lamontagne, to try to move to the point of having an annual, comprehensive statement, by the government, about defence. I don't mean the Defence Review, which is really just a departmental publication. This started in 1980, and, I think, has been done pretty well, certainly all during the Liberal time. And I think that Mr. Beatty will do something with a White Paper. Also, I think the Senate has done excellent reports, and I may have commented on that earlier -- the reports on Manpower, on Maritime Defence, on Air Defence, and Air Transport. Those are excellent reports, and they have done a thoroughly good job. But again, they have gone over like one day wonders; they haven't had any impact at all. Even the Standing Committee -- well the standing committee has really only done two, it did one on Security and Disarmament, wasn't that the title? And having mentioned that title I will come back to it, because I think it is quite germane to this whole question. The other one was on the Reserves. On the Security and Disarmament study, the original reference that was drafted by External for their Minister -- to put before the House, the reference for that Standing Committee -- was simply on disarmament. And we had a hell of a time, the officials of the two departments, to get that changed, because you know disarmament can't be looked at alone, it has to be looked at in the context of security. I believe the people in the Parliamentary Centre will find this comment interesting. It is not intended as a bouquet, but if you look at that report, on the hearings, the only witnesses that made the connection, or that talked about Canada's security policy being deterrence, defence, arms control and the relaxation of tensions, were Arthur Menzies, and the Minister of National Defence.

[HILL] Arthur Menzies being then the Ambassador for Disarmament.

[NIXON] Nobody else picked it up, except the staff of the Centre, when they were drafting the report. And if you go and look at that report, you will find that there. But what I find is fascinating is the way that Canadians, people appearing at a thing like that, could try and deal with disarmament without dealing with security.

[HILL] What happens, of course, is that you get segments of opinion that come forward.

[NIXON] Yes, but if you take a look at the total evidence that was given at that time, the only two who made that connection were Arthur Menzies and the Minister at the time, Mark MacGuigan, I think. My point is that very few people follow defence, security, arms control and related issues carefully. We don't have enough public information or a sufficiently informed public debate. And there is not the positive impact in favour of defence that there should be.

[HILL] Well, I think on that note we will close. Thank you very much, Mr. Nixon.

PART III

AMBASSADORS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS

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[HILA.] Wall, I think on that note we will close. Thank you very much, Mr. Nixon.

ROSS CAMPBELL

[HILL]¹⁰ Good morning, our guest today is Ambassador Ross Campbell, former Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council. We are delighted you can be with us this morning, Ambassador Campbell, to give us your insights into Canadian policy in NATO.

[CAMPBELL] Thank you. I hope you don't expect me to be too up-to-date because it is now 15 years since I left NATO, so you will have to accept some gaps in my knowledge.

[HILL] Well, we will do our best to jog your memory. Ambassador Campbell, as you know, the project we are engaged in here is an oral history. We are examining the development of Canadian foreign policy since 1945, and trying to see how well membership in NATO has fitted Canada's short term and long term interests. For example, the kind of things we are looking at are Canada's contributions to NATO, at the impact of various initiatives or Canadian policies within NATO, and at the ways in which membership in NATO helped Canada to pursue its goals of international peace and security.

[CAMPBELL] Indeed, I look back on those days with fondness. From a career point of view, everything that happened to me after NATO was an anti-climax.

[HILL] It is interesting that you should say that, because in my career too it was a fascinating period of time.

[CAMPBELL] Extraordinary. If anybody thinks that any bilateral post can match in career satisfaction working in a central policy area like the NATO Council, then they are wrong, or at least for my tastes. That was the apex of my career, those six years in NATO.

[HILL] The number of issues that arose in that period was remarkable.

[CAMPBELL] Unbelievable.

[HILL] Yes.

[CAMPBELL] I am proud of my time at NATO, even though I had a difficult time there. I think it was far and a way the most useful part of my career.

[HILL] Ambassador Campbell, we are particularly pleased that you are willing to participate in this project because of your extensive connection with NATO affairs. Of course, I am thinking particularly of your period as Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council between 1967 and 1972, which we have just mentioned. In addition, there were many other parts of your career that were related to NATO in one way or another, which I am sure provided very valuable insights into the role of the North Atlantic Alliance, of the NATO organization, and Canadian and world affairs.

[CAMPBELL] It's true. NATO seemed to impinge on my career from its formative time. I'm starting right back in the Scandinavian countries when we were trying to get them into NATO in the 40s.

¹⁰ Interviewers: Hill, Cox, Pawelek. Interview dates: 13/4/87 and 16/4/87.

[HILL] Right.

[CAMPBELL] And, oh, subsequently you know, I served mainly in NATO countries from my first time abroad. Then I came back here and worked in the Middle East Division, which was then a mixture of Middle East and European; it was all one in those days. Very much involved in the early days. I attended almost every NATO meeting from 1951 and on - until 1970 something, that is 20 odd years, all the ministerial meetings even when then I wasn't Ambassador to NATO.

[HILL] Right!

[CAMPBELL] Well before.

[HILL] Well, I think those are some of those points we want to get at, as well as we can. We don't want to miss them.

[CAMPBELL] I am sorry that was a digression, I shouldn't have.

[HILL] No, not at all. I think that simply emphasizes a point that we are trying to follow, that this interview is not simply to look at strictly the NATO period, in NATO headquarters, but it really is at Canadian foreign policy related to NATO and there are really many facets to the NATO experience. I mean we are not just going to trying to dig out here, what happened to this or that particular NATO document or whatever. So I think your period in Scandinavia is of interest, and then Ankara and so forth. Very much. I think they are very germane to the inquiry. In light of that, I think I should mention how we'd like to approach these two interviews - to examine your career in a series of phases. In Part One we will deal briefly with the early period, that's to say up to 1944, including your time at university, and your service in the Royal Canadian Navy during the war. Part Two will focus on the first seven years of your career in the Department of External Affairs, firstly in Ottawa and then at the embassies in Oslo and Copenhagen, and then in the European Division in Ottawa. Part Three will consider the '52 to '56 phase when you were with the Embassy in Ankara and then, from '57, head of the Middle East Division in Ottawa. Part Four might be termed "Senior positions in Ottawa", that is to say from '59 to '64, when you were firstly special assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and then Assistant Under-Secretary of State yourself. Part Five will focus on your years as Ambassador in Yugoslavia, and Algeria, in 1965-1967. Part Six will be the largest segment and will deal with your service as Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, between May 1967 and October 1972. Part Seven will deal with your years as Ambassador to Japan and Korea between 1972 and 1975. That covers an awful lot of ground; and, as you just indicated, most of your career, certainly up until the time you left the North Atlantic Council, was in fact connected with NATO in one way or another. So you have plenty of room for reflection about NATO.

[CAMPBELL] Interestingly enough, the Japanese also were very interested in trying to follow what was happening in NATO, and I was swamped with offers to speak to their institutes out there, and I did indeed as much of it as I could; but their interest in European affairs is profound. They know its there and that what makes the world tick is what happens in the North Atlantic sphere.

[HILL] Right, I think that we will be very interested to hear about that period too.

[CAMPBELL] Okay.

Part I, Early Years, to 1944

[HILL] Ambassador Campbell, you were born in Toronto and educated in that city, including Trinity College at the University of Toronto. You obtained a B.A. in the Law Faculty in 1940. Could you tell us a little of your background and your experiences up to 1940? Particularly, how do you think they have coloured your outlook on world affairs, including the question of international peace and security?

[CAMPBELL] Well, it is true that it was my period at the University of Toronto that prompted me to go into External Affairs as a career, even though I was studying law at the University. I was at the University from 1936-40 in the faculty of law, and in those days they ran a very interesting course in international law. Larry (Norman) MacKenzie, who eventually became president of the University of British Columbia, was the professor of international law, and we were living through an intensely interesting period, the prelude to World War II in fact. The Spanish Civil War and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, all these things took place from 1935-40, when I was in university. You knew that World War II was coming, you knew roughly what the broad lines of the struggle where going to be. I tried to get into External, I first wrote in 1937 saying I wanted to join; they wrote back and said finish your degree and then come along. Of course the war came instead, and I had to defer the thing until the war was nearly over.

[HILL] John Holmes said there was a sense in that period that the war was coming, and people were very conscious of that.

[CAMPBELL] Sure as could be. I don't know why I knew it so certainly, but there was no doubt in my mind that we were heading into a war.

[HILL] Well, then, during the war you served from 1940 to 1944 with the Royal Canadian Navy.

[CAMPBELL] Actually, it was longer than that - to September of '45.

[HILL] I did notice that there was a little article in the paper recently, in <u>The Citizen</u>, I think it was, with a photograph of you and some former shipmates.

[CAMPBELL] They weren't exactly shipmates, only to the extent that navies use ship's names for shore establishments. What that was, was a picture of a group of university students of 1940 vintage, university graduates, who were recruited by the Royal Navy to go straight over into the RN and serve there, because Canada did not have any ships but lots of people and they had lots of ships and not enough people over there. I was one of those recruited by the Royal Navy in 1940, early in 1940, right after graduating. They accelerated graduation in 1940 incidentally, so we could all get shot at early. There it is, I went over with that group and I remained with the Royal Navy and I never served a day in a Canadian ship. I was paid by Canada, thank god, but I was on loan to the Royal Navy.

[HILL] What field were you in?

[CAMPBELL] Torpedo boats, right almost from the beginning except for a brief training period when I was in the North Atlantic. Watching all the ships being sunk around me, I decided then it would be better to be sinking than to be sunk by them. So I went into an offensive job and stayed in that.

[HILL] Where were you serving?

[CAMPBELL] Started out in the English Channel, in the desperate days in 1940-41. Three years in the Mediterranean and I was in every campaign out there, from Greece through the western desert, North Africa, Sicily, Italy and the Aegean. And then just back in time to get in on the invasion of Normandy from in the UK. So I did not miss anything except the Far East.

[HILL] So, a very active war time career?

[CAMPBELL] Yes, I guess so; probably I had as much active service and combat service as anybody in the Canadian Navy.

[HILL] And did that leave you with any sort of particular view of foreign affairs, other than the fact that you were trying to stay afloat and alive.

[CAMPBELL] You didn't worry too much about that when you were twenty-five years old. Yes, it did. It did help confirm me in my decision that I would like to do something in foreign affairs - partly because I was on loan to the Royal Navy and was appalled at the ignorance of the average Englishman about Canada. Really, it used to just gall me, their dismal ignorance; even if they had been through university and had umpteen degrees, they knew nothing about Canada. You know, an antiquated idea, a colony they thought we were; imagine in 1940!

[HILL] It is probably not much better now.

[CAMPBELL] Then they just don't want to learn. But it made me realize that there was a need, a job to be done there, trying to get Canada a bit better known. And of course with the turmoil that we had been through, it was perfectly obvious that it was reshaping the political world, that the colonies would never survive that upheaval. That was quite clear to me, especially as regards the French ones in North Africa. And of course it went all the way to decolonization; that I guess was the major characteristic of the post war period, from 1945 to 1960. It was a wholesale shedding of colonial dependencies. That was all becoming evident to me, even in 1943-44.

[HILL] Well, I believe it was very clear, by the end of the war, that that was bound to come.

[CAMPBELL] One interesting thing is that I got into External, eventually, by a kind of funny circumstance. After I came back to England after being in the Middle East for so long, we went straight into the landings at Arromanches (Normandy). We were in action practically every night, for about 18 nights in a row, and eventually I absorbed so many big bricks that my boat was virtually a write off. So I was on the beach for about two weeks waiting for a new boat, after having been nearly sunk off Normandy, by being set on fire, very badly on fire, by a shore battery - and they were running a competition for External Affairs in London. So just for something to do I wrote the exam, and to my horror, about three months later, I was in Ostend, Belgium, with a new flotilla and everything, and External said "You're in; you're relieved of your command; you are to report immediately to Ottawa." I was just appalled. I had no intention of quitting, so I went over and I dramatically tore up the signal.

[HILL] Like Nelson's blind eye.

[CAMPBELL] Yes. The Navy people were delighted with this, but External - Norman Robertson - and I have still got the letter that he wrote, the nastiest, coldest letter you could imagine - telling

me that really, I did not realize what a flattering thing it was to have been accepted into External. Only three out of umpteen had got in, and that, no they would not keep the job as I had asked till after the war. You come now, or you do not come at all. I thought it was all over. But, they came through right after the VE Day. They were still interested, grudgingly.

Part II - Early Career at External Affairs, 1945-52

[HILL] Well, that leads us into Part Two of our interview. By which I mean the period of 1945 to 1952. You joined the Department, and initially went into the Legal Division.

[CAMPBELL] Yes, that's right.

[HILL] Then, after a brief time in Ottawa, you went to the embassy in Oslo and then to the embassy in Copenhagen. In fact you were in Scandinavia at the time the North Atlantic Treaty was being worked out in Washington.

[CAMPBELL] As I look back on that period, it was a very important period in trying to persuade those two countries to come into NATO. And because Canada was taking a fairly forward position on that, I did a lot of that work. I don't think it is apparent in the reports that came in. That was a rotten embassy in Copenhagen. I am not supposed to say nasty things about ambassadors, am I? There was a fellow called Henry Laureys, a Belgian by birth and one of Mackenzie King's friends, who had been appointed to Copenhagen when the NATO issue was really heating up, around 1947. This man was such an obstacle to our really doing a job there. He never came to the chancery, he must have thought that ambassadors were appointed just to go and have dinner every night with royalty. He had no idea why he was appointed there; I found it extremely difficult to do everything in the embassy, run the consulate, run the political side and everything. I was the only officer.

[HILL] You were the only political officer there?

[CAMPBELL] Yes, the only officer. And the Ambassador never set foot in the place; for one year he never came in to the chancery.

[HILL] Well, what about Oslo?

[CAMPBELL] That was better, but I was so new. In Oslo the Germans had only just left when I arrived. I came at the end of 1945. I guess it was January 1 or 2, 1946 when I arrived in Oslo, somewhere around there. The Germans had been only 5 or 6 months out of the country, and the people were still starving in Norway. So really, it was a kind of rescue operation, more than anything. We were helping reunite families. Norwegians that had trained in Canada and were trying to find their own families and accommodating all their Canadian wives that they had married in Toronto, in "Little Norway" where they had taken their training.

[HILL] So really the Norwegian period was the post-war phase in your life?

[CAMPBELL] Absolutely.

[HILL] Whereas Copenhagen....

[CAMPBELL] Copenhagen was the beginning of the political goal, the formation of the NATO Alliance, as I have said. I think that such reporting as I managed to do was accurate but my god,

I resented the circumstances in which I had to do it. There was a wonderful job to be done there, and it did succeed. I suppose I helped to get Denmark into NATO. And interestingly, the wartime experience of those three countries is what dictated their attitude toward joining the North Atlantic Alliance. The Swedes, who were the most important of the three, had managed to keep their neutrality at the expense of allowing the rape of Norway. They let the Germans go through, but they at least escaped war by doing so. So they were smugly content with neutrality as a successful policy, even though everybody hated their guts in that part of the world for what they did. The Norwegians had been totally raped by the Germans. You know they even practiced a scorched earth policy as they left. They burnt every village and all the crops. It was awful. So the Norwegians had no hesitation, they wanted into NATO and the faster the better, and the bigger the grouping the better. They were not interested in a Scandinavian Alliance, which was what the Swedes wanted and the Danes. The Danes had been treated like German cousins; it was a very gentle occupation. The Danish Army was mobilized until 1943, under German command, not fighting, but it was there. They were totally ambivalent; they did not know whether they wanted to be in NATO or not; and that was the hard one, to persuade the Danes, pleasure-loving Danes, that really they had had enough of a brush with fate that they ought to see the virtues of collective security. But it was not easy to persuade them.

[HILL] I was struck by the number of telegrammes on this question when I was looking through the records at External. You must have got some things through the ambassador in the end.

[CAMPBELL] Which is significant.

[HILL] I was quite struck by the fact that getting some of the Scandinavians into NATO was obviously quite important to Canada. And the other thing that I was struck by was that clearly the Scandinavians, if they came in, they did not want to be part of the Brussels Treaty Organization. They did not want to be dependent solely on the British. They did not want to be "liberated", they wanted to be "protected". So, I suppose having the United States in there, and Canada, was crucial.

[CAMPBELL] They knew that Britain was economically weakened by the war, which indeed it was, and incapable of really extending even the degree of protection they had in the pre-war period, which had been ineffective anyway. They were all let down in a way, by the ease of the invasion of Norway and Denmark. Nobody was there to oppose, and they did not oppose themselves. The Danes did not, the Norwegians did a bit.

[HILL] So, in that whole period then, there must have been quite a lot of interest in Copenhagen and in Oslo in what was going on in Washington?

[CAMPBELL] It was all a massive, semi-organized lobby, amongst those who were actively interested in promoting the idea of a North Atlantic region, if you like, or alliance; it wasn't all that clear in 1947-48 exactly where we were heading. It became clearer, but the Americans and ourselves and the British, and to a certain extent the French at the time, we were all trying to persuade the Scandinavians to come in.

[HILL] Was there an attempt to persuade the Swedes to come in initially?

[CAMPBELL] Oh yes, and it failed, for the reasons that I said. They were smugly content with neutrality as a viable policy, which they have persisted in to this day, of course.

[HILL] Right. Looking back, from today, at the association of Norway and Denmark, and then Iceland, with NATO, would you say it has been pretty much of a success story, on the whole?

[CAMPBELL] Oh, in a modest way. You may remember, we had to put the Icelanders in escrow, in the ice box for a while, because they had a semi-communist or a partially communist government. They're in only faute de mieux. I do not think there is any conviction in the hearts of Icelanders that being in NATO is an ideal situation; it is just inevitable, so they might as well relax; they are not going to be allowed to leave the Alliance, that's really it. No, I would say as far as Norway is concerned and Denmark, they seem reasonably content with the thing. But really they have had to, and have had to be, but they have made their own arrangements with the Soviets. Norwegians have an understanding of some sort with them, about never taking troops in peace time. The Danes, I don't know if they have any special arrangements. I think they do as far as the Baltic is concerned, some special arrangements with the Soviets that they don't interfere with each other. It's what I call the politics of the periphery of NATO. It's a kind of pragmatic accommodation with the big person next door. They will do nothing to provoke the Soviets, those two.

[HILL] You mention the word periphery. I did a little study once for the Defence Department on the Southern Flank. I was struck very much by how the Southern Flank of NATO is a series of bilateral relationships, more with the Americans than with anybody else, rather than NATO as a collectivity as it is on the Central front. The collective aspect is really quite lacking.

[CAMPBELL] Absolutely, and incidentally that leads nicely into that period that I was at home and then in Ankara. Because again, for my sins, I was in charge of the Middle East desk of what was then the European Division, when Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO. It was at the meeting of 1951 and it was here in Ottawa. We held out, and rightly so, against admitting Greece and Turkey, we and the Danes, and we became isolated. I remember 10:30 or 11:00 at night on the last day of that meeting, Mike Pearson said to me, "You are in charge of the Middle East, you go back over to the East bloc and in ten minutes I want a statement reversing our position". I remember the opening words, (may God strike me dead), it starts out by saying we had never been opposed to the entry of Greece and Turkey, but simply that we had had misgivings about the compatibility. Eating crow! Yes, of the worst kind. I was ashamed of myself, but we ate crow and backed down, under great American pressure. They wanted them in, and they were not prepared to look at the obvious difficulties that were going to ensue. All they wanted was to make sure that leaning up against the Soviets was a NATO member.

[HILL] Of course they had earlier announced the Truman Doctrine, which may be the key to that whole period.

[CAMPBELL] Oh sure it was.

[HILL] So in a way, parts two and three of your career overlap, because when you came back to Ottawa, then you were already working on Middle Eastern Affairs. Then afterwards you went to Ankara.

[CAMPBELL] That was an interesting period, because it was the period of John Foster Dulles and pactomania. There was a regional effort at that time - not only were these two brought into NATO in 1952, I guess it was the meeting of 1952 that they were finally admitted, the spring meeting - but there was a move at that time to form a Balkan alliance, with Yugoslavia and Greece, Turkey and even Iran; to form a kind of southern containment against the Soviets was the idea. It came to almost nothing, but again, it reflected the tensions of the time. Already it was apparent the

Soviets were going to be a real problem. Really from the invasion, the putsch in Czechoslovakia, in 1948, that's what caused all these things to happen, for NATO to be created and for all these other pacts to be contemplated. It was all part of a containment policy against the Soviet Union.

[HILL] You had Czechoslovakia, leading up to the formation of NATO itself. And then after NATO was established you have the Korean War, of course.

[CAMPBELL] A whole series of crises, in fact starting in 1948 with the Czech putsch, to the Berlin crises and failures of summits. I have got somewhere in these papers a checklist of the dreadful things that were happening from 1948 onwards with monotonous regularity about once a year to 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Just one critical situation with the Soviets after another. No matter what we did on our side always it ended up in failure and renewed tension.

[HILL] Before you went to Ankara, when you were still in part two of your career, you were at the European Desk in Ottawa?

[CAMPBELL] Right, doing Middle East things.

[HILL] Doing Middle East things. But this was also the phase when Turkey and Greece were joining the Alliance. It was the period when the Korean War was going on and the NATO command systems had been set up and defence planning was getting under way. Curiously enough, I came across references in the files and in publications such as the <u>Canada in World Affairs</u> series, about the period 1952-53, talking about the "malaise" in NATO. The thing had no sooner been set up and here was the first of the crises of the Alliance. I wonder if you could just comment on that.

[CAMPBELL] Yes, I can. I believe the reason that it had a rather hesitant beginning was because of the Brussels Treaty, which was created first, as you know. I think it came into being in 1948. And it was this incipient Europeanism that almost caused NATO to be still-born, in my judgment. And it is a trend that you can see recurring; it happened when you were there, Roger; it's happening again now with the Eurogroup within NATO. There has always been an instinct amongst the Europeans to cut the umbilical cord to the USA. On the one hand they want to cut it politically, and in a security sense they want to maintain it; and you have these incompatible objectives, both present, all the time. I think that the early part, the weak beginning in NATO was partly that, partly it was the Korean War itself, which showed really the limitations of regional alliances. Here we were, all preoccupied with trying to contain the Soviets or Communism if you want, in Europe, and what happened was that it broke out in a military sense elsewhere -the same challenge, as it would seem then, by Communism in the Far East, where there was no NATO involvement. And in the Middle East we were having similar tensions too, with no theoretical obligation on the part of NATO to do anything about it. This was the problem - that NATO seemed irrelevant to the crises that were developing, one in the Far East and one in the Middle East. But, of course, the Americans were more far-seeing on this and I think to an extent the British as well. They saw that ultimately the challenge would be in Europe, and it was indeed. With all these recurring crises, which I mentioned, from '48, Czechoslovakia, right on through, they had an annual reminder somewhere that the Soviet Union was a potential threat.

[HILL] You touch on two very interesting points, there. It seems to me that there has always been this relationship between NATO and Europe, in the sense that the ideal of an Atlantic community has always run head on into the ideal of the European community.

[HILL] And that has never been reconciled.

[CAMPBELL] No, this is an uneasy marriage too, as I see it, politically and militarily conflicting. Politically, there is no doubt where they want to go, and they are going there, through the Community and through the gradual evolution now of a European military cooperation within NATO, which I believe - I fought against it - is dangerous for NATO. I think they may wake up some morning to find that they may indeed have cut the umbilical cord to Washington and they'll live to regret it. That's what I think will happen.

[HILL] What struck me about the files on 1952, or around then, is that every two or three years you get a new spate of articles about the "crisis of the Alliance". They have got the Alliance as falling apart. But somehow NATO always lasts, despite these so-called crises.

[CAMPBELL] They weren't really crises. The truth is the absence of external crises does tend to set up centrifugal forces within NATO. It can't stand prosperity, the Alliance, this is what is wrong. In that period after Cuba when the Soviets slunk away with their tails between their legs and backed away in the face of a challenge, it was so calm that the Alliance nearly fell apart between 1962 and 1967. What brought us all back together again? The invasion of Czechoslovakia! But for those five years of total détente, the apparent acceptance by the Soviets of peaceful coexistence and absence of military challenge after Krushchev disappeared, I tell you it was deadly maintaining the Alliance. It can't stand prosperity.

[HILL] So a lot of it, you think, is all sort of cooked up by the press or by the....

[CAMPBELL] Absolutely, absolutely. But it is true to the extent that the less the external tension the more they indulge internal differences. You know they are like Greece and Turkey. Every time NATO isn't engaged in an East-West confrontation - they go fighting each other. That's the problem.

Part III - Ankara and the Middle East, 1952-59

[HILL] Well, that leads us on very nicely into Part Three. In 1952 you went to Ankara, Turkey, to the Embassy there, and then in 1957 you returned to Ottawa to serve as head of the Middle East Division of the Department for two years.

[CAMPBELL] Through the Suez Crisis.

[HILL] Exactly.

[CAMPBELL] That really had quite a profound effect on Canadian policy. It nearly tore NATO apart, because there were the British and French on one side, and the Americans and Canadians on the other, in the Middle East dispute, the only time. It helped Canada grow up, and that is one of the things that I was determined about. My own experience with the British helped me to make up my mind which way we should go with Suez. They were so out of touch with what was happening, and they thought they could just command us to come with them.

[HILL] Of course, British opinion itself was very bitterly divided about Suez.

[CAMPBELL] Yes, but they were pretty well in support of, you know, "teach the wogs a lesson; Suez is ours and it has been ours for a long time". That was the attitude at the time. Certainly the British Government had no hesitation, they were going to fight anybody to keep their hold on the Canal. It is interesting in retrospect, again, that the argument was that the Egyptians could never run that Canal, never regulate the traffic properly. But in one year they learned how to operate the Canal and make it make more money than it had ever made under the Suez Canal Company.

[HILL] Right. Interestingly, you mentioned that Suez tore NATO apart, and that is precisely the word that I have here in my notes. Exactly the very same word.

[CAMPBELL] Of course, you had the big three: two together, France and the British, against the United States. Our role was probably more important than we think simply because of Mike's enormous influence at the time. I mean he was making up for our physical weakness in a way which we have never enjoyed since. That man was Mr. Canada in the world. We should know it, we never have had it, even Pierre Trudeau, with all his high profile and high intellect, never in international affairs, had influence the like of Mike's.

[HILL] I think a number of people have described that period as being the Golden Age of Canadian Diplomacy; partly, I think, because Canada had good solid forces within NATO, a good solid contribution. And at the same time you had Pearson's own personality and capability and that of the Department behind him. That's the impression I have anyway.

[CAMPBELL] If I can leap ahead, if I'm permitted to do so, I had a very interesting conversation with Mike in 1967. It was not all that long after I had taken up the NATO job, and things were moving in a way that he had always wanted - for the Alliance to be principally a political organization, not just military. We got into it because we weren't strong; we got lost when it was purely military. But things were moving in the direction in which we wanted in 1967. By then the Council had become the workshop of the West for dealing with many, many major political problems. Yet, we were not getting much attention back here in Ottawa. So I came back on a trip and went to see him and I said I can't understand why you, who more or less inspired this organization, aren't making sure I get more support for policies that accent the political function of NATO because that is what you always wanted. He said you're right it is exactly what I have always wanted; but, he said, let me tell you something, I have got bigger problems here at home. Then he described to me what was beginning to happen in Quebec. And he said I have no more time for international affairs, this is Canada's crisis. It was absolutely perceptive, prescient, what he was saying.

[HILL] It is also quite interesting that even before that, earlier on as Prime Minister, he was much more focused on domestic issues. That was the period of the institution of all the social programmes, that we still have. And then there was the start of the Quebec....

[CAMPBELL] Mike was a foreign political analyst, and a good one, but he had grasped the Quebec movement which eventually turned into the Quebec Crisis, the FLQ. He had enough exposure to the beginnings of that trouble that he switched priorities. Sorry about the digression.

[HILL] No, no, that was very interesting. As regards the Suez Crisis, this is one of these out-of-area problems that affect NATO. What sort of particular lessons would you draw from the Suez Crisis, as far as NATO is concerned, and also as far as Canada is concerned?

[CAMPBELL] Well, they are mainly negative, I am afraid. One has to admit that when the chips are down affecting the key, great players in NATO, the three top, or perhaps the four now including Germany, will go their own way, regardless of others - they won't even inform the Alliance. We have seen that phenomenon over the Vietnam War, with the Americans. We had it in the Suez, with the French and the British members of the Council obliged on paper to consult their Allies before they took any action of that kind, but in the event ignoring the organization. Just as the Americans ignored it at the beginning in Korea, they ignored it again throughout the Vietnam War.

[HILL] There is very clearly a sense that things which happen outside the NATO area are handled in a different kind of way.

[CAMPBELL] Even though - and this is where I am trying to answer your question - you can hardly call the Mediterranean, despite the map that says this is NATO and this isn't, with Cyprus left out, and so on, Malta left out, you can't really divorce the Mediterranean lake from North Atlantic security. It's our southern border, that lake. Maybe there is something wrong with the regional restrictions on the responsibility of NATO. Because it is absurd to argue that you can have events happening in Egypt, Iran and Iraq and the Middle East, Lebanon and not affect NATO; or anywhere in the Mediterranean.

[HILL] Well, I think the Atlantic Declaration of 1974 tried to deal with that.

[CAMPBELL] It didn't succeed.

[HILL] I think they used the formula, "of things which affect the allies as members of the Alliance", or something of that kind.

[CAMPBELL] It is still a nice distinction between affecting "you as you", and "you as a member of the Alliance". Well, as I say my conclusion is negative, that given the compulsion of events, the larger members will act in their own self-interest regardless of the Alliance. That's a weakness in NATO.

[HILL] Something that NATO has just got to keep working at.

[CAMPBELL] It has improved over the years. Even in the Vietnam War eventually, the Americans, almost after the fact, were at least informing their allies. When they invaded Cambodia they even gave us twenty-four hours' advance notice!

[HILL] If we go back a little bit further, what about you period in Ankara? You were there two years, I think?

[CAMPBELL] Four.

[HILL] Four. With regard to NATO, what impressions did that leave you with?

[CAMPBELL] Well, you know, I have a mixed impression. It was right after those countries, Greece and Turkey, had been admitted to NATO, and they were weak physically. It gave Canada an opportunity to play, for once, a major military role; we gave them their first real air force, one hundred and twenty-five F8s and thirty odd T-33 training planes. We gave them their entire Air Force. It gave us a lot of prestige in Turkey and in the Alliance generally. It then enabled us to

equip ourselves with a more modern aircraft. Well, that is from a strictly Canadian point of view. My four years there in Turkey were all trying to cope with the phenomenon that was happening in Turkey; it was in desperate economic plight at the time, awful conditions, and they were getting worse all the time, and they were being constantly bailed out. We were always contributing aid to them, Canada was contributing both economic and military assistance. I think the same thing was happening more or less in Greece, but my experience was confined to Turkey. It was a matter of taking this sick man of Europe and trying to make it healthy enough to be a constructive member of the Alliance and to, you know, bolster them. That was a weak region, and the Soviets were in a very aggressive mood after Czechoslovakia. So those years, from 1952 to 1956, were rather dicey ones, while the Alliance was trying to strengthen its south east corner of the Alliance. Bases were being created, and the Americans had a huge military mission there, 4000 men and a big programme of re-arming the Turks. Turkey was the key, not Greece, as it is today, because they lean against the Soviet Union along the Black Sea.

[HILL] And the Caucasus too.

[CAMPBELL] Yes, and because Turkey touches on other sensitive spots like Iran, Iraq and Lebanon; they all have common borders. Well, the other thing about this, from a Canadian point of view, was that in 1951, it was the Middle East side of things rather than the Turkey side that I was always trying to see - the bigger picture. In 1951, Farouk was dethroned by Nasser, and there was nearly a Suez Crisis, at that time. We were involved in a very funny way, I must tell you, even though it is only an anecdote. The Canadian aircraft carrier Magnificent at that time was on a joint exercise with the British in the Mediterranean, the only Canadian ship in company with a large contingent of British ships which was visiting Istanbul; it was an almost pre-war, festive occasion, with everybody in their whites and a big ball at the British Consulate General, which is the old British Embassy from Ottoman times - a huge vast thing, a most elegant affair. Midnight, a signal comes through saying that there has been a revolution in Egypt, the British are to sail immediately, to drop this ceremonial nonsense they are going through in Turkey, and to sail operationally to take whatever action that was needed to stop this trouble in Egypt. Here we were with an aircraft carrier as part of the British visiting fleet. I had General Odlum as the Ambassador at that time, who knew absolutely nothing about Canadian policy in the Middle East. So the British Admiral who was in charge of this fleet said, "Ambassador, we are all sorry we have to break off this wonderful party and so on. We are all sailing operationally". Odlum said "Good show, you give these Egyptians hell." I said: "Ambassador, not the Canadian aircraft carrier. What is happening in Egypt is not our quarrel". "What?" he said to me, "We are going to stand by while they overthrow the King of Egypt?", and so on, and I said "Yup, unless we get instructions to the contrary from Ottawa". I had the biggest row that you can imagine, in front of the British Ambassador, the Head of the Fleet, against our own Commanding Officer of the Magnificent, Admiral Kenny Dyer, who said: "Of course I am going to go, I am going to shoot the Egyptians too". I can't tell you how awkward a situation it was - and I was a First Secretary; but I had been in charge of Canadian policy on the Middle East until then and had a clear idea of its limits. Anyway, in the end I had my way. Ottawa, of course, said: "We do not associate with this action." But it was a lesson in the difficulty of segregating the great powers' individual policy in the Middle East from NATO commitments. This was a NATO thing that was going on, this naval visit, but the operational action was strictly British. You can get into that kind of a dicey situation all too easily.

Part IV - Senior Positions, Ottawa - 1959 to 64

[HILL] Ambassador Campbell, in 1959 you were named special assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and three years later you were promoted to Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.

[CAMPBELL] Are you sure about those dates? It would seem to me that it was 1958, I was appointed to...

[HILL] Ah, it may have been.

[CAMPBELL] Because I was with Sidney Smith, you see, to start with, and I think he died in 1958.

[HILL] But it still was to 1964, was it?

[CAMPBELL] I was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary in 1962.

[HILL] Anyway, I was a bit tempted to call these "The Diefenbaker years," but I know civil servants don't have political alignments.

[CAMPBELL] I think that's what you should call them. After all, he called us Pearsonalities!

[HILL] And another thing is, of course, in 1963 the Liberal Party came back to power, so it wasn't entirely a Diefenbaker period. Nonetheless, this was a period which was marked by a good deal of controversy about Canada's nuclear policy and also Canada's relations with the United States. I don't know whether those were issues which you were dealing with.

[CAMPBELL] Oh, very much so, especially the nuclear question - the issue of whether we were going to remain a user of nuclear weapons in this country. I mean, we were into the whole business of the Bomarc at that time. The arming of the Bomarc. I handled the negotiations from our side, towards the end of that period.

[HILL] Up to 1963.

[CAMPBELL] Between 1963 and 1964. That year, that was my main task. No, it was before that. I started it in 1962, before the elections.

[HILL] Right.

[CAMPBELL] And it was an impossible task. I have never been so unhappy in my life. I had a DND delegation of about 12 officers who were totally sceptical about this, as I was myself. I remember opening the negotiations by saying we had a difficult mandate. Well eventually, as we all know, those negotiations indirectly led to the defeat of the Diefenbaker government. I think that the Americans overthrew the Diefenbaker government by means of the press release that they issued which said that they were not going to go for any contrived solution to the nuclear weapons dilemma. You may remember that. We had had General Norstad, SACEUR, over here, also making statements; Miller (Frank Miller) was backing him; it was the beginning of the crisis. But the thing that tipped it was the press release, rejecting the negotiations that were going on. They (the American Embassy) made a public declaration here in Ottawa that led very rapidly to the

disintegration of the Diefenbaker Cabinet, because we were in the position of having defaulted on our NATO obligations. We had said we would take these weapon systems; it made no sense to take the system without the warhead.

[HILL] Of course this was also the period right after the Cuban missile crisis.

[CAMPBELL] All the more reason for us to have taken a more, shall we say, Alliance position on this issue. I am one of those, I am sorry to say, who believes that we should never have dropped our obligation to share in the dirty business of holding nuclear weapons. I don't think you can be a member of an alliance that relies to a certain extent on those weapons and refuse individually to hold them, that just drops the burden on to somebody else.

[HILL] This was also at the beginning, when you were working for Sydney Smith. Wasn't it just after NORAD was set up?

[CAMPBELL] It was right after NORAD had been set up, with no thought whatsoever given to the terms on which it was set up. There again I fault the Diefenbaker régime, that they didn't consult with anybody, they didn't research what was at issue in NORAD. I am not against their having developed NORAD but they went into it unthinkingly.

[HILL] Well, apparently, the Prime Minister more or less signed a draft text without really thinking about it. What struck me was that, in one interpretation I heard, is that up to the time of the establishment of NORAD, most of what Canada did in relation to the United States was to some degree within a larger framework, that is to say within the NATO framework.

[CAMPBELL] And it was one of the virtues of being in NATO, that is to dilute that relationship with the United States by putting it into the collectivity.

[HILL] But when the agreement was drawn up over NORAD, in fact a slice was taken off the wider policy and simply adopted without too much thought as to what the implications were.

[CAMPBELL] Let me give you a modern parallel outside of the realm of military activity. I think that is what is happening in this free trade quest. We are ignoring the wider situation of GATT and all the international trappings that exist for conducting international economic relations. We are doing the very dangerous thing of trying to enter into a bilateral arrangement with the United States. Ignoring that wider range, we will pay severely for this in the long run in my judgement. We shouldn't do it in military questions; we shouldn't do it in economic questions, ever. We should not try to take on the largest country on earth alone. We can only lose.

[HILL] One of the questions on NORAD is that in fact it doesn't provide satisfactory consultative mechanisms, so there isn't any way in which you can....

[CAMPBELL] The command arrangements are a farce. The Canadians are figureheads in NORAD. Whoever is the senior Canadian and Deputy, he has no power whatsoever to activate the thing. We had an example of their trying, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, you may remember. A Canadian tried to activate the Canadian side of things, indeed did on the naval side by bypassing the government. But, there was a row about that. It was outside of anybody's terms of reference to do that. I find the command arrangements insulting to Canada, they are not real at all, even in respect of our own territory. That agreement, instead of just being blindly renewed, as it was, with an aerospace rather than a air connotation, ought to have been very thoroughly

looked at again, not with an idea of scrapping it but at least getting Canadian control over the Canadian part of it. I think we could have done it if we had taken this moment when it had to be renewed for another five years to raise all these issues. In the context of our sovereignty, I find that we're making mistake after mistake. If we don't want anybody to lay claim to our northern shore, our northern part, we had better learn to protect it properly. I don't say nuclear submarines. I think that is wildly too expensive. For the same price we could have one hell of a presence at sea; we could make the North warning defence real. Position it further north, as somebody suggested. That was a good idea.

[COX] The irony of that is that DND said it was too expensive.

[HILL] In the 1959-1964 period, you went on a number of missions to the North Atlantic Council, I think. Did you have the impression, at that time, that the problems with the decision over the nuclear equipment of the Canadian Forces, over the command in NORAD, and so on, had a significant impact on the perception of Canada in NATO?

[CAMPBELL] Not what was happening in NORAD. That was not really very well known to NATO, although NORAD in theory is a regional command of NATO. In fact they do not report at all to the North Atlantic Council on what happens. So the details of that were not known in NATO. What was known was that, at the same time as we were doing that, we were also pulling away from arming our 104s or whatever we had at that time.

[HILL] They were 104s.

[CAMPBELL] All right, we were pulling back on that commitment. That was well known in NATO, and it added to our weakened position. It was around about 1968-1969 that we got into real trouble. But it was all beginning, right back in the early '60s when we started to make it clear that we were wobbling on nuclear weapons. All of it was compounded to create a weaker Canadian presence in NATO. I am again jumping ahead, but don't believe for one minute that we are as influential in that Alliance as we used to be; we are not. The cutting of our forces in 1968 and the throwing away of the nuclear responsibility, unilaterally, not in concert with our allies, has very severely undermined our voice in NATO. We never really recovered from those actions.

[HILL] Another point that strikes me very forcefully is that, when NATO was set up in the first place, one had the impression that here was a natural focus for Canadian foreign policy. Canadians played quite a role in setting it up, but also it provided a nice psychological home for Canada. Instead of just a bilateral relationship with the USA, the North Atlantic Treaty also covered the old relationship with the British and the French. Everything was all wrapped into one envelope.

[CAMPBELL] Subsumed even economically, in a sense. We had tried to make it more important in an economic sense. All of what you say is true, in a way NATO was the ideal home and still is for a major element of Canadian external policy. Simply because we do not have to face the Americans, British or French bilaterally in a large area of activity. Almost all of our foreign policy is in some measure aired in the NATO forum. I think it is an ideal one. We should never weaken it for that reason, politically or militarily. Militarily of course it has saved us a lot of money.

[HILL] And yet, in fact, Canadian governments may have unilaterally weakened that relationship, for example in the period we are talking about, because of the indecision over the nuclear weapons issue, because of NORAD perhaps.

[CAMPBELL] They have weakened it, and it started long before Pierre Trudeau. He more or less gave it the coup de grace, with his reduction in the armed forces in 1968. Add that to the pull back on the nuclear weapons and you can see that we began to be discounted, as a voice in the Alliance, as early as 1960-61. But, I know that I am running ahead of...

Part V - Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Algeria, 1965-67

[HILL] I think that fits very much into this period. But still we will go on to the next period, Part V, just a very brief question about the period when you were the Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Algeria, which was from 1965 to 1967. It is interesting because here you were Ambassador to two Non-aligned countries which were quite active in the Non-aligned movement. Did they have close links between themselves?

[CAMPBELL] Yes, they did, it spanned both Ben Bella and Boumedienne of Algeria, in that period. It was the Yugoslavs who had more or less lent the largest amount of military support, oddly enough even weapons support, to the Algerian Revolution. The Yugoslavs were in those days a lot more militant than they are today, and under Tito were very active in using this Egyptian (which meant Arab), Indian, Yugoslav, triumvirate, to try to push the notion of the Third World as a force - and they went a long way. The Algerian Revolution was partly bankrolled by Yugoslavia, so they were pleased that I, as Ambassador to them, had this link with Algeria.

[HILL] There is also a quite interesting link with the French. The French had just pulled out of Algeria and were pushing at this point for what they called the dismantling of the blocs in Europe.

[CAMPBELL] It coincided.

[HILL] It fitted in nicely with the Yugoslav policy of neutrality in a way.

[CAMPBELL] Actually, I believe what precipitated De Gaulle's break with the allied forces, the integrated forces of NATO, was not Algeria, although it severely altered French foreign policy, the outcome there. I think it was the aftermath of Cuba. I think de Gaulle decided that there was not going to be any real conflict between the Soviets and the West on nuclear weapons. Cuba proved that when they were nose to nose, eyeball to eyeball, they both backed off; and they both did. Make no mistake about it, it wasn't just the Soviets that backed off. Kennedy gave away bases in Turkey to get that crisis settled. So they both backed off. De Gaulle read into that that it is was a safe world; that we didn't really need to worry anymore about the Soviets making a move in Europe.

[HILL] Because they cancelled each other out.

[CAMPBELL] They cancelled each other out. He said, since I don't like this tie-in with "les anglo-saxons" anyway, I will just pull out, now that it's safe to do so. That is what he did in 1966.

[HILL] So in effect that was over. Do you recall that time as being the first great period of détente?

[CAMPBELL] Well, it started in 1962. From Cuba on, it was all sweetness and light until the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact in 1968, six years later. As I told you earlier, I was worried that the Alliance was going to fall apart at that time. Because the one thing they don't

seem to be able to stand is peace - total, comfortable, absence of tension. Neither can the Warsaw Pact, of course. That's what led to Czechoslovakia. Because there was such an air of détente around, Mr. Dubcek thought he would try his luck, going a bit too far with it. So these are the realities of that period. Both sides were in some danger of disintegrating. Of course the Soviets played a little more hard ball than our side would ever play. That's why they arrested the rot in 1968 with armed repression of the Prague Spring.

[HILL] It must have been quite gratifying for the Yugoslav government to see a decline in the domination of the two blocs.

[CAMPBELL] It justified their having expelled the Soviets in 1948. Although, Tito, whom I knew very well - he lived just down the street from me, and we had quite an extraordinary relationship he was never comfortable unless things were going rather smoothly with the Soviet Union. That old pirate never got over his early years as a Moscow-trained subversive; that's where he started life. He was captured in World War I, fighting for the Austrians, and he was carted off to the Soviet Union, brainwashed and became one of the most active saboteurs in Europe in that period prior to World War II. He was in and out of Yugoslavia organizing cells and revolutions against the monarchy. In the post-War period, first of all he brutally handed the Soviets the entry into Yugoslavia in 1945 - which he had no right to do; all his support had come from the Western allies not from the Soviet Union, in the war against the Germans. Nevertheless he let the Soviets in because he was Moscow-trained. It was three years later that he kicked them all out when he found they were subverting his country. But from then on Tito was never comfortable when he was at odds with the Soviets. He tried to strike a balance, but he was never happy unless things were going reasonably well with Moscow. That's how deeply that man's addiction to the international Communist movement had been inculcated, when he was a young man. Very interesting. He was a patriot, a Yugoslavian patriot, and everything was fine as long as these two things didn't come into collision. But when they did in the end, very reluctantly he would come down on the side of Yugoslavia. But what he really wanted it to be was a reasonably independent, but awfully good member of, the Warsaw Pact grouping. He couldn't have it both ways.

[HILL] Well....

[CAMPBELL] But that period, incidentally, was dominated a great deal by the Vietnam War. Even a lot of my reporting there was on Yugoslav attitudes and the information that they were getting from the Soviets and God knows who else, maybe the Chinese for all I know, about the course of the Vietnam War. He was quite a source of information, the Yugoslav, and I know that Paul Martin, who was the Minister for External Affairs at the time, valued this route in to another point of view, through the Yugoslavs.

[COX] Did they have a direct interest in that war?

[CAMPBELL] Only an ideological one. They were very much opposed to what they considered an imperial American war. They just looked upon the Americans as a colonial successor to the French in those days. Yugoslavia still was a very active member of the liberationist school of thought.

[HILL] Well, that brings us to part six, which I hope will be the largest part of the interview. I think that we are getting along quite nicely.

Part VI - Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, 1967-72

[HILL] Ambassador Campbell, from May 1967 to October 1972, you were Canada's Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council. I believe this was first in Paris and shortly afterwards in Brussels.

[CAMPBELL] A half year later.

[HILL] This period included some very significant developments in world affairs and in Canadian policy towards NATO, including such things as the establishment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the adoption of the Harmel Report, the Prague Spring, the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, the re-birth of détente at the outset of the 1970s, the SALT I Agreement, the Ostpolitik, the Berlin Agreement, the launching of the CSCE and MBFR negotiations, and so on. This was also the time of Mr. Trudeau's rise to power, and his election as Prime Minister, and of such events in Canadian foreign policy as the publishing of "Foreign Policy for Canadians" and then in 1971 the Defence White Paper. Also in 1969 there were the Canadian troop cuts in NATO, in Europe, as we mentioned earlier. Altogether, quite a lot of things to keep you busy during that period. So I wonder if we could ask some questions about them. I would like to start with NATO's role in East-West relations in Europe. How well do you think NATO policies on East-West issues were carried out? For example I am thinking here of the Ostpolitik, the Berlin Accord, the response to the Czechoslovak crisis, and so on.

[CAMPBELL] I am very happy to answer that because I don't think that the world at large, or our government of the day, really grasped that the whole of the détente process was developed and unfolded in NATO. You can't really analyze what was happening during the period that you just discussed, that is from 1967 forward, without taking fully into account what had happened in the preceding five years. That is why I keep coming back to Cuba, which, with the back-down on both sides, introduced a prolonged period of détente in East-West relations. I said a moment ago that, to some extent, I wasn't sure that the Alliance was going to survive this thing. But, certainly we were conscious of this in the Alliance from the day I arrived there - even though there was a Middle East crisis on - the Six-day War. There was a consciousness that in the European theatre there was a calm atmosphere. So much so that we began to plan for a prolonged period of peaceful relations where the accent would shift from military preparedness to political accommodation with the East, and that is what gave rise to the so-called Harmel Report of 1967. We spent a year analyzing where we had come from, from 1962 to 1967. The total consensus was that we were on the eve of true peace. We had seen the Soviet Empire not only back away from a challenge, but eroding; the Chinese had broken off from them, there was a kind of flowering of liberalism within the East bloc; unheard of developments in places like Czechoslovakia; much more relaxed all around. It looked as if there was going be a convergence of the systems, that they could coexist relatively well. And so we had the Harmel Report, and I think it said all these things, if you wish to check. I think it is well worth reading to this day. It was the product of a full year of intensive study by the entire Alliance. I worked on it, and fully enjoyed that time. You remember the period.

[HILL] I came a bit later.

[CAMPBELL] We had Sonnenfeldt, Larry Eagleburger, and very interesting and bright guys such as Rostow working on this exercise, and it was a very interesting report. Well, it all came to an abrupt end when the very things that we had identified, the gradual liberalization that seemed to be taking place in the Communist world, went too far in Czechoslovakia, and provoked a violent

reaction - the invasion by the entire Warsaw Pact. It put the genii back in the bottle. It didn't disprove that we were on the edge of an era of more easy relations with the Soviet Union, but it did prove that if you let things run ahead too fast, they can be upset by developments within the East bloc. In other words, détente was more mortal to their system than it was to ours. We had been worried about ours, about total détente, but the Soviets cannot tolerate total liberalization within their system or it will cease to exist. So it became a matter of containing this process; it had to be a well-thought-out long-term accommodation with the Soviet bloc, not to provoke things like Czechoslovakia. If you can believe it, this was the kind of thinking that we put down in that report, in the Harmel Report, and adopted in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia. That is what gave rise to a sort of highly structured approach to creating a durable détente, and it started with the settling of what I call the border issues, and the Berlin régime.

[HILL] You are referring now to the post-Czechoslovakia period?

[CAMPBELL] Yes, post, getting-into, 1969, 1968-69. Berlin, the Polish borders, the Czech borders, all the physical interface between East and West, that was still unresolved. We decided that those things had to be decided, that those things had to be dealt with first. Then the plan was that, having got that in place, we would then insist upon some reduction in the conventional forces. MBFR was the main concept, and if we got anywhere with MBFR and with these border issues. we would then respond to the Soviet initiative that there be a European Security Conference. It was their idea, the original CSCE, or whatever - it was not called what it eventually was called, because they did not want Canadians and Americans there at all. This was meant to be European, for the Europeans, with just the Soviet Union and their colleagues there, not the United States and Canada. And we had a big battle about that in the beginning. What I am trying to tell you is that the entire structured approach to creating détente, and the détente that flowered from 1970 right through the 1970's really, was planned in great detail in NATO. Its the greatest peace organization on earth. and that fact is not known. And certainly Mr. Trudeau didn't understand it when he first came to power. Because he just about robbed us of our voice in the Alliance by considering, seriously, withdrawal, and a totally neutral posture for Canada, which can not be a reality for Canada. That is a little glimpse of the situation.

[HILL] How effective was NATO in dealing with things like the promotion of détente? Would you like to amplify a bit with regard to CSCE and MBFR?

[CAMPBELL] I think where we left off, was that I was saying that your question should have really been put in a different context, an earlier one, where NATO had been in some danger of unravelling, simply because we had been through such a long period of being totally relaxed following Cuba, that we had all come to the conclusion, by 1967, that we were in a permanent peace situation with the Soviet bloc. That's what led to the review study in NATO in 1967, the socalled Harmel Exercise, which I still think was one of the most timely and effective analyses of the state of relations between the Soviet bloc and the West that has ever been done. And it is the basis upon which the whole détente process that began in 1969, and really persisted throughout the 1970s. was based. We had the phenomenon in between of the Czech crisis in 1968, August of 1968, when the Dubcek experiment was abruptly ended by the Warsaw Pact invasion, a sort of reminder of the limits of Soviet tolerance in the world. And notwithstanding that episode, we had the common sense as an Alliance to sit down and say, okay, this is a blip in the sweep of things, but the basic premises that we have been analyzing are the right ones, namely, that we do have to come to a political accommodation with the Soviet Union, and that probably involves dealing with a number of border issues first and then step by step the disarmament issues. MBFR, and the SALT talks, of border issues first and the SALI talks, the CSCE, all of this was planned. This was what I deplored - the fact that most analysts don't

seem to know that all of this was thought out and planned for a full year, two years, before it was implemented. And it was all done in NATO, every last bit of it, from the Berlin talks, the Czech talks, the Polish borders, MBFR, CSCE, SALT, were all planned, thought out in advance and implemented as a structured policy of the West. Who knows, among present-day historians, that that was all developed in NATO? Damned few. In fact, they would say the opposite - that NATO was there just to wave armaments in the face of the other side. All of this détente planning was done in NATO. You were there.

[HILL] Yes.

[CAMPBELL] I think the problem is that people don't have access to NATO discussions, and they have a blind concept of NATO as a military alliance, interested only in, sort of, disaster control in case of crisis. It's not so. Ninety percent of the activities of NATO are political, 10 percent are military, and it has always been so.

[HILL] I think a point worth bringing up here is that NATO consultations are not just what takes place in NATO headquarters, but there is a whole network, they draw on the input from capitals.

[CAMPBELL] Yes, they do, although our own contribution to that process is not all that active, as you may know. Yes, it doesn't matter what the issue, is, be it inside or outside the NATO sphere, there is a large chunk of political consultation that goes on that is not germane to the theatre of responsibility of NATO. I mean there are consultations about Cambodia, Afghanistan and Cuba, and Nicaragua no doubt today; and all those things are aired in NATO as a political exchange of information exercise. But there are, in addition, the issues that are germane to the NATO theatre and everybody has his input into it. Canada's has not been wildly good. We were quite good in the early parts of the Middle East crisis of '67 and no doubt '72 when there was another occurrence of fighting in the Middle East -'73, yes '73 - because we had a special role in the Middle East as part of UNEF and certain other peacekeeping operations. But on the whole, our input has not been particularly brilliant, I would say. It was quite good when we were on the Vietnam commissions. We were inside a process there and you could make a certain input that was different from anybody else's. But we've become parochial here in Canada, and we do not now have a huge amount of expertise in various areas of the world. I would say it is a declining capability we've shown.

[COX] In the case of NATO, why wouldn't our people open up when they have a viewpoint?

[CAMPBELL] It isn't that they don't have a viewpoint, it's - I really don't know, I will become rude if I say what I really think about this issue. Actually, we have a good foreign service, we had or perhaps have still a very good information system. What we did not have in my day, and I don't know whether we have now, was very good direction from External Affairs as to what you should or should not be saying in the North Atlantic Council. I free-wheeled a hell of a lot, just on the basis of the wealth of information that was coming in from all corners of the globe. We were on the information list of practically every mission in the world. So you were on your own a good deal as to what you contributed to a political debate. Every now and then you'd get a direction, a directive to pursue a certain line, but on the whole you didn't; you were left on your own to do it as best as you could. I personally decided, and you may remember that this was a directive that I issued in writing, that from the day we reduced our forces we had to redouble our political commitment. That was the only way I could see of making up for the very serious loss of face, prestige, influence, etc. that we suffered from the reduction of forces, which saved us nothing and cost us dear. But it was done, and my way of answering it was to redouble the political effort to

make a constructive input into everything that was discussed there. I drove my people crazy to make a useful contribution, and it was all to try to make up for what we had lost.

[HILL] I think there is also one thing I noticed when I was there, that for example in areas like in MBFR, what you need is a fair-sized analytical capability in the capital if you're going to make a real input at NATO headquarters. And of course, it tends to be the case that people like, say, the Americans, and the Germans and so on, are really in that sort of business, and more directly affected too.

[CAMPBELL] This has been the problem. I think our problem, in Canada, is that we don't have enough interests in the world. And we confuse "doing good" with interests.

[HILL] Still, you know, even so, what struck me when I was there, seeing the Canadian delegation operating from my location, which was in the Secretariat, I think there were a fair number of instances where the delegation was fairly effective, I mean at times on things like MBFR and CSCE.

[CAMPBELL] Absolutely, we were effective in those things - they did catch the Canadian imagination, because they fitted in with a kind of policy, an extension of the detente policy that we have been pursuing for a long time. I'm not saying, and I hope I didn't say, that things like MBFR, and CSCE and SALT didn't command our attention. They did. They were aligned with the main thrust of Canadian policy. But, when it came to all the other political consultations that go on about regional situations, we were not all that good.

[HILL] One thing that strikes me from what you said, is that the maker of foreign policy is to some degree the ambassador on the spot and the delegation on the spot, i.e., if your instructions are broad. This is what the whole process is about, because the people we were talking to were those on the spot, who are making policy as it goes along, within a general framework.

[CAMPBELL] Well, you know what it's like in that Council. You can't be instructed in detail as to what you are going to say. Your interventions are all ad hoc. And it would be easy if you want to just sit silent; you don't have to say a damn word. So in a way you're right; it's up to the man on the spot within very vaguely defined instructions, to make the degree of influence we exert there, big or small.

[COX] Have you ever received instructions saying: "Say nothing!"?

[CAMPBELL] Oh, yes. Sometimes I ignored them, or I had one that said: "Say so and so"; and I would know it was so wrong that I wouldn't. And the way that you cope with that, is on the very day when it's supposed to come up, you send a message saying, "Don't you think you should think about this again". And by the time they have answered, it's too late. There are many ways of skinning that cat. It's not easy when you find yourself in a situation where you think you know more about it than either the Prime Minister or someone on the NATO desk in Ottawa. And so you do what your conscience tells you to do, or your political instinct; you don't do exactly what you are instructed to do. And of course that irritates all the people down the line.

[HILL] There is always a danger of getting carried away with the NATO sense of things. Whenever you are in a situation like that, you become part of the collectivity to some degree, and as an ambassador, you have to stay with the middle ground.

[CAMPBELL] I'm being a bit frivolous about it, but it is not easy at all. You cannot just flout the instructions of your government or the main thrust of their policy. Even though you may be dead sure they are wrong. You can't just, you know, mouth something the diametric opposite. So you find ways in between. You find language that is slightly ambiguous, interpret instructions in a way that's understood by the people who know more about it than the people who gave you your instructions, and who therefore understand that Canada's position isn't quite as bad as Ottawa had said it should be; just that it's not the 100 percent thing they might be seeking. So my views are always coloured by the fact that my period in NATO covered this dreadful hesitation on the part of Canada. Canada, which had helped set up the Alliance, been instrumental in bringing it into being, for good and valid reasons - they are as valid today as they ever were - suddenly had doubts about it, public doubts, and it really made for a very difficult time.

[HILL] I just wanted to go on to that actually. When did that start? Did that precede the troops cuts?

[CAMPBELL] Yes, it did.

[HILL] Yes?

[CAMPBELL] It coincided with Pierre Trudeau's arrival as Prime Minister, who suddenly decided, with Jim Eayrs advising him, to reopen all of these issues, to question the various fundamentals of Canada's security policy and foreign policy. And it started from the moment he came to power, more or less in '68.

[HILL] Yes. How did the Czech crisis affect this?

[CAMPBELL] That made it even worse. You know it had started before that. Pierre Trudeau came to power after June '67. I think he became Prime Minister in '68, but it was before the Czech crisis. He was already Prime Minister and had already started this process of trying to pull us out of NATO, prior to the Czech crisis, and the thing that galled me was that he went ahead after having been confronted with the Czech crisis, which proved that he was wrong, that you could not by unilateral example, by pulling back, cause Czechs to pull back, for example, in an equal amount. That was his theory. Jim Eayrs convinced him that all he had to do was to make the unilateral move and one of the weak sisters of the Warsaw Pact would be free to do the same thing. What nonsense! That shows a total misunderstanding of the Warsaw Pact, or its difference from the NATO Alliance. You can do that in the NATO Alliance. You can withdraw if you want. You can't from the Warsaw Pact. Trudeau thought you could. And one of his main theories was that, by example, we will set the pace for mutual withdrawals of forces and commitments in the military alliances.

[HILL] Just before going on to that, could you tell us whether were you there in NATO in '67 when De Gaulle came here to Canada and made the famous "Vive Le Quebec Libre" speech?

[CAMPBELL] I was already in NATO then.

[HILL] What was the reaction in NATO to all that?

[CAMPBELL] The French had already done the dirty by then, the year before, pulling their forces out of NATO. Nobody was surprised.

[HILL] There must have been quite a bit of sympathy for Canada?

[CAMPBELL] Oh yes, there was, total sympathy, because everybody disliked de Gaulle for what he did to NATO and to the NATO forces.

[HILL] So it must have also been a shock to find that Canada was then rethinking. The Europeans must have been concerned.

[CAMPBELL] The two things, together, you know: some thought we were following France. A lot of them thought that it was the French influence that was causing Canada to rethink things. You know, they had a pretty vague notion of us as a sort of bicultural country, equally affected by British and French policy. This is their classic view, but nobody seems to realize we're affected only by American policy and not by the other two. That's the classical view in Europe of this funny country of ours. So they thought we were just doing what France had told us to do. Well, between the two, of being thought to be slavishly following De Gaulle and to be totally insensitive to the lessons of Czechoslovakia, the two things together compounded this felony that we did in pulling back, announcing the pull back of our forces, in the face of both those events.

[HILL] I think that one point you mentioned that I would like to pick up on is this, that there seems to be very little understanding of Canada in Europe, amongst Europeans. I mean they really don't know much about Canada, and what they do know tends to be rather, shall we say, romanticized.

[CAMPBELL] They don't, you know. I don't know which way you want to be misunderstood, as being a satellite of France, of the UK, or of the United States, but nobody, nobody thinks of us as being anything on our own. You know that's a pretty sobering thought. How many years have we been a country? I don't know, we've been around for 400, we've been legitimate for about 125. How long does it take before people start to take you seriously? Nobody does.

[HILL] I was always struck by the fact that most of the people I knew when I was in NATO, I mean the Europeans, they had no idea of Canada having a great industrial centre like Toronto, and Hamilton, and so forth. You know, you look at the automobiles on the roads there, and the industrial production. It never occurs to them that this sort of thing is here in Canada.

[CAMPBELL] No, they don't know anything about Canada. It is, well it's our own fault in a way. Because we don't seem to be able - our history doesn't show that we are able - to forge a niche for ourselves without being part of somebody else. Isn't that so? Is that a false observation on my part?

We have not shown ourselves capable of using our enormous God-given benefits of this country to create something that is unique. We seem to be automatically a dependent of somebody else.

[HILL] I think certainly in the European case, the largest part of the problem is simply the sheer lack of information.

[CAMPBELL] Roger that's not fair, that's not fair. I mean sure they are ignorant as all hell about us. But our record doesn't tend to correct that, does it? We haven't done well. I've watched this country go from the immediately post-war period when we were a somebody, to again a nobody. We have blown it since 1950. We emerged from World War II as a major power, we

had the fourth largest navy on earth, we had an industrial base that had to be created during the war that was formidable. The rest of the world was on its back. Europe was in ruins and the Far East was in ruins. But what did we do with this God-given opportunity? We blew it. Our whole economy has been in decline since about 1955. And we are worse off; we have less manufacturing, less independence economically today than we had 30 years ago. That's a hell of a record. That's mismanagement by various Canadian governments, in my judgment, who failed to regulate to the extent that governments may regulate economic policy. It's an economic failure, not a political one.

[HILL] I ask these questions partly for their own sake, but also as a kind of lead up to asking you if you could tell us what the reaction was in NATO to the '69 troop-cut decision? And what happened then?

[CAMPBELL] Well, I have said this before, publicly, and I am only too happy to tell you again. I have never in six years of sitting on that Council and many more years of attending ministerial meetings, been at anything as dramatic. I, on instructions, gave prior notice to Brosio that we were going to make the announcement of an intention to reduce the forces. Brosio said, if you do that in the Council - in the full Council- you risk tearing this whole Alliance apart, especially in the wake of the Czech crisis. He advised me to advise our government not to do it in the Council. Do it anywhere, hire a room, go anywhere, but not to make this part of the official record of NATO. And so, instead of doing it in the Council, you may remember that it was done in my so-called residence. All the defence ministers came and Leo Cadieux was our Defence Minister at the time and we made the announcement of our intention to cut our forces by this huge amount in the wake of the Czech crisis. Two defence ministers, one Dutch, one Belgian, wept, burst into tears if you can imagine, grown men who were politicians, with tears running down their faces saying, how could this country, this Canada to which they twice owed their liberation, be so insensitive to the lessons of history, of World Wars I and II, not to mention the Czech crisis that had just passed. They said that we could undo the Alliance by this action, that they couldn't credit that we would do so and if we went ahead with it they would never forgive us. And they never have. The beginning of Canada's decline in Europe dates precisely from that day. We said to Europe, we don't care about you in the area that is most vital to you, your security when you are in danger. They said back to us, in effect, therefore, we don't give a damn about you when you come knocking economically on our door. Buzz off! You've had it with us. To me that's coloured the whole period since 1968 in our relations with Europe, and its twenty years now. And I think we are still paying for it. All these efforts later, you know, to get the special relationship or whatever it was called in Europe - what was it called, The Third Option, No not the Third Option, the Contractual Relationship - came to nothing. It was an effort, ex post facto, to remedy the wrong that had been done; it was ineffective because we had hurt them too vitally. We hit them where it hurt most. I still say, David, that we are still paying today in economic terms and in our bad relations with the Economic Community, who have given us no consideration at all. I think we are paying for that mistake in 1969.

[COX] Were there any more indications as opposed to indifference and neglect? Was there any active act of punishment?

[CAMPBELL] No, I don't think so. We have been punished by neglect and indifference. A deaf ear to our special pleadings, and when we found ourselves in trouble with the United States, Europe said: "To hell with you". I think that's been the attitude ever since, and I believe you could document this if you went back and traced all the major issues where we wanted something from Europe and they haven't given it to us. I date it from 1969.

[HILL] That must have been very, very difficult for you. I mean, as you were sort of pro-NATO yourself.

[CAMPBELL] Please, I don't want it put on that basis. You can document this. You can go to the archives today and find my messages in which I have said repeatedly to the Prime Minister, you are misjudging this situation. You are about to pay an indefinite penalty in our economic and political relations with Europe for savings in peanuts on the military side. You have got the balance of this thing all wrong. Sure we can't save NATO with our contribution, or change the balance with the Soviet bloc with our little contribution to the Armed Forces, but make no mistake, they are of vital consequence to the coherence of this thing, to the solidarity of NATO. You undermine that. you're hurting the rest. And you're North American. You're starting the rot that could lead to the rot that could lead to the Americans pulling out of the Alliance, the ultimate disaster for Europe. Make no mistake, you're taking a huge step over a tiny amount of money to do with forces, and you are going to pay. That's what I resented, that it was all written down what would be the consequence, and they paid no attention. He paid no attention. I even phoned, I phoned when I knew that Cabinet was meeting on this issue of reducing the forces. I got Basil to tell me exactly when the cabinet was meeting. I pulled Mitchell Sharp, who was the Minister at the time, out of Cabinet, and I said you can't let this thing go through. The consequences will be untold for Canada. We'll never stop paying the bill. "What do you want me to do", he said. "I've said all that. You want me to resign." I said, "Yes, if you have to, to make the point".

[COX] Isn't that because...

[CAMPBELL] ...because I went public...You can't do that. I remember that.

[COX] I would suspect that there are few people who would disagree with you now. The diplomatic cost that was paid was huge in relation to the trivial gain. OK, but I suppose that the decision, the final decision, was itself not a true decision, but was a compromise. In other words, it was not a calculated decision, it was simply...

[CAMPBELL] No, it was. That's not true, David. No, No, unfortunately, we have to come back to Trudeau and his personality, for this. He wanted to make a positive step away from alliances. He did not believe, he does not, today, believe that alliances, military alliances, do anything for stability in this world. It's just his view, that's all and nothing will ever change that view of Pierre Trudeau. It was a calculated thing - he knew that the savings were peanuts. How could he not know? What were we saving, for God's sake? The price of 10,000 men in the field is zilch in terms of Canadian modern budgets. No, he wanted to make a step away, and he also wanted to make a step towards the Soviet bloc. He believed in mutual example as a means of bringing about détente, and he has never given these ideas up.

[COX] Would he have gone whole hog and pulled us right out?

[CAMPBELL] Oh yes. He was constrained by the review process that he himself launched, but I know from my personal conversations with him that the optimum as far as he was concerned would have been to come right out of NATO and turn Canada into a neutral country and it was not until he started confronting what was involved in neutrality that he began to see that maybe it might be a bit too expensive. Or if you were not prepared to pay a high financial bill for armed neutrality, then of course you lost your total sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States. They wouldn't sit by and let us spend nothing on defence without more or less taking over the country.

[COX] I suppose that's when the current discussions about neutrality originated with the Trudeau government.

[CAMPBELL] Absolutely, they haven't changed. The premises haven't changed, and there are considerations now again of that kind. But believe me, if we're not prepared to foot a reasonable proportion of the bill to be a member of a collective organization, we sure as hell are not ready to pay the bill for an independent military policy. And I don't think, given our situation, given our location, that we can expect anything but American occupation of this country, virtually, if we default too much on our so-called military obligations. You can argue all you like that there isn't any threat, you know; but as long as there is one perceived by those south of the border, it's irrelevant whether there is a real threat or not.

[COX] Do you think that the European NATO members could have been, or could be, persuaded that a different kind of equipment would be equally valuable. I am particularly thinking of that, if you put it in a geo-political sense, our apparent advantage is in naval forces. Could you ever sell that to the Europeans?

[CAMPBELL] No, you can't, because, after all, the fact is that if we look at the map of the world, we can see that we're, well, in a sandwich. We're the ones who physically lie between the Soviet Union and the United States. Not Europe. No, they won't buy that. And indeed they are in a sense right. If there is a political prize in this world, it's western Europe. And that's where the challenge will come, not through our Arctic. So the answer is no, you cannot convince them that we have any special role to play, either in a naval or northern sense. They won't buy it.

[COX] Not even in a convoying role?

[CAMPBELL] No. Well, we do that anyway. We've got that obligation. But what they want from us, as they want from the United States, is a hostage to fortune in terms of a few professional forces not wholly negligible in their military role because they are pros, in our case anyway. Ours are professional forces where theirs are not, they are conscript forces. Ours are significant militarily, small but a significant military element. Even if they weren't, they'd want them there as a trip-wire. So that theory of the mid '60s hasn't really gone away. Americans and Canadians are hostages to fortune. They are the commitment to the trans-Atlantic link. And for that reason, they can never be pulled out as long as there isn't a dove in the Kremlin.

[HILL] I was struck by the fact that all the Europeans I knew, their view of the centre of the world was somewhere north of Paris, and that is actually the centre of the world for them. Whereas I think for Americans and Canadians the centre of the world is somewhere in North America, and you've got Japan over there and Europe on that side. But it is quite a different perception of the world on the two sides of the Atlantic.

[CAMPBELL] It is. But I think that it's not invalid, even though in strategic terms you can see it in another perspective. I believe that politically, Europe is right, that no one is going to launch a war across the North Polar regions and ignore western Europe, that western Europe is in a sense the prize of the Soviet Union.

[COX] Could I just pursue the question of Canadian involvement a minute. I mean the families are hostages too in a sense. So we stick where we are with a small professional army - we put them and their families in and say there we are?

[CAMPBELL] Oh well, I don't attach the same importance to the families. I think we could save money by rotating them more often and leaving the families at home.

[HILL] Keeping the Canadian forces there is also linked into the fact that the Americans are there. If Canada pulls out, it just starts the ball rolling.

[CAMPBELL] You start to rock the boat. I would rotate our forces much faster. I think I would give them a six-month stint.

[HILL] Could you tell us a bit more about what the European reaction was. You mentioned the Belgian minister and the Dutch minister. I understand that there was a particular luncheon given by the Secretary General where you got hammered over the head.

[CAMPBELL] It was the same lunch, it was held at my place. And, oh yes, we were soundly condemned by the British, which I resented because the British are loose in the observance of their own commitments to NATO. You know they promise X and they deliver Y and they go on talking as though it were X. Denis Healey was the UK Defence Minister at the time. He was a friend of mine. But I was mad as hell at him for being so sanctimonious and condemnatory of what we had done

[HILL] What about the others?

[CAMPBELL] The Belgian and the Dutch were the most vocal because they thought they had a special link with us. The French were just grinning in their soup over this whole thing. They didn't mind if we did what they had done. The Americans were curiously silent, they let the others say the obvious. And what pleased them, in a way, was that it was Europeans who were opposing the withdrawal, which meant that it was Europeans who wanted the trans-Atlantic connection. It proved something for the Americans and they need constant proof of this. They are always accused of using NATO as a hegemonistic instrument in Europe. It's not so, as you know; it's the other way around; it's Europe that wants the security link to North America. We're going through it right now. We're watching Gorbachev advocating an almost total withdrawal of nuclear weapons of medium range today. Who's going to oppose it? The French and the British? They want that connection. They want the nuclear umbrella in one form or another. They're dismayed that this may sever the link with the United States.

[COX] Gorbachev has called their bluff.

[CAMPBELL] Absolutely, it's the zero option and it's coming to haunt Mr. Reagan. It really is. David, I'll make a bet with you that it doesn't happen for that very reason. In the last analysis we'd rather have these horrendous weapons and preserve the link between western Europe and North America. However fatuous and unusable these weapons may be, they are the essential security link, and I bet you we don't cut it off.

[HILL] In 1971 there was the Defence White Paper, and just before that there was "Foreign Policy for Canadians"; and there's a section there which, in the pamphlet on Europe, starts with the immortal phrase, "Pending the dissolution of the alliances on two sides", or something like that. What was the impact of all this on the allies? Or did they take much notice?

[CAMPBELL] Oh, they didn't take it terribly seriously because by then they had written us off. We'd already reduced the forces, the White Paper of 1971 was regarded as a sort of <u>post facto</u> justification of what we had done. We had invented a new policy, a foreign policy to justify an otherwise unjustifiable act. That was basically the attitude of the Europeans and therefore one of indifference to this famous piece of paper. That whole period was one big agony.

[HILL] Well, there was a high tide of international relations theory at work in Ottawa.

[CAMPBELL] Ah, the whole thing was an agony. I spent half that year in Ottawa, you know, testifying before this and that committee and it was an absurdity to find that people didn't know what they were talking about. And the net result was a policy document, a 1971 Defence White Paper that had about only one thing that was commonsensical in it, and that was the fact that we were in for a period of trouble with terrorists in this world. And it did recognize that as an upcoming event. The rest of it wasn't worth a damn.

[COX] They had to take the framework from the 1969 statement. The Defence White Paper of '71 begins with the speech made in Calgary by Trudeau in April '69.

[CAMPBELL] That's right. I know this is exactly the way it was set up. It established the whole tone of the White Paper of 1971. It was a two year process and it was meant to call into question every precept of our defence policy, and of our alliance policy up to that time. And believe me, Pierre Trudeau did not get the outcome that he had at that time wanted. He wanted the outcome to be that we would become a neutral nation. You may remember in the '69 speech he envisaged that as one option, and that's where I think he wanted it to come out. And it didn't come out that way because that's not the instinct of most Canadians.

[COX] I'd like to ask you another question about this, which is to some extent an interest I've had for some time. Although I agree that some of these political requirements are basically unchanging, it does seem to me that when you put them all together, then, given that in any circumstances the defence budget is going to be a huge one, what you get is a weakened military organization. And by that I mean that we end up in this country buying three tanks, two destroyers, four aircraft and so on....

[CAMPBELL] None of them is significant in quantity in itself.

[COX] Now, from a point of view of military organization, we don't do very well in my view. Is that a consequence of trying to meet these political objectives?

[CAMPBELL] No. No, it's a consequence of being 25 million people trying to settle on half a continent. The trouble is that we have three oceans and a huge air space and a huge land mass and we're members of an alliance, and the reason we're members of the alliance is that that's the only safe way of engaging others in our defence. And I say safe, because if you try to do it bilaterally, only with the United States, you're gone as a political entity. Sure we could do that, pull out of NATO and give ourselves to the United States, and they'll look after us. They won't let the Soviets in here, they'll just let themselves in, and that's worse. You know that's the truth of the matter. It's the consequence of our being too big, too many territorial obligations, trying to solve them by going into an alliance, and just adding yet another dimension to our obligations. There isn't any answer. There's no way that we can get a nice answer, put it all in one basket, one significant basket, and look after our defence needs. No way it can be done.

[COX] Because, in addition to all these other factors, isn't it the case that by 1968 or 1969 there were serious problems from a purely military point of view in our commitment to NATO, aging equipment, etc..

[CAMPBELL] No. No more than is normal, No. No. The problems about the aging equipment have come since 1968 because....

[COX] Of the freeze?

[CAMPBELL] The freeze. Pierre Trudeau, in his entire régime, for the reasons I've repeatedly stated in these interviews, because he doesn't like military solutions, refused to give the priority to an even normal modernization and renewal of our equipment. So we've ended up 16 or 18 years later with an enormous deficit in modern equipment. If you are going to have any defences, you'd better have them at least up to date. And we're so far behind that it's now a 150 billion dollar job to modernize. It need never have been so. And it was not so in 1968. No. We had reasonably modern forces at that time. It's since then that they have become antiquated.

[COX] Let's try one more question which I sometimes kind of worry about. Is it also possible that by being there year after year, we have produced a military command which is encrusted, which is more, let me put it this way, more a social club than a fighting force.

[CAMPBELL] No, I don't think so. Again, I think that probably would happen if you were using time-serving conscript forces. We aren't. We have professional forces. They're rotated regularly and they are, to a man, pros; they're good pros too. Have you ever talked to a SACEUR about the Canadian forces? He will tell you, value, man for man, about 10 to 1, Americans included. Now Americans are all volunteer as well, but compared to British, plus Dutch, Belgian, all these people who have national service and rotate them through, our forces are worth a hell of a lot in military terms. For the same reason, I don't think they can fall prey to the things you are worried about. No, they're pros and they're thinking about their role all the time and they're always trying to improve it. I think they're good armed forces. Very good. And I think that the people in DND are very serious thinkers on the whole. We've got some pretty bright people over there. Paul Manson himself is not at all your normal conception of a fire-eating, nuke-'em-all, type. He's not like that. He's not like his counterparts in the United States.

[HILL] Just one other question, which is on the Canadian aspect of this period of NATO. In '72, Mitchell Sharp wrote this article in <u>International Perspectives</u> on the Third Option, which led eventually to the Framework Agreement, the Contractual Link and so on. Was there any attention paid to this in NATO at the time?

[CAMPBELL] No, not really. It affected me personally because I was brought back for those discussions here in Ottawa and Hull that we had endlessly about the Third Option. But the Third Option was essentially an economic concept, not a political or military one. I think it was almost irrelevant to our relations with the Alliance or with Europe, except to the extent that it made, and makes to me still, common sense. I think we made a mistake in not seriously pursuing the Third Option, and the Third Option did not mean doing anything excessive about our existing economic relations with the United States. It merely said, let's put a little bit of cap on that and see whether we can't augment our economic and commercial relations with the rest of the world, in Europe and the Far East. All of which made good sense. And I think today it would make good sense, but we're off on a diametrically opposed kick.

[HILL] Of course the linkage was made by Chancellor Schmidt and others in, I think it was '74 or '75, but that was long after. That was three years after the article, this article in <u>International Perspectives</u>.

[CAMPBELL] Yes, you know Trudeau and Schmidt were trying to put something together there that would have built up a kind of Canada-German power centre, as an element in this shift of emphasis towards Europe. And a good idea it was. I don't know what's gone wrong with it. Partly I blame the Europeans, they've been so introspective, so selfish in trying to erect a wall around themselves, and to do everything within the confines of the Common Market. They have almost no time for people like us. And in the areas in which we would have liked to be enlarging the relations, in high tech and so on, that's all selfishly guarded within the European context. In all, I would say the policy has been a failure in respect of Europe. To try to make the opening to Europe with a contractual relationship was a bust, and the Third Option is non-existent. And yet, we're in a bind. Here we are, faced with the nasty option of tying ourselves now even more tightly to a giant in decline. And it is in decline. I find this illogical.

[COX] Could I again put that question about the opening in relation to the presence or withdrawal of troops. If we had not withdrawn the forces, would be have been more successful?

[CAMPBELL] Who knows, David? I like to say, yes. I believe that we have fallen between two stools in our relations with Europe and within the Alliance. The Alliance has developed a European power Eurogroup. We tend to be dismissed by Europe and relegated to the North American context, where we don't really want to be, exclusively. So we've dropped in the middle. Part of the reason we've dropped is that Europeans lost patience with us and sympathy with us over the troop-withdrawal episode. When we needed them the most as a counter weight, they weren't there. That's my view of it.

[COX] Are there any examples pre-'69 in which one could say there's an example where, because we were good, loyal members of NATO, with our forces in Europe, we got a benefit from this? Now I know its rather stacking the question putting it that way.

[CAMPBELL] I've often pondered exactly what you're saying. I have to confess that I would not be able to document this. My hunch, my feelings about what influenced American and European attitudes towards us - I can't say there would have been a huge contract that we would have got - you just know, somehow that one day you were regarded as a member of that family and the next day you were out. That's what my view is, Roger, and you were there and you saw what was happening.

[HILL] Yes.

[CAMPBELL] We were put out of this family, David, it was a palpable thing. And yet I can't document it; I wish I could. I still believe that if we had not done what we did, the whole course of the post-'69 relationship would have been different. I spoke, at our last meeting, about this inevitable trend of Europe toward more autonomy in military affairs, to match their political and economic striving for a self-sustaining policy. It's a factor now in Europe that this Eurogroup has arisen. We didn't know where to go up to 1969; they didn't want us after 1969. They would have welcomed us before that date, but we had done them in. We had shown ourselves basically indifferent to something very important to them. And when they get around the table, I don't think Canada counts anymore. There's been a slight amelioration of that, in the last couple of years. We are beginning to forge, in particular sectors, better relations with Europe - right now in space, for example, through ESA (European Space Agency).

[HILL] I think one of the things Canadians find hard to understand is the fact that while Canada has a contractual link with the European Community, in fact the Community has contractual links with about half the world. I mean there's the Lomé Convention and all kinds of things.

[CAMPBELL] We don't have contractual links really.

[HILL] The fact is, what we have, others have too. So for the Europeans, this isn't a very special thing for them.

[CAMPBELL] Well, you know, that's generally true, that we tend to think that we loom a bit larger on the international horizon than we really do. It's like Pierre Trudeau's famous initiative, Peace Initiative, just before he didn't run again. Nobody in the world had ever heard of his Peace Initiative. Our papers were full of it.

[HILL] Yes.

[CAMPBELL] It didn't exist anywhere else. There was no crisis for one thing. He invented the crisis to invent the policy. But we get carried away with these illusions in this country. We're terribly parochial. Our newspapers are useless. Nobody here knows anything about the world at large and they in turn hardly know anything about Canada; maybe a bit, a lot more, about the United States than they do about Canada. Otherwise, the world doesn't exist. I'm in despair as you can see about this country.

[HILL] Well, to get you off that pessimistic streak, and to restore your faith in Canada, we will talk about NATO again.

[CAMPBELL] Oh yes, back to that.

[HILL] On a quite different question, going back now to the Czechoslovak crisis again; how well do you think that NATO performed in terms of crisis management at that time?

[CAMPBELL] Well, really rather well. It was about the best that I have seen. We had been through a number of crises before, the endless Berlin crises and border crises at various times, Cuba, etc. I thought that the handling of the Czech thing was superb. We even got a consensus, if you can believe it, that was never publicized, to warn the Soviet Union that it should stop where it was in Czechoslovakia; that if it made one move towards Romania or Yugoslavia, there was war. And that was something; that is the way you have to use the collective power of an alliance. The message, admittedly, was conveyed by Americans, but they did not convey it until they had the consensus in NATO.

[HILL] Do you feel that you and your fellow ambassadors in the Council had adequate information on those crises as they developed?

[CAMPBELL] I think so, as much as you can have in a situation like that. Everybody was pooling what they had, including us. Yes, I think so. I think that it worked well. The tragedy of the thing was that by drawing a line as we were around the Warsaw Pact, the full members of the Warsaw Pact, we were inadvertently or indirectly acknowledging that they could do what they liked within the Warsaw Pact. And that to me was a great tragedy, because I think what was happening inside Czechoslovakia (prior to the invasion) was, by and large, the sort of thing we had rather

hoped would happen, perhaps not quite so precipitately as it did. But it was in line with our notion that these régimes are not fixed and permanent. And what we were obliged to acknowledge in Czechoslovakia was that it was within the Warsaw Pact area, therefore, within what we acknowledged to be the Soviet sphere of influence. And as long as they didn't carry their repression and their hegemony outside that area, we could live with it. But that was like endorsing the geographical division of Europe, which we tried to reverse in the CSCE. That's what the CSCE was really all about, to try to say, "Well, we don't acknowledge that those borders are permanent. We do acknowledge that we must not change them by force, we condemn the use of force to change any border, but we do not believe that the political status quo is permanent in Eastern Europe". That's what CSCE was all about. We had indifferent success, of course, in implementing that. All of the measures of greater human contact and so on have produced very little, I would say, in the way of the assertion of the doctrine of impermanence of political régimes in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union for the same reason was trying to say: "The borders are permanent and here's our empire. We don't mind dialoguing a little bit with you across them, but don't, for God's sake, try to shake our régime or we will do Czechoslovakia all over again"; as I think they would.

[COX] It really brings us to the question of the two Germanies.

[CAMPBELL] Yes. Except there is a difference. Most of western Europe doesn't really want Germany reunited either. Whereas I think that most of western Europe would like to see Czechoslovakia, Poland and so on, freer than they are.

[COX] This brings us to what I think to be an underlying view of NATO, at least amongst the dissidents: that there is no forward progress; that what NATO does best is to maintain the status quo.

[CAMPBELL] You put your finger on the dilemma about any alliance of that kind. It's now gone on how many years, 1949, we're nearly up to 40 years. And you can argue that it saved the peace or you can say there's been no war and you can attribute that to it. And I think a lot of it can be attributable to the evidence of the Alliance during the tenser periods. How do you end a thing like this, without precipitating a kind of exploitative reaction on the other side. I don't know. I suppose, in the end, just as we are now trying to negotiate an end to certain levels of weapons, maybe they could negotiate a decline in the scope of the two alliances. I don't know. It's something like that. It will be a part of a measured, deceleration of confrontation, as I see it. It has taken one awful time, you know, to get from the plateau of détente to the ascent of entente that we're about to get into now. And I think that one of the dilemmas, coming after a long, long, 30 years or more of stalemate and armed confrontation that is just beginning to run out, is to think of a way of handling the political side of change. Alliances can't last forever.

[COX] Are we not really in this dilemma? On the one hand you have the high risk of change and on the other, the risk, which it is almost impossible to estimate, of chances foregone, of opportunities foregone.

[CAMPBELL] Yes, I would say this. I believe that we should not even address this question of the undoing of the political superstructure behind the arms build-up or its decline, until we've had prolonged proof that what's happening in the Soviet Union is permanent. One of the reasons we've been going through this long plateau is that we have been bouncing from one rigid régime to another, and occasionally have had a soft one, a Khrushchevian one or a Gorbachevian one, but we don't know whether they're permanent whereas we do know that you can get these wild swings in the Soviet Union. I don't think we should rush to undo anything. Ten years minimum of this

kind of Gorbachevian policy would be a minimum in my judgment before you undo anything. And I have another comment that I would like to leave with you, a thought that it should not be ever a Canadian initiative. We are not the most vitally concerned, we're the least vitally concerned of all the Atlantic allies. We're protected. We're not at risk. It's Europe that is at risk in this game. You watch the machinations of our British and French friends over the next little while. They're not going to give up at all easily on this. Let them make the final running on it. It's like South Africa. Let's not get out in front, it's not our main business. We are happy with our Alliance policy, it serves Canadian interests best of all. Cheaper defence, and we don't have to confront the United States bilaterally; we can bury this relationship in an alliance - which is what we should always do; even bury our economic relations in bigger entities, never take them on the way we are now in a free trade, freer trade; it's folly. We can't win, we can only lose. Why don't we learn these lessons. Anyway, that's where I think we should be, we wait for others to take the initiative to undo the political underpinning, if you like, of the present security system. And I hope that we will stick to that. David, you have a lot of influence in this because you're writing a good deal. You should say that.

[COX] I certainly agree with the time frame. I think the time frame is ten to twenty years.

[CAMPBELL] Yes.

[COX] For the replacement of the present security régime with some other security régime.

[CAMPBELL] Right, and don't look to the United Nations, that's not a security régime. It has no capability of being it either.

[COX] The only real option is, in that time frame, a European one, as far as I can see, a European security régime which is really road tested. And how you road test it, I don't know.

[CAMPBELL] I don't think they can do it. You know, they might have done it, if they had been abandoned by the United States in 1948 or '49. I think if they had not been attacked, they just might have pulled it off, and been today a significant military factor, able to look after their own military defence. It didn't happen that way. They have been kept in thrall, if you like, by the Americans, protected by them for 40 years now. It's too late to catch up.

[COX] And yet the wild card might be the United Sates?

[CAMPBELL] How?

[COX] Because you might see there a change in domestic opinion that really drives change in the Alliance much more rapidly.

[CAMPBELL] You mean because of the economic plight.

[COX] I would say the combination of the economic situation and this kind of shift towards the West, which brings with it an indifference and lack of familiarity with European affairs.

[CAMPBELL] You mean "fortress America?" Well, David, we should also pause and think what that would do to us. You know, we're just dead if our Government goes any further than they are along that path. I just don't know why none of this is entering into the present debate we're in. It must be apparent to anybody that has his eyes half open that we're deep into a highly

protectionist, highly "fortress America" philosophy, right now. Why we shouldn't be divorcing ourselves from this as fast as we can go, I really do not know. Instead, what are we doing? We have this Government of ours stumbling over itself to get deeper into the pockets of the United States. I can't understand it. Who's advising these people anyway?

[HILL] I'd like to ask you about the perception of American policy while you were at NATO. I mean, in '67 you had President Johnson and that I think was almost a policy of benevolent neglect by withdrawal. Then you had Nixon come in. What do you feel about that sort of period in US policy?

[CAMPBELL] Well, Nixon brought Kissinger along with him and we began to have a much more deft touch in relationships with the allies. Kissinger was really quite a good performer and there was a distinct warming, as you know, in the consultative process and so on. And Americans all of a sudden seemed to realize that they had some allies that had to be consulted. Czechoslovakia of course helped over this as well; the first crisis in a long, long time, and they discovered that they needed their European allies. So yes, from whenever it was that Nixon came in, when was it?

[HILL] '68, the end of '68.

[CAMPBELL] Yes, it was right after the Czechoslovakia crisis, you had a much greater sense of sensitivity towards the European allies. I thought the USA conducted things from then on reasonably well, given that they were deep in the Vietnam War.

[COX] Of course.

[CAMPBELL] In which they were running themselves without too much attention to what others tried to do. Canada tried, Paul Martin tried, to take an initiative inside NATO that would get a change in American policy in Vietnam, because he rightly perceived they were getting deeper and deeper into a mire there, a war that they couldn't win and one they were losing at home. It was tearing the United States apart. And he perceived this. Paul wasn't all words, I can tell you, and he tried to get an initiative going there when he said why don't you Americans try, for a change, risking as much for peace as you now do through rather reckless war-like moves out there? I have never heard anybody read a lecture quite like Dean Rusk thereupon read to Paul. He made a fool out of him, and he shouldn't have. It was a sincere initiative, it was a sensible one, and in the light of history, it was Rusk who was the fool.

[HILL] Was this in the Council?

[CAMPBELL] In the Council. In the Council itself. The crime that Paul committed was in not telling anybody he was going to do this, and forbidding me to tell anybody that he was going to do it.

[COX] You mean he came out of the blue into a Council meeting and ...

[CAMPBELL] A NATO ministerial meeting. And when it came to other business he put up his hand and started this thing. And said....

[HILL] "And, by the way, I've got something to add".

[CAMPBELL] I have never heard anything quite like it. It was brutal. But Dean Rusk could be like that, especially if it was a smaller nation in NATO.

[COX] Could I just ask you to compare that with Canada's NATO decision. I just want to try to make sure that we've got it straight. NATO, the European NATO in any case, had kind of listened to the debate, which was a public debate in Canada, so they presumably knew what was going on I'm talking about the withdrawal. We're back in '69. But when it finally went to NATO itself, was there consultation prior to the decision?

[CAMPBELL] We just told them what we were going to do.

[COX] So you were authorized to tell them that this speech was coming?

[CAMPBELL] Authorized, yes. I was authorized to tell them that it was coming.

[COX] But there were no consultations with them?

[CAMPBELL] No. No, we just told them what we were going to do - like everybody else.

[COX] Was that deliberate, no consultation, they're not going to be asked, we won't negotiate with them?

[CAMPBELL] There was no way that Mr. Trudeau was going to subject Canadian policy to...

[COX] Consultation?

[CAMPBELL] Consultation. I mean we complain about the Americans not consulting us. We didn't consult them, we told them what we were going to do. Afterwards, we went through all sorts of machinations which Roger will remember, to say that we had carried a disproportionate share from 1945 until 1969, during a period when Europe was flat on its back; and we thought that Europe, now being no longer flat on its back, could carry a bit more of the burden. They didn't need us as much as they had, and they had to remember that we were responsible for two areas one huge chunk of the North Atlantic area in North America, as well as our little corner of responsibilities in Europe. I had to concoct all this justification myself and try to make it sound as plausible as possible. I tried to make it sound reasonable, what we were doing. I didn't believe one word of what I was saying but I was obliged to do this.

[COX] When was the Paul Martin intervention?

[CAMPBELL] Over the Vietnam thing? I guess that must have been 1970 or '71. It was well after we had done our force reduction thing. It was at one of the autumn meetings.

I'd have to go back over my notes. You know, in my mind, there's a kaleidoscope of all these meetings from 1951 to 1972. I was at every NATO ministerial meeting but two I think. That's a long time and they get mixed up as to what the issues were.

Well, all I know is that Paul Martin's statement was one of the most unpopular moves that anybody had ever made in NATO, as far as the Americans were concerned, and they really squashed him.

[HILL] Even though the late '60s was a bad period in some respects, because the USA was preoccupied with Vietnam, my impression is that on the whole relations between the United States and the European allies and Canada were good. As you mentioned, Kissinger had a sort of deftness.

[CAMPBELL] Nixon, you know, under Kissinger, did some very good things with foreign policy, in the China opening, and all the rest of it. Those things were happening in that period.

[HILL] Right, exactly.

[CAMPBELL] And they all made for easier relations between the United States and Europe and us.

[HILL] But what about sources of difference between the US and its allies, for example during the '67 war in the Middle East. Did that create major problems in NATO or not?

[CAMPBELL] No, not really. I arrived just a few weeks before that happened. No, the '67 war didn't produce any great trauma inside NATO, and no disagreements really about what to - it was agreed that the Alliance should stay out of the thing, for one thing. There was no question of intervening on either side. The Americans muted their pro-Israeli stance considerably at that time, mainly because the Israelis were the aggressors in the war, I guess - I don't know, how do you estimate them, whether they really were? I guess they weren't, the others started it but they got wiped out. No, there were no disagreements. But what I think started to give rise to what I call the Eurogroup, and for all I know it may still be called that - the sort of European element within NATO - was indeed the Vietnam War. And even though we came out of that with Nixon and Kissinger showing a certain amount of enlightenment, nevertheless the lesson had been learned that the United States, when it wanted to, could be a pretty ruthless military actor. And I think at that stage the Europeans thought: "Well, we'd better pull ourselves together and see whether we can't assume responsibility for a bit more of European defence than we have done up to now, without pulling the Alliance apart; do it within NATO". And again, this was absolutely deadly for Canada. Where did we fit in, in a Eurogroup that comprised nearly all of the European members of NATO? Where did it leave us? You know we didn't want to be left on the shelf with the Americans, and yet that's really what has been the consequence of the growth of this European centre within NATO. I don't know where it is now. I'm not up to date. You probably know more about it than I do as to whether the Eurogroup is now alive and well.

[COX] I think it's as you have described it. Except that it has taken the form now of intermittent discussion about reviving the Western European Union.

[CAMPBELL] Oh, dear, yes. That goes a long way back. WEU. Brussels Treaty, all the rest of it. Oh well, I suppose it will come to that in due course and maybe it wouldn't be a bad thing. It's one way, David. We came up that route, you know, maybe we could walk back down it. It's my theory of the plateau. The up, the plateau, the down. I've always believed that this is a 50-or 80-year process we were looking at and we're about that far along it you know. I'll never get down the other side.

[COX] You have expressed a number of views which I guess one could characterize as the internationalist view of Canadian foreign policy, which amounts to, "Don't just stay in North America". Some people of course take the opposite view and say that it's a lost cause. And of

course some of the things you have been saying, you know, could be interpreted as fairly pessimistic about....

[CAMPBELL] Not hopeless though. I'm only pessimistic because governments won't recognize the kind of box they're stepping into, and act accordingly.

[COX] But in your time there, after all, what was discussed is relevant for the present day. It all seemed to come out at that period. I mean, were there people that said the writing is on the wall, we're going to have to move past this?

[CAMPBELL] No. No, there were not, largely because for most of that period we had Pierre Trudeau as our Prime Minister and a Liberal government, and believe me there was no disposition then to hand the country over to the Americans. You know, it was a different philosophy. I think Trudeau was right. I think his Third Option was right, badly executed, but a great idea. It's where we should be. If you are in a situation such as we are in in this continent, vis-à-vis the giant in the United States, even if the giant were healthy, we should be striving to dilute that influence in larger groupings, be it economic or military. It's why we're in NATO in part and it's why we should rely on GATT and other instruments rather than bi-lateral relations with the United States. We all lose if we go into a bi-lateral thing with the USA. It's even more apparent to me when that giant is in decline and angry and lashing out and protectionist, that again, we should have less to do with it. We should, instead of trying to accommodate to this thing. And it's unachievable in my judgment. There is no way the United States is going to give us what we want.

[COX] No.

[CAMPBELL] We were wasting time. We should have redoubled our efforts to make the Third Option work without calling it a Third Option. There is the mistake. You don't need a five-year plan to do five-year planning, you know.

[COX] Functional co-operation?

[CAMPBELL] That's right, and we should have just done it without putting a name on it.

[HILL] Of course, in the Trudeau philosophy too, he was also looking out to Africa, the Pacific and so on, at least in theory anyway. And that was all part of a sort of broader world.

[CAMPBELL] Oh yes, he had a thing about the Third World. But you know, there's no salvation for us really in the Third World. They haven't any money to salvage us with. It's an economic thing and you have to look to the prosperous non-American regions in the world. There are plenty of them. It would drive you normally towards heavy concentration on the Far East and that's what we should have been doing. And why we didn't do it, I don't know. It's the fastest growing area of the world, greatest economic potential for us anywhere, including the United States - far greater potential than south of the border. Why didn't anybody make a big pitch for it?

[HILL] You can't get it into people's consciousness somehow. It's very strange.

[CAMPBELL] We're not really international traders. We're American traders. This is a very parochial country. I am in a bit of despair. It is unrewarding to spend your whole life, your whole career, trying to make something out of your country, only to wake up as you travel to the

edge of your final box, to find the country worse off than were when you started. I find that a disagreeable fact of life and yet it's true - we are worse off.

[COX] The only countries that I can see that actually have expressed positive interest in Canada are the Scandinavian countries.

[CAMPBELL] No, I think you would find that the truth is that the countries that really are expressing interest in Canada are the Koreas, the Thailands, the Taiwans, Japan, these are giant countries on their way up at a rate of knots in this world, but they are very interested in Canada. Very, and if we had wanted to dilute this slide that we are on with the United States, we could have easily have done it, and we didn't.

[HILL] Actually, I was very struck about three years ago, on a trip to that area, by the fact that I think I saw more newspaper articles about Canada, or Canadian involvement in that area, than I'd seen normally in a year in Europe.

[CAMPBELL] That's right. In Europe and the United States, they're indifferent to us, they don't care. For all I've said about Europe, it's true they're negligent towards us, they don't care, apart from a colonial heritage from both French and British. The rest of the world is much more interested in us; the prosperous part of the world is interested in us. We are the ones who have failed to pick that up.

[HILL] I'd like to ask you some more about it later on. I just wonder if we could finish up with a couple of points that I had about the NATO period. One was: how useful were the NATO consultations on things like economic affairs, particularly East-West trade. Also, in the period you were at NATO, they set up the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, the CCMS. How valuable in your view were those activities?

[CAMPBELL] Not very. I think they were of very minor consequence. NATO has not been a success as an economic forum. We did our best, as you may know, in the formative period, to try and inject an economic element into it and indeed a political one too, so that it would not just be a military alliance. We failed on the economic front and from the creation of the OECC through its conversion into the OECD, progressively the economic and social content of NATO was hived off onto specialized organs, namely the OECD in the economics sphere and a thousand and one other bodies in the social sphere. CCMS was a bust as far as I'm concerned, and practically all economic initiatives within NATO were also. It's not an economic organization.

[HILL] My impression of the CCMS was that it was something that somebody stuck in a speech by Nixon, and NATO simply accepted it for that reason.

[CAMPBELL] Oh well, they were scratching around for, you know, new things to revivify the Alliance after it had taken some punishment over Vietnam. That's the truth. The Americans were looking for new strands to the relationship and we went along with it because it was compatible with our original views of what NATO should be. I told you the other day about that interesting conversation that I had with Mike Pearson, didn't I? Mike had always wanted NATO to be far more than a military alliance, and I can remember coming back here in the autumn of 1967 and saying to him, you must pay more attention to this alliance, it's now becoming what you always wanted it to become, the principal political consultative forum of the West. Remember this is pre-Czechoslovakia '67. It's all the things you wanted it to be, far more than a military alliance. The military side declining by the day, the political way up there somewhere, very useful. And he

said, "Look I know what's happening in NATO, and I am as pleased as you are that it's happening". But, he said, "What you don't know is that something is happening in this country that is far more important, and that is the rise of this thing in Quebec". He said, "And that is so overriding in my judgement. I have no more time for foreign affairs. That's the issue".

[HILL] Yes.

[CAMPBELL] The man was absolutely prescient, this was in 1967. It was well before the October Crisis. He saw that coming. I give Mike the credit, not Pierre Trudeau, for identifying the Quebec issue as being vital to the survival of this country. You know, that was a big jump for a man who had spent his entire life in foreign affairs and was a kind of author of NATO, member of the Three Wise Men group. He'd had a career in NATO and he deliberately had to turn his attention away from it because he perceived more important issues at home. I tell you he's an unsung hero that man; he's better than anybody thought, domestically as well.

[HILL] That was also, while he was PM, the period of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec; so it was put right before his attention, whether he liked it or not.

[CAMPBELL] What he perceived then was that it wasn't so damn quiet, that revolution; he saw the real troubles coming. No, he was beginning to think it could tear the country apart, a year or more, two years before it happened.

[HILL] So, in effect, while you were in NATO, the whole ideal of the Atlantic Community being a grouping that was on its way to becoming a federal state, that was really gone by then?

[CAMPBELL] Gone long since. And it never was realizable anyway. You know that was a concept that thrived in the euphoria, the post-war euphoria of the weakened Europe, the faith in international institutions to replace bilateralism and so on. It faded in no time at all. It was gone by the mid '50s really. Too bad in a way, that was a very hopeful mood, that of the immediate post war period. If it could have been followed through, we would have perhaps lived in a kind of utopia. But I guess nations are like individuals. There are about 50 percent that are bastards and 50 percent that are good guys.

[HILL] I probably shouldn't have used the word federal state there. That wasn't where it was going, but it was the idea of a whole collective grouping of some kind or another.

[CAMPBELL] It was a kind of super state idea, people had at one time, of the North Atlantic community. Well, I guess we messed that up when we strayed beyond the North Atlantic, and swept in people like Greece and Turkey.

[HILL] Well, of course it ran head on into Europeanism as well.

[CAMPBELL] Well, the European movement though, died in a sense, or it went into a long decline. I think you're only watching it now come back, reference your comments about a WEU type of revival. I think we're looking again at a 40-year curve. In 1948, or whenever, WEU and the Brussels Treaty were the only thing on the international horizon. Now, 40 years exactly later, here we are watching those ideas coming back because we've had 40 years of peace. Maybe the trans-Atlantic connection is not so vital now that the Soviets look a little more tame, less aggressive. These things evolve - you really have to step back and look at them in that kind of a time frame, not day-to-day.

[HILL] Of course, also the European movement itself ran head on into Gaullism. I mean de Gaulle came back in '58, and dominated the scene until 1968. I mention that year because of the student riots in Paris.

But by the time you arrived in NATO, the worst of this sort of NATO-French discord was pretty well over.

[CAMPBELL] No. We were still in Paris when I arrived, you see. No. It was far from over. The decision was taken after I arrived that we would put ourselves out of Paris, put the Council out. He expelled the forces and the Allied command, but he didn't expel the Council. We expelled ourselves. He in fact said there was no need to go. "We're staying in the Council and so you're welcome to stay." And we said: "No, thanks. It makes no sense, that you who have put yourself in a neutral category in war-time should be the siège sociale of the headquarters of the thing. No thank you." So we left. It was a very difficult decision.

[HILL] So, there was plenty of acrimony?

[CAMPBELL] Oh yes, terrible acrimony. Luckily they had a series of stars there as French ambassadors, such as Roger Seydoux, one of their most senior people. He was so good, he made everybody accept the French withdrawal from the NATO force structure. They did send extremely good people to the North Atlantic Council. They had to; their relations were otherwise appalling.

[HILL] But after that, about '68-'69, there really was quite an amiable situation.

[CAMPBELL] Amicable, and yet, you know, it led to the creation of the Defence Planning Committee, as an entity, one short of the full Council. It made us divide everything in the Alliance, and it was, you know, and still is, a very awkward arrangement to have the French in on the political side of the thing but not on the military side. It couldn't happen anywhere but in western democratic society that you would contrive an animal of this kind, almost unworkable. You're telling them that you can't rely on them militarily, and yet you're discussing all the strategic concepts with them. It makes no sense.

[HILL] How well did you feel the defence planning and nuclear planning systems of NATO worked in the period that you were there. I mean there was quite a lot of work done in that period. I'm not asking whether the eventual plans they worked out were necessarily going to be very effective if they ever had to be used, but how well did the mechanism work?

[CAMPBELL] I'm inhibited about talking about it as you know, that particular period. But I would say it again, it's a sort of contrived thing. The Nuclear Planning Group includes certain members of NATO on a permanent basis, and certain others on a rotational basis. That almost automatically defines it as a device for keeping people mildly happy rather than a serious consultative mechanism. The Americans used the Nuclear Planning Group really as a way of just barely keeping the Alliance members happy about what they were doing in the nuclear sphere. It's more of an information group than a consultative group. I think it can be very seriously faulted as a serious mechanism of the Alliance. It played a tremendous role, however, when it came to the SALT Agreement, because there you had at least a nucleus of people who had been exposed to enough of the military nuclear planning of the Alliance to understand the decelerations of the plans in that sphere. And I think that's where the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group was justified,

in that it gave the Alliance a consultative forum fairly well informed - not wholly informed, fairly well informed - on the disposition and significance of various nuclear forces in the Alliance, in terms of trying to reach a deal with the Soviet Union. And believe me, NATO was very active in SALT II, based upon the experience of the people in the NPG - the Nuclear Planning Group.

[HILL] And other fora, other defence planning mechanisms in NATO. I mean, how good do you think it is on the whole? How realistic is the NATO strategy, at least in terms of what it is feasible to work out?

[CAMPBELL] Are you asking me whether I think that a nuclear strategy really can make sense?

[HILL] Not really, I suppose what I'm asking is how realistic do you think is the strategy of forward defence and flexible response. I mean, is that about the best that can be arranged?

[CAMPBELL] I think so. I mean we've watched it evolve from trip wire and massive retaliation, in the days when we had total superiority over the Soviet Union, to other pragmatic adjustments that took place when they finally got the nuclear capability. All of a sudden we decided on graduated response, flexible response, which meant that there's no point in committing suicide. Let's develop a doctrine that is a little more realistic and that says we'll respond with the degree of force needed to restore the status quo. We won't attract a holocaust if we can help it. Well, you know you can laugh about this, in retrospect, but when you're at the peak of a Cold War, it is another matter and these policies looked sensible. They look ridiculous in retrospect. At the time they looked very sensible because we didn't really know what was going to happen in the future. We don't know now, but it's going to be very interesting to see what happens in the face of zero options which nobody really believes in. And I don't believe in them. I think we'd be mistaken if we actually implemented the zero option, until we know how permanent is the dove in the Kremlin. I'm not sure at all if he's there for good. I want to see a generation grow up that all thinks like Mr. Gorbachev. I don't doubt his sincerity. I'm astonished that this man has been able to come as far as he has in two years. And it worries me that he may be living dangerously.

[COX] But you know, if they were all gone, the Minutemen and the short-range, there would still be an awful lot of nuclear weapons.

[CAMPBELL] But then, that isn't really the point, is it? Nobody is going to really use them. It's a kind of game of chicken, that's all that nuclear weapons are used for. They're political weapons, they're not really a usable military weapon, you know. You do commit suicide if you unleash these things. It's the threat of their use that compels governments to react to threatening situations.

[COX] You wouldn't like to see even those battlefield nuclear weapons being used, of course.

[CAMPBELL] I think that is one of the great evils that has taken place is that the distinction between the strategic and medium range missiles, and theatre weapons, has been blurred rather badly. Soldiers have forgotten there's a hell of a difference between the smallest nuclear weapon and the largest conventional stuff.

[COX] And if the Soviets really were coming and they had made a significant breakthrough and you said, you come another three miles and were going to use nuclear weapons, you'd have exactly the same threat as you've got now.

[CAMPBELL] But that's what we have been saying to them, that's been the whole doctrine.

[COX] Yes, that's what I'm saying, I don't think it makes an awful lot of difference whether you've got ...

[CAMPBELL] Big ones or little ones?

[COX] Big ones or little ones.

[CAMPBELL] No. We could get rid of a lot of those things. Yes, you're quite right. But I don't think we should get rid of everything. Just keep people a little bit honest.

[HILL] Just to wrap up this point: so, by and large, you feel that while you were in NATO, the defence planning mechanisms and systems were about as good as one could hope in that kind of organization?

[CAMPBELL] Well, yes. You know, I have no illusions about it. Neither on the conventional side nor the nuclear planning side, was it a great deal more than an enlightened information system rather than a consultative one. Nobody was asking the Canadians of this world whether they might or might not do thus and so with their forces. This is just a function of being a lesser member of the Alliance. If we had let our forces grow much smaller than we did, our influence would have been even less. We were a little bit respected because we had these professional forces in NATO. But I was never happy about the consultative arrangement, no. I'm not happy now with the way even the political consultation works in NATO. It has improved, but if you're sitting in that chair you're pretty conscious of the fact that it's something short of true consultation that takes place, and if there is a crisis over the NATO area there is no consultation. You learn about it afterwards.

[HILL] One other question is, while you were in NATO was the period of the Mansfield Amendment in the United States, and that was defeated, perhaps partly because the US Administration was able to claim that MBFR was in the works. But anyway, it was defeated. But then Mansfield introduced another amendment in '73, I think it was. The thing is still alive.

[CAMPBELL] It never goes away.

[HILL] What if one of these went through? What was your impression of what would have happened at the time? What would happen now?

[CAMPBELL] There is a constant threat that it will go through. The Americans have a perpetual discontent, if you like, with the extent to which the Europeans do not carry their weight in the defence of Europe. And the Mansfield Amendment - there were resolutions before it, and there have been resolutions since - are all in the same vein. Unless Europe does more, the United States is going to pick up its toys and go home. I don't think it's a real threat. The United States isn't there in order to protect Western Europe. They're there because they have perceived that it is the front line of their own security perimeter, as we do. We think the same thing. And so it's an empty threat. The Americans can't go home without doing themselves more harm than good. And so, no, I don't believe that the Mansfield resolutions of this world are going to be implemented.

[HILL] But, certainly while I was there, I had the impression that people were very conscious of the Mansfield Amendment, while it was under debate in the US. People in NATO, I mean, Europeans and Canadians.

[CAMPBELL] It's a perennial. It's a hardy perennial. It keeps coming back and coming back in one guise or another; it's been doing it for 35-40 years to my knowledge. Almost immediately after the Alliance was formed, the moment Europe started to get at all prosperous, the moment the Marshall Plan was winding down, the United States started then to ask Europeans to do more. And by then Europeans had become comfortable in doing less, and there's no way they're going to spend the massive amounts really needed to confront the Soviet Union. Do you agree with that, David?

[COX] Yes, it's a conundrum, isn't it.

[CAMPBELL] Isn't it, though? There's a paradox there, but it's a truth nevertheless.

[HILL] Also, there is the thought that the Europeans don't want to do more financially, because this might give the Americans an inclination to do less on the nuclear side.

[CAMPBELL] Now that's exactly where we are now. We're up to the litmus test with all of these theories with Mr. Gorbachev - the cat among the pigeons.

Part VII - Japan and Korea, 1972-75

[HILL] I'd like to ask one question about Part Seven, your period as Ambassador to Japan and Korea. It's really a sort of reflection upon NATO in the world, but linked to this thought is the fact which we touched on earlier, that the world is changing and of course Japan probably has changed more than any country. Where is Japan going, where is the world going in balance of power terms and the development of this new world in the Pacific, and where does NATO fit into this scheme of things?

[CAMPBELL] The Americans are the common link between all of these regional organizations. They have a very powerful bilateral treaty with Japan born out of World War II. The Japanese see themselves, really, as sort of an ancillary member of NATO. It is a curious attitude. Unlike Europe they would like to do more in their own defence, and it's the terms of the peace treaty they have with the United States which ended the Occupation that forbade them to enter into full selfdefence. That situation is eroding right now, as the Americans get economically weaker and more and more tired of carrying both Europeans and Japanese on their backs. They are now rather dangerously urging the Japanese to do more in the military sphere. I think it is dangerous. But that's what's happening. And they've got the very man who is ready to do it, Mr. Nakasone. According to the American conception of things, Japan is a kind of Britain. It is a floating airfield as far as the United States is concerned, the way Britain was in World War II. That's the way they regard Japan and the Far East; they don't want the Japanese manning those airports themselves. they want the Americans to have the right to do so. They are still looking after the security interests of that flank of the Soviet Union, but as I said, with the Japanese being invited to do more and more. But my time there was almost entirely occupied with the economic crisis that was happening at the time. I arrived in the same breath as the first "oil shock", as they called it. They had four or five days supply of oil to make that giant economy go, and in four or five days they mounted fourteen missions to all the oil producing countries of the world with a very simple message: "What is it you want, car factories? a new port? an oil refinery? It's yours; you pay in oil." And they didn't suffer one day's shortage of oil in Japan. They overcame that crisis in the most admirable way; you can only admire it, a tour de force. They adjusted to this crisis that could have crippled them and in no time at all they had beaten it, and were just sailing on to higher economic dizzy heights.

[HILL] Where are they all going to wind up, the Japanese?

[CAMPBELL] They may end up owning half of the United States. I think that's the only place they can end up. They've got all this surplus money now and the United States is in a massive deficit and is selling off parts of itself, almost as rapidly as we sold off the majority of Canada in the same circumstances.

[HILL] You don't see them slowing down, the Japanese economy slowing down at all?

[CAMPBELL] Not at all.

[HILL] It's going to keep on going, in other words?

[CAMPBELL] I don't know where this thing, this dizzy spin-off, ends. It's frightening, but they seem to be able endlessly to adjust to new trade circumstances. They have now moved into the knowledge-intensive rather than the manufacturing-intensive industries, and to be beating the Americans at their own game, and making computer mega chips, or whatever it is...million bytes or whatever they are. I don't know, there seems to be no end to it. They're increasing the amount of money they have, they can only start now to re-invest around the world, and they seem to prefer the United States. We rank somewhere up there as a reasonably stable area for investment. They're certainly not gambling in Third World areas very much. I reckon they are going to own a good chunk of the United States before this is all over.

[HILL] And they are sort of pulling a good chunk of the Pacific Rim up with them, Korea and Taiwan and so on.

[CAMPBELL] The reason the Taiwans and the Thailands and so on in this world are prospering, is that the Japanese, whose standard of living and wage roles have now risen to about the same as ours, have been progressively moving those things off shore into the cheap areas all around them. And those areas benefit you know; they are going through a cycle of increased standards of living as a consequence of this. It isn't that the Koreans or the Taiwanese invented this. A lot of it is Japanese investment in those places, at the lower end of the manufacturing scale, cameras and motorcycles and things. They are all moving off shore out of Japan, and Japan is moving into high tech industries.

[HILL] I was struck, when you commented about the Americans pushing them to do more in defence, that perhaps this is dangerous. You start some country like Japan moving, and they're going to go their own way to some degree; especially if they form alliances of some kind or another with other countries or nations including China and so on.

[CAMPBELL] They can't.

[HILL] I mean, not necessarily a close alliance.

[CAMPBELL] Oh, they despise each other. Don't worry about that, it's not going to happen. There's never going to be any alliance between the Chinese and the Japanese. Oh no, don't worry about that. The Japanese are using the Chinese as, you know, a huge market. Here are a billion people with nothing and lots of resources, and the Japanese have all the things that the Chinese don't. What a wonderful marriage! Take their oil and coal and everything else and give them

cameras and Hondas. That's the way they're doing it. No one in the end is going to have a real look into that Chinese market other than the Japanese. We'll nibble, the Germans will nibble, the Americans too. It's 85 percent Japanese. They're doing very nicely.

[HILL] But in any case, that area of the world is going up and becoming more and more powerful; and quite rapidly, at least economically. So, by the turn of the century, where would you see the link to Canada and the link to Europe and the NATO link, where is this going? Is this going to be a central feature in world affairs or will it turn down somewhat.

[CAMPBELL] No, I can only perceive it becoming more of a power centre. You can't deny, even if they're weak in military terms, you cannot deny the clout that the Far East region now has. It's had a growth rate of something like 17% annually for almost as long as all of us can remember now. It's far and away the most prosperous part of the world. And it's not just Japan; its Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan. It's a huge area, a very, very active economic power. But not military.

[HILL] Could we turn discussion back to Europe, now, for a while? I suppose the link to Europe will remain important as far as Canada is concerned?

[CAMPBELL] Europe, to my regret, has not become an important area of Canadian concern, other than the strategic link. To me it's a growing matter of great regret that we don't seem to be able to capitalize on significant economic relations with Europe.

[HILL] In your view we should do more?

[CAMPBELL] We should have done more, I think we forfeited a lot in 1968. But if today, if you had to choose, you wouldn't go to Europe because Europe has, after all, created this great exclusive trading bloc, a group that has erected a wall against the rest of the world and has improved its own circumstances at the expense of others, including us. They more or less kicked us out; no matter how much we might have wanted in, we've been put out. And it is partly a function of what they were trying to achieve politically and still haven't, but I think will. I think there is going to be a kind of United States of Europe, and a very important power centre it will be. The other, the Rising Sun is in the Far East.

[HILL] And we would probably have a better opportunity of getting involved there.

[CAMPBELL] Sure we have. That's still a relatively unexploited marketplace. It's a growth marketplace. Europe's an old one, but a highly developed one. Incidentally, we underestimate the technological strength of Europe. We're all brainwashed by what we see south of the border. We believe that everything technologically advanced is to be found in the United States and nowhere else. It's not true, not anymore true. I can name a dozen different technologies where Europe is miles ahead. Even in space, the Soviet Union is way ahead of the United States. We've idolized the American manufacturing ability and innovative capability in our minds in this country without really examining where other countries now stand. I think they are being challenged on every front. I don't think it's just because their dollar was over valued that they weren't selling. I think it's because they have fallen behind in the race for excellence in a lot of areas.

[HILL] In light of these comments about the world scene, how would you see NATO and Canadian foreign policy in the coming decades? I mean, do you think it still should remain a key element in Canadian foreign policy?

[CAMPBELL] Yes, I'm afraid I do, but increasingly for negative reasons. I still believe that it's a very important political and military strategic forum for us. But my main concern would be, where would we go if we're not in that collective grouping? And it's this fear that I have of seeing us isolated on the North American continent with this behemoth south of the border. That's what bothers me. So I say, hang on to this mature political economic and military organization as an outlet for our foreign political activity rather than crawling into bed with the United States. We're drowned if we do it the other way.

[HILL] It always struck me that being a member of NATO costs very, very little. It's one of those things, really, for which the cost is minuscule, and yet the entrée that it gives to all kinds of discussions is significant. At the very least it gives some opportunities, and so there would seem to be little point in throwing that all away.

[CAMPBELL] Well, there is this other risk. You know, I confess to being disappointed at how little we have had in a positive economic sense out of relations with Europe. I can rationalize why, but the fact is that they are not great and they're not growing at this moment. But it's the negative aspect that I think we have to now look at. And now also there is some risk that things are beginning to fall apart, in the western security sense, under the flourishing of détente today. We could again find ourselves, through the unfolding of international events, forced into a North American mold. And it's the one thing that I think is deadly for Canada.

[HILL] That's where we'll conclude. It's been great to have you, and a fascinating session.

[CAMPBELL] I just wish I were sure all the time that I'm right.

[HILL] I'm sure that's what we all feel.

ARTHUR MENZIES

[HILL]¹¹ Good morning. Our guest today is Ambassador Arthur Menzies, former Canadian Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and holder of a number of other senior positions, including Ambassador to China, and Ambassador for Disarmament. Ambassador Menzies, we're delighted to see you this morning and very pleased that you are ready to participate in this project.

[MENZIES] I'm glad to have this opportunity to join in this very imaginative project of yours.

[HILL] Thank you. Ambassador Menzies, as you know, this project is an oral history of Canadian policy in NATO. We're examining the development of Canadian foreign policy since 1945, with particular reference to this country's membership of NATO.

Ambassador Menzies, just to make some further comments on the thrust of this project; it is aimed at examining Canada's contribution to the work of NATO, Canada's involvement in NATO in pursuit of its own direct national interests, and the function of NATO in helping Canada to pursue some of its broader foreign policy goals notably that of enhancing the prospects for international peace and security. We are looking at the formulation of Canadian foreign policy in Ottawa and elsewhere in this country, at the work carried out inside NATO headquarters in Brussels and in other inter-allied councils and channels, and at the evolving role of NATO in world affairs. So, in your own case, I would like to focus very strongly on the period when you were Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council. I'm referring to those four years, between 1972 and 1976, when you were Canada's Permanent Representative in Brussels to the North Atlantic Council and years which were a very significant period in NATO affairs. I would like to take all the time we need to go over them in a very thorough and careful fashion. I think, to that end, what we will do is deal with that as a separate entity at the end of the other parts of the discussion, so that we will have ample time for preparation and a large block of time in which to go over those issues. However, while focussing on the NATO periods of your career and on the service within NATO, at the same time I would like to ask a few questions about your years as Head of the Defence Liaison Division of the Department of External Affairs, when you were dealing with NATO issues among others: and with your perceptions of the wider world scene based on your experience in such important posts as the Embassy in China, and as Ambassador for Disarmament. I think we want to try to see NATO not only in terms of the internal workings of the North Atlantic Council and its committees, but also in terms of changing perspectives of NATO's role in world affairs, as the Atlantic Alliance and international society in general have evolved over the years.

Ambassador Menzies, the way we would like to approach these two interviews is to examine your career in a series of phases. Part One will deal with the early years up to 1940, prior to joining the Department of External Affairs. Part Two will deal with what I would call, just for the sake of a label, global service, that is to say the years from 1940 to 1972 when you held a succession of positions in Ottawa, Japan, Malaysia, Australia and so on. Part Three will be a little bit out of chronological sequence, since we'll deal with the years 1962 to 1965 when you were Head of the Defence Liaison Division in Ottawa, that is to say, prior to your posting to Australia. Part Four will concern the period 1972 to 1976 when you were Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, and as I remarked we will deal with that as a block at the end. Part Five will deal with

¹¹ Interviewers: Hill, Pawelek. Interview date: 7/5/87.

your years as Ambassador to China and Vietnam from 1976 to 1980. Part Six will cover the years from 1980 to 1982 when you were Ambassador for Disarmament.

[MENZIES] That order suits me.

Part I - Early Years, to 1940

[HILL] Good. Well, if we may move on to Part One which covers the early years up to 1940. Ambassador Menzies, if I am correct, I believe you were born in China, and I believe as a son of one of those many Canadians who went out to the Far East to serve in missionary and similar capacities. You grew up in China and Japan I believe, and acquired some knowledge of the Chinese and Japanese languages; then you obtained a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Toronto and an MA from Harvard University before joining the Department of External Affairs in 1940. I wonder if you could tell us something about those early years, especially about the impressions they left on you regarding global issues and the changing role of Asia in the world, the place of Canada in the international community and so on.

[MENZIES] It's true that I was born in China, the son of a Canadian United Church missionary, who became an expert on Chinese archaeology and taught in one of the big Christian universities in China, supported by the United Church of Canada. At that time there was no Canadian school in North China beyond the elementary level, so I went to the Canadian Academy in Kobe, Japan, for five years of high school from 1931 to 1935, and then returned to Canada to attend the University of Toronto. Looking back on those early formative years, I would say that the opportunity to live in a country like China, which was going through a very difficult period of internal civil war, was an eye-opener for me in terms of the use of military force by Chinese warlords to achieve pretty selfish and limited aims. The experience which I had in Japan was again one in which the Japanese were remarkably self-disciplined at home, but that social discipline of the community seemed to fade when they invaded Manchuria and North China, and I saw something of this in its early phases, as I traveled back and forward on ships carrying Japanese officers and Japanese businessmen to North China. I also had an opportunity when I was a boy of 12 and 13 to travel around the world when my father was on a sabbatical, and visited both India and what is now Pakistan, the Middle East and Europe, and, I suppose, in that way became a little more conscious of the world than most Canadian children brought up in a more limited environment. My father, being a professor, insisted that we do our homework every night on a trip of this kind, and that we should write up our impressions in diaries every night and I still treasure those diaries which I wrote back in 1929 about the world. Coming to the University of Toronto, I suppose that one of my disappointments was that there was no instruction available in any Canadian university in 1935 on Asian history, culture, language, economics or what have you. Of course that is quite changed today and about forty universities now provide some courses on Asia. I had to go down to Harvard to do my post graduate work on Far Eastern history, and I had the benefit of studying there under two eminent American scholars, Doctor John King Fairbank, who is one of the great American authorities on US/China relations, and also under Dr. Edwin Reischauer who was, and is, an eminent authority on Japanese history and Japan's part in world affairs. Both of these men had a considerable impact in terms of my own outlook on international affairs and the need to understand the historical background of developments in Asia and not take a superficial journalistic approach to developments which had deep sociological and economic roots.

[HILL] So in fact you were deeply involved from your own background with an interest in Asia. You grew up there in effect and pursued it also in post-graduate studies at Harvard University.

[MENZIES] Yes.

[HILL] And what about the impact of international security? I was thinking of the Manchurian question and things like that. Was there a strong sense at that time that that was part and parcel of the global international scene as well as part of the regional East Asian situation?

[MENZIES] Yes, I think that the emergence of Japanese militarism and of the manipulation of the Japanese people in the pursuit of the Imperial manifest destiny and Japan's Co-prosperity Sphere in East Asia did expose me to the sort of way in which a group in a country could manipulate the destiny of their people, through propaganda and through control of the levers of power. To be able to see that at first hand had quite an educative effect on me as as a boy growing into a young man. The question of my introduction to international political security affairs was perhaps a little more by accident than by design. I was sent to Japan, in 1950, to succeed Dr. Herbert Norman as Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur at that time, and this was just a few months after the outbreak of the Korean War. The first Canadian Forces began to arrive in the Far East during my time, and during the three and a half years that I was in Japan I visited the Canadian Forces in Korea, the Canadian Brigade which was part of the Commonwealth Division and Canadian Destroyer Flotilla Far East which served in those waters under broad American command, and I had a great number of senior officers of the Canadian Forces stay in our Embassy residence in Tokyo, on their way to and from Korea. I got to know a great number of them as well as Ministers like the Honourable Brooke Claxton and the Honourable Ralph Campney and the Honourable Hugh Lapointe and others quite well. Then at a later stage in my career, as Head of the Far Eastern Division, I got caught up in the establishment of the Canadian component of the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, following the Geneva Conference of 1954, and once more I had to work quite closely with officers of the Department of National Defence, in setting the terms of reference and guidance for these Canadian delegations which were a mixed group of External Affairs and military officers. So I acquired in my first fifteen years in the Department a fairly broad acquaintance with many of the middle and senior rank officers who had served in World War Two, in Korea and again in Indo-China, and that gave me some of the background. I think it was partly because of that background, and partly because I had an all round foreign affairs foundation, that I was selected in 1962 to be Head of the Defence Liaison Division, which is the division within the Department of External Affairs which deals with international security questions, with NATO, with North American defence and with international peacekeeping questions.

[HILL] Actually, I'd like to go on to deal with that period shortly. But before that could you just tell us something about how you came to join the Department and what your early career was from 1940 on?

Part II - Global Service, 1940-62 and 1965-72

[MENZIES] I think that my interest in serving in the Department of External Affairs matured, in a rather general way, during the period that I was at the University of Toronto as an undergraduate; but it probably became sharpened when I went to Harvard and the international situation in the Pacific was deteriorating, during the early years of the war in Europe and the Atlantic, and I thought that some of the background which I had in having lived in China and Japan and having some knowledge of the languages, and having studied Far Eastern history at Harvard could be of some service to the Government of Canada. So I took the competitive exam for Third Secretaries, just after the war had started in Europe. I was interviewed in the Easter holidays of 1940, and was lucky enough to be included in an eligible list of, I think, 11 or 12 officers who

might be called up for service in the Department of External Affairs. It was, again, an accident that the United States Congress passed a law in June of 1940 requiring all aliens entering the United States to have American visas. Up to that time I suppose three or four hundred thousand Canadians wandered across the border into the United States to visit relatives, to shop, to holiday, to work, with just a driving licence or other simple means of identification. So the Canadian government was required to set up very hastily a network of offices across Canada to issue passports which could then have US visas put in them. And they decided to issue passports valid for travel only to the United States and valid for only a two-year period, on the theory that we could probably afford to take back to Canada any of these people that might be deported from the United States. So all of us, who were on the eligible list, were contacted at the beginning of July 1940 and brought in, and I was sent to open a passport office in Toronto. Outside the door were some 800 impatient businessmen and relatives of sick people in the United States who wanted immediate service. We had in Ottawa only two people who knew anything about passports and it was very much a case of learning on the job. After some three months of this, I got permission from the Under Secretary to go back to Harvard to complete my Ph.D. work there.

During the early spring of 1941 I was contacted by the Under-Secretary to know when I would be available to return to service. I assumed that my knowledge of Asian affairs was needed by Canada for its war effort. Imagine my surprise, when I was assigned to replace Robert Ford as Head of the Passport Office in Windsor Ontario. There I lingered in a slow death for some 11 months. A side benefit from that experience, was that I came to know the Hon. Paul Martin relatively well because he had a great number of clients from his legal practice and political supporters who needed passports in a hurry, and the Hon. Paul was a great one to look after his friends and supporters in the Essex area. So that's how I came in, and it was only in the Spring of 1942 that I came to Ottawa and began to learn some of the ropes of the system. I shared an office initially with Gordon Robertson and Marcel Cadieux. We got to know each other very well in those early bachelor days when we were all working together. During those early years in the Department I also did a stint of about 18 months in intelligence work in an inter-departmental committee, so I got to understand some of the grayer side of international relations, and what the bigger powers are able to do and try to do in the conduct of informal international affairs, which is very often out of public sight.

[HILL] Then you went to Havana, and afterwards to Tokyo. Then you became High Commissioner to Malaysia and Ambassador to Burma, all in this period leading up to the fifties. You also headed the Far Eastern Division of the Department for some time in that period. Based on your own background and your service in those years, what sort of views did you have on the development of the Far East and of Asia in world affairs? This is a very broad question.

[MENZIES] I served as Head of the Far Eastern section of the American and Far Eastern Division, from 1946 to 1948, when the Far Eastern Commission was meeting in Washington to lay down policies for the occupation of Japan. And I did have an opportunity to see and learn something about how an occupation administration can mould a country, its constitution and its economic operation. When I returned from service in Japan in 1953, I served until 1958 as head of the more specialized Far Eastern Division, and during this period we observed the takeover of China by the Chinese Communist forces. As I had been born and brought up in China and was very much interested in developments there, I think I followed those developments in China more closely than I might otherwise have done. I also learned a certain prudence in my handling of subjects related to the Far East, because of the pressures of the McCarthy Senate Committee on Un-American Activities on the old China hands in the US State Department, and the extent to which that influence extended to Canada, particularly in terms of the accusation against Dr. Herbert

Norman for his connections at Cambridge with the British Communist Party. I also got drawn in, as I mentioned, to Indo-Chinese affairs. In the case of Vietnam one learned at first hand about the political and military technology of a peasant-based revolutionary group under Ho Chi Minh tackling first the French in North Vietnam, and then confronting the Americans who got drawn into the struggle there, with an increasing military commitment. That was for me another educative experience. During my time as High Commissioner to the Federation of Malaya, the British, Australian and New Zealand governments had forces in the Malayan Peninsula combating the Communist terrorist movement there. That had a profound effect on the organization of the country, the concentration of the Chinese Malayan communities into special villages for protection purposes against the Communist terrorists and to keep them under surveillance. Once again I saw the use of propaganda and political indoctrination on both sides for the control of the hearts and minds of people in Malaya as it had been in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos. Military force was used in dealing with insurgents, either effectively as the British did in Malaya, or with less success by the Americans in Vietnam. All of this was in an Asian and Pacific setting. I suppose that if I did acquire some experience a lot of it emerged from this period and it was also very useful to me when I went as High Commissioner to Australia from 1965 to 1972 because the Australian government was very much interested in Asia and that was a common link between Canada and Australia. We did find ourselves then on slightly different sides of the fence with regard to the war in Vietnam. The Australians had forces there, committed to maintaining the independence of South Vietnam, whereas Canada was on the International Control Commission and therefore not militarily involved in the war in Vietnam.

[HILL] In the early fifties, there was an inclination to see a confrontation between two systems, the Communist system and the Western system, but then that broke down to some degree later on, in the sixties, with the split between the Soviet Union and China. Did you see that kind of shift in perception over time?

[MENZIES] Yes. I think there's no doubt that there was a shift. I had always felt that the Chinese Communist movement was an indigenously based peasant movement joined by lower echelons of the nationalist intellectual group of high school and university students and that they had taken on Marxism/Leninism as the guiding principles for their revolutionary movement. But I did not think that the Chinese were going to accept Soviet control, because historical records indicated a good deal of antipathy between the Soviets and the Chinese and not much love lost. Nevertheless, the Soviets and the Chinese both supported the North Koreans in invading South Korea and resisting the United Nations forces in Korea, and I think, at that time, it was the natural approach for people like Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson to talk about global Communism as a movement across Eurasia. And certainly when the Communists took power in China, just before the outbreak of war in Korea it looked as if there was a certain monolithic unity and that unity did remain for the first ten years, or so, until the Soviets probably overreached themselves, or the Chinese got more conscious of their own peculiar national interests which they decided they wanted to defend. There were at the same time suggestions that Communism, and sometimes the yellow hordes would sweep down through South East Asia, through Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos, and the dominoes would fall over in South East Asia. Thereby hangs a little tale. I mentioned that we in Canada were members of the Commonwealth Division in Korea. At the end of the Korean War the British, Australians, and New Zealanders proposed to move the Commonwealth Division to Malaya or what is called Malaysia today. Canada did not agree to its brigade being included in this movement, and we stayed out of what we considered to be a regional security problem in South East Asia which was geographically very far from Canada, and historically unrelated to Canada, and also not a United Nations undertaking as the Korean conflict had been. Secondly, we also declined to become

involved in the South East Asia Treaty Organization, which John Foster Dulles organized in 1954, after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, to resist Communist pressure in South East Asia.

[HILL] I just wondered if I could ask you one last question on this period. Your own interests and the interests of those you were dealing with at that time were in Asia. What part did you see NATO playing in world affairs, looking at it from your perspective? Were East/West relations in Europe still seen as being the most fundamental issue of world affairs, or did you think that the world had changed to the point that concern about Europe had become a bit passé?

[MENZIES] I think that anyone who was educated in Eastern Canada and the Eastern United States, and who had worked in Ottawa for quite a few years, couldn't help but be aware of the importance of Western Europe and the Atlantic to Canada, and the emergence of NATO as an organization in 1949 certainly had a strong impact on world affairs generally. And the Korean War, in global and strategic terms, as seen by General Douglas MacArthur, was part of a policy of containment of Communism, whether Soviet or North Korean or Chinese, to its land mass area in Northern Eurasia, and blocking its expansion outward. I think that the fact that Canada fielded ten thousand men to go to Europe in 1950, at the same time that it was fielding about 8,000 in a special force to go to Korea, may have encouraged the belief of military people in Canada and people who wished to see something of the military strength which we had achieved by the end of World War Two recreated, that if you could have 18,000 abroad playing a role both in Europe and in Asia. that that was a desirable balance of the military posture of Canada. But it became pretty clear by 1953 that the government felt that it could only really support one significant non-United Nations undertaking, and that was in Europe. That area was more critical than the Pacific. Also, those of us trying to think out the military strategic situation recognized that Canada could never project a significant military force across 5,000 miles of the Pacific that would have any significant influence on the United States, short of an all-out war effort, and that position, of course, has not been altered since the end of the Korean War in 1953. The Canadian government has never sought to project its military power or to show flags in the Pacific. We are overwhelmed by the strength of the US Pacific Fleet, including its aircraft carriers and its positions in Hawaii, in Guam, in Japan, in Korea, in the Philippines and so on and we haven't that capability. I think that one learns over a long career that there are limits to the amount of GNP or of national federal budgets which the people and the Government of Canada are prepared to spend on defence in peacetime.

[HILL] Of course it's a rather interesting thing that the build-up of NATO forces in Europe didn't really get going until the impact of the North Korean invasion of the South was felt.

[MENZIES] That's right.

[HILL] Looking at the West's overall approach to world affairs, do you think that there's been an undue focus on Europe and on NATO as opposed to taking an interest in developments in the Far East? Or has it been more or less the right sort of balance?

[MENZIES] Well, given my background, I think that you would be able to guess the answer. Certainly it is my view that the Canadian government over the last forty years has given insufficient attention to Asian affairs. It is only in the last ten, fifteen years, largely for economic reasons but also because of China's opening to the world, that we have begun to see our interests in the Pacific as important. The balance of foreign trade with trans-Pacific countries exceded all our trade with Western Europe and Eastern Europe put together, although this is relatively small compared to our trade with the United States. The fact that there has been no comparable organization of a political security type in Asia to which to anchor a Canadian position has had some bearing. In Europe we

had ties with Britain and France, with Belgium and the Netherlands, with Italy, from World War One and World War Two days, and a security organization was set up into which we could fit, both from a military point of view and which also provided us with a political consultative mechanism which served Canadian foreign policy purposes very well. In Asia, I think its true to say that John Foster Dulles made a number of attempts to create, artificially, organizations which would link the non-Communist elements of the Far East together. He was successful for a time with SEATO, the South East Asia Treaty Organization, but there was not the homogeneity in Japan, Korea, China, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines and so on that existed in Europe, other than being held together loosely as part of the US containment policy. Now I would not wish to underrate the importance of the US role in NATO, in any way, but there was in addition to the United States a significant grouping of countries in Western Europe which were also eventually moving together in economic terms to form the European Economic Community, or European Community in political terms, that has emerged.

Part III - Defence Liaison Division, 1962 to 65

[HILL] Ambassador Menzies, from 1962 to 1965 you were head of Defence Liaison (I) Division in Ottawa. This was the time of the Cuban missile crisis; some very touchy relationships between Canada and the United States; the election of the Lester Pearson Liberal Government in Ottawa in 1964, the decision to resolve the problem of nuclear weapons for the Canadian Armed Forces; and the issue of the 1964 Defence White Paper. It was also a time of détente in East-West relations, the agreement on the partial nuclear test ban and so on. The United States was revising its nuclear strategy and encouraging NATO to do likewise, and there was a lot of consultation about things like the Multilateral Nuclear Force and the Atlantic Nuclear Force. NATO was also trying to cope with the problem of General de Gaulle's efforts to establish a more independent France and with that movement towards quote "the dismantling of the blocs", which among other things threatened to create widespread complacency about defence requirements throughout the Western Alliance. I wondered if you could just tell us something about this period? What happened? What were you involved in in that period and what were the major issues as you saw them?

[MENZIES] I came back from Malaya in the summer of 1961 and was assigned as Deputy to Herb Moran, Director of the External Aid Office, and was happily ensconced in that operation for a six month period. Indeed looking back over a career, I think I could say that playing Santa Claus with the money of the Canadian taxpayer would have been quite an attractive career for me. I always enjoyed working on aid projects. However, in February of 1962, I was suddenly summoned to take over Defence Liaison (I) Division, the division responsible for NATO, North American defence and peace keeping. Little did I know of some of the pitfalls that lay in that assignment, but I was compelled to learn rather quickly about what was for me a completely new set of substantive subjects and geographical subjects dealing with North America, Western and Eastern Europe and the developing world for peace keeping operations. The first thing that hit me was the realization that there were severe strains between the Progressive Conservative Government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Howard Green, and the United States administration over the arming of Bomark II missiles, which had been accepted in Canada but which did not have nuclear warheads. Each meeting of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence was faced with this problem, that the Diefenbaker government wished to have joint control over the warheads if they were to be kept in Canada, whereas the United States insisted that they have exclusive control of the key to the storage depot, although it would be within a Canadian enclosure and the Americans couldn't operate without Canadian concurrence as well (but that was perhaps a semantic question).

This issue lingered on until 1963. In January General Loris Norstad, who was the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, SACEUR, came to Ottawa and held a rather disingenuous press conference in which he said that Canada was committed to accept nuclear tactical weapons for the CF104 aircraft, which were being deployed to Europe at that time. This really put the cat among the pigeons. A few days later Mr. Pearson made a famous speech to a Liberal Party group, down in the Toronto area, in which he said that Canada was committed to NATO's nuclear policies and couldn't escape this responsibility, and that he was ashamed of the position which the Diefenbaker government had taken. The US State Department issued a press release giving their account of the negotiations which had gone on in the PJBD on the operation of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. This resulted in Mr. Diefenbaker's government being defeated a couple of times in the House of Commons and calling a General Election for April 1963. I think you said '64 but it was in '63. Well Douglas Harkness the Minister of National Defence resigned, the ever young George Hees resigned, Mr. Sevigny resigned. The election was probably fought as much on this question of nuclear weapons as on anything and the Liberals came in with the assurance that they would work out an agreement with the Americans on the acceptance of nuclear weapons.

This, I think, was perhaps the one issue which required a great deal of attention and flexibility because a civil servant is expected to support the government that is in power, namely the Progressive Conservative Government; and then to change policies completely to a Liberal Government. Another thing which occurred and muddied the waters was the Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962. This put a great deal of pressure on the government to accept nuclear weapons in Canada for defensive purposes, in case what started as a local problem in the Caribbean should escalate into a military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. We also had to very quickly update our emergency measures procedures, and I was allocated the External Affairs responsibility for dealing with the survival of government in Ottawa in the event that some of the missiles planted in Cuba were to land in the Ottawa area. We had a team of special persons picked out, with the most beautiful stenographers, who were to go down a hole out near Carp and provide some continuity of government. This was just an added strain at a time of international crisis, and gave one to understand that the whole mechanism for crisis management requires a very, very elaborate structure of planning and of communications and of contingency arrangements and so on. Also arising out of the Cuban missile crisis there was an issue raised in NATO regarding consultation on the use of nuclear weapons. While everybody understood the crisis which had faced President Kennedy and his small group of associates, and the serious decisions that they had to take about the Cuban missiles and the blockade of Cuba, there was an awareness that there was no mechanism in NATO, per se, for emergency consultation on the use of nuclear weapons. And two types of things were developed. One was a proposal to establish a Multilateral Nuclear Force -a naval force was envisaged, and this was discussed -- so that in fact there would be no temptation for the proliferation, or further proliferation, of nuclear weapons in NATO countries, to countries like Germany. This was a particular concern of the Americans, British and French, and I think also a political question in Germany itself.

We had to study this question of the proposal for a multilateral nuclear force, and the conclusion was that while it might respond to some requirements in Europe it didn't really meet any Canadian needs, and Mr. Pearson eventually indicated that we were not going to take part in any Multilateral Nuclear Force. However, the subject didn't go away. It was being discussed by the Americans with individual countries outside of NATO, and this caused interventions by both Mr. Martin at NATO foreign ministers meetings and the Honourable Paul Hellyer at NATO defence ministers meetings. Eventually this ended up with the proposal, from the US Defense Secretary McNamara, for the establishment of a restricted meeting of defence ministers which evolved into

the Nuclear Planning Group, which still exists in NATO and on which we take a rotating seat with Norway and Denmark, from time to time.

I think this was not a period of significant East/West tension, these years of 1962 to 1965 after the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis, because I think Krushchev and his military advisers realized that they did not have the maritime power to project themselves to the Caribbean. I think at the same time it generated in their minds the need for a steady, accelerated build-up of their own armed forces so that they would not have to back down again if something like the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred again. Perhaps we were a bit too much lulled by the fact that Krushchev had backed down, and also by the signing of the Test Ban Treaty and developments in the field of disarmament. I think it's proper to say that disarmament became a favorite subject under the Progressive Conservative government, and that the Honourable Howard Green, in particular, took a very strong interest in disarmament matters, in the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, and there was a lot of support for General Burns and his initiatives there. The subject was continued by the Liberal Government when it came to power in the spring of 1963.

A further development in this period was the conflict between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots which broke out in 1964, and Canada was one of those invited to provide forces to a United Nations Emergency Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus. We had very little background on Cyprus, and I had to do a great deal of digging in libraries and to get British Foreign Office reports and so on on the problems of Cyprus as it had emerged, from being a British colony up to and after World War Two, to an independent country largely ruled by President Makarios and the Greek element and with the Turks sitting in a relatively limited area in North Cyprus, and playing only a token part in the government of Cyprus. Then the struggle that broke out between them drew us in. It also weakened the southern flank of NATO, because you had Greece and Turkey really at loggerheads in support of their two communities and sending forces to assist those communities; and Mr. Martin spent a great deal of his time at NATO meetings talking with the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers and asking them to intervene with their communities in Cyprus and trying to calm down these flare-ups of community fighting between the Greeks and the Turks. Mr. Martin went to Cyprus in 1965, just before the London Ministerial meeting in May 1965, and I accompanied him on this trip. We saw President Makarios and Dr. Kucuk, the Vice-President representing the Turkish community, and the Secretary General's political representative, and got a lot of the flavour of the life lived by the members of the Canadian element of the United Nations force, because we had provided a brigade headquarters which controlled the operations in one section along the blue line between the two communities. There was this interface between United Nations peacekeeping and NATO, because it so affected Greece and Turkey and their relations.

As you know, Mr. Pearson was very much interested in the possible creation of a stand-by United Nations peacekeeping force, and with his encouragement a conference was held in Ottawa in November of 1964, I believe it was, where we had representatives from something like 23 different countries to talk about the technical aspects of the operation of a peacekeeping force. This was something that brought us into touch not only with the Scandinavian countries, which were providing people for UNEF in the Middle East and for UNFICYP in Cyprus, but also with some countries like India which provided forces, with Pakistan, with Nigeria and some of the developing countries of Africa. It was a very interesting experience.

Partly as a result of this, Canada, because of its technical competence in military affairs and the fact that it wasn't one of the great powers, was drawn into the area of military training assistance to Commonwealth countries. I remember one of our bigger projects which emerged, at the end of 1964, was to send a military investigation team out to Tanzania. We had a Brigadier

Herb Love who led the group and Arthur Kroeger who was working for me at that time went out as the External Affairs representative; and they came back with a proposal that we take on training and advisory services for the Tanzanian Armed Forces, and the government accepted this. A little while later the Tanzanians asked if we would provide an air unit and we provided a couple of Caribou and six Otter aircraft. These were to help move the troops around in case there were security requirements in the country. This was a 20 million dollar proposition with perhaps 80 Canadian officers in the field at the time; it did draw off some of the contribution which might otherwise have been made to NATO, but it was one which was enjoyed by the Department of National Defence which thought it was a good operation, and it related quite a bit to Mr. Pearson's view that it would also contribute to our capacity in the peace-keeping field.

[HILL] A couple of other points, if I might raise them, on that period. One is you mentioned the question of nuclear control in NATO and consultations about nuclear questions. This was a central issue, so far as the French were concerned, in this period. I mean they had their own proposals, which they put forward in 1958, for a three power directorate. General De Gaulle backed Mr. Kennedy very strongly during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but on the other hand his reaction afterwards was to say that if this had taken place in Europe, France would have wanted to have much more of a say in things; and then, of course, gradually France moved to an autonomous position within NATO. How much involved were you with this issue? What sort of role did Canada play in trying to bridge the gap, shall we say, between the French and some of the others?

[MENZIES] Well, I would say that Mr. Martin tried very hard to maintain links with the French and his manoeuvers before and during NATO ministerial meetings were to rush to see the French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, I believe it was at the time, and to try to ease the relationships between the French and the Americans. And probably at the Foreign Minister level he had some impact. But I think General De Gaulle had his own ideas which were perhaps not wholly communicated to all the members of his entourage. All of this, of course, was in a period in which Canada thought it had a special relationship with France--as it was before General De Gaulle's visit to Canada and his famous outcry of "Vive le Quebec libre". During this time Mr. Pearson was the first Canadian Prime Minister to ever visit Paris, and he was well received by De Gaulle and given a big dinner, and so on, and had talks with Prime Minister Pompidou and I think we felt that we were doing about as much as could be done in terms of toadying to the French. In the end it didn't do us much good because our couple of squadrons, CF104 squadrons, had to be moved out of France to Germany and the squadrons which we left at Marville had to be taken out of the nuclear strike role and made into reconnaissance aircraft, because General De Gaulle would not have nuclear weapons which were not under French control on French soil.

[HILL] There was a period when there was a whole lot of Alliance consultation about the role of France and of bargaining with the French. But I believe that would have been after the period when you were dealing with these issues.

[MENZIES] Yes, after I'd gone to Australia.

[HILL] But this issue of the French was there throughout the whole period you were with Defence Liaison. It was felt in the public, I remember.

[MENZIES] Yes. Well, one must remember that, at that time, NATO Headquarters was still in Paris, and we went there for all our Ministerial meetings that were held at NATO Headquarters. It did have some impact that the meetings were being held in Paris rather than in Brussels.

[HILL] About this period, I remember issues of *Time* magazine proclaiming the New Europe, which was going to be like America. Barriers between East and West were supposed to be breaking down. There was talk about the two political systems, Eastern and Western, drawing closer together. It was really in many ways a period when it looked as though NATO could be on the verge of becoming obsolete. Is that your impression of that period?

[MENZIES] I wouldn't have said so, myself. I think there were enough problems about Berlin. I would have said that while there was certainly not a, "severe strain", in East/West relations at this time, there was not the same euphoria which emerged in the second period when I was Ambassador to NATO and the German Ostpolitik was in play and the CSCE conference was convened. This was a period nearly 10 years later when I think détente did become a significant factor. It's also interesting that during this period, the end of 1964, October perhaps, Khrushchev was ousted by his colleagues, and I think there was an awareness after that that the Soviet leadership was not going to be as flexible as this shoe thumping Khrushchev had seemed to be prepared to be in his meetings with Kennedy.

There's one other little issue that I'd like to mention here and that is an experiment which was tried, I think it was in 1964 also, of a meeting of a Defence Committee of Ministers between Canada and the United States. The relationships for North American defence, from the time of the Ogdensburg Agreement, had been handled by the Canada/ United States Permanent Joint Board of officials and military people on Defence, and also by direct liaison between Canadian military commanders, naval, air and army, with their opposites. The experiment was to send down a team of Ministers chaired by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Martin and including Paul Hellyer, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of Finance and a couple of others, and they met with the US Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury. I think this was tried about two times, and then it was realized that this put Canadian Ministers under too much direct, heavy pressure and that it was really easier to sidestep pressure from the United States by keeping them at civil servants' arms length through the PJBD, and to avoid the embarrassment of direct organized meetings in which the Americans could put pretty direct pressure on Canada. And the mechanism for control of North American defence, either as a separate subject or as a NATO sector, has never been either brought into NATO as a political military subject nor organized in a way that Canada's contribution to NORAD or the emergency plans for the defence of North America, or cooperation in military exercises or naval exercises off either coast, well off the West coast in particular, are brought under some ministerial committee. Canada always felt a lot more comfortable in the NATO environment than it did meeting directly with the United States and the pressures that could be brought on Ministers.

[HILL] That's very interesting, because a number of other people have touched on that kind of issue, the question of the bilateral relationship with the US in NORAD and otherwise.

[MENZIES] Well, it's never been completely organized, and has been, I guess, deliberately left unorganized because a satisfactory mechanism is difficult to achieve. And it shows the difficulty that other bilateral or trilateral partners of the United States face, whether it is the US/Japan Security Treaty or the ANZUS arrangement between the United States and Australia, New Zealand, where they meet perhaps once a year and a lot of things are brought together at that point, and there can, I think, be a feeling that because of the disparity of both economic and military strength, the dialogue is not between equals in any way at all.

[HILL] Which I presume indicates that membership in NATO is a great advantage to Canada. It is easier to deal with the United States when one is associated with others, as in NATO.

[MENZIES] Yes, and it is economical for the United States to keep 14 or 15 allies informed through a mechanism in NATO, far easier than calling in the Japanese Ambassador, the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors. Indeed, one of the things that emerged in my first contact with NATO in the early sixties was arrangements by which we did some briefing of the Australians and New Zealanders about the international issues which were part of the consultative process, the political consultative process, or studies that were prepared in NATO. The Australians and New Zealanders were very grateful to get this larger perspective on East/West relations because their own arrangements with the Americans in ANZUS focused very much on the South Pacific security area and perhaps South East Asia. It did not bring them into what were in fact world balance of power and nuclear deterrence issues to the same extent. During my second time around in NATO the Japanese began to take a considerably increased interest in what was going on in NATO because they realized that there were exchanges of views on broad strategic questions taking place there which they were curious about. But they were so, what shall I say, sensitive about being seen to have any connection with NATO because of the No War clause in their constitution and the opposition of the Socialist Party, that this all had to be handled very discreetly and sometimes under the rubric of disarmament.

[HILL] I wonder if I could ask you one last question before we complete this morning's session. That is, while you were at Defence Liaison between 1962 and 1965, the 1964 White Paper on Defence was written and adopted by the Canadian government. This looked toward having more mobile forces. It also led to the unification of the armed forces. Did you feel then that the government was already looking at some changes in Canada's role in NATO and perhaps to some diminution in Canada's military contribution? If so, was this seen as a reflection of normal changes in world relationships? Did it or did it not indicate any diminution in Canada's involvement and interest in NATO in general?

[MENZIES] In preparation for the White Paper on Defence which Mr. Hellyer brought down, a great number of studies were prepared in the Department of National Defence and in the Department of External Affairs. In the first draft, which was prepared by a committee in the Department of National Defence with representation from External Affairs, one got something that might be described as a traditional 10 year projection of existing roles and priorities in National Defence. Little did we realize that all this effort was not going to be incorporated in the final paper which was written by Mr. Hellyer with the assistance of his personal executive assistant, Wing Commander Bill Lee. I think the short term impact of the White Paper was the devastating impact on the armed forces of the proposals for integration, and there was a great deal of resistance, particularly in the naval command, and a general feeling among a lot of people that this was not in the NATO pattern. No other country in NATO had done the same thing. So to some extent the creation of Mobile Command, which really was a command for the land forces to balance Maritime Command and Air Transport Command and Air Command, was perhaps obscured by the shouting and clamour over this integration of the armed forces. But there's no doubt that the idea of a Mobile Command Headquarters at St. Hubert, in Quebec, with responsibility for the brigade in Germany and in fact for the Tactical Air Units which were over there, this was a new concept which I think was only being raised, but it was not significant. It was not projected to the same extent that it was when Donald Macdonald's next review of defence came out, in which they specifically talked about air mobile forces and units. The sort of commitment which we had, particularly to Northern Norway, was something that required air portable forces. There was something a little incongruous certainly, in peacetime, in terms of the tank-equipped unit in Germany and the air mobile requirement, which fitted in with peace-keeping in terms of support for

Norway and in order to be able to move people quickly through Air Transport Command, to Cyprus or the Middle East or wherever else.

[HILL] But, in effect, although it looked towards some sort of structural changes, it was not really an indication of a diminution of Canadian interest in NATO.

[MENZIES] Oh, I wouldn't say so. I think that Mr. Pearson himself was a very, very strong NATO man. We had a meeting of NATO Ministers in Canada, in 1964 I think it was, and Mr. Pearson made quite a strong statement at that time, in which he re-emphasized Article Two of the NATO Treaty, and said if we didn't include the political, economic, and social cooperation among members of NATO, NATO would sooner or later fade away. Other mechanisms were being evolved at that time for dealing with the economic problems through the OECD and the European Community concept.

[HILL] Well, I think we will close at that point for today.

Part IV - Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, 1972-76

[HILL] Ambassador Menzies, you took up your appointment as Canada's Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council in the autumn of 1972, if I'm not mistaken. You were there in Brussels till 1976 during four very eventful years. What strikes me about that period is the fact that prior to that you'd been in Australia I think for seven years, and then, as we mentioned during the previous part of the interview, much of your earlier experience too had been on what one might call a global basis, in fact to some degree focused on the Far East aside from the period as Head of Defence Liaison (I) Division. Could you tell us something about how you came to be appointed Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council and what sort of situation you found when you arrived there?

[MENZIES] I had spent seven years as High Commissioner to Australia during quite an exciting time in Australian economic development, and I was certainly ready to move but didn't expect to be asked to go to NATO because I had no background in European affairs, other than the period from 1962 to 1965 when I served as Head of Defence Liaison (I) Division which dealt with NATO. I suppose that my general background and that period of specialized experience was thought to equip me for an assignment to NATO, but I'm not privy to the discussions that may have taken place. My predecessor, Ross Campbell, had already spent four years at NATO, and it was publicly known that he had been opposed to the Trudeau government's reduction of the Canadian military contribution in Europe by fifty percent, and therefore I suppose it was time for a change of representatives. As I was not involved in any way in the decisions of the 1969/70 period, that may have been one of the reasons I was selected for the assignment. When I reached Brussels, in the autumn of 1972, I think it fair to say that the other Permanent Representatives to NATO had digested the Canadian reduction. The world had not fallen apart because of that reduction. But the redoubtable Secretary General Luns certainly wasn't going to avoid any opportunity to chide Canadians for the example which they had set in reducing. I felt that my job was to accept the situation, as it existed, and make the best of it, and I had a great deal to learn about Western Europe, Eastern Europe, about what had been going on over the last seven years in NATO and about how to run a great big multi-faceted delegation and it took me some time to settle in.

The situation which I found on arrival at NATO I try to summarize this way. The United States had been trying to disengage from Vietnam. It was changing its approach to the Peoples Republic of China. President Nixon had been having discussions and had been making some

progress in his talks with the Soviet leaders. Our own Mr. Trudeau had his Ostpolitik which in a small way was consistent with these American efforts, and Chancellor Brandt of the Federal German Republic had his Ostpolitik, and these things made up to a spirit or tentative feeling toward detente which was reflected in the proposals for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It's true that this was to be balanced by discussions about specific troop reductions in central Europe, the so-called Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks. We in Canada had, I think, been somewhat disabused of our idea that we had a special relationship with the United States when Secretary Connolly slapped some restrictions on Canadian trade with the United States, in the same way that those restrictions were applied to everybody else's trade, and we were perhaps reviewing how we could lessen our excessive dependence on the United States. At that time Britain was in the last stages of entry into the European Economic Community. Britain had been an important trading partner of Canada, and I think the thought was that we should try to develop an economic relationship with the European Community at a time when we were going to have to change our trading relations with the United Kingdom if it entered the European Community. In broad terms, I think there was considerable European and Canadian relief that the Americans were disengaging themselves from Vietnam. There was inevitably some spill-over of dissatisfaction in Europe with what the United States had got itself into and the methods it was using in Vietnam. I think there was also a desire to see some of the troops which had been taken out of Europe by the United States for service in Vietnam, returned to their positions; and I think the Europeans hoped that the United States would pay more attention to European affairs as a result of their disengagement. Dr. Kissinger's talk about a multi-polar world struck a responsive chord. I remember Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp recognizing this, in seeing that in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union there were elements of either existing or potential strength in Japan, in China and certainly in Western Europe as it was pulling itself together as a community. But the nature of that polarity was not just a balance of nuclear terror as it existed, and rather uniquely between the United States and the Soviet Union. These were to indicate other emerging centres of power; and I think on the whole the Europeans and we in Canada welcomed this.

[HILL] Did he make these views known already in 1972? So the end of 1972 was in a way rather a watershed, because first of all you had the re-election of President Nixon, and then you also had in early 1973 the Vietnam Cease-fire Agreement, which in effect marked the pullout of the United States from Vietnam; then the United States was able to turn its attention more fully to the European theatre and the general, global scene. So these ideas about a multi-polar world that you mentioned, was that early 1973 more or less?

[MENZIES] Certainly the ideas began to be more firmly expressed, but I would say they had their origin in American recognition of the split between the Soviet Union and The People's Republic of China and the decision to move toward a more forthcoming working-relationship with China, which ended in The Shanghai Communique of September 1972, and the decision of the United States to turn over responsibility for the conduct of the war in Vietnam to the Thieu government, although they had difficulty in disengaging and in the negotiations, which had been going on for a year or so before the cease-fire of early February 1973. I think that there was a shift in Dr. Kissinger's thinking already emerging at the end of 1971-1972, and it was certainly more clearly articulated after President Nixon's re- election at the end of 1972 and going into 1973.

[HILL] I think that what you mentioned is quite fascinating, partly because you may have been more aware of some of these changes in US thinking, and at an earlier stage, than others who were involved in international affairs at that time. In my own case, being absorbed in the work of NATO in 1972-1973, inside the machine, the impression was that relations between Europe and the United States and Canada in NATO were extremely good. Things seemed to be moving along.

Everybody seemed to be moving in parallel. Consultation was good. I think the only difficulty in that period, say early 1972, was sometimes in getting the attention of the United States, owing to its absorption elsewhere. But I think that what most people expected was that the United States would follow along what you might call the more traditional paths of perhaps beefing up the Western Alliance as a solid first base before dealing with anybody else outside. But one's impression was that, instead of that, President Nixon, having been re-elected, and the Vietnam cease-fire agreement having been made, gave more attention to this other, new policy. But China and Japan were still not the nuclear superpowers that the United States was. Neither was Europe, of course. I wonder if you could say something about that. Of course Dr. Kissinger had his Year of Europe, which came in early 1973. But what about US relations with Europe? What were they trying to do there, and how did this compare with Canada's views towards Europe in this period?

[MENZIES] That's a difficult question to speak about. It seems to me that Dr. Kissinger had in his mind a sort of Atlantic dumbell relationship, that is the United States with the European Community, and there was, I think, a hankering that, instead of having to deal with the major European partners individually, they would talk out their positions among themselves, and somehow or other become a more integrated and a more responsible element that he could talk to in some kind of a collectivity. Now that concept was certainly not one that enthused Canadian ministers or their official advisors at all, because we had had a position in NATO for nearly 25 years that we regarded as giving us a multilateral forum in which we could express views, influence the formation of policies and so on, and we valued that particular forum. Not only that but in 1972 under the direction of the Secretary of State, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp, a paper had been prepared on Canada/United States relations, a paper that was missing in the five part folio on Foreign Policy for Canadians that had been issued in 1970, and this came down to favouring what was called the Third Option, that Canada should seek to strengthen its relations with other countries and particularly with the European Economic Community. So that we were thinking in terms of developing a contractual link with a consultative mechanism with the European Community. I'd like to just elaborate on that a little bit further. It seems to me that we had the objective of establishing our own economic contractual link with the European Community. But in addition to that we wanted to maintain a flexible relationship with the Western European countries on foreign policy questions, not just strategic, and not just within the NATO area, but a consultative mechanism, which had been worked out over the years of NATO, to discuss, to inform each other, take into account each other's interests and so on, in the formation of foreign policy. Now we found that the European Community foreign ministers were beginning a process of political coordination, foreign policy coordination, especially on matters which were not strategic, and quite often on matters which were outside the NATO defence perimeter area, questions like the Middle East and policies of that kind. Here we were confronted with an initiative, which involved the political directors general of the foreign ministries of the European Community getting together on a regular basis, quite often every two months, with working groups under them to coordinate their positions on a whole series of foreign policy questions. Then when they reached some common position they put that up to their foreign ministers and the foreign ministers finally hammered out a position. They weren't going to back down in consultations with the United States, Canada, Norway or the Southern flank countries, like Turkey and Greece, which perhaps were not as closely involved in some of these issues. And I think it was as a result of the discussion of that foreign policy formation by the European Community, that we probably exercised in that period a considerable influence in impressing upon the Europeans the value of keeping a good part of the discussion and exchange of views and consultation on foreign policy things in NATO, rather than creating a dumbbell situation. Now this was a real situation, for instance, for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The European Community developed their own positions before the subject was brought to the NATO Council for discussion. We had this with regard to the Middle East, with regard to

Cyprus, with regard to a whole series of issues and at one stage, I think, the professionals in the State Department, if my guess is right, managed to persuade Dr. Kissinger that it was not entirely desirable to emphasize to the European Community: "you fellows make up your minds first, and then we can talk together as equals". And of course it suited our purposes that the consultative process should remain more diffuse, because there was no room for Canada if it became a kind of trans-Atlantic dumbbell with two main focuses of power and decision-making. We would be left out of it, and some of this found its expression in the drafting of the 1974 Atlantic Declaration.

[HILL] I wondered if we might come on to that later. Although Dr. Kissinger wanted a united Europe, he wanted one which would be fast-reacting and be able to move quickly on the international scene, the way that <u>he</u> liked.

[MENZIES] That's right. That's right. Which wasn't possible with five vetos there. Our experience was that Monsieur Jobert, the French Foreign Minister, was particularly prickly and difficult. He and Dr. Kissinger clashed constantly and there was almost bad blood at that time, and a willingness on the part of the French to just hold things up, and I think that Britain and Germany began to see that this was going to affect the whole sense of trans-Atlantic solidarity. The British had always had their special relationship in discussions with the Americans and it hadn't really dawned on them, but the Germans certainly began to realize, that this type of obstacle to cooperation, trans-Atlantic co-operation, was not in their interest. Fortunately, there were also some very able officials, I'm thinking of André De Staerke, the Dean of the NATO Council in Belgium, and Viscount d'Avignon, who was the political Director General of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, people like that who had a great deal of understanding of the diffuse but necessary character of the trans-Atlantic relationship, which probably should not be jostled too much.

[HILL] The other thing, I think, is that Dr. Kissinger's vision of Europe wasn't always in tune with the reality. In effect, what he was looking for was a Europe which was under single direction, in terms of not only economic policy but also of foreign policy; and of course at that point it hadn't reached that stage on foreign policy or even more on defence. In fact the defence of Western Europe is conducted through NATO, so it wasn't really quite in tune with reality.

[MENZIES] And quite apart from NATO there was the OECD, which met in Paris and which was not restricted to NATO membership. When a crisis like the oil or energy crisis came on that was an OECD responsibility, and basically the economic aspects of the oil crisis were handled by the energy committee of the OECD, not by the European Community as such, not by NATO, but in this other body; and I think Dr. Kissinger somehow overlooked the fact there had grown up "like Topsy" a certain framework for the discussion of different subjects, and that it was better to patch that up, than to start all over again.

[HILL] I was very struck by the comment you made that there was a certain amount of friction, shall we say, between M. Jobert and Dr. Kissinger and others. I wonder if you could say something about the general atmosphere inside NATO in terms of consultations in early 1973? For example, how well conducted, in your view, were the MBFR Exploratory Talks? What was the general sense, the feeling among the NATO countries, about the state of consultations in the early part of 1973?

[MENZIES] Well, on the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, there had been advance discussion and consultation and position papers on desiderata prepared in NATO, but once the negotiations got under way in Geneva, the working talks, governments tended to send guidance directly to their delegations in Geneva, and both European Community and NATO

caucuses met there. But they were not only thinking of the position that would be adopted by the Eastern European countries under Soviet leadership, but also of the bridging role that could be played by the non aligned countries - Sweden, Finland, Austria, perhaps Malta, although Malta was a special thorn in the flesh at that time. On the other hand in the case of the MBFR, which was a conference basically between two blocs, the policy was decided at NATO headquarters and the delegations in Vienna discussed tactics, and they had of course an input to their own governments but they did not have the authority to develop policy. Now as the talks began on MBFR I think it was recognized that both the US and the Soviet Union should make the first troop reductions. What emerged, however, was that the Europeans, and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, could see that the design of the Warsaw Pact countries was to get a first phase agreement which would put a straitjacket on their forces to hold them to a certain size, to have them perhaps subject to some kind of inspection. And there was a great deal of nervousness about the imbalance of forces between East and West if some kind of restrictions were to be put on the Western countries, and this slowed the whole process down as governments began to think of the implications of an agreement. It was also interesting that, in this period, the MBFR on-going discussions were used by the United States government as a way to fend off any pressures from Congress to reduce American forces in Europe for financial reasons, balance of payments reasons or other things, - they would only reduce their American forces in Europe in a balanced sort of way. That had its implications for Canadian forces as well. We would not reduce our forces in Europe until some agreement had been reached at the MBFR.

[HILL] By and large, do you think that these talks were reasonably well conducted, or was there any sense of, say, the United States trying to move faster than the others wanted to go, or slower? What was the sentiment about that in the NATO Council?

[MENZIES] I would say that the MBFR talks were probably one of the best examples of NATO coordination that I've seen. I think that there were obvious differences between the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and other countries, but any sort of régime of control that would be established under MBFR would be imposed on Germany in particular and there was considerable sensitivity in Germany. In fact, I can recall in later years learning with interest that the German foreign ministry had weekly meetings with their Members of Parliament to talk about where the MBFR talks were going, practically on a weekly basis because of the potential implications for them of a regime that might be set up for Central Europe that would affect them. You can't imagine Canadian Members of Parliament being that much interested in the MBFR talks.

[HILL] What about the impact also of the Year of Europe, Dr. Kissinger's call for a Year of Europe? He also called for a new Atlantic Charter in early 1973. My impression was that the United States found that the Europeans picked these up and Canada picked them up a little bit, but not quite in the spirit that the Americans wanted. Then the Americans dropped them to some degree afterwards. They lost a large degree of interest in these things at a certain point.

[MENZIES] Yes, but there was this below-the-surface need to find or to reconcile the intention of the European Community countries, to coordinate their foreign policy, and a feeling that if they retreated from that it would be a sign of lack of cohesion. Yet each of the five main members of the European Community were trying to retain their veto power. There was no permanent secretariat like the European Economic Commission staffs in Brussels. The Chairmanship rotated every six months, and it was the responsibility of each foreign office under the foreign minister who was chairman for six months to provide the secretariat, and the reconciling of that aspiration, and legitimate aspiration, of the European Community to coordinate their foreign policy in certain areas

had to be reconciled with their relationships with the United States, in particular, but also with the other members of the Alliance. There was the special position of Ireland which was not a member of NATO, so NATO was not for all purposes an entirely satisfactory forum, alternative forum, for these discussions. But I think there were other distractions that came in, like the Middle East War in 1973 and the fact that the United States flew supplies, military equipment for Israel, through Germany, through Spain, through Portugal to the Middle East without so much as a by-your-leave; and the fact that the Americans went on to stage a world-wide alert for their forces, without consultation, came as a shock. Now this had reverberations even in Canada because the American component of NORAD went onto alert and the Canadian component didn't go onto alert and questions were raised in Parliament about this. There was, I think, as a result of that experience and the fact that the Europeans also made certain proposals for a settlement of the Middle East dispute which were not entirely to the American's liking and made them as a European Community proposal without consulting the United States -these things were all recognized as being rather divisive incidents and it was necessary to find ways of healing those misunderstandings; and that, I think, did result in some recognition of the need to pull together. The Americans, for instance, also wanted to see the Western position on oil fully coordinated and that we should as a group deal with the OPEC countries. Whereas the French, looking after themselves, wanted some bilateral deals and went ahead and entered into them, and this certainly didn't help relations and we tended to sympathize with the American position on this.

[HILL] It seems to me that was kind of a re-assertion of traditional cleavages within the Alliance and that was the kind of thing that had arisen in 1956 in the Suez Crisis. It's rather a different thing than Dr. Kissinger's architectural moves to restructure the world. I think one thing that seems to me to have been there is a concern about the United States going over the head of the Europeans, and Canada too, and perhaps also Japan at times, in dealing with the Soviet Union and other powers. I was wondering, what was the reaction of NATO to the early 1973 US/Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War? Did that cause much of a stir?

[MENZIES] I think one would have to say that the Americans have pretty consistently had so much difficulty within their own administration and internal opposition that they were almost as hidebound as the European Community countries were and that they tended to not consult sufficiently with their partners. They informed but they didn't consult. I think this has been a problem of American relations with their partners on strategic weapons discussions from the very beginning. Mechanisms have been worked out in recent years for consultation at the senior official level on intermediate range nuclear forces, but generally speaking NATO has been informed of what the United States is doing on the strategic weapons side. And there was, I think we mentioned this last time, the differences due to lack of consultation, real consultation, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which resulted eventually in the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO defence ministers; and that Nuclear Planning Group is again a place where the United States informs its allies of its appraisal of the strategic balance and what it's going to do about it, but not in detail (although certain exercises, hypothetical studies about the consultative mechanisms on the use of nuclear weapons, are prepared for these NPG meetings). But it is really quite difficult to envisage a full scale discussion in NATO of all the pros and cons of each option that could be chosen by the United States in its negotiations with the Soviets, and there is a problem of possible security leakage of information through out-of-date communications systems or things of that kind, that are a matter of great concern when you're dealing with such fearsome weapons as Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles of one kind or another.

[HILL] If we could then wrap up this question of the allied relationships of the United States: by and large, I have the impression that you feel, on the whole, while there may have been some

concern about US relations with the Alliance, on the whole people were more or less satisfied. I'm thinking now about the situation prior to the specific issue of the Middle East War in 1973.

[MENZIES] Yes. One of the things that was, I think, a source of satisfaction was that Kissinger came from Moscow on his way back even before going to see the President, to brief the Council, or deputed his number two man to come and brief the Council, and this meant that the information was made available to governments pretty quickly on what went on; and the atmospherics of the discussions with the Soviets were given to you; and provided we wrote our telegrams in a colourful way we could put that back to Ottawa in a way that was meaningful.

[HILL] Let's go on to the summer, then, of 1973. Already Watergate was an issue in the United States. Did that have an effect on US policy in NATO?

[MENZIES] Well, I don't think the summer of 1973 was a particularly eventful time if my recollection is correct. It's really when the Middle East war broke out that problems arose, but certainly any lame duck situation with regard to the position of the US President is difficult. People in Europe as in well as Canada are very aware that decisions are just not taken in Washington for six months or so and nothing happens unless the initiative comes from somewhere else. Watergate certainly had that effect, that the Americans were not taking initiatives because of their concern about conditions at home.

[HILL] Right. Let's go on to the Middle East War of 1973 and then the Energy Crisis. You touched on it a little bit earlier, I think. My impression is it was almost the case that you could say, looked at from the outside: "Will NATO ever learn?" "Will the Alliance ever learn?" I mean the Middle East always seems to be the biggest problem, it creates the biggest splits inside the Alliance. I wonder if you could tell us something about what happened in that period inside NATO headquarters?

[MENZIES] I'm not sure that my memory is very clear on details of that particular crisis. But the US support for Israel, military support and political support, was pretty evident and it included the transfer of military equipment through Germany, through US bases in Germany and through Portugal and through the Azores to Israel without so much as a by-your-leave to the governments concerned. There was a world-wide alert of US forces also when the threat of Soviet intervention loomed. There was a good deal of discussion in NATO about Soviet capability of moving two or three divisions by air, because they had demonstrated their capability to airlift in the annual rotation of their troops in Eastern Europe; and so there was I think a good deal of concern. The French again, and in particular, were at that period a good deal more pro-Arab and I think French logic also took the view that it was the Arabs who controlled the oil and one should pay attention to that fact. So, you had Dr. Kissinger wanting to get the Western partners to decide policies jointly, which meant really supporting US positions, and the French attitude was to go off and negotiate their own deals on oil with the Arab countries, and to get the European Community to offer to play a role in mediation in the Middle East. And they came out with a declaration, which they hadn't shown the Americans in advance, and that irritated Dr. Kissinger who always wanted to handle the Middle East himself. He didn't want the Soviets in. He didn't want the European Community to play a role in the Middle East. He wanted to run it himself. I think that did create a good deal of unhappiness in NATO and it's a constant sore point and I don't think one can say it has been solved yet, except to say that the US has not in recent years been quite as interventionist.

[HILL] This also raised the question of the utility and the depth of NATO consultations on economic issues, because, for example, you mentioned the French being dependent on Middle East

oil but of course the Italians were even more so. The Greeks and the Turks and that whole Southern wing were very dependent on Middle East oil. And to some degree the other Europeans also. But how good was the consultation on the economic aspects, on the question of oil supply, inside NATO? Did it prompt NATO to think it should do more in the area of economic consultation?

[MENZIES] Well, as you know, NATO has an economic committee which does some quite good studies particularly on the economic position of the Warsaw Pact countries. Some studies on the Middle East and so on and other areas were made by the Economic Committee but they were more informational than actual suggestions about policy. The intelligence people within NATO, that is the military and the civilian intelligence people, also did a number of papers on Middle East oil, and there were also some discussions about contingency planning, in the case of interruption of the supply of oil from the Middle East, done by the Military Committee. But by and large, I think the attitude of the governments was that this was an OECD responsibility and there was an energy committee struck which dealt, I think, pretty vigorously with oil and what could be done about sharing oil in the event of the interruption of supply and so on. Canada, and the United States, were perhaps less immediately affected than the Europeans because we had a good share of what we needed anyway in Canada and the United States was drawing oil from Venezuela and places like that, which were not subject to interruption by the Middle East war.

[HILL] When you mentioned the energy committee you were referring to the energy committee of the OECD?

[MENZIES] Yes.

[HILL] If we could move on then, into the 1974 period. That was the time when Watergate became really a major issue in the United States; and then eventually President Nixon stepped down. It was also the period in which, I think it was by June 1974, NATO had moved to establish the Atlantic Declaration, which was agreed in the Ottawa ministerial meeting here in June of that year. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about that whole process, how that declaration came to be written and agreed upon. Did it have its antecedents in the call for a new Atlantic Charter of Dr. Kissinger earlier on?

[MENZIES] Yes, I think it did, and it also flowed, I think, from the backroom discussions of the relationship of the United States, of Canada, of Norway and other non-European Community countries with the efforts of the Europeans to stake out an area and a procedure for foreign policy coordination among them. And it was as much a reiteration, I would say basically, of two concepts; one, the reiteration of the interdependence of North America and Europe for each other's security. and this was an area in which I, and other members of the Canadian delegation, had to do a great deal of work to ensure that each time the importance of the US military contribution in Europe was mentioned that there was "and Canadian troops" also put in there, because we were not to be left out on any occasion; and the second aspect of this was to emphasize the importance of close and continuing consultation within NATO on items that would have both a direct and indirect effect on the interests and security of the members of NATO, and a specific reference to the fact that these interests could be affected by events which took place outside the NATO area. I think on the whole that declaration stands up pretty well. We were enormously pleased with what we achieved. I thought I should have got a Canada decoration out of this operation, and it was rather unfortunate that it wasn't called the Ottawa Declaration, because it was approved here at the June Foreign Ministers meeting in Ottawa, but at the last moment the President of the United States said he wanted to go over to Brussels at the Head of State level and sign the document. Mr. Trudeau was sufficiently miffed by this undercutting of the Canadian role that he decided not to go to Brussels and sent the Honourable Senator Paul Martin to sign the document.

[HILL] I think one of the key phrases in that document, if I'm not mistaken, is the phrase that it was a question of things which affected members of the Alliance "as members of the Alliance". It wasn't simply that all of the other allies would back up one of the members who was in trouble in, lets say, Africa. If they were in trouble in Africa, it was a question of whether that affected Alliance interests. Then everybody else would take a role.

[MENZIES] Certainly. But there was, I think, an attitude of interdependency or a recognition of interdependency to the extent, for instance, that it is stated in one of the paragraphs that the maintenance of adequate defence forces by the European countries makes a contribution to the security of North America. It wasn't just Americans and Canadians contributing to the security of Western Europe.

[HILL] My impression, though I was not at NATO at that time, I was in Kingston, my impression, looking at this development from the outside, was that it was rather a nice development, a good result out of the earlier calls for a new Atlantic Charter. There was a solid recognition of the need for sound consultations and there were some advances made there in terms of defining just what it meant to be a good ally in terms of consulting with one's partners. Did you see it, also, as a sort of following on from the work of the Three Wise Men in 1956? The Pearson, Lange and Martino exercise?

[MENZIES] Definitely. Except that this was drafted by the permanent representatives, or some of us, and it was a very long-drawn out exercise. I'm sure if one were to get out the files of the various delegations we should find several inches of paper.

[HILL] It was a sort of deepening of the principles recorded in 1956, a further development of them. Your mentioning President Nixon's involvement with the final stage of this is interesting, because my impression of that particular visit of his to Europe was that it was a last scrambling, a looking for popular support for his administration, at a time when it was in very deep trouble. In fact it was only shortly afterwards that he stepped down. Then you had President Ford come in, and normally when a new US President comes in, as with any other government, but perhaps even more so in the US case, it takes a while for them to get a grip on things; and my impression was that from then on there was a sort of return to normal in East/West relations, and things became normal in the sense of almost too normal, solidified if you like, into the old patterns, because of President Ford being rather more small 'c' conservative in his approach to international affairs. Also, of course, in Moscow you had Brezhnev still at that time, already in a state where he was not being at all adventurous about anything. Was that how you would see the state of East/West affairs at that time?

[MENZIES] Yes, and I think some of the lampoons about President Ford and his intellectual qualities had their effect on European attitudes. He was a very nice man and the NATO Council was invited after a SACLANT meeting to go up to Washington, and we had our photograph taken in the Oval Office and everybody got an enormous ashtray and a pen and we were taken out in the Presidential yacht on the Potomac and everything was done in an avuncular sort of way, but there really wasn't any substance in it.

[HILL] But on the other hand, perhaps it was a relatively safe period in East/West relations in some ways, was it not, more or less up to 1976?

[MENZIES] Yes it was.

[HILL] Could we turn now to the question of Canadian policy in this period. Mr. Trudeau was re-elected in 1974, I think it was. Did you find any difference in his approach to NATO and international affairs, as compared with 1968 for example?

[MENZIES] Well, I would have said that Mr. Trudeau's attitude to NATO appeared to be changing about the time of the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Ottawa, in June of 1974. He made some very supportive statements when he opened the meeting in the House of Commons chamber for the foreign ministers of NATO and he was, I think, pretty enthusiastic about the Declaration on Atlantic Relations. I mentioned that he was disappointed this wasn't called the Ottawa Declaration, as many of the rest of us Canadians were. In 1974 he was finally invited by President Giscard D'Estaing to visit France, and that, I think, was a pretty important thing for him as it meant a kind of a healing of the wounds of President De Gaulle's visit of 1967. No Prime Minister had been in France or had been invited to France since then. At the same time, while he was well received by President Giscard D'Estaing and Prime Minister Chirac, the French were still not prepared to support a contractual link with Canada for the European Community, without insisting on a thorough understanding of what was involved in this, and I think--this area's not my responsibility, or was not--but I think part of their concern was that this might open the way for the Americans to ask for a contractual link. Therefore they wanted a very good definition of what was exactly involved and how much leverage might be given to Canada, and therefore to the United States, to interfere in European Economic Community internal decision-making. came to visit the NATO Council on that particular trip in October of 1974, and quite frankly I had primed most of the Permanent Representatives in advance and discussed with them what they should say on this occasion and he was very much impressed by the level of political discussion among the Permanent Representatives. Mr. Trudeau is a person who is always captivated by stimulating conversation. That's what he likes about the Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings and things of that kind. He thought this was a pretty good club and he literally said at that meeting that Canada wants to be a good member of the club. Then in the next year, I guess it was early 1975, the spring of 1975, he made a tour and the most important stop was in Bonn where he got along very well with Chancellor Schmidt. There was a certain intellectual bond between Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Trudeau, and Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher emphasized to Mr. Trudeau the importance which Germany attached to Canadian troops being in Germany. That was beginning to put some pressure on him, that if he wanted to get a contractual link there was probably also some link also to Canada's contribution to NATO. Then in May of 1975, there was a summit meeting of NATO, and Mr. Trudeau made quite a Pearsonian type of statement, including references to harmonizing our economic policies and social policies and things of that kind, which seemed to be harking back to Article Two, but also to one of the paragraphs of the Declaration on Atlantic relations. And he went on to say that he thought there ought to be more summit meetings so that the Heads of NATO governments could give more impetus to the work. Now here again is a characteristic of Prime Minister Trudeau, in my view, that he is not as keen on material that works its way up through a bureaucratic structure, but he likes to see intellectually competent heads of government meeting and exchanging viewpoints and giving directions which then will flow down into the bureaucracy. But I would say that on that occasion again, Chancellor Schmidt told Mr. Trudeau, because I happened to be there, that he would feel a good deal easier about the Canadian forces remaining in Europe if we were to get some new heavy main battle tanks and Mr. Trudeau told his press conference afterwards that he and Chancellor Schmidt had agreed that their Permanent Representatives would discuss this subject afterwards. So that I felt we had achieved just about as much as was possible, in terms of Mr. Trudeau's conversion to, or acceptance of, Canada's role

in NATO being a part of our overall foreign policy in our relations with Western Europe. But there were still problems at home, in that the DND budget has always been an area where money can be cut off at the last moment, if there's the need to economize a billion or two. And frankly, as a Permanent Representative to NATO I couldn't help but be disappointed with the constant deferral of decisions on the replacement of the main battle tank, the replacement of the CF 104, the long range maritime patrol aircraft, the replacement of ships and so on. Now it was mainly the battle tanks and the air surveillance capability and air defence capability over the brigade in Europe that was of concern to the Europeans. They weren't nearly as concerned about LRPAs and things of that kind, not to the same extent. Our area of the Atlantic was the North West Atlantic not really adjacent to Western Europe. So you had a positive attitude being expressed in meetings, with European statesmen and at your NATO summit meetings and yet the performance at home was pretty slow in coming forward with the necessary cash to support it.

[HILL] My impression is that in fact up until about 1975, it wasn't clear where the armed forces were going to go. In fact the trend was all downwards. We have heard, I think, in some of the interviews we have had, that it was the Defence Structure Review of 1975/76 which paved the way for the turnaround to go back up again. That, in addition to Mr. Trudeau's conversations with Chancellor Schmidt and so on, turned around the direction in which defence policy was going.

[MENZIES] That's true. It's also I think probably true that that rather blunt old fellow Joseph Luns, the Secretary General of NATO, had a press conference, I think it was in November or something like that of 1975, in which he said very, very bluntly that Canadian troops were among the best that there were but that the equipment was just out of date, and I think it shamed the government or certainly put ammunition into the empty muskets of the opposition to fire at the government, and I think that also helped to precipitate some action rather than putting off decisions and putting them off, and putting them off.

[HILL] One interesting piece here, as I understand it, is that when the government decided to do the Defence Structure Review here with DND and External and so on, the initial instruction was that they should see how well they could get along on an even lower budget. In fact what happened was they came to the conclusion that if it was a much lower budget the armed forces would have to move down to a radically smaller and different kind of organization. But if they wanted to keep it more or less the same type of organization they'd have to increase the budget. There seemed to be all these reasons why in that period of 1975/76 the corner was turned. You mentioned Mr. Luns' attitude towards the state of the Canadian forces at that time. Was this one of the crosses that you had to bear as ambassador in dealings with your colleagues, the fact that others were so very aware of the fact that some of the equipment of the Canadian forces was getting out of date and so on?

[MENZIES] Well as you know there is in preparation for the Defence Planning Committee, that is the twice a year conferences of the Ministers of Defence of the NATO countries, there is a review paper prepared both in the national headquarters of each Department of National Defence, a questionnaire made up for each country. And then there is a committee of one's peers, in other words, three, I think it's three Permanent Representatives make a review of this document, and you're literally up on the carpet to justify what you have done since the last review, and what your projected expenditures are going to be. We, I think, were toying around with things like saying we were increasing our defence expenditures by eleven percent, when in fact inflation was eating up a great part of that, and how we could think that when there were these performance reviews all set out on paper, with pretty competent defence accountants from Norway or Italy having a look at this stuff, that we could get away with kidding the other members of the Alliance that we were

in fact increasing our contribution by three percent, in real terms, I don't know. But Mr. Richardson made a couple of statements which were hardly sustainable, and I myself hid my head out of sight on these occasions.

[HILL] That's very interesting, because I think there is sometimes the impression that things can be hidden. But these days, with all the public information that there is on the state of different countries, defence forces, for example in The Military Balance, that really isn't possible.

[MENZIES] Oh, yes, the IISS, they don't hesitate to state quite bluntly what's missing.

[HILL] Then, in addition to that, you've got all the machinery inside NATO headquarters, where people are doing the accounting exercises that you mentioned. And of course there are visits here, there and everywhere, to the different countries' forces, by senior military officers and officials. And there are joint exercises and so on. So it's all very plain what the state of each country's forces is. Did this question of the state of Canada's forces have an impact on your ability to function? Was it something which in any way affected your position and your capability to perform as Canada's Ambassador and to present Canadian interests inside NATO?

[MENZIES] Well, I think the whole halving of the Canadian contribution to NATO back in '69/70, and then the very slow pace of re-equipment, had meant that Canada was not regarded as being as keen a contributor as we had the capability to be. We certainly weren't an example to anybody, say compared to our pride in the technical competence of our peace-keeping units in the UNEF and UNDA, where we were responsible for communications for helicopters, for things of this kind; and we had a pretty good reputation because Canadian forces could be technically competent, and I think that the attitude of the military officers and one which I took, was that even if our forces in Europe were relatively small their quality was that of professionals. They weren't conscripts. They were professionals with an average of 12 to 15 years experience in the armed forces and they were very good. And they were good, but as their equipment got older and older it was pretty difficult to maintain that line that we made up in quality what we didn't have in numbers. I wouldn't say, however, that that really seriously undermined Canada's role in political consultation. I think that Canada as a country and an economy and a piece of great geography was still a substantive member of the club and that we ranked, you know, reasonably well in the middle, in the upper middle ranks of the NATO member countries.

[HILL] Let's follow on a little bit from what you said earlier about how you felt about your capacity to represent Canada inside NATO. My impression is that to some degree there's not really a very tight linkage between the military contribution and the diplomatic capabilities. To some degree Canada's diplomatic role depends upon ideas, upon having capable people, and being able to put forward coherent policies in Alliance discussions. How would you see that situation?

[MENZIES] Yes. I think that the NATO Military Committee of permanent representatives does a good deal of work but it is always subject to and eclipsed by the Council of Permanent Representatives representing the governments. When the ministers of national defence get together, my experience has been that the meetings of the defence ministers are organized in such a way as to review the threat from the Warsaw Pact countries and their capabilities, to review again the infrastructure side within NATO, the common defence facilities that have been built up, to go through such things as the integrated communications system, a lot of necessary infrastructure of maintaining forces in Europe and to get reports. But they don't appear to have any real thinking sessions on strategy in broad terms; that's something that I think they all tend to avoid. In Canada's case, of course, the defence ministers do not discuss the North American component of the North

American region, that is the NORAD, and the other plans for the defence of North America, naval and military. On the other hand, the foreign ministers do appear to be the more senior group in NATO, after all it is called the North Atlantic Council, and when they meet they are not so much going through detailed reports, although they get some from let's say the Committee of the CCMS and things of that kind, but generally speaking the foreign ministers like to have at least one restricted session in which they get down to talking about real issues that are bothering some of the foreign ministers; and I think that, on the whole, that applies also to the Permanent Representatives meeting in Brussels.

[HILL] In addition to the political side, I mean the ministers, there's also the calibre of the Canadian officials and the officers who serve with NATO.

[MENZIES] I think that that's true. We have had in the NATO delegation some capable Permanent Representatives, but at the deputy level there have been some rising and competent, very competent, officers who have gone on to greater things in the Canadian foreign service, and that would apply at Counsellor and First Secretary level as well. Usually, the quality of officers that have been selected to man the NATO delegation has been pretty good. I would like to say, though, that the military officers that Canada has assigned to the various joint commands in Europe have been very good value. I think they have made good contributions where they are, have got on very well with both their American and European colleagues. I think they've also gained a great deal because otherwise within our own limited Canadian forces environment the opportunity to see a big picture and to deal with things in terms of corps and armies and tactical airforces, that opportunity isn't there. There is some in NORAD, but the NORAD operation is a fairly static operation, and I think the opportunities for Canadian officers from Major, Lieutenant Colonel up to Major General level to serve in integrated headquarters at NATO has been very good. And this also applies with Canadian ships in the Standing Force Atlantic, and we've had a Commodore commanding this five ship standby fleet a couple of times; and I think they've got a great deal of experience in the interoperability of naval units at sea.

[HILL] It seems to me that it would have been nice for Mr. Trudeau, after his conversion to a relatively positive attitude towards NATO, to have participated in the <u>regular</u> meetings of the Council, with the Permanent Representatives. Because there you have a forum where there is a lot of give and take. One of his main criticisms of NATO, I think, was that he found the two-day formula for the ministerial meetings rather stultifying, and a bit stylized, if you like, because each one began with a tour d'horizon which took up most of the first day. Then you had to draft a communiqué and so there wasn't really much time for the Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Defence Ministers, when they did gather together, to actually have a free give and take. But that free give and take does go on continually in the Council when it's meeting in permanent session.

[MENZIES] Yes that's true. There is also a language problem, in that the Prime Ministers of NATO countries are elected, chosen for their political importance and role at home and not in the international field. So it is quite normal to assume that the Prime Minister of Turkey will perhaps have at best some reading knowledge or limited speaking knowledge of English or French, the two working languages of NATO, and not feel able to mix into a discussion. And that, of course, is one of the things that Mr. Trudeau liked about the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, because there they all spoke English, or if he went to a meeting of La Francophonie, you again had people at the Heads of Government level who were fluent in French. But in NATO, at any one time, you'd certainly find that three or four of the Heads of Government would have too inadequate a command of either English or French to really get into any serious discussion of issues.

[HILL] One could imagine, for example, that if Mr. Trudeau and Ambassador De Staerke, the Belgian representative were on the same level, which of course they were not, but if they had been, one could imagine them having a very fascinating conversation between themselves, both being francophone and having a command of language and enjoyment of ideas. I always thought that if Mr. Trudeau had been able to be at the regular meetings of the Council, he might have had a different impression of NATO in general.

[MENZIES] There's a small extension to that comment of yours, and that is we used to hold reinforced meetings of the Council from time to time with senior officers, usually political Directors General or Under Secretaries, from capitals, and I have to say that in a number of instances there was a certain amount of jealousy on the part of the Permanent Representatives when their bosses from home came and pre-empted the chair that they were normally used to sitting in, and took over speaking for their government. And André De Staerke would certainly be a good example of that. He didn't want to yield to his political Director General from the Foreign Ministry.

[HILL] Well, that brings back to mind one thing I always remember from my beginning at NATO: as you know, the Secretariat had about six seats behind the Secretary General. These were all very carefully assigned, but it depended on which meeting you were at. There was never any label on them, so you had to know that if you sat in a certain seat at the wrong time you would very rapidly be turfed out. This brings me to one other thing. I think Canada's contribution to NATO is a very human sort of activity. It depends in part on intellectual capability and also on using imagination from time to time, when the opportunity arises. For example, what about Canadian involvement in response to the Italian earthquake crisis that took place while you were at NATO headquarters. I wonder if you could recall any of that, what happened then?

[MENZIES] Well, I'm glad you brought that up. Actually, I take some personal pride in what was an interesting development. I think it was on the 6th of May 1976, just before I left NATO to be posted as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. There was a big earthquake in the Friuli region of north eastern Italy, up near the Austrian border, and a great deal of serious destruction. At that time, the Permanent Representatives were meeting in the Deputy Secretary General's room discussing preparations for the meeting of foreign ministers, which was taking place the following month in Norway. We got word of this earthquake and I had the idea that perhaps some of the NATO forces could be of assistance on the medical and engineering and other sides in dealing with the aftermath of this earthquake. It so happened that at that time General Jacques Dextraze, the Chief of the Defence Staff, who had with him General Duncan McAlpine, the Commander of the Canadian forces in Lahr, was in Brussels, and I got General Dextraze on the phone and said "What would be the possibility of sending some medical people and perhaps a few hospital units to this devastated region by air and perhaps sending some engineering people to assist in clearing roads and so on". General Dextraze, who was a very operationally-minded Chief of the Defence Staff, took this up right away and said: "If you can get permission from the Minister of National Defence, we will perform". Before the day was out we had that permission from Mr. Richardson and two hundred Canadian medical and medical assistance people and others were in Italy on May 7, that is the day after the earthquake. Heavy equipment was moved through Austria in the next few days by road and the troops stayed there, about three hundred in all, for a period of about six weeks, gradually moving back as their jobs were completed. They did some very good work on the medical side, in disinfecting water and things of that kind, and I think this was also greatly appreciated, not only by the people of the region and the Italian government, but by the million Italian-Canadians in Canada, who also proceeded to raise something in the order of eight million dollars for earthquake relief. It was one of the notable examples of quick reaction and flexibility on the part of the Canadian forces in Europe that I think we have had. There have been

other small activities in the Lahr-Baden-Sölingen area, in terms of their relations with their German neighbours, by the Canadian forces, but on a large scale I think this was the single example that took place, and I was glad to have a little part in it.

[HILL] Most of the aircraft must have been flown over from Canada, from Trenton. Presumably they were Hercules and so on.

[MENZIES] Well, there were always aircraft, Hercules, in Europe, because they went from Lahr to support the forces in Cyprus and the Middle East there. Equipment and men came over by Boeing 707 from Canada. Then there were several aircraft which flew to Cyprus and the Middle East and also went to the various NATO headquarters where we had contingents in Europe in places like Brunssum and so on. So there was an airlift capability, and we had Chinook helicopters there by that time. So we had a remarkable airlift capability. Part of the idea was that, because Canadian forces in the Lahr area were so far behind the front, that if war broke out the roads would be so clogged with refugees that you had to have helicopters to make this move of men and equipment forward quickly.

[HILL] You mentioned Cyprus and also the Middle East. I would like to turn to them in a minute but just before going to that, I wonder if you could say a little bit more about the state of Alliance consultations on East/West issues and strategic issues, and arms control, in 1974, 1975, 1976, in the second half of your period at NATO. There wasn't very much forward movement on any of these things, although there was the Vladivostock Accord, supposedly going to lead rapidly to SALT II; but in fact it didn't move ahead very fast after that. How good were the consultations, in your view, under the Ford presidency?

[MENZIES] Well, there were a number of areas. There was an arrangement by which the NATO representatives dealing with disarmament in Geneva, under the United Nations umbrella, would come and present a report, and frankly there was very little movement at this time in Geneva on anything, and the NATO ambassadors were often immobilized by rather large lunches and when the reports from Geneva were made after one of these lunches it was possible to see some of the better trenchermen nodding off, paying not too much attention. On the other hand the MBFR talks involved a monthly report to NATO, but there was relatively little progress at the MBFR talks. They got bogged down on data, verification and whether air forces were to be included and that type of thing. And there was the CSCE follow-up under preparation.

[HILL] Can I interrupt there, with reference to the Final Act of Helsinki being signed in 1975. This must have been very well received in NATO, was it?

[MENZIES] Yes, it was pretty well received. I think on the whole it was felt it struck a balance between the intention of the Soviet Union to get frontiers confirmed and to get their Communist government hold on Eastern Europe confirmed, and on the other hand the desire of the Western governments for greater freedom of information, freedom of movement, re-unification of families, visits, marriages and things of that kind. But after the Final Act was signed in Helsinki, the sort of statements that began to appear out of Moscow seemed to suggest that on the basis of CSCE détente it would be easier for the Soviet Union to push on with its ideological struggle of undermining the capitalist countries, and there began to be, I think by the end of 1975, a good deal of scepticism about how far the Eastern European countries would go in fulfilling the spirit of the agreement, and that there was really very little movement of individuals in and out. The jamming of Radio Free Europe continued and there was very little freedom of information. And there was therefore a definite view that there should be a review conference, and that it was fortunate the

provision had been put in the Final Act for periodic reviews. Officials were beginning to say: "Well, we're going to nail those chaps the next time, because we've got high sounding phrases in the CSCE". There were beginning to be signs of movement within the Eastern European countries for monitoring CSCE performance, monitoring groups in Czechoslovakia and places like that, and I think that all of this began to register with ministers who received letters from ethnic groups in Canada. We got a good deal of that. In fact the words of the Helsinki agreement were high sounding, but the performance by the Eastern European countries was not really upped and there began to be a certain amount of cynicism and a feeling that one would have to continue to press, to push, to send notes, to send lists, that there would be nothing voluntary done from the Eastern side, unless the Western governments monitored performance and continued to press in their individual relations, meetings of foreign ministers and so on, for more forthcoming performance.

[HILL] What about the general state of East/West relations in '75 and '76? Was it a general view in NATO that, while maybe things would change eventually, probably the West would have to wait until Brezhnev had gone, and until some sort of succession had come? Or was it a period of fairly intense competition, or what was the general feeling?

[MENZIES] No, I'd say it was a relatively quiet period in terms of East/West relations. But there was a good deal of concern about the momentum of the defence industries in the Soviet Union in building up their equipment capability, and this was particularly true in terms of the ability of the Soviet navy to send quite large fleet units not only into the North Sea but well down into the Atlantic Ocean to conduct fairly large-scale manoeuvers. I suppose that one should have expected this as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but it was taking quite a few years for them to build up their capability. But there was no doubt that they had a growing capability to operate worldwide; and with the continuing problem about oil, there was some alarm that the Soviet fleets in the Indian Ocean, in the Mediterranean, in the North Atlantic, that these capabilities were a threat to Norway, to the oil lifelines and that they also put in question the US fleet in the Mediterranean and its complete freedom to move whichever way it wanted.

[HILL] One has the impression that 1972, with the SALT 1 agreement and then the start of MBFR and CSCE, that there was an expectation of fairly rapid movement towards SALT II. There seemed to be the possibility of some kind of breakthrough in East/West relations, which might turn the armaments build up downward, or stabilize it or control it. But that did not happen for a variety of reasons. By 1975 and 1976 things seemed to be going the other way. There was a relatively cautious administration in the US, and at the same time a continuing build up of armaments in the Soviet Union which was a bit hard for people to understand. There were assessments done of the Soviet build up, presumably, in NATO. What were the conclusions of that, do you recall?

[MENZIES] Well, it just seemed to be a momentum. It was in the system. They kept turning out more tanks, more field guns, more ships, more aircraft; and the Military Committee was constantly reminding us that if there was an atmosphere of détente in East/West relations it was cloaking a military-build up that was a very real one. I don't think that any civilian government of the NATO countries could say we didn't know that this was going on. We certainly did know. We were well informed, and I think the public, if they wanted to know about it, could get it from public sources, like the Institute of Strategic Studies' annual reports and other balanced statements that were being published.

[HILL] Shifting, then, slightly, to another area, which we've already touched on once. In 1973, the end of 1973, the Middle East was obviously the big, the hot issue around. But by 1975, for example, and 1976, how much attention was paid to the Middle East in NATO?

[MENZIES] Well, certainly not anything like during the time of crisis in the Middle East in the October War period. It had died down. But I think it was about that time that the Egyptians ousted the Soviets from their facilities in Egypt, and that of course was a very good development from the point of view of NATO. It was a very, very important thing because, if the Soviets had had a naval facility in Alexandria it could have been awkward. I think there was a desire on the part of the European members of NATO to reach out a hand to the moderate Arabs including Egypt and Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the Emirates of the Gulf, and so on. And there was a wonderful outlet for military equipment in Iran, because the Shah was building up all sorts of stuff. There was a great competition between the French and the British and the Italians and the Americans for sale of equipment. I think if the Americans had not been so single-minded in support of Israel the weight of NATO might have been more in the direction of supporting some kind of a balanced negotiation between the moderate Arabs and Israel. But, you know, Prime Minister Begin was not easy: - he was an irrascible chap who was extremely stubborn in terms of his ideas of Israeli objectives, for preserving and enhancing their national security.

[HILL] But there must have been a sense, nonetheless, that there would be a continual danger from that area if NATO didn't watch the whole thing fairly carefully, if the Allies didn't coordinate carefully, or do what they could to coordinate their viewpoints, or at least to consult adequately on the Middle East issues.

[MENZIES] Yes, I think so, but I would again say that the United States was more strongly pro-Israel than the European members, for a variety of reasons. They didn't really see eye to eye on this. But the United States was the dominant factor there in the Middle East and they intended to keep that position so far as they could.

[HILL] Of course, this was also the period when Sadat went to Jerusalem, wasn't it, in 1975 I think? I wonder if we could go on to another question. We touched earlier on the question of Cyprus and I think it's been said that the Cyprus crisis was in some ways a great success for NATO consultative practices. The crisis was a very severe one, in which Turkey eventually intervened in Cyprus, but at least the two, Greece and Turkey, didn't go to war, not open war. I wonder if you could say something about how well you think the NATO consultative procedures functioned at that time, and also about Canada's role in peacekeeping in Cyprus. Canada had peace-keeping forces there, of course.

[MENZIES] Yes. There's a long history of this, going back to 1964, so that by 1974 we had had forces there for ten years, and the mandate was being renewed every six months by the United Nations. We had anywhere from 450 to 1050 men in Cyprus, which was the second largest contingent there and the one that was patrolling the green line in Nicosia and got involved, therefore, whenever there was a fracas between the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus. Well, I don't know, I would say it was my assessment that the Greek Cypriots under President Makarios aimed at really running the country as a Greek Cypriot government, with a pretty minor role to be played by the Turkish Cypriots, and there was quite a large officer group from mainland Greece operating with the army. We all of course recognized the government of Cyprus, which was the Greek Cypriot element there.

Then there was a coup d'état and President Makarios was ousted and it looked for a time as if there was going to be an even more nationalistic Greek regime. Then the Turks intervened rather massively, in a military way, and there was some conflict with Canadian troops as the Turks simply bulldozed their way into the country, and eliminated some of the Canadian observation posts and so on, and pushed the Canadians back.

[HILL] There was actually some fighting between the Canadians and the Turks.

[MENZIES] Oh yes, oh yes.

[HILL] Between the Canadians and the Turks at Nicosia airport, I think.

[MENZIES] That's right. Well, there's no question but what this subject was immediately a very live one in the Permanent Council. It is a fact that the Turkish Permanent Representative, Eralp, was a very, very experienced and capable diplomat, who had an excellent command of both English and French, and was a very persuasive operator, whereas the Greek representative, who was a much younger man, did not have the same rapport with his colleagues that the Turk had, and he had been really a defender of the colonels' regime in Greece so that his stock was not too high at NATO headquarters. I guess one would say that at the NATO meetings, particularly the one in December of 1974, efforts were made by Mr. MacEachen to talk to both the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers. SACEUR also played a role in trying to influence the military of Turkey; and the Americans had the capability to offer military aid - they were giving, I don't know, military aid of several hundred million to Turkey and perhaps half that amount to Greece. There was military equipment assistance and that gave some leverage, and certainly appeals were made to not weaken the southern flank of NATO, etc. But there were temporary withdrawals of the Greeks from the integrated military command for a while. There was a very fragile situation. Certainly, if Greece and Turkey had not been members of NATO, both of the integrated military structure, and had not been receiving military equipment from the United States in particular and a certain amount from Canada, why I think they probably would have had a bash at each other; and so NATO did serve to keep the lid on, although the amount of steam that was under the lid made it jump from time to time on the stove. It heated up from time to time. Certainly NATO did prevent, I think, the two countries from going to war. That would be my view. But it's been an uneasy relationship and continues to be that.

[HILL] I understand that there was a constant succession of Council meetings in that period, and endless telephoning to Athens and Ankara from Brussels to try to get people not to go any further than they were already going. How would you rate the utility of the peacekeeping contingent in Cyprus now. It had a certain type of role before 1974, which was to some degree to keep the two sides apart and hopefully thus stave off a Turkish intervention, but of course eventually the Turks did intervene. The peacekeeping force is still there, and I suppose its role now is to try and maintain some degree of civility between the two sides at least at the local level. But do you think it's worthwhile to keep that contingent there at the present time?

[MENZIES] Well, I haven't been following the Cyprus situation. I visited Cyprus with The Honourable Paul Martin in 1964. I had been there once before, and I went through Cyprus with James Richardson also in connection with an NPG meeting in Ankara, Turkey, but I haven't been following it for the last twelve years or so. So I'd be very hesitant to comment, except to say I think having had a UN peacekeeping force on the island established a presence which does give back up to the Secretary General's representative, who has been trying and trying to bring the parties together to work out some kind of a federative regime. But there is so little trust between

the communities, and the enmity between Greek Orthodox and Muslim Turkish communities is of such historical significance; and both the Greek and Turkish governments with their claims to islands and to offshore oil resources and so on seem to keep that situation hot. The policies of the two mainland governments don't do anything I think to cool down the historic differences between the communities.

[HILL] Another major development that was going on while you were at NATO was that there was a great deal of change and ferment in the Mediterranean end of NATO, and also not just there, but in some other NATO countries as well; there was a lot of talk of Euro-communism at that time. There was even talk of revolution in some areas. It was also a little bit coterminous with, and mixed in with, the Portuguese situation, which involved the giving up of the overseas empire and the effects this had on Portugal itself. I wonder if you could say something about how these developments, the so-called Euro-communism, the developments in the Mediterranean, and so on, were perceived in NATO headquarters?

[MENZIES] I think I'd want to divide that into different parts. When the coup d'état took place in Portugal, there was a good deal of political uncertainty, and it looked at one time as if the Communists in Portugal might get sufficient support in elections to claim a part in government, and therefore there was a great deal of satisfaction when the more moderate elements in the elections, that is socialists rather than Communists, came out. I remember Mitchell Sharp had been on a visit to Africa and came back through Lisbon and met with Mario Suarez, the Foreign Minister and head of the Socialist Party, and he, I think, formed a very reassuring impression of the trends in Portugal itself; and Canada offered to provide assistance to the Portuguese if they requested it. We have quite a large Portuguese community including quite a lot from the Azores islands, in Canada. Fortunately the threat in the case of Portugal did not materialize in as serious a way as it might have. By that time governments were seriously considering whether there would need to be some kind of a naval blockade of Portugal, if there was a Communist take-over in that country. There were questions about whether the Portuguese representative at NATO would be given classified information.

That situation again presented itself, of course, when the popular Euro-communist movement showed itself in Italy, and it looked as if by legitimate means the Communists could insist upon a seat in a coalition government, or at least get that much, or that they might even become a predominant force. But it was quite clear that some of the major members of NATO would not be prepared to share intelligence and planning information with a government like the Italian government, if in fact Communist cabinet ministers were included. And there were questions then being discussed and examined as to whether you could have a special arrangement with a defence minister and a defence establishment in such a European government; and people looked at the experience of governments in Eastern Europe immediately after the War and what sort of possibilities there were to avoid infiltration of Communists into government. I would say my strong impression is it would be difficult for governments to be prepared to share sensitive information including real intelligence, hard intelligence and planning information with any government that included Communists in anything other than two minor posts dealing with non security subjects. I think that that's, - I wouldn't want to be drawn into too detailed discussion of this subject - but I think it would be very difficult for this to happen. Many other governments, members of NATO, have experience in sharing intelligence information, lets say at the confidential level, with the independent governments of former colonies. The British had this experience, the French had this experience, in providing information up to say a confidential level to their independent former colonies. The Americans have a certain amount of experience in passing classified information up to a certain level to some of their allied country associates with whom they have bilateral security

agreements, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, Taiwan at that time, and the Philippines and to SEATO countries and so on. So that it would probably have been possible to keep, let us say for the sake of argument, an Italian government with a representative in the Council of NATO, if the Italian Communist party as a Euro-communist party said that they believed in NATO and wanted to stay in NATO. It probably would have been possible to keep a representative in the Council but not to share certain information on the military side, because a great part of the discussion that goes on in NATO foreign ministers' meetings and Council meetings is only at the confidential level and in fact is mainly in the public domain. But there's always some fear about infiltration of agents. NATO's had its experience with disloyal servants of one government or another, leakages out, and I guess that sort of thing is something security people will always have to worry about.

[HILL] Of course there was a model for an allied country with some Communist ministers before that time, which was the case of Iceland.

[MENZIES] Yes, that's right, but Iceland was not a member of the Defence Planning Committee. They had no reason for being given military intelligence and planning and policy papers. They had always said they didn't want this stuff anyway.

[HILL] And again since your time at NATO the French, of course, have had Communist ministers in the government, but there again they're in a specialized situation vis-a-vis the Alliance. My impression, looking at it from the outside, was that on the whole the Alliance "played it cool", didn't get too worked up about it.

[MENZIES] My recollection in this is that, I think Mr. Sharp was still in when this issue first arose, and that he said it presents a real problem, it presents a problem for us, we don't like Communists in western governments, but if the democratic system throws these people up and they're elected by the people of Italy or Portugal or France, then we've got to find some way to live with that. I think he showed a good deal of, as you say, of cool about it, and fortunately the issue has not come up in an acute form as far as I know in the Alliance.

[HILL] Better to have Italy, for example, within the Alliance, with some Communist ministers, than outside. Its better of course when the Communist partner has in fact announced its dedication to the Alliance, as I believe the Italian Communist party in point of fact did.

[MENZIES] What was the name of the leader of the Euro-communist party?

[HILL] Berlinguer, wasn't it?

[MENZIES] Berlinguer, yes. Well he was a pretty able and astute person, and there's no doubt in my mind that the emergence of Euro-communism was a good thing for Europe generally, because it certainly undermined the Communist party of the Soviet Union's claim to papal infallibility in prescribing how Marxism, Leninism, should be applied not only in the Soviet Union but all over the world. I, of course, being a student of Chinese affairs, remarked that the Maoist parties in Europe faded out. They weren't a success, and the Chinese government finally abandoned those in Europe, for all intents and purposes, and decided that it would be more effective from their point of view to concentrate on state-to-state relations, although they have maintained relations with the Maoist parties in South East Asia, but not in Africa or Europe or the Americas.

[HILL] Communism continues to evolve. I believe now that the full edition of Pravda is banned in the GDR, due to the fact that Mr. Gorbachev is going a bit too fast for them. I just wanted to ask one last question on this period which is based on your experiences in NATO. How would you assess the importance of NATO to Canada. Do you think that being in NATO is a valuable thing for Canada?

[MENZIES] Yes. I'm quite certain of that. We have, after all, been involved in two great wars and it has been more efficient for us to be part of a collective, regional collective security organization than to try to run our security on our own. So that it has, I think, given us a link with Europe which has helped to keep us more open minded than we would have been if we had simply been part of a North American defensive organization. I have also felt that there was an advantage to Canada being in a larger organization with a number of others rather than in a position which would have been as unequal as a Canada/United States type of organization. I think that the political consultation that has gone on in NATO has been especially valuable over the years, and I think it continues to serve a role; and now that negotiations are going on for the reduction of nuclear weapons, I think that there is an opportunity for an input into, at least, the medium range and short range weapons discussions, and I'd say even into the discussions on strategic weapons. If we didn't have NATO, we would be living a more isolated or else a more dependent type of existence in world affairs. I'm not one of those that feels that NATO is the beginning and end of our foreign relations. It looks after a portion only. We have a role to play in the United Nations. We have a role to play in the OECD and the international financial institutions, the development assistance institutions and so on, and all of these are a complex in which NATO occupies a part related to international political, strategic, security considerations and the exchange of information on foreign affairs.

[HILL] Before we end this section, is there any other particular issue or event of that period that you'd particularly like to mention at this time?

[MENZIES] No I don't think so. Probably I'll go home and think about it tonight but that'll be too late.

Part V - Ambassador to China and to Vietnam, 1976-80

[HILL] I'd like to ask just a few more questions this afternoon, and we'll divide them into two segments. The next section we have to deal with is Part Five, when you were Ambassador to China and to Vietnam from 1976 to 1980. Here is a very broad question: where do you think China and the Pacific world is going? Is it going to be the brave new frontier that sometimes grasps the imagination of people here and in the United States?

[MENZIES] Well. That's a very big question. I might say that going to China in 1976, directly from NATO, gave me a great deal of "face" in China. I guess I was the first NATO ambassador to be posted to the People's Republic of China, and I'm not sure that there's been anyone since then. The Chinese were at that time, even immediately after the death of Chairman Mao, strongly suspicious of the Soviet Union and interested in the role of NATO as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union's threat to their eastern flank; just as the NATO countries were not unhappy that the Chinese were drawing off a million Soviet troops on their frontier. During the time that I was there and because of the increased influence of the pragmatic group in China, there was a great transformation in Chinese understanding of the outside world and the Western world in particular. Some of this stemmed from their decision to establish diplomatic relations with the United States, and when they did that people like Harold Brown, the US Secretary of Defence, began to draw the Chinese into

dialogue on international strategic questions. I think it is true that up until that time the Chinese had thought in rather revolutionary terms about international warfare and the balance of power, and I think that they were very much intrigued by the conversations which they began to have with the Americans and the vocabulary and the information that was supplied. We had a visit fairly early on, I'm not sure whether it was perhaps 1978, of the National Defence College of Canada to Beijing. The senior military man Mr. Wu Xinchuan, who was, I guess, a Vice Minister of Defence or something like that, talked at length to the Commandant, Deputy Commandant and myself about their conflict with the Soviets and what was their idea of the nature of the Soviet threat and the logistics of a war if it should break out. But all that was, I think, part of a growing realization that China had to play a role on the world scene as well as just within the region. And as the People's Liberation Army, the military, represented perhaps one third of the total administrative structure, infrastructure of China, this was a pretty important group. The leadership was made up largely of old men who had been involved in the Long March and the revolutionary wars, who had a great deal of practical experience of moving tens of thousands of foot soldiers around the countryside in China but very little real knowledge of the high technology of modern warfare. And to see the changes which have taken place in China over the last decade since the death of Chairman Mao and the emergence of the new leadership is a very important thing, and I've always been a very strong advocate of educating the Chinese or giving them the opportunity to educate themselves as to what the real world outside is all about in military and strategic terms. going? Well it's pretty hard to be too clear. Certainly the fact that the Chinese took a whack at the Vietnamese indicates that there is always the potential for the use of military force when they reach the stage where they have that capability. I think a number of the governments in South East Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia to some extent and others are a little worried about the eventual military posture of China and that is a risk which one can't write off. On the other hand, my own view is that the Chinese have an enormous job of economic re-construction and their big trade, which they depend on, is with the advanced industrial countries, and so it will be seen by them to be in their interests to trade effectively with the industrialized countries who are able to offer them bigger markets. I, therefore, think that there are certainly going to be inducements for the Chinese to play a peaceful role in the future. There's no doubt that China serves as a real balance to the Soviet Union in the Far East, and I would hope that eventually the Soviet Union would see advantages to itself in adopting a less military posture in the Pacific, and becoming more commercially oriented in terms of exporting some of their products of Siberia to Japan even if that competes with raw material exports from Canada.

[HILL] What about Japan, too. That's the other big country in that area, still growing at a great rate. One wonders where that is all going to end. Are they going to emerge as another major superpower?

[MENZIES] To go back to the Soviet Union, it is my view that the build up of Soviet forces in the Pacific is of concern to NATO. It's a very important factor for both the United States and for Canada, and of course to our allies like Australia and New Zealand, even though they're very far away from where the Soviets are. But think of all the shipping that moves across the Pacific, the North Pacific from Japan to Canadian ports, a hundred Chinese ships a year in Vancouver, and I don't know, fifty or sixty in Prince Rupert, many more Japanese ships coming in, many Soviet ships coming to pick up wheat and so on. All of that. If you had a crisis in the Atlantic it would immediately affect the stability in the Pacific, and therefore an alert of NATO forces in Europe would be reflected immediately in increased tension in the Pacific region.

The Japanese position I regard as very, very important from a technological point of view. They're the cutting edge of the computer revolution in the world. In my view, Japan and the

United States are quite a few years ahead of the European countries, in terms of that technology, and the European countries a good deal ahead of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The technological revolution that is going on right now, in terms of control of industrial production by computers, this will mean that Japan is going to play a really important role in the world. It is after all one of the group of seven industrialized powers. I think that through its economic and technological strength it can play just as important a part in the world as if it had large armed forces. I would certainly support those who would like to see the Japanese able to defend more of their sea lanes, at least out to 1000 kilometers from their shores, which they are not able to do yet but will gradually build up a modest capability. However, reflecting on Japanese militarism of the past and the attitudes of the Chinese and the South East Asian countries, one doesn't want to see Japan remilitarize much faster than it is doing now, and I think the aversion of many Japanese to war is a healthy thing for the country. I doubt that the Japanese will want to ally themselves much or involve themselves much more than they are now in the next decade in actual military planning arrangements rather than their security agreement with the United States. We do a little, we do an annual exercise, the RIMPAL exercise, out of Hawaii, with Australian and American and Japanese vessels. We used to have the New Zealanders till Mr. Lange blotted his copybook with the Americans.

[HILL] The second main question I have is this: when you were in China, returning to China and coming from NATO - and you mentioned that this gave you "face" in China - but going back to China and immersing yourself in Chinese affairs for a while, how then did you view NATO's role in world affairs? I mean, looked at from Beijing, say about half way through your term there, did you see NATO still as having a key role to play in world affairs?

[MENZIES] Very definitely. I think that view was held by the NATO ambassadors who met in Beijing, though that was not a formal grouping because there were other countries like Australia and New Zealand with whom we maintain very close contact in the Western group of embassies, and with the Japanese there in terms of evaluating what was going on in China. It's the practice of governments in their diplomatic services to repeat telex messages to important embassies abroad, and we got copies of quite a lot of the reports out of the Canadian NATO delegation which helped us to fit China into a world picture, rather than to see it as just a regional power. And we were expected annually to produce there papers for the NATO delegation, and there were reviews of "where is China going?" in NATO and discussions. There was a reinforced Council meeting with a subject such as that and I had to sit down on a weekend and scratch my head to try to think up some profound observations to make on "where is China going?" in geo-strategic terms, and about its relations with the Soviet Union and other countries; so that NATO continues to provide a piece of the framework for all of our missions that are dealing with world-wide geo-strategic questions.

Part VI - Ambassador for Disarmament, 1980-82

[HILL] The last part of the interview is Part Six, when you were Ambassador for Disarmament, from 1980 to 1982. Here again, it's a very large subject, and we could do a complete tape on that I'm sure. It must have been in many ways a fascinating period. It's a very unusual kind of job in some ways for someone who's been involved in the international diplomatic scene, because as Ambassador for Disarmament, you also have to deal very much with the public. This was the time of the rise of the peace movement, and of rising concern in Canada about cruise missiles testing, the unclear freeze issue, no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and that kind of thing, heading towards the UN's Second Special Session on Disarmament. As Ambassador, I believe, you would have been very much involved in work done in the UN in New York. You were representing the government before parliamentary committees. You had a lot of speaking to do across the country in church

basements and so on. Do you have any general reflections about that period, about the role of Canada's own interests in peace and security, and the interests of the Canadian public in international peace and security? And what part do you think NATO plays in this respect?

[MENZIES] Well, I haven't really thought out an answer to that question. I certainly got a liberal education in the two and a half years that I served as the first Ambassador for Disarmament, in terms of relations with the advocacy groups in Canada. Now these are not unique to disarmament. There are advocacy groups on the environment, on native affairs, on women's issues, on all sorts of subjects; but on the whole it is a relatively new phenomenon for senior public servants to become involved on a day to day basis with large groups of people who are emotionally involved in the backing of the peace movement. I learned a lot in the process, and I guess I became a more humble person in the process because it was the desire of the government to enable all Canadians to have an opportunity to express themselves on this subject. We also made quite an effort to get some balance in the thinking of people who were peace advocates or disarmament advocates by having academics to speak with the different groups, to get retired Canadian forces officers to meet with them and to get some dialogue between the different groups who were part of the Canadian mosaic as we call it, the political mosaic in this case. We also needed to develop a lot of information of a Canadian kind rather than being dependent upon literature produced in the United States for the United States groups. I found that my NATO background was of considerable assistance to me in recognizing what were the real international issues involved in disarmament, and what was involved in negotiating a chemical weapons agreement, or a biological weapons agreement or what was involved in an agreement following SALT I, SALT II and so on. And in terms of the international negotiations between the Americans and the Soviets or the Disarmament Committee meetings in Geneva or the MBFR talks or other discussions of that kind, the NATO background gave me a solid technical knowledge of the subject matter. But it wasn't of great assistance in dealing with the advocacy groups here in Canada. It was of assistance in putting up submissions to Cabinet about what directions Canadian delegations should take at different international conferences on disarmament, and I also found that it was helpful when I went to meet my opposite numbers in NATO countries. I made an annual visit to London and Paris and Bonn and The Hague and so on to be able to look at the problems as they saw them in the development of disarmament positions on a series of different things, and I succeeded to the position of Chairman of what was called the Barton Group in the United Nations in New York. This was a committee made up of NATO representatives plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Ireland, because Ireland was a member of the EEC, and we met regularly to discuss policies and issues and Canada was the permanent chairman of this group and it was our job to farm out studies to be made and so on. The NATO connection really meant that there was some pretty frank talk about which part of this was real disarmament and which part was window dressing, which resolutions were put in by whom for what, for the benefit of different public opinion groups and posturing and so on. experience at NATO, I think, was very helpful in that regard.

[HILL] And would you see NATO as being an important vehicle for the pursuit of international peace and security, particularly in the area of arms control and disarmament?

[MENZIES] Oh yes, definitely. I think it gives the member governments status vis-à-vis the major players. For example, I, as Ambassador for Disarmament, invited Victor Karpov, the principal Soviet negotiator on nuclear weapons with the United States, to come to Ottawa, and we had a day and a half of very good discussions and I was the host at that. If I'd stayed in the job, probably at another time I would have been invited to go to the Soviet Union. I think that Mr. Karpov and the Soviet ambassador at the time and his staff and those who accompanied him were aware that Canada was knowledgeable in this field, not just as a United Nations member but as a

member of the NATO Alliance, that we were involved in the MBFR talks, that we were involved in the intermediate nuclear force talks in Europe and I think that our position was enhanced because of our membership in NATO. I don't mean by that in any way to play down the potential role of Sweden or Austria or Finland who also made their contributions to disarmament and peacekeeping operations. But I think that we command respect as a member of NATO this enhances and our credentials for taking a serious part in serious negotiations on disarmament, not those that are perhaps concerned with ideal but rather with real situations.

[HILL] You would not then agree with the viewpoint that suggests that if Canada was to adopt a position of neutrality, then that would enhance Canada's moral standing in the world and put it in a better position to urge disarmament on others.

[MENZIES] No, I wouldn't. I think that in the real world of power, which I suspect is going to be with us for a long time, we, in our peculiar position, is one that we have no real option but to be a member of a regional security organization. I don't think we could operate an integrated economy with the United States if we opted out militarily. It would take us twenty-five years to detach ourselves and our standard of living would go down a great deal in the process if we were to opt out of the Alliance arrangements which we have.

[HILL] Well, thank you very much. I believe that brings us to the end of this interview.

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JOHN HALSTEAD

[HILL]¹² Good morning. Our guest today is Ambassador John Halstead, former Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and to NATO, and former Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and Acting Under-Secretary. Ambassador Halstead, I am delighted that you could be with us this morning, and we are very pleased that you were willing to participate in this project.

[HALSTEAD] I'm very happy myself to contribute to it.

[HILL] As you know, this project is an oral history of Canadian policy in NATO. We are examining the development of Canadian foreign policy since 1945, with particular reference to Canada's contributions to the work of NATO, to Canada's pursuit of its own direct national interests within NATO and to the utility of NATO in helping Canada to pursue some of its broader foreign policy goals, with respect notably to the enhancement of international peace and security. We are looking at the formulation of Canadian foreign policy in Ottawa, at the work carried out in NATO Headquarters in Brussels, at relations among the Western allies, and at the evolving role of NATO in world affairs. So, in your own case, I would like to focus on your years of service as Acting Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretary between 1974 and 1975, as Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from 1975 to 1980, and as Ambassador to NATO from 1980 to 1982. However, I would also like to ask one or two questions about other phases of your career, for example about the years prior to your appointment as Deputy Under-Secretary in 1974.

[HALSTEAD] Well, I'll be very happy to respond to any questions you have on these various periods of my career.

Part I - Early Years, to 1946

[HILL] Ambassador Halstead, you were born in Vancouver and educated there, partly at the University of British Columbia, before joining the Royal Canadian Navy during the war. You served in the Canadian Navy from 1943 to 1946, with the rank of Lieutenant. I wonder if you could tell us something about those early years in British Columbia and then in the Navy, especially about how they affected your views on international peace and security.

[HALSTEAD] Well, I remember my early years in British Columbia and in Vancouver with a great deal of affection and nostalgia. It was, from my point of view, an almost perfect environment for a youngster to grow up in. There were wonderful opportunities for recreation and, perhaps more important than that, from my perhaps very limited perspective, it appeared to be an almost classless and raceless society, and socially a very mobile one. I remember in public school and in junior high school I had classmates of every conceivable racial origin, and yet never once during all those years was any remark made about their race. In fact, it wasn't till years afterwards that I realized from their names that they were from Japan or China or Lebanon or Italy or wherever it might be. That never entered into the relationships we had. People were judged very much on what they were, rather than on who they were, which was an almost idyllic sort of situation. It was a very British sort of atmosphere in the sense of political ideas and democratic values and the rule of law. My own parents were both of English origin. I guess it was inevitable in that sort of environment that we grew up with very little sense of Canadian identity. I mean, I remember being

¹² Interviewers: Hill, Pawelek. Interview dates: 3/6/87 and 5/6/87.

aware that we were part of the British Empire and then the British Commonwealth and then the Commonwealth. But Canada as a political entity, or even a political idea, was not very prominent, and we were taught very little in the schools about Canada. I think we had in the whole of my pre-university education maybe six months on Canadian history, and another six months on American history, and for the rest it was about Europe and classical history and so on. Combined with that was the isolation in which we grew up, the isolation from the rest of Canada; the Rocky Mountains were in those days quite a physical barrier - since the development of air travel of course, that has disappeared as a physical barrier, - but it was also a psychological barrier and I'm struck every time I go back there that the psychological isolation remains to some extent. We really did grow up in a world of our own which was not an integral part of Canada. Canada was over there somewhere, east of us, and we were British Columbia and the British was very pronounced in that name. I would also say, however, that although there was little sense of Canadian identity, and I'm talking very personally now, there was a very real sense of differentiation from the Americans. Bellingham and Seattle were the closest towns in the United States and of course even in those days there was a lot of traffic back and forth. Every time we went down there I was very struck with the different atmosphere. That differentiation was very clear, but the other was very vague, and I think perhaps the very strong sense of identity and even of nationalism I have now, may be a result of a kind of delayed reaction to that lack of identity in those days. I went to U.B.C., as you have noted. I took modern languages there, which meant, in practice, French and German, because that is all they taught. I studied modern languages because languages have always fascinated me and they're still a hobby with me. I didn't have much of an idea of what kind of a career I might have. An example of the isolation I spoke of is the fact that I didn't even know there was a foreign service in Canada. Nobody at any time ever mentioned the fact that there was a Canadian diplomatic service. Of course there were only, I think, about forty officers, but their very existence was totally unknown to me and so that idea never entered my head. I thought vaguely I might become a teacher. My own father was a high school teacher, though not in So vaguely I thought I might become a teacher, but really I gave no serious consideration to my career because it was already clear when I prepared to go to university in 1939, that we were going to war. So I knew that I would be lucky if I could finish my university career and that if the war was still on then I would go straight into the services. My goal was to get into the navy. I don't quite know why, I suppose because I grew up in a port city and boats and ships always fascinated me and I did a fair amount of travelling. I travelled to England three times before the war, in the 20's and 30's, with my parents. I went around the world once in 1933. I also went to England in the summer of 1939 with an organization that brought Commonwealth students to Britain. With the light of hindsight I can see that the idea was to encourage support for the Commonwealth in the sense of Commonwealth solidarity. I was just finishing high school at that time, and as part of this tour we went both to France and to England. In France we toured the battlefields of the First World War and in England we visited various defence establishments and went on a battleship from Portsmouth up to Scapa Flow. It happened to be the Royal Oak, which was one of the first battleships sunk during the war. So those were fascinating days, because everybody knew the war was coming and yet nobody seemed to be able to do anything about it, a kind of Greek tragedy atmosphere about in that summer of 1939. Of course, to look at those acres on acres of crosses in Flanders and to think that this was going to happen again made a very deep impression on me.

So in 1943, the day after my graduation from U.B.C., I enlisted in the navy, not the Royal Canadian Navy because that was a permanent force, but the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, the so-called Wavy Navy. And because of my study of German I was taken into Naval Intelligence. I served the first couple of years in Ottawa with Naval Intelligence here. I got once to go on a four-stack destroyer out of Halifax with a group of U-Boat prisoners who had been taken

shortly before, and I interrogated them between Halifax and Boston, where they were put off for their trip to a prisoner of war camp in the United States. Then I went to England and spent most of the last year of the war interrogating U-Boat prisoners in England in an Allied Interrogation Centre. This was a very challenging experience for me, because I'd always been rather shy and always had difficulty articulating my thoughts and this forced me to do things that were very unnatural. Because it was a real battle of wits you see; I mean it was a one-on-one situation with each prisoner of war and of course I had to do it in German and it took a tremendous amount of work to get my German up to speed here in Canada before I went over there. But then it was a battle of wits with each prisoner to persuade him really to tell you what he knew but wasn't supposed to tell you. On each U-Boat that we sunk we compiled a volume a quarter of an inch thick with the whole history of that U-Boat, from the time the keel was laid to the time it was sunk, a complete story, all its armaments, all its equipment, all its crew, where it went, what it did.

[HILL] Was there any particular lesson you drew from all this, I mean the U-Boat crews had the reputation of being very hard-headed?

[HALSTEAD] Yes, and so they were. I mean, they were the élite of all the Nazi forces and they were all volunteers, right to the end of the war. Although towards the end it was almost a suicide mission, and of course they resorted to all kinds of unconventional kinds of U-Boats - one-man U-Boats, and this kind of thing, which were totally suicide missions. And yet these people volunteered right up to the end and they were hard-bitten Nazis. So, yes, one thing I learned was what made these people tick and what Nazi ideology was all about. That was a very useful lesson, because it taught me about the political motivation behind war. Whereas those chaps who were fighting the war in the fields or on ships might or might not ever have any human contact with the enemy, I had the closest possible contact, not only with the man but with what was going on in his head, because that's what I had to deal with in order to "break" him, "break" him in the sense of persuading him, as I say, to either tell me things that would be useful to us or even, as we were able to do in some cases, to persuade him to collaborate.

[HILL] It would be interesting to put some of those thoughts down in terms of the psychological bases of war.

[HALSTEAD] Well, I have thought that it could be. Certainly it gave me a tremendous insight into the political motivation of war. After that period in England I was part of one of the first teams - I think it was the first intelligence team - to go from England to Germany. We flew in an old Dakota from Gatwick to Flensburg, on the border with Denmark, and that was where, if you'll remember, at the end of the war, the whole of the Nazi High Command was bottled up, including Admiral Dönitz, who had become the new Führer after Hitler had committed suicide. The whole of the High Command was bottled up there and what was left of the German forces were in that neck of Schleswig on the border with Denmark. We landed there; we had no idea what kind of reception we would get, you know, we didn't know whether the Germans were in a kamikaze mood or what. In fact, once the order had gone out from the Führer to lay down their arms, the Germans all obeyed; they were used to obeying and thank God they did. So I participated, first of all, in Flensburg, in the operation that was designed to clear the mine fields - to find out where they were, we interrogated the German High Command - and to bring in the U-Boats which were all over hell's half acre, make sure they came in and surrendered. And then after that I went south to Kiel, I saw that city 99% destroyed. We could only drive in along the streets that were cleared through the rubble, and the people were walking on those streets as if they were shell-shocked. Where they lived I don't know, they came out of their cellars somehow. I participated in the hunt for war criminals. This was a new kind of operation for me, I had never done that before, it was a kind

of detective game. I remember chasing one suspected war criminal on to a barge in the middle of a little-known harbour on the West Coast of Schleswig. I should explain that I was attached to the Royal Navy at this time; Canada was not operating a programme like this on its own. I mean this interrogation in England was for the Royal Navy and these operations in Germany were for the Royal Navy. I was then engaged in an exercise to find German engineers who had been working on secret weapons, including rockets. One of these enterprises (the Walther Works) was in fact in Kiel and they had developed rockets fueled by hydrogen peroxide and we wanted to find the people who had done this and they had scattered of course at the end of the war. This took me all over the three western occupied zones of Germany and even into Berlin. I remember tracing one of these fellows down to a mountain hut on the border with Austria, down in an area called the Allgäu, in southern Germany, and boy, was he surprised to see an Allied Naval officer knock on his door!

I'll just mention one amusing incident because it does have some political significance. In Berlin, at the time I was there, there were no restrictions as between the various sectors. You could go through all the sectors, including the Soviet sector, and I went to see the Reichskanzlerei when it was still there, Hitler's official office, and I went in to the reception hall, the enormous, impressive reception hall, where Hitler had received visiting Heads of State. It was a drizzly day, and rain was dripping through the ceiling which had been damaged of course during the battle for Berlin. The original curtains were on the walls hanging in tatters, there was rubble on the marble floor and the remains of the desk and so on, at the end of the room, were still there. There was only one other person in the room in that enormous reception hall. You know who he was? He was a short, slant-eyed Soviet soldier from Central Asia, huddled over a charcoal brazier in the corner. There you had it in one vignette: the conqueror and the conquered; and it is a scene that will always be in my memory. I might say also in that connection, because it made a tremendous impression on me, I had nine months in Germany from May shortly after the end of the war, the capitulation, to Christmas. One thing that seared itself in my memory, well two things I guess, the enormous physical destruction of the cities: Kiel just a pile of rubble because it had been destroyed by high explosive bombs, Hamburg a cemetery of burnt-out buildings, because Hamburg had been destroyed by incendiary bombs; and every other city of any size at all between 50 and 90% destroyed. But beyond that it was the human tragedy of war, in the form of the refugees. Every road, every highway in Germany in those first few months after the end of the war, was filled with people moving somewhere. The fortunate ones were on horseback, practically nobody had cars; I mean all the cars were taken over, so most of the people were on foot; again the fortunate ones had baby carriages or a child's wagon or something to carry their personal belongings, the others toted them on their backs. This went on for months, this enormous movement of people across the face of Germany. So I had a very deeply impressed idea of what war meant, not just to the soldiers, but to the whole population. And when I came back to Canada, in the early months of 1946, I came back for about six months again to Naval Headquarters, and I was given the job by the then Director of Naval Intelligence in Ottawa, I think a very imaginative idea, to go out and visit the prisoner of war camps in Canada. I went out first on Christmas leave to Vancouver and then on my way back, by train of course, I stopped off at about half a dozen prisoner of war camps across the country, starting with one, I remember, in an idyllic situation in the Rocky Mountains, a place called Seebee, somewhere in the neighborhood of Banff or Lake Louise, which housed the hardest bitten senior Nazi officers of all three services. And that's where I started, and that was really a shaking experience. These prisoners were convoked to this meeting. They sat there ramrod in front of me in seried rows, and I was introduced, and I then began my story of what I had seen in Germany. And they could not believe it, they did not want to believe, they couldn't believe. I mean they had been away, they hadn't seen Germany, some of them, for most of the war. And they were mumbling, and when I finished, the commandant asked if there were any questions. Not a peep. Nobody would lend credence to my story by asking any questions, and they stood up as if they were on drill on the parade ground and marched off. But I heard later that that had made a tremendous impression on them. I spoke in German, of course; of all the camps - that was the hardest. In all the others they were more than willing to hear and ask; they all wanted to know what their own home town looked like and so on. I think it was a very sobering experience for them because, of course, I wove into this factual account implications - you know, you see what a certain policy has done, has created and so on, and where violence leads. And I guess the overwhelming impression I took from this war experience into my subsequent career was that wars are politically motivated, above all, and that general war must not be allowed to happen again. I guess those are thoughts that I have kept with me throughout my career.

Part II - Rising career, 1946-74

HILL] Ambassador Halstead, after the war, I believe you attended the London School of Economics and obtained a B.Sc.(Econ.) there in 1950. I believe after that, at some point, you joined the Department of External Affairs and then in your career rose through the ranks in a range of positions. I wonder if you could tell us something about your career, in that period of almost twenty-five years. Where did you serve, how much of your work was related to NATO in one way or another, and what lessons would you draw from those years regarding Canada's contributions to, and interest in, NATO?

[HALSTEAD] Well, I should explain first, perhaps, that I did join the Department of External Affairs in 1946, on July 1, the day after I was demobilized. I joined the Department of External Affairs as a result of really an accident or a coincidence. You'll remember that, in speaking of my time in Vancouver, I mentioned that I didn't even know that there was a Department of External Affairs. Well, I didn't learn that there was one until I came to Ottawa during the war in the navy. And during my time in Ottawa I met two officers of External Affairs, who really were instrumental in persuading me to join the Department - not that they tried, but that was the effect on me. Those two officers were George Ignatieff and John Holmes. I saw a fair amount of them because we had mutual friends; they knew colleagues of mine in the navy and that's how I first met them. It was as a result of listening to them tell about their work in the Department, and the things they did, and the people they worked with, and so on, that the idea first formed in my mind that this might be an interesting and indeed a rewarding sort of career. Well, I didn't do anything about it at that time, but at the end of the war, when I was in Germany, I got a circular that had been sent out from the Canadian Forces Headquarters in London, to all Canadian officers, informing them that the Department of External Affairs was holding an examination, and that anybody who had a university degree was eligible to sit for this examination, and should do so, if he was interested in joining External Affairs. So I jumped at this opportunity and replied positively, and in due course I was informed that there would be an examination, held in Brussels, for all Canadian officers serving on the Continent. So on the appointed day, I think it was sometime in July 1945, I went to Brussels and I reported to the Canadian Embassy, only fairly recently re-established, well I suppose the year before, re-established in Brussels. I wrote the examination under the supervision of the Third Secretary of the Canadian Embassy in Brussels. And what impressed me most, at that moment, about the Third Secretary of the Canadian Embassy in Brussels, was that he wore striped pants and a black jacket, and I thought this was really something for an examination. You know who that officer was? Marcel Cadieux! So that was my first meeting with Marcel Cadieux. Well, in due course, I heard that I had passed the written examination successfully and I was convoked to London to an oral interview. One of the people on that oral interview board was Charles Ritchie, who was then serving in London, and again in due course I heard that I had been accepted, tentatively, and that they would like to have another interview with me in Ottawa when I got back, so in due course I was accepted, and as I say I joined the Department in July 1946. I served in

Ottawa in something called the First Political Division of the Department, which was responsible for two things: one was the post-war settlements with the Axis powers; and the other was post-war planning and particularly the United Nations. And there were two officers in that division under Charles Ritchie: one was Jake Warren and the other was myself; Jake did the post-war settlements and I did the United Nations. My first job in the very first months of that summer of 1946 was to prepare the commentary for the second half of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly - the commentary, mind you! Nowadays, you know, hundreds of officers contribute to this; they threw this at me as my first job. Anyway, I had a very interesting first year doing United Nations work, but in the course of this year I realized that I wouldn't get anywhere in External Affairs if I didn't have some economics training. And so, at the end of the first year, I went to the then personnel Administrative Officer, Don Matthews, and explained this to him and told him I had an educational credit from the Forces and that I would like to use it if he would give me a leave of absence. He very kindly, and I think, intelligently, did so. So I was the first officer in External Affairs to take educational leave. My one idea was to go to L.S.E. (the London School of Economics), because that had the reputation of providing the best economics training you could get. So in the summer of 1947 I went to London, and I hadn't any idea what I was going to do except that I wanted to study economics. After talking at length with the supervisors there, I came to the conclusion the best thing I could do was try for the B.Sc., although I had only one year's leave of absence and of course a B.Sc. takes three years. I thought at least I'll start. So in that first year I did a year and a half towards a B.Sc., and I then went back to the Department and said: "Look, I've done a year and a half in one year. Would you give me another year and let me finish it?" And they came back and said, "No, we can't do that"; we can't spare you for another year, but what we will do if you are serious about this is post you to Canada House in London and you can finish your degree in the evenings." So I wasn't going to let them call my bluff, I felt I had to go on with this. So I accepted their offer and from the summer of 1948 to the beginning of 1952. I was posted to Canada House in London, and from 1948 to 1950 in two years I finished the B.Sc. in the evenings. I must say I think I worked harder during those two years, than I ever have before or since, but I felt it was worth it.

What L.S.E. did for me, which I now think is what every university should do, but too few in fact do, is it taught me how to think. That may sound like a funny thing to say, but I think too many universities are intent on stuffing students with information. Information you can get anywhere, you can absorb anywhere. But learning how to think, learning how to analyze, learning how to synthesize, learning how to ask the right questions, and judge the answers accurately, is an invaluable tool, and that's something that L.S.E. did admirably well.

[HILL] I think the thing that I got out of it was exposure to a much broader world than I'd previously experienced. Of course you'd been in Germany and all that. You rub shoulders with people from all over the world, which gives you a wider range of perspective.

[HALSTEAD] I certainly gained enormously from that as well. I took economic history, which I think is an ideal way of learning economics without having to get into the nitty gritty of advanced economic theory, and it throws a totally new light on history, which is complementary to the usual political history one studies. I would highly recommend it for anybody who wants to deal with what is in fact usually the political economy of a country or indeed of the world. So in 1952 I came back to Ottawa and stayed in the Department from 1952 to 1955. I was at the NATO desk there, so that was my first introduction in fact to NATO. That is how my connection with NATO began, and I have calculated that out of the thirty-six years I spent in External Affairs, I was dealing either directly or indirectly with NATO Affairs for about fourteen of those, including those first three years at the NATO desk. In that job I went to all the NATO Ministerial meetings, between 1952

and 1955, except for the one meeting in Lisbon, unfortunately that is the one I missed. But I went to all the others and got an enormous insight into the working of NATO at those meetings. I also went to a meeting that was of crucial importance to NATO, that is very little remembered these days, and that is the Twelve Power Conference in London in 1954. That was, as you may recall, the conference called by Anthony Eden after the failure of the European Defence Community, (the E.D.C.), when it was defeated in the French parliament. That was the conference that successfully negotiated both the establishment of the Western European Union, which exists still today, as you know, and the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO, and of course at the same time German rearmament; those were the three things that were tied up together. And that Twelve Power Conference was fascinating to someone like myself because it was the first time that I had ever seen heads of government actually negotiate around a table. Usually, you know, heads of government meetings are formal affairs where they ratify what has been negotiated by officials. Well, of course, officials had been negotiating, but because of the time frame in which this was held, the urgency of getting results and the delicacy of the questions under negotiation, it was in fact only the heads of government that could finally put this to bed. There was Adenauer, the Chancellor of West Germany, and there was Mendès-France, the Prime Minister of France, and they were negotiating across this table in Lancaster House. That was a fascinating insight into diplomacy at work and a very successful conference, due largely to Anthony Eden, who played a masterful mediating role there between France and Germany. Dulles was also there, and of course the Canadian representative was Mike Pearson, and that also gave me a very interesting insight into the way Mike Pearson thought and operated.

[HILL] The whole question of German rearmament was of course a major issue for all of NATO in this period. I take it there were no real reservations in Canada about this process?

[HALSTEAD] I think there were. I think there were reservations almost everywhere except in the United States about this process, and in fact the pressure for German rearmament came from the United States, because Washington had decided that the European allies were not going to be able to produce the conventional forces that the American military thought were necessary to meet the Soviet threat. Of course that Soviet threat had been re-evaluated upward in light of the Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia and the invasion of South Korea. So it was those two events that led Washington to re-evaluate the Soviet military threat because, as you will recall, NATO was originally created not so much to meet a military threat from the Soviets, as to meet the threat of ideological influence and internal subversion. This comes out very clearly if you read the articles of the time, particularly things like George Kennan's article which is forty years old now. So it was the Americans who then decided, in 1951-1952, that NATO needed to counter a potential military threat of a much greater order than they had previously calculated and that they could do this only if they could re-arm Germany. If you read again the literature of the period, very prominent in American thinking at that time was their memories of the Second World War when the German soldier became fabled for his ability to stand up to tanks, as it was put in one piece that I read, - he's the only soldier that you can rely on to fire at an advancing tank until it's only one hundred meters away, or something like that. So this kind of thinking was dominant in the idea that Germany would have to be re-armed and that is really what triggered all this. But, I think there were very serious reservations about the wisdom of going that route.

[HILL] I think I used the word wrongly, I think what I meant was that, as far as Canada was concerned, it was more or less something that had to be done, given the fact that the Americans were in favour.

[HALSTEAD] In that respect, I think we were on all fours with the rest of the allies. I mean everybody realized that something had to be done to respond to this pressure for German re-armament, and the preoccupation was to see that there were sufficient safeguards to avoid it boomeranging. Okay, well then in 1955 the personnel people in External Affairs decided that I ought to have a change of scene, and I went to Tokyo for a three year stint, which I must say I enjoyed enormously, as did my wife. I was married in 1953, so that was the first post abroad that I went to with my wife. I guess the most important aspect of that posting for me was to give me an insight into a culture and a society, and a civilization, indeed, that was totally different from anything I had been exposed to before. It was based on assumptions and premises that were almost the opposite of the assumptions I had always taken for granted. And so it was enormously stimulating, because there is nothing like exposure to something totally different to make you look again at your own assumptions. And here was a society, as I say, based on premises that were almost the opposite of ours and yet seemed to work extraordinarily well and has proved since then to be absolutely remarkable. The great irony is that we have in the West an ethic which is supposed to put the emphasis on the worth of the individual. We have in Japan an ethic that puts the emphasis on the worth of the community, whether it be the family, the clan or the larger community, right. Yet in practice what the Japanese have done with their economic miracle is to build on the worth of the individual. And where the West has fallen behind economically, it has tried to treat individual workers like cogs in machines. I find that an enormous irony. Anyway, it was a fascinating time in Tokyo because it was a transition period between the American occupation and Japanese independence. You could see the first seeds of their independent thinking; they were still rebuilding Japan, I mean there were still signs of the war-time destruction and even more signs of psychological remnants from the occupation. It took the Japanese a long time to emerge from this occupation dependency but the signs were there and it was fascinating.

[HILL] Did that tour give you cause to reflect in any way about the role of NATO in world affairs and Canada's participation in NATO? You were able to look at it from another angle there, did it seem as relevant as it must have seen when you were on the NATO desk?

[HALSTEAD] No, it didn't. Of course I was exposed there, and I should have mentioned this perhaps, to the aftermath of the Korean War. The Korean War was over by that time, just; but we were accredited in Tokyo to Seoul as well, and then we didn't yet have an embassy, in South Korea. And on one occasion when I went over to cover Korea, so to say, with one of the periodic visits, I went up to Panmunjom and saw the armistice line and all that bit. But I think I have to say that the connection with NATO was very tenuous if at all - it seemed like another world. My impression was really of another world with which the West would have one day to come to terms, rather than anything that seemed to have a connection with the European - North Atlantic world that I had been dealing with before. Well, then, in 1958 I went from Tokyo to New York to serve three years at the United Nations and I re-joined Charles Ritchie there; on that occasion he was the Ambassador to the United Nations and I went as his Deputy. That was of course a fascinating exposure to still another world, which I had had some exposure to in my very first year in the Department, but which had grown of course since then. The multi-lateral diplomacy that one was engaged in at the United Nations was a most interesting experience. I must say I think three years was probably enough there, because it tended to be repetitive. One General Assembly was very much like another; some of the subjects changed, but an enormous number did not, because they went on from one assembly to the other; the items were put automatically on the agenda from one assembly to another. But there were also some unique events. For example, within a couple of months of my arrival in New York - and I should mention that the first two of my three years in New York were when Canada was on the Security Council, so it was particularly active, and particularly interesting, - and within a couple of months of my arrival in New York there was the

first Lebanese crisis, which people nowadays may no longer remember because we have had so many Lebanese crises since then. But that was the first overt conflict between the two communities, the Christian community and the Muslim community, in Lebanon, caused by the machinations of the Arab states which had destabilized the situation in Lebanon. It was really the first sign of that enormous iceberg that we have seen so much of since, and if you remember, it provoked the landing of the U.S. Marines, which was not the most helpful aspect of the U.S. role there, but brought home to me, really, for the first time how - I mean it was the first practical example of U.S. intervention that I had seen, and I was fascinated to see how it had come about - and it revealed to me for the first time how different arms of the U.S. government operate independently, and how difficult it is to coordinate U.S. foreign policy between these various agencies. For example, I learned that the assessment, on which the decision was based, to send U.S. Marines to Lebanon, was contributed not by the U.S. Ambassador in Beirut but by the C.I.A., the local C.I.A. officer. This was the first time I had got a glimpse of this kind of operation and what a difficult problem was posed for the allies of the United States when action of this kind was taken unilaterally, and so on. And then before I left New York we had to deal with the Congo crisis, which was a very severe crisis not only for the Congo but for the United Nations and more particularly for Dag Hammerskjöld as Secretary General of the United Nations. He in fact died in a plane crash about a month after I left New York. So that was an interesting experience at the United Nations. I said earlier that I thought three years was about enough; my reason for saying that is that there is an inevitable tendency, when you work in that sort of, rather hot house atmosphere, to begin mistaking words for deeds. There is an inevitable tendency to think that when you have passed a resolution or when you have achieved a resolution which may take enormous effort to put together and negotiate, and after this enormous effort, you have such a feeling of success if you get your resolution through, that you may think you have done something; in fact of course you've not done anything at all -I mean those are words on paper - if by doing something you mean actually changing the situation somewhere. That's the great temptation, and that is very difficult to keep in perspective. So I felt that three years was probably about right to be involved in that, but I mean I have maintained my interest in the United Nations. And don't misunderstand me, I agree with people who say that if it wasn't there we'd have to create it; we'd have to invent it, it plays an absolutely invaluable role, but it is necessary to keep it in perspective in order to make the maximum use of its potential. The danger is that we downgrade it; I would submit that mistaking the passing of resolutions for actually achieving something on the spot is downgrading the United Nations, because it is substituting words for deeds and what we constantly need to do in the United Nations is remind everybody that we should be doing things not just saying things.

Well, then, from New York I went to Paris in 1961, this time for five years. That was, needless to say, a very enjoyable post, but also a very difficult one, a very challenging one. At the same time a very rewarding one.

[HILL] You were assigned then to the embassy in Paris.

[HALSTEAD] I was assigned to the Embassy. I went as Minister, in the Embassy, which was the number two position there. There were only three or four of the largest embassies, including Paris, that had Ministers as Deputy Heads of Mission. When I went there Pierre Dupuis was Ambassador. He subsequently went as Commissioner General of Expo in Montreal and he was succeeded by Jules Leger. It was a challenging post, first of all because, although I had studied French at university, and spoken it over the years in Ottawa, it was not up to speed to deal with the Parisians in Paris. And what I very quickly learned - or I mean I knew really before I went there, but it was confirmed in the very first days there - was that unless I could deal with my French colleagues, in the Quai d'Orsay and elsewhere, in their language, on their terms, then I

could never gain the credibility necessary to deal with them on an even footing. So from the very first days in Paris I refused to speak English to any Frenchmen, and they grimaced and they groaned and they tried to persuade me to speak English, which, of course, they spoke fluently. I mean I'm talking now about my colleagues in the Quai. I stubbornly refused and said I am going to learn French and you're just going to have to put up with me. As a result of that, after about a year - and it took about that long to speak French fluently, fluently enough to deal with them on a basis of equality in conversation and in negotiation; I knew I had arrived, incidentally, when I found myself speaking French in my dreams. That is the ultimate test of your ability in a foreign language. But as a result of that I was accepted then even to the extent of being invited into the private homes of French officials, which practically never happened. We were invited, and my wife Jean integrated herself equally into French society. That was where she studied sculpture and had a really very active and fruitful time. To be invited into homes of French officials was the last accolade.

[HALSTEAD] The Paris posting was challenging in another way, too, because this was also the De Gaulle period. When we arrived in Paris the plastique explosions were going off all over the city, and in fact the windows of our apartment were blown in one evening with a plastique that went off just down the street at the door of a Communist publication. So these were the days of the O.A.S., and as you will remember De Gaulle himself was almost assassinated at a place called Petit Clamard, just south of Paris. So they were exciting days, exciting days for De Gaulle, exciting days for France. But they became exciting days for Canada as well, because it was during that period that De Gaulle became convinced that he had a personal role to play in encouraging Quebec to become either autonomous or independent. He became convinced that Canada was not really a state, it was two nations, that English speaking Canada was really part of the Anglo Saxon world, as he used to say, and that only Quebec was representative of the French Canadians and could be representative of the French Canadians. And some day I think I'm going to try to write about this because this story has never been properly told. It's a story of the way an idea and indeed a mission formed in De Gaulle's mind, under the influence of some very shadowy and interesting characters who came to Canada and associated with the Independantistes in Quebec and came back and told the General stories about what was going on here and what could be done. And this, married to the General's inherent tendency to think in terms of France's mission in the world, produced the very deliberate plan, during his visit to Canada during Expo, - that famous visit - to provide the spark to light the torch of Quebec independence.

[HILL] That was deliberate?

[HALSTEAD] That was deliberate. The whole thing was carefully planned down to the last detail long before he set foot on Canadian soil. He landed, note, at the foot of the cliff where Wolfe had landed two centuries before to conquer Quebec. He landed to reconquer Quebec. And the whole thing was planned down to the last detail including the cry from the balcony of the City Hall in Montreal. I think this story should be told. I was at the Canadian Embassy in Paris during all this period. I was there of course when Jules Leger presented his letters of credence, in which he said the famous line to which the General took such severe exception, so severe that he practically ostracized the Canadian Ambassador for the rest of his tour in Paris.

[HILL] What was this famous line?

[HALSTEAD] I can't give you the quote but the sense was that French Canada, while it owed an enormous debt to France for its culture and its language, had its own independent - I don't mean independent in the sense of an independent Quebec, - but had its own path to follow and didn't need

France, or at least that was the way De Gaulle read it and he reacted fiercely to that. That affected the whole of Jules Leger's mission in Paris.

[HILL] Were you involved in any way with any NATO related issues in this period? Of course NATO itself was in Paris.

[HALSTEAD] Yes indeed, I should have mentioned that, it was during my time there that De Gaulle decided to pull out of NATO. And this of course was a direct result of his proposal for a NATO Directoire being rejected. So I was there when the Directoire proposal was put forward, when de Gaulle was trying to work out with Britain and the United States a relationship that would put France into an inner decision-making circle. And when he failed in that, he decided that France would go its own way in defence and he pulled out of NATO, and stayed in the Alliance. He made this distinction between NATO as a military organization and the Alliance as a creature of the North Atlantic Treaty. I was there also during the time when the M.L.F., (the Multi-Lateral Force), was under discussion and negotiation. So there were a lot of NATO related issues which were very active during my time in Paris. Of course I remember vividly the decision to pull out of NATO. It caused a tremendous uproar not only in the Canadian Embassy but in all the NATO Embassies in Paris. It was a decision that affected us not only as members of NATO, it affected us also as a country with troops stationed in France, because we were told to get our troops out of France. We were told to vacate the two airfields in France and the Headquarters. The Headquarters of the air division was in Metz and there were two airfields, Grostenquin was one and Marville was the second; and it was interesting because as NATO desk officer, years before, I had negotiated the agreements with France for those two airfields. So here I was in Paris negotiating their removal from France. We were of course very upset by De Gaulle's decision, but it was clear that he had made up his mind and nothing could be done about it. And it was while I was in Paris that the NATO Headquarters was then moved from Paris to Brussels, although I was not directly involved in that because, of course, our NATO delegation, which was also in Paris at that time, was the one directly affected.

[HILL] Could you say anything about the operations of the Embassy in Paris?

[HALSTEAD] Yes, I might just mention one thing that throws some interesting light on how recent the whole consciousness of bilingualism is in Canada and in the Canadian Public Service. When I went to Paris, in 1961, I found that in the Canadian Embassy there, nothing official was ever written in French. English was used exclusively for all official correspondence, despatches, telegrams between the Embassy in Paris and the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. French was used only in communications with the French Government. Moreover, French was used only in personal communications among French Canadian officers in the Embassy; all staff meetings were held in English, in spite of the fact that more than half the officers there were French Canadian and that we were operating, after all, in France. I found it astonishing, so astonishing that I took the personal initiative of telling my French Canadian colleagues in the Embassy, my fellow officers, that as far as I was concerned they could and should use their own language in memoranda to me and to the Ambassador, and moreover, that I would be prepared to sign and to recommend that the Ambassador sign despatches and telegrams to External Affairs in French. And so in a way I started, single-handedly, in Paris, a programme of bilingualism before it became the official policy of the Canadian Government. I didn't know what the reaction from Ottawa was going to be to this, but I was prepared to take the chance, and as it turned out I calculated correctly, that nobody would have the nerve in Ottawa to object to this fait accompli, because it was so obviously a sensible thing to do. But that shows you, as recently as 1961, how completely unilingual the Canadian Foreign Service was, and little wonder, I have to say, that there was an underlying feeling of resentment and

a feeling of second class citizenship on the part of the French Canadians. So we have made enormous strides since then, in a relatively short time. Well, I thought that might be interesting.

So, from Paris I returned in 1966 to Ottawa to take over as Head of the European Division, which in those days dealt with relations with all of Europe, East and West. And what I found was, of course, that I had to catch my own forward passes then, from Paris. I was dealing from the Ottawa end with all the same issues that I had dealt with in Paris, which was both easy and difficult - easy because I was familiar with these issues, but difficult because they were just as intransigent in Ottawa as they had been in Paris, and more particularly the whole question of the emerging triangle, Ottawa-Quebec-Paris, which De Gaulle's actions were making increasingly difficult to manage. And of course, all this came to a head with De Gaulle's visit to Canada in the summer of 1967, a year after I had returned to Ottawa, his visit to Canada on the occasion of Expo '67 in Montreal. As head of the European Division I had the chief responsibility at the working level for the preparation of this visit, along, of course, with the preparation of all the other visits of European heads of state and government. They were not State visits, but visits of heads of state on the occasion of Expo. That distinction was important, because we were unable, obviously, to give head of state treatment to so many visitors in such a short period. But the one outstanding visit that caused more headaches than all the other ones put together was De Gaulle's. And it was under negotiation for the whole of the time that I was Head of the European Division, I mean for a whole year beforehand, because of course there was increasing evidence during that time that De Gaulle was embracing a philosophy and a view of Canada which was quite inimical to the view and the interests of the Federal Government, in Canada. He was encouraging the advocates of independence in Quebec. He was talking and acting as though the government of Quebec was the only legitimate representative of the French fact and the French speaking population of Canada, and as if the Federal Government was representative only of English speaking Canada, and moreover was but a North American extension of the Anglo Saxon world, which he, of course, blamed for so much of his own problems in getting the sort of recognition he felt was due to France. This goes back to the war years, as you know. He focused on Canada only relatively late in his life, but when he did, he focused on it in a typically De Gaulle manner, full of nostalgia for past French glory, full of the sense of France's mission in the world and full of a dream that an autonomous or independent Quebec would be a jewel in the crown of a world-wide French community. So he planned his visit to Canada in that context, and there was mounting evidence, in the year before that visit, that he had intentions that might be embarrassing, to say the least, and disruptive, to say the most, to Canada. And various attempts were made to find out what he really had in mind; various attempts were made to negotiate a programme that would be consistent with Canadian interests; various attempts were made to restrain and control what appeared to be the intention of both De Gaulle and the Quebec Government to blow this up into something far beyond what Ottawa envisaged. And they were all unsuccessful, these attempts. And so when it came to the day, de Gaulle carried out his well-planned visit, from the time he landed where Wolfe had landed two centuries before to the time he cried from the balcony of the city hall of in Montreal, "Vive le Québec Libre"; it all went, I am convinced, according to his well-laid plans. And I had the honour of drafting the statement by Prime Minister Pearson which branded his behaviour as unacceptable. I produced a draft which Prime Minister Pearson then added to, very much out of his own feelings and his own historic experience. It was Prime Minister Pearson who added the remarks to the effect that it was ironic that's not the word he used, and that's not quite the right thought, but anyway - that it was ironic that de Gaulle should talk about an atmosphere of liberation as he moved through Quebec, when there were Canadians lying in the soil of France who had given their lives for the liberation of France as recently as the Second World War. That was very much Pearson, and came as you can see directly from his personal feelings, but I drafted the main part of the statement, the famous word - "unacceptable", plus the important invitation, the important passage, which assumed that de Gaulle

was still going to come to Ottawa, and said that we hoped that that visit to Ottawa would provide the opportunity for him to obtain a better understanding of this country. That was very important in my view and that importance was accepted by the Prime Minister. It was very important that we not be the one to kick De Gaulle out of Canada. We said his behaviour had been "unacceptable", and that was justified by any criteria, but we also said that he should complete his visit and that we looked forward to the opportunity to correct some of his misimpressions. So it was de Gaulle who took the initiative to curtail the visit, and I am personally convinced that he never intended to come to Ottawa, for the reasons that I suggested, that Ottawa was the capital of a country that, in his vision, had nothing to do with France. But it was de Gaulle who took the initiative to curtail the visit, so the onus was on him. He not only made an unacceptable public statement in Montreal, he also committed a protocol sin, if you want, by slamming the door in the face of his host. So that way the whole onus for the fallout of that incident fell on De Gaulle's shoulders. And he returned, as you may remember, to Paris, to a French public, and indeed to a cabinet, absolutely aghast at what he had done. And the reason for this is very simple - he did it entirely on his own. I am personally convinced that not even Couve de Murville, his Foreign Minister and companion on this trip, knew what he was going to do. However, that has nothing directly to do with NATO, but it does very much have to do with Canada's relationship with France, which passed through an extraordinarily difficult period, with very important domestic repercussions in this country and also with repercussions on our broader relations with Europe. Because it complicated, it clearly complicated, our relations with Europe more generally, complicated our relations with the European Community, where France played such an important role and still does, complicated our relations, our role, in the Alliance, because it made it practically impossible to maintain any sort of constructive relationship with a key member of the Alliance, though no longer a member of the military organization. And it focused public attention, in Canada, in a most negative way, on the whole European-NATO dimension of our foreign policy.

[HILL] So, this is one of the roots of the subsequent decisions on the part of the Federal Government, under Mr. Trudeau, who came in 1967, to cut the troop levels in Europe?

[HALSTEAD] Yes, I think this whole background had a profound, if not entirely acknowledged, impact on the thinking of both the Canadian public and Canadian Ministers. So when the time came under Trudeau to review our place in NATO and our contribution in Europe, instead of there being a predisposition to evaluate that relationship positively, the predisposition was to evaluate it negatively. The predisposition was to say, as a number of Cabinet Ministers did say, "What the hell good does this do us? Europeans aren't interested in us, I mean the Europeans are not acting in accordance with Canadian interests, why should we spend money on their defence, their defence, not our defence?". And I think it substantially coloured the approach to the review of NATO policy. Perhaps, as I say, not consciously.

[HILL] Ambassador Halstead, as you mentioned from 1967 to 1971, you were Director General, I think, of the European Division.

[HALSTEAD] Yes, I think I may have given you the wrong date there, because in fact I took over as Head of the European Division in 1966, when I came back from Paris. 1967 was Centennial year and the year of De Gaulle's visit to Canada. So my period as Head of European Division must have been from 1966 to 1971. And in 1971 I became Assistant Under-Secretary. But it was during my time as Head of the European Division that the Foreign Policy Review took place.

[HILL] Also of course the cuts in Canadian troop levels in Europe.

[HALSTEAD] Indeed! Now, I was very directly and very actively involved in the Foreign Policy Review and the Defence Policy Review. In fact, as part of the Foreign Policy Review, a special task force was set up on Europe which became known as STAFEUR, that is the acronym for the Special Task Force on Europe. And I was appointed Deputy Chairman of that task force. The two Co-Chairmen were Paul Tremblay and Robert Ford, both of whom were Ambassadors abroad, Paul Tremblay in Brussels and Robert Ford in Moscow. So they were out of the country most of the time. They came only for the inauguration of the work of the Task Force, and I think once to review it and that was about all. So in practice I chaired the Task Force, which was the first comprehensive examination of Canada's relations with Europe, East and West. And the Task Force consisted of representatives from all government departments with any interest in relations with Europe. And we went systematically through the whole gammut, both geographically and functionally: geographically, country by country, assessing the relative importance of our relations; and functionally, department by department, field by field, political, economic, trade and so on. And again, we assessed the relative importance of our functional interests in each of these countries. We prepared a considerable report which was confidential and which has remained confidential it has never been published - a report for the Minister, which as I recall the Minister passed on to the Prime Minister and also tabled, I think, in Cabinet. This report in general terms - it was, as I say, a very detailed report, so I couldn't possibly go through it in detail - but the general thrust was that although we had traditionally close and friendly relations, in particular with Britain, and of a rather different nature with France, our relations with the rest of Europe were for the most part relations that were conducted through multi-lateral channels, like NATO, like the United Nations, rather than through bi-lateral channels; and that our specific interests in individual countries had been rather neglected, had never been systematically pursued. And so our general thrust was that we should make a concerted effort to develop, to deepen, to broaden our relations with Europe, both bi-laterally with the various countries with particular priority to those of most importance to us, and multi-laterally with the European Community. And this was to be a parallel effort, the bi-lateral effort and the effort with the European Community. This was to be done not only to serve Canada's functional interests in these countries, political, trade, economic, cultural, scientific and so on, but also as a way of diversifying our relations, and, as some people said, of acting as a counterweight to our relations with the United States. As part of this review, of course, we looked at our defence relations with Europe and in particular at our NATO commitments. And our conclusion was that NATO had served and continued to serve Canadian security interests well, and indeed more general interests, broader political interests, and that we should maintain our membership in NATO and our participation in the defence of Europe. This recommendation of course flew in the face of what, by then, it was becoming clear, was a disposition on the part of the Trudeau Government, to, at the least reduce drastically our NATO commitment in Europe; and indeed to reduce our defence effort generally. And I think it is probably partly for this reason that the report was never released. What happened was, that when it became clear that that report was not going to recommend a radical change in our relationship with NATO, or in our commitment in Europe, the Prime Minister's office took steps to produce another report, and that report was presented to Cabinet and resulted, in fact, in the Government's decision to reduce our forces in Europe by half.

[HILL] This report that you were working on was in 1967-68.

[HALSTEAD] No, 1968-69. That task force was struck very shortly after the election of 1968. And was set up to anticipate the desire of the new Prime Minister to review foreign policy. And Europe was chosen as one of the priority areas of attention, where our NATO commitments were involved.

[HILL] Despite your report, then, in effect the PMO came up with its own report, and they had more political backing.

[HALSTEAD] Of course, I mean this was never said to me directly, but, I assume that our report, the STAFEUR report, did not satisfy the Prime Minister's own desire for radical change, with respect particularly to our participation in NATO. And so he took steps to have something prepared which corresponded more closely to his views.

[HILL] So, in the end, in fact, this paved the way to the force cuts decisions early in 1969.

[HALSTEAD] I might point out that this decision on the reduction of our forces in Europe was taken before the defence policy review, as such, had really been completed. I think it had just barely been put in hand and had not actually been completed; and of course the defence policy white paper didn't come out until 1971, by which time the changes in our defence posture, including particularly those in Europe, were already a *fait accompli*.

[HILL] Could it be argued, on the other hand, that the work that you did and similar work inside External and elsewhere, at least helped keep Canada inside NATO, whereas perhaps there was a disposition initially, on the part of the Prime Minister, to pull out entirely?

[HALSTEAD] Well, I certainly had the impression at the time that all options were under consideration by the Government, literally all options, including neutrality, withdrawal from NATO while staying in NORAD or even withdrawal from both NATO and NORAD. Withdrawal from NATO, reduction of forces in NATO, withdrawal of all Canadian Forces from Europe back to North America - all these options were under consideration. The Prime Minister encouraged people, including his own Ministers, to debate all these options, and there was a time in fact when Ministers were speaking out with very divergent opinions until they realized that this was not conducive to the image of Cabinet solidarity. So I think you're perfectly right that the STAFEUR report may well have been instrumental in at least establishing the rationale for maintaining and even reinforcing certain links with Europe. My own personal view is that, although the government's decision to cut our forces in Europe was an extremely important decision and had extremely important, and negative, repercussions on both the credibility of the Canadian defence effort and Canada's relations with its allies, the more important decision for the long-term was not that, but the decision to stay in NATO, and the decision to retain forces in Europe. Those decisions were far more important for the longer term than the decision to reduce our forces, and I think our report had a significant role to play in those decisions. Moreover, it became clear later, as it was clear to me at any rate at the time, that it was inconsistent to pursue closer political and cultural and trade relations with the countries of Europe, on the one hand, and to tell them in effect that we no longer shared their security concerns. And when, later, Prime Minister Trudeau made his several tours of the countries of Europe, in pursuit of what we called at the time a contractual link with the European Community, this became rather clear to him. This was 1974-75. So, it is my view, it's my strong view, that the way the decision to reduce our forces was taken was very harmful to longer-term Canadian interests. If we had said to our allies: "We have re-examined the relative capacity to support the collective defence effort and we feel that the European allies are in a position to bear a relatively larger share in relation to Canada's share than was the case in the past", and that we would like to see some adjustment of our commitments in light of that, I think the reaction would have been quite different. But to decide unilaterally that we were going to reduce, not only because we thought that we shouldn't bear a larger proportion of the collective defence burden, but also because we considered the threat had substantially diminished, was very badly received. So I am absolutely sure, in my own mind, that that had a very bad effect on our influence in the

Alliance and on our efforts to develop close relations with Europe. Because, of course, we were not shifting defence resources, defence assets, from Western Europe to North America; we were reducing our total defence effort, and that was a mistake that successive governments have been paying for and that the Canadian people have been paying for.

[HILL] Do you feel that is really the case, that in fact there has been a continuing price to pay for this?

[HALSTEAD] Oh, indeed, indeed. What has happened is that the Canadian Armed Forces were so neglected for so long because of the freeze on defence expenditure, and therefore the steady reduction in real dollars devoted to the defence effort, that they were starved of equipment and indeed of manpower. This is responsible for the very serious gap between capability and commitment that developed over the years. And it has become extraordinarily difficult for successive governments to do two things at once, one to maintain and modernize equipment, and on top of that to catch up on the neglect that took place before. So that is why I say we have had to pay for this mistake over the years.

[HILL] There's one other question I'd like to ask about this period, concerning the troop cuts. My impression of Canada's attitude to NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty at the time the North Atlantic Treaty was first set up, when the discussions on it were going on, then in the late 40's, was that in a sense, what Canada found there was an almost perfect outlet for Canadian foreign policy, in that NATO encompassed all the traditional Canadian linkages poured into one multi-lateral framework. I mean there's a linkage to the United States, there's a linkage to the U.K., there's a linkage to France, there's a linkage to Western Europe - they were all pooled in there together in one framework, one pole of attraction, if you like. And I think the impression I have from talking to people about those early years is that it was seen as a kind of natural outlet, almost a perfect thing for Canada. Yet in 1969 you had Canada sort of turning its back on this natural arrangement. Of course the world had changed during those years, no question about that. Germany had come up again, Western Europe was no longer destitute, and so on. Nonetheless, in a way there was a turning away from the traditions of Canadian foreign policy, and one feels that by and large this was coming from the Prime Minister and some of the people closest to him. What do you think were the impulses driving him at that time, when he looked at foreign policy? What was he trying to do? What were the antecedents of his thinking?

[HALSTEAD] Well, if we're talking about the Prime Minister now, I think the origins of his wish to introduce radical change into our role in NATO was, first of all, his desire to make his own impact on Canadian foreign policy.

I think Prime Minister Trudeau came to power with the idea that he would put his personal stamp on Canadian foreign policy; he had some prior convictions that he wanted to see made part of Canadian foreign policy. One was the emphasis on North/South-aid to the Third World, economic development, and so on; another was recognition of the People's Republic of China. I think another was probably improvement of East-West relations, including Canada's relations with the Soviet Union. And I think he felt that the continued stationing of substantial Canadian Forces in Europe was an anomaly in light of the conditions that had changed since the founding of NATO. More broadly, as far as NATO was concerned, there were people both in his cabinet and in the academic community, and more broadly in the public, who also thought that Canada was playing some kind of Boy Scout role in Europe that was expensive and that didn't any longer correspond to identifiable Canadian interests. I think one of the factors that played a role in this sort of view was some disillusionment with NATO. Because, you will recall that, when we participated

enthusiastically in the creation of NATO, we were thinking of an organization that would be more than a military alliance, hence our famous Article II of the Treaty - of an organization that would be for the defence of both North America and Western Europe, of an organization that would promote a closer-knit Atlantic community and Canada's relations within that community. Now, that vision was not fully shared by our allies, either American or European, and became clouded over time. The political dimension of the Alliance, in some people's view, at any rate, became subordinate to the military dimension. There was far more of that, certainly after the Korean War, and in the period of German rearmament. All these things were efforts to organize the military dimension of the Alliance and I think people began to feel - a lot of Canadians began to feel - that this was becoming predominantly a military alliance, and that the political objectives, political consultations, coordination of foreign policies, were not getting the priority that they should. As far as the defence of North America was concerned, in practice, of course - although in theory North America was a region of NATO - in practice it was from the very beginning treated separately, and my personal view was at the time, and is even more strongly now, that Canada made a serious mistake at the very beginning, in agreeing to purely bi-lateral arrangements for the defence of North America, and particularly the air defence of North America. I don't think that we should have acquiesced, at any rate acquiesced so readily, in the formation of NORAD as a purely bilateral defence arrangement, in practice outside the NATO organization. It's got to the point now where people talk of Canada's two alliances. Canada has in fact only one alliance, and NORAD is not an alliance at all; it is an arrangement for a unified command structure for the air defence of one region of the North Atlantic Treaty area. But the way it's been run, it looks as if it is another alliance; and this has created, what I call, the fragmentation of NATO strategy. Because the strategy for the defence of North America is never discussed in NATO.

[HILL] I should say that it is a sentiment that you share with a number of other people.

[HALSTEAD] Good, I'm glad to hear that. I have made a point of publicizing my views on this in the last few years, since I left the service, since I retired, since I've been free to do so. And I feel very strongly about that, and I'm glad to hear that others share my views. As for the Atlantic community, instead of becoming more closely knit, it has in fact become what I call compartmentalized, and polarized. Compartmentalized as between those matters, defence matters, discussed in NATO, and those matters, primarily economic and trade matters, discussed in the European Community or as between the European Community and the United States.

[HILL] What about O.E.C.D. as well?

[HALSTEAD] Yes, but they have other actors. And polarized as between the United States on the one hand, and the major European powers on the other hand. So we don't have a more closely knit Atlantic community. And Canada increasingly finds difficulty in answering the question: where do we fit in? And so I think it is this kind of feeling that was already very evident in the late 60's, a sort of disillusionment with what was happening, a feeling that NATO perhaps didn't any longer respond to Canadian needs and that Canada had nothing really to gain any longer from being in NATO, a feeling that the Europeans weren't interested in us and that we had better look after our own affairs at home. And of course you must remember this came at a time when Canadians were more and more preoccupied with their internal affairs, preoccupied with national unity, preoccupied with regional disparities, poverty, unemployment and so on, all these things were coming together to attract attention.

[HILL] I'm glad you mentioned that. Some of the Prime Minister's staff were preoccupied with domestic concerns. That was their forte.

[HALSTEAD] And there was also a wide-spread feeling, against the background of what I have just described, that Canada would get more mileage by being a big frog in the Third World pond than by being a small frog in the NATO pond. And there were all sorts of voices to say that Canada should be devoting its resources and efforts to building up its relations with Third World countries rather than continue to bother with these old fogies in Europe. So that was the background to the government's approach to relations with Europe and to Canada's role in NATO. Nevertheless, this report on Europe did have a considerable impact, over time, and I think led directly to the initiative that Trudeau then took later, which is commonly referred to as the Third Option. In fact there are two - this is another case of popular confusion - there were in fact two policies or two initiatives. One was what I called the "Diversification Policy" and that was a foreign policy initiative, and that flowed directly from the STAFEUR report. The other was essentially a domestic policy initiative, and that was the Third Option. And that was the policy that was described in a special issue of International Perspectives, in an article signed by Mitchell Sharp, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, which was developed in the aftermath of Nixon's economic measures in 1971. That policy was properly speaking the Third Option. It was primarily a domestic policy; it was a policy primarily directed at strengthening Canada's domestic institutions and policy instruments in order to increase our ability to operate with some freedom of action, and to reduce our vulnerability to the United States. Unfortunately that Third Option, while it was adopted nominally, was never incorporated in any cabinet decision, was never translated into government directives to government departments, was never given any policy instruments and in effect remained a purely declaratory policy. And in my view the policy that the government eventually adopted was not the Third Option at all; it was the First Option, which was supposed to be the option of maintaining the status quo, which the government professedly rejected because it would be ineffective in preventing Canada from being increasingly drawn into the American orbit. So that is what we have seen. People say the Third Option was a failure, because it did not correspond to reality. My response to that is that the Third Option was not a failure because it was never tried. The policy that the government actually adopted had the effect that could have been foreseen for it.

[HILL] Was it partly a question of government method in the foreign policy review? Somebody once made this comment about Mr. Trudeau's way of proceeding on foreign affairs: when asked to describe what kind of a person he was, they said that he's "an existentialist". What he does is that he gets involved in things for a while, tries out some policy, and then afterwards feels he's done what he can and then he goes on to something else. There might be a bit of truth in that, even in his treatment of North/South issues for example; there were various initiatives at various times and then somehow Canada didn't follow through on them. Maybe this was the same with respect to the Third Option. Maybe what happened was that it seemed like a good thing to do for a while, and then somehow it wasn't followed through on.

[HALSTEAD] Well, it is interesting that you should say that, because that corresponds entirely to my own impression. In fact, I have toyed with the idea of writing something, maybe a small book, on Trudeau's foreign policy. Because it is my feeling as a result of working with Trudeau, in some cases quite closely, on various aspects of his foreign policy over the years, that an enormous opportunity was in effect wasted. The opportunity was, that here was a man who was Prime Minister for longer, for a more continuous period of time, than any other Prime Minister in the Commonwealth and indeed in the free world I think, or as long as most. And yet his accomplishments in the foreign policy field, and I emphasize that, I'm not talking about domestic policies, but in the foreign policy field, are very difficult to find; they certainly don't correspond in any way to the length of time he was there. I think the reason for this is essentially what you

just said. That he dabbled in foreign policy; which is not to say that he was not interested, he was, but he would get involved in one or another aspect for awhile, and getting involved for him was essentially making speeches or attending important conferences, high profile activities - it was not following, day-by-day, the implementation of a well-defined and articulated policy. That he was not good at. In fact I think one of the problems was that he had no personal experience of, and really did not understand, the operational side of international relations, the operation of diplomacy. He didn't know anything about it at all, and never learned. I mean, you may remember some of the things he said shortly after he came to power about diplomats, about External Affairs. He wondered out loud whether we couldn't get along without these rather élitist people in External Affairs. Because, after all, we could all read the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal or what ever it was; they had perfectly adequate coverage of events all over the world. Well, you see this reflects a basic ignorance of what diplomacy is all about. It reflects a basic ignorance of how international relations are managed. It reflects an ignorance of the facts - he also suggested that we could handle negotiations quite adequately by sending the experts from Canada to whatever countries we wanted to negotiate with, and they would be experts in their field and they would negotiate, and that would be fine. Why bother with, why pay for, these expensive embassies and ambassadors? Well, you see that ignores the fact that negotiation is at least as dependent on a knowledge of the people you are negotiating with as it is on a knowledge of the subject matter of the negotiation. So I think you are absolutely right, it confirms my own impression, and I feel that Canada has been badly served in the foreign policy field as a result of this.

[HILL] If I could just take this one step further, and I do this simply because I think it says quite a lot about how Canada approached NATO amongst other foreign policy instruments and issues in this period, it seems to me that the core of Mr. Trudeau's whole government policy was really a domestic one, which is to say the area where he was continually interested and knowledgeable. The thing that really got his attention all the time was really the whole issue of the place of Quebec in Canada. And it was this constitutional issue which really drove him as a Prime Minister. The other things certainly interested him at times, but they were not of the same order as far as he was concerned. Now, even on the domestic side, with respect to Quebec and Confederation, of course he's still a controversial figure, there are different views on what he achieved and didn't achieve, but it still seems to me that that is the real explanation of Pierre Trudeau. I don't know if you will agree with me or not.

[HALSTEAD] Yes, I would, I would. I think you are absolutely right there. I think the place of Quebec in Canada was his central and overriding concern and it is there that he made his most important contribution as Prime Minister. And that was an historic contribution. I mean Canada passed through the greatest crisis of its existence so far in that period, and I think Trudeau's contribution to the continued unity of Canada was historic. But in the foreign policy field, I feel, as I say, it's a matter of opportunities lost. And I think, as far as Europe is concerned, his interest in Europe was again a reflection of domestic pressures. I think he turned to Europe in the '70s as a result of a feeling, or an impression, that important constituencies, I don't mean that in a geographical concept, but important political constituencies, felt that he had neglected relations with Europe, and therefore he embarked on this initiative. But again, although he put in a tremendous amount of time and effort over a period of about a year, there was no real follow through. And this was the problem all the time.

[HILL] Could you say something about the treatment of Europe and NATO in the foreign policy booklet and in that exercise leading up to it, to <u>Foreign Policy for Canadians</u>?

[HALSTEAD] Well, yes, there was a direct connection between the report of STAFEUR, which I chaired, and the booklet on Europe in the publication, Foreign Policy for Canadians. That booklet came as a direct descendant of the STAFEUR Report, boiled down, of course, enormously boiled down, and without the NATO component.

[HILL] Although there is a NATO section.

[HALSTEAD] Yes, that is right, but, yes, I'm sorry, I shouldn't say without the NATO component, but with a very much trimmed down NATO component. I mean NATO was a far more important part of the STAFEUR Report than it was of the booklet on Europe. And I think that I mean this is no pride of authorship at all because that was very much a joint effort - I think that was one of the best books in <u>Foreign Policy for Canadians</u>.

[HILL] What is interesting about the treatment of NATO in that booklet is that, prior to the Trudeau period if you like, NATO was seen as sort of a pole of Canadian foreign policy which was held up for its own sake. And one suspects, though I don't know, that in the report you prepared, it was probably that way too. But in Foreign Policy for Canadians, the distinct impression that I have is that NATO is portrayed there as a useful instrument "for the time being", untill such time as changes in world circumstances will have worked themselves out, whereupon alliances such as that will no longer be necessary. Now of course that might take a long time, but nonetheless there is that sense there that eventually these things will wither away, you know, NATO is something that we may belong to for the time being, so to speak.

[HALSTEAD] Yes, that's true. Well that reflects of course the political input from the Prime Minister's Office, that was considered essential to a justification, after the fact, for the decision to reduce the Canadian Forces in Europe. So it was a downgrading of NATO.

Part III - Acting Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretary, 1974-75

[HILL] I wonder if we could go on to what we call Part III. It's actually part of a continuum in a sense, because you had been Assistant Under-Secretary for that period of 1971-74, but then in '74 and '75 you were both Acting Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretary. This was the period in which the Prime Minister made his famous tour of Europe and spoke with Chancellor Schmidt and other people, and in which in the Defence Department, there was a defence structure review carried through. It was a kind of a turning point in Canadian international security policy, because now Canada turned around again a little bit and focused a little bit more on NATO than it had in the immediately proceeding period, and started to begin the lengthy process of trying to rebuild the Armed Forces which is still going on. And as you mentioned, there is such a back-log that they're still running up hill. I just wondered if you could tell us a little bit about the main thrust of your work in that period, particularly in regards to NATO.

[HALSTEAD] Well, I should perhaps mention that going back to the time when I took over as Head of the European Division in 1966, through my time as Assistant Under-Secretary and now as Acting Under-Secretary and Deputy, NATO was very much a part of my interests, although I was not, of course, as Head of the European Division, I was not responsible for NATO policy. But I attended, again, all the Ministerial meetings that were held; and when I became Assistant Under-Secretary, my two fields of responsibility were relations with Europe and defence relations. So as Assistant Under-Secretary, and then later, I did have, again, responsibility for NATO. I think the government's effort to repair some of the damage that had been done earlier by the drastic reduction of the Canadian Forces, and the effort to re-build the Canadian Forces and to play a rather more

positive role in NATO again, were all due to the realization, by the Prime Minister, that there was an inherent inconsistency between pursuing closer economic, political and cultural relations with Europe, and disassociating ourselves from the security of Europe. Some people have suggested that in fact the Europeans exercised blackmail over us; that when we came, when the Prime Minister came, and said we would like to have a contractual link with you, with the European Community, the Europeans said: "Well, you'd better do something about your defence if you want that." I was present at two tête-à-tête meetings between Trudeau and Schmidt and at numerous other meetings. I accompanied Trudeau on his visits to all the European capitals during that campaign, 1974-75, it started in the fall of '74 with visits to Paris and to Brussels and it went on in '75 with visits to all the other capitals. And not once was that said or anything near it, but never the less, you know, it was a sort of unstated assumption in the background, because it was obvious to everyone that we couldn't be credible in our professions of a desire to broaden and deepen our relations to Europe in some areas and leave security out of it. And so, in fact, as part of these visits, at one point Trudeau went himself to NATO, he paid a visit to NATO Headquarters, and addressed the North Atlantic Council, in order, so to speak, to reassure them that Canada was not contracting out of this. And I think that it was in an effort to redress, to counteract, that initially very negative impression that had been created by the unilateral decision to reduce our forces, that we owe the belated efforts to improve our defence posture and to play a more positive role in NATO. And this would then explain also why we took the initiative we did which resulted in the Atlantic Declaration. I mean that was the philosophy behind it. We also saw this as a way of re-asserting the primacy of the political role of NATO, re-asserting the political purpose of this Alliance in the management of East/West relations, not only for NATO as a whole, but I mean reasserting it here in Canada, so as to correct some of the public impressions that had grown up. So we took full advantage of the fact that it was our turn to host the NATO Ministerial meeting, to organize this declaration which was then adopted in Ottawa but signed later by Heads of Government in Brussels.

[HILL] Of course in Foreign Policy for Canadians, too, there is a section in there about political consultation in NATO, which I understand does praise the operation of NATO in that respect, I think referring to NATO as having a unique instrument for political consultation. Then, of course, in '73, I think it was, Dr. Kissinger had called for a new Atlantic Charter, and the Year of Europe; and in a way that all led up to the Atlantic Declaration.

[HALSTEAD] Yes, it's very interesting to compare Kissinger's Year of Europe Initiative to Canada's Third Option Initiative, because they had very different motives and led to very different results. Kissinger's motives, the American motives - this is my appreciation, of course - the American motive was to get a foot in the European Community door. I think the Americans were getting increasingly concerned that Europe was getting increasingly united, was talking increasingly with one voice, as they like to say, was getting increasingly effective at coordinating its foreign policy. And the Americans were very nervous that this might indeed be a sort of nascent great power, which would start making foreign policy quite independent of the United States. And so the whole point of the Year of Europe, and the Atlantic Charter, was to give the Americans a chance to influence the formation of European foreign policy before it was set in concrete. And that's precisely what the Europeans didn't want. The Europeans were not prepared to give the United States, as they put it, a place at their table.

[HILL] Whereas the Atlantic Declaration was really a declaration about good consultative practices, essentially.

[HALSTEAD] That's right, and there the balance was quite reasonably set. And, of course, the Canadian initiative - it wasn't our purpose to have any privileged position in the policy making,

policy formation process of the European Community - it was to forge a link which would enable us to discuss conflicts of interest before they became serious, and secondly to develop new forms of co-operation, industrial co-operation, which would hopefully result in an expansion of our trade. And I think that explains why the Americans failed, and Kissinger's initiatives failed, because it was an attempt to get inside the European Community. Our initiative succeeded because the Europeans saw a political usefulness in encouraging us if we were serious. That was really the essence of the question. If we were serious, they saw an advantage, a political advantage, from their point of view, in developing closer relations with us.

Part IV - Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1975-80

[HILL] Ambassador Halstead, I think there are two main issues I'd like to ask you about in this period. The first one is what was the state of Canadian-German relations in that period and in particular how did the German cabinet and senior officials and people regard Canada and regard Canada's role in NATO?

[HALSTEAD] Well, I think that when I went to Bonn in 1975 I went at a very propitious and favorable time; the timing was just right. My intention in going there, my own personal intention, was to develop this bilateral relation to the maximum extent possible. I went with the conviction that there was tremendous potential there, that Canada and West Germany had almost complementary economies, that they had a very similar way of looking at international affairs, strangely enough. One could take a lot of time to go into this, but I won't because I know time is limited, but suffice it to say that for a variety of reasons that perhaps don't come immediately to mind, Canadians and Germans find it remarkably easy to get on to the same wave length. I think both talk rather directly, rather frankly, they don't beat around the bush and they are of a size that is comparable, I mean of course West Germany is far more populated than Canada is, and has a bigger economy, but the disparity of the size and power is nothing like that between Canada and the United States, or between Germany and the United States. And I think the Germans find it easy to talk to Canadians. There's also something in the German psyche that makes Canada an extremely attractive country, the wide open spaces here which they don't have in Germany, the idea of a new frontier and so on - all these things appeal to the Germans. So I went to Bonn with the conviction that there was tremendous potential here to develop, and that it would be in Canada's interest to develop this relationship, indeed that it could become a key relationship in Europe for Canada. I mean it was already obvious then that Germany was the strongest member of the European Community, not only in military terms - well, of course if one excludes nuclear weapons but more particularly in economic terms, and was adopting an increasingly leading role within the European Community. So it seemed to me that if Canada could establish a close and mutually beneficial relationship in as many fields as possible, not only trade but industrial co-operation and so on, it would be a good underpinning to our general relationship with Europe and a good complement to our more traditional relationships with Great Britain and with France. And I think I went, as I say, at an extremely favorable time, because the Germans were just beginning to become conscious themselves of this other country in North America. They had emerged, of course, several years before, twenty years before, from the occupation period; they had become recognized and accepted as respected members of the international community; they had been preoccupied for most of those twenty years with their relations with the United States on the one hand, and with their European partners on the other. But they were just beginning in the seventies to take cognizance of the rest of the world: on the one hand of the developing countries - they were just beginning to construct a development aid programme and to cultivate actively their relations with the countries of Africa and Asia and Latin America. And they were just beginning, as I said, to see, to realize, that there was another country in North America. So what I found was the

greatest need was to make Canada better known in Germany. And I tried to do this by targeting key figures in the various fields where I wanted to develop relations, not only in the Government of course but in the business communities, the banking communities, the academic community, the cultural community; and we embarked on a very intensive program of selling Canada in all these fields. Now in this effort it was of immense importance that the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, Helmut Schmidt, had a soft spot in his heart for Canada. He had in fact a brother-in-law who lived in Canada. So he knew something through his personal network about Canada. He saw something of the same vision I think of our relationship that I've described. And he felt it would be of benefit to the Federal Republic to develop a closer relationship with Canada as well as to complement the relations with the United States. And equally important was the fact that, after an initially rocky start, Trudeau and Schmidt were able to establish a very happy personal relationship, a personal relationship of mutual respect, first of all. They respected each other's intellect. They were very different people, very different. And it was a funny match, I mean I don't think of it funny as in ha, ha; it was a curious match. But it worked and they were both highly intelligent, quick on the up-take, and as I say they respected each other's intellect. They were able to talk on an equal footing, and as you undoubtedly know, Schmidt tolerated fools badly. But equally he admired people to whom he could talk man to man and in Trudeau he found such a person. Trudeau was very impressed with Schmidt not only personally but also because Schmidt was a Social Democrat, so that politically they considered themselves very close, if not on the same wave length. And this was enormous - you could imagine - this set the tone for the relationship at the top. Now there was still an enormous problem in translating this good will at the top into concrete action down below. The more so in view of the characteristic that we have already discussed of Trudeau who was in and out of this and found it very difficult to follow through. Schmidt was far more consistent, I mean because he understood the diplomatic process and the international system far better than Trudeau did. But nevertheless, the atmosphere was favorable to this kind of operation. So that, in broad terms, was the climate of relations during my five years in Bonn.

[HILL] Could you say something about the German attitude towards the nuclear problem? This was a hot issue in that period, if I'm not mistaken. The Soviets were building up the SS-20s. If I'm not mistaken, that was the period when there was talk of the Window of Opportunity and the Nuclear Equation in that the Soviets would have a period in which they would be able to, some people thought, they might have an edge over the Americans by being able to perhaps take out American Land Based ICBMs. This was also the period in which there was the first of the episodes of the so-called Neutron bomb, which was rather an odd one from the consultative point of view, I think.

[HALSTEAD] Yes, well I'd be glad to comment on those. Perhaps I should say a word before I do that about the impact of this Trudeau/Schmidt relationship on our defence relations, because there's an important point there, that may not be well known, and which I witnessed personally. As I told you earlier, I was present at two tête-à-tête meetings between Schmidt and Trudeau, and it was Schmidt personally who was responsible for convincing Trudeau, as none of his Canadian officials were able to do, that Canada should re-equip its forces in Europe with tanks. At the time there was an enormous debate in Canada as to what the equipment of the smaller Canadian Force should be, when the Centurion tanks broke down, as they were doing increasingly, when they finally collapsed. And there was at one point great enthusiasm in Ottawa and in the Prime Minister's Office, for a more mobile force equipped with light tanks which were in fact little more than Armored Personnel Carriers, but highly mobile, lightly armored and highly mobile, until they found, as a result of feasibility studies, that this was going to cost more than re-equipping the brigade group with a new generation of tanks. And then they were really flummoxed; I mean what were they going to do and should we really continue. I mean the question was broached again, not publicly

but within the government, whether we should continue to maintain this brigade group in Germany. And it was Schmidt who really, single-handed, made the argument for the continuation of the Canadian contribution. He convinced Trudeau. First of all he explained to Trudeau, in intellectually satisfying terms, what the raison d'être was for the conventional defence of Western Europe. And then within that framework he convinced Trudeau that Canada had a symbolically important role to play and then he convinced Trudeau that role, to remain credible, had to involve a new generation of tanks.

[HILL] So, as you said earlier, it was in no sense a threat.

[HALSTEAD] No, never a hint of that, but Trudeau found that this sort of argumentation from a Social Democrat was more convincing than anything he had heard from his own officials. I thought that was important, because there were not too many witnesses to that. Now, to go to the nuclear question. This also, I heard Schmidt and Trudeau discuss, because this was very much a problem for Trudeau and he used to question Schmidt about this. "What is your attitude toward the nuclear deterrent? I mean don't you realize that nuclear war would be the end of all of us?" And Schmidt explained the rationale from his point of view of the nuclear deterrent, and said it was designed to prevent war, not to fight it. Of course he knew that nuclear war would be the end of all of us, but so would any kind of war, any major war, would be the end of Germany. So it was not a case of just preventing a nuclear war; it was a case of preventing any war from occurring. And for this it was necessary to have a credible combination, a balanced, and credible combination, of strategic nuclear, theatre, nuclear and conventional forces. And he became very concerned when it appeared that the Soviets were developing their intermediate range nuclear forces in such a way as to threaten the credibility of that leg of the NATO triad. He saw NATO's theatre nuclear forces as very vulnerable and he made the speech in London, as you know, to the IISS, back in whatever it was - I think it was 1977 or '78 - in which he raised this question of the implications of the Soviet SS-20s, and whether it would not be necessary for NATO to counter that threat. I remember thinking at the time, when I heard that report of the speech in London, that this obviously had serious implications for NATO and would lead to a review of NATO strategy. And it did lead to the December '79 decision on INF. Of course, there have since then been many arguments about who was responsible for the December '79 decision. And I think Schmidt himself has come to regret that decision.

[HILL] Really?

[HALSTEAD] I think so. It was - or let me put it this way- the aftermath of that decision, the political fallout of that decision in Germany, can be said to have led to his downfall. He became increasingly isolated in his own party, in defence of the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. And I think you could make an argument that his downfall could be traced to that decision, and he has spoken and written since then in such a way as to confirm that. I mean he hasn't said that, but he has backed away from accepting responsibility for the December '79 decision. And it is, I think, still an open question whether that was an entirely wise decision. I myself thought it was at the time, and of course once it had been taken it was absolutely essential that, regardless of what the Soviets were able to do in mounting propaganda campaign against it and in helping to arouse - they weren't responsible of course, for the massive public demonstrations, in Western Europe but they certainly did everything they could do to stimulate and encourage them - but once that decision was taken, it was essential for the credibility of NATO to carry it through. But I think that it is an open question whether that was the best decision to make. Because in fact we are not talking here about the military significance of these weapons. It is really the political significance and I think the political utility of Persing II and cruise missiles is very doubtful. And I think that

is demonstrated by the reaction, the problems we now have, NATO now has, in facing up to the possibility of an INF agreement. These difficulties are not military difficulties at all, although people are talking in military terms, that we can't afford to give up these, and if we give up these we have to compensate with those. It isn't military at all, the whole thing is political, it's all got to do, really, with the political solidarity of the Alliance. The reasons the Europeans are nervous about the possibility of going back to the status quo ante deployment of SS-20s, when they weren't nervous, why should they be nervous now about going back to that situation?; well, they are nervous now because of what has happened in the meantime, which has shaken their confidence in US leadership and which has shaken US confidence in what they like to call European steadfastness. And that's what it's all about, and so I think that the jury is still out on the December '79 decision; but that was the German part in that decision. The other thing you mentioned was the neutron bomb, which of course predated that.

[HILL] Could I just ask you first of all, on the INF decision, the two-track decision, was it mainly a German initiative or did that mainly come from the US, it's one of those things which I know is hard to pinpoint?

[HALSTEAD] Well, for what it's worth, my impression is that it was indeed a German initiative, and specifically a Schmidt initiative. But that initiative was in the form of proposing that counter measures be taken to offset the advantage that the Soviet's were gaining for themselves through the deployment of SS-20s. Where the Americans came in was in the designation of the weapons that should do this job. The Germans I don't believe had any part in that, or at least they left it to the Americans, as did the Alliance as a whole. I mean the Germans said, these SS-20s worry us, we regard them as destabilizing, and they may possibly give the Soviets a blackmail potential, because of their ability to cancel the NATO theatre nuclear weapons. We think something needs to be done about this, and that's where they left it. The Americans said, and I don't know, I must say, with how much reluctance the Americans said this - some Americans will tell you that they responded finally to this German and European initiative with great reluctance. I don't know - but anyway, when they did respond, they said, "Okay, we see your point, we agree something needs to be done, and what we are prepared to do to meet this is to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles." And as far as I know there was no real debate. Nobody on the European side said, "Oh well, we don't want Pershing IIs, because there would be only a five-minute warning time for the Soviets and that would be provocative or destabilizing". I mean, I think this sort of went through the NATO military planning structure without much debate, the Americans said, "This is what you can have", and the Europeans said, "Thank you very much." It depends on what you are talking about when you're talking about responsibility. I think the initiative was certainly the responsibility of the Europeans and, in the first instance, the Germans. The weapons systems that were actually deployed, and how many and where, was the responsibility of the Americans.

Part V - Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, 1980-82

[HILL] I wonder if we might go on to the next section, Part V, which is your period as Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, from 1980 to 1982. I'd like to follow on from what we've been talking about, not so much the neutron bomb, but rather the two-track decision of INF. I was speaking to Ambassador Taylor recently who succeeded you at NATO I think. He said that, in his period of NATO, that year the question of the implementation of the two-track decision was such an enormous question that it took up a very large proportion of his time and of his counterparts, to the point where other things although they were dealt with, were very secondary issues. Was this such a big issue in your period then?

[HALSTEAD] No, it wasn't. The big issue in my period, the biggest single issue in my period there, was the Polish Crisis. And perhaps because of that, the INF deployment question did not rank so high in attention. It did, of course, figure frequently in our discussions, if for no other reason than that public demonstrations were obviously causing difficulty for our European allies. But throughout the sessions in the NATO Council, I don't remember any serious suggestion that the deployment should be cancelled or changed substantially. I think the general feeling was that, having taken this decision, NATO had to carry through with it, in terms of its own credibility. The main question during my time there, in connection with the INF deployment issue, was the ability of Belgium and the Netherlands, in particular, to go through with the deployments that were expected of them. And this of course was a very difficult domestic issue for both of them. The most difficult problem was in fact in the Netherlands, where not only was it an issue that split the political parties, but where it also involved the churches very actively; and the churches are more actively involved in politics in the Netherlands than in most of the European countries. And the churches by and large were opposed to the deployment; and the Government, the governing coalition, was badly split, and the dominant party in the governing coalition was also split. So there was a long period of temporizing by the Netherlands government which caused the Americans a lot of annoyance, but which, as I say, never seriously put in doubt the determination to go through with it. The country that was in fact most, apart from the United States, that was most directly affected by this, was of course Germany. Because it has been the initial position of the West German government that they would accept their share only if three other countries, I think it was, accepted a share, and that was the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. Well, amazingly enough, there was no problem in Italy at all, the Communist party in Italy made practically no objection. But the main problem was in the Netherlands. Belgium was interesting, because the Belgians have their own way of handling these things. Although it was a divisive question for the governing coalition, the Prime Minister at the time was very skillful in keeping this out of public debate; there was I think only one base involved, and he decided to locate it in the area of the country, the Walloon area of the country, where unemployment was high, and where they could see economic benefits from this. And it was the Flemish population, because of the spill-over from the Netherlands, that was most vocally against it. So, he was able to play internal politics in favour of the acceptance of cruise missiles, but it took him a little time to work this out. So, it was debated in NATO, but never in a way that would put in question the basic decision, really, and my impression is that it didn't have, or occupy, as much time, as the Polish Crisis, because the Polish Crisis pushed it down the agenda. And that's what we spent most of the time on, during those two years.

[HILL] I'd like to ask you a little bit more about that, because when you went to NATO it was a sort of a turning point in East/West relations. At the end of the 70's they'd had the Salt II agreement which was signed but was never ratified, that was in fact withdrawn from Congress. Then, also there was the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which in my dealings, my own dealings with international affairs in that period, which was mainly in the Inter-Parliamentary Union, constituted a turning point, because very clearly this was a kind of a divide. The last remnants of detente went down the drain in that period. The world went back to a confrontational atmosphere. I wonder if you'd say something about the atmosphere in NATO during that period.

[HALSTEAD] Yes, indeed. I arrived at NATO in October 1980; the organization had just been through the Afghanistan crisis, had been very badly shaken by it, not because the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had all that direct implications for security of the NATO area, but because it put very seriously in doubt the capacity of the Alliance to take decisions quickly and smoothly. The divisions in NATO were laid wide open by this first use of Soviet forces in the Third World, and the allies had a terrible time putting together a united front on it. And it was as you say a mortal blow to détente, and this was very difficult for the Europeans to accept, and more particularly for

Chancellor Schmidt, because the whole German position in support of NATO was based very much on the two-track approach, military and political. Détente was an integral part of that, and of course meant an enormous amount to West Germany in particular, because of its relevance to the division of Germany. Détente was the thing of primary significance for them. Détente meant completely different things to the United States, on the one hand, and to West Germany on the other. To the United States it was a way of managing superpower relations. To West Germany it was a way of easing the division of Germany. That was the be-all-and-end-all of détente for West Germany. So anything that put that in danger was a terrible blow, I mean it threatened to undermine the underpinnings of the German role in NATO. And Schmidt found himself in an awful dilemma as a result of Afghanistan.

[HILL] Where did the other European allies, and where did Canada, stand?

[HALSTEAD] Well, I think most of the European allies were greatly in favor of détente. I mean Germany more particularly because of the division of Germany but the other European allies because of the division of Europe. Britain perhaps less than the others. I think Canada shared this European perception of detente and by and large wanted to salvage what could be salvaged of the East/West dialogue in spite of Afghanistan. I mean we acknowledged that NATO could not remain indifferent to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but we didn't think that the price should be the death of detente and the end of all dialogue, a new Cold War. So when I went to Brussels all this was still simmering. The Alliance had just put together an agreed position and taken sanctions against the Soviet Union over Afghanistan, but was still very much debating the implications of all this for the management of East/West relations, for the future of détente and so on. And then came the Polish Crisis. It really began to hot up in the following summer, I think it was 1980, I'm sorry I can't be precise about the dates. The first summer I was there was 1981. Apart from the dates, the important thing here was that, as a result of the Afghan experience the Alliance was determined not to be caught with its pants down again, in terms of preparing to deal with a critical situation, in other words, in terms of crisis management. And for the first time, I think, in the history of NATO, the organization engaged in contingency planning in advance of an anticipated crisis. And this contingency planning took place in great secrecy, largely in what were called Restricted Sessions of the North Atlantic Council, where only Ambassadors and note-takers were allowed. And what we did was to work out, first a policy framework for our approach to a possible Polish Crisis; secondly, measures, positive incentives for the Poles, to handle the situation without calling the Soviets in; and finally, negative deterrents, in other words, sanctions to deter the Poles, on the one hand, and the Soviets on the other hand, from resorting to intervention. And I think this was a remarkably successful exercise. It went on for about six months and we drew up a kind of blue print of a policy framework and of a shopping list of measures that foreign ministers could choose from, when and if they had to meet in an emergency session following some Soviet action. Now all this was based on what we called the "worst case scenario", which was overt Soviet military intervention in Poland. We recognized that this might not be what actually happened, and indeed there was a greater probability of something short of that, some form of "grey scenario", as we put it. But we also thought that the infinite number of permutations and combinations of what might come to be a grey scenario were so many, that we couldn't provide for all of them, and that all we could do in practice was draw up the shopping list of measures designed for the worst case, and leave it to the foreign ministers in case of a "grey scenario" to pick and choose among them as they saw fit. So when, then in December 1981, the Polish government introduced martial law, the NATO foreign ministers were convened, they met in January, they had the results of this contingency planning in front of them, and I think it helped them enormously to take decisions quickly, and more or less in unison. The trouble was that, in spite of all this contingency planning, in spite of all these prior consultations, in spite of all NATO's principles of political consultations -

that members should consult together on matters of common interest affecting their security before decisions are taken, so that policy and action can be concerted, or at the very least so that members will take decisions in light of these consultations - in spite of all that, the pressure in individual countries, and in particular of course in the United States, but not only there, to be seen to be doing something, was such that the United States and a number of other governments took action before the foreign ministers could meet. They took action and made statements before the foreign ministers could gather in Brussels, and as a result we were faced with a series of faits accomplis once more, which obviously put constraints on what we could or could not do. We could not do less than any member government already said we were going to do. We had the task of papering over cracks, divergencies that appeared because of different approaches that had already been proclaimed. There was the crucial question of whether the Soviet Union was directly involved in the proclamation of martial law by the Polish Government. Was it a Polish measure or was it a Soviet measure? And the Americans were particularly intent on NATO taking actions against the Soviet Union and not just Poland. And to me that was illogical, because clearly in our contingency planning our primary preoccupation was to avoid, to prevent, an overt Soviet intervention in Poland. And if we took sanctions against the Soviet Union when they had not intervened militarily in Poland, what did we have left to stop them intervening militarily? In other words, we would have been throwing away our deterrent. And yet politically, it was unacceptable to the United States to have sanctions taken only against Poland. So that's the kind of thing that happens in practice, in spite of all the fine professions of solidarity and the principles of consultation. The overwhelming sentiment of the foreign ministers, as they gathered together, was to maintain solidarity, because it had been so badly disrupted over Afghanistan.

[HILL] When you say maintain solidarity you mean solidarity, among the western countries.

[HALSTEAD] Oh yes, to maintain their own unity and cohesion. And this was the overwhelming sentiment, and they managed to do that, but only in the short term, because they did not deal with the longer term problem of a strategy for managing relations with the Soviet Union, and it was not very long after that that the very serious division of opinion appeared over the question of the Soviet gas pipeline. This had already figured, incidentally, in the consultations in the preparation of the contingency plans. The Americans had pressed, during those consultations, very hard, for a commitment from the Europeans to terminate the gas pipeline deal in case of sanctions against the Soviet Union. The Europeans had resisted this successfully, and they continued to resist, but the Americans continued to press, and it took a special meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers held in Canada in September 1982, to finally resolve this divergence. In doing so the Americans had to decide whether it was counter productive to continue insisting on their policy.

[HILL] Of course in this period in 1980, at the end of the year, you had the election of President Reagan in the United States, so when you started with NATO, it was in a US pre-election period. The advent of the Reagan Administration, with its quite different views, in many ways, on US military power, and the use of US military power, compared with those of his predecessor, must have had quite an impact on the consultative process of NATO. For example, when you mentioned actions taken in response to this Polish situation, I presume you had a sense of there being a new administration in the US with new views?

[HALSTEAD] Well, in that respect, I have to say that the impact of the change of the Administration was only gradual. It was not an overnight thing at all. First of all, I have to say that the Carter Administration, in its dying days, in its last year, was already taking a far firmer line towards the Soviet Union, was already beginning the arms build-up that was then accellerated by the Reagan Administration. So it wasn't a cut-off like that. Carter was already taking a much

tougher line and was emphasizing the importance of rearmament before the change of administration. The impact of the new Reagan Administration was not immediate, and indeed I can remember discussions with my colleagues at NATO about the true significance of the change of administration, what it was going to mean in practice, because there were aspects of it that seemed to be favorable. The Europeans liked the idea of the possibility of firmer American leadership, and some of the statements of the Reagan Administration in the early days seemed to emphasize the importance of consultations with the Allies, the importance of Alliance unity and so on. And of course the first Secretary of the State was Al Haig, who was very well regarded in Europe, having been a very successful Supreme Allied Commander. And the Europeans' view of the early years of the Reagan administration was very coloured by their opinion of Al Haig. So it was not something that changed overnight at all. It was only gradually that what we might call the true intentions and the real method of operation of the Reagan Administration became clear.

[HILL] Was there a lot of discussion about arms control and disarmament in NATO? This was prevalent in Canada, it was sort of a run up to the 1982 Special Session on Disarmament in the United Nations. Of course this was the period in which the peace movement really took off, I think; we had a lot of public debate. There were these great peace marches: in New York; Vancouver had the same sort of thing.

[HALSTEAD] I'm glad you mentioned that, because I think I was defective in my answer to your earlier question about how NATO dealt with the INF deployment during this period. I talked about the problems of completing the deployment, but I should have mentioned the other side of this coin, namely the arms control negotiation going on in Geneva. Because of course the more the public in Europe demonstrated against these missiles, the more the European governments were anxious to put the best possible gloss on their efforts to negotiate with the Soviets in Geneva. I mean that was an obvious tactic. To people who were demonstrating against the acceptance of these American missiles in Europe, the European governments were saying, "But you see we are leaving no stone unturned in Geneva to reach an agreement that will make it possible to get rid of all these weapons on both sides. We are doing everything possible." So there was a lot of discussion on that in NATO, a lot of discussion of the tactics in Geneva. Incidentally, one of the things that made this whole operation more difficult was the scuttling of SALT II by the Reagan Administration. That was something that had an immediate impact, because it was an integral part of NATO's policy decision, and one that the Germans in particular attached enormous importance to i.e. that this whole INF operation - the deployment and the arms control negotiation - should take place, as NATO said, within the SALT framework. What Reagan did on coming into power was to destroy that SALT framework, and that complicated the task of presenting a public posture that was convincing and credible.

[HILL] But, of course, prior to 1982, prior to the UN Special Session, the START talks got underway, if I'm not mistaken, in Geneva.

[HALSTEAD] Well, there was then tremendous pressure on the Reagan Administration by the European allies to get something going. But it took the Reagan Administration a long time to work out its position on what then became known as START.

[HILL] And the INF negotiations too?

[HALSTEAD] Yes, well, the INF negotiations started first, as you will recall, because the Americans were able to sort out their position on that more easily. They had a lot of trouble setting up, fixing a position on strategic weapons. I think there was about a six-month or nine-month delay

between the convening of the INF negotiations and the beginning of the START negotiations. But eventually the two got underway, and then it became a question of how you demonstrate to your public through the actions, the positions, in Geneva, that you are doing everything that you possibly can to avoid the necessity of going through with the deployment decision to counteract the SS-20s already deployed by the Soviets. And there were some very delicate questions to be solved, and NATO was in a very difficult position tactically, because all the Soviets had to do was to spin out those negotiations in Geneva indefinitely and then say to us: "But you have no reason to deploy these weapons, you said you were going to negotiate with us." So it was a very difficult tactical position. So NATO had to put a time limit on these negotiations, had to say, "But these have to be serious negotiations. We are not going to allow you to just spin them out indefinitely while you keep your SS-20s". On the other hand, we had to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the public that we weren't just going through the motions at Geneva in order to deploy as soon as we could. It was a very delicate thing, and at one point there was serious discussion in the NATO Council of a proposal which would in fact have turned the NATO tactic on its head by saying that "we will not deploy until", instead of saying "we will deploy unless." But fortunately - I think that would have been a tremendous mistake - we avoided that, and as you know, when the deadline then arrived for deployment of the missiles and deployment began, the Soviets obliged us, by breaking off the negotiations.

[HILL] What about the modalities of consultation on disarmament questions and related issues in NATO in the period you were there? There were consultations on the CSCE follow up conference underway in Madrid. Despite the Afghanistan business they continued. There were the MBFR discussions still underway in Vienna. And NATO takes interest also in what goes on in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

[HALSTEAD] Well, each of these negotiations was in a slightly different category. Let me begin with the START negotiations. Those negotiations were of course bilateral between the US and the Soviet Union. On our side they were the sole responsibility of the United States, because the weapons under negotiation were American weapons. The Americans, I must say, were entirely engaged in consultations in NATO, and kept NATO fully informed, but they clearly reserved to themselves all decisions about the negotiating position, and negotiating tactics, because they had sole responsibility for these negotiations. The INF was slightly different because, although they were again bilateral US-Soviet negotiations and the weapons were American, they were going to be based in Allied countries with various kinds of dual key arrangements, and so the Americans not only informed the Allies, but also consulted, in the sense of getting their views and taking their views into account, in the decisions on negotiating positions, policy and tactics. Of course, they reserved the final decisions for themselves; but they were extremely good in taking the Allies' views into account. We worked out, in fact, Allied positions for US negotiators. The MBFR was different again. There they were Allied positions for Allied negotiators, and it was in fact NATO negotiating in Vienna. So those negotiating positions were worked out in a collegial sort of fashion in Brussels. CSCE was different again, because there the European Community considered it their prerogative to work out a European position before there was any consultation in NATO. CSCE was not regarded - and the French were very insistent upon this - was not regarded as a bloc-to-bloc negotiation, the way that MBFR was. And the European Political Co-operation group, (EPC), which was not exactly the same as the European Community, insisted that it should have the first kick at the ball in working out a policy before it came to the NATO Council for further working over. And this created, and continues to create, serious problems, particularly for Canada, but also for the United States, because there is a tendency, of course, when the Europeans have reached a delicately balanced package, for them not to want anybody else to undo it or tinker with it at all. But subject to those qualifications, I would say that NATO consultations worked remarkably well

and that the Americans cooperated, were punctilious in the consultations. Where the position is far less clear and far less satisfactory, in my view - but this was not the case, at the time, this is since I left NATO - is with regard to defensive strategic systems and space systems, SDI in other words. The Americans, I understand, have never agreed to any really substantive discussions, in NATO, on the place of defensive systems in the Geneva negotiations, or still less, on the question of development and deployment of SDI weapons systems.

[HILL] Another question I'd like to touch on - it is a broad one - is that in 1980, Mr. Trudeau was re-elected as Prime Minister. That was the year of the election in 1980, that was the last Trudeau government starting in '80 and going up to '84. How do you characterize that government's participation in the work of NATO? What role did NATO play for the Canadian government in the years when you were Ambassador? Were there any particular difficulties, for example in respect to the European Community now being active in NATO and having a voice in working out its views on many things as you just mentioned. Had this created increasing difficulties for Canada in finding a place within the system? I'm trying to get an overview of what NATO means for Canada these days, and what it meant for us in the period you were there.

[HALSTEAD] During the period I was there I felt there were two major difficulties for Canada in the Alliance. One was the legacy of that decision back in 1968-69 to reduce our forces. I felt that that had a continuing impact on our credibility in the Alliance. I felt that it was the unspoken assumption of our allies that we were not pulling our weight in the Alliance. Our defence budget as a proportion of GNP was one of the smallest in the Alliance and well below the Alliance average. It wasn't a public issue or something that was debated in the Council, but it was, I think, an unstated assumption of our Allies, and it occasionally surfaced in the form of rather gratuitous remarks by the then Secretary General of NATO, Joseph Luns. I had, on a couple of occasions, to speak very sharply to him, and warn him that I wouldn't tolerate remarks of that kind. They were never made in the Council but they were made on social occasions and I considered them out of place. But they reflected the reality.

So that was one real obstacle to people listening to what Canada had to say, to any real influence that Canada may have had. The other is the problem that you have referred to, the problem created by the presence of, and role of, the United States on the one hand, and the European Community on the other. Between them they exercised such an overwhelming influence over Alliance policy, Alliance strategy, that it's very hard for any other country to have much influence, to have a say. And of course Canada is not alone in that. There's Norway, there's Turkey, but those countries have some advantage over Canada, in this respect, that, when they talk about their defence, people listen because nobody else can talk with the same authority about their defence. The disadvantage for Canada is, that Canada can practically never talk about its defence in the Alliance because we have already contracted out our defence, out of NATO. It goes back to the point I made earlier, the fragmentation of NATO strategy. So we are in a very difficult position, and you know we have to compensate for these disadvantages with what diplomatic skill we can muster and with what intellectual input we can make into these consultations, and we do our best. I mean I did my best in those days and I was well supported by the Department. But it wasn't easy.

[HILL] Are there any other particular aspects of your work at NATO in that period that you'd like to mention?

[HALSTEAD] It's hard for me to think of anything right off the bat like that.

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[HILL] Good morning. This is a further session with Ambassador Halstead. In the last one we were dealing partly with his period as Ambassador to NATO from 1980 to 1982, and this is the period we'd like to continue with today. However, before we go into some of those questions again, I wonder, Ambassador Halstead, if there is any small item that you think you'd like to mention with respect to earlier periods, having reflected on our conversations about them.

[HALSTEAD] Well, yes, thank you, that does remind me of a small but quite significant incident during my time between 1952 and 1955 when I was NATO Desk Officer in the Department in Ottawa. I had a conversation the other day which reminded me of an incident which came after the Lisbon Ministerial Meeting of NATO, where the famous force goals were established, which later proved quite unrealistic in terms of the capacity of the European allies to raise forces of that order. I remember accompanying Mr. Pearson to a subsequent Ministerial meeting held in Paris unfortunately I can't remember the date, but it was at a later date, when it had become clear that the Lisbon force goals had become unrealistic and when the Americans were pressing for German rearmament. At about the same time the Americans decided to extend their nuclear umbrella over the European allies in order, of course, to reassure them and to make up for the shortfall in conventional forces. And I can remember that on the eve of our setting off for this ministerial meeting in Paris, Mr. Pearson had been informed by the Americans that this extension of the nuclear deterrent to cover western Europe was going to be announced at that ministerial meeting and he asked me what I thought of this. My first reaction was to think that this was of course a good thing, in that it would enhance the security of the European allies. But my second thought, perhaps the more important, was how on earth are we going to control these things; and when I put that question to Mr. Pearson, I remember him saying that the Americans had not said anything about that, and that he assumed that their control would remain exclusively in the hands of the President of the United States, which of course was the correct assumption. But it did leave totally unanswered the broader question of how that decision would be reached and how that now crucial element of nuclear weapons and the nuclear deterrence was to be factored into NATO strategy. So that's the problem which of course remains with us today. NATO's been grappling with it ever since - the nuclear dilemma.

[HILL] Well, if we go on then to your period as Ambassador to NATO. I think one of the things which we were beginning to touch on last time was the question of NATO's consultations and policies towards those areas, or those issues, lying outside the central core of Alliance and NATO concerns. For example, there was a lot of movement on the international scene in this period in the Middle East, Central America, Asia, and Africa; and I wonder if you could say something about how you felt about NATO consultations about issues in those areas. For example, I'm thinking, at that point Zimbabwe obtained its independence. Was there much discussion about Southern Africa, what about Central America, and so on?

[HALSTEAD] Yes, this is the famous out-of-area problem. And it certainly did occupy a lot of the NATO Council's time during my period in Brussels. And this was stimulated by the invasion of Afghanistan, of course, which highlighted out-of-area as a problem for NATO. It had drawn attention to the lack of any concerted or agreed policy or even strategy to deal with out-of-area questions. There was, of course, never any idea that it would be politically feasible or even desirable to extend the NATO area as such; the NATO area had been defined at the time of the signing of the Treaty, and that remained; but what was equally clear was that events in parts of the world outside of the NATO area could affect the security of the NATO allies and were therefore a legitimate subject for discussion and consultations in NATO. And that principle had been laid

down some years before in the course of the development of the process of NATO consultations in which Canada had quite an important role to play.

[HILL] Are you thinking in particular of the Atlantic Declaration signed in Ottawa in 1974?

[HALSTEAD] I am. And earlier contributions like the report of the Three Wise Men, which Mike Pearson participated in. So Canada had traditionally taken the attitude that it was desirable for NATO to consult on the problems even though it could not as an Alliance act outside the NATO area, but that it was desirable for the Alliance to, if possible, anticipate problems and crises so as to be in a position to concert the attitude of the allies and so that they were working from the same basis of agreed assessments and if possible agreed objectives, and not arguing in public about what the importance of this or that area was, and arguing about what was at issue and arguing about how best to deal with this problem.

[HILL] And more particularly not pursuing policies which were at odds with each other.

[HALSTEAD] Right - not pursuing policies which were at odds with each other. And now you referred to Zimbabwe and my recollection is that that was already a *fait accompli* before I got to Brussels, so I can't speak from personal experience about that. But problems did arise like Central America - Nicaragua and El Salvador - problems like the Persian Gulf following the invasion of Afghanistan, (when, incidentally, it was the view of some observers, particularly of the American observers, that the Soviet objective, the longer term objective in invading Afghanistan, had been to push on to a warm water outlet on the Persian Gulf. I never personally shared that assessment.) This meant that following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan there were repeated consultations about the situation in the Persian Gulf, the threat to the Persian Gulf and how to deal with it. There were consultations about various places in Africa, Southern Africa including Angola, of course, the Horn of Africa, Soviet intentions in Ethiopia, and the implications for other countries in that part of the world and so on.

[HILL] What about Namibia?

[HALSTEAD] My recollection is that Namibia was not much discussed in the NATO Council as such, but during my time Namibia was the subject of a five power group who were in fact all members of NATO, and this five-power group met on the fringes of NATO meetings so that's the way it was handled, that's my recollection. Now the five, were, let's see, the U.S., U.K., FRG, Canada and France. So those were the five, and I can remember going to meetings of the five with the Canadian Foreign Minister held on the fringes of ministerial meetings. But that was the way that was handled. Now, I felt rather strongly that it was very bad for Alliance unity to make no serious effort to arrive at some shared assessment of these problems: that it wasn't good enough just to talk about them. Incidently, in this connection I should mention, and I'm jumping around here, but I should mention the existence of a series of regional experts' groups, which met and as far as I know still meet twice a year, in principle, to discuss, among the middle ranking officers from capitals who deal with these specific regions, discuss the state of play in these various regions with particular reference to the dangers of Soviet infiltration or internal subversion. And there is one for Latin America, one for Africa, one for the Middle East, one for Asia, one for the Mediterranean, so the world is more or less covered by these regional experts groups. But their reports are not intended to be the basis for action by the Council; they are just brought to the attention of the Council to note, and there is some pressure of course to reach a consensus, but no necessity. So, although these are very useful in bringing evolving situations to the attention of the Council, they don't provide any kind of basis for action in the Council or for decisions by the Council. But what I tried to do while I was there, was to bring the Council to agree on a procedure

for dealing with out-of-area problems, and this procedure was in three stages, really. One was just the circulation of information, and there should be some obligation on NATO members to circulate all the information that they could on problems that might affect NATO security. Then the next stage is the sharing of assessments and the arriving, if possible, at agreed assessments. And then the final stage, and of course the most difficult, is to arrive at, to establish what we call common objectives, that is to agree on what it is that it is desirable to do about that problem - the action of course being left to member governments because, as I said before, NATO as an alliance as such could not operate in these out-of-area places. And the Canadian delegation managed to get this kind of procedure outlined in the Defence Planning Committee, but when that came to the attention of the Council (of course France was not on the Defence Planning Committee), when it came to the attention of the Council, the French spotted it immediately, and expressed grave concern that this might lead NATO into the taking of positions on out-of-area problems, and this they were basically very opposed to. So our efforts to get a similar sort of procedure agreed in the Council itself, at the NATO Ministerial meeting, were not entirely successful: the wording became very watered down. In the Defence Planning Committee the decision read that it was desireable to do these things and arrive at common objectives, particularly if there was any question of some members of NATO taking action singly or in concert, in response to a request for assistance from a country outside the NATO area, and that sort of language. But we couldn't get anything that precise in the Council. Now you might think that this was going rather far for a country like Canada, which, after all, has not any particular axe to grind or fish to fry in relation to Africa, or Latin America, or some of these other places, but we proceeded on the basis of two considerations. One was that the most important implication for NATO of any of these situations was not only security but also solidarity - that NATO itself could be very severely split or fractured because of arguments and still worse, as you said a moment ago, mutually conflicting actions and statements about a problem like Central America. And we, I think, Canada has traditionally been very conscious of the need to care for Alliance coherence and unity. And the second consideration, which perhaps was a consideration in my mind more than in Ottawa's mind, was that the world has been changing and the Alliance has to change too if it's going to keep up with events. We can't look at NATO security as one thing and security in the rest of the world as something totally different. One is going to impinge on the other, and it is also bad for NATO cohesion for the United States to be left, so to speak, totally, I mean, solely responsible for global security, with the rest of the Allies focussing sort of inwardly on NATO security. This doesn't imply that the rest of us like Canada are prepared to take on concrete commitments in the rest of the world. But unless we are prepared at least to acknowledge that there is a problem there, that we shouldn't leave it exclusively to the United States to deal with out-of-area issues, in terms of policy, in terms of objectives and so on, then the United States is going to go its own way quite irrespective of the views of the rest of the allies, and those actions in other parts of the world are going to have an impact also on NATO.

[HILL] Well, I think that that's very much borne out by, for example, the situation in the Middle East, where there's never been a possibility of establishing this neat division of labour between the global responsibility and the regional one (I mean that of the European region, the NATO region). One recalls particularly the Suez Crisis and the '73 Middle East Crisis which in my opinion came close to splitting NATO apart. It was those issues, rather than any differences in assessments about Soviet behaviour, which were the most dangerous.

[HALSTEAD] Quite so. And the Middle East was, and will probably continue to be, the most difficult region for NATO to deal with, because of this overlap between NATO interests and the interests of individual allies.

[HILL] While you were there, this is sort of going on to a rather detailed point following your general comments about consultative requirements, but while you were there, I think the Israel invasion of Lebanon occurred, which certainly made an impact where I was. Was there much consultation on that in NATO?

[HALSTEAD] Not as much as I think there should have been. Of course the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, like so many of the problems in the Middle East, is complicated by the relationship of the United States to Israel, which in turn is very much complicated by domestic political circumstances in the United States. So it is an extraordinarily difficult subject to discuss with any degree of frankness and openness in NATO. The European allies, particularly the members of the European Community, which have probably the major interests in the Middle East, they have tried over the years to develop a European approach to the Middle East which they would like to see more balanced than the US approach. They regard the US approach as too unquestioningly pro-Israel, and by the same token alienating unnecessarily moderate Arab governments. The Europeans have tried for some time to establish what they would regard as a more balanced approach, that cultivates moderate Arab governments as well as Israel. And they were placed in a very difficult position by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon because it put them between a rock and a hard place. Even the moderate Arab governments that they were trying to cultivate were of course strongly critical of the Israeli move, but there was little or no criticism in Washington of that move. So where do you go, where is a balanced policy in a situation where the Israelis have undertaken a move that is censored throughout the Arab world but supported by Washington? What does that do for consultations in NATO? So my recollection is that although obviously the situation was discussed, there was more or less agreement to disagree and just to see the drama played out and try, then, to reconstruct something after Lebanon. But there was always a problem with the Middle East during my time in NATO, apart from the invasion of Lebanon, and that was that, first of all, it was difficult to talk of one US policy towards the Middle East, because there were factions in Washington; and secondly I guess the US official policy was based on the so called strategic consensus with Israel. That is a consensus that assumes that the major threat to the security and stability of the Middle East comes from the Soviet Union. Whereas, I think most, if not all, of the allies of the United States considered that the major threat to the security of the Middle East came from the Arab-Israeli conflict. And so for too much of the time these consultations consisted really of talking past each other.

[HILL] Where did the Iran-Iraq war fit into this?

[HALSTEAD] Well, it was and is a terribly complex question. I have to say here right away that I am no Middle East expert, I never have been; I've never had to deal directly with Middle East affairs. I'm an interested observer, certainly, and had to be informed to the extent that I participated in these NATO consultations, but I don't feel that I'm a Middle East expert.

[HILL] But how did NATO perceive it? How was it perceived within NATO? This is where you do have the expertise.

[HALSTEAD] Well, Iran-Iraq complicated an already complex picture still more. Because I think if there was a NATO position on Iran-Iraq, it was that it would be bad for NATO interests if either Iran or Iraq emerged from the war clearly victorious. If Iran was the clear victor it would strengthen Iranian efforts to establish its dominance in that area, and would be of course a boost to Islamic fundamentalists. If Iraq emerged clearly victorious, and that didn't seem to be a very high probability, then it would probably provide a vehicle for greater Soviet penetration of the area. So the strange thing is that NATO's position, and this was pretty well shared I think in NATO, its

position was that the war itself did not, was not, a threat to NATO security interests, I mean the war itself. But the problem was how to get any kind of handle on the outcome of the war. And during my time there, I don't recall any particularly bright ideas about this. But the war as such was not a divisive issue in NATO. It didn't divide the allies the way the Israeli invasion of Lebanon or the Arab/Israeli conflict did.

[HILL] Another issue which was discussed by NATO quite a lot while you were there, and which in some degree links into the Middle East issue, is the question of terrorism. I think there was a fair amount of discussion about that at that time in NATO?

[HALSTEAD] Well, when I was in Germany, there was an Economic Summit in Bonn at which Prime Minister Trudeau took the initiative to raise the terrorism issue. It came after some dramatic hijacking, I forget which one it was now, but Trudeau was able to produce, under those circumstances - I mean his timing was perfect - a fairly straightforward and practical approach which everybody agreed to; and that was a basis, in fact, for the later approach to the terrorist problem. I can't remember NATO contributing anything very substantial to that basic approach. But there were certainly discussions in NATO whenever there was ever a terrorist attack; and talk, of course, about reinforcing anti-terrorist measures. But the problem was not to find a new approach; the approach that had already been established earlier at this Bonn economic summit was a valid one. The question was whether all the allies were prepared to do what they said they were going to do. Because there was always a conflict of interest. One airline, you know, didn't want to go as far as another airline, another national airline, in cutting off routes to countries that engaged in terrorist activities. And of course another element that was very present in our discussions in NATO of terrorism was the US anathema to Colonel Qadhafi. That very much skewed the US approach to terrorism: they were always blaming Qadhafi for things that he may well have been involved in, but that was a running sore with them, Qadhafi. That episode in the Gulf of Sidra took place then, when the US shot down a couple of Libyan planes; and of course the feud with Qadhafi was complicated by the question of international law because Qadhafi claimed the whole of the Gulf of Sidra, and the Americans, consistent with their approach throughout the world, regarded those as international waters.

[HILL] On a quite different question, I think that this was the period, while you were there, that the Falklands War broke out. Was that a divisive issue?

[HALSTEAD] Well, it was a delicate issue. I think in the end the divisive elements were contained and, as a whole, I think NATO took a fairly unified stand. The British were careful not to bring the Falklands issue into the NATO Council. They did not want it to be considered an out-of-area issue for NATO. Their position was that it was their problem and they were going to look after it, and the implications for NATO were implications that they would let NATO know about but were not asking for any assistance on. The implications for NATO, the main implications, were the reassignment of naval and other British forces which had been assigned to NATO. The British drew down, to quite an extent, forces assigned to NATO, in order to pursue the Falklands War. The European Community was much more actively seized of the Falklands crisis than NATO was. It was to the European Community that the British went for the sanctions that they wanted against Argentina. They didn't come to NATO for that; they informed NATO of what they were doing in the European Community.

[HILL] It's an interesting case, because they were looking for support to some of the allies, or perhaps all of the allies, in one form or another, but not to NATO.

[HALSTEAD] And that was very deliberately done that way. They of course went to the Americans and asked and received enormous support from the Americans. They went to their European partners and after a certain amount of toing and froing got most of what they wanted by way of sanctions against Argentina. They came to Canada bilaterally, and asked us to support them in the United Nations and elsewhere, but they never came to NATO for any of this.

[HILL] Again on a quite different issue, how much interest was there in NATO among the other allies, in this whole issue of cruise missile testing in Canada? It is an issue which in 1982, if I remember, 1981 also, caused a great deal of furor at home here. But one wonders sometimes how much interest anyone else took in it.

[HALSTEAD] Next to none, I would have to say, and this I'm afraid is typical of NATO's attitude towards North America, the North American region of NATO. The fact of the matter is, even to this day, that NATO is regarded both by the Americans and by the European allies as an organization for the defence of Western Europe, by, principally, the United States. In that respect it is something of a one-way street. The Europeans do not contribute to North American defence and the Europeans don't really show, have never shown, much if any interest in North American defence, or in Canada's contribution to that defence. Which is why I have, particularly since my retirement, made a point on every occasion I can get, of drawing attention to the anomaly of this, and emphasizing the desirability of Canada advocating a more reciprocal relationship within the Alliance. But the cruise missile testing in Canada, to the extent that it was noticed at all by my European colleagues, it was just taken for granted as a bilateral arrangement with the United States; and I guess they wondered what all the fuss was about.

[HILL] I link this a little bit in my own mind with some other disarmament issues, and similar things, which were around at that time. We had a parliamentary study here in Ottawa at that time on Canada's security and disarmament policies, and were discussing such things as the nuclear freeze, no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and so on. Those were some of the big things that were around at that time, partly linked into preparations for the UN Special Session on Disarmament in the summer of 1982. How much discussion was there inside NATO on the no-first-use issue and the nuclear freeze?

[HALSTEAD] Quite a lot. Because, of course, those two questions were very much brought to the fore by the whole agitation that accompanied the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. And there was a parallel movement in the United States in favour of no-first-use. They got quite respectable and important backing in Congress, as a matter of fact, and there was an article by McNamara and company in Foreign Affairs; and the peace movement in the United States mounted a considerable campaign in favour also of a nuclear moratorium. So there were repeated discussions of these questions in NATO, but I wouldn't say there was any disposition on the part of the NATO council to modify NATO policy on either of these questions. And of course the US government, the US representative in the NATO Council, representing the official position in Washington, discounted these moves in the United States in favour of no-first-use. I think it was clear that no- first-use would effectively kill the NATO doctrine of flexible response, and by the same token destroy the power of the nuclear deterrent. You couldn't have a deterrent and say that you weren't going to use it. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons could not be reconciled with an undertaking not to use them. And as I said, I can remember saying during one of these debates in the NATO Council, that the problem is not the first use of nuclear weapons, the problem is the first use of force by either side, and we should focus on that. It's a false debate to talk about who's going to use nuclear weapons first. What we should focus on is the prevention of the use of force on either side. And it is the side which first uses

force that will be responsible for anything that happens after that. And you cannot realistically expect an armed conflict between nuclear powers to be limited to conventional forces.

[HILL] There was a certain amount of talk about building up conventional forces in this period. What was the impulse behind that?

[HALSTEAD] Well, as to the impulse, this came very much from an American concern that the nuclear deterrent was losing its credibility (in a situation where there was nuclear parity between the United States and Soviet Union, rough nuclear parity, but a continuing conventional imbalance which favored the Soviet Union). In those circumstances the Americans were afraid, and not only the Americans, that the threat to use nuclear weapons in case of a Soviet attack would no longer be credible because the ensuing exchange would hurt the West as much as the East. So, in other words, what was supposed to be a deterrent to Soviet aggression could, under those circumstances, become a self deterrent.

[HILL] But there has been a long long history, going back to the Lisbon force goals, of allied commanders or the NATO Council calling for more effort on the conventional side. But it seems a very difficult proposition, partly because it's a very expensive one.

[HALSTEAD] Yes, it's always been a difficult proposition. But this situation that I've tried to describe caused the Americans to mount a new effort to raise the level of conventional forces, the level of NATO conventional forces. And I can remember the first time that General Rogers, then SACEUR, called on me after my appointment, my arrival in Brussels. It was the practice for the major NATO commanders to call on each new Ambassador, new Permanent Representative. And I remember very clearly General Rogers' call. Because we got into this very question, and he said that what he wanted, as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, was sufficient conventional force to halt the initial, any initial, Soviet attack and to break up any follow-on forces, and thereby to put the onus for the first use of nuclear weapons on the Soviets' back rather than upon the Western back. He had very clearly in his mind what he wanted to do; he did not want to see NATO put in the position of having to use nuclear forces first. He thought the decision for the first use of nuclear forces was in itself a deterrent. The man, the President, the Commander, the side that had to make that decision on the first use of nuclear weapons, was going to be under enormous deterrence. So he wanted the conventional situation to be such that we would force the Soviets to bear that responsibility, we would put that monkey on the Soviets' back. I think this was very sound. And out of that reasoning came General Rogers' proposal for what later became known as FOFA. This was variously described as Follow on Forces Attack, also known as Deep Strike, but then dropped because Deep Strike was misrepresented by some European countries as a drive for Leningrad or Moscow or wherever. But the strategy, General Rogers' strategy, was to be able to hold the first line of attack, which he felt reasonably confident in doing, with some strengthening, and then have the new technological means necessary to stop that second echelon, when all those reserves coming in from the western military districts of the Soviet Union would hit an already depleted and exhausted front line. His idea was to stop those before they ever got to the NATO front line with this FOFA. And that, I think, was the origin of this new drive for greater conventional forces. And I think it has really been happening since I left. The impression I have is that it's been largely successful in strengthening conventional defence, to a point where the net deterrent, the combined deterrent effect, is credible again.

[HILL] In the circumstances, how much attention was paid to MBFR at this time? Of course, that is one other way out of this dilemma.

[HALSTEAD] A lot of attention in terms of quantity and the allocation of time. Perhaps I could explain briefly the relationship between NATO and the various arms control negotiations. The relationship is different in each case. Only MBFR was a NATO negotiation as such. And in the case of MBFR, NATO discussed and drew up the instructions for all the Western Ambassadors in MBFR. Their instructions came not from their individual governments, but from NATO.

[HILL] But they did get some instructions direct?

[HALSTEAD] Oh, obviously, each government would suggest, would add its own gloss, but the basic instructions were established in NATO. I mean it's a rather unusual thing for an organization like this to be issuing the instructions for a multilateral negotiation like MBFR. In the case of the INF negotiations, in Geneva, only the United States negotiated on behalf of NATO; but the United States consulted the NATO allies and took account of their comments in the instructions that went from Washington to the US negotiator in Geneva. In the case of the START negotiations (and also the space "non-negotiations", because they never really got anywhere), the United States is negotiating about weapons under its exclusive control, unlike INF where it's negotiating about weapons under dual control. START is exclusively about US weapons and therefore entails exclusively bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. What the US does is to inform NATO, and of course listen to anything people in NATO have to say, but the instructions that go from Washington to the US negotiator in START are not formally subject to any alteration by NATO.

[HILL] But certainly, as you say, there obviously was a lot of attention to MBFR, because NATO was deeply involved in this whole issue. Was there any expectation, as you can recall, at the time, of any breakthroughs on MBFR at all?

[HALSTEAD] No, I wouldn't say so, but perhaps my opinion is rather colored by my own assessment. I never expected anything to come out of MBFR. And I said so from the beginning and for one very simple reason: we had no leverage over the Soviets in MBFR. Why should the Soviets, trying to see it from their point of view, why should the Soviets agree to a disproportionate reduction of their forces, and thereby abandon voluntarily their conventional superiority, when they had nothing to lose, absolutely nothing, by retaining that superiority. The only way, the only leverage, we could possibly have obtained or used would have been the threat, which we would have had to back up, of course, to re-establish the conventional balance unilaterally. But of course we were unable to do that, so I always thought that MBFR was a sham. And of course it originated not in order to obtain concessions from the Soviets, it originated in order to counter the Mansfield Amendment in the US Congress, so the NATO MBFR proposal was not aimed at Moscow originally, it was aimed at Washington. And everybody knew that.

[HILL] Well, I'd like to argue this point, but I think we'd better not do that now. This does bring us to perhaps the last major question I'd like to ask you. While you were in Brussels, there was a major review of East/West relations launched within NATO. Could you tell us something about the origins of that? For example, it included the notion that NATO would be prepared to foreswear the notion of military superiority, and also to recognize the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. I just wondered what this whole process was all about.

[HALSTEAD] Why was it felt necessary to do that? It was felt necessary to do that because there was increasing evidence of a gap between the US approach and the approach of most, if not all, of the NATO Allies, on how to deal with the Soviet Union. And of course this gap first became evident, I suppose, with President Reagan's various pronouncements on the Soviet Union including the "Evil Empire" speech. As the Reagan era dawned, it became more and more clear that the

approach of the US administration under Reagan was appreciably different from what had been taken for granted, in the Alliance, as the Alliance strategy towards the Soviet Union. And this was a matter of discussion in the Alliance, not out and out between the United States and the rest, but with respect to specific policy questions on how to deal with them, how to reply to this Soviet proposal or how to deal with that Soviet action. And it became clear to a number of us that this was not only a debate between the US and its allies but it was also a debate internally in the United States. This debate was illustrated in such questions as whether NATO should be aiming at military supremacy or at military equality with the Soviet Union; whether NATO should be basing its plans on nuclear deterrence or on nuclear war fighting; whether it should be the purpose of the West to make life as difficult as possible for the Soviet Union, (should we support policies that might destabilize or weaken the Soviet Union?) or whether the Western purpose should be to seek a reasonable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. These were the sorts of questions that were being discussed both internally in the United States, and in a less open way, but implicitly, in NATO, in the NATO Council, in relation to policy questions that came up there. And these differences, as I say, became more evident over time, as the Reagan Administration took a harder and harder, hawkish line. Now a lot of people would say, "Yes, it talked, it took a very hawkish line talking but was very restrained in action." Well, that is partly true, I would grant that is true to some extent, but not entirely. But it opened up some serious rifts between the United States and the Allies in relation to such questions as the Soviet gas pipeline, because some American opinion, at any rate, or some opinion in the US Administration, was against the pipeline, not for the ostensible reason that it would create a dependency of the Western Europeans on Soviet gas. That was never, really, an argument that held any water in my view. Their real reason was that it would give the Soviets valuable foreign currency. For somebody whose approach was to do anything possible to weaken the Soviet Union, that was something to stop; and there were a lot of other things, the question of credits, trade credits to the Soviet Union were also very much to the fore. In fact, a lot of time in the NATO Council was spent, during my period, on economic questions, but economic questions that had either a strategic background or had some security spinoff. And I think we made a fair amount of progress in reaching procedures that would enable these questions to be more effectively dealt with, because one of the problems was, and I'm digressing here a little bit, of course, that from the beginning, economic aspects of defence tended to be played down in NATO. Economic questions were handled in other organizations, and there was really nowhere where the strategic implications of economic policy, the security implications, could be discussed; and I think, during the time I'm talking about, it became evident that something had to be done about it, and so some procedures were worked out involving COCOM as well, which I think enabled us to fill this gap. But also what became apparent was that what was really behind all these disagreements on credits and gas pipelines and a number of other policy questions that came up, was this basic lack of a consensus on what Western strategy towards the Soviet Union should be. Based on what premises, based on what objectives, based on what sort of an assessment of Soviet intentions. There was no agreement on these questions, and so some of us began to urge that NATO engage in a thorough-going review of these issues, another look at the whole thing, in an effort at least to bring some of the things out in the open, to talk about them as issues, and if possible of course, narrow this gap. And I think it was a useful exercise. In a sense it was re-inventing the wheel, because NATO had done a similar exercise back while I was still in Bonn, shortly before I got to Brussels. And Robert Ford was a member of a task force that did another review of NATO policy towards the Soviet Union. But this one was more thorough going, the one I'm talking about, which started just shortly after I left NATO, as I recall. The preparations for it, I mean the talk of its necessity and so on, was very much on during my time there, but the study itself was launched just after I left and was brought to a conclusion the following spring at the spring ministerial meeting in 1983 (I think the ministerial meeting was held in Washington, if my recollection is right), and the NATO ministers at that meeting adopted a new sort of statement or

declaration of NATO policy towards the Soviet Union which came down, on balance, on the side of equality, *modus vivendi*, accommodation, and the strictly defensive side of the question, as I mentioned earlier.

[HILL] Just one last, specific question. Can you say something briefly about the state of relations between France and the other Allies in the period while you were there? I'm not sure when President Mitterand was elected to office, but of course he was a Socialist and not a Gaullist, the first non-Gaullist for a long time. I wondered how much impact this had?

[HALSTEAD] Well, it's an interesting question, because while Mitterand is certainly a Socialist, there is an enormously powerful and influential body of bureaucracy in the Quai d'Orsay and perhaps in other government departments, which maintains a degree of continuity, no matter who the President is and no matter who the Prime Minister is. It gives, it adapts and it modifies, but it strives to maintain a degree of continuity, so that even under Mitterand, what I would call Gaullist ideals, about limitations on NATO political consultations, what is proper for NATO to discuss and decide on and what is not, remain very restrictive. But the fact is that, regardless of the Ambassador at NATO and regardless of the President in Paris, France plays a role which allows NATO, as an organization, a very short leash in the field of political consultation, and essentially of course France is involved in NATO only in that field of political consultation. It is something of an anomaly that France takes no part in the military side of NATO, remains in the political side, but is constantly reining in the political side. Of course, on the military side, it is true that, in practice, France has been moving, in recent years, into a position of closer and closer practical cooperation with NATO. But I think the main difficulty that NATO faces with France is not on the military side, it is in fact on the political side, where the French time and time again refuse to allow political consultation to go as far as establishing something called an Alliance position. They have an aversion to Alliance positions on things. This is a nationalist approach.

[HILL] One very last question, which is a very general one, how valuable do you think that membership in NATO is for Canada?

[HALSTEAD] Well, I think it is extraordinarily valuable. I think it is the keystone to our defence policy, in the sense that we would not have, in my view, would not have a coherent defence policy without NATO. We would have bilateral arrangements with the United States, we will always have to have those. But they would place us in a situation of permanent inferiority in the sense that because of the discrepancy, the disparity of power between us, we would simply be tagging along in such an arrangement, and tagging along moreover without really any coherent defence policy of our own, because if we were limited to contributing to the defence of North America we would be dealing with only one aspect of Canada's security problems. The other aspect is in Europe, and only by contributing to that can we have any sort of say in the policy that affects East/West stability, and it is East/West stability really that is the most important factor in Canadian security, in the security of Canada. So that's the defence side. I would say, moreover, politically, NATO provides us with a multilateral forum which we would not otherwise have, where we can discuss the most important questions of war and peace, and global security, with our closest friends and allies. And in that multilateral forum, of course, again the disparity of power between Canada and the United States alone is diluted. That's of enormous importance for Canada.

And, finally, I think that it adds an important dimension to Canada's relations with the countries of Western Europe. Our membership in NATO is a way of saying to the countries of Western Europe that we share with them, not only interests in trade and scientific co-operation and cultural exchanges and all that, but also the most basic interest any country can have, that is its

interest in its own security. And our participation in NATO, backed by the stationing of our forces in Europe, is a way of saying to the Europeans: "You and we have the same view of international security: we share with you an interest in defending our values and this is the bedrock of our cooperation."

[HILL] Thank you very much indeed.

JAMES TAYLOR

[HILL]¹³ Good morning. Our guest this morning is Mr. James Taylor, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Taylor, I am delighted that you could spare us the time to see us this morning, and we are very pleased that you are willing to participate in this project.

[TAYLOR] Thanks very much, I'm glad to.

[HILL] As you know, this project is an oral history of Canadian policy in NATO. We are examining the development of Canadian foreign policy since 1945 with particular reference to Canada's contribution to the work of NATO, Canada's pursuit of its own direct national interests within NATO, and the function of NATO in helping Canada to pursue some of its broader foreign policy goals, notably the enhancement of international peace and security. We are looking at the formulation of Canadian foreign policy, at the work carried out inside NATO headquarters in Brussels, and at the evolving role of NATO in world affairs.

So in your own case, I would like to focus very strongly on your period as Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council between 1982 and 1985. However, we would like to obtain some idea of your work and the views you developed in other periods, so we will follow your career in a series of phases.

Part I - Early Years, to 1953

[HILL] If we could turn then to Part I, which is the early years up to 1953. I note that you were born in Hamilton, and afterwards received a B.A. from McMaster, another B.A. from Oxford University and an M.A. from Oxford, prior to joining the Department in 1953. I just wondered if you could give us a little bit of your background and any impressions from the early years which you think have had a bearing on your work in the Department, particularly with respect to NATO and international security?

[TAYLOR] I suppose the only thing that is possibly of interest there is that the Department of External Affairs of those days had certainly come to public attention. It had a number of distinguished senior members, many of whom had begun their professional lives as academics. The first of them I ever met personally was Hugh Keenleyside, who came to McMaster when I was an undergraduate. My Professor, Chester New, introduced me to him. I guess that was a sign - at least in Professor New's mind and maybe in my own, although I cannot honestly remember too clearly -that the notion of entering the foreign service was a possibility then. But it was not that serious a possibility. I had intended then to be an academic. I think that was really what my professors thought I would be; and it was not until I had been at Oxford that I formed a different impression. Those who were supervising my studies in England also had the clear impression that I was more cut out to be a civil servant than I was to be an historian. By then, I had written the Foreign Service exam and been accepted.

The ties between academic life and the diplomatic career were perhaps closer then than they are in the present generation. The Department of External Affairs I entered had a number of senior officers who seemed rather closer still to academic life than is true at all of the present generation.

Interviewers: Hill, Cox. Interview dates: 21/5/87 and 28/5/87.

We had certainly some men serving as senior officers who had had distinguished academic careers, as well as being distinguished diplomats. I guess that is something that has changed in my lifetime.

[HILL] That is a rather interesting comment because I think we have been reading a good deal about people like Escott Reid and so on. In fact, we hope to meet him shortly. David knows him. I think they seem to have had a great impact, in the early years, on Canada's policy towards NATO, and one has the impression that they were ideas people, as well as practitioners.

[TAYLOR] Yes, very much so.

Part II - Early career, 1953-61

[HILL] Mr. Taylor, after you joined the Department, presumably you spent some time in Ottawa, and then went to Hanoi in 1955-1956 as advisor to the International Control and Security Commission, if I have got the title correctly. I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about that experience. That was your first assignment overseas, and it was in Asia, a long way from Oxford or Ottawa. How did you find that experience?

[TAYLOR] First, I should say that, while it was by no means a matter of regret, it was not at all a matter of choice. I had, in fact, been loaned from the Department of External Affairs after only one year of preliminary training to the Cabinet Secretariat. I was working as a Junior Secretary in the Privy Council Office. This was a tiny little affair of six or eight people located at the back of the East Block. I mention this because I had the good fortune to work very closely with R. B. Bryce, who was then the Secretary to the Cabinet, so that within a year of coming to work for the Public Service, I was as a beginner being trained by one of the great public servants of this generation. That was an extraordinary piece of good fortune - as it happened, outside the Department of External Affairs. But on the other hand, for a foreign service officer, it was a bit of a disappointment when all my colleagues were being posted abroad: I think I was the last one of my promotion that stayed in Ottawa. My first posting had been from the front of the East Block to the back, but all of us who were healthy and unmarried knew from July, 1954 on, when Canada accepted at the Geneva Conference the invitation to participate in the International Commissions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, that it was only a matter of time before we were sent to serve there because it was a tremendous drain on manpower. And indeed, that happened: the Department called in all its loans within a few months. I was brought back into the Department. In the end, I was sent to Indochina. I was only given three weeks' notice of the posting. In fact, I was told I was going to be assigned to Laos, although when I got to Indochina, I actually was sent on to Hanoi. In that sense, I got no notice whatsoever of my first posting. But in another sense, I had been mentally prepared to go for a year, because we all knew, as I say, that it was inevitable.

Hanoi was an extraordinary experience. I was not there as one of the first shift; I was really in the second shift of people who served there. It was a combined - well, a tri-national operation - under Indian chairmanship, and the Indian chairmen of the Commission (there were two while I was there), were both extremely distinguished men, whom I remember, again, as models of great public servants: M. J. Desai and G. P. Parthasaraty, who were both ICS men, and quite different but impressive men in their different ways. Desai and Parthasaraty I both saw again when I was subsequently serving in Delhi. But we were working also with a Polish delegation, an Indian delegation, and a Canadian delegation, each civil/military, as well as a little international secretariat. The headquarters of the Commission was in Hanoi. This was only a matter of months after what was then called the "Viet Minh", the Communist government, had taken over and created the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North. Hanoi was a very small place. All the eminent

figures of the Communist government were men whom we had a chance to see from time to time at quite close quarters: Ho Chi Minh himself, General Giap who was the great victor in Vietnamese eves of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Pham Van Dong, Ha Van Lau who was at that time a mere Colonel and the head of the PAVN, the People's Army of Vietnam, Liaison Office to the Commission, and so on - so a number of figures who came to prominence when the Communists won their war against the French and subsequently. Because that generation of Vietnamese leaders They were a very durable lot. They hardly changed, apart from Ho's death, for a generation. People like Pham Van Dong and Ha Van Lau were still around - so that some of these names came again to prominence in North American consciousness at the height of the Vietnam war with the involvement of the United States. In that sense, I suppose, retrospectively - particularly to the extent that Canadians to some degree are marked by the trauma of the Vietnam War because we reverberate to things that happen in the United States - I was one of this group - which in the end included almost all single officers, and a number of others as well - a certain generation in the Canadian Foreign Service, and almost all of whom served in Indo China. Some of my contemporaries and some of the people who are still my best friends in the service are people I first served with in these rather extraordinary circumstances in Hanoi. I think that there was subsequently, when the Americans' Vietnam war was on, a difference, quite marked within the Department of External Affairs, which people commented on at the time, between those who had actually served on those Commissions and those who had not. Those who had served in Vietnam were on the whole less dewy-eyed about the nature of the régime. The reason for that was not that we thought the communists in the end were not likely to win. On the contrary, when we were there, the régime that had been put together in the South seemed such a shaky undertaking that I think you would have bet against its surviving for very long. So that it was not a matter either of believing that the Communists would not in the end take over all of Vietnam, nor of failing to understand what the roots of their ambitions were; but on the contrary, out of knowledge and out of watching them come and install themselves, and run their half, what was then just the northern half of the country from the 16th parallel north, people who were serving there at the time were given a pretty direct appreciation of the incredible degree of discipline, and indeed at times the ferocity with which these people were prepared to pursue their aims. Now some of the things that were going on at that time, I am speaking here of 1955, in the North were experiments that the Vietnamese themselves admitted subsequently were mistakes. But the kind of thing they were doing was pursuing a land reform on the original Chinese model, which was accompanied with something not much removed from lynch law. Anybody who was there and had experienced that, and who had dealt with the efforts that that régime put in place, above all - and this was a matter of direct concern to our Commissions - to inhibit the movement of people between the two halves of the country, was perfectly conscious that these were, to put it mildly, not a group of men to be dewy eyed about. They were extremely tough, extremely disciplined, extremely determined, prepared to make enormous sacrifices and in many respects, in that sense, admirable if you will; but certainly very far from being lovable.

That was a set of attitudes, I think, that was shared more or less by almost everybody who went to Vietnam. Whatever attitudes they may have had when they first went there, I think that that was the impact that dealing with that régime made on people; and that set of attitudes then, when 10 years on, the Americans were at the crisis of their war in Vietnam, led sometimes to quite a sharp difference in reactions between those who had had what they felt was in many ways an unpleasant direct experience of dealing with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and those who were seeing this from a distance.

[HILL] Did it also leave you with a sense that, in dealing with Communist powers in general, that one would need to be pretty hard-nosed by and large?

[TAYLOR] Well, I would not say so entirely. For instance, we had a Communist government represented on the Commission, and the Poles obviously included people of a certain spectrum of attitudes. Remember I am talking about 1955, so it is a long time ago; you have to go back to the atmosphere of Cold War and all the rest. But even then it was perfectly evident that some of the Poles at least were a pretty free-wheeling brand of Communist, and that you could not put some of them in the same category as you put a hardened Vietnamese revolutionary who had arrived in power after years of fighting a colonial war against the French in the jungle.

[HILL] I wonder if we could go on quickly to the next period, when you came back to Ottawa, and you were in the office of the Under-Secretary for three years. This, of course, was the period of the Diefenbaker government. Could you just tell us very briefly what your duties were at that time and something about the atmosphere surrounding the conduct of foreign affairs in that period, particularly with regard to such issues as nuclear weapons for the Canadian armed forces, policy towards NATO, and so on?

[TAYLOR] I was sent first to work for Norman Robertson as his Executive Assistant, and again this was extraordinarily good fortune. In fact, I cannot think of anybody who was as fortunate in such a short space of time to have worked for R. B. Bryce and then to have worked for Norman Robertson. I am afraid education of that kind does not exist anymore in the Public Service.

[HILL] Perhaps your junior officers see it differently.

[TAYLOR] I doubt it, because everyone thought of Norman Robertson, and rightly so, as an extraordinary man. It is often said of him, and Jack Granatstein had to cope with this in writing his biography, that those who had a chance to work for him, and hear him in private conversation and so on, had a sense of why in that generation he commanded such respect. But, of course, the mystery, or the difficulty rather, is that he wrote very little; he was not a good public speaker and did not speak in public very much, so that trying to reconstruct a personality like that and explain why he was such an enormous influence and why we went in such awe of him, is a little hard to do retrospectively. But nonetheless, I had the chance to work for him for a year, and I guess one learned by a sort of osmosis. He loaned me books from time to time. He was an omnivorous reader. Part of the extraordinary impact that he had on people (and this also, I think, has been commented on by people who contributed to the biography) was that he seemed to have read absolutely everything of any importance that had been published. You wondered how he ever found the time to do it. Well, that was just one way in which he appeared to set standards that were impossibly high for the rest of us. But at least you could admire them, even if you could not reach them.

He was placed - as all the senior public servants were - in a position of sensitivity and responsibility when the Diefenbaker government came to power because, of course, that was a revolution in our affairs after what - 22 years? - of Liberal government. Mr. Diefenbaker had some ideas of his own, and some initiatives of his own over a narrow range in foreign policy, that he wished to pursue. He had certain ideas about the Commonwealth and about the relationship with Britain, and Britain's early attempts to join the Common Market and so on. That was a set of issues at the time which interested Mr. Diefenbaker, aroused certain attitudes in him, and Mr. Diefenbaker was also interested in our relations with the Soviet Union, in the sense that he had carried with him from his Western background a sense of admiration for the Ukranian community in Canada. Certain of his feelings about the Soviet Union were, I think, very much influenced by the contacts he had in his lifetime with Canadian Ukrainians.

That was, in its way, as I say, a narrow range. The government had difficulties finding a Foreign Minister. (As I recall, there was only one minister in the first Diefenbaker government who had ever served as a minister before - there was one survivor from R. B. Bennett's government.) Initially the choice was Sidney Smith, the former President of the University of Toronto. Sidney Smith was a great public figure, and in his day, I think, one of the most renowned public speakers in Canada. Everybody knew him and he had a reputation of being a great administrator and a rather bluff, direct and jolly man, in addition to being university president, so that he had quite a considerable public image. But, of course, he was being asked to come into a difficult portfolio in late mid-life. I do not know how old he was at the time - I have forgotten -but in any event, it was asking a tremendous amount of him, and of course, his health as it happened was not certain, and he died in office, after a very short time. I can remember the day, being in the East Block in Norman Robertson's outer office, when we got the news that he had died, and Norman Robertson rushed out, I guess to go see the Prime Minister about it, and then came back.

Subsequently Mr. Howard Green, happily still alive, became our minister. Mr. Green's great focus was on disarmament. I remember a good deal about that period because by then I was taken out of the Under-Secretary's office and sent to work on disarmament matters. This marked, I think, the beginning of the period in which the Canadian government and the Department of External Affairs actually began to organize itself to provide a small nucleus of people who worked on disarmament as such. Up until that time it had been considered simply a part of UN affairs in People thought about it as a sort of intellectual off-shoot of the worrying and conceptualizing that had gone into creating the machinery of the Security Council, and so on. It was still a branch, a dimension of United Nations Affairs, and indeed organizationally it was treated that way. The first official who was more or less the director of the small group that worked on disarmament was Geoff Murray, who was the Head of the United Nations Division as it was then. He supervised initially Harry Jay, who went on to be our UN Ambassador in several capacities, and myself as the junior on disarmament matters. And then the Government brought in General Burns. He was the Government's advisor; that is, he had direct access to the Prime Minister. Some extremely interesting discussions at the time focused on Mr. Green's desire to contribute to the campaign to end all nuclear tests. That was one of the great issues of the time because of widespread public fears about fall-out from the explosions from the weapons tests that were then being conducted. Mr. Green wanted Canada to take a lead in bringing the tests to an end. So that was a principal thrust of policy.

Then there was also the notion that the Canadian government ought to be making a sort of independent intellectual contribution to the sum total of disarmament proposals, which at that time were negotiated bloc-to-bloc in a Committee of ten, I think it was, five East, five West. That is the ancestor of the present body in Geneva. But at the time, it was just straight East-West. This was also in the late days of the Eisenhower Administration, so it was not a period of great promise in disarmament matters. But at least it was a beginning. I think that created a kind of tradition which has gone on since of independent Canadian activity on a modest scale. But nonetheless, I think there was a sort of consciousness - raising, if you will, within the Government at the time about the importance of the issue, and the importance of this country's making its independent contribution to furthering disarmament. That has continued since, and in one way or another, we have gone on with separate structures. We still have today, of course, a special Ambassador for Disarmament. That is part of the machinery that traces its origins to that time.

Part III - Years in Paris, 1961-64

[HILL] Next you went to Paris, from 1961 to 1964, assigned partly to the delegation to the OECD and partly to NATO. The first two of those years were under the Diefenbaker government. What role did NATO play in Canadian policy under the Diefenbaker government?

[TAYLOR] In a sense, so far as Canada was concerned, we were dealing in Paris (where NATO was then located) with the European implications of the debate which was going on in Canada about nuclear weapons, about whether the Canadian Forces should have nuclear roles or not. That was an issue on which, as everyone knows, governments stood and fell in those days. Ultimately, that debate was decided. It was launched then and it was decided by a national consensus: in effect, that the Canadian Forces should be conventional forces, that the country should not have nuclear roles. And we got out of them. The decision really dates from that time. Because of the long lifetime of weapon systems, of course, it took years for all the nuclear roles to disappear. They disappeared fairly early on in Europe, so that our Forces have been conventional forces in Europe for - what? - two decades now. But it was only a very few years ago that the last of the nuclear systems here was phased out.

[COX] Right. The last year of the Trudeau government.

[TAYLOR] Yes, but not all that debate was stirring then. I guess the difficulty for the Government - well, for any Canadian government - I mean it was a problem both for the Diefenbaker government and for Mr. Pearson, at first, when he came to power also, was that the Forces had already had some of these roles. The Air Force in particular was, in the great Canadian tradition, very professional, highly trained, very good at its job, and therefore hard to replace. The major NATO commanders of the day were, I think, anxious to keep a high quality Air Force doing what it had originally been conceived of to do. With the replacement of the Sabres of the day, we had gone for the 104s, and, of course, the original thought was that they would have a nuclear role: and there was great technical debate at the time about whether it made sense to have invested in these expensive aircraft, only to convert them to a conventional role. I would have to refresh my memory about this, but speaking totally from memory and bearing in mind that I was not in Canada while a lot of this debate was on, my impression is that people did not fully realize that, in a sense, to take on the original nuclear role conceived of for the CF-104, we had to tear the Air Force out to the back wall. That is, it was an all-absorbing task right back to initial training, pilot selection and all the rest of it; it was something so delicate and difficult that you really had to orient a very large part of the Air Force totally from start to finish, from the base to the front line, towards perfecting this role. Therefore it was not just a matter of rejigging a few airplanes; it was changing the whole Air Force in a lot of ways. It was understandable, I think, that a lot of the professionals gulped about all the implications of changing from the nuclear to the conventional role, but there it was. In Europe, the main impact of the debate of these years was particularly in the air. We had some ground systems too, Honest Johns as I recall, but that was less significant. What was really militarily significant was the change in the role of the Air Force. That debate was paralleled by the debate here in Canada about the Bomarc and all that. The decision then, as you recall, was, in the end: "No, we must get out of all of these things."

There were parallel decisions taken about that time. For instance, it was the Pearson government, in 1965, that said that there would be no further export of Canadian nuclear material to contribute to anybody's weapons programme anywhere in the world. That was a fundamental shift in our nuclear policy, which has influenced the whole safeguards and non-dissemination issue ever since. So there were some very important policy shifts that took place around the nuclear

question in the early and mid-1960s. We still live in the downstream of all that. My impression is that those were national decisions that Canadians on the whole are well satisfied with. It does not matter what government is in power or what debate you may have about defence policy, nobody wants to relive all that. Nobody has ever really suggested since that we should rethink it and get back into nuclear weapons roles in any sense. The future for our Forces remains a future totally in the conventional dimension. People simply accept that, I would say, almost without question, now. But it is of some interest to reflect on how it comes about that we are that way.

[COX] This gives a certain standing to Howard Green which he does not normally get. Officials tend to speak fondly but disparagingly of him, whereas you suggested in a way that he has a legacy.

[TAYLOR] Well, I will tell you one story which, because I have retold it over the years, may therefore be one of these things that did not happen quite this way. You can never be sure of your own memory. But I tell it because it illustrates how at the time officials may indeed have been in some sense bemused, maybe exasperated, at some of the instructions Mr. Green gave them, but where with the benefit of hindsight you arrive at a more admiring view. At least, that is the way I think of it. The story is this: Mr. Green, desirous, as I say, of having Canada make an independent intellectual contribution to the cause of disarmament, kept saying: "I want a Canadian disarmament plan." When he put that to us, you can understand that the officials were overwhelmed at the complexity and the appalling difficulty, in Cold War circumstances, as we still pretty well were then, of advancing this cause even at the margin of the margin. We were simply appalled at the notion of what it was we were supposed to be doing with the Canadian disarmament plan. I retold this story to General Burns once when he and I were both much older. He did not remember this incident but I remember it this way: Mr. Green called us all into his office. I was there because Mr. Green took everybody from the top to bottom, and I was at the bottom of a sort of vertical slice of the Department. There were there Norman Robertson, Ross Campbell, General Burns, Geoff Murray, Harry Jay and myself. Mr. Green was giving us the word, saying: "I can't understand why I can't have a Canadian disarmament plan." General Burns, by my memory anyway, put on, more or less his court martial face and gritted out: "It wouldn't take much to disarm Canada, Mr. Green."

As I say, I told General Burns that story from memory about fifteen years later. He did not recall it ever having happened, so maybe it did not. But that was the way I recall that people, even people as dedicated as General Burns, tended to react. Yet, after that meeting, something did happen that was not so crazy -that did square the circle, in a way. We went back to Geoff Murray's office. I remember Harry Jay and I were just shaking our heads and saying: "Well, what will we do? The Minister has ordered us to produce a Canadian disarmament plan. What, a Canadian plan to disarm the world?" I mean you could not get your mind around it.

Geoff Murray, who was really a marvellous boss, said, "Stop fussing. I'll will show you what we will do." He took what was then published as a UN document, which consisted of the latest set of Western proposals presented by the five Western countries then represented in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee. He took the staples out of the document, and divided it in three. He kept one third himself. He gave one third to Harry Jay, and he gave one third to me. As I recall, this was on a Friday. He said: "Look, we worked this out among the Western countries. You know that Canada made proposals about some of the clauses in these texts that were not adopted. So look at it this way: suppose we had had our way, what would this document have looked like? What would these proposals have looked like? Take your third home and amend the text, to correspond to the Canadian proposals, as they would have been had we not lost the debate within the Western group."

A great light dawned. All of a sudden, you knew exactly how, in a very simple and logical way, you could put together a Canadian disarmament plan. In a sense, it was quite simple to do. We went home and did our work over the weekend, came back Monday morning, put the three amended sections together, had it retyped, and sent it up to the Minister. And there was the Canadian disarmament plan, produced almost by a miracle within the space of a weekend.

Of course in those days, discipline within the Alliance applied even more firmly than it does now, and we will come to this later. My belief is that consultation has, in fact, made a great deal of progress in the years since. But then, of course, the great difficulty about that kind of exercise was that you were deliberately breaking ranks. I have honestly forgotten what the fate of that document was, but I am sure that our allies, in those days, would have been furious with us for advancing it too far because, of course, it would have meant competition with the agreed proposals that were standing in the name of the five Western countries in the Ten Nation Committee.

It was, as I say, not a period when much was stirring in the disarmament front anyway. But it was not a totally lost exercise. I think you can see from this that even though Mr. Green expressed himself in the simplest and most direct terms and left officials temporarily baffled about how to respond to his directives, there were ways in which it could be done. People ended up all very fond of Mr. Green because he left a memory of a very kind person, a very kind and decent man.

[HILL] Of course, in fact, in that period after the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was forward movement on the disarmament front, mainly partly resulting from general trends in East-West relations. But I think probably Canada did have some impact in that period, for example on the establishment of the nuclear test ban.

[TAYLOR] But if you want to make a bridge to the most intellectually sophisticated development of the notion of a ban, inserted into a completely intellectually integrated concept of how you would bring the nuclear arms race to an end and reverse it, the proposals that Trudeau made to the first Special Session on Disarmament have as one of the key elements in the "Strategy of Suffocation", as it was called, the notion of a CTB. But it is linked with a ban on the production of fissile material and so on. It's all put together in a highly sophisticated way. Mr. Trudeau had his way of presenting disarmament matters and Mr. Green had his.

[HILL] Could I just ask you one question about your being on the delegation to the OECD in this period? At the time of the formulation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Canada pushed for Article II, and in a way the OECD was fulfilling some of the roles that Canada had hoped for on the economic side of Western alliance. Was that seen in those terms? Was there seen to be a linkage between NATO and OECD in those days? And was Canada satisfied with what OECD was doing, in relation to the kind of things that it had wanted to see done under Article II?

[TAYLOR] Well, certainly I had to think about it because there were not many people who worked in both the OECD and NATO delegations. Jules Leger was my ambassador then, and he was accredited to both the OECD and NATO, but in practice he spent most of his time on his NATO responsibilities. Peter Towe, now head of Petro Canada International, and subsequently Ambassador to the United States, was at that time, I have forgotten what he was called - Deputy Permanent Representative, I guess - but he was in practice our OECD ambassador even though he was technically second to Jules Leger.

Below that, there was really no link except I think my own; I was the only one in the NATO and OECD delegations who actually worked in both. So maybe I was the only one who was thinking about this, at least in terms of his own experience of being one day of the week in a NATO committee and the next day in an OECD committee. I thought the OECD really did fulfill a good deal of what we had in mind with Article II or at least it had the potential to do so.

I know that there was a great deal of argument. This kind of debate is well set out in Escott Reid's book about the founding of NATO. I recall from reading the files of the Department in the 1950s, where you came across material about the period of the founding, that there was a great deal of concern that NATO might be no more, as it was seen, than a mere military alliance; and that somehow or other it had to be more than that. And therefore there were many attempts, some of them to a degree strained or artificial, to add a non-military dimension by developing Article II.

I did not feel at the time that, at least so far as economic problems were concerned, there was anything wrong with saying: "Look, what we are really saying to ourselves is that we don't wish to repeat the mistakes of the 1930s. We recognize very well that the international community failed to cope with the economic crisis through creating effective international mechanisms; that the economic crisis and the security crisis of the 1930s were linked together; and that one of the reasons why we ended up in a war was because we failed to cope with the Depression." Because the two things were linked. Therefore, in the post-war period, you had machinery that was set up to solve not only the collective security dilemma but also the problem of excessive economic nationalism; you had to set up some kind of, at least consultative machinery -and it was hoped something more than that - which would prevent us from going back to the kind of dog-eat-dog competitive measures of the 1930s.

The OECD, when I was working in it, in fact, was not yet at the stage where it could do that. What was going on at that time, which was important and exciting and interesting for Canadians, was that, in effect, the post-war period had just come to an end, that is that what had existed up until that time was the OEEC, which was really the organization set up to supervise the disbursements of the Marshall Plan. That had come to an end; and in 1960, with the arrival in power of the Kennedy administration, there was a notion that either you had to say: "This is an international organization that has fulfilled its function and should now shut its doors", or, "You should take this and adapt it to the new period of economic cooperation that is opening." And that was what was decided, the OEECD was kept in being as the OECD. It was changed, notably by bringing Canada and the United States into membership. And of course, the membership of the OECD has increased since to cover an even wider circle, with the Japanese and the Australians, and so on.

And in addition, the "D" was added for Development. There was a whole aid arm, an aid consultation dimension that was added, and that was important for us. But the part of the machine that had more directly to do with economic co-operation (since after all, aid was not a problem in the 1930s), was the dimension which was perpetuated. It was to this that you had to look to decide whether you believed that this was the way by which we could, in effect, carry out the intentions of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

I can only describe the kind of activities that went on. There were several working groups set up under the Economic Policy Committee of the OECD, and there were eminent, senior Canadian civil servants from the economic side of the government who participated very actively in the work of those committees at the time. I think they were satisfied that this was a constructive undertaking.

There was one working group which was in some ways the ancestor of the Group of Seven. It involved the notion of close confidential consultation with a view to harmonizing monetary policy. That group was very low-key. It was called Working Party II. It was given a banal kind of name. It was supposed to have no profile at all, and the secretariat was told "don't produce any documents; don't produce any agendas." It was just a bunch of the boys meeting in a back room, more or less. There were some very high-powered Canadian civil servants, and others from other countries, who contributed to those discussions; Wynne Plumptre was one of the senior Canadians who used to represent us, like Louis Rasminsky, so that we were very much present at the table. I had to learn to take notes in those meetings, because the only record you had were the records that were taken by some poor scribbler in the back row - no documents or anything else like that. For someone who was an ignoramus in these matters, it was no small challenge.

The proceedings went on, as I recall, both in French and in English. I do not know ... there may have been interpretation, but I have a feeling that everyone was expected to be able to discuss international monetary matters in both languages, or at least to understand. There was no official record beyond these delegation records. I remember Wynne Plumptre used to savage my notes; I had to work pretty hard to produce what was to him a respectable account of the proceedings.

Well, that was one piece of consultation that was going on. Of course, if that kind of thing works, then it obviously does represent a kind of co-operation among Western governments, in a most sensitive area of economic policy, that evidently did not exist - or did not exist in any effective form - in the 1930s. So that, yes, in that sense, I would say that what I saw of Working Party II was a kind of fulfillment, if you wanted to look on it that way, of the purposes of Article II.

Then there was a Working Party III, which you could not say was addressed to the problems of the 1930s quite. It was a sort of a growth group. The origin of this was that the Western European economies then had begun to take off, and they were registering quite impressive growth rates. I have forgotten - it was annual growth in the order of 4%, 5% and 6%, whereas the North American economies had been in recession and the growth rates were almost flat. Again, I do not recall the statistics but it was 1 1/2% or 2% or something like that; it was very modest. Then the Kennedy Administration came to power. Kennedy had some extraordinary people. You remember the New Frontier and all the rest of it. Well, some of the New Frontiersmen who came in with the Kennedy Administration were really extraordinary men. They were extremely dynamic and they were quite uninhibited, in the sense that they did not have any vested interest in the record of the previous Administration, obviously. They were there as new brooms, and with very open minds, and prepared to say, "Well, look, your economies grow. Our economy does not. What is the matter? What is the secret? Is there a secret to economic growth?" There were discussions in this working group, which in a way were designed to get at that question: is there a key to growth in the modern economy?

Well, the Canadian representatives in that group were David McQueen, now of York University but then with the Bank of Canada, and Sid Rubinoff of the Department of Finance. What I retain out of that experience, which I think was an idea that coloured public policy in Canada into the 1960s or through the 1960s, was the notion that when you did an analysis of the obstacles to growth in your own society, one of the things that emerged for instance was that an analysis of the structure of unemployment in Canada indicated that there was an obvious link between education and unemployment: that the people who tended to remain unemployed, the hard core, were people who were badly trained and who had no proper opportunities in their society to profit from openings to train themselves, to educate themselves better and so on. I guess the notion was that our

educational structures were in part ill-adapted and that there were social rigidities, for example the notion that kids went to school when they were young, but that by the time somebody was an adult, he was fully-formed, and went into life and tried to make his living on the basis of what he had acquired as a kid. Adult education and retraining, recycling people and all that sort of notion were not as fashionable then as they have become.

I think that was an intellectual current of permanent value. I suppose now, looking back on it, people would say: "Well, Western societies in some ways may have overdone that link." I know there is a good deal of debate about this and I am not an expert on it. I know that there are criticisms now of some of the kinds of investment that were made in our education in Canada in, let's say, the 1960s. Certainly the universities now, of course, all complain about the reverse, of being under funded. Maybe these links are much more subtle than we thought at the time, but that was an intellectually exciting experience too.

[HILL] To come back to the question about Article II, does that kind of cooperation fulfill what we were getting at in Article II?

[TAYLOR] I think it does. I was a child in the 1930s, so I do not know, except from reading, what senior officials and ministers talked about by way of international consultation on matters of this kind in those days. But one cannot escape the impression that now there is a far more lively and automatic sense of sharing problems, and of the possibilities of learning from the experiences of others, and of even the need to do so.

[COX] You have described a situation in which the substance of Article II in fact took place outside the specific framework of NATO, but did anybody ever envisage a situation in which NATO would be a structure which contained the economic aspects which are described in Article II?

[TAYLOR] Yes. On that side of it, I think there were notions of that kind but they never came to very much. I did economic work in NATO too, but that was very strictly confined, even by the time I was doing it, to defence-related economic analysis. In particular at the time it was related to attempts to provide the economic dimension of threat assessment, to consider on some systematic basis the performance of the Eastern economies and what that threw up by way of military potential, what the Alliance had to cope with. There were some other exercises that went a bit beyond that in the economic field, for instance planning for economic counter measures on a contingency basis to deal with possible international crises, but that was about what it amounted to. Of course, that kind of thing is really nowhere near covering the range, or going to the heart of, what Article II, I think, was pointed at. If you had tried to give a complete fulfillment to Article II, within the NATO structure, it would have been vast.

[HILL] Yes.

[TAYLOR] I do not think I have any real regrets that that did not come about.

Part IV - Mid-career: Ottawa, Moscow and Paris, 1964-76

[HILL] Perhaps we might move on to Part IV, which I have termed: "Mid-career, Ottawa, Moscow and Paris." It is a long period. I think I would like to ask one question about Moscow, because that was the period of the Brezhnev era. I think that Khrushchev was already out at that time. I wonder, how do you see the Brezhnev era in the long-term development of Soviet policy? I think, while you were there, Ambassador Ford was still in Moscow? And he must have been a

remarkable man to work with. Certainly he was a highly respected figure on the international scene in terms of interpreting Soviet affairs. I wonder how you would see this whole Brezhnev period and how you see the follow-on from Brezhnev which has come since?

[TAYLOR] Yes, once again I had great good fortune in working for one of the most distinguished Canadian diplomats of his generation, Robert Ford, and a man who was and is acknowledged as one of the West's most eminent experts on Soviet affairs. I was always fascinated by the experience of having lived and worked three years in the Soviet Union. I have done a fair amount of work related to the Soviet Union since, on our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, and East-West matters generally; and the experience of having lived there is a permanent source of stimulation, even though I have to say that now, looking back on it, I was there in the full mid-Brezhnev period, and that is now seen as a period of creeping sclerosis, approaching stagnation, in Soviet affairs. Since I am not a Kremlinologist and did not have a chance to serve several times in the Soviet Union, I really do not have the kind of basis for comparison or the sense of contrast, change or lack of change that the real experts do; but certainly when I was there, I had colleagues who had served in Moscow before. There were even one or two around who were old enough to have served before the War in the Soviet Union; and they told us stories about life in Moscow even before the War, which were startling in that, while the purges and all those other appalling things were going on, in some respects life at the private level for foreigners and even to some degree apparently for Soviets if you escaped the awful attentions of the Secret Police and The Terror and so on - life went on in a way that was less restricted than the life we knew. The bureaucratic controls on the movements of foreigners and so on were apparently not as strict in Stalin's day, either just before the War or just after, according to some of the old hands, than the controls when we were there the business of giving 48 hours notice of intention to travel and this kind of thing. There had been a time, apparently, when even the resident foreigners could pick up and travel around the Soviet Union much more easily, even in the worst of the Stalin period.

Then there were people who had also served there in the early period of Khrushchev's rule; and, of course, they had witnessed a period of considerable liberalization which was quite extraordinary. Some of the descriptions of that made you realize that you had missed something very exciting indeed. Well, of course, that did not last long. Khrushchev himself changed his mind about internal reform and then was ultimately displaced by the team including Brezhnev, of which Brezhnev was becoming clearly, more and more clearly while I was there, the *primus inter pares*. When I was there, Podgorni and Kosygin were still a triumvirate of a kind with Brezhnev, but Brezhnev was increasingly seen as the most powerful figure.

It was just before the shifts, notably over Germany, that really introduced the détente of the early 1970s. This included, so far as our bilateral relations were concerned, the sort of annus mirabilis about 1971 when Mr. Kosygin came here, Mr. Trudeau went to Moscow, we signed three important agreements with the Soviet Union inside of a year, and so on; and there was a sense of very rapid acceleration and exploitation of possibilities.

Well, unfortunately, I did not experience any of that period in Moscow. I was there just before all this in a period that was rather limited.

[HILL] You were there from 1967 to 1970, I believe.

[TAYLOR] I was there from 1967 to 1970. The first great public festival when I went was the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Revolution, and in my last year, they celebrated the centenary of Lenin's birth. So there was a good deal of ritual evocation of the Soviet past of a rather conventional kind

while I was there. I think even the régime itself felt that some of the manifestations of the Lenin centenary, for instance, verged on the ridiculous -that it just got out of hand. Anyway, it was not an intellectual atmosphere that was stimulating, except in a negative sense. There were a few interesting things going on, nonetheless. I mean it is a huge country. While I was there, half the territory was closed to foreigners. Even the half that was open you could not travel in without giving 48 hours' notice, and very frequently - I suppose about half the time - you would apply to travel and your itinerary would be refused or modified in some way or other. But for all that, I did travel. There are large and important parts of the country that I have never seen, and that is a source of regret to me, but on the other hand, I have been in Armenia and Georgia. I have been to Lake Baikal. I have been to Tadzhikistan. But I have never been in the Soviet Arctic. I have been in the Baltic states. I have been a little bit in the Ukraine. Anyway enough in three years to gain a whole host of impressions, and that is invaluable. I have only been back to the Soviet Union once since, and that was ten years later, but just having lived there, and sensed the reality even in a period which was in may ways frozen, or virtually, it was nonetheless an education. And working for Robert Ford was once again very much part of the education.

[HILL] In light of your recollections of that period, and what you came to know of the Soviet Union, how important do you think is Canada's continuing membership in NATO, in terms of being part of a Western group which has some relationship with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union?

[TAYLOR] I think it is extremely important. Broadly speaking, what it seems to me we are dealing with is this: a certain set of international arrangements emerged from the War. They were modified sharply and in unhappy directions by the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s, and we have lived since, and are still living, with a modified version of those structures. I think that the structures themselves have proved remarkably stable. Some people might contest this, people who worry about the accumulation of arms, the level of armaments in Europe, the competition, as they would see it, between two military blocs, and so on. There are serious matters there to discuss. But what strikes me is that the heart of the problem we were dealing with in political terms was the problem of Germany. That was settled in a certain way by the outcome of the War, by the Germans being beaten and by the division of Germany; and the alliances are related intimately to that.

Are we arriving, after more than a generation, at a stage in which we are going to see more than marginal modifications of those structures? We have seen modifications, but up until now, looking back on 30 years, you would say that they are marginal. Are we now arriving in a period where they will be more than marginal? Who can say? Maybe, maybe not. But in any event, we have all the lessons of our own history to tell us that our national interests and our security are engaged in all this. And therefore it seems to me absolutely indispensable that we go on being part of NATO; in part it is a defensive military alliance, but also - and here I think this is the other dimension of NATO which has developed a great deal, where I think it is vital that we continue to be present - because of the political dimension, which people are not sufficiently conscious of.

It is sometimes said - as if it were a kind of criticism - that the NATO we have is not the NATO of our heart's desire, because Article II and all the Canadian hopes that were put into it, that would have made NATO something more than "a mere military alliance", have been frustrated over time. So that all we have is a mere military alliance. Well, there are two things to say to that: I do not think a defensive military alliance, considering the threat over time to our interests, which continues, and which has to be coped with, you can dismiss as "mere"; it is much more than that. The problem of military balance is there, and it has to be coped with. But in addition, there is a whole dimension of political consultation within NATO. With whatever difficulties, with however

much mutual exasperation, blown fuses and failure, nonetheless there is a valid process of political consultation that goes on and that does produce harmonized Western positions. And that to me seems absolutely indispensable - particularly so if now the political order and the terms of the European security equation are about to shift. If that is what we will be coping with in the next generation, then I think it is more than ever indispensable that Canada be very much present in the political councils of the Alliance, as well as present in a valid way on the military side. And while - who knows - we may find that whatever changes we can succeed in bringing about will only come about so slowly that it will be hard to sustain public interest and public support, I do not really have any doubts about the fundamental validity of those propositions. I do not think NATO is a sterile or out-moded institution in any way; on the contrary.

[HILL] Just one last question, if I could, on the Soviet period. In that period the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. Did you form any particular impressions? Were you involved in analyses of why they did this?

[TAYLOR] Yes.

[HILL] And if so, what conclusions did you arrive at?

[TAYLOR] Absolutely fascinating; it was arguably the most important thing that happened in foreign policy terms while I was there (the other important event, which had taken place just before I went to Moscow, was the Six-Day War). But while I was there, the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia were by far the most important events that we had to observe and try to understand. Well, if I look back on that, I put it together with other reflections about the system that existed in Eastern Europe. And my reflections would be these: the Soviet Union under any Soviet leadership faces an extraordinarily difficult problem, in that this is the area, presumably, where the Soviet Union would consider that its vital national interests are fundamentally engaged. The principal historic threat to their security, as the Soviets would see it, I am sure, has come from Germany. As a result of their victory in the Second World War, they have disposed of that threat, again as they would see it, permanently. That is a fundamental victory for Soviet policy and for Soviet security, and they wish nothing to happen that would ever upset it. Well, it may seem now increasingly in the era of the two superpowers - where Germany, particularly a divided Germany, appears on any analysis to be an important state, a state, alright, but still of the second rank - that the Soviet Union does not need to brood over the German problem in the same sense as it was perfectly justified in doing as a result of its experiences in two world wars.

Nonetheless, there is every evidence that perhaps still even today, the German question agitates Soviet minds more than it does ours. That is something we have to go on understanding; and one of the most important pieces of evidence is that the Soviets are prepared, as they were in Czechoslovakia in 1968, to ensure the stability of the strategic band of territory that lies between a divided Germany and the Soviet Union, if necessary by throwing out all the credit and goodwill they obtained from liberating a country like Czechoslovakia from the Germans, by invading it. They paid an extraordinarily high price for that. The Czechs and Slovaks also paid an extraordinarily high price. Westerners, I suppose, particularly as the memories of the War fade, would be inclined to look on that as simply a mindless kind of brutality.

These are brutal solutions. They are solutions by the application of force. But they are not mindless. The analysis may be incorrect but there are profound reasons there and we have to understand them. I suppose one of the things that is interesting now is to wonder whether that kind of mentality is changing at all in the Soviet Union; whether one of the things that stirs in the back

of the minds of the new leadership is that it really is not necessary to go on thinking as Stalin did: that Eastern Europe had not only to be a sphere of influence or a conventional military alliance, but that you had to smash the structures and have states that were genuinely vassals with all their social, and political and economic structures, modelled on yours and tied to yours, in addition to the military structures.

Well, of course, even in the heyday of the Stalinist régimes in Eastern Europe, there still were national differences, and those national differences are still there. They have become more and more marked over time as you see if you go, I just did with Mr. Clark, to Poland and Hungary. You were made very conscious once again that these are nations with deep roots in a past, in a history of their own of which they are quite conscious and quite proud, and that there are many ways, even in this day and age and in their constrained circumstances, where what goes on in the Soviet Union is simply not relevant to their circumstances. They have national problems of their own that cannot be solved by any kind of increased co-operation or decreased co-operation with the Soviet Union. That is really not the point. The point is that they have problems of their own that they have to address in their own way.

That has led in the past to permanent structural instabilities. As we know, the Soviet Union is able to maintain the stability of this whole system only by the presence of what are in effect occupying forces, together with the capacity to threaten force at any time, and actually to use force as it did in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968; or to extract from one of its allies as with Poland in 1980-81 - that the ally in effect suppresses itself. The whole basis of the system still, it seems to me, is flawed, in the sense that it has continued in every decade since it has been set up to throw up periodic crises. These instabilities have nothing to do with the West: we do not produce them and we cannot cure them. We get blamed for them because they can hardly admit that the causes are all internal to the system. Therefore, as in 1968, it was West German revanchists and American imperialists who were blamed for the Prague Spring.

Well, everyone knows, no one better probably than the Czechs, Slovaks and Soviets themselves, that this is nonsense. It was not true. The crisis had to do with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; essentially it did not have a thing to do with West Germans and Americans. So that while we in the West get blamed, and that exacerbates these crises when they occur, nonetheless everyone knows that the causes are internal to the structures that are in place in Central and Eastern Europe.

Those are problems that they have to sort out. All I can say about 1968, seen in that context, is that - and I do not know whether this is cause for regret or what: I hardly know how to characterize it - when it comes to suppressing what are in effect national revolts in Eastern Europe, the Soviets are improving their technique with the passage of time. Hungary in 1956 was a bloody exercise. It is inconceivable that that kind of thing could happen again today. Czechoslovakia was brutal enough, but at least there was not bloodshed. And Poland in 1980 was accomplished - however awful it may have been, and however much we criticized the nature of the Polish régime as it was originally established under General Jaruzelski - nonetheless, I suppose that in this kind of comparison (which is inevitably odious) it was some kind of improvement, that at least it involved the Poles themselves. The Soviets in that case were kept out of it and there was no bloodshed.

Well, these are problems that arose in 1968. That seems already a long way back for some people. But it seems to me these events are all linked. We are still dealing with the same set of problems, and there is something to be said for thinking about 1956, 1968 and 1980. And now in 1987, think what it means to have a new leadership in the Soviet Union facing what on the whole

are an older generation of leaders in the Eastern European countries: all of them are still obliged to come to grips with these problems.

[COX] While you were there, could you ever have had anything like this kind of discussion with you Soviet counterparts?

[TAYLOR] During the Prague Spring and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, there were, broadly speaking, signs that a small group of people in the Soviet Union were really appalled by the notion of the Soviet Union invading the territory of its own allies - that this seemed a really shattering selfcondemnation. There were signs that there was a small body of opinion - intellectuals and so on who felt that way; and you could get, I suppose, traces of that in conversations with people. But that was not the general attitude. The general attitude of the public, I think, was that unfortunately they tended on the whole to swallow the official line. There was a tendency to say: "Well, what are those Czechs doing? We fought a war. We spilled our blood to liberate them from the Germans, and now they seem to be playing some kind of game with the West again, endangering our security. What the hell is going on? Those people live better than we do, and here they are playing fast and loose with our security. They are foolish and dangerous people." I think there were a lot of Soviets who believed that, and I had the impression that one of the difficulties in 1968 was that Dubcek, who after all began as a Slovak worker of the most conventional and orthodox Party upbringing - a dim figure, who could have been expected to be utterly square in his reactions - startled the Soviets because he ended up being a national hero - a hero even to the Czechs - and was peddling all sorts of ideas that must have seemed insane to the Soviets; and also that he turned out to be a man of some emotion, totally contrary to his original image. There may have been people who knew him intimately who thought: "Behind that rather grave facade lurks quite an extraordinary personality - you wait and see." But in Czechoslovakia he could respond to and evoke a past not just outside Soviet experience but outside Russian experience. While I cannot prove this, I realize that someone like Brezhnev simply could not understand someone who was coming to him and saying: "We want to modify the system profoundly - but we can do it in conditions that will not affect the security of our alliance. We are not like the Hungarians." (They declared their neutrality, you remember; they tried to leave the Warsaw Pact in 1956.) Well, the Czechs in 1968 thought: "We are not going to make that mistake". So they said very firmly and repeatedly: "We're not questioning the alliance with the Soviet Union. We are not doing anything - we do not propose to do anything - by way of our reform that is going to threaten Soviet security. So be reassured on that fundamental question." But then they began to talk about the reforms, and the Soviets had to listen to the kind of debate that bubbled up in Czechoslovakia. They heard about people who were going to reform Communism to the point where it appeared you were going to be able run a Communist state more or less by consent of the people; and that the role of the secret police was diminished then to nothing, because you would not need their power of coercion; and that there were going to be opposition parties, and a free press and no censorship - all this stuff. In Czechoslovakia there are enough Czechs around who remember "Of course, a country can be run this way! We ran this country with free institutions in the past." The Soviets know intellectually, of course, that the "bourgeois republic" existed. But to have Communists tell you that you can adapt Communism that way! I think for the Brezhnevs of the world, it just boggled their minds it was totally beyond their intellectual and cultural experience, beyond Soviet history. There has never been anything like this in Soviet experience; so that I think the Soviets have an awful lot of difficulty particularly when their allies come to them and say, "We want to modify our societies profoundly."

It is true that now we have a leader in the Soviet Union who sometimes talks about modifications that would make your hair stand on end. You wonder whether one of his problems

is not that there are a whole lot of people - in fact, the rank and file of Communists and even a whole lot of Soviets - who have a hell of a time understanding what it is he is on about, because they really do not have any experience of a world that has ever been like the one that he appears to want to drive towards.

[HILL] Partly because of their isolation presumably, and because of the internal restrictions and so on within the Soviet Union itself, as you mentioned earlier.

[TAYLOR] Well, while I am not in all respects, to put it mildly, an admirer of Richard Pipes, he is awfully good on Soviet history. In his proper role as a professor of Soviet history, he is, I think, marvelous. "Russia under the Old Regime," is, from this point of view, an illuminating book. In it he analyzes the way in which Russia from its historic beginnings has faced problems of producing a livelihood from a land which, outside the Ukraine, is unforgiving, and where historically there has always been a problem of the flight of population from the land; and where therefore variants of feudalism and serfdom were designed, at heart, to nail the peasants to the land, so that the land would be worked, because otherwise they all ran off to the towns. The notion of controlling the population to keep it from running off to the cities (which of course any study of feudalism says was a problem in all feudal societies: Stadluft macht frei, and all that notion) - existed in Western countries also. But in Russia, because it is a poor country, I guess, except in the Ukraine, this was a particular problem. The deepest roots of their institutional and cultural history have to do with this. Serfdom was the fundamental social institution up until just over a century ago, and that had to do with nailing people to a place, most often a remote place, and making them live there, and putting police over them to make sure they did not run off, and all that.

Serfdom was only abolished in the last century, and the distinction between peasants and city people, which had disappeared in Western society centuries ago in terms of civil status, persisted past the Czarist days into Soviet days. The internal passport that you have to carry in the Soviet Union is really an evidence of that. It is a kind of 20th century survival of serfdom, in a way. The roots of it go very, very deep. And one of the aspects of this is that there is no tradition of free emigration in the Soviet Union because there never was any under the Czar. There never has been, and they do not know what you are talking about.

They understand intellectually that in other countries things are managed differently. Their view is, "Well, that is alright -you have your way of doing things, we have ours. This is what all our history teaches us: that you have to control people, and you do not let them run all around inside the country and live where they please or leave the country when they feel like it. No, you cannot run the state successfully unless you control them. We are controlling them internally. And of course it follows from that we are not going to let them pick up and go to other countries when they feel like it either."

Then we come to them as we do and say: "That's not civilized. What about human rights and the CSCE and the Helsinki document and the UN Charter and all that." But those are our institutions, our cultural values, our history, our civilization, in many important ways, not theirs. One thing I think is profoundly true is that there are some European values, and a certain European civilization, that extends as far as Poland; and that beyond that, there is a Russia that is in some senses European but in other ways shows some really quite important differences. These are banalities of Soviet historiography, but it is an Orthodox country in its cultural origins, and the whole business of the Renaissance and the Reformation, and the end of feudalism as it came about in Western Europe, is all quite different in Russia. The end of feudalism is much more recent and the traces of it are still there in this incapacity to imagine a free society.

[HILL] Of course, I suppose another thing is that they have Russian nationalism or now Soviet nationalism, if one must use that term, as to some degree a substitute for some of these other ideas.

[TAYLOR] Yes, and people react differently; it is one of the reasons why it is hard to say things like this. I would be very hesitant to say things like this to many Soviets. Sometimes you could discuss it with people if you knew them really well. Of course, there are any number of highly civilized, highly sophisticated, highly intelligent people in the Soviet Union. It is a huge country and it has got enormous human riches and human potential - a great deal of it, tragically, rather frustrated and incapable of realizing itself fully. But if you say things like this, even someone who might know in his heart of hearts that it is true will be offended. People will say: "After all, this is some kind of racism. You talk about us as if we were inferior beings, and we won't have that!" So it is a highly sensitive area. The whole debate that you read about between Westernizers and Slavophiles which has gone on and still goes on is a reflection of that; and the Slavophiles tendency is the tendency to react to criticisms of this kind by saying: "No, our values are what they are, and they're different and they're just as good and in our view superior. This is a better society. We aren't interested in yours." And then in the Soviet days, this has been larded with Marxist-Leninist analysis and all the stuff which points to our social and economic black spots, to unemployment, racial discrimination and this kind of thing.

But you can see with Soviet citizens who come to Canada or to any Western country that some of them are quite genuinely adrift in our society, do not like it and go back having had really quite an unhappy experience here, because they feel that our society is atomized. I think their society is rather more atomized. I mean that there is nothing but the individual facing the state, with no mediating organizations. There is no community life or social life outside the family, and the organizations are all really in one or the other manifestations of the state. That is what I understand by totalitarianism. It is totalitarian in that sense, and the mediating bodies that we have in our society, just do not exist, things other than the state to which you can attach your loyalty apart from your loyalty to yourself and your family. But there is a sense in which you are taken care of in these societies, by the state. If you are prepared to throw yourself in the arms of the state - up until now anyway - it will provide you with a job and a kind of life. This leads to a lot of cynicism and jokes along the lines of: "Yes we have a bargain with the government and our leaders: we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us."

At that level, you can have quite a stable existence. Yet you come here and even if you acquire English or French, and even if you have professional training that has equipped you and so on, nonetheless a lot of Soviet emigrés are made - more than other immigrants to our society - quite uneasy at the degree to which they are personally responsible for their own fate. That is a value to us, and it is something that is intensely appreciated by some Soviets that come here. But you read every month or so in the papers, stories of people who have gone back because they cannot bear it. That I think is one of the measures of a different society.

Part V - Senior positions, Ottawa, 1976-82

[HILL] Mr. Taylor, between 1976 and 1982, you held a series of senior positions in Ottawa, including Director General of European Affairs, Assistant Under-Secretary and Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. I wonder if you could say something about Canada's relations with the NATO allies during that period, particularly following the 1976 decision to re-equip the Canadian Armed Forces. Of course, that was also the period in which Canada established the Framework Agreement with the European Community.

[TAYLOR] The new element in that period was the Framework Agreement. The origins of that are traced back to Nixonomics and the decisions taken by the United States Administration in 1971 that produced in the course of 1972 a fundamental review of Canada's relations with the United States. One of the things that emerged from that was that the country always stood in need of counterweights to the relationship with the United States; it had to find ways of reducing its vulnerability to sudden changes in American policy which ignored our interests. We had somehow or other to create a network of international relations that permitted us to rely on other strong relationships, relationships you could build, which would cushion such shocks and make us less totally dependent on the American relationship.

That was, in essence, the so called "Third Option" which was much debated at the time. The one institutional expression it took in our relationship with European countries was the Framework Agreement. The whole affair was much misunderstood. I would not propose on this occasion to debate the history of the Third Option. The Framework Agreement with the European Community was designed to deal once again with a fundamental problem that has coloured Canadian attitudes in many relationships, and which lies at the heart of the political relationship in NATO; that is to say, that a smaller country is always at risk that larger countries will dispose of its interests in its absence and without its view being heard. That is why Canada goes on insisting year in, year out, on the importance of consultation in NATO. That is why we press the United States not simply to assume everything about a largely unruffled relationship with us - or at least a relationship that is relatively easy and friendly compared to most bilateral relationships in the world. And it is why with the European Community we wished to avoid situations of a kind, that up to that point we had often experienced: where the Community negotiated furiously over a particular problem within its circle and arrived half exhausted with a consensus with a view to negotiations, let's say, with other important trading partners, with the United States or with Japan; and would then try to do a deal with, let's say the United States, and at the end of it would come around to us having exhausted itself a second time, and say more or less: "Well, there is a signature blank at the bottom of the page that says 'Canada.' Would you please just append your signature here. We can assure you this is good for you."

There were instances with particular items - for instance, in agricultural trade, I remember - where that is not much of a caricature of what happened: that you were simply expected by the Europeans not to rock the boat; that it had been so hard for them to hammer out their own consensus, and so hard for them to reach an agreement with the United States, that they did not want any country with, as they would see it, a lesser interest to come along at the end and upset the whole deal by making waves and saying: "Well, nobody asked us about this!"

The purpose of the Framework Agreement really was to ensure in various ways that you enforced consultation with the Community, so that you had a chance - again, it is the NATO story to influence the policy of your larger partners while the policy was being formed, and were not presented with a *fait accompli* at the end of the process.

Whether we have succeeded is another story. I think that the history of our relations with the Community since would suggest that this is an unending battle. It is always a problem for them, but it is a worse problem now in a way, as the Community expands its membership, than it was before. It is very difficult for them, once they have reconciled all the conflicting interests that exist within the Community, to come to the bargaining table with anything other than an absolutely immutable position. Nonetheless, Canadians I suppose ought to understand that. It has its parallel in our own difficulties in areas of provincial jurisdiction or shared jurisdiction, where Canada has

to hammer out a Canadian position by agreement between the federal government and the provinces before it undertakes an international negotiation. We all know that is very complicated. Negotiating with the Community is that, but worse.

[HILL] So, in effect Canada was interested in some sort of arrangement or linkage with the European Community for its own sake. And one of the *quid pro quos* for this from the European point of view was that Canada should take greater interest in NATO. Canada, too, for a number of its own reasons, was coming around to taking a greater interest in NATO than it had in the immediately preceding period.

At any rate, it was from 1976, if I am not mistaken, that Canada started to build up again to some degree its armed forces. What sort of impact did this have on Canada's relations with NATO? Were relations more positive, from 1976 on, than they had been in the immediately preceding period?

[TAYLOR] Yes, if we can come to the NATO side of it, I think the NATO countries generally, in the later 1970s, were becoming more aware of two things. First was the need to take concerted measures to improve their collective defences. That led to the decision, for instance, to commit to a 3% real increase in defence spending. That was one aspect. And then in the last years of the 1970s and at the turn of the decade, of course, the hopes of the early 1970s about detente had really disappeared pretty well entirely and the international atmosphere had turned quite sour by comparison. By the time we came to the crisis over Poland, for instance, following on the crisis in Afghanistan, it really came to another very low point in East-West relations. So there was a change in the international atmosphere going on in those years. That totally removed any temptation there would have been to any NATO government to argue: "Well, the world of the alliances is dissolving before our very eyes; there isn't really any need to spend anything more on keeping our defences up to date because we are all going to be disarmed in a few years."

That is an exaggeration. Nobody even in the heyday of détente believed that that was going to happen soon. I do not think any serious person believed that. But nonetheless those hopes were part of the atmosphere of the earlier days of détente. It would have been more difficult, and it obviously was more difficult, in that earlier atmosphere, for a government to sustain a programme of increased defense spending than toward the end of the decade. And then, apart from anything else, the Canadian Forces all through these years had suffered from growing difficulties over the way in which, in an age of inflation, forces composed of full-time professionals - who therefore have to be paid at the market rate -had their wage rates driven up. These personnel costs had to be satisfied out of a budget that was not growing in proportion, so that the cost of military manpower became a relatively heavier and heavier charge in Canada. That alone was one of the reasons why the proportion of spending on capital equipment, on replacements for aging weapons of one kind or another, dwindled progressively. That was a structural problem of Canadian defence spending in those years; and that too eventually had to be turned around, or we would have had Armed Forces which were of a very high standard as far as the personnel was concerned and very well paid - potentially very impressive forces - except that they would not have had any modern equipment.

Those things were coming about in any event, regardless of what happened in the world. So I think there was a kind of conjuncture, and the government of the late 1970s really ordered its course to meet the mood of the times. It committed itself to the 3% real increase, and actually met the targets by comparison with other NATO countries. But by then there had been such a long period of under-funding of major new capital programmes that it took a long time to catch up. In

a way, we are still dealing with that problem. But the process was begun then. The decisions about replacing the Centurion with the Leopard I, the decision to buy the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, and the preliminaries to some of the later decisions, of which the Frigate Programme was the last in a long series - those were all either taken or gestating in that period; and, of course, our allies looked on that with satisfaction.

[HILL] Do you think that that made it easier for Canada to pursue its own particular goals inside NATO?

[TAYLOR] I think unfortunately it is easier to demonstrate the negative than the positive. There is a link. I am convinced of that. Beyond a certain point, you cannot hope within NATO to be listened to with any kind of respect, no matter how clever your diplomatic performance may be or how great your political wisdom, if you are quite plainly out of step with the majority of your allies on what the trend of defence spending should be. The two things go together. When you start trying, as you would hope, to play a constructive role in the diplomacy of the Alliance, and to influence the general conduct of East-West relations, from a position where you are increasingly out of step with the military arrangements, then the one is linked with the other. There may be some illogic in that. It may be unjustified. But it is a fact. Your influence melts away, and you can feel that.

What about the other side of it? The other side is very hard to judge, because there is no way of measuring political influence. There is no intellectually satisfying way of demonstrating that X many million more dollars spent in any one year on defence is going to buy, as a function, y much more influence. Therefore all this is subject to endless debate and challenge. I cannot prove that an improved defence performance results in greater political credibility in the counsels of the Alliance. I believe it does, but I cannot prove it; I don't think anybody can.

One of the permanent difficulties is that people have not got the time or the patience to be bothered with the subtleties. Even people who are supposed to be quite knowledgeable about each others' affairs in the Alliance, actually use rather crude measures of each others' affairs and are on the whole rather ignorant about each other's affairs. We are subjected to that from time to time within NATO, since everyone's defence effort is subject to reciprocal criticism; we have our go at other people, and they have their crack at us. There are a few people who become deeply knowledgeable in the NATO secretariat, NATO military staffs, and some other NATO governments about Canada's political and military standing, and the true nature of its problems, and about what it is reasonable to expect Canada to do by way of defence contribution and so on, but the number of people who have that kind of knowledge you can count on the fingers on one hand. Certainly it is a tiny number compared to the number of people who choose to have opinions on the subject and know very little about it. You can get really quite ill-informed judgements almost any day of the week on subjects of this sort.

One of the difficulties that Canada faces permanently is that the American system allows a good deal of liberty to public officials to speak out, to go on the public record when the spirit moves them. This creates a situation in which, over the years, you could virtually count on that there would be almost constant criticism and pressure, from the American military establishment, to the effect that Canada was not doing enough.

Well, that is a permanent American view. I think that what one would have to say against that is that all except a handful of very well-informed Americans are probably using something as crude as the GNP yardstick. Those yardsticks, which are very popular for measuring both defence effort

and aid effort, are the beginning of analysis; they are not the end of it. Unfortunately they are frequently used as if the man who has the yardstick had discovered a kind of philosopher's stone, and was licensed to stop thinking once he had applied the yardstick. This is a pity because, intellectually, the GNP yardstick has holes in it you could drive a truck through. The difficulty is you have to have some kind of measure, and it is the only agreed measure we have. It is just that if it is to be used, it has to be used with a sense of its limitations. And that very frequently is not done.

What does that come to? I think it is another way of saying, that even if you could imagine Canada doubling, tripling or quadrupling its defence budget -if you could imagine us spending 4% or 5% of our GNP on defence - could you guarantee that the country would then become correspondingly more powerful - by some measure that is yet to be found - in international political or economic discussions? No, you could not. And even spending at that level would not make us a major military power.

Therefore, at whatever level we spend, we will be a relatively modest military power. We will not be totally insignificant in military terms, and, in particular, we will not be insignificant if we can find the most sensible niche in the collective arrangements of the Alliance. But there is no way in which even those unimaginable increases - which is what by implication some people in the United States appear to be urging us on to attain -would buy the country influence. We have never in our postwar history, except perhaps at the peak of the re-armament programme during the Korean War, spent at that rate. I have forgotten what the GNP figure was then, but I think probably we did get close to 4% of GNP or something like that. But these yardsticks really do not help. If they encouraged people to think, I would not mind, but too often they encourage people to stop thinking.

[HILL] I think that is very common. On another point, one of the major features of the international landscape in this period, 1976-1982, was NATO's decision on intermediate range nuclear forces, the INF decision, the two-track decision in December, 1979. Were you in anyway involved in that? And how well did you think that accorded with Canadian desires and intentions?

[TAYLOR] I was not as closely associated with the decision before it was taken as I was afterwards when I was at NATO, but there is one observation I would like to make about it. I have always thought that the whole INF debate, (and we are still in the INF debate) is probably the most important single example one can find to demonstrate that the Alliance is not, as its critics sometimes make out, totally dominated by the United States, with everyone else simply tied to the chariot wheels of American policy. My reason for saying that is that INF is really a European, and above all a German, issue. While I cannot prove this, I do not think that American strategists and political thinkers under any Administration, if left to themselves, would ever have defined the problem of the gray area, the Euro-strategic missile problem, in quite the way Helmut Schmidt initially defined it - that if Helmut Schmidt had not decanted the problem, so to speak, the Alliance countries would ever have been invited, by the United States anyway, to come to grips with it in quite the terms they did. At every turn of the INF negotiations - and we will come to that shortly -I think that you can see the evidence of the United States under successive Administrations, in effect deferring to its European allies, allowing them to define the problem, sharing with them in trying to find a solution, listening to them very carefully, and modifying its negotiating position as a function of consultation. You could say that even the events of the last month or so are a demonstration that, at a minimum, the United States cannot conceivably ride rough-shod over the views of its allies -that, at a minimum, they have to wait patiently for their allies to come to their own decision about what they think is right. We have just seen that once again in Germany. So that if you are looking around for a case study on the important issue of consultation at work - of consultation as a means of doing what it is designed to do, that is, ensuring that the decisions of our mightiest ally are taken after reflecting on how their decisions might affect our interests, and of how consultation works to cope with that problem - the whole history of INF, for ten years now, provides a number of interesting illustrations that, yes indeed, consultation works.

[HILL] And that applies presumably to Canadian interests, as well as to these of the Europeans. I mean in the specific case of INF.

[TAYLOR] On INF, of course, the fact of the matter is that to go right to the heart of it, since those missiles do not have a range that would touch Canadian territory, they are not a direct threat to Canada. The missiles that interest Canadians, in the end, of course, are the missiles with intercontinental range, because those are ones that could hit us. In that sense, INF for Canada has always been an issue where we were obliged to wait for our European partners to make up their minds, to try to understand their difficulties and their position, and reason our way through it, and then support the Allied position that emerged. I think under both the Liberal and the Conservative governments, this is really what we have done. But I do not think it has ever been for Canada to take a lead on that.

[HILL] No, I was not really suggesting that. I was thinking in more limited terms. Whatever views Canada had to express, whatever policies we had on this question, were they taken into account?

[TAYLOR] Oh, yes.

Part VI - Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, 1982-85

[HILL] Mr. Taylor, if we might continue with the INF question, which I must say I find a matter of great interest, I think you mentioned just a minute ago it was a major issue in NATO while you were there. I wonder if you could tell us something about the treatment of that question, the whole question of implementation of the two track decision. How effective were the consultations on this issue in NATO while you were there? How difficult an issue was it for the Allies? For example, what kind of role did Canada play in the consultations on this issue?

[TAYLOR] During the three years I was in NATO, I would say that the INF issue was the most important single political and military issue that the North Atlantic Council dealt with. It was the subject of intense consultation throughout. The basis for the policies of the Alliance throughout the period remained the two track decision, and the problem was to implement the two track decision; that is, to develop a negotiating position - or a succession of negotiating positions as it turned out - which the United States would negotiate on behalf of the Alliance with the Soviet Union, with a view to obtaining above all the removal of the SS-20s, to which the ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs were to be deployed in response; and failing success in the negotiations, to proceed with the other track, that is the deployment of the missiles.

Well, the negotiations in their initial stages were extremely difficult to launch. It was necessary to proceed with the deployment. This was highly controversial in most of the countries of deployment of the missiles at the time as we remember, and particularly so because there was a time when, in Britain, Germany and Italy, there were general elections all within the space of roughly a year. The issue of the deployment of the missiles was an issue in each of those elections. In Germany in particular there was a belief that the whole fate of the government turned on the question; and that if there were no alteration or dilution somehow or other of the German

government's position, then it would pay for it at the polls. There were massive demonstrations in that election campaign that suggested that that might be so.

In any event, from the domestic political point of view, the whole issue of deployment was obviously highly sensitive for most of our European allies throughout that period. And it was sensitive to the point almost of obsession. That is, there were other difficult issues, which in other circumstances should have been tackled within NATO at the time, which really could not be tackled because people only had time and political energy and imagination to cope with the deployment business.

[HILL] That's quite fascinating. I've never heard that said before.

[TAYLOR] And for Canadians, I think, that while that was possible to understand intellectually, it was difficult to share emotionally, because the missiles were not being deployed on our territory, nor were we threatened directly by the SS-20s to which they were a response. The degree to which this issue agitated, say, Germany, is something that Canadians had to make a very considerable effort of imagination to appreciate. For Canadians at the time, I suppose if there was a comparable issue in terms of the public debate it aroused, it was the question of the testing of cruise missiles in Canada. That was in some ways our version at the time of the kind of debate that went on in some of the European countries.

In the end, the governments concerned stuck by the two-track decision, that is the negotiations failed, or appeared to fail, because the Soviets left the table, after we had evolved in the Alliance a perfectly acceptable offer. People sometimes forget this, that it was the West that offered the first zero of the zero-zero solution that is now being discussed: total elimination of this category of missile. It was the Soviets who, as I think they subsequently realized, made the mistake of walking away from the negotiations. Then successively the Germans, the British, the Italians, the Belgians and finally even the Dutch, who had very great difficulty also in domestic politics with the issue, proceeded with the deployment. At that stage, there were leaders in the Soviet Union, we thought, who were estimating that all they had to do was to stall the negotiations, and to play enough on domestic opinion in the West, and the Western governments determined to proceed with the two track decision would simply fall - public support would be withdrawn from them and the Soviets would have gotten away with it; that is, they would have left their SS-20s in place, and paid no price for having deployed them. Meanwhile in the West, governments would have come to power that would have refused the counter-deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs

Well, that did not come about. It was a great demonstration of political solidarity and of the willingness of our allies to run very considerable political risks and bear very considerable political burdens.

[HILL] Was it also an example of effective consultative practices?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think that it was. I think it required intense consultation throughout, and it also required the United States to understand the position of its allies, to forbear and be prepared to accept negotiating positions that took a while to hammer out sometimes, and represented the solution that the Allies were comfortable with. Again, since the alternative was never tried, one cannot demonstrate this, but I am not sure that on any of these issues the United States, left to itself, would really have answered the strategic dilemma in the way that the European allies and the Allies collectively decided it should be answered.

[HILL] From what you say, I have the impression that the West Europeans really felt over-shadowed by the SS-20s. Were they really worried about being targets for these things?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think that was a particularly strong feeling in Germany, and I think there was a feeling also that Germany was naked to this threat; that is that Germany, because of the fundamental limitations on its national policies in the London and Paris agreements is, of course, permanently prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons of its own. Therefore to the extent that the East-West strategic balance is maintained in part by nuclear weapons, then Germany is protected by somebody else's nuclear weapons because it cannot be protected by its own.

I do not think there is any question at all in German minds or in anyone else's of altering those fundamental limitations. Therefore, so long as nuclear weapons exist, any federal German government has to look to its allies in this sense for protection. I think that in Germany the feeling when the SS-20s were deployed, whether this actually was the Soviet intention or not at the time, was that because of the characteristics of the SS-20, it posed a particular threat to Western Europe which was not posed to the United States because of the range of the weapon, principally. There was even an argument that it was deliberately designed to put the American nuclear guarantee to the test, and to have a decoupling effect, to break the link between the United States and Germany.

That, I think, is the heart of it as Germans would see it. Why didn't others feel it quite the same way? Well, I think the smaller NATO countries had no ambitions at all to be nuclear powers themselves, so that the only nuclear weapons that they would have would be American weapons on their territory under double-key arrangements.

The British and the French, of course, not under the same kind of fundamental legal inhibition that the Germans are, are able to equip themselves with independent national strategic nuclear deterrents, and to that extent feel that they have dealt with a threat of this kind or at least they can feel somewhat more comfortable in these circumstances.

This is why this is above all a German problem. There is the additional obvious fact that German territory lies in the heart of Central Europe and is geographically exposed. So the whole issue appears, I think, in particularly dramatic terms in German eyes; and to a lesser degree - but nonetheless to a more lively degree than it was felt in Canada - the deployment of the SS-20s was seen everywhere in Western Europe as a particular threat to European NATO countries. Again, it was really German political and defence policy-makers who had to take a leading role in defining the problem and analyzing it. It had to be demonstrated that the response to the SS-20 had in the end to be land-based missiles on the territory of the Federal Republic. An American strategic figure might very well have said: "Yes, the SS-20s pose a threat -but it is very easy, we will just move some more ships into the area or we will move aircraft carriers, with nuclear weapons aboard or something like that. These are sea-based answers." But it would really require a German thinker, I believe, or a German spokesman to say: "No, I'm sorry that will not do. We really have to have the response based on our territory. It has to be land-based". And then beyond that, while that would have dealt very directly with the heart of the threat, it would have been politically unbearable to expect the Federal Republic to have borne all of the burden of the total response by way of deployment.

[HILL] In other words, to have it installed solely on German soil.

[TAYLOR] So that there had to be a sharing of that political responsibility too, and it was shared by a number of other Allied countries.

[HILL] Another element of this is that the Soviets ran quite a diplomatic campaign to try and influence Western public opinion, I suppose particularly Western Europe opinion. They wanted to persuade Western publics to reject these missiles, that is to say the Pershing II and the cruise. How well do you think NATO responded to that?

[TAYLOR] I think the response had to come as it did from the individual Allied governments. I think that about all you could do in NATO itself, within the consultative machinery of the Alliance, was to recognize collectively that dealing with public opinion was going to be extremely important, and to compare notes, and to make sure that what was said in one country was not contradicted by what was being said in another. Beyond that, I think the lesson of all analysis of the problem of coping with public information, and public opinion, is that the central machinery of the Alliance has a useful but quite modest role to play. In the end on these great questions in democracies where you are responding to your own electorate, it is the local government that has to bear the burden of carrying a case to the public.

[HILL] Well, my impression is that the best thing to do is to tell it as it is. I do not think that highly orchestrated public information campaigns are really the way to go. How would you feel about that?

[TAYLOR] Well, certainly I think it takes a clear political lead. I think it takes heads of government and ministers who understand the problem, are convinced that they have the right answer and are prepared to go out and say this is the problem, and your government believes this is the answer, and this is our stand, and we are prepared to take our electoral chances on it. I think political leadership is really the key in all that. Successful, modern public relations techniques no doubt have something to do with it, but they cannot redeem bad policy.

[HILL] Given that this was such an important feature in the period when you were at NATO, this whole INF question, is there any other element that comes to your mind in terms of the operations of NATO or Canadian policy with regard to NATO?

[TAYLOR] You mean INF or other issues?

[HILL] INF in particular. Any lessons that you might draw from yout experience in that period?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think that, as we know now, we may be on the verge of the first actual nuclear arms reduction agreement that has ever been negotiated, and if that negotiation is successful, it will limit these very missiles, perhaps eliminate them totally. We would hope that. But if you stand back a little bit, I suppose that you would have to allow that historic accident has driven us to this. We did not decide to deploy the SS-20s, and I do not think people are entirely certain yet why the Soviets decided to make the weapon and then to deploy it. But the result of it is that, ten and fifteen years on, the superpowers are perhaps fairly close to an agreement which will eliminate this category of missile, and that will be, if it comes about, the first nuclear arms agreement of its kind that has ever been successfully negotiated. Well, we know equally that these things are all linked, that what you do about Euro-strategic INF missiles is linked, in some way or another, to what you do or would hope to do about intercontinental systems, what you do about shorter range systems, what you do about battlefield systems, what you do about conventional weapons, what you do about chemical weapons; there are links; and the trick is not to allow the whole process to be

held up, if you can get it moving, by blockage of one particular negotiation, nor to say that: "We will negotiate agreements and then we'll keep them on ice until we negotiate the whole series."

That would be impossibly long. These things are all linked, and yet we will have to find ways of segmenting them. That is, we will have to seek negotiations that will attack some of these problems *seriatim* and which will, you would hope, result in establishing successively lower levels of armament, but without the stability of the system being disrupted at any point. That is very schematic but nonetheless it is extremely important.

I would also say, very much as a personal judgement, that the problem is not, as some people maintain, the accumulation of weapons. It is true, notwithstanding some unilateral decisions by NATO which have, for instance, sharply reduced the number of nuclear warheads that are held in Europe - and people often do not appreciate the extent to which this has happened - that notwithstanding this fact, the level both of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe is nonetheless unprecedented, certainly in absolute terms - for conventional forces, unprecedented in peace-time. But that accumulation has not really produced an unstable system.

People sometimes argue that the very accumulation of weapons is of itself dangerous. They speak as if this inevitably produces an increased risk of war. I think not - that it depends on what weapons are being introduced and in what circumstances, and whether they are destabilizing. That is really the question. The evidence is that the system that has been created, while it is the product of some of these purely random factors like the introduction of the SS-20s, is nonetheless quite a stable system. My reason for arguing that is that, in any other circumstances, how could the European security system, if you can call it a system - it is hard to call something that is such a random construct a system, but nonetheless, let's say that in effect East and West have conspired somehow or other through a maze of reciprocal actions over the last generation to create a system how could that system have survived crises over Berlin in the 1950s, survived the crisis in Hungary in 1956, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Polish crisis of 1980-81? Over and over again, the system shows where it is unstable: that it is inherently unstable in Eastern Europe. The relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is flawed, and there is no way that system can be stabilized, at least by consent. They have not arrived at that yet anyway. When its stability is threatened, the stability is restored by actual applications of force, or at least the threat of force, and in any other circumstances - before the age of nuclear weapons let's say political crises of that magnitude in Europe would have brought us much closer to war than I think we have ever been.

So you could argue that in fact, however much we want to get rid of the weapons, it is quite a stable system; that it is capable of withstanding very severe shocks. So it seems to me the problem then is not the lack of stability, the problem is to retain the stability. The stability is there. It is one of the virtues of the system. I know this may seem almost a perverse logic, but I think it has some force: that the system has the virtue of stability and that we want to maintain that stability; that the criticism is that it is stability established at a very considerable political price in Eastern Europe, and it is stability established at a very high level of armament. So that the object over time is to produce a more civilized political order - and that really is what we are seeking in CSCE - and to seek through arms control and disarmament negotiations progressively to reduce the level of armaments to something that is at a more sensible level, without at any stage in the downward track destroying the stability of the system. That is really the European security programme. If you look at it in that perspective, the fact that we happen to have hold at the moment of one particular negotiation affecting one particular category of nuclear weapons strikes me almost as another one of these random happenings; it is not necessarily the point at which you

would attack this massive complex of problems if you could start tabula rasa. Let's say, for instance - some people have argued this - that it would have been far more sensible to start with negotiations covering battlefield weapons. Anyway, one way or another, we are where we are. We start from where we start. Alright, the INF thing may on one logic be an odd place to attack the problem. Nonetheless, history has brought us there, and if we can register success with that particular category of weapons, that success itself I think is far more important than the fact that by some arguments the two sides really ought to be talking about something else first.

[HILL] It's an interesting point. It brings us around also to another point. One of the things which arose while you were at NATO was the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative. I think this was announced by President Reagan while you were at NATO. My impression was that most people could not quite figure out at first what this was all about, but then when it dawned on people what it was about, then they began to worry about it. That is what happened in Canada, I think. And I have a feeling that it was not dissimilar in Europe. And when they started to worry about it, the Europeans began to wonder where would they stand in relation to the American defensive shield that was going up. Could you tell us something about the discussions that took place on this issue? Was there much discussion?

[TAYLOR] There was no conclusive discussion at all while I was there, and I do not think that there was anything that you could call more than the beginnings of a process of consultation about SDI and its implications. The President's announcement came really as quite a surprise to everybody. It surprised a lot of people in the United States. Unlike INF and the two track decision and all the rest of it, it was not something that people had had a long time to work up to. On the contrary, it was more or less dropped on the Alliance, and people had to start from there.

Well, the United States sent a number of extremely expert military and civilian defence advisers to Brussels, and there were frequent briefings about what was involved in the programme. General Abrahamson came several times for instance, and there were other senior officials from the Defense Department; and of course the Secretary of Defense himself appeared regularly in NATO meetings, and would speak to the progress of the programme.

One of the great difficulties, at least so long as I was there - and I take it this is still a difficulty - is that it all depends on what SDI you are talking about. If the most ambitious form of strategic defence could be realized, the kind that the President appeared to be talking about and appeared to believe in - he seemed to believe in the most ambitious form - that is something that would be a kind of double dome. That is, it would protect the United States, but it would also protect the territory of the Allies. That was part of the answer to European worries about is SDI just Fortress America?

In principle, the President appeared to be saying that the protective umbrella would cover all the Allies. But then there was also, you will remember, the offer to share the technology with the Soviet Union. So, the Soviet Union would be protected by another dome or umbrella as well. Well, the implications of that are breathtakingly vast; they would obviously be in a class by themselves. Now between that extreme vision of what might be possible, and whatever the United States may eventually come to as a result of the research that is going on now, there is a whole range of possibilities. Just in the last few months, of course, Secretary Weinberger has talked again about the possibilities of an early deployment of something much less ambitious. Your judgement about whether these things are possible or impossible, wise or unwise, destabilizing or not, depends in the end on what SDI is. While people use SDI as one of these very convenient labels, in fact, you know, SDI is a label like "middle class": it means all sorts of things - so far as I can see,

anyway. It depends on what you mean by SDI whether you find it acceptable or unacceptable, possible or impossible.

In any event, as you know, the Canadian government has taken a rather modest and prudent line about it and said that research is justified because we know that the Soviet Union is carrying on research in the field of strategic defence but the Canadian government for its part is not going to set up a research programme of its own to respond to the American invitation, which was extended to the Allies to join in the venture. It seems to me that the jury is still out on SDI. In fact, there are all sorts of juries, and they are all still out. You read accounts of, lets say, congresses of computer experts who debate whether the United States can or cannot find the small army of software specialists to write the software for the system. And you are aware of all the range of alternative weapons that are being considered, some of which, as research progresses, seem to be somewhat more promising, and others which it seems are being abandoned because the testing programme suggests that no, they will not pan out.

There are so many unknowables in it that I think it is very difficult to make more than the most tentative or preliminary kind of judgement. I think that all would agree, from President Reagan on down - it's so obvious, you wonder if it is worth saying - that it would be utterly foolish for any United States President, even if a particular system becomes technically possible, to authorize the deployment of a system which is quite plainly going to be destabilizing. You cannot imagine the American President doing that.

There we are. We are presumably years away from decisions of that kind. Meanwhile it seems to me that everybody is agreed on that. Whether you are justified in going from there to a quick conclusion that strategic defence is not going to be any more important in the next generation than it has been in the last decade or so, and that in the end there will never be a substitute for mutually assured destruction, and virtually total reliance on mutual deterrence of offensive systems, that I do not know. Personally, I would be reluctant to make a judgement of that kind. It may be that we can find ways to go at least some distance toward the goal that President Reagan has talked about, which involve us in finding some substitute system for guaranteeing our security other than relying on these threats of massive mutual annihilation.

[HILL] Anyway, while you were there was no sort of programme of consultation, of analysis, on SDI, in NATO? There was no sort of SDI working group set up?

[TAYLOR] Not as such. There were pieces of consultative machinery that had been set already for other purposes which locked onto the SDI problem simply as one more element in the nuclear dilemma, and certainly some of our allies pressed very hard for a discussion of the strategic implications of SDI as such - a sort of special debate on the subject - but that had not been arranged by the time I left.

[HILL] Was there a lot of discussion in NATO in this period on the nuclear dilemma? I mean many people have argued that if the US contemplates using nuclear weapons in defence of Europe, that means that potentially the Soviets might retaliate against the United States. In earlier periods people talked about "Windows of Opportunity", because of Soviet deployments of new types of missile systems and the failure of the Americans to deploy equivalent types. Dr. Kissinger got into a great phase of questioning Western nuclear credibility at one time, and then the whole debate seemed to die down.

Of course, while you were in NATO, a strong build up of American forces was going on under President Reagan. I just wondered if the particular problem of the nuclear dilemma was a major issue in that period?

[TAYLOR] The form that the nuclear dilemma took while I was there that was most debatable, centered on the question of first use, and of course that is still an unresolved problem. The SACEUR throughout the period I was in NATO was Bernard Rogers and he many, many times said in public that with the forces he had and the mission that had been given to him, if there were a war, ammunition stocks and reserves and so on would be run down to the point where in fairly short order he would be obliged to turn to Allied governments and request authority to use nuclear weapons.

He was accustomed to make a number of other observations that set that in context. For instance, he often said also that he did not himself believe that there was a very high risk of a war breaking out, that he really did not think that the major threat arose from a direct threat of war, that it was much more likely that, if imbalances between East and West were allowed to grow, the result would more likely be that Soviet diplomacy, backed by Soviet military preponderance, to which there would no longer be a satisfactory Western response, would leave the West open to blackmail and pressure of various kinds; and that that was really a more serious risk than war itself. That was also an argument for maintaining a military balance. It was also an argument for lessening the relative dependence of the Alliance on nuclear weapons, and increasing the relative dependence of the Alliance on conventional weapons. We are still there, really. That debate is still going on. General Rogers is now departing from his position, but I would think that is a debate which his successor will take up, and I doubt if on that point he will see much differently; that is, that the key words are, I think, stability and balance. You can maintain a balance at different levels, and we must try to maintain it at the lowest level we can arrange, but if it has to be maintained at a relatively high level, for reasons not of our seeking, then really you have to find the resources to do that. It does not mean that you have to maintain forces on a one for one basis. No one in NATO has ever argued that and NATO never has maintained forces on that basis. It simply means that you have to maintain some adequate combination of nuclear and conventional forces to constitute a credible deterrent. Our problems would arise if we allowed our forces to become weakened to the point where they no longer constituted that credible deterrent. That is what military commanders like General Rogers would urge on the political leadership of the Alliance, and that is still our problem. This is why we have to contribute to the maintenance of our share of a credible deterrent, in circumstances where you hope you will be able to negotiate a balance of forces over time at lower levels and with a mix of forces that is relatively less reliant on the nuclear component of the deterrent, therefore relatively more on conventional forces; but that you do not put yourself into the poor house in that way, because conventional forces are expensive forces. This is sad but true, that one of the advantages we have had from having relied on nuclear weapons is that it has been a relatively cheaper form of defence. If we had to maintain forces anything like the size of Soviet forces on the basis of, say, full-time volunteers, pay them at the going wage rates in Western economies and equip them accordingly, we would all be in the poor house. That kind of force structure is probably beyond our means. But those arguments were beginning to weigh on people. I think that there was a gradual realization in the public debate that went on while I was in NATO that, to use a North American expression: "There's no free lunch", that if you are going to depend less on nuclear deterrence, then you have got to depend more on conventional deterrence, and if we want to get away, progressively, from reliance on the nuclear weapons that produce the first-use doctrine in the first place, then that is really the road down which you have to go. We are not at the stage yet where anyone, I think, can feel safe - any military advisor anyway - in advising Western governments to abandon the doctrine of first use.

[HILL] Was this the period in which General Rogers was beginning to advocate a 4% increase in defence spending, or did that come later?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think the 4% figure was launched while I was there.

[HILL] What kind of response did that meet with?

[TAYLOR] Well, of course 4% is generally beyond the capacities of all but a handful of Western governments. I do not think they have the financial resources and I do not think they have the political strength it would take to screw down other programmes for the sake of raising increased sums of that kind.

[HILL] You mentioned the no-first-use issue. Of course, another question that was under very active discussion in the period you were there was the whole idea of a nuclear freeze. This was the period of the big peace demonstrations in North America and in Europe. Did that movement have an impact on your own work?

[TAYLOR] Well, yes, although not so much the freeze. The freeze was really a sort of rallying cry in the United States. And I suppose it had its impact in Canada also, where to some degree the debate about cruise missiles and so on was linked with the notion of a nuclear freeze, I do not think Europeans were debating a nuclear freeze so much as those who disliked the notion of course were arguing against the deployment of the INF missiles. That was the focus of the counterpart debate in Europe; and that debate, as I have already said, was of course very much the essential political background to a lot of the discussions that went on in the NATO Alliance.

[HILL] Was this the period also in which Mr. Trudeau launched his Peace Initiative? I was just wondering how much impact that had on NATO headquarters as well as on the allies?

[TAYLOR] Yes, Mr. Trudeau undertook his Peace Initiative - I am trying to think - when I was first in NATO. In any event, in a sense it did not have anything to do with NATO. That was Mr. Trudeau's deliberate choice. He wanted to make it an individual thing; it was not something he wanted to push through the machine of NATO consultation. I guess his judgement was that what he wanted to say, the message that he wanted to convey, was best conveyed by pursuing quite a different route, in which one man made a kind of pilgrimage of his own; and that he was a voice crying in the wilderness, as he conceived it, because it did seem, at the time he made the trips connected with the Initiative, that there was no negotiation going on, and no possibility of a negotiation.

Well, of course we have come an enormous distance. I suppose you cannot blame people for pooh-poohing the history of all the abortive attempts to negotiate nuclear disarmament, because people can always say: "Well, yes, you say that the superpowers have tried and so on, but what's it ever come to?" That's a good question. Because after all, the best the superpowers have ever got, with all the urging from all the rest of us, are SALT I and SALT II, which were not reduction agreements, which were encapsulations of the existing plans of the two sides, in effect, which at best capped the race but did not actually reduce nuclear weapons. And SALT II, of course, ended up, as we know, being an agreement which the present United States Administration characterized as fundamentally flawed at the outset; and then -while it continued largely to observe the limits in practice - pointed out it was defective and had never been brought into force; and then finally with the passage of time, even had it been ratified, would have expired. Yet that is one major piece of

whatever structure the superpowers have managed to erect. And the only piece that has full effect as a treaty binding the two superpowers now is the ABM Treaty.

Well, seen in that light, it is a very modest accomplishment. Public opinion is entitled, I suppose, to be jaded to a degree when it hears people say, "Well, we're maybe on the verge of actually negotiating the reduction - perhaps the elimination - of a whole category of nuclear weapons." But as against that, it is worth recalling that the first proposal for deep cuts in strategic weapons was made by President Carter; and that the offer to negotiate on that basis was rejected by the Soviet Union at the time, more or less without even opening the mail. It was rejected out of hand.

Then in its last year, the Carter Administration, of course, was totally preoccupied by the hostage situation in Iran. The Reagan Administration came to power with the view it had of the SALT II Agreement and with great reluctance even to embark on negotiations. I remember very well having been present at the first visit President Reagan paid, I think it was in March, after his inaugural, to Ottawa. Mr. Trudeau was then our Prime Minister. One of the things that Mr. Trudeau was pressing on him was that the allies of the United States expected the new United States Administration to re-open negotiations on nuclear arms reduction with the Soviet Union. President Reagan at the time smiled and was affable and pleasant and committed himself to absolutely nothing. You will recall it took a long, long time, in fact, before negotiations were even launched. Therefore, I think that Mr. Trudeau was entitled, at the low point, to feel that somebody had to say something dramatic on the subject to try to shake people out of their torpor. He was trying I think to encapsulate a certain mood, and to send a message in that sense. He chose to do it without consultation and as an independent move. But I guess he felt the circumstances were so extraordinary that they justified that. But look at the distance we have travelled since: the Administration which spurned SALT II at the outset, and would not consider in the first year or so even the thought of nuclear negotiations, is now deep in negotiations of various kinds with the Soviet Union. And - who knows? - we may actually see by the end of this year the first fruits. Well, that is what we all hope. Maybe it will not happen. Maybe there will be frustration and disappointment again. But for all that it's a damn sight better than what we were looking at, let's say, five and six years ago.

[HILL] There are a whole lot of other questions I would like to ask but I know your time is limited, and I would just like to ask one further one about this period when you were Ambassador to NATO. How useful a focus for Canadian foreign policy is NATO, in your view? For example, I mean, how good an instrument is it for Canada to work through in order to pursue its goals of international peace and security, as well as its own particular national interests? In your response, could you say why, based on your experience of that period?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think it is indispensable. Of course, there are a number of important Canadian goals that cannot be pursued usefully in NATO. There are some hopes that we had of the organization in its earliest days that have not been realized. To the extent that these hopes were based in permanent Canadian interests, we have to pursue those interests in other international bodies and in other ways. NATO turned itself, over time, into a defensive military alliance, which, with its important political dimension, is really the key consultative agency for preparing the Western position in debates on European security and Atlantic security.

That's far from saying it is the only forum in which we can pursue our interests. Obviously we are also active participants in the CSCE and the MBFR negotiations. We have a whole set of well-established bilateral relations with all the European countries. So far as defence matters are

concerned, we have special arrangements for North America and the United States. So NATO is by no means the only device available to us. Nonetheless, it is the most important in that circle. In that sense, it remains an indispensable forum. Unless the international system changes radically in a generation or so, I do not really see it ever losing its importance as a focus for dealing with the management of the East-West relationship, and with preparing coordinated positions to deal with the arms control and disarmament issues we hope will be successfully negotiated over the next decade or so.

[HILL] How about the pursuit of Canada's own particular interests? For example, what about this problem of the Europeans acting more and more together, and then dealing directly with the Americans, within NATO? Is this making things more difficult?

[TAYLOR] It is always a risk. I suppose the beginning of wisdom is to recognize the risk is there. Once you have recognized it, then you immediately start taking steps to ensure the risk is minimized. I guess we will just have to go on doing that. It is hard to imagine that a country with Canada's assets will ever be totally disregarded and negligible weight in the international system. The country has the weight it has. It is one of the strongest and freest countries in the world. It has tremendous assets, and these weights show up in international discussions. Canadians are not perhaps totally conscious of that, because we live, almost as a national obsession, in the shadow of the United States. The easiest - in fact, sometimes the only - international comparison that comes to Canadian minds at all is a comparison with the United States. But the United States is ten times as populous as we are; it is ten times as rich; and it is a nuclear superpower. Of course, people know this. These things are all clichés. But nonetheless it is material for reflection that our instinctive standard of international comparison is with a country that itself is unique in the international order. We are inclined perhaps to view ourselves through a distorting prism as a result of making that kind of comparison so often. We appear rather differently to many people outside the country. In any event, I have no doubt that we have the wit and the ability and the resources to defend our interests.

Europe goes on coalescing. We knew from the time of the debate in Canada thirty years ago over the first British application to join the Common Market, that an expanded European Common Market in a lot of ways was going to produce short-run damage to specific Canadian interests. That was true. That has happened. We would not have spent all that time worrying over and arguing against the Common Agricultural Policy if that were not true. Our interests in some ways, and in some important ways, have been damaged. Nonetheless, I suppose the broad feeling of people and here I think we probably share a certain commonality of view with the United States - is that, seen in a broader perspective, the movement in Europe lies in the logic of history, and that it is a movement broadly speaking to be applauded, not to be resisted. Our attitude - and I think this, on reflection, has been the attitude of Canadian governments for a generation now in the face of the European movement - has been, on the whole, not to be grudging about it, but to applaud and to wish the Europeans well, to be perfectly prepared to let them see their interests and work their way through to new forms of political and economic association, and to adjust our own relations with them as a function of that; but to go on pointing out at every stage that, before they make up their minds and cast everything in concrete, we would like an opportunity to be heard, and to point out where particular steps that they are proposing to take, or particular policies that they adopt, are damaging to our interests. I think we should go on doing that. Our objection to the European Community that exists now - and it is an objection a whole lot of Europeans have themselves to the Community that has been created -is, for instance, that it has a massively distorted common agricultural policy, which is profoundly damaging to world markets and price structures, to the economies of countries with an important agricultural sector like Canada; and that all this really is

iniquitous. It should be attacked, and anything that could be done about it by way of direct negotiation with the Community or in the GATT we shall go on pursuing.

Part VII - Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1985 onwards

[HILL] Perhaps I might ask just one last question, which is a rather broad one. Since 1985 you have been Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and I wondered whether, reflecting on your experience in that position, you have any comments to make about Canadian foreign policy, about the role of NATO in world affairs, and about current changes in the general pattern of world affairs?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think I have said all I need to about Canada and NATO. I do believe that it will go on being an indispensable organization for us for another generation both in political and defence terms. In that period, we may see some very important changes in the Soviet Union which will require a Western response; and that Western response is going to have to be found by the NATO countries - still, I think, as an Alliance. How far will all this go and what changes might be produced? It is very hard to speculate about. What is happening in the Soviet Union is absolutely fascinating. We spent the latter years of Mr. Brezhnev's life speculating endlessly on the question: "After Brezhnev, what?" One of the things that was recognized was that there would eventually be a generational change - time alone would take care of that. Even if all else was unpredictable, we knew that would happen sooner or later; and given the advancing age of the older generation of Soviet leaders, it looked like sooner. We would be faced with people who would represent a different expression of Soviet power. Whether that was going to be favourable or harmful to our interests - well, that remained to be seen. We have at least got this far, that after several interim stages, what is plainly the successor generation has arrived. I do not think you could say that the present leadership is firm and fixed yet, that is to say that five years from now the composition of the Politburo is going to be the same as it is now. We are bound to see further changes. There have been at lower levels very considerable changes, and presumably time too will work further changes. It seems that, naturally enough, as with any leader, Mr. Gorbachev sees his principal responsibilities as being domestic: the improvement of his own society, that he is responsible for bringing about if he can.

We see some of the extensions of this in changes in Soviet foreign policy. Since I have been in my present job there has certainly been a total change in the style of Soviet diplomacy. We have had evidence of that - a kind of precursor - with the visit several years ago paid by Mr. Gorbachev himself to Canada before he arrived at his present eminence. Since the new leadership has been in power, we have had above all Mr. Shevardnadze's visit to Canada last autumn. This gave people in Canada a direct experience of what a different style, in the conduct of Soviet affairs, we are seeing.

Well, people can say: "Yes but that is only a change in style, and we must not be gulled by people who are merely charming." Well, alright. I would say that the change in style is already an improvement. It is far easier to do business with people with whom one can have a decent and civilized dialogue than it was sometimes with people who were as obdurate as some of the conservative spokesmen of the former generation. However that may be, what matters - and I would certainly agree with the cautious people about this - is the substance, and in substance, what have we seen?

Well, in terms of Canada's own relations with the Soviet Union, some quite interesting changes. The first notable improvement in years, for instance, in dealing with family re-unification cases

including some of the most longstanding like the case of Danila Shumuk. That is noted and appreciated. There again, people could say: "Well, all right, we all applaud that development, but why should anybody give the Soviet Union credit for letting people leave the Soviet Union to be reunited with their families at long last, who should never have been prevented in the first place? They don't deserve any credit for that." There is some justice in that observation, and also there are still some unresolved cases.

Here all I can say is, there is evidence of an important change. It is undeniable evidence. I think we have to register it, and I want to weigh it in as balanced a way as I can.

There have been other aspects of our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union which have also altered for the better in the last little while. Exchange programmes with the Soviet Union, for instance, were largely emptied of content in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and now the content is being restored - restored, we hope, in a way that makes more sense, and creates more genuine benefit both to the Canadians who are involved in the exchanges and to the Soviets, because these things will only work on a basis of reciprocity, of more mutual benefit than we were able to get out of such programmes in previous years. Well, again, there have been some extremely interesting instances of successful exchanges that have allowed Canadians really to see parts of the Soviet Union that have been very difficult to see before, to have contacts with people, to have conversations with people in the Soviet Union, in a much more candid way than was true in the past, about problems that are matters of common interest.

Those are further interesting signs. They are real. They are modest but real signs of alterations in the relationship. If, however, you look over the period, say, since 1985, at Soviet foreign policy in general, it seems that you can see the signs of what? - soundings, experiments, tentative probes here and there in areas of traditional Soviet concern: relations with Japan, relations with China, even the Afghanistan question. There have been signs that perhaps new minds were looking at these problems, and that things might change.

But you have to say that the most important accomplishment -and it's not yet an accomplishment - in Soviet foreign policy, lies in the area we have already discussed, that is the fact that the superpowers have brought themselves and their allies to the point where we may yet see by the end of this year the first actual nuclear arms reduction agreement. Now that is not yet a bird in the hand, but if you are looking around for hopeful signs, that is what you can say. You can say no more and no less than that right at the moment.

On the other hand, there are other areas where you really do not see any signs of change. It seems, for instance, as between the Soviet Union and Japan, that the two sides have looked at the relationship. Perhaps the Soviets have taken a new look at the relationship; there were some signs of that. But in the end, on key questions for the Japanese like the status of the Northern Islands, there is no sign of any change in the Soviet position. And when you run through some of the other items on the list: Cambodia, Afghanistan, and so on - you cannot really say that anything has happened yet which justifies the conclusion that the new leadership has also produced a revolution in Soviet foreign policy. On the contrary, the essence of most classic Soviet positions has been preserved up to this point. That also, I think, is material for reflection so far as the thrust of the domestic reform is concerned. Of course, that is more a matter of their internal affairs. While the world watches with interest, and while no doubt whatever happens - in addition to its fascination - has long-run implications for us, nonetheless it is a process that is relatively harder for people at our distance to penetrate and to understand. The Soviet economy and Soviet society are vast and complicated affairs. How much success the leadership can hope to have in reforming them is very

much an open matter of question. I imagine it is a question they ask themselves. Certainly outsiders who know their system less well are bound to ask: "With problems as deep rooted and intractable as the Soviet leaders themselves admit these problems to be, how can anyone reasonably expect that they will be cured or attacked, or altered, to any important degree, in a short time?" I guess that must surely be a major problem for the Soviet leadership: that in the end, the people who want change in the Soviet Union, will become impatient to see it, and those who do not want change will have a chance to rally their forces to resist.

[HILL] I guess that was the thought that came to mind when we were speaking about generational and other changes. The process is bound to be a long one if it is to go anywhere.

[TAYLOR] Yes, I would not say it is without hope, and I would be perfectly prepared to say it is too early to judge. But nonetheless people from the West where societies evolve much more rapidly, are in a way impatient for change. I think this is a particularly North American cast of mind: that life consists of problems and problem-solving, and that to problems there are solutions. You do not take the attitude that the problems have always been there and you live with them, or that certain problems are insoluble. You are much more inclined to say, "Well, what's the answer? And why haven't you got it yet?"

I do not think that that is so much the Soviets mentality, although it is perhaps silly to generalize. Obviously, the Soviet people have had to learn to live with burdens that we can hardly understand and would never accept. On the other hand, we have by comparison a free and flexible society. We are accustomed to adapting it rather quickly; and even though by our own standards we may appear to deal with social and economic problems rather slowly and unsuccessfully, nonetheless by comparison with other societies, our society changes very, very rapidly. Change and flexibility are built into our attitudes. When we look at something like the Soviet Union, I think we are all too inclined to say: "Well, what's Gorbachev done today? Why hasn't he produced thorough going reform yet? How long do we have to wait?"

Well, I think that probably we will have to be patient a long time about some of the things we would like to see happen.

[HILL] Thanks very much indeed. I am very grateful to you for taking the time to do this interview.



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