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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY - II

Text of a statement delivered in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, on March 28, 1949.

Mr. Speaker, the discussion of this resolution has been encouraging; indeed it has been an inspiring example, if I may say so, of parliamentary unity, and a reflection of national unity in a fundamental question of international policy. It has shown that no matter how vigorously we may differ on domestic matters -- as we should, in a healthy democracy -- in the house and in the country we face as a united people the problems of peace and collective security.

Those who have the privilege of signing this treaty for Canada next week will, in fact as well as in theory, sign it as the representatives, -- and indeed servants -- of the parliament of Canada and the whole people of Canada, except those of communist belief who clamour and scramble on the fringes of our national life.

Tonight I wish to say a few words about the background leading up to this draft treaty and, if I may, explain as briefly as possible the articles of the draft text, during which time I hope to deal with one or two of the matters raised by previous speakers.

At the end of the second world war, as has already been pointed out in the house, relief that the terrible struggle had been brought to a victorious end was combined with the determination that the disaster should not be repeated. The free people of the world, at shattering cost and desperate suffering, had defended or regained their liberties. They had vindicated the faith that lay behind their political institutions and proved the strength of their democratic way of life. They now demanded, in terms that could not be mistaken by any government, that, in the future trial by such hard ordeal should not again be necessary. As they surveyed a background of the years of war through which they had come, they saw many occasions when the free nations, if they had acted in harmony and in strength, might have dissipated the danger of German aggression without war. Too late they discovered that the tools which might have meant their salvation had been ready to their hands, if they had only had the courage to use them.

The last war, then, taught us at least this one lesson, that the nations must act together to keep the peace, and as the instrument for such collective action, some effective international organization must be set up.

The first consequence of this lesson was the founding of the United Nations. The charter, signed at San Francisco in 1945, is a long and complicated document, but its purpose is simple. Member states agree to act together; to resist aggression wherever it may occur; to co-operate for the purpose of removing the causes of war. In the United Nations they established an international agency which they thought at that time would be satisfactory for these purposes. But as has already been pointed out by more than one speaker today, the mood of 1945 was too optimistic. It was natural, then, that the nations which by their united effort had won the greatest war in history against the most ruthless and determined enemy that man had up to that time known, should believe that they could accomplish

What must have seemed at that time to be the easier task of maintaining peace.

Unhappily, however, the basic requirements for the full success of the United Nations did not carry over from war to peace. The unity of the great powers, upon which almost everything depended, was soon eaten away by the acids of post-war controversy. At the war's end a dozen or more great and contentious political issues rose from the political confusion of western Europe and eastern Asia. Basically these problems could all be reduced to one great question: How far would the Soviet union go in exploiting the post-war situation so as to extend its territory and increase its might? That question was no idle speculation. We had seen the boundaries of Russia extended, first in 1939 and 1940 at the expense of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland. And as the war went on it became clear that the promise of freedom to Poland would not include those eastern Polish provinces which were in fact eventually surrendered by Poland to the U.S.S.R. After the war, parts of Roumania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were added to the U.S.S.R. so that by 1945 the boundaries of the Soviet union had been pushed farther to the west than ever before in Russian history.

Not content with this expansion, the U.S.S.R. then proceeded to surround itself with a group of satellite governments; imposing its will upon neighbouring peoples through local communist parties supported by Russian forces. The list alone of these captive regimes is evidence of the coercion which created them. As the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) pointed out this afternoon, who could believe that the Poles, a people who for centuries with courage and resolve had fought against all comers for their freedom, would submit of their own free will to Soviet control? For one hundred years the insistent demand for freedom of the Roumanians, Hungarians, Bulgars, Czechs and the Slovaks had been one of the strongest forces in European history. Only when it has been suppressed by ruthless physical superiority has this force lain dormant. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, we already see in Yugoslavia a sign that the peoples of eastern Europe are beginning to realize that the yoke that has been laid upon them is heavy, degrading and unbearable. The one border territory which has managed effectively to maintain its independence is Finland, but even there the long and menacing hand of Moscow threatens dire punishment if the slightest Soviet interest seems to be prejudiced.

The tight control which the U.S.S.R. has established by these oppressive means in eastern Europe has been given a false facade of international respectability by treaty arrangements. The Soviet government, and communists throughout the world, have been charging that the proposed Atlantic treaty is an offensive threat aimed at them. But they had no hesitation in initiating and negotiating, by other methods it is true, collective treaty arrangements in eastern Europe long before the Atlantic treaty was even considered. We are not sure how many of these treaties and agreements there are amongst the communist states, because, in spite of the terms of the United Nations charter, only a very few of them have been registered with the United Nations. So far as we can tell, however, there are over fifty treaties and agreements amongst the group of communist states comprising the U.S.S.R., Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Bulgaria. These are variously termed treaties for friendship and mutual assistance, co-operation and mutual assistance, collaboration and mutual aid, economic collaboration and reciprocal delivery of goods, trade and payment. Their total effect, however, is to spread a thick net of political and economic commitment over the areas under domination of the Soviet union.

In the presence of the problems created by this Soviet expansion, what could we expect of an international organization like the United Nations which was based on the assumed unanimity of the great powers? How could there be any unity about the way in which the United Nations was to fulfil its basic function and protect the security of its members when this Soviet communist expansion was the greatest threat to such security? Since we can find no immediate or satisfactory answer to these important questions we must consider how best to defend our own soil and maintain our heritage of liberty and law.

In the company of like-minded peoples we tried to find means by which the free world, of which this nation is a part, can remain free. More important still, we tried to find a way to work with other nations to search out and remove the causes of war. The North Atlantic Treaty, the draft of which is before the house, is the present answer to these demands. It is the step which we can take now while we try to bring about conditions in which the United Nations can fully perform the functions for which it is designed.

The objects of this draft treaty are very simple and straightforward. In it the nations of the North Atlantic community will agree to pool their resources in the face of common danger. By doing so they will greatly increase world stability and the chance of lasting peace, for once this treaty is made effective further aggression against any of its members cannot be undertaken with any hope of success.

The North Atlantic nations have by this draft treaty decided to put an end to the casual and piecemeal destruction of freedom which has taken place when free states stood separately against aggression. By taking a stand now they may make unnecessary a desperate stand later like that of 1940. That year of danger and dread must never be forgotten. Is there anyone in Canada, no matter where he lives or what language he speaks; no matter what religious belief he holds or what political party he follows, who does not recall with dismay the events of June, 1940? France was prostrate and the whole vast continental area from Bordeaux to Vladivostock had fallen under the control of two mighty totalitarian powers in temporary evil partnership. Staunch and steadfast Britain alone stood between ourselves and the formidable military power of Nazi Germany. Those twenty miles separating the German armies from the white cliffs of Dover, from the last free country in western Europe, were more important, so far as our safety was concerned, than the whole wide Atlantic ocean. Never was the future of this country in such peril. Those few miles of channel alone kept the war from our shores. This is the dire extremity which must never be allowed to recur. We can prevent it first by removing the causes of conflict, and secondly by demonstrating beyond any shadow of doubt to any possible aggressor that, if he takes a step against any member of this North Atlantic community of nations which are pledging faith to one another, he will face the total and unremitting efforts of all until he stops his aggression.

It is not enough, however, simply to stand on guard. Active and not merely passive defence is essential. In the long run peace can be assured only in a stable world; stability is reached when economic conditions are improving, when trade flows freely, when political problems are being solved by consultation among states determined to settle them peacefully. Security is a commodity produced as much, indeed, possibly more, by economic well-being as by military preparedness, as was pointed out this afternoon by the leader of the C.C.F. group (Mr. Coldwell). We must, therefore, co-operate as effectively to achieve the former as the latter. Security is also produced when men know that other men share and understand their basic beliefs. This is also something that we shall seek among the states which sign the North Atlantic treaty. They inherit common traditions, and the political and social practices they follow spring from a common background. The faith they have in the validity of their free institutions is strong, and it will be strengthened by the pledge which they are now giving to each other to maintain and defend them. Daily we see these beliefs attacked and defamed by the advocates of an alien, dictatorial, political creed -- communism. The power of the communists, wherever that power flourishes, depends upon their ability to suppress and destroy the free institutions that stand against them. They pick them off one by one: the political parties, the trade unions, the churches, the schools, the universities, the trade associations, even the sporting clubs and the kindergartens. The North Atlantic treaty is meant to be a declaration to the world that this kind of conquest from within will not in future take place amongst us.

The purpose of the proposed treaty, therefore, is to increase the security of the North Atlantic community, and at the same time to make more effective the efforts of this group of states to remove the economic and political causes of war. That is why this pact is an instrument of peace. It will promote

those conditions of stability and security in which peace flourishes. Nor does it in any way conflict with the charter of the United Nations. So far as this government is concerned, Mr. Speaker, it pledges itself not to take part in any activity under the North Atlantic treaty which contravenes the principles and purposes of the United Nations charter, or which is provocative or aggressive in character. I am sure the other governments which will sign this treaty can also give the same pledge. The aims and purposes of the North Atlantic treaty are precisely the same as those stated in the charter; and the effect of the proposed alliance can strengthen the United Nations by creating conditions in which it can do more effective work.

Canada's support of this pact, therefore, is not in any sense a change in our policy toward the United Nations and what it stands for. The Canadian government still hopes that the problems of post-war settlement, which have prevented the United Nations becoming what it was originally intended to become, may be solved. We hope, moreover, that the United Nations itself will contribute toward that solution. So far negotiations, either inside or outside the United Nations, on the major issues which divide the U.S.S.R. from the rest of the world have produced, as the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) pointed out this afternoon, little but failure and frustration. No doors are closed, however, and no one has permanently left the council table. So far as this government is concerned, no process of negotiation is too onerous and no conference too tedious that will lead toward settlement. We are prepared to support every effort in every council, every conference, committee, working group or whatever agency of negotiations may be suggested, to solve the problems which exist between the western world and the Soviet union. More than that, we believe that by these methods the long-term problem of security can best be solved. But in the meantime the North Atlantic treaty will serve as an instrument which, by strengthening the position of the free democracies, will make it possible for them to use the United Nations with greater confidence and more hope of success.

The negotiations leading to the preparation of the draft treaty now before the house commenced about ten months ago in Washington. A series of exploratory and non-committal meetings were held in that capital. In these meetings, which were attended by members of the United States state department and the ambassadors in Washington of the interested governments, the draft text of the treaty was worked out. As is always the case when drafts are worked out by representatives of many governments, the text and indeed the ideas in the text represent compromises and the highest possible measure of agreement between representatives of differing governments. The preparation of this treaty, I think, is an admirable demonstration of the way in which foreign affairs should be conducted amongst democratic countries. While the discussions in Washington have been confidential, their general purpose and the principles behind them have been well known to the public in all the countries concerned. Each participating government has been able to test public opinion in its own country as the agreement was being formulated. In this country there have been frequent public references to the negotiations which were proceeding in Washington. The government has missed no opportunity to tell the public that a draft treaty was being prepared and that the Canadian government was participating actively in this work of preparation. We have also given a clear indication of the purposes of the treaty and the nature of the commitments which would be involved, as the work was going on.

At the same time, however, the men who actually participated in the discussions and the governments who instructed these men, have been free from day-to-day public comment on the specific details as opposed to the principles under consideration. In the result, it has been possible to reach a conclusion generally satisfactory to all parties in the give and take of private discussion, without the difficulties which often arise when the early stages of delicate, detailed international negotiations are conducted in public. Honest differences of opinion, when they occurred in the afternoon, did not become sensational world headlines in the six o'clock editions, and of course there is nothing more difficult for a democratic government to abandon than a headline. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, it is often somewhat difficult for certain governments to set headlines.

It seems to me, then, that the preparation of the North Atlantic alliance has admirably combined the virtues of classical and confidential diplomacy with free and open discussion of the general principles under consideration. We have now reached the stage of discussion in parliament prior to signature of the treaty. The result of all this will be an open covenant privately negotiated but publicly debated and decided.

At this point I should like to direct the attention of the house to the actual text of the treaty. On another occasion, when we discuss the treaty before ratification, I shall be able to go into this matter probably in somewhat greater detail than is possible or desirable tonight, but if I may I should like to take up the treaty article by article and give the house the government's interpretation of the various articles before this resolution is dealt with.

There is first a brief and simple statement of the purposes of the states which propose to sign the treaty. I admit that in one or two respects the language of that preamble could be improved, and I admit also that there are some omissions from the preamble which might well have been filled in. But, as I have said, this is a text which represents the highest measure of agreement among a number of governments who negotiated it.

After the preamble, then, in article 1 the states reaffirm the pledge they gave in the United Nations charter, to settle by peaceful means all international disputes and differences in which they may be involved. Here is a clear statement of the peaceful intention and strictly defensive nature of this alliance, and I think it proper that it should be put in the first article of the draft treaty. By signing the charter every member of the United Nations has already given a solemn pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The states which will sign the North Atlantic treaty believe in this pledge and will respect it to the letter.

We come now to article 2. The second article of the treaty is one of particular interest to the government of Canada. Under this article, the member states promise to strengthen their free institutions, and to bring about among their own people and the peoples of other countries a better understanding of the principles upon which those free institutions are founded. They also undertake to promote conditions of stability and well-being and to seek to eliminate international economic conflict within the North Atlantic community.

I do not think, Mr. Speaker, that any sinister or dangerous interpretation can be read into those words. Surely, they can be taken at face value. The face value seems to me to make it quite clear that all we are trying to do in those words is to take a pledge that we will do our best to remove economic conflict in our international economic policy. It is a pledge, if you like, for co-operation in economic policies to the greatest extent possible and subject, of course, to our complete control over our own economic policies. It is hoped that by this co-operation we will help create, not only in the North Atlantic community but throughout the world, a progressive and prosperous society in which peace and security can flourish.

Positive and constructive consequences will, we hope, flow from article 2 of the treaty. It is by virtue of this part of the agreement, that the nations of the North Atlantic community will work together to strengthen the common foundations upon which society rests in the western world. The Brussels Powers in their treaty took the same kind of pledge a year ago, and have already taken effective steps to implement that pledge. I hope that under this article the nations of the North Atlantic community will undertake every practical step to promote the social progress of the western world. As has been stated by more than one speaker today, communism feeds on discontent and injustice which it stirs up without providing any real answer to the problems it exploits. A resolute and vigorous assault on these problems where they exist in the western world will be possible, I hope, under the North Atlantic treaty.

I shall deal with articles 3 and 4 next. By article 3 of the treaty the member states agree to strengthen the capacity of each member of the group to resist armed attack. This is based on the principle which proved so effective during the recent war, the principle of self-help and mutual aid. The term "mutual aid" is understood to mean the contribution by each party, consistent with its geographic location and resources and with due regard to the requirement of economic recovery, of such aid as it can reasonably be expected to contribute in the form in which it can most effectively furnish it; for example, facilities, manpower, productive capacity or military equipment.

Article 4 contains a pledge that the states which sign the treaty will consult together if the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any one of them is threatened. I suggest that this is a forward-looking document which takes account of the realities of the modern world. Article 3 underlines the preventive character of the agreement and so does article 4. We should not forget, as we have been reminded during this discussion, that the greater danger to a state today may arise, not from troops violating the frontiers, but from action committees overthrowing the government.

Czechoslovakia, as has already been pointed out, did not fall because of an armed attack. No war was declared and no frontiers were crossed. No bombs were dropped, yet the fate of Czechoslovakia was as clear a case of aggression as one could find in history.

Article 4 of this treaty provides that the members of the North Atlantic community shall consult together about this new and sinister kind of danger, indirect aggression. This does not mean that they propose to interfere in each other's internal affairs or hinder the healthy political growth of any member of the group. They will be able, however, to co-operate with a view to ensuring that no temporary difficulty in any state is exploited to impose by force a communist or, indeed, a fascist regime against the wishes of its people and with aid from outside.

We come now, Mr. Speaker, to article 5, which is really the heart of this draft treaty. Article 5 contains the most serious commitment which is placed on the states that signed this alliance. Should the treaty fail to achieve its main purpose, which is peace, article 5 will come into effect. If, in spite of our precautions, there is an armed attack on any of the parties in either Europe or North America, all the members of the group will assist the one which is attacked. Each will do so, and I quote from this article:

--by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

It is specifically provided that action under this clause shall cease as soon as the security council is able to take measures under the charter to restore international peace.

Under this treaty, then, each North Atlantic nation declares that it will in future consider an armed attack against any one of its allies as an armed attack against its own territory. An armed attack against one will be an armed attack against all. That does not mean that Canada would be automatically at war if one of our allies were attacked. We would, however, be found, in company with the other members of the alliance, to take promptly the action which we deemed necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

I have heard no one suggest that the full weight of the North Atlantic alliance will be brought into play, over some minor event of little consequence. In whatever action is necessary, however, we agree to play our proper part in co-operation with the others to restore peace. This action on our part may be small or it may be great; it may be brief or it may be of long duration. We shall have to decide upon it in terms of the situation which makes it necessary and the end to be achieved.

To be properly understood, I suggest that the commitment under this article should be compared with others which Canada has been prepared to take. Such a comparison has already been made during this discussion. When we entered into war with Germany and Japan, the Canadian people accepted a commitment far more general, far more exacting than those imposed by the terms of this treaty. The charter of the United Nations also imposes on us an extensive commitment. Article 43 of the charter provides that military agreements shall be entered into by the member states for the purpose of placing military force at the disposal of the security council. Once those military agreements have been completed, we shall be committed in this country to giving military support to the United Nations at the call of the security council. We are, moreover, bound to do more than that in obedience to the decision for the security council. As you know, the charter gives that council the right to impose economic or financial measures, blockades, or other forms of sanction short of war. I think it is important, therefore, to point out that the commitments which we undertake in this North Atlantic treaty are, in fact, commitments which we have already accepted in the United Nations charter and commitments which we have already taken very seriously indeed, as is shown by statements which the Canadian delegation has made at United Nations meetings. We have already recognized then, by our statements and by our actions, that peace is not kept and freedom is not preserved -- as the leader of the opposition suggested so wisely this afternoon -- merely by wishing for them or by signing peace pacts. We are a realistic people and we know that safety is not gained without effort. I know, and you know, Mr. Speaker, that the Canadian people have been willing in the past, and will be in the future, to make that effort.

I need hardly add that if, in spite of our efforts to keep the peace, some member of this alliance is attacked and we are called upon to fulfil our commitments, this country, this parliament and this government will act with the necessary determination and despatch. So far as this government is concerned, Mr. Speaker, in the face of a national emergency so grave as to call into force our commitments under this pact, it would immediately desire to consult parliament. This has now become a regular procedure in our history, and no one of course would wish to depart from it. No government could fulfil the responsibility which action under this treaty would impose without being certain of the support of the people of this country expressed through their representatives in parliament.

The remaining articles of the treaty define and amplify the articles I have already mentioned. Article 6 is a definition of the area within which the treaty has application. It reads as follows:

For the purpose of article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.

The effect of this article, therefore, is to limit the territory covered, and the obligation, to the North Atlantic area. It does not include colonial possessions or other territory outside the area which is defined.

Article 7 is a further statement of the purpose of the North Atlantic states to play their part as loyal members of the United Nations.

Then we come to article 8, which seemed to cause a certain anxiety in the mind of the leader of the Social Credit group when he made his distinguished speech on the draft treaty this afternoon. In article 8 the signatory states undertake to enter into no other obligations which conflict with this treaty. That is a normal and, I think, a useful provision in security treaties of this kind. It does not have the effect, Mr. Speaker -- as I believe some hon. members have feared -- of incorporating any other international agreements into the North

Atlantic treaty or of giving any added sanction whatever to those agreements. As I understand it -- and I certainly think I understand the interpretation that has been given to it by those who have negotiated this arrangement -- it is merely a declaration of fact, and of intention, that the parties have not made, or will not make, any treaties or secret arrangements which are in conflict with the pacific purposes of this pact.

Article 9, to which I attach great importance, provides for the setting up of a North Atlantic council through which activities under the alliance shall be arranged. It further provides that the council shall set up whatever subsidiary bodies prove to be necessary; in particular, it shall establish immediately a defence committee.

In the North Atlantic council all the members of the group will be equally represented. Through it the democratic process of reaching agreement through negotiation, discussion and compromise will be carried out. In the event of emergency, the council will also be the instrument for deciding what policies shall be recommended to the members of the group. It is one thing for a group of states to accept, as we do under this draft treaty, common responsibilities, each undertaking its fair share in discharging them, and indeed in adding to or subtracting from them. It is, however, quite a different thing for one, two or three states to make decisions which may have far-reaching consequences for all countries and all peoples, and then one, two or three of them to ask other countries to jump in and help in solving the problems which those decisions have created. There are, no doubt, times when the requirements for consultation, for discussion and for co-operative action must be subordinated to the necessities of a grave emergency. But if there is to be genuine collective action, those occasions must be reduced to a minimum. That is one reason why I attach so much importance to the council which will be set up under the proposed treaty and which is a genuine agency for collective consultation and collective decisions, in which Canada will have the opportunity of making its voice heard in regard to those collective decisions.

Article 10 makes provision for the admission of any new European state to the group by the unanimous consent of its members if they are "in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area". That seems to me, Mr. Speaker, to rule out any state which is not in a position to further the democratic principles of this treaty.

Article 11 defines the procedure for ratification. As far as Canada is concerned, the government will not deposit its ratification until parliament has had a further opportunity to consider in detail and at length the terms of the treaty, and to give its approval. This article also declares -- and this declaration is important -- that the provisions of this treaty shall be "carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes". So far as Canada is concerned, this government regards those constitutional processes as requiring both parliamentary approval and governmental action.

Article 12 provides that the treaty may be reviewed at the end of ten years, and there may be very important changes to consider at that time in the light of the situation which may then exist.

Article 13 fixes the term of the treaty at a minimum of twenty-one years. The final article concerns arrangements for official texts of the treaty in French and in English.

The states which have been asked to send representatives to Washington for the signing of the treaty are twelve in number. Eight have been participating in the preliminary discussions: they are Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. These eight have invited four others to sign: Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal. Of these four, I am sure that we are all happy to know that Denmark and Italy, democratic Italy, have already accepted this invitation. Together, these twelve states cover a wide area; they command great resources and great power. The strength of the group, however, lies not merely, as has already

been pointed out, in its size or its resources, not only in its industry or its manpower. It will also be strong rather because its members have a common tradition of liberty, a common belief in the place of the individual in the state, a common heritage of political and social thought, a common resolve to remain free.

There are many states, not included in the alliance, which share our traditions, which believe in peace and freedom as we do, and which are strong and responsible members of this democratic community. Our relations with them will be no less cordial and our willingness to co-operate with them for mutual welfare and security will be no less effective because we have made this North Atlantic treaty.

There is nothing in this treaty that should produce an exclusive or isolationist or superior attitude among the members of this group. The world is too small, and its parts are too closely related, for even regional isolation. Because we shall have increased the measure of our own security, we shall not cease to be concerned about the welfare of like-minded and peace-loving states in other areas. Our commonwealth of nations, for instance, will be no less durable if two of its members sign this treaty. We shall continue to be aware that the various regions of the world are interdependent in security matters. We hope that elsewhere in the world peace may be strengthened by agreements similar to the North Atlantic alliance or by association such as the British commonwealth of nations.

The purpose of the North Atlantic pact is peace and security. It will fulfil this purpose in two ways.

First, it sets up administrative machinery for defence, for co-operation and consultation. This machinery can and will be effectively used by the members of this group, because they all accept the basic democratic principle that nations should conduct their business by mutual agreement, and not by force. Because these nations which sign this pact have mutual confidence and trust in each other, this pact should be effective.

Secondly, the treaty will be able to fulfil its purposes also because it will do what the United Nations has not yet succeeded in doing. It will call into being a preponderance of international force, subject to law, which will protect the members of the group and add to the freedom and the security of the world community.

The consequence of the pact may be, indeed must be, much more far-reaching than merely the provision of security. It can promote progress as well as preserve peace. If the outlines and foundations of this international community can be fashioned quickly and effectively enough to serve its emergency purpose, it should lead to the growth of freedom and order everywhere. It is in the confidence, therefore, that not only Canada, but with Canada, the whole of mankind will benefit from this treaty, that I have the honour to support this resolution approving of its draft terms.

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