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

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
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Incidents in the early Military History of Canada

With Extracts from the Journals of the Officer commanding the Queen's
Rangers during the War 1755 to 1763

*A Lecture delivered on the 12th January, 1891, by Lt.-Col. A. Z. ROGERS,
40th Battalion - Lt.-Col. W. D. Oller, President, in the Chair.*

I have been asked to give an address before this Institute, embracing some of the incidents during the early military history of the country, and in particular to the part taken by The Queen's Rangers, a colonial volunteer corps that was raised in the New England settlements in the year 1756 for the purpose of assisting in repelling the encroachments of the French, who then were the possessors of the north-eastern portion of North America. This body of hardy bush rangers continued to take an active part in the various campaigns till the conquest of Canada was fully accomplished, when they were disbanded and were not reorganized until during the American Revolution, when they again came to the front under the old name and did good service in the Loyal cause. The same corps was subsequently commanded by Col. Simcoe, in 1777, who afterwards became the first Governor of Upper Canada.

The information which I am enabled to give on the subject is derived chiefly from the journals of the commanding officer and original organizer of the Rangers, Major Robert Rogers, a printed copy of which I have here, and from which I propose to make some quotations, as being more authentic and interesting than a more modern narrative of the facts. This book was published in London, in 1765, and must have been regarded with some favour by those in authority, as the author was shortly afterwards, by special command, presented to the King, and his portrait, painted in full uniform with a group of his Indian allies in the background, was about the same time entered in the *British Museum* as a compliment to the Provincial troops that had rendered such valuable assistance in bringing the Seven Years' War with France to a successful conclusion.

I have here a photograph copy of that portrait, which, to military men, is somewhat interesting on account of the style of uniform and equipment then in use. You will observe a badge of authority is worn in the shape of a small sword, and I have no doubt some of those present would be pleased to handle the identical sword worn and used by one of our volunteer officers 135 years ago. This is the sword. I can remember seeing the leather scabbard with its silver mountings, but I am sorry I cannot produce it to-night.

You will notice the chief weapon is the flint-lock musket. In these days an officer is not allowed to take part in the firing. In fact, a Captain of my regiment, on duty during the N. W. Rebellion, was severely reprimanded by the General for carrying a Winchester rifle, at a time when such a companion was likely to be called on for help *at any moment*. But in the

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old days of bush warfare, when both officers and men were liable to a man-to-man conflict, firearms were carried and used effectively, as many of the pages of this old book testify.

Another peculiar feature in the outfit is the powder-horn. I have no doubt there are some present who have never seen one. I am sorry I cannot show you the powder horn carried by the old Major, but I have one here which was worn at that time through many a hard-fought conflict by his brother James, who, at the date engraved upon it, commanded one of the companies of the Rangers. In addition to a lot of fanciful carving on this old horn are the words, "James Rogers, his horn. 19th June, 1757." Some of the letters are nearly obliterated by a scar or bullet mark, and the story in connection with that mark is, that in one of the deadly encounters between the Rangers and Indians the owner of this horn became engaged in single combat with a Huron warrior. Whilst each from behind his own tree watched for his opponent, Rogers managed by a clever device to draw his enemy's fire by exposing his fur cap on the end of his powder-horn. The cap and this old horn were badly hit, but, as breech-loaders were not then in use, the Huron brave was caught at a disadvantage and soon despatched to the happy hunting-grounds.

The object of this address is to supply information of the early military history and the modes of warfare of those bygone days. I am afraid the impression is too general that we British Americans have very little in the way of history of events of the past to be worth remembering or enquiring into. But I feel it is the duty of every one who is able to contribute anything in the way of information on that subject to do so, and thereby assist in building up and strengthening a more patriotic and national feeling in this British Confederation of Canada.

I think it will be a matter of interest, and possibly advantage, to our volunteers to enquire into the systems and observe the exploits of our forefathers in arms 130 years ago. A little reflection on the equipment and means of transportation of those days will, I think, help us to bear up against the difficulties and so-called hardships of our militia service.

At the time this book commences (1755) the chief frontier forts of the French were Louisbourg, Crown Point on the west side of Lake Champlain, Oswego, Niagara, Pittsburg on the Ohio River, and Detroit and Michillimackinac on the extreme west. For some years previous, vigorous and systematic encroachments had constantly been made by the French on the English settlements to the south. In all of these the Indians within the French territories, particularly the Hurons and the Algonquins, always took an active part. These hostilities eventually brought about the formal declaration of war between the two nations which lasted for seven years, during which the conquest of Canada was accomplished and the whole of North America, except Mexico and Florida, brought under the British flag.

The events I propose to refer to principally transpired in the vicinity of Lake Champlain and Lake George. Of all America's beautiful lakes these two, perhaps, present the greatest interest to the *greatest number*; to the tourist and pleasure-seeker, no more charming scenery can be found; to the student of history and the lover of legends and romances of a bygone age, no district can produce a greater abundance of interesting subjects. Previous to the settlement of the country by Europeans, Lake Champlain, which is 120 miles in length, had been the chief highway for warlike expeditions between hostile and powerful Indian tribes, and after the settlement it continued the same in reference to the French and English colonies. There-

*Also spelt: Michle-Macinae, Michilimackinac, Mackinaw.

fore scarcely a point or an island on either of the lakes but has been the scene of some desperate conflict between fierce contending enemies.

Before going further, we will briefly refer to some of the chief objects of interest from a military point of view in the neighbourhood of these waters.

About the year 1730, the French conceived the idea of establishing a province extending from the Connecticut River to Lake Ontario, with its chief centre at Crown Point, where they built a fort, although it was considerably to the south of their proper and legitimate boundary. In 1755 a further advance was made and Fort Ticonderoga was built also on the west side of the lake and near the outlet of Lake George, which latter lake lies to the west of and parallel to the southern part of Lake Champlain.

At the southern extremity of Lake George, which is 33 miles long, the English built Fort William Henry in the autumn of 1755.

To the south-east of Fort William Henry, about 14 miles distant on the way to Albany, was Fort Edward, the base of operations for the English forces during the French War.

To the north of Crown Point about 25 miles is one of the most remarkable physical features among the many interesting headlands on Lake Champlain and is known as Split Rock. I wish to draw attention to this for a moment in connection with the boundary question.

The Rock is about half an acre in extent, with smooth perpendicular sides rising from the water's edge and divided across by a chasm ten feet wide.

This rock was formerly the dividing line between the Mohawks and the Algonquins, whose territories were respectively occupied later on by the English and the French.

In 1710 it was acknowledged by the Treaty of Utrecht to be the northern limit of the English dominions, and in 1760 it was fixed as the boundary between the colony of New York and the newly acquired Province of Canada.

This same limit was officially acknowledged as late as 1774, but during the Revolutionary War, the insurgent forces made demonstrations considerably to the north of it, and ultimately, when the boundary was under consideration, by another of those lamentable instances of English indifference to Yankee aggression, the boundary was fixed 77 miles further north, where it now remains.

Had the British Commissioners on that occasion restricted the rebellious colonists to their previous limits, Canada would now embrace that part of northern New York lying north of the 44th parallel, which leaves the lower end of Lake Ontario at Cape Vincent and about evenly divides the States of Vermont and New Hampshire and intersects the Atlantic Coast at a point that would have continued about seven-eighths of the State of Maine as British territory.

The author of these journals was born at Londonderry, Ireland, and came to America with his parents and five brothers in 1740, being then 14 years of age.

He commenced his military career in New Hampshire by organizing a company of scouts of which he took command in the early part of 1755, and actively engaged in defence of their northern frontier against the French and Indians.

In July of that year he was summoned to Albany, the military headquarters of Major-General Sir William Johnson, who was in command of the Provincial troops.

It was then arranged that he was to take charge of the scouts, or bush-ranging service, and from that time these journals give the chief events that occurred within his own personal knowledge until the completion of his celebrated voyage in command of the first British expedition up the great lakes after the fall of Quebec and Montreal to take possession of the western French Forts of Detroit and Michillimakinak.

In the introductory chapter the writer of the journals remarks: "Should the troubles in America be renewed and the savages repeat those scenes of barbarity they so often have acted on the British subjects, which there is great reason to believe will happen, I flatter myself that such as are immediately concerned may reap some advantage from these pages.

"Should anyone take offence at what they may here meet with, they are desired to consider that it is the soldier, not the scholar, that writes and that many things here were written, not with silence and leisure, but in deserts, on rocks and mountains, amidst the hurries, disorders and noise of war, and under that depression of spirits which is the natural consequence of exhausting fatigue.

"This was my situation when the following journals and accounts were transmitted to the generals and commanders I acted under, which I am now not at liberty to correct.

"Between the years 1743 and 1755 my manner of life was such as led me to a general acquaintance both with the British and French settlements in North America and especially with the uncultivated deserts, the mountains, valleys, rivers, lakes and several passes that lay between and contiguous to the said settlements. Nor did I content myself with the accounts I received from Indians, or the information of hunters, but travelled over large tracts of the country myself, which tended, not more to gratify my curiosity than to inure me to hardships, and without vanity I may say to qualify me for the very service I have since been engaged in."

He mentions several 'scouts' that he was engaged in, in the neighbourhood of Fort Edward, and says "while I was on one of these, Baron Dieskau was defeated and made prisoner by Major-General Johnson on the 8th September, 1755, at the south end of Lake George."

This book gives the details of between 40 and 50 expeditions for reconnoissance and attack under his command, with parties varying in numbers from a small squad to several hundred men, and generally involving from 25 to 150 miles travel by land or water, by snowshoes through the bush, or on the ice.

In nearly all of these, more or less fighting occurred, but I shall only be able to refer particularly to a few instances by which I will try and show the connection of the particular branch of the service we are considering, with the general progress of the war during those campaigns.

Owing to the peculiar circumstances under which the *war* had to be carried on, the Ranger service was found to be indispensable.

They were the eyes and the ears of the army; the messengers for the conveyance of intelligence from one distant fortress or encampment to another, and the guides and protectors of the convoys of ammunition and provisions through the lonely forest roads and the exposed and dangerous waterways.

When information was wanted as to the movements, strength or intentions of the enemy which could not be gained by the ordinary methods of reconnoitering, it was customary for them to stealthily waylay and seize a prisoner from the outposts, or wherever they could be met with, and from these most valuable and reliable information was often obtained.

While the main body of the troops were comparatively inactive a great part of the time, particularly in the winter, the Rangers were kept constantly on the move, watching the various passes and routes to prevent surprises and doing what they could to damage and harass the enemy.

In the event of a general advance in force, they always took the lead as the advance guard.

Although Major Rogers was actively engaged under Major-General Johnson in conducting the scouting service with his New Hampshire Company during the previous year, there is no record of the regular organization of the Queen's Rangers till March, 1756, when he was summoned to Boston to meet the Commander-in-Chief, General Shirley, who had taken that position on the death of General Braddock, who was killed in his disastrous expedition against the French, near Pittsburgh, on the 13th July, 1755.

Of this interview we read :

"On the 23rd I waited on the General and met with a very friendly reception. He soon intimated his design of giving me the command of an independent company of Rangers, and the next morning I received the commission with a set of instructions. According to the General's orders, my Company was to consist of sixty privates at 3 shillings, N. Y. currency, per day; 3 sergeants at 4s.; an ensign at 5s., and a lieutenant at 7s., and my own pay was fixed at 10s. per day. Ten Spanish dollars were allowed to each man towards providing clothes, arms, and blankets. My orders were to raise this Company as quick as possible, and to enlist none but such as were used to travelling and hunting, and in whose courage and fidelity I could confide. They were, moreover, to be subject to military discipline and the articles of war."

In the report of the Adjutant-General of New Hampshire, 1766, this company is referred to as the nucleus of the famous "Rogers' Rangers," the subalterns of which were: Richard Rogers (a brother of the Captain), 1st Lieut.; John Stark, 2nd Lieut.; Noah Johnston, Ensign.

A short time after this 3 more companies were added to the Rangers, and the strength increased to 100 men per company.

On the 20th May following, an example is given of their manner of gaining information.

"Agreeable to orders from the General, I set out with a party of eleven men to reconnoiter the French advanced guards. The next day from the top of a mountain we had a view of them, and judged their number to be about 300. They were busy in fortifying themselves with palisades. From the other side of the mountain, we had a prospect of Ticonderoga Fort, and from the ground their encampment took up I judged it to consist of about 1,000 men. This night we lodged on the mountain, and next morning marched to the Indian carrying path that leads from Lake George to Lake Champlain, and formed an ambuscade between the French guards and Ticonderoga Fort. About 6 o'clock, 118 Frenchmen passed by without discovering us. In a few minutes after 22 more came the same road, upon whom we fired, killed six and took one prisoner, but the large party returning obliged us to retire in haste, and we arrived safe with our prisoner at Fort William Henry on the 23rd.

"The prisoner we had taken reported that a party of 220 French and Indians were preparing to invest the out parties at Fort Edward, which occasioned my marching the next morning with a party of 78 men to join a detachment of Col. Bayley's regiment, and scour the woods as far as South Bay."

By the following commission, Rogers was promoted to the full army rank of Major, being charged with the command and supervision of all the Independent Companies of this service.

The only other staff assistant seems to have been Lieutenant Stewart, "Adjutant."

"By His Excellency James Abercromby, Esq., Colonel of His Majesty's 44th Regiment of Foot, Colonel-in-Chief of the 60th, or Royal American Regiment, Major-General and Commander-in-Chief of all His Majesty's Forces raised, or to be raised, in North America, etc.

"Whereas, it may be of great use to His Majesty's service in the operations now carrying on for recovering his rights in America, to have a number of men employed in obtaining intelligence of the strength, situation and motions of the enemy, as well as other services for which Rangers, or men acquainted with the woods only are fit, having the greatest confidence in your loyalty, courage and skill in this kind of service, I do, by virtue of the power and authority to me given by His Majesty, hereby constitute and appoint you to be *Major of the Rangers* in His Majesty's service, and likewise Captain of a Company of said Rangers. You are, therefore, to take the said Rangers as Major, and the said Company as Captain, into your care and charge, and duly exercise and instruct, as well the officers as the soldiers thereof, in arms, and to use your best endeavour to keep them in good order and discipline. I do hereby command them to obey you as their Major and Captain respectively. And you are to follow and observe such orders and directions from time to time as you shall receive from His Majesty, myself, or any other superior officer, according to the rules and discipline of war.

"Given at New York this 6th day of April.

JAMES ABERCROMBY."

The several Companies of Rangers did not have a relative regimental number, but each one of them was called by a distinctive name, the Major's own company being the Queen's Company, while his brother James' corps was known as the King's Rangers.

General Abercromby assumed the command under Lord Loudoun, in June, 1756, and about the same time General Montcalm commenced his vigorous campaign at the head of a strong French army.

The autumn of that year passed without any very important or decisive action on either side.

In January, 1757, a skirmish which proved hot work for the Rangers occurred in the vicinity of the French forts, which they were reconnoitering with a party of seventy-five men.

"In this manner we advanced half a mile over broken ground, when passing a valley of 15 rods' breadth, the front having reached the summit of a hill on the west side of it, the enemy, who had been drawn up in the form of a half moon, with a design, as we supposed, to surround us, saluted us with a volley of about 200 shots, at the distance of about five yards from the nearest or front, and thirty from the rear of their party. This fire was about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and proved fatal to Lieut. Kennedy and Mr. Gardiner, a volunteer regular officer in my company, and wounded me and several others, myself, however, but slightly in the head. We immediately returned the fire. I then ordered my men to the opposite hill, where I supposed Lieut. Stark and Ensign Brewer had made a stand with 40 men to cover us in case we were obliged to retreat. We were closely pursued, and Captain Spikeman, with several of the party, were killed and others made prisoners. My people, however, beat them back with a brisk fire from the hill and gave us an opportunity to ascend and post ourselves to advantage, after which I ordered Lieut. Stark and Mr. Baker (another volunteer) in the centre with Ensign James Rogers; Sgts. Walters and Phillips, with a party, being in reserve to prevent our being flanked and watch the motions of the

enemy. Soon after we had thus formed ourselves for battle, the enemy attempted to outflank us on the right, but the above reserve bravely attacked them, and, giving them the first fire very briskly, it stopped several from returning to the main body. The enemy then pushed us closely in front, but having the advantage of the ground, and being sheltered by large trees, we maintained a continual fire upon them, which killed several and obliged the remainder to retire to their main body. They then attempted to flank us again, but were repulsed by our reserve. Mr. Baker about this time was killed. We maintained a pretty constant fire on both sides till the darkness prevented our seeing each other, and about sunset I received a ball through my hand and wrist which prevented me from loading my gun. I, however, found means to keep my people from being intimidated by this accident. They gallantly kept their advantageous situation till the fire ceased on both sides. The enemy during the action used many arts and stratagems to induce us to submit, but we told them our numbers were sufficient and that we were determined to keep our ground as long as there were two left to stand by each other.

"After the action in which we had a great number so severely wounded that they could not travel without assistance, and our ammunition being nearly expended, and considering we were so near Ticonderoga, from whence the enemy could easily make a descent and overpower us by numbers, I thought it expedient to take advantage of the night to retreat and gave orders accordingly.

"The nearest computation we could make of the number which attacked us was that it consisted of about 250 French and Indians, and we afterwards had an account from the enemy that their loss in this action of killed and those who afterwards died of their wounds amounted to 116 men.

"Both the officers and soldiers I had the honour to command, who survived the first onset, behaved with the most undaunted bravery and resolution and seemed to vie with each other in their respective stations who should excel."

The return of casualties to the Rangers in the above action shows 14 killed, 6 wounded and 6 missing.

It was after this engagement that Lieutenant Stark made a remarkably expeditious run on snow-shoes; being sent back to Fort William Henry for sleighs to bring in the wounded, he covered the distance of 35 miles in 5 hours and enabled the relief party to meet the retreating column early the next day on the ice of Lake George.

In June '57, the Rangers were ordered to New York and then embarked for Halifax with the expedition against Louisbourg, which was conveyed by a fleet of nearly one hundred vessels. Like nearly all of Lord Loudoun's expeditions this one also proved a failure—they did not go any further than Halifax, and after remaining there for a time orders were given to return, the Rangers returned to New York, from there to Albany and the fields of their former action. During the absence of the troops mentioned, Montcalm had succeeded in taking Oswego, and also compelled Fort William Henry to capitulate after a siege of considerable duration. It was on this occasion that the articles of capitulation were shockingly violated and a dreadful massacre of several hundred of the British garrison, including the women and children, was perpetrated by the Indians.

From October till the end of the year '57, the Rangers were employed most of the time in patrolling the woods between Fort Edward and Ticonderoga. On one of these expeditions it is stated by the author: "My Lord Howe did us the honour to accompany us, being fond as he expressed it to

"learn our methods of marching, ambushing, etc., and upon our return expressed his good opinion of us very generously." It is also stated, "About this time Lord Loudoun sent the following volunteers in the regular troops to be trained to the ranging or wood service under my command and inspection, with particular orders to me to instruct them to the utmost of my power in the ranging discipline, our methods of marching, retreating, fighting and ambushing, that they might be the better qualified for any future service against the enemy we had to contend with, desiring me to take particular notice of each one's behaviour and recommend them according to their several deserts."

It is interesting to know which of the old regiments of the line were at that time taking part in the American, British and French War. The names of these officers and soldiers are all given, but it will be sufficient to state that the detachment consisted of from five to ten each from the 4th, 22nd, 27th, 42nd, 44th and 48th Regiments.

These volunteers (the Major writes) I formed into a company by themselves, and took the immediate command and management of them to myself, and for their benefit and instruction reduced into writing the following rules or plan of discipline, which on various occasions I had found by experience to be necessary and advantageous:—

1. All Rangers are to be subject to the rules and articles of war, to appear at roll-call every evening on their own parade equipped each with a fire-lock, 60 rounds of powder and ball and a hatchet, at which time an officer from each company is to inspect the same, to see they are in good order, so as to be ready on any emergency to march at a minute's warning, and before they are dismissed the necessary guards are to be draughted, and scouts for the next day appointed.
2. Whenever you are ordered out to the enemies' forts or frontiers for discoveries, if your number be small, march in a single file, keeping at such a distance from each other as to prevent one shot from killing two men, sending one man or more forward, and the like on each side at the distance of 20 yards from the main body, if the ground you march over will admit of it, to give the signal to the officer of the approach of an enemy, and of their number, etc.
3. If you march over marshes or soft ground change your position, and march abreast of each other, to prevent the enemy from tracking you, till you get over such ground and then resume your former order and march till it is quite dark before you encamp, which do if possible on a piece of ground that will afford your sentries the advantage of seeing or hearing the enemy at considerable distance, keeping one-half of your whole party awake alternately during the night.
4. Some time before you come to the place you would reconnoitre, make a stand and send one or two men in whom you can confide to look out the best ground for making your observations.
5. If you have the good fortune to take any prisoners, keep them separate till they are examined and in your return take a different route to that in which you went out.
6. If you march in a large body of three or four hundred with a design to attack the enemy, divide your party into three columns, each headed by a proper officer, and let these columns march in single file, the ones to the right and left keeping at 20 yards distance from the centre column, if the ground will admit, and let proper guards be kept in the front and rear and suitable flanking parties as before directed, with orders to halt on all eminences to take a view of the surrounding ground, to prevent your being

ambuscaded. If the enemy approach in front on level ground, form a front of your three columns, or main body with the advanced guard, keeping out your flanking parties, to prevent the enemy from pressing hard on either of your wings, or surrounding you, which is the usual method of the savages if their number will admit of it, and be careful to support and strengthen your rear guard.

7. If you are obliged to receive the enemy's fire, fall or squat down till it is over, then rise and discharge at them, observing to keep at a due distance from each other, and advance from tree to tree, with one-half of the party before the other ten or twelve yards. If the enemy push upon you let your front fire and fall down, and let your rear advance through them and do the like, by which time those who before were in front will be ready to discharge again, and repeat the same alternately; by this means you will keep up such a constant fire that the enemy will not be able easily to break your order or gain your ground.

8. If you oblige the enemy to retreat, be careful in your pursuit of them to keep out your flanking parties and prevent them from gaining eminences, where they would, perhaps, be able to rally and repulse you in turn.

9. If you are obliged to retreat let the front of your whole party fire and fall back till the rear hath done the same. By this means you will oblige the enemy to pursue you, if they do it at all, in the face of a constant fire.

10. If the enemy is so superior that you are in danger of being surrounded by them, let your whole party disperse, and every one take a different road to the place of rendezvous appointed for that evening, which must every morning be altered and fixed for the ensuing evening; but if you should happen to be actually surrounded, form yourselves into a square, or, if in the woods, a circle is best, and, if possible, make a stand till the darkness of night favours your escape.

11. If your rear is attacked the main body and flankers must face about and form themselves to oppose the enemy as before directed, and the same method must be observed if attacked on either of your flanks, in which case you will always make a rear guard of one of your flank guards.

12. If you determine to rally after a retreat, by all means endeavour to do it on the most rising ground you can come at, which will give you great advantage in point of situation, and enable you to repulse superior numbers.

13. In general, when pushed upon by the enemy, reserve your fire till they approach very near, which will then put them into the greater surprise and consternation, and give you an opportunity to rush upon them with your hatchets and cutlasses to the better advantage.

14. When you encamp for the night fix your sentries in such a manner as not to be relieved from the main body till morning, profound secrecy and silence being of the utmost importance in these cases. Each sentry, therefore, should consist of six men, two of whom must be constantly alert, and when relieved by their fellows, it should be done without noise, and in case those on duty should see or hear anything that alarms them they are not to speak, but one of them is silently to retire and acquaint the commanding officer thereof.

15. At the first dawn of day awake your whole detachment, that being the time when the savages choose to fall upon their enemies. You should by all means be in readiness to receive them.

16. If the enemy should be discovered by you in the morning, and their numbers are superior to yours and victory doubtful, you should not

attack them till the evening, as then they will not know your numbers, and if you are repulsed your retreat will be favoured by the darkness of the night.

17. Before you leave your encampment send out small parties to scout around to see if an enemy has been near you in the night.

18. When you stop for refreshment choose a spring or rivulet if you can, and dispose your party so as not to be surprised, posting proper guards on the path you came in, lest an enemy should be pursuing.

19. If in your return you have to cross rivers avoid the usual fords as much as possible, lest the enemy should have discovered you and be there expecting you.

20. If you have to pass by lakes, keep at some distance from the shore, lest in case of an ambuscade or an attack when in that situation your retreat would be cut off.

21. If the enemy pursue your rear, take a circle until you come to your own tracks again, and there form an ambush to receive them, and give them the first fire.

22. When you return from a scout and come near our forts avoid the usual roads lest the enemy should have headed you and lay in ambush to receive you, when exhausted with fatigue.

23. When you pursue any party that has been near our forts or encampments, endeavour by a different route to head and meet them in some narrow pass or lay in ambush to receive them where they least expect it.

24. If you are to embark in canoes or battoes by water, choose the evening for the time of starting, as you will then have the whole night before you to pass undiscovered by any parties of the enemy on hills or places which command a prospect of the lake or river you are upon.

25. In paddling or rowing give orders that the boat or canoe next to the last shall wait for her, and the third for the second, and so on, to prevent separation, and that you may be ready to assist one another in an emergency.

26. Appoint one man in each boat to look out for fires on the shores, from the number and size of which you may form some judgment of the number that kindled them, and whether you are able to attack them or not.

27. If you find the enemy encamped near a river or lake which you imagine they will attempt to cross on being attacked, leave a detachment of your party on the opposite shore to receive them, while you surprise them, having them between you and the lake or river.

28. Whether you go by land or water give out parole and countersigns in order to know one another in the dark, and likewise appoint a station for every man to repair to in case of any accident that may separate you.

In January, 1758, five new companies were added to the Rangers.

In March following Major Rogers was ordered to make a reconnoissance of Fort Ticonderoga with 180 of his men. On the fourth day after leaving Fort Edward, as they were nearing the French outposts on the west side of Lake George, having a range of hills on their right, they were met by a party of one hundred Indians and French, which was passing them on the left. The detachment was immediately halted and prepared for action by laying off their packs. The snow being four feet deep, the whole party were on snow shoes. They faced to their left and remained steady until the enemy got directly in front, their position being concealed by a narrow ridge of land. On the signal of a shot by the Major, a volley was fired which killed about 40 of the enemy, the rest retreated and were pursued by the right flank party of the Rangers, but it was soon discovered that instead of the main body it was only the advance guard of about 600 more. By the Major's report, he says :

"I then ordered our people to retreat to their own ground, which we gained at the expense of 50 men killed: the remainder I rallied and drew up in pretty good order, where they fought with such bravery as obliged the enemy (though 7 to 1 in number) to retreat a second time, but we, not being in a condition to pursue them, they rallied again and recovered their ground. . . . They were, however, so warmly received that they retreated a third time, but our numbers now being too far reduced to take advantage of their disorder, they rallied again and made a fresh attack upon us. About this time we discovered about 200 Indians going up the mountain to attack our rear. To prevent this I sent Lieut. Phillips with 18 men to beat them back, which he did. . . . I also sent Lieut. Grafton to another part of the hill with 15 men.

"The enemy pushed us so close in front that the parties were not more than twenty yards apart in general, and sometimes intermixed with each other.

"The fire continued almost constant for an hour and a half, in which time we lost 8 officers and more than 100 men killed on the spot. We were at last obliged to break, and I with about 20 men ran up the hill to Phillips and Grafton, where we stopped and fired on the Indians who were pushing us with numbers we could not withstand.

"Lieut. Phillips was at this time capitulating for himself and party, being surrounded by about 300: he said to me if they would give them good quarter he thought it best to surrender, otherwise he would fight while he had one man left.

"I now thought it most prudent to retreat and bring off as many of my party as I could, which I immediately did, the Indians closely pursuing us and took several prisoners."

Notwithstanding the promises given on their surrender, Lieut. Phillips and his men were tied to trees, and hewn to pieces by the Indians in a most shocking manner.

The list of killed in this action shows 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 3 ensigns, 5 sergeants and 113 men. Captain Buckley's Company lost its captain, lieutenant, one ensign and 47 men.

It is probable that it was on this occasion that the Major made his escape by the rock that has since borne the name of "Rogers' Slide."

It is a bold promontory on the west side of the lake, and in the vicinity of where this fight with the Indians took place, and rises almost perpendicularly from the water more than 600 feet.

Although no mention of it is made in his journal, the story is currently told that being pursued by a number of Indians, he followed the high land to the very brink of the precipice, where he untied his snow shoes, and without moving them turned himself round and fastened them in the reversed position, and after throwing his accoutrements over the rock, he walked back to where by a ravine he could with safety descend to the ice.

When his pursurers came up they thought by the tracks that two men had gone over the cliff, and seeing the Major escaping on the ice they were convinced that his reputed protection by supernatural powers must be a fact, and gave up the chase.

In July, '58, Abercromby's whole army, 16,000 strong, with 600 of Rogers' Rangers as the advance guard, moved down Lake George and landed about five miles from Ticonderoga. In the first collision with the enemy's advance guard, Lord Howe was killed, and this brave young officer's death seemed to have a most disastrous effect on the whole army, although he held but a subordinate position. Such distrust and confusion ensued that more than a day was lost before a further advance was made. This time was

profitably spent by Montcalm, who was in command of the French garrison. He constructed a barrier of logs and trees upon a ridge a short distance from the fort, with an abatis of trees felled with the tops outward for a hundred yards in front.

The next day Abercromby, by what appears to have been a great want of judgement, made a direct attack upon this position by an assault with fixed bayonets.

The result was most disastrous, and though the charge was gallantly renewed several times no advantage was gained, and in the evening they had to retire with a loss of 1,944 officers and men.

Had the attack been renewed the next day by a judicious use of his artillery or by a flank movement, the result must have been successful on account of the disparity in numbers, but to the astonishment of all the General ordered a retreat, and the whole force again embarked on Lake George, leaving a large quantity of provisions and ammunition behind.

With this disaster a change seems to have come to the fortune of the British arms, for about that time Generals Amherst and Wolfe succeeded in taking the stronghold of Louisbourg, and Col. Bradstreet, by a brilliant dash with 3,000 men from the Mohawk Valley crossed the lower end of Lake Ontario and captured Fort Frontenac on the 25th of August.

The expedition of General Forbes from Philadelphia with Col. George Washington, second in command, was also successful in reducing Fort du Quesne, which they named Pittsburgh, after the British Prime Minister, whose energy seemed to infuse new life into the whole army.

General Amherst superseded Abercromby and the winter was spent in preparation for a determined effort to bring the war to a close by a concerted attack by General Wolfe on the St. Lawrence and Amherst by Lake Champlain.

We will next read of a midwinter 'scout' and a forced march on snowshoes by the Rangers.

On the 3rd March, '59, Major Rogers received instructions to make such arrangements as to enable an Engineer officer, who was sent with him, to make a thorough observation as to the enemy's position and the strength of their forts, and also, if possible, to capture one or more prisoners.

The party was to be made up of Rangers and Indians, and, as the order expressed it, "to insure success, a body of regulars is ordered to join you and be under your command."

Accordingly the journal on the 4th reads:

"I marched with a party 378 strong to within $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Lake George, then halted till evening to continue the march more secretly, which was resumed on the ice at 2 o'clock in the morning, and halted at the first narrows. On the evening of the 5th, we marched to Sabbath Day Point where we arrived at 11 o'clock, almost overcome with the cold. At 2 a.m. we continued our march, and reached the landing-place at the foot of Lake George about 8 in the morning. I sent out a small party to observe if any of the enemy's parties went out from the fort. They returned and reported that on the east side of the lake two parties were at work. It now appeared a suitable time for the Engineer to make his observations.

"I left Captain Williams to remain at this place with the regulars and 30 Rangers, while I, with the Engineer officer, 49 Rangers, and Captain Lot-ridge with 45 Indians, went to the isthmus that overlooks the fort, where he made his observations. We returned, leaving a small party to observe what numbers crossed the lake in the evening from the east side to the fort, that I might know the better how to attack them the next morning. At dark Lieut.

report, he says:

Brehm went again with a guard of ten men to the intrenchments and returned at midnight without opposition, having completed his plans to his satisfaction; on which I ordered Captain Williams with the regulars back to Sabbath Day Point—the party being extremely distressed with the cold, it appeared to me imprudent to march his men any further, especially as they had no snowshoes. I sent Lieut. Tute and 30 Rangers with him, with instructions to kindle fires on the aforesaid point.

“At 3 o'clock in the morning I marched with three Lieutenants, 40 Rangers, one Regular and Captain Lotridge with 46 Indians, in order to be ready to attack the enemy's working parties on the east side of the lake early in the morning. We crossed South Bay, 8 miles south of the fort. From thence, it being about 6 o'clock, we bore down right opposite the fort and within half a mile from where the French were cutting wood. Here I halted and sent two Indians and two Rangers to observe their situation. They returned in a few minutes and reported that the working parties were close to the banks of the lake and opposite the fort, and were about 40 in number: upon which we stripped off our blankets and ran down upon them, took several prisoners and destroyed most of the party as they were returning to the fort, from whence, being discovered, about 80 Canadians and Indians pursued us closely, being backed by 150 French regulars, and in a mile's march they began to fire in our rear. As we marched in a line abreast our front was quickly made. I halted on a rising ground resolving to make a stand against the enemy, who appeared at first very resolute, but we repulsed them before their reinforcements came up, and began our march again in a line abreast. Having advanced about half a mile further they came in sight again. As soon as we could obtain an advantageous post, which was a long ridge, we again made a stand on the side opposite the enemy. The Canadians and Indians came very close, but were soon stopped by a warm fire from the Rangers and Mohawks. They broke immediately and were pursued and entirely routed before their regulars could come up. After this we marched without any opposition. In these several skirmishes we had two Rangers and one regular killed, and one Indian wounded, and we killed about 30 of the enemy. We continued our march till 12 o'clock at night, and came to Sabbath Day Point, fifty miles distant from the place we had set out from in the morning. Captain Williams and his men received us with good fires, and nothing could have been more acceptable to my party, several of which had frozen their feet, it being excessively cold and the snow four feet deep.”

The result of the winter's preparations was that on the 21st July, '59, the army embarked at the head of Lake George, 12,000 strong, to try another attack on Ticonderoga. It was both well planned and well executed, and, though vigorously resisted by the French, they finally, on the evening of the 26th July, blew up the fort and withdrew by boats to Crown Point, which next became the chief object of attack.

The entry in this journal, under date July 26, is as follows:

“I this day received orders from the General to attempt to cut away a boom which the French had thrown across the lake opposite the fort, which prevented our boats from passing by and cutting off their retreat. For the completion of this order I had 60 Rangers, in one English flat-bottomed boat and two whaleboats, in which, after night came on, I embarked and passed over to the other side of Lake Champlain opposite to our encampment, and from that intended to steer my course along the east shore and privately saw off their boom, for which I had taken saws with me, the boom being made of logs of timber. About nine o'clock, when I had got about half way across, the enemy, who had undermined their fort, sprung their mines, which blew

up with a loud explosion, they being all ready to embark in their boats and make a retreat.

"This gave me an opportunity to attack them, with such success as to drive several of them ashore, so that next morning we took from the east shore ten boats with a considerable quantity of baggage and upwards of fifty barrels of powder and a large quantity of ball. About 10 o'clock I returned and made my report to the General."

As an evidence of the earnest manner in which this campaign was prosecuted I will read a rather peremptory order given by the General on the 11th of August:

"To MAJOR ROGERS, Sir,—You are this night to send a Captain with a proper proportion of subalterns and 200 men to Crown Point, where the officer is to post himself in such a manner as not to be surprised, and to seize on the best ground for defending himself. If he should be attacked by the enemy he is not to retreat with his party, but keep his ground till he is reinforced from the army.

"I am, Sir, your most obedient servant

JEFF. AMHERST."

The army followed on the 12th August and found that fort also destroyed and the French in full retreat.

On the same day that Quebec was taken by Wolfe, Major Rogers received the following order from General Amherst, dated Crown Point, Sept. 13th, 1759:

"You are this night to set out with 200 men under your command and proceed to Missisquay Bay, from whence you will march and attack the enemy's settlements on the south side of the St. Lawrence in such a manner as you shall judge most effectual to disgrace the enemy and for the success and honour of His Majesty's arms.

"Remember the barbarities that have been committed by the enemy's Indian scoundrels on every occasion when they had an opportunity of showing their infamous cruelties on the King's subjects, which they have done without mercy. Take your revenge, but don't forget that though those villains have promiscuously murdered women and children of all ages, it is my orders that no women or children are killed or hurt.

"When you have executed this service you will join me in camp wherever the army may then be.

"JEFFERY AMHERST."

This chastisement of the St. Francis Indians was considered a just and necessary retribution for a long series of cruel depredations they had been guilty of, and for a recent violation of a flag of truce taken to them by Captain Kennedy, with a proposal of peace. He and his whole party were taken prisoners and detained in captivity.

To reach the Indian town of St. Francis involved a lake trip of 90 miles and then a march of 80 miles all through the enemy's country. The party set out the same evening by water and ten days were spent in paddling to the north end of Lake Champlain. Much difficulty and delay was occasioned in avoiding the enemy's armed vessels which were found to be cruising in considerable numbers on that part of the lake.

A safe landing was, however, effected and the boats and a store of provisions were concealed and two trusty Indians left to watch the same from a safe distance.

Then commenced a march through 80 miles of unbroken wilderness. To convey an idea of the difficulties encountered, I must read from the original report, page 145:

"It happened the second day after I left them these two Indians came up to me in the evening and informed me that about 400 French had discovered and taken my boats, and that about one-half of them were hotly pursuing on my track. This unlucky circumstance (it may well be supposed) put us into some consternation. Should the enemy overtake us, and we get the better of them in an encounter, yet, being so far advanced into their country where no reinforcements could possibly reach us, and where they could be supported by any number they pleased, afforded little hopes of escaping their hands. Our boats being taken, cut off all hope of a retreat by them; besides, the loss of our provisions, left with them, of which we knew we should have great need at any rate, even in case we survived, was a melancholy consideration. It was, however, resolved to prosecute our design at all hazards, and when we had accomplished it to attempt a retreat (the only possible way we could think of) by way of Fort No. 4. on the Connecticut River. This being done, we determined, if possible, to outmarch our pursuers and effect our design upon St. Francis before they could overtake us. We marched nine days through wet, sunken ground, the water most of the way near a foot deep, it being a spruce bog. When we encamped at night we had no way to secure ourselves from the water but by cutting the boughs of trees and with them erecting a kind of hammock. We commonly began our march a little before day and continued it till after dark at night.

"The tenth day after leaving Missisquoy Bay, we came to a river 15 miles above the town of St. Francis to the south of it, and the town being on the opposite or east side we were obliged to ford it, which was attended with no small difficulty, the water being five feet deep and the current swift.

"I put the tallest men up stream and then by holding by each other we got over with the loss of several of our guns, some of which we recovered by diving to the bottom for them.

"The 22nd day after my departure from Crown Point I came in sight of the Indian town of St. Francis in the evening which I discovered from a tree that I climbed at about three miles distance.

"Here I halted my party, which now consisted of 142 men, officers included, being reduced to that number by accident and those I had sent back.

"At 8 o'clock this evening I left the detachment and took with me Lt. Turner and Ensign Avery and went to reconnoiter the town, which I did to my satisfaction, and found the Indians in a high frolic or dance. I returned to my party at 2 o'clock, and at 3 o'clock marched it to within 500 yards of the town, where I lightened the men of their packs and formed them for the attack. At half an hour before sunrise I surprised the town on the right, left and centre, which was done with so much alacrity by both officers and men that the enemy had not time to recover themselves or take arms for their defence till they were chiefly destroyed, except some few of them who took to the water. About 40 of my people pursued them and sunk both them and their boats. A little after sunrise I set fire to all their houses except three in which there was corn that I reserved for the use of my own party. The fire consumed many of the Indians, who had concealed themselves in the cellars and lofts of their houses.

"About 7 o'clock in the morning the affair was completely over, by which time we had killed at least 200 Indians and taken 15 or 20 women and children prisoners who I let go their own way. I also retook five English captives which I took under my care. When I had paraded my detachment, I found I had Captain Ogden badly wounded in his body but not so as to hinder him from doing duty. I also had six men slightly wounded, and one Stockbridge Indian killed.

"This nation of Indians (the Abenakis) was notoriously attached to the French and had for near a century past harassed the frontiers of New England, killing people of all ages and sexes in a most barbarous manner at a time they did not in the least expect them ; and to my own knowledge, in six years' time had carried into captivity and killed on the before-mentioned frontiers 400 persons. We found in the town, hanging on poles over their doors, etc., about 600 scalps, mostly English."

• It being known that a large body of French were in close pursuit, little time was spent in loading their packs with Indian corn and in hasty preparation for the return march by Fort Charlestown, or "No. 4" as it was then called, being the most northerly English settlement on the Connecticut River and 200 miles distant from St. Francis.

Although the Major had sent a request to Headquarters that a relief expedition with provisions should be sent to a place 60 miles up the river from that fort, it must have been a matter of intense anxiety for a commanding officer to undertake a march of that distance through a trackless forest in the enemy's country, where roving bands of hostile Indians would likely be met with, and with a larger force of French troops in hot pursuit.

And all this had to be undertaken on the small stock of rations which each man carried, and on which they had already subsisted during a 12 days' march. In addition to this stock, as already mentioned, each man took what Indian corn he could carry.

The journal gives a graphic account of the terrible experience met with on this tramp for life. One formidable encounter is mentioned with the enemy near Lake Memphremagog, and various other losses were sustained from hunger and fatigue. At last the mouth of the Ammonsock River was reached, where, instead of the expected stock of supplies, they only found the smouldering camp fire of the party, who had just a few hours previous returned down the river, taking all the provisions with them.

On page 148 it is written :

"Our distress upon this occasion was truly inexpressible. Our spirits, greatly depressed by hunger and fatigue we had already suffered, now almost entirely sunk within us, seeing no resource left, nor any reasonable ground to hope that we should escape a most miserable death by famine. At length I came to a resolution to push as fast as possible towards No. 4, leaving the remainder of my party, now unable to march further, to get such wretched subsistence as the barren wilderness could afford, till I got relief to them, which I engaged to do within ten days, I, with Captain Ogden, one Ranger and a captive Indian boy, embarked upon a raft we had made of dry pine trees."

A footnote by the author states "that before leaving them, he taught Lieut. Grant, the officer in charge, how to make a preparation of ground nuts and lily roots, which will serve to preserve life for a considerable time."

After a perilous trip of five days, during which they had once to construct a new raft by burning down the trees and burning off the logs to proper lengths, they successfully passed the many dangerous rapids and reached the fort, from which they despatched the much-needed relief, which reached the famishing camp within the time promised.

The Major then made his report to General Amherst, and two days later went up the river again with boats and provisions to bring in the remainder of his men.

They rejoined the headquarters of the Rangers at Crown Point, on the 1st December. The winter was spent in completing the building of the new fort.

The first move in the spring campaign of 1760 was made in the early part of June.

General Amherst then sent Major Rogers with 250 Rangers into Canada to endeavour, by attacking such places as St. Johns and Chambly, to attract the attention and possibly draw away a portion of the French troops that were then besieging General Murray in Quebec.

The expedition landed on the west shore, about 12 miles south of Isle aux Noix, which was now the only remaining French post on the lake.

The next morning they were attacked by 350 men from the fort. After a brisk bush fight the French were defeated and scattered into small parties, with the loss of 40 killed and 50 muskets captured.

The Rangers lost 2 officers and 16 men killed and 10 wounded.

The detachment pushed on and by a forced march reached St. Johns on the evening of the 15th June. It was intended to try a midnight attack, but on close examination it was found they had 17 sentries well posted within the works, and the garrison being much stronger than was expected the attack was not made, but the march was continued down by the river to St. Thérèse, a stockaded post, which was surprised and taken at daybreak. Seventy-eight prisoners were captured and the buildings and works destroyed together with a large quantity of fodder and provisions.

The party then crossed the river, intending to return by the east side of the lake to where their vessels were awaiting them. During this march they had a slight encounter with a party of 800 French, but they managed to outmanœuvre them, and got safely on board the vessels, when the party reached the shore just a little too late.

On returning to Crown Point it was found that General Amherst had gone to Albany and organized a force to proceed by the valley of the Mohawk to Oswego, from which place he was to approach Montreal by the St. Lawrence, having instructed Col. Haviland to complete the capture of the French posts on the Champlain and Richelieu waters.

It was designed that these two armies should form a junction at Montreal with General Murray, who was then approaching from Quebec.

On the 16th August, the final advance towards Canada was commenced by Col. Haviland's division of 4,000 men down Lake Champlain, the flotilla being led by 600 Rangers in whaleboats under the command of their old leader.

The first point of attack being Isle aux Noix from which the enemy, 1,500 strong, were driven and retired to St. Johns during the night of the 25th August. Two days later the Rangers were ordered to pursue, and at daylight they arrived at St. Johns, to find it on fire and the French in full retreat towards Montreal.

The closing movements of the campaign are thus described in the journals:

"In the evening Col. Haviland came in sight and landed at St. Johns. As soon as he came on shore I waited upon him and acquainted him with what I had done, and that I had two prisoners for him. He said it was very well, and ordered his troops to encamp there that night, and next day went down the River Sorel as far as St. Thérèse, where he encamped and made strong breast works, to defend his people from being surprised. I was sent down the River Sorel to bring the inhabitants under subjection to His Britannic Majesty, and went into their settled country in the night, took all their priests and militia officers and sent some of them for the inhabitants. The first day I caused all the inhabitants near Chambly to take the oaths of allegiance; they appeared glad to have it in their power to do so and keep

their possessions, and were all extremely submissive. Having obliged them to bring in their arms and fulfilled my instructions in the best manner I could, I joined Col. Darby at Chambly, who came there to take the fort, and had brought with him some light cannon. It soon surrendered, as the garrison consisted only of about fifty men. This happened on the 1st of September. On the 2nd, our army having nothing to do and having good intelligence from both General Amherst and General Murray, Col. Haviland sent me to join the latter, while he marched with the rest of the army to La Pierre. On the morning of the 5th, I got to Longueuil, about four miles below Montreal, opposite to where Brigadier Murray lay, and gave him notice of my arrival. By the time I came to Longueuil, the army under command of General Amherst had landed about two miles up the river from the town where they encamped, and early this morning Monsieur de Vaudreuil, the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of all Canada, sent out to capitulate with our General, which put a stop to all our movements till the 8th of September, when the articles of capitulation were agreed to and signed and our troops took possession of the town gates that night.

"Thus, at length, at the end of the fifth campaign, Montreal and the whole country of Canada were given up, and became subject to the King of Great Britain, a conquest, perhaps, the greatest that is to be met with in the British annals, whether we consider the prodigious extent of country we are hereby made masters of, the vast addition it must make to trade and navigation, or the security it must afford to the northern provinces of America, particularly those flourishing ones of New England and New York, the irretrievable loss France sustains hereby, and the importance it must give to the British Crown among the several states of Europe. All this, I say, duly considered, will, perhaps, in its consequences, render the year 1760 more glorious than any preceding.

"The next day General Amherst informed me of his intention of sending me to Detroit, and on the 12th, when I waited upon him again, I received the following orders :

"By His Excellency Jeffery Amherst, Esq., Major-General and Commander-in-Chief of all His Majesty's Forces in North America, etc., etc.

"To Major Rogers, commanding His Majesty's Independent Companies of Rangers.—You will, upon receipt hereof, with Captain Waite's and Captain Hazen's companies of Rangers under your command proceed in whale boats from hence to Fort William Augustus ; from there you will continue your voyage by the north shore to Niagara, where you will land your boats and transport them across the carrying place into Lake Erie, applying to Major Walters or the officer commanding at Niagara for any assistance you may want on this or any other occasion.

"With the detachment under your command you will proceed in your whaleboats across Lake Erie to Presque Isle, where upon your arrival you will make known the orders I have given to the officer commanding that post, and you will leave said party and whaleboats, taking only a small detachment with you, and march by land to join Brigadier-General Monkton (at Pittsburgh).

"Upon your arrival with him, you will deliver into his hands the dispatches you shall herewith receive for him, and follow and obey such orders as he shall give you for the relief of the garrisons at the French posts of Detroit, *Michlimakana, or any others in that district for gathering in the arms of the inhabitants thereof, and for administering to them the oath of allegiance. And when the whole of this service is completed, you will march

* See foot-note page 2.

back your detachment at Presque Isle or Niagara, according to the orders you receive from Brigadier Monkton, where you will embark the whole, and in like manner as before, transport your whaleboats across the carrying place into Lake Ontario, where you will deliver them into the care of the commanding officer, marching your detachment by land to Albany, or wherever I may be, to receive what further orders I may have to give you.

Given under my hand at the headquarters in the camp at Montreal, 12th September, 1760.

By His Excellency's command.

JEFF. AMHERST.

F. APPY.

In pursuance of these orders I embarked at Montreal the 13th of September, with Captain Brewer, Captain Waite, Lieut. Brehm, Assistant Engineer, Lieut. Davis of the Royal Train of Artillery, and 200 Rangers in fifteen whaleboats, and that night we encamped at La Chine."

We will pass over the detailed account of the next nine days, which were spent in overcoming the swift currents and the rapids of the St. Lawrence. On the 22nd instant we read: "We continued our course up the river, the wind blowing fresh at south, and halted in the evening at the narrow passes near the islands: but upon the winds abating at midnight we embarked and rowed the remainder of the night and the whole day following, till we came to the place where formerly stood the old Fort of Frontenac, where we found some Indian hunters from Oswegachi. We were detained here all the next day by tempestuous weather, which was very windy, attended with snow and rain. We, however, improved the time in taking a plan of the old fort, situated at the bottom of a fine, safe harbour. There was about 500 acres of cleared ground about it, which, though covered with clover, seemed bad and rocky, and interspersed with some pine trees. The Indians here seemed to be well pleased with the news we brought them of the surrender of all Canada, and supplied us with great plenty of venison and wild fowl. Leaving Frontenac (Kingston) on the 25th, they continued along the north shore. Each day's progress and each night's encampment are given in detail, as well as many interesting particulars and observations as to the country within sight and the several tribes of Indians met with. Fifteen miles after passing Presque Isle point, a halt for the night was made at the mouth of the Grafton Creek, where they found a party of Mississagua Indians fishing for salmon. Some of the Rangers were invited by the Indians in the evening to join in spearing the fish by the help of a lighted torch, and in half an hour, it is stated, they filled a bark canoe."

On the 30th September, we read: "We embarked at the first dawn of day, and with the assistance of sails and oars made great headway, and in the evening reached the River Toronto, having run seventy miles. We passed a high bank twenty miles in length, but the land behind seemed to be level, well timbered with large oaks, hickories, maples and some poplars. No mountains appear in sight. There was a tract of about 300 acres of cleared ground round the place where formerly the French had a fort that was called Fort Toronto. The soil here is principally clay. The deer are extremely plenty in this country. Some Indians were hunting at the mouth of the river, who ran into the woods at our approach, very much frightened. They came in, however, in the morning, and testified their joy at the news of our success against the French. They told us we could easily accomplish our journey from thence to Detroit in eight days; that when the French traded at that place the Indians used to come with their peltry (furs) from *Michlimakana (now called Macinaw) down the River Toronto, that the

portage was but 20 miles from that to a river falling into Lake Huron, which had some falls, but none very considerable. They added that there was a carrying place of fifteen miles from some part of Lake Erie to a river running without any falls into Lake St. Clair.

"I think Toronto a most convenient place for a factory, and that from thence we may very easily settle the south side of Lake Erie."

Speaking as I am to-night to an audience composed chiefly of citizens of Toronto, that visit, when the British flag was first brought to the site of your city 130 years ago, is of peculiar interest, and I fancy it will be readily conceded that the views of the old Major as to the favourable situation and prospects of this place have been proved by subsequent events to have been remarkably well founded.

The mouth of the Toronto River mentioned at that time was, I fancy, the mouth of the present harbour. Any one who has observed the peculiar appearance of the trees on the Island, on a calm day, particularly in the autumn, will readily recognize how appropriate is the Indian word Toronto, which means "trees in the water." Consequently, it would appear that the River Don and the Bay together were then known as "the River Toronto."

The journal continues: "We left Toronto on the 1st of October, steering south, right across the west end of Lake Ontario. At dark we arrived at the south shore, five miles west of Fort Niagara. Some of our boats now became exceedingly leaky and dangerous.

"This morning, before we set out, I issued the following order of march:

"The boats to keep in line. If the wind rises high and the red flag hoisted, the boats to crowd nearer, that they may be ready to give mutual assistance in case of an accident, by which means we saved the crew and arms of the boat commanded by Lieut. McCormack, which sprung a leak and sunk, losing nothing but their own packs.

"We halted all the next day at Niagara, and provided ourselves with blankets, coats, moccasins, etc.

"I received from the commanding officer eighty barrels of provisions, and changed two whale boats, which were leaky, for batteaux.

"In the evening some of my party proceeded with the provisions to the falls, and in the morning I marched there, and began the portage of the provisions and boats."

Lieutenants Brehm and Davis took a survey of the great Cataract of Niagara.

From Niagara, the Major with two officers and eight Rangers in a bark canoe proceeded to "Presque Isle" in advance of the expedition, in order to make the detour to Pittsburgh as instructed. From the fort at Presque Isle, which is now the site of the modern town of Erie, the journey to Pittsburgh and return occupied from the 8th to the 30th of October. On his return there the main body of the expedition had arrived, but had lost some boats and provisions during a storm on the lake, and to guard against a probable scarcity of provisions at Detroit a party was despatched from there with a drove of forty oxen to go by land around the west end of Lake Erie. During the voyage westward, while encamped on the spot now occupied by the City of Cleveland, a threatening demonstration was made by a large party of Indians under the famous Chief Pontiac, who was disposed to dispute the right of the English to enter his territory. A council was held, but during the anxious discussion that took place the diplomacy of the Major happily had the effect of producing a peaceful settlement.

From the 12th to the 20th of November was occupied in reaching the mouth of the Detroit River.

"Here we found (he says) several Huron Sachems, who told me that a body of 400 Indian warriors was collected at the entrance into the great straits in order to obstruct our passage; that Monsieur Beletere, the commanding officer at Detroit, had excited them to defend their country, that they were messengers to know my business, and whether the person I had sent forward had reported the truth, that Canada was reduced. I confirmed this report, and that the fort at Detroit was given up by the French Governor, I presented them with a large belt, and spoke to this effect:

Brothers—With this belt I take you by the hand, you are to go directly to your brothers assembled at the mouth of the river and tell them to go to their towns till I arrive at the fort. I shall call you there as soon as Monsieur Beletere is sent away, which will be in two days after my arrival. We will then settle all matters. You will live happily in your own country. Your brothers have long desired to bring this about. Tell your warriors to mind their fathers, the French, no more, for they are all prisoners to your brothers the English, who pitied them and left them their houses and goods on their swearing by the Great One, who made the world, to become as Englishmen for ever. They are now your brothers, if you abuse them you affront me, unless they behave ill. Tell this to your brothers, the Indians, what I say is truth. When we meet at Detroit I will convince you it is all true."

These Sachems set out in good temper the next morning.

During the ascent of the Detroit River several letters were exchanged between the two commanding officers. At length, on the 29th of November the following ultimatum was despatched:—

"To Captain Beletere,

Commanding at Detroit.

Sir,—I acknowledge the receipt of your two letters, both of which were delivered to me yesterday. Mr. Brehm has not yet returned. The enclosed letter from the Marquis de Vandreuil will inform you of the surrender of all Canada to the King of Great Britain, and of the great indulgence granted to the inhabitants; as also to the terms granted to the troops of his most Christian Majesty. Captain Campbell, whom I have sent forward with this letter, will show you the capitulation. I desire you will not detain him, as I am determined, agreeable to my instructions from General Amherst, speedily to relieve your post. I shall stop the troops I have with me at the hither end of the town till four o'clock, by which time I shall expect your answer.

I am, etc.,

R. ROGERS.

"I landed half a mile short of the fort, and fronting it, where I drew up my detachment in a field of grass. Here Captain Campbell joined me, and with him came a French officer, to inform me that he bore Monsieur Beletere's compliments, signifying he was under my command. From hence I sent Lieutenants Leslie and McCormack with thirty-six men to take possession of the fort. The French garrison laid down their arms.

"The French colours were taken down and the English flag hoisted, at which about 700 Indians gave a shout of exultation. They seemed amazed at the submissive salutations of the inhabitants, and expressed their satisfaction at our generosity in not putting them to death, and said they would always in future fight for a nation thus favoured by Him that made the world.

"I went into the fort, received a plan of it with a list of the stores, from the commanding officer, and by noon of the 1st of December we had collected the militia, disarmed them and administered the oaths of allegiance."

An attempt was made to reach Michillimakinak, but after a two days' journey on Lake Huron, the ice compelled them to return to Detroit.

On account of the winter season setting in, a return by the lakes was impossible.

Consequently, after establishing a sufficient garrison at Detroit, he on the 23rd December commenced the return march with the remainder of his detachment around the west end of Lake Erie.

The bearings and details of each day's march through the woods are given until, as the journal states, "On the 23rd of January we came again to the Ohio River, opposite Fort Pitt, from whence I ordered Lieut. McCormack to march the party across the country to Albany, and after tarrying there till the 26th, I came the common road to Philadelphia, and from thence to New York, where, after this long and fatiguing journey, I arrived February 14th, 1761."

Major Rogers was sent to Detroit again in 1763, and took part in the defence of that place against the combined Indians under Pontiac.

A short time after that he went to England, as mentioned before, and on the 10th of January, 1766, he was appointed Governor of Michillimakinak, the duties of which he entered on in August of that year. In September, 1767, he was recalled, and proceeded to Montreal to answer to a malicious charge, preferred against him by parties who quarrelled with him in the west. He was honourably acquitted and his expenses paid by the British Government. He then again went to England, where he remained till June, 1775. On arrival at Baltimore he was arrested by the Revolutionists, but released on parole, which parole was broken by his assailants in arresting him the second time, from which he made his escape, and then proceeded to reorganize his Rangers on a war footing.

Before the end of the Revolutionary War Major Rogers had to go again to England, and was succeeded in the command of the Rangers by Colonel Simcoe. The corps since its reorganization was more in the nature of a regiment taking the name of the original company, and later on received the addition of a troop of cavalry as an auxiliary attachment.

Major Rogers did not again return to America, but died in England in 1784.

Having now traced the actions of some of the participants in the strife for the supremacy of the British cause in North America during that early period, permit me to refer briefly to the continuance of the same bold spirit of loyalty, which impelled many of those men to make still greater sacrifices a few years later, when the unfortunate complications which led to the revolt of the thirteen American Colonies came about.

It was from this same class of sterling, hardy colonists that this Province received its first pioneer settlers.

Those men who in their Transatlantic settlements, while having good reason to feel they were undergoing very serious disadvantages on account of the want of a better understanding between the Home Government and the Provincial authorities, at the same time could not be persuaded that there was sufficient cause to sever the ties of allegiance to their lawful Sovereign and to the land they still called home.

When the contentions of those times unfortunately ripened into hostilities, those men naturally and energetically espoused the Loyal cause, and though the fortune of war eventually prevailed against the principles they thought were right, they heroically proved their devotion to those principles, and voluntarily gave up their possessions and moved into that part of the country where they could still live under the flag they loved.

It is estimated about 10,000 came into this Province at that time, and as many more into the Maritime Provinces.

A Canadian poet thus feelingly refers to the movement :

“ They who loved the cause that had been lost,
Yet scorned an alien name,
Passed into exile leaving all behind
Save honour and the conscious pride
Of duty done to country and to king.”

It may be satisfactory to some to have specific proof of individual cases of sacrifices made at that time.

If you will excuse my making such frequent use of my own name, I would like to say that in the case of James Rogers the commanding officer of one of the companies of Rangers, the same by the way who owned this old powder horn, on the disbandment of his corps at the conclusion of the French War he acquired, partly by grant and partly by purchase, a tract of 22,000 acres of land in Wyndham County, in the Province of New York, and now in the State of Vermont. I have here the Crown Patent of that land, as well as another of 3,000 acres on the shore of Lake Champlain, the date of which is 1765. Those desirous of inspecting the style of conveyancing of these days will find these old documents very interesting.

After the turmoil and hardships of several years campaigning, he settled down upon that land, and was making satisfactory progress and improvements when the conflict I have referred to occurred, and he again mustered his Rangers and continued in active service as long as there was any chance of benefiting the Loyal cause. When all hope in that direction was lost, he with his family and an organized party composed of most of his Rangers, with their families and what trifling effects they could speedily bring away, joined the northern tide of United Empire Loyalists, and after weeks and months of privation and sufferings, finally selected new homes on the shores of the Bay of Quinte, where they commenced the first settlement in that now populous and prosperous district.

There they lie buried, and I, a great-grandson of that old volunteer officer and leader of the Rangers, am glad of this opportunity to publicly express my gratitude to those who have been instrumental in overshadowing their graves with a beautiful memorial church at Adolphustown as a tribute to the memory of those pioneer settlers whose devotion and patriotism supply a nobler example to succeeding generations.

I need not here refer at greater length to those who fought for “the Unity of the Empire,” and having failed to accomplish their purpose, proceeded to lay the foundation of this British Dominion of Canada.

The old Loyalists of that generation have long since gone to their rest, but far and wide throughout this Canada of ours may to-day be found numbers of their descendants glorying in the name and in the traditions they have inherited, and in the ties that still bind them to the Mother Land.

And in no society or organization are so many of them to be found as in the enrolled membership of the Volunteer Citizen soldiery of our country.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN,—

I have found it difficult to condense the events of several years' active operations within the time I could reasonably expect to be favoured with a patient hearing, but I feel greatly indebted for the interest you have shown in the subjects I have been bringing to your notice, and should my exertions happily have the effect of producing an increased interest in, and a greater desire for, the study of Canadian history, I shall feel amply compensated and gratified.

LIST OF OFFICERS OF ROGERS' RANGERS.

- 1st Company, or Queen's Rangers, organized in New Hampshire, March, 1756:—Captain, Robert Rogers; 1st Lieut., Richard Rogers; 2nd Lieut., John Stark; Ensign, Noah Johnson.
- 2nd Company, or King's Rangers, organized in New Hampshire, June, 1756:—Captain, Richard Rogers (died of smallpox at Fort William Henry, July, 1757); 1st Lieut., Noah Johnson; 2nd Lieut., Nathaniel Abbott; Ensign, Caleb Page (killed in action, 22nd Jany., 1757).
- 3rd Company, organized December, 1756:—Captain Hobbs (died February, 1757); 1st Lieut. Buckley; 2nd Lieut. Ogden; Ensign, James Rogers.
- 4th Company, organized December, 1756:—Captain Spikeman (killed in action, January 22nd, 1757); 1st Lieut. Kennedy (killed in action, January 22nd, 1757); Ensign, David Brewer.
- 5th Company, organized in New Jersey, April, 1757:—Captain Burgin; Lieut. Burbank; Ensign, Joshua Martin.
- Indian Companies, Captain Jacobs, Stockbridge Indians; Captain Lotridge, Mohawk Indians.

JANUARY, 1758.

- Major, Captain Robert Rogers; Captain James Rogers, Captain Shepherd, Captain John Stark, Captain Buckley (killed in action, March 13th, 1758), Captain William Stark, Captain David Brewer, Captain Burbank (killed in action, 15th May, 1759).
- Lieut. Philips (taken prisoner by Indians, March 13th, 1758, and tortured to death), Lieut. Crafton (taken prisoner by Indians, March 13th, 1758, and tortured to death), Lieut. Moore (killed in action, March 13th, 1758), Lieut. Campbell (killed in action, March 13th, 1758), Lieut. Pottinger (killed in action, March 13th, 1758), Lieut. Holmes, Lieut. Stewart (Adjutant).
- Ensign Waite, Ensign Ross (killed in action, March 13th, 1758), Ensign McDonald (killed in action, March 13th, 1758), Ensign White (killed in action, March 13th, 1758).

UNDER MAJOR JAS. ROGERS, SEPTEMBER, 1779.

- Captains:—John Langstreet (Niagara), John Hattfield, Daniel Bissonett (Niagara), Charles Babington, Patrick Walsh.
- Lieutenants:—John Throgmorton (Niagara), Michael Smith (Niagara), John Dean Whitworth.
- Ensigns:—John Robins (Niagara), John Bears (Niagara), Eleazar Taylor (Niagara).
- Sergeant Kennedy, Sergeant Herring, John Walsh (volunteer).
- Officers gone through the country from New York:—Captain John Stinson, Lieut. Jusley and son, Ensign Anderson, and others.

Battle-Fields of the Niagara Peninsula During the War 1812-15

*A Lecture delivered on the 16th February, by Capt. E. A. CRUIKSHANK,
44th Welland Battalion.—The Hon. John Bererley Robinson in the
chair.*

It is my purpose in this paper merely to deal with the military aspects of the subject that has been assigned to me, and I shall therefore strictly exclude all details which have not any direct bearing on it from that point of view. The printed literature dealing with this period of Canadian history is very extensive, but for the military student, owing partly to prejudice on the part of the writers and partly to want of exact information, much of it is almost valueless. Although not putting it entirely on one side, I prefer in every instance where it is practicable to go to the original and official documents.

While we have in the military correspondence of the British officers engaged very precise and reliable information as to the numbers of the forces under their command, their equipment, physical condition, and movements, and a weekly, sometimes almost a daily, chronicle of their confidential views, and hopes and fears, as long as access is denied to the similar collection of documents emanating from their opponents and preserved at Washington, any account of these campaigns must necessarily be somewhat imperfect and one-sided. Such a series of letters, journals, and other documents, when thoroughly mastered, enables one to see into the minds of the writers, appreciate their motives of action and understand their difficulties in a way that is possible by no other means, particularly when their views are filtered through the mind of another man. From them we become acquainted with the state of the roads, the accidents of the weather, the knowledge of the movements and numbers of the enemy which they possessed, whether correct or false, the feeling of the inhabitants, and innumerable other minor circumstances which sometimes potentially influence military action but usually evade the notice of the inquirer.

A few words on the composition and equipment of the contending forces will not be out of place. We have the testimony of a keen-sighted and not too friendly German critic (Baron Mueffling) that the British soldier of that day was full-fed, vigorous and brave, and that the rigid discipline to which he was subjected tended to convert him into an admirable fighting machine. A multitude of witnesses inform us that he was bravely, if not always intelligently, led into action by his officers and usually faced death with that grim tenacity of purpose termed bull-dog courage by their antagonists. On the other hand, we know that their greatest leader habitually spoke of the rank and file of his army as "the scum of the earth." There is, unfortunately, good reason to believe that this description was much more applicable to a large part of the British force in Canada in 1812 than the former.

Obliged to rely on voluntary enlistment, or what was construed as such, recruiting officers had been forced to resort to many strange and discreditable devices to supply the drain of twenty years of war. "The man

who enlists into the British army is in general the most drunken and probably the worst man in the town or village in which he lives," said the same great authority whom I have quoted.¹ Nor was the enlistment of drunkards, tramps, and vagabonds the worst feature of this system of recruiting. The prisons were emptied bodily into the ranks. Men under sentence of death for the vilest crimes were permitted to serve therein by enlisting under assumed names. Prisoners of war of all nationalities were accepted as recruits in the same way, a few months after they were taken, although it was apparent they intended to desert on the first opportunity. The waifs and strays of the great towns and the children of the barrack-yard were thrust into uniform when they were not yet strong enough to carry a musket. Three of the best regiments in the army were entirely composed of pauper boys drafted from the county poor-houses.²

As yet little attention was paid to the physical condition of the recruits. Anything in the shape of a man was accepted, and hundreds of them went directly to the hospital from the recruiting office.

The best men were naturally sent to Spain and Hindostan to fill the gaps in the fighting line, and the residuum despatched to those stations where garrison duty only was anticipated. Accordingly, when war was declared by the United States, whole battalions stationed in the British Provinces were actually unfit to take the field through physical causes. In Upper and Lower Canada, on the first of July, 1812, there were, including four battalions of colonial troops, 7,147 officers and men of all arms.³ Of these the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, 559 strong, was entirely composed of old and infirm men; the 103rd, 781 so-called effectives, of boys; and the Glengarry Light Infantry and Canadian Voltigeurs, 829 officers and men, of raw recruits. Ultimately, the last three battalions became excellent soldiers. When the 2nd Battalion of the 41st arrived at Quebec, it was found to be composed almost entirely of very young boys, or very old and sickly men and only eighty or a hundred men could be picked out who were at all fit for service, out of 400 present.⁴

The drafts of recruits that were sent out during the war were of much the same unsatisfactory character.

The British squadrons on Lake Erie and on Lake Ontario were tied up in port for weeks together at the most critical periods through the weakness and inefficiency of their crews.

The equipment of the soldiers was defective and cumbrous. They had been released a few years before from the torture of tying their hair in a stiff bunch behind, but they were still compelled to march and fight in the hottest of weather in high leathern stocks, tight jackets and tall shakos. Their accoutrements were clumsy and ponderous. The utmost range of the flint-lock musket with which they were armed was supposed to be 200 yards, but was actually not more than 188. Few of them could be relied upon, as even fairly effective, for a greater distance than 70 or 80. Not more than a single round per minute could be fired for any length of time. A few battalions had been armed with the Brunswick rifle, but none of these were sent out to Canada, where they would have been of the utmost service. Most battalions consisted of ten companies nominally composed of 100 men. The tallest and stoutest men were selected for the grenadier, or right flank company, and the most active for the light, or left flank company. These companies wore a distinctive uniform, and were frequently detached from their battalion and

1. Wellington Despatches, vol. v., p. 592. 2. Wellington Despatches *passim* Ashton, Old Times. Memoirs of Lieut. John Shipp, p. 31, Larpent, Journal, p. 284.
3. Return of troops in Upper and Lower Canada, 4th July, 1812.—Freer Papers 4. Col. Pearson to Col. Baynes, 22nd Aug., 1813.

formed into separate battalions and even brigades, of grenadiers or light infantry.¹

The gunners and drivers of the Royal Artillery formed distinct corps, and as neither horses nor drivers had been attached to the field-train in Canada, both officers and gunners knew very little of the new system of field exercise, and they were quite inadequate in numbers for the service required of them. The favorite field-gun was a light six-pounder, having a range with round shot of about five hundred yards.²

Our knowledge of the composition and equipment of the American regular army is less precise. We know, however, that a very large proportion of the rank and file then, as now, were of foreign birth. Their muskets were longer and better made than the English, and several corps were armed with a rifle of superior construction. Cartridges containing a bullet and three buckshot were served out to the infantry and proved very effective at short ranges. Prior to January, 1812, the American army consisted of one regiment of artillery of 20 companies of 81 officers and men each, one regiment of light artillery of 10 companies of the same strength, one regiment of dragoons of 8 troops of 82 officers and men; 7 regiments of infantry and one of rifles, of 10 companies of 84 officers and men. By the law of January, 1812, two regiments of artillery each of 20 companies of 96 officers and men, one of light dragoons of 12 companies of 97 officers and men, 10 regiments of infantry each to consist of two battalions of 9 companies of 114 of all ranks and six companies of rangers of 72 officers and men, were added. In June, the infantry was re-organized into twenty regiments of ten companies, the complement of each company being four officers, 10 N. C. O., and 92 musicians and privates. Their field-guns were 6 and 12 pounders, fourteen calibres in length, and weighing about 100 pounds to each pound of shot thrown. The carriages were of the French Gribeauval pattern. The ordinary gun detachment consisted of two gunners and six matrosses, but in the field two additional matrosses with drag-ropes were added to a six-pounder, four to a howitzer, and six to a twelve-pounder.³ As in the British army, drivers were a separate corps. Besides the regular army, the President was authorized to take into the service of the United States 50,000 volunteers and 100,000 militia, organized in much the same way.

A return of the 4th of July, 1812, shows that there were then 1,658 officers and men of the regular army in Upper Canada; 196 of these belonged to the 10th Royal Veteran Battalion, and were only fit for garrison duty, and 368 of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment were intended for service on the lakes. More than one-third of the officers were absent on leave. The number of militia, including every male between the ages of 16 and 60, was estimated at 11,000, but the Governor-General stated that it would not be prudent to arm more than 4,000.⁴ This seems an equivalent to an admission that two-thirds of the inhabitants were suspected of disaffection. About 3,000 were actually mustered into the service during the course of the war.

The County of Lincoln, embracing all that part of the Province lying east of a line drawn from Burlington Bay to the mouth of the Grand River, contained about 2,000 men liable to militia service. Probably one-third of these would be available for the field. Four hundred might be drawn in an emergency from the County of York and half that number from the County of Norfolk. The loyalty of most of these men was beyond

1. Ward—Reign of Queen Victoria, pp. 156, 189, 264. 2. Major-General Glasgow to Sir Geo. Prevost, Sept. 18, 1811. 3. Haskins Hist. 1st Regt. of Artillery (U.S.) 4. Sir G. Prevost to Lord Liverpool, May 18, 1812.

question. Chiefly the descendants of the disbanded soldiers of Butler's Rangers and other Loyalist Corps, they had imbibed the bitterest hatred for the people of the United States, and in physical vigour and endurance were superior, man for man, to any body of militia likely to be opposed to them. In April, 1812, twenty companies of three officers and 38 men were organized in these counties and armed with old garrison muskets. They were directed to provide themselves with a jacket of some dark-coloured cloth and a round hat, and were drilled for a couple of hours, six times a month. Numbers of these men had to travel many miles to drill, and they belonged to the best class of settlers.¹ The Grand River Indians could turn out three hundred men, but not more than 150 of these appeared in arms at any one time. Apart from the lake service, the defence of the Province from June to September, 1812, practically devolved upon the 1st Battalion of the 41st Regiment and 3,000 ill-armed and untrained militia. The British, however, possessed a great advantage at the outset in having control of both Lake Ontario and Lake Erie. On each of these they had a ship and two smaller armed vessels. It is true the officers were incapable and the crews actually mustered less one-fourth of the number necessary to man these squadrons, but the arrival of five companies of the Newfoundland Regiment put them in a state to keep the lakes open as a route for the transport of supplies and close them for every purpose to the Americans until an ill-timed armistice threw away these advantages.²

Nor were any of the numerous small posts in either Province in a condition, even when fully garrisoned, to warrant a belief that they could resist any force more formidable than a war-party of Indians. The opinions of the Commander-in-Chief were summarized in these words in his despatch to Lord Liverpool of the 18th May, 1812: "Quebec is the only permanent fortress in the Canadas, and must be maintained. To the final defence of this position every other military operation ought to become subservient, and the retreat of the troops upon Quebec must be a primary consideration Defective as Quebec is, it is the only post that can be considered tenable for a moment, the preservation of it being of the utmost consequence as the door of entry for that force which may be sent for the recovery of both or either of the Provinces. If the Americans determine to attack Canada, it would be in vain that the General should flatter himself with the hope of making an effectual defence of the open country unless powerfully assisted from home. All predatory or ill-concerted attacks undertaken presumptuously and without sufficient means can be resisted and repulsed: still, this must be done with caution that the resources for a future exertion, the defence of Quebec, may be unexhausted."

From this position Prevost never receded, and in good as well as evil fortune continued to regard the troops in Upper Canada as merely a useful containing force to hold the Americans in check as long as possible while the bulk of his regular forces were carefully kept intact in Lower Canada for the defence of his only fortress. For this, he has been severely condemned; and there seems to be but little doubt that had he heavily reinforced De Rottenberg or Drummond very brilliant results might have been obtained, but in the meantime an enterprising opponent moving rapidly from Lake Champlain might easily have made himself master of Montreal and starved every British soldier and sailor in Upper Canada into an unconditional surrender.

1. Gen. Brock to Col. R. Nichol, April 8, 1812. G. O., York, 29th April, 1812. Brock to Prevost, April 22, 1812. 2. Capt. A. Gray to Sir G. Prevost, 24th February, 1812. Prevost to Lord Liverpool, May 18, 1812.

At the outset, Brock was scarcely more sanguine, and candidly admitted that he had little hopes of defending the country with success. On the 25th July, 1812, he wrote to Prevost—"That the Provinces cannot be maintained by the present force is very obvious, and unless the enemy is driven from Sandwich, it will be impossible much longer to arrest the impending ruin of the country." As late as the 4th of August, the day before he left York for Detroit, he drew this dismal picture of the situation in a letter to Colonel Baynes: "The House of Assembly have refused to do anything they were required. Everybody considers the fate of the country as settled, and is afraid to appear in the least conspicuous in the promotion of measures to retard it. A petition has already been carried to General Hull, signed by many of the inhabitants about Westminster, inviting him to advance with a promise to join him. The ungrateful and infamous conduct of the Indians on the Grand River is still more mortifying." The unprotected state of the country was well known to the enemy, and was actually one of the most powerful motives which induced them to declare war.

Within a few days of the declaration of war it was ascertained that the Americans projected a simultaneous attack upon the Detroit and Niagara frontiers. Like all others, the fortifications along the latter river had been permitted to fall into a state of neglect and decay. Fort George was simply a temporary fieldwork, irregular in outline, consisting of six small bastions faced with squared timber and planks, connected by a line of palisades twelve feet high. Its construction was very defective, and it was commanded by the high ground near Youngstown on the opposite side of the river. It contained quarters in blockhouses for 220 men, and a small stone magazine which was not bomb-proof. It could not be regarded as capable of resisting any resolute attack, and did not even command the mouth of the river. At Chippawa there was a ruinous blockhouse furnishing quarters for thirty-six men. Seven years before, the construction of new work called Fort Erie had been undertaken. In the course of eighteen months, two small barracks, two bastions of masonry, fronting the lake were completed, the foundations for two other bastions fronting the land had been laid, and the ditch excavated, when orders arrived to discontinue operations. It had since remained unfinished, and the foundations had already begun to crumble from the effects of frost. For garrison use on this frontier there had been six 12-pounder iron guns, three 9-pounders, and six mortars, but several of these were removed to Amherstburg in the spring, and had not been replaced. The field artillery consisted of one 12-pounder, five light sixes, four 3-pounders and a 5½ inch howitzer. No horses or drivers were attached, and the detachment of artillery-men consisted of one Captain (Holcroft), 3 non-commissioned officers, and 21 men. The headquarter wing of the 1st Battalion of the 41st, under Colonel Proctor, furnished the garrisons for these posts.¹

The flank-companies of militia turned out very cheerfully to the number of nearly 800 men, of whom the greater part were at once marched to this frontier. Brock desired to begin the campaign by the reduction of Fort Niagara, which would give him command of the mouth of the river; and it is probable that Prevost would have consented to the attempt had he not been restrained by positive orders from the Colonial Office to take no aggressive step whatever. The number of American troops on the Niagara, regular and militia, for more than a month after the declaration of war did not exceed 1,600, and Fort Niagara was not in a fit state to resist a determined attack.²

1. Lt.-Col. R. H. Bruyere to Sir G. Prevost, Aug. 24, 1811. Maj.-Gen. Glasgow to Sir G. Prevost, Sept. 18, 1811. Sir G. Prevost to Lord Liverpool, May 18, 1812.

2. See *Annals of the War of 1812*, p. 117.

The British General was accordingly obliged to restrict his efforts to the strengthening of his position and disciplining the militia, who soon began to seek permission to return to their farms. He was obliged to organize volunteer companies of artillery to man the guns of position and a corps of drivers for the field-guns. A system of signalling by means of flags and beacons was extemporized, and a small but effective intelligence department organized, through which he was kept well-informed of the motions of his enemies. A brigade of waggons for the transport of supplies was also formed. Already he found himself threatened by a scarcity of provisions, as the merchants had sent all the pork and flour they could purchase out of the Province in anticipation of hostilities. He was entirely without ready money, and was compelled to borrow from an association of loyal inhabitants to meet immediate demands. The militia were unprovided with blankets, tents, kettles, or camp equipage of any kind, and these things could only be supplied from Montreal.¹

Hull's invasion determined Brock to take the hazardous step of withdrawing three companies of the small regular force, leaving Col. Christopher Myers in command for three weeks with less than 300 regulars, including a detachment of the Newfoundland regiment acting as marines on the armed vessels, "Lady Prevost" and "Earl Moira," anchored on either flank, and 500 very impatient militia.² Late in August, Brock returned with the renewed determination to attack the enemy on their own side of the river, and there is little doubt that his success would have been quite as complete and easy as at Detroit. Official and private letters alike prove that the Americans were quite dispirited by their disasters. Once more he was condemned to inactivity by the armistice, and later on by explicit instructions from Prevost not only to remain strictly on the defensive and refrain from irritating the enemy, but to conciliate them by every means in his power. Reinforced early in September by the flank companies of the Newfoundland regiment and six companies of the 49th, although the forces of his opponents were daily increasing, he still felt confident of his ability to sweep them from every position they held. "His instructions," he asserted, "obliged him to exercise greater forbearance than ever was shown on any former occasion," and he was compelled to be satisfied with the construction of batteries and equipment of his militia with muskets taken at Detroit, while apparently overwhelming numbers were being arrayed against him. By the end of the first week in October, General Van Rensselaer had assembled more than eight thousand men on the Niagara, of whom 3,650 were regulars. Eleven hundred of the regulars were quartered in and around Fort Niagara, while 900 more, with 2,270 New York militia, were encamped near Lewiston. The remainder were stationed near Buffalo. Three numerous divisions of batteaux and boats were collected in the creeks flowing into the river, and an attempt to pass the river might readily be undertaken at any one of these points or simultaneously at two or all of them. Three large encampments were visible from the Canadian shore, and the number of troops was closely ascertained from the reports of deserters. They were known to be amply supplied with field-artillery and stores of every description.³

By the departure of the armed vessels which were needed for the transport of stores on the lakes, the flanks of the British position were exposed to attack, and it became necessary to watch the shore of Lake Erie as far west

1. Brock to Prevost, July 4, 1812. Brock to Prevost, July 12, 1812. Gen. Sheaffe to Lord Bathurst, Dec. 3, 1812.

2. Myers to Prevost, Aug. 17, 1812.

3. Brock to Prevost, Sept. 7, 1812. Brock to his brother, Sept. 17. Brock to Prevost, Oct. 11.

as Sugar Loaf Hill, whence a tolerable road led to Chippawa, and the shore of Lake Ontario to the mouth of Four Mile Creek. Eight small redoubts had been constructed on the left of Fort George and four between Fort George and Queenston. Eighteen guns and mortars were mounted on these works. At Fort George itself there were 20 guns of eight different calibres, but probably not more than five of these were mounted. At Queenston there was a one-gun battery, and at Chippawa another armed with three guns. Fort Erie and three adjacent batteries mounted four guns. Nearly the whole of this armament had been brought from Detroit since the capitulation. Two companies of volunteer artillery had been organized for garrison duty, partly drafted from the regular infantry and partly from the militia. The detachment of regular artillery according to the nearest return, that of the 12th November, consisted of but one officer and thirty gunners stationed at Fort George, and twenty gunners distributed at other points along the line. Four field-guns, a 12-pounder, two sixes, and a howitzer were at Fort George, two three-pounders at Queenston, and the four remaining pieces at or near Fort Erie. The regular infantry consisted of seven companies of the 41st, about 680 of all ranks; six of the 49th, 440 of all ranks; and two of the Royal Newfoundland, 120 strong. Of militia under arms, there were a troop of artillery drivers, a troop of cavalry, and fourteen flank companies of infantry, or perhaps six hundred officers and men. This would give an aggregate force of less than 1,900 of all ranks and arms, of whom 1,100 were regular infantry. A month before, three hundred Indians had been assembled, but many of them had since dispersed. Probably 500 reserve militia could be collected in twenty-four hours. About one-third of the battalion of the 41st were recruits of less than one year's standing, but as a whole it contained a large proportion of good men. Most of the 49th were old soldiers, ten years in the country, yet the regiment had not seen active service since 1801. The flank companies were composed of picked men, and had been assiduously drilled for several months.¹

This force was manifestly inadequate in numbers for the duties required of them, although so far they had continued in perfect health and spirits and not a man of the regular force had deserted, while the enemy lost many both by disease and desertion.²

Van Rensselaer's first plan is known to have been to pass the river simultaneously at Queenston and on the left of Fort George, but General Smyth, the regular officer next in rank, advocated an attempt above the Falls. Feeling confident, as he avowed, that the force already assembled in the vicinity of Lewiston was of itself sufficient for the service, Van Rensselaer finally issued instructions for crossing on the night of the 11th of October at Queenston. The spirits of his troops had been raised to the highest pitch by the success of a cutting-out enterprise near Fort Erie, in which two small vessels were taken, but his design failed through the misconduct of the officer in command of the boats. The concentration of large bodies of troops near Niagara and Buffalo had forced Brock to weaken his centre, and Queenston was then occupied only by the flank companies of the 49th and a single company of militia, with a few artillerymen to work an 18-pounder in a redoubt half-way up the heights, and two 3-pound field-pieces. Two other companies of militia were quartered between Queenston and the mouth of the river. One company of the 41st lay at Chippawa and five others were stationed in and about Fort George. The gaol and guard rooms at the latter post were

1. Brock to his brother, Sept. 17. Distribution return, Nov. 12, 1812.—Freer papers. Return of ordnance, Dec. 15, 1812.—Freer papers.

2. Brock to Prevost, Sept. 9, 13, 20, 1812.

crammed with political prisoners, rendering it additionally insecure. Brock had become convinced that an attack on his position would not be long delayed, but believed that it would be directed against his right. Even when the abortive attempt on Queenston became known he still adhered to his opinion, regarding it merely as an attempt to carry off the guard. Van Rensselaer's disposition of his troops must then be regarded as perfectly successful in misleading his opponent, and the point of attack appears to have been selected with judgment. The best known ferry on the river had long been established there, and the stream was so narrow that his artillery could cover the passage with effect. The several roads which united at Lewiston furnished ready means of concentrating troops from either wing. Even the involuntary delay which had occurred benefited him, as it enabled Col. Scott to arrive with part of General Smyth's regulars from Buffalo.¹

Three hours before daylight, fully 4,000 men were assembled at Lewiston, and four guns and two mortars planted to cover their movements. The greater part of the first division, consisting of three or four hundred men, succeeded in landing without resistance and maintained their footing, although vigorously attacked by the entire force stationed in Queenston. Reinforcements steadily arrived from Lewiston, and shortly after daylight a strong body of Americans gained the summit of the heights by a by-path and took the British battery in reverse, without losing a man. General Brock, hastily attempting to recover it with a very inferior force, was killed and the party repulsed. Several hours then elapsed during which the passage of the river was practically uncontested, and it is admitted that Van Rensselaer might easily have thrown over his entire division. Owing partly to the mismanagement of the officers in charge of the boats, and partly to the misconduct of his men, he failed to make the best use of his opportunity, but upwards of 1,000 of his best soldiers, with one field-gun, were ferried over. The officers in command of this body made a very feeble effort to fortify their position on the heights, and permitted an insignificant party of Indians to establish itself in the woods on their flank, while Capt. Holcroft, R.A., with two field-guns, took up a position in the village of Queenston to contest the passage of the river in either direction. The arrival of a considerable body of reserve militia, whom Brock had called out the night before in anticipation of the attack, liberated the garrison of Fort George for service in field. General Sheaffe, who succeeded to the command, during the afternoon assembled several companies of regular infantry and the same number of flank companies of militia, besides about thirty gunners of the Royal Artillery with four guns near the foot of the heights, while he learned that Captain Bullock, with one company of the 41st and two of militia, was approaching in the opposite direction from Chippawa. The position occupied by the Indians favoured the junction of these forces, and enabled Sheaffe, with the main body of the troops under his own command, to pass unmolested quite around the left flank of the Americans, leaving Capt. Holcroft, with two six-pounder guns and a small detachment of regular infantry and military, to hold Queenston. When joined by Bullock's command, the strength of his force probably exceeded 900 rank and file, with two 3-pounder field-guns dragged by hand. That of the Americans was nearly the same, with but a single 6-pounder. They had changed front to meet the attack, and formed behind a slight entrenchment hastily constructed of rails, logs and brushwood. They scarcely offered a creditable show of resistance, and within half-an-hour were killed or taken prisoners almost to a man.²

1. Brock to Prevost, Oct. 9, 11. John Lovett to Alexander, Oct. 14.

2. Sheaffe to Prevost, Oct. 14, 1812. S. Van Rensselaer to Secretary of War, Oct.

14, 1812. Ibid to Gov. Tompkins, Oct. 17. James Christie, Armstrong, Van Rensselaer, Prevost, Oct. 11.

General Van Rensselaer's failure at Queenston, in one way or another, diminished his army by about 2,000 men, and led to his immediate retirement, yet it could not be justly ascribed to any radical defect in his plan of attack. The remainder of his force was so much disorganized and demoralized that General Smyth, upon whom the command then devolved, immediately proposed an armistice, to continue for an indefinite period, but which might be terminated at any time by giving thirty hours' notice. Sheaffe readily consented to this, "as corresponding with the system of forbearance which policy and a spirit of conciliation had prescribed, and as permitting me to come to this place (York) and revive the supreme civil authority, the prolonged suspension of which might have proved highly detrimental to the public interest."

Smyth began at once to concentrate his forces near Buffalo, and reorganize them with the intention of putting into effect his scheme of crossing the river above the Falls. He was soon reinforced by nearly 3,000 militia and some detachments of regular artillery and infantry. His preparations for invasion, however, were not completed until the 19th of November, when he formally gave notice of his intention to terminate the armistice at nine o'clock on the next evening.

The movement of troops towards Buffalo and the conveyance of boats overland had not passed unnoticed, and Sheaffe had strengthened his right wing in consequence. In the hope of diverting his opponent's attention to the other flank, Fort Niagara was bombarded so successfully on the 21st, that several guns were dismantled, the rest silenced, and the garrison driven out. As no attempt was made to take possession, it was soon reoccupied, and Smyth resumed his movement against the British right. He had assembled at Black Rock six companies of regular artillery, two battalions of volunteer riflemen, and two brigades of militia infantry numbering in the aggregate more than 5,000 rank and file. Boats sufficient to transport 3,000 men and ten field guns with their tumbrils at once, were in readiness. The nearest return we possess of the distribution of the British regular force is that of the 12th November. There were then at Fort George and its dependencies 544 officers and men, at Queenston 209, at Chippawa 283, and Fort Erie and dependencies 262, or an aggregate of 1,275 of all ranks and arms along the entire line of the Niagara, of whom 539 were stationed above the Falls.² No precise return of the militia in service is available, but the number was probably greater than when the attempt was made at Queenston. In a letter dated the 23rd November, Sheaffe gives this satisfactory account of them. "The number of our militia has constantly increased since the termination of the armistice. They are very alert and well disposed. A number of old loyalists who have borne arms have come in, and as they are able to do stationary duty, I have not sent them away." In addition to the Lincoln militia, the flank companies of the two Norfolk Regiments had arrived on this frontier. Sheaffe also states that about 400

1. Gen. Smyth to Secretary of War, Oct. 20. Sheaffe to Lord Liverpool, Oct. 20.

	FORT GEORGE.	QUEENSTON.	CHIPPAWA.	FORT ERIE.	
2 Royal Artillery	33	Royal Artillery	7	Royal Artillery	6
Royal Engineers.....	1	41st.....	10	41st.....	4
41st.....	391	41st.....	277	41st.....	4
Royal.....	118	49th.....	192	49th.....	252
Glengarry Light Infantry....	1				
	544		209		283
					262

Indians had come in, a few of whom he sent to Grand Island, to watch the movements of the enemy.

Apparently about 500 militia were quartered between Chippawa and Fort Erie, and most of the Indians were held in reserve on that flank.¹

On the morning of the 28th November, Smyth began the attack by sending a detachment of 500 men under Major King to seize and dismantle two small redoubts about three miles below Fort Erie, each mounting a gun of position, which commanded the river at the point where he intended to attempt a landing and also to destroy the bridge over Frenchman's Creek to prevent the advance of the force at Chippawa to the assistance of the garrison of Fort Erie. Instead of instructing this party, if successful, to maintain its foothold, the American General committed the remarkable and fatal error of directing it to recross the river after having accomplished this service. King actually succeeded in taking both batteries some hours before daybreak, after a sharp struggle in which numbers alone prevailed. His men were then seized by a panic, and put off in such a hurry that he was abandoned with about 40 soldiers, without any means of escape. The guns were very imperfectly spiked and dismantled, but the bridge was scarcely injured. Colonel Bisshop advanced from Chippawa with 220 men to the point of attack, and was joined there by Major Ormsby, from Fort Erie, with 80 men and a 6-pound gun. King's party at once surrendered. Shortly after daybreak a second division of boats attempted to cross, but was repulsed by the fire of the field-piece alone.² The dismantled guns were then fished out of the shallow water into which they had been thrown, and replaced on their carriages. The American batteries opposite began a heavy cannonade with the apparent object of covering the passage of the river, but Bishop continued to show so bold a front that, after a three days' demonstration, during which his troops were repeatedly embarked and relanded, Smyth determined to abandon his project in despair. He attributed his failure largely to the misconduct of the militia, of whom he stated that 1,147 had deserted within a week.³ During these operations the British loss in action was 96, and that of their opponents probably not more than 150. The garrison order book of Fort George for this period is still in existence, and extracts from it will serve to illustrate the heroism and vigilance with which the frontier was guarded.

A district general order, dated November 1st, 1812, reads as follows: "Major-General Sheaffe has witnessed with the highest satisfaction the manly and cheerful spirit with which the militia on this frontier have borne the privations which peculiar circumstances have imposed upon them. He hopes, however, to be soon enabled by the arrival of the liberal supplies ordered from the Lower Province to furnish them with articles contributing essentially to their comfort. This will afford him peculiar gratification, for he cannot but feel that their conduct entitles them to every attention he can bestow on them. It has furnished examples of those best characteristics of a soldier, manly constancy under fatigue and privation, and determined bravery in the face of the enemy.

"By a perseverance in the exercise of these noble qualities, they may be assured of accomplishing the task in which they are engaged. The armistice will shortly be terminated, and an attack is to be expected. Major-General Sheaffe is confident that any attempt to make an impression on a frontier

1. Sheaffe to Prevost, November 3, 23. Myers to Sheaffe, November 22. Sheaffe to Myers, November 23.

2. Bisshop to Sheaffe, Dec. 1, 1812.

3. Smyth in "National Intelligencer," Jan. 28, 1813.

defended by such men cannot succeed, but that it will only heap new disgrace and disaster on the enemy, and add fresh laurels to those which have already been acquired by the brave militia on this frontier."

Another of November 20th, after announcing the termination of the armistice that evening, proceeds to say, "No officer or man is to take off his clothes at night. One-half of the troops are to be in perfect readiness to turn out at any hour of the night. During the day the men are not to stay away from their quarters and are to be accoutred with arms in their hands, and are to be so placed that each man shall be able to seize his arms at an instant's notice. Frequent patrols are to be sent out during the night, and sentries so placed that an enemy's approach may be immediately discovered, and the alarm given. The men are not to be uselessly exposed to a cannonade.

"If the enemy attempts to cross he is not to be opposed by musketry until he is well within range, and if he perseveres in endeavouring to gain the shore, he is to be attacked with the most determined resolution such as becomes the British arms, the honour of which has hitherto been so notably sustained by the troops of all descriptions on this frontier. If in spite of every exertion any portion of the troops should be forced by the great superiority of numbers to retreat, the best possible order is to be preserved during the retreat by a steady, well-directed fire, closing to that flank from which the most speedy and effectual support may be expected.

"If necessity should arise for abandoning a post, all ammunition, provisions, and other articles that may be useful are to be destroyed, timely preparations having been previously made."

During the autumn the militia on service suffered dreadfully from defective equipment. Their clothing was insufficient to protect them, and many were actually disabled from duty by want of shoes. During their prolonged absence from their farms, much of their produce rotted, and many families were reduced to a state of extreme distress. Accordingly, as soon as danger of invasion seemed at an end for the time being, the whole body, with the exception of a single flank company from each battalion, was dismissed.

The American army suffered in a much greater degree from disease, and was rapidly diminished by desertion, many men even swimming the river to escape. It was thus gradually reduced during the winter to less than 3,000 men, nearly all regulars, of whom 2,000 were quartered in the vicinity of Buffalo. The British force opposite was also seriously reduced by natural causes, and by the detachment of two companies of the 41st to assist in the defence of Detroit, and to deceive the enemy as to its strength, the expedient was adopted of frequently moving armed parties in sleighs along the bank of the river by day and taking them back to their quarters after dark.

In February, 1813, an attack on Fort Erie by crossing on the ice was projected by the commandant at Buffalo, but postponed in consequence of the desertion of a sergeant, and finally abandoned on receiving news of the British success at the River Raisin. On the 17th of March, Fort Erie and the adjacent batteries were bombarded with little effect. This symptom of activity on the part of the enemy, however, excited such alarm that the greater part of the militia were again embodied and retained in service until the end of May. In consequence, most of the arable lands in the district remained untilled, and the distress of the inhabitants became more acute than ever.

Early in the spring, Prevost signified his intention of reinforcing the troops in Upper Canada with half a company of Royal Artillery, one battalion of the 8th, six companies of the 104th, and four companies of Canadian Voltigeurs.¹ These troops would be obliged to march the entire

¹ L. Prevost to Sheaffe, March 27, 1813.

distance by single companies, as the American squadron held possession of the lake, and the resources of the country were not sufficient to permit of the advance of a larger body at once. Only four companies of the 8th arrived in time to participate in the defence of Fort George, but four companies of the 49th had come up during the winter from Kingston. These reinforcements increased the strength of the regular troops serving on the Niagara to 1,925 officers and men, of whom only 1,841 were effective. The defences of the frontier had also been slightly strengthened during the winter and spring. The six batteries on the left of Fort George mounted one 24-pounder, one 18, five 9-pounders and four small mortars. In the fort itself there were two 24-pound cannonades, one 12, one 10 and one 8-inch mortar. Three batteries between Fort George and Queenston were armed with one 12 and two 9-pounders. The redoubt at Queenston mounted two 9-pounders and another at Chippawa two 9-pounders and one 6. Fort Erie and adjacent batteries were armed with an 18-pounder, two 12's, one 6 and one 8-inch mortar. The field-guns were distributed as follows: one 12-pounder on the left of Fort Erie, two 6's and one howitzer at Fort George, two 3-pounders at Queenston, one 6 at Chippawa, three 6 and two 3-pounders at Fort Erie. Prevost commented on the fatal effects of "dividing and dissipating this force by attempting to support too many points at once," and advised Sheaffe in the event of an invasion with sufficient numbers to "act with caution and husband his resources." On the 27th April, an overwhelming force attacked York, almost annihilated two companies of the 8th and paroled the militia. This event prevented the advance of the remainder of that regiment, which fell back on Kingston. Accordingly, the force assembled for the defence of the Niagara at the end of May was much smaller than had been originally intended. Brigadier-General Vincent had succeeded to the command. Colonel John Harvey was acting as his Deputy Adjutant-General and chief adviser, and Colonel Bisshop, another officer of experience, was Inspecting Field-Officer. Harvey's view of the manner in which the campaign should be conducted was, that accurate intelligence of the enemy's numbers and movements should be obtained at any price, and then by "a series of bold, active and offensive operations they should be thrown on the defensive, no matter how superior their numbers might be." Probably only the delay in the march of the 8th prevented the British commander from making a descent on Lewiston, which was certainly under consideration as late as the 20th of May. A nominal force of about 1,700 militia had been called into service three weeks before, but Vincent wrote: "It is with regret that I cannot report favourably of their number nor of their willing co-operation. Desertion from their ranks continues beyond all conception. They are wavering and appalled by the enemy's numbers."² By the 24th of May, General Dearborn had assembled nearly 6,000 men at Fort Niagara, while considerable detachments were encamped at Lewiston and Buffalo, and the entire American squadron on Lake Ontario was anchored off the mouth of the river. The enemy's movements then seemed to indicate an attack on the British position on the right of Fort George, and the troops were kept under arms all night. During the night a number of boats were launched about four miles up the river and passed down to the lake, and at day-break Fort Niagara and six adjacent batteries mounting sixteen guns, chiefly of heavy calibre, and three mortars, opened fire with hot shot on Fort George and the batteries facing the river. In a few hours every building within the fort was beaten down or burnt, the two heaviest guns dismounted

1. Sir G. Prevost to Gen. Sheaffe, 27th March, 1813.

2. Vincent to Prevost, 19th May, 1813. Myers to Baynes, May 20.

and its fire totally suspended. In the course of the afternoon, boats from the squadron were observed sounding the water in front of the British left, and placing buoys, while the batteries there were forced to be silent for fear of drawing the enemy's fire upon the town.'

Vincent's force then consisted of 30 Royal Artillery, with five guns, 1,050 regular infantry, 350 militia and 50 Indians. A garrison of 130 men was left in the fort, and the remainder was divided into three brigades of nearly equal strength, the left under Colonel Myers, the right under Colonel Harvey, and the centre under Vincent's own orders. The men were much exhausted by constant alarms and loss of rest. Including sailors and marines, Dearborn's combined force was not less than 8,000 strong. The morning of the 27th was calm and foggy, and the American squadron, consisting of 16 vessels with a united broadside of 52 pieces, most of them long guns of heavy calibre, dropped quietly into the places designated for them within 300 yards of the shore, enfilading the batteries and sweeping the entire plain from the town to the intended landing-place two miles on the left. Under cover of their fire, 134 boats conveying about 4,000 men, advanced in three divisions and landed without the slightest opposition. Myers' brigade of 567 officers and men,* formed in a ravine, and moved forward to the attack, but the head of the column had scarcely appeared in the open before it was overwhelmed by the united fire of the shipping and Fort Niagara; Myers himself was severely wounded, and his men retired in disorder to a second ravine, 200 yards in rear. There they were joined by the 49th, and again advanced with the same result, losing nearly 300 men in a very few minutes. The Americans, after landing several guns, advanced slowly and with great caution, dragging their artillery with them. They were observed, and held in check for some time by a detachment of Royal Artillery, with two guns posted in advance of Niagara. Another division of the enemy being then seen preparing to cross the river on the right of Fort George, the fort was evacuated, and Vincent took up his retreat by the road to Queenston, having destroyed his stores and carried off all his field-guns except the 12-pounder. This line of retreat enabled him during the night and next day to draw in all the garrisons above, and by following the road on the crest of the mountain he avoided the possibility of being harassed by the American squadron, and reached the head of the lake without annoyance on the 31st. So completely did he evade pursuit, that for several days the American general actually continued in a complete state of uncertainty as to his movements, and it was not until the 1st of June that General Winder was sent in pursuit with his own brigade and one regiment of Boyd's in the direction of Burlington. Two days afterwards General Chandler followed with the remainder of Boyd's brigade.

The action had reduced Vincent's regular force by 350 men; most of the militia were at once disbanded, and 500 of them paroled within a few

1. Harvey to Baynes, May 25.

* Glengarry Light Infantry ..	90	Lincoln Militia	100
Royal Newfoundland	40	8th Kings	310
Black Corps	27		

567

Harvey to Baynes, May 29.

Harvey to Baynes, May 29. Capt. Holcroft, R.A., to Gen. De Rottenburg, Aug.

15. Vincent to Prevost, June 2. Vincent to Baynes, June 4.

days by the enemy. His effective force then consisted of 1,807 officers and men, of whom only 131 were militia, and 11 field-guns.*

On the 5th Chandler's division advanced within eight miles of his camp, and drove in the outposts. Its strength was ascertained during the day to be about 3,500 infantry, 250 cavalry and eight field-guns, and as another division of nearly equal force was reported to be advancing to its support, Vincent began to doubt the practicability of maintaining his ground, if warmly assailed. He was accordingly the more readily induced to consent to Harvey's scheme of a night attack. Notwithstanding their recent reverse, his troops were in high spirits and eager to be led against the enemy. All of the conditions favourable to a night attack were fulfilled in a remarkable manner. Harvey reported that "the enemy's camp guards were few and negligent; that his line of encampment was long and broken; that his artillery was feebly supported, and that several of his corps were placed too far in the rear to aid in repelling a blow which might be rapidly struck in the front." The straggling nature of their encampment was due to the fact that they had conveyed their heavy baggage by water, and while protecting it wished at the same time to occupy both roads lying between the lake and the mountain. In addition to these favouring circumstances, the disposition of the inhabitants was decidedly friendly, and a large body of woods extended close to the edge of the enemy's position and served to conceal the advance of the attacking party. This consisted of 704 officers and men carefully selected from the 8th and 49th.† The sentries were surprised and bayoneted, and four of the enemy's guns captured before the gunners had time to fire more than a single round, but some parties of their infantry quickly recovered from their panic, and the position of the assailants being partially disclosed by the light of the camp fires, a very effective fire was opened upon them from the neighbouring heights. Repeated charges, in which heavy loss was sustained, had to be made before these were finally dispersed. Both the American generals and 120 other prisoners were secured, and two of the captured guns with their horses and tumbrils brought off. No less than 213 officers and men were reported killed, wounded, and missing on the part of the British in this action, which did not last more than three-quarters of an hour, but they had inflicted a stunning blow, which put an abrupt end to the enemy's advance. Early next morning the American army began to retreat after

* Return of British Troops at Forty Mile Creek, 30th May, 1813.

Royal Artillery	56
do. do. drivers	43
8th Kings.	382
41st	400
49th	631
Royal Newfoundland Regt.	70
Glengarry Light Infantry.....	61
Provincial Dragoons	41
Coloured Corps	30
Militia	60
1,774	
Since joined from Fort Erie.	
Royal Artillery	8
41st	25
1,807	
Six 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, one 5½ inch howitzer.	
† 8th.....	280
49th.....	424
	704

destroying their heavy baggage, and fell back without a halt for twelve miles, when they met a body of about 1,500 men advancing to their support. On the 8th the British squadron, having three companies of the 8th on board, arrived in sight of the American camp at the Forty Mile Creek, and after throwing a few shot into it, bore away towards the head of the lake to obtain Vincent's co-operation. The latter at once pushed forward his light troops with a few Indians, while the squadron again set sail in the same direction. Three hours later they took possession of the enemy's deserted camp, capturing or destroying all their boats and baggage, and taking about 100 prisoners. The Americans continued their retreat precipitately to their camp at Niagara, persistently harassed by the militia and Indians, and on the following day abandoned Fort Erie, Chippawa, and Queenston, and concentrated their whole force at that place.¹ Nothing of much importance occurred until the 24th of June, when a column of nearly 600 Americans was entirely cut off in the Beechwoods by a small party of the 49th and a body of Caughnawaga Indians. Gradually the lines of investment were drawn closer, until the enemy were virtually confined within the limits of their camp by a force of less than half their numbers, and thrown wholly on the defensive. The manner in which these operations were conducted on the part of the British from the 6th of June until the middle of August was admirable and will bear the closest scrutiny. The American outposts and foraging parties were constantly harassed and cut off, and two very successful raids made into their territory across the river. Neither Vincent nor his successor De Rottenburg can be termed commanders of great skill or talent, but in the person of Harvey, Bisshop and Fitzgibbon they possessed daring and energetic leaders of light troops, and, although the Indians were not very reliable auxiliaries, they served effectually to mask the movements of the regular forces and to strike terror into the enemy. The difficulties of the situation in early summer were very much complicated by the wretched state of the roads, which De Rottenburg characterized as the worst he ever had seen, while the British troops were frequently in absolute distress for want of both clothes and provisions. "The 41st," Captain Fulton wrote to Sir George Prevost on the 18th of June, "are literally naked," and a few days later the 49th are described by him as being "in rags and without shoes." On the eve of the battle of Stony Creek, Vincent was obliged to borrow 500 guineas from a militia officer to buy cattle to feed the army. The Indians very soon became discontented in consequence of the restraints imposed upon them, and their numbers rapidly dwindled away. The Americans brought over several hundred of their own race to fight against them, but after a smart skirmish on the 17th of August most of them seem to have withdrawn from the field by a mutual understanding.

In the meantime the investing force had been increased by the arrival of detachments of the first battalion of the Royals, the 104th, Glengarry Light Infantry, and some troops of the 19th Dragoons, yet the effective strength of all ranks and arms was only 2,290. A return of the force entrenched at Fort George shows an aggregate of 4,587, of whom not less than 1,165 were reported sick. This return apparently does not include volunteers, militia or Indians, of whom there were several hundreds.² A reconnaissance in force, undertaken on the 27th August, accomplished the surprise of all the American outlying pickets, most of whom were taken, and, judging from the alarm and confusion which existed in their camp, might, if it had been followed up by a

1. Vincent to Prevost, June 6. Ibid, June 8. Ibid, June 9. Evans to Harvey, June 9. Vincent to Prevost, June 14.

2. James, Military occurrences.

resolute assault, have resulted in driving them from their last foothold on Canadian soil. However, Sir George Prevost, who was present in person, considered it advisable to wait for the arrival of siege-artillery which the squadron was expected to bring up from Kingston. The appearance of the American squadron on the lake prevented this, and the blockade continued six weeks longer, while one-fourth of the troops on both sides were taken down by fever and dysentery. A distribution state of the centre division, dated Sept. 13th, 1813, including all the troops stationed between Burlington Bay and Long Point, shows 2,784 officers and men fit for duty, and 933 sick. This alarming increase of disease and desertion among his troops induced DeRottenburg to concentrate his troops on the upland between Queenston and Lundy's Lane, but the departure of a large part of the American army at the close of September, in the direction of Kingston, compelled him to move with a considerable detachment to the relief of that place, leaving Vincent in command, with instructions to maintain his position as long as possible, keeping up communications with Proctor's division, which was known to be on the eve of retreat. The sick then exceeded eleven hundred and the work of removing them to the rear taxed the means of transport to the utmost. On the 8th October, information was received of the total defeat of Proctor on the Thames, and fugitives reported the rapid advance of Harrison's victorious army in the direction of Burlington, threatening Vincent's line of retreat. The troops were at once withdrawn from the vicinity of Fort George, destroying the bridges and obstructing the road as they retired. At Burlington, Vincent was joined by the remains of Proctor's army and about 2,600 Indians, of whom two-thirds were women and children. He soon after received instructions to retire to York, the intention being to abandon the whole country west of Kingston. The great difficulty experienced in removing the stores caused this movement to be delayed until the 1st of November, when it was countermanded, and Vincent was directed not to permit the enemy to establish themselves at any point between Burlington and Fort George, and to undertake expeditions to deprive them of the resources of the abandoned district.¹ Early in December, learning that the Americans were ravaging the country and carrying off the loyal inhabitants, he sent forward a very active and efficient officer, Col. John Murray, with a party of 470 men and two field-guns to check them.*

At the Twelve Mile Creek, Murray met and routed a marauding party and promptly decided to advance upon Fort George, which the enemy was reported to be on the point of evacuating. Pushing on through a blinding snowstorm, he found the town of Niagara in flames and the fort abandoned. A few prisoners were taken. The tents of the garrison were found standing, and the guns uninjured, while the works had been so much strengthened during their occupation that they were considered capable of standing a regular siege. Meanwhile, DeRottenburg had been relieved by Sir Gordon Drummond, who at once pushed forward a brigade to Murray's support and planned the reduction of Fort Niagara, whither nearly all the enemy's regular troops had retired. Boats were brought forward from Burlington and

1. Vincent to DeRottenburg, Oct. 11, Oct. 14. Ibid to Prevost, Oct. 18, Oct. 19. DeRottenburg to Vincent, Oct. 23 and 30. Vincent to DeRottenburg, Nov. 15.

* 19th Dragoons.....	20	} Royal Artillery, one 6-pounder, one 5½ inch howitzer.
Provincial Dragoons.....	14	
100 Regt.....	340	
Volunteers.....	20	
Indians.....	70	
	469	

secretly conveyed overland to Queenston. The surprise of the fort was brilliantly accomplished by Col. Murray, on the night of the 19th December, at the head of a body of only 560 men.*

The entire garrison of 420 officers and men was killed or taken, and an enormous quantity of stores of every kind captured. When Murray's success became known, Major-General Riall crossed the river at Lewiston with about 1,000 men,† taking the batteries there with ease, and dispersing a small force which attempted to oppose his progress. On the following day, learning that a body of troops was assembling at Schlosser, Riall advanced and dispersed it, devastating the country as far as that place in retaliation for the destruction of Niagara. The winter had then set in with such severity that further operations were delayed for several days, as the troops were unprovided with fur caps or mitts, and some of them were even without great-coats. Difficulty was also experienced in conveying boats around the Falls, owing to the depth of the snowdrifts. A few regular troops and a large body of militia had, in the meantime, assembled at Black Rock and Buffalo for the protection of the navy yard and some vessels of the lake squadron. On the 28th, Drummond issued orders for the passage of the river on the following night. The force destined for this service consisted of 965 regular infantry under General Riall, two-thirds of whom were to cross below Squaw Island and the remainder, on a preconcerted signal, above Black Rock.‡

The service was recognized as being arduous, owing to the numbers and exasperated feeling of the enemy, and the troops were advised not to waste their fire, but to rely chiefly on the bayonet. A body of 450 militia and Indians were directed to follow in support. Riall succeeded in crossing almost undiscovered, and forced the passage of the bridge over the creek below Black Rock, taking a battery there and dispersing a body of about 800 militia and Indians. The boats, in which the other division consisting of the detachment of the Royals was embarked, ran aground in the shallows opposite the Black Rock, where they were discovered and assailed by a heavy fire of musketry, besides round and grape from their guns planted on the high bluff. Fifty officers and men were killed and wounded before they effected a landing. The battery was then taken in a few minutes and the enemy entirely routed, with very severe loss in the pursuit.†

These successes were accomplished with a regular force of less than 1,000 men, which was described by Drummond as being harassed and disorganized, without a field-train, artificers, engineers, or commissariat. The Americans were not only deprived of their only conquest in Canada, but of their one place of strength upon their own side of the river, together with all their artillery, spare arms, clothing and munitions of war of every kind, and the country

* Grenadier Company Royals	100
Flank Companies 41st	100
100 Regt	350
Royal Artillery	12
	562

Drummond to Prevost, Dec. 19.

‡ 1st Royals	370
8th	240
41st	250
Light Company 89th	55
Grenadiers 100th	50
Militia	50
Indians	400

† 8th, and Light Co. 89th	250
41st, and Grenadiers 100th	250
Royals	400
Militia Volunteers	100

1,000

1. Drummond to Dec. 22, 26, 1813; Jan. 2, 1814.

1,415

was practically deserted as far east as the Genesee. A considerable portion of their lake fleet was destroyed, and Drummond projected without delay the recovery of Detroit and destruction of the remainder. He was prevented in the first instance from carrying this plan into execution by the exhausted state of his troops, and finally by a thaw which rendered the roads impassable.

During the year 1813 a great part of the Niagara district was laid waste and deserted, and very great difficulty was experienced in supplying the troops in the field in consequence. The disloyal element had been pretty thoroughly rooted out of this part of the country, yet Drummond stated that there were many whom it would be necessary to detain in custody, but, he added, "it is but justice to say that by far the greater portion of the inhabitants are well-disposed, and many have on various occasions manifested their loyalty to the service by their actions in the field. Those chiefly who have shown an opposite disposition are such as have from time to time crept into the Province from the neighbouring states and settled on lands purchased from individuals." His views, however, on the employment of the militia, were thus expressed: "I regret that our present circumstances should render it necessary to call upon the yeomanry of the country for their services in the field while their farms must consequently be neglected, especially when produce and provisions of every kind have become very scarce and extravagantly dear, when it is with difficulty the commissariat are able to procure the necessary supplies. These considerations would induce me most unwillingly to dispense with the militia for the domestic services of the militia, if our regular forces here were such as to enable me to do so." With this object he took measures to secure the organization of a battalion of incorporated militia, to consist of 900 men selected by ballot to serve one year.¹

In addition to the troops, the commissariat was compelled to feed 3,000 Indians during the winter, besides many destitute inhabitants, and while the effective force under arms did not much exceed 2,000, between 7,000 and 8,000 rations were issued daily. At one time Drummond even believed that he would be obliged to abandon the whole of the Province west of Kingston from scarcity of provisions. Desertion became very prevalent, especially from Fort Niagara, while disease rendered more than half the garrison of Fort Erie ineffective.

A report addressed to Sir George Prevost, dated the 3rd of July, 1814, by Capt. Martin, R.E., furnishes details respecting the state of the defences on the line of the Niagara. Fort Erie is described as being in a tolerable state of defence, strongly enclosed in rear with palisades, and a small block house commenced to flank the picketing. Three guns were mounted. At Chippawa a line of entrenchments had been thrown up on the left bank of the river, and a redoubt commenced to flank them. At Queenston a redoubt had been completed for 250 men. At Fort Niagara the land front and a splinter-proof had been nearly completed, but the post was not regarded as being tenable if resolutely assailed, and it was only retained because it commanded the mouth of the river. The new work, known as Fort Mississauga, had been constructed during the spring, the palisading and two furnaces finished, and the brick tower commenced. Owing to the want of men, little had been done to strengthen Fort George.

The weekly distribution state of June 22nd, 1814, gives the strength of the right division as follows: At Fort Erie, 146 effective rank and file, Chippawa and dependencies 428, Queenston and dependencies 258, Fort George and dependencies 927, Fort Niagara 578, Long Point and dependencies 294, Burlington 386, York 877. Sickness was so prevalent in the 8th Battalion,

1. Drummond to Lord Bathurst, Jany. 14 and March 20, 1814.

which had been stationed at Chippawa for several months, that the surgeon reported that it must be removed, and on the 27th of June it began its march to York. The health of the battalion of the Royal Scots was scarcely better, yet Prevost stubbornly refused to replace these corps by others more efficient. "I fear you believe the right division much more effective than it is," Drummond wrote to him from Kingston on the 3rd of July. "It is widely scattered, one of the best regiments shut up in Fort Niagara. One regiment is decidedly inefficient, and another expected to be so in case of taking the field." His opinions on the subject of the defence of the frontier had been conveyed in these words to General Riall some time before: "The natural disposition of the forces would be to keep them concentrated in a central position in readiness to act on either flank, but the experience of the last two years shows that such force may be distributed along the frontier without any great risk, and all posts from Fort George to Erie should be occupied. That at Fort Erie should consist of a strong company of infantry, and a party of artillery sufficient to man the 24-pounder in the southern demi-bastion, and may give employment to an invading force for a few days, or act in their rear. Chippawa to be strongly occupied, and a detachment posted between Chippawa and Fort Erie, say at Frenchman's Creek, and a rapid movement made to support the detachment on the right in case of a landing being made above Chippawa. Fort Niagara to be occupied by 500 or 600 men, which may occupy ten times their number. The occupation of Fort George is essential to the defence of Fort Niagara, and the construction of a battery of a few heavy guns to bear on the esplanade of Fort Niagara. In case of a concentration at Burlington, a small detachment should be left in Fort George, which would in turn be protected by Fort Niagara which commands it. A battery at Mississauga Point is highly necessary."

On the withdrawal of the 8th, the 100th took its place at Chippawa and Fort Erie, the 2nd battalion of the 41st was sent to Fort Niagara, and six companies of the Royals and 300 of the Incorporated Militia pushed forward to the support of the 100th. On the night of the 2nd July, the American general, Brown, landed about 5,000 men, in two divisions, above and below Fort Erie, surrounding that post, which surrendered next day with discreditable haste. On the 4th, General Brown advanced within view of the intrenchments on the left bank of the Chippawa, with nine guns and certainly not less than 4,000 men, of whom three-fourths were regular troops. During the afternoon of the same day, having recalled the 8th, General Riall rashly determined to advance and attack his opponent in the level plain beyond the river. His force was officially stated at 1,500 regulars and militia and 300 Indians.* He disposed the three light companies in advance, having the Indians and militia in the woods on their right. The remainder of his troops were formed in three columns with the 8th in reserve. A regiment of American militia was easily routed, and most of the field-officers taken prisoners. The Indians followed the fugitives into the woods and thenceforth were practically out of the fight. Preceded on the right by two light 24-pound guns and a howitzer, and on the left by three 6-pounders, Riall's two weak battalions advanced to the attack. After gaining a temporary advantage, his guns were

* 1st Royals.....	500
8th.....	400
100th.....	450
19th Dragoons.....	} 150
Royal Artillery.....	
Militia.....	

1. Drummond to Riall, March 23, 1814.

silenced and both the 24-pounders disabled by the superior fire of the enemy's artillery, and his infantry was then overwhelmed by the fire of their batteries and the musketry of two brigades, which deployed with great steadiness, and moved slowly forward in line, outflanking it on the left. The disabled guns were removed by the exertions of the 19th Dragoons, and the retreat was covered by the 8th and light infantry, with such firmness that very few even of the wounded were taken prisoners. Riall lost more than 500 men in this disastrous action, of whom 422 belonged to the Royals and 100th. The latter regiment had but four duty officers unhurt at the close of the action.' It is remarkable that he escaped an entire overthrow, and nothing but the extreme caution displayed by the American General in the hour of victory saved him from this. Three days later, finding that the enemy were preparing to bridge the river on his left, Riall abandoned his entrenchments on the Chippawa and retired to Niagara. During the retreat, he was deserted by the whole of the Indians, and most of the militia, who wished to provide for the safety of their families. On the 13th, Riall retreated with 836 officers and men to the Twenty Mile Creek, leaving garrisons in the three forts at the mouth of the Niagara, amounting in the aggregate to 1,554 effectives. It is now known that General Brown based his hopes of further success entirely upon the co-operation of the Lake Ontario fleet, of which he had been assured. On the 13th July he wrote to Commodore Chauncey from Queenston:—"I arrived here on the 10th, as I assured you I would. All accounts agree that the enemy's force in Kingston is very small. Meet me on the shore of Lake Ontario, north of Fort George, with your fleet. I have looked for your fleet anxiously since the 10th. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara and carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed directly to Kingston. I have no doubt there is sufficient means between us to conquer Upper Canada in two months if there is prompt and zealous co-operation." A week elapsed and no sign of Chauncey's vessels was yet to be seen. In the meantime Riall had been reinforced from Burlington, and a thousand militia from the neighbouring country, many of them "fine serviceable fellows," had come into his camp.

As an officer in the American army declared, the whole population was up in arms against the invaders, and never lost an opportunity of annoying and harassing them. Riall pushed forward his advance-guard to the Ten Mile Creek, while his right wing, composed of the Lincoln Militia and Indians, extended from Decew's to Street's Mills on the Niagara above the Falls, interrupting the communications of the American army with Fort Erie. This movement induced General Brown, who had menaced Fort George for several days, to withdraw to Queenston. On the 23rd of July, Sir Gordon Drummond arrived at York, bringing with him 400 of the 89th and 100 of the 104th, who were at once sent on to Fort Niagara. Riall was still watching the enemy at Queenston, with 1,700 regular troops and 1,400 militia and Indians stretching along a front of 20 miles. A small American force occupied Lewiston, where they had established their magazine of supplies. Drummond's first care was to dismiss the greater part of the militia to their homes to harvest their hay, a matter which he regarded as of greater importance than their services in the field. With the object of forcing the enemy from their position by an attack on their base of supplies, Col. Harvey addressed this letter of instructions to Lieut.-Col. Tucker, commanding the garrisons at the mouth of the river:—"Lieut.-Col. Morrison, with 400 of the 89th and the flank companies of the 104th, is sent to you to carry the American batteries near Youngstown. You will draw 200 men from Fort

1. Riall to Drummond, July 6. Drummond to Prevost, July 9.

George and use the whole of the 41st in addition at daybreak on Monday. Major-Gen. Riall will advance to St. Davids and distract their attention by pushing forward the militia and Indians. Lieut.-Gen. Drummond does not wish to risk an engagement on the left bank till the reinforcements arrive. With the 89th, five companies of the 104th, and two-thirds of your garrisons, you will have 1,500 men. Capt. Dobbs will station his vessels so as to prevent the Americans from crossing the river. I am now embarking the troops in the 'Star' and 'Charwell.'" On the next day, however, Gen. Brown retired of his own accord beyond the Chippawa, removing his magazines at the same time to Schlosser. He subsequently stated that his intentions were to relieve his men of all unnecessary baggage and make a rapid movement around his opponent's flank against Burlington Heights.

Upon learning that the American army had retreated, Drummond immediately changed his plan of operations, Col. Pearson, with the light troops of Riall's division, was sent during the night to seize the high ground at Lundy's Lane. Colonel Morrison was instructed to move forward on the right bank of the river with 500 men to Pearson's support, while Tucker on the left. Colonel Scott had also been directed to advance from the Twelve Mile Creek to Lundy's Lane at 3 a.m. with his brigade of 1,200 men, but for some unexplained reason this order was countermanded, and his troops remained in their quarters until the afternoon. Tucker's column reached Lewiston at noon, and a detachment crossed the river there, increasing Morrison's force to about 800. In the meantime General Riall had joined Pearson and assumed command, and shortly before dark he was attacked by the advance of the American army, consisting of about 1,800 men under General Scott, with two guns. As he had been advised not to risk an action, Riall had already begun his retreat when Drummond came up and countermanded the movement. Morrison's detachment soon arrived with two 24-pound guns, increasing the British force on the field to 1,637 of all ranks, and the commanding ground at the junction of the roads was reoccupied. There is no reason to suppose that either commander had the slightest intention of forcing on a general engagement at that late hour, but the action quickly became warmer than they anticipated. An American regiment turned the British left flank, drove back the battalion of incorporated militia, and took more than 100 prisoners, among them General Riall himself. This success encouraged Scott to attack the centre of Drummond's position with renewed vigour, and gradually the entire division exceeding 4,000 men was drawn into action. The British maintained their ground with great tenacity, and several attacks were repelled with loss, but they were finally forced from their position, and their artillery taken. The arrival of Col. Scott's column, after a march of nearly twenty miles, placed them on a more even footing with their antagonists, and after a two hours' struggle they regained the heights, taking two of the enemy's guns, and recovering all but one of their own. By that time the forces engaged on both sides were quite exhausted, a large proportion of the officers, and nearly one-third of the men, killed or wounded. General Brown and Scott were disabled, and the command of the American army devolved on General Ripley, who collected the remains of his army and retired to his camp beyond the Chippawa, leaving his dead and many wounded on the field. Next morning, finding the ground still occupied by the British, and his own force much diminished and disorganized, he abandoned all thought of resuming the conflict, destroyed his spare baggage, and at noon began his retreat to Fort Erie, where his entire division arrived at midnight.¹ As the

1. Drummond to Prevost, July 26, 31. Ripley, Vindication.

bridges over the creeks were destroyed, and Drummond had but a single troop of dragoons, any effective pursuit was impossible. Owing to the delay caused by rebuilding these bridges, and the weakened and exhausted condition of the troops, it was not until the 2nd of August that the British army arrived on the heights opposite Black Rock. In the interval, Ripley had employed the greater part of his force day and night in forming an entrenched camp on the left of Fort Erie, which had itself been very much strengthened. Several additional guns had been mounted, and a stone redoubt constructed at the water's edge in front of the fort. Three armed schooners were anchored at the entrance of the river in such a position as to flank the approaches to the fort, while the batteries at Black Rock enfiladed the river road. Drummond's first object was to expel the Americans from these batteries and occupy Buffalo. Their vessels could then be easily driven from the river, and the garrison would be prevented from drawing supplies and reinforcements from that place. Lieut.-Colonel Tucker was accordingly instructed to cross the river that night with 600 men and perform this service. This detachment found the bridge over the creek below Black Rock destroyed, and the passage contested by a large force. The leading sections were seized by a panic, and the entire column retired hastily to their boats in spite of the efforts of their officers to rally them. Next day the Americans at Black Rock were strongly reinforced, and any repetition of the attack was rendered impracticable.¹ The British general was then forced to rely on his field-guns alone, and a single 18-pound ship gun, but when he attempted to break ground for a battery in a suitable position near the shore, the enemy at once threw nearly their entire force into the woods to drive back the covering party, and a schooner began to cannonade his left flank. Before they were driven in, Colonel Harvey was badly hurt, and 23 officers and men killed and wounded.² This exhibition of energy on the part of the besieged induced Drummond to throw up a traverse, and place abattis before he ventured to mount any guns, and caused a further delay of several days before the batteries could be opened. Unless a large tract of woods was cut down, it was found impossible to select any site for a battery which would not be taken in reverse by the batteries at Black Rock. The garrison daily sent out large parties of riflemen to attack the covering and working parties, and although always repulsed, harassed them very much. On the night of the 12th, Captain Dobbs with a party of seamen having conveyed some boats secretly to Lake Erie, took two of the American schooners and drove the other away, relieving Drummond of a very serious source of annoyance.³ The next day the siege-batteries opened for the first time, and continued the cannonade during the whole of that and the following day, causing, however, very little damage to the works. Forty-five of the garrison were killed or wounded, and a small magazine blown up. This explosion determined the British general to undertake the assault that night, being further encouraged by the reports of deserters that the garrison was much dispirited. He had been reinforced by the Regiment De Watteville, nearly 1,000 strong, before advancing to Fort Erie. This corps, originally Swiss, had of late years been largely recruited with French prisoners of war, who evinced an alarming propensity to desert at every opportunity. The remainder of his force was made up of the remnant of Rial's division, and although they had behaved well since the opening of the siege, Drummond stated that many of his men were actually unfit for service, and that he had but little confidence in them.

1. Tucker to Drummond, Aug. 4. Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 4.
2. Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 8.
3. Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 12, 13.

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The force in Fort Erie was estimated by American authorities at 2,500. The bastions of the fort had been raised, and the ditches deepened. A line of earthworks covered by abattis running southward to the lake and terminating in a redoubt mounting five guns on the summit of a sandhill was completed. The water battery was connected with the fort by a thick rampart of earth about seven feet high, protected in front by formidable abattis extending as far as the centre of the northern face of the fort. These lines enclosed an area of about fifteen acres, and were armed with twenty guns. Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, with a column headed by a party of the 8th, followed by the Regiment De Watteville and the light companies of the 89th and 100th, was directed to attack the extreme left of this position. In order to do this he was obliged to march about fourteen miles, the last six being through heavy sand, and his men were much exhausted when they arrived at their station. To the centre column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond, numbering less than 300 men, was assigned the difficult task of attacking the fort itself, while the third consisting of the 103rd Regiment, under Colonel Scott, was instructed to escalate the line of entrenchments between the fort and the river. All these attacks were to be made simultaneously on the discharge of two rockets from the right.* Fischer's column found the line of abattis impenetrable, but the forlorn hope gained a foothold in the enemy's camp by wading out into the lake. The Regiment De Watteville gave way almost at once, bearing down all the detachments behind them in the haste of their flight. The advance party was then easily killed or taken. Within a quarter of an hour this attack was completely repulsed, and the besieged were free to send reinforcements to other parts of their works. From some unexplained cause, the other two columns did not move until the contest on the left was nearly ended. Colonel Scott's column was unable to penetrate the abattis, and after enduring a terrible fire for nearly half an hour with the greatest heroism, finally retreated, having lost its commander, ten other officers, and nearly half its number killed or wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond's attack was executed with even greater determination, and for a time was partially successful. The north-western bastion was carried, and several attempts of the garrison to recover it were repelled. As this work was separated from the rest of the fort by an inner line of entrenchments and abattis, this small party was unable to improve its advantage, and

* Instructions for assault on Fort Erie, 14th Aug., 1814.

"The right column, Lieut.-Col. Fischer, is to consist of volunteers of the King's Regiment, the light companies of the 89th and 100th, 6 companies of the Regiment De Watteville, one officer and twelve men of the Royal Artillery, a rocketeer with a couple of twelve pound rockets, and Captain Eustace's picket of cavalry. Capt. Powell, D.A.Q.M., will conduct this column, which is to attack the left of the enemy's position.

"The centre column, Lieut.-Col. Drummond, will consist of the flank companies of the 41st and 100th; marines, 50; seamen, 90; Royal Artillery, one officer and twelve men. Capt. Barney, 89th, will guide this column, which is to attack the fort.

"The left column, Col. Scott, will consist of the 103rd Regiment. Capt. Elliott, D.Q.M.G., will conduct this column, which will attack the right of the enemy's position towards the lake, and endeavour to penetrate it by the openings betwixt the fort and entrenchments, using the short ladders at the same time to pass the entrenchments, which are reported only to be defended by the U. S. 9th Regiment, 250 strong.

"The infantry pickets on Buck's Road will be pushed forward on that road, and attack the enemy's picket on that road. Lieut.-Col. Nichol, Q.M.G. of Militia, will guide that column. The rest of the troops, viz., 1st Battalion Royals, the remainder of the Regiment De Watteville, Glengarry Light Infantry, and militia will remain in reserve under Lieut.-Col. Tucker, and will be posted on the ground at present occupied by our pickets and covering parties, a squadron of the 19th Light Dragoons in the ravine in rear of the battery nearest the advance, ready to receive charge of the prisoners, and conduct them to the rear. The enemy's force does not exceed 1,500 men, and is represented as much dispirited. The Lieut.-General most strongly recommends a free use of the bayonet."

was ultimately almost annihilated by an explosion. The failure of the assault was evidently due to the want of simultaneous action combined with shameful misconduct on the part of one regiment. The total loss exceeded 900. Six battalions were so much reduced as to be unable to keep the field. General Drummond was therefore obliged to suspend any further active operations until the arrival of the 6th and 82nd Regiments placed him again on nearly an equal footing with the enemy in point of numbers.¹ Two new siege batteries were then commenced, and every attempt of the garrison to interrupt the working parties repelled with ease. The besieged were equally active constructing in new batteries, breastworks and traverses, and laying mines and fougasses. The prosecution of the siege was next delayed by heavy falls of rain, which filled the trenches and caused so much sickness that as early as the 8th of September the British General began to contemplate a retreat. His movements were hampered at once by want of siege-artillery, ammunition and provisions. The troops were without tents or blankets, and during the second week in September it rained incessantly. Selecting a day when the disaffected Regiment De Watteville was known to be on duty in the trenches, Gen. Brown, who had assumed command of the garrison, made a vigorous sortie with 3,000 men. Two hundred of that despicable corps surrendered almost without firing a shot. The batteries were taken and some of the guns disabled. Instead of retiring when this was accomplished, the Americans lingered until they were attacked by the brigade next for support, and driven back to their lines, leaving behind them 250 prisoners and the same number of killed and wounded. Drummond continued to hold his position until the 21st, when finding his camp converted into a mere lake in the midst of dense woods, and his force reduced to 2,000 effectives, while that of his adversary was supposed to be more than double that number, and a large body of fresh troops was threatening his line of communications from Lewiston, he determined to retire as far as Chippawa.²

Active operations practically terminated here, though the American army, reinforced to 8,000 men, menaced him with an attack for more than a month, and occupied Fort Erie until the 5th of November.

Although not unchequered by disaster, and even in a few instances tainted with disgrace, on the whole these campaigns must ever hold an honourable place in the annals of the British army in America. The part borne in them by the Canadian Militia, particularly the incorporated battalion and the Glengary Light Infantry was equally creditable.

1. Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 15, 18, 21, 24.

2. Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 27, 30; Sept. 2, 5, 11, 14, 18, 24, 28; Oct. 2.

Summary of Proceedings of the Annual General Meeting

HELD ON THE 26TH OF JANUARY, 1891.

Lt.-Col. W. D. Otter, D.A.G., President, in the Chair.

There was a good attendance of members, not of local officers only, but representatives of the forces all over the Dominion. Amongst those present were Lieut.-Col. Dawson, Lieut.-Col. Scoble (Winnipeg), Lieut.-Col. Macdonald (Guelph), Lieut.-Col. Hamilton, Mr. Sheriff Mowat, Majors Mason, Mead, McSpadden, and Sankey, Capts. Harkom (Richmond, Que.), Shields, Mutton, Manley, Murray, Brown, Trotter, Symons, Stinson, Eliot, Mr. Crean, Capt. McGee, Messrs. K. Miller, Fleming, etc., etc., Myles (Treasurer) and Irving (Secretary.)

The Secretary presented the annual report, which reads as follows:—

In presenting the first annual report of the Canadian Military Institute the committee begs, as briefly as possible, to give a short history of its formation.

On the 14th January, 1890, a meeting of a number of officers was held for the purpose of forming a military club; a committee appointed to elaborate the idea reported to a general meeting on the 3rd March that it recommended the following scheme:—That a joint stock company, to be known as the Military Institute Company of Toronto (limited), with a capital stock of \$3,000, should be organized for the promotion of military art, science, etc., etc.; and in connection with this incorporated company there should be a membership club, to be called the Canadian Military Institute, the fees to be fixed at as low a rate as possible. This scheme, together with the constitution and by-laws submitted, was adopted, the promoters having been most successful in obtaining the necessary subscription for stock to warrant a beginning being made.

Membership.—The efforts put forward by the organizers have met with a great deal of encouragement from officers, especially from non-residents. In the original scheme, it was confidently hoped that 100 resident and 50 non-resident members would be the maximum number that could be calculated on. On the 31st December 162 residents and 122 non-residents had been elected as members; the committee regrets that it was found necessary to enforce the constitution in respect of some nine members, who having failed to pay the fees were removed from the list.

The following statement shows how the membership of the Institute is made up, and what a firm hold the organization has already taken upon the officers of the force in all parts of the country:—

H. Q. and District Staff.....	7	Cape Mounted Rifles	1
R. M. C. Staff.....	3	R. M. C. Graduates.....	3
Imperial Service.....	8	York Militia.....	7
Imperial Volunteers.....	2	Toronto Naval Brigade.....	1
CAVALRY.			
Gov. Gen. Body Guard.....	13	3rd Regiment.....	1
1st Regiment.....	1	6th Regiment.....	1
2nd Regiment.....	1	Queen's Own Can. Hussars.....	2
ARTILLERY.			
1st Brigade Field Artillery.....	3	Toronto Field Battery.....	7
Hamilton Field Battery.....	3	British Columbia Br. Gar. Art.....	1
Welland Canal Field Battery.....	1	Toronto Garrison Battery.....	2
INFANTRY.			
Infantry School Corps.....	6	35th Battalion.....	4
Gov. Gen. Foot Guards.....	8	36th Battalion.....	4
1st Prince of Wales Regt.....	1	37th Battalion.....	1
2nd Queen's Own Rifles.....	46	38th Dufferin Rifles.....	6
3rd Victoria Rifles.....	3	39th Battalion.....	2
5th Royal Scots.....	1	40th Battalion.....	1
6th Fusiliers.....	1	43rd Battalion.....	1
7th Fusiliers.....	15	44th Battalion.....	5
10th Royal Grenadiers.....	31	45th Battalion.....	2
12th York Rangers.....	22	49th Battalion.....	1
13th Battalion.....	9	54th Battalion.....	1
14th Battalion.....	1	57th Battalion.....	5
15th Battalion.....	1	59th Battalion.....	1
19th Battalion.....	2	77th Battalion.....	5
20th Battalion.....	4	90th Battalion.....	1
22nd Battalion.....	6	96th Battalion.....	1
25th Battalion.....	3		
26th Battalion.....	1		
27th Battalion.....	1		
28th Battalion.....	1		
30th Battalion.....	2		
31st Battalion.....	5		
32nd Battalion.....	8		
33rd Battalion.....	1		
34th Battalion.....	2		
	4		
		Total.....	293
		Resident.....	162
		Non-resident.....	122
			284
		Struck off.....	9
		Grand Total.....	293

Finances.—The receipts for the nine months from members' fees, steward's departments, etc., amount to \$2,130.13. The expenses, including preliminary disbursements connected with organization, were \$1,956.84, including a dividend of 6 per cent. paid the Military Institute Company (Ltd.), leaving a cash balance of \$173.29.

From the statement of assets and liabilities prepared by the auditors, there is an excess of assets over liabilities of \$455.15.

Library, etc.—To further the objects of the Institute the committee subscribed for the leading English, American and Canadian military papers, the journal of the Royal United Service Institution, the leading Toronto, American and Canadian publications, including illustrated papers and magazines. The library of the late Militia Institute, numbering about 200 volumes of a military nature, has been transferred to the Institute; this library has also been largely augmented by presentations from members. (See Appendix A.)

Lectures.—The Institute has furnished information on military art and Canadian military history by a series of lectures. Major-Gen. Sir F. Middleton, Major Mayne, Lieut.-Col. Irwin, Maj.-Gen. Cameron, Major Sankey and Lieut.-Col. W. E. O'Brien, have during the past year kindly assisted the Institute by delivering lectures. At the end of the series it is intended that the lectures be printed and distributed amongst the members. Lieut.-Col. R. Z. Rogers and Capt. Cruikshank will contribute two most valuable papers during the present year. In conclusion the committee feels that it may, without doubt, congratulate the members of the Institute on the general success and the pecuniary results of its first year.

The report was unanimously adopted.

On the motion of Col. Scoble, seconded by Capt. Manley, it was resolved that the thanks of the meeting be accorded to Lieut.-Col. Otter and the committee for their services during the past year.

When general business came to be considered Major Sankey advocated the enlargement of the premises and the addition of a billiard room to the Institute.

Col. Scoble, speaking on behalf of the non-resident members, thought it was most desirable that the Institute should be made permanent, and the only way to secure permanency was to create an active interest in its work, and to distribute from time to time copies of the lectures delivered here. He strongly advocated the adoption of this course before incurring expenditure in other directions.

It was resolved, on the motion of Col. Hamilton, that both the suggestions with reference to the enlargement of the premises and the printing of the lectures be referred to the incoming committee, the latter to have preference.

On the motion of Mr. Irving, seconded by Mr. A. B. Lee, a vote of thanks was accorded to the Canadian Militia Gazette and the Press of Toronto for their kindness in assisting the Institute by publishing the lectures and reports of meetings.

Upon the question of the election of president being introduced Col. Otter stated that he would be unable owing to pressure of other duties to continue the presidency for another year. He had, however, no intention of withdrawing his interest and influence from the Institute, and his support could always be depended on to promote its welfare. Col. Grasett, the vice-president, was also a busy man, and he would not consent to re-election.

Major Mead, Capt. Manley, Major McSpadden and Major Mason requested Col. Otter to reconsider his decision, but while he promised the Institute his warmest sympathy and support he adhered to his determination to retire from the presidency.

The election of officers for the ensuing year then took place, with the result as printed on the cover.

APPENDIX A.

DONATIONS TO THE LIBRARY.

- Militia Reports, 1867 to 1890; Col. Walker Powell, A. G.
 Archives, Canadian, 1882 to 1890; Capt. A. L. Jarvis.
 U. S. Military Institute Journal; Major Nickerson, U. S. A.
 U. S. Ordnance Bureau Report, 1889; Brig.-General S. Benèt, U. S. A.
 R. United Service Institute, proceedings of; The Council.
 Militia Lists; Lieut.-Col. J. McPherson, D. of S.
 Militia Lists; Lieut.-Col. A. H. Macdonald.
 Reconnaissance and Scouting, Baden-Powell; Col. Sir C. S. Gzowski.
 Canadian Company Drill, Capt. MacDougall; The author.
 Rank, Badges and Dates of H. M. Army and Navy; Lt.-Col. G. D. Dawson.
 Rifle Exercises, Sgt.-Maj. Athawes; Capt. J. J. Stuart.
 Records of 8th Royal Rifles; Capt. E. F. Würtele.
 The Nation in Arms, Baron von der Goetz; Mr. Robert Myles.
 Waterloo Roll-Call, Dalton; Mr. Robert Myles.
 Officers' Manual in the Field (2 vols.), 1798; Lt.-Col T. C. Scoble.
 The War in France and Belgium in 1815, Capt. W. Siborne; Lt.-Col. T. C. Scoble.
- Army Lists, 1808 to 1847; Capt. G. P. Eliot.
 Army List, 1848; Mr. L. H. Irving.
 Infantry Fire Tactics; Major C. B. Mayne, R. E.
 Battle of Queenston Heights; Capt. J. T. Symons.
 U. S. Ordnance Bureau Reports, 1879-1887; Mr. L. H. Irving.
 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War; Capt. G. P. Eliot.
 U. S. Army and Navy Publications; Major J. M. Delamere.
 Crests and Badges of H. M. Army; Hart & Co'y.
 Dominion Rifle Association Report; The Council.
 Ontario Rifle Association Report; The Council.
 Calcutta Volunteer Rifles Report; Mr. J. P. Pringle.
 Commission Issued by the C. in C. of the N. W. Army in Patriotic Service
 in Upper Canada, 1837; Mr. Casimir Dickson.
 Specification in Improvements in Magazine Rifles, etc.; Capt. C. Greville-
 Harston.
- National Rifle Association Report, 1890; Capt. C. Greville-Harston.
 Rogers' Rangers, List of Officers, 1779; Mr. Douglas Brymner.
 Army Lists, Old;
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| Mutiny Act, 1816 and 1821;
Regulations and Orders for Army, 1839;
Staff College, Sandhurst, 1863;
Bible used by Queen's Rangers, 1773; | } | Mr. Amilius Jarvis. |
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- Militia Lists; Lt.-Col. F. C. Denison.
 Militia Lists, Old; Major A. G. Lee.

