


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# LETTER,

To the Author of an

## EXAMINATION

OFTHE

## PRINCIPLES;

And an Engury into the

Conduct of the Two B-Rs:

In which is proved,

By indisputable Facts of FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS.

That the Two B—— as are true Guardians to these Kingdoms; have done every Thing in their Power, to retrieve what was lost in a late Administration; that they have already recovered more than could probably be expected; and are therefore falsly accused by the said Latter Writer.


Beneald Their Feet, pale En ve bitet ber Chain, and Joshy Descoud miets ber Sting in vain. Sie John Braumont.

The SECOND EDITION.

#### LONDON.

Printed for G. Kelth, in Merser's Chapel, Cheapfide; and fold by the Booksellers of Lenden and Westminster, MDEGELIX.

( Price One Shilling )





A

### LETTER

To the Author of an

#### EXAMINATION

OF THE

PRINCIPLES, &c. &c.

SIR,



Doubt not but you are much pleased with your late Ferformance, as it has been greedily received, by Numbers of unwary and discontented People of all Ranks;

for Detraction, how unthriving a Diet soever it is, will always be a standing Dish, and never want Guests, with keen Appe-B tites, tites, to devour it. Curiofity will make fuch Works vendible to many, but few Mon of Judgment and Equity will rifque, their Approbation of them, till the Vendity of that Misconduct or Male-Administration charged therein, shall be, by creditable and concurring Testimonies, confirmed.

I should congratulate you fincerely upon that Satisfaction, which every fine Author, and indeed every foolish Scribbler must indulge, when he appears in Publick, and his Writings are honour'd with that favourable Reception, which yours would flatter us they have met with, if you had not been erroneous in the very effential Part, that is, Truth itself; wherein, you are greatly deficient in those few Facts you affert; and these are so sophisticated with your own Suppositions, that if there is any solid Grain in the Mass of your Allegations, it cannot be fifted by any indifferent Persons from the Chaff; as none, but the Two B-rs, whom you charge, can be the Persons who know if they are true or fallen and of their works were

of you had been furnished with Candour, as well as Truth, I would not only have applauded the Eloquence of your Performance, but also the Importance of your

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your Discoveries; notwithstanding the great Sorrow and Uneafiness it would have given me, to think that this happy Illand, for which all its Inhabitants ought to have the highest Esteem, should be deceived, and plunged into irretrievable Ruin by its own Guardians; but, as you have not really Copied the Face of the Truth to the Life, or have, thro' an Extremity in Proportions, distorted the Features of it, I must rather commiserate, than congratulate you upon the Execution of your Work; and doubt not, in the least, but, whenever you shall grow to Fortunate as to be relieved out of your Prejudices, and to consider these Affairs with Temper and Impartiality, that then, you will inwardly feel, at least, if not outwardly express, some Sentiments of Remorfe or Compunction, for the Disturbance and Contention you have attempted to raile, and unfeignedly repent that you ever was an Instrument to foment Factions, and give Occasion for any Domestic Feuds and Animolities in this Realm, settled as it now is, in a State of Tranquility; by blafting and bespattering the Characters of two fuch eminent Members in the Admini-Aration thereof. they to summonly the frients of and

Whoever you are, Sir, and what your Principles, or what your Ends, by this Enquiry into the Conduct of those Ministers, I am utterly a Stranger; and will not, after your Example, set my Invention to hard Labour, in beating out such difingenuous Suppositions and Motives for your Conduct, as you have done for theirs; but will be so charitable as to believe, as in one Place you fay, That you are a fincere Friend, and Well-wisher to the Royal Family now reigning, and to your Country; notwithstanding that, by the Air of that Language you use upon this Topic, one might be inclined to suspect your Sincerity. But this, I can affure you, whatever Friend you are to Kand Country, that your Performance against the Two B—rs can only serve the Jacobite Party; who are ever waiting to keep their hungry Hopes from starving, for fuch Bones of Contention. Their crafty Ring leaders know how to convert all manner of Divisions, that in any Shape may arise in the Government, to the Nourishment of their feeble and finking Cause; and how to revive, by these intestine Discontents the drooping Spirits of their bigotted and inconfiderate Followers; of which our foreign Enemies, in the End, are always fure to reap the Advantage:

And to this want of Unanimity, to these Domestic Divisions and Circumventions it is intirely owing, that the late War has proved so unsuccessful; and not to the Misconduct of Two B——rs, as you would very unjustly persuade us.

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Not only our Neighbouring Nations, but all the World are surpris'd, that neither Example nor Experience can eradicate that malignant Humour in us, of being ever restless, impatient, and unsatisfied with one another; that we can neither be sensible of own Prosperity, or never content with it; but still unhappy in the midst of Happinels. Are not Numbers of this Nation continually misled by deceitful Prospects, Pretentions and Prepossessions, even sometimes so fatally far, as to renounce their Duty and Allegiance, what they owe to their King, their Country, to their Family, Posterity and Themfelves; of which we often see many private and publick Instances of the greatest Calamity? So that it may be no great Master-piece in you, Sir, to please a few or many fuch People, with your Enquiry into the Conduct of the Two B-rs, especially as such Part of the People were already prejudiced against the Peace. But this Prejudice was the spurious Issue of Ignorance

Ignorance or Inconsideration. It was no where nourish'd, I say, where there was a due Intelligence acquir'd of the State and Situation of Affairs; where there was a sufficient Knowledge of the Powers we had to cope with, and how long they had labour'd to deprive us, and our Allies, of that Power and Influence we formerly had; for we most not think our Enemies are such a Flock of Sheep as to be now driven where we please. Our present State therefore, in these, and such like Lights consider'd, we shall easily discover which of the two Conditions were preferable to continue a War not so successful as would answer the End, or make a Peace not altogether so Beneficial as we could wish; since it may possibly be, that as we stood not upon such advantageous Ground as would enable us to infift, in every Respect, upon our own Terms, we might be obliged to accept of fuch a Peace, as we have, to prevent a whole Torrent of Powers from over-whelming us; and in this Case, a scandalous War would have been more dishonourable, than even a Peace that had been fo.

It is in like Manner rediculous, when our little Coffee House Politicians exclaim in your Dialect, against an unsuccessful War as te

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War, by comparing our Engagements Abroad, in the former, with those in latter Times, and concluding with you, as the English Arms, under Edward III, and Henry V. as well as several other ancient and modern Heroes, were Victorious, and as they are not so now, so consequently. that all our Disappointments must be owing to our Ministers; never thinking how the State of Affairs Abroad have changed, how greatly our Enemies have grown in Power, and how universally Schemes, Companies and Corporations have been fram'd to deprive us of, or at least, Share with us, and our Allies, in the naval Power and Commerce we have fo long enjoy'd, and to which we are fo justly intitled.

But to render these Particulars more Maniscit, and set them in a clear Light, I will transiently recite a sew Facts of the Transactions and Endeavours that have been used for those Purposes, these last Twenty Years, before the War broke out; and as they are Facts universally known to be true, they are less liable to be disputed: It is but of late, that the French and Northern Powers have nourish'd any Emulation in Naval Concerns. England and Holland boasted justly of their Maritime

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time Power, and the House of Austria was our faithful Ally, to make Divertions by Land on any Emergency. In this Posture of Affairs, the French suspected themselves to be never secure of their Plantations Abroad, and little Commerce they had, for they had too often experienced what the united Sea Powers of England and Holland could do in this respect: And, our Northern Neighbours, did not think to engage too much in their savourite Naval Project, so long as this well calculated Power did subsist: Therefore, it was, on all Quarters resolved upon, to take all Opportunities to destory, or at least reduce this Power, that they might come in for a Share of the Commerce; and we thus enfeabled, it was apprehended to be no difficult Matter to obtain advantageous Settlements in Foreign Parts; And this, Sir, is, and has been for Years, the real Intentions of all our Neighbours and for no other Reason than this, did they involve us in the War, of which fome were Actors, and others Spectators and the last did not chuse to assist us, tho pretended Friends, and that, for the same Reason that the first did act. mide with my

To compleat this sayourite Scheme, which all Nations and Powers were so fond

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fond of, and which the French Emissaries artfully and industriously promoted in all Corners of the World, it was necessary to create a fort of Jealousy between England and Holland; and several Turns of Affairs ferving for this Purpose effectually, they did bring the major Part of the States General over from the natural Interest of Great Britain, into that of France; for they had already experienced sufficiently in Queen Ann's War, that it would be in vain to compleat the Commercial Plan. altho' in a Manner united with Spain, in case the Dutch was in our Interest. the World is sensible how well France succeeded in this Undertaking; for never would the late War have been so unsuccessful, if the Dutch had performed their Duty; which, for the Sake of their own natural Interest, and the Obligations they were under by folemn Treaties, they ought to have done. caldu than this, and

Of this, Sir, you do not vouchfase to mention so much as one single Word; but the Web that is spun out of your Political Brains is very transparent, for we may plainly see thro it, that if you had entered into these known Truths, you would not have been able to establish the Doctrine of your Chimerical Conceits against

world knows, what strong Efforts and warm Solicitations they both made, to bring those deluded States to a just Sense of their Duty they owed themselves, in the Preservation and Desence of their Liberties and Properties; and it will hardly ever be credited by Posterity, that all the Intreaties made to that effect, could not avail with those corrupt Governors.

Tacle Facts, Sir, are so well known, and the Negotiations at the Hague on this Head, are so publick, that they alone would be sufficient to clear the Two B—rs from your Supposition, that, They aimed at nothing else but to ruin the War.

However, those Efforts of the Two B—rs were not altogether ineffectual, for they so awakened the People in Holland, that they very justly rescued the Administration out of the Hands of those corrupted Magistrates, and put it into those of their true and natural Patriot, the P— of O——; and this single Event, in which the Two B—rs had so eminent a Share, and such a visible Instrucce, is conspicuously pregnant with so many promising Prospects of Advantage, that

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we are likely, in the Space of a few Years, to retrieve and fettle, upon a more lasting Basis, whatever we have lost by the late War.

I beg, Sir, for the Sake of com-mon Justice, make yourfell acquainted with the Crisis of this great Affair; then you will find, that we are indebted for this figual and important Revolution, in a very confiderable Degree, to these Two B-rs: For never would the People of Holland have fettled their Government, in the hopeful Hands they actually have done, if they had not been spirited thereto, by the constant Solicitations which the Two B-rs caused to be made, in the most pathetic and perswasive Manner to the States General, to exert themselves, and act their Part heartily in the Common Caule, which was now become dangerous to the last Degree. And, furely these Etform are far from ruining a War.

Here in England, the French play'd a Game quite different from that in Holland, or elsewhere, They lult'd the late Sir R— w— into pacific Measures, and the Hypocrify, or if you please, the outward pacific Disposition of Cardinal Fleury, was too specious, too plausible,

and too fashionable to be left unimitated in good Earnest by him. The first Fraits of this Pacific Plan, which he, by the foft Sophistry, or fallacious Arguments of French Emissaries, was persuaded into, was the Treaty of Hanover, against Spain, and the Emperor Charles VI. This Treaty was succeeded by that of Sevil, to make Don Carlos King of Naples and Sicily; and then in 1734, a Neutrality was advised, when the Emperor was at War with France; for Cardinal Fleury eafily persuaded Sir R What France was at Peace with all the World. even in the midst of a bloody War. By this Means France was strengthened, by the Acquisition of Lorrain and Bar; and thus he labour'd for Twenty successive Years, to aggradize the French King, at the Expence; and to the Destruction of our old and natural Ally the House of Austria, at a Time when our Circumstances and Safety required to affist, with our utmost Power, that August House; not to mention the folemn Treatife? whereby we were obliged to to do. \*\* \*\* The forest in the first from the think of the second

Here you observe, that our natural Enemies had gained considerable Power; at the Expence of our natural Allies, by the former M——rs Misconduct; where-

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hereby by the Situation of Affairs wearing quite another Aspect, consequently gave also another Face to the succeeding War, in the Course or Conclusion whereof, the Two B——rs cannot justly be accused, because they have not only performed all that was in their Power to retrieve what was lost in their Predecessors Administration, but have actually already retrieved some Part of it, and I dare venture to assure you, that if they had not gained Ground in this respect, we should as yet, not have been able to obtain any Peace; as will hereaster more evidently appear.

The State Locusts, or Emissaries of France, were not fatisfied that they had tutor'd Sir R- W- in Publick Affairs, to their Hearts Content, but they must also have a Hand in the Family Affairs, which concerned these Kingdoms; and Sir R -- W -- was weak enough to be intirely sway'd by them in these: For as foon as there feem'd to be a Probability that the present King of Pressia might be married to our Pance is Royal, then they considered that by these Means the two Houses mig't be in such a Manner cemented, and their Interest or Power fo strengthened, as to overthrow the whole Scheme they were labouring at: There-

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As thus the Marriage between P and the P——is R—— was froitrated, and the P-s must be wedded for their Purposes; our wife M-was at once advised to marry her to the Pof O-, because it would no where ferve any better Ends than in Holland. They had preached up all the Sweetness of Power and Grandeur, of which all Men are fond, to their Party in the Senate at the Hague; and, as they once had obtained Power, they adviced them to keep it at any Rate; whereby having instill'd a Jealoufy in the Faction they had won over of the P of O it was very easy to foment and encrease it, by frightening them with Apprehenfions of his near and potent Father-in Law. How much such Infinuations have ferved the French Cause, and how much the Common Cause has suffer'd by their finister Artifices, I need not repeat here, it being obvious to all the World. But God be thanked, the Scene, beyond their Power to prevent it, is changed for the better;

better; the Post of O, inflead of being curbed and restrained to that Scantling of Power that was endeavoured by the Frenchised Partizant, is at the Head of Affairs; and we want nothing but the hearty Union of ourselves with him, and then we shall reap the salatary Consequences thereof.

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As foon as the French had obtained Lorrain and Bar; Don Carles was fottled upon the Throne of Naples and Sicily; and nothing was to be got more in the Emperor Charles the VIth's Life Time; then, they promoted a Party Cabal at the Courts of Vienna and Peterfourg; where nothing cou'd ferve their Purpose so hopefolly as a War with the Turks; and the Emperor was weak enough, to break that Peace with them which was not then expir'd. But this Stroke of French Policy, was calculated for no other End than to weaken Rill more the House of Austria, and particularly in that Part of the World from whence came those brave Fellows, the Pandours, who are the Terror of the French; and how well our Enemies fuccocded in this Point, is but too well known to all the World; for by this very Project, the House of Auftria loft very neat two Kingdoms, which, by the Treaty of Bel-731,30 grade. which, with those in *Italy*, made four in Number; and this, within the Space of Eight Years Time.

The Peace with the Turks was huddled up under French Mediation, which advised the Imperial Troops to be disbanded, and, in short, the whole army to be destroy'd; for they made the Court of Vienna believe, with their delusive or superficial Guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, that there never wou'd be any more Occasion for Military Men; and this also was not unpalatably fwallowed down by the Imperial Ministry, such Trust and Confidence it reposed in them, notwithstanding the disingaged, and more penetrating Standers-by, did plainly discern, that the French acted most disingenuously, and by their plaufible Pretentions, obtruded the utmost Impositions in this Matter, on Behalf of the Emperor. The Pope's Nuncio, then at the Court of Vienna, was very much exasperated at these their base juggling Tricks, and very zealoufly inveigh'd against the most Unchristian Proceedings of those that call themselves, " Most-Christian People; infisting, that " by their deceitful and enfnaring Mana-" gement, they had, to the great Detriment

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Manariment " of Christendom, sacrificed the Austrian "Terretories to a Pack of Insidels and Barbarians, only for their own wicked private Ends." Which Expressions did so enrage the M——is of M——x, and made such an Ebulition of his French Blood, that he laid violent Hands on poor Nuncio, and can'd him in the Drawing-Room before the Emperor's Face.

Thus far they proceeded, during the Emperor's Life; but as they cou'd advance no further, his Death became necessary to compleat the Business they had in Hand. The Emperor soon after, within a few Months, did actually die; which, to me, is very remarkable, that this Monarch shou'd so complaisantly make his Departure out of this Life, just at the Time it was wish'd for, to perfect the Schemes they had concerted,

But it is publickly known, that this Monarch was poison'd with Aqua Tustana; and that his Favorite Page, a Spaniard by Birth, to whom he bequeathed a considerable Legacy, did commit this most horrid and villanous Action. What Inducements he had, or by whose Instigation it was perform'd, I am not able to inform you, but it is best known to those Macgistrates

gistrates of Milan, who took his Deposition, or Confession, a short Time, before his Death, of this hellish and inhuman Deed; which he proved, and corroborated by Letters and other Papers of his Confederates.

The whole Proceedings of his Examination, &c. were transmitted to Vicina, and I heartily wish, that Court wou'd publish this Tragical History, with every individual Circumstance, that the whole World might be convinced, and behold with Horror and Indignation, who it was that thus treacherously conspired the Death of that most clement and virtuous Prince.

Thus, Sir, you see at one View, what our Neighbours have been at; that they have gained, by leading Sir R William for unseasonably into pacific Dispositions; more Mischief to us, than all the united Forces of France were able to do in twenty Years Time; and it is without dispute, to the Errors and Mistakes of the said late Minister owing that the War has not been so successful, as we could wish. But as under those manifest Disadvantages, the Two B recover what was lost; it is therefore unreasonable Injustice

to Charge the Two Barrs with the Inadvertancies of another Man. But to proceed to some other Particulars.

First, Sir, I will show you more distinctly, how you have been misinformed in, or have misrepresented, the Conduct of the Two B——rs in our Transactions Abroad.

Secondly, I will make it appear, that they have done more than in moral Probability could be expected; under our prefent Circumstances.

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of the rest of the city of the following the contractions of the contraction of the contractions of the contraction of the contractions of the contractions of the contractions of the con Lastly, How the Advantages they have actually obtained, many be improved, to retrieve and recover that we had lost, by the Management of the late M and if you, Sir, to these healing and salutary Endeavours, wherein the Concord and Prosperity of the Nation is so deeply concern'd, will join your great and able Talents, instead of employing them to promote Murmurs, and multiply Malecontents you may, in some Degree, Rival the B-rs themselves in Glory, those illustrious Gemini, that are always thining, but never at rest, till you become at last, both Castor and Pollux too. for it is increber with a black of it is the

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First then, As soon as the Emperor was dead, all Parts, at least France and Spain, were feemingly in Suspence for a Time, before any Alliance was concluded with P——a and B——a; and P——a was the first that opened the Scene, with a Demand of several Dukedomes in S-a; however, this Monarch was, as yet, a Stranger to his Victories; and even those great Masters of all crooked Conduct, the collusive French did not chuse to engage too closely, or engraft themselves, till they faw those hopeful Blossoms of his Military Power, which promised to Crown the Progress thereof, with the Fruits of Success. In these Circumstances, the Court of B—n was rather inclin'd to a Composition, and to Proposals extreamly favourable to the House of Austria; and particular Advantages for the Common Cause were actually offered, but were rejected at the Courts of V-a and L-n. Upon what Account these Proposals were difregarded, I will not take upon me to resolve: But this I can say, That the Two B-rs, to my certain Knowledge, did every Thing in their Power, who were not then at the Head of Affairs, to perserve the K— of P——a in our Interest. And it always has been the favourite Scheme of the Two B——rs, to restore mr o. A tradit dans it south it south

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good Harmony with that most potent M—h who is so nearly in Blood allied to us; and that this is the most advantageous Interest we can cultivate, for the good of the Common Cause, and our own Preservation, will appear undeniable at the first View.

But as this was not brought to pass, which was absolutely owing to the Misconduct of former M-rs; and notwithstanding the ill Success of Affairs the two B \_\_\_\_rs had manifestly no other Desire than to render the War victorious. advised, by all Means, that it should be endeavour'd to divert his P- Mfrom making any further Progress, who was now become very Formidable; and thro' the pressing Remonstrances of the Two B——rs, to which the Solicitations of the Hungarian Ministers being joined. two Ambassadors were sent to him in the Field; whether also Baron Ginkel, from the States-General, repair'd for the same Purpole; and these Ministers were so fuccessful, as to obtain a Peace from a powerful M—ch in the midst of his Conquests; and they thus produced the Treaty of Brestau. This Negociation was transacted solely by the Advice; or Addresses of the Two B—rs; and to their everlasting Honour, must it be recorded, corded, that this importent Accommodation was brought about.

I know very well, that there are others, to whom, the Merit of the last mentioned Transaction is ascrib'd; but as all Men are fond of having their Names and Characters embroider'd over with glittering Actions; fo there are never wanting some, who, for their own private Interest, will dispoil the true Proprietors of them, and publickly dress out those, whose Patronage they are courting, in the Plumage that belongs to others: And this being the Case here, we must restore the Merit of this Affair to its right Owners, and no longer attempt to divest the Two B-rs of it; and, as I hope you are a Gentleman of Candour and Humanity, I persuade myself that you will, for Justice-sake, enquire first into the real Truth. without Passion or Prejudice, of this, and every other Particular, relating to the Conduct of these, or any other eminent Persons, who have engaged themselves in the National Service, before you appear in Publick again, to inflame the Minds of the unthinking, or unpacified Part of Mankind.

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re olaft but as Vames with wantte Inors of whole e Plud this ore the wners, - Two 1 are a nanity, or Ju-Truth, is, and to the minent lves in appear Minds

It is manifest, the Two B-rs are not puff'd up with that Vain-glory of Popularity, or are inclined to that oftentatious Parade of representing the minutest Atome of every Achievement through large magnifying Glasses to the Publick, as their Neighbours, who reside in the capital Region of Vanity, are apt to do. I assure you, if they were thus disposed, there are Matters enough of the most folid and fignal Consequence, of the most weighty Import, in which they have been concerned, and for which they might be most justly and honourably celebrated, without the need of any fuch little Aids as magnifying Glasses, Trumpets and the like. And tho' the Actions of great Men appear with a native Grandeur, they rather chuse to deserve, than desire our Approbation of them; but the less they defire it, the more it is paid them, and no Praise flows so pure, as that which is unrequested, that which is voluntary; nor would it distill so readily from my Pen, if it were not a Free-Offering, of which, those whom it concerns, are intirely unacquainted.

The Ministers aforesaid, having by the said Treaty of Breslau, considerably weaken'd the Enemy, which was also a C 4 Means

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Means to rescue Saxony from under the Bondage of France; they next endeavour'd to strengthen the Allies at any Rate, and by their Advise, the Treaty of Warfau was produced; and this Treaty would abfolutely have been Advantageous to us in the highest Degree, if the L-d C-t had not committed that great Overfight of not inviting the K- of P- into the Treaty of Worms; and I believe it was rejected, for no other Reason, but because the Two B——rs did advise it; for if P had been invited, it is more than probable, that he, at that Time, would have heartily acceded to the same, and by this Means prevent a fecond Rupture.

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These, Sir, are all Circumstances which indisputably prove, that the Two B——rs labour'd at nothing less than to make the War as victorious as possible, and to retrieve those Honours, Dignities and Privileges of the Nation, which were lost in former Ministries; contrary to what you endeavour to persuade us, viz. That they strove to render the same precarious and unsuccessful.

Page 5. You labour with all your Power to exclude the Two B—rs from every Thing that is notable, meriterious.

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and ferviceably perform'd, during the Course of the War; and invest not only a Favourite of yours with the same, but what is more Criminal, you charge the Two B-rs with fuch Measures as tend to nothing less than to the Destruction of all that was obtained in Favour of the Common Cause. This Affertion is very extraordinary, as it is an Affair, whereof the Truth is fo easily compas'd; and therefore, I only beg that you would, without Prejudice or Animosity, penetrate to the Foundation of this Matter, then you will find what I affirm, to be Truth, viz. That the Two B-rs, had the greatest Share in those Transactions that produced such a notable Crisis in Favour of the Common Cause, wherewith you vainly endeavour to embellish the Character, or magnify the Merits of others.

You charge in your Letter, p. 4. the Two B—rs with Imposition and Deceit, upon every Individual, as well as the whole Nation: But this, Sir, give me Leave to tell you, is but like the rest, only your own ipse Dixit; and it would be great Injustice to allow this alone for sufficient Evidence. For all the World knows that the Two B—rs never did attempt to deprive us of, or, in any Shape

Shape, abridge or abolish the Habeas Corpus Act, and trying High Treason by a Jury, the two fundamental Supporters of our Liberties; upon which Rock, King James the IId. split, and beat himself to Pieces; nor ever would have lost his Crown, had he left these two Points in Statu-quo, and not attempted to over-turn them. And as these two Points are the Fountains of all our Rights, Liberties and Privileges, is it not manifest, from their very Actions, that the Two B-rs are the religious Guardians and Preservers of these our facred Pledges? Nor can it be deny'd, that next to God, it is owing to the Measures of the Two B-rs, that these three Kingdoms where not enflav'd in the late Rebellian, when both our Liberties and Fortunes were absolutely in the greatest Peril. How surprising was it therefore, that those, so much pretended Patriots, could appear so easy, quiet, and with such chearful Aspects, while they faw their Country in fuch eminent Danger, without advancing one Step to its Relief: What must one think of such Men? 254 Migas Mitter A. 4.

It may perhaps be objected, as sometimes it has, by the Disassected been, that in the late Rebellion, the Kingdom was ii

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Corpus Jury, of our 7 ames reces ; n, had uo, and And And rains of vileges, Cions, eligious ese our deny'd, to the at these d in the iberties e greatt thereded Paiet, and le they eminent Step to of fuch

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not in any Danger at all, of loling its Rights and Liberties; and that it was only to frighten the People with Slavery, &c. in order to blacken those Political Enthusiasts, the Jacobites. However plausible this Supposition may appear, at the first Glance, I can affure you, the Truth is otherwise; for upon the strictest Scrutiny that has been made, of the Designs and Endeavours of this Faction, it may be politively afferted, that the present Jacobites are still as strongly tinctur'd with the Notions of dispotic Power, as ever their Predecessors were in King James the IId's Time; and have still, to this very Day, the same Inclination to abolish the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Trial of High Treason by a Jury; and so long as this Blood runs in their Veins, no reasonable Creature, who has any regard for that Freedom which is the Birth-right of his Species, can have any Compassion for Men of such Principles, as would so basely subvert it, but abhor a Government that would deprive its Subjects of fuch natural Rights. Therefore those pretented Patriots, who did not lend an helping Hand in that perilous Crisis, are not to be excus'd, nor in any Shape to be allow'd that glorious Title they are so presumptuously tond of, But as the present Government does strict( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

ly preserve the ancient Rights and Liberties of the Subjects, it is but just and grateful in all Men, who are protected under the comfortable Shelter thereof, to acknowledge the invaluable Blessing, and applaud the Fowers that dispense it: And as the Two B—rs have been indefatigable in the Cultivation of these, and many other National Felicities, it must be the blackers Ingratitude imaginable to charge them with National Imposition and Deceit.

You affure us, Page 8. that the Emperor, Charles VII. after the Battle of Dettingen, made some Overtures, extreamly favourable at Hanau, which were rejected by the Two B—rs. We were: indeed inform'd, at that Time of some Proposals, in the publick Papers; but they were in no wife fo favourable, as you represent them to have been. The Two B-rs did endeavour to improve the Offers at that Juncture made; but when they found those Proposals to be of fuch a Nature as could not answer the Advantages that were to be reasonably expected, they justly and prudently rejected them; and, in Fact, these Proposals of the Emperor, were but Shadows of Advantage, the Issue of mere Convenience, or, only the Fruits of Political Infincerity,

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fincerity, and never really intended on his Part, but what he offered, for no other Purpose, than to withdraw the English Army from the Neighbourhood of Frankfort, where he then resided, and was under Apprehensions, that they would block him up in the City: And it we should allow that they might have forced the Emperor, at that Time, into any Terms, we see no Reason to grant that the Two B——rs were accountable for the Omission.

You tell us likewife, that there was at the same Time a Proposal made at Hanau, of a Match between the Emperor's Daughter and the Archduke, and that he was to be elected King of the Romans; This Piece of News never did I hear of before, altho' I was well informed, at that Time, of the Transactions at the Imperial Court, then at Frankfort. But there feems to me, in this Proposition, not only a very great Inconfistency, but almost a moral Impossibility; for the Archduke was then in his Cradle, an Infant but three Years. old, at which Time the youngest Princess of Bavaria was so many Years older, as would have rendered the Disproportion in such a Match too unequal, too unreasonable, for the Court of Vienna to allow of. And

And supposing the Emperor had at this Time been reconcil'd to the Court of Vienna, and his Troops withdrawn from the F ench, this would not have been of fuch happy Effect as you imagine; for all the World knows, that his Forces were of no determinate Consequence one Way or other, therefore it would have availed nothing with France; but we, in Fact, fhould have brought an additional Burthen of an 100,000 l. upon ourselves, and France would have been eased and served by this very Treaty, in case it had been concluded; for it is universally known, that this Emperor had nothing to sublist on, but the Pensions and Subsidies he received from the Court of France: Therefore if we had allowed the Emperor a Pension upon these Conditions, that of France would have ceased; and this Expence to support the Emperor, would not only have repaired the Loss of the Bavarian Forces, but have greatly contributed to augment their Army; and befides paying the Bavarian Troops, as they were obliged to do, we should have saved them full as much as our Pension, for they never then would have made a Peace, but certainly continued the War longer, and with greater Vigor, to perfect the Naval Plan; and this feems fo much more probable

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bable, in that great Grifis of Affairs at the Emperor's Death, when Bavaria was recovered and joined to our Interest: But it did not in any Degree whatsoever, alter the Military System of France; so that, in Fact, if ever the Treaty of Hands had succeeded, it would have been no more, than as if we had annually given too,000 l, to the French, to make their War more effectual against ourselves; and this would have been an admirable Piece of Policy!

It is then indisputable, that the grand Mistake lay in the Omission of making the Treaty of Worms, without inviting the K of Pama into it: All Enrope was at that Time amazed, that an Alliance of such Importance, and of which that Treaty flood in fuch need, was neglected. For if the K -- of P--- had acceded to this Treaty, as he would undoubtedly have done, if he had been properly invited, then the Emperor would have been obliged to follow his Steps; the French Schemes would have been thereby totally frustrated, and all their Acts defeated But the Two B ---not being consulted on this Head, no Inadvertency that occured in the faid Negotiation, can be laid at their Door.

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As to what is related, Page 12, That the Two B—rs had prevented the fending of a Squardron into the East Indies, and that the E-t I-a C-y might thank the Two B-rs for what was done by Mr. de la Bourdannois; for this Accusation, I say, like the rest of your Incoherences before observ'd, we have no other Authority offer'd, but your own Word; and as this Affair is of fuch a Nature, that no Body but a Member of the Privy Council can be thoroughly acquainted with the Truth of it, it is but just to suspend our Belief, as of a Matter related by a prejudiced and nameless Author, untestified, or unconfirm'd by any Voucher at all: And indeed what Credit can be given to any other Part of such an Author, who not only shews himself of fuch a doubtful Gender in the Interest of his Country, but one who is so incessantly contradicting himself; whose Sentiments are in such continual Variation about two and the same Persons; whose Weather-Cock Judgment is ever representing them, in every one, and all of their Actions, at one and the Time, Men, both of the deepest and shallowest Capacity? If this Accusation had been designed to have any weight with the considerate Part of your Readers, it ought to have been afferted under

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illerted under under the Authority of some Privy Counfellor, who was present when the sending of a Squadron into the East Indies was under Debate; and even then, the Conduct of the Two B——rs ought not, at first Sight, to be peremptorily confider'd in that violent Construction you would put upon it, till we had heard and examined the Motives and Arguments wherewith they opposed and rejected this Expedition, and compared them with the State of those relative Circumstances, which might further confirm the Inexpediency thereof: which Arguments or Circumstances, undoubtedly must have been very cogent and convincing, if it be true, as is afferted, that they prevailed upon a whole Council-Board, at a Time too, when they were not intirely at the Head of Affairs.

of your three notable Instances of Accusation, which is the Misunderstanding between Matthews and Lestock; and here we are, with the usual Authority, assured that Lestock would not Fight: You couclude that it must be so, because it was certainly reported in France, that he would not engage against them, whenever an Action should offer. I think, as this Matter has been brought to a fair Trial,

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and Lestock under the greatest Disadvantages, clear'd himself in the Face of the Publick; it is therefore one of the weakest and most partial Ways of reasoning. to draw a Character of any Countryman, from the vulgar Rumours that might be foread of him in France, and thereby to question, or attempt to overthrow a publick Enquiry, before which, Lestock had vindicated and justified his Conduct, which M ---- s was not able to disprove; tho' he had infinitely the Advantage of Leftock, for he was then a popular Man, and the whole Town in his Favour, which, at the same Time, was highly prejudic'd against Lestock. It is therefore a very coarle Way of arguing, quite unbecoming, and beneath a Gentleman, to think of strengthening his Accusations, with foul, vulgar, or violent Language, when Truth, Reason and Probability are desicient; such as the Words, infamous, furious, maliguity, &c. as we find in this Page; and many more, of the like dirty Complexion, difperfed throughout the whole Performance.

Now let us proceed to the Third and last of your notable Instances. First, You give us a Calculation of the Consederate Army that made the Campaign in the Year 1744. Secondly, Your Care is to make

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make the French weak enough, and to perfuade us, that we were able to make great Efforts against them at that Time. And, Thirdly, You charge the B---rs with giving Otders to Marshal Wade for not fighting, or making Head against the Enemy. I admit, that the French Army was not fo strong in Flanders during this Campaign, as they were afterwards in others, because the French Forces were divided, and chiefly employ'd in Alface, against Prince Charles of Lorrain; but then, it is at the same Time a Truth, that Marshal Wade never did receive such Orders of Prohibition from the Two B---rs, as you afcribe to them: For the Marihal's Instructions or Orders were, to gain all such Advantages with his Army, over the Enemy, as by a prudent Conduct he most probably might; in which, undoubtedly, attacking and fighting the Enemy is imply'd; and that the most effectual Means of defeating the Examy, was not omitted in the Marshal's Orders, is obvious to all Europe, by the Efforts and Endeavours he made this very Campaign; in fuch Manner, as would have render'd the fame notably fuccessful to the Common Cause, by fignati Actions and Exploiss, had he not been interrupted. For in these very Endeal The State of the s

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vours, he was opposed by the Dutch and Austrian Commanders; who, being Gentlemen that were possess'd of large Estates and Effects in this Country, and having impatiently flatter'd themselves with very fanguine Expectations of a sudden Peace. they strenuously strove to preserve, as long as they possibly could, that Country on every Side, in which their Properties fo largely lay, from being made the acting Theatre, or Seat of War, which might have destroy'd, and laid every thing desolate about them. And the more effectually to prevent any Engagement of the Enemy in those Parts, they used their utmost Power to engross the Command of the Army in Flanders to themselves; which, however, when the Court of Vienna grew acquainted with their narrow and felf-ended Purposes, they declin'd intrusting the same any surther with Men of fuch unsafe Principles, as were to be fway'd by their own private and particular Interest more than the general Sasety and Wellare, or good of the Common This Retulal of such Trust, or Confidence in them, both publickly testified where the Misbehaviour and Blame lay, and, at the same Time, discover'd the true Cause, why Marshal Wade could not compleat any effectual, or decifive Engagement

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gagement with the Enemy: 'Twas therefore owing to the Obstructions of those who should have been Co-operators in the War, and not to any pretended Restraint, proceeding from the Orders of the Two B——rs, as it is unjustly and maliciously alledged against them; and this appears now undeniably Evident, from that Misunderstanding, between the commanding Officers of the Consederate Army, which was caused by, and did visibly ensue, upon the said Opposition.

In the 14th Page we find another Accusation, of which, such a notable Author as yourfelf, might have made a Fourth notable Instance; and this is the Propothe Generals Ligoniere Somerfield, for attacking and laying Siege to Mauberg and Landrecy. And then you tell us by what Means the younger B——r frustrated this hopeful Scheme, of which you promise such extraordinary Advantages. We may believe it to be true, that the younger B-r might delay the immediate Entrance upon, or Execution of this Enterprize, till such Time as the Sentiments of the Dutch, their Dislike or Approbation, or how their Resolutions stood towards this Proposition were known. And in Truth, this was the

the most just, discreet and regular Course that could be taken on this Proposal; whatever Answer he might give, or Con-Aruction is put upon it. For it is not only the Duty, but the Safety of a Minister of State, to consult, as well as consider, how far the Operation of a Plan laid down by a Field-Officer, is practicable, how far it is confiseent with the Treaties that subsist between his Master's Subjects and Allies, how well the latter relish, or are inclin'd to it, how able or willing to furnish Stores, Supplies, Provisions, Men and Money to make the Event successful, and whether the Gain or Loss will be greater, if it be fo or not. These Particulars must be confer'd upon, and concerted by the Civil Powers, who are equally concerned, before the Military Powers, who are otherwise busied in their Sphere, in their own Duty, and Discipline, their Camps, Marches, &c. can put them in Execution. Thus we fee, that all the Operations of a Confederate Army, are, and must be mutually settled by all Parties; So that, in Fact, this Scheme could not be executed without the Confent of the Dutch, therefore was it indispensably requisite to consult with them upon this Head; particularly at a Time, when the Affairs in Holland grew fo ticklish or precarious

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precarious, and that rotten Government was at a Loss how to preserve or support itself. Therefore, that they might better compass their Self-preservation, and more directly preserve their own Sasety, they waited for every little frivolous Pretension to allineate themselves from their Allies: And undoubtedly, as our Disregard of their Opinion, or Disposition upon this Occasion, would have been the Cause, so their Desertion would have been the Effect, if the B——rs had suffer'd this Plan to have been executed, without any Consultation thereupon with the Dutch.

Altho' I have hitherto confined myself pretty much to Foreign Transactions, yet I cannot help touching transiently, on a few domestick Passages in your Libel, and particularly in p. 16, 17 and 18, where there are some flagrant, if not flagitious ones. 'Tis there, you give us an Account of the Contract which the Two B-rs. made with the Broad-Bottoms, and how the different includers and Heads of Parties were introduced to his - by the B-rs, and by what Means they received a Court Absolution. Give me Leave, Sir, to observe to you, that, in the Detail of your Discourse, you do not approve yourfelt that Friend to his -- and the R-D 4

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F---, as with some Readers, you would delusively insinuate yourself to be; for if you were, you would not falfely represent his -- in a Light fo mean and disadvantageous as you do. I am shocked also at those Expressions which attempt to render an exalted Character so abject; when all the World can give Testimony of that inherent Valour and Magnanimity in him, which are most averse and repugnant to any such pusillanimous Submission, any such K or Degree of Slavery as you would to ggest: Therefore, it must be none but his Enemies, who can offer to infuse such despicable Conceptions of his ——s being a C——e to his M-s; which would strike him with greater Horror, than if he was really one to his most professed Foes. Human Nature, especially in those of the highest Dignity, is most jealous of any Bondage, and most impatient under it; nor can they endure any Proportion of it, without the highest Resentment, as the Poet truly lays;

Condemn'd to Fetters, and to Scepters born!

?Tis in this State, unhappy Princes mourn.

But what mourning, what Complaints, what Exprobations do we hear of, as we should

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should loudly enough do, if there was any Truth in these seditious Intimations? If there is none; were the old Talion Law to be put in Execution, and yourself made the Judge, in any other Case but your own, I would leave you to determine, whether he, who fallely persuades another, he is suffering under a State of Bondage or Imprisonment, did no deserve to be truly punish'd with it himself. If the necessary Decorum of a proper Reservation, in Persons of supreme Authority, to prevent their becoming popularly cheap and familiar; or if, a beneign and gracious Deportment, a generous Confidence in, or Complaisance towards their Ministers. Officers, &c. according to their Rank, whom they employ, or with whom they treat, as far also, as is proper, and most confistent with the Dignity invested in them, must be called C-t-y, I leave you to reconcile the Propriety of the Term to Men of Sense; to those, whom you have left dissatisfied in it, and who may call upon you for a further Explanation thereof.

A monstrous Disparity, also there is, in your Parallels of Times and Events; such as you introduce of King John, Henry III. Edward, and Richard II. To compare them

them and their Ministers, with the present Princes and their Administration, and to write of fuch distant, or disproportion'd Reigns, by skimming off their superficial and general Similtudes, or by fuch strained and partial Conformity to the Doctrine of Parallels, as you and others, to serve some present Ends have attempted, has, by confounding of Times, distorting and maining of Characters, in extending of some, and rescinding of others, no less than by abridging and contracting that natural Variety there is in the Springs of Human Actions, proved one of the greatest Corruptions of History. Such tyrannical Treatment, is like that wherewith a certain, noble Robber of Attica, named Procrustes, was want to entertain his Guelts; who was not content to Plunder them of whatever they had, most rich and valuable, but must cripple them too; by reducing every one he pleased to the Measure of his own Bedstead: If they were too short, they were rack'd and stretch'd out, if too tall, chop'd off at the Legs, to the Extent, or Dimensions of it. The same use is made of these malevolent Comparisons, and commonly with the same Humanity, when any modern Characters of Eminence are to be reduced to the Standard of some that

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that are most fit for the Purpose in Antiquity; whereby the Merits of Friends and Favourites may be lengthned out, and those of Competitors and Antagonists, shortned to the Patterns or Examples prepar'd, or shap'd out for them : But more especially, when such inc mparable Comparisons are drawn out by your Grumbletonians, and those, who desparing of having any Power in the Government, cannot leav fnarling and growling out Invectives against such as have. This Way of writing, has been an old Artifice, to dissatisty or incense a Prince against his Ministry, and the People against their Prince; and if he who wilfully fires an House, is justly sentenced to Death, as a capital Offender, I know not what Punishment that Incendiary deserves, who kindles such Fuel as may inflame a whole Nation: If you urge, that it is but the Embers of Two B-rs, that you have been raking up, and that no great Danger can be feared from them; I answer, that it is not to be heeded, how few the Sparks are, or even how small, in those Embers, so much as how combustible the Matter that may be about them.

Page 26. You give us another Specimen of your perfound Skill in State Poli-

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cy, or your zealous Propensity again, was a Porpagation of State Difcords and Dissentions, tho you prove yourfelf, but a Novice, in the wife and well-contrived Form of our Oeconomical Constitution thereby. For never was an H-r Ap-t, with fo many shining Qualities, as you justly celebrate in ours. by any prudent Managers of the Govern ment in this, or any other Country, placed at the Right Hand of the T-e. With how many Instances are we not furnish'd, of the melancholy Disasters that have befallen whole Countries, when ever such an indiscreet and disadvantageous Polition has been prefer'd, as would make the two greatest Luminaries of the Kingdom most effectually eclipse one another? Such Contiguity, whereby Monarchy in Possession might be skreen'd, or interpos'd by Monarchy in Reversion, would be look'd upon in the Art of Politicks, as a Disposition of Power no less profuse or improvident, than in the Jeweller's Art he would be, to gild over a Diamond, or in the Science of Heraldry, the laying of Or upon Or. Besides an H——r Ap——t is always looked upon, and indeed, is no more than a Subject to his S-n Fa-r, as by the Motto under his Pr--ly Cognizance, is, to this Day, most

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most dutifully acknowledged: For these Reasons, among others, it has been thought most eligible, by our best experienced Managers of Government, from the most wholesome Rules and Examples of State Policy, that 'tis most to the Interest of the Nation, as well as the S—n, and his Su—r himself, that he should have a Situation, or Court allow'd, becoming his State and Dignity, separate to himself. I have all the Reason I could wish, to believe, that if the H--r Ap—t were preser'd to a Station so near the Th-e, he would, most certainly, shew and express the greatest reverential Regard to his R-- F---, and make the best use of the Power that should be invested in him. But as to any Arguments that might be advanced to reduce such a Proposition to Practice, they are either here sufficiently answered, or it is totally unnecessary to expaniate further upon them; fince they have neither fway'd, nor do confift with those Maxims, Rules and Customs, which have prevailed in the Appointment of a different Establishment; since they might only further tend to distrub and distatisty those Heads and Hearts, which are of equal Depth and Disposition with your own, to relish the Blessings of a prudent and quiet Government;

Two B—rs have nothing to do with.

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I cannot omit observing here, that none but the most inveterate Enemies to the R--- H---e of H---r, and fuch: whose restless Heads are continually agitated and tormented with the Vertige, or Discase of Revolution, could ever see any Prospect of Encouragement, in creating a Misunderstanding between the H----r Ap—t, and the Two B—rs: For they have, with the most indefatigable Zeal, exerted the utmost of their Power. in promoting the Interest of the H-e of H—re; so that, it would be a most unproportionable Return, if any of the S-rs of this august H-e, should reward fuch faithful and unwearied Diligence in their Establishment, with any Difgrace or other Indignity, instead of the most gracious and honourable Acknow+ ledgments. If fuch Gratitude were to become a Court Fashion, who would not hereafter fear to ferve a P----e, in his most just and important Occasions? But these ungrateful Infusions can only work upon Ignorance, Prejudice and Ingratitude itself; therefore, I am persuaded, Sir, you may give over your Endeavours on this Head, and despair in Time, that any Now tions

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itude ( your this ( Now ( ever find Harbour in any noble and generous Mind: For, God be thanked, our Heart Ampt, is endow'd with fuch virtuous Qualities, such fine Discernment, and happy Intelligence, as will enable him, not only to perform all Things that must redound to his own Honour, and the true Interest of his Country; but to perceive how easily those, who have selfishly studied nothing but their own Ends, may fall thereby, into that Disgrace themselves, which they have thus enviously, or mainciously, been contriving for others.

But here we must return a little to the Foreign Affairs; where, Page 24. You. charge the Two B-rs, that they were ried the Dutch, and compell'd the Queen of Hungary to confent to the Extension of the Command to the D-e, over the whole Army. Here, Sir, you are misinform'd. It is true, there was Application made, for the De to Command the whole Confederate Army; but then, the Case is quite otherwise, than as you represent, and vainly persuade us it was: Therefore I will endeavour to fet you. right in the Truth of this Matter, if you have any towardly. Inclinations in you to embrace it; tor, in Fact, the Affair was this MICH

this. — The P—— of O—— his Party. by this Time, did confiderably increate among the People; his few Friends in the Council, did improve their Adherence, as much as lay in their Power; and, as they forelaw, that if the Army continued in the Hands of the contrary Party, then their great Design, might probably, in the very Attempt, miscarry, or be entirely suppress'd with the Army; therefore his faid Friends were actually the first, who privately promoted, and advisedly confented to the investing of the D-e with the Command of the whole Army: And then, if our M——rs laid hold of this fair Opportunity, to cultivate their favourable Disposition, by joining their Application, for bringing the same more effectually to pais, is this, Sir, to be branded with any such arbitrary or violent Terms, or Measures, as Worrying and Compulsion?

That this was a prudent Step of our Friends at the Hague, is manifest, by that great and memorable Event, the Election of the P—— of O—— to the Hereditary Stadboldership of all the United Provinces; how unfuitable soever the Reflexions may be, that have been made of it: And that, by this Means, the said Command has produced

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produced more good Effects, than ever cou'd be expected from a Commander of Interior Rank, is without all Doubt; for, the Court of V-a and the Datch, never cou'd, nor indeed wou'd have suffer'd their Armies to be headed by a General, who, in Quality, was below the D-e, lest they shou'd raise Contentions for that Authority, among Competitors of greater Equality with one another, and difgust several Princes who had Commissions in the said Armies: And it was of the highest Importance, to intrust the Army under the Conduct of a Commander, in whose Integrity they cou'd fately confide; for if the Dutch Army had not been thus secured, the El ion of a S-db-r wou'd certainly have en precarious, if not totally prevented; because the French Party in the Council at the Hague, wou'd undoubtedly have recall'd the Army, to oppose the Populace by Force, in the very Attempt of this Election; and that, all under the specious Name of restoring the Publick Tranquility; but as they cou'd not have the Army to their Affistance, this grand Affair was brought about, without any great Difficulty, and scarcely any Blood-Thed. Thus, Sir, you have beheld, by what Means the D-e became Commander in Chief of the Confederate Army, and what the same of

what happy Ends it has answer'd in this respect. Is it not therefore a Barbarity. of which the very Turks, who are remarkable for calling their Prime Ministers, under the least Pretence, to Account, when they have a mind to facrifice them, wou'd, or might be ashamed; to conceal the Truth, introduce fuch enormous Falfities, and pervert the good Deeds or Actions, into Capital Offences, of those they design to make their Victims? For when they have no real Crimes to charge them with, and vet their Destruction is resolved on, they fend them Word, that their Death is determin'd, either by the Janazaries, Grand Signor, or Mahamed; and indeed, to gratify fuch humane and fweet temper'd Gentleman as them, and yourfelf, it wou'd be the shortest Way among Christians, to introduce Turkifb Principles, in the Treatment of English Ministers, But before we part with these Principles, wherein yee to harmoniously agree, let me invite you to hear those of a Heathen, or rather to read them aloud, before any Company, in which this friendly Epistle may be canvasi'd; if you can do it, undisturbedly, and without much change of Countenance. " As we wou'd," fays my Author, "that " a Painter, who is to draw a beautiful " Face, in which there is yet wanting " fomething

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" something to render it persect, shou'd " neither totally omit, nor rigidly ex-" press, that which is defective; because " this, wou'd deform it; and that, spoil " the Resemblance: So, since it is very " hard, nay almost impossible, to display " the Life and Transactions of the greatest " Man, wholly free from all Frailty, Fai-" lure or Overlight, let us in the same " Manner follow Truth: And if fome "Laples shou'd occur, which have been " occasion'd by any Misrepresentation of " others, any Emotion of fudden Paffion "in themselves, of the mere Necessity " of the Times, let us look upon them, " rather as the Delects of Virtue, than as "Vices; let'us carry the Pencil tenderly "over them, out of respect to Human " Narure; which never furnish'dany Man. " with fo many amiable Qualities, fo many " Inclinations to Excellence, but that there " was fill wanting fornething, that wou'd "furnish him to Perfection." Here my Author, kindly stops, to ler you rumimate.

You endeavour in the succeding Pages, to flatter the D—e; but, Pages 28 and 29, the Scene is changed, to a coarse and unfavourable Prospect; for here you begin to anatomize him, and reduce him to a

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mere Skeleton. You feem to intimate, or rather, boldly affert, that he did not understand the Art of War; but of this, like the rest, there is still wanting sufficient Proof. To make us link with you in Belief; the Regions you offer, of his Touth and Inexperience, are too weak and insufficient. Have we not many Examples before our Eyes, and particularly one, in the last War, of a young Hero, who has throughout the whole Course of it been, both an amazing Conqueror, and furprifing Transactor of Affairs in the Closet; and that, without any Assistance or Advice? He has not only succeeded in every Thing he has undertaken, but all the World must own, that he has performed all these Affairs with the greatest Prudence and Conduct imaginable; and yet, he was not only young, but also unexperienc'd: So that, not only from this, but many Instances more, too tedious here to enumerate, it is very manifest, that Age and Experience, tho' advantageous Concomitants, are not always the only, or absolute Requisites, to make a good Councellor in the Closet, or Here in the Field war and the feel

But your Performance is extraordinary, where you enter upon the Arcana of the Two B——rs, the Magazine of their Secrets

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crets, tho' by what Means, or Intelligence, we see not; however, being only known to yourself, you Pamphleteer it freely away to the Publick, without any Proof or Evidence at all; expecting every Body will build the most firm and solid Structures of Belief, upon your imaginary Foundations. Such trothy Food may fatisfy your Politick Camelions, and those who chule to feast upon Air, but will starve all these who expect, and are capable of digesting, any substantial Entertainment. those, it obviously appears, that it was impossible you cou'd give the true and real Motives of the Two B-rs, for putting the D-e at the Head of the Army; and in ever they were the principal Means of it, it is but reasonable to suppose, that they wou'd reserve such Secrets, of the utmost Consequence, to themselves: Therefore, this lame and tottering Assertion, wanting the Feet of Authority, cannot stand long, or support itself in the Credit of rational Readers, without falling to the Ground.

It is conspicuously known, how the D—e has been Educated, and that he was design'd for a chief Commander from his Intancy; that he was constantly train'd to it, and in his most early Years, introduced into the Army: considering E 3 these

these Circumstances on one Hand, and on the other, the private Solicitations of our Friends at the H-e, as was before related; I say, it cannot then, with any Colour of Reason be suggested, that it was the original Act of the Two B——rs, nor that they could possibly have any secret Views or sinister Designs in the same, as you endeavour to persuade us: So superficial or sophistical, is your whole Representation of this Matter.

In the last Page quoted, we meet with another Piece of News, unheard of, or unconfirm'd; for here it is affirm'd, that the P-- of O--, after he was made S-dh-r, had a Quarrel with the D-e. about the Command of the Army; that this Ferment, as you are pleased to call it, was put into Agitation by the Two B-rs, and that the D-e dared not to hear of any Temperament. In the First Place, I have Reason to believe, that never any such Difference as you inform us of, did subfist between the D-e and the P-of O- Secondly, That both Armies have been joined, is certain; and that the D-b Troops have at all Times shared in fome Degree with ours, in the Warlike Operations, is also manifest; as well, as that they did nor, on all Sides, behave them**felves** 

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selves altogether so tardily, as, from time to time, has been reported here in England: And, in the Third Place, it feems improbable, or rather impossible, that the Pof O-hou'd at this Time, have any defire of Commanding the Army, when he had, and still has, so much Business upon his Hands, to restore the National Concord, and relieve his Country from those civil Commotions, under which it had been so long harrass'd: So that, the Arguments which wou'd suggest him to have been any fuch Competitor, or covetous of making himself such a Leader in War, at the very Time that he was so deeply engaged in cultivating Peace about him, being inconfistent with themselves, reduces all your Substance, upon this Topic also, to Shadows.

In the next Pages, 30, 31 and 32, The good Understanding between the D—e, as Commander in Chief of the Army, and the Two B—rs, you suppose to be too great; from whence you draw a whole Chain of such Consequences, as betray a Spirit of setting the Nation in a Ferment, if I may use your own Word: But from that which I have already observed, by what Means the D—e was introdued, or rather educated in the Army, and by what

Means he was advanced to the Head of it, all your Conjectures on this Matter, will clearly diffipate and vanish away; more especially, when we consider, that the Two B-rs have a firmer Footing in the Civil Power, than they can possibly think of obtaining by a Military one; for this, as it wou'd be a weaker, so it wou'd be both a more uncertain and more dangerous Support; and as they are at present, in a State of perfect Safety, it wou'd be Madness to run into one of so much Jeopardy. For, that the Military Power, can never be that Supporter of a Civil one, as you suggest, I cou'd prove to you by innumerable Instances, of which it may be sufficient only to refer, to what we may daily fee with our Eyes, in that Contempt wherewith the Civil Power is treated throughout those Neighbouring Countries, where the Military Power prevails; which demonstrates, that these Powers cannot agree, and the last is almost incapable of subsisting, where the former is predominant. So that it cannot be imagin'd, that he who is once at the Head of the Civil Power, will ever dream of being most firmly or safely suftained in it, by a Military one; especially as the latter is maintained by, and dependant upon the former. But if you think that the Standing Army is still too great, make a Motion in the H-- of C-ns, and

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and if it is made apparent, that our Forces are still too numerous, I am perfuaded, the Two B-rs will not be against a furher Reduction, of those that shall be deem'd superfluous or unnecessary, tho' we daily see, and hear, that whole Regiments of Sea, and Land Forces are difbanded and reduced; at which all our Neighbours are greatly surpris'd, considering how Affairs at present in Europe fland; and tho' it has created many Difputes, both in Parliament and Print, which is the most prudent Step, to disband our Armyand Marines, or keep ourselves still in a manner arm'd? I confess, I am for the latter, and that upon no other Account than for the Sake of Self-preservation. But I will not expatiate upon this Topic, because it has already been most accurately handled, and to revive it afresh, might draw the whole Cabal upon me, that endeavours to over-rule all Measures of Goverment, without Reason or Foundation. But 70,000 Men are not so easely raised, as you imagine, at least, it cannot be done by the common Way of Recruiting, imperceptably, as you suggest: So that we may be very easy on this Head.

Your other Suggestions, which you call ugly Symptoms, and from which you draw frightful Consequences, were current among

mong the Jacobites, about two Years ago: and from those Gentry, you have, to allarm the Public, copied these ugly Symptoms, which were first raised by the crafty Ring-leaders of that Faction, to ferve their Ends; and I am heartily forry to find, that fuch a bleffed Patriot, as you endeavour to appear, fuch an Enemy to Strife and Diffention, fuch a Promoter of Concord and Quietness, one so desirous of making his great Loyalty, Candour and Abilities, thine thro' the Understanding and Memory of Mankind, should so imperceptably, fo seemingly unawares, or unknown to himself, prostitute his Pen in the Service of such a Threadbare and shabby Cause.

But, Sir, if you cou'd really make such Facts good, against the Two B——rs, what need was there of going this Way by Pamphleteering, to work, and by that Means, to raise insignificent Prejudices among that Rank of People, mostly in private Condition, which are ineffectual and cannot avail your Purposes? There is a shorter, juster, more equitable, as well as a more noble and effectual Way of Proceeding, than this, if they are guilty of the enormous Crimes wherewith you load them; which is, in the House

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House of Commons. Introduce your Allegations there, and make them good; and then, it will to some Consequence appear, and to the most considerable, the most equal Judges, that you truly are, what you endeavour to feem; whereas at prefent, no Body can judge otherwise, but that this Production is the overflowing of your Gall, or Spleen, upon some Disappointment or other, by one or other of the Two B—rs, in some Preferment, or other like Cause of Discontent; for it is impossible that those who are at the Head of public Affairs, especially here in England, where the Nation is so much divided into Parties, can gratify them all; and therefore in this abject, vulgar Method, roar out to the Multitude for Revenge; as the Puritan of Amsterdam more fuccessfully did, against one of the finest trained Creatures for the Field, in a certain Nobleman's Pack, because he had deprived him of a dainty Morsel, on which he had proposed to feast: His Conscience or his Courage, would not let him beat him; no, he would not, for the Indies, hurt a Hair of his Head, but he would give him a bad Name; so drove the generous Creature, whose true Characteristic was Fidelity itself, into the Streets, and cry'd out, a mad Dog; thus having configned 1 14 2 5

figned him to the Mob, they, without Examination or Enquiry into his great and capital Offences, knock'd out his Brains.

From Page 33, to 37, You give the the Two B—rs, with Sir R—W—, equal Share in the former Administration, and in all the foregoing Pages, you allow them no Share in his Ministry, nor for some Time after. But, however, you cannot do otherwise; you will make the Two B——rs guilty, right or wrong, which were impossible to be done, but by your sophistical Reasons and false History. For here you become sensible, that our Misfortunes are owing, as I have already observed, to the mistaken Meafures and pacific Disposition of that former M-r; and therefore, with all your Labour, you find it impossible to question or challenge the Two B—rs, unless you bring them headlong into the former Administration; and when the Scene of Affairs begins to shift, and Saxony and Bavaria recovered, then the Two B--rs must not be in the Ministry, but some other Favourites must be intitled to the Merits thereof: And then again, so soon as the Affairs go not successfully on, the Two B—rs are brought in to appear

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in the Conduct thereof; and all this for no other Reason, but that they may be accused as the Fountain of all our Disasters. And, indeed, Sir, I am surprised that you are not ashained at yourself, throughout all these monstrous Prevarications, Contradictions, and Intanglements of Truth; which are to palpable, that the meanest Capacity can discover them. If the B-rs had a Share, during Sir R--W--'s Time in the Administration, they had it undoubtedly, in Times after him, when Affairs did change for the better; and, in course, a Share in the Merit of the same: But it is needless to reason upon this Head; for all the Nation, and all Europe know, that the B—rs were no Partners with Sir R— W-- in the Administration: They had indeed their Posts, but never any Share in the main Management, or Direction of Affairs, either Domestic or Foreign; and therefore could deserve no Share in the Censure.

But notwithstanding the several Difficulties and Disadvantages under which they labour'd, they would actually have retrieved more than they have done, if they had met with an hearty Concurrence in some of their Proceedings, and had

had not been interrupted by some unfortunate Interventions in others; for in the midst of that sourishing Progress the French was in, the Two B-rs omitted no Opportunity to resque P-a from an Alliance with France; and when thus the English and Austrian Party at that Court gained Ground, and opened the Way for the succeeding Treaty of Dresden, then the unnatural Rebellion in Scotland broke out; whereby we were obliged to withdraw, not only our own Troops, but also 6000 Dutch, from Flanders; and, if this fatal Incident had not happen'd, the French would never have made those Conquests there, which they afterwards did.

Since I have mentioned this infamous Rebellion, which has been so detrimental to the last War, I cannot help observing, how much we debase ourselves in the Opinion of our Neighbours; how much associated into Party Contests against one another; which our Enemies are ever watching for, to foment and blow them up into intestine Commotions! It is an eternal Scandal and Reproach to this Nation, that so many of our Countrymen become thus the Fools, the Tools and Vassals

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Vassals of these French, and other foreign Foes, and all by this Means, only to contrive their own Enslavement; to become Traitors, as unavoidably to Themselves, and their Families, as their contemporary Countrymen, and all their Posterity: But 'tis observable, that you do not chare to enter into the Particulars of this Affair, because you could not do it without allowing some singular Commendations to the Two B---rs, who so eminently exerted themselves in the quelling and defeating of this Rebellion, and must consequently therein be acknowledged the Two principal Guardians of these Three Kingdoms.

How monstrously absurd therefore is it, for you to accuse them, in Page 43, with even conniving at the Growth of this Rebellion? I wonder you did not, by the same Rule of Reason, and Justice to Veracity, affirm too, that they were private Promoters of the Pretender's Interest. You tell us, that all Europe was amazed at the Behaviour of the Two B—rs; but it may be much more so, at the Unconscionableness of your salie Assertion, because it is absolutely incredible. You endeavour to establish this Accusation, by boasting of Proofs, but have

have produced none; which you wou'd furely have done, if you had really preserved such material and authentic Proofs. as would render Doubt impossible. Of these, we cannot judge, because we are left unacquainted with them; but what your Meaning is, what Ends you aim at, or what Censure you deserve yourself, for making such a flagrant Charge, without fatisfying your keaders with any Authority for the same; I say, such disingenuous Aspersions, which almost every Individual in the Nation, knows to 13 false, and of which, not only a great Part of Europe besides, but even all the Facobites themselves, to my certain Knowledge, have already, before your Performance appeared in the World, given their Testimony to the contrary, in Favour of the Two B—rs, may highly deserve a more folemn and judicial Examination, than is here pretended to.

Almost in every Paragraph, you are repeating your Charge against the Two B—rs, of their aiming at nothing so much, as to Ruin the War, as the only one, where you endeavour to accuse them with; and I have already made it manifest, that this Charge is without any Foundations whatsoever,

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and it will so evidence itself, as to render it past all manner of Doubt, from what I shall further observe upon this Head hereafter. But, Page 41 and 42, you endeavour to support this Imputation, with a Story so incredible, that you vainly labour to render it plaufible; because, what you affert, is, undoubtedly, a plain Proof against your own Assertion: For, if it was the Intention of the Two B-rs to Ruin the War, they would then have thrown some other Impediment more effectual in the Way, and therefore would not only have utterly refused to furn sh the D-e with Fighting Orders, but also have omitted every other Means that would promote the same: For, by this Time, the D-e had gained Experience to his Theory in War, and therefore, if your Affertion had been the real Cause, they would not thus precariously hade risqued their favourite Scheme, by merely conjecturing what the Troops would, or would not do. And besides, you do not give us a right Calculation of the Forces then under his Command; for there were also Hessians and Austrians in the Army, which you have forgot to mention; and besides this, the Dutch did not all turn Tail; they were but 3,000

Men at the utmost, who were defective in their Duty, the rest perform'd it.

To this, we may add another Consideration; that Fighting Orders are never iffued in that Sense you take it, for they are always directed to the Commanding General, to attack with Conduct, first to be settled in a Council of War, held on the Spot for that Purpole, in which, is always consulted the best Manner; and where no Advantage is to be gain'd, or offers in their Favour, the same is declined or postpon'd. Therefore, Sir, if the Two B-rs had furnished the D-e with fuch Orders to attack the Enemy, without his first calling a Council of War, and without his having previously inform'd himself of the Enemies Strength and Situation. &c. but attack them at all Adventures, without confidering any Obstacles whatfoever; or if he had actually engaged them without the Opinion of a Council of War, without any apparent Probability of Advantage, and contrary to all Advice or Prospect of Success, then, I say, your Assertion might have some Air of Plausibility; but so long as you cannot absolutely prove such peremtory Fighting Orders, or such incautelous and premature Management in the Camp. withctive

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ly enof a parent mtory is and lamp, withwithout any Confultation in Councils of War, your Affertion will ever appear Self-convicted, without the Trouble of our proving any farther Absurdity or Incongruity in it, and in open Defiance of any Support or Countenance you can further give it.

In Page 46, At the Emperor's Death, you bring the young Elector of B--a on the Stage, whom you represent as of the greatest Importance to our Cause and Interest; but his Forces, his In erest in the Electoral College, and the whole Power of this Prince, are, according to your Assertion, rejected by the Two B-rs; and you heavily complain, that they have not made any proper Use of them: But a little further, Page 48, you complain as much, that we are actually engaged with these very B-ns, whom you just before so much wanted, and that they were now received into the Number of our Dependants, if not Allies. Thus, I leave all the World to judge, how plainly you contradict yourfelf, and how publickly you confess yourself at a Loss, in not knowing what you would be at, by confessing, how great a Stranger you are, as to this Matter, in that you conot determine, Whether the B -- no are our Allies or Dependants?

It is almost unnessary to answer this Part of your Story, as it is already, from your egregious Contradictions, and Corruptions of the Truth, obvious, that you either are not capable of attaining to it yourself, or not willing to display it sincerily to others: Yet, for the sake of these, I may here unravel so much of this Occurrence, as will enable those who are most slenderly acquainted therewith, and even of the shallowest Capacity, to discern your unpardonable Mistakes, or fallacious Misrepresentations thereof. It is so well known. as to be beyond all Dispute, that before the E-m-r died, his Army was defeated, his Country ruin'd, and he had nothing left to subsist on, but what the French Court allow'd him. When his Son, the present E-l-r, a Prince of excellent Qualities, came to the Throne, he was hardly able to bring 6,000 Men into the Field, and those being the Remains of many Regiments, therefore not in a Condition of taking the Field immediately, it requir'd fome Time to equip them; and indeed, if there had been Money, they might, in a short Time, have been considerably augmented; for the Austrians evacuated B-a, and

and released the B-n Prisoners; which were all Means that ferved this fo much wanted Augmentation. Now it is most Part publickly known, that this Prince, immediately after his Imperial Father's Death, our ions enter'd into the Confederate Alliance, and with the Subfidies he received from us, and are our Allies, he brought his Troops into , or good Condition, confiderably augmented ners: them, and fent them into the Confederate unwill Army; where they shared of all the Warlike Operations and Fatigues, with the acthe greatest Intrepity and Resolution: And these are such known Truths, that all un-Mif-Europe is a Witness of them. Is it then not aftonishing to the last Degree, to own. fore charge the Two B—rs with fuch open Falshoods when every Individual can be so ated, left eafily acquainted with the Truths themourt felves, which are so manifest, and of such esent a publick Nature, as must most unanswerities, ably detect and refute them? But there is able nothing aftonishing in these Days, espeand cially where Spleen, Malice, and Envy, or Ambition, Avarice and Pride, have gained egithe Ascendancy over the Reason and n, of iir'd Discretion of Men. l, if

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I have before observed, that the Addition of the B—n Forces to the Confederates, could not in any wise be decifive

five or determinate; and this has confirmed itself, by the Experience last mentioned; nor did P-- W-- of H---, act the low Part of a T--1, when he laid the Blame of the Miscarriage of the Tr—v of H—u upon the E—of G-, which was but the common Belief of every Body, that had any Intelligence of this Matter: Neither ought this Tr-v, or that of W-s, to have ever been ratified, as was before hinted. without the K-- of P--. The Overfight was wondered at, on all Sides, the Advantages it lost the Consederates, plainly beheld, and by what Prejudices against those who advised it, the Coalition of that Interest therein was rejected.

Page 47, You endeavour to charge the Two B——rs with the Loss of Brussels, owing to our not having the Bavarians in our Service; and your Reason is, that our Allies were not then in a Condition to defend it: But, give me Leave to assure you, that the Case was not so as you would represent it; for we were then obliged to withdraw our Troops from Flanders, to oppose that Insurrection, which was then raised in our own Country, by those very good Friends to it, the Jacobites: And then it was the Duty of the D—cb

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D-ch to defend Bruffels; but as they were at that Time so remarkably Frenchified, they absolutely refused to hinder the French from taking this Place, tho' the Prince of Waldeck, who then commanded the D--b Troops, most earnestly affured the States-General, that the F - b endeavoured to take it by Surprize; and plainly fet forth, in what Manner their Attempts might easily be prevented. But all this had no Effect; nothing was approved of, or put in Execution to oppose it; so that the F--b had nothing else to do, but to take Possession; which vexed the brave and excellent Prince of Waldeck, to that degree, that he threw up his Commission: And pray, Sir, how do you like this true Account of the Matter. in answer to your false one?

After this, you go on for a while, very censoriously, to find Fault with every Thing that was done in the Field, without giving any colourable Reason or Authority to confirm the same; but are, every Moment, drawing your incomprehensible Consequences of the Two B—rs aiming at nothing else but the Ruin of the War; which, as it is but the same stale Dish over again, only broil'd and fry'd, and differently cook'd up, to make

it go down; tho' having no Relish or Goodness in it at first, but soon growing nauseous to the Palate of Truth, and unfit for any wholsome Digestion, I shall finally throw it out, among the other Offal of your Political Entertainment.

So I proceed to follow you to the Subject of the Russian Troops, in Page 64, which you have handled so like a Crastsmaster, that however crooked or wearisome the Path may appear, it will be necessary to trace you thro' all the Serpentine Windings of it. Here then, that you may, according to the usual Obliquity of your Plan, further deprive the Two B-rs of their Merits, you acquaint us, that the E-- of G--, some Years before, recommended the biring a Body of Russian Troops, but that it was then rejected by the Two B——rs. To this I answer, that, perhaps the E - of Gmight recommend this very Scheme; but it remains to be answered, Whether it was possible for him, at that Time, or any Body else, to bring the same into Execution? And this may be immediately resolved or decided, by looking into the Situation of Affairs then existing at the Court of Pctersbourg, when, at one View it will appear, that it was utterly impossible

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impossible for the E -- of G-- to hire any Troops from Russia: But to imagine, that in treating of such considerable Affistance, that he did it in such a fordid Light, and with fuch contemptible Expressions as you do; as if it were generous enough in us, to degrade that Service and Favour we were at the same Instant feeking; by faying only we could hire it, implys such a Complication of Indignity, towards that powerful Ally, with Ingratitude, at the very Juncture we wanted the Shelter of its Power, and Infolence, at the Time that we were fensible ot our own Imbecility, as would very much derogate from the high Opinion which the World conceives of that great Politician, who endeavoured to be at the Head of Affairs; if, I fay, in no better, than the coarse Colours, wherewith you daubt it out; he could use only such sneering and mechanical Phrases towards those, who might be, in his Master's greatest Exigencies, his greatest Auxiliaries, altho' it were only in Embrio, or Proposition. Those who are in a State of Neutrality, or Independency, and totally unneedful of fuch Supplies, may think of them as they please, or call them Mercinaries; but those that stand in need of their Aid and Affistance, Assistance, will find other Language to treat with, or of them.

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To look then into these Times, wherein the E- of G-, according to your Account, did recommend the bire of these Troops, you will find, that First, But shortly before a Revolution had happened in the Ru—-n Government. Secondly, That in this very Revolution, the present Empress was elevated upon the Th——e. Thirdly, Therefore, the absolutely required her Forces at Home, for her own further Safety. Fourthly, That the French Party had a great Share in this Revolution. was, at this Time, the most prevailing at Court, and continued so, till the Year 1744, when by the Difgrace of the Marquis de la Chetardie, only glimmering Hopes remain'd for us to promote our Interest; for the Treaties you mention, Page 67, that were concluded with the Courts of London and Vienna, in 1742, and 1746, did not, in any Ways, oblige the Court of Petersbourg to take Part in the late War; and tended to nothing else, but to acknowledge one another, in their respective Stations: In this Situation of Affairs, I ask, How was it posfible to bire any Troops from R—a,

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how much soever the E— of G——might dream of it?

It is well known, that the French Party did maintain themselves at the Court of P--e, till the latter End of 1746, when the Scene changed in our Favour, which the Two B——rs immediately did improve, and do the utmost in their Power to reap the Advantages of; and they were so successful, as to obtain 30,000 Auxiliaries, whereby the good of the common Cause is notably restored, and the Ruffian Ambassador now residing at our Court. His Excellency Count Ez-w has, with his extraordinary Address and Application, been greatly instrumental to facilitate and accomplish this good Understanding between our Court, and his: for which he deserves the fincere Thanks and Esteem of the whole Nation.

It is also well known, and Europe can witness it, that while the Treaty for these Auxiliary Troops, was in Agitation, the French, to the utmost of their Power, oid endeavour to prevent the same; but when they perceived they could not, they then endeavour'd to the last Degree, to throw every Obstruction they could in the Way of these Troops, to impede or retard the March

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March of them, hoping by some Accedent or other, by Weariness, Dejection of Spirit, Mutiny, Defertion, Sickness, or want of Provision, &c. they might frustrate their Advancement towards, or Conjunction with the Confederate Army. For this Purpose, they sent Emissaries into Poland, to raise civil Commotions; and for no other Reason, but to delay this March: Many other Obstacles they devised, but all in vain; and for some of these Practises, the Count de Salle was detected, and imprison'd at Dantzic. Here now it appears openly, and beyond all Controversy, how essential it was thought by our Enemies, these Troops would be in deciding the Common Cause, and rendering Inesfectual all further Opposition; yet to defeat all those that had been made by the French, to hinder the faid March, or Conjunction, the Two B——rs were most assiduous: and, notwithstanding all these Artifices of our Enemies, the Two B—rs broke through, and overcome all the Impediments contrived thereby, to their everlasting Honcur.

Here, Sir, let us pause and consider a Moment, Whether, if what you so repeatedly affirm be true, That the Two B—rs endeavour'd to Ruin the War, because

Acceejection ness, or nt frusor Cony. For nto Poand for March: but all ractifes, ind imappears ly, how nemies, ing the ffectual feat all French. inction, duous; fices of broke mpedir ever-

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because they would thereby oppose the E- of G-, and bis Measures; they wou'd in any likelihood, thro' all these Difficulties, bire those Auxiliaries, the very Project, and Recommendation of that E - of G - himself, and then so highly regard, as to put that in Practice, which was the Invention of their Rival. in Opposition to their own Measures? Are there not Madmen in Bedlam, whose Arguments are more reconcilable? But as it is a Jesuitical kind of Expression, you have been so fond of, for the Ruin of the War, is but an equivocal Phrase, and may fignify not only, the Ruin of its Succe/s, by starving it of Supplies, Recruits, &c. but the Ruin of its very Being, among the contending Powers, when the Weaker is so strengthned, that the stronger Party can fee no Hopes of Advantage, but the Prospect of Victory hovering between both, upon doubtful Wings, they are both brought more easily to Accommodation; and so, the War is ruined, by, what all Sides desire it should be, a Peace: In this Sense the Two B—rs may be faid to have ruin'd the War, by bringing down the Northern Auxiliaries to enforce the Confederates, who otherwise, might have been ruin'd by it: And further, in this Sense, it deserves to be consider'd, whether those

those unpacified Minds ever deserve to taste the Comforts of Peace, who can so ungratefully exclaim against, and revise such providential Ruin of the War, which has so honourably preserved its Warriors from Ruin?

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Those Auxiliaries made also a more effectual Progress, by their Land March, than ever could be expected, if they had been transported by Water, and landed in the Baltick; for it this Course had been pursued, then certain Powers could easily have made such Diversions, that all the Service which could have been expected from these Troops would have been reduced to nothing; but as the Way was directed them through Poland into Germany, where it was too tender a Point to oppose them, because they were then arrived at the very Vitals, it was thereupon more expedient for all opposite Powers to embrace a general Pacification, without regarding any Navel Scheme they might have in view; for now it became necesfary for them, to defift from compleating the same, as for us, it was prudent to lay hold of this Opportunity, in order to make such a Peace, as we may daily improve, if our own Indolence, Discontent and

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more March, ey had ided in d been d easily all the pected een reay was o Geroint to ien arreupon vers to vithout might necefleating to lay der to ily imcontent

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and Dissentions do not disable us; and all these fortuitious Circumstances and Events could never have joined, or succeeded one another, if these Troops had been transported by Water, and landed in the Baltick.

I could prove this more copiously, with many convincing Particulars, but have already exceeded the Limits whereunto I proposed to confine myself; but whenever my Pen turns into this Track again, I will not only make this Argument more evident, tho' it must be to many sufficiently fo; from what has been already faid, but also shew you, that the Overtures or Proposals of France, whereof you take Notice, in Page 56, were inconfistent with, and would have been detrimental to the Interest of the Nation. if they had been accepted. But now I will proceed, shortly to recapitulate what the Two B-rs have performed, more than in moral Probability could be expected in our present Circumstances.

I. If we recollect from what has been before related, it will plainly appear, that they have, by their Transactions, intirely frustrated that Naval Plan, which was con-

concerted by our Neighbours, wherein they already were to tar advanced; for the French Navy itself is worsted, and they were not able to cause us to acknowledge a new Maritime Power, or any Settlement in other Parts of the World, the Definite in Treaty, or in Favour of other Powers thereupon depending.

II. They restored the Imperial Crown to the House of Austria, at such a precarious Juncture, when the same was transferr'd to the House of Bavaria, and the most considerable Powers in Germany did oppose the same; by which Means, all Germany is regained to our Interest.

III. By this Means the House of Austria is restored to the Condition of keeping a standing Army of 100,000 Men, provided they imitate their Neighbours, become trugal, and suffer the Military, to be the prevailing Power, in their Countries.

IV. Their obtaining the Hereditary Stadholdership, for the P—— of O——; whereby we can be enabled to have the Service of 50,000 Men upon any Emergency, at once, without Loss of Time;

not as of late, when the Government was divided within itself.

V. The Alliance with Russia; which is of so great Consequence, that it gives the Sway in the Ballance of Power. I cou'd add other Instances of less Importance; but as these, at the first View, are obvious to every Body, they may, at this Time, suffice.

Lastly, Let us here consider, How these and other Advantages, which the Two B——rs, as faithful Guardians of these Nations, have obtained, may be improved.

First, As nothing cou'd be a greater Reproach to our Readiness in making a Peace with our Enemies, than our appearing more ready to go War, with one another; so let us not be content with having ended our Wars Abroad, without being careful to Cultivate all the Advantages of Peace at Home. As we know that nothing can hazard our Liberties and Properties, like Discords and Divisions; fo let us learn, that nothing can more firmly fecure them, than Concord and Unity; without which we shall be sure to make ourselves both the Prey of our Foreign Enemies, and their Scorn at the same Time. Sa

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Competitors in the Administration of State Affairs, and fomenting our own Malignities, in rivalling, undermining, and overthrowing others in Power, let us be ambitious of exerting our better and more laudable Qualities, in such Things, as will promote the Publick and National, more than our own Private Interest and Grandeur.

And, Thirdly, Let us enable our Ministers to establish a good Understanding with our Neighbours, and improve all the Advantages we are capable of, with our Allies; and when we can thus join Hand in Hand, we shall become a much more sourishing and happy People, than we are.

More might be said, and may not be wanting, upon these Subjects, when the Author of this well-mean Endeavour shall find, he has had such hopeful and towardly Readers, among those he design'd it for, that he has not labour'd in vain, more especially with yourself, for whom the same was principally intended, by,

SIR, Yours, &cc.

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