




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


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SPEECH

OF

HON. JOSEPH A. WOODWARD,

OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

ON

THE OREGON QUESTION,

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1846;

**WASHINGTON:
PRINTED BY BLAIR & RIVES.
1846.**

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THE OREGON QUESTION.

Resolution from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, requiring the President to notify Great Britain of the intention of the United States to terminate the joint occupancy of Oregon, and to abrogate the convention of 1827, being under consideration in Committee of the Whole—

Mr. WOODWARD addressed the committee as follows:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I am not of a temperament to take much pleasure in addressing argument to others, in the absence of all hope of being able to influence their opinions, or control their action; and, perhaps, there never was, and never may be, an occasion, less favorable to such hopes, than the present. I know there is, in this committee, a large and determinate majority opposed to me; and that opposition has not diminished my confidence in the justness of my views, or shaken, in the least, my purpose of adhering to them.

Among the great variety of matters discussed, on the other side of the argument, there is one question, that has not, so far as I have heard the debate, been so fortunate as to be included; and that one happens to be the only question properly before the committee. There may be something of severity in this stricture, but I appeal to the justice and the candor of my opponents to bear me out in the general truth of the declaration. We have heard declamation and discourse, interminable, upon the title to Oregon; the importance of that country to the Union; the reasons why the British ought not to have it; the propriety of promoting settlements there; the duty and necessity of extending laws and protection to the settlers, the right to give the notice, &c., &c., &c. Who, sir, denies we have rights in Oregon, or that they must be defended, whenever, or from whatever quarter assailed? Who desires the country to fall into the hands of the British? Who is opposed to its settlement? Who is not ready to vote for all such laws, as may be essential to the well-being of our people there? Who so stupid, as to question the right to give the notice, or to declare war, even, if it suits you to do so? Sir, I am at a loss to conceive, what motive could have induced gentlemen, putting aside the real question of debate, to spring upon the committee innumerable false issues, and to argue them with a solemn vehemence, positively disgusting to the candid and ingenuous mind. Am I to indulge the suspicion, that their purpose has been to exhibit

the minority in a false light before the country?—to put them in a position they never meant to occupy, and to impute to them sentiments and opinions they never entertained, but do utterly repudiate? This might be considered an uncharitable suspicion—and, of course, I would exempt from it all who might be entitled to escape under the plea of ignorance; but with regard to those who are wise and discreet, what could they say, why sentence should not be pronounced upon them? I shall not undertake to affirm, what has been the object of this most extraordinary discussion; but I have no hesitancy in saying what it has, in fact, done: It has perverted and falsified everything it has touched. It has sent forth no shining light to the country, but enveloped everything in darkness. Its only tendency has been, to produce that very thing, which it is the object of free discussion to destroy—ignorance. Sir, I choose not to refrain from speaking with a degree of freedom on this occasion. Sentiments of profound indignation impel me.

Mr. Chairman, let us see what is the question, this committee ought not to have been discussing, and to which my friends in the minority have vainly endeavored to draw your attention.

We have a convention with Great Britain for the joint use and occupancy of the northwest territory. That convention provides, that either party may annul it, by giving twelve months' notice to the other party. And the only question before the committee, upon which there is difference of opinion, is, Shall the notice be given? So, the question is merely one of notice. Nor does it involve the substance of notice, but only the time. All are agreed, that the notice should be given, at some period not very remote. But is it expedient, is it good policy, to give it at the present time? I think it is not. And as it is preposterous to pretend that national honor, or dignity, or essential right, is involved in this matter of time, I maintain that considerations of good policy and expediency ought to direct our councils, and determine our action. And this, sir, is the issue that gentlemen ought to have met, and which the honor of our country, and the welfare of the people, made it their duty to meet, and discuss in an honest and statesmanlike manner. And dismissing every feeling of prejudice from my mind, I now propose to express some views upon this question.

We are not, Mr. Chairman, the advocates of total inactivity on this subject. On the contrary, I believe the time has come when it is proper to adopt such measures as will promote the settlement of the Oregon territory, and give law and protection to our people there. But I do not believe the time has yet come for abrogating the convention of joint occupancy.

It has suited the views and purposes of gentlemen, to represent this policy of masterly inactivity as a South Carolina scheme; as though it was not adopted, as far back as 1818, by the united councils of the nation; as though, after an experience of ten years, it was not again established in 1827, by a unanimity almost unexampled; as though it was not adhered to throughout the twelve years of Andrew Jackson's Administration, and that of Mr. Van Buren; as though South Carolina were doing anything more than advising you not to disturb what so much wisdom and disinterested patriotism had devised and sanctioned, and what so long a period of time had proved to be beneficial. You, sir, and not we, are proposing innovations and new schemes of policy. You are advising to set at naught the councils that have endured throughout five Administrations;—the wisdom of which councils was, all the while, so self-evident and palpable, that the cunning selfishness of party, or the schemes of plotting ambition, never ventured to make a question about it; and I am at a loss to see what else ever could have made a question about it.

Let the committee follow me a moment, while I give a brief account of this matter. Gentlemen represent Great Britain as aiming to keep off, as long as possible, this question of notice; and ourselves, as the dupes of her temporizing policy, destined to be caught in some snare she has laid in the future, for us. I deny that this policy is of British origin. It is our own, both in its beginning and its continuation. The first conception of it we find, in the instructions given, in 1818, to Mr. Rush, at that time our Minister at the Court of St. James. It was the desire of Lord Castlereagh, the English Minister, that the conflicting claims of the two countries, in relation to the northwest territory, should be included among the subjects of negotiation, then pending at London, and be brought to a final adjustment. Mr. Rush sought instructions from his Government, and Mr. J. Q. Adams, then Secretary of State, in his instructions to Mr. Rush, for the first time, sets forth distinctly and most comprehensively the policy of "taking Oregon upon time." Alluding to some things proper to be mentioned by Mr. Rush to Castlereagh, in regard to this matter, Mr. Adams proceeds as follows:

"In suggesting these ideas to Lord Castlereagh, rather in conversation than any more formal manner, it may be proper to remark, the minuteness of the present interest, either to Great Britain or the United States, involved in this concern, and the unwillingness, for that reason, of this Government, to include it among the objects of serious discussion with them. At the same time you might give him to understand, though not unless in a manner to avoid everything offensive in the suggestion, that from the nature of things, if, in the course of future events, it (Oregon) should ever become an object of serious im-

portance to the United States, it can scarcely be supposed, that Great Britain would find it useful or advisable, to resist their claim, to possess it by systematic opposition."

He then adds, that Great Britain could have "no solid interest" to prevent the extension of territory "until all possibility of doing so, should have vanished."

Here, sir, is the first conception of the time that would best secure our rights in Oregon and by recurring to the language of our Secretary (Mr. Adams,) it might be inferred that he entertained some doubts, whether it would ever become an object of importance to the United States, to possess themselves of that country. But I admit he spoke as a diplomatist.

Now, in 1818, Great Britain was in the exclusive and adverse possession of Oregon. And yet, high a value did our diplomatist set on the act of time, to fortify our rights, he desired to avail himself of all negotiations, and leave to Great Britain all advantage which exclusive and adverse possession would give her in future negotiations. He thought time worth more to us than exclusive, adverse possession to Great Britain. But fortunately a species of convention was hit upon, which, while it did not conflict with our policy of procrastination, gave nothing to Great Britain, but in fact destroyed the adverse character of her possession, and prevented the legal effect of such a possession in future negotiations upon the title. And gentlemen tell you this convention was a scheme of Great Britain to advance her interest and undermine ours! I have said, Great Britain, in point of fact, took nothing by the convention. Her exclusive occupancy was a state of things persistent to the convention. We did not stipulate for the purpose of occupying, but, simply, of occupancy, claimed by both parties, as a right prior to, and independent of, convention, should not be made a cause of quarrel. You will perceive, therefore, from what has been said and quoted, our diplomatist, so far from being disinclined to the convention, was, in fact, in the first instance, anxious to adopt a policy far less to our advantage; that is, to avoid all negotiations, and leave Great Britain in exclusive and adverse possession.

Such, sir, was the beginning of this policy, that masterly act of diplomacy; and who among great and patriotic men of the day disapproved it?

Well, sir, in 1827, the term of the convention of 1818 was about to expire, and negotiations were to be renewed: Was any new policy then recommended by the venerable gentleman from Massachusetts, then President of the United States? No, sir. Notwithstanding we had acquired the title to Spain, and, perhaps, supposed we had some reason to feel indignant, that Great Britain, under her new state of the question, should still dispute it with us, the stipulations of 1818 were renewed in 1828; and I have yet to learn that the people, not, with one voice, approve. What said Mr. Monro, Gallatin, Crawford, Clay, Lowndes, Clinton, and Van Buren? What did Andrew Jackson say? At this time the second contest between Mr. Adams and General Jackson had reached its highest pitch of excitement. The whole political life of Mr. Adams was scrutinized with no feelings of indulgent charity. It was a favorite object of the opposing party to fix upon him an unfair

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liness to the interests of his own country; in his diplomatic transactions. Every saying and doing of his, that might be worked up into available political stock, was assiduously collected and exhibited in hold coloring to the country. And yet, I have never heard that the treaty of 1823, which, fastidious gentlemen now say, subjected our soil to be dishonored by British footsteps, was brought forward as one of the misdeeds of Mr. Adams. It was never once objected, that, setting no value upon the newly acquired title of Spain, he sanctioned a treaty in 1823, no more favorable to his country than that of 1818, when we were not possessed of the Spanish title.

Nor can it be pretended there was some strange oversight in this matter—that it was kept as a Cabinet secret. The whole subject came up incidentally in this House, and was here placed before the American people; and what said James K. Polk on that occasion? “By delay we can lose nothing; by acting now we hazard much.” The subject directly under discussion was a bill extending law to Oregon, and authorizing a military establishment at the mouth of the Columbia river; but not for giving this “notice.”

In connexion with the treaty of 1823, there is another fact not to be overlooked. Notwithstanding the acquisition of the Spanish title, and the greatly-increased wealth and strength of our country, we were again desirous that the convention should be made irrevocable for ten years, as in 1818. But the British Minister objected. Seeing how time was working for us and against his sovereign, he insisted on the right, at any time, to abrogate the convention, by giving twelve months’ “notice;” and this was the British part of the policy. But it is not at all surprising that this fact should be overlooked by gentlemen.

In 1829 Andrew Jackson took the Chair of State. Who ever suspected Old Hickory of being afraid of anything? Or who ever charged him with being on the British side of any question? The diplomatic transactions of 1823 were then fresh. What said he to them? Our Oregon interest was committed by the country to the charge and keeping of the treaty-making power. He was the great head and initiatory functionary of that power. There was a paramount obligation resting on him to see that the country suffered no detriment in this matter. Unless he acted first, no one else could act at all; and he had it in his power to cause the notice to be given at any time. But throughout the period of his eight years of public service, and the four years of Mr. Van Buren, which followed, not a word was said by either on this subject. Indeed, the Jackson party, in the year 1829, voted down the bill of Governor Floyd, which went no further than to give law and protection to our emigrants to Oregon; and I am proud to be able to say, that there is no other difference between General Jackson and ourselves on this subject than this: while he was not only unwilling to give the notice himself, but opposed, also, to the enactment of any laws for Oregon, which might induce Great Britain to give the notice, we are opposed to notice only, and are in favor of laws. While he declined both to give notice, or to take the risk of receiving it, we are prepared to take that risk.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, I have given a brief his-

tory of our Oregon policy. I have shown how it has been approved by all our statesmen, patriots, and warriors; by the people and the politicians; by all political parties, uniformly, from the beginning to a very recent date; when, all of a sudden, the discovery is made, that it is an anti-American policy; that it is dishonorable to the country; that it has tarnished the national escutcheon, and brought a very pollution upon our soil; and that all who advocate it are on the British side of the question! Sir, what is the vile spirit of partisan demagoguism not capable of!

But certain gentlemen have come to the high-minded conclusion, that it would be dishonest to take Oregon by operation of time under the convention. This is a most unaccountable objection. The convention is no stipulation for mutual favor or advantage; no agreement between the parties for the reciprocal support of each other’s rights and interests. It is in the nature of an armistice. Each nation claimed rights prior to, and independent of, the convention; not reciprocal, but adverse and antagonistical; and being unable to adjust the difficulty, they agreed not to go to war, but to forbear for a season. I say, the convention was, to all intents and purposes, an armistice. And who ever heard that an armistice disabled the parties to make ready for war? or, when war did come, made it dishonorable for them to use any advantage that time or other resource had placed in their hands? Sir, the consideration of the advantage that time would bring us, was the only consideration that induced us to enter into that convention; and our Minister openly avowed it. Our Secretary instructed Mr. Rush to say to Lord Castlereagh, of course, in as polite a manner as possible, “that if, in the course of future events, it [Oregon] should ever become an object of importance to the United States, it could scarcely be supposed that Great Britain would find it useful or desirable to resist their claims.” Castlereagh saw the policy of the United States, and himself predicted it would be successful in the end. And yet, when we propose to avail ourselves of the only consideration that induced us to enter into the convention, we are told it would be a fraud upon Great Britain! But I will argue no longer a proposition so consummately ridiculous. If making laws for our citizens in Oregon displeases Great Britain, let her give the “notice.”

But while some gentlemen think our reliance upon time inconsistent with good faith, others esteem it deceptive and futile. What, they ask, will delay do for us? What, I ask, has it done for us since 1818? It has increased ten millions of people to twenty millions; covered the valley of the Mississippi with a warlike race of men; extended population, arts, and agriculture, far towards the region of Oregon. Time has, in all respects, advanced our strength, relatively to Great Britain and the world. The last three years have sent 7,000 people to Oregon; exceeding, threefold, the British residents there. If we had had forty millions of people, Mr. Polk would never have offered to compromise upon 49°; and if we had had twenty million in 1818, we would never have entered into the convention; for twenty millions then would have given us as great relative strength as forty millions now. These are the things that time is doing; and this progression is, in all respects, still steadily an-

rapidly onward. Gentlemen are sensible of this, and have expatiated on the very idea, without being conscious they were arguing against themselves. In what vivid colors has the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BOWLIN] painted the growing greatness and future grandeur of our country? And yet, in a few moments, he asks, what is time going to do for us towards getting Oregon? He pictured to the imagination the valley of the Great River, in a political and commercial point of view, rising in colossal magnificence, with its hundred millions of human beings, and innumerable cities, and marts of unimaginable wealth, throwing the petty Atlantic States into utter insignificance by the contrast; and yet he gravely asks, what is time going to do for us? He has gazed at our western tide of immigration, now beating against the Stony mountains, now flowing beyond and spreading over the great geographic slope of the Pacific ocean; he has seen, in fancy, our children going west, instead of east, to Japan and China, and has exhibited to our wondering vision myriads of rich and elegant fabrics, from the workshops of those ancient peoples, (numbering 300,000,000,) gorging every storehouse of our western continent; and still he asks, indignantly, what is time going to do for us? And all this stupendous future he represents to be close at hand, looming, as it were, in the sensible horizon, like the blue eminence of the Stony mountains. But he does not cease to exclaim, impatiently, what is time going to do for us? Why, sir, can it be possible, that the honorable member means to intimate, that these sublime results, this tremendous destiny, is to depend upon our first getting ... getting at this very moment, the barren deserts, the everlasting snows, the mountain crags ... erns, north of the 49th parallel?

Mr. Charman, it is because I have a degree of faith in the gorgeous picture drawn by the honorable member, that I would, confidently, have left this matter to time. Time, which is to bring to pass these great events, will bring with them, and as a part of them, Oregon—the whole of Oregon. The period is rapidly approaching, when Great Britain will perceive the uselessness of attempting to resist our claims—when, in the language of the venerable gentleman from Massachusetts, in 1818, “all hope of doing so will have vanished.” You will thus avoid the calamities of war, and yet be able to make your own terms. You may take the whole of Oregon, if you think you are entitled to the whole. England will be at your mercy—at your mercy not only in relation to Oregon, but all the possessions she has upon this continent.

Gentlemen have laid down the proposition that “the notice is not war itself, or cause of war;” and, with earnestness and gravity, have argued out the proposition. I shall not venture a rencontre upon this point; but will beg gentlemen to listen to an observation or two. The convention of 1818 was, in the language of the venerable gentleman from Massachusetts, “the alternative of instant war.” Now, the notice will take away this alternative; and though “not war itself or cause of war,” it will prove itself a most potent destroyer of a cause of peace. In 1818, the cause of war was the disputed title to Oregon. The notice will again render this cause active and operative, and leave no alternative but negotiation or war. And I believe there are none who will deny, that, if we in-

sist on our claims to 54° 40', negotiations will be impossible, and war inevitable. I, therefore, feel at liberty to say, that all who vote for this notice, with a view to claim the whole territory, knowingly vote for war; and they ought, in candor, to admit the fact, and not deceive the country.

Mr. Chairman, it is a remarkable fact, that although I stand here in a minority, the views I entertain and policy I advocate meet the approbation of a large majority of this body and of the other branch of the National Legislature. I know what I am saying, and I know the ground upon which I stand when I say it. The great majority of the Whigs, if not all of them, admit, I think, that the time had not come for abrogating the convention, and deprecate the agitation of this question; but they say, now that the matter is set on foot, the sooner we get rid of it the better. Well, sir, the venerable gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. ADAMS,] the author of the convention of 1818, and its renewal in 1827, still believes it the true policy for getting the whole of Oregon, and he has abandoned that policy solely on account of the admission of Texas into the Union; and this I will prove out of his own mouth. At the last session of Congress, in debating the Oregon bill reported by Mr. Brown, of Tennessee, the venerable member said:

“At the last session I was not prepared to act upon this subject at all. I was not then prepared to agree to a termination of the joint occupancy of that territory (Oregon); but I am ready now to do so, and am satisfied this subject should now be settled.” * * * * “I am as much as any member of this House for bringing this issue to a point.”

Again, in his next speech on that occasion, the honorable gentleman said:

“It was not without much serious deliberation that I came to the determination, before this debate commenced, to agree to give notice to the British Government that this thing must be settled.”

The Oregon debate, at the last session, commenced two days after the passage by the House of the Texas resolutions; and by considering carefully the extracts I have read, it will appear that during that short interval, or thereabouts, the views of the venerable gentleman in regard to Oregon underwent a radical change. Just before then, “he was not prepared to act at all” on the subject of Oregon; then “he was as much as any member of this House for bringing this issue to a point.” But I need not labor to connect the gentleman’s purposes in regard to Oregon with his sentiments concerning Texas. He himself has made the thing sufficiently manifest. In the conclusion of the speech alluded to, he uses the following remarkable language:

“He wished to have the reasons given to the world for our taking seven degrees of latitude, and perhaps more; and when we took it, too, he hoped we should have it defined geographically, defined politically, and, more than all the rest, defined morally.”

Who does not remember the vehement emphasis with which the venerable gentleman announced the word *morally*. If what I have stated is not satisfactory, go read carefully the speeches to which I have alluded, and the proof will be found so perfectly conclusive, that the venerable gentle-

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man could not, in the face of this House, deny the fact, without jeopardizing his character as a man of honor. Doubtless the honorable gentleman considered it perfectly fair to get additional territory north, to counterpoise Texas in the south. But there is one consideration worthy of your special attention: the honorable gentleman has himself afforded the most conclusive evidence that the settled and abiding conviction of his mind has been, that the true and effectual policy for securing Oregon, is the joint-occupancy scheme. Now, if it be, in reality, the object of the honorable gentleman to save Oregon, why should he, on account of Texas, abandon that policy? Why not, rather, adhere the closer to it? Can it be that the honorable gentleman has been reasoning, as all prudent and sagacious men have been reasoning about this city, that a war with Great Britain would end in the loss of Oregon, and the acquisition of New Brunswick and the Canadas? Good backing for the Eastern States against both the South and the West!

I could bring to the attention of the committee other collateral causes that have aided in generating this large majority for the notice; but I forbear.

I have, however, a matter to propound to certain of my western friends, who have signalized themselves in this debate, as going for the "whole of Oregon," and a little beyond, to make it absolutely certain, they get enough. Some three or four of these gentlemen, the most *ultra* of all, do admit the fact, that Mr. Polk having offered the 49th parallel, will be bound to accept it, if it should now be offered by Great Britain. And they acknowledge they would feel bound to sustain him in the fact. Now, if those gentlemen are sincere in professing to go for more of Oregon than the rest of us, why will they, by passing this notice, force on negotiations under auspices so unfavorable? Why will they, by making an issue that may lead to war, put Great Britain under the urgent motives the alternative of war would present, to make the proposal which Mr. Polk is bound to accept? If this notice be not, with them, a mere humbug; if this cry for the "whole or none" be anything else than a political hobby, why will not gentlemen permit this matter to lie over, until a new Administration shall come in uncommitted to 49°. Am I to suspect that gentlemen are really anxious for the settlement of this question, and to be relieved of its terrible responsibilities; and that this *whole-hogism* is only meant to be used hereafter as an *ex post facto* hobby in elections; when, having been opposed to giving up any part of Oregon, is to constitute a high claim to office; just as having been opposed to the northeastern boundary treaty seems, at this time, in certain quarters, to be relied on as constituting a meritorious claim to popular favor?

I have not, Mr. Chairman, thought proper to argue the question of title. It is not properly before the committee. The question here is as to the most effectual means of securing our rights in Oregon. We are not debating rights, but remedies. I have investigated the matter of title laboriously, and have come to conclusions satisfactory to myself. And I think we should never give up any portion of the territory south of 49°. But the people, having to do the fighting if war come, and being, therefore, entitled to decide for themselves

whether there shall be war, and how much of Oregon they can conscientiously go to war for; should, when they take the matter in hand, be possessed of the full argument on both sides. And as the letters of Messrs. Calhoun and Buchanan have been sent forth, I deem it proper to suggest that their arguments were intended for the British Minister, and not for the public; and if you suppose they considered all they said as gospel, you never labored under a greater mistake. What are the circumstances? Here is a controversy about land between Great Britain and the United States. The United States engage Messrs. Calhoun and Buchanan to argue our side of the question; Great Britain appoints Mr. Pakenham to argue hers. Now, it was the business of each to make the most of his side of the question. This is the practice of lawyers the world over. If Mr. Pakenham left his side unargued, it was not Mr. Calhoun's business to argue it for him. I would not insinuate that our Secretaries stated anything that was not true. I mean to say, it was their duty to sum up the facts and considerations in our favor, and nothing besides. But when the argument shall be taken out of diplomacy, and committed to the people, they will act in the character of judges; and a judge should always hear both sides of a question fully and fairly stated, especially if he is about to decide upon his own rights.

Mr. Chairman, the prominent position held by the venerable gentleman from Massachusetts upon this question, the reliance which the friends of "notice" seem to place upon his co-operation, and the great weight his name is likely to have with the community and the world, make it my duty, as I conceive, to take some further notice of his course in this matter. All eyes here are turned towards him; all encomium and adulation are heaped upon him; and, indeed, if any one here may be called a leader, he is, unquestionably, that person. The venerable gentleman professes to be the friend of peace; but look, sir, at his conduct. Last winter he pronounced the notice a war measure; calling it a "terrible question." Nor can he pretend it was an inadvertency; for the point before the House was, whether the power to give the notice was with the Congress, or with the President; and his whole argument in favor of the power being in Congress, rested upon the single proposition that the "notice was war." His effort, at that time, was to postpone action until Greenhow's book, ordered by the House, could be procured, and the people made acquainted with the evidence of our title. This *ex parte* argument would, he supposed, stimulate the popular mind up to 54° 40'. Let his speech be consulted. Well, sir, having carried this point most successfully, he now tells you to "pass the notice; it is perfectly peaceful; no harm in it."

Thus the only important objection against notice being removed, he then assures you that you can pass no laws in relation to Oregon until you have first given the notice; leaving you no alternative, but to give the notice, or abandon utterly your people there, and every measure to promote the settlement of the country: notwithstanding he, himself, in 1825, recommended certain laws to be passed on the subject, and notwithstanding, too, the British Government admitted our right to make needful laws, and denied expressly that Great

Britain intended to "prevent the progress of American settlements." By all this, he would persuade you that the notice is both a harmless thing and an indispensable thing; and, as such, of course no one could hesitate to vote for it. Conceiving, then, the convention to be abrogated and the contest to be brought to a point, the next object to be attained is, to excite the two nations to the most uncompromising pertinacity in their respective demands. He therefore, in terms of taunt and derision, predicts that if Great Britain should stand firm, "Mr. Polk and the Democratic party will back out." He then turns about, and applies language of the

same import to Great Britain, upon the supposition that Mr. Polk should stand firm. Thus does he aim to nettle each party to the conflict, by all those powerful impulses that spring from national pride and sensibility. Two haughty and imperious nations, that would rather suffer annihilation than be humbled and abased before the world. And yet the venerable gentleman says he is opposed to war. He opposed to war! What more could he, or any one man, have done, to bring about the bloody catastrophe?

[Here the Speaker's hammer fell.]

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