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The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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
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PM at NATO Meeting on Geneva Summit

After the post-Summit meeting of NATO leaders in Brussels on November 21, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney made the following statements to the press.

"The [US] president spoke in great detail and with great candour about his meetings in Geneva and I am heartened by the productive personal relationships that the president seems to have established with General Secretary Gorbachev, and their agreement as well to meet on a regular basis in the future. The Geneva meeting has established, I think, some simple but powerful truths that success in summity at this level is predicated upon a number of things, including the strengths and resolve of the United States and its president and the unity and determination of our Alliance, NATO. The new Soviet leadership, I think, understands and respects these realities and because of this a constructive dialogue was initiated in Geneva. The Summit was clearly well prepared and I can tell you that members of the Alliance were well consulted throughout and prior thereto. There are many chapters still to be written, but I think an important prologue was begun at Geneva. As I have indicated, Canada is pleased with the productive, personal relationship established and most of all the expressed determination of the two leaders to meet on a regular basis and deal with the real issues of arms limitation in a nuclear age to which the Government of Canada and all Canadians are deeply committed....

I see a substantial improvement in the situation from where we were. First of all, for six years there have been no meetings. Now we have a two-and-a-half



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (right) with United States President Ronald Reagan (left) and Lord Carrington, NATO Secretary-General, at Brussels meeting on November 21. PMO

day meeting taking place, breaking free from the agenda, with spontaneous unrehearsed, apparently very cordial and productive personal relations developing. I see that first of all. I see an abundance of important, but not paramount, in terms of arms control, arms limitation agreements undertaken.... I see as well a personal undertaking by Mr. Gorbachev to go to Washington next year for further discussions and President Reagan in 1987 to spend an extended period of time in Moscow. I mean, that to me represents a substantially changed climate and it's within an improved climate that substantial and real progress is possible. So I'm not euphoric. I don't think anyone is. But I think realism suggests that we ought to be happy with the progress that we have known."

The Disarmament Bulletin is published periodically by the Department of External Affairs. It is intended to be a source of information on arms control and disarmament issues to a broad spectrum of Canadians. If you wish to be placed on our mailing list, or need additional copies, please write to: Editor, The Disarmament Bulletin, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Dept. of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2. Cette publication existe également en français.



SSEA Addresses House of Commons on US-USSR Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations

On January 23, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made the following statement in the House of Commons on the US-USSR nuclear arms control negotiations.

"For Canadians, no duty is more challenging than to contribute constructively to peace among nations. In a world threatened by the spread of arms, we are one country who, decades ago, chose deliberately not to acquire nuclear weapons. We had the capacity. We made the choice, not as a gesture, but as a practical contribution to the control of arms. That is part of the character of Canada.

One of the first acts of this Government was to reconstitute the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs. On October 31, meeting with that Group, the Prime Minister spelled out six Canadian goals in arms control and disarmament:

1. negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability;
2. maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
3. negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban;
4. support for a comprehensive test ban treaty;
5. prevention of an arms race in outer space; and
6. the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

A year ago, in a statement in Parliament, I expressed the Government's satisfaction at the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to resume negotiations in Geneva. The decision to meet again, and to expand the agenda to encompass the prevention

of an arms race in outer space and its termination on earth, was an act of confidence and statesmanship. These negotiations have been underway for nine months now.

As I said last year, we should be under no illusion that the course at Geneva will be an easy one. It will be long and arduous. We are encouraged by the signs of progress, in particular, the tabling last fall of detailed American and Soviet proposals which contained some important common features: a 50 per cent reduction of nuclear arsenals, limits on warheads as well as launchers, and sublimits on ICBM warheads. We hope that, in this International Year of Peace, the experienced negotiators of both sides will be able to enlarge significantly on this common ground. Agreement on an equitable formula for the radical reduction of nuclear forces and on the appropriate relationship between offensive and defensive strategies and systems will remain the key challenges.

We welcome the broad-ranging proposal issued last week by General Secretary Gorbachev and its reaffirmation of the Soviet Union's commitment to nuclear disarmament. That is the most recent in a long history of suggestions, by both superpowers, on how to achieve general and complete disarmament. In this context conventional arms, where the Soviet Union has an overwhelming superiority, will also have to find their place. The Soviet Union has the opportunity to address this imbalance in its response to the Western proposal, tabled in Vienna last month, at the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

The Soviet Union does not address the issue of missiles deployed in Asia. But we take satisfaction from the fact that Mr. Gorbachev seems to be moving closer to President Reagan's 1981 zero-zero proposal on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The explicit Soviet recognition of the importance of verification in the negotiation of

arms control is gratifying, as is the apparent movement towards long-standing Western positions on the need for on-site inspection. The exact nature of what the Soviets will accept in this regard will have to be determined. We also note potentially constructive references to issues before other arms control forums.

It is, of course, too early to offer more than this tentative assessment of the proposals. They contain some intriguing new elements alongside well-worn positions and some disturbing preconditions that could hamper negotiation. They clearly warrant very serious consideration, but there are also many aspects that require clarification in the ongoing negotiations. The real test of the Soviet Union's commitment to radical and verifiable arms reductions will come when it moves from the stage of public diplomacy to the confidential confines of the negotiating room.

The Geneva Summit and the decision to regularize this high-level contact improve the prospects for progress in arms control. Besides bringing leaders together, regular meetings build in an annual accounting of progress on arms control and encourage leaders to resolve issues which negotiators cannot.

Through the channels open to us, Canada will actively encourage the conduct of serious and constructive negotiations. The House should note the extraordinary degree to which the United States has informed and consulted with its Allies since the Geneva process was resumed. The Prime Minister's personal meetings and conversations with President Reagan provide a continuing avenue of Canadian influence on the Administration's positions on arms control.

In December, in Brussels, I convened a special meeting of Canadian arms control ambassadors to identify specific areas where Canada might contribute to practical progress. One instrument is to press within NATO for more frequent and focused consultation on the state of the various arms control negotiations and their implications for Alliance policies.



We will not, however, be talking only amongst ourselves. This Government is committed to promoting a more active and meaningful dialogue with the countries of the Eastern bloc. In September the Prime Minister wrote to General Secretary Gorbachev outlining Canadian views and priorities with respect to arms control and disarmament. Last month I sent a team of Canadian officials to Moscow for consultations on arms control with the top Soviet experts, Ambassadors Petrovsky and Karpov. Similar consultations are planned with other East European countries this year. We are ensuring that the key players in international security affairs are made directly aware of Canadian views.

What else can Canada do? What special practical contributions can we make to arms control?

This Government's activity will be focused in three directions: 1) encouraging compliance with existing treaties; 2) developing verification mechanisms and 3) building confidence between East and West.


To deviate from a policy of full compliance is to threaten the credibility, and hence the viability, of arms control. Canada firmly supports the regime created by the ABM Treaty and the existing SALT agreements on limiting strategic forces. Our stance towards SDI research is rooted in the need to conform strictly with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. We will continue to urge the parties to these treaties to do nothing to undermine their integrity, but rather work to reinforce their status and authority.

Effective verification provisions can help ensure compliance with arms control treaties as well as facilitate their negotiation. Verification is an area where Canadian expertise and diplomacy come together. At the UN this fall, a Canadian-initiated resolution on verification was unanimously adopted. We are second to none in our activity to develop verification procedures and technology that meet the practical requirements of arms control agreements actually under negotiation or envisaged.

To cite only the most important projects recently completed or underway:

1. the Peace Satellite, or *PAXSAT*, project examines the technical feasibility of a satellite-based system for monitoring potential arms control agreements covering outer space or conventional forces in Europe;
2. research into seismic technology for detecting low-yield nuclear tests that pose a major obstacle in the way of agreement on a nuclear test ban;
3. the elaboration of operational procedures for effective investigation of incidents of alleged chemical weapons use, the results of which have recently been handed over to the UN Secretary-General;
4. the tabling at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva of a working paper on the nature of the legal regime governing outer space.

We must not forget that the prospects for progress on arms control are clearly linked to an improvement in the general East-West relationship. Confidence can be gradually generated through political



The Secretary of State for External Affairs addressing the House of Commons on January 23.

Canapress

actions that promote East-West consultation and cooperation.

The enhancement of the political dialogue with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and the inclusion in it of a healthy element of people-to-people contact are major objectives of our Government. This past year has seen an impressive number of high-level visits between Canada and Eastern bloc states. Both the Prime Minister and I visited the Soviet Union, and Mr. Kelleher and Mme Vézina travelled *inter alia* to Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. We received in Canada the Romanian President, the Premier of the Russian Republic and the Deputy Prime Minister of Hungary.

Canada was host to the Human Rights Experts Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and is playing an active part in the other CSCE-mandated meetings which are working to realize the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. These include the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures, the Bern meeting on human contacts, and the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting which will convene in November to review the whole spectrum of CSCE activity. Last summer I joined the Foreign Ministers of the other CSCE participating states in Helsinki to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act and to reaffirm our commitment to increase the level of security and cooperation in Europe. Canada believes the CSCE can be an important vehicle for advancing our security and humanitarian goals.

So, as the fourth round of Soviet-American nuclear arms talks gets underway in Geneva, this Government will assist, in every way possible, the process of negotiation towards an equitable agreement. By encouraging compliance with the fundamental arms control treaties, by developing practical solutions to verification problems and by supporting an improvement in the East-West political relationship, Canada can make a distinctive and significant contribution to realizing the critical objectives of the Geneva negotiations. That is our goal, our duty, and our Canadian tradition."



Canada Achieves Breakthrough on Verification Question at UN

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

At its first Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, the United Nations General Assembly agreed by consensus in paragraph 91 of the Final Document that: "In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements."

In paragraph 92 of the Final Document, the General Assembly agreed that: "In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered...."

No in-depth examination of the concept of verification has taken place since UNSSOD I. Indeed, it has been argued by some that the question of verification cannot be considered in isolation from specific arms limitation measures.

In recent years, the importance of verification has tended to be minimized by some who have regarded insistence on high levels of verification as a pretext for not engaging in meaningful disarmament negotiations.

The Canadian Government has always regarded verification as a key issue. In 1979, following the adoption of the Final Document, it gave very serious thought to this aspect of the consensus document. Its review of 20 years of arms control and disarmament negotiations confirmed that verification was a central problem which, unfortunately, was often misunderstood.

An arms control agreement is essentially a compromise in which each side bases part or all of its national security on the promises of the other contracting parties rather than on the strength of its

own weaponry. Consequently, reciprocal confidence that all parties will live up to their obligations is essential. Promises of restraint, therefore, have to be accompanied by means to ensure that promises are kept. By confirming that activities which are prohibited by agreements are not taking place and that parties are fulfilling their obligations, verification may help to generate a climate of international confidence. That is indispensable for progress in arms control. In light of these considerations, Canada assigned a high priority to research in the area of verification.

At the second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982, the former Prime Minister of Canada expressed the view that the international community should address itself to verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s. As he pointed out at the time, the work on verification should prepare the way for arms control agreements that still lie ahead.

In 1983, the Government gave practical expression to these views when it announced the establishment of a verification research programme with an annual budget of \$1 million. The Canadian programme aims at coming to grips, in very practical ways, with the essential reality of today: the continuing sense of mistrust and the need for an improved climate of confidence, for concrete disarmament commitments and for respect for them.

After unsuccessful attempts in 1980 and 1984 to have the United Nations focus on the question of verification, Canada managed a breakthrough at UNGA 40 when, on December 16, 1985, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a Canadian-initiated resolution [40/152(0)] entitled *Verification in All its Aspects* which called upon member states:

"to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1986,

their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification...."

In putting forward this resolution, Canada was joined by ten other co-sponsors: Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Costa Rica, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Canada's aim was, first, to set out the picture of what governments had agreed to, by consensus, regarding verification. By having the United Nations reaffirm the provisions on verification contained in the Final Document, Canada hoped to clear the air regarding this concept, to gain a degree of common understanding and to enable the United Nations to initiate some useful groundwork on this subject.

In presenting the draft resolution to the First Committee of the General Assembly, Mr. Douglas Roche, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, outlined the long-standing Canadian interest in verification and addressed some of the main concerns that have been expressed about the concept. In defending the generic approach adopted in the resolution, he recognized the validity of the view that verification provisions had to be agreement-specific, but he pointed out that this did not exclude advance work on verification which would produce a source on verification principles, procedures and techniques from which disarmament negotiators might draw.

"It is obvious that verification provisions will always have to be tailored to the purposes, scope and nature of any specific agreement to which they apply. This was recognized in the UNSSOD I Final Document and it is recognized in our draft resolution.

We believe, however, that work should and can be done, in advance, on certain principles, procedures and techniques."



Mr. Roche gave examples of the work which Canada had done on its own or together with others in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in advance of any specific agreements:

- (a) the seismic data exchange (in the CD framework);
- (b) a manual of procedures for investigating allegations of chemical weapons use;
- (c) a study of the technique of space-to-space remote sensing by satellites;
- (d) a study of the technique of ground-to-space remote sensing by instruments of astronomy.

As he pointed out further, "The proposal made by France at UNSSOD I in 1978 concerning an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, which most members of the UN agreed should be studied further, is another example of the conceptual development of verification techniques in advance of specific agreements."

In concluding his statement, Mr. Roche drew attention to the role of the United Nations in verification:

"The scope of our draft includes the question of the role of the UN in verification which requires some examination by the UN since all Member States have an interest in this aspect of the subject. This, I might add, is a subject in which Canadians concerned with questions of arms control and disarmament expressed considerable interest at a recent meeting that reviewed the activities of the UN in disarmament."

The adoption of the Canadian-initiated resolution reflects the growing awareness within the world community of the importance of verification in facilitating the negotiating process. The new attitude towards verification has been evident in the amount of attention it has received in public statements by world leaders since the adoption of the resolution. The basis for a productive discussion of this central issue at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in the fall has thus been laid.

Canadian-Initiated Verification Resolution

Co-sponsored by: Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Verification in all its aspects

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the urgent need to reach agreements on arms limitation and disarmament measures capable of contributing to the maintenance of peace and security,

Convinced that, if such measures are to be effective, they must be fair and balanced, acceptable to all parties, their substance must be clear and compliance with them must be evident,

Reaffirming its conviction, as expressed in the Final Document adopted by consensus at its first special session devoted to disarmament, that in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements,

Reiterating its view that:

- (a) Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties;
- (b) The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement;
- (c) Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process;
- (d) Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed,

Recalling also that:

(a) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered;

(b) Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development,

Believing that verification techniques should be developed as an objective means of determining compliance with agreements, and appropriately taken into account in the course of disarmament negotiations,

1. *Calls upon* Member States to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures;
2. *Invites* all Member States, bearing in mind the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than April 15, 1986, their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a report containing the views and suggestions of Member States;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects" under the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session: implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session."



How Canada and Others Voted at the Fortieth Session of the United Nations

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 40), which met from September 17 to December 18, adopted 66 arms control and disarmament (ACD) resolutions (20 of them without a vote). This number represented approximately 25 per cent of the total of 259 resolutions adopted at the session.

Since the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 when a consensus was reached on a Final Document which set out guidelines relating to arms control and disarmament issues, there have been two noticeable trends:

- (a) an increase in the number of ACD resolutions; and
- (b) a greater fragmentation of views on

The wide divergence of views regarding the 66 ACD resolutions adopted is evidenced in the voting record of the following countries, which include representatives of the various geographical groups:

	YES	NO	ABSTAIN	ABSENT
Tanzania	63 (95.5%)	0	3 (4.5%)	
Mexico	60 (91%)	0	5 (7.5%)	1 (1.5%)
USSR	59 (89%)	3 (4.5%)	4 (6.5%)	
Greece	57 (86%)	0	9 (14%)	
Sweden	54 (82%)	0	12 (18%)	
Argentina	54 (82%)	0	12 (18%)	
India	48 (73%)	1 (1.5%)	16 (24%)	1 (1.5%)
China	48 (73%)	0	15 (22.5%)	3 (4.5%)
Japan	42 (64%)	8 (12%)	16 (24%)	
Canada	41 (62%)	12 (18%)	13 (20%)	
Federal Republic of Germany	36 (55%)	12 (18%)	18 (27%)	
USA	29 (44%)	27 (41%)	10 (15%)	

(Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania are the countries which issued the six-nation joint appeals to the two superpowers regarding nuclear weapons and outer space.)



Delegates in United Nations First Committee voting on arms control and disarmament resolution. UN Photo

ACD issues as indicated in the move away from consensus.

In the period from 1978 to 1985, the number of ACD resolutions increased from 41 to 66. At the same time, the number of these resolutions adopted without a vote dropped from 43.9 to 30 per cent. (The 30 per cent represents a slight improvement from the low of 27 per cent reached in 1983 at UNGA 38 and the 28.6 per cent at UNGA 39.)

At the 1985 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) last May, Canada joined others in expressing concern about the implications of these trends during the discussion of the role of the United Nations in disarmament (which will continue at UNDC 1986). In its view, attention had to be paid to the growing demands that arms control and disarmament were making on the General Assembly and its First Committee which dealt with these issues. The First Committee could not



do justice to so many issues in the six or seven weeks available to it. Moreover, not enough time and effort was being devoted to trying to reach common approaches to these issues. The danger inherent in this situation, as Canada saw it, was that "decisions taken by straight majority vote (and these now account for two-thirds of the First Committee's resolutions) without regard to the views of a minority whose support may be essential for their implementation may lose their credibility."

Similar conclusions had been reached earlier by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Writing in the *Disarmament Times* (February 1985), Mr. Jozef Goldblat of the Institute pointed out that UNGA resolutions on arms control and disarmament had made little impact on the course of arms control negotiations partly because their proliferation had reduced their value and partly because, in some cases, resolutions adopted on the same issue contained divergent recommendations.

As Mr. Goldblat pointed out, "All such resolutions ceased to play the main role originally assigned to them, namely, that of serving as a sounding board for ideas and proposals." Of considerable importance as well was the fact that "those voting in favour do not necessarily include all the militarily significant states, that is, states whose consent is indispensable to reach a disarmament agreement. Therefore the important role of the General Assembly, that of providing guidance for arms control talks, is no longer fulfilled either."

Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) Resolutions at UNGA 40

(Total ACD Resolutions Adopted — 66)

Resolutions marked with an asterisk were co-sponsored by Canada.
Countries in parentheses are lead sponsors.

RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (41 including 20 adopted without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote)
40/94B (Finland)	Study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones	WOV
40/82 (Egypt)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East	WOV
40/83 (Pakistan)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	104-3-41
40/89A (Mauritius)	Denuclearization of Africa	148-0-6
40/79 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	139-0-7
*40/152B (UK)	Bilateral nuclear-arms and space arms negotiations	107-0-40
40/18 (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	76-0-12
40/81 (New Zealand)	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	116-4-29
40/152G (Mexico)	Nuclear winter	141-1-10
*40/94G (Canada)	Fissionable material for weapons purposes	145-1-7
40/86 (Pakistan)	International arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	142-0-6
*40/94M (Egypt)	Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	138-0-11
40/91A (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	WOV
40/91B (Sweden)	Reduction of military budgets	113-13-15
*40/94K (UK)	Objective information on military matters	107-13-16
40/94C (Denmark)	Study on conventional disarmament	WOV
40/84 (Sweden)	Conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	WOV
40/94A (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	128-0-8
*40/92B (Canada)	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	WOV
*40/92C (USA)	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	112-16-22
40/87 (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	151-0-2
40/152D (Mexico)	Comprehensive programme of disarmament	WOV
40/150 (Romania)	Economic and social consequences of the armaments race	139-1-7
40/152F (13 initiators)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	WOV
40/152L (Nigeria)	Second Disarmament Decade	WOV
40/94N (Australia)	Disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security	99-0-53



RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION	VOTE
40/94D (Australia)	Radiological weapons	WOV
40/94F (Sweden)	Study on the naval arms race	146-1-3
*40/94J (Poland)	Prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof	WOV
*40/152O (Canada)	Verification in all its aspects	WOV
*40/94L (USA)	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	131-0-16
*40/155 (France)	Relationship between disarmament and development	WOV
40/153 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	WOV
40/151B (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	139-0-11
40/94E (Sweden)	Study of concepts of security	WOV
40/151G (Mauritius)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	WOV
40/154 (Spain)	World Disarmament Conference	WOV
40/152K (UK)	UN disarmament studies	WOV
40/151H (Nigeria)	UN programme of fellowships on disarmament	148-1-1
40/151I (Yugoslavia)	Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	WOV
*40/94O (Cameroon)	Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament	WOV

NOTE: In addition to the above resolutions the following was also adopted.

DECISION (Sweden)	Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies	WOV
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Opposed by Canada — 12

40/152A (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war	123-19-7
40/152C (GDR)	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	117-19-11
40/151C (Mexico)	Nuclear-arms freeze	131-10-8
40/151E (India)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	126-12-10
40/151F (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	126-17-6
40/85 (Bulgaria)	Convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	101-19-25
40/94H (USSR)	Nuclear-weapon freeze	120-17-10
40/152H (GDR)	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon	70-11-65
40/152P (Argentina)	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	131-16-6
40/152I (Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	109-19-17
40/152N (Yugoslavia)	Decisions of the tenth special session	135-13-5
40/94I (Bulgaria)	Curbing the naval arms race	71-19-59

Canada abstained — 13

40/80A (Mexico)	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	124-3-21
40/89B (Mauritius)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	135-4-14
40/88 (Hungary)	Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests	120-3-29
40/80B (Mexico)	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	121-3-24
40/93 (Iraq)	Israeli nuclear armament	101-2-47
40/152Q (Argentina)	Prevention of nuclear war	136-3-14
40/90 (Byelorussia)	Weapons of mass destruction	128-1-21
40/92A (GDR)	Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons	93-15-14
40/151A (Cyprus)	Disarmament and international security	123-1-23
40/152J (Iraq)	Decisions of the tenth special session	128-0-20
40/152M (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	133-2-18
40/152E (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	129-0-22
40/151D (Bulgaria)	World Disarmament Campaign	114-0-34



Consultative Group Discusses Canada's Role in the Multilateral Disarmament Forums

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, which includes over 60 representatives of non-governmental organizations, academics and concerned individuals, met at the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa from October 31 to November 2 to discuss Canada's role in the multilateral disarmament forums and ways in which Canada can make a further contribution to international peace and security. This meeting was in keeping with the question posed in the Department of External Affairs Discussion Paper (Green Paper) entitled *Competitiveness and Security* as to whether there are "new practical ideas that Canadians believe we could bring" to discussions in this area.

The Consultative Group meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, whose responsibilities include representing Canada in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Canada's Ambassadors to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (Mr. J. Alan Beesley), the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Mr. Tom Delworth), and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in

Vienna (Mr. Tom Hammond), also participated and led the discussion in their respective areas of responsibility.

The Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, provided the keynote address to the Consultative Group on October 31, the first time the Group had ever been addressed by the Prime Minister. (The full text of his address is found on pp. 10-12.)

During the two days of discussions, members of the Consultative Group, on the whole, recognized that Canada had played a constructive and effective role in these forums. However, there was concern expressed over the pace and rather limited achievements of some of these negotiations. There was considerable support for Canadian efforts to promote the role of verification in the arms control process and the Government's research efforts in this area were applauded. The Group also supported the maintenance of a strict interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and supported Canadian efforts to support the Treaty. A number of proposals for possible action by the Canadian Government were put forth for the Government's consideration. Copies of the final report on the meetings were sent to the Prime Minister, the Secretary

of State for External Affairs and members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND), and were circulated widely in Canada.

A special evening session was held on November 1 dealing with the Geneva bilateral negotiations between the USA and USSR on nuclear and space arms. It featured Ambassador James Goodby, formerly the US representative to the Stockholm Conference, and Mr. Eugeni Goussarov, Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Each participant provided the Consultative Group with an outline of his Government's approach to the bilateral negotiations in Geneva. The moderator of the discussion was Mr. John Halstead, former Canadian Ambassador to NATO and Bonn.

Members of the Consultative Group will next meet on a regional basis with Ambassador Roche and departmental officials at meetings to be held across Canada from April 14 to May 2 as part of Canada's International Year of Peace programme. The theme of these meetings will be the relationship between disarmament and development, in light of Canada's participation at the International Conference on that subject to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2.



Left photo: view of Consultative Group meeting. Right photo: Ambassador Douglas Roche (centre) addressing opening session. At left is Firdaus Kharas, Executive Director of UN Association in Canada. At right is Col. Alex Morrison of Canada's mission to UN.



"In Pursuit of Peace" Theme of PM Address to Consultative Group

"In Pursuit of Peace" was the theme of the following speech made by Brian Mulroney to the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control in Ottawa on October 31.

"We often think of the pursuit of peace in terms of meetings and summits, negotiations and agreements. Yet these are instruments, not goals, means not ends. The desired object of our quest is the careful construction of a framework for enduring security — security for tomorrow, as well as today. And security for all, not simply for some.

In the absence of a stable and secure international environment, all our domestic achievements and pursuits, as well as our aspirations for the future, are put in jeopardy. Just as peace cannot endure without justice and prosperity, so too prosperity is meaningless in the absence of peace. The shadows of our nuclear age are deep and terrible, but we must not allow ourselves to become overwhelmed by them; numbed into fatalistic indifference. For the spectres that man creates, man can also dispel. The pursuit of peace leaves little time for counsels of despair.

Unfortunately, we know that the spectre of war will continue to haunt us until a

just peace is secured for all time, not just our time. Yet fear of the future must not be permitted to take root in the youth of today, who deserve nothing less than the opportunity to live and grow in an atmosphere of hope and security.

So I approach the pursuit of peace with determination, recognizing both the enormity of the task, and the requirement for action. To those who say it can't be done, I say it must be done. To those who say Canada can't do it alone, I say we can do it together. And to those who claim it is none of our business, I say the search for peace is everyone's business.

Shortly after assuming office, I said that Canada would work relentlessly to reduce tensions, to alleviate conflict, and to create the conditions for a general and lasting peace. I added then, and I repeat: 'the exercise of political will is nowhere more important than on this issue, on whose outcome the lives of our children and of humanity depend.'

At this juncture, with the world hoping that the coming weeks will see a triumph of just such political will, it is appropriate to elaborate on this theme. I would be remiss, however, if I did not first congratulate the members of the

Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs for the interest, expertise and responsibility each of you brings to this complex agenda. Certainly the revitalization of the Consultative Group has enriched the quality of opinion and advice available to the Government in considering these critical issues.

I think it is appropriate that the Consultative Group's current meeting is devoted to the multilateral arms control forums where Canada has 'a seat at the table' and thus can have a direct impact on the course of events. In your discussions here I hope you will identify and put forward practical suggestions as to how Canada can contribute to progress in these areas.

Canada is not and shall not be neutral in the struggle between freedom and totalitarianism. We are a member of the Western Alliance and we are members out of choice, not circumstance. It is an Alliance which requires military commitment and political solidarity. Yet it is also an Alliance which relies on consultation and consensus. A healthy allied military effort would not survive in the absence of such consensus. But the right to be heard must constantly be earned. Canada earns that right.

The pursuit of arms control and disarmament has its place beside the defence effort, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. All are essential components of Canada's approach to international peace and security. We must vigorously pursue each of these if we are to maintain Canada's sovereignty and independence. And the world at large should recognize that arms control is a component of, not a substitute for, a healthy national security policy.

A wise and correct approach to security cannot ignore the virtues of arms control, just as arms control cannot ignore the requirements of national security. The search for either at the expense of the other is fruitless. And the search for both is imperative.



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney addressing Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs on October 31.



Let us recall that the Nobel Prize awarded to Lester Pearson for his superb diplomatic efforts in ending the Suez Crisis was also an award to the dedicated Canadian troops who helped make up the United Nations peace-keeping force. Without the forces trained and equipped to provide a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian armies, the United Nations resolution would have been only so much paper.

We must realize that our sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be safeguarded by mere proclamation or protest. In addition to a firm legal position with respect to our sovereignty in the Arctic, we require a military capacity to respond to the threats posed by clandestine incursions into our waters, or probes of our air space. This is not a question of political expedience or choice. It is a question of responsible national policy. At the same time we should remember that, for over 35 years, the defence of Canada has been not only a national but an Alliance obligation.

I am reminded, in this connection, of a great Canadian who personally embodied the four facets of Canada's security policy. As a soldier, a peacekeeper, an arms controller and a diplomat, the late General E.L.M. Burns personified the basic coherence and compatibility of each one of these roles in the conduct of Canada's security policy. In establishing arms control policies, Tommy Burns perhaps summarized it best when he said there had to be a dialogue between the proponents of security through armament, and the proponents of security through disarmament.

No one component can provide all of the answers. The decisions our Government has taken are all directed to the over-arching goal of promoting international peace and security and, through these initiatives, Canada's own peace and security. These decisions have not been easy ones. They involved making some hard choices. We have decided, for instance, that Canada should have the capability to keep open our Arctic waters for the development of that region so that we can effectively patrol all of our Canadian territory all of the time.



Ambassador James Goodby (left) addressing Consultative Group during panel on Geneva negotiations. At right is Eugueni Goussarov. Moderator is John Halstead.

We have decided to strengthen our military presence in Europe as a further contribution to the Alliance's collective defence and deterrence of military aggression. And as we build up NATO's conventional deterrent, we reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, a goal I am sure we all share.

We also signed an agreement earlier this year with the United States to modernize the early warning radars in Canada, this as part of our commitment to honour our North American defence obligations.

We have decided to participate in the Sinai peacekeeping force to help maintain peace between Egypt and Israel, to create a climate in which the divisions of that part of the world may have some chance of healing.

Finally, as each of you is aware, in January of this year our Government expressed the strong view that the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) research programme was prudent, given similar research already being conducted by the USSR. We continue to be of that view. That being said, we decided in September that we would not participate on a government-to-government basis in the SDI research programme. The Government's research priorities were judged to lie more in the investigation of outer space verification technology than in feasibility studies of space-based weapon systems.

Underlying all these decisions is our unyielding commitment to a strong, independent Canada working in concert with other countries, in the interest of common global security. Within the field of arms control and disarmament, our Government has six specific objectives:

- negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability;
- maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban;
- support for a comprehensive test ban treaty;
- prevention of an arms race in outer space; and
- the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

The resumption of the Geneva negotiations and the successful review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which concluded last month, have advanced the first two objectives. It is imperative that these negotiations lead to deep cuts in nuclear arsenals and that a firm cap be placed on any initial reduction to ensure that future movement will be in a steadily downward direction. In my view, this would be a nuclear 'freeze' that works.

The other four aims are being pursued in related forums: the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Stockholm Conference and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna. The Canadian delegations at these conferences are seeking, in concert with our Allies, practical and equitable measures to reduce armaments and increase confidence.

I am pleased that our ambassadors who are engaged in the various disarmament negotiations are with us tonight and I am confident their contributions will both enliven and add considerably to your discussions. By way of illustration of this practical approach, Canada will provide to the UN Secretary-General a manual of procedures for investigating allegations of chemical weapons use. We have carried out a series of discussions with non-signatories of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to urge them to accede to this vital agreement.

At the Stockholm Conference we have explored with our NATO Allies new ideas on how the attainment of a substantial result can be facilitated.

Recent progress during the discussions at Stockholm portends concrete results from this important forum. At the Conference on Disarmament, Canada has tabled a study on the existing legal regime pertaining to outer space. This represents the first substantive contribution of any country to the work of the conference.

It is exactly through the cumulative effect of such practical measures that progress in arms control is most surely achieved. This basic stance underlies the Programme of Action Canada will advance throughout the last half of the Second Disarmament Decade. One of the predominant themes in that Programme will be Canada's decision to focus on the vital issue of the verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

Without the knowledge that one's partners in an arms control agreement are actually honouring their obligations, the whole purpose of the agreement and, by extension, the arms control process

itself, is called into disrepute. Verification is not an end in itself. Verification enhances the confidence of the parties.

In so doing, it creates a sense of predictability. And predictability is one of the most important outcomes of effective arms control.

For my own part, I have concentrated on developing channels of communication with leaders from both East and West, to facilitate an exchange of ideas and to convey Canadian concerns and practical suggestions. Last month, I wrote to General Secretary Gorbachev outlining Canadian views and priorities with respect to arms control and disarmament. I have, of course, been in frequent contact with President Reagan on a range of international issues. I was pleased to participate at the meeting which he hosted last week in New York of summit heads of government to discuss the forthcoming Geneva Summit.

It has been six years since the leaders of the USA and USSR have met. That is far too long in a world where superpower tensions cannot be left unattended. It would be preferable to regularize East-West summitry, to have the leaders of the USA and USSR meet, perhaps annually, to discuss problems and areas of common concern.

You can do much to promote the concept — and the reality — of Canada as a state with a vital role to play in building the political, economic and social structures of peace in a world of great change.

Postscript:

Earlier this afternoon I received a message from President Reagan outlining a new American proposal designed to achieve real reductions in nuclear arms. This development is indeed a positive and welcome step.

While it would be clearly inappropriate for me to discuss any of the details of the President's new proposals, I am pleased that this new USA initiative builds upon common ground and thus should provide a basis for serious and substantive negotiations."

Government Provides \$3.2 million to Upgrade Yellowknife Seismic Array

On February 7, the Government released a statement announcing its plans to upgrade the Yellowknife seismic array.

The following is the text of the communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced today that the Government has agreed to provide \$3.2 million during the period 1986-1989 to upgrade the Yellowknife seismic array as a major Canadian contribution to monitoring an eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB).

The achievement of a CTB is a fundamental Canadian objective which Canada promotes multilaterally within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Canada has played a particularly prominent role in verification, a central issue in which seismic technology is the key. Since 1976, scientists from the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources have participated in the international group of seismic experts in the CD working on technical aspects of a worldwide exchange of seismic data. Canada's leadership is internationally recognized in this area.

Yellowknife is recognized as a unique and sensitive location to monitor global seismic events including underground nuclear tests. Updating and modernization of the Yellowknife seismic array, which consists of a series of short-period and long-period seismometers, will enable Canada to contribute to an international system which will constitute an essential monitoring element of a negotiated CTB using the best technology available."



Canada Makes Second Contribution to Palme Commission

On July 19, 1985, the then Canadian Ambassador to Austria, Mr. Alan W. Sullivan, presented a cheque for \$25 000 to Mr. Jagge Anderson, Administration Officer of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission), on behalf of the Government of Canada.

This was the second such contribution made by the Canadian Government to the Palme Commission. An initial contribution of \$160 000 was made in 1981. These contributions reflect the support of the Canadian Government for the Commission's efforts to enhance public awareness of international security and disarmament issues.

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, originally set up under the chairmanship of the late Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden, was created in 1980 to identify security and disarmament measures that

can contribute to peace in the 1980s and beyond. The membership of the Commission includes representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as the neutral and non-aligned countries. Mr. Robert Ford, a former Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and one of Canada's leading experts on East-West relations, is a member of the Commission.

In 1982, the Commission issued its recommendations in a report called *Common Security — A Program for Disarmament*. The Commission's work is continuing with periodic meetings on specific themes in order to offer an independent political forum for the discussion of disarmament issues and to continue the dialogue undertaken during the initial work of the Commission.

The next meeting of the Palme Commission will be held in Budapest, Hungary, in October 1986 and will focus on European security issues.

Ambassador Beesley Addresses Conference on Disarmament

On February 4, Mr. J. Alan Beesley, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, made a major statement to the Conference. Following are excerpts from his statement.

"As we began our deliberations here just a year ago, there was a note of cautious expectation in the air. The governments of the USSR and the USA had only recently agreed to resume negotiations on the central arms control and disarmament issues of our time. Moreover, in taking this step, which entailed considerable statesmanship on each side, the two governments set themselves agreed negotiating objectives which are impressive in their scope and comprehensiveness, namely: 'The prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on earth; the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms; and the strengthening of strategic stability.' They stated as an ultimate goal 'the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.' We, and the watching world, saw a glimmer of hope.

Now, little more than a year later, that flame of hope not only remains alive, but burns a little brighter. Negotiators for the two governments completed three rounds of negotiations in Geneva during 1985. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva in November and issued an important Joint Statement, affirming *inter alia* the intent to accelerate the work of their negotiations. The fourth round of negotiations is already underway.

Happily, this process has produced more than rhetoric. Detailed and substantive proposals and counter-proposals have been made, reflecting a readiness on both sides to agree to major reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals as a first step towards implementing the agreed negotiating objectives in their entirety. Thus, in the Canadian view, the good faith and serious intent of each of



Mr. Alan W. Sullivan (left), then Canadian Ambassador to Austria, presenting a cheque for \$25 000 to Mr. Jagge Anderson, Administration Officer of the Palme Commission. Mr. Sullivan is now Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs.



the parties to these negotiations have been persuasively demonstrated. We applaud the constructive beginning which has been made in this all-important negotiation. We recognize that the negotiation is likely to be long and arduous and that to expect quick, comprehensive solutions on the many outstanding issues would be unrealistic. We urge the two parties to continue their negotiating efforts with all the determination, skill and patience that the importance of the subject matter demands, as they have pledged to do. Canada, for its part, pledges that in the Conference on Disarmament and all other relevant international fora, we will support, facilitate and attempt to reinforce these crucial bilateral negotiations.

It is a reality of our time that the USA and USSR, by their separate and joint decisions, will determine central aspects of any international framework for preserving global security. But of course, the establishment of a stable basis for enduring international peace and security must not and cannot be a proprietary monopoly of the two superpowers. Their negotiations are of vital concern to all peoples; as Canada's Prime Minister has recently affirmed, peace and security is everybody's business. It is for every responsible government, through its national policies and by constructive participation in international fora such as the Conference on Disarmament where such issues are addressed, to make its own contribution to the collective international effort to come to grips with the complex and seemingly intractable issues involved in creating conditions for stable, enduring international peace and security. The Canadian Government reaffirms its determination to do just that.

In this forum, the seriousness of Canada's commitment to the pursuit of realizable arms control and disarmament measures is well known. Canada's long-standing approach to arms control and disarmament, sometimes criticized as idealistic, is not starry-eyed but directed to the pursuit of practical and achievable goals. We see arms control not as separate from, but intimately bound up with, the legitimate concern of all states for their national security....

I have alluded already to the Canadian Government's generally positive appreciation of the course of the negotiations thus far between the USA and the USSR. While this should be a source of encouragement to us here, it should not prompt us to slacken our efforts but rather to intensify them. It should entitle us to a heightened expectation that in this forum, where our first obligation is to seek out common ground and expand areas of agreement, we will be able to avoid political polemics, invective and recriminatory exchanges, which are out of place in any serious negotiating forum.

As in recent years, the negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is a priority item on our agenda. Modest but detectable progress was made on this item during the 1985 session but there is still cause for disappointment in spite of the strenuous efforts of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, the chairman of the Chemical Weapons Ad Hoc Committee. Known instances of recent chemical weapons use should add to our collective sense of urgency to attain the earliest possible conclusion of such a ban. We note with particular attention the affirmation by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Joint Statement of their intent to 'accelerate their efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention' as well as their intention to 'initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.' It is our understanding that this latter initiative is not intended in any way to divert efforts from the priority need to conclude a comprehensive chemical weapons ban; so too with respect to the statement contained in the proposals most recently made by General Secretary Gorbachev raising the possibility of 'certain interim steps,' possibly involving multilateral agreement on matters relating to the non-transfer of chemical weapons. As others have pointed out, and indeed my delegation has in the past, it will be of limited utility if we get an effective bilateral convention which is not a comprehensive convention in both senses in extending to all the main issues under negotiation and comprising a genuine non-proliferation convention.

Despite the considerable progress which has been made, there remain several difficult issues to be resolved if a chemical weapons ban is to be concluded. Among these, the verification provisions of the treaty will require especially serious and dispassionate effort if agreement is to be achieved. It will be recalled that, in April 1984, almost two years ago, the Vice-President of the United States of America tabled in this forum a draft treaty text which is the most comprehensive proposal yet before us setting out in detail the kind of verification regime his Government prefers and would regard as adequate. Canada has indicated its readiness in principle to accept and apply the kinds of verification provisions contained in the US text. However, while there has been much criticism of these proposals, no delegation has thus far come forward with concrete, substantive alternative comprehensive proposals which would delineate with clarity the area of common ground and the areas of disagreement, thus providing a basis for serious negotiation with a view to arriving at verification provisions which would be acceptable to all.

The Canadian Government noted, and welcomed, the reaffirmation by the US spokesman in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on October 31, 1985, that 'No imbalance in inspection obligations is either desired, intended or contained in any provisions of the United States draft convention banning chemical weapons.' The Canadian Government has also noted with particular care and interest the recent statement by General Secretary Gorbachev that, with reference to declarations of the location of chemical weapons production facilities, the cessation of production, the destruction of production facilities and the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, 'All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections.' We are greatly encouraged by this statement. We hope that during the present session of this Conference the delegation of the USSR will be in a position to further elaborate on its precise meaning. The task of seriously negotiating effective, operable and politically acceptable verification



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley addressing Conference on Disarmament, February 4. Bianco

provisions for a chemical weapons treaty will be difficult and time-consuming. However, it should not be postponed any longer....

Another important item on our agenda is the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a subject on which there is widespread and legitimate public anxiety. Last year, an important step forward was taken when we were able to agree on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on this item. I pointed out at the time that it was a realistic mandate which takes into account and both complements and accurately reflects the realities concerning the bilateral negotiations already then underway between the USA and the USSR, but does not undermine or undercut or prejudice or in any way interfere with those negotiations. At the same time, I expressed the hope that this mandate would not expire at the end of 1985, bearing in mind the wishes of some delegations who would like something more and something better. The view I then expressed continues to be the view of the Canadian Government. The mandate has enabled us to make a beginning, but it has by no means been exhausted. It was attained only with great difficulty, skill and perseverance. Any attempt to negotiate it or re-negotiate it would almost certainly involve further lengthy discussion at the expense of substantive deliberation, with little prospect of agreement on a new mandate. Moreover, the political

and negotiating context in which the mandate was agreed has not appreciably changed. Indeed, to the extent that the USA and USSR are seriously coming to grips with the negotiating objectives they have set for themselves, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space, our need to ensure that our deliberations are complementary to, and not disruptive of, those negotiations is enhanced. Finally, I would note that, due to regrettable procedural delays, our substantive discussions on this item last year were seriously curtailed and as some delegations have pointed out we were able to have only nine meetings. Nevertheless, those discussions, in the Canadian judgement, got off to a reasonably good start. They were substantive. They were for the most part objective. They went some way towards elucidating the complexities and intricacies — technical, legal and political, and we have heard some of them today — involved in this process. However, they remain incomplete. The importance and difficulty of the subject demand that we discharge our last year's mandate with determination and dispatch before we embark on a new one. The reputation of the Conference would not be enhanced by procedural wrangles on this item....

The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains an especially important item on our agenda. It has, unfortunately, become one of the more contentious issues. The intensity of feel-

ing it generates reflects both the inherent importance of nuclear weaponry as a core element of the strategic policies of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the profound public anxieties arising from an awareness of the massive and relatively indiscriminate destructive power of such weapons. Because the use of such weapons on any significant scale would have serious repercussions not only for combatant states but, almost certainly, for all others as well, the active interest in this item shown by all delegations of this Conference is legitimate and understandable. In these circumstances, there may be a consequential need to take care that the strength of our views and concerns, and the vehemency with which they may be expressed, do not become a hindrance to rational discussion of the central issues involved. Here or elsewhere, polemics will not lead the way to better understanding.

I wish to emphasize that a negotiated, verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. Canada continues to favour a careful, step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, both on procedure and substance, although we respect the views of those who differ. The Canadian Government is clearly on record as favouring the re-establishment in the Conference of a subsidiary body to address this subject, and I now reiterate that position. Such a body must have a concrete and realistic mandate which would enable the immediate resumption of substantive work, with a view to negotiation of a treaty. We suggest that priority attention be given to reaching agreement on a programme of work, which might address the issues of scope, as well as verification and compliance, with appropriately structured working groups. We sense among the countries represented in this room a growing recognition of the potential value of a focused approach along these lines. The Canadian delegation would be ready to take an active and constructive part in implementing an agreed work programme. We hope too that, in support of such efforts, there could be general agreement to press ahead with our important work on seismic exchanges...."



Peacekeeping: A Canadian Contribution to Peace

The following article was prepared by the Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs.

Canada has been and continues to be a strong supporter of peacekeeping and a major contributor to peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping may be generally defined as the employment of military, para-military or non-military personnel or forces in an area of political conflict, for the purpose of restoring or maintaining the peace. The purpose of peacekeeping is to enable the parties to disengage and to give them confidence that their differences can be settled by negotiation. Peacekeeping activities range from unarmed missions with a role of observation and reporting only, through roles of investigation, supervision and control, to the interposition of armed military units and formations between the parties.

Peacekeeping has not been confined exclusively to the post-World War II period. Previously there were some very successful international police operations, such as the 1935 peacekeeping force, established by the League of Nations during the Saar plebiscite, which resolved the dispute between France and Germany. On this topic Anthony Eden wrote in his memoirs: "The



Member of Canadian peacekeeping force on duty at observation post in Cyprus.



Canadian peacekeeping troops patrolling "Green Line" in Nicosia, Cyprus. DND Photos

machinery in the SAAR both before and during the plebiscite gave a glimpse of a supranational salvation to a world which was imprisoning itself all the while more closely within the confines of the National State...."

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the concept of peacekeeping has been perceived by the international community as a practical means of limiting and mediating disputes and avoiding the outbreak of a major conflict.

Since 1947, Canada has participated in a total of 15 UN peacekeeping operations. Canada's preference has been that peacekeeping operations be conducted under UN jurisdiction, and that the UN machinery for doing so be strengthened. Recognizing, however, that this is not always possible, in particular where great power interests are involved, Canada has participated in peacekeeping-type missions outside UN auspices: the 1954 and 1973 Control Commissions in Indo-China and the International Observer Team in Nigeria. A summary of Canadian participation in these operations is contained in the annex.

Canada contributes forces to three current UN peacekeeping operations and has agreed to participate in another peacekeeping mission in the Middle East not under UN auspices, commencing in 1986. These operations are:

(a) *The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO)* This, the oldest of the UN operations in the Middle East, was permanently established by the Security Council in 1948. Canada has participated in UNTSO since 1954. Its task is to observe and maintain the ceasefire ordered by the Security Council and to assist in the supervision of the application and observance of the General Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. The Canadian participation at present consists of 20 officers, out of a total of 297 members.

(b) *The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)* Created in May 1974 by Security Council Resolution 350 after the Yom Kippur War, its task is to observe and maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria by interposing troops between the parties concerned. The force is deployed on the Golan Heights. Canada provides a contingent of approximately 220 personnel, whose task is to provide logistic, communications and other technical support to the force. UNDOF enjoys the cooperation of both Israel and Syria and has been highly successful in carrying out its mission.

(c) *The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)* This force was established in 1964 following the outbreak of hostilities between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish



Cypriot communities. Canada has been a major contributor since that time with a current commitment of 515 personnel. Its mandate is to prevent a recurrence of fighting between hostile factions, and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and assist in the return to normal conditions. Although it is regrettable that the parties to the dispute have not yet been able to reach a negotiated settlement, the continued presence of UNFICYP is considered necessary to maintain a peaceful situation in which the search for a political settlement may continue.

(d) *The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)* The MFO, which is based in the Sinai peninsula, was established in 1981 to monitor the provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. The force was established by a protocol to the Treaty and is not under the auspices of the United Nations. In response to requests from Egypt and Israel, Canada has agreed to provide a contingent of up to 140 personnel and nine helicopters to the MFO, commencing on March 31, 1986. Canadian participation in the MFO will contribute to the reinforcement of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, and reaffirms Canada's commitment to peace and stability in the Middle East.

In addition to the above operations, Canada provides periodic airlift support to the UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and the Canadian Forces Attaché in the Republic of Korea provides Canadian representation on the UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC).

Our military role in international peacekeeping helps to prevent the outbreak or spread of hostilities so that underlying political problems can be settled through negotiation, thus minimizing the possibility of direct great power involvement. However, Canada has never considered peacekeeping to be a sufficient objective in itself. The purpose of peacekeeping is not only to prevent conflict, but also to create the conditions in which the search for solutions to the underlying causes of conflict can take place. For this reason Canada has held the view

ANNEX

CANADIAN ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES AND OBSERVER MISSIONS - 1947 ONWARDS

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK)	Korea	1950-54	8,000	—
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	Egypt	1956-67	1,007	—
Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Congo	1960-64	421	—
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	West New Guinea (now West Irian)	1962-63	13	—
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	515
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-79	1,145	—
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel Syria (Golan Heights)	1974-	220	220
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	1978 (Apr-Sep)	117	—
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)	Korea	1947-48	Unknown	—
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Kashmir	1949-79	27	—
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria	1954-	20	20
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)	Korea	1953-	2	1
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-59	77	—
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Yemen	1963-64	36	—
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	India-Pakistan Border	1965-66	112	—
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Cambodia Laos Vietnam	1954-74	133	—
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	South Vietnam	1973	248	—
Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968-69	2	—



that considerable emphasis should be placed on the inter-relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts by all parties concerned.

It has become apparent from many years' experience that certain conditions must exist if a peacekeeping operation is to have a reasonable chance of success. It is very important that the peacekeeping mission be associated with an agreement for a political settlement, or at least an expressed willingness by the parties concerned to seek such a settlement. The parties to the dispute must agree to maintain a ceasefire, and must agree to accept the presence and composition of the peacekeeping mission and respect its mandate. The mission must have a clear and attainable mandate, and must have the necessary freedom of movement and action to carry out its tasks, including adequate authority for self-defence. Peacekeeping forces are not normally strong enough to impose their will militarily on the belligerents, and hence can only operate effectively with the cooperation of the parties concerned. The peacekeeping organization should be responsible to a political authority, preferably the United Nations, capable of supervising the mandate of the mission, receiving reports and exercising some influence over the parties concerned. It is important that a fair and equitable method of financing the operation be agreed.

In addition to these criteria, the desirability of Canadian participation in any peacekeeping operation would of course be influenced by the degree to which it would serve Canadian foreign policy interests and by the ability of the Canadian Forces to provide the required resources.

Together with other nations which have contributed to peacekeeping operations, Canada continues to work to improve the practical implementation of peacekeeping. In particular, through its membership in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Canada has sought to enhance the ability of the UN to mount and control peacekeeping operations. A continuing effort to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes is one of the foundations of Canadian security policy.

Canadian Views on Disarmament and Development

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

A major study on *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* was launched at the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 and was completed in 1981 by a group of experts, including a Canadian, Mr. Bernard Wood, Director of the North-South Institute in Ottawa.

In 1982, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) supported the recommendations of the experts and decided that the question of reallocation and conversion of resources, through disarmament measures, from military to civilian purposes should be included on the UNGA agenda periodically, beginning with UNGA 40 in 1985. It also recommended that an investigation of the modalities of an international disarmament fund for development should be undertaken. In 1983, at the initiative of France, the United Nations solicited the views of member states on the relationship between disarmament and development and referred the question to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) for consideration.

At its thirty-ninth session in 1984, the UNGA decided to convene an international conference, after thorough preparation, on disarmament and development. It established a 54-nation Preparatory Committee, of which Canada is a member, to work out the details for the conference.

At its fortieth session in 1985, the UNGA decided that the conference would be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2, 1986.

The substantive agenda covers three main issues:

(a) all aspects of the relationship between disarmament and development;

(b) implications of the level of military expenditures for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for the developing countries, and remedial measures;

(c) ways and means of releasing additional resources, through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular for the benefit of developing countries.

The Preparatory Committee met from July 29 to August 9, 1985, to work out the procedural aspects relating to the conference. Subsequently, meetings from April 1 to April 12 and from June 2 to 13, 1986, were added in order to prepare for the substantive discussion which is to take place at the conference.

In his statement on July 30 to the first Preparatory Committee meeting, the Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, outlined the views of the Canadian Government on this subject in the following way:

"It wishes to see a serious and orderly discussion of the main aspects of the disarmament/development question, including whether a greater measure of security can be attainable through development rather than through arms build-up.

The two-fold objective of the conference, as outlined in UNGA resolution 38/71B, must be constantly borne in mind, namely:

— action on the arms build-up and the resulting risks for world peace and security; action on development.

The basic question is how *disarmament* might offer a way to make a contribution to development. Attention must focus on the question of how military spending both in developed and developing countries has detracted from the development process.

The Canadian Government believes that the conference should involve a



practical, in-depth examination of the question with a view to establishing:

- what resources are tied up in armaments;
- how this spending has affected development;
- what resources might be diverted from military spending;
- what the problems are in doing so and what the benefits are.

Canada believes that the approach must be a global one involving both nuclear and conventional disarmament. It should also involve not only the super-powers but other countries as well, both developed and developing.

It must take full account of the security concerns of states. Security is the touchstone. But security cannot be viewed only in its narrowest military sense. The economic and social well-being of a state are other important aspects of its security.

It must be realistic in its recognition that very few governments, if any, are prepared to commit in advance resources that might eventually be saved through future disarmament measures. The creation of mechanisms in anticipation of such transfers must be approached with realism."



The flags of some UN member states with facade of UN Secretariat building in background. UN Photo

External Affairs Prepares Handbook to Investigate Alleged Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons



Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, (centre) and Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, (right) presenting CW handbook to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. UN Photo

On December 6, the Department of External Affairs issued a communiqué concerning a major Canadian initiative at the United Nations regarding procedures for dealing with alleged uses of chemical or biological weapons. The following is the text of that communiqué.

"In a very important step, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, today conveyed to His Excellency Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, the results of an extensive Canadian study on procedures to apply in cases where there are alleged uses of chemical or biological weapons. Ambassador Stephen Lewis, accompanied by Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche, delivered a letter from Mr. Clark to the UN Secretary-General and presented him with a ceremonial copy of a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*.

The Handbook is the result of a study by Canadian scientists and officials, concluded under the auspices of the Verification Research Programme of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The text of the letter from the Secre-

tary of State for External Affairs is as follows:

Excellency,

On September 25, 1985, I had the honour of addressing the 40th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, at which time I stated that Canada had devised its own Programme of Action for the latter half of the Second Disarmament Decade. At that time, I indicated that Canada would present to the United Nations the results of detailed, practical studies it has undertaken related to the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

As you know, over the past few years Canada has submitted documentation to the United Nations that has had a bearing on specific allegations. In addition, Canada submitted a study and made a presentation to the Group of Consultant Experts appointed by you under General Assembly resolution 37/98D concerning provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical or biological weapons. In accordance with that resolution, Canada also advised you of the names of scientific experts and laboratories upon which you could draw in the event of a requirement to investigate an allegation of the use of chemical or bio-



logical weapons. As you are fully aware, the use of such weapons would constitute a violation of either the 1925 Geneva Protocol or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, or both. The international community ignores such acts at its peril.

Your initiatives to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons have been greatly appreciated in Canada, and have had our full support. If, regrettably, further investigative initiatives by you become necessary, you can count on Canada's continued support. It is, therefore, with particular pleasure that I am conveying to you, on behalf of the Government of Canada, the formal results of our work in the form of a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*.

This document constitutes a manual of procedures which would be useful to UN experts who may be called upon to investigate such an allegation. An impar-

tial investigation would determine, to the extent possible, whether or not there are grounds to support the allegation. It is for this reason, we strongly believe, that a comprehensive and known set of procedures should exist to conduct a timely on-site investigation, a point which has been made many times in the past by the Experts appointed by you. This Handbook identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats which would go a long way to ensuring that the findings of an investigation are as conclusive, as convincing, and as impartial as they can possibly be.

Canada will continue to explore ways in which it might make further practical contributions to the reinforcement of international law prohibiting the use of chemical or biological weapons. We hope that our efforts will stimulate other concerned governments to continue and to increase their own efforts to the same end. Only through the concerted activity of the international community can present and future generations be

spared the scourge of these weapons of mass destruction.

We see this Handbook as the first substantive manifestation of what we had in mind in putting forward with other co-sponsors resolution L.62/Rev.1 on 'Verification in All its Aspects,' which was adopted without a vote in the First Committee on November 22, 1985. We see procedures such as these being relevant to the on-going negotiations and eventual agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. While awaiting such agreement, we see this Handbook as a contribution to the role of your office and the United Nations in ensuring that allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons be investigated in a timely and effective manner.

We would certainly be pleased to be associated with any follow-on action which might be prompted by this Handbook.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration."

Canada and USA Renew NORAD Agreement



Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan at signing of NORAD agreement. PMO

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and US President Ronald Reagan signed a five-year extension of the NORAD agreement during their Summit meeting in Washington, March 18-19. The two leaders noted that "the extension of the NORAD agreement is fully consistent with the provisions of the ABM treaty and is in full accordance with other US and Canadian treaty obligations." Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan also discussed the Geneva arms control negotiations and underlined the importance of making progress in these negotiations. During their discussions they also underlined the importance of full compliance with existing arms control obligations.

The NORAD agreement, first signed in May 1958, provides for joint Canada-US arrangements in regard to North American air defence, aerospace surveillance and early warning of ballistic missile attack. The term NORAD stands for North American Aerospace Defence Command.

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
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Canada at the Stockholm Conference



General view of an opening session of the Stockholm Conference.

Reportagebild

The Stockholm Conference, or, as it is formally titled, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, is a creation of the ongoing 35-state Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Participants include Canada, the United States and all the European States with the exception of Albania. The first undertaking of the CSCE was the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act (signed in 1975) which set out a series of principles that were to govern the relations between the participating States. Subsequent CSCE meetings have reviewed the implementation of the Final Act and explored means for improving the level of security and cooperation in Europe. Proceeding on the basis of a mandate carefully worked out at the last CSCE Follow-Up Meeting which concluded in Madrid in September 1983, the Stockholm Conference is "to undertake,

in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations."

The first stage of the Conference, which like all CSCE meetings operates on a consensus basis, is specifically devoted "to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe." These confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs for short) are an elaboration of the modest confidence-building measures (CBMs) contained in the Helsinki Final Act. As such, they are seen as "second generation" measures and part of a novel and still largely undefined approach to East-

This is the first in a series of supplements to the *Disarmament Bulletin* that have been prepared by the Department of External Affairs in order to provide a more detailed presentation of Canada's efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.

Cette publication existe également en français.



West arms control and disarmament. Since no short standard definition of CBMs exists, we will reproduce here a functional description of CBMs elaborated by a Canadian researcher in order to capture their essence:

1. CBMs are a variety of arms control measure entailing
2. deliberate state actions
3. that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral
4. that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)
5. by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
6. often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive
7. and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve
8. and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

While the mandate of the Stockholm Conference stipulates that the CSBMs are to be militarily significant, politically binding, adequately verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, the exact nature of these measures is left up to the Conference to determine. Since its January 1984 opening, which occurred at the foreign minister level as urged by Canada, the Stockholm Conference has been engaged in the complicated process of trying to arrive at a mutually agreed understanding of what form these CSBMs should take. This negotiating process is intended to reconcile the divergent views of participants as to the appropriate nature of the CSBMs the Conference is to adopt, and in particular

those approaches to confidence-building held by the West and the East.

The Western approach to confidence-building emphasizes the need for better mutual understanding of the normal military activity of participating States through imparting a greater degree of openness and regularity to this activity, with a view to reducing the risk of military conflict caused by surprise, misperception and mistrust. The East, on the other hand, has favoured the adoption of broad political undertakings which in its view create a necessary climate or background of confidence which can then facilitate the acceptance of more practical "military/technical" measures — as the East describes the "concrete measures" approach to confidence-building. To put it another way, the West favours a gradual building up of confidence through a series of concrete steps, whereas the East prefers an initial declaration that confidence exists and its subsequent reinforcement with subordinate and limited specific measures. The Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) States, while generally in harmony with the Western approach, tend to pursue individual national security interests.

After its formal opening on January 17, 1984, the Conference devoted its first year of discussions to a general debate in plenary outlining the different approaches to confidence-building espoused by the various participants. Proposals reflecting these approaches were tabled by the major groupings of States during the course of the year. The NATO countries were first to table a comprehensive proposal in January, followed by the NNA in March and the Warsaw Pact (WPO) States in May.

After considerable preliminary negotiations the Conference finally agreed in December 1984 to establish two subsidiary working groups: working group 'B' dealing with measures of observation and notification (i.e., those CBMs already present in the Final Act) and working group 'A' examining all other proposed measures (i.e., CBMs which are not now included in the Final Act). This working structure facilitated a more detailed examination of the original

proposals during the course of 1985 and was further refined in October on the basis of an informal agreement. This agreement (in typically qualified CSCE language) specified "those topics which might figure in the subsequent process of drafting language on a set of mutually complementary CSBMs, in accordance with the mandate, for possible inclusion in a concluding document." As a result, working group 'A' meets three times a week to discuss: 1) non-use of force; 2) information exchange, compliance and verification, and development of means of communications and consultations, in the context of a notification system comprising a set of mutually complementary CSBMs; and 3) constraining measures and annual forecasts of military activity; while working group 'B' continues to meet twice a week to discuss observation and notification of military activity.

Although it might appear merely a procedural arrangement, the October agreement was highly significant, as it fixed, for the first time, the type of measures that should figure in any eventual final agreement. By means of the October arrangement, the Soviet Union agreed to set aside all of its initial political-declaratory measures (such as an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons or the establishment of a chemical weapons free zone with the exception of an agreement on the non-use of force (NUF)), while the West agreed in return to negotiate some reaffirmation of the NUF principle. It is by such subtle and informal (the October agreement is not officially recorded in the Conference's documents) understandings that the Stockholm Conference moves forward to its elusive goal — a significant agreement on European military security affairs that at the same time is agreeable to all 35 participating States.

Another noteworthy development in the Conference's deliberations was the December 1985 agreement on a complete work programme for 1986 which sets September 19, 1986, as an adjournment date. This act of the Conference sets a time limit of sorts for completing the negotiations prior to the convening of the next CSCE Follow-up Conference in Vienna in November 1986 which is to



COMPARISON OF PRINCIPAL PROPOSALS TABLED TO DATE* AT STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

MEASURE	ALLIED	NNA	SOVIET BLOC
Annual Forecasts	Of all notifiable military activities.	Similar to Allied but with additional information.	All notifiable activities, limited information.
Notification (Land)			
Threshold	Division or majority of combat elements of division or 6 000 men.	Division plus equipment threshold and numerical threshold.	20 000 troops.
Pre-notification time	45 days.	42 days.	30 days.
Information	Detailed, calls for an exchange of information relevant to the notification of out-of-garrison activities.	More details, mostly in the context of prior notification and observation.	Less detailed, only in the context of prior notification and observation.
Notification (Mobilization)	Involving 20 000 troops or more.	None.	None.
Notification (Naval)	Only when functionally linked to land activity. No threshold set.	Not included but not explicitly ruled out.	Whenever at least 30 combat ships and 100 military aircraft are involved in manoeuvre.
Notification (Air)	Only when functionally linked to land activity. No threshold set.	Not included but not explicitly ruled out.	Whenever 200 or more aircraft involved in a manoeuvre.
Notification (Amphibious)	When three or more battalions or 3 000 amphibious troops carry out a landing.	Three or more battalions.	7 000 troops.
Constraint Measures	None.	A complex proposal that imposes constraints on the scale, number and duration of exercises with varying thresholds.	Ban on exercises involving over 40 000 men.
Observation	Universal right to observe all phases of notifiable activity.	Universal right to observe all notifiable activity from point when threshold reached.	Universal right to observe all notifiable activity.
Communication	Dedicated Telex Lines.	Dedicated Telex Lines.	Not specified.
Verification	NTMs and Challenge On-site Inspections (two per State per year).	Observation at short notice in exceptional cases. Receiving State has right to refuse.	NTMs.
Consultation	None.	<i>Ad Hoc</i> meetings plus regular meetings to review implementation.	Urgent consultations if risk of use of force.
Non-Use of Force	Will reaffirm in context of CSBMs. Partial text tabled.	Political declaration based on Final Act.	NUF Treaty that tries to "develop" the principle.

* As of May 1, 1986



review the progress achieved at the Stockholm Conference as required by the mandate. The existence of an adjournment date distinguishes the Stockholm Conference from other open-ended arms control forums and could facilitate the process of coming to terms on a final agreement.

The negotiations at Stockholm have now advanced to the point where the outline of a final agreement is relatively clear. It will contain improved notification measures of military activity with lowered thresholds and increased advance notice, mandatory observation, enhanced information and verification procedures and a reaffirmation of the NUF principle. The principal proposals tabled to date reveal significant areas of convergence, although some major differences on the scope of certain measures still remain. The table on page 3 attempts to set out in comparative form the main elements of the current proposals of the NATO, NNA and WPO groupings of States.

While this chart provides a basic representation of the negotiating matrix at the Conference, it is more difficult to convey the politico-military positions which lie behind these respective proposals and the degree of their intercompatibility. The major points of conflict between the three groupings have involved the scope of notification, information, verification, constraints and non-use of force. A brief discussion of each of these issues follows.

On notification, the WPO has sought to include independent air and naval as well as land activities which NATO has resisted, arguing that the mandate provides for the notification of air and naval activities only when they are part of activities taking place on land. In his January 15 statement on arms control, the Soviet leader Mr. Gorbachev suggested that the problem of the notification of naval activities should be postponed to a future stage of the Conference, with the notification of land and air activities to be decided upon during the current stage. Most of the NNA, while not rejecting the NATO view that only land activities (which represent the

most threatening form of military activity for European security) should be notified at this stage, has not pronounced on the matter. In light of the NNA disposition plus the fact that air activities pose serious verification problems, it would seem that a notification regime restricted to land activities is the most probable outcome for this stage of the Stockholm Conference.

On information, NATO has argued that the exchange of information about each State's combat force structure in the zone is necessary in order to establish an independent standard of information. The information exchanged would be a valuable contribution to confidence-building in its own right. It would also simplify and assist materially in the verification of the notification measures, particularly the proposal to notify divisions out-of-garrison. The WPO, while not rejecting the principle of information, does not accept an exchange of information on combat force structure in the zone and has focused its attention on information in the context of notification which would only provide information on

forces actually participating in military activities at the time.

On verification, the WPO has generally insisted on the adequacy of National Technical Means (e.g., reconnaissance satellites) coupled with consultation to verify any CSBM agreement. NATO has insisted on the need for mandatory on-site inspection to verify compliance with the agreed CSBMs. NATO has not proposed any consultative measures of its own, because of concerns that such consultations could be used by a State to prevaricate and impede verification.

The NNA has proposed a measure providing for observation upon request and at short notice in exceptional circumstances. It would not, however, be mandatory for a State to grant such a request. The NNA also favours consultations both *ad hoc* and at fixed intervals to discuss implementation. Verification will form part of any agreement reached at Stockholm, but it is as yet not clear what verification provisions will be finally agreed to.



The Canadian Delegation to the Stockholm Conference. At lower right is Mr. Tom Delworth, Head of Delegation. Behind him is Col. C. Namiesniowski, Military Advisor. At lower left is Mr. Chris Anstis, Deputy Head of Delegation. Behind him is Mr. Robert Vanier, Delegation Secretary.



With respect to constraints (i.e., measures that actually constrain or limit military activities through geographical restrictions or ceilings on the manpower and/or equipment committed to such activities), both the NNA and the WPO have proposed measures that would put a cap on the size of military exercises. NATO has resisted the notion of constraints primarily because the prevailing asymmetries of the European military situation would tend to render any constraint measure more disadvantageous to it. While NATO is not a *demandeur* on constraints, it can accept constraints in principle and is ready to consider any constraint proposal which equitably affects all participating States.

With respect to the non-use of force principle, NATO believes that this obligation is already clear and concrete in international law and that the question should not be one of improving its formulation but rather its observance. The WPO remains convinced that the politico-military situation in Europe has deteriorated to the point where an NUF agreement is essential. Such an agreement in the words of one WPO delegate "would be a welcome signal about the underlying political intentions of the participating States and would help to establish clear and elaborate standards for the international conduct of States." The NNA, in its proposal of November 15, tabled an NUF text that may represent a compromise formulation containing, as it does, references to collateral issues (such as human rights and peaceful settlement of disputes) that in the NATO view are vital complements to the obligation not to threaten or use force. In the context of a meaningful set of CSBMs, NATO will likely agree to a reaffirmation of the NUF principle along the lines of the NNA text, although agreement on the exact formulation may elude negotiators until the end of the Conference.

Canada has long been an exponent of confidence-building as a means of reducing tensions in East-West relations and facilitating the negotiation of arms control agreements. One of the Government's six priority objectives in the field of arms control and disarmament



The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, addressing press conference following meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels on December 12, 1985. Canada has advocated within NATO that a high priority be attached to a successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference. Mr. Clark spoke to this effect at the Brussels meeting.

is "the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere." Canada was closely involved in the formulation of the mandate for the Stockholm Conference and the subsequent development of the package of CSBMs put forward by NATO at Stockholm.

Canada is playing a prominent role among its Allies on the questions of NUF and verification and we are members of the sub-groups within the NATO caucus that have the primary responsibility for negotiating these issues in the relevant Conference's working groups. The Canadian Delegation has been both active and innovative in its efforts to bring this first stage of the Conference to a successful conclusion. Canada believes that agreement at Stockholm on a substantial set of CSBMs will be of as much political as military significance, and would make a major contribution to the further development of the Helsinki process to promote cooperation and security in Europe.

Additional Reading

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ANNEX

Canadian Statements at the Stockholm Conference

Following is a selection of major statements made by members of the Canadian Delegation to the Stockholm Conference. These statements reflect Canada's positions on the various issues before the Conference.

Statement of January 25, 1984, on Verification

"Few would contest the proposition that the question of conventional arms in Europe must be approached from the premise that if the danger of conflict is to be lessened, a more stable balance of forces at the lowest level possible must be established between the two military alliances. The trend unfortunately has been in the other direction; not down, but upwards. The problem we are faced with today is how to assure States that their security can be maintained without increasing military potentials to an even more dangerous level, especially in central Europe. The key to this agonizing problem is to be found, I suggest, in the political intentions of governments and even more important in the degree of frankness and openness with which they make those intentions known. Mechanisms are needed which will lead to greater openness in military affairs among the participating States so that political intentions become easily discernible — and less readily misunderstood.

With these basic concerns in mind my Delegation joined a group of friends on January 24 in tabling a package of mutually complementary, confidence- and security-building measures which have been deliberately designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack, diminish the threat of armed conflict in Europe which could result from misunderstanding and miscalculation, and inhibit the use of force for the purpose of political intimidation. In other words, our proposal is aimed at increasing the

sense of security to a point where the tangible reduction of arms could become a policy option that might actually be chosen by the States concerned.

The proposals which we have co-sponsored are based on a mandate agreed at Madrid by participating States calling for measures which are militarily significant, applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals, politically binding and verifiable according to content. Taken together this set of interdependent measures would, if agreed to and implemented in good faith, take us a long step forward towards the creation of a new basis on which we could all approach the problem of actual arms reductions with confidence — and in the confident expectation that something might actually be achieved. Canada regards the challenge as urgent.

Canada believes that the provisions for confidence-building measures in the Final Act were a novel and ambitious

beginning. But we also learned after almost nine years' experience that those measures are not adequate to confirm the intentions of some governments. The fact that it has not been possible to verify whether States have, or have not, complied with these measures raises questions about motives and has demonstrated a major flaw in the regime of CSBMs in the Final Act: they are voluntary and they are not verifiable.

Based on this experience it is obvious that if CSBMs are to be significant, they have to be mandatory; they must be verifiable in including provisions for ensuring that any State participating in the system will permit action which would clarify doubts about compliance.

The precise mandate which has been given to us for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is intended to overcome these deficiencies. We agreed on a mandate at Madrid which gives us a very precise compass by which to chart our course; if we follow it closely it will facilitate the development and application of measures that, in being militarily significant and verifiable, could carry us forward



Delegates to the Stockholm Conference during recent working group session. Seated at immediate left are members of Canadian Delegation to the Conference. Reportagebild



towards genuine arms control. The set of CSBMs which was tabled on January 24 has been compiled with these considerations in mind.

Canada realizes we have set ourselves ambitious goals and we do not underestimate the inherent difficulties in achieving them.

Conflicting interests exist in an international climate marked by mistrust and ideological confrontation. We shall need concrete and verifiable CSBMs if we are to overcome this mistrust and to reduce tensions.

In these circumstances exhortations for trust and confidence in the abstract sound hollow and unreal; the problem of security must be attacked on a more concrete basis. How to find some accommodation so that States perceive themselves as less threatened and more secure? The CSBMs to be agreed at this Conference will therefore have to involve verification of credible evidence that military activities by any State do not constitute a threat to the security, sovereignty or political stability of any State or States.

The establishment of a verification mechanism as part of a mandatory CSBM regime is necessary if confidence is to take root and flourish. Confidence can only be based on specific moves that can be verified and evaluated and indeed predicted.

As in the case of all negotiated security arrangements, the establishment of a viable verification process, as part of a mandatory CSBM regime, is essential if the security of the participating States is to be enhanced in a real way. The verification mechanism which we adopt must help us to decide, as a political judgement, whether or not military activities are in conformity with the agreed CSBMs or whether by exceeding agreed parameters they have other purposes and objectives.

Some governments in the past have misinterpreted the idea of verification as a gathering of intelligence which would eventually be used to their military

disadvantage. These arguments do not really stand up under close analysis. Indeed, such an interpretation invalidates the basic premise of CSBMs, but I expect that it will be advanced during the course of the discussions to come. And because it does invalidate the basis for CSBMs, it must be faced early on. The essential difference between intelligence gathering and verification is the form and purpose of the respective activities. On the one hand, intelligence is covert, generally unilateral and frequently merely quantitative. On the other hand, to be effective, verification would have to be overt, multilateral and cooperative, operating in accordance with agreed rules. Verification differs from intelligence in the emphasis it places on intentions, something which raw intelligence gathering is not normally able to provide.

Adequate means of verification have to be implicit in each CSBM. In other words, the CSBMs must be clear in terms of parameters and purpose so that in a crisis situation there would be no doubt whether the CSBM had been implemented or not.

Verification provides a mechanism for clarifying misunderstanding. It is really at the heart of the confidence- and security-building process. To perform this function, verification must involve continuous collection and analysis of data, it must command the authority for, and control the means of, clarification, and it must be capable of carrying out a credible inspection.

Let me comment briefly on these three requirements. First, the continuous collection and analysis of data. This function is vital to the whole process. It consists of gathering and analyzing data dealing with activities defined by CSBMs and on a continuous basis, by a combination of whatever sources of information are agreed upon as being appropriate. In the context of CSBMs, analysis should show whether a violation had occurred or not, so that a decision could be taken whether and how to take the matter up with a violator. The results of such analysis could require additional information, or trigger off an inspection.

A request for clarification would be intended to provide an opportunity for rapidly answering genuine concerns which could arise from misunderstanding, factual errors or abnormalities in relation to the provisions of a CSBM agreement. An inspection might or might not be required in the process of verification, but should such a requirement exist it would be essential to avoid delays which may have significant consequences for the security of States.

Inspection would involve the right to conduct, on demand, at any time, and without delay, within a specified period of time and by agreed means, an unobstructed survey of forces and military activities in order to confirm or deny suspected non-compliance with the terms of an agreed CSBM. Modalities for inspection would establish a process that in itself would form a real deterrent to non-compliance. Therefore, refusal of inspection, or an inadequate response to it, would be recognized as an act of political significance in itself.

Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention today to discuss in detail the CSBM verification mechanisms that could flow from our negotiations here, but I did wish to share with other Delegations some general thoughts on these problems, and by so doing to suggest the magnitude of the task before us.

Verification means could clearly take several forms.

But if they are to enhance security and stability in Europe and increase the extent to which intentions become more transparent, the verification techniques discussed here will have to cut new ground.

I fully recognize that the goals we have set ourselves are very ambitious, and that the inherent difficulties that will face us as we endeavour to pursue these goals will likely mean that we will have to progress step by step. But let progress be deliberate and purposeful. Because the task is urgent. And because so many hopes and expectations are focused on our endeavours."



Statement of May 11, 1984, on CSBM Proposals and Non-Use of Force

"As this second session of our Conference begins, it is time to get down to concrete work. I doubt that any Delegation here would disagree. But how to do it?

Briefly, let me restate the objectives of this Conference as seen by my Government — and indeed, we hope, by all other participants. We are trying to adopt confidence- and security-building measures whereby States can demonstrate that their routine, military activities need not be interpreted by other States as being potentially hostile. This demands that a new and wider degree of openness be imparted to military affairs in order to make them more predictable.

Another way of expressing these notions, in a nutshell, is to say that we must develop concrete measures which will give effect and expression to the principle of the non-use of force. What changes in military affairs could make this pledge credible? A reply to this question should be based on an examination of the proposals on the table before us. This is the first step in getting down to concrete work.

Since SC.1* was first on the table, let us look at it first. The measures it contains would enhance trust and security in the following ways:

1. Exchanges of information about military forces would provide a common framework for the other measures and for understanding the significance of the activities of particular units.
2. An annual review of military activities would create a pattern of normal, non-aggressive military behaviour.
3. The advance notice of important military activities in the zone of application would make them more predictable, thus reducing the possibility of misinterpreting the intentions behind such activities by clarifying whether they are routine or possibly threatening.

*NATO proposal

4. Observation of military activities could confirm that they were routine and unthreatening but, if necessary, they could also defuse tensions at critical moments or warn that something threatening might be going on.

5. Measures of compliance and verification would involve the usual requirement not to interfere in National Technical Means and a requirement for monitoring compliance.

6. Communications between the participating States concerning the regime of CSBMs could be enhanced through appropriate arrangements.

These CSBMs will not transform East-West relations overnight. But they are practical and realistic steps to increase confidence that military forces in peacetime are intended only for defence and not attack. They would be concrete and solid contributions to security and stability. Even if they would not immediately modify the serious imbalance of conventional forces in Europe today, they would at least make this imbalance less menacing in the perception of the participating States.

What about SC.2?*** Notably, it emphasizes that the measures we adopt here should conform to the criteria in the mandate of the Conference; and it envisages building on the experience gained in implementing the confidence-building measures in the Final Act.

The 12 measures in SC.3*** are also in line with the mandate of the Conference, aiming, in part, at making military activities in Europe more predictable. It too envisages building on the experience of implementing the measures in the Final Act. Although it does not specify parameters, SC.3 — and, by the way, SC.2 as well — envisages an approach primarily based on organizational levels rather than simply counting the number of troops. This is of course

**proposal by Romania

***initial NNA proposal

significant for the process of verification and, remarkably, all of the 12 measures would require adequate forms of verification.

Now we come to SC.4 tabled by the Soviet Union a few days ago. It is a disappointment. In deploring what are adduced as attempts to upset the existing military and strategic balance, the proposal calls for, and I quote, '...a radical turn in the policies of States' But the suggestions it then puts forward are radical only because most of them do not belong here.

This Conference, grouping together nuclear and non-nuclear participating States, is not an appropriate forum in which to discuss nuclear issues. They are global and the complexity of trying to discuss them here would soon render this negotiation sterile. The zone of application of CSBMs can in no way relate to nuclear arms because many of those situated outside Europe could also strike the continent. The Atlantic to the Urals can only be considered as constituting limits in terms of surprise attack or the use of force for political intimidation by conventional troops.

Proposals to create nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe also violate the principle of an integral zone of application of CSBMs and would result in some kind of division of Europe, 'partitioned' arbitrarily into some form of sub-zones. They would not increase security because the zones would still be under threat from outside. A zone in Europe free from battlefield nuclear weapons, many of which are fitted for dual-capable delivery systems, involves complicated questions of verification and would require procedures for on-site inspection which are unlikely to be agreed upon. The kind of redistribution of weapons envisaged in this suggestion would not be a real substitute for reduction of them.

The issue of chemical weapons is best left in the hands of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the



United States has recently made a comprehensive proposal, although it is distressing that the Soviet Union, which holds the major stock of chemical weapons in Europe, has rejected it. The key difficulty in dealing with chemical weapons is, of course, verification, not the zone. Similarly, we are convinced that the question of military budgets should be tackled at the United Nations in line with Sweden's proposals for a technical reporting system.

Putting aside then these inappropriate and misplaced elements, what is left in proposal SC.4? Like the other proposals on the table, it calls for the negotiation of confidence-building measures which would be more significant in nature and broader in scope than those in the Final

Act based on the experience in implementing these Helsinki-type measures. While I do not intend today to comment on these specific measures, I can commend the intention of expanding on the confidence-building measures in the Final Act.

The last remaining proposal in SC.4 calls for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty member States. This is characterized as — and I quote — 'a major confidence-building measure.' Is it?

The commitment not to use force is already enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. At

the NATO Summit in Bonn in 1982, Western leaders pledged that their weapons would never be used except in response to attack. Last December, NATO Foreign Ministers renewed this pledge in the Brussels declaration.

Still, the Warsaw Pact persists in proposing some kind of non-aggression treaty as it did following the meeting of its Foreign Ministers in Prague in January 1983. The Canadian Government concluded that the proposal was unlikely to lead to the successful negotiation of meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements. However, since the proposal has been advanced again, we will look at it again. In this assessment, our guideline will be whether it could lead to a reduction in the current level of East-West tension and to the successful negotiation of meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements.

Certainly non-aggression is a valid principle, and the aim of this Conference, as spelled out in the mandate, is to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations. The mandate directs us to accomplish this by undertaking new, effective and concrete actions.

The proposal for a treaty on the non-use of military force is not new — it is a relic out of the museum of diplomatic failures. It is not concrete — it is simply a renewed declaration. It is questionable whether it would be effective — it only has to be breached once.

What *would* be effective is a series of CSBMs which, provided with adequate forms of verification, would constitute means of observing preparations for aggression before the principle was breached.

We have before us on the table, Mr. Chairman, four proposals which in varying degrees include elements of what I might call disincentives to aggression which could break out due to misperception of intentions or miscalculation of results. In this sense, the areas of congruence among the proposals are considerable.



A commitment to regularly notify and invite observation of routine military exercises will help demonstrate their non-hostile intent.

Canadian Forces Photo



Again, how should we get down to concrete work? We should quickly structure this Conference in such a way that we can focus on these areas of congruence. We must get on with our task of giving effect and expression to our duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in our mutual relations.

Mr. Chairman, mutual confidence is built on predictability. It cannot be created by waving a magic wand. It cannot be declared. It has to be built. This is the only way to persuade each other that our respective military forces

are there for the legitimate protection of our national security and the maintenance of peace and that they do not threaten anyone's sovereignty. It will only be when such conditions of mutual confidence are achieved by concrete effort that stability in European politics can become a reality. It is only then that conditions for reducing forces can become a viable proposal leading to a process of improvement in relations between States which could go beyond this Conference and evolve into meaningful agreements. I believe these are the essential expectations of the people of all our countries."

The essence of the first approach to confidence-building is the communication of information in order to clarify intentions through more openness in military affairs. The second approach amounts to declarations of benevolent intent.

There is nothing new in this. The two approaches long pre-date the current period of difficult East-West relations.

During the negotiation of the Final Act, at a time, a decade ago, of more relaxed East-West relations, the notion of transparency in military affairs was often decried as espionage — decried in such bitter terms that the negotiations seemed to be on the verge of collapse. But there was no attempt then, nor is there any now, to force the word 'transparency' down anyone's throat.

We use the word now as we did then to describe an antidote to secrecy and secretiveness. In our context here, secrecy and confidence are incompatible, and secretiveness for its own sake and as a habit of mind is the arch-enemy of those who seek to create more stable relationships among us.

But it is the concept, not the word, that matters. As our French colleague said the other day, we are not obliging those who do not like it to inscribe the word 'transparency' in our concluding document. Let us, to use the expression wisely chosen by the Ambassador of Belgium, 'demystify', let us demystify this notion once and for all. What we mean by transparency is that military information — which is already available through the press in some countries and by other means — should become the subject of regular and cooperative exchanges between and among governments.

If we can be clear about this notion and its desirability, and its usefulness in terms of confidence-building, we can use another word to describe it. For instance, we could talk about 'openness'.

Whatever word we use, we agreed upon the idea in negotiating the Final Act. The Final Act prescribes that 'clear

Statement of September 27, 1984, on Openness and the Conference Mandate

"We seem to be having a problem getting going. Our work is proving to be at least as difficult as some had feared it might be — and in light of our discussions so far, I suspect that this would have been the case even if the international situation were more relaxed than it is, in fact, today.

We are dealing with competing approaches to confidence-building. They reflect profound differences in ideology and in military doctrine. But, both approaches aim at reducing the chances of war breaking out in Europe.

This is the essential point of common interest. It is surely the ringing message of our mandate. It comes through strong and clear. No one here has questioned it.

Why then do some Delegations seem prepared to pick away at other aspects of the mandate? Such attempts threaten to unravel the whole fabric by quarrelling with specific provisions of it.

The two competing approaches to confidence-building are clearly demonstrated in the proposals before us. What I would judge to be a majority of participating States opt for measures which, in effect, would communicate, between and among members,

credible evidence of the absence of feared threats. While such measures would, in certain respects, only publicly express what is already known through other information sources, they have a profound political and psychological importance because they can be implemented only at the express wish and with the determination of the States involved. These measures, when accepted, would carry with them a political commitment of intent that would make it easier to recognize normal patterns of military activity, thus enabling States to discern significant deviations which could indicate possible threats.

A minority of our negotiating partners seems to favour a less specific, a less concrete approach to confidence-building. They see it as a wide process — a process which, in being essentially declaratory, is much more difficult to quantify, to measure and actually see. In this scheme of things, we would know that a solemn undertaking had been broken only when it had been broken — which is, of course, tragically too late.

We note, however, that all of the participating States recognize the importance of political will. What differs are our views on how to apply it.



and timely information' about military activities is necessary in order to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculations to which they could give rise. The Final Act specifies measures intended to implement this prescription. Surely we do not have to go over old ground once again, in order to convince ourselves of the validity of this concept and the wisdom of attempting to develop this type of measure further.

This question is all the more pertinent when we recall the negotiation of our mandate at Madrid. Again, the two approaches to confidence-building were in full competition during a period of rising East-West tension. But at least the wisdom of the Final Act, which I have noted, was generally respected. As a result, a compromise between two approaches to confidence-building finally emerged, again around consensus on the need to aim at reducing the chances of war breaking out in Europe.

We all agreed at Madrid — and I emphasize all — we all agreed to seek to give effect and expression to refraining from the threat or use of force. But now some Delegations seem to champion that cause as if it belonged to them and was not shared among all of us. This is not a negotiation in which the non-use of force is being pitted against some other objective. Every Delegation here is already committed to that principle, and we should all be seeking ways to implement it in specific activities. The question is how: dynamically, by giving effect to it through new and concrete measures? or statically, by reaffirming an intention?

In the view of my Delegation, this is what the negotiation is about; and it is about Europe, only Europe. To expand the scope of the negotiations will defeat our efforts. We have agreed that we are dealing with the territory of Europe, and the concentration of military power there. We are not dealing with Chinese soldiers in their millions, or Cuban soldiers, wherever they may be just now, or even Soviet troops in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. We are dealing with soldiers who march on European soil.

Even though Canada is not part of the European land mass, our commitment to a stable and secure Europe involves approximately 50 per cent of Canada's land forces. In applicable circumstances their activities would be notified, they would be observed, and they would be inspected, in order to verify that their intentions were not threatening.

We have agreed that the CSBMs will apply to the military activities of the participating States in the adjoining sea area and air space wherever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe. I would stress this conjunction: 'as well as'.

It means that two conditions must be met. On Tuesday, it was argued here — if I understood the line of reasoning correctly — that activities in the adjoining sea area and air space — they were in fact called independent sea and air activities — which affect security in Europe should be notified so long as they meet that one condition. To exclude the other condition, that such sea and air activities must constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe, would mean a selective application of the conditions which any one party could employ — perhaps perversely — in deciding for itself what should be notified by others. This is not an interpretation of the mandate that my Delegation could support. The tendency to go over old ground, to reopen issues already resolved at Madrid, came out in another recent statement here, alleging that some Delegations were obstructing negotiations by refusing to proceed to practical consideration of nuclear issues.

But who is being impractical and who is obstructing negotiations? Why are these issues persistently pressed on us here? Of course, they are of the utmost importance, and of course they must be dealt with. So must problems of international debt. But surely we are not to believe that we have a duty to deal with nuclear arms, many of which could strike Europe from outside the continent, in a forum grouping together nuclear and non-nuclear participating States. Our negotiations would quickly become

sterile if we tried to grapple with the complexity of nuclear weapons and we believe that the drafters of the mandate were wise enough to reach such a conclusion.

This assessment became apparent at Madrid where proposals to deal with nuclear issues at this Conference did not achieve consensus. In fact, they received little support. This is why the mandate refers to 'other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe.' The impact of injecting these issues into our negotiations is to distract the attention of this Conference away from the kind of practical results that we could achieve here. Even issues such as notification of military activities, which all Delegations seem willing to tackle, will need long and detailed negotiation as the Swiss Delegation recently demonstrated so clearly — without first having to work our way through problems which, while crying out for solution, are not the real reason for our meeting here in Stockholm.

To argue that we are duty bound to discuss a subject on the grounds that it is not specifically excluded from our mandate would be to make a pointless nonsense of every effort to organize the work of any meeting according to an agenda, a work plan that seems likely to be helpful in producing results, rather than making those results impossible or unattainable.

With these concerns in mind, we must at this point in our proceedings ask ourselves frankly, and with openness: can the two competing approaches to confidence-building be reconciled?

My answer is yes — yes if an 'organic fusion' means welding together a set of measures which would make it more difficult to threaten or to use force. It matters less what we put into the negotiating crucible than assuring ourselves as we go along that the resulting 'organic fusion' will be 'a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe'."



Statement of December 7, 1984, on the Zone of Application and Information

"My Delegation draws much satisfaction from the positive atmosphere which has marked the fourth session of our Conference. This atmosphere has undoubtedly contributed to the good progress we have at least been able to make in achieving a satisfactory solution to the problem of a working structure. Let us now make good use of it. To the Finnish Delegation for their wise and careful work in helping to bring this about, we are all grateful. And let us also bear in mind that it was a Swedish initiative some months ago that started this ball rolling on its long and difficult course. And we must all, I think, acknowledge the contribution made by the Delegation of Sweden.

I urged a moment ago that we make a determined effort to put to immediate and effective use the working arrangements we have adopted. It is quite clear that we have a long way to go before we reach a meeting of minds on what it is we should be looking to achieve in our detailed work; I must confess that some of the lines of analysis enunciated in our general debate in recent weeks have caused me to scratch my head in puzzlement. Expressions such as 'geographical asymmetry' and 'seeking unilateral advantage' are not very auspicious portents for our future work, as we begin a new day of discussion.

It is alleged that our Conference must deal with security in national, regional and global dimensions. It has been stated that the regional aspect involves an inherent geographical asymmetry because one of the two major partners here is a European country, while the other is not. What does that mean? The fact is that one is geographically a North American country, while the other is geographically not only a European, but also an Asian country as well. So, yes indeed, from the narrowest geographical point of view, there is an obvious asymmetry in this situation. What all this boils down to is that the two are not the same — which we all knew from the beginning.

How should we take these obvious geographic realities into account, keeping in mind two things: first, this Conference is not about geography, and we are not called upon to deal with the impossible problem of counteracting the spread and dispersion over the face of the globe of the countries we represent; and second, the mandate of this Conference is based on the concepts of equality of right balance and reciprocity, as well as equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States? This issue is not new. Our negotiators grappled with the problem for years at Madrid. The solution which emerged was a mandate which makes it clear that this Conference is about military activities taking place in the whole of Europe; that is, a geographical entity stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains.

The extension of the zone of application of confidence- and security-building measures beyond the limitations in the Final Act to the Ural mountains was in recognition of the facts of geography. It was not a concession, and it is not really accurate to attempt to portray it as such. Although the Madrid meeting was haunted for months by cries from some quarters for some mysterious 'corresponding step' in return for this extension, we can be thankful that good sense prevailed since the mandate does not, in my reading, reflect this argument in any way. Any so-called corresponding step in return for the logical geographic extension to the outer boundary of Europe, in the East, could only mean, I think, an extension beyond Europe to the West. In other words, a move out of Europe: that is, out of the zone. But it has been long accepted that the CSCE, of which the Stockholm Conference is a part, is about Europe, not the Atlantic Ocean, not Asia, not Africa, and not the whole world.

Any attempt to question this most basic premise of the CSCE would drag us down into a quagmire of unresolvable controversy. Does anyone in this room

really want that to happen? Or do we want to address ourselves to the concrete issues of confidence-building? The principles of the Final Act, as well as its various provisions, relate to activities in Europe. Similarly, the chapter in the Helsinki Final Act on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament, from which the Stockholm Conference draws its inspiration, deals with military activities in Europe. This has never before been questioned. Any other interpretation of the Final Act would involve what could only be described as an asymmetry among its various parts.

Some participating States have implied informally that informal discussions in Madrid led to some kind of implicit 'understanding' of the mandate. Everyone is free, of course, to have his own 'understanding' or interpretation of the mandate. But what matters for us here is what the mandate actually says. And it clearly says that the zone covers military activities in Europe, taken as a geographic entity, as well as the adjoining sea area and air space when activities there affect security in Europe and constitute a part of activities taking place in the whole of Europe.

It has been argued that equal respect for the security interests of the participating States requires that their relations should not be asymmetrical in the field of security. It is therefore necessary for us to focus as well on the asymmetry caused by the imbalance of information on military activities.

This is the real asymmetry from which this Conference's work takes off.

To correct it is one of the major basic purposes of the measures contained in proposal SC.1. The authors of this proposal have been accused of seeking unilateral advantage. In fact, their intention is to create a situation of mutual advantage in which the flow of information on military affairs from East to West, and West to East, would be balanced. Or, at any rate, more balanced than it is now.



A number of Delegations have spoken convincingly in this respect. They have clearly demonstrated that it is this asymmetry of information on military activities which induces insecurity. Let me repeat an assertion I have made several times before: secrecy is the enemy of confidence.

We must face up to this state of affairs. As one of our colleagues put it so accurately, we must try to demystify the issue of military information. Of course, it can be argued that in the life of any State many areas of military

activity constitute a kind of 'holy of holies'. There are aspects which any State does not wish to reveal about its military affairs. We all respect these concerns. But a great deal of military information on force postures and out-of-garrison activities could be made available to other States without threatening anyone's security.

The reluctance to recognize this fact constitutes in my view the basic asymmetry here and it results in a unilateral advantage for one side. The Stockholm

Conference presents an opportunity to set this asymmetry right and to change a unilateral advantage to a mutual advantage. If the result of our work were more openness in military affairs, exchanges of information about these matters could become a valuable channel of East-West cooperation. If our efforts are successful, the Stockholm Conference could realize its potential, which we have all recognized: its potential for improving East-West relations and advancing the process of arms control and disarmament."

Statement of January 29, 1985, on Non-Use of Force

"My Delegation welcomes any proposal which would contribute to moving this Conference forward towards its aim of adopting concrete confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce mistrust and misunderstanding among the participating States. We shall study the proposal just presented by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in this spirit, and with close attention.

I am bound to observe, however, that initiatives like this one, looking to the working-out of treaties on the non-use of force or non-aggression pacts are familiar. History is replete with examples of proposals for the promotion of peaceful relations among nations by renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. One such agreement was signed, in 1928, by 65 States, many of them represented in this hall. It has never been rescinded and therefore remains in effect even today. What a disappointment the Briand-Kellogg pact has been.

It was motivated by laudable political intent. But it was not backed up by concrete CSBMs nor by means of verification. As a declaration of good intentions, it failed to achieve its aims.

My Delegation has more than once expressed its views on proposals of this nature. They are static obligations which are fully enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and already reaffirmed in the

United Nations Declaration on the principles guiding friendly relations among States, and, on a regional European basis, in the Helsinki Final Act.

It is not a restatement or a re-working of the principle of non-use of force that is needed now. What is needed now, as confirmed in the mandate of our Conference, is to give dynamic expression and effect to this principle. We need to reduce the risk of war in Europe by adopting concrete CSBMs which would make military activities more predictable. We need to ensure that a conflict will not

break out because of misperception of intentions. This is the purpose of the proposal submitted by Canada and a number of other Delegations over one year ago.

As the Canadian Government has stated in the past, and as my Delegation has reaffirmed here, we are prepared to study proposals of the kind just presented to us. We shall judge its merits from the point of view of what contribution it could make to achieving the aims of this Conference and to promoting the process of verifiable arms control, and strengthening security in Europe."



Divisional-size movements out-of-garrison would be notified under the NATO and NNA proposals at the Conference.

US DOD



Statement of June 3, 1985, on Non-Use of Force

"More frequently perhaps than on any other subject, I have commented on the principle of refraining from the threat of use of force in the past at this Conference. I had thought that our views were clear. However, the intervention in the plenary on Friday by the Soviet Delegation prompts me to return to this subject at the first subsequent meeting to provide an opportunity to comment on and discuss what appears to be a serious misunderstanding.

In his statement in plenary on May 31, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union quoted me as saying that a simple reaffirmation of this principle would be pointless. That is, indeed, our position — and I believe it to be widely shared.

We have said that we would examine proposals on refraining from the threat or use of force, and we will live up to that commitment. We have said that we do not believe that a treaty in this regard would be appropriate. We will continue to hold to that view. We have said that any language which might be adopted here in regard to this principle must not undermine the principle as expressed in the United Nations Charter and in the Helsinki Final Act. We have said that while a reaffirmation of the principle alone would be pointless, it would have point and purpose if it were combined with concrete CSBMs which would be militarily significant and politically binding. What else does 'organic fusion' mean? What else does our mandate mean?

Refraining from the threat or use of force is a political objective. It must be met through political means. Declaratory policy is one way, a static way. Another way, a dynamic way, is to begin a process of political cooperation by adopting and implementing a set of militarily significant and politically binding measures, which would make it more difficult to threaten, or to use force.

This is the position of the Canadian Delegation. In practical terms, we believe that the Conference should focus now on measures which will form the basis of political cooperation aimed at giving expression and effect to the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force.

Meanwhile, the Canadian Delegation awaits further suggestions on this issue which we will examine with an open mind."

Statement of June 13, 1985, on Compliance and Verification: On-Site Inspections

"The theme of our debate today, as it has emerged, is the need for clear and timely information and verification of compliance with CSBMs through on-site inspections. The two issues are obviously related. A number of Delegations, representing a wide sample of views at the Conference, have intervened this morning on these subjects. It is notable that Delegations representing yet another view of our work here have remained silent. This is disquieting because, as previous speakers have demonstrated, the need for clear and timely information and verification is firmly linked to this Conference through the Madrid mandate.

Earlier this week in Group A/B, the United States, in one of a series of recent interventions on verification by Delegations from all sides, spoke about the 'tool' of verification, particularly on-site inspections. I should like today to share some views with colleagues about how on-site inspection is also firmly linked to the Conference through the Madrid mandate.

The 35 participating States have acknowledged the principle of verification. The mandate states, *inter alia*, that CSBMs will '... be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.'

The proposals of the participating States confirmed this principle. As part of the negotiation of the agreement on CSBMs, it remains to decide what the principle means, in practical terms, and how to apply it.

The mandate directs that verification should be 'adequate'. On the one hand, verification should provide a means for each participating State to assure itself, through clear and timely information, that military activities conform with the terms of CSBMs. On the other hand, verification should not be so intrusive that it encroaches upon military secrets.

The mandate further states that verification should correspond to the content of the CSBMs. On the basis of

the proposals already on the table, the broad content of the measures likely to be adopted is emerging. The capacity to verify them will soon have to be established before the detailed content of the measures can be worked out. The CSBMs and the means to verify them should thus be negotiated *pari passu*. In this way, there is more possibility of reaching a final agreement by avoiding subsequent renegotiation over questions of verification which could risk reopening issues.

In accordance with the mandate, verification should be effected on the basis of 'reciprocity', in conformity with 'equal respect for the security interests of all the CSCE participating States.'

The mandate also calls for '... a set of mutually complementary CSBMs....' Each measure in the set should reinforce the effect of the other.

Finally, means of verification should be an integral part of the agreement



on CSBMs. This means that a measure aimed at determining whether a military activity is, or is not, in compliance with the agreement would itself be a CSBM. By having the means to verify that violations were unintended or had not occurred, confidence would be enhanced as States realized through their cooperative interaction that their suspicions were unwarranted. Suspicion is inherent in relations among States. But verification of compliance with CSBMs would serve to convert mutual suspicion into mutual confidence that security is not at risk. Adequate verification would also alert States to possible violations.

Verification has another intrinsic function. In calculating the risk to threatening or using force, States would have to take into account that their actions would more likely be discovered in the preparatory stage before a *fait accompli* was possible. They would be more reluctant to risk detection and the danger of jeopardizing the agreement and political relations among the signatories to it.

In summary, the mandate establishes the criteria for defining, in practical terms, what is meant by the principle of verification: adequacy to establish with a reasonable degree of certainty compliance with the regime of CSBMs,

without overly intruding on security interests; correlation of forms of verification to the content of the CSBMs; in other words, the integration of means of verification into the set of mutually complementary CSBMs; and, finally, reciprocity in accordance with respect for the security interests of all the CSCE participating States.

Measure 5 of proposal SC.1/Amplified, aimed at verifying whether notifiable activities are non-threatening and are duly announced, is designed to meet these criteria.

It is adequate because participating States would be able to examine whether a military activity complies with the CSBMs. This examination could be undertaken, to a certain extent, in a number of ways, including National Technical Means, which, as specified in Measure 5, should be unimpeded by the participating States. Such means can indicate to a degree whether activities are taking place. But they are limited in capability by climate, orbital constraints and evasive measures. Moreover, only a few of the participating States possess advanced National Technical Means.

A further method of examination is necessary, which would provide closer insight into military activities and which

would be mutually applicable. Inspections, as further proposed in Measure 5, would meet this requirement. Since each participating State could conduct only a limited number of inspections each year, they would not be automatic. But if requested, they should be permitted in order to verify whether or not a perceived activity complied with the regime of CSBMs.

Inspections would be reciprocal. As Measure 5 specifies: 'Each participating State will be permitted to inspect a military activity or a possible military activity within the Zone for the purpose of monitoring compliance with agreed CSBMs.' However, in accordance with the principle of sovereignty, inspections would not encroach on sensitive military interests. Measure 5 stipulates that: 'The receiving State will not be required to permit inspections of restricted areas.' In addition, the modalities suggested in Measure 5 call for inspections to be kept short, the number of inspections and inspectors to be kept low and the suggested provisions for exemptions are comprehensive. Such a system of inspections would not intrude on sensitive military interests. Rather, inspections should be seen as a kind of audit conducted by any enterprise from time to time to ensure that affairs are being properly managed. But just as refusal to permit an audit would alert management to a possible misdemeanour, a State refusing to permit an inspection would alert other States to possible non-compliance.

Inspections would correspond to the content of the CSBMs. They would verify whether an activity complied with the information supplied under the measure on notification. Inspectors could confirm whether an activity was, or was not, occurring. They would also be able to ascertain, in the short term, more detailed information than could be obtained by other measures. Inspections would complement other measures in providing evidence whereby compliance could be adequately monitored.

Inspections under Measure 5 would be an integral part of the agreement because in providing each State with



Allied proposals at Stockholm are designed to impart greater predictability and openness to military activity in Europe

US DOD



assurance that the other States are complying with it, they complete the confidence-building process. They constitute an element in a mutually complementary set of CSBMs which corroborate each other.

Under such a regime of CSBMs the exchange of information on military forces in the zone would establish a basis of judgement of military potentials. It would be complemented by annual forecasts of how these potentials would be deployed out-of-garrison in the future. This information would be further complemented by the details furnished under the notification measure about the more immediate deployment of these military potentials. Observation would provide the routine basis for assuring the non-threatening character of this activity. But there could be cases where the observers questioned the conformity of the information notified with the activity they witnessed. There might also be cases where military activity occurred which should have been notified, but was not. Inspections would permit the participating States to clarify the nature of such activity.

The question has been asked: how can you verify verification? In a mutually complementary set of CSBMs, each measure reinforces the other and partly serves to verify the other. The confidence-building effect of each measure lies both in its immediate function and in its place in forming an aggregate of

verification. Measure 5 further assures a self-verifying mechanism. Initial monitoring through National Technical Means, including the monitoring of mass media, would indicate whether a notifiable activity was taking place. If this led to suspicions about lack of compliance with the CSBMs, an inspection could verify whether these concerns were justified. Further monitoring might to a degree corroborate the findings of the inspection. On the basis of what I have called an aggregate of verification, clarifications could, if necessary, be sought through communications among the participating States.

In summary, the principle of verification has been recognized by the participating States. The principle of on-site inspections has also been widely recognized. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the 'Palme Commission', which includes among the commissioners Giorgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, stated: '...on-site inspections should not be ruled out in principle.' The Madrid mandate provides guidelines for defining what the principle of verification means in practical terms and how to apply it. Measure 5 of our proposal SC.1/Amplified is an *adequate* form of verification which would *correspond* to the content of a set of mutually complementary CSBMs, and as a confidence- and security-building measure itself would form an *integral* part of the agreement."

Statement of July 5, 1985, on Confidence-Building and Its Political Significance

"Eighteen months ago" this Conference began its work in a spirit of hope and urgency. We had gone through a difficult period, a period of harsh words and of tension: a period of threatening political and military horizons. Against an ominous background our Foreign Ministers launched, in this hall, a badly needed process of mutual dialogue on questions of security.

We started out with high hopes.


But I am afraid that the political promise of this Conference may be fading. It is adding little to the East-West dialogue. If the experience of the work of a year and a half is any indicator, we may be well on the way towards a non-achievement; we may have doomed ourselves to add little to East-West cooperation. Bargains, of course, come at the end; but we have yet to begin any preliminary trading of a significant sort.

On the one side of the negotiating table is a detailed and comprehensive programme for cooperation in military affairs. The response of many of our partners has been mostly tactical.

As long as this imbalance persists, it is difficult to see how we should go about generating a negotiating dynamic — and certainly the distinction between 'formal' and 'informal', or one type of meeting or another, will not matter very much.


Let us recall that we are here to contribute to a process. It is a political process aimed at building mutual confidence. Without that confidence, measures of arms control and disarmament will not take root — assuming, even, that they might be negotiated. The confidence we seek needs cooperation.

Our ultimate objective is to stimulate the process we began in Helsinki. But so far, we seem to have been talking



Notifiable military exercises would be subject to observation under a Conference agreement.

Canadian Forces Photo



View of Kulturhuset in downtown Stockholm, site of the Stockholm Conference. Flags of Conference participants can be observed on roof of building.

past each other. The prospects for agreeing on meaningful cooperative action do not seem bright. We have failed to set up a basic negotiating equation, or what others have called a negotiating framework — and, without it, and in fairly short order — we shall never be able to come to grips with the myriad of details facing us in the critical area of military affairs; without a basic decision soon we shall never be able to come to grips with these specific problems in the time remaining to us.

The policy — indeed the philosophy — underlying the measures which my Delegation has co-sponsored is clear. We seek a programme of cooperative action based on informing and verifying, in other words, a coherent system, a compendium of information and verification measures. We believe that only in this way can confidence be built. Confidence rests on deeds, not words.

At the very outset of this Conference, we gave our objectives a preliminary concrete formulation by proposing measures through which the participating States could inform each other of their intentions and verify them with a view to building mutual confidence. We have spelled out this policy in further detail through a series of working documents. We later consolidated these documents in the form of an amplification of our

original proposal in order to give a clearer and more precise impression of our approach to confidence-building, thus to facilitate negotiations. During recent weeks, we have gone one step further towards this end by illustrating how the participating States could exchange information in annual calendars, how military activities could be effectively observed and how they could be verified by on-site inspection.

In recent weeks our policy of seeking to build confidence through concrete measures seems to have elicited a response from some of our partners. After months of emphasis on unverifiable declarations of good intent, some sketchy concrete measures have finally been tabled, presumably in accordance with proposal SC.4*, which envisages the elaboration of additional confidence-building measures, more significant and broader in scope than those in the Final Act. We are continuing to study these proposals, although in some cases they contain parameters that are hardly more significant than those in the Final Act; certainly not significant enough to warrant the considerable effort this Conference, in its totality, represents. In other cases, these newly presented measures seem to seek unilateral advantage, and in still other

* proposal by the Soviet Union

cases, they would involve military activity outside Europe, which would only lead this Conference into an endless and fruitless debate.

My Delegation has repeated often that we do not believe that words alone will inspire confidence; we do not believe that static declarations of good intentions are enough. But in an attempt to define a negotiating equation, we have recognized that it would be appropriate to reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or the use of force. It could be a reflection of the very barriers to these actions which we seek to establish through measures of information and verification.

We have thus tried to set the stage for a balanced and meaningful negotiation. But we have seen little sign that some of our partners are willing to take a corresponding step in meeting us half way. The possibility of the out-of-garrison concept serving as a comprehensive definition of ground-force activities which should be notified has not won general acceptance. Similarly, we have yet to come to grips with the need to define the threshold for notification in structural terms which could be effectively identified, observed and verified. While a broad consensus seems fortunately to be emerging in acknowledging the fundamental importance of contributing to the building of confidence through information and verification, a detailed discussion of how this principle should be applied has eluded us. This is all very discouraging.

The sixth session has focused on concrete measures, and that is all to the good as far as it goes. But it has not redressed the negotiating equation which remains lopsided with a clear policy and a clearly articulated objective on one side, and on the other, a clever and carefully orchestrated display of tactics. This is what discourages me.

We have been given a chance at Stockholm to make the revitalization of the process of *détente* a practical possibility: to show that it can be done. Let us not throw this chance away by playing the tactical game too long."



Statement of October 18, 1985, on the State of the Negotiations

"As we approach a pause in our work, it is not inappropriate that we should stand back for a moment to survey what we have done, what we have not done, and what we may be about to do, if we can believe our own words about the political importance of this Conference in the total system of East-West relationships in all their complexity.

Almost two years ago, our Foreign Ministers assembled in this hall in an international atmosphere of apprehension and uncertainty. Surveying the sombre horizons of the moment, the Foreign Minister of Canada remarked: 'Never has a Conference been more urgently required than this one. And never have expectations and hopes been greater for a successful outcome.' Fortunately the gloomy horizons of those dark days of January 1984 have brightened somewhat. But our task has not changed in the slightest; nor has our time frame. Are we making the best use of the time and the political impulses we have been given? With about a year to go, if we are to come to a satisfactory result here by the autumn of next year, my Delegation views the working mode inaugurated this week with a sense of relief.

We sense relief that the procedural agreement finally adopted at this session marks a watershed at the Conference, which has already taken too long to get down to exchanging ideas in concrete form. The agreement could further our task of achieving the concrete result defined by our mandate, which enjoins us to devise measures that will increase confidence and security.

But has this breakthrough we have now made been accompanied by a renewal of our sense of urgency corresponding to the importance of our mandated tasks — because the time remaining to us is so short?

The procedural agreement is not a panacea. It will not guarantee that we

make progress. We now have to seize the opportunity which is long overdue to get down to the concrete exchange of ideas in specific terms that will lead quickly to drafting; to move the process of discussion to the process of forming text even if in fragmentary and preliminary form. We have to translate impressions of flexibility into concrete terms that can be written down even if it will be subject to review in broader context. We have to clear away the remaining underbrush in order to lay down roads leading in the direction that has been chartered over the past almost two years.

Although this is not always self-evident to the media — and it is not easy to explain it to them and others — we have in fact accomplished a lot in clarifying concepts, some of which are highly complex. I believe we have understood each other's positions pretty well, and as a result we have been able to begin looking beyond our own respective positions in search of common interests.

We have found some. For instance, my Delegation has repeatedly referred to CSBMs as 'disincentives to aggression'; other Delegations have called them 'operational barriers to the use of force'; recently, it was suggested that the CSBMs are 'safety fuses'. These expressions are different, but I think the meaning is the same. The job now is to abandon the metaphors and elegantly turned phrases, and begin drafting the details in order to grasp and commit to text the common ground implicit in our different approaches.

We had thought, too, that by now we had established enough confidence between and among us to realize that military affairs can and must be demystified, that secrecy is the enemy of confidence, and that transparency is not the same as espionage. We had thought there had been a wider acceptance of the view that information on military affairs should become the subject of regular and cooperative and open exchanges among governments.

Most recently, we have noted that apparent and gratifying convergence of view that has emerged on the notion of annual forecasts — although much discussion still seems necessary on the circumstances in which this concept is to be applied.

Although my Delegation, along with others, continues to doubt the value of codifying purely declaratory policies, we have agreed that in supplementing concrete CSBMs there will be a role for a reaffirmation of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force. While recognizing that other critical factors involved in the threat or use of force are being dealt with in appropriate forums, we have agreed to focus on a major problem at Stockholm: the threat posed by conventional forces in Europe, as defined in the mandate of the Conference.

We have all agreed that it would be useful to conduct at least one week of informal, exploratory talks before the end of this session. The resulting experience has not relieved, but rather enlightened, our sense of urgency. On the one hand, some Delegations say that conditions are ripe for beginning to draft a reaffirmation of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force. On the other hand, they say that consideration cannot be given to measures of information and verification until the content of the measures of notification is determined. And that content is in dispute because the same Delegations continue to interpret the mandate in a way that extends the zone of application of CSBMs to include activities that fall outside of it. Such a line of argument can surely have no other effect than to delay us — or even bring us to a standstill.

Our main achievement over these long months of discussion has been to identify an adequate basis — and I believe we may now have done so — for designing a set of CSBMs which would reduce the risk of military conflict in Europe. We must now spare no effort — and impose on ourselves no artificial time limits for those efforts — to ensure that a substantial result at Stockholm is achieved prior to the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting."



MANDATE

Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

The participating States,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Act according to which they recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament,

Have agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The aim of the Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

Thus the Conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

The first stage of the Conference will be held in Stockholm commencing on 17 January 1984.

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area* and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

*In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.



Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.

Taking into account the above-mentioned aim of the Conference, the next follow-up meeting of the participating States of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4 November 1986, will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the Conference.

Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Act, and having reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the Conference, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda, time-table and other organizational modalities for the first stage of the Conference, will be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25 October 1983. Its duration shall not exceed three weeks.

The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

(Madrid, 6 September 1983)