



Action for Reserves



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| J | House of Commons. |
| 103 | Sub-committee of the |
| H7 | Standing Committee on |
| 1980/83 | External Affairs and |
| A75 ^{DATE} | National Defence on |
| A12 | Armed Forces Reserves |

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HOUSE OF COMMONS

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Issue No. 49

Fascicule n° 49

Thursday, December 10, 1981
Monday, December 14, 1981
Tuesday, December 15, 1981
Wednesday, December 16, 1981

Le jeudi 10 décembre 1981
Le lundi 14 décembre 1981
Le mardi 15 décembre 1981
Le mercredi 16 décembre 1981

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

**External Affairs
and
National Defence**

**Affaires extérieures
et de la
Défense nationale**

RESPECTING:

CONCERNANT:

Order of Reference pertaining to Armed Forces
Reserves.

Ordre de renvoi se rapportant aux Forces armées
de réserve.

INCLUDING:

Y COMPRIS:

The Seventh Report to the House
(Armed Forces Reserves)

Le Septième rapport à la Chambre
(Forces armées de réserve)

First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981

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(Quorum 16)

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Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

Pursuant to S.O. 65(4)(b)

On Thursday, December 10, 1981:

Mr. Shields replaced Mr. Murta
Mr. Gass replaced Mr. Wenman
Mr. Bradley replaced Mr. Forrestall
Mr. Greenaway replaced Mrs. MacDonald
Mr. Gamble replaced Mr. Stewart
Mr. Stewart replaced Mr. King

On Monday, December 14, 1981:

Mr. Marceau replaced Mr. Lachance
Mr. Peterson replaced Mr. Gimaïel
Mr. Landers replaced Mr. Dupras
Mr. Dion replaced Mr. Collette
Mr. MacLellan replaced Mr. Hudecki
Mr. Frith replaced Mr. Duclos
Mr. MacBain replaced Mr. Robinson (*Etobicoke-Lake-*
shore)
Mr. McCauley replaced Mr. MacLellan
Mr. Forrestall replaced Mr. Shields
Mr. King replaced Mr. Bradley

On Tuesday, December 15, 1981:

Mr. Collette replaced Mr. Dion
Mr. Duclos replaced Mr. MacBain
Mr. Hudecki replaced Mr. Landers
Mr. Daudlin replaced Mr. McCauley

On Wednesday, December 16, 1981:

Mr. Dupras replaced Mr. Peterson
Mr. Robinson (*Etobicoke-Lakeshore*) replaced Mr. Col-
lette
Mr. Murta replaced Mr. McLean
Mr. Gimaïel replaced Mr. Daudlin
Mr. MacBain replaced Mr. Flis

Conformément à l'article 65(4)(b) du Règlement

Le jeudi 10 décembre 1981:

M. Shields remplace M. Murta
M. Gass remplace M. Wenman
M. Bradley remplace M. Forrestall
M. Greenaway remplace M^{me} MacDonald
M. Gamble remplace M. Stewart
M. Stewart remplace M. King

Le lundi 14 décembre 1981:

M. Marceau remplace M. Lachance
M. Peterson remplace M. Gimaïel
M. Landers remplace M. Dupras
M. Dion remplace M. Collette
M. MacLellan remplace M. Hudecki
M. Frith remplace M. Duclos
M. MacBain remplace M. Robinson (*Etobicoke-Lake-*
shore)
M. McCauley remplace M. MacLellan
M. Forrestall remplace M. Shields
M. King remplace M. Bradley

Le mardi 15 décembre 1981:

M. Collette remplace M. Dion
M. Duclos remplace M. MacBain
M. Hudecki remplace M. Landers
M. Daudlin remplace M. McCauley

Le mercredi 16 décembre 1981:

M. Dupras remplace M. Peterson
M. Robinson (*Etobicoke-Lakeshore*) remplace M. Col-
lette
M. Murta remplace M. McLean
M. Gimaïel remplace M. Daudlin
M. MacBain remplace M. Flis

Friday December 18, 1981

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

SEVENTH REPORT

In accordance with its Order of Reference of Wednesday, March 18, 1981, your Committee assigned responsibility for the study of the status, capability and role of the Armed Forces Reserves to a subcommittee consisting of nine members.

The Subcommittee on Armed Forces Reserves has submitted its report to the Committee. Your Committee has adopted this report with amendments. The text of the report follows:

The Subcommittee on Armed Forces Reserves has the honour to present its

FIRST REPORT

In accordance with its Order of Reference from the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of March 24, 1981, the subcommittee has considered the "status, capability and role of the Armed Forces Reserves."

The subcommittee is composed of the following members:

Chairman: Maurice Harquail

Vice-Chairman: Len Hopkins

Ursula Appolloni

Garnet Bloomfield

Stan Darling

Paul-André Massé

Donald Munro

Terry Sargeant

Ron Stewart

Bud Bradley also served on the subcommittee.

Subsequent to its organization meeting, the subcommittee placed advertisements inviting the submission of briefs in major daily and weekly newspapers throughout Canada. As a result, 63 briefs were received from individuals and organizations and these became a major input into the subcommittee's study.

The subcommittee throughout the summer months undertook various visits to observe the training of reserves. At Camp Gagetown, members visited Rendezvous 81 and viewed various military exercises including firing exercises and met reservists in both the communication reserve and the militia. At Camp Petawawa, they witnessed reserve training at the (Armoured) Militia National Rank Qualifying School. In Winnipeg, the subcommittee was briefed on the role of the air reserves at Air Command Headquarters. Naval reserve training was observed at both Vancouver and Victoria. In Vancouver, a further opportunity was afforded to the subcommittee to observe the training of the militia reserves.

The subcommittee then undertook a West European tour and was briefed on the defence systems and the role of the reserve forces in Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, West Germany and France. Members also visited Canadian Forces Europe in Lahr and were briefed on the role of the Canadian reserves in Germany.

At this stage, the subcommittee undertook public hearings. Eleven public hearings were held and 39 witnesses were heard, 34 of whom represented organizations and five who appeared on their own behalf. (See Appendix B) The work of those who submitted briefs, as well as those who appeared before the subcommittee, was of invaluable assistance to the study.

The subcommittee also wishes to express its appreciation to Nino A. Travella, clerk of the subcommittee, who coordinated the general administration of the subcommittee's work. For the background work and the long hours in drafting the report, the subcommittee expresses its gratitude to Peter Dobell and Daniel Bon, assisted by Douglas Rowland and Roger Hill, all of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, and Peter Alward of the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament.

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COMMUNICATION RESERVE

RADIO TECHNICIAN

INTRODUCTION

In carrying out its mandate "to study the status, capability and role of the **Armed Forces Reserves**", the subcommittee's aim has been to determine the roles of the reserves in relation to those of the regular forces and to identify and recommend policies that would have to be adopted to ensure that these roles could be fulfilled. While testimony and submissions received by the subcommittee have ranged widely over all manner of questions relating to the Canadian armed forces, this report will be confined to the mandate.

Canada's reserve forces have served the country well in times of crisis, most notably during the last two world wars. With roots throughout the country, in large and small communities alike, militia and other components of the reserves have been a major social force. Reserve training has contributed importantly to the development of local leadership and nurtured a sense of citizenship and patriotism. Service in the reserves has been a significant expression of the voluntary tradition which runs so strongly through Canadian society.

The size of Canada's armed forces and of the reserves has fluctuated dramatically during the post-war years, as Table I reveals, reflecting different perceptions of military need.

Source: Defence 80, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Canada, 1981.

TABLE I: CANADIAN FORCES MANPOWER - REGULAR AND PRIMARY RESERVES

| Year | Total Regular | Primary Reserve - Strength by Service | | | | | Total | % Reserve vs Regular |
|------|---------------|---------------------------------------|--------|-------|---------------|--------|-------|----------------------|
| | | Navy | Army | Air | Communication | | | |
| 1925 | 4,290 | 999 | 50,492 | - | - | 51,491 | - | |
| 1935 | 5,163 | 1,199 | 50,474 | 308 | - | 51,984 | - | |
| 1939 | 7,945 | 1,672 | 51,248 | 966 | - | 54,055 | - | |
| 1945 | 761,041 | - | 83,264 | - | - | 83,264 | - | |
| 1950 | 47,185 | 3,663 | 43,047 | 2,369 | - | 59,079 | - | |
| 1955 | 118,077 | 5,631 | 45,085 | 5,774 | - | 56,490 | 49% | |
| 1960 | 119,597 | 3,470 | 42,661 | 3,513 | - | 49,664 | 42% | |
| 1962 | 126,474 | 3,679 | 60,246 | 2,308 | - | 66,233 | 52% | |
| 1965 | 114,164 | 2,351 | 30,331 | 795 | - | 33,477 | 29% | |
| 1970 | 93,296 | 2,714 | 19,343 | 751 | - | 22,808 | 24% | |
| 1971 | 89,563 | 2,981 | 16,343 | 702 | 779 | 20,805 | 23% | |
| 1972 | 84,339 | 3,069 | 15,327 | 709 | 828 | 19,933 | 24% | |
| 1973 | 82,402 | 3,108 | 14,481 | 696 | 903 | 19,188 | 23% | |
| 1974 | 81,822 | 2,350 | 15,008 | 726 | 1,167 | 19,251 | 24% | |
| 1975 | 81,822 | 3,105 | 15,576 | 700 | 1,385 | 20,766 | 26% | |
| 1976 | 79,738 | 3,325 | 14,821 | 730 | 1,450 | 20,326 | 25% | |
| 1977 | 80,386 | 3,171 | 15,780 | 706 | 1,592 | 21,249 | 26% | |
| 1978 | 81,137 | 3,070 | 15,401 | 700 | 1,585 | 20,756 | 26% | |
| 1979 | 80,591 | 2,966 | 15,263 | 1,101 | 1,477 | 20,807 | 26% | |
| 1980 | 80,298 | 2,841 | 14,270 | 961 | 1,470 | 19,542 | 24% | |

Notes:

1. Regular Strengths - as of 31 March annually.
Primary Reserve Strengths - as of 31 December annually.
2. During the Second World War all reserve naval and air personnel were on active service. Their numbers are included with the total for the regulars.
3. Reserve strengths tend to fluctuate throughout the year, rising from a low of around 19,000 in January to an August high of approximately 23,500.

Source: Defence 80, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Canada, 1981.

It will be evident that, compared with the inter-war period, Canada's regular force is larger while the reserves are smaller absolutely and much smaller relatively.

The ratio of reserves to regulars, as Table II shows, is now in fact lower in Canada than in any other NATO country or in Australia, in many ways the country closest to Canada in terms of military traditions and resources for responding to threats. The presence of large Soviet forces in Europe has forced NATO countries to maintain highly trained permanent forces and Canada has been influenced by this situation. By contrast, the small proportion of reserves reflects a perception - until recently virtually a dogma - that, in this same situation, Canada should give priority to forces-in-being. Understandably, NATO members in Europe, being geographically much closer to the potential front line, maintain larger reserves.

TABLE II: REGULAR/PRIMARY RESERVE FORCE COMPARISONS

| Country | Regular Force | Reserve Force | Ratio Reserves to Regulars |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------------|
| Australia | 72,500 | 32,000 | 0.44 |
| Belgium | 87,900 | 115,500 | 1.30 |
| Britain | 329,200 | 118,000 | .35 |
| Canada | 80,000 | 21,300 | .25 |
| Denmark | 33,000 | 57,500 | 1.75 |
| France | 494,700 | 450,000 | .90 |
| Greece | 181,500 | 290,000 | 1.60 |
| Italy | 366,000 | 738,000 | 2.00 |
| Netherlands | 115,000 | 171,000 | 1.50 |
| Norway | 37,000 | 162,000 | 4.40 |
| Turkey | 567,000 | 425,000 | .75 |
| U.S.A. | 2,050,000 | 806,300 | .40 |
| West Germany | 495,000 | 750,000 | 1.50 |

The subcommittee's view leads it to the conclusion that the reserves are in urgent need of revitalization. There have been many - too many - reviews in the post-war years, as is brought out in Chapter I. In military terms unprecedented changes have taken place, reflecting the decision to maintain a Canadian contingent abroad in peace-time and the dramatic shifts in military doctrine caused by the development of nuclear weapons. Policy relating to the reserves has had to respond to these and other developments which are briefly noted in Chapter II. Over time, the reserves have undergone frequent change and have suffered in the process.

Although the subject of the reserves has been debated sporadically in the House of Commons, no parliamentary committee has previously been asked to report on their condition and to make recommendations for their improvement. The subcommittee is greatly honoured by the unique opportunity afforded to it by the House and wishes to emphasize the need for action.

TABLE II. RESERVE FORCES BY COUNTRY

| Country | Reserve Force | Active Force | Total |
|-------------|---------------|--------------|---------|
| Australia | 25,000 | 25,000 | 50,000 |
| Belgium | 125,000 | 27,000 | 152,000 |
| Britain | 118,000 | 320,000 | 438,000 |
| Canada | 21,300 | 20,000 | 41,300 |
| Denmark | 27,000 | 32,000 | 59,000 |
| France | 420,000 | 494,700 | 914,700 |
| Greece | 200,000 | 181,200 | 381,200 |
| Italy | 158,000 | 350,000 | 508,000 |
| Netherlands | 170,000 | 113,000 | 283,000 |
| Turkey | 125,000 | 180,000 | 305,000 |

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL SURVEY

Canada's reserve force consists of the Primary Reserve, Supplementary Reserve, Cadet Instructors List and the Canadian Rangers. The primary reserve is made up of four components: the Naval Reserve, the Militia (army reserve), the Air Reserve and the Communication Reserve. When Canadians refer to the reserve force they generally think of the primary reserve. However, there are other components. The supplementary reserve is a list of retired officers and other ranks from the regular force, former members of the primary reserve and former cadet instructors who have volunteered to return to their service should a need for them arise. The cadet instructors' list is composed of men and women who have been commissioned as officers for the purpose of training cadets and administering their programs. The Canadian Rangers is an organization composed largely of native people, the bulk of whom are Inuit volunteers. They provide a military presence in the sparsely settled, northern coastal and isolated areas of Canada with a view to detecting and reporting on any penetration of Canadian territory by hostile and unusual elements.

Canada's reserves trace their roots back to the seventeenth century. The Department of National Defence, in a briefing note to the subcommittee, noted that the militia is one of the oldest institutions in Canada, having been established for the defence of New France against the New England colonists, backed by the British Army and the Indians. By the nineteenth century the defence role had broadened to include both upper and lower Canada. French Canadian and English Canadian militiamen supporting the British army now stood side by side against the Americans. Without the York Volunteers under Brock at Queenston Heights or the greatly outnumbered Voltigeurs under Charles de Salaberry along the Chateauguay, the War of 1812 might have had a different ending. Out of these and other actions came a strong belief in the ability of the militia to protect the nation and it was not until the withdrawal of the British garrisons in 1870-71 that Canada raised its own regular units. In fact, the militia tradition was so strong that the word 'army' was not applied officially to the land forces until 1940.

'Sea militias' have been identified in New England and Nova Scotia from the end of the seventeenth century. The Provincial Marine formed after the Seven Years' War in the lakes of Canada survived until the War of 1812. These were auxiliary forces not unlike the 'Sea Fencibles' raised in Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. After the War of 1812, the Flank Companies of the Provincial Marine formed part of the Upper Canadian Militia and were called into service for the 1837 rebellion and subsequent border troubles.

THE PRE-1945 RESERVE

The Militia

The origin of the modern reserve force is to be found in the Militia Act of 1855. Under this act, a 5,000 volunteer force of cavalry, artillery and infantry was established. Because of tensions resulting from the American civil war of the early 1860s and the Fenian raids of the late 1860s, this volunteer force rapidly expanded until it reached an approximate strength of 40,000 in the early 1870s, out of a population of 3,700,000. There was little organizational change until the eve of World War I at which time a carefully nurtured regimental system was discarded - virtually overnight - in favour of a hastily developed, ad hoc mobilization plan. Nevertheless, the Canadian militia with its broadly-based organization was large enough to provide a platform on which to raise an army of 619,000 officers and men in a country with a 1914 population of some 8,000,000. Of these officers and men, 418,000 served overseas and close to 60,000 were killed.

Two reorganizations of the militia took place between the wars. The first of these was prompted by the Otter Committee which was formed in 1919. It began work by reviewing petitions from many Canadian expeditionary force (CEF) units which wanted to be perpetuated in the militia and it soon became apparent there was no consensus. The old pre-war regiments did not wish to lose their identities and the new CEF regiments, which had fought and suffered in the trenches, did not want to be assimilated by them. In the end, nearly all the units of the pre-first war militia lost their titles and/or numerals. The committee based its manning recommendations on a militia strength of four cavalry divisions and 11 infantry divisions, plus supporting arms and services. The supposed need for this unrealistically large force was based on a defence plan which made allowance for an invasion of the country by the United States. The scheme found little favour and was never developed, although the peace-time establishment eventually agreed upon was 135,000. Another factor in authorizing such a large establishment centred around the attempt to accommodate the almost limitless number of CEF units who demanded perpetuation. By 1931, the non-permanent active militia (NPAM) as it was then called, had an actual strength of 51,000 officers and men.

The second reorganization was planned in 1932 but not carried out until 1936. Designed to provide a more realistic base on which to build, it aimed at developing and training a force of one cavalry (armour) and six infantry divisions as a practical Canadian contribution to the Commonwealth in the event of another overseas war. By 1938, the peace-time establishment of the militia was set at 86,000 although actual strength was about half this number.

During World War II, some 605,000 men and 25,000 women voluntarily served in the Canadian Army Active Service Force (CAASF) out of a population of approximately 11,000,000. Under the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) of 1944, an additional 100,000 men were conscripted, providing a total intake of some 730,000. When naval and air force volunteers are added - respectively 106,000 and 250,000 - the figure comes to over 1,000,000 men and women who were in uniform.

The Naval Reserve

The Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve (RNCVR) began as an unpaid volunteer movement in Victoria in 1913. During the First World War it provided some 7,000 officers and men for service in the British fleet and the Canadian East coast patrols. It was disbanded in 1919.

With severe cuts in defence budgets in the early 1920s, the Director of Naval Service decided to dispose of half of his regular establishments to close the naval college and raise a series of naval reserve units in cities from coast to coast, so as to maintain a naval presence in the eyes of all Canadians. It was a bold, yet wise decision for it enabled the navy's manpower to expand as soon as war was declared in 1939, and to go on growing to more than 50 times its peace-time strength by the end of that war.

In 1923, two separate components were raised: the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve (RCNR) consisting of men who made their living at sea, and the RCNVR who were landsmen or yachtsmen willing to serve afloat. The naval reserve units, often referred to as 'stone frigates', were static. In war-time they acted as recruiting and training centres, sending officers and men to either coast for further training and assignment to ships or shore establishments as required.

During World War II no Canadian warship was without a naval reservist and, by 1944, it was often the case where only one or two officers had had prior sea service (merchant or fishing) before 1939.

Until 1940, the reserves were administered from naval service headquarters in Ottawa, after which they were placed under a flag officer, first at Toronto and

then at Hamilton, until the integration of the Canadian armed forces in 1965. Also, after World War II, the RCNR and RCNVR were amalgamated to form a single organization under the former title. The principal role of providing trained or partly trained personnel to the fleet remained the same. Additional tasks which survived the vicissitudes of time and reorganizations included: the provision of a mobilization base, survival operations and maintenance of a naval presence in peace-time.

When the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service (better known as the WRENS) was raised in 1942, it was administered as part of the RCNVR and achieved a strength of over 6,000. It was disbanded after the war, but from 1951 onward, women were enrolled in the RCNR, and shortly afterwards in the regular service of the RCN.

The Air Reserve

The history of the air reserve covers a much shorter period than that of the militia. Despite this, the air reserve has seen many changes since it was first conceived and has experienced both good and bad days.

Although the first country in the Commonwealth to successfully experiment with aeroplanes, Canada paid little attention to their military application until World War I. After some false starts, Canada's main air effort developed into supplying pilots for the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) during that conflict.

In 1920, the Canadian Air Force (CAF), a non-permanent organization, was authorized by Order-in-Council. The purpose was to train former RFC pilots and ground crews in month-long refresher courses every second year. This proved unsatisfactory and by 1924 the Royal Canadian Air Force - reorganized and with an active component - came into being. Over the ensuing eight years, the RCAF nearly trebled in strength within its three elements - the active, auxiliary and reserve air forces. The two main elements, the active and auxiliary forces, became deeply involved in civil government air operations and over two-thirds of the appropriations in the early 1930s were for non-service needs.

Some of these civil activities included transporting officials into inaccessible regions, photographing the vast northern reaches of Canada, establishing air routes, experimenting with air mail services, delivering 'treaty money' to Indians, and evacuating seriously ill and injured persons from remote communities.

During the depression years, the RCAF suffered major budgetary cuts but 1936 saw the beginning of an upswing for both regular and reserve elements.

Much of the civil aviation role was transferred to the Department of Transport and a new reorganization brought the RCAF into recognizable service lines. The next three years saw a major re-equipment and development program and by 1 September 1939, there were some 3,000 personnel in the regular RCAF and 1,000 officers and men in the RCAF auxiliary.

The auxiliary at that time provided three wing headquarters and 12 squadrons for the RCAF. These squadrons provided the nucleus of much of the early RCAF contribution to the war-time defence effort, including the first squadron to go overseas.

POST-1945 DEVELOPMENTS

The onset of the cold war following World War Two, coupled with the advent of nuclear weapons, produced a revolutionary rearrangement in the relationship of the reserves to the regulars. Whereas previously the regulars had supplied a small cadre of professionals to train reserves and to provide the skeleton of an armed force, they were vastly outnumbered by the reserves who were counted upon to provide the flesh and muscle. Since the last war, the regulars have exceeded the reserves in number consistently, and the reserves step-by-step were relegated to the position of an auxiliary force as the country came to rely primarily, and for a time almost exclusively, upon the regulars to provide its defence.

Nonetheless, there was an imaginative addition to the reserve forces in this period. In May 1947, the Canadian Rangers were formed. Each member of this largely native Canadian formation is, upon enrolment, issued a rifle, an identifying arm band and 200 rounds of ammunition replenished on a yearly basis. The ranger concept capitalizes on the native northerner's knowledge of the environment, a tradition of hunting and the ability to live off the land. Rangers maintain a justifiable pride in what they do and their contribution to Canada's defence should not be underestimated.

The post-war Canadian Army was divided into two components, the active force and the reserves. The reserves, in turn, were divided into five sub-components: the reserve force, the supplementary reserve, the Canadian Officer Training Corps (COTC), the cadet services of Canada and the reserve militia. In this reorganization, reserve establishments were based on four armoured brigades and six infantry divisions plus a number of home defence units of both coasts and anti-aircraft artillery. At the same time, a new active force was authorized on a much larger scale than ever before. The traditional role of instructing and preparing the reserve force for mobilization remained the same.

The Naval Reserve maintained generally the form of organization established in the inter-war years, although the RCNR and the RCNVR merged to

form the RCNR, and uniforms indistinguishable from those of the regular force were adopted. Like the other components of the reserve forces, however, the naval reserve saw a steady erosion of its strength and suffered the vicissitudes of a number of policy shifts pursuant to various studies and commissions.

At the end of World War II, the RCAF resumed its roles in aerial photography, survey and air transport. The year 1946 saw the reorganization of the RCAF on the basis of a regular force of eight squadrons and air auxiliary (reserve) force of 15 squadrons. For a dozen years the air auxiliary continued to expand and by 1958 it was represented in many cities from St. John's to Victoria. A high point in personnel strength was reached during this year when a figure of 6,000 was attained. Over the next 16 years the air reserve went through a series of cuts and restructurings until it arrived at a strength of 580 personnel, supporting six squadrons of single-engine Otter aircraft in four Canadian cities. The year was 1974 and it marked a turning point through the introduction of two successful concepts - twinning and the Air Reserve Augmentation Flight (ARAF).

Post-war, a number of reorganizations of the primary reserve have taken place. In most cases a reasonable rationale was at first presented, citing changes in defence policies, efficiencies and economics as the main reasons for change. However, in the main, these reorganizations have had a detrimental effect on the morale, strength and usefulness of the primary reserve - particularly the ones initiated after the Korean War. For example, the diminution in the strength of the militia brought on by the reorganizations of the 1950s and 1960s seriously impaired its capability to recruit, train and administer itself. To see how the primary reserve arrived at its present state, it is necessary to look at some of these review committees and commissions and briefly consider the impact which each of them made.

The investigatory bodies of the past 30 years which have so greatly changed the fabric, size and direction of the militia began with:

a) The Kennedy Committee. In May 1953, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) on the recommendation of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), established a committee under the chairmanship of Major General Howard Kennedy to examine the organization, training and administration of the reserve army and make recommendations on ways of improving its effectiveness. Justification for the committee centred around new developments which had evolved over the past five years. They included: the Korean War; the commitment of an infantry brigade group to NATO forces in Western Europe; the rotational requirements that such a commitment involved; the increasing emphasis on North American defence; and more than a doubling in the size of the regular army between 1950 and 1953.

Major organizational changes resulting from the Kennedy Report were: the disbandment of formation headquarters in favour of new militia group headquarters; an increase in armoured units but a decrease in the number of infantry battalions; and a large reduction in artillery regiments due to the transference of the anti-tank defence role to the armoured corps and responsibility for coast and harbour defence to the navy and the air force. The primary role of this modified reserve force was defined as the provision of a partially trained and equipped force to be utilized as a nucleus for units to be mobilized in case of an emergency. It was further concluded that the effectiveness of the force would depend upon a strong hard core of volunteers.

Despite these organizational changes, no amendments were made to Order-in-Council PC 4/3144 of 6 August 1947 which continued to authorize a strength of 90,000. Actual strength between 1953 and 1964, when the next examination of the militia was undertaken, fluctuated between 50,000 and 60,000.

One of the most important recommendations made by the Kennedy Committee was in response to the weakened state of the reserve force which was attributed, in the committee's opinion, to apathy on the part of the public. It proposed that a statement be made at the highest government level to the effect:

"... that the Reserves Forces are not only necessary but vital to the defence of Canada and deserve the support of all citizens."
(Hansard, June 21, 1954)

It was also emphasized that popular support could only be attained through a continuing and widespread effort on the part of all authorities and if it was not forthcoming the changes recommended would be largely vitiated. As it turned out, this "continuing and widespread effort" did not evolve and the committee's prediction was proven right.

b) Civil Defence Order 1959. At first glance, this Order-in-Council PC 656 appeared as a straightforward and uncomplicated transfer of tasks among three or four government departments. No formal investigation into the reserve force took place nor did the order concern itself with organizational change. But it did involve a dramatic change in direction for the militia. In consequence, the first commitment of the militia became oriented towards the new role of national survival while the traditional role of support for the regular force was relegated to secondary status.

In effect, Civil Defence Order 1959 widened responsibility in civil defence matters. The Department of National Health and Welfare retained responsibility in the areas of emergency medical, hospital and public health services; the Department of Justice was given duties relating to aid of the civil power and

maintenance of law and order during civil defence operations; the Prime Minister's Office (through the Emergency Measures Organization) retained control of certain civil defence powers, including liaison with other countries and NATO; and National Defence was made responsible for warning the public of the likelihood and imminence of nuclear attack, determining fallout patterns, assessing casualties and damage, controlling, directing and carrying out re-entry operations into areas affected by nuclear explosions, and maintenance and operation of emergency communication facilities.

The danger of a nuclear war was of real concern to Canadians in 1959 and this new role for the militia expressed the mood of the times. In retrospect, however, the national survival role should not have been allowed to preempt the other militia roles. The abrupt change in direction had a damaging effect on morale and esprit de corps. What Civil Defence Order 1959 proved was that well-disciplined military forces, primarily trained for warfare, can easily and effectively adapt to such secondary roles as aid to the civil power or peacekeeping or national survival, but that the reverse is not the case.

c) The Suttie Commission. The formation of this commission was approved by the Minister of National Defence in February 1964 and placed under the chairmanship of Brigadier General E.R. Suttie, from whence it gained its name. If Civil Defence Order 1959 is included, it marked the seventh change in either organization or direction for the militia since the turn of the century. The commission was instructed to recommend the changes needed in the organization of the militia in order to carry out more efficiently and realistically the newly revised roles which it had been given. These revised roles reduced the emphasis on national survival and returned to the reserves their primary role of support for the regular force. They also directed the militia to provide a training base on which to build in times of emergency as well as giving them tasks related to internal security and national survival.

As the Kennedy Committee before it, the Suttie Commission stressed the need for public support for the militia. It asked for a vigorous public relations campaign to be spearheaded by vocal government support at all levels but this was not forthcoming.

The organizational changes resulting from the commission's recommendations were sweeping and structurally disruptive. They brought about a diminution in the strength of the militia in terms of units and personnel and reduced its capability to recruit, train, and administer itself.* In fairness to the commission, it had few options because of the budgetary restrictions that were imposed. The major changes were as follows:

* Brigadier General P.J. Mitchell, "Understanding the Militia as a Precondition of Supporting and Fostering It", Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1978.

- The 25 militia group headquarters formed by the Kennedy Committee in 1954 were disbanded;
- Nineteen senior militia officers were appointed as advisors to the regular force;
- Seventy-two militia units were disbanded. These included six armoured regiments, 18 artillery regiments and seven infantry battalions;
- A system of major and minor units was introduced - a major unit being one with an establishment of 300 all ranks and a minor unit having about half, or 150 personnel;
- The militia establishment was reduced to approximately 42,000 but limited to a paid strength of 30,000. Numerical strength at the time of the reorganization was about 45,000.

d) The Deputy Chief Reserves Study. In mid-1965 the establishment of an organization known as the Deputy Chief Reserves (DCRES) was approved by the Defence Council. From its location at National Defence Headquarters, it was given command of the reserves throughout Canada and was directed to exercise its responsibilities through a network of five regional and seven district headquarters. In order to provide realistic tasks within current fiscal constraints and the two new concepts of unification and forces-in-being, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) directed DCRES to review the reserves and survival program from the point of view of role, command and control, training, equipment and organization.

The most detailed and comprehensive tasking plan ever developed for the reserves in peace-time evolved from this review. Briefly, the militia was divided into three categories:

- The ready reserve - to consist of individuals trained to such a degree in their particular trade that they could readily augment individual deficiencies in regular force establishments when required;
- The regional reserve - composed of units and individuals required to reinforce units (other than field force units) committed to the defence of Canada or needed to augment the Civil Emergency Operations organization;

- The Mobile Command reserve - to consist of those units which would form the training organization needed in an emergency to reinforce and enlarge upon the fighting formations of armour, artillery and infantry.

The creation of these categories led to a fundamental change in the militia's system of training. No longer would units proceed to summer training camps as organized entities under their own commanding officers. In future only sub-units tasked as part of the Mobile Command reserve would proceed to summer camp. At camp they would be grouped into ad hoc units of battalion size for training under regular force commanders. Training for the balance of the militia would be conducted locally or at regular force schools or through in-job training with units and organizations requiring individual augmentation in the event of an emergency.

In this way it was felt that the training resources could be concentrated upon the tasks to be performed, rather than upon a general military training system that would not allow for the high degree of expertise and professionalism demanded by modern equipment and weaponry. The concept was sound from a financial point of view but it overlooked two things - the lack of training for senior militia officers in the handling of troops in the field, and the demise of that esprit de corps so necessary in holding a unit together and which can only be nurtured through long periods of working and training together as an organized body.

e) **The Departmental Review of 1969.** In April 1969 the government made two announcements which had a profound effect upon the organization and operation of Canada's armed forces. The first was that the defence budget would be frozen at \$1.815 billion for three years and, secondly, that new roles were to be assigned which would place greater emphasis on the protection of Canada's sovereignty.

Six months later the minister announced stringent changes that would take place in the reserves to conform with the redefined roles and defence budget restrictions imposed on the regular force. The main features were:

- The establishment of the militia was reduced to approximately 23,000, subject to a budgetary limitation of 19,200;
- The five regions and seven districts, so recently created by the Deputy Chief Reserves Study, were dismantled and replaced by five militia areas and 21 districts with considerably reduced establishments;
- The number of major units was reduced from 96 to 87 and the number of minor units from 133 to 78;

- The establishment of a major unit was reduced from 300 to 157 and a minor unit's establishment was reduced below 100 all ranks;
- All armoured regiments and infantry battalions were retained but six artillery regiments were reduced to nil strength and transferred to the supplementary order of battle;
- Major reductions were made to supporting service units.

To complement and provide closer support for the operational roles of the regular force, all militia units with the exception of 11 signal units, were placed under the command of Mobile Command as of 1 April 1970.

The communication reserve was born out of this last reorganization. Its formation was authorized in 1969 by the then Minister of National Defence and, as already mentioned, 11 signal units comprising some 900 personnel came under Canadian Forces Communication Command (CFCC) on 1 April 1970.

f) Unification Review of the Canadian Forces. Two studies of the 1970s affected the reserves. A Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces (commonly known as the Fyffe Report) was initiated by the minister on 6 September 1979 with instructions to submit a report on 15 March 1980. Its mandate was:

"...to examine the merits and disadvantages of unification of the Canadian Forces and at the same time to provide comment on the unified command system."

The task force travelled widely and heard a great deal of diverse opinion from commands; senior serving officers of general rank; retired officers; associations and organizations with a continuing interest in DND; and the public at large.

The task force emphasized that it had not undertaken a complete review of all the problems relating to the reserves but that most of the concerns were sufficiently well-founded to require further consideration. It noted that concerns for the reserves related specifically to four areas: role definition (the need for a mobilization plan); the provision of resources (equipment and personnel to match the roles assigned); adequate opportunity to train for the assigned roles (better accommodation and civilian job security while undergoing training); and environmental identity.

In order to give due regard to the recommendations of the task force, a review group* was formed in May 1980 to provide an appreciation of the task force's report so that "appropriate disposition of its recommendations could be achieved." The review group's report was submitted to the Chief of the Defence Staff on 31 August 1980. It concurred with many of the recommendations made by the task force. It noted that the work of the task force should be acknowledged as a constructive and timely contribution to the development of the Canadian forces.

The many full-scale investigations into the reserves that have taken place over the past 80 years have greatly changed the form and direction of that organization. They responded to a need for accommodation to shifting spending priorities of the government and to changing conceptions of the most likely military threats to Canada and the most appropriate responses to them. Some were also, it must be said, the product of the regular force's fight for survival in the 70s when, starved for money, it stood in danger of becoming incapable of operating as an effective fighting force.

THE RESERVE FORCES TODAY

The forces-in-being concept of the mid-1960s was predicated upon the theme of a short, sharp, intensive war in which nuclear weapons were to be employed at the beginning and where there would be little time to mobilize anything. Under these circumstances there was little requirement for reserves and it seemed a waste of time and money to prepare them for a situation in which they were unlikely to be used. The result was that the regular forces (the forces-in-being) were trained for their task while the reserve force was left to languish. As time went by, this scenario gave way to the idea that a longer conventional-type war could be a realistic possibility. The new change in thinking dictated a posture whereby possibly many more personnel would be needed over a longer period of time if the nation were to protect its sovereignty and achieve its military aims. Out of this line of reasoning came the 'total force' concept where service would be required of both the primary and supplementary reserves in partnership with the regular force. Also out of the total force concept came the impetus and the need to develop NDHQ Policy Directive P26 (The Development and Employment of the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary Reserve), promulgated 11 January 1978, the operative guide to the missions of the reserve forces.

* The official title of this group was: Review Group on the Report of the Task Force on Unification of the Canadian Forces. The group's authority and terms of reference are contained in NDHQ Action Directive D2/80, dated 27 May 1980.

Policy Directive P26 relates in the main to the primary reserve. This major component of the reserves, as has been already noted, is itself divided into four sub-components, which comprise approaching 200 units that report through a chain of intermediate headquarters to their responsible command headquarters.

The Naval Reserve

The naval reserve is divided into 18 divisions (known as naval reserve units) in major centres across the country from HMCS Malahat in Victoria to HMCS Cabot at St. John's. It is an integral part of Maritime Command. It was not organized to provide complete units. Its purpose is to supply individuals to augment the regular force and to staff completely, if mobilized, the Naval Control of Shipping organization (NCS).

The Militia

The militia is organized into five geographic areas - Atlantic, Eastern, Central, Prairie and Pacific - each commanded by a militia brigadier general. These five area headquarters control, in turn, some 22 district headquarters across the land, each of which is commanded by a militia colonel. The organizational thread further unwinds to encompass 136 units, grouped geographically at 111 locations to facilitate command and which are the responsibility of their respective district headquarters.

Current policy assigns to the militia the same responsibilities that it provides the other three sub-components of the primary reserve: individual augmentation of regular force units in an emergency and the provision of a base for subsequent expansion. In the case of the militia - and only in the case of the militia - these two requirements are seen as mutually exclusive.

The Air Reserve

The air reserve consists of an air group headquarters commanded by an air reserve brigadier general. The group consists of four air wings, two of which have seven flying squadrons and nine Air Reserve Augmentation Flights (ARAFs). The air reservists perform operational activities alongside the regular force and provide direct augmentation for regular force bases and units.

The Communication Reserve

The communication reserve consists of six regiments, 12 squadrons and three independent troops, all widely dispersed throughout the country and found at virtually every Canadian forces base. Over the last few years unit strength has remained near the authorized paid ceiling of 1,560, and it is noteworthy that approximately 40 percent of all these personnel are women.

The role of the communication reserve, as an element of Communication Command, is to provide strategic communications for the Canadian forces and emergency government facilities. The command is organized under six communication groups with headquarters at Halifax, St. Hubert, Ottawa, Trenton, Winnipeg and Vancouver. Within these groups, regular and reserve units are completely integrated and function through the same chain of command. Both in concept and in practice, therefore, a very close association has developed amongst them.

* * *

These, then, are the forces the subcommittee has been called upon to examine. Their current roles, size and configurations are the end products of several post-war policy shifts. Many critics appearing before the subcommittee complained that the changes were not all for the better and that the reserves are less effective today than they used to be. They point to a number of problems ranging from training difficulties and inadequate accommodation to confusion over the nature and purpose of the militia. They also offered a variety of suggestions for correcting the ills, each of which the subcommittee has carefully reviewed.

CHAPTER II

CANADA'S MILITARY OBLIGATIONS

The functions of Canada's armed forces, including the reserve forces, must be examined in relation to current commitments and tasks. Government statements and decisions set the immediate framework for the country's defence obligations and defence planners must also take into account the long-term strategic situation, perceptions of the military threats to Canada and possible Canadian responses to them.

Canada's fundamental strategic situation is a highly immutable one. Like all countries, Canada has to maintain military forces to protect its own territory and ensure that sovereignty is preserved in the national airspace, coastal waters and geographic area. However, Canada is also located between the world's two superpowers and thereby involved in a military situation which is unlikely to change radically in the foreseeable future. Canada would be seriously affected by direct military exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union but lacks the economic and military power to exert an independent influence on the bilateral strategic equation between these two countries. Canada's main option is to vary its contributions to the joint defence of North America, bearing in mind that the United States can be expected to take all necessary measures to ensure its own defence whether Canada participates in such activity or not. The level of Canada's contribution to North American defence reflects a need to maintain this country's sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States, as well as to contribute to the protection of the continent.

Canada has also participated in the defence of Europe since the formation of NATO in 1949. This has reflected a belief that Canada itself would be threatened if Western Europe fell under the domination of the Soviet Union or any other power which was considered to be fundamentally antagonistic towards Canada and the Canadian way of life. The government of Canada evidently believed, in the late 1960s when it carried out a review of Canadian foreign and defence policies, that the Soviet Union had modified its objectives since the dark days of Stalinism and embraced new policies founded on a desire for accommodations and possible eventual rapprochement. But the subsequent massive build-up of Soviet military forces, the invasion of Afghanistan and

growing concern about Soviet policies in Africa, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, have generated uneasiness in Canada and in other western nations and led to a more cautious and pessimistic appraisal of Soviet intentions. Participation in the collective defence of Western Europe now seems to be a virtually fixed element in Canadian foreign and defence policy and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Canada's geography and economy also necessitate continuing relations with the international community in general, since regular contacts are needed to permit the harmonious pursuit of trade and other exchanges. Even if Canadians wished to do so, they could not live in isolation. Most recognize the need for effective foreign policies designed to preserve national interests and also ensure Canada's security in the long term by enhancing a more peaceful and prosperous world community. Canada has long sought opportunities to advance its interests at the multilateral level through participating in the work of the United Nations and other international bodies. This, also, has become a virtually fixed element in Canadian foreign and defence activity.

These long-term geographic, strategic, economic and political imperatives have been recognized in all major Canadian government pronouncements on foreign and defence policy since the Second World War. The 1971 white paper, Defence in the 70s, was no exception. It merely reflected the then current situation and shifted the emphasis to be placed on the various fields of interest. Instead of focussing on NATO and peacekeeping, it established a new order of priorities. The protection of Canada was to be Canada's first defence concern, followed by the defence of North America and then NATO and peacekeeping, in that order.

The 1971 white paper has continued to provide the framework for Canadian defence activities since it was issued, though the emphasis in current policy has shifted back again towards increased attention to NATO. What determines the shape of a country's defence policy is not only the basic documents which set out the principal objectives and commitments, but also the specific military tasks which are prescribed for the armed forces and the equipment and manpower provided to carry them out. The resources devoted to the protection of Canada have not matched the priority assigned to that objective in 1971, whereas expenditures on new materiel for Canada's NATO forces, such as the Leopard tank, have been much greater than was once thought likely.

There has been a feeling for some time that a new defence white paper is needed. In the meantime, the functions of the reserves and the regular forces have to be examined in relation to the broad commitments outlined in Defence in the 70s and in relation to evolving military tasks and the threats they are designed to meet. The Canadian armed forces are charged with 55 main military tasks which, taken together, are intended to provide a secure response to the various military and similar dangers that concern this country.

The protection of Canada involves surveillance and control of Canadian territory, airspace and waters; guarding vital installations; aid to the civil power; assistance to the civil authorities; and providing search and rescue services. These are immense duties requiring substantial numbers of aircraft, ships and ground forces.

Canada's role in the defence of North America is largely undertaken through participation in NORAD - the North American Air Defence Command Agreement - and by contributing to the detection and tracking of Soviet ballistic missile submarines cruising off Canadian coasts. Both activities are carried out in partnership with the United States. Deterrence of attack on North America is the task of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. The land defence of North America is ensured through a collaborative arrangement with the United States.

NORAD's missions consist, at present, of surveillance of North American airspace and defence against the manned bomber; warning and assessment of missile attack; and detection and tracking of space vehicles. The Soviet Union maintains a sizeable force of manned bombers and is now deploying the Backfire which, with in-flight refuelling and air-to-ground missiles would have the capacity to attack Canadian and U.S. targets from northern Canada. It also continues to build up its ICBM forces and to develop its military capability in space. Canada is responding, in association with the United States, by purchasing the new CF-18 fighter aircraft, fitting out two new Regional Operations Control Centres (ROCCs) and participating modestly in Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS). Canada may also join with the United States in upgrading existing ground radar networks and in the development and deployment of space satellites and other new systems based on advanced technology. Air Command, with 22,000 regulars, 1,000 reserves and 7,000 civilians, is the main Canadian command involved in these activities. Communication Command also has a vital role to play in the operation of such key installations as telecommunications networks and command and control centres.

Provision for the land defence of North America was described in the 1971 defence white paper which noted that, in the event of a requirement to defend the land mass of this continent, a mutual support arrangement exists with the United States. An agreement provides for American forces to operate under Canadian command if the area of operations is within Canadian territory, and vice versa. The three brigade groups of Mobile Command regular troops in Canada would be drawn on for this purpose, though they also have other duties including aid to the civil power and those related to NATO defence in Europe.

Canada's contribution to the detection and tracking of Soviet ballistic missile submarines is provided mainly by Maritime Command and Maritime Air Group. The threat continues to increase as Soviet submarine fleets expand, though the allied ability to counter it may decline relatively in the coming years as new Soviet submarines with very long-range missiles are deployed, capable of

attacking North America from coastal waters near their own bases. Canada has purchased 18 Aurora Long Range Patrol Aircraft for anti-submarine warfare duties over the last five years and has plans to build six new patrol frigates. Additional ships, aircraft, and other equipment may be required in the future, though careful analysis is needed of the possibilities for continuing to make a solid contribution in this highly complex and very costly area.

Canada's contribution to NATO consists of the Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (4 CMBG) and the First Canadian Air Group in Germany (1 CAG), plus land, air and naval forces in Canada. A key question is how many of the forces in Canada could be brought to bear on a European conflict. In the late 1960s it was widely believed that a war in Europe would be of extremely short duration - perhaps two to four days before the use of nuclear weapons would bring a rapid end to hostilities. Since then, views seem to have become less dogmatic; once the Soviet Union attained nuclear parity with the United States, the inclination on both sides to engage in nuclear war became less attractive. The idea of a longer war of two to four weeks or even more seems to have gained credence, which implies that the Canadian armed forces might have the time to transport augmentation personnel and reinforcements to Europe by air or sea. The Canadian forces-in-being in Europe of 5,400 personnel would not be the only Canadian NATO force to be involved in a conflict. Canada has undertaken to augment the Brigade Group with 2,400 troops and to send a force of 4,000 to north Norway. This latter formation is known as the CAST (Canadian Air-Sea Transportable) Force. To fill these commitments, most of the regular troops in Mobile Command would also be required, together with elements of the other commands and available reservists. This should not be taken to mean that a war in Europe would be on the First World War or Second World War patterns where Canada had ample time to train the reserves before committing them to battle. The forces-in-being in Europe would still be crucial. However, there does seem to be some prospect of sending in reinforcements and Canada must have the trained troops ready for this eventuality.

Canada's main military effort at the worldwide level is through the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. This country has gained a first-class reputation in the peacekeeping field and is likely to be involved in further operations of this kind in the future.

Canada's armed forces will be hard-pressed to cope with all the tasks likely to face them in this decade. The scope of their activities has been suggested in broad terms in this chapter. What needs to be done now is to examine the contribution of the reserves to the performance of these tasks and to assess their capacity to meet these requirements.

CHAPTER III

CURRENT ROLES OF THE RESERVES

Canada's regular forces lack the numbers needed to carry out all military obligations. Without the support of the reserves, the country would fall short of meeting its commitments in peace-time, in times of crisis and in war-time. The reserves have once again a critical part to play in supplementing the regular forces in a variety of ways. Together, the regulars and the reserves make up the total force.

The most recent elaboration of this theme is NDHQ Policy Directive P26 (the full text appears as Appendix A) which sets out the role of the reserves as follows:

"The role of the Reserve Force is to enhance the war deterrence capability of the Canadian Forces and to support the Regular Force in ongoing peace-time tasks and activities."

Essentially, P26 provides a series of guidelines for the preparation of the primary and supplementary reserve to augment the regular force as required. In so doing, it sets out the specific war-time and peace-time missions of the reserves, component by component.

Briefly summarized, the tasks identified for the reserves in the P26 directive are:

in war-time -

- to provide individual and sub-unit augmentation to the regular forces;
- to provide reinforcements to deployed units;
- to provide a base for further mobilization.

in peace-time -

- to provide aid to the civil power and assistance to civil emergency organizations;
- to provide personnel for peacekeeping duties.

The Naval Reserve

As an integral part of Maritime Command, the main war missions of the naval reserve are: to provide personnel for the augmentation of the regular force in all types of operational units ashore and afloat; to provide a base for further mobilization; to provide all the personnel for the NCS; to crew or augment the crews of the vessels of other departments; to provide liaison teams for fast sealift container ships; and to supply the bulk of the personnel for the Naval Officer-in-Charge organization (NOIC). NOIC is the organization which would provide security, protection, seaward defences and logistics in an emergency for all major Canadian ports. It is estimated, for example, that about 100 small vessels will be needed to support the NOIC organization alone and that the personnel to man these vessels will have to come from the naval reserve.

In peace-time, the naval reserve is expected to prepare for its war missions; to augment the fleet as required; to provide personnel and support for peace-keeping and truce supervisory operations; to provide personnel for aid to the civil power and to civil emergency organizations; and to support national development projects "including ceremonial representation and community sport and other activities."

The authorized paid ceiling of the naval reserve now stands at 3,250.

The Militia

P26 assigns to the militia the war-time missions of: providing units, sub-elements or troops to augment the regular forces combat headquarters and service support organizations; to contribute to base defence forces, operational training support and movement control; and to provide a base for further mobilization. These missions are of essentially the same order as those assigned to the naval reserve except that augmentation by formation, as well as by individuals, is contemplated. In addition, the militia is "to provide trained reinforcements to any deployed theatre base."

The missions of the militia in peace-time are described in essentially the same words as those of the naval reserve except that the specific augmentation

tasks are different, demanding the ability to respond to the requirements of Mobile Command and Canadian Forces Europe.

The authorized paid ceiling of the militia currently stands at 15,500.

The Air Reserve

The air reserve has the expected war-time missions of providing personnel to augment the regular forces Air Command, National Defence Headquarters and the Canadian Forces Training System (CFTS), and of contributing to the enhancement of operational support and the strategic air-lift capability necessary to carry out the first stage of mobilization.

In peace-time, P26 for the most part states the same kinds of requirements for the air reserves as for the naval reserve and the militia but its specific augmentation efforts are directed towards Air Command. The major difference is that the air reserve is assigned an ongoing operation role in peace-time, that of, "to the extent of their equipment capabilities," supporting the regular force through providing search and rescue capability, a light transport capability and maritime surveillance and patrol capability.

The authorized paid ceiling of the air reserve is 950.

The Communication Reserve

P26 assigns the communication reserve with but two war-time missions: that of providing trained personnel to augment the regular forces of Communication Command, Mobile Command, Canadian Forces Europe, Air Command, NDHQ units and CFTS, as well as providing a base for further mobilization.

In peace-time the missions of the communication reserve are, with the necessary variations to take account of its different specific function, like those of the other three elements. It is additionally charged with the specific responsibilities of supporting other components of the reserve during exercises and "supporting the regular forces as required in the manning of non-military communication systems."

Of all components of the primary reserve, the communication reserve is the most fully integrated with its regular force counterpart. Indeed, without the communication reserve, it is unlikely that Communication Command could meet its peace-time obligations. Major operations in special situations impose heavy

workloads on the Canadian forces' information-handling systems and often on short notice. These needs are met through the use of communication reserve personnel serving in Canada, the Middle East and Europe.

The authorized paid ceiling of the communication reserve is 1,560.

* * *

Directive P26 has been both lauded and denigrated in testimony before the subcommittee. General Dunn, Chief of the Reserves, referred to it as "a solid basis for training and equipping the reserve force - a policy giving clear direction to all." (2:19)* A critic claimed that it does not provide direction because most reserve units do not really know what is required of them in the event of an emergency. (3:25) Brigadier General Cowan described it as an authority for establishing a partnership between the regular and reserve forces, a partnership in which all components of the Canadian forces are responsible for the defence of the nation. (2:27) The subcommittee has been left with the impression that most critics of P26 are attacking neither the basic concept behind the document nor the general elaboration within the document of that concept. Rather, they seem for the most part, to be decrying a lack of follow-through.

* This and other similar citations which follow refer to the proceedings of the Subcommittee on the Armed Forces Reserves of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the First Session of the 32nd Parliament, 1980-81. Numbers indicate the issue and page number of the proceedings. The letter 'A' refers to an appendix to the proceedings.

CHAPTER IV

RESERVES STRENGTH IN AN EMERGENCY

If the primary function of the reserves is to supplement the regular forces in time of emergency and conflict, a major criterion for judging their effectiveness must be a calculation of their capacity to make up war-authorized complements for the major commands.

General Belzile, the Commander of Mobile Command, was very open in describing his problem in the event of an emergency:

"I would have to augment, say, the forces in Europe...from my existing regular forces, thereby reducing them more than they are now. I would also be required to send the other committed organization (CAST Force) to Norway, and there again I may have at the last minute to do some inside command tailoring...

Now, I would be left with a shortfall in Canada to fill my other missions, which are defence-of-Canada operations. I would be left with a shortfall...at the outset, of about 13,000." (7:23, 34)

Reliable figures in this area are hard to come by. The Department of National Defence has estimated that its immediate requirement to meet Canada's commitments in the event of a major conflict involving the NATO alliance would be 108,000 troops. With approximately 80,000 to come from the regulars, this leaves 28,000 troops to be secured in one way or another from the reserves. On paper, with about 23,000 names on the primary reserve list and another 14,000 to 18,000 on the supplementary reserve, the 28,000 target would appear to be easily attainable. However, evidence presented to the subcommittee by the separate commands and confirmed by other submissions, indicate that this is far from being the case.

The basic problem is that most reserves would be unavailable or unprepared - for one reason or another - when called upon.

First, the figure of approximately 23,000 primary reservists includes some persons who are not actively training. While not entirely reliable, paid ceilings offer a better guide and the subcommittee has been told they total under 21,500. Second, and far more importantly, a large number of primary reserve personnel would either not be available or would be barred from use in various types of war emergencies. Depending on whether a particular emergency required the deployment of reserves in the front lines rather than in the rear, abroad rather than at home, and in combat rather than for support purposes, figures could vary greatly. The full primary reserve complement could, at any rate, never be used. Categories barred from combat include: women, students attending school, personnel on medical or age lists and youths under 18. Other affected categories range from non-effectives and recruits undergoing training to reservists in essential civilian occupations such as policemen. Finally, the ability of the armed forces to locate and immediately mobilize a sizeable number of supplementary reservists is questionable. The response to the first departmental mailing ever shows that 25 percent could not be located or did not reply. Of the balance of 13,500, 1,000 declared themselves to be medically unfit, 4,400 placed conditions on their availability, a number have had very limited training and others have had no connection with the military for over five years. (11:11, 26)

Considerations such as these explain the responses of the various commands when asked by the subcommittee to indicate the number of reservists they would expect to secure in a crisis and what shortfall this would leave in their war-authorized establishments. Their oral testimony was in round numbers and they cautioned the subcommittee as to their reliability. The witnesses were, moreover, naturally hesitant about acknowledging that the planning goals which they are called upon to meet in an emergency were so far short of realization. It can be presumed, therefore, that the figures given to the subcommittee by the commands erred on the optimistic side; other submissions and some periodical literature suggest that the probable shortfall on the first day of hostilities (Day One) could be substantially greater than indicated by the commands.

Bearing these qualifications in mind, the four major commands reported as follows:

TABLE III

| Command | Augmentation Needed | Current Numbers of Primary Reserves | Numbers which might be attracted from the Primary & Supplementary Reserves | Approximate Shortfall on Day One |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| Mobile Command | 13,000 | 18,500 | 10,000 | 3,000 |
| Maritime Command | 8,000 | 2,800 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| Air Command | 5,000 | 1,000 | 900 | 4,000 |
| Communication Command | 1,550 | 1,550 | 1,100 | <u>500</u> |
| | | | | 11,500 |

There is a further problem hidden in these figures. The current manning establishment for the fiscal year 1980-81 for the regular force is 80,100. However, the Senate subcommittee was informed that of this number, 1,100 are class C reservists, leaving only 79,000 regulars in the forces. Class C reservists is the term used to describe reservists who are called under contract to serve, normally for six months to two years, and who complete the complement of the regulars. However, they remain charged to the reserves. In many instances, there is double counting of class C reservists - both as part of the regular force and also as available reservists - and to the extent this is the case, it would increase the shortfall reported by the commands.

Evidence presented to the subcommittee reveals some special problems with the supplementary reserve. In practice, the supplementary reserve is primarily made up of a list of names of former regular and primary reserve personnel who reported at the time of retirement a willingness to serve again in a crisis. It also includes 3,800 former cadet instructors some of whom have had minimal military training. While the majority of supplementary reservists served in the regulars or primary reserves within the last five years, they undergo no regular refresher training, there is no annual reporting requirement, their current physical condition is unknown and there is no procedure in force for mobilizing the supplementary reserve in time of emergency. The commander of Mobile Command and the chief of reserves both advised the subcommittee that they look to the supplementary reserves in future to become the major source of individual augmentation and of a possible ready reserve. Undoubtedly, there is within the supplementary reserve a pool of skilled talent whose past experience would make them a valuable asset to the armed forces in time of emergency. But the subcommittee has grave doubts that, as now organized, the supplementary reserve could contribute significantly to the realization of war-authorized manpower levels.

Turnover

Numbers in the primary reserves fluctuate by several thousand each year, from an average winter low of under 19,000 to a summer high of over 23,500. To a considerable degree this reflects an increased involvement of students during the summer months. General Belzile observed that within the militia "we estimate about 80 percent are students or have similar seasonal occupations." (7:5) This is likewise true of the naval reserve. Captain Traves, Director of Naval Reserves, complained of the problem of attrition in his opening statement to the subcommittee:

"Retention: We lose a high proportion of our young students as they move into careers in civilian life and acquire family responsibilities. We would like to develop some incentive to keep a higher portion active in the naval reserve over this transition period." (7:9)

Mr. Nicholas Stethem of the Strategic Analysis Group and a former regular officer was asked a question about the high rate of attrition in the reserves. He claimed the problem was that:

"Basically the reserves...are not attracting people. What is attracting people are summer student employment programs and basically making a few bucks and getting out. So the problem is perhaps even stronger than you have said. It is not a problem of attrition. It is a problem...that the militia is existing at present in an artificial way." (10:35)

The subcommittee was interested to learn from Tom Sullivan, First Assistant Secretary in the Australian Department of Defence, that the Australian reserves also have experienced a high attrition rate even though the proportion of students is much lower. This situation was costly since "once you have trained the fellow for one, two or three years, he is a better investment than to let him go and have to retrain completely another one." (10:10) Mr. Sullivan said there were indications that the increased importance attached to the reserves in the past year, and publicity associated with the campaign to enlarge the army reserve from 22,000 to 30,000, may be causing the rate of attrition to drop in Australia.

The subcommittee was not given an overall figure on attrition, but the impression was conveyed that the average reservist remains less than 30 months in the primary reserve. It was notable that the communication and air reserves experience lower rates of turnover, apparently because to a greater degree than the militia and the naval reserves, they can offer a continuing, meaningful and credible role to their small numbers of reservists.

High rates of attrition are costly. They add to training costs and significantly reduce the numbers of available trained reservists. However, there are benefits to society: the training program helps to develop desirable social and personal qualities in those who participate and contributes to building up their health; the income received can help students to complete their university studies; military training contributes to the development of self-reliance and leadership among citizens; and, over time, the total numbers in society with some experience of military service is increased. But the high rate of attrition and the very high proportion of students seriously diminish the capacity of the reserves to supplement or replace regulars in time of emergency.

Mr. Sullivan told the subcommittee that Australian reservists represent "quite a broad spectrum and...are definitely not mostly students." (10:10) A more balanced mix of reservists is also needed in Canada. If the role, capabilities and status of the reserves could be improved, the subcommittee is satisfied that the rate of attrition would fall and the mix of reservists would balance itself.

Situation in Each Service

The capacity of reservists to serve alongside, or in place of, regular troops is considerably influenced by the kind of equipment with which they are able to train. In the next chapter, the adequacy of equipment for the reserves is examined. At this point all that needs to be noted is that, except for the two smallest reserve components, the air reserve and the communication reserve, which have recently acquired equipment that now makes it possible for them to mesh more easily with their regular counterparts, the lack of some modern equipment leads to a shortage of reservists having the sophisticated skills necessary to operate the machinery and weapon systems of the regulars they would be called upon to augment. An example of the limitations concerns naval reserve officers: the maritime surface classification and watchkeeping certificate, awarded after three to four years of summer and winter training - two phases of which often include training aboard destroyers and minesweepers - qualify them only for service aboard the antiquated gate vessels used to acquaint the naval reserve with seamanship. Nonetheless, in an emergency it would be reasonable to assume that they could take on routine watchkeeping duties aboard destroyers and fleet replenishment vessels and fairly rapidly achieve standards which would make them useful in combat.

In terms of their ability to provide appropriately trained complements of reservists to field units, the situation of the various commands is as follows:

The communication reserve may be unable to provide all the field communicators needed since career and social considerations incline communication personnel to seek static positions in peace-time from which they could not easily convert back to field communications. By and large, however, the men and women it provides

are well qualified. They frequently serve in regular force installations. The object of communications training is certification for augmentation and many reserve communicators are regularly called upon by the forces, even in peacetime, to provide the armed forces with skills in short supply throughout Canadian society.

The air reserve would supply air and ground crews which, although numerically insufficient, would possess the necessary skills and qualifications. Thanks to the twinning of reserve and regular units and the recent acquisition of Kiowa helicopters, with one or two notable exceptions, the air reserve's squadrons and augmentation flights have been in a position to work side by side with regular airmen and -women and, therefore, should have no difficulty in carrying out war-related missions. However, because of geographical imbalance, only nine out of 15 air bases have air reserve augmentation flights. The air reserve would also be in a stronger position to complement the regulars with larger numbers of more modern helicopters. Another shortcoming is the lack of an arrangement in place to tap Canada's civil air talent and equipment.

The naval reserve would be in greater difficulty. Although almost all officers and many enlisted personnel in the sea-going trades have had some service in ship-types employed by the regular force, their limited numbers alone would restrict their capacity to fulfill the tasks assigned to them under Directive P26. With an authorized paid ceiling of 3,250 personnel, the naval reserve has scarcely enough manpower to fulfill Naval Control of Shipping and Naval Officer-in-Charge functions, let alone augment ships' companies and fill the host of shore positions for which it is expected to be responsible. Moreover, given that the vast majority of naval reservists are students who do not stay in the reserves more than an average of 30 months, there is reason to suspect that there could be mismatches between the demands of the navy and the qualifications of the reservists.

The militia's ability to respond depends on the way it would be used. Its present situation is especially difficult. The three other reserve forces accept, by and large, that their personnel will be used to augment regular units on an individual basis. They expect in time of emergency to merge with the regulars. For the militia, post-war developments have been confusing and frustrating. The tradition developed during more than a century of activity and expressed with distinction in two world wars and Korea, has involved the use of autonomous reserve units. Militia units retained in war an independent existence and a distinctive, often localized identity. With the decision to maintain, for the first time in Canadian history, permanent forces abroad and subsequently, with the development of nuclear weapons in turn generating scenarios of short, all-out war, the emphasis has changed completely. The accent during the last two decades in Canada has been on forces-in-being with the ground forces looking to the militia as a source of augmentation. In responding to a question on how many qualified personnel Mobile Command could find in the reserves, General Belzile admitted "It is a very difficult thing to answer...any figure I give you is bound to be what I feel is a personal estimate. In the case of the militia I would say about 5,000." (7:29)

Regardless of whether the militia would be available in the numbers anticipated, the concept of individual or small unit augmentation has a devastating impact on the militia's self-image. It means that the most able, the natural leaders among the militia would in effect be creamed off to join the regulars. This would undermine the capacity of the militia to generate the autonomous units which would inevitably be needed in a longer conflict.

There are signs that an important change is taking place within the army. General Belzile stated in his opening presentation to the subcommittee:

"On October 22 of this year, defence of Canada tasks were assigned to six artillery batteries and the regimental headquarters of the militia. As we gain experience, I hope to expand this more precise tasking to other units and corps, and this to meet identified operational shortfalls: to provide for any future operational reinforcements deemed necessary and to establish a more effective operational training base for any unforeseen expansion that may be necessary in future." (7:5-6)

This is a most encouraging change in orientation and one which the subcommittee commends. Not only does it give to units within the militia a role which they want, but it also uses the militia in ways which recognize the inevitable limitations of military training. At the same time, it frees the regulars to undertake tasks which only they can perform.

There remains the problem of augmenting the regular ground forces on an individual basis. Evidence from General Belzile indicated that Mobile Command was looking to the militia to provide about 5,000 men and to the supplementary reserve to provide another 5,000. In this connection, Mr. Stethem made a strong argument for augmenting the regulars from the supplementary reserve:

"It would be easier for a supplementary reservist who is trained and brought up to date on the British model...to integrate into a regular unit than it would for a person trained in the militia to integrate into a regular unit in any numbers. This view comes from my own experience in working with units of militia attached to regular force units. There is all the enthusiasm in the world but the (ex-)regular soldier knows personally probably 30 percent of the people in that unit even if he has been out for 10 years...there are personal bonds there that are incredibly important in military organizations..." (10:40)

This perception strikes the subcommittee as making a lot of sense. It would also free up the militia to do the things which it does best.

The program of training the militia will be a two-phase one. The first phase will be a 10-day course in basic military training. This course will be held at the National Training Center at Fort Benning, Georgia. The second phase will be a 30-day course in advanced military training. This course will be held at the National Advanced Training Center at Fort Benning, Georgia. The program will be held in the summer of 1964.

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CHAPTER V

CAPABILITY AND STATE OF READINESS OF RESERVES

Apart from the number of reservists ready to respond in an emergency, the capability and state of readiness of the reserves depend on the quality of their training, the equipment available to them and their state of morale.

Training

The **naval reserve** is in the process of restructuring training so as to provide training to regular force standards in operator trades. For the time being, sea training is provided mainly on five gate vessels. While these small, ill-equipped and ancient vessels offer adequate initial sea training when they are operational, most submissions claimed that this training was neither thoroughly tested nor properly elaborated when individual reservists join the fleet for the summer. Many have privately complained about an 'elitist' attitude on the part of their regular force counterparts which leads to misemployment during their limited summer training time. There have been reports, for example, of reservists being detailed with some regularity to ship's husbandry tasks rather than assigned duties which could make them more useful if called up. At a time when naval hardware is becoming increasingly sophisticated, both these factors can only complicate further augmentation operations already rendered quite complex by manpower and vessel shortages.

In the **militia** a yearly training cycle is followed. During the winter months training is conducted mainly at local units or headquarters and is aimed at producing instructors and junior and senior non-commissioned officers for the summer. The annual militia concentrations, referred to as MILCONs, usually take place at the end of August under command of militia area commanders. This is the one time in the year for officers to supervise and/or gain experience in the handling of their men up to sub-unit level. In addition to the cyclical training activities, there are special summer programs such as exercises in the north; support of regular force training at CFB Gagetown; and the very successful Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP).

With the total force concept in mind, a limited number of individual militiamen are also given the opportunity of training with the regular force at various times during the year on a fully integrated basis. This training can take place in Canada or in Europe or on U.N. peacekeeping missions in the Middle East.

Armouries have posed a particular problem for some time to both militia and naval units because of poor location or rundown conditions, or both. Louis Desmarais, M.P., Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of the 4th Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment described the problem vividly, first in terms of location:

"...The Montreal Island armouries are all located downtown within two miles of one another...Since the majority of the population no longer lives downtown, (reserve units) are now competing for the same clientèle. On the other hand, there is no armoury in the second largest city in Quebec, Laval, or on the West Island or in the northeast end of Montreal, all heavily populated outlying areas."
(3A:5)

later, in terms of conditions:

"Our principal armoury...is an old mattress factory...we have a small classroom on the ground floor and another small room on the second floor...(It) is so small that we are unable to line up the entire unit in three ranks..." (3A:12)

Others have described similar situations elsewhere, and in particular the H.M.C.S. Catarqui Association. The problem has definite negative implications for training, all the more so since it can affect the ability of units to store equipment safely. The subcommittee is therefore glad to note that the Department has begun to remedy the situation, and that five new armouries are being built and an additional ten planned.

The year 1974 marked a turning point for the **air reserve** with regard to training as well as organization. Two successful concepts were introduced in that year. The first was twinning where a regular squadron and a reserve squadron share the same pool of aircraft. The second was the Air Reserve Augmentation Flight (ARAF). An ARAF is a cadre of trained personnel whose role is to fill war establishment augmentation positions. Members of ARAFs came from all trades classifications, ranging from aircrew to dental assistants, and from cooks to firefighters. The concept has proven sound and is cost efficient. In any event, most of the training in the air reserve centres around maintaining regular force standards in the ARAFs and the twinned squadrons.

Communication reserve training is integrated completely into the Communication Command program. The reservist takes basic military training followed by individual training in such trades as radio teletype operator, lineman, and technician. In the summer the command conducts reserve schools at Camp Wainwright, Alberta and at Longue Pointe, Quebec. Junior and senior leadership courses are held as well as communications courses (conducted in both official languages at Longue Pointe). Advanced trades training and communication officer training is conducted at the Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics in Kingston by regular force instructors. Training with units is inadequate, however, due to lack of both satisfactory equipment and sufficient opportunities to participate in field exercises.

Generally speaking, trades training in the reserves is very good. Where the system is somewhat inadequate is in sea training for naval tradesmen and officer training at unit and sub-unit level in the militia.

Equipment

Policy Directive P26 states that "The Canadian Forces policy guideline on equipping the Reserves is to provide the Reserve Force with contemporary equipment as part of the procurement program for the total force. Normally this will be done by procurement of equipment to war establishments with the difference between war and peace establishments being issued to the Reserves."

The **militia** is in fact woefully ill-equipped, even though it is now being issued with some Grizzly, and Cougar vehicles, equipment well-suited for use by reservists, and there are plans for new communications materiel, additional light arms and clothing. At the present time, the militia has few armoured personnel carriers and there are severe shortages in virtually every other category including trucks, modern rifles, machine guns, mortars and ammunition. Also, uniforms are in short supply. In addition, much of the equipment which it has is old and worn out. The militia needs access to equipment similar to that used by units of Mobile Command if it is to constitute an effective part of the overall defence establishment.

The **naval reserve** has five gate vessels and a few other old vessels. It also helps to man a number of regular force ships on each coast. Gate vessels have serious drawbacks because they are slow and lack proper tactical communication equipment, a bridge radar and other navigational aids. One suggestion is that the naval reserve should be equipped with wooden-hulled minesweepers and fast light patrol vessels which would enable it to perform effective roles in coastal defence and fisheries surveillance.

The **air reserve** has been flying DC-3 and Otter aircraft and is now receiving about 16 Kiowa reconnaissance helicopters. Its personnel also augment regular squadrons and help to fly Tracker, transport and other aircraft, when they are available. There are a variety of proposals for re-equipping the force, including the purchase of Buffalo or Caribou transports, but assistance to the regular force seems likely to remain a primary interest.

The **communication reserve** suffers from some shortages, notably of field equipment, although its situation is generally good.

In general the equipment available to the reserves is inadequate and insufficient for the tasks they have been assigned.

Air Transport

The subcommittee wishes to draw attention to the problem of obtaining readily available air transport for the armed forces.

The Canadian armed forces have enough transport aircraft to provide for the defence of Canada in the north and elsewhere, but would have to rely on assistance from civilian carriers if there were a major crisis in Europe. However, even though Canada has a large civilian air fleet, this country at present lacks the necessary arrangements between government and airline companies to make aircraft and crews available when needed. Canada's commitment to NATO is based on the assumption that augmentation troops would be flown to Europe in a crisis period preceding hostilities, yet the government has no power to requisition or direct civilian aircraft prior to the outbreak of war. As a result, Canada might be unable to move reinforcements to Europe even though this country has the aircraft and aircrews to do so. An inter-departmental study group in the government is working on this question, considering such ideas as the establishment of a voluntary plan for aircraft utilization in crisis periods and the establishment of an air transport reserve which would make it easier for Canada to obtain air crews for wartime flights overseas in times of emergency. Indications are that solution of this problem might ultimately require new legislation.

Morale

Morale is hard to weigh but the evidence heard by the subcommittee indicates that this problem is felt mainly by the militia. The key factor is a sense of purpose - the militia appears to have doubts about the importance of its roles. By contrast, the naval, air and communication reserves are essentially satisfied both with their augmentation roles and with the other special tasks they have

been assigned, even though there are complaints about the quality and quantity of equipment available to them.

Maintaining a real sense of purpose in the militia has been very difficult in face of the lack of clear-cut military roles. When the forces-in-being concept was accepted as virtually an axiomatic truth in the 1960s, the militia was unable to develop a satisfactory place for itself among the instruments of national policy. It was believed there would be no time to transport militia units to Europe if hostilities broke out there and even individual augmentation or reinforcement would be difficult in many circumstances. The direct military threat to Canada was seen as mainly an air and naval problem to which the militia could make little contribution.

At the outset of the 1970s there was almost a sense of redundancy about the militia which inevitably affected morale. Numbers continued to decline thereafter under budgetary and other pressures. The subcommittee received some evidence of a disregard for militia concerns on the part of the regular force which could not help but sap vitality. Militiamen came to believe that their organization was being reduced to a mere holding establishment, intended to produce a few trained personnel for the regulars but not to be taken seriously as an effective partner in the eventuality of war.

This negative perception of the militia's possibilities was reflected in low budgets, lack of modern equipment, inadequate training facilities and other shortages. It also made itself felt in society in general - which was in an anti-militarist phase in the wake of the Vietnam war - and this further undermined the close connections with local communities which had always been the militia's great strength.

Until recent years, a militia unit was very much a part of the life of the community in which it resided. Units were normally represented at important community events; members came from all strata of local society; retention rates were high and the officers and senior NCO's messes were centres of the social life of the community. At present, unit morale and unit esprit de corps is generally at a low ebb and the family spirit, so necessary to an effective military organization, has been seriously weakened. This is reflected in the disquietingly high turnover rates among personnel.

Today, regrettably, few militia units are effective military units. Most are not capable - nor would their present organization allow them - of functioning as a battalion of infantry or as a regiment of armour in the field. They are not battalions nor can many even be considered as under-strength sub-units (such as an infantry company or artillery battery). They are composed mainly of senior and junior NCOs, tradesmen and other specialists who have been trained to a high professional degree at regular force schools and are available to regular force

units on an individual augmentation basis. They are no longer attuned to what should be their natural role, the deployment of combat-ready units for the territorial defence of this country or reinforcement of Canadian forces overseas. Morale is crippled as a result.

The naval reserve benefits from "not (being) uneasy about being a reservoir or a well of manpower which can be drawn on by the regular force" and from unique features setting it apart from all other reserves. It is "the only naval presence beyond the sea coasts and while its members identify with the navy as a whole, as units (they) do not mean very much." (5:17) The communication reserve is almost totally integrated with its regular counterparts (7:10) and the air reserve has been more comfortable with its roles since twinning has been implemented and since Kiowas helicopters have allowed it to function side-by-side with the regulars. (9:23) While the naval and air reserves are disappointed with their limited paid-ceilings and frustrated with the shortage of adequate equipment, this does not affect the performance of the existing reservists.

CHAPTER VI

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

A. RATIONALE FOR RESERVE FORCES

Shielded from external threats by geography and for many years by the British navy, Canada has not had to develop a large professional army and has had only limited recourse to conscription for service overseas. Instead, to provide a base for raising forces to send abroad during two world wars and the Korean conflict, Canada has relied on a system of local militia units. When the need arose, the system was adapted to the naval and air elements and it has served the country well.

The development of nuclear weapons and the Soviet threat hanging over Western Europe have generated new military requirements. The accent in the post-war years has been on forces-in-being, causing Canada for the first time in peace-time to raise a professional military force and to maintain a contingent overseas. These represent dramatic changes for Canada. In the process, the reserves have suffered, feeling that their principal task has become to constitute a pool into which the regulars can dip when they need men and women in an emergency. And in the competition for scarce funds, especially for equipment, the reserves have again fared badly.

The subcommittee is persuaded that the reserves can be relevant to today's military needs. They can be adapted to provide militarily effective forces at reasonable cost, with some elements tasked to respond at short notice. The reserves could and should become a viable component of the total force.

There are signs that the Department of National Defence is beginning to re-discover the potential of the reserves. A preliminary step has been taken to activate the supplementary reserve and, for the first time in decades, specific tasks were assigned in October 1981 to a few militia units. The subcommittee supports these moves but much more needs to be done if the reserves are to become a viable part of the total force.

The members of Canada's armed forces, regulars and reserves alike, have shown impressive dedication. Both regulars and reserves share a commitment to the defence of Canada. But in recent years the partnership has not been equal. The regulars have become the dominant element, which has damaged the relationship between the two. This has not been healthy because each needs the other. But without mutual respect, there can be neither effective cooperation nor coordination.

This situation has other consequences which are unfortunate. Professional soldiers tend to be set apart so that they can train realistically without disturbing the civilian society. This means that the citizenry loses touch with the military fact. And the regular forces for their part risk becoming professionally introverted and out of touch with the attitudes which prevail in society. This situation is equally harmful to citizens and to soldiers. The reserves can do much to bridge this gap.

With a strong reserve, the regular forces will draw into their ranks officers and men from the reserve forces who have not been formed by military structures and military attitudes and who can help to pass on the expectations of the larger society. The same function will be performed by having regular forces personnel in close and continuous contact with reservists. Conversely, the existence within the civilian community of citizen-soldiers, people with military skills and connections whose primary focus and interests remain civilian, will help to interpret to the community the professional preoccupations of the military, and thus enhance community understanding and appreciation of the role of the armed forces.

The underlying strength and the necessary support for reserve forces is a personal sense of commitment of the individual reservist and a shared belief within each unit that the common objectives are important to society. This means that an effective reserve requires not only the dedication of its members but also the support and appreciation of the public which it serves.

One of the great strengths of North American society is the emphasis which has been given to citizen responsibility for the common welfare. Reserve units which are active throughout the land provide young people with an opportunity to contribute to the defence of their country and remind all citizens of the importance of being militarily prepared. Canada needs an active and effective reserve to fill out the forces in time of emergency. But the reserves may be even more important as a reminder to Canadians that defence must be the concern, not just of paid professionals, but of all citizens.

B. THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE RESERVES

The functions assigned to Canada's reserve forces in policy Directive P26 are described in Chapter III. The deficiencies limiting the reserves' ability to provide the complements needed to allow Canada to meet its military objectives and treaty obligations are explored in Chapter IV and Chapter V looks at the equipment and state of readiness of the reserve forces. From this base it is possible to assess the current situation and prescribe remedies where appropriate.

The tasks of the reserves continue to be based on the P26 directive and include peace-time, crisis-period and war-time roles. In peace-time the reserves perform such duties as providing aid to the civil power, assisting in civil emergency operations, assigning personnel to peacekeeping units, contributing to search and rescue operations and helping with maritime surveillance and patrolling. During a crisis-period preceding hostilities they would provide individual personnel and sub-units to augment the regular forces. And in war-time they would supply personnel and units for reinforcement and also provide a basis for further mobilization. During war-time the naval reserve would also be charged with all naval control of shipping and harbour control.

Although little evidence was presented to the subcommittee regarding the performance of peace-time roles, the reserves have established a good record in this area. On several occasions in recent years they have provided aid to the civil power and assistance to civil emergency organizations, for example in connection with the Montreal Olympics and flood relief operations. They have helped to sustain Canada's reputation in peacekeeping, serving with the regulars in Cyprus and elsewhere. Communication reserve personnel enable the armed forces to provide peak service when necessary, and the air reserve makes a solid contribution to Canada's search and rescue, maritime surveillance and other air operations. Personnel from all components of the reserve assist the regular force by serving as class C reservists.

Providing reserve personnel for augmentation of regular units in a crisis period would be much more difficult. By their own admission, as set out in Table III in Chapter IV, the four major military commands expected to fall short of the government approved objective by 11,500 men and women. Most of the testimony from non-government sources offered a far more pessimistic assessment of the situation than this, leading the subcommittee to the conclusion that the 11,500 shortfall figure is a minimum and probably understates substantially the deficiency. These personnel are needed to fill out the war-authorized establishment by Day One of hostilities and they would have to be brought into the active force on very short notice since a crisis period leading to major war is likely to last, at most, a few weeks. There would be no time to recruit and train fresh reserve personnel.

In a crisis, the shortage of effective reserves for augmentation would be felt primarily in Canada among the Mobile Command units designated to protect Canadian territory and installations or to move overseas once war had broken out, and among the Air and Maritime Command formations charged with the defence of Canada's airspace and waters. Communication Command would be in a better position since there is an especially close relationship between regulars and reserves in peace-time and Canadian Forces Europe is not heavily dependent on reserves for augmentation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The augmentation of Canadian Forces Europe would be almost entirely by regular force personnel and should not pose a problem provided that transport aircraft were available and any crisis lasted long enough to carry out the movement before actual hostilities.

The shortfall mentioned above would affect Canadian military operations on Day One, that is, immediately at the outbreak of hostilities. For example, Mobile Command would be short of personnel for units guarding vital installations in Canada, training to go into action in Europe or held in readiness for other tasks. Maritime Command would lack some of the qualified reservists needed for augmentation of ships crews, essential shore duties, control of shipping and naval officer-in-charge operations. The last two tasks could require up to 3,000 personnel which alone is almost equal to the total number of primary and supplementary reserves available.

The insufficiency of Canada's reserve forces emerges more starkly in relation to their second war-time mission - the provision of reinforcements to bolster existing formations or replace casualties. This would only be possible if Canada was unable to carry out some present military tasks, such as the CAST commitment to north Norway or if the government decided to risk depleting forces in Canada so as to reinforce units in action elsewhere. Canada is far from having the sizeable trained force of militia units and other reserve formations which are needed to provide unit or individual reinforcements in the early stages of a modern war. Aside from the question of numbers, the militia in particular suffers from several problems which tend to reduce combat-readiness and this limits the force's capacity for reinforcement. For example, the average militia unit has now been reduced to 157 personnel which is not large enough to be committed to battle.

Only if a war continued for any length of time would there be an opportunity to carry out traditional mobilization. However, with remarkably few exceptions, witnesses were agreed that future conflict would not last long enough to permit, or require, the kind of extended mobilization undertaken during the two world wars. A mobilization plan to take account of current requirements has not yet been completed. Moreover, the country simply does not possess the war materiel or military training systems which would permit rapid expansion of the armed forces and their commitment to battle within six months or so. Most of the equipment now in the hands of the reserves would be absorbed by the forces active on Day One of hostilities, leaving little for new personnel. As General Dunn, Chief of the Reserves, stated: "long lead times...in the procurement of

military pattern equipment, vehicles and ammunition, impose severe constraints on mobilization." (2:21)

The subcommittee's review has revealed serious deficiencies in the capacity of the Canadian armed forces, including the reserves, to meet the crisis and war-time obligations which successive governments have accepted. Although his judgment may be dramatic and somewhat harsh, Mr. Stethem's critique that "the total force concept as it exists in Canada is a way of creating a paper...army" (10:25) has an element of truth, in the sense that the impression conveyed of effective strength is illusory. On paper, the reserves make up the shortfall between the war-authorized complement of the armed forces and what the regulars can provide. The subcommittee's examination of the status, capabilities and role of the reserves makes it clear that, as now constituted, the reserves are simply not in a position to fill the gap.

This situation is unacceptable even though it has existed for more than a decade and Canada has remained free and secure during this time. Canada should have the reserve forces necessary to make up war-authorized requirements in a crisis or on the outbreak of a conflict, since otherwise the peace-time deterrent and war-time capability of this country are undermined. Allies and adversaries are well aware of present deficiencies and will revise their judgments of Canadian capabilities only when concrete measures are taken to rectify the situation.

To remedy this situation the subcommittee offers the following conclusions and recommendations:

- **Increasing international tensions make it necessary for Canada to pay greater attention to strengthening its defences and improving the state of readiness of the armed forces.**
- The shortfall in forces required to meet war-authorized strength could be made up by increasing the numbers of the regulars or by improving the availability and capability of the reserves to respond in an emergency or both. Funds are not available at this time to expand the regular force to war-authorized levels. **Current commitments and future crises can only be met by having a realistic and harmonious balance of forces, including both regulars and reserves, together comprising a total force.**
- **Canada's reserves are in serious need of strengthening. Although they constitute an integral and essential part of the total force, they are deficient in a number of vital respects.**

- The subcommittee commends the Chief of the Defence Staff for initiatives taken in 1981 relating to the reserves. However, this new policy thrust should be pressed with greater vigour, given strong political backing and supported by the necessary financing. To ensure that the need to upgrade the reserves is taken seriously at all levels of the regular force and understood by the public, **a commitment to enhance the status, capability and role of the reserves should be publicly enunciated at the highest political level and supported by increased funding.**
- **The most urgent requirement is to upgrade the military effectiveness of the reserves so that they could provide support for the regulars and become a viable component of the total force.**
- To be effective, **the reserves must have relevant training, tasks for which they are adequately equipped and a new awareness of the importance of their role.** Measures are needed in each of these areas.
- **The subcommittee strongly supports the decision to assign operational military tasks to militia units and urges the Commander of Mobile Command to apply this policy as widely and as swiftly as possible.** This is primarily a problem for the militia; the other reserves expect to augment the regulars and are satisfied with the additional roles assigned to them.
- The subcommittee welcomes the initial steps taken by the Department of National Defence to enter into contact by mail with the members of the supplementary reserve and to establish a computerized list. **The supplementary reserve should be re-organized so that it could become a major source of individual augmentation for the regulars.** As a minimum, there should be an annual check-in, a uniform issued, retraining as required and an assignment planned so that immediate augmentation could occur in time of emergency. The British system of making a small annual payment at the time of checking-in might also be considered.
- As Table II shows, Canada has the lowest percentage of reserves to regulars among the NATO countries. While the immediate need is to improve the effectiveness, readiness and capability of existing reservists, the subcommittee recommends that, as a second step, **the reserves should be increased to whatever size is necessary to respond, jointly with the regulars, to the mobilization plan requirements.**
- The militia and the naval reserves suffer from too high a rate of attrition and the fact that a large proportion are students who remain less than 30 months in reserve service. **The reserves will need a greater challenge, greater capability and more clearly defined and positive roles in order to**

reduce turnover and achieve higher rates of retention. If this can be done, it would produce over time more experienced reservists.

- The subcommittee approves a number of elements in directive P26 but disagrees with others such as the use of the militia to provide individual augmentation for the regulars. The subcommittee concludes that **a new directive will be required to conform with any commitments by the government to enhance the status, capability and role of the reserves.**

C. EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

While the provision of an adequate supply of appropriate equipment to the reserves would not completely overcome all of the inadequacies identified by the subcommittee in preceding sections of this report, it would go a long way toward doing so.

The most desirable recruits for the reserves are bright, young, mature, settled men and women with a desire for service and the will and dedication to honour a commitment given. The kind of people, in other words, that everybody wants and who, therefore, have before them a multitude of opportunities for the rewarding employment of their leisure time. These people can be attracted to the reserves only if they can be convinced that the reserves have an important job to do. That kind of conviction is difficult to engender when it is obvious that the nation has not supplied reservists with the tools they need to do the tasks they have been assigned. Even if reservists have been persuaded to enroll, retention of those who do becomes a problem if equipment is not adequate for the task.

The subcommittee's investigation leads it to share General Rohmer's assessment:

"There are many areas of the militia where equipment is not available that should be available. There is clothing that should be available that is not available...it is all a matter of budget, but in any event it is where a major concern lies. It is in the...equipment of the reserve force." (4:11)

This situation should not be allowed to persist. Reservists must have arms in the required numbers available to them at their concentration points. Infantrymen without rifles and automatic weapons, armoured units without armour or anti-tank weapons, seamen without ships, cannot perform their assigned tasks.

Speaking of the regular force, General Withers had this to say when appearing before the Senate Subcommittee on National Defence:

"We are not in the position that you mentioned before, of having a nucleus on which we can expand, because the fact is that today the limitation is materiel...We are today involved with weapons systems with regard to which we are really saying, if you haven't got it on the day it starts, you probably are not going to get it." (SEN 1:74)*

If this is true of the regular force, the concept of a total force makes it equally true for the reserves and leads to the conclusion that, despite recent and welcome improvements, **it is crucial that more resources be devoted to providing equipment to the reserves to carry out their assigned duties.**

From the lack of proper equipment, it follows that the training of reservists will be inadequate; even more seriously, it results in reservists being unfamiliar with equipment that they may be expected to employ if called to active duty. The subcommittee accordingly recommends that **greater efforts must be made to ensure that those reservists who might be called upon directly to augment regular formations be thoroughly familiar with the equipment employed by their regular force counterparts.** This is a problem particularly for the army and the naval reserves.

It does not follow that the reserves should be assigned the same equipment as the regular forces in every instance. The types of tasks and equipment appropriate to the militia were discussed in submissions and evidence presented to the subcommittee and most explicitly stated by General Rohmer:

"...I do not see it necessary...that (reserve) armoured regiments...be equipped with Leopard tanks...But I do see them being equipped with the Armoured Vehicle General Purpose..." (4:11)

The militia should not expect to have highly sophisticated materiel. It would not be cost-effective to place complex, expensive equipment at the disposition of reservists who could make only part-time use of it. Militiamen also lack the time for the thorough training needed to learn to handle sophisticated

* Where a citation is preceded by the letters SEN, the reference is to the proceedings of the Subcommittee on National Defence of the Standing Committee of the Senate on Foreign Affairs of the First Session of the 32nd Parliament, 1980-81.

equipment. It is preferable to equip militia units with the kinds of materiel which reservists could learn to operate and maintain within the limits of the time they are able to devote to training and peace-time service.

The subcommittee heard testimony on the situation in Australia and among the European allies and noted that these countries limit service on sophisticated equipment to regular forces personnel. By and large, reservists and conscripts in these countries are not tasked to perform roles beyond those requiring limited initial individual training, limited individual and unit refresher training, and limited quantities of complex, expensive equipment. Yet, in these countries, the contribution of reservists and conscripts is regarded as an essential part of the overall national defence effort and there is no reason why the situation should be different in Canada.

General Belzile commented favourably on 'specialist' roles which the militia could perform to reinforce the regulars:

"...such experiences as 'Rendezvous 81' have shown us a serious shortfall of what we call third-line units, or specialist units, which would exist in a larger formation than what we operate in Canada. I would also see the militia particularly being an ideal ground for using specialist equipment...to form specialist units should the need ever arise under a mobilization scenario." (7:15)

In this context, specialist roles include the provision of types of units which do not now appear in the regular force. General Belzile, among others, mentioned the following:

"...anti-tank specific or specialist units; rocket-launcher units for higher level artillery commando types of organization which may be needed for raids and things like this...they are the sorts of units that we may very well need should there ever be an expansion. I would see the reserves being an ideal place to concentrate on that sort of thing." (7:15)

Understanding the difficulties of assigning new equipment to the reserves and of training them to use it, the subcommittee concludes that **reserve units should have equipment appropriate for the tasks assigned to them.** The tasks and equipment should take account of the limited time which reservists can devote to training. With some imagination, it should be possible to identify important and challenging tasks requiring equipment neither too complex nor too costly.

D. OTHER SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

a) Need for a Mobilization Plan

During the course of the subcommittee's hearings, there were frequent references to the work of a task force in the Department of National Defence which is developing the basis for a mobilization plan. The subcommittee is relieved to hear that a plan is now being developed as it is clearly a necessity. Canada's regular force is at present about 28,000 personnel below war-authorized strength, and this number of extra troops is needed to permit full manning of units which are currently undermanned, augmentation of Canadian Forces Europe and the dispatch of the CAST force to north Norway. Additional personnel beyond the 108,000 war-authorization level would also be needed to provide reinforcement so as to build up strengths beyond the augmentation level or to replace casualties. A mobilization plan specifying, as a minimum, how the reserves would fill these sudden gaps, is central to meeting Canada's treaty commitments in a timely manner. In its first public meeting with senior officials of the Department of National Defence, the current status of the mobilization plan was of particular interest to members of the subcommittee.

In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on National Defence, General Richard Rohmer, the retired Chief of Reserves, stated that he had some part in the decision to initiate a mobilization plan. He reported that "in December, 1978, I went to the CDS, who was then Admiral Falls, and I said to him, 'Admiral, I am concerned that there is no plan for the tasking of the reserve force on augmentation day...I think there should be such a plan!'" (SEN 15:14) Some months later, he reported, "a task force was established to prepare a mobilization plan for the regular force which would involve the reserve." (SEN 15:14) Later, during the same meeting, General Rohmer noted that "a substantial part of the (task force) report has to do with the reserve force because it involves utilization of the reserves, then mobilization, then expansion." (SEN 15:29)

The mobilization plan is directly concerned with the 'role, capability and status' of the reserves and therefore is of immediate concern to the subcommittee. For this reason, a request was made to the minister that the subcommittee be given information on the current status of the departmental review. However, the minister decided that, since the review involves classified information, he was not in a position to approve "dissemination of the mobilization study report, in whole or in part." (7:37)

In the course of the hearings, the separate commands reported on their requirements for immediate augmentation through the reserves in time of emergency. As noted earlier in this report, the reserves as now constituted are simply not able to furnish immediately the personnel which would be required.

This situation leads the subcommittee to conclude that **a realistic mobilization plan is urgently needed clearly specifying the missions which the reserve would be called upon to perform.** Reservists need to know what would be expected of them in an emergency.

Although there were suggestions made to the subcommittee that it should refrain from reporting to Parliament until the mobilization plan is ready, the subcommittee has actually concluded that the fact that the plan is not yet completed gives it an important opportunity to contribute positively to its development. In spite of repeated assertions by senior officials in the regular force appearing before the subcommittee that the reserves are an essential component of a total force, there is considerable evidence that the reserves have in fact been neglected during the past decade and more. It is understandable that the regular forces have been traumatized by the major reductions in the size of the armed forces made during the 1960s and by the restrictions in the defence budgets which, for many years, prevented the re-equipment of the remaining forces. However, the situation has improved in recent years insofar as equipment is concerned and the government has also agreed to a modest increase in peacetime strength. For the first time in many years, the regular forces can now focus on less immediate problems. General Belzile reported in testimony that since assuming his command in April 1981, he has concentrated on "improving the operational orientation or focus of the militia" and by October 22 had "already started assigning operational missions to selected units." (7:5)

This is a welcome change of emphasis but the subcommittee is persuaded that more needs to be done. General Rohmer, appearing before the Senate Subcommittee on National Defence, was critical of the way the task force on mobilization has ignored the reserves:

"This task force never consulted with me or the Reserve Council once...the preliminary report of the mobilization task force contained matters in relation to the reserve which had no validity whatever. Once again we are back to the attitudinal situation...I am concerned that the mobilization planning task force report will not do what it ought to have done in the first place. From my vantage point right now, I am still grievously concerned that the task force will come up with a final plan to which the reserve will have made no contribution." (SEN 15:29)

And later in his evidence, in response to a question, he noted, "Throughout the mobilization report there are denigrating remarks, that are unfounded, made with regard to the capability of the militia." (SEN 15:29)

This approach to the reserves is not unique to Canada. Tom Sullivan of the Australian Department of Defence described to the subcommittee the substantial

increase in size and role assigned to the Australian reserves during the last years. He reported that an important hurdle which had to be overcome was to persuade "the Australian regular army to take a greater and more direct interest in the reserves." (10:5) There is evidently need for some similar change of approach on the part of regular officers of the Canadian armed forces.

In these circumstances, the subcommittee considers it important that its report on the reserves should be available to Parliament before the mobilization plan has been completed. Since a realistic and significant role for the reserves is a necessary part of such a plan, the subcommittee is pleased to have an opportunity to contribute its findings so that they can be taken into account by the Department of National Defence as it prepares the mobilization plan.

To ensure that this report is carefully considered by the government the subcommittee recommends that **the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence should examine in a systematic way the 'role, capability and status' of the reserves in the course of its future annual review of defence estimates.** For this to be done effectively, the Department of National Defence estimates would have to identify more fully expenditures on the reserves.

b) A Separate Budget for the Reserves?

Such is the cost of modern weapons that matters financial always evoke great interest and heated debate among observers of the defence scene; none as much, however, when it comes to reserves, as the merits of a separate budget for the reserves. Partisans of the idea of separate funding for the reserves, exemplified by General Rohmer, argue that the single budget "is one of the reasons that the reserves force is as small as it is and one of the reasons that it is in the condition that it is, which is not particularly good." (4:11) They point to the fact that the regulars themselves face pressing needs and inevitably their control of the budget leads to procurement decisions which favour the professional armed services. Advocates of separate budgets for the reserves have few difficulties in pointing out obvious disadvantages of the current method for allocating funds to the reserves.

The best example concerns class C reservists. They are called out on a full-time basis by the armed forces, not for training purposes, but to fill the ranks of regular units. Nonetheless their salaries are charged to the reserves' portion of the budget. At the same time, the wages of the support staff from the regulars who serve with reserve units are also charged to the reserves.

Opponents of the two-budget system respond with L.E. Davies, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) in DND, that "a reserve force budget would serve no useful purpose...nor provide additional benefits to the reserves or the department," (2:36) and that

"...it would be naive to assume that a budget structure will influence the allocation of available funds within the restricted envelope levels which the department will have to face for at least the next few years." (2:37)

In spite of their differences, however, there seems to be support for a compromise position, based on a solution adopted in Australia. (10:12) While there is no outright separation of budgets in Australia, there are separate envelopes within the various budget chapters - and most particularly for equipment - for the reserves and the regular forces:

Major General Rohmer: "...it is my individual opinion that there has to be a certain amount of the defence budget earmarked, which is never done in any of the estimates." (SEN 15:17)

Brigadier General Bell: "I do not agree that you want to have a regular force budget and a reserve budget...But I do agree that you should have defined programs that are identifiable in terms of the reserves..." (6:51)

Lieutenant General Lane: "...the federation (of the Military and United Services Institutes of Canada) would not...recommend a separate vote for the reserves. However, we do feel...when the program is being put together DND might break out a little more clearly...that which is being spent on the reserves..." (6:16)

L.E. Davies: "We are currently...developing a set of planning elements for use in the new policy and expenditure management system. One of these could be used to display the direct cost of the reserves, plus the assigned cost developed from the program data base." (2:37)

The subcommittee has found it difficult to reach a conclusion in this controversial matter. It is evident that budgetary control equates to policy control. In the past the regular force has benefited from control of the purse strings. With the new emphasis on the total force, however, the Department of National Defence must consider the overall defence requirement of Canada.

The subcommittee concludes that a separate budget for the reserves might lead to reserves and regulars pulling in different directions. However, to enhance the means available to the reserves of influencing the decision-making process within the Department of National Defence, the subcommittee recommends that **the Canadian armed forces should continue to have a single budget, but all funds**

intended for expenditure on reserve programs, and in particular all equipment expenditures, should be clearly identified as such; and, further, the Department of National Defence should be required to give Parliament advance notification of any cancellations or significant reductions of reserve equipment programs as well as of other major modifications of reserve expenditure programs.

c) Command and Control of the Reserves

Since 1976 the reserves have been fully integrated into the command and control structure of the Canadian armed forces and the subcomponents of the primary reserves are respectively under the functional and operational command of the commanders of Maritime, Mobile, Air and Communication Commands. They in turn report to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).

The office of the Chief of Reserves is the advisory and consultative link in the organizational structure. The Chief of Reserves himself is the senior reserve force officer in the Canadian forces. He is appointed by the CDS and remains in his appointment for two years. His responsibilities include advising the CDS on reserve matters pertaining to organization, administration, operations and training; consulting with the commanders of commands on the above subjects; and organizing public support for the reserve force. To assist him the Chief of Reserves has five senior reserve officers (at the brigadier general and colonel level) who are also appointed by the CDS, one from each of the four subcomponents of the primary reserve and the fifth from the Judge Advocate General's Branch.

Although the Chief of Reserves has direct access to the CDS, his views and those of his small staff are routinely passed through the Director General of Reserves and Cadets which is the agency that translates these views into requests for action by the responsible NDHQ agencies. (2:17-19) But the Chief has the right to attend meetings of key DND decision-making bodies if he considers it necessary to do so and the agenda concerns the reserves.

General Rohmer complained that on some matters of direct interest to the reserves his views had not been sought. The subcommittee is concerned about the degree to which the interests of the reserves and their potential importance in the defence of Canada could be kept to the fore in National Defence Headquarters, bearing in mind that they are represented by a relatively junior officer of field or flag rank in the regular force and a senior reservist who, by definition, stands outside the professional hierarchy and who does not serve full-time.

The subcommittee is advocating militarily more effective reserves. This would make it necessary and appropriate to find a way to strengthen the voice of the reserves within the councils of the Department of National Defence. A

change in attitude with regard to the reserves in the department would also be required. To achieve these goals, the subcommittee recommends that the Chief of Reserves should be re-designated Chief of Reserve Forces. **The Chief of Reserve Forces should be of the rank of major general, called out to serve full time during the term of his appointment, be a fully participating member of the Program Control Board and be eligible for re-appointment.** The regular force officer responsible for the reserves in National Defence Headquarters should have the rank of brigadier general and have a voice on policy and finance affairs in order to ensure coordination between the regulars and the reserves.

d) Financial Incentives for Reservists

While opinions differ as to whether financial rewards or other incentives are the best means of ensuring that recruitment objectives and a high rate of retention are achieved among reserves, the bulk of the evidence presented to the subcommittee supported the notion of some increase in rewards, particularly for continuing service. As Captain Fox-Decent observed: "there is a factor of reward which is being sought." (5:18) At the same time, most witnesses insisted that pay scales were only one of many factors motivating or likely to motivate citizen-soldiers.

The financial reward question covers a variety of issues including: pay scales proper; equal pay for equal service for reservists and regulars; comparability of the compensation package of the regular forces (which includes many fringe benefits) with the reserves (which does not); retainers for supplementary reservists; re-enlistment bonuses; tax exemptions of reserve pay, bonuses and retainers.

An argument could be developed for making pay scales more attractive, particularly in the lower ranks. Privates in the reserves receive little more than the minimum wage and, in most cases, could earn more filling grocery bags at a supermarket. In addition, the reserve per diem is paid only for days of service but is compared to a regular per diem rate computed on the basis of 365 service days per year - i.e., which does not take into account week-end and vacation time. Several witnesses objected to service of equal value and duration being paid according to different scales in the regular and reserve establishments; the case of naval reservists serving alongside navy regulars aboard the same ships and performing the same duties was a frequent complaint.

Tax exemptions have the attractiveness of all such advantages - visibility - and allow for possible differences to be tolerated in the financial treatment of regular and reserve soldiers. Australia has exempted the pay of reservists for many years; it goes further and allows unemployed persons drawing unemployment benefits to continue to do so even if they are on paid service with the reserves. Australian experience suggests that tax benefits may have helped to attract a broader cross-section of the population to the reserves, although the rate of turnover is not significantly lower than in Canada.

The list of possible non-financial inducements to join and remain in the reserves could also be extended. These include the extension of medical, dental and hospital service benefits to reserve personnel. However, since Canada provides an advanced program of medical and hospital insurance, and since more and more employers are providing adequate dental insurance, it is doubtful that there is need for such an extension. Individual reserve members would not save significant amounts while the aggregate bill to the federal treasury might be quite substantial.

The adoption of any of these systems of rewards or incentives would cost money, but the benefits in terms of increased retention should be carefully considered. The subcommittee concludes that **primary reservists should be offered some financial incentives. The subcommittee favours a tax exemption and considers it would also be desirable to relate pay to length of service.**

The issue of retainers for supplementary reservists was also raised. The 100 pounds a year bounty paid British regular reserves (former regulars under obligation to serve in the reserves) to encourage their willing participation in annual one-day call ups and possibly other exercises seems to yield Britain dividends in terms of savings and readiness. On the one hand, it makes it possible to get by with fewer, more costly regulars and to train fewer territorials than would otherwise be needed; on the other hand, the country continues to benefit from the skills of former soldiers whose familiarity with armed forces environments and military missions make it possible for them to reintegrate within a matter of days in an emergency. Obviously, re-enlistment bonuses, in the case of reserves or regulars, have much the same results; they allow for savings on costs of training while ensuring that continued benefits accrue to the armed forces from skills and experience gained over years of service.

The subcommittee recommends that **supplementary reservists should be paid a modest annual retainer to induce them to maintain a regular link with the defence authorities.**

e) Financial Incentives for Employers and Job Protection Legislation

No matter how attractive the conditions of service, how good the equipment or how meaningful the role in the reserves, it will all be for nought if reservists cannot find the time to train. This issue was of particular concern to the subcommittee and was explored at length during the hearings and in the course of consultations in Europe.

Difficulties have been experienced in the past. The high ratio of school teachers and students in the reserves must be seen more as a reflection of the relative ease with which they can free themselves to take part in summer

exercises than in a lack of interest on the part of other socio-economic groups. At first sight, a seemingly simple solution to the problem would appear to be to follow the course that others have taken in NATO and make it compulsory for employers to release reservists for training purposes. As attractive as this approach might seem at first glance, it would, however, create more problems than it would solve.

First, in a country with a strong volunteer tradition, any legal obligation would be regarded as a serious infringement of both personal liberties and societal values. Second, it would be disruptive of economic activity, particularly in the small business sector of the economy. Third, it would probably make it more difficult for a number of reservists to find employment - or, alternatively, cause many to leave the reserves to enhance their chance of getting employment. Fourth, such legislation would have to be so riddled with possibilities for exemptions as to become either meaningless or highly discriminatory (which would, in addition, encourage delinquency). Fifth, in the absence of a legal obligation for reservists, legislation aimed at employers would tend to cause the latter to put undue pressure on the former to ignore call-ups. Finally, since people become less easily replaceable as they rise in organizational hierarchies, such an obligation might well inhibit future managers and professionals from joining or remaining in the reserves. Accordingly, the subcommittee decided that **it would be impractical to impose a legal obligation on private employers to release reservists wishing to take part in individual or unit training exercises.**

It is preferable in Canada to concentrate on improving the array of persuasive mechanisms than follow the lead of countries with quite different military traditions. The government should continue to support actively organizations that attempt to win the right to serve, such as the National Employers' Support Committee (NESC), and grant to them all due recognition so as to increase their visibility and facilitate their work.

The government should encourage employers to offer time off for reserve service by setting a proper example itself. Treasury Board* does allow reservists to take military leave but not as a matter of entitlement. The right to grant leave rests with deputy ministers. The deputy minister is, undoubtedly, rarely apprised of the request and decisions are made lower down the line. General Robertson, chairman of the NESC, finds there is a lack of appropriate federal departmental regulations - or more precisely, the lack thereof. He even reports having had to call the matter to the attention of the minister of National Defence, whose own department had a very loose set of regulations. (8:20)

*See Personnel Management Manual; Personnel Legislation Supplement, Annex 500-1A, p. 20 (August 1976), paragraphs 48 and 49.

If the federal government had model regulations in place, it would be in a better position - and so would the NESC and other organizations - to press for similar support at the provincial level. And there is reason to believe that the private sector, currently ahead of the government in this respect according to General Robertson, could be persuaded to make an extra effort to let reservists train. Organizations which declined to cooperate voluntarily would to a large extent, be the same as those given exemptions under any form of legislation: small businesses, hospitals, small police forces, and other institutions and firms where one person can be almost indispensable.

Obviously, persuasion might not suffice in every case. For this reason there might be value in granting some kind of tax advantage to employers agreeing to release their reservists. Objections can be, and have been, raised however. To begin with, it would not seem unreasonable to expect from employers, who are often community leaders, that they show the same kind of public and national spirit of patriotism as the men and women who serve in our armed forces reserves - that they 'volunteer' their company, as it were. Second, it could be argued that Canada's defence is worth a sacrifice of some sort on the part of business organizations that do not - unlike reservists - have to put their lives on the line. Third, it can be pointed out to corporation executives that not only do reservists tend to be particularly well motivated and idealistic people who have proven their willingness to give freely of themselves, but they are used to discipline and team work and thus, are likely to be good, productive employees. Finally, the private sector as a whole draws considerable benefits, in many instances, from skills and leadership qualities developed in the regular forces or on reserve duty. These skills and qualities can be worth money to companies.

Having reviewed the pros and cons of offering a financial incentive, the subcommittee decided not to recommend such a measure. It decided instead to recommend that:

- **The federal government should amend current public service policy and grant to duly registered reservists in its employ an entitlement to leave for the purpose of training with the Canadian armed forces.** Refusal to grant leave would have to be validated by the deputy minister. This policy should apply and be communicated to all federal departments, agencies and other institutions without exception;
- **The federal government should direct crown corporations to do the same through an amended Crown Corporations Act;**
- **The federal government should urge provincial governments to grant a similar entitlement to duly registered reservists in their employ.**

Incentives and leave privileges combined may be sufficient to allow the reserves to train more often and under better conditions. Morale could significantly benefit as married reservists would again be in a position to devote their annual vacation time to relaxation with their families. Unit training could also improve to a considerable extent as more troops and cadres could be counted on to take part in collective exercises.

On the other hand, one ingredient might still be missing for guaranteed success: satisfactory compensation. A student loses little or no pay when he attends a summer exercise even if it lasts a few weeks; a working man or woman does. For people in the higher income brackets the sacrifice, although real, may not prove overly burdensome. For a young worker with a family - precisely the type of reservist which Canada's forces need - the sacrifice may just be too much. Nevertheless, the subcommittee concludes that this problem will not be solved by asking employers to complement reservists' military pay. A better strategy is probably to offer some tangible reward or benefit to the reservist.

f) Reserve Training at Universities and Community Colleges

Many briefs and a number of witnesses advocated reactivation of the reserve officer training corps at universities. Organizations such as the Canadian Officer Training Corps (COTC) and the University Naval Training Division (UNTD) were familiar activities on university campuses between the 1930s and the late 1960s. Depending on the size of the contingent, a regular force officer with one or two clerical staff was located at the university. During the winter months instruction was usually provided on a weekly basis and each summer full-time training was carried out at various military schools and bases across the country. On completion of the three-year program, officer candidates received commissions as reserve lieutenants and were expected to take up appointments in a reserve unit.

The contingents gave generations of future lawyers, doctors and accountants an insight into military life and, in many instances, helped develop latent leadership qualities. In a written brief to the subcommittee, retired naval officer Robert I. Hendy succinctly stated the case when he wrote:

"The effectiveness of the armed forces is predicated on the quality of leadership...as the universities are generally regarded as the primary source of future leaders of the country, it would seem fitting that an opportunity to participate in military activity should be an option for undergraduates especially having regard to the substantial public funds which are allocated for the support of the universities."

The problem was that, by the end of the 1960s, a number of factors had combined to militate against the continuance of the reserve officer training programs - the regular force was in the midst of a major reorganization (unification), its funding was being reduced and the military need for reserves was being questioned. Student revolt against authority had developed into anti-military demonstrations and enrolments in the reserve officer contingents fell dramatically. An investigation at the time showed the programs were not effective and that only ten to 15 percent of the successful candidates were enrolling in the reserves or regulars, with the majority joining the supplementary reserve. After an unsuccessful attempt to amalgamate all programs during the 1968-69 academic year, the university program was dropped in favour of one that was less expensive and broader based.

The current program is known as the Reserve Entry Scheme Officers (RESO) and major differences between it and the old-line university contingents are as follows:

- RESO, although considerably more open and broadly based, is much smaller in scale and in number. Some 375 students from across the country are undergoing training at present;
- Regular force representation on the university campus is no longer a part of the program;
- RESO is available to students of all post-secondary educational institutions including CEGEPs and community colleges as well as universities;
- To be a part of the program, a student must first have volunteered and been accepted into the officer cadet program of a local reserve unit (either navy, militia or air);
- RESO is a two-year program. During the winter months the cadet receives instruction from his local reserve unit and during the summer he receives up to 16 weeks training at a command school.

Statistics show that between 1973-1979 some 1,400 militia students successfully completed the prescribed course and close to 50 percent have remained with their units. Percentages for the naval and air components of RESO are similar though actual figures are smaller. While RESO has shown itself to be a successful program, officer production is at a low rate compared to the size of the reserves and annual attrition rates. It is this fact, rather than the RESO program itself, that seems to have accounted for the requests to reactivate the COTC and the UNTD.

The subcommittee recommends that the Department of National Defence should assess the current attitudes of the post-secondary student population toward the reserves and, if receptive, expand the RESO program to a level commensurate with the needs identified in the forthcoming mobilization plan.

g) Community Recognition

As regular forces dwindled in number after the last war and returned to base camp, usually in rural areas where training can take place without interfering with civilian activities, the visibility of Canada's regular armed forces diminished significantly. At the same time, cuts in the militia and the other reserves and the closing down of many reserve units across the country has drastically reduced the presence of the reservist in society. The bond with the civilian community has traditionally been provided by the reserves, especially the militia. The combination of these decisions has led to a situation where, outside Ottawa and a handful of communities bordering CAF bases, few civilians ever get a chance to see a uniform - much less meet or associate with soldiers. "Out of sight, out of mind." The community/military link has, in many instances, been severed even in places where a military tradition had flourished for many years. These developments have contributed to public indifference and a diminished awareness of the importance of adequate defences.

The subcommittee has pointed to the need to assign to the reserves militarily valid roles. When this is done, the subcommittee believes the public will give increased recognition to the value of the contribution from reservists. However, new directions should not result in the termination of current viable activities or the dismantling of effective units. Also there were suggestions that other small steps could be taken to renew the bond between reserve units and the communities from which they spring. Measures identified by the subcommittee as likely to have a positive impact in this respect include:

- Ensuring that the community/unit link provided by regimental names such as "The Ontario Regiment" or "The Brockville Rifles" is maintained and indeed cultivated by bringing back to smaller communities sub-units (likely platoon-sized) of the battalions with which they have identified. Several sub-units could be amalgamated to form viable larger units but each would retain its distinct name and insignias;
- Exploring the possibility of establishing a journal for reservists and exploiting opportunities in smaller communities to publicize the work of the reserves, thereby increasing public awareness;
- A conscious effort to bring more uniforms back into cities where the overwhelming proportion of our population lives;
- Creating opportunities for the reserves to parade more often in public.

h) Role of Women in the Reserves

In Canada, the armed forces and especially the reserves, have responded positively to the determination of women to seek a military career. The progress in a relatively short time is borne out by comparisons with most allies: no women serve in either Italy or Germany; few are in uniform in France; their proportion does not exceed one percent in Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands; in Belgium and Britain, the corresponding figures are, respectively, four and five percent. In Canada, women represent six percent of the regular force (two percent less than in the United States) and fully 20 percent in the reserves. Specifically, they make up: 29 percent of the naval reserve; 16 percent of the militia; 32 percent of the air reserve; and 42 percent of the communication reserve. They also provide 8.5 percent of the supplementary list.

Women have been excluded from the armed forces because of limitations in their capacity for physical combat. However, there are many tasks which women can perform in time of combat. The subcommittee accordingly commends the Canadian armed forces for opening the reserves to women in the numbers which they have. The only suggestion which the subcommittee wishes to offer is that more trades be opened to properly qualified women.

i) Problems of Dual Nationals

Many Canadians, themselves born abroad or whose parents immigrated to Canada from countries which conscript their citizens, are highly suspicious of anything military. That sentiment is made worse when they are called for military service by a country they may never have visited - that is, the country from which their parents came.

The subcommittee believes that the government should seek a solution to this distressing problem faced by some Canadians with dual nationality, a problem which generates a negative attitude toward the armed forces on the part of those affected. The aim should be to negotiate agreements with the countries concerned regarding military service obligations by dual nationals.

E. RESTRUCTURING THE RESERVES IN THE FUTURE

The subcommittee was told repeatedly that the last thing the reserves needed at this time was yet another reorganization. The subcommittee agrees. In the post-war years, there has been a profusion of studies and inquiries all leading to reductions in establishments, confusion about roles and, in the militia, identity crises.

Yet evidence produced before the subcommittee brought out a variety of suggestions which together form a coherent picture of how some components of the reserves might usefully be organized in the future. If the reserves are to be strengthened, changes must be guided by a clear set of goals. As the first parliamentary group to consider the role, capability and status of the armed forces reserves, the subcommittee considers it important to develop some general concepts of the kind of reserve forces needed in the future.

1. Organizational Changes

The **army reserve**, which is now comprised of the militia and a number of supplementary reservists, might make a more effective and timely contribution to Mobile Command if it were organized on the following basis:

(a) A Ready Reserve

The creation of a ready reserve corps was supported by numerous witnesses including senior officers of the Department of National Defence. The role of a ready reserve would be to provide individuals for augmentation and reinforcement purposes. It would be composed principally of ex-regulars or former militia personnel with recent active service (except in some trades where skills do not diminish rapidly) who had given a commitment to serve overseas if required. Ready reserve volunteers would keep uniforms and personal effects at home and accept an obligation to report once a year for medical tests and, when necessary, for a refresher course. At that time they would be given new or updated assembly and mobilization instructions for emergencies. This would make it possible for them to deploy speedily, should a crisis arise. They could be paid a modest, tax-exempt retainer. Once mobilized, they would be paid the full rate for their ranks. This force could provide much needed depth for augmentation and reinforcement of the regular force. A ready reserve along these lines would, in effect, replace the supplementary reserve and one of the roles of the militia.

(b) A Revitalized Militia

If the ready reserve were to have initial responsibility for individual and sub-unit augmentation of the ground force regulars, the militia could have as its primary role unit reinforcement and territorial defence, with units tasked for missions ranging from combat to maintenance of security at airports, oil refineries and other vital facilities. If regular force units were sent abroad in an emergency, reserve units would be needed quickly to fill in. They could respond more quickly and much more effectively if they had been assigned their tasks well in advance and had been able to prepare themselves.

The central element would be a renewed emphasis on the unit. This would necessitate the overhaul and re-equipment of the militia and, according to Professor Willett, the creation of viable units "of sufficient size and 'body' to be something in (their) own right." (6A:4) This aim might be achieved in part by consolidating sub-units from neighbouring communities. Existing names and insignia should be preserved in some form by these sub-units within the larger formations so as to reinforce their links with their communities.

General Hughes, commander of the air reserve group, underscored that the 4,000 personnel needed "to bring our (air) units near their war strength...(would) not cater to the strength requirements of units for tasks not now in being..." (7:21) Units of the revitalized militia might usefully be assigned responsibility for the kinds of tasks General Hughes envisaged and which are not now provided for, including base defence (i.e. security), emergency runway repairs and fire fighting, as well as low-level airfield defence.

2. Creation of an Air Transport Reserve

Canada may have serious difficulties in airlifting the troops needed to augment Canadian forces in Europe speedily in an emergency unless arrangements are established to involve civilian aircraft and crews. A strong case can be made for the creation of an air transport reserve which could form a separate component within the air reserve. The following seems to be required:

- Some means - legislative, contractual or other - to acquire the use of appropriate numbers of suitable civilian aircraft in time of crisis;
- Organization of reserve pilots and other personnel on lines similar to the proposed ready reserve of the land element;
- Acceptance of a need to serve when called upon by the government. Aircraft and pilots should be ready to fly within hours.

The subcommittee recommends that **to enhance the airlift capacity of the Canadian armed forces, an air transport component should be added to the air reserve and the necessary arrangements for acquiring the use of civilian aircraft should be worked out and specified in a mobilization plan.**

3. Maritime Needs

On the coasts, appropriate arrangements with other federal agencies operating ships - particularly the Coast Guard and the RCMP Marine Section - could speed up the integration of their services and their personnel into the national maritime defence effort in an emergency and facilitate their full integration in war-time. For its part, the naval reserve would find itself in a better position to support the regular naval forces, as well as to play some of its own roles, if it could train in peace-time on ships with which it might actually perform war-time coastal and northern patrol missions, once they had been appropriately equipped with weapons and other materiel stockpiled in suitable locations. The subcommittee believes that such arrangements might be spelled out in a mobilization plan.

The subcommittee's principal conclusions and recommendations are set out below in summary form. The page in the text from which they are drawn is given in brackets.

1. Increasing international tensions make it necessary for Canada to pay greater attention to strengthening its defences and improving the state of readiness of the armed forces. (51)
2. Current commitments and future crises can only be met by having a realistic and harmonious balance of forces, including both regulars and reserves, together comprising a total force. (51)
3. Canada's reserves are in serious need of strengthening. Although they constitute an integral and essential part of the total force, they are deficient in a number of vital respects. (51)
4. A campaign to enhance the status, capability and role of the reserves should be publicly associated at the highest political level and supported by increased funding. (52)
5. The most urgent requirement is to upgrade the military effectiveness of the reserves so that they could become a viable component of the total force. (52)
6. The reserves must have relevant training, tasks for which they are adequately equipped and a new awareness of the importance of their role. (52)

On the coast, and quite a distance inland, the
operations - particularly the coast guard in the
could be of the greatest assistance in the
national maritime defence effort in an emergency and
integration in war-time. For its part, the naval service
better positioned to support the regular navy, as well as to
own role. It could train in peace-time on ships which
perform war-time coastal and northern patrol duties, and
supportably equipped with weapons and other material
location. The submarine bases that were mentioned in the
out in a hypothetical case.

2. Submarine Bases

to be used in the event of an emergency, and to
arrangements made for the use of the bases in
peace-time and in war-time. A strong case
states a well known fact which is true
- that the submarine bases are not

in the event of an emergency, and to
arrangements made for the use of the bases in
peace-time and in war-time.

and in the event of an emergency, and to
arrangements made for the use of the bases in
peace-time and in war-time.

* The bases are to be used when called upon by the
government, and should be ready to fly within
15 minutes.

The submarine bases are to be used in the event of an
emergency, and to arrangements made for the use of the
bases in peace-time and in war-time.

CHAPTER VII

CONSOLIDATION OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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4. A commitment to enhance the status, capability and role of the reserves should be publicly enunciated at the highest political level and supported by increased funding. (52)
5. The most urgent requirement is to upgrade the military effectiveness of the reserves so that they could become a viable component of the total force. (52)
6. The reserves must have relevant training, tasks for which they are adequately equipped and a new awareness of the importance of their role. (52)

7. The subcommittee strongly supports the decision to assign operational military tasks to militia units and urges the Commander of Mobile Command to apply this policy as widely and as swiftly as possible. (52)
8. The supplementary reserve should be re-organized so that it could become a major source of individual augmentation for the regulars. (52)
9. The reserves should be increased to whatever size is necessary to respond, jointly with the regulars, to the mobilization plan requirements. (52)
10. The reserves will need a greater challenge, greater capability and more clearly defined and positive roles in order to reduce turnover and achieve higher rates of retention. (52)
11. A new directive will be required to conform with any commitments by the government to enhance the status, capability and role of the reserves. (53)
12. It is crucial that more resources be devoted to providing equipment to the reserves to carry out their assigned duties. (54)
13. Greater efforts must be made to ensure that those reservists who might be called upon directly to augment regular formations be thoroughly familiar with the equipment employed by their regular force counterparts. (54)
14. Reserve units should have equipment appropriate for the tasks assigned to them. (55)
15. A realistic mobilization plan is urgently needed clearly specifying the missions which the reserve would be called upon to perform. (57)
16. The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence should examine in a systematic way the 'role, capability and status' of the reserves in the course of its future annual review of defence estimates. (58)
17. The Canadian armed forces should continue to have a single budget, but all funds intended for expenditure on reserve programs, and in particular all equipment expenditures, should be clearly identified as such; and, further, the Department of National Defence should be required to give Parliament advance notification of any cancellations or significant reductions of reserve equipment programs as well as of other major modifications of reserve expenditure programs. (59)

18. The Chief of Reserve Forces should be of the rank of major general, called out to serve full time during the term of his appointment, be a fully participating member of the Program Control Board and be eligible for re-appointment. (61)
19. The regular force officer responsible for the reserves in National Defence Headquarters should have the rank of brigadier general and have a voice on policy and finance affairs in order to ensure coordination between the regulars and the reserves. (61)
20. Primary reservists should be offered some financial incentives. The subcommittee favours a tax exemption and it would also be desirable to relate pay to length of service. (62)
21. Supplementary reservists should be paid a modest annual retainer to induce them to maintain a regular link with the defence authorities. (62)
22. It would be impractical to impose a legal obligation on private employers to release reservists wishing to take part in individual or unit training exercises. (63)
23. The federal government should grant to duly registered reservists in its employ an entitlement to leave for the purpose of training with the Canadian armed forces; direct crown corporations to do the same through an amended Crown Corporations Act; and urge provincial governments to grant a similar entitlement. (64)
24. The Department of National Defence should assess the current attitudes of the post-secondary student population toward the reserves and, if receptive, expand the Reserve Entry Scheme Officers program to a level commensurate with the needs identified in the forthcoming mobilization plan. (67)
25. To enhance the airlift capacity of the Canadian armed forces, an air transport component should be added to the air reserve and the necessary arrangements for acquiring the use of civilian aircraft should be worked out and specified in a mobilization plan. (70)

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| CAST force | The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable combat group committed for use in north Norway. |
| 1 CAG | First Canadian Air Group, headquartered in Lahr, West Germany. |
| CDS | Chief of the Defence Staff. |
| Class C reservist | A reservist called up to fill a regular force establishment position for a period in excess of 130 days, usually six to 24 months. |
| CFE | Canadian Forces Europe, headquartered in Lahr, West Germany, includes both 1 CAG and 4 CMBG. |
| 4 CMBG | Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, headquartered in Lahr, West Germany. |
| COTC | Canadian Officer Training Corps, a former reserve officer training program. |
| DND | Department of National Defence. |
| NDHQ | National Defence Headquarters. |

- P26 Policy Directive P26, defining the roles of the reserves, promulgated 11 January 1978.
- Rendezvous 81 Major division level army concentration held in Canadian forces base Gagetown from 15 May to 17 July 1981, in which the reserves participated actively in augmenting regular force troops. The main exercise, which took place between 1 June and 6 July involved 472 personnel from the militia and 147 reserve communicators (i.e. 619 reservists) as well as 8,181 regulars.
- SYEP Summer Youth Employment Program, operated in conjunction with Employment and Immigration Canada.
- RESO Reserve Entry Scheme Officers, for students interested in a reserve officer career.
- UNTD University Naval Training Division, a former reserve officer training program.

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NDHQ POLICY DIRECTIVE P26

DIRECTIVE SUR LES
POLITIQUES P26 DU QGDNTHE DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
OF THE PRIMARY RESERVE
AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY LISTPERFECTIONNEMENT ET
AFFECTATION DES FORCES DE
LA PREMIÈRE RÉSERVE ET
DU CADRE SUPPLÉMENTAIRE

Background

Exposé

1. The White Paper entitled "Defence in the 70s" enunciated the Government's policy that "the composition of the Reserve Force must be adjusted from time to time to keep pace with changes in overall Force manpower and cannot, therefore, be considered in isolation from the Regular Force." In the Paper, the Government also stated its intention to continue to depend upon the Reserve Force for a more effectively balanced share of the manpower needs of the Armed Forces and that the Reserves would be provided with the equipment they need to train adequately for their assigned tasks.

1. Dans le Livre blanc intitulé "La Défense dans les années 70", le gouvernement énonçait en ces termes sa politique à l'égard de la Force de réserve: "(...) le niveau de ses effectifs doit être maintenu à une certaine proportion des effectifs totaux, et doit tenir compte de l'évolution de la Force régulière.". Dans ce Livre, le gouvernement exprimait aussi son intention de continuer à dépendre de la Force de réserve pour mieux équilibrer les effectifs des Forces canadiennes et il précisait que la Force de réserve recevrait le matériel d'instruction nécessaire afin que les réservistes possèdent les connaissances voulues pour accomplir leurs fonctions.

2. Commencing in 1973, the Primary Reserve was subjected to a revitalization program, whereby:

2. Dès 1973, la première réserve était soumise à un programme de renouvellement en vertu duquel:

a. clearly defined and more meaningful roles and missions were assigned;

a. des missions et des rôles mieux définis et plus significatifs lui furent confiés;

b. quality rather than quantity was stressed;

b. on a accordé plus d'importance à la qualité des réservistes qu'à leur nombre;

c. increased training assistance was provided by the Regular Force including attachments to Regular Force units for training in Canada and Europe; and

c. la Force régulière a appuyé davantage l'instruction des réservistes, en acceptant même certains de ceux-ci dans ses unités, au Canada et en Europe; et

d. substantial increases in clothing, equipment, and pay were authorized.

d. on a autorisé des augmentations considérables en ce qui touche la solde, la dotation en vêtements et en matériel.

3. In the past it has been the policy to task the Primary Reserve for the provision of trained individual reinforcements to take their place in Regular Force units upon augmentation. While this policy will continue to apply primarily in the domain of combat support, combat service support, communication specialties and the Supplementary List, it is the intention to task units and sub-elements of units (provided that such units and sub-elements are operationally effective, ie, have reached an adequate emergency standard) to take their place in the order of battle whenever augmentation is required. In the longer run, it is the department's intention to enhance the quality and responsiveness of the Reserve Force to that level which will permit formed units of Reservists to augment the Regular Force, if and when required.

Aim

4. The aim of this directive is to enunciate the policy for the ongoing development and the employment of the Primary Reserve and Supplementary List sub-components of the Reserve Force, for the period 1978-1983.

General Policy

5. The first task of the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary List is to be prepared to augment the Regular Force, in a graduated response within a specified time frame, during Level One (augmentation) of the mobilization process. Therefore, there remains the ongoing need to continually realign the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary List so that they will be capable of providing augmentation while adhering to the following fundamentals:

- a. no major reorganization of the Primary Reserve is envisaged and the existing Command and Control structure shall be maintained;
- b. the Canadian Forces Policy guideline on equipping the Reserves is to provide the Reserve Force with contemporary equipment as part of the procurement program for the total force. Normally this will be done by procurement of equipment to War Establishments with the difference between War and Peace Establishments being issued to the Reserves. Application of the policy shall be managed by the Program Control Board, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the normal departmental resource allocation process. In support of this objective, it is intended to off-set the Reserve Force current equipment shortfall, in so far as is practicable, on the basis of a reasonable reallocation from existing resources;

3. Auparavant, la première réserve devait fournir le personnel de renfort capable de s'intégrer aux unités de la Force régulière en cas d'augmentation des effectifs. Cette politique continuera d'être appliquée principalement pour ce qui regarde l'appui au combat, l'appui des services non combattants, les communications et le cadre supplémentaire, mais nous avons l'intention de demander aux unités et à leurs sous-éléments (à condition que ces unités et sous-éléments aient atteint un niveau opérationnel convenable, c'est-à-dire qu'elles puissent intervenir en cas d'urgence) de participer au combat quand l'augmentation des effectifs l'exigera. À plus long terme, le Ministère désire améliorer la qualité et la disponibilité de la Force de réserve de façon telle que des unités de réservistes puissent renforcer la Force régulière au besoin.

But

4. La présente directive a pour objet d'énoncer une politique en vue de continuer à perfectionner et à employer les sous-éléments de la Force de réserve, c'est-à-dire la première réserve et le cadre supplémentaire, pour la période allant de 1978 à 1983.

Politique générale

5. La tâche primordiale de la première réserve et du cadre supplémentaire consiste à être prêts à renforcer la Force régulière, de façon graduelle et dans une limite de temps définie, pendant la première étape du processus de mobilisation (augmentation). Par conséquent, nous devons continuer à rajuster constamment l'effectif de la première réserve et du cadre supplémentaire, afin que les réservistes puissent fournir le renfort nécessaire; il faut le faire tout en respectant les principes suivants:

- a. on ne prévoit pas réorganiser en profondeur la première réserve, et la structure actuelle d'exercice du commandement sera conservée;
- b. la ligne de conduite des Forces canadiennes portant sur la dotation de la Réserve en matériel consiste à lui fournir du matériel moderne, dans le cadre du programme d'acquisition prévu pour toutes les forces. Pour ce faire, on achètera normalement le matériel nécessaire aux effectifs de guerre et l'on remettra à la Réserve le matériel dont on n'aura pas besoin en temps de paix. La Commission de contrôle du programme appliquera cette politique, en étudiant chaque cas et selon le processus que le Ministère emploie d'habitude pour répartir les ressources. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous avons l'intention de compenser, dans la mesure du possible, la pénurie actuelle de matériel dans la Réserve en procédant à une redistribution raisonnable des ressources existantes;

- c. quality and retention rather than quantity (growth) shall continue to be the first priority;
- d. where required by Commands, and in so far as a satisfactory level of operational effectiveness has been demonstrated, the Primary Reserve may be tasked as units, sub-units or individuals;
- e. greater use shall be made of the valuable resource of skilled manpower available in the Supplementary List;
- f. closer integration with Regular Force units and formations including, in so far as it is practicable, assignment of Reserve units to specific Regular units, is to be achieved;
- g. training standards and unit effectiveness are to be enhanced; and
- h. trained Reservists should be employed with the Regular Force as much as possible, to include employment in CFE and on peacekeeping duties.

6. The strength and composition of the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary List should be such that they are capable of meeting the total augmentation requirement of the Regular Force, during Level One of mobilization. This will be the primary goal of this policy.

7. While the Primary Reserve generally, and the Militia in particular, will continue to be challenged and encouraged to aim at the eventual provision of formed units or sub-units where this is feasible, greater emphasis at all levels shall be placed on the integration of the Regular/Reserve team.

Current Capabilities

8. The operational responsiveness of the Primary Reserve does not meet its Level One augmentation requirement. While on the one hand the Primary Reserve must be given the requisite resources with which to train personnel, on the other hand, the Primary Reserve must achieve a higher level of operational training before placing individuals in unit establishment positions. Currently, an undesirable level of operationally non-effective personnel is inhibiting the operational responsiveness of the Reserves. Therefore non-effectives, such as medically unfit, untrainable personnel and the like, shall not exceed ten percent of the Reserve unit establishment.

c. la première priorité consiste à améliorer les compétences des réservistes et à les conserver dans les forces plutôt qu'à en augmenter le nombre (croissance);

d. selon les besoins des commandements et pour autant qu'un niveau acceptable de rendement soit atteint, la première réserve peut recevoir des missions destinées à des unités, des sous-unités ou des membres en particulier;

e. on doit recourir plus souvent à la précieuse main-d'oeuvre qualifiée qu'on retrouve dans le cadre supplémentaire;

f. on doit parvenir à une meilleure intégration de la Réserve aux unités et formations de la Force régulière et, dans la mesure du possible, affecter des unités de la Réserve à des unités déterminées de la Force régulière;

g. les normes d'instruction et le rendement des unités doivent s'améliorer; et

h. la Force régulière doit employer autant de réservistes formés que possible, même en Europe et pour les missions de maintien de la paix.

6. L'effectif et la composition de la première réserve et du cadre supplémentaire doivent leur permettre de satisfaire à tous les besoins de la Force régulière en renforts, pendant la première étape de la mobilisation. C'est là le premier but que vise la présente politique.

7. La première réserve en général et la milice en particulier continueront d'essayer de fournir à la Force régulière des unités et des sous-unités formées, mais là où c'est possible, on doit s'efforcer davantage à tous les niveaux d'intégrer les équipes de la Force régulière et de la Réserve.

Compétences actuelles

8. L'état de préparation opérationnelle de la première réserve ne lui permet pas d'atteindre le premier niveau de renfort. Bien que la première réserve doive disposer des ressources nécessaires pour former ses membres, elle doit aussi améliorer la formation opérationnelle qu'elle dispense avant de pouvoir affecter ses membres à des postes prévus à l'effectif des unités. En ce moment, un trop grand nombre de réservistes non opérationnels nuit à l'état de préparation opérationnelle de la Réserve. Par conséquent, la proportion de ces réservistes non opérationnels, tels que ceux qui n'ont pas la catégorie médicale nécessaire, ceux qui ne peuvent pas être formés et les autres, ne doit pas dépasser dix pour-cent de l'effectif des unités de la Réserve.

9. The training progression of Reservists is in some instances adversely affected by a lack of adequate training equipments. A preliminary survey indicates that these deficiencies include such items as crew-served weapons, radios and electronics, vehicles, ammunition and technical stores. Further inadequacies may well be identified when ongoing Command redistribution studies have been completed. These deficiencies will be addressed and where practicable, will be off-set from existing resources until Reserve Force equipments, represented by the difference between the Forces' peacetime requirement and the War Establishment purchase are forthcoming as a consequence of the future Defence Services Program.

10. Small numbers of Reservists are now being used to assist the Regular Force on peacekeeping duties. More trained Reservists (individuals and, where practicable, formed units or elements) are to be challenged for extended periods to train for, and be employed on, peacekeeping duties.

Development Guidelines

11. Role The role of the Reserve Force is to enhance the war deterrence capability of the Canadian Forces and to support the Regular Force in ongoing peacetime tasks and activities.

12. Missions - To meet the Level One Mobilization requirement and to enhance the responsiveness from within the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary List, the element missions of the Primary Reserves are as follows:

a. The Naval Reserve missions are -

(1) War,

(a) to provide personnel to augment the Regular Forces of Maritime Command, NDHQ and CFTS units,

(b) to assist the Regular Force in providing that functional augmentation required to enable Level One Mobilization to take place (such as Reinforcement Holding Units, Base Defence Forces, Operational Training Support, etc),

(c) to provide a base for further mobilization,

(d) to provide all the personnel required to man the Naval Control of Shipping Organization,

(e) to provide personnel to augment the Maritime Command Operations Authority,

9. Dans certains cas, la pénurie de matériel approprié de formation retarde la progression des réservistes. Une enquête préliminaire montre qu'il manque notamment de ce qui suit: armes nécessitant des serveurs, matériel radio et électronique, véhicules, munitions et fournitures techniques. Les études sur la redistribution qu'effectuent à l'heure actuelle les différents commandements pourraient bien mettre en lumière d'autres pénuries. Nous devons y remédier et, dans la mesure du possible, les compenser à l'aide des ressources actuelles jusqu'à ce que le matériel de la Réserve, que représente la différence entre l'équipement qu'emploient les Forces canadiennes en temps de paix et ce dont elles disposeraient en temps de guerre, soit arrivé, conformément aux dispositions du futur Programme des services de défense.

10. Un petit nombre de réservistes prêtent maintenant assistance à la Force régulière pendant les missions de maintien de la paix. Nous devons inviter plus de réservistes formés (des personnes et, si possible, des unités ou des éléments constitués) à s'entraîner pour être affectés à des missions prolongées de maintien de la paix.

Lignes de conduite en matière de perfectionnement

11. Rôle - La Réserve doit augmenter le pouvoir de dissuasion des Forces canadiennes et appuyer la Force régulière dans ses fonctions et activités en temps de paix.

12. Missions - Pour satisfaire aux exigences du premier niveau de mobilisation et améliorer l'état de préparation de la première réserve et du cadre supplémentaire, chaque élément de la première réserve doit accomplir les missions suivantes:

a. Les missions de la Réserve de la Marine sont -

(1) en temps de guerre,

(a) renforcer les effectifs réguliers des unités du Commandement maritime, du QGDN et du SIFC,

(b) aider la Force régulière à fournir les renforts nécessaires pour permettre la mobilisation de premier niveau (tels que les unités de renfort, la défense périphérique des bases et unités, les dispositifs d'instruction opérationnelle, etc.),

(c) fournir les éléments de base permettant la poursuite de la mobilisation,

(d) doter en personnel le Bureau de la surveillance navale de la navigation,

(e) fournir le personnel nécessaire pour renforcer l'Organisme opérationnel du commandant maritime,

- (f) to augment the Fleet Diving Units,
- (g) to operate minor vessels in harbour control, and
- (h) to crew, or augment the crews of, other department vessels with trained personnel as well as provide liaison teams for fast sea lift container ships.

(2) Peace,

- (a) to prepare for war missions,
- (b) to augment the Fleet, when necessary, to meet periodic operational deployments,
- (c) to provide personnel and support for peacekeeping/truce supervisory operations,
- (d) to provide personnel in Aid of the Civil Power operations,
- (e) to provide support to the civil emergency organization (eg natural disasters including snow emergencies, storms, floods, fires, explosions, and the like), and
- (f) to support national development projects, including ceremonial representation and community sport and other activities.

b. The Militia missions are –

(1) War,

- (a) to provide units, sub-elements or troops to augment the Regular Forces of Mobile Command, NDHQ, and CFTS units,
- (b) to provide service support troops to augment the Regular Forces of Maritime Command, Air Command, Communication Command, and NDHQ units,
- (c) to assist the Regular Force in providing that functional augmentation required to enable Level One Mobilization to take place (such as Base Defence Forces, Operational Training Support, and Movement Control),

- (f) renforcer les unités de plongeurs-démineurs de la flotte,

- (g) piloter les petits navires dans les ports, et

- (h) doter d'équipages compétents d'autres navires du Ministère ou renforcer les équipages existants, et fournir des équipes de liaison pour les navires de transport rapide.

(2) En temps de paix,

- (a) se préparer pour les missions de temps de guerre,
- (b) au besoin, renforcer la flotte lors des déploiements opérationnels périodiques,
- (c) fournir le personnel et l'aide nécessaires pour les opérations de maintien de la paix ou de surveillance des trêves,
- (d) fournir le personnel nécessaire aux opérations d'aide au pouvoir civil,
- (e) appuyer les organismes civils des mesures d'urgence (désastres naturels, tels que tempêtes de neige exceptionnelles, tempêtes, inondations, incendies, explosions, etc.), et
- (f) accorder son appui dans le cadre des projets de développement national, y compris les cérémonies, les manifestations sportives communautaires et d'autres activités du genre.

b. La Milice doit –

(1) en temps de guerre,

- (a) fournir les unités, sous-éléments ou troupes nécessaires pour renforcer les effectifs réguliers des unités du Commandement de la Force mobile, du QGDN et du SIFC,
- (b) fournir les troupes de soutien pour les services afin de renforcer les effectifs réguliers des unités du Commandement maritime, du Commandement aérien, du Commandement des communications et du QGDN,
- (c) aider la Force régulière à fournir les renforcements fonctionnels nécessaires pour permettre la mobilisation de premier niveau (par exemple, la défense périphérique des bases et unités, les dispositifs d'instruction opérationnelle, et le contrôle des déplacements),

- (d) to provide a base for further mobilization, and
- (e) to provide trained reinforcements to any deployed theatre base.
- (2) Peace,
- (a) to prepare for war missions,
- (b) to augment Mobile Command and CFE, when necessary, to meet periodic operational deployments,
- (c) to provide troops and support for peacekeeping/truce supervisory operations,
- (d) to provide troops in Aid of the Civil Power operations,
- (e) to provide support to the civil emergency organization (eg natural disasters including snow emergencies, storms, floods, fires, explosions and the like), and
- (f) to support national development projects, including ceremonial representation and community sport and other activities.
- c. The Air Reserve missions are –
- (1) War,
- (a) to provide personnel to augment the Regular Forces of Air Command, NDHQ and CFTS,
- (b) to assist the Regular Force in providing that functional augmentation required to enable Level One Mobilization to take place (such as operational support, enhancement of Strategic Airlift capability, and the like), and
- (c) to provide a base for further mobilization.
- (2) Peace,
- (a) to prepare for war missions,
- (b) to augment Air Command, when necessary, to meet periodic operational deployments,
- (c) to provide personnel and support for peacekeeping/truce supervisory operations,
- (d) assurer une base pour la poursuite de la mobilisation, et
- (e) fournir des troupes de renfort entraînées à toute force déployée dans un théâtre de guerre.
- (2) En temps de paix,
- (a) se préparer aux missions de temps de guerre,
- (b) renforcer le Commandement de la Force mobile et celui des Forces canadiennes en Europe, si nécessaire, lors des déploiements opérationnels périodiques,
- (c) fournir les troupes et le soutien nécessaires pour les opérations de maintien de la paix ou de surveillance des trêves,
- (d) fournir les troupes nécessaires pour les opérations d'aide au pouvoir civil,
- (e) appuyer les organismes civils des mesures d'urgence (désastres naturels tels que chutes de neige exceptionnelles, tempêtes, inondations, incendies, explosions, etc.),
- (f) accorder son appui dans le cadre des projets de développement national, y compris les cérémonies, les manifestations sportives communautaires et d'autres activités.
- c. La Réserve aérienne doit –
- (1) en temps de guerre,
- (a) fournir le personnel nécessaire pour renforcer les effectifs réguliers du Commandement aérien du QGDN et du SIFC,
- (b) aider la Force régulière à fournir les renforcements fonctionnels nécessaires pour permettre la mobilisation de premier niveau (par exemple, le soutien opérationnel, l'accroissement des possibilités de transport aérien stratégique et d'autres opérations semblables), et
- (c) assurer une base pour la poursuite de la mobilisation.
- (2) En temps de paix,
- (a) se préparer aux missions de temps de guerre,
- (b) renforcer le Commandement aérien, si nécessaire, lors des déploiements opérationnels périodiques,
- (c) fournir le personnel et le soutien nécessaires pour les opérations de maintien de la paix ou de surveillance des trêves,

- (d) to support the Regular Force to the extent of their equipment capabilities, support, and the like, through provision of -
- i. search and rescue capability,
 - ii. a light transport capability,
 - iii. Maritime surveillance and patrol capability,
 - iv. service support to bases and squadrons, and
 - v. aircrew to augment Regular Force squadrons; and
- (e) to provide personnel in Aid of the Civil Power operations,
- (f) to provide support to the civil emergency organizations (eg natural disasters including snow emergencies, storms, floods, fires, explosions, and the like), and
- (g) to support national development projects including ceremonial representation and community sport and other activities.
- d. The Communication Command Reserve missions are -
- (1) War,
 - (a) to provide trained personnel to augment the Regular Forces of Communication Command, Mobile Command, CFE, Air Command, NDHQ Units and CFTS, and
 - (b) to provide a base for further mobilization.
 - (2) Peace,
 - (a) to prepare for war missions,
 - (b) to provide personnel and support for peacekeeping/truce supervisory operations,
 - (c) to augment the Regular Force in Aid of the Civil Power operations,
 - (d) to provide support to the civil emergency organization (eg natural disasters including snow emergencies, storms, floods, fires, explosions, and the like),
- (d) soutenir la Force régulière dans la mesure permise par son matériel, son soutien et les autres facteurs pertinents en assurant -
- i. les moyens nécessaires à la recherche et au sauvetage,
 - ii. les moyens nécessaires au transport léger,
 - iii. les moyens nécessaires pour effectuer les patrouilles et la surveillance maritimes,
 - iv. le soutien voulu en matière de services aux bases et aux escadrons, et
 - v. le personnel aérien pour renforcer les escadrilles de la Force régulière, et
- (e) fournir le personnel nécessaire pour les opérations d'aide au pouvoir civil,
- (f) appuyer les organismes civils des mesures d'urgence (désastres naturels tels que chutes de neige exceptionnelles, tempêtes, inondations, incendies, explosions, etc.), et
- (g) accorder son appui dans le cadre des projets de développement national, y compris les cérémonies, les manifestations sportives communautaires et d'autres activités.
- d. La Réserve du Commandement des communications doit -
- (1) en temps de guerre,
 - (a) fournir le personnel qualifié pour renforcer les effectifs réguliers du Commandement des communications, du Commandement de la Force mobile, des FCE et du Commandement aérien, et aussi pour renforcer les unités du QGDN et le SIFC, et
 - (b) assurer une base pour la poursuite de la mobilisation.
 - (2) En temps de paix,
 - (a) se préparer aux missions de guerre,
 - (b) fournir le personnel et le soutien nécessaires pour les opérations de maintien de la paix ou de surveillance des trêves,
 - (c) renforcer la Force régulière pour les opérations d'aide au pouvoir civil,
 - (d) appuyer les organismes civils des mesures d'urgence (désastres naturels, tels que chutes de neige exceptionnelles, tempêtes, inondations, incendies, explosions, etc.),

- (e) to support national development projects, including ceremonial representation and community sport and other activities,
- (f) to augment the Regular and Reserve Forces when necessary, to meet exercise and periodic operational deployments, and
- (g) to support the Regular Force as required in the manning of non-military communication systems.

Implementation Guidelines

13. The following guidelines shall govern the implementation of this policy:

- a. Commands, in consultation, shall task subordinate headquarters and units to provide the units, sub-elements and individuals identified by the Commands to meet their war requirements;
- b. Reserve establishments, including the requisite equipment tables and first line support, shall be prepared and structured to meet the requirements of the war tasks assigned by the Command;
- c. Reservists should be assigned to unit establishment positions only upon successful completion of that training required to meet the Reserve Force standard for those establishment positions. Follow-on training, as required, will be completed upon integration with the Regular Force;
- d. the size of unit training lists should be determined by the functional Command in consultation with the staffs of their Primary Reserve element;
- e. in accordance with DND policy, female personnel, when trained, shall only be assigned to combat service support or service support unit establishments; they may, however, be carried incrementally on combat establishments for peacetime only;
- f. current enrollee standards shall be maintained except that the minimum age requirement shall be raised to 17. (Raising the minimum age to 17 will ensure that the 'ranks' of service Cadet units, which provide an excellent source of well motivated and well disciplined manpower, will not be prematurely depleted by a too early transition to the Reserve Force);

- (e) accorder son appui dans le cadre des projets de développement national, y compris les cérémonies, les manifestations sportives communautaires, et d'autres activités,
- (f) renforcer, si nécessaire, la Force régulière et la Réserve, lors des exercices et des déploiements opérationnels périodiques, et
- (g) renforcer la Force régulière au besoin pour ce qui est du personnel affecté aux réseaux de communication non militaires.

Principes directeurs de mise en oeuvre

13. Les principes directeurs énoncés ci-dessous doivent présider à la mise en oeuvre de la présente politique:

- a. les commandements, travaillant en collaboration, doivent confier aux quartiers généraux et aux unités subordonnés la tâche de fournir les unités, les sous-éléments et le personnel désignés par les commandements pour faire face à leurs besoins en temps de guerre;
- b. les effectifs de la Réserve, y compris les barèmes d'équipement voulus et le soutien de premier échelon, doivent être prévus et organisés de façon à correspondre aux besoins entraînés par les tâches de guerre confiées par le commandement dont relève la Réserve;
- c. les réservistes seront affectés à des postes dans les unités seulement après qu'ils auront reçu la formation requise par les normes de la Réserve pour occuper lesdits postes. Toute formation supplémentaire, si nécessaire, s'effectuera après incorporation au sein de la Force régulière;
- d. l'importance des listes de formation à l'unité devrait être déterminée par le commandement fonctionnel, en collaboration avec les états-majors de sa première Réserve;
- e. conformément à la politique du MDN, le personnel féminin, une fois formé ne doit être affecté qu'à des services non combattants ou à des unités de soutien des services; il peut, cependant, faire partie du personnel surnuméraire affecté à des postes combat en temps de paix seulement;
- f. les normes concernant le personnel enrôlé ne seront pas modifiées, exception faite de l'âge minimum qui sera fixé à 17 ans. (En remontant l'âge minimum à 17 ans, on empêche les "rangs" des unités de cadets, qui sont une excellente source de personnel très motivé et discipliné, de se vider trop tôt par suite d'un passage prématuré des cadets dans la Force de réserve);

- g. while the objective is to get the core of the Reserves as operationally ready as is possible, Commanders may determine the size and shape of a 'special' list, except that the list shall not exceed ten per cent of the Reserve unit establishment, against which normally non-effectives (such as medically unfit or over-age personnel) may be carried;
- h. where required, the Regular Force Support Staff establishments shall be reassigned within the current allocation to meet the increased emphasis on training. Priority for reassignment, inter alia, should be based on the objective of reinforcing achievement or alternatively, a demonstrated willingness and ability to move toward success;
- j. the scale of training equipment shall be increased commensurate with the availability of such equipment from the Regular Force and shall be allocated in a manner which reinforces achievement: the greater the level of accomplishment, the more equipment and hence, the better training, will be made available;
- k. personnel of the Regular Force and/or the Primary Reserve who either retire or are honourably released shall be encouraged to place their name on the Supplementary List; and
- m. the Supplementary List shall be the subject of a detailed instruction to ensure that the personnel carried on this List are current in their trade/occupation and meet the age-medical requirements.

Implementation

14. This document enunciates the policy which will govern the Primary Reserve and the Supplementary List for the short term. The Office of Primary Interest (OPI) will review and report upon implementation of this policy annually and, as necessary (but in any event not less than every three years) shall report recommendations for significant change.

15. Commensurate with the availability of resources, the development of an implementation plan for the continued enhancement of the Primary Reserve, to achieve the aim of this policy directive, will be undertaken by the OPI in concert with Commanders of Commands. The OPI will issue the necessary instructions and guidelines as required.

- g. bien que le but poursuivi soit de rendre le plus opérationnel possible les éléments "centraux" des réserves, les commandants sont autorisés à déterminer l'importance et la composition d'une liste "spéciale", à condition que ladite liste ne dépasse pas dix pour cent des effectifs des unités de la Réserve; la liste pourra comprendre les militaires non opérationnels (ceux qui n'ont pas la catégorie médicale nécessaire ou qui sont trop âgés);
- h. lorsque cela s'avère nécessaire, les effectifs du Personnel de soutien de la Force régulière seront redistribués, dans le cadre de dotation en vigueur, afin de faire face à l'importance accrue de la formation. Pour la redistribution, on cherchera d'abord à accroître le rendement, ou alors on se basera sur le désir du personnel de réussir et sur son aptitude à le faire;
- j. le barème d'équipement pour la formation devra être relevé en fonction du matériel dont dispose la Force régulière, et on devra répartir ce matériel de façon à encourager le rendement: plus le rendement sera élevé, plus la quantité de matériel fourni, et donc la qualité de la formation, augmentera;
- k. le personnel de la Force régulière, de la première Réserve, ou des deux, qui prend sa retraite ou qui est libéré avec certificat de bonne conduite devra être encouragé à s'inscrire au Cadre supplémentaire; et
- m. il sera émis une directive détaillée sur le Cadre supplémentaire afin que les personnes en faisant partie gardent leur compétence dans les métiers ou les occupations qui sont vraiment les leurs, et qu'elles satisfassent aux conditions d'âge ou de santé.

Mise en oeuvre

14. Le présent document énonce la politique devant s'appliquer à court terme à la première Réserve et au Cadre supplémentaire. Le Bureau de première responsabilité (BPR) examinera cette politique et rédigera un rapport annuel sur son application; si nécessaire (une fois tous les trois ans au minimum), il recommandera des changements importants.

15. Le BPR et les chefs des commandements établiront, dans la mesure des ressources disponibles, un plan visant à améliorer encore la première Réserve, et cela, pour atteindre le but de la présente directive. Le BPR fournira les instructions et principes directeurs nécessaires en temps utile.

16. The OPI shall also direct that an examination of the Supplementary List be undertaken to ensure both accuracy of information contained thereon and validation of currency of training. Complementary to this examination, and recognizing the value of the special skills which are available to the Forces in general and to the navy in particular, efforts should be made, in consultation with appropriate military and civilian agencies, such as the Conference of Defence Associations, to associate personnel on the Supplementary List with local units appropriate to their service background.

Coordination/Responsibilities

17. OPI - DCDS.

18. OCIs - NDHQ Group Principals, Commanders of Commands, and Major General Reserves, as required by the OPI.

19. The OPI may form working groups with representation from NDHQ Groups, Commands and Major General Reserves. Consultations should take place with other military and civilian organizations, such as the Conference of Defence Associations, as appropriate.

20. Periodic reports on implementation of this policy will be submitted to DMC through the VCDS at the discretion of the OPI, but not less frequently than detailed in para 14.

16. Le BPR devra aussi faire examiner le Cadre supplémentaire pour que l'on soit sûr de l'exactitude des renseignements qu'il contient et que l'on vérifie si la formation offerte est à jour. En plus de cette vérification, on devra, compte tenu des spécialistes précieux dont disposent les Forces canadiennes en général et la Marine en particulier, faire un effort particulier, en collaboration avec les organismes militaires et civils appropriés (la Conférence des associations de défense), pour mettre en rapport les membres du Cadre supplémentaire avec les unités locales correspondant à leurs antécédents militaires.

Coordination/Responsabilités


17. BPR - SCED.

18. BRA - Chefs des groupes du QGDN, Chefs des commandements, et le major-général des Réserves, selon les indications du BPR.

19. Le BPR peut créer des groupes de travail comprenant des représentants des groupes du QGDN, des commandements et du major-général des Réserves. On devrait aussi, au besoin, consulter d'autres organismes militaires et civils, par exemple la Conférence des associations de défense.

20. Les rapports périodiques concernant la mise en oeuvre de la présente politique devront être soumis au CGD par l'intermédiaire du VCED, à la discrétion du BPR, mais au moins aussi fréquemment qu'il est indiqué au paragraphe 14.

Le Chef de l'état-major de la Défense
L'Amiral R.H. Falls



R.H. Falls
Admiral
Chief of the Defence Staff

APPENDIX B

LIST OF WITNESSES AND SUBMISSIONS

Organizations and individuals are listed separately. The number of the printed issue of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Armed Forces Reserves meeting at which they appeared is indicated within brackets.

Witnesses

ORGANIZATIONS

Australian Government

- Major John James,
Assistant Army Advisor to Canada (10)
- Tom Sullivan,
First Assistant Secretary, Financial Service and Internal Audit,
Department of Defence (10)

Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

- Brigadier General George G. Bell (R) (6)

Conference of Defence Associations

Lieutenant Colonel J.M. Boulianne,
Chairman (3)
Lieutenant Colonel P.D. Scanlan,
Senior Vice-Chairman (3)
Colonel B. Shapiro,
Immediate Past Chairman (3)

Council of Honorary Air Colonels

Air Commodore L.J. Birchall (9)
Colonel J.K. Campbell (9)
Colonel W.A. Goodson
Brigadier General J.I. Perodeau (9)
Honorary Colonel M.C. Sifton,
Chairman (9)

Department of National Defence

Vice-Admiral J. Allan,
Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (2, 7)
Lieutenant General Charles H. Belzile,
Commander, Mobile Command (7)
Colonel B.J. Bennett,
Director General, Communications and Electronics Operations (11)
Brigadier General James A. Cowan,
Director General, Reserves and Cadets (1, 2, 7, 11)
L.E. Davies,
Assistant Deputy Minister - Finance (2, 11)
Major General J.J. Dunn,
Chief of Reserves (2)
Brigadier General Daniel Philip Harrison,
Commander, Canadian Forces Communication Command (7)
Brigadier General R.L. Hughes,
Commander, Air Reserve Group (7)
Colonel Gordon Lewis,
Deputy Chief of Staff, Militia (7)
Major General P.D. Manson,
Chief, Air Doctrine and Operations (11)
Major General P.T. Mitchell,
Chief, Land Doctrine and Operations (11)
Colonel G.M. Reay,
Director, Military Manpower Distribution (11)
Captain Peter John Traves,
Director of Naval Reserves (7)
General R.M. Withers,
Chief of the Defence Staff (11)
Commodore J.C. Wood,
Director General, Maritime Doctrine and Operations (11)

Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada

Lieutenant General R.J. Lane,
National Chairman (6)

National Employers' Support Committee

D. Lorne Glendinning,
Executive Director (8)
Brigadier General (R) George B. Robertson,
Chairman (8)

Naval Officers' Association of Canada

Commander Frank H. Morrow,
Member of Ottawa Branch (9)
T.C. Turner,
National President (9)

Royal Canadian Legion

Colonel (R) Colin Graham,
Service Officer (9)
Colonel (R) J.E.A.J. Lamy,
Dominion Secretary (9)

Treasury Board

Robin C. Hacquoil,
Chief of Policies & Procedure (8)

INDIVIDUALS

Louis R. Desmarais, M.P. (3)
Captain (N) W.N. Fox-Decent,
Senior Staff Officer to the Chief of Reserves (5)
Major General (R) Richard Rohmer (4)
Commodore Tom Smith,
Senior Naval Reserve Advisor (5)
Nicholas Stethem,
Executive Director, Strategic Analysis Group (10)

Submissions

Bentley, Jack
Black, Hawley, Lieutenant Colonel
Buglass, P.D., Warrant Officer
Canadian Forces Logistics Association - Halifax Branch
Cann, C. Lawrence
Carstead, G.W.F., Colonel (R)
Chouinard, J., Lieutenant Colonel (R)
Collins, D.B., Lieutenant Commander (R)
Davies, C.K., Major
Del Villano, L.G., Major
Dunseath, P.S., Lieutenant Colonel
Easton, J.H.
Eassy, Duleran
Emberley, D.W.
Ervin, M.J., Lt. (N) (R)
Featherstone, J.W., Lieutenant
Fletcher, J.E., Major
H.M.C.S. Cataraqi Association
 D.M. Chown, President
H.M.C.S. UNICORN
 D.P. Ravis, Commander
Haley, M.M. (Mrs.)
Henderson, M. Bruce
Hendy, Robert I.
Herold, Robert A., Captain
Honorary Officers' Association of British Columbia
Hsu, Berry
Hunter, J.C., Major
Kearney, M.D., Colonel (R)
Keenan, Thomas G.
Leclerc, Yves
Lucas, M.S., Captain
MacDonald, Brian C., Lieutenant Colonel
MacPherson, Andrew
Maritime Defence Association of Canada
 Captain (N) M.L. Hadley, President
Marrotte, Gordon L.
Military Engineers Association of Canada
 Major (R) R.E.R. Stanfield, Senior Vice-President
Milroy, J.B., Lieutenant Colonel
Morrison, W.A., Major
Murphy, C.H., Colonel (R)
Navy League of Canada - Kingston Branch
 D.M. Chown, Branch President
Needham, H.G., Major
Ontario Regiment R.C.A.A.
 LCol. N.F. Wilton, Chairman
Pittendrigh, A.D., Captain

Porter, R.F., Major
Provincial Airmotive Corp.
H. Day, Manager
Rae, D.W., Lieutenant Colonel
Rice, H.J., Captain
Royal Canadian Air Force Association
LGen. H. McLachlan (R), Honorary National President
Royal Canadian Dental Corps Association
Royal Canadian Military Institute
J.L. Erskine, President
Schjerning, Eric J.
Seymour, J.P., Second Lieutenant
Smith, Frank J.
Steady, Charles W., Lieutenant Colonel
Steady, Newton
Townsend, James & Jacqueline
Vachon, Jean Pierre, Capitaine (AR)
Wallace, John Francis
Weir, W.J.
White, S.N., Lieutenant Colonel
Willett, T.C.
Williams, John T.
Yost, W.J., Brigadier General (R)

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Subcommittee on Armed Forces Reserves (Issue Nos. 1 to 12 inclusive) and a copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (Issue Nos. 33 and 49 which includes the report) are tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Marcel Prud'homme,
Chairman.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1981

(57)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 9:40 o'clock a.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bloomfield, Bradley, Crouse, Darling, Duclos, Dupras, Gamble, Gass, Gimaiel, Harquail, Hopkins, Hudecki, Lachance, Massé, McKinnon, McLean, Munro (*Esquimalt-Saanich*), Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke-Lakeshore*), Sargeant, Schroder, Shields and Stewart.

Other member present: Mr. Roche.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, March 18, 1981, relating to Armed Forces Reserves. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, March 24, 1981, Issue No. 33*).

The Committee commenced consideration of the First Report of the Sub-committee on Armed Forces Reserves.

At 11:30 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Robert Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

MONDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1981

(58)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 8:10 o'clock p.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bloomfield, Crouse, Darling, Dion (*Portneuf*), Flis, Forrestall, Gamble, Gass, Greenaway, Harquail, Hopkins, Irwin, King, Landers, MacBain, Marceau, Massé, McCauley, McKinnon, McLean, Munro (*Esquimalt-Saanich*), Ogle, Peterson, Prud'homme, Schroder and Stewart.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated March 18, 1981, relating to Armed Forces Reserves. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, March 24, 1981, Issue No. 33*).

The Committee resumed consideration of the First Report of the Sub-committee on Armed Forces Reserves.

At 10:22 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Robert Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1981

(59)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 9:40 o'clock a.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bloomfield, Collenette, Crouse, Darling, Forrestall, Gamble, Gass, Greenaway, Hopkins, King, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt-Saanich*), Ogle, Prud'homme, Schroder and Stewart.

Other members present: Messrs. Hudecki and Robinson (*Etobicoke-Lakeshore*).

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated March 18, 1981, relating to Armed Forces Reserves. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, March 24, 1981, Issue No. 33*).

The Committee resumed consideration of the First Report of the Sub-committee on Armed Forces Reserves.

At 12:03 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned until 3:30 o'clock p.m.

AFTERNOON SITTING

(60)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 3:53 o'clock p.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bloomfield, Crouse, Darling, Daudlin, Duclos, Flis, Forrestall, Gamble, Greenaway, Harquail, Hopkins, Hudecki, King, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt-Saanich*), Peterson, Prud'homme and Schroder.

Other member present: Mr. Robinson (*Etobicoke-Lakeshore*)

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated March 18, 1981, relating to Armed Forces Reserves. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, March 24, 1981, Issue No. 33*).

The Committee resumed consideration of the First Report of the Sub-committee on Armed Forces Reserves.

At 6:00 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned until 8:00 o'clock p.m.

EVENING SITTING

(61)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *it camera* at 8:10 o'clock p.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bloomfield, Crouse, Darling, Flis, Forrestall, Greenaway, Harquail, Hopkins, Hudecki, King, Marceau, Massé, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt-Saanich*), Prud'homme and Schroder.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated March 18, 1981, relating to Armed Forces Reserves. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, March 24, 1981, Issue No. 33*).

The Committee resumed consideration of the First Report of the Sub-committee on Armed Forces Reserves.

At 10:25 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Robert Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1981
(62)

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met *in camera* at 3:50 o'clock p.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bloomfield, Crouse, Darling, Duclos, Dupras, Forrestall, Gamble, Greenaway, Gimaiel, Harquail, Hopkins, Hudecki, Irwin, King, MacBain, Massé, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt-Saanich*), Prud'homme, Sargeant, Schroder and Stewart.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, March 18, 1981, relating to Armed Forces Reserves. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, March 24, 1981, Issue No. 33*).

The Committee resumed consideration of the First Report of the Sub-committee on Armed Forces Reserves.

On motion of Mr. Darling, the First Report of the Sub-committee on Armed Forces Reserves, as amended, was concurred in.

Ordered,—That the Chairman present the First Report of the Sub-committee on Armed Forces Reserves, as amended, as the Seventh Report of this Committee to the House.

It was *ordered*,—That the Committee print an additional 4,000 copies of Issue No. 49 of the Committee's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence with a special cover.

At 5:10 o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Robert Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Chair of the Committee
Korolov A.S.

At 10 o'clock p.m. the committee adjourned to the end of the day.

of the Committee Minutes of Proceedings and Minutes with the agenda of the Committee. It was noted that the Committee will in addition conduct a series of 100-100

Chair of the Committee

At 10 o'clock p.m. the committee adjourned to the end of the day. The Committee Minutes of Proceedings and Minutes with the agenda of the Committee. It was noted that the Committee will in addition conduct a series of 100-100

Minutes of Proceedings and Minutes with the agenda of the Committee.

On the motion of Mr. D. King, the Chair of the Committee adjourned to the end of the day.

At 10 o'clock p.m.

The Committee adjourned to the end of the day. The Committee Minutes of Proceedings and Minutes with the agenda of the Committee. It was noted that the Committee will in addition conduct a series of 100-100

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