




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

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


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DEMONSTRATED
FROM AN
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OF OUR
MEASURES for Twenty Years past.

From whence is shewn

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PLACEMENT, and all PENSIONERS, from
having SEATS in the

House of **C O M M O N S.**

With a POSTSCRIPT, containing Remarks upon
the *French* DECLARATION lately publish'd.

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FRANCIS HUGHES

UPON

ENGLISH COUNTESS

DEMONSTRATED

FROM AN

Extensive Examination

OF THE

State of the Nation

IN 1790

By FRANCIS HUGHES, Esq.

of the Middle Temple

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1791. Price 1s. 6d.

By the Author.

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FRENCH Influence,
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ENGLISH COUNSELS,
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AS I have often employed my Pen in explaining the true Interest, and asserting the just Rights of my Country, against *Ministerial Writers*, and *Ministerial Measures*; and as I shall always think it both my Honour and Duty to do so, as often as I have the Misfortune to think it necessary, I could not look with Indifference upon a vile Attempt lately made in the *Gazetteer*, to justify the *French* joining with *Spain* against us in the present War. The *Gazetteer* I mean is that of *September* the 29th, in which is inserted, what is there called the Extract of a Letter from *Paris*, tho' I am convinced that it was, like most of the other political foreign Letters, published in our News-Papers, forged upon the Ministerial Anvil set up in this Kingdom, or upon some such Anvil lately set up Abroad; and that it was publish'd here, with a Design to convince the People of this Kingdom, that we can attempt to make no Conquests upon

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Spain

Spain in the *West-Indies*, without giving *France* a Right to declare against us.

As this *Gazetteer* has probably, long before this Time, incurred the general Fate of all the Pamphlets and Papers that come from the same Quarter, and may not therefore be now easily met with, I shall beg leave to transcribe this Letter entire, that the *French Agents* and *Advocates* here may have no Reason to say, I have misrepresented the Arguments they make use of.

The Extract of this Letter, as publish'd here, was as follows, *viz.*

Extract of a Letter from Paris, Sep. 19th.

There is not a Method which the Cardinal de *Fleury* has not try'd, nor an Effort which he has not made, amicably to divert the *English* from directing their formidable Armaments against the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*. His Eminency declar'd a hundred times to my Lord *Waldegrave*, that as *Great-Britain* could not execute her Designs upon *Spanish America*, without doing an infinite Prejudice to *France* and her Subjects, his most *Christian Majesty* would be indispensably oblig'd to oppose the Execution of it, and that moreover, as she was Guarantee of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, she would be oblig'd to take care of the Preservation of the *Spanish* Dominions, and of the Balance of Power in
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those Parts, which was inseparable from it, in order at the same time to protect the lawful Commerce of all Nations in the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*. But so far were those Remonstrances from having the Effect which was hop'd for, that *England* only hasten'd and increas'd her Armaments the more, declaring publickly, that they were design'd against *Spanish America*; which has oblig'd the King at length to send his Fleets to that Country, pursuant to the Declarations made by his Eminence to the *British* Minister.

However, the Commadores of those Squadrons are order'd to commit no Hostility against either of the two Powers at War, and only to hinder them from making Conquests upon one another, and from turning things out of their present Channel. At this Juncture our Court could not act more wisely or justly, since 'tis neither for the Advantage nor Disadvantage of one of the two Powers at War more than of the other; and since the King, by exerting his utmost to discharge the Engagement he is under as Guarantee of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, prevents any Innovation in the System of the New World, and keeps things there on the Footing they ought to be for the common Benefit of all the Nations trading in *America*. 'Twas not possible to contrive any other Method for equally answering all those important Ends, and so well adapted for restoring Peace; especially if the

other Powers concern'd as well as we in this publick Cause do not delay to second the pacifick Intentions of his Majesty. If the formidable Armaments of the *English* against *America* were to have been let go without any Dispositions to observe them, and to check their Designs, it might have been in their Power to have seiz'd those vast Dominions, of which when once they had been the Master, it would have been a difficult Task to have dispossest'd them, and still more difficult to have perswaded them to have given them up by a Treaty of Peace, any more than they did the other Conquests formerly made by them in that Country, or those which they made from *Spain* in *Europe*. The Reason which induc'd *France*, *England*, and *Holland* to guarantee the *Spanish* Possessions in *America* at the Treaty of *Utrecht* has subsisted hitherto, and does so still; it being a Reason consistent with the common Benefit of the Nations interested in the Commerce; which would cease to be common the Moment that it should pass from the Hands of the *Spaniards* to those of the *English*.

From this Letter it appears, that his *most Christian Majesty* has now openly declared, that he will not permit us to take from the *Spaniards* any Part of their Dominions in *America*, and that he has sent his Squadrons into those Seas to join with the *Spaniards* in

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repelling us, in case we should make any such Attempt; and at the same time to protect the lawful Commerce of all Nations in the Spanish Dominions in America. By these last Words we may see, that the *French* mean something more than protecting the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*; they likewise mean to protect the lawful Commerce of all Nations in those Dominions: That is to say, if the Court of *Spain* should give Licence to a *French* Ship, or Fleet of *French* Ships, to carry on the Trade between their Dominions in *Europe* and those in *America*, we must not pretend to interrupt them. Thus we are in a pretty Situation; *Spain* has insulted and plunder'd us for these twenty Years; we have at last most justly declared War; but *France* now comes and tells us, *We must carry this War on in such a Manner alone, as may enable Spain to do us great Injury, without being liable to receive any Injury from us*; for this will be the Case, if we must neither attack their Dominions at Land, nor interrupt any neutral Vessel that shall be employed in carrying on a Trade between one part of their Dominions and another.

Is this a Declaration that any Minister of *England* could hear with Patience? Is it a Law or Rule of War that any *British* Subject can submit to, as long as he has Money in his Purse, or Vigour in his Nerves? It is a most haughty, a most contemptuous Declaration;

ration; and if it was made as insinuated in this Letter, before the Sailing of the *French Squadrons*, I am sure we ought to have been ready, as we had it in our Power, to have sunk every Ship of them as soon as they launch'd out into the open Sea.

But now let us examine into the Arguments advanc'd by our *Frenchify'd Gazetteer* for this *French Declaration*. *The Chief of them are, That his most Christian Majesty, as Guarantee of the Treaty of Utrecht, is obliged to take Care of the Preservation of the Spanish Dominions; and of the Balance of Power in those Parts, which is inseparable from it, in order at the same Time to protect the lawful Commerce of all Nations in the Spanish Dominions in America.*

That as Great-Britain could not execute her Designs upon Spanish America, without doing an infinite Prejudice to France and her Subjects, his most Christian Majesty would be indispensably oblig'd to oppose the Execution of those Designs. And,

That, as the Commodores of their Squadrons had Orders to commit no Hostility against either of the Two Powers at War, and only to hinder them from making Conquests upon one another, and from turning Things out of their present Channel; they could not act more wisely or justly, since it was neither for the Advantage or Disadvantage of one of the two Powers at War, more than of the other; and since
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their King, by exerting his utmost to discharge the Engagemnts he was under as Guarantee of the Treaty of Utrecht, prevented any Innovation in the System of the New World, and kept Things there on the Footing they ought to be, for the common Benefit of all the Nations trading in America.

These Arguments I shall examine in the Order I have placed them; and with respect to the first must observe, that the King of France is no more a Guaranty of the Treaty of Utrecht, than any of the other Parties Contractors in that Treaty. But suppose he were, the Obligation that arises from the most express and solemn Guaranty, can never take Place, but when the Party guarantied is unjustly attacked. This is a Maxim in all Guaranties, and is not only founded in common Sense, but confirmed by the Opinion of every Author that has ever wrote any thing upon the Subject. To engage in an unjust War, or to support or defend a Nation in the carrying on of such a War, is what no Nation can be obliged to do by any Alliance, Guaranty or Engagement, that can be entered into. In all Wars, where one Man or Nation may be oblig'd to engage for the Sake of another, the famous Grotius in his *Rights of Peace and War*, lays it down as a Maxim, *ad injusta Bella nullam esse Obligationem**. No

Engagement

* Grotius de Jure Belli & Pacis, Lib. 1. Cap. 3. Parag. 23. Subd. 2. Lib. 2. Cap. 15. Parag. 13. Subd. 1. Cap. 25. Parag. 4. Cap. 26. Parag. 3. Subd. 1.

Engagement can oblige us to enter into an unjust War. This he makes a Condition in an Ally's being oblig'd to assist his Ally: This he makes a Condition in a Vassal or Tenant's being oblig'd to assist his Lord: Nay, this he makes a Condition in a Subject's being oblig'd to assist his Sovereign.

Now, as none of our domestick *French Advocates*, nor even the *French* themselves, have as yet said, that the War is on our Part unjust, I must therefore conclude, that his *most Christian Majesty* is no way oblig'd, by his having been a Guarantee of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, to assist or defend *Spain* in the present War; but that on the contrary, he is oblig'd to assist this Nation in compelling the *Spaniards* to make Satisfaction for the many open, direct, and notorious Breaches they have committed, with respect to us, of that solemn Treaty, and to give us the most indubitable Security against their committing the like in Time to come.

As to the 2d Argument advanced by this *Frenchified English Advocate*, I cannot pretend to say, what Designs we may have, or whether we have any or no, upon *Spanish America*; but this I will say, that we ought to have form'd and prepar'd for such Designs before we began Hostilities, and that we not only ought, but might have had most of them executed long before now. I shall, indeed, grant, that the Execution of these
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Designs might have been of some Prejudice to the Subjects of *France*, but it would not have been an Injury, either to the King, or to any of the Subjects of *France*. An Injury is a just Cause of War, but a Prejudice never can be so. It would be doing an infinite Prejudice to the Subjects of *France*, to prevent their getting any of our *Wooll* from us; but no *British* Minister, nor the Tool of any *British* Minister, will, I hope, ever dare to say, That this would be a just Cause for his *most Christian Majesty's* declaring War, or joining with our Enemies, against us; because we have a Right to prevent the *Exportation of our Wooll*, and ought to do it as soon as we can.

In the same Manner, our taking Possession of some of the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*, would be doing a Prejudice to the Subjects of *France*, because, while we remained in Possession, I believe, they could not sell near so many of their Manufactures to the Inhabitants of that Country; but this we have a Right to do: The *Spaniards*, by provoking us to War, have given us a Right to seize upon all their Dominions in *America*, and to keep Possession of them till we are fully satisfied for all the Damages we have sustained, and all the Expence they have put us to, and fully secured against any future Injury. This Right, I say, they have given us, and the King of *France* has no Right, nor is he, as I have shewn, under any Engagement with

Spain, to endeavour to hinder us from making use of this Right; If we allow the King of *France* to say, that he will not suffer us to execute any Design, for no other Reason but because it may be of Prejudice to his Subjects; if we allow ourselves to be frightened by any such haughty and insulting Menace, from doing what we ought and have a right to do; I make no Question but that the next Time a Bill shall be brought into Parliament for preventing the *Exportation of our Wooll*, the *French* Minister at this Court will be order'd to threaten us with a War, in case such a Bill should be pass'd into a Law. Nay, I do not know but that at last we may be told, *we shall not manufacture our own Wooll, because, by so doing, we do an infinite Prejudice to France and her Subjects.*

The third Argument may be said to consist of two Parts, one of which is pretended to be founded in Justice, and the other in Wisdom. That Part which is pretended to be founded in Justice is again supported by the Guaranty of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, which I have already shewn can have no Concern, nor be of any Weight, in the present Case. But then says this *French Advocate*, our Squadrons are to act an impartial Part: *They are only to hinder the two Powers at War from making Conquests upon one another, which is neither for the Advantage or Disadvantage of one of the two Parties at War, more than of*

the other. Most egregious Impudence! Most insufferable Insult, because it is an Insult upon our Understandings! Can we do *Spain* any considerable Injury, or reap any considerable Advantage to ourselves, but by attacking their Dominions in the *West-Indies*? Are we afraid of their attacking our Dominions in any Part of the World? Can they do us any Injury but by privateering and interrupting our Trade? These just and impartial Mediators then are to prevent our attacking the *Spaniards* in that Method by which *alone* we can hurt them; and to allow, perhaps assist, them to attack us in that Method by which *alone* they can hurt us. Is this Impartiality? Is it common Justice? They could not have had the Assurance to have said so, if they had not been encouraged by our late perplexed Negotiations to imagine, that our Understandings may be darkned and confounded by the least Shadow of Reason. Every Man who looks through a true *British* Medium must see the Chicanery of this Pretence; and the Heart of every *Briton* that has any, must swell at such a bare-faced Attempt to impose upon his Understanding.

There is therefore neither Justice nor Impartiality in the Design of sending these Squadrons to the *West-Indies*; and now I shall consider the Wisdom of this Proceeding. I shall, indeed, grant that, as we have hitherto managed the War, there may be some Wisdom

in it, and from our future Conduct there will, I am afraid, appear to be more Wisdom in it than some People at present imagine; but then this Wisdom consists not in what they express, but in what they most artfully conceal. When I say there is any Wisdom in this *French* Piece of Politicks, I hope my Readers will suppose, I mean political, and not real Wisdom. Injustice, either publick or private, can never be attended with real Wisdom; and as I have shewn, that the *French* have no just Reason for joining with *Spain* against us, or for preventing our making use of that Right which the Laws of War have given us, in such Manner as we may think most suitable to our own Interest, therefore, there can be no real Wisdom in the Design upon which they say they have sent their Squadrons to the *West-Indies*. But as to political Wisdom, it consists in Self-Interest, and therefore a Nation may with such Wisdom engage in War when and as often as their Interest calls upon them to do so, and they have a probable View of Success: There may, therefore, be some sort of Political Wisdom in what the *French* have done, but this, as I have said, does not consist in what they express, but in what they most artfully conceal.

They say, *They could not have acted more wisely, because they may thereby prevent any Innovation in the System of the New World, preserve the Balance of Power in those Parts,*
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and keep Things there on the Footing they ought to be for the Common Benefit of all the Nations trading to America, which was the Reason that induc'd France, England, and Holland to guarantee the Spanish Possessions in America, at the Treaty of Utrecht; and this Reason, they say, has hitherto subsisted, and does so still. Here we see, they most artfully trump up upon us the Pretence of a Balance of Power, because, in the last two Wars carried on against them, the Balance of Power in Europe was made a Pretence for continuing the War against them. Here, I suppose, they hug themselves with the Conceit of having caught us in our own Snare, and imagine we cannot now disapprove of their Conduct, without condemning our own in the last two Wars we were engaged in against them; but I must tell them, the preserving or restoring a Balance of Power, either in Europe or any where else, may be a good and a just Reason for continuing a War, but can never of itself be a just Reason for commencing a War *, or for joining with a Nation that has unjustly commenced War; but when a War is begun, and those who have Justice on their side have Success, they may continue the War, till they have put it out of the Power of a troublesome Neighbour to do them a new Injury; that is to say, they may establish such a Balance of Power, as to leave no Room for any Nation

* Grotius de Jure Belli & Pacis, Lib. 2. Cap. 1. & Parag. 17.

Nation to trust so much in its own Strength, as to think that it may, without Danger, do a real Injury to any of its Neighbours. It was not the preserving or restoring *a Balance of Power* in *Europe*, that was the Cause of our joining in either of the two last Wars against *France*. It was the many Injuries *Lewis the XIVth* had done to ourselves as well as our Allies; and after he had thus given us a just Cause to declare, or join in the War against him, the restoring of *a Balance of Power* was a good Reason to continue it; but neither was this the only Reason: A full Satisfaction for all Costs and Damages an Injured Nation may justly insist on, and may with Justice continue the War till That be obtained. Can it be said, that we obtained such a Satisfaction, or any Thing near it, either by the Peace of *Reswick*, or the Peace of *Utrecht*? Therefore, without Regard to the *Balance of Power*, we had a just Reason to have continued both these Wars much longer, and to have pushed our Successes much farther then we did.

France therefore must not pretend to impose upon us, nor can she seriously think of being able to justify her Proceedings by this ridiculous Conceit of preserving *a Balance of Power* in *America*. But can *France* or any Nation in *Europe* say, that *a Balance of Power* can be preserved, if *Spain* be enabled or allowed to usurp a Dominion over the Seas
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of *America*; and to tell the other Nations of *Europe*, that they shall not fail with their Ships in those Seas but by her Leave, and according to her Directions? This is what she now pretends to: This is the present System of the New World: This is the System she is endeavouring by this War to establish against this Nation at least; and if it be once established against us, she may in time be able, and will certainly endeavour, to establish it against every other Nation in *Europe*. Is this the Footing upon which Things ought to be for the common Benefit of all the Nations trading to *America*? Is this the Reason that induced *France*, *England*, and *Holland* to guarantee the *Spanish* Possessions in *America* by the Treaty of *Utrecht*? No Nation in *Europe* will say so. *France* herself would not say so, if she had not something in *Petto*, which must not as yet be declared. *France* and *Spain* are, 'tis true, good Friends at present: They have been made so by our late Negotiations, at our great Expence, and at the Loss of almost every Ally we had in *Europe*. But this Friendship may soon come to an End; and if the ancient Jealousy and Animosity between *France* and *Spain* should revive, it would be better even for *France* to have us in Possession of some cautionary *Spanish* Towns or Islands in *America*, than to have *Spain* established in the Dominion she pretends to over the Seas of *America*.

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This is an usurped Dominion which may soon become as troublesome and injurious to *France* as it has been of late Years made to us; and therefore if the Court of *France* had not some hidden Design at Bottom, they would be far from assisting *Spain* to establish such an Usurpation against us. They would be glad to see *Spain* beat out of such an Usurpation, and effectually prevented from being ever hereafter in a Condition to set it up, without their being put to any Expence, or suffering any Interruption to their Trade. They know, all the Nations in *Europe* know, we can have no Design to take and keep Possession of the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*, or of any considerable Part of them. It would be against our Interest to do so. *Manufactures* are better, and contribute more to the Strength of a Nation, than *Mines of Gold or Silver*; while we preserve the former, we have no Occasion to envy the *Spaniards* the Possession of the latter. In the present War, we can have no Design but to compel *Spain* to give us *Satisfaction* for past Injuries, and *effectual Security* against future; therefore, if we should take Possession of any of their *Mines*, or of any of their Dominions upon the Continent, it could be with no other View, but to restore them as soon as *Spain* should agree to give us this *Satisfaction* and *Security*. From our keeping Possession of *Jamaica*, *Gibraltar*, and *Minorca*, which are the only
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Dominions we ever conquer'd from *Spain*, is it possible to conclude, that we would keep Possession of the *Spanish* Dominions upon the Continent of *America*? The former we keep Possession of, because they preserve and encourage our Trade; the latter we would for the same Reason give up, because, if we should keep them, they would destroy the Industry of our People, and consequently the Manufactures and Trade of the Nation.

This the *French* must be sensible of, and this must prevent their being under any real Apprehensions of our having a Design to conquer the *Spanish* Possessions in *America*, or to make that Commerce pass from the Hands of the *Spaniards* to our own. But I must think, that, in order to have quieted the Minds of our Neighbours upon the Continent, we ought to have begun this War with some sort of *Manifesto* to this Effect. We ought to have declared, That if we should attack and take Possession of any of the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*, it could proceed from nothing but Necessity, because we had no other way of compelling that Nation to agree to reasonable Terms; and that it would not be with a design to keep them, but to restore them to the Crown of *Spain*, as soon as that Crown should give us *full Satisfaction* for the Injuries done to us, and *effectual Security* against the like in Time to come. We might have added some Promises with regard to the

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Religion, Liberties, and Possessions of the Inhabitants, both while we continued in Possession of the Country, and when we restored it to the Crown of *Spain*, in order to shew the Inhabitants that, in all Events, their Condition should be improved by being conquer'd by us which would probably have contributed not a little to the Facility of our making the Conquest. Such a *Manifesto* as this we ought to have publish'd, as soon as we declared War; and therefore I must conclude, that the *Manifesto* publish'd in *Holland*, and said to be That which the Lord *Catbcart* carries along with him, is a spurious Piece, contrived on purpose to give the *French* a plausible Pretence for interfering in the War between *Spain* and us *.

Thus, I think, it is evident, that the political Wisdom of the *French*, in sending their Squadrons to the *West-Indies*, does not consist in what they express. It cannot consist in preserving the present System of the New World; that is to say in preserving and establishing the Dominion which the King of *Spain* has usurped over the Seas of *America*. It must consist in something not fit to be declared, and this I shall now endeavour to investigate and explain. His most *Christian Majesty*, I am convinced, seems now to assume a Concern for the *Balance of Power* in the *New World*, in order to overturn the *Balance of Power* in the *Old*. This Design
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* Daily Advertiser, Oct. 6th.

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the *French* have long had in View, and they now think they have got an Opportunity of making a large Step towards it. In this Design they have always been hitherto defeated by the Riches, the Strength, and the Conduct of this Nation ; and therefore, if they can by Degrees render us so poor and feeble, as not to be in a Capacity to give any effectual Assistance to our Neighbours upon the Continent, they hope to be at last able to effectuate their long meditated Design. They have already tried what they could do by mere force of Arms, but as we were then in our full Strength, they found they came off with nothing but hard Blows and deep Wounds. This made them betake themselves to Art ; and in this way they have succeeded, beyond the Hopes, I believe, of the *most sanguine of sanguine Frenchmen* ; but this has not been owing to *French* Cunning or Ability, so much as to what I may call a certain sort of Fatality, or something worse, in our Counsels and Conduct.

In order to shew this, I must observe, that the Maxim which seems to have been laid down by the *French*, immediately after Peace was restored to their Country by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, was, *To take all the Methods they could think of for encouraging and promoting the Manufactures and Trade of their own Country, and for distressing and diminishing the Trade and Manufactures of this.* To describe

all the Arts they have made use of for this Purpose, and how those Arts might have been disappointed by us, would far exceed the Bounds I have prescribed to myself in this Treatise, and therefore I shall confine myself to one only, in which they have had most extraordinary Success. I mean that of keeping us in a sort of continual Strife with some one Neighbour or another; and as the Influence they had upon the Councils of *Spain* was of great Advantage to them in this Particular, they have made all the Use of it they could, and much more than they could have done, had we taken the proper Measures to prevent it; which were not, nor ever can be by *Tame-ness* and *Treating*, but by making the *Spaniards severely feel the Weight of our Arms*, if they should ever offer the least Injury to us or any of our Allies.

This was the Measure resolved on, and wisely and vigorously pursued in the Year 1718; but in the Year 1721, I must suppose, that some Gentlemen began to have an Influence upon our publick Measures, who were *vastly fond of Peace*, and at the same time *vastly ignorant of the true Interest* either of their own Country, or of any other Country in *Europe*, and therefore *vastly liable* to be govern'd by *French Address*, who never want *proper Agents* in this Country for such a Purpose; and *these Agents*, we must suppose, got the entire Management of our immoderate

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rate *Lovers of Peace*, because the salutary Measure resolved on in the Year 1718, was entirely altered in the Year 1721, and when we might have *dictated* our Terms, we seem to have *begg'd* a Peace; for if we had not at that time been *begging* a Peace, I do not think, that any *British Minister* could with Patience have heard the least Mention made of the Restitution of *Gibraltar*, or of the restoring of those *Spanish Ships* that were so justly taken in the Year 1718, and much less would any *British Minister* have thought of concluding a Peace with *Spain*, without a most explicit Acknowledgment of our Right to cut *Log-wood* in the *Bay of Campeachy*, which is of so great Consequence to our *Woollen Manufacture*. What could make us at that Time so fond of an immediate Peace, I cannot comprehend. The *French*, 'tis true, having got their own Ends served, had in some Measure deserted us in the War; but they durst not join against us, because we then had the *Emperor* our firm Friend as well as Ally. No Power in *Europe* durst then have given the *Spaniards* any Assistance, and therefore, I will say, we had them absolutely in our Power. If we had insisted upon our Right to *Campeachy*, which they had even then begun to contest: If we had insisted upon their paying us all the Expences we had been put to by the War, and upon their giving us some of their strong Towns or Islands in the *West-Indies*

Indies as a Pledge for securing the Payment; they must have complied, because we might have taken as much as they could refuse.

If we had insisted upon these Terms, they would have smarted for their Folly, they would have felt the effects of our Resentment, perhaps to this Day; and in this Case, it would not have been in the Power of *France* to have prevailed on them, to provoke our Resentment a second Time, by inroaching upon our Rights, or distressing our Trade, in any Part of the World. But this would have deprived *France* of the chief Handle she had for executing her Designs against the Trade and Manufactures of this Kingdom; therefore the *French*, from being Parties in the War against *Spain*, became Mediators for procuring her a most honourable Peace; and our *Lovers of Peace* not only gave Ear to their Mediation, but prevailed on us to grant *Spain* such Terms as left her under no Apprehensions of provoking afresh our Resentment. This Advice could proceed originally from nothing but *French Artifice*, of some kind or other; and I shall now prove, as plainly as it is possible to prove a latent Cause from its apparent Effects, that our *publick Measures* have ever since been principally directed by the same sort of Advice. It is a Task I undertake with great Concern, with infinite Regret; but it is a Task, I think, I am in Duty to my Country bound to undertake, because,

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I am convinced, the present unlucky Situation of this Nation, the present dangerous Situation of the Affairs of *Europe*, are both owing to this Cause; and therefore, I hope, my Readers will suppose, that in finding fault with any Part of our past or present Conduct, I have no other View, but singly That of preventing, as much as lies in my Power, our being any longer deluded by the *Address* of *French Councils*, or the *Artifice* of *French Tools*.

Luckily for us, a Dispute happened, soon after this Treaty in 1721, between *France* and *Spain*, which we might have made very good use of; but our *Lovers of Peace* were so complaisant to *France*, as to refuse what was then offered by *Spain*, and what might have been of signal Advantage to *Europe* in general, as well as to this Nation in particular. I mean that of being *sole Mediator* for reconciling all Differences then subsisting between *Spain* and the *Emperor*, a Task so very far from being difficult, that in a short time after, these two Powers reconciled all Differences by themselves without any Mediation; and in Pursuance thereof a Treaty of Peace, and reciprocal Defence and Guarantee, was concluded between them at *Vienna* the 30th of *April* 1725, and next Day a Treaty of Commerce.

This was, indeed, a thunder Stroke to *France*. By this she was deprived of all Hopes of being ever able to make use of *Spain* as a
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Handle for destroying or interrupting the Trade of *Great-Britain*: Nay, if *Britain* had entered into this new Alliance, 'tis more than probable, that the sending back the *Infanta of Spain* would never have been forgiven; and in that Case, *France* could expect no particular Favours or Encouragements for her Trade or Manufactures in *Spain*. On the contrary, if she had attempted to extend her Territories, or prescribe to her Neighbours, she must have expected to have seen *Spain* in a Confederacy against her, which would have put a final End to her favourite View of overturning the *Balance of Power* in *Europe*. This new Alliance was therefore to be defeated if possible. *Britain* was to be kept from acceding to it; and Methods were to be contrived for reconciling herself to *Spain*, and for creating a new Breach between *Spain* and the *Emperor*. All this she effected by the means of *her Agents* here, and is it possible to think, that all this could be owing to our Ignorance or Imprudence alone? In the first Place, *France*, by *her Agents* here, persuaded his late Majesty, that by some secret Articles of this Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, they had agreed to set the *Pretender* upon the Throne of these Kingdoms, and had concerted such Measures together, as would ruin our Trade. The *Emperor* and *King of Spain*, by their Ministers here, protested the contrary: They communicated the

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the Treaties: Invited his Majesty to accede, and protested, there were no secret Articles. It signified nothing! To our Misfortune: To the Misfortune of *Europe*, the *French Agents* here had greater Credit with his late Majesty, or with some that had great Credit with him, than the most solemn Declarations both of the *Emperor* and *King of Spain*; and by this means, he was prevail'd on to join in a defensive Alliance with *France* by the Treaty concluded at *Hanover* the 3d of *September 1725*, in which the *King of Prussia* was prevailed on by the *French* to join, under Pretence that they would assist him in revenging the Massacre of the *Protestants at Thorn*, and in re-establishing the *Protestant Religion* in that City; which was and afterwards proved to be as false a Pretence as that they made use of for prevailing with his late Majesty to join with them in this Alliance

If there had been any Truth in what was alledg'd by the *French Agents* against the Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, or if there had been so much as a Probability of its being true, the Treaty of *Hanover*, as it was only defensive, might perhaps have been reasonable, because, in that Case, it would have been necessary to have provided for the Defence of *Hanover*, tho' I cannot think, that even for this Purpose, *France*

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was a necessary or proper Ally; but in my Opinion, it was not so much as probable that the *Emperor* and *Spain* had such Intentions as were imputed to them; because neither of them had at that Time any Dispute with this Nation, and because it would have been impossible for them both joined together, to have carried such Designs into Execution against us, tho' we had at that Time been, as we are now, without one Ally in the Universe, that could have given us *effectual Assistance*. If the *Emperor* and *Spain*, when they entered into that Alliance, had an *offensive Design* in view against any Power on Earth, it was against *France*; and if they had any such, I am sure, it was none of our Business to have prevented their carrying their Design into Execution; because such a War would have ruined, or at least suspended all the *French* commercial Views, and would have been of great Advantage to the Trade and Manufactures of *Britain*; and by under-hand assisting the weaker Side, we might have made it last almost as long as we had pleased.

But the preventing of any Designs the *Emperor* and *Spain* had against *France*, was not the only Thing the *French* had in view. This they effectually did by the Treaty of *Hanover*; and for this Purpose, nothing farther would have been necessary: But they had a mind to convince *Spain*, that
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the *Emperor* was not such an Ally as could defend them when they had Occasion for it ; and for this Purpose it became necessary to prevail with us to make some sort of Attack upon *Spain* ; because we were the only People in *Europe*, against whom the *Emperor* could give the *Spaniards* no Assistance. One would think, this was a difficult Point to be gained, because we were no way obliged by the Treaty of *Hanover* to begin the Attack. We had not the least Occasion to put ourselves to any Expence even in providing for our Defence, unless the *Emperor* and *Spain* had begun to prepare for putting some of those Designs in Execution with which we had been frightened. But nothing, it seems, is in this Country difficult for *French Address*. Before either the *Emperor* or *Spain* began so much as to prepare for any warlike Expedition, we sent one Fleet, in a hostile Manner, to the Coasts of *Spain*, and another to block up their *Galileons* at *Porto-Bello*, which the *Spaniards* looked upon as a Declaration of War, and accordingly began Hostilities against us, in which the *Emperor* could give them no Assistance.

In the mean time, the *French* took special care not to do any Thing that might disoblige the *Spaniards*, nor to allow us to do any Thing that might really hurt them ; and we may believe, they made great Merit

of this at the Court of *Spain*, by which they entirely reconciled themselves to that Court. Thus they gained two of their chief Ends, and now the third was to be thought on, which was that of making a new Breach between the *Emperor* and *Spain*. For this Purpose, after they had thus made a Breach, they then became *Mediators* between *Spain* and us; and by the same means, I suppose, which they had before so successfully made use of, they prevailed upon us to conclude the famous Treaty at *Seville*, which finished the *French* Design, and laid a certain Foundation for a Breach between the *Emperor* and *Spain*; and what was still more, by that Treaty they got us joined in an Alliance with them and *Spain*, the certain Consequence of which would have been a War against the *Emperor*, if we had not prevented it by the Treaty we concluded with him in the Year 1731.

By this Treaty it seemed as if we had got out of *French* *Leading-strings*; but from what afterwards happened, it may be supposed, that this was only a Piece of *French* *Finesse*, in order to prevent *their* *Agents* or *Tools* here from being brought to Justice by an undeceived Parliament, or tore to Pieces by an enraged Populace, which probably would have been the Case, if they had engaged us in an open War, jointly with *France* and *Spain*, against the *Emperor*.

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We thereby, it is true, guaranty'd, in the most express and solemn Manner, the *Pragmatick Sanction* ; but whatever the *French* might pretend, it is probable, they privately connived at this, because they knew it would signify nothing, and because the Court of *Spain*, now their sincere Friends, got their Son into the immediate Possession of *Parma* and *Placentia*, and their Troops into the strong Places of *Tuscany*.

The *French* and *Spaniards* being thus again firmly united, and *French Influence* got again to its *Zenith* at the Court of *Spain*, the latter begun to shew less regard to this Nation than it had ever done before, and in a Manner laughed at us when we desired Performance of the *little* that was stipulated in our Favour by the Treaty of *Seville*. But in order to give the *Spaniards* a full Licence to interrupt our Trade, and the *French* a full Power to prescribe Laws to the other Princes and States of *Europe* ; one Thing more was necessary, and that was to break the Alliance between us and the *Emperor*, which the latter thought had been sincerely established by our Treaty with him in the Year 1731.

For this Purpose it was necessary to find a Pretext for attacking the *Emperor*, and for prevailing upon us to leave him in the lurch. This was furnished by the forcible Opposition made by the *Muscovites* to the Election

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of *Stanislaus* as King of *Poland*. Tho' the *Muscovites* had a Right by Treaties to make that forcible Opposition, tho' the *Emperor* no way joined in or countenanced it; yet from this the *French* took Occasion to attack the *Emperor*, because he happened to be at that Time in an Alliance with *Muscovy*; and we were told, and our *French Agents and Tools* made us believe, that we were under no Obligation to perform our Guaranty, because the *Emperor* had drawn this Attack upon himself. I believe every Man will now confess, I am sure the *French*, who now pretend being obliged to assist *Spain* in Consequence of the *Utrecht* Guaranty, must now confess, that we were under the strictest Obligation to assist the *Emperor* upon that Occasion. But suppose we had not, considering the Circumstances we were then in with regard to *Spain*, our own Interest, our own Preservation, ought to have prevailed with us. *Spain* had refused to perform the little she was obliged to by the Treaty of *Seville*, tho' we had on our Part performed the whole, and more than the whole: *Spain* had continued to plunder our Merchants, and interrupt our Trade in the *West-Indies*: *Spain* had continued to debar our People cutting Logwood in the Bay of *Campeachy*, besides many other Injuries; and therefore we ought to have taken that Opportunity to balance Accomps with that haughty and faith-

less Court. But *French Influence* prevailed over all Considerations, and we left the *Emperor* a Prey to *France* and *Spain*, when we might, and ought to have saved him, tho' we must have even then foreseen, that we ourselves, in all human Probability, would be the very next.

The *French* having now got all they wished for, except that of reducing this Nation to the lowest Degree of Poverty, Impotency, and Contempt; and having likewise, by their late Favour done to *Spain*, got the entire Management of that Court; they prevailed with that Nation to redouble their Depredations upon us in the *West-Indies*. These we tamely submitted to for some Years; and if we had allowed ourselves to have been as absolutely directed by *French Agents or Tools*, as we had been for many Years before, we should have been still *submitting* and *negotiating*; but the Cries of our plundered Merchants and Seamen at last awakened the Spirit of the Nation, and this brought *our French Agents* a second Time into the Danger of being tore to Pieces by the Populace, or brought to Justice by a relenting Parliament. They had then nothing left for it but to seem to give way to the Torrent, and then to take care that this Torrent should not bear away some principal Part of the Monarchy of *Spain*, before the *French* could come to the Assistance of
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that impotent, ill connected, and ill governed Monarchy.

That we might have done this: That we might have been long before now in Possession of some of the *Spanish* Settlements in *America*, our brave Admiral *Vernon* has fully demonstrated to the World. If we had sent along with that Admiral, or soon after him, but 3 or 4000 veteran Land Soldiers, which we might easily have spared, we might long since have been in Possession of *Portobel*, *Panama*, and *Veracruz*; and if we had been once in Possession of any Part of the Kingdom of *Mexico*, as it is a healthful Climate, and fruitful Soil, we might have poured in Troops and Men there at all Times of the Year. There they might have been supported, and might have lived healthfully; and there they would have been at hand, and ready to be sent upon any Expedition we thought proper to undertake. If we had done this, I am convinced the *French* would not have dared to interfere by their Arms, whatever they might have done by a sincere and impartial Mediation, between *Spain* and us.

The Land Forces of *France* and *Spain* can be of very little Signification to them in a War with this Nation alone. It is their naval Force only that can be of any effectual Service; and their united Naval Force is not as yet equal, at the Beginning of this War
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it was far from being near equal, to the Naval Force of this Kingdom; therefore we could not suppose that *France* would engage against us at the very Beginning of the War. Even as yet, and notwithstanding the little Care we have taken, since the Commencement of the War, to increase our Number of Seamen, it would be impossible for *France* and *Spain* to fit out a Naval Force equal to ours; and therefore it would be ridiculous in us to desire any of our Friends upon the Continent to engage in the Quarrel, unless we could form such a Confederacy as would be near equal to the united Land Force of *France* and *Spain*; because if we should engage any one of our Friends, if we have any upon the Continent that may be attacked by Land, for Example the *Dutch*, it would cost us more to assist in defending them at Land, than any Benefit we could reap from their Assistance at Sea.

This must shew, that it was neither the Business of *France*, nor had she it in her Power, with any Safety to her own Possessions in *America*, to join with *Spain* at the first breaking out of the War. I believe no true *French* Politician can as yet think so. I do not imagine, they can suppose, we are as yet so weak or so poor, as that they may, without Danger, make use of open Force against us. As our Trade must suffer by the Continuance of the War, and as it will suf-

fer more by a dishonourable and precarious Peace, since *France* found that *her Agents* here could no longer prevail with us to submit tamely to the Depredations of *Spain*, it was her Business to get us to carry on the War in such a Manner as might most expose and injure our own Trade, and least hurt the Enemy ; and if she could do this, it was then her Business, and is so still, to get the War continued as long as she can ; because during its Continuance, the Trade and Riches of this Country, must be daily decreasing, and the Trade and Riches of *France* increasing in Proportion, till at last it must of course come to be in her Power, to join in the War against us without Danger, or to make us accept of whatever Terms of Peace she may have a mind to prescribe.

This, I say, was the Business of *France*, and whether *her Agents here* have exactly followed her Directions, I shall now take the liberty to enquire. As the *Spaniards* have no Trade, nor any Ships, but that which is carried on, or those which sail from one part of their own Dominions to another ; and as this Trade may, with their Leave, be carried on in neutral Ships, and in the Name of Foreigners, it was ridiculous in us to think of getting any Advantage, or of compelling them to submit to reasonable Terms, by the Method of *Reprisals* alone ; because in this way we should generally have

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have been Losers upon the annual Balance, and therefore the *Spaniards* would in this way have continued in War with us to all Eternity, or at least as long they were under *French Influence*, rather than submit to reasonable Terms. Yet this was the way *our French Agents* advised us to carry on the War, and in this way we should probably have carried it on to this Day, if a Blunder of the *French* themselves, in complaining of their Ships being searched for contraband Goods, had not compelled us to declare War, in spite of all could be done or said by *their Agents here*.

I have said, that all the Trade the *Spaniards* have, may, by their Leave, be carried on by neutral Ships, and in the Name of Foreigners; to which I must add, that there now appears to be such a Design, from what is said by our *French Advocate* in the *Gazetteer* above-mentioned. By him we find, the lawful Commerce of all Nations in the *Spanish Dominions in America*, made use of as one of the Reasons for *France's* being obliged to take care of the Preservation of those Dominions. I should be glad to know from this, or any other *French Advocate*, what lawful Commerce any Nation in *Europe*, besides ourselves, has in the *Spanish Dominions in America*. That the *French* and other Foreigners have Goods on board the *Spanish Galleons, Flota, and Régister*

Ships, I know, but that these Goods must be loaded on board, and entered at landing, in the Name of *Spaniards*, I likewise know; and therefore, by the Law of Nations, they are good Prize, whatever our *French Advocates* may say against it, if the Ship should happen to fall into our Hands. I shall grant, indeed, that the *Spaniards* may lay open the Trade in their *American Dominions* to all the Nations in *Europe*, and may, by that Pre- tence, have even the Trade of their own Subjects carried on by neutral Ships, and in the Name of Foreigners, without its being in our Power, by the Law of Nations, to prevent it, except with regard to contraband Goods, under which I must particularly take notice, that *Gold and Silver* is not comprehended, nor any Thing that belongs to the sustaining and nourishing of Life, unless the Ships be bound to a Town or Place besieged, blocked up, or surrounded.

This, I believe, will be done, in case the War between us and *Spain* should last for any Time, and we, *persuaded* by *French Counsels*, or *frightned* by *French Menaces*, from carrying it on by any other Method than that of *Reprisals* alone. I believe the *Spaniards* will open the Trade to *America*, and in that case *Spain* may and will carry on the War with us as long we please, because we must either give up entirely our Trade, or at least our mercantile Navigation,

tion, or otherwise they will be every Year taking something from us, and we can take nothing from them. This shews the Ridiculousness of carrying on the War in that Method, which *our French Agents* first advised us to, and to which alone the *French*, by their Squadrons, seem now resolved to confine our future Hostilities against *Spain*.

Having our Eyes thus opened, as I have said, by a *French* Blunder, or at least by their imagining that *their Agents here* would have been able to have prevented our declaring War, and at the same Time to have prevailed with us not to visit any foreign Ship bound to or from *Spain*; and the War being declared by us in Form, and with great Solemnity, every one expected, that we should have done as *Queen Elizabeth* and *Cromwell* did, that we should have immediately sent a powerful Squadron to the *West-Indies*, with 8 or 10000 of our oldest and best Troops on board, in order to have conquer'd and kept Possession of some of the *Spanish* Settlements in that Part of the World, at least till we had obtained *full Satisfaction* for past Injuries, and *effectual Security* against future. Such an Expedition ought, indeed, to have been sent out two or three Months sooner, in order to have had the whole Winter before them, which is the best Season for Action in that hot Country: But as we had been, by the Advice of *French Agents*, pre-

vented from beginning the War in this Manner, when we did declare War, we ought to have sent out such an Expedition as soon after as possible ; we ought to have been preparing for it before hand ; and as we had Troops enough on foot, Men of War enough in Commission, and incredible Numbers of Merchant Ships lying idle in the River, we could neither want Troops, nor Ships ; and no Country in the World can so quickly victual a Fleet as we can, if our Government act with any Foresight or Alacrity. If the Fleet designed for such an Expedition had sailed in *November*, it would have been in the *West-Indies* time enough to have stript the *Spaniards* of some of their most valuable Possessions, before the extreme hot Season came on ; and the Northern Parts of *Mexico* we may attack, our Troops may there keep the Field at any Time of the Year, if it does not happen to be a very hot Season.

But instead of this, we were amused and terrified by our *French Agents here*, with an Invasion, tho' we were never more united amongst ourselves, and tho' no Power on Earth had at that Time a Fleet, nor could in *six Months* time prepare a Fleet sufficient for making a dangerous Invasion upon this Nation : And by these Terrors we were made to think of nothing but how to defend ourselves, when our chief Thoughts ought to

have been, how to offend the Enemy, in order to obtain some signal Advantage over them, before they could provide for their own Defence, or obtain any Assistance from their Friends the *French*. At last the Spirit of the Nation grew violent for attacking the Enemy in the *West-Indies*; and in order to allay, or at least to amuse this Spirit, an Expedition was resolved on, and Preparations begun to be made for it: But how were they made? in the most public and a very tedious Manner; whereas they ought certainly to have been made in the most secret and expeditious Manner that was possible; and instead of making the Rendezvous at *Cork* in *Ireland*, which is the most proper Port we have for that Purpose, the Rendezvous was appointed, and the Soldiers put on board, at the Isle of *Wight*, where they were almost sure of being detained by *westerly* Winds, which generally blow at that Season, which is the most proper for sailing upon such an Expedition; and accordingly the Fleet was there detained for several Months, tho' some People are of Opinion that, if they had been at first fully provided, they might have sailed at least *two Months* sooner than they did.

I know some Objections may be made against appointing the Rendezvous of our Fleet at *Cork* in *Ireland*. It may be said, that the Transports and Men of War must
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have all failed first from the *Downs* or *Portsmouth*, and therefore might have been detained there by contrary Winds as long as the whole Fleet was ; but there was no Necessity for sending our Men of War and Transports thither all at once, they ought to have been sent thither in small Numbers, a Man of War and two or three Transports at a Time, for Secrecy as well as Conveniency ; and a Man of War with two or three Merchant Ships well manned, may, by tacking, easily turn down the Channel even against the Wind, unless it blows very hard, which a large Squadron and a numerous Fleet of Transports cannot easily do.

In the next place it may be said, that we could not have victualled our Fleet at *Cork* ; but might not a great part of the Victualing have been sent from hence, and the rest easily found there ? I shall grant, that the *Irish* Beef is not so good as the best *English* ; nor will it keep so long ; but it is, I believe, as good as most of the *English* Beef provided for this Expedition ; and every one knows, it is good enough, and will keep long enough for a *West-India* Voyage, especially when Provisions are to be laid in for the outward bound Voyage only.

Lastly, It may be said, that it would have been troublesome, expensive and dangerous, to have transported the Land Forces from *Britain* to *Cork* ; but what Necessity

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was there for bringing any Regiments from *Ireland* at first. If we had kept all the Regiments in *Ireland* that were there when we first began to prepare for War, or rather for that new Sort of War called *Reprisals*, and had ordered *two* or *three* of our new Regiments, most preposterously called *Marines*, to be raised in *Ireland*, or sent thither as soon as raised here, we might have spared Land Forces enough from *Ireland*, to have been sent upon this Expedition; and if an Attack upon the Enemy be really designed, I am sure, some of the old Regiments we had in *Ireland* would have been more fit for the Service than new and undisciplin'd Troops.

The chief Argument made use of for these twenty Years, in favour of a numerous Standing Army, has been, That new-raisd Troops are not fit for immediate Service; and now those who have been so long making use of this Argument, have made the best and strongest Answer that was ever made to it; for now that we have Occasion for immediate Service, the only Troops they have sent upon that Service are our new-raised Troops. As I must from thence conclude, that they have changed their Way of Thinking, I hope, when this War is at an End, they will disband every Regiment in the Service; allow the Soldiers to return to Labour, in

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which they may be useful, and no way expensive to their Country; and keep the Officers, at least such of them as cannot otherwise support themselves, upon Half Pay, by which means they will be fully as useful, and much less expensive, to their Country, than they can otherwise be in Time of Peace.

Thus, I hope, I have made it appear, that by the Influence of *French Agents*, we have been hitherto prevented from doing any real Injury to *Spain*; for what our brave Admiral *Vernon* has done, I am convinced, did not proceed from any Resolutions taken here at Home. When he sailed from hence, we had not come to a Resolution to declare War; we had resolved only to begin *Reprisals*; and therefore I am convinced, that Admiral had no express Instructions to attack the *Spaniards*, who were not then formally declared our Enemies, at Land; but as he had Orders, as our public Orders for *Reprisals* authorised him to seize the Goods as well as Ships of the King and Subjects of *Spain*, he had a Power to attack them wherever he thought proper; and luckily for the Honour of this Nation, he put that Sense upon his Orders which our Injuries required, tho' it was not That the *French Agents* designed. Nay even after we had declared War, no Orders were sent him to attack the Enemy at Land; for if I can depend upon the Information

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formation I have had from Gentlemen that came from *Jamaica* in *May* last, which was after he had taken and destroyed *Fort-Chagre*, he had not then received any fresh Orders or Instructions from the Time of our declaring War to that very Day ; and indeed, I am apt to believe it ; for he was not then, nor is he yet, provided with a Force that was thought sufficient for attacking the *Spaniards* at Land, by those whose Business it was to send him fresh Orders, if we may judge of their Opinion from what they have themselves declared upon a very Solemn Occasion ; so that it would have been most unwise in them, to send him Orders to do what they themselves thought they had not enabled him to do ; and for attacking the *Spaniards* at Sea, the Orders he carried along with him were sufficient.

But the *West-Indies* was not the only Place where we might have hurt the *Spaniards*. Tho it was not our Business to have attempted to make any Conquests in *Europe*, yet surely in order to distress them, and prevent their interrupting our Trade, or sending any Supply of Troops to the *West-Indies*, it was our Business to have made frequent Incursions upon the Coasts of *Spain*, and to have burnt their Ships of all sorts in their Harbours, wherever we could at any Risk have come at them. For this purpose, our Squadron in those Seas ought to have had 5 or 6000 of our best Troops along with it, and a confi-

derable Number of *Bomb-Vessels* and *Fire-Ships*. With this small Number of Troops we might have done them infinite Prejudice, because it is impossible for them to have 5 or 6000 regular Troops at every Place where an Enemy may land; and as we were Masters at Sea, and as a Squadron may sail much faster than a Body of Troops can march, our Troops, as soon as any large Body of the Enemy's Troops were approaching, might have re-imbark'd with their Booty, and might have failed to make an Incurfion, perhaps upon that very Place from whence the Enemy's Troops had marched to attack them. Thus we might have plundered the Country, and harassed their Troops, in such a Manner as might probably have produced a Mutiny, considering the wretched Condition their Troops are at present reduced to by their want of Pay, and by the Dearness and Scarcity of Provisions in that beggarly Country.

In this manner we might have distressed their Country; and with regard to their Shipping, there are but very few Ports in *Spain* where we might not, by means of *Fire-ships* and *Bomb-Vessels*, have burnt every Ship and Boat in their Harbour. Even at *Cadiz* itself, tho' we could not, without a great Land Force, have taken the Town, yet instead of blocking up their Squadron that was there at the Beginning of the War, if our Squadron had been properly provided—
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and properly instructed, it might have gone in within the *Puntals* in spite of all their Forts, and might have burnt or destroyed every Ship in that Harbour. And with regard to the Fortifications and Batteries they have been of late Years permitted to raise against our Town and Bay of *Gibraltar*, we might very probably have found an Opportunity to destroy them. Nay, I am surpriz'd, the Garrison itself has not done it, if it be true that these Fortifications and Batteries have, sometimes since the War begun, had not above two Regiments to defend them.

These Things we might have done, or at least attempted; and these Things we had the more Reason to do, because we knew that *France* was preparing to assist the *Spaniards*, or prescribe Laws to us. Therefore, to force *Spain* to a Peace, or to weaken them as much as possible, and especially to destroy their Men of War before *France* could come to their Assistance, we should have begun and carried on the War in the most vigorous and active Manner. But *our French Agents* persuaded us we were in Danger at Home, and this has I am affraid, made us carry on the War in languid and dilatory Manner Abroad.

I am sensible it will be said, that a powerful Squadron was prepared, and intended to sail upon a glorious Expedition against *Old Spain* itself, but was prevented by contrary Winds. I am sorry that Squadron met with

such a Disappointment; but I must observe, that most People are of Opinion, this Squadron might have been ready to sail much more early in the Season, and before the Winds began to set in against it; and I must farther observe, that it was very extraordinary to order such a Squadron to sail as Convoy to a large Fleet of Merchant Ships; for most Seamen are of Opinion, that this Squadron, if not retarded by something not yet heard of, might have got out of the Channel, and might have proceeded on its intended Voyage, if it had not been oblig'd to sail as Convoy to a great number of Merchant Ships. One Thing is certain, that several of the Merchant Ships, that sailed from *Torbay* with this Squadron, did proceed upon their Voyage, and notwithstanding the contrary Winds got safe to *Lisbon*, and to some of the Ports in the *Mediterranean*. Therefore I must suppose, that the Backwardness in fitting out this Squadron, and the Orders given to it for sailing as Convoy to a large Fleet of Merchant Ships, likewise proceeded from some sort of *French Influence*; because the *French* were not ready in the Beginning of the Season, to send out a sufficient Squadron for opposing its Designs.

Having thus shewn the Success of our *French Agents* in preventing our hurting the Enemy: I shall now endeavour to point out their Success in persuading us to begin and carry

carry on the War, in that manner which most exposed and injured our own Trade. As in Time of Peace, none of our Seamen can get Employment but such as are employ'd in the Merchant Service, or on board the few Guard-Ships kept in Commission, all the rest that have been bred Seamen in time of War, must either go Abroad, or betake themselves to some other Employment; and in a few Years, this supernumerary Number, either by Death, or by being well settled in some easy and profitable Business at Land, become quite extinct, without any Supply; so that after a few Years Peace we can never have a greater number of Seamen, than is barely sufficient for carrying on our Trade, and therefore, at the beginning of every War, we must be in great Distress, and must draw the Seamen away from our Trade. This is an Inconvenience we must labour under at the Beginning of every War: It is ridiculous to think of preventing it by a *Register* alone, or any such *Quack Method*. There is no way of preventing it, but by keeping 20 or 30,000 experienc'd Seamen always in Pay, and taking care that they shall every now and then, and by turns, go a Voyage in the Merchant Service, when the publick Service has no Occasion for them, in order to keep them expert in their Business. This could not but have been foreseen by those who consider the Situation, the natural Strength, and the true Interest

Interest of this Kingdom; but instead of keeping a greater Number of Seamen in Pay than we had Occasion for in time of Peace, we have for these twenty Years been advised to keep a great and dangerous Number of Land Forces in continual Pay, and entirely to neglect the Discipline of our *Militia*; tho' every one knows, that the natural Strength of this Nation, as long as we preserve our Liberties, must always consist in the Number of our Seamen and Ships of War, and the good Discipline of our *Militia*.

By this Management we were at the Beginning of this War under a Necessity of drawing the Seamen away from our Trade, or of employing a great number of Landmen on board our Ships of War. One of these two Methods we were oblig'd to chuse; but then from the Nature of the War, from the Circumstances of the Enemy we had to deal with, we had this Advantage, that we might without Danger have chosen the latter. *Spain* was an Enemy that could not cope with us at Sea, and *France* could not declare against us without having some time, a Year at least, to repair and augment their Navy. We could therefore be under no Apprehensions of being engaged in any dangerous Sea-Fight, for one Twelve month at least. For this Reason, we had no Occasion for any greater Number of expert Seamen on board any of our Ships of War, than was barely sufficient for navigating

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ing and working the Ship, which is never above *One fourth* of her Complement. The rest might have been filled up by able bodied Landmen; and if we had given proper Encouragement to Landmen to enter, and had accepted of all the able bodied Vagrants that might and would have been sent in from the several Counties in this Kingdom and in *Ireland*, considering that we had during the preceding Year at least 12,000 Seamen in the publick Service, I dare be bold to say, we might have fitted out more War Ships and Sloops than we did, without drawing a Man away from the Merchant, Fishing, or Coasting Service; or at least we might have done so, without any *Pressing* or *Embargo*.

This was the Method we ought to have taken for Manning our Navy, in order to prepare for the present War, and this Method we ought the rather to have chosen, because we had great Reason to suspect, that *France* would declare against us, in case we should not be able to force the *Spaniards* to a Peace, before the *French* could venture to declare publickly in their favour. If we had taken this Method, most of the Landmen employed in the Sea Service would have become expert Seamen before *France* could repair and augment her Navy; and if *France* had at last ventured to declare against us, or prescribe openly to us, as she now does, we could then have taken a fresh Number of Landmen on board,

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and might have thereby so increased our Naval Force, as to leave no room for our having any Thing to apprehend from the insulting Menaces, or open Violence of the *French*. But as this Management would have been directly contrary to all the Views *France* could have against our Trade and Naval Force, her Agents here took Care to advise us to take all the Methods they could think of for distressing our Trade by *Pressing*, *Embargoes*, and drawing all the Seamen away from the Merchant, Fishing, and Coasting Service; and such Care did they take to prevent our endeavouring to increase the Number of our Seamen, by taking Landmen into the Service, that no Reward was offered for Landmen to engage; nor would the Regulating Captains, for the most part, accept of any but expert Seamen.

Thus our Trade was distressed as much as we could by ourselves, and now I shall shew how it was left to be distressed by the Enemy. It is certain we had nothing to fear from *Spain* but their fitting out Privateers to intercept and seize our Merchant Ships; and from hence we had more to fear at the Beginning of the War, before our Merchant Ships could be apprised of the Rupture, than at any future Time; therefore, before we published *Reprisals*, or began open Hostilities, we ought to have prepared, and ought to have had the Coasts of *Spain* almost

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most surrounded, or at least all the Ports from whence they could have fitted out Privateers, blocked up, by *fifth* and *sixth* Rate Men of War and armed Sloops. But this would have been contrary to the two principal Views of *France*. It would have prevented our Trade's being distressed, which is their View in all the peaceable and warlike Hostilities they have prevailed with *Spain* to commit against this Nation; and it would have prevented the Subjects of *Spain* from getting any Thing by the War; the Consequence of which would probably have been, that when they found themselves daily suffering, without seeing or hearing of any Advantage, it would have raised such a general Discontent among the People, as would have forced the Court of *Spain*, notwithstanding its absolute Power, to accept of reasonable Terms, before it was convenient for the Court of *France* to declare openly in their Favour. Therefore, *our French Agents* took care that no new War Sloops or Twenty Gun Ships should be built, nor any other Preparations made by us, for protecting our Trade against *Spanish* Privateers, before the *Reprisals* were published: Nay even the fifth and sixth Rates and War Sloops belonging to his Majesty's Navy, were not all fitted out for Service; and what Care has since been taken to have proper *Cruisers*, either upon our own Coasts, or the Coasts of *Spain*, or to provide our Merchant Ships with

Convoys as soon as wanted, I shall leave to the Consideration of those whose Duty it is to take notice of it.

Thus by *French Influence*, or *French Artifice*, I think, I have shewn, that we have been prevented from hurting the Enemy; and prevailed on to begin and carry on the War in a Manner which has greatly exposed and interrupted our Trade, and at the same Time prevented any great Increase in our Number of Seamen. In the mean time the *French* were openly repairing and augmenting their Navy as fast as they could, and it seems, or at least as they pretend, insultingly declaring, that if we attempted to carry on the War in that Manner in which alone we could put a speedy or honourable End to it, or in any Manner other than that in which we must always be certain Losers as long we have any foreign Trade or mercantile Navigation left; nay as long as we have any Trade or mercantile Navigation from one Part of our Dominions to another: In either of these Cases, I say, they declared, it seems, that they would interfere in the War; and being encouraged by our having so long carried on the War, with so little Effect, against *Spain* alone, and by the little Care we had taken to increase the Number of our Seamen, they at last ordered their Squadrons to sail to the *West-Indies*, and by means of some of their Tools here, they told

told us in the most insulting Manner, nay published it, as I have mentioned, in one of our *Gazetteers*, that they had ordered their Squadrons to sail, *in order to give a Check to our Armaments or Designs against Spain in the West-Indies.*

Most insulting Declaration! Could any *British* Minister hear it without Resentment? Could any one but a *Tool of France*, or the *Tool of a Tool of France*, publish it, with all the Reasons for justifying it, in one of our own News Papers, and that without the least Remark or Reflection? Such a Method of Publication seems to insinuate, as if the Publisher approved of those Reasons; but whatever Effect those Reasons might have upon the *Publisher*, or the Patron of this Paper, I hope they will have a good Effect upon the Nation, and make us resolve to remove far from our Councils, every Man that seems to be (if there be any such) under any Sort of *French Influence*, or under any Sort of Dependance upon *France*. I shall not say, that we ought to have declared War against *France* as soon as she made any such Declaration to us; but such a Declaration ought to have induced us to make the best use of our Time against *Spain*, in order to have weakened her, and strengthened ourselves, as much as possible, before *France* could come to her Assistance; and now that *France* has openly declared her Intentions, instead of being frightened, we ought

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to act with the more Vigour and Alacrity, and send immediately such a Naval Force, and such a Number of good Troops, to the *West-Indies*, as may be able to carry our Designs into Execution, in spite of all that both *France* and *Spain* can do to oppose them.

But this, I am convinced, will not be done, as long as the *Friends* or *Agents* of *France* can prevent it. It is not yet the Business of *France* to declare openly and directly against us. It is still her Business to protract the War, and for that End to frighten us from doing any Thing that may bring it to a speedy Conclusion; or otherwise to frighten us into a dishonourable and ruinous Peace; and as she still hopes to have the same Influence upon our Measures that she seems to have had for almost these *twenty* Years past, this, I believe, is the true Intention of her sending her Squadrons to the *West-Indies*. She thereby intends no more than to furnish *her Agents* here with Arguments for frightening us into her Views. If they should succeed, I shall expect no vigorous or offensive Measures. Our intended Expedition may, I believe, proceed to the *West-Indies*; because, like many former Expeditions or expensive Preparations, it will serve for a Parliamentary Amusement. It will be a most excellent Expedient for carrying us through next Session of Parliament; and like our last Preparations

tions against *France* and *Spain* when they attacked the *Emperor*, it may be of great use at our next General Elections for a new Parliament. But if we be under *French Influence*, I am sure no real and hearty Attack will be made upon any of the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*; and when the General Elections are over, our Fleet, or a great part of it, may probably return, and the War will be continued as it has hitherto been, by Way of *Reprisals* only, or a new Convention clapt up, perhaps worse than the last we concluded with *Spain*.

Far be it from me to endeavour to point out where these *French Agents* lie concealed, or how they exert their dark and baneful Influence; but that our Measures for near these *twenty* Years past have been, and are still under some such Influence appears evident, I think, from its Effects. I have mentioned but some of the principal of them; but I could mention a great many more; and if it be true, as I have heard, that when a certain Person was once in Danger of being removed, the *French* Minister declared, that if he should be removed, the Prime Minister of *France* could no longer answer for preserving the Peace between the two Nations: If this, I say, be true, we may guess how these Agents exert their Influence, tho' it may be absolutely impossible to come at any legal Proofs; but in Parli-
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ment, we know, that Proofs may be convincing, tho' they are far from being legal or convicting. †

Whatever may be the Cause, it is certain, that this Nation is at present in the most unlucky Circumstances, and the Liberties of *Europe* in the most extreme Danger. The present close Union between *France* and *Spain*; the Dissolution of the ancient Confederacy between the House of *Austria*, *Britain*, and *Holland*; and the unexpected Death of the Emperor, have really rendered the Affairs of *Europe* almost irretrievable, and have, I am afraid, put it in the Power of *France* to raise whom she will to the *Imperial* Dignity, and upon what Conditions she may please to prescribe. Nothing but a popular, a wise, and a vigorous Administration in this Kingdom can prevent it. This it is in the Power of next Session of Parliament to establish, but for any future Session it will be too late; and therefore, I hope, every Gentleman that wishes well to the Liberties of his own Country, or the Liberties of *Europe*; every Gentleman that abhors being a Slave to *France*, will in this ensuing Session of Parliament, lay aside all selfish Considerations, and resolve to agree to every Method that may be proper for obviating the Danger to which this Nation,

† *A notable Distinction made use of by an Hon. Person in a late Parliamentary Prosecution.*

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If any of our late Measures have been directed by *French Councils*; if we have been advised by any Person under the *Influence* of *French Artifice*, or under a *Dependance* upon *French Power*, we now smart for it, *Europe* smarts for it; but, I hope, it will be a Warning to us, to take the proper Method for preventing the like in future Times, which can only be done by taking care, that no future Parliament shall be under any Sort of *corrupt Dependance* upon the Crown, or any of the Favourites of the Crown. We have had a King entirely governed by a *Spanish* Minister; and another very much governed by a *French* Mistress. By the former we lost the great Sir *Walter Rawleigh*; and the *Palatinate* was lost to its *natural Prince*, and to the *Protestant Religion*: By the latter we had a ruinous War with the *Dutch*, and very much contributed to that *French Grandeur*, which afterwards cost us so much Blood and Treasure to reduce. We may hereafter have a King entirely governed by one *sole Minister*, and that *sole Minister a Pensioner, a Tool, or a Dupe* of *France*. If it should be in the Power of that *sole Minister*, by means of the Places and Pensions he has to bestow, to have both Houses of Parliament always under a *corrupt Dependance* upon him, the Interest of this Nation would

be daily sacrificed to the Interest of *France*. Of this the whole Nation, except those who depend upon the Minister, might be long sensible, and yet during the Joint-Lives of *that King* and *that Minister*, there could be no *legal* Redress: Whereas an independent Parliament would immediately, and in a *legal* Way, rid the King of such a treacherous Minister, and the People of such a weak and mercenary Administration.

I know, one of the mercenary Writers against the *Place Bill* has wisely said, That our Members of Parliament ought to be under a Dependance upon Ministers for the Places they possess or expect, in order to prevent their falling under a *corrupt* Dependance upon *France**. To suppose that *France* could ever get any considerable *corrupt* Influence over our Parliaments, any other Way than by first *corrupting* our Ministers, is an Imagination that can never proceed from any Thing but a wrong Head or false Heart. It is an Attempt the Court of *France* knows to be impracticable and impossible; for as this Influence can be got by nothing but ready Money; and, as a sufficient Sum, in proportion to the value each Man puts upon his Honour, must be given not only to every Member of Parliament, but to every individual Elector, so far at least as to form a Majority of each, it would be impossible
even

* *An Impartial Enquiry, &c. printed for Roberts 1739.*

even for the Crown of *France* to spare such a Sum as would be sufficient for this Purpose. But if any one of our Ministers should get the sole and entire Guidance of our King, and thereby the Disposal of all the public Money, and of all the Pensions, Posts, and Offices, which the Crown has in its Power to bestow, the yearly Revenue and Profits of which, in the whole, I could shew to be above *six Millions Sterling*, such a Minister by means of these Pensions, Posts, and Offices, might get a corrupt Influence not only over a Majority in each House of Parliament, but over a Majority at most of the Elections in the Kingdom; and if this should ever come to be our Case, the Court of *France* might, and certainly would endeavour to gain that Minister, either by a large Sum of Money, or by promising him their Protection, in case he should by any Turn of Fortune be in Danger of meeting with that Fate, which, thank God, most sole and prime Ministers have hitherto met with in this Kingdom. And if the Crown of *France* should by either of these means gain a *corrupt* Influence over that Minister, the Pensions, Posts, and Offices he had in his Power to bestow, would be brought in Aid of the *French* Influence upon him, and then our King, our Administration, and our Parliament might be properly said to be under a *corrupt* Dependance

upon the Crown of *France*. This is a Danger we ought to guard against, and it can be guarded against no other way but by preserving the Freedom and Independency of our Parliaments.

To pretend that our Parliaments were under a *corrupt* Influence from *France* during all King *William's* Reign, is a most ridiculous Chimera. The Reverend Prelate whom this Author quotes as his Authority, was certainly mistaken, when he supposed the Parliament mentioned by him * to be bribed by *France*. If we consider the Circumstances and Transactions of *Europe* from the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Ryswick*, to the Time this Session of Parliament began, we must allow, that both the *Partition* Treaties were Snares laid for King *William* by the Artifice of *France*. These Snares he unluckily fell into, not by the Advice of his Parliament, nor even by the Advice of his Privy Council, but by the Advice of a few Favourites, or rather of one Favourite Minister; and therefore, if any extraordinary Sums came at that Time over from *France*, we may most reasonably suppose, they were the Price paid by *France* to our Ministers or Minister, for the wrong Advice they gave to their Sovereign; and that those Ministers, or this Minister, was cunning enough not to bring it over at the very time it was paid, lest it should have occasion-

* *Burnet's History*, Vol. II. p. 257.

ed a Suspicion against him. But suppose, that these extraordinary Remittances were actually made with a design to attempt bribing that Parliament, the Behaviour of that very Parliament is a Proof upon Record, that the *French* failed in their Attempt; and their Failure at that time has convinced them of the Ridiculoufness of the Attempt; for, I think, no Historian has since dreamed of their having made a Second upon our Parliaments, whatever they may have done with regard to our Ministers.

We have indeed, great Reason to dread any extraordinary Remittances from *France*: They are generally ominous to this Nation; and I must observe, that in the Year 1733, there were such great Remittances from *France*, that most of the *French Merchants* upon *Change* took Notice of it; but what occasioned them must be left to time to discover: I shall only take Notice, that towards the End of that Year, the War broke out between *France* and the *Emperor*.

But whatever may be in the Arguments for or against excluding effectually most Placemen, and all Pensioners, from having Seats in the *House of Commons*, it is now become necessary to pass some such Bills, in order to restore that Influence and Weight which this Nation ought to have upon the Counsels of *Europe*. It is certain that this Nation never had much Influence Abroad, but when it was governed

governed by a popular Administration; and therefore, in order to reconcile the Minds of the People to our Administration, it is become absolutely necessary to pass not only the *Place* and *Pension Bills*, but several other *Bills* that are proper for securing our Constitution. There is not now a Man in the Nation, not possessed of a Pension or Place under the Crown, but is persuaded, that the Freedom and Independency of Parliament, and consequently the Liberties and Constitution of this Kingdom, are in the most imminent Danger. The *Place* and *Pension Bills* are look'd on by all as the most obvious Expedients for avoiding this Danger; and it is necessary to give the People Satisfaction in this Point, if we have a mind to preserve the Independency of this Nation, or the Liberties of *Europe*. The present Conjuncture is the most extraordinary, the most critical, and the most dangerous, this Nation ever saw, therefore it is absolutely necessary to have Men at the Helm who have not only great Authority at Home, but also some Character Abroad. We must make some Steps towards securing our own Liberties, before we can do any Thing for securing, or rather restoring the Liberties of *Europe*.

Those who have disapproved of these Bills. Those who have constantly approved of all our publick Measures, are hitherto excusable, and they may see, by several late Instances,

stances, how ready the People are to forgive. In Questions of a very complex Nature, which all political Questions are, the wisest, the most impartial may be mistaken; and when a Gentleman's private Advantage or Emolument is engaged on one Side of the Question, as every Gentleman's must be who has or expects a Place or Pension from the Crown, it is natural for him to judge that Side to be right, and to think he judges impartially. He must have a very clear Head, as well as a very honest Heart, who judges one Side of any complexed Question to be right, when there is an Argument of 1000 l. or 10,000 l. a Year upon the other side of the Question. Of this we must now be convinced from Experience. We now feel the Effects, *Europe* feels the Effects of the Influence we have been under, and *France* rejoices and triumphs. Can the Nation now approve of such Measures? Can any one *True Briton* now approve of them? But of all Things it would be most amazing, should such Measures be now approved of and supported by any one of that Family which owes its Greatness to that Glorious *English* General, who but lately recovered the Liberties of *Europe* from the Jaws of *France*, and made her *Grand Monarque* tremble upon his Throne. The Glory of that Family, or even its Existence, is absolutely inconsistent with the Glory of *France*, and therefore its utter Extinction must

be the certain Consequence of the Consummation of *French* Power.

Every Man must now be sensible, that we ought to have held a Conduct very different from that we have held for these 20 Years past. Every impartial Man must be sensible, that none of the Treaties or Measures, I have mentioned, could have met with the Approbation of a *British* Parliament absolutely free from Prejudice as well as Dependance. Yet they were all approved of and applauded. I am far from saying, that any of those that did so then judged them to be wrong: No, They imagined at the respective Times they gave their Approbation, every one of those Treaties and Measures to be in itself wise and right: But Experience must now convince them of the contrary; and from hence they must grant, that, as they held or expected Places or Pensions under the Crown, they were prejudiced in favour of every Thing that was done by the Ministers of the Crown. Therefore, I hope, they will now join in taking Care, that neither themselves, nor any of their Successors in Parliament, shall ever hereafter be under the like Prejudice.

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P O S T S C R I P T.

THE French King's Declaration, containing his Reasons for fitting out the Brest and Toulon Squadrons, and for fortifying Dunkirk [and Port L'Orient, having now appeared in Print, I think myself obliged, by Way of Postscript, to make a few Remarks upon it.

§. 1. — *To make known clearly the Principles of his Majesty's Conduct to this Day, and the End he proposes.* In the preceding Sheets I have clearly shewn the Principles of French Conduct ever since the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and the End they propose.

§. 2. — *The opening of the Conferences at Madrid gave some hope of Accommodation; but the unforeseen breaking up of those Conferences gave Suspicion that England was remote from every pacific Sentiment.* Does not every one know, does it not appear from the Reasons given by the King of *Spain* himself for not paying the 95000 *l.* that we did not break off the Conferences, nor begin any Hostilities, till his Catholick Majesty had actually refused to pay this 95000 *l.* so expressly stipulated by the Convention, and had likewise refused to acknowledge our Right to a free Navigation in the *American Seas*? Does not this shew, that it was not *England* but *Spain* that was remote from every pacific Sentiment?

§. Ditto. — *And the Hostilities which the English Nation began in America, before the Declaration of War could be there known, left no Room to*

doubt any longer of its Intentions. This really seems to have been dictated by those *French Agents* here, who advised us to begin the War with the Publication of *Reprisals* only, and are therefore angry with *Admiral Vernon* for carrying Hostilities farther than they intended; but what Intentions could these Hostilities leave no room to doubt of? The *French Court* had heard, I believe, to their great Mortification, of our declaring War in the most solemn Manner: They had an Account of it, long before these Hostilities were committed; and an Attack upon some Part of the Enemy's Dominions, has always hitherto been the Intention of a Declaration of War, and by the late Example of *France* it self ought to be the immediate Consequence: The *French*, therefore, long before they heard of these Hostilities, could not doubt of our intending to attack the *Spanish* Dominions in *America*, unless they had Assurances from some Persons here, that what we ought to do should not be done; nor can they say, that these Hostilities were begun in *America*, before the Declaration of War could be there known, unless they have better Intelligence here than they ought to have; because, if we acted prudently, we resolved upon declaring War long before we did: We probably resolved upon declaring War as soon as the *Spanish* Minister departed from hence, which was the 5th of *September*; and who told the *French Court*, that we did not then send Advice to *Admiral Vernon*, that War would be declared here on the 23d of *October*, and at the same Time send him Orders to begin Hostilities as soon after that Day as possible? If we did, and I am sure it was what we ought to have done, *Admiral Vernon* might have

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have had those Advices and Orders some Time before he sailed from *Jamaica* upon his Expedition against *Porto Bello*.

§. 3. — *There was room to think, that the Warmth of People's Minds had hastened its Measures; that, at the Bottom, it had no other aim but to do it self Justice for the pretended Vexations of the Spanish Guarda Costas; and that after this first Fermentation, both Parties would resume the Methods of Negotiation.* Here we may see the Impartiality of *France*. This War is not on our Parts owing to a just Resentment, but to the Warmth of People's Minds: The Depredations and Cruelties of *Spanish Guarda Costas* are by the *French* called by the soft Name of *Vexations*, as if those Pirates had only given our Ships a little Trouble in their Navigation; and even these Vexations are said only to be pretended, tho' their Depredations were notorious, and in several Cases allowed to be unjust, even by the Court of *Spain* it self. Therefore the *French* hope, that in order to obtain Justice, we will, as soon as the first Heat is over, return to the Method of Negotiation, tho' we have already negotiated for *twenty* Years in vain. I hope to see them disappointed: I am sure our Trade will be undone, if they are not.

§. 4. — *It was not that France had not on her Side Grievances against England, &c.* I believe it will be easy to give them an Answer, when they come to explain these Grievances. I am sure we can balance Accompts with them, if they will please to come to a fair Reckoning.

These Paragraphs I thought it necessary to make particular Remarks upon: As for what they say about our intending to make Conquests,

and disturb the Commerce of all Nations in *America*, I have, in the foregoing Sheets, already sufficiently answered it; and as to the *Manifesto* given Lord *Catbcart*, if they mean that which has been published, I have given a good Reason for thinking it spurious; therefore I shall only add some Remarks upon the 9th Paragraph which relates to the Precautions taken by his most Christian Majesty at Port *L'Orient* and at *Dunkirk*. Here we may see a Piece of *French Finesse*, in joining these two Places together, as if they had as good a Right to erect Batteries at *Dunkirk*, as they have to erect Batteries at Port *L'Orient*. To shew that they have no Right to erect Batteries or any other Sort of Fortification, or to make a Port for any Shipping, at *Dunkirk*, I can take no better Method than giving my Readers the 9th Article of the Treaty of Peace at *Utrecht*, which was as follows, *viz.*

‘ The most Christian King shall take Care
 ‘ that all the Fortifications of the City of *Dunkirk*
 ‘ be razed, that the Harbour be filled up,
 ‘ and that the Sluices or Moles which serve to
 ‘ cleanse the Harbour, be levelled, and that at
 ‘ the said King’s own Expence, within the Space
 ‘ of five Months after the Conditions of Peace
 ‘ are concluded and signed; that is to say, the
 ‘ Fortifications towards the Sea, within the
 ‘ Space of two Months, and those towards the
 ‘ Land, together with the said Banks, within
 ‘ three Months; *on this express Condition also,*
 ‘ *that the said Fortifications, Harbour, Moles or*
 ‘ *Sluices, be never repaired again.* All which
 ‘ shall not however be begun to be ruined, till
 ‘ after every Thing is put into his Christian
 ‘ Majesty’s Hands, which is to be given him in-
 ‘ stead thereof, or as an Equivalent.’

And

And the 4th Article of the Treaty of Alliance between *Great Britain, France, and Holland, 1717*, which was as follows, *viz.*

‘ IV. And the most Christian King being sincerely desirous, that every thing heretofore agreed on with the Crown of *France* concerning the Town of *Dunkirk*, may be fully executed, and that nothing be omitted which the King of *Great-Britain* may think necessary for the entire Destruction of the Port of *Dunkirk*, and to prevent all manner of Suspicion that there is an Intention to make a new Port at the Canal of *Mardyke*, and to put it to some other Use than draining off the Waters which might drown the Country, and carrying on the Commerce necessary for the subsistence and maintenance of the People of that part of the *Netherlands*, which is only to be carry’d on by small Boats, that are not allow’d to be above 16 foot wide; his most Christian Majesty doth engage, and promise to cause every thing to be executed, which the Sieur *d’Ibberville* his most Christian Majesty’s Envoy having full Power for that purpose, did agree to at *Hampton-Court*, as is contain’d in a Memorial of the 1st/₃₀th of *November, 1716*, sign’d by the Sieur *d’Ibberville*, and by the Lord Viscount *Townshend*, and Mr. *Metbuen*, Secretaries of State for *Great-Britain*, which is as follows.

An Explanation of what shou’d be inserted in the IVth Article of the Treaty concerning the Canal and Sluices of Mardyke.

‘ 1. THAT the Great Passage of the new Sluice of *Mardyke*, which is 44 Foot wide, shall be demolish’d from top to bottom, that is to say, by

And

‘ by taking away its * *Bajoyers*, Planks * *Busks*,
 ‘ * *Longerines*, and * *Traversines*, from one end
 ‘ to the other; and by taking off the Gates, the
 ‘ Wood and Iron-work of which shall be taken to
 ‘ pieces, and all these Materials be employ’d else-
 ‘ where to such Uses as his most Christian Majesty
 ‘ shall think fit; provided nevertheless, that they
 ‘ be never made use of for any Port, Haven or
 ‘ Sluice at *Dunkirk* or *Mardyke*, or in any other
 ‘ Place whatsoever, within two Leagues from ei-
 ‘ ther of those two Places: it being the Intention
 ‘ of the contracting Parties, and the End they
 ‘ propose to themselves by this Treaty, that no
 ‘ Port, Haven, Fortification, Sluice or Basin, be
 ‘ made or built at *Dunkirk*, the Sluice of *Mar-*
 ‘ *dyke*, or any other Place whatever along the
 ‘ Shore, at such Distance upon that Coast.

‘ 2. That the little Sluice shall remain as it is at
 ‘ present, with respect to its Depth, provided the
 ‘ Breadth thereof be reduc’d to 16 Foot; that is
 ‘ to say, by advancing the *Bajoyer de la Pille* ten
 ‘ Foot on the Westside, after having taken away
 ‘ 6 Foot of the Flooring, and the Busks of the
 ‘ * *Radier* all along on the same side, the remain-
 ‘ ing four Foot of Plank or Flooring being ne-
 ‘ cessary to serve for the Foundation of a new
 ‘ * *Bajoyer*; and forasmuch as the said *Bajoyer*
 ‘ must be advanc’d ten Foot towards the East-side,
 ‘ there shall likewise be demolish’d ten Foot of the
 ‘ same Pile on the West-side from the Foundation,
 ‘ to the end that the present *Radier* may never
 ‘ serve for a Sluice of 26 Foot broad, as this is at
 ‘ present.

‘ 3. The Jettees and Fascine-Work from the
 ‘ *Downs*,

* These are Terms for Beams, &c. which cannot be ren-
 der’d into *English*.

‘ *Downs*, or the Place where the Tide rises upon
 ‘ the Strand, when ’tis High Water, down to
 ‘ lowest Ebb, shall be demolish’d on both sides
 ‘ of the new Canal, and made level with the
 ‘ Shore; and the Stones and Fascine-Work that
 ‘ are above the said Level, may be carry’d away
 ‘ and employ’d to such use as his most Christian
 ‘ Majesty shall think fit; provided however, that
 ‘ they be never made use of for any Port or Ha-
 ‘ ven at *Dunkirk*, or *Mardyke*, or any other Place
 ‘ whatsoever, within two Leagues from either of
 ‘ those two Places: the Intention of the Parties
 ‘ contracting, and the End they propose to them-
 ‘ selves by this Treaty being, that no more Jettees
 ‘ or Fascine-Work shall ever be made again upon
 ‘ the Shore of this Coast, within that distance on
 ‘ either side.

‘ 4. ’Tis also stipulated, that immediately after the
 ‘ Ratification of this present Treaty, a sufficient
 ‘ number of Workmen shall be employ’d in the
 ‘ Demolition of the said Jettees along the new
 ‘ Canal, to the end that they may be raz’d; and
 ‘ the Work finish’d, if possible, within two
 ‘ Months after the Ratification. But for as much
 ‘ as it has been represented, that because the Sea-
 ‘ son is so far advanc’d, they cannot begin to nar-
 ‘ row the Radier of the small Passage, nor demo-
 ‘ lish the great Radier till next Spring, it is agreed
 ‘ that this Work shall be begun ^{April 25} and en-
 ‘ tirely perfected if possible, in the manner above-
 ‘ mention’d by the end of *June*, 1717.

‘ 5. The Demolition of the Jettees or Peers on
 ‘ both sides of the old Canal or Port of *Dunkirk*,
 ‘ shall be entirely finish’d and made level with the
 ‘ Ground, all the way from the lowest Ebb, as far
 ‘ as within the Town of *Dunkirk*; and if there
 ‘ shall

• shall remain any pieces, of *Fort Blanc, Chateau Verd,* and *Bonne Esperance,* they shall be totally laid flat to the Ground.

• When this Treaty shall be ratify'd, the King of *Great-Britain* and the Lords the States General of the *United Provinces* may send Commissioners to the Spot, to be Eye-witneffes of the Execution of this Article.

• We have sign'd this Article provisionally, and upon condition that it be approv'd by his most Christian Majesty, his *Britannick Majesty,* and the Lords the States General of the *United Provinces.* At *Hampton Court* the $\frac{1}{2}$ ^oth of *September* in the Year 1716. Sign'd by *D' Ibberville, Townshend,* and *P. Methuen.*

By these Articles we may see, that his most Christian Majesty has no Right to make a Port or Fortifications at *Dunkirk*; and yet he has been suffered to make a Port there, and we have made use of that Port for several Years past, as appears by our Custom-house Books; and now he has published a Declaration, the very Title of which is, *Reasons for fortifying Dunkirk.* What our Ministers have said to this, what our Parliament will say to it, must be left to Time to discover. It is, in my Opinion, past Time to say, I hope, it is not past Time to do.

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