

STATEMENTS ON CENTRAL AMERICA BY THE
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
THE HONOURABLE ALLAN J. MACEACHEN

DEC 16 1987

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RETURN TO DEPARTMENTAL LIBRARY
RETOURNER A LA BIBLIOTHEQUE DU MINISTERE

1. Speech at Ottawa University Seminar on Latin and Central America - June 3, 1983.
2. Interview - CBC Radio - Sunday Morning - Canadian Policy on Central America - June 26, 1983.
3. Central America - Interview with Terry Milewski for The Journal - August 22, 1983.
4. Statement to UN General Assembly (pp 4-5) - September 27, 1983.
5. CBC Radio - Central America - New Role for Canada - October 6, 1983.
6. SCRUM - Peacekeeping in Central America - October 6, 1983.
7. Press Conference with the Hon. George Shultz - Halifax - October 17, 1983. (pp 5, 9)
8. Press Conference with Mexican Foreign Minister Sepulveda November 2, 1983.
9. Toast for Colombian Foreign Minister - February 20.
10. SCRUM - Observers to El Salvador Elections - March 13.
11. SCRUM - El Salvador elections, Honduras - March 30.
12. Response to the Inter Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America Brief of October 1983 - March 1984.
13. CBC Sunday Morning - April 1.
14. CTV National - DPM/SSEA in Washington, D.C. - El Salvador - April 2.
15. Press Conference in Washington, D.C. - April 2.
16. CBC Radio News - DPM/SSEA in Washington, D.C. - April 2.
17. Press Conference on arrival in San Jose - April 3.
18. Press Conference on departure from San Jose, Costa Rica - April 5.
19. Public Statement - Bogota, Colombia - April 6.
20. Press Conference in Bogota, Colombia - April 6.

40-247-113

...2...

21. SCRUM - Managua, Nicaragua - April 9.
22. SCRUM after meeting Comandante Daniel Ortega - Managua - April 10.
23. Interview with Radio Canada "Le Point" - Nicaragua mining - April 11.
24. Press Conference - Managua Airport - April 11.
25. Press Conference Tegucigalpa, Honduras - April 12.
26. CBC Radio - As It Happens - Canadian Policy in Central America - April 12.
27. CBC Radio - Morningside - Interview on Central America - April 16.
28. Interview for CBC Radio - The House - April 19.

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STATEMENT DISCOURS

NOTES FOR A SPEECH BY THE
HONOURABLE ALLAN J. MACÉACHEN,
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
AT A SEMINAR ON LATIN AMERICA
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH CANADA
SPONSORED BY THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION
OF CANADA AND THE
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION,
UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA,
JUNE 3, 1983

The theme of your Conference is North meets South: Canada and Latin America. I welcome this opportunity to participate, and I endorse fully your decision to situate Canada's relations in the broader context of North meeting South.

Interdependence is a word that seems to go in and out of fashion. However the reality of interdependence is very fresh in my mind. Last weekend, I participated with the Prime Minister in the Williamsburg summit. On Tuesday and Wednesday, I met with the Secretary General of the United Nations, Senor Perez de Cuellar. In both cases, the interdependence of North and South occupied a prominent place. Economic recovery, trade, foreign debt, and aid -- all of these fit very directly into the economic picture of developed and developing countries, of Canada and Latin America.

The discussions in New York and Williamsburg have also contributed to my assessment of some of the main political issues raised by your conference, in particular the turmoil in Central America. At Williamsburg, I had the opportunity to continue my discussions with Secretary Shultz and to exchange views with the foreign ministers of the other five summit countries. In New York, I had the benefit of the Secretary General's views. Mr. de Cuellar is, I believe, one of the most enlightened and dynamic Latin Americans to have assumed a major role on the wider

international stage. He has been following the situation in Central America very closely. When I mentioned my invitation to address this conference, he asked me to pass along his appreciation for your work in support of the United Nations, which I do willingly.

This past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the role of Latin America on the world economic and political scene. Major countries, such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil, have become more active in international affairs, particularly in North/South dialogue, energy issues, trade, and economic development. Latin America has become an increasingly attractive market for exports and investment; but at the same time the debt problems of several countries have raised concern and required action by the international community. In the field of peace and security, the dangers of wider international conflict have been raised by confrontations such as that over the Falkland Islands and by the turbulence of change and revolution in Central America.

Unfortunately, the first task in approaching Latin American questions must still be to counter the widespread tendency to see the region as homogenous. The differences in population, geography, political and economic development are often lost in popular impressions of the region. The all-too-common image of turbulence, repression, and economic disorder in the whole of Latin America is a distortion.

Violence in the small and relatively poor countries of Central America tends to displace the news of peaceful democratic changes. Mexico and Colombia in the past year have replaced their leaders through democratic elections. Costa Rica has a firmly established democratic tradition. Venezuela is in the midst of a presidential election campaign, and Peru and Ecuador will have theirs next year. Argentina is also going through the process of returning to elected civilian government after eight years of military rule, and Bolivia returned to constitutional government last year. These are events that herald evolutionary democratic change which is important for the stability of the Western Hemisphere and which commands our support and encouragement.

Another feature of popular attitudes to Latin America concerns the respect for human rights. Some countries in the region currently have a deplorable record in this regard, but it is a mistake to assume that this is the situation in all of them. Many people in the Americas, including those in positions of authority, are concerned about abuse of human rights in the hemisphere. Many outstanding leaders in the struggle for basic decency in a state's behaviour towards its citizens are Latin Americans. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has courageously documented abuses and recommended measures to improve conditions and to ensure that human rights are observed more fully.

In economic matters, we tend to be shocked at the magnitude of the foreign debt incurred by Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and other countries of the continent, but too quickly overlook the fact that these countries have vibrant economies and immense human and political resources. Our own economic relationship shows these positive features very clearly. Latin America is Canada's most important export market after the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Venezuela and Mexico supply over half of Canada's petroleum imports. There is more Canadian investment in Latin America than in any other part of the world except the United States.

Canada therefore must approach Latin America as a diverse region in which our political and economic interests vary from country to country. Yet recognizing diversity does not frustrate the formulation of coherent policies.

If our relations with Latin America are to develop real strength, durability and content, if our commercial and economic relations are to flourish, and if Canada is to have influence in the continent, we must develop more substantial, broad-ranging political relations with the countries of Latin America. By so doing, we can advance a number of our objectives.

We can consolidate and expand our commercial and economic interests. We can also encourage the forces for positive change that are active in Latin America. We can contribute to the promotion of the fundamental values of Western civilization which are a common bond of all the countries of the hemisphere. We can work toward greater mutual understanding in bilateral relations. And we can help promote broader respect for human rights.

The process of enhancing political relations has already begun. The Prime Minister and other Canadian ministers together have visited almost every country of Latin America. Leaders from most of those countries have visited Canada. Canada and Mexico have established a range of important agreements regarding energy supply, agricultural sales, trade, industrial cooperation, tourism, cultural exchanges and political consultations. With Brazil and Venezuela, we have established formal mechanisms of regular political consultation and concluded agreements on various forms of trade and industrial cooperation with these countries as well as with Argentina, Ecuador and Cuba. We will have increased our economic assistance to the Commonwealth Caribbean, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the countries of Central America to an amount of about one-half billion dollars by 1987. Another \$150 million has been dedicated to programmes in Colombia and Peru as well as lesser amounts to Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador. We have strengthened our diplomatic representation in Latin America generally, re-opened an Embassy in Ecuador, appointed a resident ambassador to Guatemala and upgraded our consulates in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo to Consulates-General. We have also developed Parliamentary exchanges with Brazil and Mexico. Indeed, just last week, we hosted a meeting of the Mexico-Canada Interparliamentary Group.

These efforts complement the vigorous pursuit of our economic relations. We will also continue to encourage and support cultural exchanges because, as nations, we can best cooperate when our peoples have a better understanding of each others' character and unique forms of expression. We will also maintain -- and hopefully increase -- an active program of development assistance to the extent that our resources allow.

Another important aspect of our policy of reaching out to the hemisphere is our increasing involvement in the Inter-American system. Canada is a member of several regional organizations such as the Pan-American Health Organization, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in Agriculture, and the Inter-American Conference on Telecommunications. Canada contributes some \$8 million annually to these various inter-American institutions -- not counting our substantial subscriptions to the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank. Through these and other specialized agencies and bodies, we cooperate actively in promoting social, economic and technical cooperation in the Americas.

The Government at present is considering whether Canada should go beyond its current status of Permanent Observer at the Organization of American States and seek full membership. I do not intend to prejudge tonight the

results of that consideration by the cabinet. I can say that weighing the advantages and disadvantages, however carefully, does not produce an automatic result. This is apparent from the divergence of views expressed within the House of Commons Sub-Committee on Canada's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, and among the public. Within the cabinet we are examining the membership question with an open mind, but a decision to join the OAS would have to be based on a firm conclusion that it would have decisive advantages for our political relations with Latin American states and for the promotion of Canadian interests in the region.

Another important factor in our relations with the countries of Latin America -- as with all countries -- is the question of human rights. The enhancement of respect for human rights is a fundamental element in our foreign policy, and Canada has a respected place among the countries of the Americas championing common ideals and demonstrating how these can be put into practice. The voice of Canada should -- and will -- be heard alongside Latin American voices seeking to advance the cause of human rights in this hemisphere.

We have not hesitated to condemn abuses of human rights wherever they occur. We have done so by quiet but persistent pressure through diplomatic channels and by speaking out when it has been useful. In all cases we must chose the instrument that will have the maximum real impact. This can be achieved to a certain extent through more intense political relations with

governments concerned but we must also rely on the effective mobilization of international opinion in concert with other nations to remind governments of their international commitments and responsibilities to their own citizens.

One area of the hemisphere -- Central America -- is currently suffering from deplorable violence and abuse of human rights, both driven by a political and military crisis. The fundamental problems of Central America are the result of a long history of political, economic and social repression. Stability cannot be restored until the forces for change have been accommodated, until social and economic progress remove the explosive pressures of popular frustration. Interference by outside ideologies and political forces holds great danger for this process. Already such interference is aggravating the crisis and increasing the risk of escalating military confrontations.

How can the process of escalation be reversed? How can restraint be encouraged? And how can conditions be created in which military assistance from outside -- from all sides -- is stopped and replaced by a new influx of economic support?

In his April 27 address to Congress, President Reagan offered U.S. support for any agreement among Central American countries for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military advisors. He supported the inclusion of opposition groups in the political process of all Central American countries. He also

promised to support any verifiable reciprocal agreement among Central American countries to renounce support of insurgent activities and for an end to the arms race in Central America.

The Government of Canada shares the basic objective of a politically and economically stable Central America, governed by democratic regimes responsive to the needs of the people. We fully appreciate the dilemma that is facing the United States government as it seeks to respond to these explosive events in a region of strategic importance to U.S. interests. We have therefore welcomed President Reagan's proposals and have followed carefully the reactions to them. We urge the United States and the countries of Latin America, including Cuba, to pursue political dialogue.

Currently, the eye of the storm is in El Salvador. The Government of El Salvador has its faults, but it is the legitimate government of that country, recognized as such by the United Nations and by all governments of the world. It enjoys a broad degree of political support, demonstrated by the 1982 elections, and it is seeking -- against considerable odds -- to implement social and economic reform and to develop democratic government. That process has been painfully slow, and we hope it will accelerate.

Canada cannot condone activities of left-wing guerrilla groups seeking to overthrow a legitimate government by armed

force and bent on destroying the economic infrastructure of the country to achieve their political ends. We know that the guerrilla forces are obtaining support from abroad and we accept that the Government of El Salvador has the right to seek support from other countries, such as the United States, to defend itself. But in our view the solution in El Salvador cannot be based primarily on military responses.

Canada does not supply arms to any side in the conflict in El Salvador. We believe that if all countries followed a similar policy, the people of El Salvador would have a better chance of solving their problems. We take this position because we see a serious risk that the process of foreign involvement may lead to the very results which we and other western countries wish to see prevented -- political repression, protracted violence, and the victimization of the Salvadoran people in the extension of East-West antagonism.

By the same token, the escalation of violence offers no true hope to the Nicaraguan people nor to the other neighbouring countries who stand to suffer from the flow of violence across international borders.

The Government of Canada recognizes that Nicaragua is a sovereign state with the right to chose its form of government. At the same time we are dismayed by the increasing tendency toward authoritarianism. The threat to the welfare of the Nicaraguan people, and to the stability of the region, however

extends beyond the domestic effects of authoritarianism. Departures from professed non-alignment, and support for insurgencies in neighbouring countries only adds to the risks of violence and impedes progress toward peaceful change. For Canada, no ideology justifies the export of violence.

The process of social change and economic progress in both El Salvador and Nicaragua cannot achieve success in an atmosphere of military confrontation. Canada, therefore, fully endorses the regional peace initiative sponsored by the Contadora Group of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. This attempt to find regional solutions to regional problems deserves the support of all concerned. We also think that at an appropriate stage these talks should be supplemented by direct dialogue between the United States and Nicaragua, between the United States and Cuba, and between Nicaragua and Honduras and Costa Rica. Leaders of all these countries have declared their willingness to engage in such discussions. The time has come when talking about talks should be replaced by serious discussion.

We believe that escalation can be reversed, that the crisis in Central America need not move inexorably towards greater political danger. We believe that military responses and the export of violence will not serve the interest of the peoples of Central America, no matter what the political orientations of

their leaders may be. By the same token, foreign intervention of any party will not assist the objectives of peace, stability, social and economic progress. If serious efforts are not made to open political dialogue within and among states, if military solutions are pursued at the expense of accommodating social and economic change, the results within states will be political oppression, violence, and misery. Among states the result will be dangerous confrontation.

Canada is ready to assist the parties to promote or facilitate political dialogue. Although we do not seek to involve ourselves directly unless requested to do so, our message to all who seek to restore peace in the region is to reverse the pattern of military escalation so that the social change, economic progress and the exercise of freedom will not be stifled.

Serious as the current situation in Central America is, it is not, of course, one that is common to the whole of Latin America. Canada is very alive to the fact that the other countries of the region are getting on with the tasks of political and economic development.

Latin America is varied and complex; its potential is enormous. It is clear that the interests of Canada are more closely linked with those of the hemisphere than ever before. We can promote our interests only by strengthening and enhancing our political and economic relations with the countries of the region. We intend to do this.

-13-

I am confident that by using our resources with vigour, determination and imagination we will be able not only to advance Canadian interests but also contribute actively to the greater good of the entire hemisphere.

Transcript

Interview with SSEA, CBC Radio Sunday
Morning, Canadian Policy on Central America

Date	June 28, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR- 0605

CARDY: The turmoil of Central America seems far away from Parliament Hill on a steamy, summer day. In fact, the battle grounds of the isthmus are closer to Ottawa than Ottawa is to Vancouver Island. After decades of neglect Central America is now a priority concern in Canadian foreign policy. In recent months, the Prime Minister's office has received a growing number of letters on the subject. Opposition members of Parliament demand the Liberal Government take an independent stand on Central America. Pauline Jewett, is the N.D.P. Foreign Affairs critic. She says the Prime Minister gives conflicting and contradictory signals.

JEWETT: Canada, in many respects does not seem to have an independent foreign policy. On the one hand the Government does say that countries should have the right of self determination, that there shouldn't be military intervention in their affairs, or in the other intervention, and yet he says that Central America is an area of strategic proportions to the United States, and therefore military intervention is justified.

CARDY: Government critics say Canada lost whatever independence it had in Foreign Policy on Central America when the Reagan administration came to office. Before President Reagan's inauguration, Ottawa was becoming increasingly critical of U.S. policy in the region. University of Toronto political economist. Stephen Clarkson says a major shift in Canadian policy occurred after the inauguration. That's when former Secretary of State Alexander Haig began putting pressure on Canada. Stephen Clarkson.

CLARKSON: Mr. Haig, then Secretary of State got to the Canadians and said this is evidence that Communist arms are coming in or whatever. We don't know what other pressure might have been brought to bear, but we then turned around and said, well no we agree with the Americans. It is a very serious question and it is basically a Communist and anti-Communist issue. So we .. it was quite a clear change of opinion in the Government, which seems to have been based much more on American information than on our own reassessment of the situation.

CARDY: After Mr. Haig's private conversations with Canadian officials, Ottawa's criticism of U.S. involvement in Central America sank to a whisper. Then External Affairs Minister, Mark MacGuigan announced the U.S. could count on Canada's quiet acquiescence to Washington's shipment of offensive arms to El Salvador. Since then, the formulation of Canadian policy has been a delicate balancing act. On one side, our long held Canadian foreign policy principles, such as the right of states to self determination

and opposition to outside intervention. But against this is the weight of continuing pressure from the U.S. administration, for America's allies to see things the way it does. External Affairs Minister, Allan MacEachen, illustrated how he juggles these factors in a June 3rd. speech to the United Nations Association in Ottawa. Mr. MacEachen, explained that an important principle for Canada is how his government understands the causes of Central American conflicts.

SSEA: The fundamental problems of Central America are the result of a long history of political, economic and social repression. Stability cannot be restored until the forces for change have been accommodated.

CARDY: In this respect, Canadian policy differs from that of the United States. The Reagan administration describes Central America as a battleground in the East-West conflict. It wants a military victory against revolutions it believes are inspired not by homegrown discontent, but by outside Communist forces. But, Mr. MacEachen shares part of the American interpretation. In tune with Washington's East-West analysis, he recognizes that the United States has a right to claim a sphere of influence in Central America. That foreign influences are interfering with the natural process of social change.

SSEA: Interference by outside ideologies and political forces holds great danger for this process. We fully appreciate the dilemma that is facing the United States Government in a region of strategic importance to United States interests.

CARDY: Critics of Canadian policy are upset with Mr. MacEachen's adherence to President Reagan's view of a red menace in Central America. Edgar Dosman. teaches Political Science at York University. He helped prepare a major study on Latin America, with a recent Parliamentary review of Canadian relations with the Continent. Professor Dosman says Canadian policies are not even-handed. That Washington has sold Ottawa on its cold war concept of Central American strife. The concept, he says doesn't fit the reality.

DOSMAN: The Department of External Affairs has demonstrated an acute interest in what is termed Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador. Unfortunately, there has been in my opinion, far less attention to current activities of Washington against Nicaragua in particular. It is a flight from reality to believe that the Soviet Union is willing to pounce on Central America. The first principle of Central America is that there is only one outside power. and that is the United States. It has in many cases installed the very regimes that have brought such great suffering to the region. The U.S. is damaging immensely its influence in all of the hemisphere. For the Soviet Union, it must be a source of satisfaction, that while it's bogged down in Afghanistan, it now can see the U.S. chasing rainbows in Central America.

CARDY: Foreign policy experts say Canada lacks independent positions, because it doesn't have an independent means of intelligence gathering and political assessment. Ottawa follows Washington's analysis that the Salvadorean regime is a legitimate government defending itself against rebels who receive outside military aid. Yet External Affairs officials admit they have never seen conclusive evidence of either Nicaraguan or

Cuban involvement. In another case, External Affairs says it might cut off Canadian aid to Honduras, if there was evidence of direct Honduran support for anti-Sandinista guerillas attacking Nicaragua. But Canada doesn't have that kind of evidence and we're not collecting any. Ottawa has no experts in the region to monitor the situation. Instead, we rely on U.S. information and analysis, which can be flawed and distorted. Member of Parliament, Pauline Jewett, says this a fundamental defect in Canadian foreign policy.

JEWITT: If the United States says that there is an enormous flow of arms going into El Salvador to the rebels from Nicaragua or Cuba, we just sort of automatically say in the Canadian Government, well there is an enormous flow of arms. We don't even do as much independent assessment as a major newspaper like the New York Times does.

CARDY: Stephen Clarkson is the author of Canada and the Reagan Challenge. In preparing his book, Professor Clarkson interviewed more than 200 foreign policy officials and experts. He believes that Ottawa's relationship with Washington colours our entire Foreign Policy. Ottawa bureaucrats are constantly trying to smooth the waters between Canada and the United States over a host of issues from fishing rights to lumber exports. They don't want to make waves by taking Washington to task over Central America. Professor Clarkson.

CLARKSON: I think Canadian Foreign Policy is designed in general to reaffirm to Canadians that Canada is an independent country. It expresses our seperateness abroad. But where that foreign policy comes up against a major American interest as it did in Vietnam or in Central America, there, we are very careful not to come up head on against the Americans. We tend to back off and say, well we don't want to get them mad as us because we're worried about their possible counterveil against lumber exports or against uranium exports, or against our truckers, or about the auto pact. Not to express our own thoughts about the issue, but support the Americans, hoping that it'll smooth our bilateral relationship with Washington. The tone of the relationship is important. It's important whether Trudeau gets on well with Reagan. Now if Trudeau has gone around saying that the Americans are creating a second Vietnam in Central America and that it's crazy to talk about Communism being a threat when it's poverty, and that directly criticizes Reagan's position, the next time Pierre meets Ronnie, the atmosphere is going to be pretty frigid.

CARDY: Allan MacEachen admits that a major part of his job is keeping Canada-U.S. relations warm and friendly. For him, that means Canada won't be as outspoken as some Canadians would wish. Nor as forthright as Mexico, another nation bordering the U.S. and dependent on it, which has firmly and frequently challenged U.S. foreign policy. Mr. MacEachen prefers quiet diplomacy. He has told his American counterparts that he agrees with them on some points and disagrees on others. He points to Canada's support of the Contadora initiatives. It's an effort by Mexico, Panama, Columbia and Venezeula to find a non-military solution to the conflicts in Central America. And Ottawa has told Washington it should stop resisting direct talks between the U.S. and Nicaragua and the U.S. and Cuba. Allan MacEachen insists that Canadian policy is written in Ottawa, not Washington. But he says there are limits to Canada's role in Central America.

SSEA: I think that we do have an independent foreign policy. We don't agree with the military solution. We don't believe in foreign intervention. To that extent we differ with the United States. We've said that to the Vice-President, to the Secretary of State. We've said it in my speech. I think we've been rather candid with the United States.

Q: Not more candid perhaps than Mexico though?

SSEA: Well, quite true. But we believe also as part of our policy that the regional countries have a bigger stake, have a bigger role than we do and that is why we have supported the Contadora group.

Q: Some Latin American countries say that we could have a much bigger role in the Continent. Do you think we could?

SSEA: We've made it clear that if we can help, we're available. But, it's certainly not for us to go in there and say, yes, here we are. We want to solve this.

Q: I've noticed though that some of your critics seem to grant you that you have raised objections to your counterparts in the United States. But, they're a bit frustrated that so often that this is a private criticism of the United States that often follows with a public defence of U.S. policy, that somehow, at least publicly your Department does not appear to be aggressively boldly, criticizing the United States.

SSEA: Well, there's always a judgement as to what is the effectiveness of your views, whether you press them patiently and persistently, or whether you pound the table. But, I don't think that it is appropriate for Canada in the light of its overall interests to escalate beyond what we have done our differences with the United States.

CARDY: The ambiguity of Canadian foreign policy has not yet tarnished Canada's image in Latin America. Ottawa is respected for its support for the third world in North-South debate. Latin American government see Canada sharing with them a common dependence on the U.S. economy. Professor Dosman believes that, as a result, Canada could make a difference in Central America. He says Ottawa must identify its own political interests in the region. As a start, Professor Dosman thinks Ottawa should promote peace plans for Central America by giving a clear signal on the issue of Canadian aid to Honduras.

DOSMAN: What Canada can best do is follow the lead of the Contadora Group. It supports that group, but at the same time it provides aid to Honduras, while dragging its feet on aid to Nicaragua. There is a clear signal there. Development aid should not be a reward for military adventurism. This is a state of principle. Yet at the moment Honduras is notoriously a base for attacks, is a country for training troops in El Salvador. Surely, if we're going to reconcile our principles, if we're going to maintain our principles, we should cut off aid immediately, suspend aid, but we haven't.

CARDY: In the coming months the ongoing conflict in Central America will push Ottawa to clarify its position on a range of issues. The continuance of aid to Honduras, the extension of new aid to Nicaragua a response to growing US military involvement in the region. So far, Ottawa has adopted an arms length, at times ambiguous, attitude. By expressing its differences quietly, Canada has avoided angering the United States. But, that same quiet diplomacy may mean that Ottawa is missing an opportunity to be a peace maker in Central America. For Sunday Morning I'm Robert Cardy in Ottawa.

Central America - SSEA Interview with Terry
Milewski for a future JOURNAL
22 August 1983

Date

August 30, 1983

Number/Numéro

FPR-0757

Milewski: Mr. MacEachen, basically I'd like to start with a statement of Canada's attitude to the conflict in Central America and particularly, a summary, if you would, of the Government's attitude as to how a peaceful regional settlement might be arrived at.

MacEachen: My view is that an important step in reconciling the situation in Central America is to have all military presences from foreign countries removed. That would include military advisers, armaments, soldiers, from foreign countries that are presently in Central America. In the absence of that development, it seems to me difficult to contemplate how these countries can on their own begin the process of reconciliation and rebuilding their economies, and moving towards more democratic arrangements. I think that is an important element and I've also stated that ultimately the stability of Central America will depend more on social and economic improvements rather than on military solutions. I doubt very much if in the long term the military approach is of much value in solving the problems that are present in Central America.

Milewski: In that connection, sir, you've described as positive and useful the Ortega proposals, which include a ban on military exercises involving foreign powers. Arising out of what you just said, do you mean specifically that Canada opposes or views with alarm, or what, the proposed military exercises in Honduras with the American Forces?

MacEachen: We have supported the proposals that have emerged from the Contadora Group. We have supported them because it makes a lot of sense for the countries involved in the region to attempt to reach peaceful solutions and for that reason we have supported their efforts and will continue to support their efforts. The President of the United States did say in April, I believe, in an address to the Congress, that his country

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was prepared to remove all military advisers and all military presences if all others would do the same thing, and particularly if it could be done on a verifiable basis. I believe that international public opinion and international support ought to be gathered to encourage not only the United States but all others to move out. Now, I don't think that it's reasonable to expect them to leave the scene to others.

Milewski: O.K., I guess you anticipated my next question, which was, whether you see any prospect that the chorus of voices, not only Canada's, asking the Americans to desist from these exercises, is likely to have any effect?

MacEachen: I think that, an effective response will occur when all countries, whether it be Cuba, or Cuba through the Soviet Union, will agree to do the same thing. And I think it also means, as is indicated in the proposals made by the Presidents of the countries in the region, that steps have to be taken to improve the relations between the countries, their boundaries, their pressure on each other, but I think that's more for the countries themselves to deal with.

Milewski: Thirdly on the question of the Sandinista government, I guess that's what this is about. It depends what you think of the Sandinista government, what sort of attitude you take to them. How, if at all, does the Canadian government's attitude to the Sandinistas differ from that of the United States? That is that they're, potentially at least, Soviet puppets?

MacEachen: Well, we've taken the view that countries should be permitted to pick their own governments without the benefit of assistance from outsiders and there came into being in Nicaragua the Sandinista government. It had very noble ideas. It has emblazoned upon its escutcheon the prospects for democratic pluralism, better relations among the groups in the country, religious conciliation and so on. We thought these were noble ideas and it would please us much if they were implemented by the authorities in Nicaragua. And we understand the difficulties, but we would support certainly their efforts to implement the original principles. We haven't withdrawn in distaste from Nicaragua. I received the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister in Canada not so long ago. We would appreciate a situation that would make it possible for us

to assist the economic reconstruction of that country. We have in process a considerable line of credit that might yet be made available to the government of Nicaragua.

Milewski: To pursue that for a moment. There seem to be two schools of thought. First, that the reason the Nicaragua government is not bringing about its promises, as you've described them, is because of external pressure. The other school of thought is that the external pressure is arising from the United States because of the Nicaraguan government's failure to keep its promises. Which of these two competing schools do you agree with?

MacEachen: Well, I think that my school is it would be easier to judge the situation if all foreign presences were out of there. Then we could see what is happening internally. But if you have contending forces, there is no doubt that there are outside influences there, in the form of military advisers, maybe arms and soldiers, and once these are removed, then I think one could judge these questions more easily.

Milewski: In conclusion then, to place this in the context of this discussion here this week-end, we're hearing a lot in interviews with other participants to the effect that Canada has to speak out, to take a more independent course from the United States, to make its views felt a little less cautiously. Do you see some room for doing that? You've spoken, for example, of perhaps some credits to Nicaragua, of making our views known, our independence of the American course of action in Central America a little more apparent.

MacEachen: But I have done that in Washington, for example, in a discussion with Mr. Shultz. We had a very protracted, or I should say, we had a full discussion of the situation in Central America and we agreed to disagree. So we made our views known. I think in public statements I've made these views known, that we don't attach the same, we don't give the same validity to the military approach that the United States is giving at the present time.

Milewski: I appreciate your taking the time, thank you, sir. Can I just make a note of the... when you mentioned... (inaudible - noises). They're probably trying to drag you out of here.

MacEachen: They're monitoring my comments (laugh).

STATEMENT DISCOURS



NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS BY THE
HONOURABLE ALLAN J. MACEachEN,
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, TO THE 38TH SESSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 27, 1983

STRENGTHENING THE UN:
THE SEARCH FOR SPECIFICS

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Mr. President,

I would like to congratulate you on your election to the Presidency of the General Assembly. I assure you of the full co-operation of the Canadian delegation in the discharge of your duties. You can count on our support in your efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the Assembly, a concern which you emphasized last week in your opening address.

I would also like to welcome St. Christopher and Nevis as the 158th member of the United Nations. St Kitts is a hemisphere neighbour, a Commonwealth partner and a close friend to many Canadian visitors.

Mr. President,

We meet at a time of heightened tension. The urgency of many world problems has intensified since last year. The need for a dynamic United Nations has never been greater.

One year ago, the Secretary-General inspired us to take a hard look at this Organization. We measured expectations against realities and, to no one's surprise, found ourselves wanting. We recognized that we were in the midst of what the Secretary-General called "a crisis in the multilateral approach in international affairs". We unanimously agreed on "the imperative need to strengthen the role and effectiveness of the United Nations." We have not yet succeeded.

It is now time to move from high-sounding generalities, on which we can all agree, to specific measures for strengthening the multilateral system.

PEACE AND SECURITY

The reputation of the United Nations is widely measured by its contribution to peace and security. We must turn around the current perception that the UN cannot respond forcefully to crisis and conflict. We must make more creative use of the existing provisions and mechanisms of the Charter.

The key is the Security Council and the way in which the Secretary-General works with the Council and the members work with each other. Council members have been seeking ways to make the work of the Council more effective. It will be unfortunate if political realities prevent any significant improvements. We count upon the members of the Council, particularly its Permanent Members, to exercise their responsibilities on behalf of all member states.

Is it naive to demand an enhanced spirit of co-operation and acceptance of responsibilities in the Council? One wonders in the light of recent events. The world will not forget that the Council was prevented from taking action on the destruction of a civil aircraft by the Soviet Union. We cannot write off the Soviet veto as a harsh fact of life. This exercise of the veto was callously irresponsible. It frustrated the Council from taking action to preserve the safety of international civil aviation.

Canadians continue to be outraged by the tragedy of September 1. On September 12, the Canadian House of Commons unanimously condemned "the unwarranted attack on and destruction of the Korean airliner on the orders of Soviet authorities". The House demanded "a full and truthful explanation of this brutal act from the Soviet Government". It demanded "that the Soviet Government co-operate fully in any impartial investigation under the auspices of the United Nations and of the International Civil Aviation Organization to prevent any repetition of such a tragedy". And it demanded "that the Soviet authorities immediately offer full and generous compensation to the families of all victims, including Canadians". The text of this resolution was distributed on September 13 as a document of the Security Council and is available to all UN members.

Canadians are dismayed by the continuing failure of the Soviet Government to respond to official Canadian communications on this matter. A Tass report is an insulting response to a reasonable request for information.

One UN agency - the International Civil Aviation Organization - is undertaking an urgent and impartial investigation to determine the facts of the incident. It is also reviewing ways of preventing a recurrence of this tragedy. Canadians expect the Soviet authorities to cooperate fully with ICAO.

The ineffectiveness of the Council in dealing with the Korean Air Lines incident demonstrates once again the need to find more flexible and creative ways for Council members to address disputes. I would hope that agreement could be reached, among Council members, on the following specific measures:

- First, the Secretary-General should make greater use of his authority, under Article 99, to bring current or potential crisis situations to the attention of the Council. To do this, he requires a greater "fact-finding capacity".

- Second, the Council should meet informally to avert potential crises by examining incipient disputes during in camera sessions with the Secretary-General.

- Third, the Secretary-General requires additional personnel and resources for the more effective use of his "good offices" in the resolution of disputes.

These are not revolutionary steps. They can be taken on the basis of existing authority and by reallocating resources. But they would be useful and concrete.

They would, Mr. President, facilitate the tangible progress on specific problems that is so urgently required. The Secretary-General has assumed his responsibilities in exemplary fashion. He does not, however, possess supernatural, nor alas supra-national, powers. We, as member governments, must also assume our responsibilities.

The Secretary-General has just reported on one problem that is crying for a solution - Namibia. It is almost five years to the day since the Security Council adopted resolution 435. The outstanding issues regarding its implementation have, in substance, been resolved. All the parties have made concessions to achieve this result.

There is no excuse for further delay. South Africa's pre-condition to implementation, the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, cannot legitimize its illegal occupation of Namibia. The question of principle is clear. Namibia should have its independence regardless of what happens or does not happen in Angola.

The Secretary-General has spelled out the political realities very clearly in his report to the Security Council:

- further disastrous consequences will result if we do not quickly reach the stage of implementation; and
- reaching this stage will require a determined effort by all concerned and particularly by those directly concerned.

The first step is clear. South Africa must end its incursions into Angola and its intervention there. It cannot seek unilaterally to reshape the region: boundaries and sovereignties must remain inviolate.

Second, the President of Angola has reaffirmed that his country has no desire to rely on foreign troops nor keep them on its soil once Angola is no longer threatened. Measures to strengthen confidence and lessen tensions are urgently needed between those directly concerned.

Third, the implementation of resolution 435 during 1984 is the essential step. Without this, there cannot be peace in the region. Those who seek peace will meet this challenge.

A fourth step should follow. UNCTAD is at present studying Namibia's economic and social needs. The international community will need to provide assistance to an independent Namibia. Canada stands ready to play its part.

Mr. President, the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, and of Kampuchea by Vietnam, persist in defiance of resolutions passed by this Assembly. The ASEAN countries, as recently as last week, have made constructive proposals aimed at a solution to the Kampuchean situation. On Afghanistan, the Secretary-General and his personal representative have made an effort to get a real dialogue going. The achievement of an equitable solution, however, will require the demonstration of a greater sense of responsibility on the part of the Soviet Union.

Canadians have participated in fifteen UN peacekeeping forces and observation teams. Peacekeeping can be an important way of promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. The presence of the UN Force in Cyprus, for example, has prevented a recurrence of intercommunal fighting and has helped to maintain law and order. There is still, however, no solution to the fundamental problems of the island. The Secretary-General and his representative have recently provided useful ideas on how a settlement can be reached. But until the parties themselves are prepared to make a serious commitment to negotiations, no just and lasting settlement can be found. Peacemaking must be seen to go hand-in-hand with peacekeeping.

The alarming course of events in Central America continues to preoccupy us. Political solutions to the region's problems are slow to emerge. For this reason we have welcomed the initiative of the Contadora Group, working with the five countries of Central America, to find a path toward reconciliation. We are convinced that lasting solutions to the region's problems can be arranged only by the countries of the region - this approach is fully consistent with the UN Charter. The Contadora initiative provides a basic framework for stability

and cooperation within which the root causes of the region's problems can be more constructively attacked than by military means.

One factor critical to the success of the Contadora initiative will be a positive response from all parties concerned to President Reagan's welcome offer of verifiable demilitarization. There has been some response both from Nicaragua and Cuba but, as yet, no dialogue nor any decrease in military activity. This is essential if an effective settlement in Central America is to be achieved. Canada would support concrete proposals by the Contadora group to stop the process of militarization and to verify and monitor the progressive withdrawal of all foreign military personnel from the region.

Canada is committed to supporting these regional mechanisms. If renewed efforts by the five countries of Central America could lead to agreement among them on a common approach to economic and social planning, Canada would increase its contributions to the necessary regional infrastructure projects. We are more than willing to help all countries there to solve their problems by themselves. But assistance to these countries will be effective only once they have jointly decided to reject outside military involvement. A common effort of this sort could help to restore the political stability and confidence without which programs for development cannot succeed.

Perhaps no issues have more frustrated this Organization than the successive crises in the Middle East. The situation in Lebanon becomes daily more tragic. We hope that the cease-fire just arranged will hold. The internal problems of this country have been complicated by others in the region who have chosen, at Lebanon's expense, ruthlessly to pursue their own interests on Lebanese soil. Canada strongly supports Lebanon's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Foreign troops must withdraw unless they are present at the specific request of the legitimate government of that country. We must all actively support, through the United Nations and by any other means open to us, the search for a just solution based on national reconciliation.

Nor can we allow events elsewhere to deflect our attention from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nothing has occurred, in the twelve months since we last gathered, to lessen the burning need for a permanent solution which assures the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to a homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I encourage all parties to exercise restraint. I call on Israel

to rethink its policy on settlements. I urge all parties to enter into genuine negotiations. I call on them to make clear, in unambiguous terms, their readiness to accept the right of all states in the area, including Israel, to exist in security and peace.

Questions of disarmament and arms limitation have become the central preoccupation of our time. Negotiations between the major powers have yet to show significant progress. President Reagan's announcement yesterday provides some encouragement that movement may be possible on the question of intermediate-range nuclear forces. The proposals he advanced are an important step forward and demonstrate a constructive flexibility on the U.S. side which, we hope, will be matched on the Soviet side.

The major powers have the paramount contribution to make in disarmament and arms limitation. At the same time, we must ensure that multilateral negotiations, under UN auspices, serve to reinforce the arms control and disarmament process. Machinery already exists for this purpose, but it has to work more effectively. The Committee on Disarmament, for example, has shown mixed results over the past year.

I regret that a working group on arms control and outer space was not established this year by the Committee on Disarmament. Prime Minister Trudeau warned at the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament that "we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars". This issue is urgent if we are to succeed in keeping outer space off limits to weapons of war. I commend the Group of 21 for their recognition of this urgency. Having tabled a substantive working paper on this subject in 1982, Canada has continued its research program on both the legal and technical aspects. We urge the establishment of a working group early in the 1984 session. We are prepared to co-operate fully in the detailed examination of the issues.

The Committee on Disarmament did make significant progress in the area of chemical weapons. Thanks to the co-operation extended to the Canadian Chairman of the Committee's Chemical Weapons Working Group, we now have, for the first time, a complete document, approved by consensus, which outlines the elements of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their destruction. The Working Group has been tasked to undertake, immediately at the outset of 1984,

intensive negotiations on the text of a convention. Canada's concern with the need to eliminate chemical warfare is long-standing. It goes back to World War I when Canadian forces were subjected to the first massive gas attack. Since then, technological developments have made chemical weapons, as events in South East Asia in recent years have unfortunately demonstrated, even more pernicious. It would be a real achievement if a draft convention on chemical weapons could be agreed upon by the end of 1984.

We recognize the absolute necessity of verification if we are going to make real progress in international disarmament and arms control negotiations. Since World War II, Canada has attached special importance to the development of international verification mechanisms and has assigned a high priority to research in this area. We have been making available increased funding for research which will help in the technical and practical aspects of verification. We hope that by sharing the results of our work through the Committee on Disarmament, we shall make a real contribution to the Committee's effectiveness.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Multilateral institutions face the same challenges in the economic as in the political sphere. We have started to meet the challenge. International co-operation has been strengthened through the most intensive round of high-level economic consultations in several years. The series of meetings beginning with the IMF and IBRD meeting in Toronto in September last year, moving on to the first GATT Ministerial meeting in ten years, and then to the New Delhi Non-Aligned and Williamsburg Summits, and to UNCTAD VI, has been exhausting but worthwhile.

These consultations have encouraged mutually-reinforcing national action in a number of sectors. There has been a welcome drop in inflation and nominal interest rates. In the debt area, we have seen an outstanding co-operative effort in handling major simultaneous reschedulings. The IMF has performed with vigour and resilience. Developing countries have adopted courageous adjustment programs to restore their payments equilibrium. International financial institutions and bilateral donors have kept open the flow of resources for development. The GATT Ministerial Meeting compelled governments to take a hard look at their own behaviour and elicited renewed commitments to the open multilateral trading system. At the Williamsburg Summit, the major Western nations

agreed on the vital interdependence of the world economy. The developing countries - seriously affected by the world recession - must be full partners in global recovery.

There is clearly no room for complacency. As I said at Belgrade, there are no quick fixes to problems which are deep and ingrained in the world economy. To turn this partial and uneven recovery into one that is durable and widespread, we shall need action on many fronts. Continuing efforts are essential to reduce interest rates. In responding to the debt problem, we must ensure an adequate flow of funds to the debtor countries to support their adjustment efforts. Adequate official funds must be made available through the IMF and the development institutions, especially to the low income countries, while commercial banks must continue to play an important role in international financing. The needs of IDA are particularly acute. For its part, Canada has re-committed itself to increasing Canada's ODA to .5% of GNP by 1985 and to make best efforts to achieve .7% by 1990. We have today deposited our instrument of ratification of the Common Fund for Commodities.

In trade, the task ahead for our governments and international institutions is to work together to carry out and monitor the commitments we have already made. It is positive action, not just pledges, that will build confidence in the trading system and contribute to economic recovery. Canada is actively supporting efforts in the GATT and elsewhere to monitor commitments to resist protectionism. If individual governments are to resist protectionist pressures, they need to know that they are engaged in a genuine collective effort and are not simply standing alone. We are mindful of the vital role of trade in the process of global economic development, and of the contribution which export earnings can make to relieving severe strains on the payments balance of many countries. These efforts require our attention and resolve.

There is another area where co-operation must be nurtured. This is producer-consumer co-operation on petroleum. Repeated energy price shocks have been an important cause of accelerating inflation, lower real growth, the debt crisis and the muting of the North-South dialogue. We are now facing an opportunity for producers and consumers to work together, as a reflection of overwhelming common interests, in conservation, assurance of supply, and a fair, stable long-term price. There is now a greater spirit of realism in consumer-producer relations that offers some hope for pragmatic discussion of oil and related concerns in the coming years.

Mr. President, the international community has spent far too much time in trying to devise new machinery and not enough in making what we have work better. I am encouraged by the pragmatic direction that the debate on reform of the international financial system has taken. The Commonwealth Study Group's report on Challenges for the World's Financial and Trading System represents a most useful recent contribution to this debate. Many of its recommendations are aimed, in the first instance, at bringing about greater multilateral co-operation within the parameters of the present institutional system.

The same concern - to make existing institutions work better - has prompted the efforts by my country within the UNDP Governing Council to achieve a more assured system of funding for that institution, and to reinforce its role as a central fund for all UN technical assistance activities for development. We likewise attach importance to the current triennial review of the operational development activities of the UN system. This review provides an opportunity to reassert a coherent sense of purpose and direction to practical co-operation between North and South.

* * * * *

I have emphasized the most difficult issues of peace and security and economic co-operation. We should, however, balance our natural concern with these problem areas by recognizing and publicizing the on-going achievements of the UN system. Too often, these are taken for granted. To cite a few examples:

- First, the UN Specialized Agencies continue to spearhead international cooperation in many vital technical areas. The International Civil Aviation Organization is the most recent case in point. It is important for us to ensure that the Specialized Agencies succeed in preventing extraneous political issues from diverting them from their principal tasks.
- Second, slow but steady progress has been made, since the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, toward the creation of a body of

international treaties, mechanisms and procedures which should eventually cover all flagrant violations of human rights. No government can claim any longer that human rights abuses are solely within their domestic jurisdiction. The UN's work in human rights goes hand-in-hand with its efforts in the coordination of humanitarian assistance to refugees and in the case of natural or man-made disasters. We agree with the Secretary-General that the "individual human being" is "the ultimate raison d'etre for all our activities".

- Third, the UN system remains in the vanguard of the progressive development of international law. Pioneering legal regimes have been established in crucial fields - such as Law of the Sea, Outer Space, Civil Aviation, Telecommunications, and Trade. If the system, however, is going to keep pace with new developments and technologies, legal considerations will have to take precedence over political objectives.
- And fourth, the UN system is also actively facilitating international co-operation to come to grips with the most persistent problems facing society. One innovative proposal, which will be considered by the General Assembly at this session, is for the establishment of an International Commission on the Environment. The Commission would address one of the major challenges facing the international community by studying the impact of economic and social development on the world's environment up to and beyond the year 2000.

If the UN system is to deal effectively with the panoply of current issues, we the member states must not stray from the basic groundrules of the system. Universality of membership remains fundamental to the viability of the system. As stated in Article 4 of the Charter, membership in the UN should be open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the Charter. This description

certainly applies to the Republic of Korea which, in its reaction to the calamity of September 1 and in its other actions, has demonstrated clearly its responsibility and desire for peace.

Another basic obligation of membership is that member states must pay their assessed shares of UN budgets and resist the temptation of refusing selectively to pay their shares of certain parts of these budgets. Otherwise, the system will be undermined.

Mr. President, this very week many Heads of State and Government, including my own Prime Minister, are conferring here in New York. They have not yet lost faith in the multilateral institutions we have so painstakingly constructed. The UN system need not become irrelevant. It may be far from becoming, as some would hope, a world government which can enforce its decisions. But it is also far from being dominated, as others would have us believe, by a "tyranny of the majority." We must dig beneath these slogans. We must reinvigorate our multilateral institutions in practical ways. Canada is committed to this goal.

CBC Radio October 6, 1983 - 0800
Central America - New Role for Canada

Date October 6, 1983

Number/Numéro

FPR-0902

The Minister of External Relations says Canadian soldiers could be sent to Central America if negotiations can bring about a general ceasefire in the region. Mr. Pepin was speaking in New York where he has been meeting with foreign ministers from Latin America. The Canadian force would be used to monitor border areas and the movement of weapons in the region.

T. Row The new Canadian position is an attempt to bolster the role of the Contadora group of nations, made up of Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia and Panama. It is the result of informal approaches by members of the group. Mr. Pepin says one foreign minister had already enquired whether Canada would be willing to send an observer force to the region. So far there has been no official request but Canada has signalled its interest in participating. Mr. Pepin added that once there is a lessening of conflict in the region, Canada also will be called upon to increase its economic aid.

Mr. Pepin That's the price you pay for having been involved all along. You cannot expect to be just in the cheering section. At one point you are asked to become a player.

T. Row The Minister says that if Canada is asked to be a player, its role will be modest. He says it would involve limited personnel, some communications equipment and transport vehicles. Nevertheless, the fact that the Government is prepared to consider such a role marks a significant shift in the Central American policy. No longer is Canada limiting itself to encouraging the efforts of the Contadora group. Instead it is expressing interest in playing a more active role in the region. For CBC News this is Trevor Row at the U.N. in New York.

A. J. MacEachen Scrum
J.-L. Pepin Scrum - Peacekeeping in Central
S. Stevens Scrum America -13H30 Oct 6-

Date	October 6, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-907

Question: Is it your view that it concerns the House to the extent that there might be a debate on it before you went ahead and responded officially to the request?

Allan J. MacEachen: Well, I think first of all we don't have a request, so I think a debate would be premature.

Q.: We missed the top of it, could you confirm for us whether the Government is going to send peacekeepers down to Central America?

SSEA.: I haven't been asked to send peacekeepers to Central America. I don't think any decision has ever been made by any group in Central America to bring peaceforces in there for peacekeeping. I think that that development has not yet taken place.

Q.: According to Mr Pepin in New York Canada is willing, is reading if asked ?

SSEA.: Well, I haven't talked to Mr Pepin, he just came into the House, about exactly what he said. We have indicated our support for the Contadora Group, we've given them our political support. If they reach precise arrangements with the Central America countries about security questions that would require some form of assistance by way of observers, then of course they would make a request and we'd have to consider it then. But it would be quite impossible at this stage without knowing what the nature of a hypothetical request would be to say yes.

Q.: Would it be in the form of troops?

SSEA.: Who knows? That's a very good question. I don't know. To my knowledge the political situation hasn't evolved in the Contadora Group to reach a judgement of that kind.

Q.: Do you want to take them out of Cyprus ?

SSEA.: I wouldn't link it to that.

Q.: Was Mr Pepin flying a trial balloon ?

SSEA.: No, I don't think so. I think that as I've said, I have not had a chance to discuss whether there have been any new developments in his discussions with the Contadora Group. But when I was in New York last week it is true the Contadora Group was attempting to work out precise arrangements with the Central America countries, based upon a set of principles. They were still working at that and how far it has gone since is not known to me, but certainly we have received no request of any kind.

Q.: How would you assess the prospects for increased trade with China following the Foreign Minister's visit?

SSEA.: I think that we had a very good visit. We talked extensively about economic questions and I think that his visit will give a fresh impetus to our economic and commercial cooperation. We intend to convene meeting of the Joint Trade Committee in 1984 and that will give us a chance to give a further boost to our trade efforts.

Q.: If you are asked to send troops in there, are you ready to do it? and will you do it?

SSEA.: Well I think that Canada would want to see the request to see the circumstances of the political settlement. It would be quite premature to begin to say yes to a request not made and in a form unknown to us.

15:45 hrs 06 October 1983

Mr. Pepin's Scrum

The five countries of Central America have now signed that 21 point declaration. So progress I thought was being done. Now, Canada has followed that very closely. The Prime Minister has written to the four countries of the Contadora Group, once twice has seen them; Mr. MacEachen has talked to them, I talked to some, he talked to others. So the point is that at one point someone asked me what are you going to do now? I said that it follows we cannot simply talk around the subject that should progress be accomplished, and in a modest fashion should Canada be

.../3

needed for jobs like surveillance of borders and things like that kind, logically Canada would accept that. That's what I said.

Q.: How far away do you think we are?

J.-L. Pepin: I don't know. Some people seemed to describe as what I said as going to happen in the next half an hour. That's not so. Progress is being made, meetings are taking place and it may take weeks, I don't know. But I thought it was useful to say that we weren't only winking at the girl as I said, we were only making eyes at her that we meant what we were doing and we were showing more than simply the interests of the looker by, that we expected that at one point should we be asked in a modest way to be involved.

Q.: You've thought it through to some extent, is it your view that its possible that a peacekeeping force might be needed by Canada? If that's the case, that Canada would be able to respond?

J.-L.P.: I would think that. Because what is the preoccupation if the countries of Central America? What are their preoccupations? Essentially two: they have borders and there's trouble in these areas. Secondly, some of them are acquiring arms. So that's their two main preoccupations. So if you want to reassure them, you will give them people there from the region or partly from the region supervised by the UN or somebody else. You will give them people to re-establish the confidence, who will keep an eye to make sure that trouble doesn't happen. And that is a surveillance force of some kind.

Q.: So did you actually tell them that, that if they wanted a surveillance force that you would be prepared to do so?

J.-L.P.: They're quite bright. They understand that. They take it for granted, that we're not simply showing the interest of the witness. One of them told me that he was already preparing a shopping list of the things that Canada could do, if and when a situation like the one I described should take place.

Q.: Do you have any idea when you'll get the shopping list?

J.-L.P.: No, I don't know, but you know that Canada is an expert at this kind of operation. We have a list of names of people who have served, who are willing to serve

in this kind of operation and our knowledge is known so presumeably in due course if it materializes, they'll come to us and they'll say we think you might provide the following and we will listen to that request.

15:55 6 October, 1983

Sinclair Stevens Scrum

S. Stevens: This is a very important move that they have under consideration. We feel they should not only come to Parliament to explain what the parameters are, of what we may be called upon to perform, but secondly to seek the approval of Parliament. I would think their hand would be much stronger, instead of just acting as an executive, to have the Parliament of Canada either approve or disapprove the sending of observers or troops into a peacekeeping situation in that area.

Q.: What about the principle of the thing?

S.Stevens: Well, as you know, it's been I think a very cardinal thing in Canadian diplomacy to help where we can in a peacekeeping sense. The situation in Central America is still very uncertain, and I can only say that it is odd that the same government that was reluctant to send observers to witness an election in one of those countries is now seriously considering actually sending in observers possibly peacekeeping troops into the same area.

Q.: Do you think its premature ?

S.S.: I think its certainly premature unless we're given much more information as to what the Government feels would warrant this move on the part of Canada. For example I'm curious as to who did the Minister of State for External Affairs speak in New York ? The newspaper accounts said he met with the representatives of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Guatemala. What about the other three countries, what about Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador ? These are the unanswered things which certainly weren't satisfied to my satisfaction in the reply by the Minister of State for International Trade.

TRANSCRIPT OF A PRESS CONFERENCE WITH
THE HONOURABLE ALLAN J. MacEACHEN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AND

THE HONOURABLE GEORGE P. SCHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

HALIFAX, OCTOBER 17, 1983

Statement by The Honourable George Schultz

Well I'd like to express my appreciation to Allan MacEachen and his colleagues and to the people of Halifax for the very good setting and the good conversation that we've had. We've had a very worthwhile meeting from my standpoint, so I am glad to have had the opportunity once again to have the meeting. I'm glad that Bill Ruckelshaus was able to join me and help in signing the Agreement on phosphorous, also to help in explaining about acid rain.

Statement by The Honourable Allan MacEachen

Well I certainly share Mr. Schultz's appreciation of the meeting. I think it was an extremely good meeting I appreciate his presence in Canada for another meeting and particularly in Halifax, and also the presence of Mr. Ruckelshaus because it illustrates the importance which both governments attaches to environmental questions and the necessity of making progress as we are both determined to do in the future. We had a pretty thorough canvass of bilateral questions and that has been the practise of our regular meeting and I think I can say that the question of bilateral issues has never been addressed more intensively in the past and we have certainly appreciated that development. On multilateral questions, East-West relations, alliance questions were part of our discussions and certainly, as I stated in my address last evening, Canada stands with the United States and its other allies in support of the two-track NATO decision and the implications of that decision as may be demonstrated in the deployment of missiles in Europe in the absence of a satisfactory agreement. We have demonstrated our solidarity with the Alliance and our association with the United States in our commitment to test the cruise missile. Those decisions are still very important parts of Canadian foreign policy and I believe that constituted a very important common cornerstone of our discussion.

- Q. Mr. Schultz, have you had communication with Foreign Minister Genscher and if so could you share with us some of the background he gave you on his meeting with Mr. Gromyko?
- A. (S) I've had a cable from Foreign Minister Genscher which I'd received just a few minutes ago here, and basically it said that immediately as he has returned to Bonn he has asked our Ambassador, Arthur Burns, to see him and I believe by this time that conversation has been completed we'll be having a cable from Dr. Burns shortly and in the meantime he's sending two people who were present throughout the meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington, and they're leaving tomorrow morning and we will be meeting with them on Wednesday. So we'll be having a full read out but as to the content I haven't received that material as yet.
- Q. I'd like to ask Secretary Schultz if I may whether he discussed with Mr. MacEachen the emphasis the Canadian Government, particularly Mr. Trudeau, as well as Mr. MacEachen, has laid recently on the need to reduce the high level of rhetoric between the superpowers as a means of reducing tension, and if so, what response do you, Sir, have to that?
- A. (S) We discussed of course so-called East-West issues at great length and I think very fully and I think we both expressed the importance of observing the situation accurately and describing it accurately, fully, of determination to maintain our strength and purposefulness. Minister MacEachen has already mentioned the dual tract-decision and the determination to follow through on that and at the same time to maintain our posture of being ready for strong discussions, and in reasonable positions and positions of give and take in the various fora where we are meeting with the Soviet Union. So I think we agree on the importance of all of those matters and I might say that I admire very much the strong statements, and for that matter, leadership, that came from the Canadian side in the Korean airliner catastrophe. The Canadian position was immediate and strong, well out in front of many other countries.
- Q. Mr. Schultz, the recent casualties by marines in Lebanon has raised concerns about the status of the American forces there. Will they have to be just left there to take further casualties or can steps be taken to protect them or do they have to keep going?

- A. (S) Any casualties of course are matters of great concern and concern on the part of the President and all of us. The marines are there to serve a purpose, they're there along with the representatives of other countries and the multinational force of Italy, France and the United Kingdom, and we are determined to see that purpose through and that's why they are there. As far as defending themselves is concerned, they will defend themselves.
- Q. Mr. Schultz, yesterday for the presentation of the toasts, both of you stressed the friendship of the two countries and usefulness of these meetings to solve bilateral issues. One issue of great importance to Nova Scotia is the boundary issue and the fishing rights on Georges Banks. Do you believe that we'll have to go all the way to the Hague before we get a solution to that problem?
- A. (S) Well if it takes that then we'll do that but we'll do it in a good spirit, in a sense of presenting our respective sides and in a sense of being prepared to accept whatever the verdict is. So I think that a good way to approach that, the subject of dispute over fishing matters, is something that I find as a Foreign Minister exists with many countries and fish seem to be a source of great tension somehow, but we want to resolve these issues and I think in the case of West Coast salmon, to take another example, we did manage to keep things under control during the current fishing season and we both have agreed to instruct our negotiators to do everything they can to bring about a positive result in that particular negotiation.
- Q. May I ask if you have discussed that issue, Mr. MacEachen, with your colleague, or if you intend to discuss it at future meetings?
- A. (M) The question of fish?
- Q. The question of Georges Bank and the question of the boundary on the Gulf of Maine?
- A. (M) Well the question of the boundary is now, by agreement with both countries, before the Court.
- Q. You don't forecast an out-of-court settlement.

- A. (M) No because we did our best to reach a conclusion, our best efforts didn't achieve that and we have put the matter before the International Court. The question of Georges Bank is before the Court, we are preparing each of us a case and it will be determined by the Court. So that is our decision and that is not part of our discussion because that is in a sense an issue that has been dealt with in the past in that way. We did talk about, as the Secretary has stated not only about Pacific salmon but also the impact of possible investigations on the Canadian fishery by United States authorities but we don't have at the moment, in a sense, major immediate live issues except on the necessity of concluding a treaty with respect to the Pacific salmon.
- Q. I'd like to return to the Gromyko/Genscher talks, are you more or less optimistic of breaking the deadlock ...
- A. (S) Well as I said I have no information directly from Mr. Genscher about the content of his discussions so I don't have a basis for answering your question.
- Q. Tass quoted Gromyko as saying an agreement in Geneva was still possible
- A. (S) I'm glad to hear it.
- Q. Mr. MacEachen, in all of the briefings leading up to these meetings, it's been suggested that in no way are you carrying the message to the Middle East on behalf of Mr. Schultz. Nevertheless you have presumably spent several hours discussing the Middle East and I was wondering what sort of message on your own behalf you would be carrying to the Middle East, and inasmuch as you're going to visit Damascus and Cairo, and Amman, and possibly Beirut, what effect do you think you could have on the current situation in the Middle East?
- A. (M) Well the first point, it is true that we did spend some time on the Middle East. I'm leaving for that part of the world tonight and I wanted to get the benefit of Mr. Schultz's experience in that area, and indeed we did discuss the matter, but I'm not carrying any specific messages to the Middle East. My purpose is to conduct bilateral visits in five countries and to assess the situation. I have no plan to bring about peace there. I have expressed support not only in our

discussions this morning, but earlier, for the Reagan peace plan which offers the best promise for progress. I realize that the situation is very difficult and that no one, certainly not myself, sees the light that would ensure a settlement, but I certainly would encourage, and did encourage, Mr. Schultz to continue those efforts in the prospect that at some point there will be a breakthrough. I think we have to continue those efforts. But as far as Canada is concerned we do not seek a special role in that process.

Q. Mr. MacEachen, what is Canada's position regarding the increasing externally-supported attacks on Nicaragua? Do you think that Canada can do anything in this situation, and did you discuss the matter with Secretary Schultz?

A. (M) We have, as a matter of policy, indicated our support for the Contadora group recently at New York. I expressed our political support for that effort and expressed an interest in contributing to that process if in our judgement we could make a contribution. I believe it is a step ahead that the twenty-one points of the Contadora Ministers have now been agreed and it remains to be seen how they can be implemented through a political process. I also mentioned the speech that the President of the United States made to Congress in April on Central America and that his suggestion with respect to a possible military verified withdrawal of forces from that area was a constructive one and that should receive international support. If the Contadora Group could accelerate a process leaning in that direction then it would be very constructive in the Canadian point of view.

Q. Do you have a position on the attacks on Nicaragua?

A. (M) I have not discussed specifically the attacks on Nicaragua. I have already discussed on an earlier occasion with Mr. Schultz our view as to how a military, in our view how the solution to the situation in Central America does not rest in the military root. That is a Canadian point of view that we have discussed in the past and to which I refer today.

Q. Did you press Mr. Schultz to perhaps do what he could to speed approval of gas exports from Nova Scotia, offshore gas, anywhere else to the United States.

A. (M) No I didn't press, not yet, that may come in the future.

Thanks for the tip.

Q. During the past couple of days you both spoke somewhat about the good relationships between Canada and the United States. At the moment there are a number of outstanding issues, particularly in the area of trade, for instance natural gas exports, steel and so on. Can you tell us what progress has been reached in those areas.

A. (M) Well on natural gas, we did discuss that. I think that that is a situation that is moving but there was a more accommodating atmosphere in that area in our meeting today. We have attempted to make our gas export policy more market sensitive and without speaking for Mr. Schultz, I think that has been noted by him. On specialty steel of course we have brought to the attention of the American authorities the impact of the application of Article 19 on Canadian sales and we are presently working, Mr. Reagan is working Mr. Brock, on possible solutions. We don't know if they will take place but certainly it is an area where discussions and possible action is in place.

(S) I would add a point, the trading relationship between the United States and Canada is the largest country-to-country trading relationship in the world and I think you can take two facts, inferences, from that fact. Number one, we must be doing something right, number two there will always be problems and so these problems come and go and we try to work them out. I think when we talked the last time we talked a lot about trucking and lumber. We didn't talk about those anymore because those problems have been dealt with. I think that the proposal, the paper put forward by Mr. Regan on behalf of the Canadian government on trade is a very interesting one and he proposes that we go about the continued opening of trade, and I believe that something like 80% of the trade takes place without any tariffs, quotas, or anything, but continued opening on the basis of a sectoral approach. We think that offers some interesting possibilities. So I would expect to see that pursuit on specialty steel and petro-chemicals

I think were two areas that were put forward by Canada as subjects for discussion.

- Q. Mr. MacEachen, could we have your opinion on acid rain? Do you feel there has been a set back or has the negotiations or the talks slowed somewhat?
- A. (M) No I don't think that the talks have slowed. While yesterday we weren't able to conclude to the point where we could decide to have bilateral discussions looking to a bilateral agreement, I think the presence of Mr. Ruckelshaus and Mr. Schultz indicates the importance that the United States Government attaches to this question. While I have to say that we would be much better pleased if Mr. Ruckelshaus had been able to disclose a final decision of the Administration that we could support, nevertheless, we have made some progress in terms of acknowledging together that there is a real problem. The United States Administration is deeply concerned and that what is in issue now is what programs could be put in place. I'm aware that since we began our discussions more than a year ago, that is the discussions between Mr. Schultz and myself, we have made progress, but we haven't yet reached the goals that Canada wishes.
- Q. The four points raised by Mr. Ruckelshaus, as where will the money come from, who is going to pay, how are we going to administer the rules and what kind of rules we will have. Do you have any opinion on how Canada views these four points.
- A. (M) No I don't have an opinion on these four points because they are issues that are the responsibility of the United States Administration. Mr. Ruckelshaus has made clear the situation that he has to deal with and I think that is the responsibility, and not for me to make comments on how each of them could be addressed.
- Q. Question for Mr. Schultz. At the time of cease fire in Lebanon you said that was the first step for withdrawal of many of the foreign forces out of the country. Do you think it would be feasible to try and bring about yet another Israeli partial withdrawal in the absence of any Syrian movement.

- A. (S) Well I think in Lebanon right now of course the effort is to see that the cease fire does hold, that observers can be put in place, that the national reconciliation and broadening the base of government discussions go forward. I believe that if those things can take place successfully then we have the basis for working on the withdrawal of foreign forces and of course that subject will be kept up front and precisely how that ought to be managed and who should do what is a matter for negotiation.
- Q. As the Canadian Government has become more actively involved in the East Coast fishery ... has this lead the United States to renew talks about the possibility of investigating price setting and posing duties?
- A. (S) Well countervailing duty and dumping cases can be brought by United States citizens and it is up to them to decide if they want to bring case, and if they do then that will be taken up by the organization within the Commerce Department. That's the process and I'll just stand on that process.
- Q. I believe that some Canadian officials (inaudible)
- A. (S) Well you understand that a case under the Countervail Duty Law is not an action of the United States Government. It's an action that is open to anyone in the United States; a competent party that feels in some way aggrieved under our law so that a decision about whether a case is going to be brought is up to individuals then the governmental authority examines the case and decides what to do about it and I might say that the Canadian Government or whatever government or party involved has ample opportunity to provide information.
- (M) May I make a comment. You mentioned the restructuring. I don't think that the issue that may arise as a result of the interest of Senator Cohen has anything to do with the restructuring program in the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland fisheries. It's quite a separate matter.

- Q. Mr. MacEachen, you mentioned earlier that Canada has an interest in contributing to the process in Central America. Did you make any commitments of what we might contribute there, was there any response from Mr. Schultz in terms of an interest in the Canadian contribution in Central America?
- A. (M) No, I have made no commitments. We haven't had any request even from the Contadora Group and if a request for assistance or a contribution were made, we would obviously consider it. But without knowing much more about the circumstances that might prevail it wouldn't be possible to give any commitment in advance.
- Q. Mr. MacEachen, a moment ago Mr. Schultz suggested that one of the problems in the Middle East is the withdrawal of foreign forces out of Lebanon. You're going to be going to Damascus and I believe Syria was mentioned as a specific example. Could you enlarge a little bit on exactly what it is you will be talking about in Damascus and how the Canadian position is either similar to or closely aligned to that of the American position and what sort of effect or effort you will be able to bring in Damascus to restore some sort of order. What are you going to be saying.
- A. (M) The first point is that this is the first time that a Canadian Minister has ever visited Damascus in an official capacity, and has ever had a dialogue with the Government of Syria and I think that is a very important objective in itself for Canada now to engage in a discussion to understand more of what Syria wants to do, why it is pursuing certain courses. That is a very important object in itself that I intend to pursue. But beyond that I do not intend to present a proposal or to attempt to inject Canada into a situation for which we do not have an obvious role.
- Q. I would like to ask the Minister why it is that we do not have an obvious role when this is a situation that has been going on for years and Canada has a well formulated foreign policy and at least you can explain to them what the Canadian position is or attempt to do something. Is this surely just a fact finding mission after decades of knowledge between the two countries. Are you not going to say something that would be of a definitive value in putting forward or extending a peacekeeping role.

- A. (M) Well most of my life I have been searching to say things that are of difinitive value and if I find something I certainly will say it in Damascas.

Canada/Mexico Press Conference
November 2, 1983 - 1715.
The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen

Date

November 2, 1983

Number/Numéro

FPR-1025

SSEA We can begin by telling you we have just completed a series of meetings over the past two days with Mr. Sepulveda, the Foreign Minister of Mexico, and his colleagues. The meetings were held in the context of the Canada/Mexico Joint Ministerial Committee, which meets every two years. Mr. Regan has had trade discussions with his Mexican counterparts, Mr. Hernandez, Mr. Whelan had talks on agriculture with the Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Garcia, Mr. Chretien had discussions on energy matters with the Secretary of Energy, Mr. Labastida, and the Foreign Secretary and I had our counterpart discussions on international issues. The meetings, I think, were very good. The big thing is that we have re-affirmed our bilateral interest in each other. We have found a lot of interests to discuss and that has been particularly true in trade, agriculture and energy affairs. and particularly in energy where cooperation could be enhanced by the exchange of information not only in the oil sector, but also in respect of coal and nuclear technology. There are possibilities for strengthening our bilateral relations, we explored those. Also, we had discussions, as I mentioned, on international questions. I won't say anything further, I think I will turn the floor over to my colleague, who may wish to make a statement and then we can carry on.

For. Secy: I want to say only that we share your views, Mr. Vice-Prime Minister. I think that the Mexican mission is also very happy with the results of the meeting we have had. We find them very provocative, they have been a confirmation of what was already known, the special interest the Mexican Government has in having a very close link with Canada and with the Canadian Government. I am certain that

with the groundwork we have done within the last few days, we have sufficient basis for an extremely fruitful work ahead of us, and one that will benefit our two countries. Thank you very much for your hospitality also. Thank You.

/Reuters

P. Majendie / Where will Mexico be going - to the bank - to negotiate the next four billion dollars for re-scheduling its debt. I believe negotiations are due to start some time in the near future, do you have a date when they will start?

For. Sécy: Well, I may remind you that I am the Minister for Foreign Affairs, not the Minister for Finance. As you know, Mexico has gone through a process of re-financing of the debt it has. My understanding is, it has been settled in every respect, but since that is not my jurisdiction, I think I will just say that.

P. Majendie Do you think it will pose problems for Mexico to have to continue the austerity measures that they have at the moment? Like restricting imports, so do you have a trade surplus at the moment, by restricting imports Do you think this can pose major problems for your country?

For. Sécy: I am certain it will not.

E. Stewart (CP) I wonder if you discussed the situation in El Salvador in any way. I recall that Mr. Pépin, when he was in New York, a few weeks ago, spoke at least of the possibility of some role, some Canadian role, in El Salvador at the request of the Contadora Group, and I was wondering - at the possible request of the Contadora Group - and I was wondering if you discussed that in any way?

For. Sécy: We examined the situation in Central America. I was able to provide Mr. MacEachen with the views of the Contadora Group. We of course had a previous conversation on this topic as a matter of fact, we did that in March, here in Ottawa. We met again in September, in New York, and on these three occasions I provided Mr. MacEachen with our own interpretation of the facts and the diplomatic efforts the Contadora Group is undertaking, in order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Central America. We believe that we have made some progress in this respect. At the end of September, we informed the Secretary-General of the U.N. of the agreement that five Central American Governments under the auspices of the Contadora Group had reached its so-called document of objectives, which has the basic principles for a settlement in Central America regard this as a very important step forward. We think that if this set of principles is fully respected, there is a good possibility

for finding a solution in Central America.

E. Stewart Well, I wonder what role you envisage for Canada? I would like to ask Mr. MacEachen what role he sees for Canada in that area of the world?

For. Secy: What we have asked governments that we highly respect, and that we deem important in world affairs, and that is, of course, the case of Canada, we have asked and obtained by the way, support for our diplomatic efforts. The Canadian Government has been very specific in this respect. We also regard as important the diplomatic influence these governments may be able to exert in order to convince all parties concerned that the path undertaken by the Contadora Group is the right one and perhaps the only one that may be able to achieve a peaceful solution to these problems.

SSEA In reply to your question directed to me, I reiterate Canadian support for the efforts of the Contadora Group. We have indicated that support in the past, we believe that the regional effort as exemplified in the Contadora Group is the best possible approach, and we are committed to its support. And of course we are deeply committed to a peaceful resolution of the problems in Central America.

E. Stewart: Number 1 - I am interested in what diplomatic influence and on whom you would like Canada to exercise it, of course. Also, again, was there any discussion of a Canadian peace-keeping, or observation, force of any kind?

For. Secy: Well, on the first part of your question: there are a number of governments who are directly involved in the conflict. It is very obvious that the five Central American countries are the ones who have the largest participation and the largest responsibility for sorting the whole crisis. By that I mean, not only the political or the military problems, but also other problems that are there, such as, economic and social ones, that by the way are included in the document of objectives. So, they are the ones mainly responsible for solving their own issues, and the Contadora Group has been very clear on this. There is also a participation on the part of the Contadora Group and of course on that account, we have undertaken certain responsibilities of a political nature, basically. There are other countries outside the region that have an influence on events in Central America. They may have

/operations different degrees of participation, or influence, and inasmuch as they may be able to have an impact in the results we undertake, we regard these as important, and as something that may require the influence I was mentioning beforehand. Now, as to peace-keeping operations: We did review the experience of the U.N. in different parts of the world. We did review other /not within the framework of the United Nations, and I thought it was very useful in my particular case, to gain the experience Canada has had in peace-keeping operations in different parts of the world. In that respect, I was very happy to review this issue, in order to see what the problems are in establishment of a peace-keeping operation, and how they can be solved.

CTV B. Nelson Gentlemen, I wonder if you would be kind enough to give an outline of what discussions you had on the invasion of Grenada and Mr. Sepulveda. I was wondering if you could tell us if, during those discussions, you had expressed a wish that Canada would take a stronger line in condemning the invasion of Grenada principally because of the possible dangers that that action may repeat itself somewhere in Central American. Was that a concern of yours at any time in the discussions?

For. Secy: If I may answer the last part of the question. From what I have read in different documents, deeds, newspapers, or releases from Parliamentary debates, the position undertaken by the Canadian Government is very similar to the one Mexico has also expressed. If I am correct, you, in Parliament, was it, am I correct? A statement was made in this respect, and I noticed how close the position of the two governments were.

SSEA We did discuss the situation in Grenada, no doubt about that. I think that the Secretary has kept himself quite well-informed, about what the Prime Minister, and my colleague Mr. Regan stated in the House of Commons, in the past week. As I mentioned in the House of Commons today, the resolution, -or resolutions, on the situation in Grenada, will be dealt with at the United Nations, and that will give us a further opportunity to indicate our views on the situation. I just don't know exactly what form these resolutions will take at the/time, but we will have to deal with them and make clear in a Statement, likely, how we see the situation and that would be a more formal indication of our views.

/present

F. Bastien/Radio Cda The question I wanted to put to you, or push that argument a bit further, if I may. I was wondering if, in the course of the discussions, whether you discussed the possibility of perhaps in the future, harmonizing your positions in a more direct way, in view of the fact that Canada and Mexico share the same neighbour?

(laughter)

SSEA I always give the guest the first opportunity...

(laughter)

For. Secy: Well, surely one of the aims of these ministerial meetings, of the Joint Ministerial Commission, is precisely to coordinate positions on different matters. In the case of the political issues that are the particular responsibility of Mr. MacEachen and myself, yes, I think that we aim at establishing a mechanism that may provide us with all the tools for consultation and coordination, and / information, as well, on different issues of common interest. In the three opportunities we have had for meetings and discussing the affairs of the world, I have found in every instance, the clear possibility of establishing such coordination. Of course in very many instances, this coordination cannot always be previous to the events. Sometimes we are surprised by how quickly events take place and also I think that in every case, we would prefer to consult before anything happens. Sometimes events overtake us. So, this means that whenever we have that possibility, I am certain that we shall make every effort to consult previous to events, but if it happens afterwards, we shall do our very best to take a common position on a specific issue.

SSEA Well, I have found that on quite a number of issues we discussed, we were, generally, in the same field. Maybe there are, if we were to write resolutions, we might use different words, but I think generally we saw the situation from a similar point of view. And on the consultation, or coordination, I think that is very important. You ask the question with respect to our neighbour - and we would have appreciated consultation from our neighbour, at least Canada would - more consultation, prior to the recent events, I think we have made that clear.

F. Bastien/Radio Cda:combined this lack of consultation and the invasion itself? Doesn't that bring to you more urgently, does that bring the issue of necessity to consult to a more acute level?

SSEA: I believe that one of the principal objectives of effective international diplomacy and action, one of the principal requirements is maximum prior consultation and minimum of surprises. I think that particularly when concerns of a country can be affected or interests of a country can be affected by the actions of another. Surely that is the time when consultation can be very helpful. I certainly speak for Canada when I express the view that we will attempt with our friends, the Mexicans, to consult as much as possible in the field of international questions. But the matter of consultations is much more pointed seems when it comes to an incident like Grenada, to which we have to react, and upon which subject we have views and counsel to offer. I am not making any other point except that in the consultation context.

P. Majendie: Do you think that the Grenada invasion heightened the risk of a similar U.S. incursion in Nicaragua? On that specific point, what is your opinion?

For. Sécy: Well, I have no claim to become a prophet; it is a very risky profession. But anyhow, what is true, is that the invasion of Grenada has increased the regional tensions altogether in Central America. That makes, perhaps, the diplomatic task, the political undertakings of the Contadora Group more difficult. We would prefer an easing of the tensions in Central America, and we may find ourselves with larger constraints in terms of negotiations. I couldn't answer your question, because I don't think anyone can predict what may happen in the near future. What I can see very clearly is a greater tension, a greater difficulty in negotiating the very difficult issues we have before us.

SSEA: Is that the time to stop...?

Hostess: We have one more question, Sir, if I may.

United Nations: I wonder if Canada and Mexico might be working on any "joint draft" that they might put forward themselves, or whether you are putting your support behind any draft now in existence?

SSEA: We haven't discussed a particular draft. Our delegations in New York, well I speak for the Canadian Delegation, is following the situation very closely. At the last word, there were two resolutions in play. One was proposed

by Nicaragua & Zimbabwe, I believe. The second was to be put forward by Trinidad. I don't know exactly, I have both texts but I have not, I am not finally aware of which text has gone to the vote. I find the situation changes very rapidly in New York. The report that I am giving now could be outdated. But when we come to the vote on whatever resolution is before the General Assembly, and we will declare our position and probably make a statement.

E. Stewart: I just want to go back to one of my earlier questions, and that was on El Salvador. Do I take it that there was no discussion of any kind of Canadian presence, or a peace-keeping force in that country?

SSEA: We have not been presented with a proposal.

E. Stewart: There was no discussion between the two of you as to what role Canada might play?

SSEA: We discussed the general political role, namely, support, understanding and encouragement. But we haven't advanced to the point where we are considering, as we are doing in the Commonwealth, context at the present time, a possible security role with the consent of the Grenadians in Grenada.

Q. Perhaps I could address this to Mr. Regan. I noticed today that you announced two Lines of Credit to Mexico - one for 20 and one for 10 million dollars - Was this a result of the discussions over the last two days, and were there other trade areas that are under discussion between you?

G.R. We also, in addition to signing the two Lines of Credit by EDC, through financial institutions in Mexico, to deal primarily with small purchases and to facilitate the rapid handling of them, we also had a meeting of the Canada/Mexico business forum, with a group of 28 businessmen from Mexico and fifty businessmen from Canada, and had discussions on coal investment opportunities, export opportunities, and current market conditions in Mexico and Canada. In the area of the Joint Ministerial Committee in the area of industrial cooperation, we specifically discussed Canadian involvement in the phase-in of the Mexico City sub-way and other urban transportation projects; the Mexican satellite program, and particularly the earth-segment in its applications, the supply of oil and gas equipment to Pemex, because Canada of course specializes in many types of gas and oil equipment, and has sold it in all parts of the world, but very little to Mexico at the present time, and the supply of electricity generating and transmitting equipment to Mexico's electrical utilities company. We also discussed the possibility of

increasing the sales of Mexican products in Canada, The possibility of direct shipment of various types of vegetables and other tropical fruits, and we, in general, discussed ways in which trade could be increased as well as investment. Mexico has a review agency similar to FIRA in relation to foreign investment. We have indicated that our people would only be interested in investments in Mexico that fitted within their desires, but while our investments in Mexico at the present time, Canadian businessmen are substantial, they amount only to something like 1-1/2 percent of the total foreign investment in Mexico. The Mexican Minister, Secretary. Hernandez, expressed particularly the interest in additional joint ventures. We have something like a 160 Canadian companies involved in investment and joint ventures in Mexico. We think there are ample opportunities for greater cooperation in that direction. We will be encouraging Canadian businessmen directly, and through the Canada/Mexico business forum, to pursue those opportunities.

SSEA: The last answer is the best.

G.R. Thank you very much.


Hostess Thank you, gentlemen, very much.

SECRETARY
OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS.

SECRÉTAIRE
D'ÉTAT AUX
AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES.

NOTES FOR A TOAST OFFERED BY THE
HONOURABLE ALLAN J. MACEachEN,
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
ON THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT
TO OTTAWA OF THE FOREIGN
MINISTER OF COLOMBIA,
H.E. RODRIGO LLOREDA CAICEDO

FEBRUARY 20, 1984



It is a pleasure for me to welcome you, Doctor Lloreda, to Canada today. Your visit to our capital and the opportunity it has provided to continue discussions on matters of mutual interest is a significant catalyst in the development of closer relations between Canada and Colombia. For too long both Canada and Colombia have overlooked the wealth of possibilities for mutual cooperation. In recent years, however, the threats to peace and stability in the Caribbean and in Central America, our common membership in the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Caribbean Development Bank have led Canada and Colombia to take a much greater interest in each other and in the political, economic and social development of the whole region. There is need for us to consult more closely.

I am pleased to note that our two countries are now realizing some of these possibilities. An excellent indicator has been the level of trade between Canada and Colombia which has doubled in the past five years. This is due in part to the complementarity of our economies and the similarities of our development priorities in such areas as mining, hydro-electricity and communications over difficult terrains. My colleague, Mr. Pepin, the Minister of External Relations, during his recent visit to Colombia announced the establishment of a \$30 million concessional financing facility to provide Colombia with access to Canadian goods in the fields of energy, transportation and communications. Canada organized a transfer of technology Fair in Bogotá in 1982 and this was so successful that we are preparing for a second exhibition in May of this year in the city of Medellín. In honour of the 15th anniversary of the Andean Pact, we have invited more than 200 businessmen from the Andean region to attend the Fair.

Doctor Lloreda and I signed today a line of credit for \$10 million to assist small and medium sized Colombian industries using Canadian equipment to become more productive in such fields as forestry and agriculture.

Our Ministers of Agriculture have also identified other opportunities for cooperation in the agricultural sector and we have only begun to identify further areas where Canada and Colombia can cooperate on projects that will serve our mutual advantage.

Equally important, we have now begun a process of close consultation on political questions. Your visit to Ottawa today is part of this process of consultations that you and I began at the United Nations General Assembly. It was furthered by the visit of my colleague, the Minister for External Relations, to Bogotá in November last year.

It is particularly opportune to have this occasion to discuss the crisis in Central America with the Foreign Minister of a Contadora country. There is a growing Canadian public interest in Central America. There is every reason for Canadians to be interested and to be concerned. Geography alone is a reason. It is the area closest to us of serious instability and East/West confrontation. We have been and continue to be appalled by the human rights violations that take place, most particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala. We are concerned about the need for economic development in order that the root causes of so many of the region's problems can be addressed.

You will not be surprised to learn that the Canadian public do not speak with one voice on Central America. For this reason, it may be useful for me to re-state briefly the Government's position on Central America.

We believe that any meaningful and enduring solution to the problems of Central America must come from the region. Accordingly, we believe that Contadora, in close and active collaboration with the five countries of Central America, offers the best opportunity to achieve a solution. We have been impressed by the remarkable efforts which have been made by Contadora and the Central American countries to build a framework of reconciliation. The Contadora meeting in Panama last month marked the first anniversary of this initiative with solid progress in approaching seemingly insurmountable political differences.

I would like to congratulate Colombia and the other Contadora members for their initiative and courage in taking on the complex and potentially explosive situation in Central America. You and your colleagues are realists. You recognize that you have not found a magic formula for the resolution of conflicts in Central America any more than you have a panacea for the underlying socio-economic causes of so many of these problems. Nevertheless, what you have achieved is not simply statements of good intentions. It is already significant that on bringing together all of the countries of Central America to discuss and agree upon a series of socio/political security objectives, you have found a consensus which over-rides deep and continuing conflict. By this means and by making the international community more sensitive to the dangers inherent to the situation of Central America, you have already forestalled a wider conflagration.

I indicated at the United Nations General Assembly that once political consensus had been reached Canada would respond sympathetically to invitations to help with

economic and perhaps other support. To enable the Canadian Government to examine more effectively those requests which may be forthcoming, I am instructing Canadian officials to consult with the three commissions of the Contadora group which will be set up in Venezuela to review social, economic and military verification requirements. I have also authorized our officials to accept an invitation to consult with the Action Committee for Socio Economic Development in Central America (CADESCA) which has been established in Mexico with a view to assessing and coordinating economic requirements of the region.

We have already agreed to increase our commitments to Central America. Canadian aid to the region has tripled for the five-year period 1982-87 to over \$100 million. Last month I announced a new component of this program which was a \$13 million line of credit for assistance in cattle and fertilizers to Nicaragua. This complements the most important program we have in Honduras - the second poorest country in the hemisphere - and the increasing levels of assistance given to Costa Rica.

It is important to recognize that the aid support given by Canada to the countries of Central America is not intended to penalize or to reward on the basis of political complexion. Such a policy would be totally inconsistent with our objective to help countries of the region to overcome those social and economic disabilities which are the cause of social, political and economic injustice.

However, where there are consistent and massive abuses of human rights, a line is drawn. In the case of El Salvador and Guatemala, our bilateral aid relations have been suspended as a result of the internal security situation and its effect on human rights and the difficulty of delivering aid programs in these countries. Our views on human rights violations were made clear in our voting last fall at the United Nations. However, purely humanitarian assistance is provided through non-governmental and international organizations to help meet the increasingly desperate needs of the victims in these countries.

For these same reasons, we have taken a lead in offering to accept refugees from the area. Last year we accepted 2,000; this year it will be 2,500. Canada has also established a special program for amnestied political prisoners from El Salvador. We have accepted 400 persons under this program, including close relatives.

In this same context, I welcome the commitment taken by the USA Administration, based on the Kissinger Commission, to address some of the basic problems of the region through economic support. In the case of El Salvador, I am encouraged by indications that the proposed conditionality of USA aid upon performance in the human rights field will stand. We are, however, concerned about the extent to which military aid is a major component of the Kissinger Proposals. In keeping with Canada's position against third party intervention in Central America and the supply of armaments to opposing factions, we oppose continued military support for anti-Sandinista insurgents just as we oppose the promotion of, and support for, armed insurgency in El Salvador and Guatemala by outside powers.

We do not believe in military solutions for Central America. Moreover, we do believe that any attempt to impose military solutions will decrease rather than promote stability in the area. Militarization engenders political polarization. The militarization of Central America, whether of the left or of the right, has the consequence of weakening those moderate indigenous political forces which, in harness with Contadora, are indispensable if national reconciliation in these countries is to be secured.

Equally indispensable will be the full cooperation of the United States and Cuba. In September, I welcomed the offer of verifiable demilitarization made earlier by President Reagan. There has been some positive reaction from Cuba and Nicaragua - but still no dialogue.

I have been talking at length about an important part of the world that I do not yet know at first hand. I am anxious to correct this omission. I am planning to visit Central America as soon as possible. I expect to learn from this visit and to have the opportunity to express more directly Canada's support for the Contadora peace initiative.

Doctor Lloreda, we have already had productive discussions and I look forward to the further development of our conversations.

May I now ask our guests to join with me in a toast - and I am not certain whether it would be more appropriate to take up the coffee cup or the wine glass - to His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Colombia.

DPM/SSEA Scrum - Armenian Terrorists, Seals
and Observers to El Salvador Elections.

Date

March 13, 1984

Number/Numéro

FPR 0267

Q: Due to the concerns that resurrected as a result of the arrest of the four Armenians, I am wondering if you have advised Canadian diplomats abroad to be much more aware of the terrorists' threat, in light of what happened two years ago?

SSEA: Yes, we have notified our missions abroad that there have been some arrests and that therefore they ought to exercise some extra caution and vigilance in the future and in the immediate days ahead.

Q: Why do you say that they should exercise extra vigilance in the immediate days ahead? What do you fear?

SSEA: I think that it's been made clear by terrorists themselves that they wouldn't look very kindly on countries which arrested any of their membership who might be accused of terrorist acts. And this, I think is what is happening in this case.

Q: Are there requests coming to the Canadian Embassy, either Washington or the Embassies in Europe, about the seal hunt and requests to ban it or face the consequences?

SSEA: No, I don't find extraordinary traffic on that subject from other countries at the present time. We're being kept informed but I don't think that the traffic of information or telegrams is unusual.

Q: Nobody is asking any questions about what the policy is in light of the threat of a boycott?

SSEA: I think that our policy has been stated so clearly and our views have been stated so frequently in Europe, to Ministers, to Parliamentarians, that probably they're not asking us anymore.

Q: Are we sending any observers to the El Salvador elections?

SSEA: We have been asked, as have about 30 other countries, to send observers to the Presidential election in El Salvador, I believe on the 25th of March. Quite a number of countries have decided to send observers. I have given it some thought and I think, all things considered, that it would be a good idea if we did have a group of credible persons who could observe the election and make an objective and factual report

to the Government and that would be useful. So I've asked Mr. Gordon Fairweather, Chief Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission, to head an observer team to El Salvador. He will be joined by the Assistant Chief Electoral Officer, Mr. Gould, I believe his name is. He is Assistant to the Chief Electoral Officer, and our Ambassador to El Salvador will also be a member of the observer team, Mr. Filleul.

Q: So there will be three members?

SSEA: That's our idea. We're sending two from Canada and our Ambassador will join them on the spot. We hope that the facilities and support will be such that these persons can tell us really what went on.

Q: You didn't send observers to the last one. What changed your mind about this one?

SSEA: Well, I think that the mandate is clearer, in my opinion. The assurances given by the authorities there are better, namely that they will provide support facilities, give them access to necessary information, and I think that was an inducement, plus the fact that other countries like the United Kingdom, the Organization of American States, not a country, the Netherlands, Belgium and others have agreed to send observers. And I would personally like to have the facts.

Q: The level of violence is about the same, the possible manipulation is about the same - those are reasons that kept you away last time.

SSEA: This time there may be violence or there may a danger to life in certain areas. Their assurances have been given with respect to the provision of security. I think that all told it will valuable to know what went on during that period, how the election was conducted and to have people who electoral process, far from it, I regard it as an effort to tell us what is going on - if the observers, whom I think are credible, find that the process was useful, then they are free to say so. If they have criticism to make of it, then that should be done as well. So I think that all told we are better off with reliable information than without it.

Q.: Are you likely to add El Salvador to your Central American trip in that case?

SSEA: No, I haven't any plans at the present time to do that.

Q.: Minister, coming to the seal hunt just for the moment is the review process on the seal hunt still underway or has Cabinet decided to just tough it out during this publicity time?

SSEA: The situation in under the Minister's review. He has been answering questions in the House for a number of days and as far as I'm concerned, if there is any further comment to make, it should come from the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.

Q. Can you tell us about this telex that came from the Canadian Consulate in Boston - the threatening telex from the Mac Donald's buyers, Gortons, with the deadline of November 9th (sic) that came into External Affairs? The telex inferring that if the seal hunt wasn't stopped the MacDonald buyer would not buy any more Canadian fish?

SSEA: No, I cannot tell you about that telex.

DPM/SSEA Press Scrum -
March 30

Date

4 April 1984

Number/Numéro

FPR-0371

DPM/SSEA: No, I don't have any information. he is an official of the UN whom I met when I was in Syria and I was greatly impressed with him, but I think it's up to the United Nations in this case to clarify the reasons why he would be treated this way by the Syrian.

Q: So the Canadian government has had no contact with him?

DPM/SSEA: No, but that doesn't mean to say that we won't be interesting ourselves after the UN has done its part.

Q: Mr. Fairweather met with reporters yesterday, and he was asked would he go back to El Salvador for the run-off elections and if it's not just half a job if we don't go back. I understand we have to be invited first of all, but if we were invited, would Canada send observers for the run-offs?

DPM/SSEA: Well, as you say, we haven't been invited officially and I think the same reasons would likely convince me to respond favourably, unless the situation changes, and I would hope that the same group would be prepared to serve if they were asked, but we haven't faced that yet. I thought their report was quite balanced and quite useful and it's an objective benchmark against which we can refer the issue of how well the elections went.

Q: Concern has been expressed by NGO's about the increasing militarization of Honduras. Will you be making representations to the government about the harbouring of Contras and the militarization of Honduras?

DPM/SSEA: I will be raising the whole question of militarization in my discussions in Central America. I met with the Council on International Cooperation yesterday, which is an umbrella organization of NGO's and we had a very deep discussion about Honduras and Nicaragua and obviously militarization is one of the keys. It is the key question in my view in Central America.

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Q: ...bring up the response to the U.S. government protest over the Canadian sports pool when you meet with Mr. Shultz this weekend?

DPM/SSEA: No, I don't intend to raise that subject.

Q: I thought you were talking to Mr. Olivier about some sort of response. Have you been?

DPM/SSEA: I have been talking to Mr. Olivier, but I don't feel it necessary to raise this question with Mr. Shultz. We have other items which I think are more important, not that this isn't important, but we have to have some priority in our discussions.

Q: Is anyone with External Affairs going to raise it with the U.S. State Department?

DPM/SSEA: Well we don't have the problem. It is not our problem, so why should we raise it?

Q: Mr. MacEachen, Mr. Eagleburger apparently thought it was important enough to call in Mr. Gotlieb and talk about it. Do you not think Mr. Shultz may feel the same way.

DPM/SSEA: Maybe. I'd be surprised. I know that he's a baseball fan from years back. When we were at MIT, he was intently interested in baseball, much more than I was.

Q: You say it's not your Department's problem right now.

DPM/SSEA: What I'm saying is that I don't think that we should escalate this into an important bilateral problem at the present time. I don't see any reason to escalate it to that point. We ought to try and see the problem settled in some way, but lets not at this point, say well here is a big issue between Canada and the United Staes, so important that the Ministries have to deal with it. I don't think that we should escalate to that point, that's what I'm saying. I'm not saying that it's not a matter of interest and that it has to be resolved in some way.

Q: So it's just too early, Sir, at this point?

DPM/SSEA: Well, maybe.

Q: Sir, on another issue, concerns have been expressed about human rights and I am told the IFI has been providing Canadian assistance through our participation in the IFIs, through to Guatemala and Honduras. The

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position of the Finance Department is that they won't allow political considerations, or ideological considerations to intervene in the Human Rights issue with the IFIs. Is it the position of the government that human rights considerations are ideological and political?

DPM/SSEA: You're raising a very specific question of policy, namely, do we make decisions in the financial institutions on the basis of ideology, and the answer is no. It's been the policy of the government that we would treat applications before the financial institutions on the basis of financial and economic criteria. I think that it would be extremely difficult to operate these institutions if we had to take into account the current political flavour of a government and how it treats individuals in the country. I know that is a very important question, but it is often the case that these applications are for long-term development assistance that extends over, that brings about development and growth and incomes to people who need it in the country. Oftentimes these projects are approved at a time and not completed until maybe several governments have changed. So it's not a very good way to undertake long-term economic planning.

Q: Sir, human rights is a universal principle. Shouldn't it be applied to the operation of the international financial institutions?

DPM/SSEA: I think that it would make the work of the financial institutions very difficult and it would, I think, complicate it to the point where their functioning would be rendered ineffective or less effective.

Q: So, Canada is opposing the politicization of the institution when it's occurred with the United States and Nicaragua.

DPM/SSEA: That has been our view all along, I think it's a sound view and we're sticking to it.

RESPONSE TO THE
INTER CHURCH COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA (ICCHRLA)
BRIEF OF OCTOBER 1983
CANADIAN POLICY ON CENTRAL AMERICA

Caribbean and Central
American Relations Division
Department of External Affairs

MARCH 1984

A. Regional Peace Initiatives

- P1 "that the Government of Canada clearly and publicly state to the United States and the Honduran governments Canada's opposition to military and naval manoeuvres and to the construction of new military bases on the grounds that they undermine the spirit and the letter of the initiatives for peace undertaken by the Contadora."
- P2 "that the Canadian Government give continued and energetic encouragement to the Contadora Group in its initiatives for regional settlement of conflicts."
- P3 "that the Canadian Government seek cooperative supportive action backing regional peace initiatives such as the Contadora Group's July 17 declaration through approaches to friendly states who have indicated an interest in peaceful solutions to the conflict, including France, Spain and certain Nordic states."

The Canadian Government has been very active in its support for the Contadora group initiative as acknowledged by the Contadora Group itself in its July 17, 1983 declaration. These expressions of support took the form of personal letters from the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau to the presidents of Mexico and Venezuela when they suggested the creation of such a group in November 1982 and again, in May 1982 to the four Contadora presidents. The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs made statements on the subject in May, June, July and September of 1983.

As mentioned at the meeting of October 11, 1983, the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs had met the preceding week in New York with most Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Group to share and exchange information on the latest proposals to have come out of the September 8 meeting of Contadora. During the same week at the UN, the Prime Minister had met with Daniel Ortega, the Coordinator of the Sandinist Junta and the Minister for External Relations, M. Jean Luc Pepin, had had other meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister and the Foreign Minister of Guatemala.

Mr. MacEachen reiterated before the General Assembly of the United Nations that Canada would support concrete proposals by the Contadora Group to stop the process of militarization and he indicated Canada's intention to increase its contributions to the necessary regional economic infrastructure, through regional development institutions, when the necessary political and social stability of Central America could be guaranteed.

- P4 "that the Canadian Government condemn the funding, training and encouragement of ex-Somocista or "contra" forces in their war against

Nicaragua as well as the objective of the "destabilization" of Nicaragua in energetic public protests to the government of the United States".

The funding, training and encouragement of "contra" forces is a question that has prompted intense debate in the United States and within the Congress of that country.

Proponents of that policy believe that this overt campaign of covert activities has been and continues to be instrumental in forcing the Nicaraguan regime to review its own policy of material and logistical support for subversive movements operating within neighbouring countries. Nicaragua has indeed admitted it would end such support in exchange for treaties offering guarantees for its own internal security.

On November 11, 1983 the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously condemned such acts of aggression against the sovereignty and territorial independence of Nicaragua.

The Canadian Government has reiterated to the Governments of the United States and Honduras its serious concern about the escalation of conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras and about reports of United States involvement in military operations against Nicaragua conducted from Honduras. The Canadian Government does not favour third party intervention in Central America or the supply of armaments by any country to opposing factions in that area. The Government has expressed its position in this regard on a number of occasions to the United States Government, to Central American Governments and to other Governments concerned, including that of Cuba. Mr. MacEachen directly reiterated this position to Secretary of State Shultz in October 1983.

P5 "that the Government of Canada establish an Embassy in Managua, Nicaragua".

For over thirty years, Canada maintained a commercial delegation in Guatemala that was upgraded to full Embassy status in 1982. An Embassy was opened in San José in 1961. The extent of our representation in Central America (and Panama) was examined in 1980/81 when it became clear that the region was quickly becoming one of major interest to Canadians. On the basis of cost/opportunity and given the austerity measures prevailing in the Foreign Service establishment, it was deemed more efficient to increase the resources of our existing posts. We upgraded the Embassy in Guatemala (which is also accredited to Honduras) to the level of resident Ambassador and we hope to add an immigration capability to the existing resources. Three persons were added to the staff of the Embassy in Costa Rica in order to handle the increased workload of new development assistance activities in Nicaragua (and Costa Rica) as well as general relations work in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama.

It should be pointed out that the actual distance separating the capitals of Costa Rica and Nicaragua is equivalent to a five hour drive or a 25 minute flight.

Canadian representatives in San José make very frequent visits to Managua and maintain contact with a large number of Nicaraguan officials and citizens. Short of opening a new Embassy, which financial restrictions prevent us from doing, we view the quality of Canadian representation in Nicaragua and our awareness of the situation there as very good.

- P6 "that the Canadian Government reiterate publicly and directly its opposition to the renewal and enlargement of foreign military aid to parties in conflict in El Salvador."

This is Canadian Government policy. It has been presented successively to the governments of the region, of the United States and of Cuba. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1983, the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs stressed the importance of neutralizing the military build-up in Central America.

- P7 "that the Secretary of State for External Affairs reinitiate high-level conversations with representatives of the Salvadorean opposition and encourage his United States counterpart to follow the Canadian example."

Our position has been made very clear to the Government of El Salvador and to representatives of the FMLN-FDR. Canada is willing to participate in facilitating political discussions in whatever manner deemed useful by the parties, if requested to do so. The fact of the matter is that we have not been asked to do so by either party. We presume Ambassador Stone is in a very good position to report on ongoing discussions to Secretary Shulz. FMLN-FDR representatives can meet with Canadian Government officials on request and have done so.

- P8 "that the Canadian Government support the process of dialogue leading to full negotiations between all representatives of political forces in El Salvador."

The Canadian Government would support fully a process of dialogue between the Government of El Salvador and its (armed) opposition; however, Canada is in no position to advocate negotiations the parties do not wish to have.

- P9 "a visit to Central America in the very near future by the Secretary of State for External Affairs."

As mentioned to you at the October 11 meeting, the possibility of such a visit had been contemplated for some time. The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs will make such a visit in early April 1984. This will provide a further opportunity of

meeting some of the principal personalities of Central America and the Contadora Group. Information and views gleaned from these meetings will complement the reporting of the Canadian missions in the region and also that of other interested parties such as your Committee.

A 1) "that the Canadian Government should continue its suspension of all forms of bilateral aid to Guatemala and El Salvador."

The suspension of bilateral aid to Guatemala and El Salvador continues.

The remarks made by ICCHRLA on the Mission Administered Funds (MAF) projects and the relative increase of this program since 1980 are most disquieting.

CIDA has increased the annual maximum ceiling of such funds to \$350,000 for most countries. The nature of the projects undertaken as well as the careful implementation of them by Mission staff prompt us to question ICCHRLA's claim that the MAF program is being used as a substitute channel of bilateral aid. Mission administered funds are directed mainly towards communities, cooperative groups, and NGO's and do not endanger these bodies when they are involved in authentic development pursuits such as introduction of electricity, construction of rural schools, introduction of potable water, etc.

A 2) "that the Canadian Government immediately reconsider seriously its "core country" programme of bilateral aid to Honduras"

In determining "core country" programme eligibility the Canadian Government takes into account a large number of factors and considerations and tries to project them over a five to fifteen year period.

In the particular case of Honduras, the ICCHRLA recommendation to reconsider the eligibility of Honduras ignores important factors such as the level of economic development of Honduras and the nature of Canada's programmes there. The recommendation is based on the unrealistic view that a curtailment of our input into the management of the forestry sector, for example, would influence the Honduras Government or military to alter their approach to the current conflict with Nicaragua. The Canadian Government believes there is more to be gained in terms of support for a peaceful solution by being present in Honduras than by being absent.

Canadian development assistance proceeds from a genuine Canadian humanitarian concern for the Third World and subscribes to such general objectives of Canadian foreign policy as peace and stability. It is not

designed as a tool to reward or punish foreign governments. Canada signs an international agreement for each project of importance and is therefore committed to deliver its share of any number of agreements with a foreign country.

A 3) "that the Canadian Government should designate Nicaragua as a "core country", giving it priority for greatly increased levels of Canadian official aid"

While the focus of Canadian aid in Central America is directed towards Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua at the present time, the economic factors and growth prospects for Honduras justify the core country category. Core country eligibility is not determined by political whim but by socio-economic levels of development. As a "project country" Nicaragua remains eligible for a type of assistance which includes lines of credit, Industrial and Institutional Cooperation projects as well non-governmental organizations and mission administered funds projects funding.

ICCHRLA, in stating that Nicaragua has received less bilateral aid than any other Central American country, ignores Canadian Government contributions to Mission Administered Funds (MAF), food aid and Industrial and Institutional Cooperation programs. The total aid provided by the Government of Canada to the five Central American countries from FY 1980/81 to FY 1982/83 has been

Guatemala	\$ 6,776,000.
El Salvador	\$10,326,000.
Honduras	\$15,085,000.
Nicaragua	\$12,484,000.
Costa Rica	\$ 4,850,000.

It should be noted that the above figures do not tell the whole story. The sums shown for Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador reflect the end stages of commitments made in the 1977-1981 period while the Nicaraguan figure of \$12.48 million reflects a start-up of projects and operations in 1980 that included normal initial delays.

It is unfortunate that representations made by Canadians to the Canadian Government on the paucity of the efforts being made in Nicaragua continue to ignore figures that were released to the public in good faith. While the Government is sensitive to the generosity of Canadians towards the self-development efforts of Nicaragua, it has nothing to be ashamed of in terms of its own participation.

Official Canadian development assistance to Nicaragua includes two grants for emergency food aid, in the form of wheat: \$4,500,000 in 1981, and \$3,000,000 in 1983. The wheat provided under the latter grant

is being sold by the Nicaraguan Government to flour mills and the local currency generated will be used to construct silos and grain storage warehouses.

The food aid program was the result of a \$655,000 nutrition study; the objective of which is to prepare a long term strategy for food self-sufficiency.

The Government has allocated \$18,000,000 for Lines of Credit to Nicaragua: a \$13,000,000 Line of Credit was approved in January 1984 and will be used for the purchase of fertilizers, dairy cattle and farm equipment; the remaining \$5,000,000 will be used to assist Nicaragua in improving its potable water system.

From 1980/81 to 1982/83 Canada's official development assistance to Nicaragua has been:

	(in thousands)
Bilateral project	\$ 239,800
Food aid	\$ 4,500,200
Industrial cooperation	\$ 621,200
Institutional cooperation	\$ 1,638,700
Non-Governmental Organizations program	\$ 4,770,200
Mission Administered Funds program	\$ 714,200
	<u>\$12,484,100</u>

It should be noted that Canada provides no military assistance to any country within the region and has terminated aid programs in Guatemala and El Salvador, except for projects currently in the implementation stage, due to the security situation in those two countries. Aid to Honduras has been concentrated in the forestry and agricultural sectors and is directed at resolving grass roots problems and socio-economic infrastructure deficiencies.

A 4) "that the Canadian Government oppose loans and other technical and financial assistance in international financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, to Guatemala and El Salvador which persist in gross and systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms"

The position of the Canadian Government is well known and is similar to that of other countries which hold the view that the Charters of the International Financial Institutions of which they are members have to be respected.

The international financial organizations work on the same basis as private banks and objectively assess development projects according to their technical soundness and feasibility, financial viability and perceived economic return. As such, human rights considerations do not enter in the deliberations of such institutions decision-making process.

Consequently Canada has objected to the views of other countries trying to negate the need for a project for purely political reasons.

- A 5) "that the Canadian Government take energetic steps to prevent the transfer of Canadian military and dual purposes equipment to governments engaged in systematic and gross violations of human rights and to combattant forces in Central America".

The Canadian Government does not export military products to any country of Central America nor to any groups of combattant forces in Central America. Non-military products having a possible military application are examined according to established Cabinet guidelines and regulations and must be submitted for ministerial approval before an export permit may be issued.

The Twin Otter aircraft transaction referred to in the ICCHRLA brief was a proposed transaction for which the manufacturer sought and obtained an export permit for four civilian Twin Otters. The transaction did not materialize and is not being pursued by the parties. Two Twin Otters have been flying commercially in Guatemala since the late 1970s and are involved in a shuttle service to oil exploration sites in the Peten.

- A 6) "that the Canadian Government should recognize and reinforce Canadian non-governmental aid channels for people to people aid in Central America".

The Canadian Government has allocated for the period FY 1980/81 to FY 1982/83 the following amounts to Canadian and international NGO's for projects in Central America:

Guatemala	\$ 1,167,000.
El Salvador	665,000.
Honduras	4,325,000.
Nicaragua	4,770,000.
Costa Rica	401,000.

In most countries of Central America, the Government insists that it has to keep apprised of the involvement of foreign workers or foreign funding in socio-economic development tasks. The remarks made by ICCHRLA about the "Comite Nacional de Reconstruccion" of Guatemala arise more from suspicion than hard facts. Canadian and international NGO's have contributed to the alleviation of the plight of the indigenous people in many areas of Guatemala with the full cooperation of the Comité Nacional de Reconstruccion.

HRI "That the Canadian Government initiate through the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence or a sub-committee thereof, regular annual parliamentary hearings regarding human rights and Canadian foreign policy."

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence can examine any facet it chooses of Canadian foreign policy in relation to the management of the programs of this Department or of CIDA.

The question of the human rights performance of a government is implicit in the formulation of a corresponding policy by the Government of Canada towards that country.

An extensive review of foreign countries' human rights records by a national body would probably not add much to the findings of international institutions whose mandate it is to perform such studies and examinations.

The Canadian Government participates actively in multilateral forums on the subject of human rights and regularly receives recommendations made by specialized groups in this sphere. The material thus received is evaluated and reflected in policy formulation when feasible.

In the final analysis, it is for Parliament to decide whether it wishes to form a Parliamentary Human Rights review body or use the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence to hold hearings regarding human rights and Canadian foreign policy.

HR 2) "that the Canadian Government initiate and support measures of strong condemnation of increased human rights violations in Guatemala and El Salvador at the 1983 General Assembly of the United Nations, and publicly cite the dangerous trends in Honduras."

As in past years, the Canadian Government has been consulting with different bodies and other foreign governments to determine an appropriate action vis-a-vis various human rights situations such as the ones the ICCHRLA report mentions. The Canadian Government does not address the issue of human rights only in terms of condemnation and denunciation. It tries to put forward resolutions that could eventually modify less than satisfactory performance from various governments, and also take stock of the reports of the UN's own Rapporteur Special, where applicable.

In the case of Guatemala and El Salvador, ICCHRLA has witnessed the Canadian Government's action at the General Assembly of the United Nations last December when Canada co-sponsored a resolution on Guatemala and voted favourably on a similar resolution in the case of El Salvador.

The human rights situation in Honduras does not, in our opinion, warrant such extraordinary measures at this time.

HR 3) "that Canadian Government bilateral relations with the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador be based on a clear public recognition of the continuing gross and systematic violation of human rights by the government and military forces of these countries, and continue to denounce such violations in the strongest public terms."

The continuing suspension of bilateral development assistance is the most evident testimony to the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala that the internal situation in these countries, including human rights violations, has not improved since 1981 to point where the Canadian Government might reconsider their eligibility for bilateral assistance.

The suspension of the bilateral (government to government) assistance program is an extraordinary measure rarely taken by the Canadian Government. The maintenance of that decision is a continuing public recognition of the gross and systematic violation of human rights in those countries.

HR 4) "that the Canadian Government encourage its diplomatic personnel to initiate dialogue and seek information from representatives of independent Guatemalan and Salvadorean human rights agencies."

Such dialogue exists and is useful. Representatives of Guatemalan and Salvadorean human rights agencies have been received by officials of the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, and do meet with Canadian diplomatic staff in these two countries and/or elsewhere. The Department also receives current information bulletins provided by these and similar organizations.

A. Refugees in Temporary Situations

R 1) "We urge the Canadian Government strongly to resist efforts to relocate Guatemalan and Salvadorean refugees and support the position of the refugees themselves not to be moved further inland."

The Government of Canada shares ICCHRLA's concern over the precarious situation of Guatemalan and Salvadorean refugees in Honduras. Although moving refugee camps inland is not a permanent solution, it would nonetheless add some degree of security to their situation by lessening the threat posed by neighbouring armed forces. The UNHCR has taken the lead in securing adequate living arrangements for these refugees and we are fully supportive of their undertakings. The Government of Honduras has agreed not to relocate refugees without prior consultation and, to date, there is no evidence to suggest that it will not adhere to this agreement. Canada will support the UNHCR action in this regard and will

seek the best solution possible, bearing in mind the refugees' self-sufficiency and security.

- R 2) "We encourage the Canadian government actively to support an increased UNHCR budget for Mexico to a level of \$12 million for 1984."

The UNHCR has stated that one of their goals in Southern Mexico is to ensure adequate maintenance for all refugees in known settlements. As you are no doubt aware, we fully support the UNHCR's efforts and we will continue to urge them to dedicate the maximum available funds to this area. In this context, Canada has raised its contributions to the UNHCR to \$3 million in the present fiscal year from \$2.25 million in 1982-83.

B. Internally Displaced Refugees

- R 3) "We urge the Canadian government to support generously emergency assistance ONLY through the Canadian and international non-governmental sector to internally displaced refugees inside Guatemala and El Salvador."

Since 1981, Canada has suspended the planning of all direct bilateral aid projects with either government. Funds are allocated to reliable non-governmental organizations for various humanitarian programs and their performance is evaluated by officials who continually review the disbursement of these funds. Canada is also a major contributor to numerous international agencies, such as the International Red Cross. The latter Organization was allocated \$975,000 by Canada this year for its relief program for displaced persons in El Salvador.

C. Refugees in Flight

- R 4) "We urge the Canadian government to reinforce its policy of selecting refugees on the basis of protection as a priority factor by facilitating the admission to Canada of several extraordinary groups of Salvadoreans."

- i) We have made regular and frequent representations on behalf of political prisoners not released under the amnesty. It is our intention to continue doing so and we are prepared, whenever possible, to accept for resettlement those political prisoners who have indicated an interest in resettlement in Canada.
- ii) The Canadian Government shares your concern for the plight of Salvadoreans in El Salvador and, indeed, for those other nationals who, although in their country of citizenship, are somehow threatened. As you are no doubt aware, Canada instituted a special program for Salvadorean political prisoners earlier this year. Canadian officials are prepared, in the future, as in the past, to

examine sympathetically the applications of Salvadoreans who wish to join family members already in Canada.

iii) Our Embassy in Mexico City is fully cognizant of the needs of those who find themselves in Mexico on short-term visas. Canadian officials there have been instructed to make use of Minister's Permits to facilitate the early admission to Canada of those persons who, for whatever reason, cannot remain in Mexico to finalize the processing of their visa applications.

R 5) "We support the Canadian government's maintaining Guatemala as a visa-exempt country."

As you are no doubt aware, citizens of Guatemala wishing to leave their country must first obtain an exit visa from their government. Presuming this facility is not always available to prospective refugees, the alternative is overland travel to an adjacent country. From there, an application can be made at the nearest Canadian Embassy for resettlement in Canada, thus rendering the question of seeking a visa or not in Guatemala City purely academic.

In any event, any modification by the CEIC of the present visa requirement for Guatemalan visitors would probably be accompanied by programs designed to facilitate the selection of potential refugees and oppressed persons from within Guatemala itself.

CBC Sunday Morning - April 1
DPM/SSEA

Date	4 April 1984
Number/Numéro	FPR-0353

CBC: Canada's Minister for External Affairs today embarks on a politically charged trip to Latin America. Following two days of talks in Washington, Allan MacEachen will spend 10 days visiting Costa Rica, Colombia, Nicaragua and Honduras. It will be the first trip ever by a Canadian foreign minister to Central America.

Mr. MacEachen's mission comes at a time of escalating warfare and instability in the Central American region. The trip may herald a new role for Canadian foreign policy in the region's turmoil.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, there was a full page ad in the Globe & Mail on Friday by a group called Canadians for Non-Intervention in Latin America. It urged you to play a more forceful role in the region and to distance Canada from the U.S. military posture. Is that, in your own mind, the purpose of your trip to Central America?

SSEA: My purpose is to indicate a very direct interest on the part of Canada in the area and also to have the opportunity to see at first hand the situation in the countries I intend to visit. I have already in a number of statements made clear the Canadian view that we do not see the military route as the route that will bring a solution to the basic problems of Central America. So it is not necessary at this stage for me to respond to that ad because our position has been made quite clear prior to the ad.

Q: I suppose the implied criticism in that ad was that Canada has been too careful not to offend the United States. You're saying that Canada does have a truly independent policy that differs from that of the U.S.

SSEA: Well, I think that we have made it clear that we don't see eye to eye with them on their military approach to the situation in Central America. I think that because the Contadora proposals do foresee or strive to bring about a demilitarization of the situation, is why

we find it a very important development which we intend to support and continue to support.

Q: How specifically can Canada help the Contadora process, the initiative by the moderate Latin American countries to find a peaceful solution? Both Cuba and the United States support Contadora's general goals it seems a bit like a motherhood issue.

SSEA: From what I have learned from discussions with the Ministers from the Contadora group, they look to Canada first of all to give them political support. That we are doing. Now the Contadora group has set up three commissions, social, economic and security and we have sent observers to those meetings, so there are a number of ways that we can support. But we cannot lead the situation because we have taken it as a basic proposition that what is required is a regional solution to the problem and that we should support as much as possible and respond as much as possible to the regional initiatives that are taken. Otherwise we become part of the interference program. It seems to me that the most positive thing any of us can do is to try to support a process that will demilitarize Central America.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, I'd like to ask your views on some of the specific issues in the region. First, the election in El Salvador. Do you think that was a valid exercise in democracy, considering the fact the Democratic Revolutionary Front did not take part in the vote?

SSEA: We did send a group of observers to El Salvador and they made a number of quite important conclusions in their preliminary report. One was that there was a very deep commitment on the part of the officials conducting the election to see that it was a success. Unfortunately, it resulted in organizational overkill. There was no evidence of coercion or fraud in the conduct of the election and that if more than a million people exercised the franchise, that it would represent a broad expression of the will of the people. We have to now wait to see the run-off and make the process better.

Q: I wasn't thinking so much, Mr. MacEachen, of the mechanics of the election, whether it was fair within the scope it took place in. I was thinking more of the principle of holding an election without having one of the key parties contesting the election and having an election in the situation of a civil war.

SSEA: It would obviously be better if all elements in the community were prepared to participate in the election. However, I don't draw the further conclusion that if a particular element refuses to participate, that therefore the electoral process or the process

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towards democracy ought to be stalled or ought to be totally kept dead in its tracks. I think that what has been happening there is an effort to try to democratize the country and seek the will of the people and I think it's worth looking at with some objectivity.

Q: I'd like to turn briefly to Nicaragua. There's going to be an election there in November. How do you characterize the Sandinista Government these days?

SSEA: Well, I think that it's very important that countries like Canada permit other countries, including countries in Central America, to seek their own solutions without outside interference. We have attempted to support the efforts in Nicaragua through economic assistance through mission-administered funds, through industrial cooperation, through food aid and through lines of credit. In a sense it is not for me to characterize the Sandinista Government. It is their government. They ought to characterize it in the way they choose without outside interference. It seems to me that is what's bedeviling the situation in Central America is the number of players who are there who ought not to be there and if they go out, all of them together, it would be a much better situation.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, thank you for joining us this morning.

CTV National - April 2 - DPM/SSEA in
Washington - El Salvador

Date
4 April 1984

Number/Numéro
FPR-0359

CTV: External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen has turned down a formal US request to add El Salvador to his itinerary for his 10 day tour of Central America. MacEachen has been in Washington for the past two days for meetings with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz before departing for Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Columbia. We have more from Robert Hearst.

RH: Shultz and MacEachen talked for six hours over two days and much of the time was spent arguing about Central America. Canada believes that U.S. policy in the region is dead wrong. MacEachen wants the U.S. to stop its military involvement in the area and stop the covert support of rebels who are trying to overthrow governments that are anti-American. On other side, the United States is affronted by MacEachen's plan to meet with U.S. enemies in Central America like to Sandanistas in Nicaragua and at the same time ignore U.S. allies in El Salvador. George Shultz asked MacEachen to visit El Salvador, but MacEachen refused.

DPM/SSEA: If it were possible at some future time, I would be pleased to consider going to El Salvador, or indeed if my programme could be adjusted I would consider it, but I don't think that is likely at the present time.

RH: MacEachen's trip into El Salvador at this time might be viewed as support of U.S. military policies there, something MacEachen wants to avoid.

DPM/SSEA: The military developments that have been taking place in Central America we do not believe in third party intervention from any source.

RH: MacEachen will be touring Central America for 10 days, at which time he will be considering more financial aid to the region, even though some of the recipients may be unfriendly to the United States government. Robert Hearts, CTV News, Washington, D.C.

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE
HONOURABLE ALLAN J. MAC EACHEN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 2, 1984

Ladies and gentlemen, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, will talk to you this afternoon about the meeting he has just completed with Secretary of State Shultz.

He will make an opening statement, following which he is open to questions. I would ask that you signal to me your indication or your wish to raise a question and I will recognize you in the order in which I see you. That way we can control the situation.

Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs (DPM/SSEA): We've just completed our seventh bilateral consultation. When we had our first meeting, we agreed that we would meet four times a year to discuss principally Canada-U.S. relations, but also general international questions, economic and political. This has been an extremely good meeting, I think. It's been business-like and friendly and we've been able to register progress on some items in our relationship. We have still some difficult areas in which progress has not yet been possible, but I believe that the general drift of the process has been in the direction of the resolution of problems.

I can say without fear of contradiction that at no other period in our history have Canada-U.S. relations received such detailed and close attention by the foreign ministers.

We were able today to cover a very large number of items on the bilateral front and do so with an efficiency that I think is the result of the previous meetings. Of course, we registered a major step forward today in the signing of the Skagit River Treaty. That has, in a sense, as Mr. Shultz said, been the capstone of the day.

But since, for example, our last meeting, our meeting in Brussels, we have put in place a method for discussions on the Garrison Diversion. We've had a series of meetings at the technical level, which will be concluded by a meeting later this month with the expectation that we'll be able to remove our concerns on phase one of the Garrison Diversion.

We have received some results in terms of the delivery of imports through the pre-build of the northern gas pipeline. We've completed a tax protocol, which will be of benefit to

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social security recipients in Canada. On extraterritoriality, we have not only reached a memorandum of understanding on the antitrust front, but we're working towards a mutual assistance arrangement on criminal matters. And we have further discussions to take place on extraterritoriality.

On trade, we have restored access to the U.S. market for Canadian cement. We have a joint work program to examine sectoral free trade arrangements. We have reached since our last meeting better understanding on air defence modernization and we have also listened and discussed the interest of the United States in securing better access for its banks to Canadian business.

These are some of the items that we have made progress on; obviously, there are others that have been stalled for one reason or another. In that I include particularly acid rain and Pacific salmon. On the latter point, we have agreed to give greater political impulse to these negotiations to see whether we can get them moving more constructively in the direction of a solution and conclude or ratify a treaty.

You may want to ask me some questions on the range of bilateral issues.

Las night, of course, at dinner we discussed a wide range of international political questions, including Central America, Libya, East-West Europe, America, and at the first part of our meeting this morning we discussed quite intensively how we might coordinate our efforts at the London Economic Summit, particularly in the trade area.

In conclusion to this brief statement, I want to tell you that I will be leaving for Central America in the morning where I will spend 10 or 11 days and I look forward to that visit very much in order to have an opportunity to test Canadian policy against the reality that will be evident in my visit.

Q: Mr. Minister, can you tell us why you rejected the American proposal that you go to El Salvador on your Central American trip?

DPM/SSEA: The itinerary which I am following, was drawn up some considerable time ago and it included four countries, which seemed to be manageable within the time available to me. The non-inclusion of El Salvador on my itinerary does not have any political connotations to it at all. We did send official observers to El Salvador at the request of that government. These observers have released an objective report on the electoral process that took place in El Salvador and if it were possible at some future time, I would be pleased to consider going to El Salvador. Indeed, if my program could be adjusted, I would consider it, but I don't think that is likely at the present time.

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Q: Mr. MacEachen, did Mr. Shultz convince you that what is needed on acid rain is yet another research report?

DPM/SSEA:No. We went into that question very deeply at our Halifax meeting with Mr. Ruckleshaus and Mr. Accia and at that time certainly Canada had hoped there would be an action program put in place.

That has not happened. We are not opposed to research; indeed, we are conducting considerable research in Canada. What we do object to is research only and I believe that the sad reality is that we won't make progress this year on acid rain. But that will not prevent us from pursuing our objectives, which are to secure a coordinated program of reductions of emissions in cooperation with the United States. That objective has to be pursued beyond 1984. I made that quite clear to Secretary Shultz in our discussions this morning.

But that is an area where it appears that progress is not possible in the way we want it in the short term. We have ourselves in Canada, as you know, increased our commitment in cooperation with the provinces to secure reductions of emissions by 50% in 1994. That will cost us a lot of money but we're prepared to do it and it's an indication of our commitment. And we will pursue this important question with our friends, I think, into the indefinite future.

Q: Minister, how did Secretary Shultz respond to the Canadian diplomatic note on acid rain? Did they respond at all to you verbally?

DPM/SSEA:Yes. We had a discussion on acid rain but we've also had a response to our note in the form of a diplomatic note from the United States, which has explained the American attitude and which we do not find convincing. But that has been made clear on so many occasions. It is a problem that hasn't been solved. It is one area where we haven't made progress. I'm quite confident that we will make progress in the future because it is of such vital importance, not only to Canada but also to the United States.

Q: Mr. Minister, last night you spoke with Mr. Shultz about Central America. Did Mr. Shultz raise the issue of Nicaragua and did he ask you, for instance, why you're going to Nicaragua, what you will be saying, and so on and so forth?

DPM/SSEA:We discussed Nicaragua. You know that I received some time ago the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua in Ottawa, Foreign Minister Descoto, and on that occasion I was able to explain Canadian attitudes to Nicaragua. I think I should underline that I regard and Canada regards the Contadora initiative as probably the most promising avenue to support in the resolution of these regional difficulties. There have been a series of

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principles put forward by the Contadora group. Three commissions have been established on security, the economy, and social development. And of course in the field of security what should be pursued with diligence is the demilitarization of the region.

In my view, at least if the Contadora is to have an impact, it will have to succeed in the gradual or immediate demilitarization of Central America. That's one of the objectives of Contadora. We have discussed Central America in detail on my last visit to Washington.

There is no doubt in anyone's mind as to how Canada looks upon the military developments that have been taking place in Central America. We do not believe in third party intervention from any source.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, did Secretary Shultz indicate to you in any strong way what they might interpret as the disproportionate amount of time you're spending in Nicaragua compared to no time in El Salvador? Was it in fact not in America's interest?

DPM/SSEA: I believe that Mr. Shultz would like it if I went to El Salvador. I would like it myself. I do not regard, as I've said already, not visiting El Salvador as a political statement of any kind.

I think I have in my itinerary attempted to get a balanced, at least, perspective on the area, and at some future time I may be able to go to El Salvador, maybe earlier than anyone expects. But there's no great debate between us on that issue.

Q: Minister, you said yesterday that you would be bringing up the Contadora group again; the United States has been at best lukewarm for it. Did you bring it up again and what was the Secretary's response specifically?

DPM/SSEA: I brought it up again, yes; and I asked the Secretary, was he lukewarm, and he said no, that they supported Contadora. I didn't put it in quite the term "lukewarm", but certainly I wanted to find out again directly from Mr. Shultz his view on Contadora, and it was his view that it ought to be supported and was being supported by the United States.

Q: Do you feel it's being supported strongly enough, because you said yesterday in your view that you felt it should be supported very strongly.

DPM/SSEA: Well, I do; I think that it should be supported very strongly, and it is my job in Canada to ensure that it is supported very strongly and we intend to do that.

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Q: What about the United States?

DPM/SSEA: I take Mr. Shultz at his word. I don't go behind his word.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, what is Canada's position on Occidental's proposals for cleaning up or containing hazardous waste in the Niagara area? Did you outline the Canadian concerns to Mr. Shultz?

DPM/SSEA: Yes. We're not satisfied that sufficient progress has been made in that area. It's been disappointingly slow. I've attempted to make some suggestions that would accelerate our ability to deal with that problem jointly.

I will be receiving at an early date a response from the American authorities as to whether they will accept the proposal that I put forward in a letter recently to Mr. Shultz. I am hopeful that that proposal will be accepted, that we will be able to grapple with the current situation more effectively than we have been able to do up to the present time.

I want to register progress on this seepage into the Niagara River.

Q: What suggestions did you make, though, specifically?

DPM/SSEA: I've been drawing upon the experience we've had on the Garrison Diversion, in which we have held a series of meetings of technical people with the intention of attempting to ensure that in phase one of the Garrison Diversion that there will be no transfer of biota into Canadian waters.

Now, we think we have a series of remedial steps that might be taken, and these will be discussed and, if acted upon, will go a long way later in the month. I would like us to do something similar in dealing with Niagara. I was heartened by the response that I received today.

Q: Mr. Minister, you mentioned at the beginning that you thought never before have the U.S. and Canada dealt so closely with bilateral issues since this series of seven meetings began. Given the fact that there's been little or no progress on acid rain, given the fact that there are a whole list of needling problems between the two countries, ranging from sports betting to CIDA experiments to any number of other things, can you give us a line on whether - has tension been eased at all between the two countries since October 1982? And if you care to, briefly just touch on, say, the sports betting, the LSD-CIA thing, a couple of the other minor things that have been outstanding? Has there been any movement or progress on any of those points?

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DPM/SSEA: It is true; you've selected a single area in which we have not been able to get the progress that we would like, acid rain. Presumably, for years, people at a similar press conference would raise the Skagit River, say when are you going to settle that question. And I dare say that into the future we will have one or two or three outstanding issues in our relationship because it is a very diversified and dynamic relationship. But you know, we talked about acid rain, the Garrison Diversion, the Niagara River, the Skagit River Treaty, the northern gas pipeline, trade issues, extraterritoriality, unitary tax, North American Air Defence modernization, U.S. weapons testing in Canada, fisheries, Pacific salmon. Those are sort of a listing of Canadian bilateral priorities at the moment.

On some of them we've made considerable progress. I began my press conference by reading a listing of incremental steps that have been taken to resolve these issues. I think that, you know, I was in this job before for several years. Mr. Kissinger and I met. We did meet. We didn't have a systematic method of dealing with bilateral issues, where we have to put our noses to the grindstone every three months and review what the difficulties are and see where we've made progress and give direction to the members of our departments to do more and develop more activity. This is what we're doing and I think that's quite a change. Now if you're asking for a trouble-free, an irritation-free relationship, you're not going to get it because we will always have current issues to resolve because we're living together. We have enormous traffic in trade, in personnel, you name it. So I guess my testing of the situation is what is the tone of our relationship? Are we working at it and are we making important progress in various areas? I think on all of the three I say yes.

Now you asked me about the pool, the sports pool. What about that? Certainly, that's not a government to government issue at the present time, and I hope it won't become one.

Q: Hasn't there been a diplomatic protest made?

DPM/SSEA: No, no. Not at all. We didn't raise it today. I didn't and Mr. Shultz didn't.

Q: Were you betting on the side?

Q: Mr. MacEachen, two on Central America, if I may. Could your visit there be taken as a start of an updating of Canada's diplomatic representation in the area? I'm talking specifically about the number of embassies and consulates and things like that?

Secondly, you said earlier Canada has made its position abundantly clear, that it does not believe in third party intervention in Central America. Did you say this to Mr. Shultz, who is after all the man that is going to the Capitol and

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arguing in favour of the administration's increase in military aid for the Contras to topple the Nicaraguan government. Did you specifically lay out Canada's opposition to that?

DPM/SSEA: You know, I have laid it out on more than one occasion.

Mr. Shultz is a very bright man, and I don't think I need repeat every item at every meeting. But I did last night refer again to a statement which the President of the United States made about a year ago, mid-April I believe, on this very question of military presences in Central America.

You recall that statement; he expressed a willingness on the part of the United States to pull out of Central America all its military manifestations, if other participants were prepared to do likewise. I must say that I have been surprised that in the interim that suggestion has not been picked up more and advanced by world public opinion and by international political pressure.

That was a statement of principle, and I repeated it last night. That seems to me that is the solution, for everybody to get out. And that is what the Contadora presumably is trying to bring about in an organized way. So I don't think there's any - that is the point of Canadian policy that has been repeated time and time again. So I refer to that subject again in the context which I mention to you now.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, your embassy has very kindly provided a Canadian Press report on your meeting yesterday, quoting a Canadian spokesman on what was discussed. And I was struck by the concluding paragraph which says that the initial talks ranged over leaks in government and what the spokesman said was "the vile character of the news media and the general deterioration of values in the west." Did you have something specific in mind?

DPM/SSEA: Well, are you quoting me?

Q: No, this is, I guess, your spokesman. I don't know---

DPM/SSEA: I think he must have been---

VOICE: Into the Chinese beer.

DPM/SSEA: He must have returned from a Chinese dinner or something. Anyway, are you serious about asking me that? It's an amusing incident. This is a Canadian Press report, not from the embassy.

Q: Well, it was made available by the embassy.

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DPM/SSEA: Yes. We're always --- we're accessible, open government. But I think that, you know, to take your question seriously, I don't think that we would -- I would not characterize the discussion on the part of myself and Mr. Shultz as concluding that the news media was vile. I don't think we spent very much time on that.

Q: How about the deterioration of values in the west?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that leads us into quite a large subject.

Q: Mr. Minister, in the United States' refusal to modify its position at all on acid rain, do you find a reflection of the American presidential election campaign?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think you could have inferred that from my initial statement when I said that I didn't think there would be progress in 1984.

Q: Mr. Minister, Canada continues to enjoy a growing share of the soft wood lumber market here in this country. Some have charged that it's an unfair advantage that the Canadians have, that you are in fact dumping soft wood lumber into this country at the expense of American timber producers.

First of all, your reaction to that; and secondly, is there any level at which Canada would refrain from exporting more soft wood lumber?

DPM/SSEA: It's interesting you raise that question because it fits into one of those areas where, from Canada's point of view, quite a lot of progress was made, because when I first met Mr. Shultz, one of the issues was the fear that the United States would take action against very large importations of lumber into the United States because of alleged subsidization. Well, what was at issue was a stumpage system in Canada that was different to that in the United States. I need not go into it, but it was fully examined and that case was dropped.

Q: Dropped?

DPM/SSEA: Yes. So that threat has been removed.

Q: But there are still many here who believe that there is an unfair advantage in that system. Will Canada continue to export its soft wood lumber at ever increasing amounts, or do you see any need for voluntary restraint?

DPM/SSEA: I think we seek access for our products and we will continue to seek access, and to compete in a fair way. I think the petition, as the Ambassador reminds me, raised against importations of Canadian lumber was heard in the United States and it was dropped because the allegations could not be proved,

because the question was based upon a difference of pricing of the wood supply as between Canada and the United States, as I recollect it.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, was there any discussion of the continental shelf in connection with salmon fishing? And were there any agreements on that?

DPM/SSEA: Not on the entire continental shelf. We didn't have any particular discussion today. We did refer to the fact that the Gulf of Maine case is being heard presently in the International Court of Justice in The Hague. We, as you may remember, failed to conclude a treaty on the delimitation of the boundary between Canada and the United States on George's Bank and we agreed to send it to the International Court of Justice. It's a very big case and the argument has begun before the court. It will take some considerable time. That's another sort of trans-boundary issue we've had to deal with.

Q: Last Wednesday, Secretary Shultz was appearing before a Senate appropriations subcommittee and the committee was discussing the presence of American troops in Grenada, and Secretary Shultz in reply to one question said that he had hoped Canadians would participate in a military police force. But there hasn't been any movement on that yet. Was there any discussion last night about Grenada?

DPM/SSEA: Yes. We did touch upon Grenada and we attempted to examine developments there. Canada has under consideration, if not implementation, the provision of assistance to the police force on the island of Grenada in training and in the provision of infrastructure orequipment for the more efficient operation of the police force. And that will strengthen the civilian authority in Grenada. I think Mr. Shultz was appreciative of that.

Q: Did he give you any indication when American troops would be withdrawn?

DPM/SSEA: No, I did not -- what I do acknowledge is that there has been a very rapid decrease in American troops and I question in my own mind whether I'm accurate in using the term "troops".

Q: Yes. Elections are expected to take place in Nicaragua at the end of the year. Do you support the election in Nicaragua and do you think they present a good chance to bring an end to the fighting in Nicaragua?

DPM/SSEA: When elections are freely conducted, when people have a chance to vote and choose their own political options, then I think that elections are absolutely essential to a democracy. So I support fair and propoer elections in Nicaragua and elsewhere. Whether the elections will bring an end

to the fighting depends on whether the mass of the people and those who are doing the fighting accept the results of the election and are ready to live under those results.

Q: President Regan last week in an interview, referring to the elections pending in Nicaragua said that he believed them to be unfair, that there was not at work freedom of choice. There were no opposition parties and in a sense he was prejudging the elections as being particularly meaningless. Do you share his observations?

DPM/SSEA: I would like to deal with the elections in Nicaragua in the same way as we dealt with the elections in El Salvador. When we were asked to send observers to El Salvador, there were those in Canada who said we ought not to send observers, that that would merely legitimize what was to be a rotten election anyway. We did send observers. We sent three persons, including our Ambassador on the spot, the Chairman of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, a well respected person in that field, a former member of parliament, a person who had participated in the Zimbabwe elections, and the assistant to the chief electoral officer in Canada. They went there and they were free to call the shots as they saw them. And that's what they did. And I would like to judge Nicaragua with the same criteria in mind, with objectivity and on the spot investigation.

Q: Will that team return for the run-off election?

DPM/SSEA: It may very well if we're asked and if they're prepared to go. I think I would be very sympathetic to sending them because it gives me a way of assessing the elections that was not available to me before and to others in the country. We all can't go and watch. Our observer team in El Salvador found that there was organizational overkill. There was complicated bureaucracy and over zealous administration of the election. That's on the negative side. They also said that they found that there was deep commitment on the part of the officials to carry out a good election. They also said that the public wanted to have an election. They found no evidence of fraud or coercion. And they said that if more than a million people voted in the election, it would be their conclusion that the results represented the broad will of the people of that country. That's what they said.

We can all judge that, but that is the conclusion of the observer team, and I think that's a good way if you want to find the facts, if you want to live by the facts, to send people who are ready to probe the facts, not being blinded by ideological blinders.

Q: Could I ask a clarification question on the salmon treaty?

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DPM/SSEA: Yes sure.

Q: What did you mean by political emphasis? Are the talks going to resume? What's the basis for (inaudible).

DPM/SSEA: We have to get these talks going. We have to resume them. They're stalled and we have decided we would give them some political impulse. We have in mind one or two particular mechanisms that we intend to employ, but we haven't put it in place yet and I don't intend to describe it until we have it in place.

Q: Wouldn't both sides be better off moving unilaterally?

DPM/SSEA: What about the salmon? That would be bad for the salmon.

E N D

CBC Radio News - 0800 April 2
DPM/SSEA in Washington

Date

April 2, 1984

Number/Numéro

FPR-0344

CBC: The Minister for External Affairs is spending a second day in Washington before he starts a tour of Central America. Mr. MacEachen spent more than three hours last night with the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, discussing a wide range of subjects. Later, a Canadian spokesman told reporters the talks were very relaxed and held in a good atmosphere. Reporter Michael MacIvor is in Washington.

M.M.: Last night Mr. MacEachen went to Mr. Shultz's house for dinner and for a discussion of international issues ranging from the Middle East to arms control. High on the list was Latin America. Mr. MacEachen's heading south when he leaves Washington to visit Costa Rica, Honduras, Colombia and Nicaragua. He told Mr. Shultz that Canada's worried about the flow of U.S. arms to rebels trying to overthrow the government in Nicaragua. They also talked about the Contadora Group, four Latin American countries that are trying to negotiate some sort of settlement to the fighting in El Salvador and Nicaragua. So far, the Americans have not been very enthusiastic about the Contadora Group, so Mr. MacEachen urged the U.S. to take more interest.

DPM/SSEA: We think the Contadora Group is a very promising avenue for reconciliation and progress in Central America and I think that it would be very very helpful if there were strong American support.

M.M.: Today the discussion will centre on bilateral issues, such as resuscitating the Pacific coast salmon talks on quotas and major environmental issues, like the dumping of effluent in the Niagara River, the Garrison Diversion project and, of course, acid rain. Michael MacIvor, CBC News, Washington.

---DPM/SSEA PRESS CONFERENCE ON ARRIVAL SJOSE, CRICA 03APR 14:15

QUOTE: DPM/SSEA OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FOR CANADA IS HERE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS—VERY FEW QUESTIONS— FROM YOU ON HIS ARRIVAL IN COSTA RICA TODAY...SO, I WOULD ASK IF YOU WOULD SIGNAL YOUR DESIRE FOR QUESTIONS, I WILL RECOGNIZE YOU AND MR MACEACEEN WILL GIVE YOU THE ANSWERS.

Q:—MR MINISTER, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF YOUR VISIT TO COSTA RICA.

DPM/SSEA:—MY OBJECT IN COMING TO COSTA RICA IS TO EXPRESS CANADA'S INTEREST IN CENTRAL AMERICA AS A WHOLE, AND ALSO TO EXPRESS OUR INTEREST IN COSTA RICA. WE HAVE HAD A GOOD, LONG HISTORY OF SATISFACTORY RELATIONS WITH COSTA RICA, WE HAVE MUCH IN COMMON AND I THOUGHT, AS I BEGIN MY TOUR OF CENTRAL AMERICA, THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO HAVE AS MY FIRST STOP, COSTA RICA.

Q: (TRANSL):—MR MINISTER, ARE YOU PLANNING TO SUCCEED MR PIERRE TRUDEAU...AFTER HIS RESIGNATION, DOES THE MINISTER ASPIRE TO THE

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PAGE TWO WWGR0079 UNCLAS

POSITION WHICH MR PIERRE TRUDEAU WILL SOON LEAVE VACANT?...IN VIEW OF THE RESIGNATION OF MR PIERRE TRUDEAU DO YOU WISH TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER?

DPM/SSEA:-IF I WERE IN THE LEADERSHIP RACE,I WOULDNT BE HERE.

Q:(TRANSL):-AND WHO WOULD YOU SUPPORT EVENTUALLY?DO YOU SUPPORT ANY CANDIDATE?

DPM/SSEA:-WELL, YOU TELL ME WHICH ONES YOU KNOW ABOUT, AND I LL... NO/NO, I HAVE NOT/NOT INDICATED IN CANADA, NOR WILL I INDICATE HERE, WHICH CANDIDATE I MAY SUPPORT. I HAVENT MADE UP MY MIND YET. ITS MORE THAN TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE CONVENTION WHICH WILL CHOOSE A SUCCESSOR TO MR TRUDEAU AS LEADER OF THE LIBERAL PARTY, AND THAT GIVES ME A LOT OF TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT.

Q:(TRANSL):-GOOD AFTERNOON, MR MINISTER, WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE WORK CARRIED OUT SO FAR BY THE CONTADORA GROUP.

LPM/SSEA:-WE ARE VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE CONTADORA EFFORTS. CANADA HAS INDICATED ITS SUPPORT, AND WE INTEND TO EXPRESS THAT SUPPORT IN A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT WAYS, INCLUDING OUR READINESS TO DISCUSS WITH THE COMMISSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN SET UP, THEIR WORK AND CONSIDER IN WHAT WAY WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO BE HELPFUL. CANADA REGARDS THE CONTADORA EFFORT AS PROBABLY THE MOST PROMISING AVENUE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO REGIONAL QUESTIONS.

Q:(TRANSL):-MR MACEACHEN: I UNDERSTAND THAT CANADA... PROVIDES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE AREA... HONDURAS IS IN FIRST PLACE, THEN COSTA RICA,

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PAGE THREE WVGRO079 UNCLAS

AND THEN NICARAGUA. ARE YOU GOING TO CHANGE THIS ORDER OF CANADIAN ECONOMIC SUPPORT, OR ARE YOU GOING TO ELIMINATE ANY OF THE THREE COUNTRIES FROM YOUR ECONOMIC COOPERATION?

DPM/SSEA:-AS YOU REALIZE, WE DO HAVE AID PROGRAMS IN EACH OF THE THREE COUNTRIES YOU HAVE MENTIONED. WE HAVE HAD A GOOD PROGRAM IN COSTA RICA. I EXPECT TO BE DISCUSSING DURING MY VISIT THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASE IN OUR AID PARTICIPATION IN COSTA RICA, BUT I DO NOT/NOT INTEND... I DONT THINK THAT MY TRIP WILL RESULT IN A BASIC CHANGE IN OUR AID APPROACH. THAT REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

Q:(TRANSL):-MR DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, YOU WERE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. HOW DO YOU INTERPRET THE CRITICISMS THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS MAKE ABOUT THIS ORGANIZATION AND WHAT SOLUTION DO YOU SEE TO THE PRESENT INDEBTEDNESS OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES?

DPM/SSEA:-I THINK THAT THE JOB THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAS TO DO IS A VERY DIFFICULT JOB. ITS PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT AND WHEN THE FUND DOES THAT, IT ASKS THE AFFECTED COUNTRY TO UNDERTAKE WHAT IS DESCRIBED AS QUOTE ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS UNQUOTE. I AT ONE TIME WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BECAUSE I SERVED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE AND I KNOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM ABOUT THE CONDITIONS WHICH THE FUND IMPOSES AND SOMETIMES THEY ARE QUITE DIFFICULT, BUT THE INTENTION IS TO PERMIT THE COUNTRY AFFECTED TO

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PAGE FOUR WGR0079 UNCLAS

RECOVER ITS ECONOMIC POSITION AND TO BECOME MORE SELF-SUSTAINING AS FAR AS FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS ARE CONCERNED. I THINK ITS A VERY COMPLICATED QUESTION. I THINK CRITICISMS ARE INEVITABLE, BUT I THINK ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS ARE ALSO INEVITABLE AND THEY ARE BOUND TO BRING CRITICISMS.

DPM/SSEA: OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN: LAST QUESTION:

Q: (TRANSL): -I WOULD LIKE TO ASK THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS THE FOLLOWING: GIVEN THAT IN THE CASE OF USA POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL AMERICA, THIS IS A MATTER WHICH ONLY CONCERNS THEM; AND GIVEN CANADA'S PEACE-ORIENTED POLICY, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION REGARDING USA SENATOR GARY HART'S STATEMENT THAT THAT COUNTRY SHOULD WITHDRAW TROOPS WHICH REMAIN IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE MANOEUVRES WHICH THEY ARE PRESENTLY CARRYING OUT TOGETHER WITH THE HONDURAN AND SALVADORAN ARMIES IN THE SO-CALLED MILITARY EXERCISE QUOTE CANADERO I UNQUOTE. WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE?

DPM/SSEA: -WELL, CANADA HAS ALWAYS HAD IN ITS POLICY ON CENTRAL AMERICA THE VIEW THAT MILITARY SOLUTIONS ARE NOT/NOT LIKELY TO BE LASTING SOLUTIONS; OR TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, THAT WE DO NOT/NOT ACCEPT OR AGREE WITH THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION FROM ANY SOURCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. AND WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE VERY KEEN TO SUPPORT STEPS THAT WOULD RESULT IN THE DEMILITARIZATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA SO THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO SORT OUT THEIR OWN PROBLEMS WITHOUT ENGAGING IN WAR... FIGHTING. THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID ON THIS POINT, BUT I WANTED TO GIVE A BRIEF ANSWER...

MFF/SPOKESMAN (TRANSL): -ON THURSDAY WE WILL HAVE ANOTHER PRESS CONFERENCE UNQUOTE.

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---DPM/SSEA PRESS CONFERENCE ON DEPARTURE SJOSE 05APR 12:15

DPM/SSEA OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN:GOOD MORNING LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CANADA,THE HONORABLE ALLAN J. MACEACHEN,WILL SPEAK TO YOU ON THE RESULTS OF HIS VISIT TO COSTA RICA.AFTER A BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT,HE IS OPEN FOR QUESTIONS.I WOULD ASK THAT YOU SIGNAL TO ME YOUR DESIRE TO RAISE QUESTIONS;I WILL RECOGNIZE YOU IN THE ORDER IN WHICH I SEE YOU.THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

DPM/SSEA:IVE COMPLETED WHAT I CONSIDER A VERY GOOD VISIT TO COSTA RICA.I HAD MEETINGS WITE THE PRESIDENT,FOREIGN MINISTER,THE ECONOMIC MINISTERS,THE PRESIDENT OF THE BANK AND OTHER OFFICIALS.AND IN THE COURSE OF THAT SERIES OF MEETINGS,I WAS ABLE TO HEAR MORE ABOUT REGIONAL ISSUES,PARTICULARLY THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO SECURE PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA,AND I EXPRESSED CANADAS SUPPORT FOR THE CONTADORA EFFORT AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THAT EFFORT IN WAYS THAT MIGET

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PAGE TWO WWGR2089 UNCLAS

APPEAR TO BE USEFUL IN THE FUTURE...I ALSO DISCUSSED THE CANADIAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN COSTA RICA, AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE THAT PROGRAM IN THE FUTURE. WE BELIEVE THE ACTIVITIES TO DATE HAVE BEEN VERY SATISFACTORY AND WE WANT TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE AND STRENGTHEN THAT ASSISTANCE...

WE HAVE ALSO IMPORTANT TWO-WAY TRADE AND WE DISCUSSED HOW THAT TRADE COULD BE IMPROVED, HOW IT MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR COSTA RICA TO GAIN ADDITIONAL ACCESS TO CANADIAN MARKETS, AND INDEED HOW CANADA MIGHT PARTICIPATE MORE IN THE COSTA RICAN ECONOMY...

AND FINALLY, I WANT TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED I WAS TO MEET WITH THE ELECTIONS TRIBUNAL, AND I THINK THAT VISIT--UNDERLINED AGAIN FOR ME THE STRONG DEMOCRATIC TRADITION EXISTING IN COSTA RICA, HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT THAT TRADITION BE MAINTAINED. OF COURSE, CANADA AND COSTA RICA HAVE STRONG ELECTORAL AND DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS AND I THINK WE OUGHT TO KEEP IN TOUCH IN THE FUTURE TO ENSURE THAT THAT COMMON LINK BETWEEN US IS DEVELOPED, AND THAT WE COOPERATE IN OTHER FORMS TO MAINTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES.

THAT WILL BE MY LAST STATEMENT AND I WILL LET YOU ASK SOME QUESTIONS.

Q: MR. MACEACHEN, YOU HAVE...YOU WERE IN COSTA RICA THREE DAYS. I THINK GOVERNMENT PEOPLE MAKE YOU KNOW ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICAN PROBLEMS. I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT IF YOU HAVE SOME RECOMMENDATIONS...

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PAGE THREE WWGR2089 UNCLAS

ANY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINISH THE PROBLEMS IN THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN WAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA.AND THE OTHER QUESTION IS,IF YOU CAN TELL US ABOUT THE PLANS...CANADIAN GOVERNMENT PLANS TO HELP THIS COUNTRY.

DPM/SSEA:WELL,THE SECOND QUESTION,WE HAVE PROVIDED IN THE PAST LINES OF CREDIT TO COSTA RICA IN THE AMOUNT OF DOLLARS 15,000,000.THAT HAS BEEN MAINLY USED TO PURCHASE RAILWAY EQUIPMENT AND FERTILIZERS AND IT HAS BEEN A SUPPORT FOR COSTA RICAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS.WE MUST EXPLORE,WITH THE COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES,IN WHAT SECTORS OUR FUTURE INCREASED ASSISTANCE WILL BE PLACED AND WE HAVE INDICATED THAT THERE WILL BE A TECHNICAL MISSION COMING TO COSTA RICA TO EXPLORE THAT VERY MATTER...THE LINES OF CREDIT IVE BEEN MENTIONING ARE CONCESSIONAL RATHER THAN COMMERCIAL LINES OF CREDIT...

ON YOUR FIRST QUESTION,I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE...AS IVE STATED ALREADY,THE STRONG DEMOCRATIC TRADITION AND HOW IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE PEOPLE OF COSTA RICA TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS,THROUGH THE EXPRESSION OF THEIR WILL AND IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT IF THE PRACTICE COULD BE EMULATED OR TRANSMITTED OR...TO OTHER PARTS OF CENTRAL AMERICA,THAT IT WOULD BE A VERY USEFUL AND VALUABLE DEVELOPMENT.

Q: AT THE RISK OF SOUNDING REPETITIVE,WERE ANY COMMERCIAL OR AID AGREEMENTS AGREED TO SPECIFICALLY AT ALL DURING YOUR VISIT HERE?OR IS

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PAGE FOUR WW3R2029 UNCLAS

IT ALL GENERAL TERMS?

DPM/SSEA:WELL,IT WAS IN GENERAL TERMS.WE DIDNT...THE PURPOSE WAS NOT/NOT TO NEGOTIATE NEW PROJECTS;WHAT I DID INDICATE TO THE AUTHORITIES IS THAT WE INTEND TO INCREASE,I WOULD SAY SIGNIFICANTLY, OUR ASSISTANCE TO COSTA RICA BECAUSE WE FOUND WHAT WE HAVE DONE HAS BEEN RAPIDLY DISBURSED.AND WE HAVE BEEN VERY SATISFIED WITH THAT,AND NOW WE HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH THE COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES WHAT IS IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS,BECAUSE WE DONT IMPOSE UPON A COUNTRY LIKE COSTA RICA--WE DISCUSS AND WE REACH A COMMON CONCLUSION.SO THATS WHAT WE HAVE AGREED TO DO.SO NOTHING WAS SIGNED,IN OTHER WORDS.

Q: NC/NO, NO/NO SIGNATURES.

Q(TRANSL):IN TODAYS AGENDA YOU HAD A TOPIC:ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA:THE COSTA RICAN SYSTEM COMPARED WITH THAT OF EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA.MAY WE KNOW YOUR IDEAS AFTER DISCUSSING THIS TOPIC WITH THE MAGISTRATES OF THE SUPREME ELECTIONS TRIBUNAL?

DPM/SSEA:I DID DISCUSS WITH THE TRIBUNAL THE SYSTEM OF ELECTIONS IN COSTA RICA AND THE ROLE WHICH THE TRIBUNAL PLAYS IN THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF COSTA RICA,AND OF COURSE,I HAVE SOME INFORMATION ABOUT THE SYSTEM IN CANADA WHICH WE THINK WORKS AND SUITS US AS YOU THINK YOUR
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PAGE FIVE WVGRE089 UNCLAS

SYSTEM WORKS AND SUITS YOU, BOTH DEMOCRATIC AND BOTH REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. WE DID DISCUSS THE ELECTION IN EL SALVADOR AND CERTAINLY I THINK WE DID REACH SOME COMMON CONCLUSIONS THAT IT WAS A SINCERE EFFORT TO SECURE THE EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. I SHOULD SAY THAT... I WANT TO MAKE A POINT ABOUT THE RECENT ELECTION IN EL SALVADOR. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT DID SEND THREE OBSERVERS AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR. THE LEADER OF OUR OBSERVER TEAM IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, AND ALSO A PERSON WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ZIMBABWE ELECTIONS, WHEN INDEPENDENCE WAS ACHIEVED IN THAT COUNTRY. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THAT CANADIAN TEAM ON THE EL SALVADOR ELECTION WAS AS FOLLOWS: FIRST OFF, THAT THERE WERE ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFICULTIES, A LOT OF COMPLICATIONS AND CONFUSION, MAYBE ARISING FROM AN OVER-ZEALOUS EFFORT TO ADMINISTER AN ELECTION, AND ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A GOOD ELECTION, AND ON THE PART OF OFFICIALS TO CONDUCT A GOOD ELECTION. THERE WAS NO/NO EVIDENCE OF COERCION OR FRAUD, AND THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE RESULT DID, INDEED, REFLECT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR. THOSE ARE THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH THE CANADIAN TEAM ARRIVED AT. THEY WERE FREE TO EXPRESS THEIR OWN OPINIONS, TO CALL THE SHOTS AS THEY SAW THEM, AND THATS WHAT THEY DID.

Q: (TRANSL): MR. MINISTER, HOW DO YOU ANALYSE THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CONFLICTS? DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE MAINLY A

...6

PAGE SIX WVG2089 UNCLAS

RESULT OF POVERTY...SOCIAL INJUSTICE,OR DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE INTERVENTION OF FOREIGN POWERS IN OUR REGION PLAYS AN IMPORTANT PART? WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE RISK THAT THIS INTERVENTION MAY MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE AND WHAT POSSIBILITIES DO YOU SEE FOR THE SEARCH FOR NEUTRALITY BEING EXTENDED TO OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS HONDURAS,SO THAT CENTRAL AMERICA BECOMES A ZONE OF PEACE?

DPM/SSEA:WE...CANADA BELIEVES THAT BASICALLY THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE UPHEAVALS TAKING PLACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA ARE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FRUSTRATIONS THAT HAVE EXISTED FOR A LONG TIME.WE HAVE NO/DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THE NECESSITY FOR CHANGES AND WE THINK THAT IS PROBABLY INEVITABLE AND DESIRABLE.WE DO NOT/NOT LIKE THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION.WE THINK IT WOULD BE BETTER IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO HAVE ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTIONS REMOVED,SO THAT THE PEOPLE OF THE AREA COULD GO ABOUT THEIR BUSINESS AND SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS,AND THAT IS WHY WE FIND THE CONTADORA EFFORT PROMISING,THAT IT MAY ACHIEVE THAT VERY THING.

Q:(TRANSL):THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS INTERESTED IN INCREASING AID FOR COSTA RICA.IS THAT ALSO TRUE FOR NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS,AS YOU ARE VISITING THESE COUNTRIES ALSO?

DPM/SSEA:WE HAVE AN AID PROGRAM IN BOTH HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA;IN THE ...7

PAGE SEVEN WWGR0089 UNCLAS

CASE OF HONDURAS, WE ARE INCREASING OUR AID AS RAPIDLY AS HONDURAS CAN ABSORB THE AID. IN NICARAGUA WE HAVE RECENTLY EXTENDED A LINE OF CREDIT AND WE WOULD BE MORE AGREEABLE TO INCREASING OUR AID IF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA WERE IN THE DIRECTION OF THOSE ORIGINALLY ESPOUSED BY THE SANDINISTA LEADERS.

Q: I HAVE TWO QUESTIONS: FIRST, HOW, SPECIFICALLY, MIGHT CANADA BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CONTADORA PEACE INITIATIVE? AND SECONDLY, DOES YOUR VISIT IN PART REFLECT AN ATTEMPT BY CANADA TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND HOW DOES CANADA SEE... AT WHAT POINTS DOES CANADA HAVE DIFFERENCE WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, IN TERMS OF POLICIES TOWARDS CENTRAL AMERICA.

DPM/SSEA: WELL, WE, AS IVE SAID, HAVE SUPPORTED THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE. WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO MEET AND DISCUSS THE WORK OF THE THREE COMMISSIONS, THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AND THE SECURITY COMMISSION. IF OUT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS, THERE APPEAR USEFUL WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD HELP, THEN WE WOULD CONSIDER THAT. MY PURPOSE IN COMING HERE IS NOT/NOT TO DISTANCE MYSELF FROM THE UNITED STATES. WE DO HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY; I HAVE DISCUSSED THOSE DIFFERENCES WITH MR. SCHULTZ AND JUST AS RECENTLY AS LAST WEEKEND, BUT I THINK THAT IF WE COULD MOVE FORWARD IN THE DIRECTION OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS, WE
...8

PAGE EIGHT WVGRO029 UNCLAS

WOULD BE, I THINK, ALL OF US MAKING A CONTRIBUTION THAT WOULD POSSIBLY BRING US TO A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS... (TRANSLATION DIFFICULTIES FOLLOWED)... I THINK I'LL REPEAT IT. THAT WERE INTERESTED IN THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE. WE WILL... WE ARE READY TO SIT DOWN WITH THE WORKING GROUPS AND IF OUT OF THOSE WORKING GROUPS THERE COME PROPOSALS WHERE WE COULD BE USEFUL, WE WOULD CONSIDER THAT...

THE SECOND POINT... THE SECOND QUESTION WAS IS MY VISIT AN EFFORT TO DISTANCE MYSELF OR CANADA FROM THE UNITED STATES POLICY. THAT IS NOT/NOT THE REASON WHY I'M HERE. I'M HERE BECAUSE OF AN INTEREST IN CENTRAL AMERICA, TO SEE THE SITUATION AT FIRST HAND, AND TO BE HELPFUL IF POSSIBLE...

WHILE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES WITH THE UNITED STATES ON AT LEAST ONE PARTICULAR ASPECT OF POLICY, IF PROGRESS COULD BE MADE IN THE CONTADORA PROCESS, MAYBE THERE WOULD... IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A GREATER CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS...

YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SAID ABOUT A YEAR AGO THAT THAT COUNTRY---HIS COUNTRY--- WAS PREPARED TO GET OUT OF CENTRAL AMERICA IF ALL OTHER FOREIGN INTERVENERS WERE PREPARED TO DO THE SAME...

AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THE CONTADORA PROCESS COULD TAKE STEPS OR SEEK THAT SOLUTION, IT WOULD ALL BE VERY USEFUL.

DPM/SSEA OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN: LAST QUESTION.

...9

PAGE NINE WWGR0089 UNCLAS

Q:(TRANSL):MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:TWO QUESTIONS:IN WHAT SECTORS WOULD CANADA BE WILLING TO AID COSTA RICA,APART FROM THE DOLLARS 15 MILLION FOR RAILWAYS AND THE PURCHASE OF RAW MATERIAL FOR FERTILIZER PRODUCTION?

DPM/SSEA:IN ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION,IT IS UP TO THE COSTA RICAN AUTHORITIES IN THE SENSE TO DETERMINE THEIR PRIORITIES,AND WE DISCUSSED WITH THEM WHERE THEY WANT TO GO IN THE FUTURE.THERE MAY BE FURTHER WORK IN THE RAILWAY FIELD,BUT IM NOT/NOT SURE OF THAT.I THINK ITS UP TO US TOGETHER THROUGH DISCUSSION TO DETERMINE WHERE THE ADDITIONAL,WHERE NEW FUNDS WILL BE SPENT.WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST IS IN FERTILIZERS AND RAILWAY EQUIPMENT.

Q:(TRANSL):YES,BUT GENERALLY THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES HAVE SPECIFIC PRIORITY SECTORS,BECAUSE COSTA RICA HAS AT PRESENT GRET NEEDS IN DIFFERENT AREAS.

DPM/SSEA:WE DO HAVE PRIORITIES AS A COUNTRY IN OUR AID DISBURSEMENTS, BUT WE HAVE TAKEN A RATHER PRACTICAL VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN COSTA RICA,WHERE THEY NEEDED...WHERE THE COUNTRY NEEDED QUICK BALANCE OF PAYMENT SUPPORT,WHICH WE DO AT TIMES AND WE RENDER THAT SUPPORT THROUGH LINES...CONCESSIONAL LINES OF CREDIT IN FERTILIZERS AND RAILWAY EQUIPMENT.

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PAGE TEN WWGR0089 UNCLAS

Q:(TRANSL):WHEN YOU MENTIONED THAT CANADA WOULD BE WILLING TO INCREASE AID TO NICARAGUA IF THEIR OBJECTIVES WOULD BE THE SAME THAT THERE WERE ORIGINALLY...DOES THIS MEAN THAT NICARAGUA HAS CHANGED THE DESTINATION OF THIS AID,OR HAS NICARAGUA CHANGED ITS POLITICAL ORIENTATION IN CANADAS OPINION?

DPM/SSEA:NEITHER IS THE ANSWER THE THE QUESTION.I WASNT ATTEMPTING TO CONVEY EITEER CONCLUSION.WHAT I DID SAY IS THAT WE HAVE HELPED NICARAGUA AND WE HAVE BEEN HELPING IN THE EXPECTATION THAT NICARAGUA WOULD MAKE MORE PROGRESS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE GOALS WHICH WERE INITIALLY ESPOUSED BY THE REVOLUTION.

END OF PRESS CONFERENCE

(DURATION: 38 MINUTES).

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---LPM/SSEA PUBLIC STATEMENTS BGOTA 6APR

FOLLOWING TRANSCRIPTS OF DPM/SSEA SCRUMS 6APR AFTER MTG WITH
COLOMBIAN PRES BETANCUR AND TO CDN JOURNALISTS RE CHALLENGER
INCIDENT.

QUOTE:Q:WHAT HAVE BEEN THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH PRES
BETANCUR?

DPM/SSEA:WE HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION ON THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE EFFORTS THAT COLOMBIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE
TAKING TOGETHER IN THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE TO BRING SOLUTIONS TO
CENTRAL AMERICA.ON BEHALF OF CDA I CERTAINLY EXPRESSED CDN SUPPORT
FOR THAT EFFORT AND GAVE EVERY POSSIBLE ENCOURAGEMENT TO
CONTINUATION OF THAT EFFORT.

Q:WHICH IS THE MECHANISM OF SUPPORT THAT YOUR GOVT WILL PROVIDE
FOR THE CONTADORA GROUP?

DPM/SSEA:WE HAVE INDICATED OUR READINESS TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH

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PAGE TWO MEEL0012 UNCLAS

THESE WORKING GROUPS (COMMISSIONS) THAT HAVE BEEN SET UP IN THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY FIELDS. IF FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORK OF THESE COMMISSIONS THERE IS HELP THAT CDA CAN GIVE WE WILL BE PREPARED TO GIVE IT. IN FACT WE ARE QUITE READY TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WHEN THESE COMMISSIONS ARE PREPARED TO RECEIVE US.

Q: DO YOU THINK WE'RE CLOSE TO PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA?

DPM/SSEA: I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO SAY YES, BUT I THINK THERE IS A LOT OF WORK YET TO BE DONE BEFORE I COULD SAY THAT YOU ARE CLOSE TO PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. AND I BASE MY CONCLUSIONS ON WHAT I HAVE HEARD, MAINLY ON WHAT I HAVE HEARD SINCE I ARRIVED IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

Q: WAS SOMETHING SAID ABOUT TRADE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES?

DPM/SSEA: WE WILL BE DISCUSSING ECONOMIC BILATERAL QUESTIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF COLOMBIA LATER TODAY. OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT WERE MAINLY ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES AND WERE FOCUSED ON CENTRAL AMERICA.

Q: IS CDA WILLING TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE WITH THE ANTI-SANDINISTA GROUPS AND THE GOVT OF NICARAGUA, AND THE GUERRILLA GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR AND THE GOVT OF EL SALV, IN ORDER TO FIND PEACE IN THESE COUNTRIES?

DPM/SSEA: WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR FOR A LONG TIME THAT WE FAVOUR DIALOGUE. BUT OF COURSE IT IS A PROCESS THAT THE PARTIES THEMSELVES

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PAGE THREE MDEL0012 UNCLAS

HAVE TO UNDERTAKE, NO/NO ONE CAN FORCE THEM TO UNDERTAKE A DIALOGUE. I THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING AND IF WE COULD HELP IN ANY WAY WE WOULD. I THINK PRINCIPALLY ITS A MATTER FOR THE PARTIES THEMSELVES.

Q: IS CDA GOING TO ENTER THE OAS AS AN ACTIVE MEMBER AND NOT/NOT AS NCW SIMPLY AN OBSERVER?

DPM/SSEA: WE ARE AN OBSERVER IN THE OAS AND THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION IS A MATTER OF LIVELY CONSIDERATION IN CDA AT THE PRESENT TIME.

Q: DO YOU THINK THAT THE OAS IS STILL A VALID ORGANIZATION WITH ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BESET OAS?

DPM/SSEA: I BELIEVE IT IS A VALID ORGANIZATION. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE ORGANIZATION, WHETHER IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR CDA FOR US TO TAKE THE IMPORTANT STEP OF BECOMING A MEMBER. WE HAVE SHOWN OUR INTEREST IN THE ORGANIZATION NOT/NOT ONLY BY OUR OBSERVER STATUS BUT BY PARTICIPATING IN A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES OF THE OAS. WE WOULD WANT TO CONCLUDE THAT OUR MEMBERSHIP WOULD BE A HELP TO THE ORGANIZATION AND THAT IS WHAT WE ARE CONSIDERING.

SCRUM TO CDN JOURNALISTS RE CHALLENGER INCIDENT/

DPM/SSEA: THANKFULLY WE WERE ALL ABLE TO MANAGE TO GET THROUGH AND I THINK THE PILOTS AND THE CREW DID AN EXTREMELY GOOD JOB IN TELLING US WHAT TO DO AND IN GETTING US OUT OF THE SITUATION. BUT

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PAGE FOUR MDEL0012 UNCLAS

FOR A FEW MINUTES IT WAS QUITE UNPLEASANT.

Q:DO YOU THINK THE SUBJ OF A POSSIBLE ENQUIRY AS FAR AS MAINTENANCE IS CONCERNED COULD BE RAISED SIR?

DPM/SSEA:I AM SURE THAT THE AIRCRAFT PEOPLE,PILOTS AND THE ENGINEER WILL WANT TO KNOW EVEN MORE DILIGENTLY THAN WE DO WHAT WAS THE CAUSE OF THIS AND HOW TO CORRECT IT.IM SURE THEY WILL DO ALL THAT IS NECESSARY,BUT I HOPE WE DONT NEED AN ENQUIRY BEYOND THAT.

Q:THIS AFTERNOON YOU WILL BE GOING TO CARTAGENA.WILL YOU BE TAKING THE CHALLENGER OR ANOTHER PLANE?

DPM/SSEA:THE CHALLENGER IS NOT/NOT IN SERVICE YET.WE RE GOING TO CARTAGENA AND WE LL BE CONTINUING THE JOURNEY IN ANOTHR CHALLENGER.SO WE HAVENT BEEN DETERRED BY THAT INCIDENT FROM CCNTINUING TO FLY IN THE CHALLENGER.ARE YOU READY TO COME ON THE CHALLENGER ALSO?

Q:ALL THE WAY.

DPM/SSEA:I REMEMBER RETURNING FROM GEORGE NOWLANS FUNERAL FROM GREENWOOD THAT WE HADTO DO PRECISELY THE SAME PROCEDURES BECAUSE THE WINDOW HAD CRACKED AND THEY WENT INTO AN EMERGENCY AND DIVED RAPIDLY AND WE HAD OXYGEN AND ALL THAT.WE COULDNT DO ANYTHING WE WERE JUST STUCK THERE.WEAT CAN YOU DO?THE KEY TO ME WAS THE STEWARD WAS REALLY JUST GOING...

MACDONALL:TREMENDOUS PRESENCE OF MIND AND THE PILOT SEOW ENORMOUS ...5

PAGE FIVE MDEL0012 UNCLAS

SKILL.

YES.BUT HE WAS OBVIOUSLY AGITATED.UNQUOTE.

PRESS CONFERENCE AT FOREIGN MINISTRY BOGOTA 6APR 15:00 ERS IN

BOGOTA TEL ZPGR0724 7APR.

UUU/016 091448Z MDEL0012

---CONFERENCE DE PRESSE DU VPM/SFAE 6AVR-15:00

VOICE TRANSCRIPTION CONF DE PRESSE DONNEE SUITE A REUNION AVEC
PRES BETANCUR ET MAE LLOREDA:CIT

DPM/SSEA OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN:LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.THE HONOURABLE
ALLAN J MACEACHEN,DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS WILL SPEAK BRIEFLY TO YOU ON THE DISCUSSIONS HES
HAD YESTERDAY AND TODAY WITE THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER AND
OTHER COLOMBIAN OFFICIALS.FOLLOWING THAT,HE WILL BE READY TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS ON THE RECORD.I WOULD ASK THOSE OF YOU WHO WANT TO ASK
QUESTIONS TO SIGNAL TO ME AND I WILL RECOGNIZE YOU.WE DO HAVE
INTERPRETATION AND I WILL ASK YOU TO BEAR WITH US ON THAT.

MR MACEACHEN:I JUST COMPLETED MY DISCUSSION WITE THE FOREIGN
MINISTER AND EARLIER THIS MORNING I HAD A VERY GOOD DISCUSSION
WITE THE PRESIDENT AND IN THE COURSE OF THAT PERIOD OF TIME WE
HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS,
PARTICULARLY,THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA,THE ROLE OF THE

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PAGE DEUX ZPGR2724 NONCLAS

CONTADORA GROUP, AND WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THAT PARTICULAR FRAMEWORK. AS YOU KNOW, THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS IN CANADA A SHORT TIME AGO, IN FEBRUARY AS A MATTER OF FACT, AND AT THAT TIME WE HAD A REVIEW OF THE ALREADY EXCELLENT RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN CANADA AND COLOMBIA AND THIS HAS PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT MOMENTUM AND THIS MOMENTUM HAS BEEN CARRIED FORWARD IN THIS PARTICULAR VISIT.

REPORTER: MR MINISTER. IS THERE A CONCRETE INTEREST IN CANADA WITH REGARDS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CONFLICT AND WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF YOUR TRIP, NOW THAT YOU ARE LEAVING COLOMBIA AND ARE ABOUT TO VISIT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES? WHAT CONCRETE FORMULAS DOES THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT HAVE TO HELP CENTRAL AMERICA?

MR MACEACHEN: WE ARE PRESENTLY PROVIDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO A NUMBER OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING COSTA RICA, HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA. WE HAVE A NEW INCREASING PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN COSTA RICA. I INDICATED THAT WE WOULD BE INCREASING SIGNIFICANTLY THE PARTICIPATION IN THEIR ECONOMY AND THAT WE WOULD BE DISCUSSING HOW WE CAN DO THAT, AND I WILL BE DOING THE SAME IN THE TWO REMAINING COUNTRIES I VISIT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THAT IS IN RECOGNITION OF OUR PRECEPTION THAT THE ROOT CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA ARE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AND THAT WE WANT TO CONTRIBUTE IN OUR WAY TO THE RESOLUTION OF THOSE PROBLEMS. SO THAT IS QUITE CONCRETE.

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PAGE TROIS ZPGR0724 NONCLAS

ON THE POLITICAL FRONT WE HAVE DECLARED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE CONTADORA EFFORT. WE ARE GIVING THAT OUR POLITICAL SUPPORT AND WE ARE PREPARED TO FOLLOW CLOSELY THE WORK OF THE THREE WORKING GROUPS ESTABLISHED BY THE CONTADORA AND ENGAGE IN DISCUSSION AND, IF REQUESTED, AND IN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ARE APPROPRIATE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP FURTHER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE WORK OF THE SECURITY COMMISSION IS OF INTEREST TO US BECAUSE WE HAVE HAD A GOOD DEAL OF EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD OF VERIFICATION AND CONTROLS. THAT WOULD BE A CONCRETE RATIFICATION OF OUR INTEREST IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HELP. WE ARE NOT/NOT SEEKING PARTICIPATION, WE ARE NOT/NOT LOOKING TO IMPOSE OURSELVES, BUT IF WE CAN HELP WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER IT.

WE HAVE JUST RECENTLY SENT OBSERVERS AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR FOR THE ELECTIONS AND WE HAD A REPORT FROM OUR OBSERVERS. WE DID THAT IN ORDER TO EXHIBIT OUR INTEREST AND OUR CONCERN, BUT ALSO TO BECOME AS OBJECTIVELY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE AS TO WHAT IS GOING ON IN EL SALVADOR.

FINALLY, JUST TO WRAP UP THIS CONCRETE ASPECT, WHAT CONCRETE THINGS ARE WE DOING AND TO ANSWER THAT I WILL CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT IN CENTRAL AMERICA WE ARE INCREASING OUR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE THREE-FOLD, AND THAT ALL THIS IS UNDER CONCESSIONAL TERMS, NOT/NOT COMMERCIAL TERMS.

REPORT: MR MINISTER, HOW DOES CANADA SEE THE ATTITUDE OF THE SUPER

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PAGE QUATRE ZPGR0724 NONCLAS

POWERS AND WHAT POLITICAL TREATMENT DOES CANADA GIVE TO GROUPS SUCH AS FMNL ETC. IN EL SALVADOR?

MR MACEACHEN: WE DO NOT/NOT FAVOR THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

REPORTER: I WOULD LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT. I UNDERSTAND HALF THE REASON OF YOUR VISIT HERE OR PART OF YOUR TALKS, CONCERN THE POSSIBLE INTEGRATION OF CANADA INTO THE OAS AS A FULL MEMBER RATHER THAN OBSERVER, HOW CLOSE IS THIS?

MR MACEACHEN: THE SUBJECT HAS COME UP ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND I HAVE LISTENED WITH GREAT CARE TO WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ON THAT SUBJECT, BUT MY PRINCIPLE OBJECT IN COMING TO CENTRAL AMERICA IS REALLY NOT/NOT TO EXAMINE THE PROS AND CONS OF JOINING THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. I HAVE A MORE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE AND LET ME SAY THAT CANADA IS AN OBSERVER AT THE OAS. WE VE PARTICIPATED IN A NUMBER OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OAS. I BELIEVE IN THE FIELD OF HEALTH WHERE WE CAN MAKE A CONTRIBUTION. WE HAVENT BECOME A FULL MEMBER. THE MATTER IS UNDER CONTINUING CONSIDERATION IN OTTAWA. IT IS NOT/NOT QUITE CLEAR, THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION IS NOT/NOT SELF-EVIDENT WHETHER CANADA COULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE OAS OR WHETHER IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF CANADA ITSELF. BUT THE ISSUE WASNT RAISED, FOR EXAMPLE TODAY OR YESTERDAY, IN COLOMBIA. IT IS A MATTER THAT WE HAVE UNDER VERY ACTIVE CONSIDERATION.

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PAGE CINO ZPGR0724 NONCLAS

REPORTER: BECAUSE THERE WAS A LOCAL RADIO REPORT TODAY WHICH SUGGESTED THAT YOU COULD BECOME A MEMBER WITHIN A MATTER OF TWO OR THREE MONTHS. YOU'RE SUGGESTING THAT THIS IS NOT/NOT TRUE?

MR MACEACHEN: IF IT IS A TECHNICAL COMMENT I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT IS TRUE OR NOT/NOT, BUT CERTAINLY FROM FROM DECISION POINT OF VIEW, CANADA HAS NOT/NOT TAKEN ANY DECISION ON THAT POINT YET.

REPORTER: WILL THE DECISION BE MADE SHORTLY?

MR MACEACHEN: I DON'T HAVE IT AT THE FOREFRONT OF MY AGENDA.

REPORTER: YOUR MEETING WITH MINISTER LLOREDA IN OTTAWA, YOU REFERRED TO IT AS HAVING PROVIDED AN QUOTE EXCELLENT MOMENTUM UNQUOTE. DID YOU MEAN AN EXCELLENT MOMENTUM WITHIN THE CONTADORA CONTEXT, OR WERE YOU REFERRING STRICTLY TO BILATERAL RELATIONS?

MR MACEACHEN: WELL, I THINK WHEN I WAS TALKING I MADE THAT COMMENT BASICALLY ABOUT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN SIMMERING AND WE ARE NOW BRINGING TO THE BOIL, WHICH WE DISCUSSED TO GREAT DETAILS IN OTTAWA, AND CAN BE ENHANCED WITH THESE BILATERAL MINISTERIAL VISITS. THIS IS WHAT I MEANT BY EXCELLENT MOMENTUM.

PRESS SECRETARY NOBLE: ONE MORE QUESTION:

(NO/NO RESPONSE FROM REPORTERS).

PRESS SECRETARY NOBLE: OK, THANK YOU GENTLEMEN.

UUU/216 071300Z ZPGR0724

---DPM/SSEA SCRUM MANAGUA 09APR

FOLLOWING ARE TRANSCRIPTS OF DPM/SSEA SCRUMS FOLLOWING MTG WITH
ACTING FM TINOCO AND AT CHILTEPE DAIRY PROJECT:

QUOTE DPM/SSEA:THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA AS SEEN BY NICAR
AND THE CONTADORA GROUP,RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS AND THE USA,
THESE WERE ALL DISCUSSED.

Q:WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS ON THE NICARAGUAN VIEWS OF THE AREA?

DPM/SSEA:I MUST SAY THAT THE MOST PROMISING PART OF THE DISCUSSION
WAS THE DECLARED SUPPORT FOR THE CONTADORA PROCESS AND THE
REALIZATION ON THE PART OF NICARAGUA AS EXPRESSED TO US THAT THIS WAS
THE ONLY PROMISING AVENUE.THAT THERE WAS NO/NO OTHER WAY AND THAT
THEY WERE PREPARED TO GO ALONG AND WORK AT IT.I THINK THAT THEY
RECOGNIZE THAT PROGRESS IS VERY DIFFICULT AND HARD TO COME BY.THEYRE
NOT/NOT MOVING AHEAD BY LEAPS AND BOUNDS.LET ME TELL YOU THAT.

Q:DID YOU HEAR A HARD LINE AGAINST WSHDC,THEIR RHETORIC AGAINST
WSHDC?

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PAGE TWO MDEL0013 UNCLAS

DPM/SSEA: I THINK THAT NICARAGUA IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY DESCRIBED AS INCREASED TROOP PLACEMENTS IN THE AREA BY THE USA, BY THE MINING OF THEIR HARBOURS. AND THESE ARE POINTED OUT AS TWO COMPLICATING FACTORS IN THE PROCESS.

Q: CAN YOU TELL ME WHETHER THE MINING OF NICARAGUAN HARBOURS IS AFFECTING THE DELIVERY OF CANADIAN AID AND CANADIAN COMMERCE?

DPM/SSEA: NOT/NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE, CERTAINLY NOT/NOT YET.

Q: DOES CANADA INTEND TO MAKE ANY SPECIAL PROTEST CONCERNING THE MINING?

DPM/SSEA: CANADA IS CONCERNED ABOUT IT, LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY THE REQUIREMENTS OF INNATL LAW THAT THEY BE OBSERVED IN A SITUATION OF THIS KIND. BUT AS I SAID UP TO THE PRESENT WEVE HAD NO/NO DIFFICULTY IN DELIVERING OUR AID SHIPMENTS. I THINK THERE WAS A VESSEL ENTERED LAST NIGHT.

Q: DOES CANADA INTEND TO TAKE STRONGER ACTION TOWARD SEEKING REGIONAL PEACE?

DPM/SSEA: THATS PART OF MY OBJECTIVE TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS ANYTHING

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PAGE THREE MDEL0013 UNCLAS

ADDITIONAL CDA CAN DO.WE CANT IMPOSE OURSELVES.WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE CONTADORA PROCESS.WE THINK THAT IS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE WAY WE CAN HELP AND WEVE OFFERED OUR ASSISTANCE IN WAYS THAT MIGHT BE HELPFUL BUT THESE HAVE NOT/NOT YET BEEN DEFINED FOR US.

CHILTEPE PROJECT:

DMP/SSEA:I LEARNED A GOOD DEAL ABOUT THE EFFORTS THAT ARE BEING MADE TO IMPROVE THE LIVESTOCK AND PARTICULARLY DAIRY PRODUCTION IN NICARAGUA AND IM PLEASED THAT CANADA IS COOPERATING.

Q:WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT CURRENT CENTRAL AMERICA SYSTEM AND THE MINING OF NICARAGUAS PORTS?

DPM/SSEA:WELL THE SITUATION IS NOT/NOT VERY EASY,ITS FILLED WITH TENSION AND DIFFICULTY AND I WOULD THINK THAT THE MINING OF THE PORTS IS ANOTHER ELEMENT OF TENSION THAT DOESNT CONTRIBUTE AT ALL TO THE RELAXATION OF THE SITUATION.

UUU/161 100232Z MDEL0013

—DPM/SSEA SCRUM AFTER MTG COMANDANTE DANIEL ORTEGA MANAGUA

12APR 1900 ERS

Q: WAS THE QUESTION OF THE MINING OF NICARAGUAN PORTS RAISED?

DPM/SSEA: NO/NO NOT/NOT REALLY IT WAS ONLY REFERRED TO BUT WE DIDNT
GO INTO IT IN ANY DEPTH,CERTAINLY I DIDNT.

Q: HOW WAS IT REFERRED TO?

DPM/SSEA: WELL SIMPLY THAT THERE WILL HAVE BEEN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
BETWEEN MR ORTEGA AND THE PRIME MINISTER WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE MINES.

Q: WHAT POSITION IS CANADA TAKING ON THAT?

DPM/SSEA: WELL WERE NOT/NOT A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,BUT I
THINK WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ANY POSSIBLE SITUATION THAT IMPLIES A
DISREGARD FOR INNATL LAW.

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PAGE TWO MDELZ014 UNCLAS

Q: DOES THIS VIOLATE INNATL LAW?

DPM/SSEA: WELL OUR LEGAL ADVISORS ARE QUITE CONCERNED THAT IT HAS THAT EFFECT.

Q: HAVE YOU COMMUNICATED ANY PROTEST TO THE STATE DEPT?

DPM/SSEA: NO/NO, IVE BEEN ON THE ROAD AND I HAVENT REALLY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE ANY VIEWS KNOWN, BUT IF YOU ASK WHAT IS OUR THINKING ABOUT SUCH AN ACTION THAT WOULD BE OUR THINKING.

Q: THAT IT DOES VIOLATE INNATL LAW?

DPM/SSEA: THAT IT RAISES A VERY DEEP QUESTION.

Q: IS THAT THE SAME THING AS SAYING IT DOES?

DPM/SSEA: WELL ITS A LEGAL QUESTION AND THATS WHAT OUR LAWYERS TELL TELL US.

UUU/161 111834Z MDEL0014

"Le Point"

Date	13 avril 1984
Number/Numéro	FPR-0404

Vous trouverez sous pli la transcription d'un segment de l'émission "Le Point" du Réseau de Radio Canada diffusé le 11 avril 1984. Le segment porte sur la participation américaine au minage des ports de Nicaragua.

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5000AE
840411 DL
OTTAWA/HULL CBOFT 10H30 LE POINT

SIMON DURIVAGE: RONALD REAGAN N'AIME PAS LE GOUVERNEMENT ACTUEL DU NICARAGUA. ON LE SAVAIT. DEPUIS PLUS DE 3 ANS EN EFFET IL CHERCHE A LE MINER MORALEMENT AVEC L'APPUI. IL FAUT LE DIRE, DU CONGRES ET DE L'OPINION AMERICAINE. MAIS DE LA A LE MINER PHYSIQUEMENT CETTE FOIS S'EN EST TROP. SEMBLE-T-IL, LE SENAT AMERICAIN A MEME SERVI UNE SEVERE REBUFFADE AU PRESIDENT REAGAN HIER A 84 CONTRE 12 EN EFFET DONC A 7 CONTRE 1 AUTANT DE REPUBLICAINS QUE DE DEMOCRATES AU FAIT. LES SENATEURS ONT DENONCE LES OPERATIONS DE MINAGE DES PORTS NICARAGUAYEN FAIT AVEC L'AIDE DE LA C.I.A. AMERICAINE. LE SENATEUR REPUBLICAIN BARRY GOLDWATER POURTANT RECONNU POUR SON ULTRA CONSERVATISME EST MEME ALLE JUSQU'A DIRE QUE CE GESTE EQUIVALAIT NETTEMENT A UNE DECLARATION DE GUERRE AMERICAINE CONTRE LE NICARAGUA. CETTE RESOLUTION DU SENAT EVIDEMMENT N'OBLIGE EN RIEN LA MAISON BLANCHE A CESSER LES OPERATIONS AU NICARAGUA MAIS IL RESTE QU'ELLE FORCE QUAND MEME MORALEMENT M. REAGAN A REVOIR SA POLITIQUE CENTRE-AMERICAINE QU'IL A BASE SUR LA CONVICTION QU'IL A PERSONNELLEMENT QUE LE NICARAGUA EN FAIT CHERCHE A EXPORTER SA REVOLUTION SOCIALISTE D'ABORD AU SALVADORE PUIS AILLEURS

EN AMERIQUE CENTRALE ET EVENTUELLEMENT JUSQU'AU MEXIQUE. LE VOISIN DES E.U. QUI A UNE FRONTIERE GRANDE COMME UNE PASSOIRE. IL N'Y A PAS QUE LES SENATEURS AMERICAINS QUI SOIT AUSSI DE CETTE NOUVELLE ESCALADE. IL Y A DES AMIS DES E.U. AUSSI PAR EXEMPLE PLUSIEURS PAYS D'EUROPE NOTAMMENT SONT INQUIETS. LA FRANCE A MEME PROPOSE D'ALLER DEMINER LES EAUX DU NICARAGUA. QUAND AU CANADA, J'AI REJOINT UN PEU PLUS TOT PAR TELEPHONE. EN DEBUT DE SOIRES, LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES DU CANADA, ALLAN MACEACHEN, JE L'AI REJOINT AU HONDURAS MAIS M. MACEACHEN ETAIT HIER A MANAGUA, LA CAPITALE DU NICARAGUA.

DURIVAGE: MR. MACEACHEN, YOU WERE IN NICARAGUA YESTERDAY. WHAT IS CANADA'S POSITION ON THE MINING OF NICARAGUA'S HARBORS WITH THE HELP OF THE CIA?

MACEACHEN: WELL CANADA CERTAINLY DOESN'T APPROVE OF THE MINING OF NICARAGUAN WATERS. CANADA THINKS IT'S NOT ONLY A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BUT ALSO THAT IT IS LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE ADVERSELY TO THE TENSION THAT ALREADY EXISTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THAT THE TENSION THAT IS OBVIOUSLY PRESENT IN THE MINDS OF THE NICARAGUAN LEADERS WITH WHOM I TALKED WITH DURING MY TRIP. SO WE THINK THAT THAT IS NOT A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITY AT THE PRESENT TIME WHEN ALL EFFORTS OUGHT TO BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE LESSENING OF

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TENSIONS AND THE REMOVAL OF OUTSIDE MILITARY ADVISORS AND FORCES FROM ALL OF CENTRAL AMERICA.

DUVIRAGE: DID CANADA SEND A NOTE OF PROTEST TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THAT?

MACEachEN: WELL WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR DISAGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS BOTH PUBLICALLY AND PRIVATELY AND WE HAVE STATED THAT WE DISLIKE THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF ANY THIRD PARTY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THAT INCLUDES THE UNITED STATES AND INCLUDES ANY OTHER FOREIGN PRESENCE LIKE THE CUBANS OR THE SOVIET UNION. WE BELIEVE THAT IT'D BE A GOOD THING IF ALL OF THEM GOT OUT AND ALLOWED THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEOPLE TO WORK OUT THEIR OWN SOLUTIONS IN A SITUATION OF PEACE AND IT IS BECAUSE WE THINK THAT DEMILITARIZATION IS THE REAL SOLUTION THAT WE ARE SUPPORTING VERY STRONGLY. THE WORK OF THE COMPADORA(?) GROUP, ONE OF WHOSE OBJECTIVES IS TO BRING ABOUT THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN ADVISORS, MILITARY ADVISORS AND AT LEAST THE FREEZING OF ARMAMENTS IF NOT DISARMAMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. BUT WE HAVE MADE OUR VIEWS CLEAR. WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR DIAGREEMENT ON THAT PARTICULAR POINT AND WHETHER ONE ADDS TO IT BY USING THE WORD DENOUNCING IS QUITE DOUBTFUL.

DUVIRAGE: THANK YOU VERY MUCH SIR.

MACEachEN: THANK YOU.

URR RER ---DPM/SSEA PRESS CONF MANAGUA AIRPORT APR 11 0915 HRS.

DPM/SSEA: WILL MY STATEMENT WON'T BE VERY LONG, I'M JUST COMPLETING WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE A VERY VALUABLE VISIT TO NICARAGUA. I'VE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE REGIONAL SITUATION, THE POLITICAL FORCES THAT ARE OPERATING IN THE AREA, AND WHAT STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN CONSTRUCTIVELY TO REDUCE TENSIONS. THAT FEATURED A GREAT DEAL IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE GOVT. IN ADDITION TO THAT I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS CDA/NICARAGUA RELATIONS. WE HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL AID PROGRAMME AT PRESENT IN PLACE IN NICARAGUA AND WE ARE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN THAT PROGRAMME AND AS TIME GOES ON DEVELOP IT FURTHER AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN NICARAGUA DEVELOP IN A FAVOUR WAY. I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE ONE PARTICULAR PROJECT, A DAIRY PROJECT THAT WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE GOVT. OF CDA. WE HAVE BEEN MAINLY PROVIDING LINES OF CREDIT AND THAT HAS BEEN OF IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF NICARAGUA.

I SHOULD SAY THAT IN MY DISCUSSIONS I HAVE PAID PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA.

PAGE TWO MDEL0021 UNCLAS

THAT GENERAL ELECTION WOULD BE TOTALLY CONNECTED WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION AND WOULD BE A VERY IMPORTANT DOMESTIC AND INNATL EVENT. CERTAINLY WE WILL ENCOURAGE IN ANY WAY WE COULD THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THESE ELECTIONS.

IN ADDITION TO MGT MEMBERS OF THE GOVT I HAD A FURTHER PERSPECTIVE FROM PERSONS WHOM ONE MIGHT REGARD AS HOLDING DIFFERENT VIEWS, OPPOSITION GROUPS TO THE GOVT. THAT CERTAINLY ADDED AN IMPORTANT DIMENSION TO MY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITU IN NICARAGUA.

Q.CAN YOU TELL US WHY OTTAWA IS NOT OPENING AN EMB IN NICARAGUA?

DPM/SSEA:IT IS TRUE THAT WE DO NOT HAVE AN EMB IN NICARAGUA.WE HAVE A AN EMB IN CRICA AND THE AMB,MR. FILLEUL, WHO IS ALSO ACCREDITED TO NICARAGUA MAINTAINS VERY CLOSE.COMMUNICATION WITH THE SITUATION IN MANAGUA. WE HAVE INCREASED QUITE CONSIDERABLY OUR PERSONNEL IN CRICA IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE OUR CAPACITY,NOT ONLY IN CRICA BUT IN NICARAGUA. WE HAVE THAT SITUATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE, BUT AT THE MOMENT THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY WE CAN'TFORESEE OPENING AN EMB IMMED IS A BUDGETARY CONSIDERATION.THERE ARE QUITE A NUMBER OF AREAS IN THE WORLD WHERE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INCFIASE OUR REPRESENTATION, BUT WE ARE PRESENTLY PREVENTED BY BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS.BUT WE INTEND TO ENSURE FROM CRICA WE ARE PAYING PROPER ATTN TO THE SITUATION HERE.

Q.IS THE BUDGETARY REASON THE ONLY REASON?

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PAGE THREE MDEL0221 UNCLAS

PDM/SSEA: CERTAINLY THERE ARE NO POLITICAL REASONS WHY WE ARE NOT/ NOT OPENING AN EMB. IN EVERY SITUATIONS WHERE WE CONSIDER OPENING A NEW MISSION WE HAVE TO ASSESS THE REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA FOR CDN REPRESENTATION AND HOW WILL CDN INTERESTS WILL BE SEIZED FOR EXAMPLE IN THE FIELD OF IMMIGRATION, TRADE, INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RELATIONS. SO WE UNDERTAKE AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT. WE ATTEMPT TO PRIORIZE THE VARIOUS REQUIREMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THERE ARE OTHER PLACES AT THE PRESENT TIME WHERE THERE IS A DEEP INTEREST IN HAVING ADDITIONAL CDN REPS. BUT WE CAN'T DO IT ALL AT THE SAME TIME. YOU KNOW WE HAVE INCREASED OUR EMPHASIS IN CENTAM. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE TRIPLED, WE ARE INCREASING THREEFOLD OUR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, AND THAT IS A QUITE SIGNIFICANT INDICATION OF CDN INTEREST.

Q. WILL CDA PARTICIPATE IN THE OCEAN VENTURE 84 MANOEUVRES SCHEDULED FOR LATER THIS YR AS IT HAS DONE IN PAST OCEAN VENTURE MANOEUVRES?

PDM/SSEA: OCEAN VENTURE? THE TERMINOLOGY IS NOT FAMILIAR TO ME.

Q. WILL CDA CONTINUE TO SUPPLY AID TO HONDURAS THROUGH CIDA AND SUCH AID HAS BEEN USED TO BUILD ROADS IN THE FRONTIER REGION BETWEEN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA?

PDM/SSEA: WE HAVE AN AID PROGRAMME IN HONDURAS. WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN IT AND WE REGARD THE ALLEGATION THAT WE'VE USED AID MONEY AS INCORRECT IN THE WAY YOU'VE DESCRIBED. (IF NO SUCH ROADS BUILT BY CDN FUNDS)

Q. DID YOU RECEIVE ADEQUATE ASSURANCES OF THE ABILITY OF OPPOSITION PARTIES TO PARTICIPATE FREELY AND FULLY IN THE ELECTION AND WAS CDA ASKED TO SEND AN OBSERVER TEAM?

PAGE FOUR MDEL0021 UNCLAS

DPM/SSEA: I WAS NOT ASKED TO SEND AN OBSERVER TEAM. REFERENCES WERE MADE THAT OBSERVERS MIGHT BE ASKED AND ALSO REFERENCES WERE MADE TO POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE IN A TECHNICAL WAY OF HOLDING AN ELECTION. BUT WE WERE NOT DIRECTLY ASKED. I CERTAINLY IN MY DISCUSSIONS UNDERLINED ONE OR TWO POINTS WHICH I REGARD AS IMPORTANT IN THE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS :ONE OF COURSE IF THAT IN ORDER TO HAVE A GENUINE ELECTION ONE MUST HAVE AN OPPOSITION.AN ELECTIONS WITHOUT AN OPPOSITION IS A NON EVENT. I DREW ON MY OWN E

ELECTIONS IN CDA WHERE I'VE WON AND LOST ELECTIONS

AND I THINK IN ANY SITUATION ONE HAS TO ACCEPT THE POSSIBILITY OF LOSING. YOU CAN'T LOSE UNLESS YOU HAVE AN ORGANIZED OPPOSITION.

Q CAN YOU COMMENT ON THE MINING OF NICARAGUA PORTS AND THE USA DECISION NOT TO RESPECT THE WORLD COURT REGARDING CENTAM?

DPM/SSEA:WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE MINING OF NICARAGUAN WATERS. WE THINK IT IS ANOTHER DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT IN THE WAY OF FURTHER ESCALATION IN THE TENSION IN THIS AREA. WE FIND IT QUITE WORRISOME. I'VE NO DIREKT COMMENTS ON THE DECISION OF THE AMERICAN...

(CONF INTERRUPTED BY NOISE FROM DEPARTING AIRLINER).

Q.WILL CDA BE WILLING TO JOIN FRANCE IN AN INNATL EFFORT TO CLEAN MINES OUT OF NICARAGUA WATERS?

DPM/SSEA: I DON'T FORESEE THAT POSSIBILITY AT ALL.

Q.HOW COULD THE MINING OF THE PORTS AFFECT THE ELECTION PROCESS IN NICARAGUA? YOU HAVE ALREADY SAID YOU SEE IN A GOOD OPINION THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NICARAGUA. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON IT?

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PAGE FIVE MDEL0021 UNCLAS

IPM/SSEA: YES. I DO HAVE A DEEP BELIEF IN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, AS A WAY OF PROVIDING LEGITIMACY TO THE GOVT OF THE DAY. AS I SAID, I WOULD SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE THE HOLDING OF SUCH ELECTIONS IN NICARAGUA.

I HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE MINING OF NICARAGUAN WATERS AND IT IS SELF EVIDENT TO ME THAT THE ESCALATION OF TENSION THAT MAY BE CAUSED BY SUCH MINING DOES NOT ASSIST IN CREATING A GOOD ATMOSPHERE FOR THE HOLDING OF AN ELECTION IN ANY COUNTRY. IT MAY NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO THE HOLDING OF GOOD ELECTIONS, BUT IT IS CERTAINLY DOES ADD TO THE ATMOSPHERE THAT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE.

Q. IS CDA WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO TAKE AWAY THE MINES OUT OF THE NICARAGUAN PORTS? THIS IS ONE QUESTION. THE OTHER IS WHAT IS THE AMOUNT OF CREDITS, DONATIONS THAT CDA HAS GRANTED TO NICARAGUA?

DPM/SSEA: CDA HAS ALWAYS RESISTED THE MILITARIZATION OF CENTAM. WE HAVE FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED THAT OUR OPPOSITION TO THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN CENAM. WE HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT INSTEAD OF MORE FOREIGN COUNTRIES COMING INTO THE AREA, THAT THOSE PRESENTLY HERE OUGHT TO LEAVE. AND I WOULD NOT FORESEE THAT CDA WOULD INTERVENE IN THAT KIND OF AN ACTIVITY, AS I LOOK AT IT AT THE PRESENT TIME. IN ANSWERING YOUR QUESTION ON AID, WE HAVE PROVIDED ABOUT DLRS 25 M IN THE LAST THREE YEARS. WE HAVE PROVIDED A 13 M LINE OF CREDIT AND TWO SHIPS ARRIVED IN NICARAGUA THIS WEEK BRINGING FERTILIZER.

Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE APPROVAL OF THE CONDEMNATION RESOLUTION IN THE USA SENATE OF THE MINING OF THE PORTS?

PAGE SIX MDEL0021 UNCLAS

PDM/SSEA: I THINK THAT I WOULD APPROVE OF THAT RESOLUTION. I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO READ THE EXACT TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION, BUT ANY EXPRESSION OF OPINION AGAINST THE MINING OF THE NICARAGUAN WATERS WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE MY SUPPORT. I THINK IT IS AN IMPORTANT EXPRESSION OF OPINION ON THE PART OF THE USA SENATE.

Q MR. MACEACHEN, WHY DOES CDA NOT WANT TO HELP SWEEPING THE MINES AND WILL CDA CONDEMN OR OPENLY PROTEST TO THE USA AGAINST THIS ACT AS DID THE BRITISH GOVT?

PDM/SSEA: WE HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TWO WEEKS AGO TO THE AUTHORITIES IN THE USA. I HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED WHY IT WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CDN POLICY TO UNDERTAKE ACTIVITY IN MINE SWEEPING IN NICARAGUAN WATERS.

Q. I DONT KNOW IF YOU TALKED ABOUT THE FACT THAT USA DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL AND YOUR OPINION ON THAT?

PDM/SSEA: WE HAVE A CASE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE HAGUE. WE ARE ARGUING A VERY IMPORTANT BOUNDARY CASE IN ASSERTING A CDN CLAIM TO GEORGE'S BANK OFF THE COAST OF NOVA SCOTIA. WE ARE ARGUING THAT CASE AGAINST THE USA WHO IS MAKING ITS CLAIM FOR THE GEORGE'S BANK. BUT U- SHOULD ADD THAT FROM TIME TO TIME COUNTRIES DO REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT, ITS COMPULSORY JURISDICTION, FOR EXAMPLE THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER ACKNOWLEDGE THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INNATE COURT. SO, IT'S NOT A NEW DEVELOPMENT.

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PAGE SEVEN MDEL0021 UNCLAS

Q. WHAT IS THE BIGGEST ACHIEVEMENT OF YOUR TRIP SO FAR?

DPM/SSEA: I WOULD REGARD THE RESULT OF MY TRIP, IS THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DIRECTLY WITH COMANDANTE ORTEGA AND OTHER REPS OF THE GOVT THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA, THE POSSIBILITY OF DEEPENING MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION. TO TEST CDN POLICY AGAINST REALITY. I DID NOT COME HERE TO DO ANYTHING MORE THAN THAT. BUT I EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST ON THE PART OF CDA IN THE SITUATION IN CENTAM.

Q. IN YOUR OPINION, DOES IT APPEAR THAT NICARAGUA REALLY IS INTERESTED IN PEACE OR DO YOU SEE NICARAGUA AS BEING A DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE REGION?

DPM/SSEA: I BELIEVE THAT THE FIVE CENTAM COUNTRIES HAVE ALL COME TOGETHER IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE THROUGH THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE, ALONG WITH THE FOUR CONTADORA COUNTRIES. FROM WHAT I HAVE HEARD THE NICARAGUAN GOVT IS INTERESTED IN SEEKING PEACE, AND IS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TROUBLED SITUATION IN THE REGION. AND I MUST SAY I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND ANYONE WHO WOULD NOT SEEK PEACE. BECAUSE AS IT'S QUITE CLEAR TO ME THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS COUNTRY IS GOING TO BE HELD BACK, IF THIS PRESENT SITUATION IS MAINTAINED. I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BUILD UP ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES, TO OVERCOME THE POVERTY, TO IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS WHILE THEY ARE ENGAGED IN THIS KIND OF WARFARE OR FIGHTING. IT JUST DOESN'T MAKE SENSE. SO I TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT PEOPLE ARE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN PEACE. THE CONTRARY BELIEF WOULD BE PREPOSTEROUS. UNQUOTE

1145 MAYABOT HO

---DPM/SSEA PRESS CONFERENCE TEGUCIGALPA APRIL 12

DPM: I WILL MAKE A VERY FEW COMMENTS BECUAE IT WOULD BE BETTER IF I GIVE YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS. I AM COMPLETING TODAY MY VISIT TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND I AM CERTIANLY VERY PLEASED THAT I CAN CONCLUDE THE VISIT IN HONDURAS, THE PLACE THAT IS SO ATTRACTIVE AND WHERE THE CDN DEL HAS BEEN SO WARMLY RECEIVED. MY PURPOSE IN COMING HERE IS TO UNDERLINE THE INTEREST THAT CDA AND THE CDN PEOPLE HAVE IN THE FUTURE CENTRAL AMERICA. WHAT STEPS WE ARE TAKING AND HOPE TO TAKE IN THE FUTURE TO ASSIST IN THE PROGRESS THAT IS SO URGENTLY REQUIRED ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. CDA HAS AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WITH HONDURAS SINCE 1974. AND AS I SAID LAST NIGHT, SINCE THEN WE HAVE SPENT ABOUT DLRS 60 M IN BILATERAL FUNDING FOR PROJS OR PROGRAMS IN HONDURAS, PARTICULARLY IN AGRIC, FORESTRY, AND ENERGY. AND APART FROM THAT WE ARE ALSO SUPPORTING GRASS ROOTS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS CONDUCTED

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PAGE TWO MDEL0026 UNCLAS

THROUGH NON GOVTL ORGANIZATIONS. I HAVE INDICATED TO THE AUTHORITIES IN HONDURAS THAT CDA WILL CONTINUE ITS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING IN 1984 AND THAT OUR ASSISTANCE WILL INCREASE OVER THAT PERIOD OF TIME.

I HAD DURING MY VISIT AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE PRES, WITH THE MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY, MR FLORES, THE MIN OF FINANCE, AND OTHER ECONOMIC MINISTERS. AND IN THE COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, WE TOUCHED UPON OBVIOUSLY THE SECURITY SITU IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE CO TADORA PROCESS, THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES THAT HONDURAS FACES, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER SUBJS THAT WERE RELATED TO THESE.

Q: CAN YOU TELL US WHAT THE GOVT OF HONDURAS SAID TO YOU ABOUT THE CURRENT CDN AID PROGRAM ABOUT ANY OF THE WAYS THEY WOULD LIKE US TO HELP?

DPM: THE AUTHORITIES IN HONDURAS ARE AGREED WITH CDA THAT ITS GOOD IDEA FOR US TO SPECIALIZE IN THE SECTORS OF FORESTERY, AGRIC AND ENERGY. THESE ARE URGENT PRIORITIES IN HONDURAS AND WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO HELP. AND WE DID DISCUSS PRACTICAL QUESTIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS. THE MIN OF FINANCE DID RAISE WITH ME IN OUR DISCUSSION THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS OF HONDURAS. THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY BETWEEN HONDURAS AND THE INNATL MONETARY FUND IN ORDER TO GET BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SUPPORT. AND IN THAT CONTEXT, THE MINISTER DID MAKE AN APPEAL TO CDA TO PROVIDE SOME BALANCE OF PAYMENT/SUPPORT
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PAGE THREE MDEL0026 UNCLAS

ON A INTERIM BASIS.I WAS NOT/NOT IN A POSITION TO REPLY TO THAT REQUEST BECAUSE WE DO BELONG TO THE INNATL MONETARY FUND WHICE WE REGARD AS THE IMPORTANT INSTITUTION IN THE WORLD FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS/SUPPORT.I DID POINT OUT THAT SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY UNDERTAKEN BY CDA COULD BE REGARDED AS DIRECT BALANCE OF PAYMENTS/SUPPORT BUT THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER HIS VIEWS ON THIS POINT AND I SUGGESTED THAT HE BE IN TOUCH DIRECTLY WITH THE CDN MINISTER OF FINANCE.

Q: CAN YOU ENLARGE ON CDAS CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO THE SECURITY SITU IN CENTRAL AMERICA?

DPM:WE ARE QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THE TROUBLED ATMOSPHERE THAT PREVAILS IN THE AREA AND THE APPREHENSION THAT IS EXPRESSED SO FREQUENTLY BY SPOKESMEN FROM THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES AS TO THE SECURITY SITUATION.WE THINK THAT EFFORTS THAT NOW ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN THE CONTADORA PROCESS SHOULD BE FULLY SUPPORTED.THAT MEANS THAT IT NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF THE INNATL COMMUNITY,CERTAINLY THE USA CERTAINLY ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP AND THE CONTADORA GROUP.WE THINK AS A COUNTY THAT THERE IS NO/NO POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS,ECONOMICALLY,OR SOCIALLY OR INDEED POLITICALLY,IF THE PRESENT TENSE SITUATION CONTINUES.AND THAT LEADS US TO URGE THE DEMILITARIZATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE,AND THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN ADVISERS,FOREIGN TROOPS AND FOREIGN SOLDIERS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA.

...4

PAGE FOUR MDEL0026 UNCLAS

Q: SINCE CDA IS PREECHING FOR THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE AREA, DID YOU RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE CONTRAS IN HONDURAS AND IF SO WHAT IS CDA VIEWS ON THIS SPECIFIC POINT OF THE CONTRAS IN HONDURAS?

DPM: YES I DID RAISE THAT QUESTION IN HONDURAS AND AS WELL IN NICARAGUA. I CANT GIVE YOU THE RESPONSE OF MY INTERLOCUTIVES BECAUSE IS FOR THEM TO MAKE THEIR COMMENTS. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE CONTRAS OR GUERRILLA FORCES, IS VERY MUCH RELATED TO PROCESSES THAT ARE GOING ON OR HAVE TO GO ON IN CENTRAL AMERICA. ONE IS THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION. SURELY, THE REASON FOR THE COUNTER FORCES IS A REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LEGITIMACY OR THE ACCEPTIBILITY FO EXISTING POWER STRUCTURES IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE ELECTORAL PROCESS HAS TO BE USED TO THE MAXIMUM IN ORDER TO REMOVE THAT KIND OF PRESSURE. I ALSO THINK THAT ITS VERY MUCH RELATED TO THE CONTADORA SECURITY PROCESS. BECAUSE, AS YOU KNOW, IN THE SECURITY COMMISSION THERE IS A PROPOSAL DEALING WITH WHAT I CALL DEMILITARISATION WHICH INCLUDES THE QUESTION OF THE IRREGULAR FORCES WHICH IS...WEAT...A EUPHEMISM FOR THE REALITY OF GUERILLAS AND CONTRAS.

Q: DO YOU THINK THAT HONDURAS QUALIFIES, DOES IT CONTINUE TO QUALIFY FOR CDN AID ON THESE GROUNDS AND HOW DOES THE CDN GOVT SEE THE OPERATION OF MINING WHICH HAS BEEN CRITICIZED BY SO MANY OTHER GOVTS.

DPM/SSEA: THERE IS NO/NO SITU THAT IS VERY CLEAR CUT OR ABSOLUTE I
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PAGE FIVE MDEL0026 UNCLAS

FIND, IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHING CRITERIA FOR THE GIVING OF AID.

CERTAINLY IT IS NOT/NOT MY INTENTION TO RECOMMEND THAT THE STATUS OF HONDURAS BE CHARGED AS A CORE COUNTRY, EITHER FOR THE SITUATION WHICH YOU DESCRIBED OR ANY OTHER THAT MIGHT BE BROUGHT IN.

IF THAT WAS THE CASE I WOULD HAVE TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF NICARAGUA AND MAYBE THEN ADDRESS MANY OTHER SITUATIONS. AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT I MUST DO IS TO OBSERVE THAT THESE PROGRAMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN HONDURAS ARE REACHING THE OBJECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT. THEY ARE HELPING THE PEOPLE AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE QUITE UNWISE TO TERMINATE OR ALTER THE STATUS OF HONDURAS. I'M ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT IT IS BACK ON THE ROAD TO STRENGTHENING ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WHICH ALWAYS APPEALS TO A COUNTRY LIKE CDA. THOUGH WE DON'T DENY AID TO COUNTRIES WHO DON'T HAVE FULLY-FLEDGED DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION. ON THE MINING WE DON'T LIKE IT VERY MUCH, WE DISLIKE IT.

Q: WHAT WOULD BE THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE IF THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE FAILS?

DPM/SSEA: I DON'T SEE GOOD ALTERNATIVE, QUITE FRANKLY I THINK THAT AS WE SAY THE CONTADORA PROCESS IS THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN AT THE MOMENT.

Q: IF CDA WILL BE VERY CAREFUL WITH ITS AID TO COUNTRIES THAT ARE ENGAGED IN THE ARMS RACE?

DPM: YES I THINK THAT WE TAKE THAT INTO ACCOUNT VERY MUCH. AS I SAID EARLIER IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND A TOTALLY CLEAR CUT SITUATION. BUT I WOULD SAY THAT IF A COUNTRY WERE DIVERTING EXPENDITURES TO WHAT

...6

PAGE SIX MDEL0026 UNCLAS

ONE MIGHT CALL ADVENTURES ABROAD, RATHER THAN DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, THEN THAT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A MATTER THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED VERY CAREFULLY. I KNOW ONE COUNTRY WHERE WE DID REDUCE AND FINALLY TERMINATE AN AID RELATIONSHIP BECAUSE IT WAS FINANCING, WHAT WE THOUGHT, WERE FORCES ABROAD.

Q: WHAT WOULD BE CDAS POSITION IF THE USA CARRIED OUT AN INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA SUCH AS THE ONE CARRIED OUT IN GRENADA?
DPM: WELL LET ME TELL YOU WHAT CDAS ATTITUDE WAS ON THE INVASION OF GRENADA. WE THOUGHT IT WAS UNJUSTIFIED AND IT HAD NO/NO BASIS ON INNATL LAW, AND WE SAID SO.

Q: HAS THE CDN GOVT TAKEN A DECISION ABOUT THE MINING OF THE HARBOURS IN NICARAGUA?

DPM: WELL, IVE ALREADY SAID THAT WE OPPOSE IT, OF COURSE. WE DONT LIKE WHATS HAPPENING, WE DISAPPROVE OF IT, WE THINK ITS A VIOLATION OF INNATL LAW, AND WE MADE THOSE VIEW, OUR CONCERN KNOWN TWO WEEKS AGO, AT LEAST.

Q: ABOUT THE REFUGEES—HONDURAS IS FACING A DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF REFUGEES AND APPARENTLY CDA HAD OFFERED TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP, AND THIS HAS NOT/NOT BEEN CLARIFIED, APPARENTLY THERE WAS A PROGRAM OF PERHAPS TAKING A THOUSAND REFUGEES A YEAR, ARE THERE ANY PROJECTS, IS CDA THINKING OF DOING SOMETHING ABOUT THIS TO HELP HONDURAS?

DPM: WE ARE AWARE OF THE ADDITIONAL BURDEN THAT HONDURAS IS CARRYING
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PAGE SEVEN MDEL0026 UNCLAS

BECAUSE OF THE REFUGEES PROBLEM. AND WE CERTAINLY RESPECT AND ADMIRE THE FACT THAT HONDURAS HAS RECEIVED THESE REFUGEES. WE ARE HELPING AS A COUNTRY, THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, IN HIS SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES IN HONDURAS. SECONDLY, WE HAVE A REFUGEE PROGRAM BY WHICH WE ACCEPT INTO CDA 2,500 REFUGEES EACH YEAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THAT IS OUR CONTRIBUTION TO HELP THE SITU AS WE TAKE REFUGEES, AND HAVE TAKEN REFUGEES IN THE PAST FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN CDA ON THE REFUGEE SITU. FOR EXAMPLE, BEFORE I LEFT FOR MY TRIP TO CENTRAL AMERICA, I WAS SEEN BY A NUMBER OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WHO ASKED ME TO IF POSSIBLE TO VISIT THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN HONDURAS, THEY ASKED ME ALSO TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS AND THEY HOPED THAT THE REFUGEES WOULD NOT/NOT BE RELOCATED FROM THEIR PRESENT LOCATION NEAR THE BORDER OF EL SALVADOR. THAT IS NOT/NOT THE VIEW OF THE GOVT OF CDA. BUT OUR VIEW IS THAT WE HOPE THAT IF THE REFUGEES ARE TO BE RELOCATED, THAT THE OPERATION BE CONDUCTED SMOOTHLY AND HUMANLY AND THAT THE NEW LOCATION, IF IT OCCURS, THAT THEY BE WITH AN ACCESS TO MARKETS AND BE INTEGRATED WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.

Q: HOW MUCH DID HONDURAS ASK FOR THE BALANCE OF PAYMENT AID?
NUMBER 2 HOW MUCH MONEY IN AID FOR THE THREE AREAS ALREADY MENTIONED, ON WHAT TERM? AND 3RD QUESTION IF IS SOMETHING LIKE GRENADA HAPPENED TO CENTRAL AMERICA WHAT WOULD BE CDAS POSITION?
DPM: THE MINISTER DID NOT/NOT MENTION ESPECIFIC FIGURE AND PRESUMABLY

...8

PAGE EIGHT MDEL0026 UNCLAS

IF THE DISCUSSIONS DEVELOP AT ALL, THE FIGURE WOULD EMERGE. MAYBE IT WOULD BE INCLUDED IN SOME DOCUMENTATION. THATS THE FIRST QUESTION. THE SECOND QUESTION, I DONT KNOW THE ANSWER, BUT ILL GET THE ANSWER FOR YOU, WHAT WILL BE SPENT IN THREE SECTORS IN THE NEXT THREE YEARS IN HONDURAS. IVE INDICATED WHAT WEVE SPENT IN THE PAST. THE THRID QUESTION--I CONFIDENTLY EXPECT THAT NO/NO SUCH SITU DEVELOP IN C.A. AS DEVELOPED IN GRENADA, AND IVE ALREADY INDICATED HOW CDA REACTS TO SITUATIONS OF THAT KIND, BY THE WAY WE REACTED IN THE CASE OF GRENADA.

WE HAVE MORE MONEY NOW AVAILABLE FOR SPENDING IN HONDURAS THAN THERE ARE PROJECTS UPON WHICH IT CAN BE USED. AND THE TERMS OF OUR AID ARE HIGHLY CONCESIONAL--ITS GRANT, OR LOANS AT ZERO RATE OF INTEREST, THE FIRST PAYMENT IN 10 YEARS AND YOU PAY IT ALL OFF IN 50 YEARS. YOU CANT GET A BANK THAT WOULD TREAT YOU LIKE THAT.

Q: YOU SAID YOU RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE CONTRAS WITH THE HONDURAN CONTADORA EXPERTS.

DPM: YES THERE AND EARLIER.

Q: COULD YOU TELL ME WHAT ELSE YOU RAISED WITH THE HONDURAN CONTADORA EXPERTS?

DPM: WELL, I RAISED MAINLY THE QUESTION OR THE PROBLEMS IN THE SECURITY FIELD. THE INTENTION, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, OF THE SECURITY COMMISSION IS TO BRING ABOUT A WAY OF KNOWING THE AMOUNT OF ARMAMENT, AND SOLDIERS AND FORCES IN EACH COUNTRY, THE NUMBER OF

...9

PAGE NINE MDEL0026 UNCLAS

BASES, THE NUMBER OF FOREIGN ADVISERS, THE NUMBER OF FOREIGN TROOPS, THAT THERE IS A WAY TO FIND THAT OUT AND THEN TO ESTABLISH CEILINGS TO WHICH THE FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED, TO WHAT IS DESCRIBED AS A STATE OF EQUILIBRIUM. AND THAT IS A VERY INTRICATE SERIES OF PROBLEMS THAT WE DISCUSSED, AND THAT WE DIDNT COMPLETE OR SOLVE I ASSURE YOU IN OUR DISCUSSION.

Q: THE CONTRAS MAY HAVE PLANNED THE MINING OF THE PORTS OF NICARAUGA FROM HERE. IS CDA WILLING TO USE THE AID LEVER TO INFLUENCE THE HONDURAN GOVT APPEARANT TOTAL INDULGENCE IF THESE PRESS REPORTS ARE TRUE OF CONTRA ACTIVITIES HERE?

DPM: YOUR QUESTION REALLY IS VERY CONDITIONAL BASED UPON IF CERTAIN THINGS ARE TRUE. AS I SAID, THAT IF CDA DECIDED TO TERMINATE AID IN HONDURAS, FOR EXAMPLE, IF IT WERE ESTABLISHED THAT CONTRAS WERE OPERATING WITH THE APPROVAL AND SUPPORT OF THE HONDURAN AUTHORITIES, WHICH IS SOMETHING I CANT ESTABLISH ON MY OWN ACCOUNT OR WITH MY OWN RESOURCES, BUT IF THAT WERE TRUE AND WE TOOK THAT ACTION, THEN I THINK WE WOULD BE ON A REALY MERRY-GO-ROUND. WHAT WOULD WE DO THEN IN NICARAGUA ABOUT THE ALLEGATION THAT THEY ARE ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE GUERILLAS IN EL SALVADOR, AND SO ON AND SO FORTH? SC I THINK THAT IT RAISES THE QUESTION ABOUT USING AID AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT. I DONT THINK YOU CAN IGNORE ENTIRELY THE POLITICAL SITU IN ANY COUNTRY AND BE BLIND TO WHAT IS HAPPENING. BUT I THINK THAT YOU HAVE TO BE RATHER CAREFUL ABOUT HOW YOU USE

...10

PAGE TEN MDEL0026 UNCLAS

IT AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT, BECAUSE THAT IS NOT/NOT THE PURPOSE
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE. THE PURPOSE OF IT IS TO HAVE THE
COUNTRY DEVELOP AND IMPROVE THE STANDARDS OF LIVING OF THE
CITIZENS OF THE COUNTRY. AND I THINK YOU HAVE TO BE VERY HESITANT
IN CUTTING THAT OFF. THATS MY ANSWER.

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CBC Radio - As it Happens - April 12
DPM/SSEA - Canadian Policy in Central
America

Date	April 13, 1984
Number/Numéro	FPR-0407

External Affairs Allan MacEachen completes his four country - 10 day tour of Central America tonight. He visited Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras on a mission to, as he put it, test Canada's policy against the reality. MacEachen questioned the heads of government and top officials in every country. Canada has poured millions of dollars in economic aid into Central America. We've reached the Honourable Allan MacEachen in Tegucigalpa, Honduras:

Q: Mr. MacEachen has this visit affected the way you think we should define our interests in Central America?

DPM/SSEA: I haven't come up with any new policies. I think that what we're doing stands the test reasonably well, but I think my perceptions of the situation have sharpened considerably and I hope my understanding of the situation has improved.

Q: Are you going to come away from there feeling that we should somehow in some way have a higher profile?

DPM/SSEA: Yes, I think that I come away with that idea, that what we are doing in the Aid Program is important. We ought to, I think, increase our political consultations. I think we ought to support where possible the democratization of Central America. Countries like Costa Rica, a fledgling democracy like Honduras where I am now, certainly deserve support of a country like Canada, and I think they need that support.

Q: Can we do that with one Embassy in Costa Rica covering the four countries or do we need more diplomatic representation?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think that probably it would be better if we had a stronger presence in Nicaragua, for example, and I think that my visit increased my consciousness and

certainly, in Nicaragua itself, there are developments occurring not only internally but externally that are very important that we ought to know a lot about, and that we ought to know about objectively and have the facts and have the truth and not be, in a sense, driven by ideological preconception, which I think is a danger for outsiders like myself who come in and who may be influenced by preconceived ideas.

Q: You must've talked about the coming election in Nicaragua and I would assume you discussed with government people the lifting of censorship, press freedom there, as an election approached. What did they tell you?

DPM/SSEA: I think one of the most striking experiences I had was to meet the editorial board of La Prensa in Managua and to have them explain in detail and with examples the rather rigorous press censorship to which they are currently subjected. I'd never understood that in this hemisphere press censorship could take place so systematically, and I think that a state of emergency exists and that is the justification for the press censorship. But I did talk about elections and had a very good exchange with the President of the Council of State in Managua about elections. It's a subject that I thought I know a bit about and tried to make the point that an election was an non-event if it didn't have strong opposition.

Q: How important is the opposition in the Nicaraguan election, is this issue of censorship to the question as to whether we might send observers there?

DMP/SSEA: I think that we haven't been asked for observers, but I think I would be at least in principle guided by the same consideration that guided me in terms of El Salvador, namely that we ought to have people who could go, who would call the situation as it occurs according to their lights and tell us what happens as well as they could find out.

Q: I gather one of the main topics of conversation on this trip just about everywhere you went was the Contadora Group. Where are those conversations leading? What is the perception of the achievement so far as Contadora?

DPM/SSEA: I have heard some very reputable commentators say that the process probably has, if not lessened tensions between Nicaragua and if it has not prevented a war between Nicaragua and Honduras, it has at least lessened tensions, and I think the process is very difficult. I've just come from a meeting with those in Honduras who are participating in the three Commissions, the security, the political and the economic and social, and one has only to listen to their recounting their experience to understand how very complex it is, as they search for some way to bring about peace in this region. I can only say that their commitment is genuine and that we have to get behind them and support them despite the difficulties. What one might fear is the possibility of bad faith on the part of any one of the participants, and if that were the case it would be very very sad indeed, or if the international community, including the United States, did not give the process its full and sincere backing, because if the United States isn't behind it fully then it would be a serious impediment to a solution.

Q: You know while you were in Washington on this visit that you just referred to, you were asked not to go to Nicaragua, but you did. I mean it does underline a certain difference in position towards this area between our two countries. Is that a route for you to pursue now that you've been there?

DPM/SSEA: I think we have to keep talking, expressing our views to the United States and where we disagree, as we do, we have to tell them so.

Q: For example on this whole question of the mining of Nicaraguan harbors?

DPM/SSEA: Yes I think that that is a very serious development and it's not something that we can condone in any way. I was interested in noting that the Contadora Ministers issued a statement just a couple of days ago in which they analyse the security situation in the area and included the mining as one of the destabilizing elements that has occurred recently. It's serious. There are other serious things happening and I think that we have to have our eye on those as well, as we show our strong disapproval of mining.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, thank you very much.

External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen spoke to us from Tegucigalpa, Honduras.

CBC Radio Morningside - Central America
Interview with DPM/SSEA April 16

Date

April 16, 1984

Number/Numéro

FPR-0414

The crisis that grips the nations of Central America is of great interest to the whole world, not least of all to Canadians. It involves wars, revolutions and counter-revolutions only a few thousand miles south of this country. Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, returned late on Friday from a 10 day visit to Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras and I welcome Mr. MacEachen to our Ottawa studio. Good morning, Sir.

DPM/SSEA: Good morning.

Q: As a Nova Scotian, I imagine you have the odd bear story as well, but let us turn our attention this morning to other matters. Mr. MacEachen, all week we've been hearing about one of the largest assaults to date on Nicaragua by the Contras. This morning we hear the Contras have occupied an Atlantic port there. You're just back. Do you believe the source of the conflict that we're now seeing is an East-West source, as the President claims, as President Reagan claims, or is it simply endemic to that part of the world? Is it the social conditions of Central America.

DPM/SSEA: Well I think that it would be a mistake to say that what is happening there is totally related to East-West rivalry. I think that has been brought into the situation. It is now there, but I think the Central American countries which I visited have very many local or endemic problems, as you term it. There are a lot of things that they have to do to straighten out their economies, their social organization, their politics, in order to handle their own affairs successfully. But when you add to that the intrusion of outsiders in the form of military advisers or military forces, I think you complicate the situation very badly and you put in the way of necessary social and political change additional obstacles. I think it's a very complex and difficult situation that's going to take a lot of time to correct.

Q: By those outsiders you mean ...

DPM/SSEA: I mean the United States, I mean Cuba, I mean the Soviet Union and any others which are, any other countries which are implicated and involved. But there is no doubt that there is a flow of support from several directions into the Central American area and I don't think it's useful to talk about one group or one sector leaving without ensuring that everybody gets out and permits the people, with outside support of another form, to get on with the job of democratizing their countries and building up their economies.

Q: Mr. MacEachen with the Contras specifically in the news and specifically this morning, can I ask you your position on those people, on that movement. Do you condone what the Contras are doing against Nicaragua?

DPM/SSEA: Well, it's a very difficult picture to assess, I think, with total objectivity, but certainly there is opposition to the Sandinistas, both within and outside Nicaragua. I found that opposition within Nicaragua, as I talked to various groups, a rather diversified collection of groups in Nicaragua, and the opposition presumably which is expressed on the Honduran border or the Nicaraguan border is made up of individuals who oppose the Sandinista régime, presumably with support from other quarters.

Q: But it's fairly widely accepted now, is it not, that that is American support.

DPM/SSEA: I think it's generally accepted. It would be difficult for you or me to prove it, because we don't have that kind of capacity, but it is certainly widely accepted that the effort is supported by the United States.

Q: Now no secret that the CIA put those mines in those waters.

DPM/SSEA: Well, that seems also to be a conclusion that at least there is United States involvement. I'm not aware that any official spokesman for the United States has clarified the situation to that extent, but there seems to be enough evidence coming out of Washington in recent days to indicate that there is United States or has been United States involvement in the mining of the harbours.

Q: And if there is, do you condone it?

DPM/SSEA: Well, of course not. We have made it clear for some time now that we oppose third party intervention in the area whether it be from the United States or other sources

and we certainly regard the mining of the harbours as another evidence of escalation of tension or violence or whatever term you want to use. I think it's a mistake to conclude that the sole difficulty is the mining. The Contadora Ministers just recently issued a statement in which they link the mining to a number of other things, including the escalation of the guerilla activity in whatever country it may take place. The mining is serious and so are the other developments. It seems to me that what is required now is a major international effort through the expression of world opinion to put pressure on the countries in there to move out under some orderly conditions, and I think that is what the Contadora Ministers are trying to do.

Q: One of the difficulties surely in trying to muster or use the leverage of world opinion is that much of the outrage in Washington already has been caused by the announcement of the Reagan Administration that they won't accept the jurisdiction of the World Court regarding Central America for the next two years. What are we going to do about that?

DPM/SSEA: That's a very complicated legal issue but I think that while that is important no doubt, I think that the effort on the part of the Nicaraguans to go to the World Court is a symptom of the underlying difficulties that exist there. They are obviously going to the World Court probably to secure justice, but certainly to draw international attention to the situation that exists there. It seems to me it would be equally or more constructive for all of us to get behind the negotiations that are taking place under the auspices of the Contadora Ministers, which have as their objective the demilitarization of the area. The removal of military advisers, the ultimate disarmament of the Central American countries and the restoration of some equilibrium as between the military forces of the various countries.

Q: I'm not sure what you're saying, Sir, about the World Court itself, about the Nicaraguan attempt to go to the World Court and the United States statement that they will ignore what the World Court does.

DPM/SSEA: Well, what the United States have done is to say that it does not accept, or will not accept, the jurisdiction of the World Court for two years with respect to Central America. That is their decision.

Q: Does that strike you as at the very least ironic when the United States was going to the World Court about Iran?

DPM/SSEA: Well, the Americans themselves argue a great deal about that, as you know. I think it is a bit ironic, it may be a bit odd that they have excluded their own participation in

in the Court at a time when both Canada and the United States are arguing a very important boundary case. I think, just to keep it in perspective, we ought to recognize that other countries, some other countries, do not accept the jurisdiction of the World Court ever. For example, as I now, recollect the Soviet Union has never accepted the jurisdiction of the World Court and other countries from time to time exclude certain aspects of their domestic or international affairs from the Court, so that while we may deplore this action, it may be, or we may not like it, it's not new.

Q: Could it have some affect on that boundary dispute that's about to go before the World Court, the dispute between Nova Scotia and Massachusetts?

DPM/SSEA: The case is being argued, and I don't see where it will have any affect. The case ought to be argued on its merits and it shouldn't have any affect.

Q: Mr. MacEachen if I can just take you back to Nicaragua, Was it an embarrassment for you to be there at the time when there was so much controversy raging in Washington itself? You were there as the Foreign Minister or the Minister of State for External Affairs of Canada. Was that an embarrassment for you?

DPM/SSEA: No it wasn't an embarrassment. In fact, the rhetoric employed in North America, both in Canada and in the United States, was more vigorous and more striking than the rhetoric employed in Nicaragua, surprisingly enough. Not to say that they didn't take a serious view of the matter, quite the contrary, they regard it as an aggression. But it didn't seem to strike the same note of stridency in Nicaragua as it did in North America, whatever the reasons. They say that they're accustomed not only to heat politically, but also climatically and maybe they've become accustomed to remain cool in these adverse circumstances. But it didn't cause any embarrassment to Canada because Canada has, I think, made it quite clear that we take a different view of events in Central America, different from the United States. We're not attempting to isolate Nicaragua. We are attempting to understand the social transformations that are taking place. We are providing development assistance to Nicaragua and we are striving to encourage Nicaragua to take additional steps in completion of the goals which the revolution set for itself, and certainly there is a way to go on that score yet. I think we have to acknowledge that changes, required changes, have taken place in Nicaragua, that improvements have taken place, but that the reality is still rather complex and it's not either black or white. What we have to do, it seems to me, a country like Canada, is to maintain relationships with Nicaragua and encourage them to continue on the road to democratization. They haven't had elections in Nicaragua yet and I don't see how any country, including Nicaragua, can reconcile its internal conflicts and the varying opinions that are expressed unless there are genuine and open elections that will permit the people to express themselves.

Q: There are elections scheduled for November.

DPM/SSEA: There are elections scheduled for November and I think it would be very worthwhile, not only for Nicaragua itself, but for the world, if these elections were genuine elections in which opposition parties were permitted to participate fully and under the auspices of an electoral machinery in which all the parties have confidence. I had a full discussion on this matter with the Council of State and its Chairman and expressed those views to them, because I think it is important that when visitors go to Nicaragua or any other country, that views are expressed directly rather than by long distance and we did have a very good discussion.

Q: Mr. MacEachen, you said this morning and re-emphasized things that you said in other places, although to me they sound a little more firmly convinced this morning, but you said that we take a different view from the United States towards Central America. You said we need to maintain relationships with Nicaragua. You've just repeated that we need to continue to have first-hand experience with them. Would that lead to the conclusion that we ought to have an Embassy there? Right now we're dependent on the United States for reports from that part of the world, except I think for our Embassy in Costa Rica.

DPM/SSEA: Well, no, we're not dependent on the United States. We have an Embassy in Costa Rica. Our Ambassador is accredited to Nicaragua and he and his staff try to do their best to keep in touch with the situation in Nicaragua by visiting.

Q: Wouldn't that argue though for an Embassy in Nicaragua?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think one can make an argument for embassies in Nicaragua and other locations in the world, and if one had unlimited resources, one would probably open an Embassy, but we are doing our utmost to maintain close contact with the Nicaraguans by the additional resources that we have placed in Costa Rica to handle the situation in Nicaragua. We've put more people there to do that job, and I appreciate fully the necessity of having first-hand information. When I was in these various capitals, it was possible to talk not only to the Nicaraguans, not only to the Americans, whom I met at various public events, but also to the Ambassadors of many countries throughout the world, and from them it is possible to get a perspective. I think it would be a mistake to think that Canadians talk only to the Americans when we are in a posting abroad. We talk to everybody who has useful information to offer to us and I think that's the only way to get a balanced view because we ought to try and know the truth and not take an ideological approach to a situation like Nicaragua. It's much more complex than one would believe and one can't be enlightened simply by ideological slogans.

Q: Will you be attempting in the days and weeks to come to separate our policy from United States policy in Central America? You've emphasized that difference this morning. The Prime Minister has said he would wait for your return before issuing a formal statement on the mining of Nicaragua. I'm wondering if we might see a statement of condemnation there or varying ways that would separate Canada from the United States.

DPM/SSEA: Well I don't think we want to separate Canada from the United States just for the sake of being different. If we have different views as a result of our analysis of the situation, then we ought to express them and we've done that on the general situation in Nicaragua. I've had my discussions with Mr. Shultz several times and we have disagreed on that important point of militarization, which the United States regards as essential and which we think is probably the wrong route to travel. So I don't, we have differences, they've become even clearer on this mining question and we say so, but I think we ought to not necessarily escalate our differences beyond those that are useful in the circumstances. I notice that the four Contadora Ministers, the Ministers from the Contadora countries, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Mexico, who are working with the Central American countries, issued a statement on the mining just on the weekend. They of course deplored the mining ...

Q: And the British have deplored it and the French have deplored it.

DPM/SSEA: So have we, so is it a battle over words or is it a battle over substance. I think on substance we have taken quite the same view as the Contadora Ministers and I think that's good company to keep because they are in the forefront. They're up front on this and we have said that we would support them in their efforts to bring about a regional solution, and believe you me that the solution has to come internally from these countries along with their neighbours. It's not going to come from abroad. We have help politically, we can help economically by our assistance in the form of development aid but we cannot impose our solutions on these countries. I don't think that's possible.

Q: We North Americans.

DPM/SSEA: We North Americans nor any other country in the world.

Q: Mr. MacEachen thank you very much for speaking with us this morning.

DPM/SSEA: Thank you.

Allan MacEachen, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs spoke to us from our studio in Ottawa.

DPM/SSEA Interview for CBC Radio -
The House - April 19

Date
24 April 1984

Number/Numéro
FPR-0435

Q: ...that Canadian policy should be in that area?

DPM/SSEA: I don't think it changed my mind on, for example, development policy. We have programs of development assistance in Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and as a result of my trip, I have not decided for example to withdraw our development assistance at all. I think that in all countries we have a role to play and we ought to continue to play it. There may be some insights I've received about the process of development assistance in one or other country but basically I haven't decided we would cease or terminate our support in any particular country.

Q: What about Canada's position that all third parties should withdraw from any intervention in the area?

DPM/SSEA: That has been certainly reinforced by my visit, and it, of course, is directly related to the Contadora process, which is, as you know, the effort being made by the five Central American countries and the four Latin American countries to bring about a solution to the troubles in Central America. As part of that process, they've established a number of commissions, one of which is the security commission, and in that commission they are attempting to tackle the question of militarization, and particularly the question of military advisers from other countries or military, presumably troops, from other countries. It seems to me that I can say now that the Contadora process is even more relevant from the point of view of demilitarization or from the point of view of getting the third parties out of Central America. If that can be accomplished, of course, it would be a major achievement towards peace in the region, towards hopefully more rapid economic and social development and hopefully more rapid democratization of the countries.

Q: That process has been going on for I think 15 months now. Guerilla activities have increased. Do you think it really stands any chance of success? It doesn't seem to have the full backing ...2

of the United States.

DPM/SSEA: I think that it is a process that is moving slowly, maybe because it is so difficult. I've heard people say in Central America that it is very valuable because at least they are speaking and trying to resolve. They have a forum in which they can deal with each other, the five Central American countries for example. Others have said it may have had an effect in halting possible conflict directly between Honduras and Nicaragua but I agree that it is moving slowly and it's a fragile process and therefore it has to be nurtured very carefully and supported by other countries even more strongly than it has been in the past I would say, including the United States and the Soviet Union and Cuba and all others.

Q: Do you think there needs to be a stronger commitment on the part of all third parties that are now in the area?

DPM/SSEA: Well, I think when I say greater support I have in mind of course the countries directly involved, but also the international community as a whole, which may have tended to leave everything to the Contadora. And I think that's good, as the first decision, that it's better to have a regional solution. But in order to have a regional solution, it requires international support and the existence of a regional process doesn't mean that everybody else can wash their hands of the problem and say well you go to it. I think that is not a likely productive route.

Q: Canada has been accused of doing just that though by the Conservatives. They feel we have no policy in that area, that we're just ignoring it, that we should take our responsibilities as a full partner of the OAS, join the OAS and take a more active involvement in Central America.

DPM/SSEA: Well, if you're relating the question of the OAS to the problems in Central America, then of course, the OAS itself is not seized directly with the problem. It is a Contadora process which may be composed of members of the OAS, but it is not an OAS sponsored activity. So it doesn't seem to me at the moment that Canada joining the OAS would have any direct bearing on what we're talking about, namely the troubles in Central America. There may be other reasons why we should join, but I don't see that as an immediate or pressing reason.

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Q: You've appeared lately to be distancing yourself somewhat from the policies in that area adopted by the United States. You went to Nicaragua and refused to go to El Salvador. Are you indeed trying to distance yourself from the U.S.?

DPM/SSEA: I think people are paying more attention probably to what I have been saying recently than what I had said earlier, because I have been saying that we disagree with the United States from the point of view of its military presence in Central America. We have a difference of opinion with them and with other countries which are involved in that area from the outside. One shouldn't just talk about the United States. One should talk about Cuba and the Soviet Union. It's always very difficult to identify with full precision exactly what each country is doing. Even some members of the Senate and the Congress find it difficult to be kept fully informed as to what their own government may be doing or may be involved in. But I have made it clear for quite some time that we don't agree with that aspect. Maybe my trip has sharpened the presentation somewhat but the substance has been there all along.

Q: The mining incidents though have been taking place for several months now. Are you concerned about incidents like that? Do you think that the mining incident clarifies differences with the United States? Are you concerned about increased activity in the area?

DPM/SSEA: Yes, I think that the mining has been a further escalation of the tension, although it's interesting that I found the rhetoric stronger in the United States and Canada than I did in Central America on the incidents. But it is also worth mentioning that the Contadora ministers themselves have stated in their comments on the mining, have stated their concern about the increase in guerilla activity, not just directed against Nicaragua but generally in the area. One has to, in talking about the mining, look at the overall situation and the overall situation is not a very appetizing one or an appealing one at the moment. So what is the solution? The solution is to try to seek a political settlement through the process I have been talking about and with the support of the international community and I think the international community has been somewhat lax in exerting its full pressure on the situation.

Q: So will Canada be taking a more active role in that area?

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DPM/SSEA: Well, we have been as active as we can be, because when I was there I put the question not only in Costa Rica, in Colombia, but in every country I went: what can Canada do to help you? We stand ready, especially in the security commission, but the fact is they have not formulated their conclusion or they have not formulated a settlement to the point where they can ask a country like Canada for help in control and verification and that is, it seems to me, apart from our developmental assistance, and we're tripling our assistance in Central America developmentally, apart from that and apart from our political support which we are giving and which we will continue to give, there would be another area where we might be helpful and that is in the area of control and verification and we would consider a role, I think, once we knew the circumstances.

I have also said, made it clear and instructed the officials of the department to have discussions with the three commissions that have been established by the Contadora Group, namely the Security Commission, the Political Commission and the Social and Economic Commission. To the present we have not been able to have that done, not because we're not ready but because they haven't given us a method of doing it. So in order to help, there has to be a way you can help and a readiness to accept your help and a facility by which it can be had, can be accepted.

W: The Reagan Administration has quite a public relations campaign going on to try to get people on the side to support the Administration. Are you concerned that this might escalate into another Vietnam?

DPM/SSEA: That is a concern that is expressed in the United States and I think, well, the President has made it clear that it is not the intention of the United States to put troops into Nicaragua to fight a battle on the ground, so that it seems to me the prospect is not real at the moment that the United States would undertake an expeditionary force into Nicaragua.

Q: You don't see any parallels to the days of the Vietnam war then?

DPM/SSEA: Well, there may be parallels. You're asking whether I think they will fight, involve American fighting men, in Nicaragua, and I think it's quite unlikely, but I think that one has to examine American concerns and the American concern as I understand it, is that the process of social change is being

influenced by the Soviet Union and Cuba and they are not prepared to have a base of Soviet source established in Central America. They are not prepared, as I understand it, to have Central America Sovietized or Cubanized, if you want to put it that way, because they have stated and restated that their security interests are directly involved and they will not tolerate that. Now that is their decision and how does the international community deal with that? It seems to me the way to deal with it is to ensure that the process of development or the process of social change in Nicaragua and in the other countries of Central America is undertaken by the people themselves and that other countries help economically. I think that is necessary but that they not attempt to establish their own influence in the countries. And if everybody did that then we might have a way of getting out of this situation.

Q: One last question. Do you think that the U.S. should abide by whatever decision the International Court of Justice brings down with regards to the mining of Nicaraguan waters?

DPM/SSEA: I find it difficult to answer that question because they have refused to accept jurisdiction of the Court. If the Court has a case, it won't be....

Q: Are they justified in saying....

DPM/SSEA: Well, it's not for me to justify what the United States is doing. That's their job. All I can say is that it's not the first time that a country has refused to accept the authority of the International Court on certain things. The Soviet Union for example as I understand it doesn't accept the Court at all, I don't want to, I don't regard that as a standard of behaviour but it happens.

Q: Thank you very much.



