

STATEMENT DISCOURS

SECRETARY
OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS.

SECRÉTAIRE
D'ÉTAT AUX
AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES.



NOTES FOR AN ADDRESS
BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
THE HONOURABLE MARK MACGUIGAN,
TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY
COMMEMORATIVE MEETING OF THE
PUGWASH MOVEMENT,
PUGWASH, NOVA SCOTIA,
JULY 16, 1982

A twenty-fifth anniversary is a very special occasion. It is a time both for reflection and for looking at the future. Characteristically, the Pugwash Movement will, I feel certain, tend to look ahead, as I propose to do today.

I am delighted to join with you in commemorating the first Pugwash Conference held here in Pugwash, Nova Scotia in 1957 at the invitation of Mr. Cyrus Eaton. I commend the initiative of Mrs. Eaton and the Canadian Pugwash Group in convening this silver anniversary meeting. Today, as never before, people throughout the world are increasingly concerned about the spiralling arms race and are looking not only to governments but to groups such as yours to generate possible new approaches to the complex issues of arms control and disarmament.

The founding of the Pugwash Movement anticipated this increased public interest. The manifesto issued by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein called on governments to renounce war rather than to follow a course which could put an end to the human race; the core of people's concern today is exactly that. As Prime Minister Trudeau put it at UNSSOD II, the people of the world "are reminding political leaders that what is at stake is the crucial matter of the life or death of mankind."

The manner in which the Pugwash Movement has spread to embrace distinguished individuals in many countries reflects its importance. In Canada its influence continues to expand in what I consider to be a most significant way, because it is reaching out to the young men and women of our country. I am referring to the birth a year ago of Canadian Student Pugwash, which held a well-organized and successful first conference in Ottawa and, a few weeks ago, an Atlantic Regional Conference in Halifax. The Canadian Government was pleased to offer assistance for both of these conferences, as it did for your conference in Banff last summer.

During the next two days you will undoubtedly be discussing the second UN Special Session on Disarmament which ended last week, and also the prospects for the period ahead. I would like to share with you some thoughts on each. In my view, it should be a mistake to dwell too long on what was not achieved at UNSSOD II or to succumb to the temptation of sustained hand-wringing about failure. Rather, we should be grateful that it was held in spite of an exceedingly unpropitious international atmosphere.

We should also welcome the fact that UNSSOD II preserved intact the viability of the United Nations system to deliberate constructively on international security matters, particularly arms control and disarmament. Despite the temptation to vote resolutions which could not achieve consensus, the non-aligned countries in the end chose the path of realism rather than a procedure which could only devalue the system.

An important achievement of UNSSOD II was its reaffirmation of the Final Document of UNSSOD I. The Program of Action in that Final Document highlighted the importance of the negotiating process, as did the many world leaders who addressed the Special Session.

In his address Prime Minister Trudeau seized the occasion to call again on the nuclear powers to negotiate four verifiable arms control agreements which, in their combination, would halt the technological momentum of the nuclear arms race. They are: a comprehensive nuclear test ban; a ban on the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; a limitation and eventual reduction of military spending for new strategic weapons systems. This strategy of suffocation, the Prime Minister stressed, is not in competition with current negotiations on reductions of nuclear weapons. To underline this point, he proposed that the strategy be enfolded into a policy of stabilization which has two complementary components: the current negotiating approach aimed at achieving a stable nuclear balance at lower levels; and the strategy of suffocation aimed at inhibiting the development of new nuclear weapons systems.

Canadian statements in the working groups and the Committee of the Whole underlined Canada's flexibility and desire to search for consensus language on such agenda items as a comprehensive program of disarmament, enhancement of the effectiveness of disarmament machinery, and a world disarmament campaign. It was a Canadian informal paper which formed the basis of deliberations on a world disarmament campaign, and sustained Canadian efforts played no small part in the consensus achieved on the conduct of the campaign. Canada was also active in its traditional role of chairman of the Barton Group, the informal consultative body of twenty like-minded Western countries. Attached to the Delegation were nineteen parliamentary observers and fifteen consultants drawn from non-governmental organizations and universities. In addition, the Canadian Delegation provided regular briefings for members of Canadian non-governmental organizations attending the Special Session.

Although the second Special Session on Disarmament did not achieve all that many people and governments hoped for, it did serve to focus attention on the crucial and often complex arms control and disarmament issues of our time. It also served, I believe, to underline the extent to which an exceedingly heavy responsibility rests with those countries which have embarked on serious arms control negotiations.

While the picture may not appear as bright as many would like, I am nevertheless hopeful about the future. I believe that the superpowers themselves want to avoid moving in the direction of nuclear confrontation and that each can see national interests being served by agreements.

Why, you may ask skeptically, am I so persuaded?

First, the existence of nuclear weapons and the incalculable consequences of their use, even on a limited scale, have proved to be an effective deterrent for over 30 years. The fact that either side can now absorb a first strike and still respond with devastating effect has caused each side to proceed with caution and to avoid confrontation in times of crisis.

Second, existing agreements are being respected. In accordance with SALT I (which includes the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms) both the Soviet Union and the United States have taken steps to dismantle strategic systems. The USSR has dismantled a number of "Yankee" class submarines and the USA is dismantling its Polaris subs as new Trident submarines are being put into service.

Third, although considered "badly flawed" by critics, SALT II is being largely implemented by both sides. In a recent speech President Brezhnev expressed his willingness "to preserve" the positive aspects of previous agreements. President Reagan has welcomed Brezhnev's statement and has indicated that U.S. policy is to take no action that would undercut existing agreements provided the Soviet Union exercises equal restraint.

Finally, two negotiations on nuclear weapons are underway in Geneva. I do not need to rehearse for this specialized audience the details of the positions put forward by the United States, which in the case of intermediate-range nuclear forces have been worked out in consultation with allies, including Canada.

Numerous criticisms have, as you know, been levelled at the Western position in both sets of negotiations, the main one being that by concentrating on those forces where the USSR has superiority the positions are manifestly unfair, if not non-negotiable. My answer to this criticism is two-fold. First, our prime objective is to create a greater degree of stability, and consequently it makes sense to concentrate in the first instance on those systems which have created a high degree of imbalance and are destabilizing -- the SS-20s in the European theatre and heavy Soviet ICBMs with multiple warheads in the intercontinental theatre. Second, the USA has made clear in the START talks that other systems of direct concern to the Soviet Union (heavy bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles) are indeed negotiable. Most important, the West is seeking in these talks actual reductions. One should not lose sight of the fact that both of the SALT agreements established limits. They did not result in any significant reductions in existing forces, and in some respects allowed the parties to increase up to the agreed limits. Frankly, from the reports I have received to date on the INF and START talks, I am impressed by the serious and businesslike approach of both sides.

The Vienna talks on force reductions in Central Europe are in their ninth year but have so far not attracted much media attention in Canada. While some progress has been made in these negotiations, in which Canada is a direct participant, the principal stumbling block has been the failure to reach agreement in factual terms on the present strength of Warsaw Pact forces. The Soviet Union insists that the total number of WPO forces in the area is almost 150,000 less than the number which has been confirmed by the best allied intelligence available. Continuing efforts have been made by the Western negotiators to persuade the Eastern members to provide a detailed breakdown of their figures to support their calculations or to cooperate in clarifying the differences between Western and Eastern figures. Unless both sides can agree on the numerical base from which reductions must be made, clearly it is virtually impossible to verify what is left after reductions even if such reductions can be monitored. Moreover, the Eastern side has proved to be very reluctant to accept what NATO would regard as adequate verification measures.

New life is being injected into these negotiations through a draft treaty tabled by the West last week in Vienna which makes substantial concessions to the Eastern side. The West now proposes that the countries concerned should undertake a binding obligation in one agreement (instead of two sequential agreements as proposed previously) to reduce to a common collective ceiling on each side of approximately 700,000 ground force manpower and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined. These reductions would be in four stages over a period of seven years, with the United States and the Soviet Union withdrawing 13,000 and 30,000 troops respectively in the first year after conclusion of the agreement. Other direct participants including Canada would join in the reduction process in the three final stages. Agreement on manpower data would remain a pre-condition. If the Warsaw Pact countries are prepared to cooperate, particularly on the question of the actual present strength of their forces in the area and on verification, it should now be possible to progress more rapidly toward an agreement.

I am certain you would agree that a reduction and balancing of the existing levels of troops of the two Alliances confronting each other in Central Europe would serve to reduce tensions and improve the climate of East-West relations. Such an agreement would also maintain and even enhance the security of the two sides.

The Committee on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, will resume its 1982 session early next month. Its new Working Group on a Comprehensive Test Ban will begin its work on verification and compliance. Its Working Group on Chemical Weapons will build upon previous progress. Another subject to be taken up is that of arms control and outer space. This question is one of special interest to Canada. In his speech to UNSSOD II the Prime Minister drew attention to the serious gaps in the present international agreements and proposed that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space.

With such an arms control and disarmament agenda - START, INF, MBFR, CD - there are grounds for hope, especially compared to the situation as recently as a year ago when you gathered in Banff.

I would now like to suggest areas in which the Pugwash Movement might expand its efforts in the years ahead. It should come as no surprise that they are areas of traditional importance to Canada.

One of the great strengths of the Pugwash Movement has been its recognition that the promotion of peace and human survival necessarily involves the consideration of all weapons systems. I am thinking in particular of the excellent work over the years in the Pugwash Chemical Weapons Seminars. I consider these meetings to be among the major achievements of the first twenty-five years of the Movement. Ever since the first World War, a ban on chemical weapons has been high on any list of Canadian priorities in arms control and disarmament. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the same expert who has attended Pugwash Chemical Weapons Seminars has participated with experts from other countries in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons established in 1980. One of the initiatives I announced last week is that henceforth Canadian experts will participate in the Working Group for longer periods as and when warranted. We are convinced that the international negotiating machinery that is in place must be used to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Adequate verification provisions will be among the most important parts of such a treaty. Canada has noted with interest the positive approach to verification procedures in Foreign Minister Gromyko's remarks at UNSSOD II. We would be encouraged if this attitude were reflected in the ongoing negotiations in the CD.

It is my hope that in the next twenty-five years members of your Movement will give even greater attention to chemical weapons and to other non-nuclear weapon systems. Part of the educational task of the Movement is, I believe, to increase public understanding that to attain peace and human survival one must seek to limit and reduce all weapons systems. It would be a tragedy if a result of the understandable and justifiable public concern about nuclear weapons were to make non-nuclear war more likely. Your business and the business of governments must continue to be the promotion of steps which reduce the likelihood of the use of force - the use of any weapons system.

My second suggestion concerns verification. Prime Minister Trudeau said at the second Special Session that "the international community should address itself to verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s." He was, of course, addressing primarily governments. But individuals with expertise and non-governmental organizations also have a vital role to play not only in achieving greater public understanding but also in ensuring that all available expertise is applied to this increasingly complex subject. Since World War II Canada has attached special importance to the development of international verification mechanisms. In recent years the Government has drawn on technical expertise in a number of departments. Further steps are being taken at the present time. We have committed funds to enable Canada to become a member of the international seismic-data exchange, an international verification mechanism being developed in connection with a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In a few months Canada will be joining those countries already exchanging data on a provisional basis. We have called for the early implementation of the Exchange in advance of a treaty.

Within our research and public information program, established after UNSSOD I and substantially increased in size this year, we intend to put special emphasis in the coming year on research projects related to verification by Canadian universities, institutes and individuals.

We will also institutionalize an expanding Canadian role in verification issues in order to utilize effectively expertise in several government departments and in the private sector in the negotiation of agreements on nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons systems. I am referring in particular to expertise in seismology, nuclear safeguards, remote sensing, toxicology and protective measures against chemical weapons, and communication satellites.

There is a third subject, Mr. Chairman, which deserves the attention of the Pugwash Movement in the years ahead. It is horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. At UNSSOD II member states including Canada quite rightly concentrated on vertical proliferation. But Canada, as a strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has always insisted that the two cannot be separated in reality. Thus Canadian priorities in arms control and disarmament include the promotion of the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the NPT.

Canada's non-proliferation policy as it is applied to nuclear exports is intended to inhibit the diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. Our two-tiered approach to the safeguarding of nuclear exports provides a strong lead to the rest of the world.

In the first instance, we require that prospective nuclear partners, if they are non-nuclear weapons states, be parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or have made equivalent commitments, including "fullscope" safeguards. Secondly, countries must enter into a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada which incorporates, inter alia, the provision of "fallback" safeguards. These two requirements combine in a comprehensive, systematic manner and form the foundation of Canadian nuclear export policy, which is applied without discrimination, and under which proliferation cannot occur unless treaty obligations are broken.

Canada's commitment to the use and diffusion of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes continues. Indeed, in the context of a broad Canadian effort to redouble its assistance to developing countries, Canada has recently signed or negotiated nuclear cooperation agreements with Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico and the Philippines, as well as with Sweden, Euratom and Australia. We are currently engaged in an initiative to enlarge cooperation to include regulatory training, the exchange of technical information, and cooperative responses to potential radiation emergencies. It is our hope that this initiative can become a model of technology transfer to strengthen nuclear cooperation with the Third World.

A realistic assessment, however, suggests that Canada has, for the most part, proceeded as far as is feasible on its own in exerting national influence to prevent a spread of nuclear weapons. It is now clear that further progress will be largely contingent upon multilateral agreements under the auspices of the United Nations and the IAEA.

The international community accomplished a significant step forward with the NPT, and we can look back with satisfaction at the fact that there are now some 115 signatories. At the same time, however, it should be recognized that the NPT is an initial treaty and that it needs to be perfected. I hope that in historical terms the NPT will be considered as a watershed, as it has provided the vehicle for a large majority of UN member countries to express formally and for the first time their total renunciation of nuclear weapons and weapons capability. I would also hope that the NPT will spawn new, more comprehensive and more truly universal treaties.

In this regard, it cannot be ignored that although the NPT emphasizes the non-discriminatory transfer of peaceful nuclear technology, it also provides, under Article VI, for the rapid and effective movement towards disarmament and the de-escalation of the arms race on the part of nuclear weapons states. The fact that this key element of the NPT remains unfulfilled suggests to me that a tangible move towards disarmament on behalf of the superpowers represents the best possible means to indicate, with sincerity, their belief in the legitimacy of non-proliferation.

Accordingly, in the context of the United Nations and the IAEA, Canada is prepared to seek international consensus on the development of principles which would result in a more universal and effective approach to non-proliferation. Such principles should include a formal renunciation of nuclear explosive devices and an agreement to permit the safeguarding of all nuclear activities throughout the entire range of the nuclear fuel cycle as fundamental to the creation of a stable and permanent non-proliferation régime. Under such conditions, bilateral nuclear commitments could then be subsumed into a truly equitable and responsible international order.

It is my belief that the moment has arrived for genuine movement through collective institutional and policy approaches towards the realization of these objectives. If states fail to engage this challenge in a manner which is both imaginative and just, the prognosis for the uncontrolled horizontal proliferation of nuclear capabilities will remain more of a threat than an opportunity for enhanced international cooperation.

One of the underlying themes of my remarks today has been public understanding, which has been a continuing objective of the Pugwash Movement. The challenge of promoting greater public understanding faces governments and non-governmental organizations alike. In the period between the first and second Special Sessions, there were a number of UN

studies designed to improve public understanding. In addition, there was the very thoughtful Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues chaired by Olof Palme. Canada was active in these endeavours. Robert Ford, the former Canadian Ambassador in Moscow, was a member of the Palme Commission and the Canadian Government made a substantial financial contribution to its work. Canadian experts participated in a number of UN disarmament studies. In the case of the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, the Government also funded the writing of a popular version of the report, which has now been published commercially in French and English and other languages.

I have no quarrel with those who wish to alert our peoples to the potential horrors of a nuclear war. The objective they seek, a world safe from the threat of a nuclear conflict, is the same goal which the Canadian Government pursues by every means at its disposal. We are not always in agreement, however, on how this end can best be achieved. To explain complex negotiating positions to the general public can be exceedingly difficult. Simple declaratory statements are fairly easy to grasp but the potential negative implications for our overall objective - peace and security - are seldom self-evident. Moreover, in my experience, efforts to describe them can often be misunderstood. I very much hope that the Pugwash Movement will play its part, for which it is so eminently suited, in explaining that facile declaratory measures are no substitute for the negotiation of equitable and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements.

The easy response to the current tensions of the international situation is to argue that only disarmament or only defence fundamentally matters. However, to insist that only one or the other can enhance security and preserve peace is to misunderstand the basic components of security policy. The realistic position is to recognize that disarmament and defence complement and support each other. Our challenge as responsible internationalists is to search for and discover new approaches to a balanced security policy which will both maintain our dedication to our ideals and enable us to move towards a realizable possibility of world peace.