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Ottawa, Canada

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The Colombo Plan Conference

THE 1954 annual meeting of the Consultative Committee on Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia was held in Ottawa from October 4 to October 9. This event was remarkable in that it brought to Canada for the first time representatives of all the countries with which Canada is co-operating under the Colombo Plan. The Canadian Government and people were given an unusual opportunity to be hosts to a distinguished group of delegates from all the countries of South and South-East Asia, from most of the Commonwealth countries, and also from Japan and the United States.

As the meeting of the Consultative Committee was preceded by a two-week meeting of officials from member countries, the conference lasted three weeks in all. During the peak period more than ninety visiting delegates were in Ottawa, some of them accompanied by their wives. At the conclusion of the conference a large number of the delegates joined tours, arranged by the Canadian Government, which extended their stay in Canada by one to two weeks. Thus many Canadians, both in Ottawa and in several other cities, had opportunities to meet the delegates and to learn more about conditions of life and ways of thinking in their countries. The press and radio interviews given by many of the delegates and the articles and programmes about the Colombo Plan and the Colombo Plan countries which were featured in the press and on radio and television during the conference, brought an even larger number of Canadians into indirect contact with the conference and the people who participated in it.

At the same time, the delegates, most of whom had never before been in Canada, were able to learn more about this country and about the Canadian way of life. While in Ottawa they visited the National Gallery, the National Research Council, the Experimental Farm, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and the atomic energy plant at Chalk River. The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources arranged an evening on northern Canada. Some of the delegates saw a hockey game and a football game, and they all had opportunities to listen to Canadian music or music performed by Canadians and to see a play performed by Canadian actors. Many of the delegates went on tour following the conference and thus saw other parts of Canada.

Countries Represented

The countries represented at the conference were Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom (with its dependent territories in South-East Asia), the United States and Viet-Nam.* The Director of the Colombo Plan Bureau for Technical Co-operation and the senior officer

* The following were the leaders of the delegations:

Australia: Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, Minister of External Affairs

Burma: Sao Hkon Hkio, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Cambodia: Mr. Phlek Phoeun, Director of National Planning

Canada: Hon. Walter Harris, Minister of Finance (in the absence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs)

Ceylon: Hon. M. D. H. Jayawardene, Minister of Finance

of the Colombo Plan Information Unit, both of whom have their headquarters in Colombo, were present throughout the conference. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East were represented by observers, and the Chairman of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board attended some of the meetings.

Delegates to the preliminary meeting of officials began arriving in Ottawa toward the end of the week of September 13. They quickly became at home in their new surroundings and Ottawa citizens soon became used to seeing friends from the four corners of the world moving casually through the shopping districts or walking to and from the meetings on Parliament Hill. The conference was held in the Railway Committee Room. Mr. K. W. Taylor, Deputy Minister of Finance and leader of the Canadian delegation to the official meetings, was elected Chairman at the first session. On the afternoon of the first day Mr. Nik Cavell formally opened the Colombo Plan Exhibition, prepared by the Exhibition Commission of the Department of Trade and Commerce, which had been set up in the west lobby of the Centre Block. During the ensuing three weeks a large number of visitors, including school children, saw this exhibition. It graphically depicted the growth and operation of the Colombo Plan in the countries of South and South-East Asia.

Preparation of Draft Report

The main task of the officials was to prepare for the consideration of Ministers a draft report reviewing progress under the Colombo Plan and assessing future prospects. Although the Consultative Committee had first met in 1950 and several Asian countries had by that time made some progress in economic development, the early meetings were organizational, and it was not until June 1951, that the Plan formally commenced. It was envisaged as covering a six-year period running to June 1957. When the Ottawa meetings began two annual reports had already been produced covering the first two years of the Plan. The task of the Ottawa meetings was to review progress over the three-year period from June 1951, to June 1954, with the main emphasis on what had been achieved since the 1953 report was drawn up.

After holding several plenary sessions the officials continued their work in subcommittees set up to work on separate chapters of the draft report. At the same time a drafting committee was appointed to take in hand the draw-

- India: Hon. C. D. Deshmukh, Minister of Finance
- Indonesia: H.E. Dr. Sunario, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Japan: H.E. K. Matsudaira, Ambassador of Japan in Canada
- Laos: H.E. Ourot R. Souvannavong, Minister of Laos to the United States
- Nepal: Major-General Maahabir Rana, Minister of Planning, Development, Industry and Commerce
- New Zealand: H.E. T. C. A. Hislop, High Commissioner for New Zealand in Canada
- Pakistan: Hon. Chaudri Mohammed Ali, Minister of Finance
- The Philippines: Congressman Ferdinand E. Marcos
- Thailand: H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakan
- The United Kingdom: The Most Honourable the Marquess of Reading
- Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil, Member for Local Government, Housing and Town Planning, Federation of Malaya (Ministerial Representative for the United Kingdom Territories in South East Asia)
- Hon. C. C. Tan, Government of Singapore (Ministerial Representative for the United Kingdom Territories in South East Asia)
- The United States: Hon. Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
- Viet-Nam: H.E. Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador of Viet-Nam to the United States



—Capital Press

COLOMBO PLAN EXHIBITION

Standing before a row of flags of Colombo Plan countries at the Colombo Plan Exhibition held on September 20, 1954, in the Parliament Buildings, Ottawa, are, left to right: M. S. M. Koreshi, Secretary of Pakistan delegation; Dr. S. Gupta, First Secretary, Office of the High Commission for India in Canada; Dr. Usman Sastroamidjoyo, Indonesian Ambassador to Canada; Mr. R. G. Nik Cavell, Dept. of Trade and Commerce, Canada; Mr. Ismail Bin Mohammed Ali, Federation of Malaya; Mr. C. V. Narasimhan, Joint Secretary, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, India; Mr. Prem Narain, India.

ing up of the report as a whole. The chapters under discussion included an introductory chapter dealing with the general economic and financial background of current Colombo Plan operations, a chapter devoted to each of the Asian countries, a chapter on the contributions being made by member countries, a chapter on technical assistance and a final chapter to contain a summary and conclusions. The work of the committees was carried on in the smaller committee rooms in the Centre Block or in the offices there which had been assigned to delegations.

The officials, often working until the early hours of the morning, completed their draft and their other recommendations in good time for the commencement of the Ministerial meeting on October 4. On the morning of that day, as the Ministers, accompanied by their officials, drove up to the Parliament Buildings for the opening session, the flags of member countries were flying in front of the Centre Block and the Dominion Carillonneur was playing a medley of their national anthems. The Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House of Commons received the delegates in the Speaker's Chambers. After the delegates had chatted for a while in the delegates' lounge, they moved into the House of Commons Chamber for the first session, which was

open to the public. The galleries, and part of the floor of the House, were very nearly filled with distinguished guests, including members of the diplomatic corps, and interested members of the public. Press, television and newsreel cameramen covered the session.

Meeting Opened by Prime Minister

The Prime Minister opened the meeting with an address of welcome in which he paid tribute to the Colombo Plan and to its Asian members. He laid stress on the human values which the Plan is designed to serve, and he expressed satisfaction with the increasing knowledge which the people of Asia and the people of the West are gaining of each other's aspirations and ways' of life. The parts of his speech which were spoken in French were particularly appreciated by the delegates from Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The Prime Minister was followed by Mr. Deshmukh of India, Lord Reading of the United Kingdom, Dr. Sunario of Indonesia and Mr. Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, all of whom gave thoughtful expression to their countries' attitude toward the Colombo Plan and to their hopes for the meeting and for the future of the Plan.

During the ensuing five days the Ministers and their advisers met continuously to consider the draft report and to discuss common problems. Outside the meetings the delegates and their wives were appropriately entertained by the Canadian Government and by the heads of missions of Colombo Plan countries. Among the Canadian hosts were His Excellency the Governor General, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Senate, Mrs. L. B. Pearson, and Mrs. Hugh O'Donnell, daughter of the Prime Minister. Mayor Charlotte Whitton visited one of the meetings and presented the delegates with a scroll of welcome on behalf of the City of Ottawa.

The atmosphere in the meetings was unspectacular but cordial. Many of the Ministers and officials who were present had attended previous meetings of the Consultative Committee and had come to know one another well. The discussions were at all times pervaded by a spirit of friendly informality which reflected the ease with which all member countries fit into the free association of the Colombo Plan. It is not the practice of the Consultative Committee to make policy decisions which are binding on members but it is the aim of the Committee, when it meets, to reach agreed judgments regarding the progress being made under the Colombo Plan. All delegation leaders participated in the discussion of this subject. Valuable contributions were also made by the observers representing the three United Nations agencies.

Most delegates, recognizing that the Colombo Plan had passed the half-way point of the period covered in the first report, seemed to feel that it has reached a transition stage in its development. There were frequent references in the meetings to the fact that the Plan was at its mid-point or moving into the final stages of at least the first planning period. Some delegates suggested that a "new spirit" was evident in the Consultative Committee; the exact nature of this new spirit was not defined but the suggestion seemed to reflect a feeling that the Committee's capacity for constructive co-operation in a mutually understanding atmosphere was increasing.

There was a further indication that the Colombo Plan is in transition. During the Ottawa meetings the membership of the Consultative Committee was

enlarged to include Japan, which had not previously been associated with the Plan, and Thailand and the Philippines, which had been represented by observers at previous meetings and which had sent observers to the Ottawa meetings. The new members were cordially welcomed by the older members who were glad to have their circle enlarged to include all the countries of South and South-East Asia (the area which the Plan is designed to serve) and Japan, an important Asian country which already has economic relations with the countries of the Colombo Plan area and which should be able to make a useful contribution to their economic development.

Membership Expands

While the Colombo Plan was originally a Commonwealth response to the economic development needs of South and South-East Asia and while the only governments which contributed data for the Plan as it was drawn up in 1950 were the governments of the Commonwealth countries of South and South-East Asia and of the United Kingdom territories in that area, it was recognized from the beginning that other countries of the area, and some countries outside it which were interested in helping to develop it, would be welcome as members. It was on this basis that Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal and Viet-Nam, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, had previously joined the Plan. There were therefore solid precedents for the expansion which took place during the Ottawa meetings.

The United States has been a full member of the Consultative Committee since 1951; its contributions to economic development in South and South-East Asia have regularly been taken into account by the Committee in assessing the progress being made under the Plan, and its representatives have consistently played a constructive part in the deliberations of the Committee. This year the United States sent a strong delegation to all of the meetings, and Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, Mr. Harold Stassen, attended for the last few days.

The true spirit of the Colombo Plan was especially in evidence at the farewell dinner which the Prime Minister held for all delegates at the Country Club. A most friendly atmosphere prevailed throughout the evening, and both the Prime Minister, who spoke informally at the conclusion of the dinner, and Mr. Deshmukh of India, who was chosen to reply, aptly expressed the cordial feelings of the delegates.

The Annual Report

In the report of the conference the delegates expressed in more formal terms their current assessment of the Colombo Plan and the progress which is being made under it. The report,* which has been released in the capitals of several of the Colombo Plan countries, contains much valuable information and statistical data on economic trends in the countries of South-East Asia and in the area as a whole. It also describes in specific terms the development programmes in each of the countries, the progress made in implementing these plans, and the contributions of member countries. The concluding chapter, en-

* "The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South East Asia - Third Annual Report of the Consultative Committee - Ottawa, October, 1954" (The Queen's Printer, Ottawa - Price 50¢).

titled "Summary and Conclusions", reviews the progress being made in, particular fields such as food production; production of other commodities such as jute, rubber, tea and tin; manufacturing; and public utilities and services. It discusses the financial problems faced by the Asian members in connection with economic development, the external grants and loans available to them, and the importance of technical assistance. Finally it surveys the task ahead.


The report contains many encouraging examples of projects completed or well on their way to completion in the countries of South and South-East Asia. These include such projects as the Thal Development project in Pakistan; the Mayurakshi dam, the Sindri fertilizer plant and community development projects in India; the Gal Oya hydro-electric project in Ceylon; the Taungpulu dam in Burma; water reservoirs in Indonesia; and the establishment of a Rural and Industrial Development Authority in Malaya. These are but random examples which could be multiplied several times but which demonstrate that, in varying degrees, the countries of South and South-East Asia are actually achieving concrete results in their efforts to make the benefits of modern techniques available to an ever-increasing number of their people. Actually, at this stage, the rate of development is difficult to assess in physical terms because many of the important projects take years to complete and will yield returns only gradually. Also, much of the progress being made is in fields where results are not easily measurable such as health, education and improved technical capacity. On the other hand, the heaviest task in these fields still lies ahead and, in another less tangible field—that of employment—the situation is still serious in some countries.

The report records that, in the area as a whole, total development expenditure increased by 27 per cent during the past year and is expected to increase by 31 per cent in the current year. The current food supply of the area has been improved; food production has increased in several countries; and continuing heavy investments in agriculture should ensure a rising volume of food production and a higher measure of economic stability for the whole area. There has been expansion in manufacturing and in public services such as power and transport during 1953-54.

Financial Problems

The report states that the financial problems of the Colombo Plan countries, relative to their development needs, are most serious, and that, although important steps have been taken to use domestic capital more effectively, the low level of average individual incomes makes it difficult to mobilize sufficient domestic resources for a rapid rate of development. Note is taken of steps which certain Colombo Plan countries have taken to enlist the co-operation of private enterprise in the economic development field, and of measures to encourage the investment of private capital from abroad. However, the report states that new private investment has been small and that, in the main, economic development in the area will probably be carried on within the framework of public planning for some time to come.

The report indicates that the amount of grant aid known to be available for the coming year will be about the same as in the recent past, supplemented, as heretofore, by loans. It states that the countries of the Colombo Plan area are aware that the main burden must be borne out of their own resources, al-



COLOMBO PLAN MEETING

Delegates to the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee meeting held in Ottawa October 4-8, 1954, are grouped on the steps before the main entrance to the Parliament Buildings. Front row, left to right: Mr. Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil, Federation of Malaya; Hon. C. C. Tan, Singapore; Prince Wan Waithayakan, Thailand; His Excellency, Tran Van Chuong, Viet Nam; Hon. C. D. Deshmukh, India; Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, Australia; Hon. Samuel C. Waugh, United States; Hon. James Sinclair, Canada; Hon. Walter B. Harris, Canada; Marquess of Reading, United Kingdom; Hon. Chaudri Mohammed Ali, Pakistan; His Excellency T. C. A. Hislop, New Zealand; His Excellency Dr. Sunario, Indonesia; Hon. M. D. H. Jayawardene, Ceylon; His Excellency Dr. Koto Matsudaira, Japan; Major-General Maahabir S. J. B. Rane, Nepal; Mr. Phlek Phoeun, Cambodia.

though external aid can do much to smooth and to accelerate progress toward a higher standard of living. The report concludes: "But they (the countries of the Colombo Plan area) have come through the initial difficulties, and not as isolated entities but as members of a great and growing partnership animated by a common purpose and increasingly conscious of each other's problems and aspirations."

When the conference was over many of the delegates proceeded homeward, or to other destinations, but about half of them participated in a post-conference tour to Montreal, Kingston, Toronto and Niagara Falls. Travelling by bus, car and special train, they visited universities, industrial plants and hydro-electric installations. In each city they were cordially received and entertained by civic, provincial or university authorities. The tour was arranged to allow free time in the evenings, when the delegates were able to attend the theatre or accept invitations to private homes. The final evening, on which most of the delegates dropped into a top-floor suite at the General Brock Hotel

to chat and look at the illuminated spectacle of Niagara Falls, was a particularly happy occasion.

Following the main tour, a small group of delegates proceeded in aircraft provided by the Department of Transport to Arvida, where they were entertained at lunch and saw an aluminum plant in operation. Bad weather prevented the party from reaching their second objective, Knob Lake, where they were to inspect an iron mine.

At the same time a larger group set out by train on a tour of Winnipeg, Regina, Edmonton and Vancouver. "Hurricane Hazel" delayed rail traffic for thirteen hours on the first leg of the journey and, as a result, the Winnipeg programme unfortunately had to be cancelled. In other cities, where they were hospitably received, they visited grain elevators, farms, refineries, oil fields and logging, lumbering, mining and fishing operations. They also met several representative groups including the Cabinets of Saskatchewan and Alberta. On their final evening in Vancouver they were the guests of a Chinese Canadian who took them to dinner in a Chinese restaurant. From Vancouver most of them proceeded homeward over the Pacific.

A Memorable Experience

In retrospect the Canadians who took part in the Colombo Plan conference look back on it as a memorable experience. They feel it was no small thing to have, sitting around the same table, the representatives of seventeen countries which, among them, account for about one third of the world's population. Their common objective—the raising of the living standards of some 600,000,000 people whose destiny is of the greatest importance to the future of mankind—is one they are proud to share. It is also a source of satisfaction that the Canadian Government and people were given an opportunity to repay, in like terms, the warm and generous hospitality accorded to the members of the Consultative Committee at previous meetings in Karachi, New Delhi, Colombo, London and Sydney.

Next year the Consultative Committee will meet again in Asia—this time in Singapore. All those concerned with the Colombo Plan look forward to being able at that time to review continued substantial progress and to a further meeting of good friends who are co-operating in one of the most significant joint enterprises of modern times.

NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 1954

THE North Atlantic Council held a Ministerial meeting in Paris on December 17 and 18, the third this year (previous ones having been held on April 23, prior to the Geneva Conference on Far Eastern Questions, and on October 22, to discuss arrangements for associating the German Federal Republic with the West). Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, the Foreign Minister of Greece, was Chairman, and Lord Ismay, the Secretary-General of NATO, was Vice-Chairman. Canada was represented by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Ralph Campney, and the Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Mr. L. D. Wilgress.

The text of the Communique issued at the end of the meeting is given in full below.

A "Stock-taking" Meeting

This was one of the regular annual "stock-taking" meetings whose purpose is to review what has been done so far to prepare against any threat to the security of the member countries and to decide what has to be done next to continue defence preparations. On this occasion ministers had an eventful year behind them, which had seen improvements in NATO's position on both the military front (the strength and efficiency of NATO forces had increased) and the political front (the vacuum left by the demise of the European Defence Community had been filled by the London and Paris agreements, which offered good hope of an enduring settlement).

Ministers had before them a report on the 1954 Annual Review, prepared by a subordinate committee of the Council with the assistance of the NATO civilian Secretariat and the NATO military authorities and in the light of comprehensive information supplied by member countries on their military, financial, and defence production plans. On the basis of the recommendations in this report, ministers agreed upon the level of NATO forces to be achieved and maintained over the next three years, the goals for 1955 being firm commitments, and those for the two subsequent years being provisional and planning goals. The levels accepted for 1955 are to be about the same as those for 1954 in numbers, but there are to be further improvements in training, equipment and effectiveness. It has been assumed that there will also be added to these forces the German defence contribution envisaged in the Paris agreements. It was a source of satisfaction to the Council that many member countries have been able to combine their defence efforts with an expansion of economic activity and an improvement in general welfare.

The ministers exchanged views, with complete unanimity, on international questions of common concern, including the trends and implications of recent Soviet policy. It was agreed that since the death of Stalin, Soviet foreign policy had shown more flexibility than previously but that its direction remained



NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

—NATIS

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, left, and the Minister of National Defence, Mr. R. O. Campney at the December 1954 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris.

unchanged. It was still aimed at weakening and dividing the non-communist world and it was backed by increasingly formidable military power. The Soviet leaders had spoken of coexistence but had not so far put forward any constructive proposals for the promotion of international peace and security. However, there was agreement in the Council that, once the Paris agreements were ratified, the Western powers should be ready to negotiate whenever the Soviet Union gave tangible evidence that negotiations could be fruitful. Such evidence might be given with respect to any of the outstanding European problems, for example, or to the United Nations' efforts to achieve a general agreement on the limitation and control of armaments.

Military Committee Report Approved

On the military side the Council considered and approved a report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO defence over the next few years, taking into account the most modern military developments. This report was the first of a series of studies that had been authorized by the Council to review the whole concept and organization of NATO defences in the light particularly of the effect of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, there had been before the Ministerial meeting a great deal of unfounded and misleading speculation in the press suggesting that there was a serious conflict among the NATO countries on this matter. The fact is that the point at issue in this first

report was not whether nuclear weapons should be used by NATO in the event of war, but what assumptions should be used by the NATO military authorities in revising their defence plans. In approving this report the Council made it clear that it was merely agreeing to the planning assumptions suggested by the NATO military authorities and was not in any way delegating the political responsibility of governments for making final decisions to put plans into operation in the event of hostilities. The military assumptions which were approved for planning purposes are, of course, secret, but it can reasonably be expected that they take into account the fact that, if the Soviet Union were to launch an overt aggression against the West, the NATO forces should have made such preparations as would permit them to defend themselves with all necessary means at their disposal.

The Council also took note of progress reports by both the Secretary-General and the Military Committee. The former dealt with the activities of the civilian Secretariat and agencies of NATO, while the latter summarized the progress made during the past year in NATO military planning and organization. This latter report was introduced by brief statements from the NATO Supreme Commanders: Admiral Wright, (the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic), Admiral Creasy (the Commander-in-Chief, Channel and Southern North Sea), and General Gruenther (the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe). General Gruenther emphasized in particular the need for greater efforts to inform public opinion of the importance of NATO.

Finally, ministers were invited by the Greek Foreign Minister to hold their next meeting in Athens some time in April. It was left to the Permanent Representatives to consider this invitation in more detail in the light of whatever administrative difficulties might be involved.

Final Communiqué

(Approved by the North Atlantic Council on December 18, 1954)

1. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris in Ministerial Session under the Chairmanship of Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, completed its work today. It was attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Economic Affairs and Defence Production.

2. The Council noted the Progress Report by the Secretary-General covering activities and developments in the Organization during the past twelve months.

Ministers welcomed the extension of political consultation within the Council.

They noted with interest the steady progress in the infrastructure programmes and in emergency planning in the civil field, and recommended the continuation of these studies and of this work, in particular in civil defence.

The Report referred to the dissemination of information about NATO and to the forthcoming publication of the Secretary-General's Five-Year Report. It also emphasized the value of the visits of Parliamentarians, of the development of voluntary organizations interested in NATO, and of the tours of journalists to member countries.

3. In accordance with its regular practice, the Council exchanged views on matters of common concern in the international situation.

The Council welcomed the efforts being made under the aegis of the United Nations for a world-wide agreement for a general limitation and control of armaments.

4. The Council agreed that Soviet policy, backed as it is by ever-increasing military power, continues, in spite of some outward signs of flexibility, to be directed towards weakening and dividing the Western nations. Soviet policy contributes no constructive solution for ensuring world security and for maintaining the freedom of peoples. It provides no ground for believing that the threat to the free world has diminished.

The Council reaffirmed its will to build for peace on solid foundations of unity and strength. The Council noted with satisfaction the progress which has been made towards bringing into effect the Paris Agreements which it regards as an essential contribution to the unity of Europe, to the security of the free world, and thereby to the cause of peace.

5. The Council took note of a Progress Report submitted by the Military Committee. It noted with satisfaction that a request by SACEUR had led to negotiations between the Netherlands and the United States, the recent completion of which will permit the establishment of a SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre in The Hague at which scientists of all member nations will be able to contribute to the development of air defence. The Council also noted that the NATO Defence College, now in its fourth year, has made a valuable contribution of qualified personnel to staffs and agencies of NATO and of member governments.

6. The Council considered a report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength over the next few years, taking into account modern developments in weapons and techniques. It approved this report as a basis for defence planning and preparation by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments to make decisions for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities.

7. The Council considered the Report on the Annual Review for 1954, which sets forth the co-ordinated NATO defence programmes for the next three years. The Review was based on the Council directive adopted in December, 1953, that it would be necessary for member countries to support over a long period forces which, by their balance, quality and efficiency, would be a major factor in deterring aggression.

The Ministers considered and accepted as military guidance a report by the Military Committee giving its comments on the 1954 Annual Review. This report stressed that the level of forces for the defence of the NATO area should be maintained as planned.

The Council noted that there had been an increase in the strength of NATO forces and further steady improvement in their efficiency over the past year. This improvement in quality resulted primarily from the large-scale combined exercises held by NATO land, sea and air forces, from the increases in operational and support units and from the supply of large quantities of new equipment.

The Council expressed its satisfaction at the expansion of European production of defence equipment as well as the continued provision of North

American equipment, and urged continued co-operation in research and development.

Following the recommendations made in the Annual Review Report, the Council adopted firm force goals for 1955, provisional goals for 1956 and planning goals for 1957. The force goals agreed upon for 1955 are of about the same numerical strength as those for 1954, but further improvements in training, equipment and effectiveness are provided for. The German defence contribution under the Paris Agreements remains, in the opinion of the Council, an indispensable addition to the defence effort of the West.

8. The Council noted with satisfaction the encouraging economic developments in many member countries over the past year and particularly the expansion of production in several European countries. The additional resources thus made available have enabled further improvements to be made in general welfare and social progress, while at the same time permitting a continued contribution towards increases in the strength and effectiveness of NATO forces. The Council recognized that further steady growth in the economic strength of the Alliance as a whole is essential in order to preserve and increase the well-being and security of all member countries, and that to this end it is necessary to strengthen economic co-operation between member countries.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.
20th December, 1954.



Miss Elizabeth MacCallum, Charge d'Affaires of Canada at Beirut, Lebanon, takes leave of Mr. Fuad Ammoun, head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the presentation of her credentials to the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, Mr. Alfred Naccache

at Beirut, Lebanon,
occasion of the present-

UNESCO Conference—Report of the Canadian Delegation

THE eighth General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was held at Montevideo, Uruguay, from November 11 to December 10, 1954. The Canadian delegation consisted of: Mr. S. D. Pierce, Canadian Ambassador to Brazil, Chairman; Mr. Bona Arsenault, M.P., Vice-Chairman; Mr. C. W. Carter, M.P., Delegate; Dr. Philippe Panneton, Delegate; Dr. Garnet T. Page, Delegate; Mr. F. K. Stewart, Alternate Delegate; Dr. A. Vibert Douglas, Alternate Delegate; Mr. Fulgence Charpenier, Alternate Delegate; Mr. M. N. Bow, Adviser; Mr. C. F. W. Hooper, Secre-

tion to implement the Conference's decisions has been taken
ve been evaluated.

ree principal areas of achievement:

g of tension and a degree of rapprochement (in matters with-
ompetence of UNESCO) between the delegations of the
and the United States was apparent;

ntial increase in UNESCO's programme of activities and in
get provided to finance this programme was approved;

responsible attitude of member states toward UNESCO and
dual representatives toward their governments was evident
rganization approached universal membership.

neral Conferences are held every two years and the ninth
ce will be held at New Delhi, India, in 1956. At that time
of these developments may be more apparent.

ounded in 1945, and the first General Conference was held
er 1946. In its early years UNESCO's energies were directed
habilitation but in 1948 the Organization turned toward the
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ticipation brought the total membership to 72 nations.

Miss Elizabeth MacCallum, Charge d'Affaires
of Canada at Beirut, Lebanon, takes leave of
Mr. Fuad Amoun, head of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, on the occasion of the presentation of
her credentials to the Foreign Minister of
Lebanon, Mr. Alfred Naccache

UNESCO Conference—Report of the Canadian Delegation

THE eighth General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was held at Montevideo, Uruguay, from November 11 to December 10, 1954. The Canadian delegation consisted of: Mr. S. D. Pierce, Canadian Ambassador to Brazil, Chairman; Mr. Bona Arsenaux, M.P., Vice-Chairman; Mr. C. W. Carter, M.P., Delegate; Dr. Philippe Panneton, Delegate; Dr. Garnet T. Page, Delegate; Mr. F. K. Stewart, Alternate Delegate; Dr. A. Vibert Douglas, Alternate Delegate; Mr. Fulgence Charpentier, Alternate Delegate; Mr. M. N. Bow, Adviser; Mr. C. F. W. Hooper, Secretary.

The extent of the progress made by the Conference can only be properly assessed when action to implement the Conference's decisions has been taken and the results have been evaluated.

There were three principal areas of achievement:

- (a) An easing of tension and a degree of rapprochement (in matters within the competence of UNESCO) between the delegations of the U.S.S.R. and the United States was apparent;
- (b) A substantial increase in UNESCO's programme of activities and in the budget provided to finance this programme was approved;
- (c) A more responsible attitude of member states toward UNESCO and of individual representatives toward their governments was evident as the Organization approached universal membership.

UNESCO General Conferences are held every two years and the ninth General Conference will be held at New Delhi, India, in 1956. At that time the consequences of these developments may be more apparent.

Historical Notes

UNESCO was founded in 1945, and the first General Conference was held in Paris in November 1946. In its early years UNESCO's energies were directed toward post-war rehabilitation but in 1948 the Organization turned toward the task of eradicating ignorance and illiteracy. Dr. Jaime Torres-Bodet, of Mexico, an international authority on mass education, was appointed Director-General. He envisaged an expanding programme and budget for a sustained attack on urgent international problems, but he resigned in 1952 when the General Conference did not approve the increased programme and budget which he presented. In July 1953, Dr. Luther H. Evans, of the United States, was elected Director-General of UNESCO. One of his first endeavours was a re-orientation of the Organization's programme. It was proposed that 1955 and 1956 should be transitional years and that a remodelled programme should come into force in 1957. In 1954 the entry to UNESCO of the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine and Byelorussia and the return of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to active participation brought the total membership to 72 nations.



UNESCO CONFERENCE AT MONTEVIDEO

The eighth General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization was held at Montevideo, Uruguay from November 11 to December 10, 1954. Above, a portion of the Canadian Delegation, right to left: Mr. Bona Arsenaull, M.P., Vice-Chairman of the Delegation; Dr. Garnet T. Page; Mr. Fulgence Charpentier; Mr. C. W. Carter, M.P.; and F. K. Stewart.

Easing of Tension

On the first day of the Conference the Soviet delegation unsuccessfully urged the admission to UNESCO membership of Roumania and Bulgaria and rejection of the Nationalist Chinese credentials. The comparatively restrained and moderate statement of the Soviet spokesman was indicative of the attitude taken by the U.S.S.R. throughout the session. The United States also scrupulously avoided provocation and concentrated on supporting increased technical aid to under-developed countries. Under these circumstances, the two leading participants were disposed to be reasonable, even conciliatory, toward each other.

The debate on obligations and rights of UNESCO staff members which involved three United States' citizens who had declined to answer questions concerning alleged communist associations, illustrated these attitudes. Some European countries were prepared to make this an issue of civil liberties, individual freedom and the independence of international civil servants. The United States said that the whole future of UNESCO was at stake and it was obvious that a major propaganda debate could be precipitated. Because of the reticence of the principals a major clash was avoided and the Conference approved the Director-General's recommendations which were designed to bring UNESCO staff regulations into conformity with those of the United Nations.

Three resolutions on atomic energy offered another opportunity for political argument on such questions as banning atomic weapons, disarmament, the harmful effects of radiation and the control of nuclear energy. However, thanks to the co-operative spirit of all concerned, it was possible to combine

the three resolutions into one which authorized the Director-General to extend full co-operation to the United Nations on questions concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The joint resolution was approved unanimously.

A Soviet resolution on "Measures to prevent the use of means of mass communication for the propaganda of war" seemed certain to create trouble until the Soviet joined Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States in sponsoring an alternative resolution on "Freedom of Information". The resolution was approved unanimously but the variation of interpretations of the operative paragraph which invited member states "to take the necessary measures to ensure freedom of expression and to remove barriers to the free flow of undistorted information" somewhat circumscribed the enthusiasm with which this Soviet concession had been greeted.

Expansion of the Programme and Budget

Throughout the Conference there was an insistent demand from under-developed countries for a substantial extension of UNESCO's programme and a large increase in the budget. The crisis of 1952 did not recur because the contributions of new members provided additional revenue and made expansion of the programme and budget possible without any increase in the individual contributions of member states. By an overwhelming majority vote the Conference approved an assessment level of \$20,000,000 for 1955-56, an increase of approximately \$2,000,000 over 1953-54. Redistribution of contribution percentages as new members joined UNESCO caused Canada's percentage to decline from 3.54 to 2.77. The amount of the Canadian contribution for 1955-56 will be approximately \$554,000 compared with more than \$600,000 in 1953-54.

The under-developed countries obtained approval of a resolution calling for a study of the possibility of establishing an educational, scientific and cultural development fund. They explained that western-trained experts on educational and cultural development were ineffective because of differences in languages, educational methods, cultural conceptions, etc., and that they preferred a development fund from which loans could be obtained for building schools, libraries and laboratories and for financing fellowships to train their own nationals.

The programme proposed by the Director-General and the Executive Board was approved with minor alterations.

Attitude of Responsibility

The decisions to remodel UNESCO's programme and change the structure of the Executive Board to provide for representation of governments rather than of individuals competent in the areas of UNESCO activity are developments to be welcomed as they bring the Organization closer to the governments that contribute to it.

At the last two UNESCO Conferences proposals to alter the structure of the Executive Board were defeated, although in 1952 a Canadian compromise proposal received more sympathetic consideration and a decision on it was postponed. At the recent Conference a United States resolution to change the composition of the Executive Board encountered stiff opposition. However,

when the operative paragraph of the Canadian compromise was inserted, the Conference voted by a large majority to elect an Executive Board of government representatives to "... exercise the powers delegated to them by the Conference on behalf of the Conference as a whole." Nevertheless, when the new Executive Board of 22 members was elected many of the same individuals and the same countries that had served in 1953-54 were returned to office, and it is unlikely that the attitude of these representatives or their governments will alter immediately.

Recommendations concerning remodelling UNESCO's programme were approved unanimously but this decision appeared to be something of a paradox in view of more than 100 new resolutions, many of which would detract attention and resources from concentration on major projects of international importance. The net effect was therefore: unanimous agreement in principle on concentration of the programme, but in practice a tendency to continue the wide diffusion of activities.

Conclusions

The easing of tension at the Conference was a consequence of a series of compromises and concessions. At the next General Conference at New Delhi, India, in 1956, an evaluation of the results of compromise resolutions may reveal whether further steps in the same direction would be profitable.

(Continued on page 30)



CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

—State of Israel

The new Canadian Ambassador to Israel, Mr. T. W. L. MacDermot, presented his credentials on November 24, 1954, to His Excellency Y. Ben Zvi, President of Israel.

Canada and the United Nations

Korea

During its ninth session, the General Assembly, having considered the factors which had made for failure at Geneva to unify Korea peacefully, did not favour a renewal of negotiations at a time when there had been no change in those factors.

The Political Committee of the General Assembly, which began consideration of the Korean item on December 1, dealt first with the procedural question of which non-member states should be invited to participate in the debate. Three draft resolutions were tabled, one by the Soviet Delegation calling for North Korean and Peking representation, one by the Thai Delegation for South Korean representation and a third by the Syrian Delegation, by which North and South Korea would have been invited to appear. In the event the Thai resolution was adopted by a vote of 43 in favour (including Canada), five against (the Soviet bloc), and 10 abstentions. The Representatives of the Republic of Korea were invited to take their places with the Committee.

U.N. Objectives in Korea

One of the substantive draft resolutions submitted to the Committee was sponsored by the fifteen member states which had participated in the United Nations action in Korea and had attended the Geneva Conference. On November 11, these countries had transmitted to the Secretary-General a report on the Korean phase of that conference. The report pointed out that by June 15, they had concluded that further consideration of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose because the Communist Delegations would neither recognize the legitimacy of the United Nations mission in Korea nor accept a Korea unified on the basis of free elections under the supervision of an international agency acceptable to the United Nations. The resolution called for the Assembly to approve this report, to reaffirm that the United Nations objectives in Korea remained the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of Government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area, to express the hope that progress towards these objectives might be made soon and to request the Secretary-General to place the Korean item on the Provisional Agenda for the next session. An Indian draft on the same lines, but not expressing approval of the report, was also tabled.

The Soviet Delegation sponsored two resolutions, one asking the Assembly to convene in the nearest future a conference of the states concerned to settle the Korean problems and the other, which would have resulted in the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). It subsequently withdrew the former.

On December 8, the Political Committee adopted the 15-power resolution by a vote of 50 in favour (including Canada), five against (the Soviet bloc), with four abstentions. The Indian Delegation withdrew its draft. The Soviet

resolution concerning UNCURK was rejected by five votes in favour (the Soviet bloc), 51 against (including Canada), with one abstention. On December 11, the General Assembly meeting in plenary approved the 15-power resolution by a vote which followed the pattern set in Committee.

West New Guinea

On November 23 the Political Committee began the debate on the West New Guinea item. It had for consideration a resolution sponsored by the Indonesian Delegation calling on the parties to the dispute to "resume negotiations as provided for by the Round Table Conference Agreement". This dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the status of West New Guinea turns on the interpretation of the Round Table Conference Agreement, signed at The Hague in 1949, which noted that a dispute existed and provided for negotiations to take place between the parties. Although negotiations were carried on until 1952, it was not found possible to reconcile the conflicting views of the Dutch and Indonesians. In the First Committee the Canadian Delegation spoke against the Indonesian resolution and *inter alia* made the suggestion that the present dispute, being largely a legal one concerned with the interpretation of an agreement, might be referred to the International Court of Justice rather than to the General Assembly. This resolution was withdrawn, however, after a new resolution calling on the parties to continue their endeavours to find a solution to the dispute, sponsored by eight countries, including India, obtained the required two-thirds majority in Committee.

The Canadian Delegation abstained in the Committee vote on this resolution, solely because it had not had sufficient time to study it. When it was found upon examination that it contained the same objectionable implications as the original Indonesian resolution, the Canadian abstention was changed to a negative vote in plenary on December 10. In a part by part vote, none of the parts received a two-thirds majority in plenary, with the result that the resolution as a whole was not carried.

Question of Captive U.S. Airmen

On December 4, the United States Delegation requested the inscription on the General Assembly agenda of an item concerning the detention and imprisonment by Communist Chinese authorities of United States military personnel in violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The 11 airmen, whose case gave rise to the item, were on a B-29 aircraft which was attacked 15 miles south of the Yalu River on January 12, 1953, and shot down. All of the men on the aircraft were in uniform and the aircraft itself bore United States Air Force markings.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, addressed the Assembly on December 8, when the inscription of the item on the agenda was under discussion. He said that the Armistice Agreement clearly covered these men and that communist spokesmen had made it clear that the agreement applied to prisoners accused of crimes. He recalled the need to protect the interests of prisoners and the previous General Assembly discussion and Armistice negotiations to this end. He said that the action of the Chinese communists in sentencing the U.S. airmen served only to increase international tension and to make difficult the solution of outstanding issues. The Soviet representatives

in the Assembly supported the Communist Chinese action and maintained that the 11 men were rightly convicted of espionage in the courts.

A resolution which was sponsored by a number of countries with forces in Korea, including Canada, was adopted by the Assembly on December 10, by 47 votes for, seven abstentions and five votes against. The resolution declared the detention and imprisonment of United Nations Command personnel to be a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and requested the Secretary-General to seek the release of personnel so detained. In accordance with the resolution, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjöld, left for Peking on December 30 to discuss this matter with the Communist Chinese authorities.

Two Soviet Items Concerning China

In the course of the Assembly session, the Soviet Union placed on the agenda two items concerning China. The first item dealt with alleged acts of aggression against the Peoples' Republic of China and the responsibility of the United States Navy for those acts. The Soviet Delegation submitted a resolution which was strongly anti-American and propagandist in tone. The resolution was considered in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and after a short discussion, it was rejected by five votes in favour, 39 (including Canada) against seven abstentions. One paragraph of the preamble concerning the possibility of the reduction of international tension received considerably more favourable votes.

The second item was a complaint of the violation of the freedom of navigation in the China Seas. This was also discussed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee which adopted a resolution introduced by the United States, Cuba and the Philippines referring the documents of the case to the International Law Commission. This was adopted by 35 votes (including Canada) in favour, five against and 15 abstentions.

In both cases, the plenary Assembly endorsed the decisions of the Committee.

Cyprus

On December 15 and 17 the General Assembly dealt with the Cyprus item which had been proposed by the Government of Greece.* In the First Committee New Zealand introduced a resolution by which the Assembly would decide "not to consider further" this issue which had already had undesirable consequences on the relations between Greece and the United Kingdom and between Turkey and Greece. Briefly stated, the New Zealand argument was that the matter should not be considered further because no benefit but much harm might result from a full-dress debate by the Assembly.

Colombia and El Salvador proposed an amendment which in effect recognized that "for the time being" it did not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on Cyprus. This amendment was accepted by the majority of the Committee, and the New Zealand resolution passed by a large majority. In plenary

* *External Affairs* for November 1954 reviews the inscription of the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the ninth session.

session the vote was fifty in favour, none against, with eight abstentions (Australia, Chile, South Africa and the Soviet bloc).

Notwithstanding its procedural nature, the debate afforded an opportunity for the delegations immediately concerned and others to express their views on the Cyprus issue. In explanatory statements on December 17, both the United Kingdom and Greek delegates expressed satisfaction about the outcome of the Assembly proceedings. The former hailed the vote on the procedural resolution as a victory for common sense which supported the United Kingdom view that a full-scale debate could achieve no useful purpose and could only serve to damage the free world; the Greek representative declared that the adoption of the resolution on Cyprus meant that the United Nations recognized the issue as an international problem and that if nothing were done to implement the Cypriots' right of self-determination, the question would be reintroduced in the United Nations.

Canada voted with the majority in favour of the amendment and the main resolution. In a very brief intervention the Canadian representative said that what he had heard during the debate "only served to confirm" the arguments which had prompted the Canadian Delegation to vote against the inscription of the Cyprus item on the Assembly agenda.

Morocco and Tunisia

The Tunisian and Moroccan questions were discussed for the first time at the seventh session of the General Assembly in 1951 and since then have been included, as separate items, in the agendas of the successive sessions. A number of African and Asian states had shown an increasing interest in the cause of self-government for Morocco and Tunisia, and disturbances in the two French Protectorates induced them to submit the question to the attention of the United Nations. From the start the French contended that the Assembly was debarred from considering these questions under Article 2 (7) of the Charter, and French Delegations have been absent when either question has been discussed.

Tunisian Question

The first resolution on this question was adopted by the Assembly in 1952. It was the result of a compromise between conflicting tendencies, one denying the right to interfere and the other suggesting a Committee of good offices. The resolution expressed the hope that the parties would continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government in Tunisia, and appealed to the parties to refrain from any action likely to aggravate tension. In 1953, the General Assembly failed to adopt a resolution.

This year the question came up for discussion in the First Committee on December 16 against a background of considerable progress towards self-government. The Tunisian Nationalist groups had accepted the proposals made by the French Government for internal autonomy as an intermediary step, while France was to retain its authority and control over defence and foreign affairs. A new Tunisian government had been formed and negotiations with the French authorities were well under way. A decree of 1938 declaring the nationalistic Neo Destour Party illegal had been revoked. Under promises of amnesty both by the Tunisian and French authorities, the *fellaghas* who

had been causing considerable trouble had started to turn over their arms. The French Prime Minister, in a speech to the General Assembly on November 22, had refused to admit that there was no solution and had reiterated his faith in the future of a liberal policy of mutual understanding and political, economic and social progress.

Under these circumstances, it was apparent that a discussion at the United Nations could not be useful and a resolution calling for the postponement of the consideration of the item was tabled by the Afro-Asian Delegations. After some delegations had suggested that no resolution at all be adopted, and others that any words implying criticism be dropped, a resolution for postponement which noted with satisfaction that the negotiations were taking place and expressed confidence that the negotiations would bring about a satisfactory solution was adopted in plenary by a vote of 54 in favour (including Canada), none against and three abstentions.

Moroccan Question

In 1952 Canada voted in favour of a resolution expressing the hope that both parties would continue negotiations with a view to developing free political institutions.

Again in 1953, the question of Morocco was discussed at the Assembly against a troubled background. The Sultan, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, had been deposed as the spiritual and temporal leader of Morocco, and had been replaced by Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa. An atmosphere of suspicion prevailed in Morocco and the authorities had resorted to severe police measures. In the Assembly, a number of African and Asian delegations failed to obtain support for a resolution recommending complete independence within a limited time, the removal of oppressive measures and the establishment of democratic institutions. A milder Bolivian resolution recommending the development of free political institutions failed in plenary to obtain a two-thirds majority vote. When the question was discussed this year at the Assembly, circumstances had changed. M. Mendès-France had proposed reforms which included the progressive management by the Moroccans of their own affairs and the establishment of local assemblies with authority over economic and social matters to be followed later by the creation of central elected assemblies. All reforms were to be achieved on recommendations from round-table conferences to be attended by French and Moroccan representatives. In the course of the debate at the Assembly, the African and Asian delegations, while declaring that they had no desire to create trouble for France, asked for the return of the former Sultan and the recognition of Moroccan independence and sovereignty. The resolution which they first introduced recommended negotiations between the "true representatives" of the Moroccan people and the French Government. However, they later submitted a new text under which the Assembly, noting that negotiations between France and Morocco would be initiated, decided to postpone for the time being the further consideration of the question. The resolution was adopted in Committee by a vote of 39 in favour, 15 against and four abstentions (including Canada). When the matter came up for discussion in plenary, the Dominican Republic submitted an amendment expressing confidence that a satisfactory solution would be achieved. The resolution, as amended, was approved by a vote of 55 in favour, including Canada, none against, and four abstentions.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Speech from the Throne

Delivering the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Second Session of the Twenty-Second Parliament on January 7, 1955, the Governor General said in Part:

Since you last met, the people of Canada have been given an opportunity of extending once more an affectionate welcome to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother. They have also had the pleasure of greeting again the consort of our Sovereign, the Duke of Edinburgh, who came to attend the British Empire and Commonwealth Games held in Vancouver during the summer and to visit northern parts of Canada.

While there is hopeful evidence that the increasing strength of the free world has lessened the likelihood of aggression, the terrible destruction that war would bring to North America and indeed to all mankind has been magnified by the increase in the number and effectiveness of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the means of delivering them.

My Ministers are convinced that, while the resources of diplomacy must never be neglected in the search for peace, the efforts of the free nations in building their deterrent forces must be maintained. To this end, Canada was represented at the London and Paris Conferences which formulated an alternative to the European Defence Community and provided for the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. You will be asked to approve the agreements reached at those meetings.


Our country continues to give full support to the United Nations. The Canadian delegation took an important part in the deliberations of the recent meeting of the General Assembly in New York. It is earnestly hoped that the adoption of the resolution on disarmament introduced in the Political Committee by the Canadian delegation may lead to agreement on an effective system of international safeguards.

While no final settlement has been reached in Korea, the lessening of the threat of renewed aggression in that area has made possible the withdrawal of a substantial portion of the Canadian forces.

At the invitation of the Geneva Conference Canada has accepted the heavy responsibility of serving on the Armistice Commissions which have been formed to supervise the restoration of peace in the Associated States of Indo-China.

Last autumn our nation was the host at the annual meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Colombo Plan. You will be asked to approve Canada's continued participation in the Plan as well as in the United Nations' Technical Assistance Programme.

A meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers will be held in London at the end of this month to consider a number of problems affecting the peoples



—NFB

SECOND SESSION OF THE TWENTY-SECOND PARLIAMENT OPENS

His Excellency the Governor General, the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, delivered the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the new session of Parliament. Seated at his right is the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Louis S. St-Laurent, and on the left is the Leader of the Government in the Senate, the Honourable William Ross Macdonald.

of this great association of nations. My Prime Minister plans to attend this conference.

During the summer arrangements were completed to permit the navigational facilities of the St. Lawrence River to be enlarged and a hydro-electric project to be undertaken in the International Rapids Section.

Work on these two projects has already begun and my Ministers are convinced the stimulus to the national economy resulting from their construction will be shared in all parts of the country.

. . . Amendments to the Electricity and Fluid Exportation Act and a measure to control works which affect the normal flow of rivers which cross the international boundary will be proposed for the purpose of ensuring that natural resources are developed in the best interests of the Canadian public.

You will be asked to consider a measure to implement a convention between Canada and the United States relating to fisheries research on the Great Lakes.

. . . You will be asked to approve a convention signed by the members of the International Civil Aviation Organization which fixes the responsibility for damage caused to third parties by foreign aircraft . . .

NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE

Issued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, on December 31, 1954

The year now ended has been an eventful one for those engaged in the search for peace and security.

During 1954 there have been important successes. There have also been days when the western democracies have had to face disappointments and setbacks. More serious and disturbing than the actual disappointments themselves, however, is the lack of cohesion that they have sometimes revealed between the democracies. On occasions during the past year the essential unity of our partnership, on which the security of the free world rests, has been threatened by tendencies of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic to find for frustration and failure an easy release in mutual recrimination and exasperation.

There have been days, during 1954, when many in the free world have been disquieted by fears that governments might be provoked into hasty or ill-considered action with results which would inevitably commit us all. Others have feared that we might be lulled into an unrealistic and dangerous complacency of the kind that proved so costly to Europe in the 1930's.

Need for Unity Essential

Meanwhile the steadily increasing power of weapons and the advancing techniques for their delivery have made the prospect of war more terrifying and, to prevent it, unity, calm, and steady strength more essential than ever.

A few months ago, Sir Winston Churchill pictured us today as from time to time "peering around the rim of hell". Certainly there have been moments during the past twelve months when a consideration of international issues has involved more than a glance in that direction. No one can truthfully assert that we have yet achieved a situation of international order and confidence where this hell of a thermonuclear war is unthinkable.

It is salutary, therefore, to be reminded of the dangers that we face: that of disunity on the one hand, which could lead without physical hostilities to defeat in the cold war; and that of the outbreak of cataclysmic destruction which could come either through miscalculation or through deliberate aggression.

We can, however, take comfort from the fact that the critical periods through which we have passed during the year now ended have proved, on the whole, sobering, rather than shattering to our coalition. Where there have been set-backs, these have been accepted and plans made to recover from them. As the year ends, our coalition for peace seems, I think, stronger than it was at the beginning. We are learning to live with the situation that exists, without panic but without illusions.

There have also, we must not forget, been significant successes during the year. In Korea, though it has not proved possible to advance from truce to a political agreement for peace, the armistice has been maintained and a withdrawal of United Nations troops, including Canadian, has begun. Agreement was reached at Geneva last summer which stopped the fighting in Indochina. The settlement there has involved heavy new responsibilities for Canada. To assist in the difficult task of pacifying that area, Canada was asked, with India and Poland, to undertake the onerous and complex duties of membership on three International Supervisory Commissions. These responsibilities were certainly not sought by us but we could not refuse them.

And so today, Canadians in the service of their country and of peace are seeing the old year out and the new year in not only in diplomatic missions throughout the world, not only in garrisons and airfields in Western Europe and outposts on hilltops in Korea, but also in patrols along the jungle paths of Indochina.

Another important Asian development during the past year was the decision of a number of countries located in or with particular historic interests in South-East Asia, to develop in SEATO collective defence arrangements somewhat analogous to those developed in NATO for the North Atlantic region.

Equally important, a group of South Asian countries, which has come to be known as the Colombo powers, has also met to consider the contribution which they can make to peace in that area.

The further development and extension of membership in the Colombo Plan for economic development of that region is also noteworthy. We were happy to be host in Ottawa in the autumn to Ministers from Colombo Plan countries at their annual consultative meeting.

Association of Germany with NATO

In Europe the most important political events in the international field have been connected with the plan, worked out at conferences in London and Paris in the early autumn, for the association of a free, democratic, sovereign Germany with NATO and the Western European Union. The programme of debates in our various capitals, on the ratification of these arrangements, has called forth from the Kremlin a remarkable mixture of blandishments and threats; of "sticks and carrots". Their obstructive purpose is obvious and it is to be hoped it will not be achieved.

This time last year we were still wondering to what extent the new masters of the Soviet

Union proposed to follow in the footsteps of the old. During the year we learned that there were to be some interesting and important variations in tactics, although in strategy and in the basic aims of policy Mr. Malenkov and his associates do not appear thus far at least to have abandoned the dangerous paths of Marshal Stalin.

Until recently we have had to face a heavy-handed Soviet policy of intimidation and threats. This has often had the useful result of consolidating the western world in resisting crude Soviet demands. It seems that now the men in the Kremlin are becoming more astute, and may be seeking to undermine democratic unity and to sap our strength by gestures for what they call peaceful co-existence.

Perhaps this adventure of Moscow into more beguiling tactics is an acknowledgement on their part that the West was not to be intimidated. It is to be hoped that it will soon be realized also that we are not to be cajoled by words alone.

What we must still hope and work for, is a realization on the part of the Soviet leaders that words divorced from deeds will not do; that while we are neither to be frightened nor lulled into an abandonment of policy or principle, we are always prepared to consider at the conference table or through the normal diplomatic channels any legitimate and sincere proposal from them which might strengthen peace and security in the world.

Prepared to Consider Sincere Proposals

It would be dangerous for the West not to be prepared for deceit, but it would be stupid not to take advantage of every reasonable opportunity for sincere negotiation. We cannot, even if we wanted to, wipe out our memories of Soviet obstruction to the humanitarian work of economic assistance since the end of the war; nor of the U.S.S.R.'s more open and forceful activity in the Berlin blockade; nor of its expansion and the overthrow of liberty all over Eastern Europe. But though we have learned to be cautious, we must never forget that the ultimate goal that we must continue to seek must involve not only

coexistence, but the constructive co-operation, of all men.

Throughout the year, as previously, the United Nations has remained the basis of Canada's policy for seeking with other states solutions to international problems, just as NATO has been the foundation of our policy for collective defence.

Apart from these larger associations, we have had occasion more than once during the year in Canada to appreciate the value of our membership in the Commonwealth of Nations, an important part of which is its role in facilitating close and friendly relations with new democracies in Asia.

We have also had cause during the year to be thankful for the good neighbourhood between the United States and Canada, and for the continuing closeness and friendliness of our relations with France and the other free countries of Western Europe.

Some Progress Made

The year now ending has seen final solutions to very few of the problems that we face. But in several of them it has taken us forward, and kept open the road to further advances toward genuine peace. It has seen at least the partial realization of some of the plans and hopes of earlier years. These very achievements have, of course, brought with them new problems on which we must now set to work in the hope that a few years hence we may look back without reproaching ourselves for lost opportunities or lack of foresight. In world affairs it is rarely possible to say that an issue is settled and the books closed. Diplomacy is a continuing process; with the end of one problem often becoming the beginning of another. Our purpose should be to ensure that the process at least moves in the right direction! I think that in 1954 we have on the whole been doing that.

May 1955 bring to all of us real happiness, and may we make during the next twelve months genuine and steady progress towards an assured peace on earth to all men of goodwill.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. D. S. Cole was appointed Canadian Ambassador to Mexico, effective November 1, 1954. Mr. Cole left Ottawa November 20, 1954.
- Mr. H. F. B. Feaver was appointed Canadian Minister to Denmark, effective November 1, 1954. Mr. Feaver left Ottawa November 17, 1954.
- Mr. P. E. Renaud was appointed Canadian Ambassador to Chile, effective November 15, 1954. Mr. Renaud left Ottawa November 24, 1954.
- The Hon. R. W. Mayhew, former Canadian Ambassador to Japan, retired from the diplomatic service effective November 23, 1954.

- Mr. R. B. Edmonds was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, effective November 26, 1954.
- Mr. A. A. Day was posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective November 29, 1954.
- Mr. G. K. Grande was posted from home leave (Athens) to Ottawa, effective November 29, 1954.
- Mr. P. Dumas was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, effective December 18, 1954.
- Mr. J. R. Flourde was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective December 28, 1954.
- Mr. A. W. Mathewson was appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective December 1, 1954.

The Department regrets to announce the deaths of two members of the Service. Mr. J. H. Thurrott, Adviser to the Canadian Commissioner, Laos, was killed in an automobile accident in Vientiane on December 24, 1954; Mr. George F. Power died in Ottawa on January 8, 1955, after a brief illness.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 54/46 — *Statement on Disarmament*, statement made on October 22, 1954, by the Canadian Permanent Representative, Mr. David Johnson, in the First Committee of the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly.
- No. 54/47 — *The Challenge of Co-existence*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made at the Economic Club, Detroit, Michigan, November 8, 1954.
- No. 54/48 — *United Nations Day*, statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, on United Nations Day, October 24, 1954.
- No. 54/49 — *Should Canada Recognize Red China?*, a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, for the "Peoples School", St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, N.S., November 7, 1954.
- No. 54/50 — *International Co-operation in Developing the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*, a statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Vice-Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Paul Martin, November 5, 1954.
- No. 54/52 — Statements by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, on the article "Expanding the United Nations Community" by Dr. van Wagenen, in the November 1954 issue of the "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science".
- No. 54/55 — *Reflections on Neighbourhood*, an address to the Central Council of Canadian Red Cross Society, at Toronto, Ontario, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Arnold Smith, on November 22, 1954.
- No. 54/56 — *Christian Foundations for World Order*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Assembly of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, Boston, Mass., December 2, 1954.
- No. 54/58 — *The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*, an address by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, at a meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, at Geneva, December 6, 1954.
- No. 54/59 — *Complaint of Detention and Imprisonment of United Nations Military*

Personnel in Violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, the statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made

in a plenary session of the General Assembly on December 8, 1954.

No. 54/61 — New Year's Message by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, December 31, 1954.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

No. 54/51 — *Canadian Mining Outlook*, a speech by the Deputy Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys, Mr. Marc Boyer, to the American Mining Congress, at San Francisco, September 23, 1954.

Lesage, to the Canadian Club of Toronto, November 22, 1954.

No. 54/57 — *The Pattern of Canadian Investment and Trade*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to the Investment Bankers Association Convocation, at Hollywood, Florida, December 2, 1954.

No. 54/53 — An address by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, to the Humanities Research Council of Canada, at Ottawa, November 19, 1954.

No. 54/60 — *Canada's Economy in 1954*, a statement by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, issued on December 26, 1954.

No. 54/54 — *The Trend is to the North*, an address by the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Mr. Jean

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Second Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. A/2719. New York, 1954. 121 pp. \$1.50. G.A.O.R.: Ninth Session, Supplement No. 16.

Report of the Agent General on United Nations Reconstruction Agency for Korea (1 October 1953 - 1 September 1954). A/2750. New York, 1954. 37 pp. G.A.O.R.: Ninth Session, Supplement No. 20.

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency—Financial Report and Accounts for the year ended 30 June 1954 and Report of Board of Auditors. A/2757. New York, 1954. 17 pp. G.A.O.R.: Ninth Session, Supplement No. 6 C.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Accounts for the financial year ended 30 June A/2760. New York, 1954. G.A.O.R.: Ninth Session, Supplement No. 6 B. 19 pp.

International Co-operation in a Latin American Development Policy. E/CN.12/359. New York, September 1954. 147 pp. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1954.II.C.2.

An Economic Programme for Korean Reconstruction (Prepared for the United Nations

Korean Reconstruction Agency). 459 pp. (Printed April 1954).

Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1953. ST/STAT/SER.G/4. New York, August 1954. 481 pp. \$4:50. Sales No.: 1954.XVII:3. (Prepared by the Statistical Office of the U.N., Department of Economic Affairs).

ICJ—*Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal.* "I.C.J. Pleadings, United Nations Administrative Tribunal". 451 pp. Sales No.: 126. (bilingual).

Some problems in the Organization and Administration of Public Enterprises in the Industrial Field. ST/TAA/M/7, 23 July 1954. (U.N. Technical Assistance Administration). 87 pp. Sales No.: 1954.II.H.1 (Documents selected from the material prepared for a U.N. Seminar held in Ragoon from March 15th to 26th, 1954, under the Auspices of ECAFE, the UNTAA, the International Institute of Administrative Sciences).

ILO—*Vocational Guidance in France.* Geneva, 1954. (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 39). 134 pp. \$1.00.

Year Book of Labour Statistics 1954 (Fourteenth Issue). Geneva, 1954. 397 pp. \$5.00 (English-French-Spanish).

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

UNESCO

Adult Education Towards Social and Political Responsibility. (UNESCO Institute for Education Publications, No. 1). 143 pp. 75 cents. UNESCO Institute for Education, Hamburg, 1953.

XVIIth International Conference on Public Education 1954. Paris 1954. 147 pp. \$1.25. IBE, Publication No. 159.

A report of the Fourth National Conference of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, September 15-17, 1953. 73 pp.

World Theatre, Volume III, No. 4. 119 pp. (Quarterly) \$1.00. (iTi, published under the auspices of UNESCO).

The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Sociology, Social Psychology and Anthropology. (Teaching in the social Sciences). Paris, September 1954. 252 pp. \$1.75.

Culture and Human Fertility by Frank Lorimer and others. (Population and Culture Series). Paris, October 1954. 514 pp. \$4.50.

Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character. (A guide to its operation). Paris, October 1954. 26 pp. (booklet).

WHO — *Seventh World Health Assembly,* Geneva, 4 to 21 May 1954. Resolutions and Decisions, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records, Committees, Minutes and Reports, Annexes. Geneva, November 1954. 512 pp. \$2.75. Official Records of the WHO, No. 55.

b) Mimeographed Documents:

Systematic Compilation of International Instruments relating to the legal status of Aliens (UNIDROIT — International Institute for the Unification of private law):

CANADA—ST/LSA/13, Rome February 1954. 134 pp.

AUSTRALIA—ST/LSA/11, Rome, April 1954. 77 pp.

NEW ZEALAND—ST/LSA/14, Rome, April 1954. 75 pp.

UNESCO CONFERENCE—REPORT OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION

(Continued from page 18)

The Director-General and the Secretariat have the difficult assignment of attempting to reconcile the Conference's decision to remodel UNESCO's programme toward concentration on a few major projects and its approval of a large number of new activities. The Director-General will require strong support from member states who wish to see UNESCO established on a progressive and stable basis.

The next two years will be of great importance in the responsible development of UNESCO. It is by endeavouring to secure popular participation in its activities on a well-organized national basis that the Organization can probably acquire greater strength and stability.

CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Country	Designation	Address
Argentina.....	Ambassador.....	Buenos Aires (Bartolome Mitre, 478)
Australia.....	High Commissioner.....	Canberra (State Circle)
“	Commercial Secretary.....	Melbourne (83 William St.)
“	Commercial Counsellor.....	Sydney (City Mutual Life Bldg.)
Austria.....	Minister (Absent).....	Vienna 1 (Strauchgasse 1)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Belgian Congo.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Leopoldville (Forescom Bldg.)
Belgium.....	Ambassador.....	Brussels (35, rue de la Science)
Brazil.....	Ambassador.....	Rio de Janeiro (Avenida Presidente Wilson, 165)
“	Consul and Trade Commissioner.....	Sao Paulo (Edificio Alois, Rua 7 de Abril, 252)
Ceylon.....	High Commissioner.....	Colombo (6 Gregory's Rd., Cinnamon Gardens)
Chile.....	Ambassador.....	Santiago (Avenida General Bulnes 129)
Colombia.....	Ambassador.....	Bogota (Edificio Faux, Avenida Jimenez de Quesada No. 7-25)
Cuba.....	Ambassador.....	Havana (Avenida Menocal No. 16)
Czechoslovakia.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Prague 2 (Krackovska 22)
Denmark.....	Minister.....	Copenhagen (Trondhjems Plads No. 4)
Dominican Republic.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Ciudad Trujillo (Edificio Copello 410 Calle El Conde)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Egypt.....	Ambassador.....	Cairo (6 Sharia Roustom, Garden City)
Finland.....	Minister (Absent).....	Helsinki (Borgmästarbrinken 3-C. 32)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
France.....	Ambassador.....	Paris xvi (72 Avenue Foch)
Germany.....	Ambassador.....	Bonn (Zitelmann Strasse, 22)
“	Head of Military Mission.....	Berlin (Perthshire Block, Olympic Stadium (British Sector) B.A.O.R.2)
Greece.....	Ambassador.....	Athens (31 avenue Vassilissis Sofias)
Guatemala.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Guatemala City (28, 5a Avenida Sud)
Haiti.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Port-au-Prince (Route du Canape Vert, St. Louis de Turgeau)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Hong Kong.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Hong Kong (Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Bldg.)
Iceland.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
India.....	High Commissioner.....	New Delhi (4 Aurangzeb Road)
“	Trade Commissioner.....	Bombay (Gresham Assurance House)
Indonesia.....	Ambassador.....	Djakarta (Djalan Budi Kemuliaan 6)
Ireland.....	Ambassador.....	Dublin (92 Merrion Square West)
Israel.....	Ambassador (Absent).....	Tel Aviv (Farmers' Bld., Dizengoff Rd.)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Italy.....	Ambassador.....	Rome (Via Saverio Mercadante 15)
Jamaica.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Kingston (Canadian Bank of Commerce Bldg.)
Japan.....	Ambassador.....	Tokyo (16 Omote-Machi, 3 Chome, Minato-Ku)
Lebanon.....	Minister (Absent).....	Beirut (Immeuble Alpha rue Clemenceau)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
Luxembourg.....	Minister.....	Brussels (c/o Canadian Embassy)
Mexico.....	Ambassador.....	Mexico (Paseo de la Reforma No. 1)
Netherlands.....	Ambassador.....	The Hague (Sophialaan 1A)
New Zealand.....	High Commissioner.....	Wellington (Government Life Insurance Bldg.)
Norway.....	Minister.....	Oslo (Fridtjof Nansens Plass 5)
Pakistan.....	High Commissioner.....	Karachi (Hotel Metropole)

Peru.....	Ambassador.....	Lima (Edificio Boza, Plaza San Martin)
Philippines.....	Consul General and Trade Commissioner.....	Manila (Ayala Bldg., Juan Luna St.)
Poland.....	Chargé d'Affaires.....	Warsaw (31 Ulica Katowika, Saska Kępa)
Portugal.....	Minister (Absent)..... Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Lisbon (Avenida da Praia da Vitoria)
Singapore.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Singapore (Room F-3, Union Building)
Spain.....	Ambassador.....	Madrid (Edificio Espana, Avenida de José Antonio 88)
Sweden.....	Minister.....	Stockholm (Strandvägen 7-C)
Switzerland.....	Ambassador.....	Berne (88 Kirchenfeldstrasse)
Trinidad.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Port of Spain (Colonial Bldg.)
Turkey.....	Ambassador.....	Ankara (Müdafaai Hukuk Caddesi, No. 19, Cankaya)
Union of South Africa.....	High Commissioner.....	Pretoria (Suite 65, Kerry Bldg., 238 Vermeulen St.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Cape Town (Grand Parade Centre Building, Adderley St.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Johannesburg (Mutual Bldg.)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	Ambassador.....	Moscow (23 Starokonyushenny Pereulok)
United Kingdom.....	High Commissioner.....	London (Canada House)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Liverpool (Martins Bank Bldg.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Belfast (36 Victoria Square)
United States of America.....	Ambassador.....	Washington (1746 Massachusetts Avenue)
“ “	Consul General.....	Boston (532 Little Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Chicago (Daily News Bldg.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commis- sioner.....	Detroit (1035 Penobscot Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Los Angeles (510 W. Sixth St.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commis- sioner.....	New Orleans (215 International Trade Mart)
“ “	Consul General.....	New York (620 Fifth Ave.)
“ “	Honorary Vice-Consul.....	Portland, Maine (443 Congress Street)
“ “	Consul General.....	San Francisco (400 Montgomery St.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Seattle (Tower Bldg., Seventh Avenue at Olive Way)
Uruguay.....	Ambassador (Absent)..... Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Montevideo (Calle Colonia 1013, piso °7)
Venezuela.....	Ambassador.....	Caracas (2° Piso Edificio Pan-Ameri- can, Puente Urapal, Candelaria)
Yugoslavia.....	Ambassador.....	Belgrade (Proliterskih Brigada 69)
North Atlantic Council.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (Canadian Embassy)
*OECC.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (c/o Canadian Embassy)
United Nations.....	Permanent Representative.....	New York (Room 504, 620 Fifth Avenue)
“ “	Permanent Delegate..... Deputy Permanent Delegate	Geneva (La Pelouse, Palais des Nations)

*Organization for European Economic Co-operation.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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February 1955

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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Canadians in Indochina*

(Notes by an Eye-Witness)

IN INDOCHINA today some 160 Canadians are doing their best to help bring peace and stability to that troubled peninsula. They are to be found in Viet Nam, in Laos and in Cambodia, for it is misleading to lump these states together as Indochina. The three states differ in race, in size, in history and in the nature of the problems that confront them. How did these Canadians come to be where they are, in an area with which Canada has had little direct connection? Living conditions and the climate are difficult, the work is hard and at times dangerous; the Department of External Affairs mourns the death of one of its able young officers, J. H. Thurrott, killed in a jeep accident on December 24 in Vientiane.

The Geneva Agreements

On July 20, three Agreements were signed in Geneva, after long negotiations, bringing an end to hostilities in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. Just as the problems facing the three countries are different, so the Agreements are different, but a good many provisions are common to the three; the most important of these relates to the way in which the Agreements are to be carried out. In each case, the two parties to the dispute—the recent belligerents—were given the responsibility of executing the Agreement, and an International Commission was set up to supervise the proper execution by the parties of its provisions. The Commission's job was to observe, to supervise, to mediate, to interpret and in general to help the two parties iron out any difficulties that might arise. This is where Canada comes in.

As noted above, the Agreements were signed on July 20. On July 21 the Canadian Government received an invitation from the co-Chairmen of the Geneva conference, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov, to accept membership on the three international commissions. Canada had not taken part in the Geneva Conference on Indochinese problems, and certainly did not seek the heavy responsibility of assisting in supervising the settlement. But things by then had reached the point where the Agreements had been signed, stating baldly "An International Commission shall be set up . . . It shall be composed of representatives of the following states: Canada, India and Poland. It shall be presided over by the representative of India."

The Department of External Affairs was thus under an urgent obligation to provide the Government with material on which to base a decision, and in particular to find out what duties and responsibilities would be involved if Canada became a member of the three international commissions. The texts of the agreements were not yet available. A good deal of hasty telegraphing to and fro produced these, and a careful study of them was made. On July 28, a week after the invitation had been received, the Government announced its decision to accept membership on the Commissions. It is not proposed to comment here on the problems of policy involved, but some account of the

* See also "External Affairs", August 1954, p. 257, and September 1954, p. 299.

practical problems which had to be dealt with quickly may convey an idea of the complexity of the operation.

The matter was of great urgency, and everything had to be done quickly. While the Canadian Government was considering the invitation, the Government of India announced its acceptance and further informed us that, as the country providing the chairmen of the three commissions, it was prepared to call a preliminary conference in New Delhi on August 1, if Canada and Poland decided to accept membership. The Department of External Affairs, therefore, while clearly having to avoid any action which would seem to anticipate the decision of the Government, had to be ready to move rapidly should it be decided that Canada would send representatives to the international commissions.

A study of the Geneva agreements made it evident that the bulk of those sent to Indochina would have to be provided by the armed forces, particularly by the army. The chief demand for personnel arose from provisions in the agreements specifying a number of points at which there would be fixed inspection teams composed of equal numbers of officers from Canada, India and Poland. An unspecified number of mobile inspection teams was also required by each agreement. Only the army could supply and maintain the Canadian members of these teams. For its part, External Affairs would have to provide a number of foreign service officers and clerks to serve as advisers and as staff for the Commissioners, and would have to organize and administer the various headquarters offices. Both National Defence and External Affairs began considering immediately where they could hope to obtain these officers, if needed. There was also the more immediate problem of designating representatives who would be ready to go to the preliminary conference at New Delhi; this meant among other things that they must be inoculated against enough diseases, if not to protect their health fully, at least to comply with international quarantine requirements.

New Delhi Conference

On July 28 the Government announced its decision to accept the onerous but honourable responsibility and that evening Mr. R. M. Macdonnell took off for New Delhi with two officers from National Defence, to assist the High Commissioner at the preparatory conference. In New Delhi, these were joined by the military attaché from Tokyo who had been hurriedly assigned to the Indochina operation for an indefinite period, so that when the talks opened on August 1, a well-balanced delegation was ready to start work. It is always interesting to compare efficiency of the democracies' procedures with those of the countries beyond the curtain. While Canada had people from Ottawa at New Delhi for the opening meeting, the Polish representatives from Warsaw did not turn up for several days, and Poland was in consequence represented by its Ambassador in New Delhi. As he had little in the way of instructions and was not in a position to take decisions it was necessary to postpone decisions until the arrival of the Warsaw contingent, though this did not result in any real delay.

The task before the New Delhi conference was primarily an administrative or housekeeping job. It was known what the three international commissions were to do, since this was clearly defined in the Geneva Agreements.

But none of the Canadians or the others knew anything very precise about such things as working and living conditions, communications, transport and so on in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. The orderly way of proceeding would have been to send an advance party to investigate conditions on the spot, discuss administrative questions with the local authorities, and to report their recommendations. This would at least have provided a few facts. But there was no time for such leisurely methods. The Agreements called for each commission to begin its work on August 11, ten days after the opening of the New Delhi conference; and even this fact was not clearly established until after the New Delhi talks began. Some people had interpreted the Agreements to mean that since there were various dates for the cease-fire—ranging from July 27 to August 11—so the commissions would come into being on successive dates. A closer examination of the texts revealed, however, that all three commissions must be open for business on August 11, at 8.00 a.m. Peking mean time.

What had to be done in New Delhi, therefore, was to construct a rather elastic administrative framework, which—it was hoped—could be made to fit whatever differing conditions might be encountered. The three delegations, Canadian, Indian and Polish, worked in complete harmony on these practical problems. Tentative establishments were drawn up for the secretariats, and for the national delegations to each commission. Rough tables of accommodation required for offices and living quarters were prepared, even although what might be available was not known. Transport and communications and security were considered together with all the manifold administrative problems that must be solved if the communications were to work properly. Most of this could be only guesswork, but it represented the best guesses of experienced foreign service and military officers, and in the result it proved a very useful basis for the administrative structure of the commissions.

Administrative Plans Drafted

After five days' hard and very hot work, the administrative plans were roughly sketched out, and it was time to move on to Indochina. It had long since become clear that the three governments would scarcely be able to have their eventual commissioners on hand on August 11; time was required to appoint people and to extricate them from their present jobs. In fact, it would be a considerable achievement if there could be on hand a few people at each of the headquarters—Hanoi for Viet Nam, Vientiane for Laos and Phnom Penh for Cambodia—on August 11. The problem was least acute for the Indians, who were relatively close to the area of operations; the Poles and ourselves had very few people in this far-eastern region.

Despite various difficulties the three commissions were established on the required date. For the Canadian task, a group of army officers who came by air on short notice from Korea provided much of the initial strength. In Cambodia, Brigadier Morton, later to serve as Senior Military Adviser in Laos with the rank of Major-General, was named to act as Commissioner for the time being with a staff of two army officers. To Laos were sent two more army officers with Mr. Frank Ballachey, a Foreign Service Officer posted to Indochina as a Political Adviser, acting as Commissioner. Mr. Macdonnell was designated to serve as Canadian Commissioner in Viet Nam and started work with two army officers and the added luxuries of a senior clerk from External Affairs and an NCO. The Indian Air Force flew the Commissioners and staffs



—Government of India

INDOCHINA SUPERVISORY COMMISSION MEETS

Members of the International Armistice Supervisory Commission for Indochina held a preliminary meeting in New Delhi in August. Present at the inaugural meeting, left to right: Air Commodore H. H. C. Rutledge, Canada; Mr. R. M. Macdonnell, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada; the High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. E. M. Reid; Mr. Jerzey Grudzinski, Polish Ambassador to India; Mr. H. Joreszek, First Secretary, Embassy of Poland; Sri Badahur Singh, Conference Secretary; Sri I. S. Chopra, Chief of Protocol; Sri M. K. Vellodi, Secretary, Ministry of Defence; Sri R. K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary; Sri V. K. Krishna Menon; the Prime Minister, Sri Jawaharlal Nehru; Sri N. R. Pillai, Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs; Sri S. Dutt, Secretary, Commonwealth Relations; and Sri T. N. Kaul, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs.

from New Delhi to Indochina, and on August 11 the three commissioners held their first meetings.

What does an international commission do when it hangs out its shingle and declares itself open for business? At least in Indochina it hopes that its collective strength and digestive capacities will hold out from one day to the next. The following observations on activities during the first few days of the International Commission for Viet Nam will indicate the number and variety of things that had to be done, and may suggest that diplomacy is not invariably an ivory-tower occupation.

At 8.00 a.m. on August 11, in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Agreement, the International Commission for Viet Nam held its first meeting. The locale was the one available public room in the Hotel Metropole in Hanoi, and the Commission sat down a little self-consciously under the eye of the press to announce its entry into the world of international affairs. It went through various formalities, such as adopting provisional rules of procedure which had been drawn up and agreed on in New Delhi; and it adjourned. Not much of a day's work, perhaps, but this was only the beginning.

In order to waste no time, the International Commission had arranged a meeting that morning with the Joint Commission, and this may require a word

of explanation. Under each of the Geneva Agreements, the two parties, whether in Viet Nam, Laos or Cambodia, were made responsible for the execution of the Agreement, and a Joint Commission representing the two sides was set up in each country to work out details of such things as re-groupment of forces and the exchange of prisoners of war. Thus in Viet Nam there was a Joint Commission representing the high command of the forces of the French Union and the high command of the forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam—familarly known in International Commission circles as the DR and often referred to as the Viet Minh. To reach the headquarters of this Joint Commission, the International Commission had to use no fewer than three forms of transportation. First there was a trip by car to one of the Hanoi airports. Then there was a flight of about twenty minutes by light aircraft, flown by the French Air Force, Canadian Beavers, incidentally, to a pasture in a demilitarized zone. Finally came a ride in brand new Russian-built jeeps belonging to the Democratic Republic; in the days that followed the Canadians got to know every pot-hole in that five-mile jeep ride—got to know them well if not favourably.

In passing it might be observed that the headquarters of the Joint Commission displayed an interesting mingling of oriental and occidental influences. The huts in which business was conducted had half-walls of woven straw and roofs of corrugated iron. The combination did little to mitigate the effects of the tropical sun beating down on a shadeless patch of the Tonkin delta. Further, the conference tables were covered with a singularly abrasive type of army blanket; and there for several sweating hours on that first day the Canadians and their colleagues waded into the problems which the International Commission had to take up with the Joint Commission.

Help Arrives

On getting back to the hotel in Hanoi for a very late lunch, the Canadians found that welcome reinforcements had arrived. Mr. T. R. G. Fletcher, the Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, had arrived from the north for briefing on his way to fill in as Commissioner in Cambodia for a month; and two more army officers had turned up from the south to make themselves useful. There was never any advance notice of arrivals in those days, because of the almost paralytic slowness of the local telegraph service. Instead of the rest after lunch which is almost obligatory in such climates if health is to be maintained, a daily delegation meeting was held at which reports were made by each member on what he had been able to achieve; and decisions were taken as to what was to be done next. This delegation meeting was followed by the International Commission's second meeting of the day and, when it concluded as the afternoon began to wane, a stream of callers descended—a group of Canadian Redemptorist fathers come to pay their respects, the British Consul, two press correspondents, one from the United States and one from France, and finally the head of the French liaison mission and a member of his staff.

The problems of getting organized,—finding offices, building up secretariats, arranging adequate communications, and so forth—were formidable. They were surmounted eventually—and in trying conditions of great heat. In the early days the Commissions got through their business with a minimum of organization and a maximum of improvisation—brilliant or otherwise—made possible by hard work and a co-operative attitude on the part of all national

delegations. Not only did they have to grapple with the administrative problems mentioned, but there were substantive questions arising out of the Geneva Agreements that had to be dealt with. Moreover, it was not enough merely to get the three headquarters into working shape. It was essential to get the fixed and mobile inspection teams on the ground as soon as possible.

While the few Canadians were battling with administrative and other problems in Indochina, the Department of National Defence at home in Ottawa was selecting officers for duty and arranging for them to be brought together, briefed and despatched to Indochina by air. As a result, on each of four successive days, from September 1 to 4, there arrived in Hanoi an RCAF North Star bringing a group of officers and much-needed supplies and equipment. Thanks to quick but careful planning and the smooth operations of the RCAF, Canada was the first of the powers serving on the Commissions to have a full complement of personnel for the inspection teams ready for duty in Indochina. In particular, the Canadians were far in advance of the Poles, who chose to send their officers by air only as far as Peking, transferring them there to trains running to a point north of the border between China and Viet Nam, and leaving them to make their way to Hanoi by motor transport over extremely indifferent roads. For some time they seemed to the Polish members of the Commission to have disappeared into the void.

It is not intended here to say a great deal about the work of the Commissions, much of it of a delicate nature, but something can be mentioned of the first problem to come before the Viet Nam Commission. The first problem is always a test, and if it is surmounted successfully, the way is easier in the future.

Prisoner-of-War Problem

Within a few days of its arrival in Hanoi, the International Commission was informed by the two sides that they were having difficulty in agreeing on methods of exchanging prisoners-of-war. By using its good offices informally, the Commission was able to get discussions resumed and the exchange proceeded. But within another ten days new difficulties arose and the two sides had reached a complete deadlock on how, when and where prisoners were to be exchanged and in what numbers. Each side had a long list of complaints against the other, and each charged the other with being unreasonable. It was not surprising that there should be difficulties. The release of prisoners-of-war gave rise to acute emotional and political tensions. The two sides had ceased fighting each other only a fortnight earlier and the atmosphere, not surprisingly, was edgy. The Joint Commission, which was dealing with the problem, was working long hours every day, in great heat and without proper rest. In such circumstances, it was understandable that friction should develop.

The International Commission had been created to deal with just such a question as this. It had no powers of enforcement and could issue no orders. It had to rely on its moral authority and by mediation, persuasion and recommendation, to find a solution which the two sides would accept as fair and just. On a given day in August the International Commission spent the morning going over such facts and figures as the two sides had presented, discussing possible ways of getting around the difficulties. In the afternoon, the Commission went to the headquarters of the Joint Commission and heard each side

state its case separately. This was a fairly lengthy business, for each side had a great deal to say and further time was required for translation into and out of Vietnamese, French and English.

When the two sides had finished arguing their cases, the International Commission held a private meeting to analyze further the causes of friction and to see whether proposals could be framed that would be fair and would at the same time satisfy each side that its particular worries could be met. As the evidence and the arguments were reviewed, the outlines of a solution began to emerge, drafts on various points were hastily scribbled in various hands, and revised until they seemed satisfactory. At length the two sides were called in and the Commission's proposals were put to them by the Chairman. After brief study they were accepted, and an awkward corner had been turned. As a result of a 5½ hour meeting—from 3.30 till 9.00—a deadlock had been broken and the two sides expressed their appreciation to the International Commission for doing what they themselves had been quite unable to do. The Commission acquired both prestige and self-confidence in the process.

Change-over of Hanoi

Another good example, a little later, of the role of the Commissions occurred at the time of the handing over of Hanoi from the French Union side to the side of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The agreement provided that the French Union forces were to withdraw from Hanoi by a given date and the two sides got together and worked plans. The International Commission of course was not given the responsibility for putting the plans into effect. That responsibility rested clearly with the two sides. It was for the International Commission to supervise, to observe, to mediate if necessary and to try to smooth over difficulties. For the transfer of Hanoi, an extremely detailed plan was worked out by the two sides and with very little reference to the Commission as far as the purely military aspects were concerned.


There were some difficulties, however, with regard to the civil aspects. The two sides could not agree on how, for example, the handing over of public utilities should be managed, and there the commission was able to offer suggestions that were accepted by the two sides, and allowed for the handing over without any interruption of the water works, the power plant, and so on.

The change-over started early in the morning of October 9 and Hanoi was handed over sector by sector. The town had been divided into a great many sectors of perhaps four or five city blocks each. At a given moment, as laid down in the plan an officer from the D.R. and an officer from the French Union would get together. They checked their watches, their maps. The French officer would obtain a receipt and off he would go with his vehicles and a column of DR vehicles would move in. This took place throughout the day as the movement converged on the big bridge that crosses the Red River. By the end of the day the last French forces had moved out. While this was going on, the International Commission had a number of mobile inspection teams going through the city in white jeeps to be on hand if any difficulties should arise, and to indicate that in a sense the eyes of the world were on this exercise.

The members of the Commission themselves spent a good deal of time observing various stages of the transfer and were present when the French Union forces left the city. The change-over at Hanoi was perhaps the most

dramatic single incident in the early life of the International Commissions. It is not easy for two armies which have been fighting for eight years to work out a withdrawal of that size. The assistance of the Commission was available to the two sides in the negotiations and its teams were on hand to prevent difficulties if possible, or to smooth them out if necessary. The movement went off without any real friction or difficulty.

These notes have dealt largely with the Viet Nam Commission, but the Commissions in Laos and Cambodia were going through similar stages of growing pains, doing their best to get established, and at the same time to do the work for which they had been created. Everywhere the inspection teams were being set up as soon as accommodation could be found for them, often in remote, inaccessible and unhealthy locations. The Canadian officers serving on those inspection teams, despite living conditions which often were pretty formidable, went to work cheerfully and quickly to learn their jobs and to find the best ways of carrying them out. They used tact and judgment in meeting difficult problems and displayed those qualities of initiative and inventiveness which we like to think are characteristic of Canadians. They are doing a job of which this country can be proud, and in their remote, thankless but highly important responsibilities, they are only too apt to be forgotten.



—Fotobureau Friezer

FIRST SOD TURNED

The first sod on the site of the new Canadian Chancery at The Hague, the Netherlands was turned on January 25, 1955, by the two Netherlands Foreign Ministers, Mr. J. W. Beyen and Mr. J. M. A. H. Luns. The shovel used in the ceremony was made of Canadian aluminium. Above, left to right: Mr. Luns; the Canadian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Mr. T. A. Stone; and Mr. Beyen.

Canada and the United Nations

Freedom of Information

A draft convention on freedom of information was prepared as long ago as 1948 by the Geneva Conference on Freedom of Information. The text was revised in 1951 by a special committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations which reported to the Economic and Social Council. Since that time, ECOSOC has not recommended any further action on the proposed convention. At the ninth session of the General Assembly, the subject was discussed in the Third Committee, which adopted a motion requesting the Economic and Social Council to formulate recommendations on the draft convention in time for the General Assembly to discuss them not later than at the eleventh session in 1956. Canada abstained on the motion.

At the same time, a resolution was tabled by the U.S.S.R. Delegation advocating the transfer to the United Nations of the responsibilities assigned to the League of Nations by the "International Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace". Canada was not a party to this Convention, which was signed in 1936. After discussion, the motion was modified by an amendment asking the General Assembly to recommend that members which were parties to the Convention state "whether they wished" the transfer to be made. A further amendment, adopted against the vote of the Soviet Delegation, suggested the inclusion of a new article providing that each contracting party should not interfere with the reception, within its territory, of foreign radio broadcasts. The resolution thus amended was adopted without opposition, though some countries abstained, including the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Canada voted for these amendments and the resolutions and also concurred in the adoption of another resolution calling on the Secretary-General to assist member states in promoting freedom of information by rendering services which do not fall within the scope of objectives of existing technical assistance programmes. Canada's vote on this resolution was based on the understanding that no substantial increase of expenditure was involved. These three resolutions were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly.

International Code of Ethics for Information Personnel

On December 16, 1952, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to seek the opinion of a number of information enterprises and national and international associations on the advisability of organizing an international non-governmental conference to prepare the final text of an International Code of Ethics for the Use of Information Personnel. According to the Secretary-General's report of August 16, 1954, the various enterprises and associations which favour the organization of such a conference do not appear to constitute a sufficiently representative group. Consequently the resolution adopted by the Third Committee and ratified by the General Assembly stated that no further action should be taken at the present time.

Economic Questions

General

At the ninth session, as in previous years, the Second Committee had under consideration a wide range of economic subjects, some of which had been reviewed by the Economic and Social Council subsequent to the eighth session. Discussion in the Second Committee revolved almost entirely around questions affecting economic progress in under-developed countries. The subjects considered included the question of the establishment of a special United Nations Fund for economic development, the establishment of an International Finance Corporation, United Nations technical assistance programmes, the international flow of private capital, the question of the establishment of a world food reserve, land reform, and United Nations reconstruction and relief programmes in Korea.

In the general debate on the question of economic development of under-developed countries, representatives of these countries pointed out that the rate of economic growth in the less developed parts of the world is not keeping pace with that of the wealthier areas. Considering this a dangerous situation, they stressed the need for outside capital, both public and private, to accelerate progress in under-developed areas. Spokesmen for industrialized and capital-exporting countries agreed that the problem of financing economic development in less developed areas is an important one. They pointed out, however, that there are practical limitations affecting the flow of both public and private capital to under-developed countries. Considerations such as defence, domestic economic development and the needs of dependent territories must be taken into account by the countries which are called upon to make the largest contributions to United Nations programmes. It was further pointed out that the main responsibility for development rests with the under-developed countries themselves, and that sound internal fiscal and administrative policies are of great assistance in attracting outside capital, either from governments or from private interests.

The statements of representatives of the Soviet bloc were on the whole restrained. One of their main objectives seemed to be to promote the idea of East-West trade and of trade between the Soviet countries and the under-developed countries. They were strong in their support of the technical assistance programmes.

Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED)

At the eighth session the members of the United Nations had joined in a declaration that they stood ready to ask their peoples, when sufficient progress had been made in internationally supervised world-wide disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings therefrom to an international fund, within the frame work of the United Nations, to assist development and reconstruction in under-developed countries. Consideration of this question at the ninth session resulted in the unanimous passage of a resolution which requested Mr. Scheyven, a past President of the Economic and Social Council, who had reported comments obtained from members since the eighth session, to prepare a further report giving "a full and precise picture of the form or forms, functions and responsibilities" which the Fund might have if established. Spokesmen for Canada and other industrialized countries (which had indicated in

their comments that they would not contribute to such a Fund at the present time) made it clear that they did not regard the resolution as giving Mr. Scheyven a mandate to draw up draft statutes for the proposed Fund. The Canadian spokesman pointed out that Canada is already making a substantial contribution to the development of under-developed countries through its subscription to the International Bank, through the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, and through capital and technical assistance under the Colombo Plan.

International Finance Corporation (IFC)

The proposed International Finance Corporation, which has also been under consideration in the United Nations for a considerable time, moved a stage closer to realization at the ninth session. The function of the Corporation would be to help to finance productive private enterprise in under-developed countries without the necessity of government guarantees. The Canadian Government has adopted a generally favourable attitude toward this proposal in the past. When it seemed likely (following an announcement last November that the United States Administration would support it) that adequate capital would be forthcoming, the Canadian Government reaffirmed through its representative at the United Nations that it was prepared to support the proposed Corporation.

In December, the General Assembly adopted, by 50 votes in favour, none opposed with five abstentions (Soviet bloc), a resolution requesting the International Bank to draw up draft statutes for the Corporation. In his statement on the resolution (which Canada co-sponsored) the Canadian representative indicated that the Canadian Government believes that the Corporation will fill an important gap in the existing machinery for financing economic development, and that it hopes that it will encourage a greater flow of private capital to under-developed countries. He expressed the belief that, in establishing the Corporation, there would be no need to set up new international machinery of an elaborate and costly kind and that the Corporation would be able to draw on the present managerial and technical staff of the International Bank. When the Bank has drawn up draft statutes and ascertained the degree of support which may be expected from member countries, it will make a further report to the Economic and Social Council which will probably report on the matter to the tenth session of the General Assembly. It is expected that contributions will be proportionate to the subscriptions of member countries to the International Bank.

Technical Assistance

The Second Committee's consideration of technical assistance matters covered both the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, which is controlled by the Economic and Social Council and financed through voluntary contributions from governments, and the "regular programmes", which are financed from the regular budgets of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. A considerable part of the general debate was devoted to discussion of administrative and financial aspects of the Expanded Programme, which had been under consideration in the Economic and Social Council. There was a general feeling that much progress had been made in promoting greater operating efficiency, that more remains to be done in this field, and that lines

along which the Economic and Social Council is working in this connection are sound. A resolution on administrative and financial aspects of the Expanded Programme was adopted unanimously. The general debate was essentially constructive and non-controversial and indicated broad support for the programme. In a brief statement in the course of the discussion the Canadian representative said that the Canadian Government believes that the United Nations programmes, as well as those under the Colombo Plan, are making a positive and fruitful contribution toward the improvement of living standards throughout the world.

At the pledging conference which followed the Canadian representative announced that it is the intention of the Canadian Government to seek Parliamentary approval of a contribution of \$1,500,000 for the 1955 Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. He added that an offer of this size by Canada was based on the assumption that contributions of other countries would be on a scale which would permit of an effective programme.

International Flow of Private Capital

After a relatively non-contentious debate the General Assembly passed two resolutions dealing with the international flow of private capital based on recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The first, which was passed by a vote of 48 in favour (including Canada), none against with 8 abstentions, calls upon countries seeking to attract private foreign capital and countries able to export capital to take steps to improve the investment climate and to stimulate the flow of private capital. The second, which was passed by a vote of 51 in favour, none against with five abstentions (Soviet bloc), requests the Secretary-General to continue his studies of double-taxation problems, particularly as they affect investments in under-developed countries.

World Food Reserve

The Canadian Government has adopted a cautious attitude toward proposals for a world food reserve; while believing that international action to make the best use of food supplies and to bring a measure of stability to agricultural producers is worthwhile, the Government has considered that commodity-by-commodity approach to such problems would be desirable and that any international agency which might be set up should not compete with, or replace conventional arrangements. At the ninth session Canada voted in favour of a resolution inviting the Food and Agriculture Organization to prepare a report on what is being done in the field of international co-operation on food problems, though abstaining on one part of the preamble which seemed unclear and possibly inaccurate. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 43 in favour, none against with 1 abstention (the United States).

Land Reform

The Canadian delegation voted in favour of a resolution on land reform which recommends various measures which, it is hoped, will make land reform measures more effective. The vote on the resolution was 51 in favour, none against with five abstentions (Soviet bloc).

United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)

The Second Committee also discussed briefly the annual report of the Agent General of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. The representatives of the United States and Commonwealth governments, which have been the largest contributors to the UNKRA relief and rehabilitation programmes, commended the Agent General on progress achieved so far and invited member governments to make initial or additional contributions to enable the Agency to carry out its approved programmes for 1955. In this connection, the United States Representative announced that his Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada were prepared to contribute a further \$13.5 million to the Agency. The Soviet Representative on the other hand criticized the work of the Agency, declaring that it had achieved nothing substantial in South Korea and existed only to serve the interests of the United States. Both the Soviet and Polish Representatives compared the situation in South Korea with that in North Korea where they claimed that assistance given by the Soviet Union, China and other communist countries had achieved notable progress in reconstruction and rehabilitation. At the conclusion of the debate, the Committee adopted a resolution by a vote of 38 in favour, five against (Soviet bloc) with no abstentions commending the Agent General for the excellent progress made by the Agency and urging all governments to provide the necessary financial support for the continuation of the Agency's programmes.

Other Questions

During the Committee's consideration of Chapters II and III of the Report of the Economic and Social Council, the Soviet Delegation submitted two draft resolutions, the first relating to "measures to reduce unemployment and to increase employment", and the second concerning "removal of measures of discrimination applying to international trade". Both these draft resolutions were rejected by the Committee which subsequently endorsed resolutions previously adopted by ECOSOC dealing with full employment and expansion of international trade.

Conclusion

On the whole, debate in the Second Committee at the ninth session was constructive and restrained. Representatives of industrialized countries endeavoured to show understanding of the problems of the under-developed countries, and the representatives of these countries, while pressing for prompt action by the industrialized nations, displayed an awareness that the latter face serious problems of their own.

Speaking at the end of the session, Sir Douglas Copland of Australia, Chairman of the Second Committee, said that, if the Committee could continue, over a period of years, to work in the same atmosphere which had marked the session just concluded, the world might come closer to find a basis on which an expanding world economy could be sustained.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

North Atlantic Treaty

Approval of Protocol on Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany

A debate on the proposed accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty took place in the House of Commons on January 20 and 21, 24 and 25 and concluded on January 26.

The debate opened with the moving of the following resolution by Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

Resolved, that it is expedient that the Houses of Parliament do approve the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed by Canada at Paris on October 23, 1954, and that this House do approve the same.

Mr. Pearson said:

... I doubt whether any matter placed before the House this session will have greater long-range implications for our country and for peace. Because of its importance I should like to examine this particular protocol in its context.

What is that context? Part of it is the series of related agreements which were worked out at the London and Paris meetings last autumn, and which with this particular protocol make up a co-ordinated programme. But more fundamentally the context in which we should consider this protocol is, I think, nothing less than the present position of the cold war and our chances of peace.

Fundamental Problems

Incomparably the most important political problem facing Canadians today is the danger of that cold war becoming a blazing thermonuclear one. We know that such a war, of course, would threaten the very existence of every nation, indeed of the whole human race. The supreme task of statesmanship today, therefore, is to act so that the fantastic physical power which scientists are placing at man's disposal will be used not for warfare but for welfare.

Related to this danger of thermonuclear war or thermonuclear annihilation is the

problem posed by totalitarian imperialism. The communist dictators have already dragooned hundreds of millions of men into highly centralized empires which deny the dignity and worth of the individual except as a creature of the state. This imperialist and materialist conspiracy has recruited its dupes in the rest of the world and organized them into fifth columnists. It thereby seeks, through propaganda and subversion, to foster disunity in the non-communist world while it expands the area of its own direct control by coup d'état or military forces around its periphery in Europe and in Asia.

Disarmament

Facing up to these fundamental problems, there are three main areas in which we must seek to advance. The first area involves a search for agreement of effective disarmament, substantial enough to lessen the burden of present defence expenditures and including the total and effective prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. But such a programme must be carefully balanced to avoid creating the incentive to aggression, and with reliable safeguards, inspections and controls to guarantee that it will be carried out.

For years the Canadian Government has taken an active part in the search for

such an agreement. Last autumn at the United Nations Assembly the Canadian Delegation, I think it is fair to say, took the lead in submitting proposals of certain principles and procedures with a view to further negotiations on this vital matter. These proposals, after arduous negotiations conducted on the Western side, under the skilful and devoted leadership of my colleague, the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin), won the unanimous approval of all the governments represented at that world organization. We will continue to do all we can to pursue agreement on effective disarmament.

As I see it, there is nothing inconsistent between this policy and the agreements I am about to discuss. Indeed, if the communist powers would accept the level of armaments, as well as the limitations and controls, in these agreements, we would be well on our way to universal United Nations disarmament treaty which would make limited defence arrangements such as NATO and those under the Western European Union unnecessary. The limitations on national prerogatives involved in the provisions of the relevant Paris agreements, dealing with the maximum size of forces, with international inspections, controls and deployments are, I suggest, significant as a development illustrating to the world at large that international supervision and control of national armaments is possible, granted a genuineness of desire and willingness on the part of nations effectively to harness and check the destructive potential of national forces.

Defensive Strength

It is true that the Paris agreement apply only to a limited group of nations. They are however, not only consistent with but may some day be recognized as a useful precedent for an effective universal system. Meanwhile, pending agreement on such a universal and therefore a better system, an essential step in maintaining peace lies in building and in maintaining controlled and defensive strength in the free world to deter aggression. That, I suggest, is the second area in which we must move forward.

International Co-operation

The third area in which progress is essential, and this area is the most fundamental of all, lies in improving relations between states; in removing the causes of war and in the development of the international community, which involves fostering wherever we can an effective sense of co-operation and unity amongst the free peoples. We cannot do very much to promote this idea amongst the unfree. It involves patient efforts to heal national rivalries, to heal the causes and tensions of war, and to bind the peoples together. Yet we cannot afford to be naïve or unrealistic; so while we must do everything we can to make war impossible, through trying to resolve issues that divide, and promote co-operation through the United Nations and elsewhere and through seeking effective disarmament, we must, as I have just said, consolidate our deterrent strength and by removing the greatest temptation of all to aggression which, in the present circumstances, is weakness, strengthen the chances of peace.

I believe that our activities in the development of the North Atlantic community are a vitally important contribution to this specific purpose. For the time being at least, in this tense and dangerous world, the unity and strength of the North Atlantic nations unquestionably provide the most important and immediate existing guarantee of peace. But the North Atlantic community—this has been said many times before—is potentially far more than a military alliance. These other non-military aspects of the development of NATO will, I think, grow more important as the military danger recedes, as we must hope it will in the course of time. The attitudes and agencies of co-operation among these free nations which NATO fosters can then remain to chart the way to a better state of society long after the present danger of military aggression has passed into the limbo into which history eventually tosses all tyrannies.

Communist Propaganda

So I am asking the House today to approve the adherence of the Federal German Republic, not only to the North Atlantic defensive alliance but also to

this North Atlantic community which we are seeking to develop, and to which the free and democratic Germany of today has the right to belong. The Soviet government and its satellite governments are seeking to prevent this development by an unparalleled campaign of intimidation, of cajolery and distortion, by the exertion of every kind of pressure through the lure of promises and the threat of punishment. In our own country the communists are doing all they can, of course, to further this campaign, but a propaganda barrage focusing on the statement that a vote for this protocol is merely a vote for German rearmament. Such an over-simplification is grossly misleading. It is, indeed, the most insidious type of distortion, a fractional truth.

Communists themselves, as agents of Moscow, have so far abandoned intellectual integrity and simple honesty that it is futile to try to enlighten them by discussing their charges. But in this case their campaign unquestionably strikes some response in the hearts of many honest and sincere Canadian patriots, who have good reason to remember and fear the dread effect of German arms. It must therefore be objectively and exhaustively examined.

Significant Features of Agreements

There are several significant features of the Paris agreements which we have to consider today. It is I think reasonable to expect that in the long run the most fundamental and durable of these features will be, first, the restoration of German freedom and sovereignty—that is, freedom and sovereignty to the people of West Germany; second, acceptance of the voluntary adherence of these people to the western coalition. Those two features, as I see it, are fundamental.

The third feature of course is the provision that is being made for the Federal German Republic, in the exercise of the first right of sovereignty, to bear a fair share of the common burden of defence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through the Western European Union.

Attitude of Germans

In this connection I think hon. members would delude themselves if they con-

ceived of the people of the German Federal Republic today as a nation of militarists straining at the leash for freedom to rearm, to tax themselves for weapons, and to conscript themselves for military service.

The fact is that in Germany, as elsewhere, there is revulsion against war and militarism from which Germans as well as the rest of us have suffered so much and so recently. In the Federal Republic of Germany as elsewhere in free countries, rearmament, when it is supported—and there is a strong body of opinion in Germany which does not support it, some from good motives and some from bad motives—but where rearmament is supported in Germany today, as it is supported by the freely elected government of that country, it is generally regarded at best, as indeed it is here, as a tragic necessity.

In Germany as elsewhere moods and attitudes can change; but at present the situation is, I think, as I have described it. West German policies are of a kind which merit our support, and West German leadership is of a character that we should encourage. Indeed if that leadership had been in existence in Germany in 1914 and 1939 we would have avoided, I think, two world wars. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more calculated to discourage the development of healthy political forces in Germany; or to encourage a dangerous relapse into narrow nationalism and disillusionment with democracy, and ultimately into dangerous militarism, than a rejection by the parliaments of the West of the plans worked out by the democratic government of Germany and other western democracies for the integration of that people into the West European and North Atlantic communities, where they can play a proper and worthy role.

Strength of Communist Forces

It is also a gross distortion to represent the London and Paris agreements as an aggressive move which threatens the people of Russia. It is too late in the day to be surprised by the falsity and hypocrisy of Soviet propaganda in this matter, but I am still sometimes astonished by the continuing gullibility of some who are taken in by it.

So let us not forget, and let us keep on emphasizing, that the defence policies of the west in EDC or in NATO or in these Paris agreements are not the cause but the result of the aggressive policies of Russian imperialism, and of the huge communist armies backing those policies; of aggressions in Berlin, Czechoslovakia and Korea. It was all this, with the fear that followed it, that forced the world reluctantly to regather some of the strength it had thrown away in 1945, while Russia remained under arms on land, on sea and in the air.

It is also worth recalling in particular that the Russians began the rearmament of Germans in the Eastern Zone as long ago as 1948, when there was not a soldier in the Federal German Republic. The communists have made a transparent effort to disguise this by calling the armed forces in East Germany, which they had organized, barrack police. Quite apart from some 80,000 frontier and civil police, there are almost 100,000 more of these barrack policemen organized into army corps and divisions, and into air force and naval formations of Soviet lines. The East German army units have some 600 tanks, 250 self-propelled guns and 1,700 other pieces of artillery. Any ex-Nazi who wishes to sell himself to communism is welcomed into these forces and into their leadership. Their strength would be even greater if the communist masters felt that they could count on the reliability of more of their German subjects, if they were given arms.

For many years the Russians have also been organizing military forces in other European nations, including those who were our fascist enemies in the last world war and are supposed now to be disarmed by treaty. There are, for example, about a quarter of a million Bulgarian troops, over 225,000 Hungarian troops and some 350,000 in the Roumanian forces. There are in all, 75 satellite divisions, some of them armoured, and over 2,500 planes. All are under complete Russian control, and in Poland that control has been carried to the point where the Defence Minister in that country is a Soviet marshal. But far more important even than these are some 500,000 Soviet troops in occupied Europe west of the Soviet

frontiers, no less than 400,000 of whom are stationed in Eastern Germany, where they are European spearhead of the 175 divisions of the Soviet army.

So much, then, for the absurd contention that the present Western defence programme is a hostile, aggressive move which threatens the Russians and their peace-loving friends, who have never had any policy or any plan, so we are told, except peaceful coexistence in a world without arms.

German Unification

We should also examine the false assertion that the adherence of the Federal German Republic to the West European and North Atlantic communities would make the west responsible for perpetuating a partition of Germany, which the Soviet Union would like to see ended. It is worth recalling in this connection that the original plan, which was agreed to at Potsdam in 1945 among the four victorious allies, called for a peace treaty with a democratic, freely elected all-German government. Hon. members will recall, I am sure, the frustrating years when, despite Western efforts to implement the Potsdam agreement in this regard, the Soviet Government refused to allow their zone to co-operate economically or otherwise, with the three other zones of Germany. The Soviet rulers had decided that unless and until they could ensure a united Germany which would do their bidding, they would make of East Germany a communist puppet state, which of course they have done. And so it was this policy that resulted, in September 1949, in the creation of the German Federal Republic, in order to achieve the maximum degree of democratic unity which was possible in the circumstances.

There are those today who are saying, some with sincerity but others, the communists, with calculated deceit, "Why do we not have one more conference with the Soviet on German unification and on a peace treaty before taking the final step to ratify these agreements?" I would remind those persons that from October 1950, until the present time there have been at least 16 occasions on which France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the occupying powers of

Western Germany, have in notes to the Soviet Government or the Government of the German Federal Republic, in notes to the authorities of East Germany, proposed, as a basic condition of agreement on German unification, the holding of free elections under a form of international supervision which would ensure that those elections were honestly carried out.

One of those occasions was the conference in Berlin among the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, which took place less than a year ago. For 25 days every possible avenue of approach to a mutually acceptable solution of the problems of German reunification, and peace treaties for Germany and Austria, was exhaustively examined, but all to no avail. Surely that conference exposed in a clear-cut and unmistakable way the obstinate refusal of the Soviet Government to allow any settlement of the German and Austrian problems except on terms which, regardless of the wishes of the peoples themselves, would in effect guarantee the continuation of Soviet control of those countries equal to, if not exceeding, that already obtaining in the areas which they were occupying. There is no reason I can see to believe that this attitude has now suddenly changed, in spite of the honeyed but ambiguous words which are now issued from the Kremlin and other communist centres.

A reason for, if no justification of, the adamant stand of the Soviet against German unity on the basis of free elections is shown by the results of two recent elections in Germany and Austria. In certain Austrian areas under Soviet army occupation—and this of course if very significant—our type of free election took place in August 1954, and the result was a resounding repudiation of the Communists; right under the intimidating shadow of Russian military might. In the Austrian provinces, all or partially within the Soviet zone, the communist party won only 6 out of 100 seats in Vienna and 3 out of 56 in lower Austria. The overwhelming majority of seats were divided fairly evenly between the two government coalition parties. In the two other provinces where elections were held the communists candidates failed to gain any seats at all. In

West Berlin only a month or so ago, in elections for the Berlin House of Representatives, the Communists, under free elections, again could do no better than poll 2.7 per cent of the vote. They got about 41,000 votes against 684,000 for the Social Democrats, 446,000 for the Christian Democrats and 190,000 for the Liberal Democrats. No wonder the Communists shudder at the prospect of free elections.

The Berlin Conference then made it quite clear that an honourable and acceptable basis for German unity could not be found. Therefore surely the only possible course that offered any hope of progress was for the West to make its own arrangements with the German Federal Republic, without losing sight of the essential objective of unification, because Germans rightly insist—and we certainly should support them in this—that unification must remain the essential goal of German policy.

Conference With Russia

It is well to keep this background clearly in mind now that we are being urged in some quarters to scrap our present policy and agree to another conference with the Russians immediately; a conference designed by Moscow not, I suggest, so much to achieve constructive results as to delay and prevent the ratification of these agreements, and to divide and disunite the West.

Experience surely shows that we should refuse to be lured into this false course, but should follow through with the policy charted in the Paris agreements for the restoration of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic, the integration of this sovereign Germany into the Western community, and the appropriate participation of Germany in that community's common defence effort to deter aggression. Once that has been done conferences or diplomatic discussions with the Soviet union on Germany, on Austria or on any other subject can be resumed and the west can then talk from strength and unity.

Collective European Security

It was hoped about a year ago that we would implement this policy of German

association with the west through the European Defence Community. Those hopes, of course, have been destroyed. We supported the European Defence Community. We supported it in this house two years ago. So it was with deep concern that we watched the dramatic developments of last summer when Mr. Mendès-France undertook to obtain at a special conference in Brussels the agreement of the other signatories to the modification in the EDC treaty which he claimed would be necessary if that treaty, after two years of indecision, was to be approved by the French Parliament.

As we all know, the Brussels conference did not succeed, and soon after EDC was rejected entirely. The resulting dangers were great. Western solidarity and unity of purpose were shaken. The hopes which EDC has aroused for closer European unity and Franco-German co-operation and friendship were in danger of being replaced by disillusionment and despair. In the German Federal Republic the unceasing effort of Chancellor Adenauer to rally the German people to support a close and lasting alliance with France and with her other free European neighbours might soon be lost in cynical and destructive nationalism. The danger also existed that the allies, short of patience and dismayed by the difficulties entailed in devising a new European system, might try to disregard France and work out separate agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany.

During those months which saw the end of the European Defence Community, and indeed in recent weeks also, there has been talk of a European and Atlantic security system functioning without France. In my view this is careless talk, or worse, as it ignores the great importance of France politically, strategically and industrially. I do not think any Atlantic or European system of security really could be satisfactory or effective to which France did not willingly contribute.

The importance of France to collective European security is not restricted to its strategic or economic role. We should be poorer culturally and weaker spiritually if we had to attempt to arrange our own defences or those of our civilization without

the participation of the country to which we owe so much. Therefore a Western alliance which excluded France or which was forced on France against the wishes of the majority of the population is not, as I say, a prospect which would be faced with any satisfaction by the Canadian government or people.

Continental Defence Not Enough

At this time it is well to remember that the danger last summer was not limited merely to the exclusion and possible isolation of France, fateful as that might have been. The very existence of NATO, the whole North Atlantic concept, was threatened. Just as there has been among some sections of Europeans an understandable, but in my opinion a superficial and mistaken, tendency toward what I might call continental neutralism or isolationism, so there has been among some North Americans a tendency to move toward either bilateral or continental defence arrangements. There was developing a few months ago a "go it alone" psychology in this part of the world, due in part to impatience with allies but rationalized by strategic theories, based on impregnable continental defences coupled with almost exclusive reliance for victory against aggression on massive retaliation by long range planes and missiles of the intercontinental or global range. Certainly, as we all know, continental defences for North America are vitally important and may well become more important, but any implication that in themselves they would ever be an adequate basis for security is quite another matter.

I ventured to point out in an address to the National Press club in Washington last March that in my view any idea that the great coalition which we have formed for peace should be replaced by an entrenched continentalism would make no great appeal to Canadians as the best way to prevent war or defeat aggression. Nor would it be likely to provide a solid basis for good United States-Canadian co-operation.

Indeed the idea of continental self-sufficiency, in the military as in the economic or political fields, makes no appeal, I suggest, either to our sense of reality or to

our deepest Canadian instincts as exemplified over the whole of our history. In 1914 and 1939 Canadians were quick to recognize that a threat to the democracies of Western Europe was a threat to their own freedom; and subsequent events confirmed rather than upset this deep-seated conviction that it would not be safe or ultimately possible for us on this continent to stand aside from events in Europe. And so NATO, with the United Kingdom, the United States and France in it, is for us an indispensable instrument both for co-operation and defence. But last autumn NATO was in danger of being lost.

I may appear to be digressing, but certainly these thoughts were very much in the minds of those of us who had the responsibility for action on behalf of the government during the rapidly moving events of last summer and last autumn. I think it is well that these considerations should be put on the records of this House.

London and Paris Conferences

In this situation so full of danger which followed the French rejection of the projected European Defence Community immediate remedial action was required to weld together the cracks which were appearing in the north Atlantic structure and to continue the progress toward European unity which had been interrupted. It was more important, we felt at that time, to look ahead than to indulge in recriminations as to who was responsible for the set-back. It was in that spirit that we took part in the developments of that time.

The initiative to restore the situation came from the United Kingdom, whose earlier refusal to join the European Defence Community had heightened French distaste for that treaty. Therefore I am sure it was with a profound feeling of admiration and relief that all of us in Canada followed the skilful and untiring effort of the United Kingdom foreign secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, as with the strong backing of the United States secretary of state he gathered support in the main European capitals for a new approach to the problems arising from the failure of EDC.

As we over here watched those developments, while we were happy over the initiative taken in London, we were also concerned that any arrangement to replace the European Defence Community should not impair the strength and unity of NATO as the organization primarily responsible for defence planning and for co-operation in the non-military field, we desired that progress toward European unity should be made within the larger framework of the Atlantic community. We wanted all these things to be done within the framework of our North Atlantic Organization to the greatest extent possible. For this reason we felt, and indeed we suggested, that the new proposals to replace EDC should be submitted initially to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council for consideration. However, that idea did not command general support, and it became clear that the majority of the countries most directly concerned were in favour of the United Kingdom proposal for a conference in London of the countries signatory to the proposed EDC, along with the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.

We were glad to support that procedure and to accept an invitation to attend the London conference as a country with a direct and important stake in any arrangement to take the place of EDC, and as a member of NATO with sizeable forces on the European continent itself. As a participant in this conference we endeavoured with some success to stress the importance to NATO of the solutions which were discussed in London, and to ensure as far as we could that these problems should be discussed and solved within the NATO concept.

At these London meetings, which began on September 28, we were able to work out the broad lines of an agreement for associating the Federal Republic of Germany with the Western community on a basis of equality, the only basis of course which was possible, and to further the aims of Western defence and European unity within the North Atlantic alliance.

Moreover, it was recognized that these historic decisions together formed part of one general settlement which was directly or indirectly of concern to all the members

of NATO. It was therefore agreed that the final act of the London conference, which outlined the main understandings reached, should be put into the form of more detailed agreements which would be submitted later, as appropriate, either to the four powers, the seven Brussels powers, or to the whole NATO council. That was done, and we met in Paris on October 22. All the resulting agreements were signed the next day, October 23.

I approach this result in no defensive, defeatist or apologetic manner. I think it was a great achievement. I can say that with more conviction because it was an achievement which others had far more to do with bringing about than we did. I think it was a great achievement all the greater in view of the price we would have had to pay for the failure to bring it about, a failure which seemed so close only a few weeks before.

Terms of Agreements

... These Paris agreements can be divided, for purposes of consideration, into four parts. There are the four-power agreements signed by the three occupying powers and the West German Government, which provide for restoration of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and for the present and future stationing of foreign forces on the soil of that republic. Then there are a series of seven-power agreements which provide for the reconstitution of the Brussels Treaty Organization to include two new members, namely Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, into a new organization which we now call Western European Union. Then finally there are certain NATO agreements which include the protocol now before the House and certain resolutions designed to strengthen the NATO defence structure.

Restoration of German Sovereignty

So far as the first series of agreements are concerned—and they are of immediate importance to Canada because we have troops in Germany—the special problem of the four powers was to determine how and when the Federal Republic should be given its sovereignty, in a manner which would permit it to function as an equal partner in the western coalition and

which at the same time would not preclude eventual unification of all Germany. In addition, it was necessary to provide a legal basis for the stationing on German soil of foreign forces when the Federal Republic became a member of NATO.

In effect, what was done was to provide that the occupation regime, which was already pretty much of an anachronism, should be ended as soon as possible and that, in the meantime, until that regime ended legally and formally, the occupying powers would act in accordance with the spirit of the agreements under consideration.

Regarding disarmament and demilitarization, however, it was provided that the three powers should continue to exercise certain responsibilities until the Federal Republic became a member of NATO. Also the continuing responsibilities of the three occupying powers with respect to German reunification and a peace treaty are reaffirmed.

To answer the criticisms—and we hear criticisms—of those who might view the agreements as a deliberate step in the direction of the permanent division of Germany, the three powers issued a joint declaration during the London conference—to which later in Paris, Canada and the other NATO members subscribed—which stated among other things:

A peace settlement for the whole of Germany freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their (i.e. the three powers) policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

And further:

The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.

That is the policy of the NATO countries. I am sure all hon. members would agree that this statement of policy provides a fairly clear response to any who may maintain that in their efforts to associate the German Federal Republic with the West, the Western Powers had lost

sight of the ultimate aim of a peace treaty for a united Germany.

Western European Union

I now turn to the second series of arrangements, which are intended to associate a sovereign German Federal Republic with NATO and with the move toward European unity which has been interrupted. When these agreements go into effect we shall have a new organization which we now call Western European Union. That new organization is essentially a modified version of the structure based on the Brussels Treaty of 1948, with this one important difference which I have already mentioned. To the original members of the Brussels organization are now added Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. So Western European Union can be considered as an alternative method of achieving much the same purposes which the European Defence Community had been designed to achieve.

There are, of course, some differences. There are in particular two main differences: The first difference is the inclusion of the United Kingdom in Western European Union with that historic, courageous and, in my opinion, far-reaching pledge which she gave for the maintenance of four divisions and the second tactical air force on the continent of Europe for another 44 years. The second main difference is that the European Defence Community placed greater emphasis on supra-national features.

Western European Union will have a permanent council, an assembly and an agency for the control of armaments to be set up by and under the authority of the council. The council will sit in London and the armament control agency is to sit in Paris, where it will work in close cooperation with the NATO secretariat and for carrying out its duties will use to the greatest possible extent NATO personnel.

Control of German Rearmament

I now come to an extremely important part of the WEU agreements, namely that part which gives Germany the rights to rearm. Much attention has been paid to this right which it is now proposed to give, but not so much attention has been

paid to the way in which it is limited and controlled. I should therefore like to put on record what these limitations and controls are.

The first is that the maximum forces to be permitted to Germany under WEU are the same as those which would have been permitted under EDC, namely 500,000 men organized into not more than twelve divisions with 1,350 fighter—that is defensive—aircraft. That number must not be increased except by the unanimous consent of the Western European council. Second, all German forces, if and when they are constituted, are to be brought under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, SACEUR, and are to be integrated into NATO forces. That means that there will be no separate German national army apart from NATO. Nor has Germany, under this agreement, the right to deploy her own forces. That can only be done by SACEUR, subject to political guidance from the NATO council. Furthermore, German forces—and I think this is extremely important—are to be dependent upon NATO rather than upon national logistic support.

It is worth remembering in this connection that the whole system of logistic support for forces in Europe, which includes such vital things as fuel pipe lines, transportation, communication facilities, air fields and other essentials for the conduct of modern war, has been organized on a highly integrated basis under NATO. As such it makes for economy and efficiency. But it would also—and this is probably more important in the context of the matter we are discussing—make it incomparably more difficult for any NATO country to operate its forces separately because they are mixed up, especially in such vital things as logistics, with the other NATO forces. In other words this provision involves important built-in safeguards against purely national action.

Third, Germany agrees unconditionally not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons and guided missiles, mines, warships, except some small ones for coastal defence, or bomber aircraft; and she can only be relieved from these obligations by a request of the supreme allied commander, Europe, which re-

ceived a two-thirds majority of the Western European Union council.

Fourth, certain other types of heavy armaments, a long list in fact, are to be controlled for all members of the Western European Union, including Germany, by the arms control agency of the Western European Union. There are other proposals for limiting and pooling the manufacture of arms which are at the moment under discussion in Paris.

Fifth, and I have mentioned this, there has been set up an arms control agency in Paris to work closely with the NATO authorities and to use NATO inspectors to visit and check national plants for the production of arms whenever they see fit in order to see that the limits accepted are being observed.

Sixth, and finally, there are also certain political controls and limitations written into these agreements. Germany solemnly pledged at the London conference that she would conduct her foreign policy in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, and in particular she undertook:

... never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic—and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other states.

If Germany should violate these undertakings a special provision contained in the joint declaration of the three powers, to which the other members of the NATO Council later subscribed, would come into play. The pertinent paragraph of that provision, by which we would all be bound, reads as follows:

They —

That means the NATO powers.

— will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic Alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three governments —

Now it is 14 governments.

— for their part will consider the offending government —

It might be the German government; it might be any other government.

— as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking other measures —

That is, against the offending member of NATO.

— which may be appropriate.

Now, sir, I submit that it would be difficult to devise a more impressive set of safeguards than these. But I know that when I say this I will be asked what guarantee there is that they will work. Can we expect these limitations and controls that Germany has accepted to be of any value? Will she throw them aside whenever she feels like doing so? We are conscious of the fact that this has been done in the past.

Lesson of History

All international agreements, even those we make with our friends and neighbours, have this element of risk and uncertainty. It is inherent in international arrangements; but some of those who now are stressing that element and challenging the value of these agreements with Germany are, however, quite ready to take the same risk in making another effort to bring about an agreement with Russia which they think would remove all our fears and uncertainties about Germany.

I frankly admit, however, that we have every right to be concerned with German good faith in this series of agreements. Many Canadians, including many of us in this House, and even more of our allies who are taking this decision with us and with all its consequences, bear on their bodies and in their minds scars from the German war machine. We remember how Hitler, with shocking and unscrupulous design, and with Soviet connivance and assistance, started World War II in 1939. We do not forget how the Nazis conducted that war with savage brutality, and how the German people supported it.

While we do not forget that and cannot forget it, it is my considered view that support of these agreements with the safeguards I have described is both wise and far-sighted, and of all the courses that are open to us this is the best course to follow in our effort to shape a better future.

I do not suggest that we should ignore the lessons of the past. Indeed, as George Santayana has said, "Those who will not learn from history are condemned to repeat it". But we should draw the right conclusions from the past, and we should also not ignore the vision of the future. Indeed, experience of the past teaches us that if a nation only looks backward to justify its fears of the future, it is likely by that very fact to suffer again the same tragedy which in the first place caused that fear. The past must influence but, I suggest, it should not determine and distort the future.

So, Mr. Speaker, it is because of my appreciation of history and not in spite of it that I believe the safeguards which we have worked out in these agreements within our North Atlantic Community Organization against unilateral abuse by Germany, or any other member, are of real value and make even stronger the case for a coalition which will include the Federal Republic of Germany with its sovereignty restored and on an equality with the other members. I also believe that the institutions and habits of co-operation which our Atlantic community is developing, and with which we now desire to associate Germany, may well be of even greater value than military safeguards in removing the risk that might follow from putting arms in the hands of Germans.

In the very nature of things there can never be on this earth, as I see it, absolute assurance or safety for anyone, individual or nation, because the future will depend among other things on attitudes and choices which we shall have to adopt from time to time. But there are good grounds, I think, for reasoned confidence in this matter. Moreover, whether this confidence will be justified will depend upon our own policies as well as upon those of Germany.

Position of Germany

We now have a type of government

and a political system in western Germany which are democratic and European-minded. Surely—and I mentioned this a few minutes ago—we should do what we can to encourage and strengthen that type of government, not weaken it by suspicion, mistrust and rubuff. That government, moreover, is led by a man who believes in freedom, peace and co-operation, a great European and internationalist, Herr Adenauer.

It is also, I believe, reasonable to believe that national self-interest will counsel the Germans to stand by these agreements, which are not imposed on them but which have been freely negotiated with and accepted by the government which they have chosen for themselves. Surely in that respect the situation is very different from that of the 1920's, when relations of the victors in the war with Germany were characterized by uncertainty and vacillation. We never did make up our minds then whether to treat Germany as a new friend or an old foe, and as a result we got the worst of both worlds.

Quite apart from the pressing fact of the Soviet threat to Western Europe it would, I submit, be wrong and foolish to deal with Germany now as a rejected, unequal people in international society. If we do so they will soon conclude that their choice lies only between isolation and a brooding introspection, or seeking domination and aggressive strength on their own. Surely the sensible course, even if the threat of communist aggression were removed, would still be to bring the Germans into the West European Community, which includes the United Kingdom, and into the North Atlantic Organization where they would only be one of 15 members, including the United States, and which they could not hope to dominate. It is precisely by such participation in partnership that nations as well as individuals learn to prefer co-operation and good will to domination and submission.

Though I can certainly understand and deeply sympathize with the hesitation and soul-searching which I know are involved for very many in the issues we face, it is nevertheless my conviction, I repeat, that the course of wisdom is to bring about

German participation in the western coalition where we can work together for the common security and welfare.

Alternatives

I believe I should take enough time to examine another aspect of the matter. What are the alternatives? There is a good deal of criticism of this course, part of it sincere and genuine criticism, but very rarely do I ever read or hear of any satisfactory or better alternative than the one which is before us. What are the alternatives which would produce a better policy?

Well, the first—these are the only ones I have been able to think of, but there may be others—is to keep Germany disarmed and neutralized as at present. This might seem to many people an appealing course, and would indeed be so in a world where all arms were limited and controlled. But it is impossible under present circumstances. It was impossible in the twenties. How then could it be done now, with the victors of the last war divided and bitterly hostile and in the face of the control of a rearmed communist East Germany by an aggressive, mighty Russian imperialist power? Is Russia likely to give up that control for genuine international system of supervision of a disarmed, neutral and united Germany which, in its turn, assumed a situation in which the east and west would work amicably and altruistically together for a common peaceful purpose?

The question answers itself from the history of the last ten years. Even if it were possible, how long would a dynamic, powerful and proud people like the Germans—fifty millions in the heart of Europe—be willing to accept a position of this kind? In short, the neutralization or disarmament of Germany, as I see it, would be difficult under any conditions, impossible under present conditions. It would, in any event, leave a vacuum right in the heart of Europe. A vacuum may be regarded by nature as something to be abhorred, but it is regarded by the communists as something to be filled.

A second alternative would be to do nothing, continuing as long as possible the present occupation arrangements and hoping that something would turn up. As

I see it, that would be a futile and negative course. What turned up would probably be a Germany increasing in strength, with a growing national feeling, taking advantage of every opportunity to end or whittle away the occupation and determined to remove restrictions or her sovereignty as she grew stronger. At best such a policy would lead to an increasingly resentful and unfriendly Germany. At worst the result would be reminiscent of the thirties, with extremists in control.

A third alternative which has been suggested would be to give West Germany back her sovereignty unconditionally, but without making any arrangements for associating her with the Atlantic system or the Western European Union, and again hoping for the best. That might be followed by a separate alliance between Germany and one or more of those Western powers which desired it; or the Federal Republic of Germany might remain outside any collective arrangement while we merely hoped, in our turn, that if there were aggression against the west she would line up with us. We would also hope, and I do not know what basis there would be for our hopes, that under such circumstances Germany would not move east or, even more likely, play the east and west against each other to her own advantage.

Any of the above courses I believe, especially in view of the declared United States policy, would mean the end of the Atlantic alliance we have been building up and which is now our greatest deterrent aggression. It would also end the move toward European unification, which though these dreary post-war years has been a bright hope for peace and prosperity in free Europe.

We return, then, to the only possible solution in my view, bringing a free Germany into closer association with a group of other free countries in an alliance through which Germany may contribute to collective security, but which will be so constructed that no one member can possibly dominate the others.

Effect of Canadian Policy

Now before I resume my seat, I did indicate that I would say something about

the effect of these agreements more particularly on Canadian policy and what, if any, the effect will be on Canadian commitments or obligations in Europe. I should like to apologize for the length of time I am taking.

So far as the NATO resolution passed last October are concerned, those resolutions have strengthened SACEUR's powers and have increased the mutual inter-dependence of NATO forces. So far as those resolutions are concerned, they will not make any significant change in the position of Canadian forces in Europe, because our forces are already closely integrated with those of other NATO countries. They are subject to the over-all authority of SACEUR in military matters. Their movement in Europe would take place only as part of agreed NATO strategy. Therefore the new arrangements—and they are outlined in the documents before you—merely set down in writing and make generally applicable the arrangements by which we are already bound.

With respect to the new territorial commitment involved in the protocol before us on German accession to NATO, the situation so far as Canada is concerned is similar to that which arose in June 1952, when the House approved the NATO protocol extending to all members of the European Defence Community the assistance guarantee of the North Atlantic Treaty. I pointed out in this House then that since the Federal Republic of Germany was the only member of the European Defence Community not a member of NATO the effect of the protocol, if it came into force, would be to extend the obligations which Canada had undertaken under the North Atlantic Treaty to the Federal Republic of Germany.

I emphasized then, as I should mention now, that this extension of our obligations was more theoretical than real, because under article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, by which we are bound, we were already under an obligation to come to the assistance of the NATO forces stationed in the territory of German Federal Republic. The situation then, is substantially the same under the present protocol in so far as extending our territorial guarantee is concerned.

While I am on the subject of commitments—and there has been some discussion about this previously outside the House—I should like to assure the House that the Canadian Government took no new commitments in London or in Paris to keep Canadian forces in Europe at any given level or for any given period. What was emphasized at the conference was our determination to continue to play our full part in the North Atlantic Organization. As I stated to the nine-power conference in London last October—and this statement was made public immediately—

As I see it, European unity cannot be effectively secured unless the lines not only across the channel but across the Atlantic are strong and unbroken. My country has a part to play in this Atlantic aspect of the problem. Therefore, we accept the continuing obligations arising out of our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and we are resolved to continue to do our best to discharge them.

Also at the same time I declared to that conference:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed—

I hope I was correct in saying this; I think I was.....

—enduring and whole-hearted support for NATO is for us a policy above politics on which I think our friends can rely.

As regard the proposals for an arms pool, which by hon. friend from Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) brought up the other day, these proposals, which as I mentioned a minute ago were submitted originally by the French government, are now under active discussion among the European governments concerned. We are being invited to send an observer to those meetings when matters come up which are of interest to us. As this matter is under discussion it would be premature

for me to comment on it now. But our direct interest in the arms pooling proposals would of course relate only to the allocation of Canadian arms made available through our mutual aid programme to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I may say that we are quite satisfied with the present procedure, and we are not anxious to have it changed—the procedure under which recommendations for the allocation of these arms are made by the standing group of the NATO organization. But if a proposal emanated from the conference which concerned our allocation of mutual aid, then of course we would give it consideration.

Soviet Reaction

Now finally—and this is final—I wish to come back just for a moment to the argument, the most impressive one to my mind advanced against this policy, that these agreements will not make for peace but will make for division and controversy and renewed trouble in Europe; that they will provoke the Soviets into violent reaction, and will drive that country into intransigent Stalinism again at a time when its government, under new leaders, seems to be getting somewhat more co-operative and less hostile.

As to the first, I do not think there is cause for undue alarm over Soviet threats to retaliate—and we have heard these threats in strong language—by forming a heavily armed eastern European alliance. While we should never dismiss pronouncements from Moscow as unworthy of serious examination. I do not think we should become unduly worried by Soviet “kicks” any more than we should become unduly elated by Soviet “carrots”. Both are often offered for the same purpose, to weaken our resolve and confuse our purpose.

There is certainly no reality behind the threat of an eastern NATO, because they have now a military alliance system, as I have tried to show, which is already more heavily armed than NATO, and under complete Soviet control. There are certainly no limitations or controls over armaments or men or anything else in that line. They could hardly go any further. As to the second point, there is no possible

validity to the contention that these agreements justify or make inevitable an intensification by the Soviet Union of the cold war, at a time when it seemed to be lessening.

I point this out because in the harsh and unreasonable things which the Soviet government has been saying recently about western policies, there is the constant accusation that western nations respond to offers of peace and friendship from Soviet Union by the warlike action of arming Germans for an eventual attack on the Soviet Union. It is hard to believe that the Soviet leaders can make these claims seriously.

The Soviet government has never shown any inclination to discuss these agreements on a rational basis, or to take any reasonable attitude toward Germany or Austria. It has avoided constructive discussion and made no attempt to find out about or to seek reassurance or any point about western policy toward the German Federal Republic which it regarded as menacing to the Soviet Union.

No one of course would deny to the Soviet Union, which suffered so cruelly from German arms, the right to issue warnings about German militarism. But we cannot regard Soviet judgments on this subject as superior to those of other nations, which also suffered from the same source.

The logic of the Soviet position on this matter seems to be either that Germans in the German Federal Republic, regardless of the prior rearmament in East Germany, must never possess the right to carry arms, even within a defensive association which imposes controls, or that any arming of Germany can be carried out only on Soviet terms. Looking back a few years this logic seems pretty strange. According to it the western powers had no right to feel alarmed when the Soviet Government, contrary to agreements with allies about the occupation of Germany and without any regard for the wishes of these people, armed its eastern satellites and bound East Germany into the monolithic unity of communist Europe.

The Soviet Government now claims the right to regard almost as a provocation to war the culminating act of a slow process

whereby the German Federal Republic, with the consent of its freely elected government and that of 14 other free nations, enters into an association which has one of its chief purposes the prevention on a permanent basis of German militaristic nationalism.

So we would be unwise and short-sighted if we yielded to Soviet threats about what will happen if these agreements are ratified. Nor in my view will that ratification provoke warlike retaliation, unless the Soviet government, for other reasons, desires to pursue such a belligerent policy.

Western Aims

I think myself that the chance that such retaliation will happen and war might follow are less now than they were last summer after EDC was rejected. On our part we have made it abundantly clear that NATO policies in Europe are defensive and pacific. Among many others, President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have both recently emphasized that the aim of the West is to be strong enough to defend itself, to be moderate in responding to the provocation of others, and to be active in seeking every means of easing tensions and ensuring peace.

We know that the political and moral values which we cherish and the political system on which we rely do not thrive in conditions of war or continued tension. Our preparations are made for defence only, and war is for us not a means of combatting ideologies which we do not like. Therefore any genuine Soviet move to lessen tension, even if it affects only a

limited area of international relations, should be welcomed by us, and we should be willing to go half way at any time to meet it.

There is, of course, the constant danger of conflict from a misunderstanding on both sides of each others motives. In the West we remain with good reason alarmed by the threatening and aggressive policies of the U.S.S.R. in recent years. In turn I think it is not inconceivable, given the atmosphere of totalitarian isolation and ignorance in Moscow, that the Soviet people, and even certain Soviet leaders, may at times consider—sincerely consider—that they are threatened by the West. One of the great tasks in the next few years in diplomacy is to try somehow to bridge this gap in misunderstanding, to build what His Holiness the Pope recently so aptly described as “a bridge of truth” between East and West.

I wish in closing to reaffirm my confidence that we are on the right path, and that the agreements we drew up in London and Paris will make an important contribution to security and peace. From the foundations of defence strength and constructive unity, which they will provide the West, I sincerely trust that it will now be possible to convince the Soviet leaders of our firm intention, and indeed determined resolution, to defend ourselves without in any way menacing them, or without rejecting any opportunity to ease a state of international tension which is both sterile and dangerous.

For all these reasons I hope this House will give strong support to the resolution which is before it.

The grave importance of the question was appreciated by every member of the House and serious and thoughtful statements were made by the leaders and many members of every party. The only other member of the Government who spoke was the Minister for National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, who brought to the attention of the House the carefully contrived propaganda campaign which has been launched by the communist party in Canada the approval of the protocol. Mr. Martin also spoke about the discussions on disarmament which were held in New York during the recent sessions of the United Nations Assembly, and explained that the proposed strengthening of the NATO defensive alliance was not in any sense incompatible with the efforts for agreement on an effective system of universal disarmament.

The great majority of speakers were in favour of adopting the resolution, but several members of the C.C.F. Party spoke against it, though the leader

of the party, Mr. Coldwell, supported the resolution. Particularly moving speeches were made by two Jewish members of the House, who said that despite the sufferings of their friends and relatives at the hands of the Nazis, they would support the association of Germany with the Western Nations as they believed it offered the best hope of peace.

In his summing up of the debate on January 26, the Secretary of State for External Affairs replied to various questions and criticisms which had been put forward during the debate and gave further explanations of the implications of the association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In conclusion he said:

... I deny these agreements will stop the process of negotiation and bring about war. I think the experience of the last four or five years, as the hon. member for Vancouver-Kingsway (Mr. MacInnis) said last night, bears this out. *The Economist* put it very neatly in this manner.

"Russia wastes no concession on the weak and a policy of negotiating from strength—however fiercely denounced by the Russians—is the one thing that gets results."

As I see it, it is far more dangerous to peace, far more likely to provoke ultimate conflict, if we refuse to accept these agreements.

I wish to conclude by summing up the reasons why I say that, and I hope my remarks will make some impression on those who are opposing these agreements.

My first reason is well expressed by Sir Anthony Eden when he said:

"The only alternative to the Paris agreements would be to plunge the world into confusion and desire."

Would that be a good basis for negotiation? Would it be better to negotiate now and abandon or drop our policies as the Soviet Union is begging us to do? We were asked last night, and indeed during the debate on Thursday and Friday, to look at new Soviet offers and particularly at Mr. Molotov's of January 15. I have looked at it, like the hon. member for Mackenzie (Mr. Nicolson) and others, and I find it a very stale carrot indeed. I am quite sure I am correct in saying that it is a transparent and rather clumsy effort to bring pressure on the Germans on the eve of their debate. It has not deceived the German people, but it may have deceived some hon. members in the house. The hon.

member for Mackenzie at page 488 of *Hansard* referred to this matter. I checked with the text of the proposal and I would like to give a translation of the paragraph on elections which I think, and he agrees, is most important. The translation is as follows:

"The Soviet Government deems it possible in the event of the consent of the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic to come to an agreement on appropriate supervision.

This has been interpreted by some as an advance on the part of the Soviet Union. But I would point out that it reads "... in the event of the consent of the government of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic . . .", and one is a communist state.

It might give some indication of what German communists and the Russians mean by "appropriate supervision" in this connection if I state what Herr Ulbricht, the communist leader in East Germany, had to say on this issue, almost at the same time. I think it is a lurid commentary on the January 15 offer. He described how the elections should be conducted if they ever got around to holding them. He advised the Communists in East Germany to carry out:

"The setting up of joint lists of candidates for the national front as a preparation for what we wish to extend to the whole of Germany later."

That has a very ominous ring. We have had experience with that kind of procedure in East Germany, in Korea, and in other parts of the world where the communists have been in control or have been trying to get control. The hon. mem-

ber for Mackenzie (Mr. Nicholson)—and he quotes the London *Times* in this respect—feels that this new offer has created a great deal of confusion. I think it has done so; but I think it has created more confusion in some minds in this house than it has created elsewhere.

Then the second reason why I asked for unanimous support of these agreements is that if they were rejected they would be a rebuff to the peaceful democratic forces in Germany which now form a great majority of the members of that legislature. In this respect I cannot refrain from saying that I have been amazed at the attack made on these governing forces in the Federal Republic of Germany at the present time. My friend the hon. member for Yorkton, dealing with this matter, talked about nazi leadership. At page 493 of *Hansard* he is reported to have had this to say:

"I refuse to support a nazi German army forced upon a reluctant German people who know the real nazis."

The same feeling was expressed by the hon. member for Regina City and the hon. member for Nanaimo. Let me quote from someone who knows the government in Germany and these people probably better than most of us know them in this House of Commons. I refer to an experienced and responsible journalist, Mr. Théodore H. White. This is what he has to say—and it was written last week—about the Bonn government:

"There are certain important points to note about Bonn. Here, in the Bundestag, sit 487 representatives of the people, put there by an election in which 86 per cent of all Germans eligible to vote went freely to the polls . . . Yet among all these elected representatives of Germany there is not one latter-day nazi, not one Communist. These men of the Bundestag, together, have given Germans the freest, most decent government in their history."

This is the government that asks to be admitted into our partnership. This is the regime against which remarks are aimed when some of my hon. friends opposite talk about nazi leadership. If we rebuff these forces in Germany and if we dis-

courage and make cynical Herr Adenauer and the men around him, I suggest we shall play right into the hands of the right and left extremists; and there are some of those in Western Germany today.

Who are these so-called nazi leaders responsible for German defence who would organize the Germany army at this time? They would be under the leadership of a great European, as I have characterized him, namely Herr Adenauer, a man who on the S.S. black-list and was arrested by Hitler. The four top men who would have charge of the defence organization they are permitted would be Herr Blank, a trade union leader; Adolf Heusinger, never a nazi; Hans Speidel, a German general who was in the plot against Hitler and who was tortured in nazi prisons; while the officer in charge of military education and indoctrination has been described as a man of "glowing conscience" who truly wants to make a new democratic army that belongs to the people.

My third reason is that if we defeat this measure, the move toward European unity would be stopped and France and Germany would once again drift apart. My fourth reason is that NATO, on which our hopes depend for so much than defence, would be seriously, indeed I think fatally, weakened. I am absolutely convinced of this and not merely, as was suggested last night, because of United States policy in this matter: How could NATO forces remain in Germany indefinitely without that country being a member? How could that country be a member without sovereignty, unless it became a second-class member? And it would rightfully not accept that status. How could it exercise sovereignty if it were refused any share in the collective defence? These are the imperatives of the situation and not, as I say United States pressure.

This is not an act of war but of faith; faith in the better forces in Germany, and that includes the Social Democratic party in Germany; faith in our own increasing strength, under increasing collective controls, used for pacific defence purposes; faith in our ever-widening system of collective action; faith in European union and the Atlantic community. It is also an act of faith that the Soviet Union,

when it faces the reality of our determination to proceed steadily on this course, will decide to negotiate realistically for a solution of those European and world questions which will help to heal some of the ills and evils that now plague our distressed world.

Before I left Paris at the last meeting I had a conversation with a leader of one of the NATO countries, one who had suffered such cruelties from the Nazi forces in his country during the war that it would make the blood run cold to hear about them. As we parted I said to him, "In the light of your experience, it is not going to be easy for you personally to support these agreements". His reply was more or less in these words: "Not at all. Indeed, it makes me more anxious than ever to get these agreements through, because I believe they can help to bring

about a European and Atlantic unity in which national madness and cruelty of this kind will be prevented and which will give us a better chance for peace".

A vote against this resolution will not defeat it in this House but it will be a declaration of support for such defeat in other countries as well as in this country, with all the unhappy and dangerous consequences that would, I am certain, flow from that defeat. There may be risk in the course we are advocating. There is risk in every international action. But there is more than risk involved if this were defeated; there is a very real and immediate danger to European unity, Atlantic co-operation and peace in the rejection of this course to which we have set our hand. I therefore hope that no member in this Canadian House of Commons will vote against this proposal.

The resolution was approved by 213 votes to 12.

Formosa

On January 25, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in reply to a question in the House, made a statement on the attitude of the Canadian Government to the Formosa question. The text of this statement will be found on page 65. Because of the seriousness of the Far Eastern situation, the Prime Minister announced in the House on January 27 that the Secretary of State for External Affairs would accompany him to London to take part in the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers which was to begin on Monday, January 31.

FORMOSA

Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons, January 25, 1955.

In reply to what my hon. friend (Mr. Coldwell) has said, and also in reply to the question asked yesterday by the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker), I shall make a statement on this matter now, as follows:

The President of the United States yesterday sent to Congress an important message dealing with the situation in the Formosa straits. The President's proposals in this message are, of course, a matter of United States policy. The United States has particular commitments of its own in this area. These, and the effect of the President's message on them, will now be under consideration by Congress and it would not, of course, be appropriate for me, or for any member of this government, to comment on this aspect of the matter.

Although we are not involved in United States commitments in this area, we are of course deeply concerned over the dangerous situation existing there and we, with other free governments, are anxious that steps should be taken to bring an end to the fighting which has now been taking place for some time along the China coast.

In this message the President of the United States referred to the possibility of action by the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire. The United Nations has, in Indonesia, Palestine and in other parts of the world, been successful in bringing to an end fighting which might have had dangerous consequences, and if it could achieve similar results in this case it would be a cause, I am sure, of great satisfaction to us all.

If the question is raised in the United Nations—and there are reports that it will soon be raised—this would presumably take place in the Security Council of which Canada is not at present a member. However, we are being informed of developments in regard to the possibility of such a reference, and we are watching the matter with great interest and concern. Incidentally, an essential party to any cease-fire of this kind would be the communist government of China, which though a non-member of the United Nations, would have to be invited, I assume, to participate in the Security Council deliberations if they were to have any chance of success. Whether this particular government would accept such an invitation in another matter.

While it is not proper for me to comment on United States policy in this matter which is

now being considered by Congress, I think I can say that any move or proposal within the United Nations or through diplomatic channels could serve to achieve the purpose as stated in the President's message "to improve the prospects of peace in the area" will be warmly welcomed by the parliament and by the people of this country.

Before the Korean armistice I expressed on more than one occasion in this house the view of the Canadian Government that Formosa should be neutralized as far as possible while hostilities continued in Korea. We thought then, and we think now, that the final disposition of Formosa should be subject to be discussed at a conference on Far Eastern problems which at that time we thought might be held after the cessation of fighting in Korea. That was the view adopted by the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on January 13, 1951. Despite developments since then, it remains the view of the government that final disposition of Formosa should be dealt with by international negotiation, at a conference if you like, on Far Eastern problems, if one could be held. Certainly, in any decision regarding the future of Formosa the wishes of the people there, which are often forgotten in discussions of this matter, should be a primary consideration. Pending such a decision I think that a strong case can be made for the neutralization of Formosa both in order to prevent any assault upon it by communist forces and also so that it will not be used as a base for invasion of the mainland.

In this area of tension and danger a distinction can validly be made between the position of Formosa and the Pescadores and the island off the China coast now in Nationalist hands. The latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had a checkered history before that, are not. I suggest therefore that the considerations which recommend the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores do not necessarily apply to the coastal islands so close to the mainland and a hundred miles or so away from Formosa. Therefore, I welcome that part of the President's message which looks to the redeployment of the Nationalist forces which are now in these islands. "Some of these forces", the President's message states "are scattered throughout smaller off-shore islands as a result of historical rather than

military reasons directly related to defending Formosa”.

My understanding of the basis of a truce or ceasefire is that neither the Nationalists, the Government of China which we recognize, nor the Communists need be asked to give up their claims on the territory now held by the other side. What they would be asked to give up of course is the use of military means to achieve their aspirations. In other words, negotiations for a ceasefire need not involve any question of the final disposition of the territory in dispute; for in our view this is a suitable matter for international negotiation

at a later date through the United Nations or otherwise.

I am sure this House will particularly welcome the closing paragraph of the President's message which is as follows:

“Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served if we demote our unity and our determination. In all that we do we shall remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Nations to be ready to settle our international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. A. Irwin was posted from the Canadian Embassy, Djakarta, to duty outside the Department (International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal) effective December 1, 1954.
- Mr. J. B. Seaborn was posted from home leave (The Hague) to Ottawa effective January 3, 1955.
- Mr. J. H. Taylor was posted from duty outside the Department to the Department of External Affairs, effective January 3, 1955.
- Mr. K. Goldschlag was posted on temporary duty to Indochina. He arrived at Hanoi January 6, 1955.
- Mr. G. F. Bruce was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Tel Aviv, effective January 13, 1955.
- Mr. J. E. G. Blais was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective January 17, 1955.
- Mr. G. R. Harman was posted from the Canadian Consulate General, New York, to Ottawa, effective January 17, 1955.
- Mr. G. Ignatieff was posted from duty outside the Department to the Department of External Affairs, effective January 10, 1955.
- Mr. G. V. Beaudry was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission, Indochina, effective January 19, 1955.
- Mr. J. George was posted from the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the United Nations, New York to home leave, effective January 24, 1955.
- Mr. G. G. Riddell was posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective January 24, 1955.
- Mr. P. R. Jennings was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective January 28, 1955.
- Mr. R. H. Jay was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective January 28, 1955.
- Mr. S. F. Rae was posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective January 28, 1955.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Japan

Agreement for Air Services. Signed at Ottawa, January 12, 1955. (Not yet in force).

Publications

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated)

Treaty Series 1951, No. 2:—Convention between the Canadian Government and the French Government relating to the terms of compensation of Canadian interests in nationalized gas and electricity undertakings. Signed at Paris on January 26, 1951. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1952, No. 14:—Agreements concerning leased bases in Newfoundland: 1941-1952 Canada-United States. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1952, No. 22:—Exchange of notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an agreement regarding the leasing of certain lands situated within RCAF station Goose Bay. Signed at Ottawa, December 5, 1952. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 1:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an agreement concerning the sealing of mobile radio transmitting equipment. Signed at Washington, March 9 and 17, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 3:—International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. Signed at Tokyo, May 9, 1952. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 4:—Final Act of the Third United Nations Technical Assistance Conference. Signed at New York, February 27, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 7:—Agreement between Canada and France for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Paris, March 16, 1951. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 8:—Agreement between Canada and France for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to succession duties. Signed at Paris, March 16, 1951. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 11:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and Mexico constituting an agreement for air services between and beyond their respective territories. Signed at Mexico, D.F., July 27, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 13:—Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their force. Signed at London, June 19, 1951. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 15:—General Agreement between Canada and Belgium concerning the transit through and stationing in Belgium of Canadian forces. Signed at Brussels, March 30, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 17:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany constituting an agreement giving effect to the Convention between His Majesty and the President of the German Reich regarding legal proceedings in civil and commercial matters signed at London, March 20, 1928. Signed at Bonn, October 30, 1953. English, French and German texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 19:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany constituting an agreement regarding visa requirements for non-immigrant travellers of the two countries. Signed at Bonn, April 10 and 15, 1953. English, French and German texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 21:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an agreement for the establishment of the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of Engineers. Signed at Washington November 12, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 5:—Instrument for the amendment of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization. Adopted at Geneva, June 25, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 55/1—*North Atlantic Treaty*: Approval of Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of Germany. Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made in the House

of Commons January 20, 1955.

No. 55/2—*Formosa*, statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made in the House of Commons January 25, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

United Nations Children's Fund: Report of the Executive Board (9-17 September 1954.) E/2662, E/ICEF/276. New York, 1954. 47 pp. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 2.

International Monetary Fund—Annual Report 1954. Washington, D.C. 200 pp. (E/2661, 3 January 1955).

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—Ninth Annual Report to the Board of Governors 1953-1954. Washington, D.C. 71 pp. (E/2668, 3 January 1955).

Drug Supervisory Board—Estimated World Requirements of Narcotic Drugs in 1955. E/DSB/12. Geneva, 15 December 1954. 63 pp. Sales No.: 1954.XI.5.

ECE—Growth and Stagnation of the European Economy by Ingvar Svennilson. Geneva, 1954. 342 pp. \$4.50. Sales No.: 1954.II.E.3.

Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945. Documents of the Co-ordination Committee including Documents of the Advisory Committee of Jurists:

Volume XVII—Part 1: Records of Meetings of the Co-ordination Committee. Records of meetings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists. Arrangement of the Charter. Skeleton Charter: First and second drafts. New York, 1954. 583 pp.

Volume XVIII—Part 2: Texts passed by the Technical Committees. Co-ordination Committee: drafts of the Charter and of the Statute of the Inter-

national Court of Justice. Conference Procedure. Guides to Co-ordination Committee documents. New York, 1954. 835 pp.

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1946-1951. ST/PSCA/1, 6 August 1954 (New York), 514 pp. \$5.00 Sales No.: 1954.VII.1 (U.N. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs).

ILO

European Regional Conference, Geneva, 1955. Report of the Director-General. ILO, Geneva, 1954. 143. pp.

Statute and Rules of Court of the Administrative Tribunal. ILO, Geneva, 1954. 13 pp. (bilingual).

UNESCO

Man Measures the Universe (Scientific exhibition organized by UNESCO). Paris, December 1954. 80 pp.

When the Mountains Move—Technical assistance and the changing face of Latin America. by Daniel Behrman. UNESCO, December 1954. 69 pp.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

Commission on International Commodity Trade—Survey of Primary Commodity Markets. (Provisional version). E/CN.13/L.1, 31 December 1954. 120 pp.

UNIDROIT—International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. Systematic compilation of International Instruments relating to the legal status of aliens: United Kingdom. ST/LSA/15, Rome, July 1954. 302 pp.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

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CANADA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



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THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

April 4 marks the Sixth Anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is good at this time to remind ourselves what NATO has meant for the security of our land, for the solidarity of the Atlantic community of nations, and for the peace of the world. With our partners in NATO we have built forces designed to make war unprofitable to any aggressor, we have developed invaluable habits of inter-governmental consultation and co-operation, and we have strengthened Canadian defences against the increasing dangers of direct attack. We have accomplished much, but these are tasks that are never done once and for all. If we would remain free we must pay the price of never-ending vigilance until peace and security are firmly established on a basis of international co-operation and good will.

L. B. Pearson

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting—1955

IT is exciting to leave the biting cold and the looming snowdrifts of Ottawa, to pause briefly at Gander where wind-driven snow whips across the runway, and to find oneself a few hours later in quite a different land where the air is mild, where the grass is green and the fields are open, and where the winter sun struggles valiantly to make its warmth felt through the soft mistiness of a fine winter day. Such in brief was the experience of those who travelled to London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting at the end of January. The Canadians were the last to arrive but the welcome accorded us was no less warm on that account.

Nature of the Commonwealth

An appropriate starting point for a piece on the recent Commonwealth Meeting might be a look at the nature of the Commonwealth. The communique describes it as a "unique association" whose countries contain "a fourth of the world's population, embracing peoples of many races and religions". This is not the place for a discussion of Commonwealth constitutional arrangements. But a glance at one or two of its essentials may help to reveal the nature of this flexible political instrument which offers an example to the world of how nations can live and prosper in mutual friendship and respect. Perhaps the point of first importance is that the Commonwealth is a voluntary association; each of the members is free, independent and completely sovereign. None of the members is under compulsion of any sort to agree with any or all of the others. Each government makes its own decisions except in the few cases where the decision may affect the nature of the Commonwealth itself and thus require consideration by all.

What are the positive features which make the Commonwealth such a useful association and which keep it in being? In the formal sense the single common link remaining is recognition of the Crown as the symbol of the free association of its sovereign members. The Head of the Commonwealth is a constitutional monarch but has not the same position in all Commonwealth countries. But the real substance of the association is possession by the members of common ideals, and a common interest in promoting and defending their democratic ways of life. This sharing of ideals is buttressed by adherence to the principles of free parliamentary government and political institutions and governmental practices which are based on the rule of law and respect for the dignity of the individual. They are in fact part of a common political heritage which assures mutual understanding without the necessity of formal instruments of association. And it is this sharing of ideals from which stems the common outlook which despite geography, religion and race gives the Commonwealth its peculiar stability, lends weight and substance to its steady progress towards peace, liberty and human betterment and evokes a broadly similar response to most international problems.

Commonwealth meetings are characterized by friendliness, by free and open discussion, and by informality. There are no rigid or formal procedural rules to limit the range of subjects to be brought before the gathering by any of those present. The meetings are not stereotyped and discussion is not restricted to subjects on an agenda. The Membership of the Commonwealth ensures that matters under discussion are approached from a variety of angles and points of view. This is an enrichment and a source of strength. It is true to say that most problems look different when viewed from the equator than they do from a vantage point near the North Pole. There is great benefit to be gained from an exchange of views with trusted and like minded associates. At the recent meeting, it was particularly important to have views of Asian countries, as the meeting was largely concerned with Asian developments.

The conference met from January 31 - February 8. During this interval there were nine plenary sessions and four meetings dealing with defence questions in various regions. In addition there were *ad hoc* meetings on questions of interest to two or more members. The defence talks were not attended by all of those present at the conference, the membership being governed by specific commitments which countries had undertaken in the areas under discussion.

The plenary sessions were held in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street under the eye of the first British Prime Minister, Sir Robert Walpole, whose portrait hangs above the fireplace. The informality and friendly family spirit which characterized the meetings were reflected in the fact that no identity cards or passes were issued to delegates. Admittance to the official residence of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom could be gained with ease by a word of explanation to the friendly man on the front door. United Kingdom Ministers were present in strength supported by an equivalent number of senior officials; arrangements for the meeting were in the hands of the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir Norman Brooks, and his competent Cabinet Office staff. In considerable degree, the meetings followed the pattern of Cabinet discussions save for the fact that officials were present behind those seated around the table.

Emphasis on International Affairs

To a greater extent than most previous meetings the 1955 Conference concerned itself with international affairs. The talks took place in the shadow of the crisis over Formosa and in part this contributed to the emphasis on Far Eastern problems.

Consideration of far eastern affairs including Formosa took up almost half of the plenary sessions. Discussion of these matters was extremely frank. As Mr. St. Laurent emphasized in his report to Parliament, it was of immense value to the Prime Ministers of the western governments to get the point of view of important leaders from Asia on this vital Asian problem and indeed on all the matters before the meeting. Although no joint pronouncement issued from the conference, the very fact that leaders of a number of important nations from all quarters of the globe were assembled at a time of mounting tension, and could discuss dispassionately the issues involved with full knowledge of the gravity of the issues at stake helped to dispel tension and to create an atmosphere of calm and moderation in which a political settlement might be sought by negotiation. This in itself was an important success of the conference.

The meetings were dominated by two outstanding personalities. The conference met under the chairmanship of a great statesman to whom all free men will forever be in debt. Although no longer young, Sir Winston Churchill is possessed of a sweeping imagination whose range and grasp was a source of inspiration to all who heard him. His unequalled experience, his mastery of the subjects of particular interest to him, and the power of his vigorous mind well fitted him to preside over the discussions and to enliven them at intervals by brilliant shafts of wit. His command and love of language was reflected in the zest with which he set to the task of re-drafting and polishing the communique.

The Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, held a position of special importance as the spokesman for the resurgent nations of Asia which have recently attained full independence or continue to live their revolution. His exposition of the Asian point of view, based on rational argument moderately expressed, flowed inevitably from his analysis of the basic factors shaping affairs in Asia. He gave eloquent expression to the hopes and aspirations of the Asian peoples.

No Discussion on Constitutional Aspects of Commonwealth

The conference was notable for the fact that it was the first within living memory in which there was no discussion of the constitutional aspects of the Commonwealth or questions of Commonwealth organization. Proposals for the creation of additional machinery for formal consultation, suggestions that Commonwealth policy be co-ordinated and concerted through a permanent secretariat which have exercised Commonwealth leaders at previous meetings played no part in the proceedings. The one exception was Pakistan's request to be accepted as a continuing member of the Commonwealth after becoming a republic. In broaching this matter at the fifth plenary session, Mr. Mohammed Ali emphasized that there was no desire in Pakistan to weaken the link with the Commonwealth. The satisfaction of the desire of his people for a republican form of government would only strengthen Pakistan's determination to co-operate with the other members. The people of Pakistan would retain their loyalty, admiration and devotion to Her Majesty even though it flowed through an elected President rather than an appointed Governor General.

The decision that a nation of 80 million people should cease to owe allegiance to the Queen was not taken without a sense of the drama involved and a feeling of emotion. There was ready agreement that it was for Pakistan to decide what form of constitution she should have, and the Prime Ministers unanimously welcomed Pakistan's wish to continue her close attachment to the Commonwealth. The declaration recording this constitutional change which will enable Pakistan to establish a relationship similar to that of India will be found at the end of this article.

One of the most successful features of the conference was its function as a meeting ground for leaders of free Asian countries as well as of free nations from the West. In this sense, it made possible not only an exchange of views around the conference table but provided opportunities for informal private discussions in restricted groups which is essential to that meeting of minds so necessary if the Commonwealth is to fulfil its role as a bridge between East and West.



THE QUEEN AND THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS

Her Majesty the Queen with the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth who were in London attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. Left to right: Sir Godfrey Huggins (Rhodesia and Nyasaland); Mr. Mohammed Ali (Pakistan); Mr. R. G. Menzies (Australia); the Hon. C. R. Swart (South African Minister of Justice, deputizing for the South African Prime Minister); Sir Winston Churchill, K.G. (United Kingdom); Her Majesty the Queen; Mr. S. G. Holland (New Zealand); Mr. L. S. St-Laurent (Canada); Mr. Nehru (India); and Sir John Kotelawala (Ceylon).

Another aspect of the meeting which reflects the air of trust and understanding so characteristic of this friendly association and which augurs well for the future was the easy acceptance of the right of groups of members to discuss questions of mutual concern privately. This was particularly evident in respect of the regional discussions on defence matters about which all members had been informed in advance.

All delegations are indebted to the United Kingdom for the trouble which it had taken to ensure the comfort and convenience of visitors, and the smooth functioning of the meetings. Incoming parties on arriving at hotels where they were to stay found offices organized for them complete with desks, filing cabinets, and telephone switchboards. In keeping with the tradition of close and informal exchange of information, which is such an important part of the functioning of the Commonwealth, while in London Prime Ministers had access to information available to United Kingdom Ministers and were enabled to continue to follow developments throughout the world without interruption. The arrangements for recording the conference proceedings were handled with commendable efficiency.

As is customary at Commonwealth gatherings the Prime Ministers and delegates were entertained at a series of colourful and impressive social functions. These ranged from large formal receptions commencing with Viscount Swinton's party at Lancaster House on the opening day, and a joint reception

by Commonwealth High Commissioners at Guildhall to smaller and less formal dinners and luncheons at Downing Street, Chequers, and the residences of Sir Anthony Eden, other United Kingdom Ministers and High Commissioners. The Prime Ministers and Ministers dined with the Queen at Buckingham Palace. Delegation members of less senior rank enjoyed an informal evening party given by Her Majesty and the Duke of Edinburgh. Prince Charles and Princess Anne were present for a short time and were one of the centres of attention. And advantage was taken of the occasional opportunity to escape from the round of official and private functions for an enjoyable evening at the theatre, the opera, or a football match.

Freedom of City of London Accorded to Mr. St. Laurent

The conference was the occasion for a ceremony of dignity and splendour at Guildhall when Mr. St. Laurent was accorded the freedom of the City of London. In accordance with ancient custom, after 'subscribing to the Oath, the Prime Minister was admitted to the band of freemen in the presence of the Lord Mayor, the Sheriffs and members of the Common Council resplendent in their traditional robes of scarlet and mazarine before an assembly of Commonwealth statesmen, civil and military leaders and persons prominent in business and cultural circles. The Prime Minister spoke impressively of the ties which link Canadians with the people of Britain, and of the value of cherishing ancient customs and traditions which make for stability and continuity amid the change and bustle which is so characteristic of the modern world. Here, and at the luncheon which followed in Mansion House, the forms of ancient custom gained life and warmth from the dignified yet friendly courtesy of the chief participant whose sincerity in thanking those assembled for the honour they had bestowed on him, and through him, on the people of Canada, was a memorable experience for Canadians present and formed a fitting climax to a splendid occasion.

ANNEX

Declaration

The Government of Pakistan have informed the other Governments of the Commonwealth of the intention of the Pakistan people that under the new Constitution which is about to be adopted, Pakistan shall become a sovereign, independent Republic. The Government of Pakistan have, however, declared and affirmed Pakistan's desire to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and her acceptance of The Queen as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations, and as such the Head of the Commonwealth. The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ceylon, the basis of whose membership is not hereby changed, accept and recognize Pakistan's continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this Declaration. The Government of India, the basis of whose membership is also unaltered, similarly recognize Pakistan's continuing membership.

In notifying the other Prime Ministers of Pakistan's intention, Mr. Mohammed Ali reaffirmed his country's steadfast adherence to the Commonwealth. The other Prime Ministers, in accepting this proposal, welcomed Pakistan's continued association and co-operation as a member of the Commonwealth and assured Mr. Mohammed Ali that the friendship and goodwill of their countries towards Pakistan would remain unaffected by this constitutional change.

Accordingly, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare, as they did in 1949 when a similar decision was taken in respect of India, that they remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.

COMMUNIQUE

The Governments of the member nations of the Commonwealth are resolved to do their utmost to ease international strain. It is their aim, not only to bring any open hostilities to an end, but to promote conditions in which real peace can grow and thrive so that freedom and plenty may be enjoyed by all peoples.

Since the last Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in 1953, agreements have been reached in various parts of the world which have had the effect of removing differences and widening the area of understanding among Governments and peoples. The Prime Ministers welcomed the settlement of the Trieste dispute. They recorded their satisfaction that, in the Middle East, the United Kingdom's differences with Egypt and Iran had been resolved. They looked forward to closer collaboration between all the countries of that area so that its economic development and the welfare of its peoples could be advanced. They welcomed, in South-East Asia, the end of hostilities in Indochina and stressed the need for strict adherence to the conditions of the Geneva Agreement and for increased welfare and stability in that area.

The Prime Ministers were informed that the Commonwealth countries associated with the North Atlantic Treaty were convinced that the early ratification of the Agreements reached in London and Paris and the acceptance of Federal Germany into the community of the Western nations would mark an important advance towards the security and cohesion of Western Europe.

The Prime Ministers met at a time of tension in the Far East. In view of developments which occurred during their meeting, their discussions of this problem assumed a special significance. They were united in their conviction that it was necessary that incidents should be avoided while means were sought for a peaceful outcome. They were confident that the intimate and personal discussions which they had held at this Meeting would be a vulnerable foundation for future consultations, with one another and with other countries directly concerned, and for the development of their policies on this question.

The Prime Ministers noted the improvement in the outlook for world trade and prosperity which had taken place since the Commonwealth Finance Ministers met at Sydney in January 1954. They recognized that Commonwealth countries had made a substantial contribution to this by maintaining the stability of their currencies, by continuing their development programmes, in which the Colombo Plan had played its part, and by expanding their production. They had also continued their progressive approach towards the widest practicable system of trade and payments, which best serves the interest of the sterling area and Canada.

The Prime Ministers affirmed their determination to continue these policies of economic progress. They agreed, in particular, that all Commonwealth countries should strive to develop further their resources and their earning power. By these means they could best consolidate their strength and make an increased contribution to economic stability throughout the world.

The Prime Ministers gave anxious thought to the problems of nuclear energy. The latest discoveries confront humanity with a force which is almost beyond the capacity of man's brain to comprehend or measure. They present a choice and a challenge. Is this vast power to be developed for the benefit of man, or is it to be used to bring ruin upon the human race?

The Prime Ministers once again declare that their countries will never embark upon aggression. Indeed, it is their hope that, when the peoples of the world understand the magnitude of the disaster which world war would bring, all nations will shrink from violence and follow peaceful means of settling their differences. The annihilating power of the new weapons renders it imperative that sanity should prevail and that war should be prevented.

It is the aim of the Commonwealth countries to work for a disarmament agreement which includes forces and weapons of all kinds and is both comprehensive and effective. Commonwealth Governments have already devoted much time and thought to producing and furthering practical plans to achieve this purpose, and two of the Commonwealth countries are members of the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

With international accord on disarmament, it would become possible to turn the vast resources of atomic energy increasingly into channels which benefit mankind. The Prime Ministers were informed of the progress made by the United Kingdom Government in the use of atomic energy for industrial and other peaceful purposes. They looked forward to the prospects of continued close co-operation between the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in the development of the civil uses of atomic energy.

In the course of the Meeting, the Prime Minister of Pakistan informed the other Prime Ministers that Pakistan was about to adopt a republican form of constitution but desired to remain a member of the Commonwealth. They were assured that the people of Pakistan were resolved to maintain, despite this constitutional change, their steadfast adherence to the Commonwealth and their recognition of the Crown as the Symbol of the free association of its sovereign members. In a declaration issued on February 4 they signified their agreement that Pakistan should continue on this basis to be a full member of the Commonwealth after becoming a republic. All the Prime Ministers re-affirmed that their countries would remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.

The Commonwealth is a unique association. Its countries contain a fourth of the world's population, embracing people of many races and religions. Among its members are countries of importance in all quarters of the globe. Its strength and influence in the world today are derived from this and from a common outlook which, in spite of differences of geography, religion and race, evokes a broadly similar response to most international problems of the day.

The Commonwealth countries do not pursue any selfish purpose. They seek no aggrandisement and will always oppose aggression. In concert with all who share their ideals, they are resolved to do their utmost to further the cause of peace throughout the world.

London, S.W.1.

8th February, 1955.

REGIONAL DEFENCE DISCUSSIONS

While the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were in London the opportunity was taken to hold a series of additional meetings on regional defence problems. These meetings covered the main areas in which the forces of Commonwealth countries may have to be deployed in the event of war. Each was attended by representatives of those Commonwealth countries whose forces might in war be operating in the particular area under discussion. Their purpose was to enable the representatives of those countries to join together in reviewing the plans for the defence of each area.

The representatives of the Commonwealth countries concerned with these regional defence plans recognized that the advent of thermonuclear weapons involves fundamental changes in the strategic approach to defence problems. They agreed that the overwhelming superiority of the Western Powers in nuclear weapons offers at the present time the most effective and practical assurance that world peace will not be disturbed by any deliberate act of aggression. They agreed that their defence policies should be founded on the principle that world war can be prevented if the free democracies are resolved to maintain in readiness forces sufficiently strong to deter any potential aggressor.

In Europe great progress has already been made in building up the defensive shield provided by the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, and the Commonwealth representatives who took part in these discussions welcomed the steps which are being taken to increase the strength of those forces by a military contribution from Western Germany. The defence problems of the Middle East were reviewed in the light of recent developments and agreement was reached on the basis for a new approach to defence planning in this area. Discussion of the defence problems of South-East Asia covered plans to help the countries in that area, not only to resist aggression, but also to strengthen their internal security. The four Commonwealth countries which are signatories of the Manila Treaty took this opportunity of reviewing, in preparation for the forthcoming conference at Bangkok, progress in making that Treaty an effective instrument for these purposes.

The opportunity was taken to discuss, as one element in the defence of the Manila Treaty area, the security of Malaya, which is regarded by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand as of vital importance. The strategic position of the area was clarified by these discussions and it was considered that, in future, joint planning among the three Governments and discussion with other participants in the Manila Treaty would go forward more effectively.

Throughout these regional defence discussions it was accepted that military plans must be concerted with other countries involved in the defence of these areas. The Commonwealth countries concerned also recognized the need for the closest association with the United States in all defence measures. They agreed that on this basis regional defence planning can afford a solid foundation for the preservation of peace.

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base

THE Middle East affords the most important land bridge in the world, linking as it does the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. Through the area pass the shortest sea and air traffic routes linking Europe with Africa and Asia. Moreover, it is a major oil producing area, containing 40 per cent of the world's known resources of oil. The peace and security of the Middle East is therefore of vital importance not only to peoples in the area but to all free nations.


The experience of two world wars showed the value of having defence facilities available in the Middle East prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Easily the most important of these installations before the Second World War was the military base in the Suez Canal zone. It was a vital factor both in halting the German and Italian thrusts on Egypt and the Sudan and, later, in the successful campaigns which resulted in the liberation of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Syria. The Suez Canal base also served as the supply centre for military operations which preserved Iraq from Axis domination and for the resistance movements in Greece and Crete. In the course of these operations the base supported the equivalent of about forty-one army divisions of which thirteen were armoured, air forces totalling about sixty-five squadrons and a substantial naval force.

Treaty of 1936

Before and during the Second World War the United Kingdom occupied the Suez Canal base by virtue of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 26, 1936. The main articles of that Agreement provided for the termination of United Kingdom military occupation of Egypt and the establishment of a permanent alliance, for mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Egypt should either become involved in hostilities, and for the abolition of the régime of capitulations. Under Article 8 the United Kingdom was authorized to maintain a limited number of troops in the Suez Canal zone "until such time as . . . the Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure, by its own resources, the liberty and entire security of the navigation of the Canal". The duration of the Treaty of 1936 was fixed for twenty years but after ten years the Parties might with mutual consent negotiate a revision.

Between 1946 and 1952 the popular demand in Egypt for a revision of the Treaty of 1936 grew in intensity. It was an integral part of the Egyptian nationalist awakening and linked in the public mind with other political, economic and social conditions in the country. This nationalist movement proved irresistible and wrought important changes in Egypt which, although for a time they blocked efforts to bring about a new Anglo-Egyptian accord, ultimately resulted in an atmosphere favourable to that end. In particular, the Council for the Revolutionary Command was able to establish a stable government in Egypt and to make a fresh approach to the problems which had soured its relations with the United Kingdom.

By 1954, moreover, new factors were affecting the technical aspects of security. The development of the power of nuclear weapons and their availability to potential aggressors, had necessitated a general re-thinking of defence



strategy. A strategic review carried out by the United Kingdom had implications for its policy in the Middle East. Some indications of this re-assessment were given by the Secretary of State for War, Mr. Anthony Head, in the United Kingdom House of Commons on July 29, 1954, in the debate on the Heads of Agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom: The advent of the hydrogen bomb, together with other thermo-nuclear weapons, had put a premium on dispersion and was very much against the concentration of military forces and material. The ability to equip, train and maintain overseas, at long distances from the United Kingdom, large numbers of troops would be restricted. Moreover, the growing strength of Turkey and its membership in NATO improved the chances of a successful defence of the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus the United Kingdom was more likely to take part in defensive strategy on Turkey's right flank, an area from which Egypt was relatively remote. These and other considerations enabled the United Kingdom Government to modify its approach to the negotiations with Egypt.

After informal discussions during the autumn of 1953, formal negotiations between Egypt and the United Kingdom were resumed on July 10, 1954 which led to the initialling of the Heads of Agreement on July 27. After a further period of negotiating the details the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Base was signed in Cairo on October 19, 1954. The Agreement envisaged

that United Kingdom troops would be withdrawn from the Suez Canal zone within twenty months from the date of signature, that specified installations in the existing base would be maintained by civilian technicians on behalf of the United Kingdom Government for the remainder of the seven year term of the Agreement, and that the base would only be placed on a war footing in the event of an attack by an outside power on an Arab League state or Turkey. The United Kingdom and Egypt would consult if there was a threat of such an attack.

Provisions of the Agreement

The Agreement was necessarily complicated and for this reason its contents were broken down into a Main Agreement of thirteen Articles, two lengthy Annexes, sixteen Exchanges of Notes and an Agreed Minute. All of these were equally integral parts of the Agreement, as was made clear in the main document. The provisions in these documents fall into three categories:

- (a) those affecting the military withdrawal;
- (b) those establishing the base on a civilian footing; prescribing which installations should be given into the charge of civilian contractors, which should be maintained by the Egyptian Authorities and the conditions under which the installations should be so run; and
- (c) those relating to problems which arose during the existence of the military base and prior to the signature of the Agreement.

These three elements had financial implications which were also dealt with in the Agreement.

The withdrawal of the 83,000 British troops was provided for in Article 1 of the Main Agreement and Part A of Annex I, which laid down the phases of withdrawal in percentages of troops to be withdrawn by specific dates. By June 19, 1956 the withdrawal is to be complete. Articles 4 and 5 of the Main Agreement provide for the reactivation of the base in the event of an armed attack by an outside power or any country which is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo April 13, 1950, or on Turkey. In the event of the return of British forces to the Suez Canal base, they will be withdrawn immediately upon the cessation of the hostilities. In the event of the threat of an armed attack there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

Article 3 of the Main Agreement provides that the base should be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use in accordance with the provisions for its re-activation. The organization of the base under civilian contractors is dealt with in detail in Annex II. The installations which the United Kingdom government have the right to maintain and operate include the base workshops, ordnance depots, vehicle depot and power station at Tel el Kebir; the base ammunition depot and power station at Abu Sultan; the engineer stores base depot, base workshops, spare parts depot and power station at Fayid and Fanara; a number of petrol and oil installations, storage tanks and pumping stations at Agrud, Fanara, Nefisha and Suez. The Government of Egypt is required to maintain in good order other installations, which will be available to the United Kingdom government on re-activation of the base and which include filtration plants, airfields, power stations, a Royal Air Force maintenance unit, hospitals, railway workshops, sidings and certain road

and land links, and a base ordnance depot. A number of other installations and equipment were to be transferred to Egyptian ownership on completion of the withdrawal, including all airfields and certain naval installations at Adabiya and Port Said. Specific provisions have been made for the British technicians who will maintain the base and for the companies which employ them.

Article 9 of the Main Agreement deals with the United Kingdom's right to move at its discretion any British equipment into or out of the base. The level of stores to be maintained is fixed in accordance with Part C of Annex II. These stores include 50,000 tons of ammunition, 300,000 tons of ordnance and engineering equipment, 2,000 vehicles, 30 locomotives and 100 railway cars. Unless both the contracting governments agree upon any extension of the Agreement, it will terminate seven years after the date of signature and the government of the United Kingdom will take away or dispose of their property then remaining in the base.

The preceding paragraphs describe briefly the highlights of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Both parties have expressed satisfaction about the Agreement which in the words of the Preamble meets their desire "to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship." In addition to this improvement in the relations between the parties, the Agreement has been widely hailed at providing a basis for better understanding between Egypt and the Western democracies as a whole. At the same time it ensures that in the event of outside aggression in the region of the Middle East a substantial base will be available to meet the emergency.



CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

The new Canadian Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. K. P. Kirkwood, presented his credentials to Colonel Abdul Nasser, Premier of Egypt on December 27, 1954. At the right of Colonel Nasser is Wing Commander Hassan Ibrahim, Minister of State for Republican Affairs.

The International Control of the Military Uses of Atomic Energy

THE ramifications of this subject are considerable. In order to focus attention on some of the more important problems which arise in trying to bring the military uses of atomic energy under international control, the subject will be treated under three main divisions. First, the technical background of the control problem will be discussed, with special reference to the increased potential destructiveness of atomic weapons and to the current armaments race. Secondly, the efforts made by direct and indirect approaches in search of a negotiated agreement on disarmament will be reviewed. Thirdly, there follows an analysis of some of the major questions which arise when one tries to form a judgment as to the prospects of success of this search, which continues.

Technological Background

It has been said that "the subject of atomic energy is dynamite". That is perhaps as good a starting point as any in the consideration of what atomic weapons can do. For as with dynamite, we are concerned with explosions. An explosion by definition is a sudden and violent release of energy in large amounts. The scientific discoveries of nuclear physics and the development of technology have put at man's disposal the capacity of making explosions on a revolutionary scale of magnitude and this capacity has been continually increasing.

President Eisenhower has spoken of the "awful arithmetic" of the atomic bomb. Reviewing just the published material, one can get some idea of the advance in the destructive power of these weapons.

It is now almost ten years ago that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the end of the last war, and the beginning of the atomic age. The explosive energy released in the first of these atomic bombs was equal to approximately twenty thousand tons of T.N.T., or twenty kilotons. This, as it were, "model T-bomb" has since been used as a yardstick, against which all progress in destructive power has been measured, and for this reason it is usually referred to as the "nominal bomb".

Now this nominal atomic bomb already represented a tremendous advance in destructive power over the weapons hitherto employed in bombing, for the release of explosive energy in the nominal bomb was already about one thousand times as much as that of the block-busters of the last war. President Eisenhower, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953, revealed that the atomic bombs have since become "twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned".

But an even more revolutionary development in the destructive power of the individual weapons was achieved in the so-called hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb. By fusing or binding the elements of light atomic weight such as hydrogen, instead of splitting the heavier elements such as uranium or plutonium, it was found that a far greater release of energy could be obtained.

Thus, in the first test of this type of weapon which was carried out by the United States Government at Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands in November 1952, energy equivalent to between five to seven million tons of T.N.T. (or five to seven megatons of T.N.T.) was released. In a later test carried out at Eniwetok last year, the energy released, according to newspaper reports, was again at least doubled. Thus, in the first decade of the atomic age, the already tremendous destructive power of the uranium bomb has been dwarfed almost a thousandfold by the power of the hydrogen weapon.

One of the important consequences of this rapid multiplication of the destructive power of these new weapons, is that an economy can be made in accomplishing a given amount of destruction with nuclear fire power as compared with conventional fire power, despite the high cost of the weapons and the equipment required to produce them. Representative Sterling Cole, then Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress, illustrated this point in the following statement made in a speech in New York on April 29, 1954: "Today a single plane . . . on a single mission, can carry more destructive cargo than the total carried by the combined air forces of all the allies and all the Axis nations through all the six years of World War II."

Effects of the Latest Weapons

There is not much detailed public information available on the effects of these latest weapons,* although there has been considerable speculation in the press on what this might be in contrast to the effects of the nominal atomic bombs. However, we have it on the authority of the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (President Eisenhower's press conference, March 31, 1954) that these hydrogen weapons can be made as large as military requirements demand and that any city in the world could be destroyed—in the sense of "being put out of commission"—by one such weapon.

Apparently, the radius of destruction from blast does not in fact increase proportionately with the amount of energy released in the explosion. The scientists tell us that the radius of damage from a big explosion increases as the cube root of the energy released. Thus with a bomb about one thousand times more powerful than the nominal atomic bomb, the radius of damage would be about ten times greater. Since the radius of complete destruction at Hiroshima was about one mile, the corresponding radius for a hydrogen bomb one thousand times as large, would be approximately ten miles.

There are other damage effects from atomic weapons, such as flash-burns and the effects of radiation. With the hydrogen bomb explosions, there is also the phenomenon of "fall-out", that is the sucking up of earth and water particles by the explosion and the subsequent falling out of heavy particles. This significantly increases the lethal range of these weapons, as the experience of the crew of the Japanese fishing boat during last year's Eniwetok test dramatically illustrated.

But the "awful arithmetic" of atomic weapons is not limited to the increase in the destructive power of individual weapons. There is also the accumulation of destructive power in the growing stockpiles of bombs. Improvements are

* This was written before the Report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission on High-yield Nuclear Explosions was released in Washington on February 15, 1955.

also continually being made in the capacity to deliver these weapons to their targets, through the development of carriers of longer range and greater weight-carrying capacity, including manned and unmanned aircraft, missiles and projectiles fired from cannon.

This growing capacity in atomic destructive power is not limited to the United States. The United Kingdom is producing atomic bombs too, but on a lesser scale. More important from its impact on the control problem, is the growing atomic capacity of the Soviet Union. In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1953, President Eisenhower emphasized this fact when he said: "If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly has ceased to exist some years ago".

The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in a test in August 1949. Since then, this capacity has been growing and now is taken to include the hydrogen bomb. In August 1953, the Soviet Government officially announced that a hydrogen bomb had been successfully tested in Siberia. In a description of this test published in the Red Army newspaper "The Red Star" of March 26, 1954, the effect of this explosion was likened to the impact of a tremendous meteorite of a weight of not less than half a million tons that fell in Siberia in 1908.

Thus, within the first decade of the atomic age, we find a combination of the following technological factors which obviously have far-reaching political, economic and social, as well as military implications. These factors are: (a) a tremendous increase in potential destructiveness of atomic weapons, particularly with the addition of thermonuclear weapons; (b) improvements in the means of delivery of these weapons; and (c) the growing Soviet atomic capability with its consequent effect upon the race in armaments between the Communist and non-Communist powers.

Search for a Negotiated Agreement on Disarmament

So far we have been considering the destructive power of atomic weapons in terms of broad orders of magnitude. These weapons exist as the product of advances in science and technology. Their tremendously destructive power could be used. The political question arises whether the political framework of society—internationally as well as nationally organized—will permit them to be used.

Efforts to assert international checks and restraints on the use of these weapons began with the dawn of the atomic age. Within a matter of months after the bombs were dropped on Japan, a Commission was set up in the United Nations to study the whole question of the international control of atomic energy and to see whether a system acceptable to all countries concerned could be devised which would "ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only".

These words, quoted from the terms of reference of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, are important because all efforts to work out a system of control have to be based on the premise that the peaceful uses of atomic energy are inseparable from the risks of war at least as long as the underlying impulses to international conflict persist. This is so because the raw

materials used, the processes of production and the processed material are largely interchangeable between military and peaceful uses. Thus control to be effective, has to cover the raw material, the processed or fissile material, the atomic plants or reactors, as well as the stockpiles of atomic materials and bombs.

System of Control

The first scheme of control which emanated from the United Nations Commission, involved the setting up of an international monopoly over all large-scale atomic industries. At that time, (i.e. before 1949), the United States enjoyed a monopoly of atomic weapons and the large-scale industry required to maintain their production. The United States Government in proposals put before the United Nations, offered to give up this monopoly by transfer to an international authority, on condition that there were adequate safeguards against any nation being able to produce atomic weapons.

To ensure that this internationalization would be fully effective, and that in any dispute between any national government and the international authority, the will of the latter would prevail, it was proposed that the ownership of raw materials, as well as the ownership and operation of all but laboratory and similar non-dangerous atomic energy activities, would be vested in this international agency or trust.

Production of materials would be strictly limited to consumption, so that there should be no accumulation of stockpiles which might be siphoned off for secret national atomic activities. As the United States was the only possessor of atomic stockpiles, which were not substantial at that time, the difficult technical problems of making an inventory of existing stockpiles and of checking them by inspection were comparatively less formidable than they would be today. The problem of safeguards at that time was therefore primarily related to the productive processes and the handling of the raw material.

It was contemplated that this system of control by monopoly would be set up step by step. Only after the international authority was fully in operation, the manufacture of atomic weapons by the United States would cease, the bombs would be banned, and the stocks of fissile material held by the United States would be transferred to the authority, and put to peaceful purposes only.

This scheme of control which was deemed quite feasible from a technical standpoint by the experts, ran into difficulties on political grounds. The United States conception of control and atomic disarmament was that security should be established first, in the form of an international authority and the far-reaching controls and safeguards which it would administer. The Soviet Government had a different conception. What they evidently had in mind was that priority should be given to the establishment of a position of equality with the United States in atomic weapons, by their prohibition and total elimination. Security, in the form of guarantees against the production of atomic weapons, was to be left to later negotiations.

The Soviet Government proposed that as a first step there should be a pledge to outlaw the atomic bomb. The Soviet representatives never really got around to spelling out exactly what would constitute their conception of

security. The Soviet representatives insisted that safeguards against the violation of the pledge of prohibition, could be achieved by the international inspection of national atomic plants and activities, which the national government would declare to the international agency.

The main objection from the standpoint of the Western Powers to this Soviet insistence upon first achieving a parity—at the point of zero—with the United States in atomic weapons, was that it would have left the Soviet Union with a great preponderance in military power by reason of its marked superiority in conventional arms and forces, without the offsetting advantage in security of an effective system of international control.

The weakness of the Soviet approach to the problem of international control was its dependence for effectiveness on the will of the national authority to co-operate loyally with the international authority, including the granting of the right to international inspectors to move freely in and out of the country and to move about anywhere where they might choose in order to assure themselves that in fact no secret atomic activities for military purposes were going on.

Thus the negotiations for atomic disarmament became stalled mainly over the argument of whether security through international control was to come first, or whether equality in the balance of atomic power, was to come first, through the elimination of United States atomic capability. Underlying this argument was, of course, the conflict of aims and power between the Soviet Union and the United States in particular, and between the Communist and non-Communist nations in general. This basic underlying conflict was recognized as a major obstacle to an agreement on international control in the second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, when it had to acknowledge failure to reach agreement.

The New Approach to the Disarmament Problem

Such was the position of stalemate in the negotiations on the international control of the military uses of atomic energy until last year, when a new approach was tried in the light of the radically new circumstances. The Soviet Union now had developed an atomic capability, and the vastly increased destructive power of the hydrogen weapons had to be reckoned with.

Even less than before could the United States, or the Soviet Union, be expected to base their atomic disarmament merely on the faith that the other side had disclosed all its stockpiles, without having this fact carefully established by check. The problem of security against atomic attack is therefore now tied more closely than ever with the international inspection of the stockpiles of military power and materials and with their disposal. Moreover, with such very potent weapons in the scales, it is more important than ever to maintain a balance of military power between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers throughout the process of disarmament. In view of the marked superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies in traditional weapons and manpower, in addition to its atomic capability, the elimination of atomic weapons has to be tied in with a balanced reduction in conventional war potential, if the total balance of military power in the world is not to be dangerously disturbed.

When at the end of 1953, the General Assembly had received another disappointing report on the lack of progress in the field of disarmament, it

directed the United Nations Disarmament Commission to set up a sub-committee of the five powers which would be principally concerned with this problem, including the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., U.K., France and Canada, to explore the issues in private sessions. These meetings, which took place in London in May and June of last year, at first traversed the unprofitable arguments of previous disarmament discussions including the question of which was to come first, the pledge to ban nuclear weapons or the machinery of control.

Basis of Compromise

But just before the end of these meetings the British and French Governments, with the support of Canada and the United States, put forward a memorandum on June 11 designed to try to bring the two sides closer together. The basis of compromise was to make disarmament a gradual process, i.e. to implement the pledge of prohibition of atomic armaments by stages, to reduce conventional armaments and armed forces by stages, as well as introduce the controls which are to ensure the execution of these measures in good faith.

Thus the proposals of the Western powers envisaged an immediate agreement that under the terms of the United Nations Charter, the parties should regard themselves as being prohibited from the use of nuclear weapons, except in defence against aggression. Then the first step in the disarmament programme would be the creation of a control organ.

Following the creation and positioning of the international control organ, the first step in the Disarmament Programme would be the freezing at levels existing on December 31, 1953 of military budgets covering expenditures on atomic as well as non-atomic weapons and manpower, as soon as this organ were in a position to enforce the implementation of this measure.

After the freeze would come a gradual reduction. As soon as the control authority was capable of enforcing this reduction, a two-phase programme of disarmament would begin. In the first phase, half of the agreed upon reductions in conventional arms would take place. Then as soon as the control organ was prepared to enforce the next phase, the second half of the agreed reductions in conventional arms would occur. The ban on the manufacture and use of atomic weapons would also become effective in this later stage, and all atomic materials would be converted to peaceful purposes.

The aim of this phased disarmament programme as a whole, would be to bring armaments on both sides of the Iron Curtain gradually down to the level strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of United Nations Charter obligations, and to maintain these levels balanced, under a system of strict international control.

At first, these proposals were turned down by the Soviet Government. However, at the session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York last fall, Mr. Vychinsky sprang a surprise. In a speech on September 30, which in other respects did not seem to strike a compromising note, he proposed that the British-French memorandum of June 11 be taken as the basis for negotiating a disarmament convention, on the condition that certain "basic provisions" put forward by the Soviet Government were also included.

These Soviet provisions differ from the Western proposals in a number of particulars. They do not provide, for instance, for an initial freeze on military

budgets and manpower levels before the phased reductions begin. Instead, they envisage a two-step reduction plan, with a time limit of six months to a year for each step. In the first stage, conventional armaments are to be reduced from their December 31, 1953 levels, by 50 per cent of levels to be agreed to. In the second stage, the other 50 per cent of reduction of conventional weapons is to be carried out and the production of atomic weapons is to cease. Atomic materials are to be converted to civil uses. So far the two sets of proposals bear a certain resemblance.

On the nature of controls, the differences between the Soviet proposals and those of the Western powers are more marked. While the Western proposals make the start of each phase of disarmament dependent on the readiness of the control organ to carry out its responsibilities for seeing that the implementation of the undertakings are carried out in good faith, the Soviet plan apparently contemplates that the control bodies would be created during the phase which they are supposed to police.

The first phase under the Soviet plan would be supervised by a "temporary International Control Commission" established under the Security Council. The second of the Soviet phases would be supervised by a "Standing International Organ".

Not only the process of establishing controls, but also the powers to be given to these international bodies under the Soviet plan require clarification. Apparently their powers are not to extend beyond "the power of inspection on a continuing basis to ensure implementation of the convention by all states". What the powers of an international inspectorate would amount to in practice when matched against the powers of a totalitarian national state, and what influence the Security Council may have in putting pressure on a national government which refuses to co-operate, are the kind of important questions which will have to be explored.

Disarmament Negotiations Continued

These moves from both sides in the direction of compromise raised hopes sufficiently in the United Nations that it was possible to witness the rare spectacle of a resolution adopted by unanimity in the last General Assembly to continue negotiations on disarmament.

The Canadian Delegation played an important part in bringing about this display of unanimity. Earlier in the debate in the General Assembly, the Canadian Delegation had introduced a resolution requesting the Disarmament Commission to reconvene the five-power sub-committee and, in the light of these new proposals, to seek agreement on "comprehensive proposals" for the "regulation, limitation and major balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;" and the "total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes".

This resolution also provided that "effective international control" was to be established through a "control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance" of the agreement; and "the whole programme" was to be "such that no state would have cause to fear that its security was endangered". This resolution received the support and co-

sponsorship of the other Western powers. Then after some days of suspense and of patient negotiation by the Canadian Delegation with that of the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R. joined as a fifth co-sponsor and the resolution was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly.

Indirect Approaches

While efforts continue on the basis of this resolution to negotiate an agreement on a comprehensive scheme of disarmament, including the elimination of atomic weapons, mention should also be made of some indirect approaches to the question of controlling the military uses of atomic energy.

President Eisenhower's "Atomic Pool Plan", for instance, though not intended as a scheme of disarmament, seeks to get international co-operation started in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The essence of the scheme put forward by the President about a year ago and since unanimously approved in principle in the United Nations, is that there should be an international agency which would try to equalize the beneficial use of atomic energy by encouraging research and development activities, facilitating arrangements to supply fissile material, to set up research reactors and to train technical personnel in all countries that may be interested.

Since international control involves voluntary co-operation between nations, as well as the imposition of checks and restraints, co-operation even though not related directly to the military uses of atomic energy, might help to create goodwill, and might develop into a habit. It is also not without some utility that at least some fissile material, which would otherwise go into the military stockpiles, might find an outlet in peaceful uses.

Attempts to Ban Nuclear Tests

Because of the violence of thermonuclear explosions in the tests conducted in the Marshall Islands in 1953 and last year, and especially because of the alarming aftermath in the injury caused to Japanese fishermen by the "fall out" of radioactive particles, an attempt has been made particularly by India to put an end to further atomic tests in the Pacific. Since the Marshall Islands group (the scene of these U.S. tests), was transferred to United States administration under the authority of the United Nations Trusteeship Council as a former Japanese mandate, an effort was made to have that body order a ban on further tests. In the event a resolution was passed to the effect that if tests were continued, the United States should take precautions to prevent the exposure of the inhabitants of the Marshall Islands to the radioactive particles. In the last tests apparently some of these islanders were exposed to radioactivity, but all recovered.

A standstill on tests might be technically enforceable by an international monitoring agency and might contribute to relaxation of international tensions. To have this limited effect, it would have to apply to all tests, Soviet, British as well as those of the United States. However, this might prove unacceptable to the Soviet Union if they believe that such a ban might be prejudicial to their efforts to catch up with the United States in atomic technology. For similar reasons, it might put the United Kingdom, also a late starter, at a disadvantage. In any case, it would not offer a solution to the main problem of accumulating atomic stockpiles.

Control of Means of Delivery

Another indirect approach might be the abolition, or at least limitation of the means of delivering atomic explosives including manned and pilotless aircraft, guided missiles and projectiles fired from cannon. It is another symptom of the armaments race, that efforts to extend the range and load carrying capacity of atomic carriers or vehicles are continually being made on both sides. Elaborate controls would be necessary to check on compliance, and it is hardly to be expected that carriers, as distinct from their lethal charge, would be singled out for control. Both carriers and their charges are of course to be covered in the comprehensive disarmament scheme under discussion in the United Nations.

Major Questions

Rather than attempt to forecast the results of these efforts to reach agreement on disarmament, perhaps it would be more useful to analyze some of the major questions which arise when one tries to form a judgment about the prospects of success of these efforts.

The first such question might be: Is it possible to put an end to the atomic armaments race in any way other than by international agreement?

Ruling out preventive atomic war as a possible deliberate choice on the part of the Western Powers, the answer could hardly be to stop the race, merely by having the United States or Britain drop out. This would leave the field of atomic military power free to the Soviet Union and would in effect amount to unilateral disarmament. So long as Soviet aims and policies remain hostile and aggressive, such a course would be unthinkable. Unilateral disarmament was tried between the two World Wars and brought the democratic nations to the brink of disaster. If the alternatives represented by the two extremes of preventive war and unilateral disarmament are both ruled out, there are still the alternatives of going on with the armaments race indefinitely, or of continuing to try for a negotiated agreement on disarmament.

If the atomic armaments race goes on is it possible to rely on atomic retaliation alone as a restraint against the use of atomic weapons?

Some have argued that with the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, having the capacity of atomic retaliation and with the added frightfulness of the hydrogen bomb, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would risk mutual catastrophe in atomic war. Captain Liddell Hart, the well-known British analyst of military affairs, put the issue in a recent letter to the London *Times* in the following terms: "The supreme fact of the hydrogen bomb era is that war has become palpably suicidal".

The deterrent effect of the atomic weapons cannot be denied. President Eisenhower recently said: "War would present to us only the alternatives in degrees of destruction; there could be no successful outcome". The former Soviet Premier Malenkov is on record as saying about a year ago: "A third world war would mean the destruction of world civilization".

But to be effective as a deterrent, certain conditions require to be fulfilled. For instance, it is necessary that each side should equally believe that there is at least a high probability that atomic weapons would in fact be used in certain circumstances; as for example, if continued national existence or some essential principle were at stake.

The handling of this issue of the deterrent has posed a special problem for NATO, through which the Western powers have principally organized their collective defensive and deterrent strength. At the last Ministerial meeting of the NATO Council held last December, approval was given to a report of the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of NATO defence over the next few years, taking into account the effect of nuclear weapons. In approving this report, the Council made it clear that it was merely agreeing to certain planning assumptions which had been suggested by the NATO military authorities and was in no way delegating the political responsibility of governments for making final decisions in the event of hostilities. Now these military assumptions which were approved for planning purposes are, of course, secret, but it can be clearly implied from statements made by the military chiefs of NATO, General Gruenther and Field Marshal Montgomery, that if the Soviet Union were to launch an overt aggression against the West, the NATO forces would be justified in defending themselves with all the necessary means at their disposal.

To be effective as a deterrent also, it must be reasonably clear to each side that neither is so vulnerable to the other, that a mortal blow could be struck, before the retaliation to such an attack could be effective. Put in another way, reluctance to attack may be induced not only by the risk of receiving retaliation, but also by the prospect that an atomic attack may not succeed in inflicting a knock-out blow, or at least a mortal hurt to the atomic military potential of the victim, before the full might of retaliation takes effect on the country that strikes the first blow. The reduction of vulnerability to atomic attack of course involves the whole range of activities connected with continental air defence, as well as civil defence.

The Risk of War Developing Unintentionally

There is also the grave risk that atomic war might develop unintentionally. If the penalties for using total atomic force may have become too horrible, the possibility of aggressors using limited or conventional force cannot be ruled out. This risk will presumably continue as long as there is a cold war. The Secretary of State for External Affairs referred to this risk when he said in the course of a speech in the House of Commons on January 20 (on the approval of the protocol covering the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO): "Incomparably the most important political problem facing Canadians today is the danger of that cold war becoming a blazing thermo-nuclear one".

A conflict which starts out as a limited war may involve the major security interests or resources of one of the powers possessing nuclear weapons. Imperceptibly perhaps, such a power may be drawn into a position where it may decide to use atomic weapons.

As Mr. Pearson indicated in his speech there are three main areas in which efforts must be made to reduce this type of risk of a limited conventional war turning into a total atomic war. "The first area", he said, "involves a search for agreement on effective disarmament, substantial enough to lessen the burden of present defence expenditures and including the total and effective prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction". The second lies in "building and in maintaining controlled and defensive strength in the free world to deter aggression". The third area, (and this the Minister said was the most fundamental of all) lies in "improving relations between states: in removing the causes of war and in the development of the international community, which involves fostering wherever we can an effective sense of co-operation and unity amongst the free peoples."

Feasibility of International Control

Has the technical feasibility of the international control of atomic weapons been effected by the accumulation of atomic stockpiles on both sides and the addition of hydrogen weapons?

Reference has already been made to the fact that when the initial efforts of reaching international agreement on the control of atomic energy began in 1946, the problem of disposing of the stockpiles was comparatively simple, for the disposal of stockpiles involved only the limited amounts held by the United States. Now this issue has been complicated both by the build-up of the Soviet stockpiles, as well as by the increasing magnitude and power of the accumulation on both sides.

This issue involves some highly technical considerations as well as some interesting political ones. It is necessary, for instance, to establish an accurate inventory of the stockpiles and to check these by inspection. This is a technical problem. But in order that both sides should have faith in the results, it is also necessary that the international inspectors should have the power to investigate for the existence of undisclosed stocks, as well as checking the materials, that the national government may declare. This, of course, raises the whole question of the diverse conceptions held by the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on the nature of the international control organs and their powers of inspection.

The question of technical feasibility also arises in relation to the disposal of nuclear explosives. Both the Western and the Soviet proposals for disarmament envisage as the final stage of disarmament, the conversion of existing stocks of atomic material to peaceful purposes. How is this to be done? The answer apparently involves some way of denaturing the nuclear explosives by turning them into economic fuel elements for power reactors, while rendering them unusable for weapons, except after further processing.

It is for the technological experts to say how effective it would be as a safeguard. The importance of the issue may be judged from the fact that pending such conversion, atomic armaments, in the form of explosives readily convertible into bombs, would continue to exist in stockpiles even though their manufacture might have been banned by the pledge of prohibition. Thus atomic disarmament cannot be regarded as fully effective,

until there are guarantees to both sides that all stockpiles, disclosed and undisclosed have been accounted for, and that conversion has actually been carried out. There must also be an assurance against the reconversion of the denatured explosives which might be concealed, or siphoned from the pipe-line of fissile material intended for peaceful uses.

This consideration, together with the added destructive power of hydrogen bombs, also emphasizes the importance of insisting upon effective international control being coupled with a parallel balanced reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces, if the international balance of military power is not to be dangerously disturbed.

In trying to find a way out of the vicious circle of the armaments race, the question is sometimes raised; which should come first, disarmament or a political settlement of the underlying causes of conflict? Those who contend that a political settlement must come first, argue that men do not fight because they have arms; they have arms because they deem it necessary to fight on account of some unresolved political, economic, or social conflict. Pursuing this reasoning, they also say that the elimination of certain types of weapons, such as atomic bombs, would in itself have no influence upon the incidence of war; it could at best affect only the technology of warfare and the way hostilities would be conducted.

Certainly historical experience tends to support this line of reasoning. There is, for instance, the familiar example of the Rush-Bagot agreement, providing for naval disarmament in the Great Lakes. The success and permanence of this agreement is no doubt based on the permanent absence of any competition for power between the United States and Canada, which might transform itself into armed conflict. Contrariwise, the arguments between the Soviet and Western representatives over atomic disarmament in the United Nations have reflected the continuing underlying conflict in power and aims between the communist and non-communist world.

This is a version of the old dilemma of the "chicken and the egg"—which has to come first—a political settlement or the disarmament negotiations? Even granting that the existence of underlying political conflicts does represent a most serious obstacle to agreement on disarmament, so long as there is even a gleam of hope that some progress might be made, there are good grounds for continuing to persevere in the reduction of areas of disagreement both for its own sake—in the hope of achieving a balanced reduction and control of all armaments and armed forces both atomic and non-atomic—as well as for the sake of reducing international tensions.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. J. W. Duchastel retired from the Diplomatic Service effective December 13, 1954.
- Mr. H. B. O. Robinson was transferred from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, effective January 20, 1955.
- Mr. D. Stansfield was transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, to the Canadian Embassy, Athens, effective February 7, 1955.
- Mr. V. C. Moore was posted from the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, Germany, to home leave effective February 10, 1955.
- Mr. G. J. L. Choquette was posted from the Canadian Embassy, Paris, to Ottawa, effective February 13, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Statistical Yearbook 1954 (Sixth Issue). New York, 1954. 594 p. (bilingual). Sales No.: 1954.XVII.5.

Non-Self-Governing Territories — Summaries and analyses of information transmitted to the Secretary-General during 1953. ST/TRI/SER.A/8, 9 May 1954. 293 p. Sales No.: 1954.VI.B.2.

ILO—Systems of Social Security: United States. Geneva, 1954. 106 p.

UNESCO

Compulsory Education in Indonesia by M. Hutasoit. (Studies on compulsory education—XV). Paris, December 1954. 111 p.

The University Teaching of Social Sciences: Law. (Teaching in the Social Sciences Series). Paris, November 1954. 133 p. (Report prepared by Charles Eisenmann, Professor at the University of Paris for the International Committee of comparative law).

Social Aspects of Technical Assistance in Operation. (Tensions and Technology Series). (A report by Morris E. Opler of a conference held jointly by the U.N. and UNESCO). Paris, April, 1954. 79 p.

Development of Public Libraries in Africa —The Ibadan Seminar. (UNESCO Public Library Manuals—6). 155 p.

Egypt—Paintings from Tombs and Temples. Introduction by Jacques Vandier. (UNESCO World Art Series). 32 full

page colour reproduction. Published by the New York Graphic Society by arrangement with UNESCO.

Index Translationum—International bibliography of translations. No. 6. Paris 1954. 567 p. (bilingual). \$10.00.

International Directory of Photographic Archives of Work of Art. Volume II. Paris, 1954. 70 p. (bilingual).

WHO—Proposed Programme and Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1 January–31 December 1956 with the proposed programme and estimated expenditure for technical assistance for economic development of under-developed countries. Geneva, December 1954. 323 p. Official Records of WHO, No. 58.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

Report on the Administration of the British-United States Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste for the period of 1 January to 31 December 1953 by Major General Sir John Winterton, KCMG, CB, CBE.) Report Number 13). S/3353, 26 January 1955. 43 p.

Systematic Compilation of International Instruments Relating to the legal status of aliens: Union of South Africa. (UNIDROIT—International Institute for the Unification of Private Law). ST/LSA/16, Rome, November 1954. 51 p.

Resolutions of the Eighth Session of the General Conference of Unesco. 8C/Resolutions, Chapters I to VI. Paris, 13 January 1955.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Peru

Agreement for Air Services. Signed at Lima, February 18, 1954.

Entered into force provisionally February 18, 1954.

Ratifications exchanged February 17, 1955.

Entered into force definitely February 18, 1955.

NOTE

In its December 1954 issue, *External Affairs* published an article entitled "Slavonic Studies in Canadian Universities" contributed by Dr. J. St. Clair-Sobell of the Department of Slavonic Studies, University of British Columbia. The Director of the *Centre d'Études Slaves* of the University of Montreal, Dr. Theodore F. Domaradzki, has drawn the attention of the Department to what he considers may be a misunderstanding on the part of the author of the ends which the *Centre d'Études Slaves* has set itself to achieve. Dr. Domaradzki stresses that the Centre has by design been established as principally a graduate school in Slavonic and Eastern European studies and that it has attracted and aims to continue to draw its student population not only from the foreign born but from the autochthonous Canadian population.

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The Gaza Incident

Report of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Chief of Staff

Major-General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine, attended a meeting of the Security Council in New York on March 17, 1955 to present his report concerning the incident of February 28, 1955 near Gaza, which involved a clash between the military forces of Israel and Egypt. General Burns, who is on leave from his post as Deputy Minister of the Canadian Department of Veterans' Affairs, became Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization in September 1954. Following is the text of his report without appendices, as it appeared in United Nations document S/3373 of March 17, 1955.

The Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, at an emergency meeting held on March 6, 1955, found that on the night of February 28, 1955 at 20:30 local time, a force of the Israeli Army estimated at two platoon strength, crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line east of Gaza, advanced more than three kilometres inside Egyptian-controlled territory, and, using mortars, anti-tank projectiles, hand grenades, bangalore torpedoes and heavy explosive charges, attacked an Egyptian military camp, the Gaza stationmaster's house and a concrete water-pump house supplying part of the Gaza area. The water-pump house, a stone military building and four Nissen huts were completely destroyed. Another group of the Israeli Army crossed the Demarcation Line six kilometres south-east of Gaza and ambushed a military truck carrying a lieutenant and thirty-four other ranks, who were moving from the south to reinforce the garrison of the Egyptian camp near the railway station. This attack was carried out on a highway south of Gaza and three kilometres within Egyptian-controlled territory.

The casualties on the Egyptian side were found to be 36 military personnel and two civilians killed, 29 military personnel and two civilians wounded.

Violation of Agreement

The Mixed Armistice Commission decided that this attack was a violation of Article I, paragraphs 2 and 3, Article II, paragraph 2, and Article V, paragraph 3 of the General Armistice Agreement.

An Israeli complaint dealing with the same incident was considered by the MAC. The complaint alleged that at about 21:00 local time an Israeli patrol was ambushed inside Israeli-controlled territory by an Egyptian armed force and that as a result a running fight, starting in Israel and carried on into Egyptian-controlled territory, ensued between the Egyptian force and the reinforcements brought to assist the Israeli patrol. The draft resolution submitted by the Israeli delegation was not adopted by the MAC.

In this draft resolution, the Israeli authorities reported that eight of their soldiers were killed and thirteen wounded in the ambush and in the subsequent fight. The reports of the United Nations observers on the investigation

of the Egyptian and Israeli complaints are attached to this report as Appendices I and II. The draft resolutions adopted and rejected, in their full text, are attached as Appendix III.

Serious Clash

The character and extent of the operations, the damage done and, above all, the heavy casualties which must be a subject of the deepest regret, make this the most serious clash between the two Parties since the signing of the Armistice Agreement.

I shall attempt to set forth the state of affairs on the demarcation line between Egyptian-controlled territory in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli-controlled territory surrounding it, in the several months preceding the actual event. In my opinion, it is most important to assess the causes contributory to this very grave incident, with a view to persuading the Parties to modify their attitudes and so prevent still further deterioration of the situation.

In a previous report to the Security Council (S/3319) I submitted a number of tables containing the complaints received from the Egyptian and the Israeli delegations during the months of September and October 1954.

The tables (Appendices IV, V and VI) annexed to the report which I have the honour to submit today contain a complete list of the complaints lodged by both Parties during the last four months. Out of 99 Israeli complaints 80 alleged infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory, 10 crossing of the demarcation line by armed groups, 4 firing across the line, 3 crossing the line by an armed unit. Out of 36 Egyptian complaints, 9 alleged firing across the line, 9 overflights of Egyptian-controlled territory, 6 crossing of the line by armed groups, 3 crossing of the line by an armed unit. The number of casualties prior to the Gaza incident reflects the comparative tranquillity along the armistice demarcation line during the greater part of the period November 1954 - February 1955. According to the complaints received from both sides there were during these four months: 4 Israelis killed and 4 Israelis wounded; 1 Egyptian killed and 7 Egyptians wounded. There were more casualties among Arab infiltrators into Israel territory: 8 were killed, 2 wounded and 13 captured.

It would be a difficult task to assess the relative importance of alleged incidents if the Parties themselves—by requesting an emergency meeting of the MAC in certain cases, an investigation but not an emergency meeting in other cases, and neither an emergency meeting nor an investigation in a third category of cases—did not indicate that, in their opinion, there are major and minor incidents. We may consider that the major incidents are those which are dealt with in emergency meetings of the MAC, while the other incidents are placed on the agenda of the regular monthly meetings.

It must be added that a study of the major incidents alone does not give an adequate picture of the situation, since repeated minor incidents contribute to creating a state of tension. Infiltration from Egyptian-controlled territory has not been the only cause of present tension, but has undoubtedly been one of its main causes.

Incidents Dealt with by Emergency Meetings

The following are the incidents which have occurred since November first and have been dealt with in emergency meetings:

November fifth: the MAC condemned Egypt for the penetration of three men from Egyptian-controlled territory deep into Israel, where they blew up two houses in the village of Patish on November first. The MAC condemned Israel for the penetration of three Israelis up to about three kilometres inside Egyptian-controlled territory and their firing at the guards of a water tower on November first.

November tenth: the MAC condemned Israel for an attack carried out by a group of Israelis on a Bedouin tribe at Ein Quedis, three kilometres inside Egypt (2 Bedouins were kidnapped, camels and sheep were stolen).

Between the first of November and the 24th of December, there was only one incident for which an emergency meeting was requested. Israel requested an emergency meeting for the blowing up of a water pipeline leading to a *kibbutz* south of Faluja. The Chairman did not agree to an emergency meeting, as the alleged tracks led in a direction away from the Gaza Strip.

The incident which took place on December 24 was easily settled. Israel had complained that on that day an Egyptian military unit had crossed the international frontier and taken position within the Demilitarized Zone of El Auja. The MAC condemned Egypt for this violation of the Armistice Agreement. The Egyptian delegation stated that the unit which, according to the reports of the United Nations observers, did not exceed the strength of a platoon, had been removed. Both Parties agreed to call upon the Sub-Committee of the MAC to mark the international frontier on the ground, including the area where the incident had taken place. I have been informed that the Egyptian authorities are now opposed to a joint marking of the frontier and intend to mark it themselves.

Another incident relating to the area of the Auja Demilitarized Zone took place on December 29. Egypt presented a complaint and Israel a counter-complaint. The Egyptian delegation requested the condemnation of Israel, alleging that armed Israelis in vehicles coming from the Demilitarized Zone had approached the international frontier and shot at an Egyptian check-post. The Israel delegation alleged that an Egyptian military unit, after crossing the international frontier into the Demilitarized Zone, had opened fire, inside the Zone. No decision was taken by the MAC, the Chairman having abstained both on the Egyptian and the Israeli draft resolutions.

No incidents for which emergency meetings were held took place between the end of December 1954 and January 21, 1955. On the morning of that day an Egyptian military patrol attacked an Israeli post manned by three soldiers of whom one was killed, and the other two wounded. Egypt was condemned for that attack. The Egyptian delegation had requested a condemnation of Israel, alleging that Israeli soldiers had opened fire from an ambush upon an Egyptian patrol across the demarcation line. The Egyptian draft resolution was not carried, the Chairman having abstained from voting.

On the same day (January 21) at about 23:30, armed infiltrators from Egyptian-controlled territory attacked two Israelis of Ein Hashlosa settlement, six kilometres from the Demarcation Line, while they were ploughing their fields with a tractor. One was killed, the other was wounded. Two attackers were killed. The MAC condemned Egypt for this attack. The attack created much emotion in Israel and the draft resolution moved by the Israel delegation was couched in very strong terms. It noted with grave concern the serious



—United Nations

PALESTINE TRUCE SUPERVISION CHIEF ARRIVES AT U.N. HEADQUARTERS

Major-General E. L. M. Burns, of Canada, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, right, with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld.

situation prevailing along the Gaza Strip resulting from what it referred to as "these repeated attacks". It noted "once again with extremely grave concern that, despite the obligation imposed on Egypt by the General Armistice Agreement and a number of MAC resolutions, these penetrations and killings of Israeli citizens have not been terminated". It called upon the Egyptian authorities to put an immediate end to such aggressive acts. The Chairman voted for the resolution moved by the Israel delegation and the Egyptian delegation abstained.

On the afternoon of February 1, an exchange of fire took place across the Demarcation Line between an Israeli patrol and an Egyptian military position. The Israelis used automatic weapons and 3" mortars. One Egyptian soldier was killed, two were wounded. One Israeli soldier was wounded. By adopting the resolution moved by Egypt, then the resolution moved by Israel, the MAC divided responsibility between the two Parties. The MAC is often criticized for such judgments. It has been argued that it should state which side started the shooting. However, in the absence of a neutral eye-witness observer in the immediate vicinity, the contradictory evidence collected from the two sides rarely permits responsibility for the first shot to be assessed. Patrols in command cars drive a few meters from the demarcation line, close to the outposts on the other side and in a period of tension an incident may easily occur.

I should point out in this connexion that on February 25 and again on March 9, the Chairman of the MAC had to draw the attention of the Israel

delegation to the fact that Israeli patrols had provoked the Egyptians by cursing them in Arabic or shouting and laughing at them. The danger of such provocations, especially in present circumstances, need not be emphasized. On both sides, elements guarding the border should observe strict military discipline.

There was another exchange of fire on the morning of February 22 when according to the Egyptian resolution submitted to the MAC, an Israeli patrol fired with automatic weapons and mortars at an Egyptian military position in the Rafah area, wounding four Egyptian soldiers. According to the draft resolution submitted by the Israel delegation, when an Israeli patrol approached infiltrators who were cutting grass on the Israel side of the demarcation line, it was fired upon by the infiltrators and by the Egyptian military position. The latter used automatic weapons and mortars. There were no Israeli casualties. As in similar cases of exchange of fire, the MAC adopted both the Egyptian and the Israeli resolutions and the two Parties were condemned for having violated the General Armistice Agreement.

This was the latest shooting incident along the demarcation line prior to the Gaza incident six days later. From the Egyptian point of view the firing by the Israeli patrol at an Egyptian military position was one more hostile act against Egypt. From the Israeli point of view there was in the incident on February 22 both one more instance of the illegal activities in Israel of infiltrators crossing illegally from the Gaza Strip and one more hostile act against Israel.

The Bat Galim Case

The recurrence at more or less frequent intervals of shooting incidents along the demarcation line, the much more frequent cases of crossing of the line by infiltrators and their activities in Israel helped to maintain a state of greater or lesser tension, which was increased by the emotion created in Israel by the Bat Galim case and, in January, by the trial in Cairo of Jews charged with espionage and the condemnation to death of two of the defendants.

The tension following the Cairo trial was marked by the fact that the Israel delegation henceforth would agree to meet the Egyptian delegation only in emergency meetings of the MAC. By the end of February, however, there was some hope that the regular monthly meetings and also informal meetings might be resumed.

I have endeavoured to find out whether there had been a special, immediate cause for the Gaza incident on February 28. It must be noted that on the morning of March 1, the Israeli newspapers which had gone to press before the Israeli army spokesman issued his communiqué on the incident, reported extensively the information given by the same army spokesman concerning the alleged activities of a group of three armed men from the Gaza Strip. According to the English language Israeli newspaper "Jerusalem Post", the army spokesman explained that on the night of February 23, the three men had broken into an Israel Government building near Rishon Le Zion (some fifty kilometres from the Demarcation Line) and stolen official documents. Two days later, near Rohobot, 40 kilometres from the Demarcation Line, a cyclist was murdered allegedly by the same group (on March 7, the MAC condemned Egypt for this murder).

The Israel army spokesman's statement in the Israeli press on March 1 went on to say that when, on the morning of February 26, the three men who had allegedly committed those crimes in Israel crossed into the Gaza Strip, they were fired upon by an Israel patrol and they had to abandon their loot, including a telephone stolen from the Israel Government building on February 23. At the same time another alleged Egyptian group was operating in another area. An Israel unit patrolling on February 25 in the vicinity of Yad Mordechai, near the Demarcation Line, encountered two armed Egyptian agents and killed one of them. On the body was found a report of the movement of military vehicles in the south of Israel during February 24 and 25.

These incidents were connected by the Israel Army spokesman with previous activities of the Egyptian intelligence service during the past year. He claimed that Egyptian agents had been caught by the Israel army and sentenced to prison terms; ten had been killed in clashes with Israel patrols, five had escaped. The army spokesman added that the Egyptian military authorities in the Gaza Strip were conducting spying and sabotage operations in Israel territory.

The above officially-released information about Egyptian intelligence patrols was supplemented in the Hebrew newspapers of March 1 by details on alleged Egyptian espionage and intelligence activities since January 1954. Appendix VII to this report contains a translation of the most complete list published to my knowledge in a Hebrew newspaper—viz., the list published in *Lamerhav*. It refers to thirteen cases for the thirteen months January 1954 - February 1955.

The Gaza incident could appear in this context as retaliation for the spying, sabotage and murders for which the Egyptian military intelligence service was said to be responsible.

It had several times been intimated to me by the Israel military authorities that they had evidence proving such Egyptian activities. However, the evidence was not shown to me, presumably because the methods of espionage and counter-espionage are highly secret. Nor had Israel referred to Egyptian intelligence activities in any complaint lodged with the Mixed Armistice Commission except in two cases. On May 3, 1954, a complaint was submitted alleging that on May 1 there had been a clash between an Israeli patrol and five armed spies sent by the Egyptian authorities. Two of the spies were killed. On one of them was found a report concerning the traffic on the Faluja-Beersheba road on April 30 and May 1, 1954. Another Israeli complaint, dated November 22, 1954, alleged that, nearly two months earlier, on September 29, a clash had occurred between the Israeli police and an armed group of four men who had crossed the demarcation line. One of the men was wounded and taken prisoner. The complaint stated that the group had committed acts of violence in Israel territory from September 19 to 29. A United Nations Observer interrogated the prisoner, an Arab from Gaza, who stated that he was an Egyptian agent.

Lacking, except in these two cases, formal complaints to the MAC by Israel linking sabotage and murders in Israeli-controlled territory with the Egyptian military intelligence service, and lacking other evidence on which I could make formal representations directly to the Egyptian authorities, I was only able to inform them of Israeli suspicions. The position of the Egyptian

authorities was that persons committing murders and sabotage were being inspired, paid and equipped by political elements in Egypt inimical to the Government, and desirous of aggravating the border situation.

I may add that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission reported to me on November 5, 1954 that according to the Egyptian authorities, armed Israeli groups had been carrying out repeated reconnaissances deep into the Gaza Strip during the preceding three weeks.

There is no peace between the two countries and a request that they should curb the activities of military intelligence in obtaining information through agents would have been of little use. However, persons who might kill or sabotage have to cross the demarcation line to do so and a close guarding and patrolling on both sides of the line would hamper such activities, as well as those of ordinary thieves and marauders. The willingness of the Parties to co-operate effectively in such guarding and patrolling could, to a degree, indicate whether they really desire to keep the border area quiet.

Report to Security Council

On November 11, 1954, I reported to the Security Council on the situation as between Egypt and Israel, in the area of the Gaza Strip (S/3319). For some weeks prior to that report there had been much comment in the Israeli press on the deteriorating situation and hints that if it were not improved it would be impossible for Israel to remain passive.

With a view to decreasing tension along the Demarcation Line, I suggested in that report that the two parties should examine in an informal meeting the possibility of agreeing on certain measures. These were:

- (a) Joint patrols along sensitive sections of the Demarcation Line;
- (b) Negotiation of a Local Commanders' Agreement;
- (c) A barbed wire obstacle along certain portions of the Demarcation Line;
- (d) Manning of all outposts and patrols by regular Egyptian and Israeli troops.

On November 14, I had a preliminary discussion on these matters with the Director of the Palestine Affairs Department of the Egyptian Ministry of War; and I discussed them on November 24 with the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces. Both these Officers agreed that the proposals should be further considered. The Israeli Chief of Staff, however, stressed his opinion that it was essentially Egypt's responsibility to prevent infiltration. Owing to the Bat Galim negotiations and other difficulties, it was not until January 6 that I could arrange a joint discussion on a Gaza arrangement. The following is a summary of the results of that meeting:

- (a) The Israeli representative did not consider that the institution of joint patrols by the two Parties along the Demarcation Line would serve a useful purpose at this time. I pointed out that such joint patrols, while they might not be effective against infiltration, would prevent the recurring incidents in which fire was opened by Egyptians on Israeli patrols or by Israelis on Egyptian positions, and the mining of patrol vehicles. All of these types of incident have been the subject of

complaints in the past and occurred in the period preceding the Gaza incident.

- (b) After considerable discussion, it was agreed that an arrangement for the control of infiltration and incidents in the Gaza area might be made between the two Parties, on the general line of the proposed Jerusalem Area Commanders' Arrangement, and that the Parties would consider a draft which I would prepare.
- (c) Both parties felt that in principle it was desirable that those entrusted with security duties in a zone on either side of the Demarcation Line should be either regular military forces or full-time police forces.
- (d) The representatives considered the erection of physical obstacles to prevent infiltration, namely, barbed wire fences with mines and under observation. The Egyptian representative was not prepared to agree to a joint effort for the erection of such an obstacle, but had no objection to Israel putting one up, if it were desired.

The Israel representative has since informed me by letter dated January 19 that "we (Israel) did not, and cannot, agree to any joint responsibility regarding infiltration since, as there is no infiltration from our side, the responsibility lies solely with Egypt".

Draft Proposal

On January 12, I sent a draft of a proposed "Arrangements for the Purpose of Preventing Incidents in the Gaza Area" to both Parties for their comments. I received some comments from the Egyptian representative, but by the end of January, Israel had not yet replied. As a result of the Egyptian representative's comments and further examination, a second draft (copy attached as Appendix VIII) was despatched to both Parties on the first of February under a covering letter which suggested a meeting to arrive at a final agreed text.

On the eve of my departure for New York, on March 12, I received a letter from the Israel representative in which he confirmed his agreement expressed in the informal meeting of January 6, to conclude an Area Commanders' Arrangement in the Gaza Strip area for the purpose of preventing the crossing of the Demarcation Line and other breaches of the General Armistice Agreement. A draft incorporating the Israeli proposals for an Arrangement was attached to the Israel representative's letter.

I am still of opinion that if an agreement were effected between the two Parties on the lines I have suggested, and if an honest attempt to fulfil the conditions were made by both Parties, infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance, a kind of thieving which Israel must probably regard as inevitable so long as there are vast numbers of poverty-stricken refugees on her borders—more than 200,000 in the Gaza Strip alone. Moreover, if such incidents were presented to the public by publicity media in proportion to their intrinsic importance, tendencies to demand retaliatory action could be restrained.

On the other hand, though I am aware that stealing—retaliatory or not—has not been limited to one side, especially in the case of cattle, the Egyptian authorities should take appropriate measures against theft and the sale of

goods such as irrigation pipes, produce, nursery stock, etc., stolen by infiltrators from Israeli settlements. The Egyptian authorities should apply strictly the severe penalties provided by Egyptian ordinances against illegal crossing of the Demarcation Line, take the measures necessary to ensure that no arms or explosives are in possession of unstable elements and, especially, give adequate publicity to punishments meted out for theft or illegal crossing. Such publicity should include notification to the MAC. Otherwise, it is understandable that, seeing no news of infiltrators being punished, the Israelis refuse to believe that a serious attempt is being made to prevent the depredations which eventually build up tension to a dangerous point.



—Capital Press

FOREIGN MINISTER OF BELGIUM VISITS OTTAWA

Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak visited Canada from February 24 to March 2. He spent several days in Ottawa as the guest of the Governor General and had discussions with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs and met members of Parliament. The latter part of his visit he spent in Montreal when he was entertained by the Mayor, visited McGill University and the University of Montreal, and was the guest of honour at functions organized by the International Civil Aviation Organization and by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Above, Mr. Spaak, right, is received at Rockcliffe Airport by Mr. Pearson.

The GATT To-day

The Origins of the GATT

A characteristic feature of the early post-war period was an effort to renew peacetime endeavour and to establish international machinery to supplement national activities and to make it possible for national aspirations to be pursued in relation to the needs of the world community. The basic concept was that, by accepting the obligations of membership in international organizations, participating countries would receive compensating benefits—generally out of the security afforded by internationally accepted codes of conduct, and specifically out of attention to their particular needs when these could be established as deserving special consideration.

In the economic and social field this objective found expression in the setting up of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, with its subsidiary commissions, and in the formation of the Specialized Agencies. In addition, many existing arrangements which before the war had proved valuable in particular fields were again set in motion, and new arrangements were made to tackle the immediate problems of certain areas.

The main new economic agencies established immediately after the war were the Breton Woods twins: the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At that time it was recognized that these financial institutions would not be wholly effective until international agreement was secured on trade matters as well. To meet this need broad international discussions were initiated under the auspices of the United Nations as early as 1946. These discussions led to the completion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the autumn of 1947 and to the preparation of the draft charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) in the spring of 1948.

Significant Features

One of the most immediately significant features of the GATT was the fact that it embodied the results of extensive tariff negotiations, and provided that these reduced tariffs would be stabilized for a fixed period (subsequently renewed to June 30, 1955) and generally made applicable to all the contracting parties in accordance with the "most-favoured-nation" principle. The agreement also contained complex provisions relating to the other barriers to multilateral trade which many governments had found it necessary to introduce—import quotas, measures discriminating against or in favour of particular countries or areas, special taxes, export subsidies, and the like. The broad aim of the GATT in relation to such barriers to normal trade was to provide for their progressive elimination and to bring their operation in the meantime under the surveillance of the contracting parties to the agreement in the light of the generally accepted "rules of the road" or "code of conduct".

For reasons into which it is unnecessary to enter here the ITO was never ratified, and the GATT, although only a provisional agreement, continued to operate as the principal instrument for collectively reducing tariff barriers and for regulating international trading practices. Two further rounds of tariff

negotiations were held under the GATT, one in Annecy, France, in 1949, and the other in Torquay, England, in 1950-51. By this time the membership of GATT had expanded from the original twenty-three to thirty-four countries, and the goods covered by the GATT tariff schedules represented more than 80 per cent of the world's trade. Tariff reductions under the GATT, covering about 50,000 tariff items, were made possible by the readiness of the contracting parties to negotiate but it would also be fair to say that the such progress would have been extremely difficult if the United States, implementing its Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, had not at this time been prepared to join actively in seeking to lower tariffs on a mutually advantageous basis.

Between 1947 and 1954 the contracting parties to the GATT met, about once a year, to attend to normal business. This business consists chiefly of such matters as consideration of requests from contracting parties—perhaps for permission to renegotiate bound tariff items under special circumstances; questions relating to customs administration; consultations with respect to the balance-of-payments positions of particular countries or with respect to other matters as provided for in the Agreement; the hearing of complaints from contracting parties which consider they have suffered damage as a result of actions taken by other contracting parties; and other matters of this kind. From time to time, too, amendments have been made to the Agreement but, until the most recent session, these were of a fairly routine nature.

The Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties

The ninth session, which was held in Geneva from late October 1954, until early March 1955, had not only to deal with matters of ordinary business but also to deal with three special matters. In October 1953, the contracting parties had agreed to allow Japan to participate in their sessions pending her accession to the GATT. At the ninth session arrangements were made for tariff negotiations involving Japan so that that country, with the agreement of the contracting parties, might eventually adhere to the Agreement. These tariff negotiations, in which Canada is participating, are now going on in Geneva.

The second special matter dealt with at the ninth session was a review of the Agreement which it was decided to undertake in order to bring its provisions more into line with present-day trading conditions. It was thought that the time might have arrived when the binding of tariff schedules might be arranged on a more permanent basis. Also, the improvement in the balance-of-payments positions of most member countries, and the growing possibility of convertibility, made it desirable to consider some tightening up in the "trade rules" governing the use of quantitative restrictions; and the underdeveloped countries wished to have their special problems more specifically recognized. For these and related reasons it was decided that as envisaged in the original agreement, there should be a thoroughgoing review of all the provisions of the Agreement at the ninth session.

The third special matter was the drawing up of an agreement on an organization which, coupled with the revised GATT, would transform the embryo organization already embodied in the GATT into a permanent international institution. The contracting parties decided to do this because they felt it was time that the GATT lost its provisional character and became established in a suitable form as a feature of international life.

With all these matters to attend to, it is not surprising that the contracting parties were in session for just over four months. Delegates attended from the thirty-four member countries, from Japan, from ten observer countries and from international organizations.* Mr. L. D. Wilgress of Canada was Chairman of the Ninth Session. Working parties and panels were set up to deal with both the ordinary business and the review of the Agreement; most working parties had several sub-groups to deal with selected segments of their work.

Canadian Participation

The Minister in charge of the Canadian delegation was the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, who attended the GATT session in December. The Canadian delegation, under the leadership of Mr. Wilgress, was represented on the working party dealing with customs administration and played an active part in the work of most of the other working parties dealing with the regular business of the session.† There was a Canadian representative on three of the four working parties set up to review the Agreement, and Canadian delegates also participated in the work of the fourth of these working parties.‡ The Canadian delegation provided the Chairman of the Working party on Organizational and Functional Questions which, among its other responsibilities, had the task of drawing up the agreement for the new Organization for Trade Co-operation.

The Results of the Ninth Session

The main results of the ninth session may be most conveniently summarized by treating together questions decided in the course of regular business and matters dealt with during the review of the Agreement.

* *Member countries:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay.

Participating in the ninth session: Japan.

Observer countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mexico, Portugal, Switzerland.

International organizations in attendance: The United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Labour Organization, Organization for European Economic Co-operation, Council of Europe, Customs Co-operation Council, European Coal and Steel Community.

† The Canadian delegation consisted of the following:

Representative: Mr. L. D. Wilgress, Canada's Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation; *Alternate representatives:* Mr. A. F. W. Plumptre, Department of Finance; Dr. C. M. Isbister, Department of Trade and Commerce; Mr. L. E. Couillard, Department of External Affairs; Dr. A. E. Richards, Department of Agriculture; Mr. A. W. Brown, Department of National Revenue; Mr. B. G. Barrow, Department of Trade and Commerce; Mr. C. A. Annis, Department of Finance; Mr. M. Schwarzmann, Department of Trade and Commerce; *Secretary:* Mr. W. Lavoie, Department of Trade and Commerce.

In the course of the session, Dr. Isbister, Mr. Plumptre, Mr. Brown and Mr. Barrow returned to Ottawa and Mr. M. W. Sharp, Associate Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. S. S. Reisman of the Department of Finance and Mr. L. C. Howie of the Department of National Revenue joined the delegation.

‡ The following working parties were set up to review the General Agreement: Working Party I on Quantitative Restrictions, Working Party II on Tariffs, Schedules and Customs Administration, Working Party III on Barriers to Trade other than Restrictions or Tariffs, and Working Party IV on Organizational and Functional Questions.

Stability of Tariff Schedules

In the field of tariffs the contracting parties drew up a declaration on the continued application of tariff schedules which, when accepted by governments, will provide for the continuing firm validity of schedules until the end of 1957, with automatic three-year extensions thereafter. (Previous agreements to maintain tariff levels had been for single periods only, sometimes for less than three years.) There is provision for renegotiation of bound items toward the end of each period in the event that contracting parties find this necessary. This is consistent with the provisions of the present Agreement, under which a limited number of renegotiations are now going forward relating to the period of binding which was due to expire on June 30, 1955. These negotiations are on a small scale and will have very little effect on the main structure of the tariff schedules. The contracting parties decided to set up a working party to consider the possibility of another round of tariff negotiations the object of which, if held, would be to further reduce tariffs on a multilateral basis.

The "Rules of Trade"

It had been hoped that, because of the improved economic positions of most GATT countries, it would be possible to strengthen the "trade rules" of the GATT in a way which would provide for the fairly rapid elimination of remaining quantitative restrictions and discriminatory treatment of various kinds. It was found, however, that many countries were not prepared to contemplate early removal of all such restrictions. Consequently the "tightening up" agreed upon by the contracting parties took a somewhat different form.

No change was made in the basic principle of the Agreement that contracting parties which maintain quantitative restrictions for balance of payments reasons have to eliminate them as soon as they can no longer be justified for balance-of-payments reasons. But in order to make this principle more effective in practice, and particularly in order to adapt it to a period when the major currencies may become convertible, it was proposed that, soon after entry into force of the amendments, the Organization will review all quantitative restrictions still maintained for balance-of-payments reasons. Thereafter a system of annual consultations with contracting parties still applying restrictions of this type would come into effect and these countries would be required to justify each year the restrictions still being maintained.

The "Hard-Core Waiver"

In association with the proposed new system of control on the use of quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons, the contracting parties took a decision, with immediate effect, to assist in resolving the problems faced by contracting parties in eliminating the so-called "hard-core" of their import restrictions. These are restrictions whose sudden removal, when no longer justified for balance-of-payments reasons, would result in a serious injury to a domestic industry or branch of agriculture, to which they have afforded protection. The decision granted a temporary waiver from the obligation to eliminate quantitative restrictions in such circumstances subject to the concurrence of the contracting parties in each case. The contracting parties may impose such conditions and limitations as they determine to be reasonable and neces-

sary and the obligation is laid on the applicant to eliminate the quantitative restrictions in question over a comparatively short period of time. The application of these "hard-core" restrictions and the progress made towards eliminating them will be reviewed by the contracting parties annually.

The "United States Agricultural Waiver"

In connection with the review of quantitative restrictions, the contracting parties, by a separate decision, dealt with the conflict which occasionally arises between action required under United States legislation and the provisions of the GATT which deal with quantitative restrictions and additional charges on imports. The contracting parties adopted a Decision, effective forthwith, which recognizes the difficulties arising from the terms of Section 22 of the United States Agricultural Adjustment Act, permits the United States to apply measures under this legislation, but at the same time preserves the right of a contracting party whose trade is damaged by import restrictions or additional charges imposed under that Act to have recourse to the procedures of the Agreement for adjusting the balance through negotiation. The contracting parties will review annually action taken by the United States under this legislation, and the United States Government has given assurances that before taking any new action it will consult with substantially interested countries and will terminate any restriction imposed under the legislation as soon as it is no longer required.

Canada and many other countries were concerned over the United States' request for this "blanket" waiver which does not provide for close supervision by the contracting parties as does the "hard-core" waiver. Canada, and most countries which export agricultural products to the United States, opposed the waiver and voted against it. Of course, the fact that the United States has been granted a waiver from its obligations with respect to import restrictions on agricultural products does not mean that the United States is about to impose new and severe restrictions on imports from Canada. And Canada has, of course, retained its rights under the GATT to take whatever action would be appropriate if the United States were to embark on such a course.

Assistance for Economic Development

Many of the countries which participate in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are among the economically under-developed countries of Asia and Latin America. These countries face real difficulties, which are recognized by the other contracting parties. These countries are not going to be able, at an early date, to participate fully in the reduction of trade barriers and the attainment of the convertibility of world currencies. Most of them are still in need of sympathetic aid and assistance in the solution of their own problems. It is in the interest of more advanced countries like Canada to meet them in this spirit. The contracting parties did this, in effect, by writing a GATT within a GATT to deal with their special problems. Each of these under-developed countries, however, will find that its own situation will be improved, in the future, when convertibility of the major world currencies, and the dismantling of import restrictions currently being imposed by some of the major trading countries, have been achieved. The problems which to-day create difficulties for them will then be much easier to solve.

Miscellaneous Matters of Importance: Export Subsidies, Problems of Commodity Trade, etc.

The contracting parties dealt with a great many miscellaneous matters important to their trading arrangements. Provisions, additional to those already in the Agreement, were drawn up to limit the harmful effect of export subsidies. In the field of primary products contracting parties would be under an obligation not to use subsidies which increase exports so as to obtain for themselves more than a fair share of world trade. In the field of non-primary products no new or increased export subsidies would be permitted. The contracting parties agreed that there should be a re-examination to determine before the end of 1957, whether existing export subsidies on non-primary commodities can be abolished or whether the maintenance of the standstill should be extended for a further period.

The contracting parties adopted a resolution providing that if a contracting party decides to liquidate any agricultural surpluses it should do so in such a way as to avoid unduly provoking disturbances on the world market that would adversely affect other member countries. They recommend "that when arranging the disposal of surplus agricultural products in world trade, contracting parties should undertake a procedure of consultation with the principal suppliers of those products and other interested contracting parties, which would contribute to the orderly liquidation of such surpluses including, where practicable, disposals designed to expand consumption of the products, and to the avoidance of prejudice to the interests of other contracting parties, and that they give sympathetic consideration to the views expressed by other contracting parties in the course of such consultations".

The contracting parties also recommended that, whenever practicable, any contracting party intending to liquidate a substantial quantity of strategic stocks of primary commodities should give advance notice and should consult fully with any contracting party which considers itself substantially interested and requests such consultations.

During the course of the Review the contracting parties established a working party to consider a proposal for a convention which might govern international action on problems arising in the field of international trade in primary commodities. The working party, acting in the capacity of an expert group, concluded that it could not put its recommendations into final form until the interested governments had studied its preliminary views. It was decided therefore that the working party will meet again in the summer of 1955 after receiving the views of governments.

The Organization for Trade Co-operation

For the past seven years the GATT has been administered in an ad hoc manner. The main work has been done at the sessions of the contracting parties, with assistance from a small secretariat and from an international committee meeting in advance of the main meetings. One of the major objectives of the ninth session was to lay a foundation for a permanent organization which would administer the GATT and conduct its business.

The contracting parties drew up an Agreement which, when it comes into force, will establish the Organization for Trade Co-operation. The Agreement

contains the basic provisions relating to the structure and functions of the Organization. There would be an Assembly, and Executive Committee and a secretariat headed by a Director-General. The main function of the Organization would be to administer the General Agreement. In addition, the Organization would be able to sponsor international trade negotiations and to serve as an intergovernmental forum for the discussion and solution of other questions relating to international trade. The Agreement will enter into force, among the governments that have accepted it, after it has been accepted by countries which account for 85 per cent of the total external trade covered by the Agreement.*

Present Status of the General Agreement

The results of the ninth session covering revision of the Agreement and the proposed Organization for Trade Co-operation are now before member governments for consideration.†

The Revised GATT

The revised General Agreement is not markedly different from the agreement now in effect. In some respects it has been strengthened, chiefly by providing for closer and more continuous consultation designed to reduce barriers to trade. Another stabilizing feature of the revised agreement is the provision for indefinite continuation, with appropriate arrangements for adjustment, of the tariff schedules negotiated by the contracting parties. Another major step in the direction of permanence and stability for GATT is the proposed Organization for Trade-Co-operation, which is to come into force when it has been ratified by countries accounting for 85 per cent of the trade of the GATT countries:

* The following table indicates the percentage of the trade of the GATT countries accounted for by each of them considered separately:

<i>Contracting parties on March 1, 1955</i>		<i>%</i>		<i>%</i>
Australia	3.1	Haiti	0.1	
Austria	0.9	India	2.4	
Belgium-Luxembourg	4.3	Indonesia	1.3	
Brazil	2.5	Italy	2.9	
Burma	0.3	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	4.7	
Canada	6.7	New Zealand	1.0	
Ceylon	0.5	Nicaragua	0.1	
Chile	0.6	Norway	1.1	
Cuba	1.1	Pakistan	0.9	
Czechoslovakia	1.4	Peru	0.4	
Denmark	1.4	Rhodesia and Nyasaland	0.6	
Dominican Republic	0.1	Sweden	2.5	
Finland	1.0	Turkey	0.6	
France	8.7	Union of South Africa	1.8	
Germany, Federal Republic of	5.3	United Kingdom	20.3	
Greece	0.4	United States of America	20.6	
		Uruguay	0.4	
				100.0

† These documents are: (1) Protocol Amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement (2) Protocol Amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement (3) Agreement on the Organization for Trade Co-operation (4) Protocol of Organizational Amendments to the General Agreement (which amends the General Agreement to take account of the Organization for Trade Co-operation when it comes into force). Another instrument (5) which has also been opened for signature by member governments, is the Declaration on Continued Application of Schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which will extend the assured life of the tariff schedules from July 1, 1955, to December 31, 1957. The Canadian authorities have under consideration a proposal to publish the revised General Agreement, and related documents, in a form in which they can easily be examined by those wishing to make a detailed study of the subject.

Attitude of Canadian Government

The present attitude of the Canadian Government toward the GATT has been indicated in general terms in recent statements by Canadian Ministers. On March 8 the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, informing the House of Commons of the conclusion of the ninth session stated: "I think I should make it clear at this time that the GATT will go on. We already have an agreement which is being provisionally applied by the member governments, and this agreement will continue. In regard to amendments that have been proposed, I have only one remark to make at this time. This is to say that while they do not add up to as strong and effective a GATT as I had hoped last October when the review began, they do add up to a more satisfactory agreement than I had feared when I returned from Geneva last December. The result is not as good as it might have been, but it might have been much worse. It will continue to be in Canada's interest to adhere to the GATT."

On March 21, the day that the results of the ninth session were released to the press, Mr. Howe said in a speech to the Canadian Club of Montreal:

"This (the decision to establish the GATT) marked a great step forward. For the first time in history, there came into being a commonly accepted code of commercial behaviour, applicable to all except a minor fraction of world trade. For the first time in history, the major trading nations got together for the express purpose of reducing the level of tariff barriers.

"That is why the Canadian Government has been such a strong supporter of the strongest possible GATT. We are a trading nation. In a literal sense we live by trade. It is in our interest to support international efforts to reduce barriers to trade, and to give leadership in that direction when opportunity arises. This is not impractical idealism. For a country like Canada, it is the most practical kind of realism and common sense.


"Admittedly the GATT is not a perfect instrument from our point of view, or from any country's point of view. Any trade agreement, acceptable to a large number of countries, must involve compromises amongst different points of view. While none of the participating countries can be completely satisfied with it, it has undoubtedly performed a useful job for all concerned. I think there is a wide measure of agreement in all countries that the world is richer, and standards of living are higher than they would have been, had there been no GATT. Certainly Canadian trade has benefited from the major tariff reductions that have been negotiated, particularly with the United States, as have we benefited by the existence of a code of trading rules . . .

"You will understand . . . why I said in Parliament that it will continue to be in Canada's interest to adhere to the GATT. It can be argued, I know, that one of the principal results of this recent session has been to relieve other countries of their obligations without corresponding relief for Canada. I am not much impressed by that kind of argument. Surely our essential interest lies not in weakening the GATT by asking for special exemptions or special treatment. Surely it lies in continuing to support the efforts of those in all countries who are striving to base international trade on a sound and sure foundation of sensible rules."

On April 5 the Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter Harris, stated in the course of his budget speech in Parliament:

Our trade relations with most of the outside world continue to be governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This Agreement, I believe, serves our interests far better than a series of separate international trade agreements with all the other contracting parties and it is, of course, infinitely better for us than the chaotic trade warfare that might take place if there were no trade agreements at all. The articles of the General Agreement were the subject of close scrutiny during a long conference this winter in Geneva and a number of amendments were provisionally agreed upon there.

These negotiations were under the personal direction of my colleague the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe), and I am sure we all agree that there is no one better qualified to conduct such negotiations on behalf of Canada. He has reported to the House that the revised GATT is greatly to be preferred to no agreement at all, and that it will continue to be in Canada's interest to adhere to it. In this connection I can now announce that we propose to join with others in the general rebinding of tariff schedules as from July 1 of this year.



—Capital Press

PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA ARRIVES AT OTTAWA

The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Robert Gordon Menzies, visited Canada from March 7 to March 13. For the first two days of his visit he was the guest of the Governor General at Government House. Mr. Menzies, who was accompanied by members of his Government and senior advisers, had meetings with members of the Canadian Government and attended a number of dinners and receptions held in his honour. On March 11 Mr. Menzies visited Montreal when he was given an honorary degree by McGill University. On March 13 he left Ottawa by air for Washington. Mr. Menzies, left, is shown above being received by the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, at Uplands Airport, Ottawa.

Canada and the Specialized Agencies

A review of the work of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, released by the Organization's Department of Public Information, shows that many of the Agencies are co-operating in the campaign of the United Nations against starvation, poverty, disease and ignorance in the economically under-developed areas of the world. The Canadian Government, as well as individual Canadians, are lending support to the Agencies engaged in the campaign. In 80 countries and territories, seven of the Agencies aided governments through the U.N. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, financed by a special fund of voluntary contributions pledged by 74 countries. A recent survey showed that more than 700 experts sent by the Specialized Agencies were at work in the field and some 350 fellows were receiving advanced training in special skills needed for economic and social development. In addition, a number of the Agencies provided technical assistance under their regular budgets.

The Specialized Agencies' regular programmes are carried on under budgets financed by assessed contributions of member governments. The net 1954 budgets of the seven Agencies engaged in technical assistance work—the International Labour Office (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)—totalled \$34,703,759. Canada's total assessment amounted to \$1,387,000. Two other Specialized Agencies—the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—derive their budgets from income or earnings from capital made available by member countries, including Canada. They co-operate with the Programme but finance their technical assistance solely from their own budgets.

U.N. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance

The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance is carried out through the Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) in co-operation with the Specialized Agencies. The TAA, headed since its inception in 1950 by a Canadian, Dr. H. L. Keenleyside, was established as an Agency of the United Nations to provide technical assistance in the industrial and related fields which were not within the scope of the existing Specialized Agencies. The Technical Assistance Board (TAB), which operates under the Economic and Social Council, co-ordinates and reviews the activities carried out under this programme, and administers the annual allocation of Expanded Programme funds to the participating Agencies. In 1954 \$25,342,501 was made available for the Expanded Programme by member Governments on a voluntary contribution basis. Canada's contribution of \$1.5 million was third largest, following those of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Canadian participation in the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations is not limited to financial support. The Technical Co-operation

Service of the Department of Trade and Commerce which administers the Canadian Government's activities in the field of technical assistance, assists the TAA and several of the Specialized Agencies in locating Canadian consultants and technicians and arranging Canadian facilities for their trainees. Other Specialized Agencies, such as WHO and FAO, often deal direct with other Canadian Government Departments or institutions for this purpose.

Canadian Experts Abroad

In all, as of December 31, 1954, there were 70 Canadian experts serving abroad under the TAA and the Specialized Agencies in 28 countries. Under UNESCO's Technical Assistance, there were in December 1954, Canadian experts in science teaching, documentation, adult education and the production of teaching films in Burma, Jordan, India and Thailand. Under WHO's programmes as of December 31, Canadian scientists, medical doctors and nurses were serving in Bolivia, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Nationalist China, India, Indonesia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak; and under FAO, Canadian experts in farm machinery, agricultural engineering, range management, land use and farm management, irrigation and drainage engineering, forestry, home economics and cotton growing in Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Iceland, Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Two examples of Canadians whose expert knowledge in diverse fields is being put to use under Technical Assistance are Dr. A. E. Hardy, Professor of Agricultural Engineering at the University of Saskatchewan, and Dr. Gustave Gingras of the Montreal Institute for the Rehabilitation of Invalids. Dr. Hardy, one of this continent's leading agricultural engineers, has served abroad from February 1951, since November 1954 as Chief of FAO's mission in Ceylon. Dr. Gingras was earlier instrumental in establishing, under the auspices of the TAA, an Institute for the Rehabilitation of Invalids in Venezuela, and is now engaged in similar work in Uruguay. A preliminary step will be to bring doctors and nurses from Uruguay to Montreal and Toronto for special training.

This training will be part of the technical assistance programme under which the Department of Trade and Commerce and other government departments co-operate with the TAA and the Specialized Agencies in organizing the visits of "fellows" or trainees from other countries. From 1950 to December 31, 1954, with generous co-operation from the provincial authorities, private industry and the universities, the Technical Co-operation Service had already placed 264 persons from 59 countries and territories. These trainees have been making practical studies, mainly in such fields as public administration and finance, engineering, agriculture, social welfare, railroads, education, co-operatives and marketing, hydro-electricity, mining, smelting and oil production. There have, for instance, been trainees from Mexico studying foreign capital investment, from Korea studying local government and from Hong Kong studying federal government administration.

Canadian participation in the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations is additional to Canada's share in the Programme for Technical Co-operation under the Colombo Plan for Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, which was originated by Commonwealth countries, including Canada. Under the Colombo Plan Canada co-operates actively with the United Nations Agencies on many of their projects.

Current Activities of the Specialized Agencies

FAO

Technical Assistance is being given by FAO in 55 countries. More than 300 final reports of FAO experts have been transmitted to governments, and 270 fellows have finished their studies and returned home. Much of FAO's effort in South and Southeast Asia had been devoted to increasing the production of rice, and optimistic reports of the results of new measures introduced were given in Tokyo last October at a meeting of the International Rice Commission (which is sponsored by FAO). FAO's international action against the desert locust in the Middle East has reportedly "prevented any serious loss to food production" in the past three years. The comprehensive operational plan for the 1954-55 anti-locust campaign throughout the Arabian peninsula is expected to provide a blue-print for similar international campaigns in areas affected by this pest. Canada has agreed to provide, under the Colombo Plan, a portion of the equipment to be used in this campaign. In individual countries, FAO carried on programmes to control livestock diseases, improve the quality and cut the costs of rubber production, improve fishing methods, and other special projects. Because surpluses of certain foods have been developing despite a continued low consumption in many areas, FAO has been urging "selective expansion" of agricultural production and consumption, and has sent experts to Latin America, the Near East and Asia to advise on the production of non-surplus foods and the increased use of products which are plentiful in the area.

WHO

The World Health Organization reports encouraging developments in the field of health—including control of malaria and of the disfiguring tropical disease of yaws, a sharp drop in infant mortality rates, "remarkable progress" in combating tuberculosis, and a "sanitary awakening" in Southeast Asia during the past year. In India, Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa, WHO has achieved striking results in reducing malaria. The first continent-wide campaign to wipe out malaria started in the Western Hemisphere has been initiated this year under the sponsorship of WHO's Regional Office for the Americas. WHO reports that there is "reason to believe that co-ordinated action" by all governments will make possible "the eradication of malaria in the Americas" in less than five years. In this and other campaigns, there has been close co-operation between WHO and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

UNESCO

By the end of 1954, some 350 UNESCO experts had been sent to member states, and projects in education and science were under way in 36 countries. Twenty-eight projects had been completed and the governments concerned were continuing the work launched by the UNESCO teams. UNESCO has been placing special emphasis on assistance to member states in public school education, helping 19 countries in reorganizing their educational systems. For example, 18 of the 21 Latin-American countries were represented at a UNESCO-aided regional training centre for fundamental education in Mexico. 159 students have completed the 19-month course and are now being used by their governments as leaders in national fundamental or rural education programmes. The attention being given by governments to this problem is indi-

cated by India's report that within the past seven years 5,000,000 more children have been placed in primary schools; high school enrollment has risen from three to six million; the number of schools has more than doubled, and the national budget for education has been raised from 45 million dollars to 300 million in the same period. In the field of natural sciences the most significant development for UNESCO last year was the coming into force of a UNESCO-sponsored convention setting up a European Centre for Nuclear Research. The Convention has been ratified and the Centre set up by 10 European countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, the German Federal Republic, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In addition, Italy and Yugoslavia have signed the Convention. Scientific documentation centres, through which research workers will be kept abreast of scientific news from all over the world, have been turned over to the governments of Mexico, India, Yugoslavia, Uruguay and Egypt.

ILO

More than half the technical assistance funds available to ILO in 1954 were spent to increase workers' productivity and total production through the use of modern techniques. By the spring of 1954, more than 4,000 supervisors in four Asian countries—Ceylon, India, Pakistan and the Philippines—had received instruction in institutes started by ILO. In all, ILO had 105 technical assistance projects in hand in 45 countries, and at the end of the year 88 ILO experts and instructors in the field. National productivity centres were set up in India and Egypt with ILO aid during the year. What proved a "most valuable form of technical assistance" is the worker-trainee programme under which workers have been sent abroad from Bolivia, Columbia, Israel, Turkey, Yugoslavia and other countries for advanced industrial experience. After their return to their own jobs, their employers have reported increased productivity, improved quality of goods, and promotion of the workers. In June 1954, ILO's 37th General Conference adopted a formal recommendation that employed persons with certain exceptions be entitled to an annual paid vacation of not less than two working weeks for a year's service. At a meeting in Rome in November the Governing Body placed the question of forced labour on the 1956 Conference Agenda.

ICAO

On December 7, 1954, ICAO observed the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Having drawn up standards of air navigation and regional plans for navigation facilities and services on the world's airways, ICAO has been concentrating on ensuring that they are put into effect by each of its 65 member states. ICAO reports from its Montreal headquarters that the statistics of international scheduled airline operations show that, as a result of this change in emphasis, a great proportion of the "serious deficiencies" which existed throughout the world in the provision of air navigation facilities have disappeared. Under U.N. technical assistance, more than 100 ICAO experts have helped under-developed countries expand air transport services needed for economic progress. Approximately 1,000 students have been enrolled in ICAO-established classes for radio operators, radio maintenance mechanics, air traffic controllers, weather observers and forecasters and other specialists, and more than 100 advanced students have received fellowships for training abroad.

ITU

Under the ITU technical assistance programme, 14 experts have helped under-developed countries, chiefly in the Middle East and southern Asia, improve their telecommunication systems in the past year. In addition, 12 telecommunication specialists from under-developed countries have been granted fellowships for advanced study abroad. Three technical committees of ITU—composed of experts in telegraphy, telephony and radio—have co-operated in the development of a General Switching Programme for linking major international telecommunication lines in Europe and the Mediterranean Basin to countries of the Middle East and southern Asia. ITU has continued co-ordinating the assignment of frequencies to various radio services, and marked progress was reported in 1954 in the preparation of new plans for high-frequency broadcasting and in carrying out plans to increase the effectiveness of aeronautical and maritime radio communications.

WMO

A main objective of WHO in the past year has been to increase the contribution of meteorology to the solution of economic problems such as the creation of new natural sources of power, an increase in agricultural output, development of water resources and the fight against locust and insect pests. In Libya, Syria, the Dominican Republic and Jordan, WMO under its Technical Assistance programme has provided assistance in setting up national weather services and in training local students in weather-observing practices.

International Bank

By the end of the calendar year 1954, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had made 112 loans totalling approximately \$2,064,000,000 for use in 36 countries and territories. A good proportion of this was applied to electric power development in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Austria, the remainder being devoted to such basic projects as highway construction in Ecuador and El Salvador to benefit agricultural areas, railway modernization in Mexico and French West Africa, provision of farm machinery for Peru and Colombia, port development in Turkey, waterways development in Belgium, the expansion of Norway's merchant fleet, construction of a natural gas transmission line in Pakistan and general economic development in Australia.


The Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

In the field of atomic energy, first steps were taken to implement a resolution of UNESCO's General Assembly in November, 1954 instructing the Director-General to study "measures of international scope to facilitate the use of radio-isotopes in research and industry", to co-operate fully in the United Nations programme of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and to disseminate objective information on the dangers and practical uses of atomic energy. Canada was represented at a meeting of experts called together by WHO in December to explore constructive uses of atomic energy in medicine, biology and public health—for example, in the diagnosis, treatment and control of diseases—and to study problems of health protection. Member governments were earlier asked to send in copies of any regulations in force on the protection of technical workers against radiation from X-rays

and radio-active isotopes. The World Meteorological Organization has asked member states to provide all available information on the possible effects of atomic explosions on the weather, and at the annual meeting of its Board of Governors in September, 1954, the International Bank was urged by the Governor from Pakistan to help in the harnessing of nuclear power for economic development projects.

These actions by the Specialized Agencies were in harmony with a resolution, co-sponsored by Canada, and unanimously adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations last December which called for the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency and the holding of an international technical conference. The Canadian Government has already accepted the invitation of the Director-General of the United Nations to participate in the Technical Conference to be held in Geneva from August 8 to August 20, 1955, and is represented on the committee preparing for it. The purpose of the Conference will be "to explore means of developing peaceful uses of atomic energy through international co-operation, and, in particular, to study the

(Continued on page 130)



—Capital Press

The Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. John Foster Dulles paid an official visit to Ottawa from March 17 to March 19, staying at Government House as the guest of the Governor General. During his visit Mr. Dulles had discussions with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs and other members of the Cabinet, and attended a special meeting of the Standing Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs. At a press conference on March 18, Mr. Dulles stressed the importance to his Government of close co-operation with Canada on all matters of foreign policy and defence. Above, Mr. Dulles is greeted on his arrival at Uplands Airport by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

External Affairs Debate

In an address in the House of Commons on March 24 the Secretary of State for External Affairs reviewed the policy of the Canadian Government on a number of international questions. As the House had recently had a full discussion of European affairs during the debate on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO, (reported in the February issue of *External Affairs*) Mr. Pearson spoke mainly about the situation in Indochina, Korea and Formosa.

Mr. Pearson referred to the increase in Canada's international responsibilities and this country's special and close relationship to London and to Washington which enabled it to exert on occasion a special influence on those capitals and thereby influence the course of events. Our effectiveness in this regard, however, the Minister pointed out, would depend not only on the way in which we accepted and discharged our own international responsibilities, but also on the reputation that we acquired and maintained for sound and objective judgment and action.

The Far East

Turning to the areas of tension in the Far East, Mr. Pearson pointed out that the most significant of all the political developments of the past decade or indeed of the past quarter century, has been the national awakening of the hundreds of millions in these nations and their insistent demand for economic, social and political progress towards a better life. While Canada welcomed the growth of national freedom and democracy among the people of Asia, the spread of communism in China and in other parts of Asia and the actions of the Peking regime had caused deep and understandable anxiety in Canada and in the whole of the non-communist world.

It was important, the Minister told the House, to try to understand the origins and purposes of communism in Asia and to discover the basis of its support. He said:

The communist movement in Asia is not simply a conspiracy of evil and alien forces seeking power and domination; unfortunately it is more than that. It has secured too many followers who see in it, at least until they have acquired some experience of its workings in government, a means of improving the welfare and happiness of their own people and ensuring their freedom from western pressure and control. Therefore I feel we shall not make much appeal to the peoples of Asia unless we make clear to them that while we denounce communistic doctrines and methods we wholeheartedly support the ideals of these people for liberation from hunger, misery and outside domination.

Mr. Pearson went on to say that because of their past experience Asians were preoccupied with the question of colonialism and imperialism. We should understand their view point that self government is more important even than good government. We should understand also the mistrust and suspicions of those who for years had felt themselves to be the victims of prejudice and at times of racial arrogance. If we remembered these things we might be able better to understand why so many nations failed to see as clearly as we do the gulf which divides communism from democracy and why they are so reluctant to join our side without reservation.

Mr. Pearson noted that increasing attention is being paid to the social and economic sources of communism. The various programmes of economic and technical assistance in under-developed countries were intended to help to reduce the impulse towards communism by raising the standard of living and by proving that it is possible to do it without a loss of political freedom and under a democratic system. The Minister went on:

But, I suggest that we should not forget that these social and economic aspects are only one element of this complex problem. I think there is a danger of oversimplifying the issues in Asia in these terms. Confronted by the appalling defence and political problems involved in the emergence of a free Asia, it is easy to lapse into the comfortable belief that we can save Asia—and that is how it is often put—with economic aid alone; that we can buy off communism and purchase peace for ourselves merely by stepping up our economic assistance.

That, as I see it, is unhappily nothing but a comforting illusion; and in saying that I do not minimize the importance of such economic assistance. What we are seeking to do, of course, in the Western world is help the Asian people to help themselves. That continent, I make bold to say, will not be saved or even, in the long run, helped by aimless assistance or by making political support a condition for such assistance, or by westerners attempting to assume the direction of political and economic forces in these Asian states, however benevolent their intentions. The danger to Asia comes from weakness which will not be removed merely by dumping in millions and millions of dollar or sterling aid for projects not carefully enough planned.

The west can help in this way, of course; but the west can help even more by co-operating in a partnership of mutual understanding, respect and support with genuine leaders of the Asian peoples. Democracy—and it does not necessarily need to be our type of Parliamentary democracy—can be established in those areas only by the efforts of the people themselves. Therefore, as I see it, the main problem at this time for Asians is to organize, as some Asian states have done, governments and administrations which are strong enough, free enough and incorruptible enough to make use of western assistance and support in helping to establish the conditions of law and order, freedom and prosperity which alone can counter the appeal of communism.

Indochina

A most significant effort to work out these problems, said Mr. Pearson, was being made in Indochina, in which Canada had a particular interest because of her participation with India and Poland in the supervision of the cease-fire agreements. The settlement reached at Geneva in July 1954, provided for the establishment of three separate international supervisory commissions, each made up of representatives of India, Pakistan and Canada and each charged with the task of supervising the carrying out of the cease-fire agree-

ment for the particular country to which it was assigned, Viet Nam, Laos or Cambodia.

Viet Nam

The Minister referred to the varying degrees of success that the Commission in Viet Nam had had in supervising the regrouping of military forces on both sides, in checking the introduction on either side of new military forces or supplies and in facilitating the movement of refugees. He noted that it was expected that the Commission will be asked to supervise the elections which are to take place in due course in Viet Nam.

Laos and Cambodia

The main problem facing the Commission in Laos, explained Mr. Pearson, had been to prevent a recurrence of hostilities in the northern provinces between the communist Pathet Lao forces and the Royal Laotian forces. There had been a number of incidents which because of communist obstruction it had not always been possible to investigate properly or thoroughly, but on the whole the military provisions of the Laotian Agreement had been fairly satisfactorily carried out. In Cambodia the most important problem has been the reintegration into the national community of the indigenous resistance forces which had also received communist support. Mr. Pearson expressed the hope that Canada, as a member of the Supervisory Commission in Cambodia, would be able to help pave the way to a prosperous and peaceful future in that country. Referring to the recent abdication of the King of Cambodia, the Minister denied that there had been any unwarranted interference of any kind by the Commission in the domestic affairs of that country.

Before going on to other matters, Mr. Pearson paid a tribute to

... the very fine and unselfish work which is being done by our people in Indochina, not only by the chief commissioner, a very distinguished Canadian who has served his country so well both in peace and war, Mr. Sherwood Lett, and the other Canadian commissioners who are members of the External Affairs Department, but by all the members of our armed services and our foreign service, numbering now something over 160, who are in these three countries. Many of them have to work and live under conditions of discomfort, hardship and even danger. They are, however, carrying out their difficult assignments with resourcefulness, with devotion, with patience and skill. Theirs is an important contribution to the maintenance of peace in Indochina, and they are making a fine impression wherever they work as representatives of Canada.

Korea

The Minister referred to the failure of the Geneva Conference to reach any agreement for the peaceful unification of Korea and to the resolution passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations reaffirming the United Nations' objectives. He stated that further negotiations to unify Korea peacefully would have to include the governments of North Korea and communist China, which are not members of the United Nations.

Formosa

Coming to the Formosan question, Mr. Pearson said that there had been certain new developments since he last spoke to the House on this subject

(see *External Affairs*, February 1955, p. 65). It was reassuring that the evacuation of thousands of civilians and soldiers from the Tachen and Nankishen Islands had taken place without any serious incident. There was however, much concern as to what the Chinese communists have in mind regarding Formosa and the few coastal islands which still remain in the hands of the Chinese Nationalists. It was to be hoped that the Chinese communists would not by use of force renew the war over these islands, the consequences of which might spread further, but given the combination of national revolutionary fervour and the messianic delusions of communist ideology, it was not possible to count on wisdom or restraint on the part of the Peking regime. The Minister told the House:

We cannot ignore in this connection the communist intention, loudly and frequently proclaimed, to attack and occupy Formosa and the islands. We can, however, having regard to declared United States policy to help in the defence of Formosa, retain strong doubts about their capacity to achieve this objective in the near future by any direct assault. To maintain an amphibious or airborne attack 100 miles across the Formosa straits would be a hazardous operation for a land power like Communist China and would certainly strain its as yet limited resources, much more than did the operations in Korea.

The Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, was asked in an interview a few weeks ago what he thought of the Chinese communists' ability to carry out their threat to, as they put it, liberate Formosa. Admiral Radford's reply was:

"They cannot do it at this time. They just do not have the military capability to carry out an amphibious operation of the scale required, particularly in view of the announced United States position and the immediate availability of United States naval and air forces to counter such an operation."

That was Admiral Radford's conclusion, and that same conclusion has led many to doubt that the communists have in mind an invasion of the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu as a prelude to or part of an attack on Formosa. In any event, it would be tragic if widespread hostilities, or indeed hostilities of any kind, were to develop over the possession of these two islands which are, in effect, part of the Chinese mainland, and the strategic role of which would seem to be more important in the defence of that mainland against attack than in offensive action against Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. Pearson emphasized that this problem of Formosa and the coastal islands was one of the most difficult which the free world has to face at this moment. It was one on which it was possible for friends and allies to honestly hold different opinions. Formosa was considered by many to be one of the positions of tactical and strategic advantage in the struggle with communist aggression and imperialism which could not be lightly abandoned in the face of communist threats. There was also the political problem arising out of the bad effect on morale in Formosa and in the neighbouring free Asian states if further losses or retreats took place in the face of joint communist attack or pressure or both. Furthermore, the people of Formosa have a claim to consideration, both in respect of the proposals to hand them over to the communist regime against their will and in respect of the proposals to involve them in a Chinese civil war without any regard to their own wishes but the Minister emphasized that doubts or divisions on these problems must not be allowed to spread or seriously weaken the non-communist peace coalition.

Mr. Pearson pointed out that the United States was committed to the defence of Formosa by a treaty with the Nationalist Chinese Government and that President Eisenhower, whom he described as a "man of character and integrity with a passion for peace" had the responsibility of deciding whether an attack by the Peking Government on the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu should be considered as a stage in an assault on Formosa itself. On their part, the Chinese communists insist that the islands are part of the Chinese mainland and that if Chiang-Kai-shek's troops do not evacuate them they will be driven out.

Canadian Position

The Canadian position in this matter, said Mr. Pearson, was as follows:

We have accepted no commitment to share in the defence of either Formosa or the coastal islands, or to intervene in any struggle between the two Chinese governments for possession of these off-shore islands. Our obligations in this matter arise only out of our responsibilities as a member of the United Nations, and I have stated in this House what those are. We also think that a distinction, politically and strategically, can be made between Formosa and the coastal islands; also indeed between Formosa and Korea. Nevertheless, the fact that we have no commitments certainly does not mean that we have no concern. We have a deep and abiding concern because of considerations which make isolation from these questions wellnigh impossible.

There is first our general concern with peace and anything that might threaten it. Then there is our special concern with United States policy from the consequences of which Canada, a North American country, cannot escape. Finally there is our close concern with anything that weakens—as this question may—that coalition the strength and unity of which, under the leadership of the United States is at present the strongest deterrent against communist aggression and war.

Mr. Pearson repeated his view that it would be impossible for either the United States or Canada to be neutral if the people of another country were engaged in a major war in which their very existence was at stake. This was one of the facts of our international life. The interdependence of our foreign defence policies with those of the United States was accepted by the people of Canada because we believed that any war in which we were jointly engaged would be a defensive one, and because the only aggressive force that threatens us today is communist imperialism, which if victorious, would end everything that makes for free and decent existence.

Our inevitable co-operation with the United States means "as the United Nations and NATO mean," said Mr. Pearson, "that our right to be neutral has been limited by our desire to strengthen the security of our country and to protect the peace. It does not mean, although I have heard it mentioned in these terms, that whenever the United States is engaged in any kind of war we are at war".

It certainly did not mean, he continued, that we must participate in limited or peripheral wars, although we were naturally concerned with preventing the outbreak of any local conflicts which might spread and cover the world.

After referring to the recent visit to Ottawa of Mr. Dulles, United States Secretary of State, who had emphasized that the United States Government

valued the support of Canada in international affairs, Mr. Pearson went on to say:

While believing strongly in the view that the destinies of our two countries are intertwined . . . I want to reaffirm my view that we could not stand aloof from a major war which threatened the very existence of the people of the United States; but I must add in all frankness that I do not consider a conflict between two Chinese governments for possession of these Chinese coastal islands, Quemoy or the Matsus, to be such a situation, or one requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the Chinese Nationalist regime. That view has already been made known more than once to our friends in Washington.

Canada was deeply concerned with this particular issue lest a limited intervention by the United States might start a chain reaction as a result of which a little war might spread and "become literally the little war before the last". Mr. Pearson expressed his hope that it would still be possible to find a solution of the Formosan dispute by means of direct diplomatic negotiations, in spite of the obvious difficulties of getting the two Chinese governments to deal directly with each other.

Disarmament

At the conclusion of his statement to the House, Mr. Pearson said a few words about the disarmament discussions which were taking place in London. A subcommittee of five powers, of which Canada was one, were meeting in accordance with the United Nations Assembly resolution to discuss the limitation of arms that are now ironically called both conventional and atomic weapons. The Minister did not report any details of these discussions which were still being held in confidence, although he mentioned that the main problem was to reach agreement on an acceptable system of inspection and control. Mr. Pearson concluded:

The stakes are too high in this matter to call any discussions off quickly. We are told by scientists there is no means of ensuring complete or even adequate defence against these nuclear weapons and the means of carrying and dropping them on great masses of people. Therefore we must concentrate more than ever not only, I suggest, on the limitation of armaments, important though that may be, but in the search for measures which will prevent war itself. What is certain is that the control of our power to destroy ourselves is a subject of such desperate importance that if either side should use it as a means of propaganda or counter propaganda it would be utter folly and might be supreme tragedy.

There are some who get comfort out of the conclusion that those new weapons are so annihilating that no side will dare use them if it is certain that the other side will retaliate and has preserved the means to do so against surprise destruction. It was said by an authority whose words we always respect, I refer to Sir Winston Churchill, in the House of Commons in London the other day:

"It was an ironic fact that we had reached a stage where safety might well be the child of terror and life the twin brother of annihilation."

In other words, according to this view, peace instead of resting on a balance of power now rests on a balance of terror. I think that in one sense it is true that the greatest deterrent against a general war, although not against a limited one, is the certainty of nuclear retaliation. In present circumstances that may be our

best safeguard. If that is true it may give us some time which can and must be used for continuing the persistent and patient search for the solution to international problems and for the easing of international tensions. If we do not find such agreement and understanding then peace, such as it is, will be balanced on a hydrogen bomb or, to use the words which Mr. Nehru used a few weeks ago in London:

“Mankind would be doomed to hover indefinitely on the brink of catastrophe.”

To avoid such a fate demands, and I know it will receive, all the support, all the strength, the energy, wisdom and faith of every member of this House.

Ireland

On March 10 there was a discussion in the House of a proposed agreement between Canada and Ireland for the avoidance of double taxation during which the Secretary of State for External Affairs made a statement on the constitutional position of Ireland. An amendment had been made that the Bills covering the agreement should be altered to describe the other contracting party as “the Republic of Southern Ireland”.

Mr. Pearson said that the adoption of an amendment of this kind would make extremely difficult, if not impossible, the negotiation and signing of agreements with that country. He said:

To support that position, Mr. Speaker, I must put on the record what I think is the factual situation with regard to the designation of this state with which we are negotiating this agreement. As my hon. friend who has just spoken has pointed out, it is true that between 1921 and 1937 the 26 counties of southern Ireland were known as the Irish Free State. It is also true that the Irish constitution, adopted in 1937, stated—I think it is article 4—that the name of the state is Eire, or in the English language, Ireland. That is how these people have designated their own state in their own constitution. I submit that is the proper designation because it is the constitutional one.

Article 2 of this constitution states that the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland; but article 3 in the constitution provides that pending—and I think these are the words of the article—reintegration of the national territory as so described, the laws enacted by the Irish parliament are to be limited in application to the area of the 26 counties.

Then in 1949 Ireland severed her last remaining link with the crown by a statute which is named, it is true, the Republic of Ireland Act. It is also true that that act declared that the description of the state shall be the Republic of Ireland. However, I believe that this does not change the name of the state as established by the constitution, which could only be changed by a constitutional amendment.

I therefore submit, Mr. Speaker, that the description of Ireland in this treaty is the proper one. If it were to be altered, it would be extremely difficult indeed for us to negotiate agreements with a country in a name which that country does not accept for itself. I also submit that the correct form of address for the head of the Irish state is the President of Ireland. But when we use this word “Ireland” or the expression “President of Ireland”—certainly this is our understanding—that use carries no territorial or political implications of any kind. I therefore feel that the wording of the agreement is the proper one and that it would be most unfortunate if it were changed, and I submit that this amendment should not be adopted.



—Capital Press

His Excellency Mario Scelba, Prime Minister of Italy, being greeted at the Union Station, Ottawa, by the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent. In the background is His Excellency Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Ambassador to Canada. Mr. Scelba visited Canada from March 24 to March 27, spending one day in Montreal and two days in Ottawa. In Montreal Mr. Scelba was given an honorary degree by the University of Montreal. In Ottawa Mr. Scelba, who was accompanied by a number of senior advisers had discussions with Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Pearson as well as with other Ministers on defence and political matters related to the partnership of Canada and Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Agreement for Co-operation Regarding Atomic Information

The Department of External Affairs announced on April 13 that the North Atlantic Council has recommended to member governments the signature of an Agreement for Co-operation regarding Atomic Information. It is expected that the Agreement will be signed within the next two months when the Governments of the NATO countries have indicated their readiness to do so.

The draft agreement proposed by the Council will, when concluded, make it possible for the United States to make available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its civil and military agencies and commands, atomic information which the Government of the United States of America deems necessary to the development of defence plans, the training of personnel in the employment of and defence against atomic weapons, and the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons. The draft agreement also provides that the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, other than the United States, will, to the extent they deem necessary, make available to NATO information in the same categories under conditions similar to those which will apply with respect to the United States.



CANADA AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

(Continued from page 121)

development of atomic power and to consider other technical areas—such as biology, medicine, radiation protection, and fundamental science—in which international co-operation might most effectively be accomplished.”

In accordance with the General Assembly's resolution, the competent Specialized Agencies, in particular FAO, WHO and UNESCO, are being consulted on the plans for the Conference. Meanwhile, negotiations are continuing with the U.S.S.R. and among a group of 8 atomic powers, including Canada, to establish an International Atomic Energy Agency as proposed by President Eisenhower in December 1953. It is the hope of the Canadian Government that this Agency will include all countries in a position to contribute materials and experience in this field, and that the Agency when established will become closely related with the United Nations, perhaps as a new Specialized Agency.

TREATY INFORMATION

Multilateral

Ocean Weather Stations:

Agreement on North Atlantic Ocean Stations. Signed at Paris, February 25, 1954.

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited July 13, 1954. Entered into force February 1, 1955.

Bilateral

Egypt:

British Commonwealth-Egypt War Graves Agreement. Signed at Alexandria, June 8, 1952.

Entered into force February 28, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During its Ninth Session, 21 September - 17 December 1954. A/2890. G.A.O.R., ninth session, supplement No. 21. 56 p.

United Nations Administrative Tribunal Statute and Rules (Second revision). A/CN.5/2/Rev. 2. N.Y., January 1955. 12 p. Sales No.: 1955.X.1.

Resolutions Adopted by the Economic and Social Council During its Eighteenth Session (resumed), 5 November - 16 December 1954. E/2654/Add.1. 4 p. ECOSOC Official Records: 18th session (resumed) Supplement No. 1A.

Processes and Problems of Industrialization in Under-developed Countries. E/2670, ST/ECA/29. N.Y. 1955. 151 p. \$1.50. Sales No.: 1955.II.B.1.

United Nations Children's Fund. Report of the Executive Board, 17 December 1954. E/2676, E/ICEF/280. 3 p. ECOSOC Official Records: 19th Session, Supplement No. 2A.

Foreign Capital in Latin America. E/CN.12/360, ST/ECA/28, November 1954. 164 p. \$1.75. Sales No.: 1954.II.G.4.

Economic Survey for Europe. E/ECE/194, Geneva, 1955. 315 p. \$2.50. Sales No.: 1955.II.E.2.

Guide to the Charter of the United Nations (Fourth Edition). 48 p. Sales No.: 1955.I.II (Department of Public Information).

International Directory of Schools of Social Work. ST/SOA/20, December 1954. 127 p. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1955.IV.2.

Foetal, Infant and Early Childhood Mortality:

Volume I—The Statistics. ST/SOA/SER.A/13. 137 p. \$1.50. Sales No.: 1954.IV.7.

Volume II—Biological, social and economic factors. ST/SOA/SER.A/13/Add. 1. 44 p. Sales No.: 1954.IV.8.

International Review of Criminal Policy (English, French, Spanish). January 1954. ST/SOA/SER.M/5. 171 p. \$2.00.

ICJ—Index to the Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders 1954. Pp. 115-175 (bilingual). Sales No. 129.

UNESCO

Variations Abroad. Vol. VII, 1955. Paris 1955. 179 p. (English-French-Spanish).

Inventories of Apparatus and Materials for Teaching Science, Volume III: Technical Colleges; Part 5: Medical Sciences. Paris (UNESCO) December 1954, WHO, Geneva. 191 p.

WHO—Executive Board, Fifteenth Session, Geneva, 18 January - 4 February 1955. Part I: Resolutions; Part III: Organizational Study. Annexes. Geneva, March 1955. 148 p. \$1.25. Official Records of the WHO, No. 60.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 55/3 — *Canada's Atomic Energy Programme*, an address by the President, Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited, Mr. W. J. Bennett, to the Toronto Board of Trade, January 24, 1955.
- No. 55/4 — "*Nations Business*" Broadcast (Comments on the debate in the House of Commons regarding the approval of the Paris Agreements under which the Federal Republic of Germany would be invited to join NATO; and the current situation in Formosa.) A radio broadcast by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, delivered in the "Nations Business" series over the CBC, January 28, 1955.
- No. 55/5 — *Education, Foreign Policy, and the Hydrogen Bomb*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made at the Ontario opening of the Canadian Education Week, Ottawa Technical School, March 6, 1955.
- No. 55/6 — *The Commonwealth of Nations — A Canadian View*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to The Round Table, Palm Beach, Florida, February 21, 1955.
- No. 55/7 — *Nuclear Energy for Peace or War*, an address by the Chairman of the Defence Research Board, Dr. O. M. Solandt, to the Canadian Club, Toronto, March 7, 1955.
- No. 55/8 — *Some Aspects of Canadian-American Relations*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Canadian Club, Toronto, March 14, 1955.

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May 1955

CANADA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

May 1955

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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Canadians in India

(Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in India.)

The 900 or so Canadians in India are scattered across the face of the country from the Himalayas to the Cochin coast, and from the great port of Bombay to the hills of Assam. Some are in the big cities of Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Madras, but more than half live in those small towns and villages where eighty per cent of the people of India live and which are the stuff and substance of India.

Missionaries the Largest Element

Missionaries and their families represent the largest element in the Canadian community in India—about 650 of the 900. The business community accounts for about 100, the Canadian Civil Service for about thirty-five. (These figures do not include about a hundred people who are home in Canada on leave.

Members of all the main churches in Canada are working as missionaries in India, most of them as teachers, doctors and nurses. About three hundred and fifty Canadians give full-time to missionary work; others who are wives and mothers of families give part-time. Of the full-time workers about eighty-five are Roman Catholics, about fifty belong to the United Church, and forty-two are Baptists. There are about twenty Anglicans, twenty Presbyterians and fifteen Salvation Army. The India Mission, the Evangelical Alliance, the World Wide Evangelical Crusade and the Mennonites each have about twelve full-time Canadian missionaries in India and the Lutherans and the Apostolic Church of Pentecost about eight each. There are Canadians working for about twenty-five other missionary organizations in India. Each of these twenty-five organizations has one to four Canadians on its staff.

The total amount of educational and health work done by Canadian missionaries in India is very considerable. Thus the missions in India of the Protestant churches of Canada maintain twenty-five hospitals, of which five are for leprosy, five orphanages, thirteen middle schools, twelve high schools and one university college (Indore), in addition to hundreds of village schools. Some of the missions are also doing agricultural extension work in the villages. No comparable statistics can be given for Canadian Roman Catholic Missionaries in India since in most Roman Catholic missionary institutions in India there are missionaries of many nationalities.

The Canadian missionaries in India, like the Canadian community as a whole, are widely scattered. For example, the Capuchin Fathers work in the Gorakhpur District in Central Uttar Pradesh (the former United Provinces), the Jesuits work in the Darjeeling District of West Bengal, and the Fathers of the Holy Cross in Assam. Most of the work of the United Church of Canada is carried on in Central India; the Canadian Baptist missions are located mainly on the Bay of Bengal in Andhra and in Orissa; the Canadian Presbyterian missions in the Jhansi district and the Bhil tribal areas in Central India; and the Anglicans in the Punjab. One of the Anglican Bishops in India is a Can-

adian, the Right Reverend Heber Wilkinson, Bishop of Amritsar, who comes from Toronto. Monsignor Breen, whose home is in St. John, New Brunswick, is Prefect Apostolic of Haflong in Assam, and Monsignor Jerome Malenfant from St. Eloi in Quebec is Prefect Apostolic of Gorakhpur.

The Canadian Jesuit Fathers in the Darjeeling District, together with their colleagues from other countries, conduct two orphanages, five dispensaries, one industrial school, three Indian high schools, three middle schools, seventeen primary schools and one university college. The Jesuit industrial school at Kurseong, near Darjeeling, gives practical training in skills such as woodwork, leather work, carpentry and weaving to the teen-age boys of the Kurseong district. Its success is demonstrated by the fact that all its pupils get jobs. St. Joseph's College in Darjeeling draws its students from Iraq and Iran as well as from all the countries of South and Southeast Asia: Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, India, Burma and Thailand.

Education for all Races and Creeds


The Canadian missionary schools and colleges in India do not cater for Christians alone. They provide an education for all races and creeds. For example, the girls school at Palampur in the Punjab, which is run by Canadian Anglicans, has only about thirty Christian pupils out of approximately 250.

Two Canadians work at the interdenominational Christian Medical Hospital at Vellore in Madras State which is well known in South India for its excellent work, especially in the treatment of lepers. Miss Florence Taylor from Brantford, Ontario, is director of nursing education at this hospital.

One of the Canadian missionaries who has worked longest in India is Miss A. C. Munro of Serango, Ganjam District, Orissa. Miss Munro, who was born in Embro, Ontario and received her nurse's training in Winnipeg, has spent thirty-five years as a Baptist missionary and nurse with the aboriginal Saora tribe in Orissa. She has recently completed a valuable contribution to both the Saoras and to Indian scholarship by devising a Saora alphabet. She is now at work providing the tribe with its first book, a translation of the Bible.

Dr. Robert B. McClure of the United Church of Canada who works at the Ratlam Christian Hospital in Madhya Bharat spent many years with a medical mission in China working as a surgeon and public health organizer. During the last war he was for a time in charge of Red Cross supplies sent over the Burma Road. Since then he has worked in southern Palestine among Arab refugees and also in Egypt where he organized the first large-scale TB survey ever conducted in that country.

Monsignor Malenfant, the Prefect Apostolic of Gorakhpur, is doing valuable work for Indian Christian art. He is the director of an All-India Commission of the Roman Catholic Church which co-ordinates the work of adapting Christian art and liturgy to Indian artistic and cultural traditions. Father Packwood of Gorakhpur, who is from the Gaspé Peninsula, is a leading exponent of the use of Indian music in Christian liturgy. This is typical of the important work which Canadian missionaries of many denominations are doing in India to speed up the process of Indianizing not only the personnel of the Christian Churches in India but also their liturgy, language, religious arts, festivities and customs.



Commerce and Industry

Commerce and industry account for the second largest number of Canadians in India, about 100 in all, including wives and children. Thirty-eight of these live in Bombay and forty-three in Calcutta. Their jobs are in a wide variety of businesses and industries, including oil, insurance, industrial chemistry and tea planting. There are four Canadian tea planters in India—three of them in Assam. Canadians are to be found in many other Indian industries, from tractors and shoes to tobacco, carpets and aluminum.

Three large Canadian companies have subsidiaries or affiliates in India. The Indian Aluminium Company is an affiliate of the Aluminum Company of Canada. The firm was converted into a public limited company in 1954 but it had operated in India for many years before then. In the complex process of making aluminium the company spans four corners of India. It has bauxite mines in Bihar and Bombay, a reduction smelter in Travancore-Cochin, rolling mills at Howrah, near Calcutta and a paste and powder plant near Bombay. The managing director, Mr. J. W. Cameron, was born in Calgary, and has served in various parts of India since 1941. Of the company's 2,722 employees all but seven are Indian citizens. Three are Canadians.

The Massey-Harris-Ferguson Company of India, with headquarters in Bangalore, was formed in 1954 to develop the sales of agricultural equipment throughout India. Until the amalgamation of Massey-Harris and Ferguson the two firms were competitors. Massey-Harris first entered the Indian market in 1948. The new combined firm sells probably 80 per cent of the agricultural equipment which is imported into India. Most of this machinery is manufactured in the United Kingdom. The company is a leader in the work of adapting machinery to both traditional and improved methods of agriculture in India. What is probably the first mechanical equipment for the preparation of wet paddy land prior to transplanting rice seedlings has been developed by the firm, which tests new agricultural methods on its eighty acre farm near Bangalore. Mr. D. A. Trimble who was born in Smiley, Saskatchewan, came out to India four years ago as the principal representative of Massey-Harris and is now the director in charge of sales of the combined firm, which otherwise is almost entirely staffed by Indian citizens. All but six of its fifty-eight employees are Indians.

Although at one time three Canadian life insurance companies conducted business in India, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada is the only one that is now operating. The Sun Life has been established in India for fifty years. It has its head office in Bombay and branches in Calcutta, Madras and New Delhi. The company has the largest share of purely life insurance business of any non-Indian insurance firm. There are four Canadians on the staff of Sun Life in India and six other non-Indians. The remaining 143 employees are Indian citizens.

The Standard-Vacuum Refining Company of India at Bombay is responsible for the presence in India of about twenty-five Canadians, the largest group of Canadians in India associated with one single business enterprise. The Managing Director of the Company is Mr. William A. Williams of Sarnia, Ontario. He has been in charge of the construction and operation of the refinery which the company recently erected at Trombay on the outskirts of Bombay at a cost of about \$30 million. This is the first large modern oil refinery to be

constructed in India. Mr. Williams has nine Canadians on his staff. The majority of them have their families with them and most of them live at the Standard-Vacuum housing colony near the refinery which as a result has a definite Canadian atmosphere. Most of these Canadians will be temporary residents of India since it is the company's intention to Indianize their senior staff as quickly as possible, and they are training Indians to fill the posts held by Canadians and other Westerners. It is expected that in six years' time the number of non-Indians in the company will be reduced from 55 to 44.

The Arts and Professions

The Canadians in India are also represented in the arts and professions by one painter, one sociologist, one cabaret artist, one dentist, one doctor and two nurses (not counting missionary doctors and nurses or those employed by the World Health Organization). Dr. M. L. Freeman from Montreal is a Canadian of long standing in Madras where he has practised dentistry for 40 years. Dr. (Miss) A. D. Ross, who is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology of McGill University, has spent the last year in Bangalore studying changes in the structure of the urban Hindu family. Miss Corinne Robertshaw who graduated from the University of British Columbia in 1954 is the only Canadian university student in India. She has been studying at the University of Delhi. Miss Robertshaw was the first Canadian holder of a World University Service exchange scholarship between Canada and India.

A distinguished Canadian educationalist is Miss Dorothy Pearson from Mount Forest, Ontario, who has been in India for twenty years and is now a professor of nutrition at the Women's Christian College in Madras. Miss Pearson is an outstanding pioneer in the Home Service field in India. Another Madrassi by adoption is Mr. Wallace Forgie from Ottawa who has been engaged in boys' work in India for the last thirty years. He is now the director of a camp at Avadi outside Madras where camping groups of all kinds are accommodated on a splendid site and the camp leaders trained by Mr. Forgie. Two more Canadians who have recently been playing an active role in Indian life are Mr. and Mrs. David Hopper from Ottawa who have for eighteen months been living in a mud house in the village of Senapur about twenty miles from Banaras. Mr. Hopper was conducting an economic research project on the problems of productivity in the rural Indian economy, while Mrs. Hopper applied her Canadian nursing training at a clinic for the villagers.

Then, of course, there are the civil servants. They with their dependents number thirty-four. Five are connected with the Trade Commissioner's office in Bombay and twenty-nine with the High Commissioner's Office in New Delhi. The High Commissioner's Office constitutes the largest single group of Canadians in India and also the most transient, since most serve for only two or three years. Some of them will, however, return for a second posting to India. Others have entered another statistical group which consists of thirty-four Canadian housewives married to non-Canadians in India.

The Canadian experts of all kinds who come to India under the Colombo Plan are another transient group. One of the recent arrivals was Miss M. E. Yamanaka from Toronto who is spending two years in India as a nursing arts instructor at the Osmania School of Nursing in Hyderabad. She was the first of six Canadian public health nurses to come to India in 1954-55 under the Colombo Plan.



—*Indian Express*

CANADIANS IN INDIA

During his visit to India early in 1954, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, centre, greets a four-year old Canadian boy held in the arms of Miss Dorothy M. Pearson of the Women's Christian College in Madras. To the left rear of Mr. St. Laurent is the High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. Escott Reid and Mrs. Reid.

Canadians are to be found too among the international civil servants in India. There are in India nine Canadian employees and dependents of WHO and the UN Technical Assistance Board. Mr. J. N. Corry from Fernbank, Ontario, is the representative in India of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board. Dr. Olivier Leroux from Hawkesbury, Ontario, is the World Health Organization representative for India. He spent about ten years before and during the last war in the Army Medical Corps in India before going back to Canada to work for the Department of National Health and Welfare in Ottawa. Now he has returned to India with his wife and the youngest of his five children.

Other Canadians on international service in India are six reserve Army officers who are members of the United Nations Military Observer group in Kashmir. The observers serve for one year and divide their time between India and Pakistan. Lt. Col. J. R. Paquin who is the senior Canadian officer in the United Nations group feels at home in the hills of Kashmir. He is from the Laurentian Mountains of Quebec. Another Canadian soldier in India is Major Alfred Robbins, who is spending one year's exchange duty at the Defence Services Staff College at Wellington in the south of India.

Soldiers, priests and merchants have been the traditional explorers of new worlds. The Canadian soldiers, priests and merchants in India today are explorers from the New World of North America to the new world of independent India. Together with the 2,500 Canadians of Indian origin in Canada they are ambassadors of goodwill between India and Canada.

Reconstruction in South Korea

Building a Text-Book Printing Press

By B. E. ROTHWELL, Printing Consultant, UNKRA

The United Nations Korean Rehabilitation Agency was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950 in order to assist in the restoration and rehabilitation of the Korean economy which was shattered by the war. The prolongation of hostilities, however, prevented the Agency from undertaking large-scale operations until the latter part of 1952. The Agency's programme is concerned with long-range reconstruction, particularly in the fields of agriculture, education, industry and fisheries. The Canadian Government has contributed \$7,250,000 to UNKRA and has also supplied a number of experts to assist the South Korean Government in the reconstruction of their country. Mr. B. E. Rothwell, a member of the staff of the Government Printing Bureau in Ottawa, spent over a year in South Korea, from August 1953, constructing a large modern printing plant for the production of school text-books and has written the following account of his experiences.

To print thirty million school text-books for the children of war-ravaged South Korea was the problem which confronted the writer early in June 1953. And all this without a printing plant and without printers, skilled or unskilled. Such was the problem confronting the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. In this dilemma the Agency asked to have a technician go out from Canada, construct a plant and train a staff to get it into operation. To do the job in any modern printing establishment, under the most favourable conditions, with supplies, equipment and personnel readily available, would require plenty of thought and planning. To do it in a war-torn country where none of these items were available was something else again.

An appeal was made to Mr. Edouard Cloutier, Queen's Printer, by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, through our External Affairs Department, to have a technician sent out to take charge of this project. I was honoured in being chosen to do this job in one year in a country unknown to me.

Challenge Accepted

Having accepted the challenge, I landed in Tokyo, Japan, on August 10, 1953. It was originally planned that I was to remain in Japan for some time to study printing techniques and equipment in order that I might have some knowledge of how to go about the proposition in Korea, but on arrival at UNKRA Headquarters there I received an urgent cable to come directly on to Pusan, Korea, and have a conference with the Government of South Korea and UNKRA officials. The reason for this was to have an exchange of ideas as to how best to proceed with the project.

My arrival in Pusan was on one of their national holidays. I think it commemorated the ill-fated attempt by the Koreans to drive the Japanese invaders out some thirty years ago.

I will never forget my first glimpse of Pusan with its great natural harbor. It was one of the hottest days of the year, and it seemed to me that all the people in the world had congregated there. It seemed that nearly the whole population of South Korea had been evacuated to the Pusan area and the congestion was a swarming human hive. People were living under the most awful conditions, in sheds, in cardboard shacks, and in shacks that had beer cans nailed to the roofs and sides. They had taken the tops and bottoms off of the cans and flattened the sides out and nailed them on to roofs and sides. It was originally a city of 500,000, but the population had overflowed to about two million.

To get to Hialeah compound, where I was to be quartered, was really something. The smell of the open sewers on a hot day was an olfactory experience I will never forget. The compound was a barbed-wire enclosure under the control of the U.S. Army and we were assigned to rooms in quonset huts which were equipped with military cots and facilities for washing and shaving. In the centre of the compound was a large mess hall where our meals were cooked and served by Korean personnel. The food was supplied by the Army.

Preliminary Survey

Because of the chaotic condition prevailing with the Government trying to get re-established in Seoul, I could not get to see any of the officials. I decided therefore to see some of the printing plants in and around Pusan. This I did with the aid of an interpreter. These were little corner holes in the wall. Some did not have any floors, and the equipment was very obsolete. Some of the presses were 50 and 60 years old and were mostly of Japanese and German manufacture. How they ever produced school books in any quantity under such conditions was a mystery. There was one plant that had quite recently been established for printing currency which had several presses and was doing a fairly good job, but the paper was ordinary printing paper and when put into circulation had no durability.

The United Nations Agency was constantly keeping in touch with the Government of the Republic of Korea for me, and in a few days I got orders to report to the Minister of Education in Seoul. My first trip to Seoul was my introduction to riding on military planes. I was given a parachute by a sergeant to strap on my back. I did not know how it was done and the crew of the plane did not have the time to bother with me. But after watching some of the others who had been up before, I finally got the hang of it and to me it seemed to weigh a ton. It takes about three hours by plane from Pusan to Seoul and about eleven to twelve hours by rail.

At that time there were no regular airports in Korea except those established by the U.S. Army. The run-ways were perforated steel sections which are laid down temporarily, and they felt really bumpy when you landed. The air fields are called K-9, K-16, K-10, etc.

My first glimpse of Seoul was a city which had been almost levelled to the ground. There was hardly a building which had not been burned or bombed. It had been fought over three times and the smashing it had received was fantastic.

There were very few people on the streets except soldiers and nothing whatever in the stores. I could see that it had once been a very beautiful city.



—United Nations

KOREA'S NEW TEXTBOOK PRINTING PLANT

An interior view of the new textbook printing plant, with the books coming off the automatic sorting and stitching machine.

Then I was taken to the U.S. Embassy Compound, where living conditions were quite good. The mess hall was somewhat similar to Pusan and food cooked and served by Korean personnel.

I finally got an interview with the Minister of Education, Mr. Kim Bup Rin, a very impressive and intelligent official, and had many talks with him and his staff. He insisted that I take an office adjoining his, and fitted it up with drawing boards, office equipment, etc. He had been educated at the Sorbonne in Paris and spoke French fluently and a little English. At one time he had also been a Buddhist priest.

At that time, they were not quite sure whether the government would remain in Seoul, and the Minister asked me if I would look over some possible sites for the plant with him in the cities of Taijon, Taegue and Pusan before reaching a decision as to where the plant should be located. At all these places we were met by the Mayors and City Councils and well received. They were all anxious to rebuild their cities and would do almost anything to get the plant located there. They showed me some very good sites and offered the land free. But in all those cities the problem of water supply was a big factor. None of them at that time could promise any quantity.

I was convinced that, for all practical purposes, the plant should be located as near Seoul as possible because it was the seat of government and I had to work directly with the Minister and the R.O.K. Cabinet. It would have been

difficult to be located at some distant city. Also I envisaged that at some future time there would come a saturation point in the demand for school text-books, and when that time came it could be used as a Government Printing Plant. As a matter of fact, before I left we were accepting a few jobs from the National Assembly when we had extra capacity on the presses. The quality of printing was a revelation to them and they were lavish in their praise of the new plant.

Site Chosen

I talked the matter over with the Minister of Education several times and he finally agreed with me that it was the logical thing to do. Consequently, we looked over many sites in and around the city of Seoul, and finally decided on a location just outside the city at a suburb called Yong-Dong-Po on the other side of the Han river about 20 minutes' drive from the centre of the city.

The next step was to draw up the design and specifications for the building. I knew this would be a problem, but it was pretty well settled in my own mind that to produce 30 million text-books it would have to be of one-floor construction to lend itself to straight line production, low cost maintenance, and inexpensive construction.

Through the Minister, we engaged a young Korean architect who had studied at the University of Tokyo and who could speak a little English. He was a very smart boy but as I said it was a problem to sell them on the idea of this type of building because it was altogether different from Eastern architecture in Korea. I had not seen anything remotely resembling a modern design of this kind. After a lot of persuasion I sold Kim Tai Shik, the architect, on the idea, and then left it to him to sell the Minister and the Cabinet. They were continually remarking that they would like to adapt themselves to Western ideas and Western methods and that was my trump card in getting the type of building I wanted.

The size of the building was the next question to be decided. The property was ample enough for a good sized building, but there was no point in putting up a large sprawling building just for the sake of occupying all the property. The essential factor was the work it was required to produce without crowding, and with ample provision for paper stores, moveability, storage and office space.

I had been getting all the catalogues I could from Japan on what they had in the way of printing equipment, and had given a great deal of study to what type of equipment would do the job required and the space occupied by the equipment. Before definitely deciding on the equipment, I made my first trip to Japan towards the end of October to assess the equipment and find out what printers were using there. The first thing to do was get the names and addresses of leading printing firms. In this I had a stroke of luck. They publish a monthly bulletin somewhat similar to our "printing trade magazines" which listed all the leading printing firms. The chap who was editor of the magazine somehow got word that I was over there to buy printing equipment. Don't ask me how he found out. I still don't know, but that is one of the mysteries of the East. I never did find out, but I suggest it was through one of the natives employed by UNKRA at their Tokyo Headquarters. From there on, it was just a case of checking the equipment they were using as to performance, production, quality of printing, etc., and the status of the firms which I considered prospective suppliers.

They were all polite,—painfully so at times. It is a fact, that the more important a buyer is, the lower the bow and the more polite they are. Well, I was there to buy and they were most eager to sell, so I got my full share of those real long, low bows.

My first trip took about three weeks. At the end of that time I had decided what equipment should be purchased. I returned to Seoul with blueprints and detailed specifications as to sizes, etc. From there on, it was a question of making paper templates of every piece, placing it in position and thereby determining the size of the building. This procedure paid off eventually when it came time to set up the equipment.

The main building, heating plant and auxiliary power plant contained approximately 40,000 square feet and having decided this point, I got together with the architect and showed him pictures of some of our modern plants here and in the United States and I must say he was quick to adopt the idea.

We finally ended up with about 25 full scale plans of the building, the electric work, plumbing, heating plant and auxiliary power plant. Before calling for tenders, we had to get the approval of the UNKRA Housing Commission but nothing was changed after giving them a full explanation of all the details. The most difficult part for me was to work from millimeters and centimeters because inches and feet are practically unknown over there and it would only be confusing to them.

Tenders Called

We finally got to the stage where tenders were called for the grading of the land. There was quite a slope to the property and to level it and raise it up about eight feet it was necessary to get bulldozers from the R.O.K. Army to do this work. I visualized that a one-story building would look squatty unless raised up to a fair level. The contract for grading was let about the end of November and completed towards the end of December. A separate contract was drawn up for the construction of the main building, heating plant and auxiliary power plant and water tank. Tenders were called from among the Korean contractors and the work started in January.

I will say this for the Korean contractors, The Kuck Dong Construction Co., they were smart and knew their job. The work was all hand labour such as the mixing of cement and the making bricks right on the job. No power saws or other labour-saving equipment was used. It is interesting to note that the hand saws they used were shaped like a cleaver—larger at the outer end than at the handle. When they saw a board they do not bear down as we do, but draw the blade towards them. They claim it is more accurate and have been doing it that way for centuries.

They employ more labour on their construction work than we do and the reason for this is that it is so abundant and so inexpensive. We had about 300 employed on construction and among them 25 women. The women over there do manual labour the same as men. These women were engaged in grading gravel by hand and carrying as many as 15 bricks on their heads to the bricklayers. Some of them even had babies strapped on their backs and worked 15 hours per day. This method certainly gives them a wonderful posture and it is a revelation to see how straight they walk.

The men have strapped to their backs what is called an "A" Frame. It consists of two boards joined together and strapped to their backs, with two wooden prongs jutting out from the two cross members. It really is amazing the loads they can carry on this contraption without any seeming effort.

Telling of this "A" Frame reminds me of an experience I had. The man in charge of the Housing Division for UNKRA asked me to go with him one morning and see what I thought of the housing units he was erecting. After we had inspected some of the houses he proudly pointed out some 10 or 12 bright new red wheelbarrows equipped with rubber tires, etc. He called the lieutenant in charge of that particular area and told him to put the Korean labourers to work using the wheelbarrows. The lieutenant saluted and said: "yes, Sir!"

The next morning we were passing and he said: "let's stop for a moment and see what progress has been made with the new equipment". There they stood with not a scratch on them. Well, my friend nearly blew his top and proceeded to give the lieutenant the most artistic bawling out that I had ever heard. When the lieutenant could get a word in edgeways, he said: "Just a minute, Sir". He called to two of the Koreans and told them to load up one of the wheelbarrows. After they had it loaded, instead of wheeling it away, the two of them picked it up, load and all, and placed it on the "A" Frame and trotted away with it! You just cannot change the habits of centuries overnight.

Building Material Shortages

But to get back to the construction of the plant. There were many difficulties and frustrations, mostly in regard to building materials. The country being in such a war-torn condition, it was almost impossible to get supplies and keep the construction going, and I very much doubted at times if I would ever have a building to put the equipment in. However, by begging, borrowing and every other means we did our best to keep the project moving.

The Korean contractor was one of the most resourceful men I have ever met. There is a saying that you can get anything you want in Korea if you know where to go, and this chap really proved that the saying is correct. Construction continued intermittently and by the end of May things began to take shape and the buildings began to look like a real modern printing plant.

In between times I had made frequent trips to Japan to check on the progress of the equipment. Some of the smaller items used in the composing room, photo-engraving and offset plate making divisions were readily available, but for the most part all equipment had to be fabricated at the factories. There had to be a continual follow-up because time over there is not so important as over here, but I was working against time, and wanted to get the job done in one year if possible.

I had made arrangements to have the equipment shipped to Inchon and warehoused there until the plant was ready to receive it. Some of it began to arrive in the early part of February and I think the balance was received early in July.

Not being too familiar with their manufacture, I specified that before acceptance of the larger presses, etc., that test runs be made at their factory



SOUTH KOREA'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AIDED

—United Nations

Mr. B. J. Rothwell, of the Department of Public Printing and Stationery, Ottawa, UNKRA printing consultant, was responsible for the erection of a new printing plant near Seoul, South Korea. Above, Mr. Rothwell examines one of the first four-colour books produced in the plant. With Mr. Rothwell is, left to right, Mr. Kim Do Joon, vice-manager of the plant; Mr. Kim Yung Ju, manager, and an interpreter.

and another at the plant in Korea before final acceptance. A certain amount was of course pledged to them to begin manufacture. This precaution worked out very well and insured proper attention to detail of fabrication, shipping and packing.

Construction by the end of June had been well enough advanced to commence trucking the equipment from Inchon to the plant and start setting it up.

The whole thing was a matter of co-ordination, but at this stage we had a very serious setback. The rainy season set in, and when it rains over there it really rains, day and night, for two or three weeks. Also, the clay in Korea is the gooiest and stickiest clay I have ever seen. You can imagine what it was like trying to get presses weighing as much as 29 tons through that mud. Once again, the Army came to our rescue and supplied us with cranes, wreckers, etc., and virtually lifted trucks and equipment out of the mud. The trucks were mired down to above their running boards.

Those poor Koreans really worked to get the crates into the plant. Bare to the waist and just a pair of trunks on they stayed out in that rain and never complained.

Another bad break happened at Inchon while loading the crate containing the feeder mechanism on one of the two-colour offset presses into a truck. The

cable surrounding the crate slipped sideways and one corner caught against a pile of plywood after it had been raised about eight feet. Down it came, and made an awful mess of the feeder. This called for a quick trip to Tokyo to replace the damaged parts and in two weeks' time these were delivered to the plant.

From there on, the slow process of installing the equipment took place. We had no cranes or gantrys to work with, and it was hand labour all the way in lifting and setting the heavy parts of the presses into position. It was amazing what these Koreans can lift. They put poles across their backs and with heavy ropes they move loads that you would not think possible. We would not attempt it without blocks and tackles. An interesting thing about them is that they sing some kind of chant as they work, and if you watch them closely enough and listen you will detect a kind of rhythm to their movements.

Installation Problems

The problem of setting up the equipment was a real one. We had recruited some technicians who had some previous experience, but for the most part they were untrained. I had taken the precaution to have blueprints made of every piece of equipment and also instruction books printed in both Japanese and English. They could all read and speak Japanese, this helped greatly. On one of my early trips I had taken four Koreans with me to Japan and placed them in the factories to study the equipment and they were of great assistance. It was a terrific job to watch and check every step of the way, but the Koreans were most co-operative and I really liked working with them. They had no fixed ideas and nothing to unlearn which was a big help.

Just imagine the problem it was to have a good sized complete printing plant delivered at your door all in huge cases. The problem of having to open these cases, clean all the grease off and sort it all out and then begin the job of putting it together was tremendous. I took the precaution of having the cases distinctly marked with the letter corresponding to the division and the number of the case, along with the total number of cases. All told there were around 300 large cases.

An interesting feature regarding the equipment was that it was all painted a light grey colour with all the electrical parts painted yellow, the dangerous moving parts painted red and all oil inlets painted red. The underside was painted a light blue. The cement floor had been painted a tile red. Lights had been placed under the machines to facilitate repairs and greasing. The presses had been mounted high enough to allow a man to get underneath without having to get doubled up like a corkscrew.

It must be remembered that it was taboo to bring Japanese technicians to Korea for obvious reasons. It would have simplified my work somewhat, but as it turned out it was much better to let the Koreans set it up themselves, thereby gaining a knowledge of the adjustments and purpose of each part. If Japanese technicians had been allowed to do the work and things had gone wrong, it would have been an easy "out" for Koreans.

We were fortunate in being able to attract personnel to the plant who had come from very good families but had lost everything during the invasion. Also, through the Minister of Education, we hired a fair proportion of college

graduates. A good many of them had degrees and were glad to get work in this modern printing plant.

Long before coming to the process of setting up the machinery much thought had to be given to the quality, quantity and size of paper for the different machines. Quality, price and delivery date were the determining factors. We had to consider the amount of roll stock required, cover stock, flat offset and regular book paper for the cylinder presses. All of which took a great deal of precise calculation. However, the paper question was finally settled and although it gave me many anxious days, it was finally delivered just a week prior to the opening of the plant.

Plant Self-sufficient

I would just like here to explain that the plant itself was totally self-sufficient. By that I mean that it was capable of accepting a job—any job—and turning out the finished product within the plant, even to the extent of engraving their own matrices for casting the type.

A complete list of the many divisions is as follows:

art department; photo engraving; offset plate-making; offset plate-graining; stereotype; electric plating and chrome plating; type casting; composition (photo and hand); benton engraving; presses-rotary; multi-colour offset and automatic cylinder; bindery; shipping; carpenter shop; machine shop; paper storage and supplies storage; executive offices; central heating, auxiliary power and water facilities. The following special features were included: modern cafeteria; rest rooms; shower rooms; first-aid room with nurse in attendance; fluorescent lighting; adequate ventilation; special type of steel window with roll type sliding panes; tennis court at rear of building.

The plant was finally whipped into shape and we decided to have the official opening on September 16, 1954, just thirteen months after landing in Korea.

The Korean personnel really went all out to have their printing plant at its best for the opening. The main entrances were decorated with flags and bunting. On top of the main entrance the flags of the Government of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations were flown and looked very impressive.

In attendance at the ceremony were, of course, President Syngman Rhee and his Cabinet; members of the National Assembly; General John B. Coulter, Agent General of UNKRA; Mr. Tyler Wood, Co-ordinator of F.O.A.; General Maxwell Taylor, Commander of the Eighth United States Army; General Frederick Haydon, Commander of K.C.A.C.; the Presidents of several colleges in the Seoul area and many others.

The President made a very fine speech in Korean and English, praising the efforts of UNKRA for such an outstanding contribution to the reconstruction of South Korea and to the children of his country.

It was my great pleasure to show the President through the plant and explain the operation of the equipment which greatly interested him. Before leaving he took great pleasure in planting several trees to mark the occasion.

(Continued on page 167)

North Atlantic Council Meeting

Text of a Statement made by Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on the occasion of the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris, Monday, May 9, 1955.

The historic significance of this Council meeting is apparent to us all. The German Federal Republic, as a result of agreements freely concluded, and which have been approved by our legislatures, now becomes a member of NATO—an organization devoted solely to international peace and security and welfare. We warmly welcome Chancellor Adenauer as the first representative of Germany to our Council, and as a man who has already proven his devotion to the ideals we share.

We are here also to examine in confidence and frankness the international situation, particularly in the light of recent developments. That situation, at least in Europe, has improved. This gives us reason for satisfaction, but none for abandoning those policies which have to a large extent been responsible for that improvement.


This Council meeting marks the successful completion of long and patient effort by those around this table and by others who are no longer with us on the Council to broaden and strengthen the basis of our NATO association.

It marks also a new phase in the development of both European unity and the Atlantic community. France and Germany, not because they forget, but because they remember the past, have come together in a Western European Union which includes Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and also Great Britain whose vision across the seas has not prevented the acceptance of a new and indispensable European role. Europe, however, even a united Europe, is not enough, and NATO, the vigorous and hopeful expression of the Atlantic idea, is recognition of that fact.

NATO is growing stronger and free Germany adds to that strength. This strength is, however, merely a means to an end, international peace and security. Therefore we must exploit every genuine opportunity to seek by negotiation solutions for the problems which today keep alive fears and tensions in the world.

This remains our most important NATO task. Only strength and steadiness will see it through to a successful conclusion.

All these things have been said so often by so many so much better than I have been able to do, that I feel almost apologetic for repeating the obvious. I am, however, grateful for the opportunity to reaffirm, and on an occasion of such momentous importance, the loyalty of the government and people of my country to the ideals of peaceful and fruitful co-operation which inspire this great Atlantic Organization, into which we now welcome our German colleagues. The developments which have culminated in this meeting give us greater reason for faith and confidence in the future.



—United Nations

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK

Aerial view of the permanent headquarters of the United Nations, in New York, with the East River in the foreground, and mid-town Manhattan in the background. The three U.N. buildings are, left to right: The Secretariat building; the Conference Area; and the General Assembly building.

Canada and the United Nations — The Record After Ten Years

THE names of Canada and Canadians appear frequently in the record of the first ten years of the United Nations. The history of the world Organization shows that Canada has participated energetically in most of its activities.

Hopes for a new world based on a secure peace, economic and social justice and effective international co-operation were high in the spring of 1945 when delegates of 50 nations assembled in San Francisco in the dying days of World War II to draft the Charter of the United Nations. The ideals and aspirations of the delegates, who represented more than 80 per cent of the world's population, were summarized in the Preamble of the Charter which stated in part:

WE THE PEOPLES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom . . .


Drafting of Articles

The Chapters of the Charter which follow the Preamble define in 111 Articles the purposes, principles, and methods of the Organization and establish the structure of each constituent part. These Articles were hammered out in final form in San Francisco during two months of intensive negotiations. Twelve technical committees responsible for drafting the various sections held nearly 400 meetings. The results of their efforts inevitably reflected the serious clashes of opinion and divergencies of outlook which might have wrecked the conference if a spirit of conciliation and compromise had not prevailed; but the seeds of later procedural disputes had been sown in a number of the Articles of the Charter. Without the compromise they represented, the Charter could not have been written.

The records of the San Francisco Conference indicate that the Canadian Delegation played an important part in drafting the Charter. The Delegation sought in the debates on security measures to ensure adequate scope for the influence and capacities of the Middle Powers. Largely as a result of Canadian initiative, Article 23 of the Charter provided for the election of non-permanent members with due regard to their contribution to peace as well as to geographical distribution. The Canadian Delegation also was responsible for the

inclusion of Article 44, under which the Security Council is required to invite a member to participate in decisions concerning employment of that member's armed forces. Canada helped to ensure recognition in the Charter for the role of the International Court of Justice; obtained inclusion of Article 109 which provides for the question of review of the Charter to be considered at the 10th session of the General Assembly next September; helped strengthen the international position of the Secretariat and establish relationship of the General Assembly and the Security Council as organizations of varying functions but with equality of status. Among the amendments submitted by the Canadian Delegation to the conference was a complete revision of the important chapter in the Dumbarton Oaks proposal on international economic and social cooperation. Proposals put forward by the Canadian Delegation to strengthen the position of the Economic and Social Council and clarify the relationship between the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies were adopted by the Conference. Referring to the role of the Canadian Delegation in the drafting of the chapters on the Economic and Social Council in his book "The Four Cornerstones of Peace", D. M. Dean wrote: "Canada . . . made an outstanding contribution in its carefully thought out proposals for expansion of the functions and authority of the Economic and Social Council."

The record shows that Canadians have served in most of the main offices and organs of the United Nations. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, presided over the Special Session of the General Assembly in



—United Nations

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ACTION

The Acting Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, addressing a meeting of the General Assembly, with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson presiding as President of the seventh session.

1947, and he was the President of the 7th session of the Assembly in 1952. Canada served on the Security Council in 1948-49; was a member of the Economic and Social Council from 1946-48 and 1949-52, and currently holds membership in all the Specialized Agencies. Canada participated in the drafting of the statute of the International Court of Justice—one of the principal organs of the United Nations—and a Canadian, Mr. J. E. Read, has been a member of the Court since its inception. Canadian representatives have served and are serving on many commissions and committees of the United Nations.

Canada as a Mediator

With the Security Council frequently unable to bring force to bear upon the parties to a dispute, the United Nations has gradually developed less forthright and more flexible means of carrying out its responsibilities. In dealing with threats to the maintenance of international peace, there has been effective use of the facilities of the United Nations for promoting discussion, compromise, and mediation. These facilities were helpful in encouraging withdrawal of troops of the U.S.S.R. from the province of Azerbaijan in Iran in 1946, the lifting of the Berlin blockade in 1949, and a settlement of the disputes between Greece and her northern neighbours resulting from aid allegedly provided to Greek guerillas by Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Yugoslavia. As a member of the Security Council in 1948-1949, Canada played an active role in mediating the dispute between India and Pakistan concerning Jammu and Kashmir, and in obtaining a settlement of the Indonesian dispute. Late in 1949, in his capacity as President of the Security Council, General A. G. L. MacNaughton was appointed to assist representatives of India and Pakistan in finding a solution to the dispute over Kashmir. His efforts to secure agreement on de-militarization were not successful, but the Security Council adopted a resolution embodying the proposals he had advanced. At a critical stage of negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Canadian Representative on the Security Council proposed a practical course of action which helped the Netherlands Government and the Indonesian Representative to work out an agreement on the aspects of the Security Council proposals on which they differed. This led to preliminary talks at Batavia followed by a round table conference at The Hague and ultimately to the establishment of the United States of Indonesia. Canada was represented on the Special Committee on Palestine established by the General Assembly at its Special Session in 1947 and its representative supported the majority plan for the partition of Palestine. Later as a member of the Security Council, Canada helped secure the armistice agreements that terminated hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbours. A Canadian, Major General E. L. M. Burns, currently is Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for Palestine. A number of Canadian army officers are serving as members of the Palestine Truce Supervision Organization and others are attached to the United Nations military observer groups on duty in connection with the Kashmir dispute.

Korea a Challenge

The chronicle of the United Nations shows the greatest challenge to its principles came in 1950 with the invasion of South Korea. The record proves the Organization met its responsibilities promptly and squarely. The boycott of the Security Council maintained at the time by the Soviet Delegate prevented him from vetoing the decision of the Security Council to take collective

action against aggression in Korea. Canada was one of the 16 nations which contributed military forces to the United Nations Command. She was represented in land battles by a specially-recruited army combat unit, at sea by destroyers and in the air by the transport planes which ferried men and munitions across the Pacific towards the war zone. Canada provided the third largest number of armed forces from the outside and many Canadian servicemen gave their lives in the United Nations' cause in Korea. In every stage of the difficult negotiations that finally led to an armistice in Korea, Canada tried to show that she recognized all her duties as a member of the United Nations. The significance of the fighting in Korea to Canada was described at the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly on August 19, 1953 by the Acting Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Martin:

The United Nations forces have done all they were asked to do by force of arms. It has been the first major application of the principle of collective security by an international organization, and it has been successful. We are thereby marking certainly one of the greatest achievements in human history. Had the United Nations failed to act, or had it acted and failed, not only would a brave and ancient people have lost their freedom, but the United Nations itself would, I fear, already have become the dead husk of another great idea unrealized, not for lack of resolutions but of resolution.

The Korean action made it clear that a Soviet veto could have nullified the determination of other members to resist aggression. A number of member states, including Canada, therefore took action at the 5th session of the General Assembly in 1950 to establish new procedures and machinery through which the Assembly could cope with breaches of the peace or acts of aggression when the Security Council failed to exercise its primary responsibility in such matters. Canada became one of the sponsors at the 5th session of the General Assembly of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which provided for the calling of an emergency session of the Assembly on 24 hour notice, the establishment of a Peace Observation Commission, a request to each member state to maintain elements within their armed forces for prompt use as United Nations units, the establishment of a Collective Measures Committee and a call for intensified respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and social progress. "The Uniting for Peace" resolution in effect authorized the General Assembly to assume the peace-making and peace-safeguarding responsibilities of the Security Council, if the latter were unable to act in a crisis.

Canadian Influence in Disarmament

The record discloses that Canada has played a key role in efforts of the United Nations to promote disarmament. As a member first of the Atomic Energy Commission and later of the Disarmament Commission, which was established in 1952 to combine responsibilities of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, Canada has shared in the wearying quest for a system of control, reduction, and prohibition of armaments that would be acceptable to the U.S.S.R. At the eighth session of the General Assembly, Canada was appointed a member of a five nation Sub-Committee—the United Kingdom, the United States, France, U.S.S.R., and Canada—to negotiate in private on the disarmament question. At the 9th session of the General Assembly, Canadian representatives took the initiative in sponsoring a resolution requesting the members of the Sub-Committee to continue their negotiations. The U.S.S.R. became a co-sponsor of the resolution and it



—United Nations

THE UNITED NATIONS IN KOREA

Troops guarding the approaches to a Korean pass, one of the first defences put up to halt the attacks by the North Korean forces, reported to the United Nations on June 25, 1950.

was adopted unanimously by the Assembly—the first unanimous vote on an important political question in the history of the Assembly. In a subsequent unanimous vote, the General Assembly endorsed President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace programme, which provided for a conference of scientists on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the establishment of an international agency to promote the sharing of atomic know-how and skills in the interest of humanity. Canada is a member of the committee appointed to organize the conference of scientists.

Economic and Social Problems

While much of her interests and energies in the United Nations have been devoted to the solution of the problems which directly threatened peace, the record shows that Canada has played an active role in the Organization's efforts to promote higher standards of living, improved health, extension of economic co-operation, respect for human rights and recognition of accepted standards of international law. There are three separate but related areas of operation in which an effort is made to carry out a number of these objectives in the Charter:

- (a) programme organized by the Economic and Social Council under which member states combine their resources and knowledge to help less fortunate countries and territories;
- (b) programmes for social progress and the achievement of human rights; and
- (c) widespread operations of the 10 Specialized Agencies which function in close co-operation with the Economic and Social Council.

Canada has taken a prominent part in all of these areas of activity. The major operational undertaking of the Economic and Social Council has been the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. This is an imaginative plan for exchanging technical skills and assisting under-developed countries in the improvement of industry, health, and education. Canada, the third largest contributor, to date has contributed \$4,700,000 for the programme. A Canadian, Dr. Hugh L. Keenleyside, is Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration. Canada's participation in the Colombo Plan is in accord with ideals and efforts of the United Nations to raise standards of living in under-developed countries. The problem of increasing the flow of public and private capital for financing economic development has been under discussion recently in the Economic and Social Council and in the Assembly. At the ninth session of the latter, Canada supported a resolution providing for the early establishment of an International Finance Corporation to help achieve this objective.

Financial Contributions

Canada, which subscribes 3.63 per cent of the administrative budget of the United Nations, is sixth in the list of contributors. The Canadian Government has contributed \$7,750,000 in cash and \$750,000 worth of Canadian salted cod for United Nations relief and reconstruction programmes in Korea. Contributions in cash and kind totalling approximately \$4,000,000 (U.S.) have been made to the United Nations programmes for the relief of refugees in Palestine. To UNICEF, the United Nations Child Welfare Fund, the Canadian Government has made contributions totalling \$8,826,060 (U.S.). Canada has been a member of the 26 nation UNICEF Executive Board since its inception. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to date has received contributions from Canada totalling \$150,000.

Canada has taken a strong interest in the work of the Specialized Agencies as the instruments for achieving the Charter objectives of "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress". Each of the Specialized Agencies carries out specific economic or social activities according to the functional purpose for which it has been created. Each operates on the basis of a separate constitution and independent budget; and each maintains close co-ordination with the Economic and Social Council.

Some of the Specialized Agencies—notably the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)—are mainly functional in their operations. They facilitate commerce and communications amongst nations of the world by establishing uniform practices and removing technical difficulties. The others—the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund—devote themselves primarily to the task of improving the economic and social conditions of the people of the world. The headquarters of ICAO are in Montreal.

Internal Divisions in the United Nations

The record shows that within the United Nations, Canada has endeavoured to reconcile opposing interests and blocs. While most of the more serious



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN OTTAWA

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, left, with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, before the Peace Tower in Ottawa.

internal divisions have resulted from East-West tensions, other frictions have reduced the effectiveness of United Nations machinery. Disagreements between anti-colonial countries and those administering dependent territories account for much of the heat and ill-will engendered in debates in the Organization. As a non-administering country which achieved its independence by evolutionary processes, Canada has been well qualified to attempt to mediate differences arising on colonial issues. In these matters, Canada's policy has been to weigh carefully her sympathies with the legitimate aspirations of dependent peoples against the desirability and necessity of recognizing the domestic jurisdiction, the experience and the special responsibilities of the parent states. The unsolved questions of the admission of new members and the right to represent China have weakened the structure of the United Nations. Canadian representatives have participated in efforts at a number of sessions of the General Assembly to break the deadlock on the admission of new members; these efforts have not as yet been successful and the Soviet veto stands up against the admission of most of the 21 present unaccepted applicants. On the question of Chinese representation, Canada has shared the majority view that Communist China has not yet earned the right to be seated. Opinions of the International Court of Justice have been helpful in solving a number of problems that have beset the United Nations.

Canada's Faith in Future

At the opening of the 9th session of the General Assembly in September 1954, Mr. Pearson expressed Canada's continuing faith in the effectiveness and potentialities of the United Nations. He said:

Our direction (for the U.N.) is clearly laid down. It is toward economic and social progress and away from poverty; it is toward full and free self-government and away from dictatorial regimes imposed from inside or from outside; toward the progressive realization of human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person . . . The United Nations serves a more fundamental purpose in providing an efficient framework and endless opportunities for negotiation and conciliation under a system which embraces both sides in what we call the cold war . . . The United Nations is the main highway to international co-operation and unity . . . Mankind is only beginning to develop and use the institutions of inter-dependence of which the United Nations is by far the most important. The work will not be completed in a day. But it will not be completed at all unless we keep everlastingly at the job of building; of correcting those tendencies which have already made the work fore difficult and which may, if we are not careful, stop it altogether.

External Affairs in Parliament

STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Conclusion of External Affairs Debate

On April 21 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, concluded the House of Commons debate on external affairs which he had opened with the statement reported in the April issue of *External Affairs*. The Minister replied to questions and commented on points which had been raised in the course of the debate.

The Commonwealth

During the debate several speakers had referred to the valuable part being played in these tense and difficult times by the British Commonwealth of Nations. One member had advocated the strengthening of the Commonwealth through a central secretariat and an intra-Commonwealth defence force. He had asked what was the basic difference between the Commonwealth and, for instance, the United Nations. The Minister suggested that:

The basic difference in the Commonwealth relationship is that it has been formed, has grown up and has been built on the habit and the tradition of co-operation. We have developed within the Commonwealth a feeling of close unity. There is a genuine understanding among its members to work together in peace and in war, and a strong desire to co-operate and to work out agreed policies and agreed solutions to problems, even when it is not always possible to do so. And then of course we have the great advantage of a common head in the Commonwealth, both for the monarchical and the republican members, and also the bond of common Parliamentary institutions and Parliamentary traditions.

If we tried to build up some strong centralized machinery for the Commonwealth, and a centralized defence force, said the Minister, far from strengthening the association it might weaken it to the point where it would disappear. The Commonwealth included within its membership a variety of peoples, at times antagonistic peoples, who could not be brought together in any formal and organized way for defence or exclusive economic co-operation. The concept that the Commonwealth might develop into a third power bloc, powerful enough to act as a counter-balance to the United States and Russia was a dangerous one. It would imply that we in the Commonwealth were separating ourselves from the United States and coming between the United States and the NATO powers on the one hand and the Soviet imperialist communist powers on the other. It was better to stick to the concept of two blocs, two forces in the world—if there had to be two—the forces of peace and the forces that we think threaten the peace.

One specific respect in which the Commonwealth had played a useful part in recent years was in the provision of technical and capital assistance to under-

developed countries, especially those in Southeast Asia under the Colombo Plan. There had been criticism that Canada has not contributed enough to the Colombo Plan. The Minister pointed out that in the four years of the Plan's existence, contributions from outside the countries which are recipient members had amounted to \$1,300,000,000, of which Canada had contributed \$28,400,000. To those who criticized that this was not large in relation to the amounts spent on defence, Mr. Pearson pointed out that some of the countries which we were helping spent one-half of their own budgets on defence.

The Far Eastern Situation

International developments in the Far East had been the main subject of the debate. The Minister said:

Discussion of that subject has, to a very large extent in this debate, revolved around our Canadian relationship with the United States to a point where it has been difficult at times to disentangle the two things. I think it is a normal and healthy sign that we should be so preoccupied in this House in a debate on external affairs with the most important aspect of our foreign relations at the present time, namely our relationship with the United States of America. I think of that relationship, important as it is bilaterally to us, in terms of collective action, in terms of collective defence, not merely as something between Canada and the United States, but as something between Canada, the United States and its friends in NATO and in United Nations. I also try to distinguish in this defence relationship with the United States, the problems which may come from what we have begun to call peripheral conflicts from those which will be posed by a major all-out war of extermination.

There was a danger that war in and around Formosa and the coastal islands might spread to this continent. It might spread, not by any all-out massive attack of some Chinese communist Government on the North American continent, which was not possible under present conditions, but by a reaction on the part of the Chinese Government's allies—the Soviet Union. Mr. Pearson said:

Now, if that reaction took place as a result of a local conflict in China, that would be an aggression; it would be a violation of the United Nations Charter and we would be asked to undertake the commitments which we have accepted as members of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Minister went on to explain that if war over Formosa did spread

and there was a massive aggressive air attack on this continent, a struggle in which the very existence of the people of the United States and of Canada would be at stake, all our continental, all our NATO defence arrangements and our whole system of collective security which we have built up over recent years would come into play. In that kind of situation, and I limit it to that kind of situation, how could we be neutral?

It was not correct to deduce from this hypothesis that Canada would automatically support or be willing to intervene on behalf of or with the United States in any war, major or minor, on the continent of China or any place else where that kind of intervention would take place.

Whether support in those circumstances could be counted on from Canada would depend entirely on whether our commitments under NATO were involved, whether there was aggression under the United Nations Charter.

The Minister emphasized that anything he had said in recent statements on Canada's foreign policy did not mean, nor could it fairly be interpreted as meaning, that whenever the United States was at war we were bound to participate. It did not mean that we had any obligation to participate in any war except a war against aggression within the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Some members had made the criticism that by affirming our support of the United States in such circumstances we weakened our influence in Washington. A sounder verdict, said the Minister, was that of the London *Daily Telegraph* which had said in an editorial:

"The conclusion to be drawn from the interdependence of the two nations in a major war is not, as some of Mr. Pearson's critics have suggested, that the United States can take Canadian support in a circumstance for granted, and therefore may disregard Canadian views. On the contrary, it gives the Canadian government both the right and the duty to warn and to dissuade."

On this the Minister remarked:

That remains our right and I hope that we will exercise it on appropriate occasions in Washington. It is also our duty and I hope that we will discharge it on appropriate occasions. It seems to me that the moral of this position is that if all these dangers surround us, little wars with their obligations, or big wars with all their catastrophes, if we are surrounded by these dangers, then the moral is to do everything we possibly can to stop any war before it starts.

Mr. Pearson quoted the suggestion made during the debate by the leader of the CCF party that the Government should state forthrightly and without equivocation that we would do everything we possibly could to ensure that Canada's influence and Canada's policy, especially in its relations with the United States, would be directed towards the avoidance of conflict, political and economic. Mr. Pearson said that he was happy to repeat that assurance and suggested that if we failed, and we might fail, our policy should be: "When possible, to limit conflicts, to prevent them from spreading, and then to end them."

In reply to criticism that our foreign policy should be made in Ottawa only and not in Washington, the Minister said that the decisions in foreign policy and any other policies had to be made in the Canadian Parliament. That was a very different thing from saying that our policy could only be made in Ottawa and should not be made or even influenced anywhere else.

Foreign policy in this world of interdependence cannot be made in any one country or any one capital no matter how powerful that country or capital may be. We are working together today in a peace coalition, and the very essence of that coalition is that every member of it acts only after discussion and consultation with others. In that sense each member must influence the other members' policy, and I hope it will remain that way, because that is the way it should be. That gives our best chance for peace, by collective policy and collective action. In this respect I am distinguishing between decision and the formulation of policy. Suppose the United States adopted that maxim and made its own policy solely in Washington, or the United Kingdom decided to make its policy solely in London, or the French government solely in Paris; it would not be long before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would itself dissolve. If it dissolved we would not be worrying so much about whether we were

making our own policy; we would be worrying far more about our protection against potential enemies even than we do now.

Mr. Pearson said that it seemed to him that the CCF party took a jaundiced and morbidly suspicious view of everything that went on in the United States or at least in the United States official circles. Their leader had emphasized the danger of being dragged into a war by the policies that were being pursued by the Secretary of State of the United States. The Minister suggested that we were in much more danger of being dragged into war by policies that were being pursued by the Foreign Minister in Peking and by the Foreign Minister in Moscow than we were by the policies pursued by the Secretary of State of the United States.

The leader of the CCF party, Mr. Coldwell, said the Minister, had outlined in four points what his own policy towards China in the present situation would be. The first was that we should exile Chiang-Kai-shek—presumably by force. Mr. Pearson did not know who was anxious to take part in this particular expedition. The second suggestion was that Formosa should be neutralized and placed under a trusteeship. This might turn out to be the wisest solution, but Mr. Pearson pointed out that the Chinese communists and the Chinese nationalists were unanimous in opposing it. Canada had no other commitment in regard to Formosa than that which arose from our membership in the United Nations. We felt that the status of Formosa has not yet been fully determined but we also felt that the communist Government in Peking should not use force to bring about that determination.

The third point made by the leader of the CCF party was that we should seat communist China in the United Nations and he had contrasted our policy unfavourably with that of the United Kingdom. The Minister pointed out that the United Kingdom, while recognizing the Peking Government, has not at any time supported the application of that Government for membership in the United Nations.

The fourth point of the CCF's China policy was that we should not intervene in the struggle between the two Chinese Governments over the off shore islands. Mr. Pearson repeated that it was our policy to stay out of the struggle for these off shore islands and he thought that other governments would be well-advised to adopt the same policy. He was even bold enough to hope that that would be the policy which will be adopted in due course by all the governments concerned.

Lines of Defence

Mr. Pearson referred to the concept of lines of defence which had been raised in the debate—the suggestion that Formosa should be our first line of defence, as it was for the United States. This kind of concept was misleading and dangerous. If Formosa was absolutely vital, it could be argued that the off shore islands should be protected as vital to that first line position and then the coast of China vital to the protection of these islands. It was, however, equally dangerous to suggest that no country in its search for security had any right to establish a line of defence outside its own borders. Our own troops, after all, are stationed in Europe today. Mr. Pearson said:

The fact is, surely that our own line of defence is attacked and our own security is jeopardized whenever a free people anywhere is the victim of aggression.

In fact, our safety is endangered whenever there is any war any place. Our only safe policy is to join with friendly states in maintaining that peace and preventing war by collective action.

Relation with the United States

Concluding his statement, the Minister said he would return almost to where he began. He said:

The subject which has loomed so large throughout this debate has been our relations with the United States and our preoccupation with those relations. This preoccupation, indeed this anxiety, is understandable over our relations economic, our relations political and our relations strategic. I suggest that that relationship, vitally important as it must be to us and as it has been in the past, will be even more so in the future. A relationship to be successful on both sides must be based on mutual respect, a freedom to hold and to express our own views. I assure my hon. friends who have been criticizing the Government because we have not, as they have said, had enough courage to express those views, that they do not feel any more strongly about that than we do. However, we in the Government happen at this time to have some responsibility for the conduct of international relations. It is not always advisable in the conduct of diplomacy and international affairs, even with our best friends, to shout from the housetop and throw our weight about, in order to impress our own people with the fact that we are very independent.

This relationship must also be based on recognition of the fact that if our coalition, which is now headed by the United States, breaks up, then indeed there will be a grave danger to peace and security. I suggest; therefore, that while we must be independent and speak up when it is necessary to do so, we must be sure we do nothing avoidable by our words and by our deeds to further that wrong end of disunity and division. When we do disagree with the United States we must be sure that that disagreement is not only based on a narrow conception of our national interest, but is a disagreement which goes to the very basis of the coalition policy and which we maintain on the highest principles of peace and international security.

It is quite true that there are strains and stresses on the coalition at the present time. There has never been a coalition, even in wartime, which was easy to manage. In peacetime, they are not very often necessary. But in a period such as we have at present, between peace and war, a coalition is not only desperately required, but it is very difficult indeed to manage. So there are stresses and strains now pressing against it, but we will be able to weather them. It is quite true that the greatest of these at the present time is in the Far East. I have not come across a better short expression of the nature and the importance of these Far Eastern strains than I have found in a paragraph in the April 9 edition of the *Economist*. It reads as follows:

“The danger of the next few months is that, confronted by the threat of renewed fighting off the China coast, many otherwise sensible people in Britain—

And the writer could have added Canada.

“—will say that they would rather have peace than the American alliance. Nothing, in fact, could be sillier, for there is no such choice. It is still possible to have both peace and the alliance. It is certainly not possible to have peace for long without it.”

We wish to have in this Parliament and in this country both peace and the alliance—not merely the American alliance but an alliance for friendly co-operation with all peace-loving free countries of the world.

Indochina—Statement on Vietnam

On May 3, the Secretary of State for External Affairs tabled in the House of Commons the first interim reports of the International Supervisory Commissions in Laos and Cambodia and the first interim reports of the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam. On the same date Mr. Pearson made the following statement concerning freedom of movement for refugees in North Vietnam in response to a question on this subject which had been asked in the House of Commons by Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker on April 29.

Last Friday the hon. member for Prince Albert asked a question concerning freedom of movement in North Vietnam, a matter which has aroused very considerable interest throughout the country, and I should like to make a statement on it now.

The situation with respect to freedom of movement for refugees from Vietnam, which was provided for under article 14(d) of the armistice agreement, is not satisfactory, nor does the international supervisory commission regard it as so; certainly the Canadian member on that commission does not.

The commission announced early in February last that it has found that the procedure to ensure this movement by the issue of travel permits was cumbersome and complicated, and that fears current among the population of North Vietnam had tended to make them reluctant to apply to the authorities for such permits. Action was taken by the commission which it was hoped would facilitate the proper and more effective implementation of this part of the agreement. However, reports to the effect that people in North Vietnam were still being prevented from exercising their rights of freedom of movement have persisted. Therefore the International Commission recently sent three further mobile teams, on each of which of course there was a Canadian, to make a special survey of those areas in North Vietnam concerning which complaints had been made. On the basis of the reports of this survey, the commission is now determining what further action is necessary.

There are, of course, limitations on the effectiveness of international inspection by the commission in this and in other matters. Some of these limitations are inherent in the cease-fire agreement itself. It reflects the fact that the Commission is not a supra-national body, that it does not have any executive responsibilities with respect to the carrying out of the agreement and that its inspection teams do not in any sense constitute international police detachments. The Commission can only operate with the effective co-operation of the parties to the agreement and it does not always receive that co-operation, especially in this question of freedom of movement, from the communist government in North Vietnam, and that is the main reason why in this matter the results have been disappointing, to say the least.

I would not wish anyone to think that our representatives on the International Commis-

sion for Vietnam are satisfied with the way the freedom of movement provisions of the armistice agreement are being carried out. They are not satisfied, and the government fully shares that dissatisfaction. Our views have been stated very clearly in the International commission in Vietnam, and have, I think, had some effect on the decisions of the Commission.

If one of the parties to the agreement is evading its clear obligations and responsibilities with respect to the freedom of movement for civilians, it is not going unnoticed by our representative on the Commission or by the Government. But this is not a situation, I suggest, which will be solved merely by letting off steam. We are convinced that in order to ensure that the provisions of the agreement are carried out to the greatest degree possible in the circumstances, we must continue to work through our representative on the Commission in the same manner as we have done over the last eight months, pressing for better performance in every way possible and exposing violations when they can be detected. That still seems to us to be the most likely method of ensuring that the greatest possible number of people who wish to do so can leave North Vietnam for the south.

There have been suggestions in some quarters that Canada might withdraw from the Commission as a gesture of protest about the way the Commission has been prevented from correcting the situation with respect to freedom of movement. Such a move would, however, prejudice also the fulfilment of the main military provisions of the agreement, thus creating new tensions and possibly jeopardizing the maintenance of peace, not only in Vietnam but also in the neighbouring countries of Laos and Cambodia. Nor would our withdrawal be of any assistance whatsoever to those in North Vietnam who want to leave. Indeed, it might eliminate any remaining hope that their lot might be alleviated. We must, therefore, keep our sense of perspective in this matter; but without condoning or forgetting some of the terrible things that are being done.

A question was asked also by the hon. member for Prince Albert the other day as to the possibility that the time for freedom of movement for refugees might be extended beyond the terminal date, which is May 18,

(Continued on page 167)

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. W. F. A. Turgeon was transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Dublin, to the Canadian Embassy, Lisbon, with the rank of Ambassador, effective April 20, 1955.
- Mr. H. W. Walker was posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Belgrade, effective March 17, 1955.
- Mr. K. Goldschlag was transferred from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective April 5, 1955.
- Mr. C. E. McGaughey was posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, effective April 25, 1955.
- Mr. Earl Gordon Drake was appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1 effective April 1, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Survey of World Iron Ore Resources. Occurrence, Appraisal and Use. E/2655, ST/ECA/27. New York, 1955. Sales No.: 1954.II.D.5. 345 pp. \$3.50.

Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1954. Bangkok, 1955. 223 p. \$2.00. Sales No.: 1955.II.F.3. (Also issued as Vol. V, No. 4 of the Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East).

Demographic Yearbook 1954 (Sixth Issue). New York, 1954. 729 p. (bilingual). \$6.00. Sales No.: 1954.XIII.5.

Yearbook on Human Rights for 1952. New York, 1954. 490 p. \$5.00. Sales No.: 1954.XIV.1.

Multiple-Purpose River Basin Development. Part I: Manual of river basin planning. Flood Control Series No. 7. ST/ECAFE/SER.F/7. New York, 1955. 83 p. Sales No.: 1955.II.F.1.

Laws Concerning Nationality (United Nations Legislative Series). ST/LEG/SER.B/4 and Add.1. July 1954. 594 p. \$4.00 Sales No.: 1954.V.1.

Study on Expulsion of Immigrants. ST/SOA/22. March 1955. 77 p. Sales No.: 1955.IV.6.

Middle East Seminar on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders, Cairo, 5 to 17 December 1953. ST/TAA/SER.C/17, 6 August 1954. 97 p. Sales No.: 1954.IV.17.

ICJ Pleadings, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (U.K./France). Judgment of November 17th, 1953. 736 p. (bilingual). Sales number 130.

ILO

(ILO publications may be secured from Canada Branch, ILO, 95 Rideau St., Ottawa 2, Canada.)

Administrative Practice of Social Insurance. Geneva, 1955. 86 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 40).

Guide for Labour Inspectors. Geneva, 1955. 107 p. (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 41).

ITO (GATT)

Final Act adopted at the Ninth Session of the Contracting Parties and Protocol amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement; Protocol amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement; Protocol of Organizational Amendments to the General Agreement; Agreement on the Organizational Trade Co-operation. Geneva, 10 March 1955. 216 p. (bilingual).

Fourth Protocol of rectifications and modifications to the Annexes and to the texts of the schedules to the GATT. Geneva, 7 March 1955. 81 p. (bilingual).

Declaration on the continued application of schedules to the GATT. Geneva, 10 March 1955. 15 p. (bilingual).

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

UNESCO

Approved Programme and Budget for 1955-56. Paris, 13 January 1955. 329 p. (re 8C/5 and 8C/5 Corrigenda).

Teaching Abroad. No. 7, February 1955. Paris 1955. 81 p. (bilingual).

Economics and Action by Pierre Mendès-France and Gabriel Ardant. (Science and Society). 222 p. \$3.50. New York, Columbia University Press 1955.

Compulsory Education in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam by Charles Bilodeau, Somlith Pathammavong, Le Quang Hong. 157 p. \$1.25. (Studies on Compulsory Education—XIV).

Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword (A study of the attitudes of youth in post-war Japan) by Jean Stoetzel. 334 p. \$4.00. Columbia University Press/Unesco 1955.

The Cross and the Sword by Manuel de Jesus Calvan. Translated by Robert Graves. (A novel of ruthlessness and intrigue when greed followed in the wake of Columbus and the Indian fought for survival). 366 p. \$3.75.

UNESCO Collection of Representative Works: Latin American Series. Published with the co-operation of the Organization of American States. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1954.

International Yearbook of Education 1954. UNESCO and IBE, Publication No. 161. 409 p. \$3.00.

The Social Sciences. Paris 1955. 64 p. (UNESCO and its Programmes—XII).

WHO

The Work of WHO 1954. Annual Report of the Director-General to the WHA and to the U.N. Geneva, March 1955. 209 p. \$2.00. Official Records of WHO. No. 59.

Executive Board, Fifteenth Session, Geneva, 18 January-4 February 1955. Part II: Report on the proposed programme and budget estimates for 1956. Geneva, March 1955. 137 p. \$1.25. Official Records of WHO, No. 61.

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

International Survey of Programmes of Social Development. (Prepared by the Bureau of Social Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, in co-operation with ILO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO). E/CN.5/301, 31 March 1955. 591 p.

Progress made by the U.N. in the field of Social Welfare during the period 1 January 1953-31 December 1954 and Proposals for the Programme of work 1955-57. (Report by the Secretary-General). E/CN.5/308, 15 March 1955. 128 p. and Annexes A to G.

Report on the Latin American Meeting of Experts on the Pulp and Paper Industry, Buenos Aires, 19 October-2 November 1954. E/CN.12/361 (E/2697), FAO/ETAP No. 462, ST/TAA/SER.C/19. 139 p.

Systematic Compilation of International Instruments relating to the Legal Status of Aliens—UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (UNIDROIT—International Institute for the Unification of Private Law). Rome November 1954. LSA/20. 477 p.

CORRIGENDA

Vol. 7, No. 4, April 1955, page 123, last paragraph, line six for "Pakistan" read "Poland".

Ibid, page 126, paragraph four, line two, for "another" read "the other".

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Portugal

Trade Agreement. Signed at Lisbon, May 28, 1954.

Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1954.

Ratifications exchanged April 29, 1955.

Entered into force definitively April 29, 1955.

RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH KOREA

(Continued from page 148)

It was also my great privilege to be signally honoured by receiving a personal citation from His Excellency and also one from the National Assembly of South Korea.

The day I left for home they closed down the plant and everyone came to the airport, as did also members of one of the universities where I had spoken on "Canada". The flowers and presents that they gave me really showed their gratitude and were appreciated.

It was a tremendous job, but despite the difficulties it was a most satisfying and gratifying assignment, and gave me a real sense of achievement. When I returned to Canada the knowledge went with me that I had helped a country and its people who so richly deserved help, assistance and guidance.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS IN PARLIAMENT

(Continued from page 164)

I think. The Commission is actively concerned with finding ways and means of ensuring that this provision of the cease-fire agreement is properly implemented, and it will, I am sure, consider the possibility of an extension, if necessary; but any extension of the period would require the concurrence of both parties to the cease-fire agreement, whose full cooperation would be required if an extension were to provide a real solution to the problem.

I tabled today, copies of the first interim reports of the Commission for Vietnam and the second interim report. But I should like to point out now and emphasize that the reports of the Commission were in each case prepared by the Commission as a whole, in-

cluding the Polish and Indian members as well as the Canadian representative. It may be that these reports, therefore, do not reflect entirely our dissatisfaction with the freedom of movement position.

I understand that the Vietnam Commission has recently completed a third interim report which is now being forwarded to the Geneva conference powers, as indeed the first two have been. In connection with the submission of this report, steps have been taken by the Canadian representative to ensure that the unsatisfactory situation with respect to the carrying out of the provisions in the agreement for freedom of movement for the civil population will be given special attention.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 55/9—*World Trade at the Crossroads*, an address by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, to the Canadian Club, Montreal, March 21, 1955. made in the House of Commons, March 24, 1955.
- No. 55/11—*The Americans—How Well Do We Really Know Them*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to the Women's Canadian Club, Montreal, February 7, 1955.
- No. 55/10—*The Far Eastern Situation*, a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, introducing the debate on external affairs,

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

- No. 55/12—*The House Building Industry*, an address by the Minister of Public Works, Mr. R. H. Winters, at a meeting of the National House Builders' Convention, Toronto, March 29, 1955.
- No. 55/13—*The Effects of Radiation on Human Health*, a reply tabled in the House of Commons by the Minister of Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, in answer to an enquiry by Mr. F. A. Enfield, M.P., April 4, 1955.

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's
Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1955.

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MONTHLY BULLETIN

Department of External Affairs

Ottawa, Canada

Vol. 7 - No. 6

June 1955



CANADA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

June 1955

Vol. 7 No. 6

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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Ministerial Meeting of NATO Council

THE North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Paris on May 9, 10, and 11. Canada was represented at this meeting by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, and Mr. L. D. Wilgress, the Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council. They were accompanied by Mr. J. W. Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs, and other officials from the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council in Paris.

The main occasion for this Ministerial meeting was the admission of the German Federal Republic to NATO. There were originally twelve countries signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States. Turkey and Greece joined the alliance at the beginning of 1952.


On Monday, May 9, the flag of the West German Republic was hoisted beside those of the other fourteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Chancellor Adenauer took his seat among the other Foreign Ministers at the Council. Mr. Pearson's statement of welcome on the accession of the German Federal Republic may be found in *External Affairs* May 1955, page 149.

The other purpose of the Ministerial meeting was to provide an occasion for a most useful discussion and exchange of views between the Foreign Ministers on a number of matters of political importance, both of direct and indirect concern to NATO. The discussions were held at a time when public interest in the possibility and substance of Four-Power talks was running high and the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, whose governments had already had a preliminary exchange of views on this question, were able to examine this problem informally with the representatives of the other members of the Organization. This consultation with governments which would naturally have a direct interest in the outcome of such talks, fitted conveniently into the process of diplomatic preparation for the Four-Power conference.

Broad Agenda

The agenda of the Ministerial meeting was sufficiently broad to cover all subjects of greatest concern to NATO countries and three full days were set aside to permit the Foreign Ministers to carry on the discussion in some detail. Moreover, the procedure, which was tried for the first time, of agreeing informally that certain Ministers should lead the discussion on matters they were most directly informed on, proved useful in promoting an exchange of views.

There was no attempt to reach decisions at this meeting nor to reach any conclusions except in the most general terms. These conclusions are set out in the communique issued at the end of the talks, the text of which appears on page 172.



—NATIS

NEW NATO HEADQUARTERS

A model of the new NATO Headquarters to be built at the Place de la Porte Dauphine, at the end of Avenue Foch between the Boulevard Lannes and Avenue Marechal, Paris.

While there was general agreement on the policy aims of all members in the North Atlantic Treaty area, the main purpose was not so much to reach an agreement on a common denominator of policy, as to attain a better understanding of the various points of view on problems of common concern.

As the Secretary of State for External Affairs said in an interview after the session:

I have always thought that if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is to survive the emergency which gave it birth, it must be much more than a simple military alliance.

I mean that as well as being an organization for co-operation on defence it must also be a centre of political, economic and social co-operation.

The last Council meeting during which we were able to exchange what seemed to me to be a wide range of opinions and views furnished us with the proof of the important progress we are making in the field of political co-operation.

The latest in the series of Ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council is, therefore, mostly to be remembered for having marked a notable growth in size and stature of the Organization. The German Federal Republic has entered NATO and into full political and defence association with the Western nations. This meeting also demonstrated a growing capacity for collective responsibility in taking counsel before important decisions are made

on the use of its increasing military and diplomatic strength. As the Atlantic community is reflected in a growing feeling of community among its members, as well as in the development of various forms of co-operation, non-military as well as military, this meeting was an important milestone in the development of NATO.

COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The North Atlantic Council, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece, met in ministerial session in Paris on May 9, 10 and 11, 1955.

I

To welcome the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Council held an opening public session. In speeches made on that occasion, the texts of which have already been made public, Ministers stressed the significance they attach to the entry of the Federal Republic as a democratic and sovereign state into the North Atlantic community. The Federal Chancellor, replying to the welcome extended him by his colleagues, emphasized the full harmony existing between the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty and the ardent desire for peace, security and freedom felt by the whole German people including the eighteen million in East Germany.

II

The Council reaffirmed the purely defensive character of the Atlantic alliance. It recorded its deep satisfaction at the entry into force of the agreements which establish Western European Union and which promote peace and provide specific safeguards, including the control of armaments. The Council also noted the valuable mutual support made possible by close collaboration between NATO and Western European Union in their respective fields of activity.

The Council welcomed the declarations made by the Ministers of member governments signatory to the Italian Peace Treaty recalling the active part taken by Italy in the progress of Atlantic and European co-operation, and reaffirming that various discriminatory aspects of that treaty were considered to be inconsistent with the position of Italy as an ally.

III

The Ministers examined major aspects of the international situation within and beyond the NATO area.

They discussed a report on the current negotiations regarding the Austrian State Treaty, and welcomed the indications that the Soviet Union may now join in concluding such a treaty, long sought by the Western Powers.

They were resolved to continue the policies heretofore followed in building and maintaining the strength and unity of the West.

The Council welcomed the initiative of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in proposing to the Soviet Union negotiations to find means

(Continued on page 183)

Disarmament Discussions in London

THE second round of private discussions of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee began in London on February 25 and was suspended on May 18. The Sub-Committee, which consists of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R., was reconvened in accordance with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 4, 1954. At that time the Soviet representative, Mr. Vyshinsky, accepted "as a basis" for further negotiations the Anglo-French proposals which had been presented during the first round of discussions of the Sub-Committee in the spring of 1954. These proposals had then been flatly rejected by the Soviet Government. Mr. Vyshinsky's announcement, together with the fact that the General Assembly resolution on disarmament secured a unanimous vote, had been hailed as hopeful signs that some progress in the lengthy disarmament negotiations might at last be made.

The recent discussions in London may have brought about a substantial narrowing of the gap between the Western and Soviet positions. This is all the more remarkable in view of the negative attitude of the Soviet Union at the outset. The hope that some progress might be made was dashed—temporarily—at the first meeting when the Soviet delegation tabled new proposals which represented a complete reversal of the Soviet position taken at the ninth session of the General Assembly. These proposals which actually ignored the Anglo-French plan approved earlier by Mr. Vyshinsky were merely a revised version of the old "ban the bomb" propaganda theme which, this time, suggested that "all states which possess atomic and hydrogen weapons . . . should destroy completely all those weapons in their possession". Conventional armaments and armed forces under these proposals were to be left as they were and as per usual the question of international control would be discussed *after* the decision to destroy nuclear weapons. These proposals were of course completely unacceptable to the Western Powers since they would nullify the United States lead in the nuclear field while the Communist powers would retain preponderance in conventional armaments and armed forces. Not only did the Soviet Government abandon the co-operative attitude adopted last fall but at the same time it disregarded the rule of secrecy under which the Sub-Committee is operating by releasing the text of its proposals to the press in order to gain propaganda advantages.

Western Disarmament Plan

When the Western representatives decided to let the record speak for itself and prepared to abandon the talks the Soviet Union found itself in a vulnerable position and reverted for all practical purposes to the Vyshinsky proposals presented at the ninth session. This second set of proposals did not call for the immediate destruction of stockpiles and even represented some improvement on the Vyshinsky proposals, although the Western and Soviet positions remained far apart on the vital issue of international control over the disarmament programme. This happy development, however, was marred by the publication in *Pravda* (March 24) of a distorted account of the Sub-Committee proceedings followed on the same day by a more detailed distorted

story given to the Tass correspondent in London by the Soviet representative on the Sub-Committee. In the meantime the Western Powers had confirmed their position by re-introducing the Anglo-French proposals in the form of a draft resolution sponsored this time by all four Western members of the Sub-Committee. Like the Anglo-French memorandum, the Western resolution calls for the preliminary acceptance by all states of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons *except in defence against aggression*. It also calls for the preparation of a Disarmament Treaty which would provide for:

- (a) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;
- (b) Major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments;
- (c) The establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.

The disarmament programme embodying these provisions should be carried out by stages, the first stage consisting of a freeze of armed forces and military expenditures, both atomic and non-atomic, at levels existing on December 31, 1954 (or such other date as may be agreed at the proposed World Disarmament Conference). During the second stage, the first half of the reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces agreed upon at the Disarmament Conference would go into effect and on completion of these reductions the manufacture of nuclear weapons would cease. At the third and final stage, the second half of agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces would take place whereupon the total prohibition of nuclear weapons would go into force and stockpiles of these weapons would be eliminated. One essential feature of the western proposals is that the measures envisaged within each stage should only take place when "the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them".

Additions to Western Proposals

The return of the Soviet Union to the Vyshinsky proposals of the autumn of 1954 set the stage for the constructive work accomplished by the Sub-Committee during its recent discussions. The Western powers took the initiative by tabling a number of proposals which supplemented or improved the general disarmament programme outlined in their basic proposals.

The most significant additions to the Western programme related to the levels at which armed forces should be reduced and to the principles of international control. On the first point the United Kingdom and the French delegations submitted proposals whereby the forces of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China would be reduced to between 1 and 1½ million men, while those of the United Kingdom and France would be reduced to 650,000 men. On the second point the four Western members tabled a draft resolution outlining in some detail what they mean by effective international control. This paper suggests that the control organ should have, among others, the power to supervise and verify the disclosures of information required at each stage of the disarmament programme and to organize and conduct field and aerial surveys to ensure its implementation and to ascertain whether all installations and facilities have been disclosed. The Western paper also specifies that the inter-

national control officials should be stationed permanently in the countries adhering to the Disarmament Treaty and that they should have the right "of unrestricted access to, egress from and travel within the territory of participating states, and unrestricted access to all installations and facilities as required by them for the effective performance of their responsibilities and functions".

Soviet Objections

The discussion of these and other proposals brought about useful exchanges between Western and Soviet representatives on their respective positions. The Soviet delegation insisted that the Western plan should specify precise time limits for each stage of the disarmament programme and for the programme as a whole. To meet this objection, the Western delegations accepted the principle of precise time limits being embodied in the disarmament treaty "subject to any extension of time which may be essential in any phase to permit states to complete disarmament measures".

The Soviet delegation objected that the total prohibition of nuclear weapons under the Western plan was postponed until all agreed reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces have been completed. The Vyshinsky proposals provided that the manufacture of nuclear weapons should cease as soon as the second half of the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces begins and that the completion of these conventional reductions should coincide with the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In order to meet this second objection, the French and the United Kingdom delegations proposed what is probably the most important modification in the Western position since the tabling of the Anglo-French memorandum in June 1954. They suggested that instead of becoming effective only after the completion of all agreed reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should go into force upon the completion of the third quarter (i.e. 75 per cent) of these reductions. Simultaneously, the elimination of stockpiles and the last quarter of agreed reductions would begin and both processes would be completed within the time limit laid down in the Disarmament Treaty. This considerable concession was made contingent upon agreement being reached with the Soviet Union on two essential points, i.e.,

- (1) "Drastic reductions of the armed forces and conventional armaments of the Great Powers" and
- (2) "The institution of an effective system of control which would operate throughout the whole disarmament programme".

New Soviet Proposals

After a number of frustrating exchanges during which the Soviet Representative ignored the Western representatives' concrete answers to the objections raised against their proposals, the Soviet Union tabled a twenty-two page document dealing with disarmament and "the elimination of the threat of a new war". These proposals insist on a rigid timetable whereby the whole disarmament programme would not only be negotiated but fully implemented by the end of 1957. The Soviet Government thus refused to accept the Western compromise on one of its two major objections to Western plans. The new Soviet proposals, however, embodied the Anglo-French compromise on phasing which had been presented to meet the other Soviet objection. They also in-

cluded the United Kingdom and French proposals on the level of armed forces which was one of the conditions attached to their compromise on phasing.

The Soviet position on the second Anglo-French condition concerning an effective system of control is not clear. There is no specific indication that the Soviet Union is ready to accept the Western proposal that the officials of the control organ should be enabled to carry out inspection anywhere at any time in the territories of states. Nor is there any clear indication that the Soviet Government agrees that a control organ should be established and its officials installed in national territories *before* the implementation of the disarmament measures which they should supervise. The new Soviet paper, nevertheless, represents some advance towards the Western position of control. For instance, the U.S.S.R. now agrees with the Western view that there should be one permanent control organ which would have wide powers throughout the disarmament programme.

The new Soviet paper also agrees with the Western suggestion that states should pledge themselves not to use nuclear weapons "except in defence against aggression". The Soviet acceptance, however, is qualified by the provision that the exceptional use of these weapons should only be permitted "when a decision to this effect is taken by the Security Council" where the U.S.S.R. has a right of veto.

The Problems of Germany and Military Bases

Against these concessions the new Soviet plan contains a number of features which did not appear in the Vyshinsky proposals of last September or in the new version of these proposals tabled during the recent discussions. Many of these features were actually present in various proposals put forward in the past during discussions on disarmament proper or on "the reduction of international tension". They call for the dismantling of all military bases in foreign territories (by 1957), the immediate withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany followed by the formation of "strictly limited contingents of local police forces", the condemnation of war propaganda, the removal of every form of discrimination in the field of trade, etc.

As in the case of previous Soviet proposals tabled in the Sub-Committee, it is clear that the latest proposals were submitted partly for propaganda purposes and in particular with an eye to the German problem. This is borne out by the fact that they were made public shortly after their presentation in the Sub-Committee in spite of requests by the Western members that the proposals should not be released, at least not until they had had an opportunity to study them. The question now arises whether the concessions made by the Soviet Union on the problem of disarmament, which are indeed impressive by any standards, are conditional upon the acceptance by the West of the suggestions on other issues contained in the proposals. If this were to be the case, the value of the recent Soviet concessions on disarmament proper would be reduced considerably.

Four Power Talks

It is difficult to see how the discussion of the political questions raised in the latest Soviet proposals can be regarded as coming within the terms of reference of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. Yet the Soviet representative made it clear that these questions were an integral part of the Soviet disarm-

ament proposals and that the proposals should therefore be considered as a whole. If this is the case it would seem that the Soviet plan could usefully be examined during the forthcoming discussions of the Four Powers. In any event, while every effort should continue to be made to reduce the gap remaining between the Western and Soviet positions on disarmament, it might be wondered whether a final settlement of this problem is likely to occur before at least some measure of agreement is reached on the outstanding political issues between the East and the West. The Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed this view in the House of Commons External Affairs Committee on May 25 when he said:

I would hope myself that one of the subjects to be discussed at the four power meeting to be held presumably in July—and I think this will turn out

(Continued on page 192)



HEAD OF INDIAN DELEGATION TO U.N. VISITS OTTAWA

His Excellency Krishna Menon, Head of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, with Mr. L. B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, during his visit to Ottawa in June.

Visit of The Right Honourable C. D. Howe to Australia and New Zealand

CANADA is no stranger to distinguished visitors. Since the end of World War II, Canada's growing stature in world affairs and its favourable geographical location have made it possible for her to play host to leaders of countries from widely separated parts of the world. Among the distinguished visitors we have been glad to welcome have been the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia, as well as other leaders from these sister nations of the Commonwealth. But it is not always easy for busy statesmen to undertake tours in distant countries. Unfortunately, despite pressing invitations on several occasions, it has not been possible for a Canadian Prime Minister to travel to Australia or New Zealand. Although a visit to these countries had been planned by Mr. St. Laurent in 1954, circumstances compelled our Prime Minister to forego this pleasure.


In April and May of this year, the Minister of Trade and Commerce and of Defence Production, Mr. C. D. Howe, was able to undertake a goodwill tour of these sister nations to return the compliments which Australia and New Zealand have frequently paid to Canada. Accompanied by the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Howe left Vancouver for Sydney via Honolulu and the Fijis on April 8. Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull reached Vancouver again on May 4 after an absence from Canada of nearly four weeks.

Australia

Mr. Howe arrived in Sydney on April 11. During his stay in Australia, he visited four of the six states, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, and South Australia, and the national capital, Canberra. His travels took him to Sydney, Brisbane, Bundaberg, Newcastle, Melbourne, Geelong, Mildura, Radium Hill, Canberra, and the Snowy Mountains area. Although his itinerary was confined to the south eastern seaboard and much of his time was spent in the larger centres, the tour touched on a number of geographic areas and enabled Mr. Howe to see a representative cross-section of the Australian scene.

In Queensland the Minister visited a thriving sub-tropical sugar growing community centred around Bundaberg some 200 miles north of Brisbane and inspected a sugar mill. The sugar operations were of special interest in view of Canada's annual purchase of some 100,000 tons of Queensland sugar and on a number of occasions Mr. Howe expressed the hope that Queensland would be able to increase its sugar sales to us. His stay in this important north eastern state included a visit to a large co-operative pineapple canning plant on the outskirts of Brisbane.

The party spent the better part of a day at Newcastle on the coast about 100 miles north of Sydney where Mr. Howe saw the Broken Hill Proprietary steel plant and went down one of the company's coal mines. Mr. Howe described the steel plant and its ancillaries as one of the best integrated operations of its kind to be found anywhere.



En route to Melbourne from Sydney, Mr. Howe caught a glimpse of the highly developed sheep grazing and mixed farming country of southern Victoria. His subsequent tours to the General Motors-Holden and Ford plants enabled him to see something of Australia's secondary industry. The highlight of his visit to Melbourne was a special convocation of the University where he received the honorary degree of Doctor of Civil Law.

At Mildura, an irrigation settlement on the Murray River founded in the 1880's by two Canadian brothers, the Chaffey's, the Minister saw something of the growing and processing of dried fruits, an industry of which Canada is one of the largest consumers.

At Radium Hill just inside the eastern border of South Australia, the Minister, accompanied by the Premier of South Australia and his Minister of Mines, visited the underground workings of the uranium mine and inspected the mill where the ore is concentrated. Radium Hill is situated in a marginal grazing district of South Australia where the average holding runs from 250 to 300 square miles and the carrying capacity is about one sheep per fifty acres. The Minister was thus afforded a chance for a look at the Australian "outback".

In Canberra on April 21 and 22 Mr. Howe visited Parliament House, called on the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Prime Minister, and laid a wreath on the Australian War Memorial. He also attended a luncheon given by the Commonwealth Ministers of State and dined at Government House.

The Minister's visit to the A.£422 million Snowy Mountains power and irrigation development coincided with the official opening by Prime Minister

Menzies on April 23 of the scheme's first power unit delivering 60,000 kilowatts. At the invitation of Mr. Menzies the Minister attended as a special guest. The proceedings were broadcast over an interstate Australian Broadcasting Commission network and generous reference was made to Mr. Howe, both by the Prime Minister and by Mr. W. Hudson, the Commissioner of the Snowy Mountains Authority.

During his stay in Australia, Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull had conversations with members of the Australian Wheat Board, civil aviation authorities, trade officials, and other Australian leaders including members of the Commonwealth and state governments. These conversations were helpful in reaching an understanding of Australian problems and points of view but were subsidiary to the main purpose of his trip.

Goodwill missions invariably involve speech making. Mr. Howe delivered four major speeches, the first at a Civic reception given by the City of Brisbane, the second at a State luncheon given by the New South Wales Government in Sydney, the third at the University of Melbourne convocation and the fourth as a broadcast over the Australian Broadcasting Commission's Interstate Network on a fifteen-minute "Guest of Honour" programme. He also spoke informally six times.


In the main, the Minister's speeches stressed the desire of Canada for closer political and commercial relations with Australia and the similarity of the economic problems which confront the two countries. In Brisbane he expressed the hope that it would be possible for Canada to secure more Australian sugar and canned pineapple and said "that Canada was looking forward to the day when Canadian goods could enter Commonwealth countries free of quantitative restrictions. We believe that it is your desire to trade with us. We certainly want to trade with you".

State Luncheon

At the State luncheon in Sydney he spoke in some detail of the Canadian atomic energy programme and stressed the desirability of co-operation between Canada and Australia in measures to stabilize wheat markets. The Minister's address at the University of Melbourne emphasized the importance of the role which the university must play in securing a stable balance in a highly complex world society.

In his "Guest of Honour" broadcast, the Minister referred to the three aspects of Australian life which had impressed him most. The first of these was the sense of so much achieved in so little time. Another was the immense potential awaiting development and the third was a way of life which he found uncommonly attractive. He emphasized the desirability of closer association between Canada and Australia within the Commonwealth and suggested that this might be furthered by exchanges of ideas and personnel in governmental and non-governmental fields. Mr. Howe made much of his interest in such exchanges in the scientific and engineering fields particularly that of atomic energy.

Throughout the tour Mr. Howe was received with warmth and cordiality wherever he went. The spirit of friendliness and kinship was reflected in the press and radio coverage of the visit. One of the most important themes ex-



SNOWY MOUNTAIN HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECT

pounded by editorial writers and commentators was the need for closer cooperation between Canada and Australia. As expressed by the Sydney Daily Telegraph, "It is a pity that Canada and Australia do not engage in more frequent flag showing in each other's territory". The Sydney Morning Herald observed that Mr. Howe's visit was "a welcome reversal of what has been, perhaps inevitably, a one-way traffic in political personalities . . . His arrival is a reminder of the highly important part that Canada now plays in world affairs".

During his stay in Canberra, the Australian government took up Mr. Howe's suggestion that a flag-pole provided by Canada be erected on some suitable site in the Commonwealth capital as a memento of the visit and a symbol of the affectionate relations between Australia and Canada. Arrangements are in train to give effect to this gesture.

New Zealand

Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull flew to New Zealand on Anzac Day, April 25, arriving at Christchurch in the South Island. The following morning Mr. Howe laid a wreath on the Cenotaph and later attended a civic reception and a civic luncheon in his honour. In the afternoon, the Minister visited the Kaiapoi Woollen Mills and later drove to Lyttelton to take the overnight ferry to Wellington.

Next morning after a formal call on Prime Minister Holland, Mr. Howe was privileged to meet for an hour with the New Zealand Cabinet. This was followed by the high point of the New Zealand tour, a magnificent state luncheon. Among those present were New Zealand Ministers, all members of Parliament, the diplomatic corps, and representative leaders of all sections of

New Zealand life. In proposing a toast to Mr. Howe, Mr. Holland spoke of Canada as the valued and affectionately regarded senior partner in Commonwealth affairs whose advice was always listened to with respect. He referred in warm terms to the part played by Canada in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan during World War II and pointed out that although New Zealand and Canada have their differences, these do not disturb the underlying unity of ideal and purpose. Mr. Holland was supported by the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Nash, who dwelt at some length on Canada's historical background and the part played by several distinguished Canadian leaders. Mr. Howe's speech in reply which touched on the position of the two countries in the Commonwealth and recent developments in Canada was warmly received.

Later that day, Mr. Howe was an interested visitor to a session of the House of Representatives and met representatives of the New Zealand press.

Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull left Wellington on April 29 for a four day tour of the North Island. During this trip, Mr. Howe inspected the geo-thermal investigation area at Wairakei, the Kaingaroa State Forests, and the Tasman Pulp and Paper Company's newsprint mill in course of construction at Kawerau. At this centre, Mr. Howe saw the new village built to house among others Canadian technicians and lumbermen and their families who have gone to New Zealand to assist in development of the forest industry. At Rotorua, Mr. Howe saw the local thermal reserves and subsequently motored across the Island to the Waitomo Caves, visiting en route hydro installations on the Waikato River.

Mr. Howe's final days in New Zealand were spent in Auckland as the guest of the Governor General at Government House. The programme included a brief press conference before a civic reception, a formal dinner at Government



WELLINGTON, N. Z.

House, and some sightseeing in the vicinity of this important seaport and business centre on New Zealand's north coast. Late in the afternoon of May 3, Mr. Howe and Mr. Bull took their farewell of New Zealand and boarded a Canadian Pacific Airlines plane for Canada.

Although Mr. Howe's visit was primarily a goodwill tour, he and Mr. Bull found time for friendly discussions with leading officials on matters of common interest such as trade, general political affairs, and atomic energy.

Mr. Howe's tour of New Zealand, as of Australia, was a splendid success. In both countries, the thoughtfulness and excellence of the arrangements made by the local authorities in conjunction with the Canadian High Commissioners and their staffs was an important factor in this. The warmth and cordiality which was tendered to him on both the official and unofficial level and the keen interest displayed by the press in his distinguished career as a Commonwealth statesman and his leadership in the field of Canadian commercial and industrial development testify to the lively sentiments of friendship which New Zealanders and Australians entertain for Canada. It can be said with confidence that Mr. Howe's tour marks a new stage in the development of closer and more cordial relations between Canada and the Commonwealth nations of the South West Pacific.

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF NATO COUNCIL

(Continued from page 172)

for resolving outstanding issues. The Council hoped that this initiative would lead progressively to agreements which would remove sources of conflict and contribute to the security and liberty of all peoples. In particular, the Council hoped that such negotiations might help to bring about the peaceful unification of Germany in freedom, and promote progress toward reduction, under effective safeguards, of armaments and armed forces. The Council emphasized that this process of negotiation required careful preparation, and must be pursued with patience and determination.

The Council also reviewed the situation in the Middle East and Far East. The Council received reports on the conclusion of various security pacts in these areas, including the Manilla Pact and the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The Council welcomed measures taken to strengthen the defence of the Middle East and the Far East areas. A report was made to the Council on the Bandung conference. The Council expressed the hope that there would be a cessation of hostilities in the Far East and no further resort to force, since this would so clearly endanger the peace of the world.

IV

Ministers expressed their satisfaction that the procedures followed in the Council had enabled them to have frank and free discussions and a thorough exchange of views. These discussions constitute a most significant proof of the solidarity of the alliance and show the great value of the Council as a forum for political consultation on matters of common concern. They also resolved to continue to follow these procedures, which enable the member governments to develop their policies on common principles.

External Affairs in Parliament

Statements of Government Policy

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their Parliamentary Assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Standing Committee on External Affairs

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, met with the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the House of Commons for its sessions on May 24, 25 and 26. The Minister discussed some aspects of the work of the Department of External Affairs and replied to a number of questions asked by members of the Committee.

International Situation

At the first meeting which he attended on May 24, Mr. Pearson gave a statement on the international situation generally. He said that he thought there had been an improvement and, particularly in Europe, some relaxation of tension. Soviet tactics, if not strategy, had changed and the Soviet Government appeared to be more co-operative in regard to several international problems that had been troubling us since the war.

The reasons for the change in the Russian attitude could not be known for certain. Mr. Pearson suggested it might be due to domestic difficulties in Russia—both political and economic; it might also be due to the fact that the Russian leaders, who were realists, had realized that if war came now it would be a hydrogen war. Moreover, they might have been impressed by the growing unity and strength of the Western world and that might have impelled the change in their tactics towards us. And there was a final motive which might be still of great importance:

they may hope to put us off our guard by adopting a more reasonable and co-operative attitude in respect of certain problems. It may be that they think they can lull us into a false security and that we shall then abandon the policies which themselves have been in a large part, through NATO, responsible for the improved situation.

Evidence of the change of Russian tactics in Europe included their signing of the Austrian Treaty, their agreement to participate in four-power talks and their apparent willingness, contrary to their statements before the conclusion of the Paris Agreements and the admission of Germany to NATO, to discuss German questions at the four-power Conference.

This change of tactics does give us on the Western side an opportunity for negotiating; as I put it the other day it means that in the diplomatic field we are "out of the trenches"—out of the period of "trench warfare" and into the open. That gives us opportunities but it also may result in risks and dangers now that we are manœuvring in the open. I hope we shall be able to avoid the dangers, and I hope we shall be able to take advantage of the opportunities.

Far East

In the Far East, said the Minister, there had been some improvement of the situation over the last two or three months. In Korea we had settled down to a divided country and while we must maintain our efforts, through the United Nations, of trying to bring about unity, there was an uneasy feeling that this was going to take some time. Though the Armistice had not been converted into a Peace Treaty there was no immediate likelihood of that Armistice being broken.

In Formosa and around the Formosan Straits things seemed to have settled down somewhat. While the problem remained, the situation had not worsened in recent weeks either in regard to the off-shore islands or in regard to Formosa itself, and a kind of de facto cease-fire position seemed to be growing up in the Formosan Straits. One should not ignore the fact that the dangers inherent in that situation still remained and that there had been no particular advance to a settlement except possibly in the announced decision of the Foreign Minister of the Government of Peking to discuss these questions directly with the United States and the response given in Washington by the President of the United States to the terms of that announcement.

NATO Meeting

Mr. Pearson also spoke to the Committee about the situation in Indochina and about the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris which is discussed elsewhere in this issue.* He described the Meeting as "the most useful and effective meeting that we have held in the Council from the point of view of exchanging views and trying to understand each other's policies".

United Nations Charter

In the discussion which followed the Minister's statement, questions were asked on a great variety of subjects, all of which cannot be summarized in this article. In connection with the forthcoming celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco the Minister was asked what were the probabilities of the Charter being revised at the present time. Mr. Pearson said:

As far as Charter revision is concerned, that is a matter which I know the committee has been interested in in the past. We have been working on that in the Department and we could go into it in more detail later on if the committee would like me to do so. Our first problem is to decide whether we should support a Charter revision conference at all at this time. At San Francisco, and I recall this very well and some of the members of the Committee will recall it also—we, the Australian and other delegations were insistent that there should be provision for a revision conference after ten years. We were determined to avoid if we could the use of a veto against the calling of such a conference. And we succeeded. So a conference can be called now by the majority of the Assembly and any seven members of the Security Council. But that does not mean that in the light of the experience of the last ten years and in the light of the present international situation that it is necessarily wise to have a conference at this time. There is no veto on the holding of the conference, as I mentioned, but there could be a veto exercised against all the recommendations which such a conference might make. It would be a great mistake I think to have a conference which would be acrimonious in character and where the positions of

*See page 170.

both sides would be so far removed from each other—I am thinking of the East and West—in regard to any changes to the Charter that all that would happen would be the majority would pass recommendations which would be vetoed by the other side. I think it would be better to see if we could not first have preliminary discussions with the Soviet Union and the other side to see if there was any possibility of agreement on certain amendments to the Charter. That might be possible and in that case certainly a conference should be held.

Among possible amendments to the Charter Mr. Pearson mentioned the giving Asia greater representation in the Security Council and the removal of the veto in respect to the admission of new members to the United Nations.

Unification of Germany

Mr. Pearson was asked what was the attitude of the NATO countries towards the unification of Germany. He replied that this had been discussed in Paris at the meeting of the NATO Council and for the first time in the presence of a German representative. He said:

German reunification remains a primary object of German foreign policy and the entry of Germany into NATO has not changed that. And certainly no German government would survive which reduced that objective to a secondary place. By unification I have in mind the unification of West and East Germany, not the unification of Germany as it was before 1939, but the bringing together of the two portions of Germany, the one which we call West Germany and the other that part of Germany which is occupied by the Soviet Union and which is now governed by the communist government of East Germany. That is what we mean by unification. It is, as I have said, a major problem and it remains a major problem irrespective of the fact that Germany is now a member of NATO. It certainly will be one of the subjects which will be discussed both 'at the summit' and by the foreign ministers.

There is a good deal of talk about how this unity could be brought about and we also hear a good deal about an attempt to 'neutralize' all Germany as the price of unification. I have no doubt in my mind that there was an impelling reason for the Soviet Union changing its policy in regard to Austria and accepting an Austrian Peace Treaty involving the neutralization of Austria. It may have been in their minds that the example of a free united and neutralized Austria would have some effect on German public opinion; that it would result at this stage in the detaching of Western Germany from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Members of the committee may have read however that Dr. Adenauer has said again recently that neutralization does not appeal to his government.

Parliamentarians' Visit to Russia

At the meeting of the Committee on May 25, Mr. Pearson explained the circumstances in which an "invitation" had been received from the Soviet Government for parliamentarians from Western countries to visit Russia. It was part of a declaration issued by the Supreme Soviet on February 9, which included an appeal in Communist language for world peace on communist terms and it contained three paragraphs at the end advocating direct contacts between parliamentarians, including an exchange of visits by delegations and speeches by visiting parliamentarians in the host parliament. The document was unfriendly in its terms so far as Canada and the Western countries were concerned because the first part of it was filled with propaganda attacks on

the policy that our Governments have been pursuing. Mr. Pearson informed the Committee,

We have not received any further invitation from the Soviet Government apart from this statement of the Supreme Soviet and we have as a Government taken no action in regard to it. One would think that if this matter were to be followed up and if the Soviet Government were serious in its desire to invite Canadian parliamentarians to visit the Soviet Union we would hear from that Government to that effect.

Disarmament

During this meeting of the Committee, Mr. Pearson outlined for its members developments which had taken place in the disarmament discussions which are reported in a preceding article in this issue.* Concluding his remarks on this subject, Mr. Pearson said that he hoped disarmament would be one of the subjects discussed at the four-power meeting which will presumably be held in July. He said:

I am not suggesting now that the foreign ministers, even less the heads of governments, will be in a position finally to deal with this matter, but if they and the foreign ministers can look at the problem in its broad aspect and agree on what lines progress can be made and try to disentangle some of these political conditions from the technical considerations, and above all create an atmosphere of confidence which we have not got now by solving some political problems, then there will be a far better chance for the disarmament committee of the United Nations to be successful in its work. This has been the case in the past because as we have learned from experience it is hard to have limitation of armaments in an atmosphere of fear and political uncertainty.

Article 2 of North Atlantic Treaty

At the Meeting held on May 26 Mr. Pearson discussed problems of the International Commission in Vietnam particularly the question of the movement of refugees, and then made a statement on the implementation of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. Pearson said that in addition to political consultation and co-ordination of foreign policies about which he had already spoken, there were other aspects of Article 2.

Economic co-operation . . . social and cultural co-operation, exchange of information between NATO countries and movement and mobility of labour. The approach to the implementation of article 2 has been pragmatic. It may be that we thought more could have been done under article 2 a few years ago than has proved to be possible, but that does not mean we should not continue to do all we can to work it out even as a long range problem. It really in essence means we should, under article 2 work toward every practicable form of co-operation in the non-military field in building up what we have called the Atlantic community. That community, of course, cannot easily be defined; but it is I think reflected in growing consultation and a feeling of community within the group. It does not necessarily have to express itself always and immediately in institutional terms. For instance, in the North Atlantic Organization we have an Annual Review Committee which primarily reviews defence collaboration, training, defence plans, and projects for the coming year. But it does consider economic problems connected with defence and it does consider other aspects of

*See page 173.

co-operation flowing out of defence and some indeed that are not primarily matter of military defence.

We have a committee under NATO that looked into the question of economic collaboration and we found—I have said this before—that it would be a mistake to use article 2 to build up economic machinery within NATO which would duplicate international machinery in the United Nations or under GATT, or OEEC which is turning out to be an effective agency for economic collaboration. While OEEC is a larger body than NATO in the sense that all European countries belong to it, it does not include the United States and Canada, it does include however all the free European countries some of whom are not members of NATO. The association of the United States and Canada with OEEC is getting closer all the time. We now have some high officials in Paris connected with NATO who spend much of their time in liaison work with OEEC.

There are also certain committees which have been set up under NATO dealing with non-military questions. There is the working group on labour mobility which has been working since 1953. That committee is studying the problem of facilitating labour mobility in and between NATO countries. It has been up to the present more immediately concerned with the movement of labour within European countries. We have been a little worried that a committee of this kind should again overlap other international agencies which are concerned with migration problems; such things as the International Labour Organization and the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration. This committee of NATO has, however, submitted reports to the council on trends in employment, labour mobility and migration and action taken by member governments and international organizations in this field.


There is also a standing committee which is meeting regularly on information and cultural relations, of which the Canadian member of the permanent council is chairman. That committee has made useful progress in the development of modest but practical projects designed to increase co-operation and understanding among members of the Atlantic community. We have, as a matter of fact, in Ottawa at the moment, one evidence of the useful work of that committee in the visit we are now receiving from a body of NATO journalists. This group organizes visits of that kind among other things.

Then, there is the committee dealing with emergency planning. That is primarily for European emergency planning but we have kept in contact with it also. There is the committee on civil organization in time of war which makes recommendations based on its analysis of the problems member governments might have to face in the civilian field in time of war. That committee has set up three sub-committees to deal with specific aspects of civilian emergency planning: (1) civil defence planning; (2) a committee on refugees and evacuees; and (3) a medical committee.

Then, there is a planning board for European inland surface transport which considers the co-ordination in time of crisis of the use of roads, railways and canals and ports of western Europe. They have done a great deal of work in this very important matter and have detailed plans to put into effect in time of emergency.

There is a committee on wartime commodity problems which, with sub-committees studies the difficulties which might arise in particular commodity fields in wartime and recommends what measures can be usefully taken in advance to overcome or at least to minimize them. There are subcommittees under this committee dealing with petroleum planning, coal and steel planning, food and agriculture planning, and industrial raw materials planning.

So there is a certain amount of work being done in this field although I know it is a disappointment to many that there has not been much more done.



ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE

On the occasion of the opening of the Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, sent the following message to the Prime Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjoyo:

"On the occasion of the convening of the Asian-African Conference, I would like to convey through you the good wishes of the people and Government of Canada for the success of the Conference. I hope that the Conference will contribute to the welfare of the people of Asia and Africa and promote the settlement by peaceful means of all disputes likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." Mr. Sastroamidjoyo replied as follows.:

"As Chairman and on behalf of Asian African Conference I would like to express our high appreciation for the good wishes of the people and Government of Canada to the Conference. The heartfelt sentiments underlying those

wishes were warmly received by the Conference. I am convinced that you and your Government receive in the same spirit the results of the Conference which I hope may contribute to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. With assurances of my highest consideration." In the above picture the five architects of the Conference are, left to right: Mr. U. Mu, Prime Minister of Burma; Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India; Mr. Mohammed Ali, Prime Minister of Pakistan; Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon; and Mr. Sastroamidjoyo.

APPOINTMENTS, TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENTS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. D. K. Doherty posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, effective May 5, 1955.
- Mr. V. G. Turner posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission, Hanoi, Indochina, effective May 14, 1955.
- Mr. C. E. Bourbonniere posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commission, Saigon, Indochina, effective May 29, 1955.
- Mr. A. I. Guttman appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1 effective May 16, 1955.
- Mr. R. M. Tait appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1 effective May 31, 1955.
- Miss G. M. Mather retired from the Canadian Diplomatic Service effective April 29, 1955.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Multilateral

- Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Paris, October 23, 1954.
Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited April 29, 1955.
In force May 5, 1955.
- Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. Done at Paris, October 23, 1954.
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited May 3, 1955.
In force May 6, 1955.
- Procès-Verbal extending the validity of the Declaration of October 24, 1953, regulating the commercial relations between certain contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Japan. Done at Geneva, February 1, 1955.
Signed by Canada April 7, 1955.
- Agreement concerning the International Institute of Refrigeration (Replacing the Convention of 21st June 1920, as modified on 31st May, 1937). Done at Paris, December 1, 1954,
Signed by Canada, May 31, 1955.
- Convention concerning Customs Facilities for Touring. Done at New York, June 4, 1954.
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited June 1, 1955.
- Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles. Done at New York, June 4, 1954.
Canada's Instrument of Accession deposited June 1, 1955.

Bilateral

Italy

- British Commonwealth-Italy War Graves Agreement.
Signed at Rome, August 27, 1953.
In force May 20, 1955.

Union of South Africa

Exchange of Notes regarding the temporary suspension of the margin of preference on wool.

Signed at Capetown January 20 and March 21, 1955.

In force April 1, 1955.

United States of America

Exchange of Notes governing the establishment of a distant early warning system in Canadian territory.

Signed at Washington, May 5, 1955.

In force May 5, 1955.

Publications

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 20.—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement concerning the installation of an oil pipeline from Haines to Fairbanks, Alaska. Signed at Ottawa, June 30, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 6.—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America regarding the construction and operation of a Loran Station by the United States Coast Guard at Cape Christian, Baffin Island. Signed at Ottawa, May 1 and 3, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Review of International Commodity Problems 1954. (Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements). E/2672. New York, 1954. 42 pp. Sales No.: 1955.II.D.1.

Restrictive Business Practices:

Report on current legal developments in the field of restrictive business practices. E/2671. New York, 1955. 124 pp. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 3.

Report on Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade. E/2675. New York, 1955. 20 pp. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 3 A.

Transport and Communications Commission—Report of the Seventh Session, 7-15 February 1955. E/2696, E/CN.2/164. New York, 1955. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 4.

Nationality of Married Women. Report submitted by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/254. New York, 1954. 80 pp. Sales No.: 1955.IV.1.

Ten Years of United Nations Publications 1945 to 1955. A complete catalogue. ST/DFI/SER.F/7, December 1954. New York, 1955. 271 pp. Sales No.: 1955.1.8.

A Bibliography of the Charter of the United Nations. ST/LIB/SER.B/3, April 1955. 128 pp. (bilingual). U.N. Headquarters Library, Bibliographical Series No. 3.

Draft International Covenants on Human Rights. (Reprinted from the United Nations Review, Vol. 1, No. 7, January 1955).

GATT—Basic Instruments and Selected Documents. Volume I (revised): Texts of the General Agreement, as amended, and of the Agreement on the Organization for Trade Co-operation. Geneva, April 1955. 85 pp.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Montreal Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

ICJ-Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Second Phase) Judgment of April 6th, 1955. 65 pp. (bilingual). Sales No.: 131.

ILO

(ILO publications may be secured from Canada Branch, ILO, 95 Rideau St., Ottawa).

International Labour Conference, 38th Session, Geneva, 1955. Report I—Report of the Director-General. Geneva, 1955. 123 pp.

UNESCO

International Bibliography of Economics. (Documentation in the Social Sciences.)

Paris 1955. 429 pp. \$7.50.

Yearbook of Youth Organizations. Volume 1: Europe. First Edition, November 1954. UNESCO/Youth Institute. Gautins/Monchen, Germany.

Current Sociology, No. 4, Volume III, 1954-55. Electoral Behaviour (A trend report and bibliography). Paris. Pp. 281-344 (bilingual).

WHO—Financial Report 1 January - 31 December 1954. Supplement to the Annual Report of the Director-General for 1954 and Report of the External Auditor to the World Health Assembly. Geneva, April 1955. 53 pp. Official Records of the WHO, No. 62.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

No. 55/14—*Debate on External Affairs*, statement made in the House of Commons on April 21, 1955, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, closing the debate on external affairs (see Statements and Speeches No. 55/10 which opened the debate).

No. 56/16—*India's Development Programme*, an address by the High Commissioner for Canada in India, Mr. Escott Reid, at the final plenary session of the United Nations Association's Conference on Canadian Aid to Under-Developed Countries,

Ottawa, May 28, 1955.

No. 55/17—*Canada: Energy to Spare and Share*, an address by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, to the Dallas Council on World Affairs, Dallas, Texas, March 28, 1955.

No. 55/18—An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Conference of United Nations Associations in Canada, at Ottawa, May 27, 1955.

The following serial number is available abroad only:

No. 55/15—*Some Possible Features of Economic Growth and Investment in Canada, 1955-1975*, remarks by the Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr. J. E. Coyne,

at the Annual Meeting of the Dominion Mortgage and Investment Association, held in Montreal, May 5, 1955.

DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON

(Continued from page 177)

to be the case—will be this whole question of disarmament. I am not suggesting now that the foreign ministers, even less the heads of governments, will be in a position finally to deal with this matter but if they and the foreign ministers can look at the problem in its broad aspect and agree on what lines progress can be made and try to disentangle some of these political conditions from the technical considerations, and above all create an atmosphere of confidence which we have not got now by solving some political problems, then there will be a far better chance for the disarmament committee of the United Nations to be successful in its work. This has been the case in the past because as we have learned from experience it is hard to have limitation of armaments in an atmosphere of fear and political uncertainty.

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1955.

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CANADA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

July - August 1955

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Ottawa, Canada

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Canada in the Soviet Encyclopaedia

IN recent years scholars in the Soviet Union have been busily engaged in producing a new edition of the "Large Soviet Encyclopaedia". Not long ago Volume 19 of the new encyclopaedia appeared and in it will be found a six-page article on Canada. The following extracts and summaries of parts of the articles on Canada will permit the reader to judge for himself the bias, not to mention the veracity, of this official picture of Canada presented to the Soviet reader in a government-sponsored publication.

Early in the article a section on population deals briefly with the majority of the population of Canada and then goes on to treat in more detail the "basic population" of Eskimos and Indians, "who are deprived of elementary civil rights, are cruelly exploited and subjected to racial discrimination . . . In the southern regions the Indians live in special centres—reservations—where they are abandoned to the arbitrary domination of bureaucrats, speculators and usurers".

The Canadian Economy

Several long sections outline the Canadian economy. The following sentences set the tone of this analysis:

General characteristics of the economy:—Canada belongs to the industrial-agrarian developed capitalist countries and at the same time it is a country dependent economically and politically upon the United States and to a lesser degree upon England. This dependence generates the particular instability and vulnerability of its economy, as well as malformed disproportions in the development of its individual sectors.

The main theme in our economy is apparently a bitter struggle between the United States and Great Britain which the United States is now apparently winning, and in which the interests of Canada itself are always sacrificed. Our industrialists first developed their businesses to meet the needs of war and are now eager for a new war:

The monopolies of Canada, significantly enriching themselves during the war, became in the post-war period zealous champions of the preparation of a new world war. They achieved the transformation of the country to a war footing, accompanied by an increase in taxes and the cost of living and a further impoverishment of the working masses; on the other hand it brought about a big increase in the excess profits of the monopolies.

As a result of the concentration on this industry with military significance, "the production and broad distribution of consumer goods is in a state of stagnation".

We are told that agriculture in Canada "is characterized by sharply expressed class differentiations." According to the article, about two-thirds of all agricultural land is to be found in "big farms . . . of more than 40 hectares". While there is no doubt that to a Russian peasant 40 hectares of land all his own would seem incredible wealth, in Canadian terms 40 hectares or about 100

acres, considerably less than a quarter of a section, is a modest enough holding. By way of contrast with these allegedly large holdings, we are informed that one-sixth of all farmers, having tracts of land of less than 20 hectares, (about 50 acres) occupy only one-fifth of all the land. It would be interesting to know whether any group of peasants in the U.S.S.R. constituting a similar proportion of the total Russian peasantry has ever in Russian history held anything like so equitable a proportion of the total agricultural land of Russia. The article goes on that:

Agriculture is in fact dominated by the banks. They seize farms under the guise of assistance via one-sided loans and then they expropriate the land and all the property of the farmers. Even by official and *clearly lowered* data, the sum of mortgage debts of farmers in 1951 constituted 20 per cent of all the value of the land and the buildings.

The flat and unsupported statement that official Canadian statistics are deliberately falsified is worth noting.

The Monetary System

The following short paragraph quoted in full on our monetary system and finances is a good example of distortion:

The monetary unit is the Canadian dollar (100 cents). The state budget of Canada reveals the growth of state monopoly capitalism, the militarisation of the economy and the growth of the taxation burden on the working masses. Military expenditures (in million dollars) in 1950-51 were 425; in 1939-40, in spite of Canada's participation in the war, they stood at 118. To cover up the growing expenditures of the state, which results in a lowering of the living standards of the workers, the government resorts to larger issues of paper money. Monetary circulation in 1937 was 240 million dollars and in 1950 1.21 billion dollars.

It is noteworthy that this paragraph exaggerates our present military expenditures in comparison with wartime expenditures by the simple device of making the comparison with the 1939-40 fiscal year. Soviet readers are also led to believe that the increase in money in circulation in Canada between 1937 and 1950 is exclusively the result of sheer inflation by the Government with no reference to the large increase in population, in economic activity of all sorts and in national wealth in that period.

A lengthy section on Canadian history contrives to give a Marxist interpretation to most events in our past; for example, the 1837 uprising failed because its "leaders ignored the demands of the peasants and failed to call into the struggle the large popular masses".

More recent political developments in Canada have apparently turned on the desperate efforts of the older political parties and the "right-wing Socialist Party" to frustrate the vast progressive forces in Canada which would otherwise sweep into power the Canadian Communist Party. Thus we are informed that the Progressive Party, which had won a large number of seats in the Federal elections of 1921 "withered away after losing the elections in 1926, and the revolutionary elements of the working class and of the farmers rallied around the Communist Party of Canada which led the struggle of the working masses of the country". We learn that the Communist Party was outlawed in 1940,

“while encouragement was given to the activities of the Canadian fascists”, but that with the “heroic war of the Soviet people against the Germano-fascist aggressors” and the growth of the “anti-fascist sentiment of the masses . . . the King government was obliged in 1943 to permit the creation of the Labour Progressive Party which appeared as the successor of the Communist Party of Canada”. However, this new communist party has a difficult time; “the ruling circles of Canada hate and persecute (it) and nurture plans to outlaw it”.

Relatively brief sections on the other political parties of Canada point out that the Liberal Party represents “the big Canadian monopolies linked mainly with American capital” and that its leaders “carry out a policy of complete subservience of the national interests of Canada to the imperialists of the U.S.A.” The Liberal Party also “stands for the launching of a new world war”. The Conservative Party, also a party of Canadian monopoly capital, wants a strengthening of relations with England and the outlawing of the Labour Progressive Party. The C.C.F. is a “right-wing socialist party” which “leans upon the well-to-do farmers and on the petty bourgeoisie”. Both the C.C.F. and the Conservative Party are shown to be losing strength rapidly, but the author of the article curiously omits any mention of the electoral fate of the Labour Progressive Party.

Education in Canada

The encyclopaedia devotes a substantial section to education in Canada and, while there are no doubt many improvements which could be made across Canada in our educational arrangements, it is difficult to recognize in this account any similarity to normal educational conditions in Canada. For example:

The reactionary character of the educational system of Canada is particularly visible in the organization of secondary education. There are four groups of secondary schools: (1) the independent ones, reserved for the aristocracy—they are not under the control of local governmental organs but they receive subsidies from them; (2) the private secondary schools, for children of the bourgeoisie, which charge a high fee for the education they dispense; (3) the so-called separate secondary schools for the preparation of denominational clergy; (4) the state-supported secondary schools which work in really difficult conditions (there is a shortage of qualified teachers, the school buildings are poorly-equipped and the classes are over-crowded). However even these schools are far from being attended by all the children of the workers.

On the content of our education the reader is informed that:


The curricula and methods of teaching in Canadian schools are ruled by American pedagogy. Science is replaced by the propaganda of racism, chauvinism and militarism.

Other parts of the article are worth brief mention. We learn that, judging by the amount of space devoted to him, Canada's greatest literary figure is undoubtedly Mr. Dyson Carter. Radio broadcasting in Canada is “entirely in the service of the Anglo-American imperialists”. The armed forces of Canada are “formally a part of the armed forces of the British Empire but in fact they are commanded by a defense committee responsible to the cabinet of ministers and working according to the directives and under the control of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the U.S.A.” A brief section on the Canadian judiciary points out that the courts of Canada carry out a policy of repression against the working masses and that in their composition they represent the owning classes.

It might be fitting, as a footnote to this article from the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, to mention a curious incident related to the publication of the new encyclopaedia. Purchasers of the encyclopaedia recently received a notice which read:

The State Publishing House recommends subscribers to the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* to remove from Volume V pages 21, 22, 23, and 24, as well as the portrait between pages 22 and 23, and to insert in their place the enclosed pages containing a new text. The pages indicated should be removed with scissors or razor blade, leaving a margin to which the new pages should be pasted.

The pages to be removed contained an impressive portrait of Beria and a very complimentary account of his career. To replace this, the authors of the encyclopaedia had produced an extended article on the Bering Straits and had dug up one or two hitherto neglected items beginning with the letter "b". It is left to one to hope that for the sake of accuracy, not to mention Soviet scholarship, the article on Canada will eventually be replaced by one which better reflects the true picture of our country.



CORNERSTONE FOR NEW CHANCERY

The ceremony of laying the cornerstone for the new chancery of the Canadian Embassy at The Hague was performed by Princess Margriet of the Netherlands on June 14. With Princess Margriet, above, are the Canadian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Mr. T. A. Stone; and an official of the Netherlands Government.

The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

THE International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) held its fifth annual meeting in Ottawa from June 6 to 11. Member countries are Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

At the closing session, after some 40 meetings held over voluminous biological, hydrographical and statistical reports, the commissioners made recommendations to restrict the mesh sizes used by trawlers fishing in additional areas off the Northwest Atlantic banks for cod and haddock.

When it was first established in 1951, the commission divided itself into five panels, each of which was to deal with one segment, or sub-area, of the fishing grounds, the divisions being made on the basis of the areas in which the nationals of member countries were interested.

These sub-areas, and the countries which are represented on the panels, are as follows:

1. The West Greenland waters—Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom.
2. The sea off Labrador—Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
3. The Newfoundland Banks and adjacent waters—Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States.
4. The Nova Scotian waters with the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy—Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United States.
5. The sea off the New England coast—Canada, United States.

Historic Decision

The decision made at the Ottawa meeting was historic in that it was the first time conservation measures had been recommended which will affect a group of countries. Mesh regulations for sub-area 5 have been in force for two years, but this affects only United States fishermen, who are the only ones who fish in that area outside of an occasional Canadian effort.

The fishing districts concerned in the new recommendations are sub-areas 3 and 4, which are fished intensively by Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United States. British fishermen also have been operating recently in sub-area 3. If the regulations are officially sanctioned by the member governments concerned the minimum mesh size for trawlers in sub-area 3 will be four inches; that for sub-area 4, four and one-half inches. Those sizes were determined after the commission's scientific advisers had presented evidence to show that cod and haddock grow more slowly and mature later in the more northerly sub-area 3, so that a smaller mesh net there would be most effective.



FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF ICNAF

—NFB

The Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, left, opens the fifth annual meeting of the International Commission of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries held in Ottawa, June 6 to 11. On Mr. St. Laurent's left is the Chairman of the Commission, Dr. Stewart Bates, and the Minister of Fisheries, Mr. James Sinclair.

The four and one-half inch mesh size for sub-area 4 conforms with the regulation referred to as already in effect on the Georges Bank and the Gulf of Maine (sub-area 5).

The mesh regulations, both those proposed and those in effect, apply only to those fishing for cod and haddock. Vessels fishing for other species are permitted to use nets of smaller mesh.

The united desire to maintain the Northwest Atlantic banks at their greatest productive levels, and the spirit of co-operation that is making it possible, were commented on by all speakers at the opening plenary session of the June meeting, which was held in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons. In welcoming the delegates, the Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent emphasized Canada's belief in international agreements for conservation, citing her participation in such arrangements as the North Pacific Halibut Convention, the International Sockeye Salmon Commission, the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention, the International Whaling Commission, and the North Pacific Fisheries Treaty.

At the meeting, in addition to commissioners from the member countries, were observers from the Federal Republic of Germany, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Pacific Halibut Commission, the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission and the Special Committee of the International Geophysical Year.

Mr. St. Laurent was introduced by the Minister of Fisheries, Mr. James Sinclair, who mentioned that the international fishery off Canada's Atlantic coast went back for five hundred years, that the rich fisheries formed Canada's oldest industry, and that the Europeans who had come to fish and had then settled here had helped build a strong and prosperous nation.

For the opening plenary session, the flags of member nations of ICNAF flanked the entrance to the House of Commons, and the Prime Minister made his welcoming speech in front of an exhibit, designed by the Department of Fisheries of Canada, depicting the commission's history and functions.

Dr. Stewart Bates, former Deputy Minister of Fisheries of Canada and now President of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, as chairman of ICNAF, presided over the annual meeting. At the closing session Captain Americo Tavares de Almeida, who had been vice-chairman, was elected to succeed Dr. Bates as chairman for a two-year period. The new vice-chairman is K. Sunnanaa of Norway.

Officers elected to head the standing committees are: Research and Statistics, Dr. L. A. Walford, United States; Finance and Administration, J. Howard MacKichan, Canada (re-elected). The panel chairmen are: Panel 1, B. Dineson, Norway; Panel 2, Commander H. F. Barbier, France; Panel 3, C. L. Chicheri, Spain; Panel 4, J. Howard MacKichan, Canada; Panel 5, F. W. Sargent, United States.

Background of ICNAF

The need for joint action in the investigation of, and where necessary, the conservation of the fishery resources of the North Atlantic has been realized for many years, but no united action was taken until 1937, when a conference was called in London, at which many nations were represented. That conference resulted in an International Convention for the Regulation of Meshes of Fishing Nets and Size Limits of Fish. This convention, designed to apply to the entire North Atlantic, never entered into force, but the general problem of the fisheries of the North Atlantic was considered again at subsequent meetings in London in 1943 and 1946.

At the third conference, on the suggestion of the United States, it was agreed that the ends of conservation could be better served if the North Atlantic were separated into eastern and western sections for any work that was to be done. In January, 1949, the United States Government called a conference in Washington, at which the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries was signed. It was subsequently ratified by the ten member governments, the convention area taking in all waters from Rhode Island to the west coast of Greenland, and east as far as the 42nd Meridian.

The first annual meeting was held at Washington, D.C., in 1951, and temporary headquarters was established at St. Andrews, N.B., in offices placed at the Commission's disposal by the Atlantic Biological Station of the Fisheries Research Board of Canada. The second annual meeting was held there and the third, in 1952, at New Haven, Conn. At this meeting the Commission accepted the invitation of Dalhousie University, Halifax, and the Halifax Board of Trade, to make its permanent headquarters in that city. The fourth annual meeting was held in Halifax, which will also be the scene of the sixth meeting, to be held next year.

The Australian-Canadian Association

On June 3, 1955, Mr. James S. Duncan launched the Australian-Canadian Association at a luncheon in Toronto. The members of this non-Governmental body are men and women representing the arts, universities, labour, business, journalism, publishing and finance. The broad purpose of the Association is to promote a greater exchange of information and ideas between Canada and Australia in all spheres of their economic, social and cultural life in order to foster a more intimate association between them in their common developmental problems and in their membership in the Commonwealth. The Association will undertake to increase personal contacts between Australians and Canadians by encouraging more frequent visits by educational, trade and professional associations, women's organizations and youth movements. It will attempt to widen the channels of communication between the two countries through the press, radio and television, through visits of persons prominent in the fields of art, music, literature, business and finance, and through the interchange of exhibitions and the work of creative artists.

Association Members

Mr. Duncan, who is president of Massey-Harris Ferguson Ltd., is Chairman of the new body. Associated with him on the executive as Vice Chairman is Sir Douglas Copland, High Commissioner for Australia in Canada, and Mr. K. A. Greene, former Canadian High Commissioner in Australia, is Honorary Secretary General. The association includes such prominent Canadians as Dr. C. H. Best, Director of the Banting Institute, Dr. Claude T. Bissell, Vice President of the University of Toronto, Mr. L. W. Brockington, Q.C., Dr. Edward Johnson, Chairman of the Royal Conservatory of Music, Toronto, Dr. J. R. Kidd, Director of the Canadian Association for Adult Education, Dr. Norman MacKenzie, President of the University of British Columbia, Mr. H. R. MacMillan and Mr. G. W. C. McConachie of Vancouver, Mr. James Stewart, President of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, and Dr. Freda Waldon, Senior Librarian of the Public Library, Hamilton.

As Mr. Duncan pointed out in addressing the inaugural luncheon, both Australia and Canada are growing in population, wealth and influence and both are members of the Commonwealth. But in neither country is knowledge of or interest in the other increasing in proportion to the prominence each is assuming in Commonwealth and world affairs. Ties of friendship, understanding, and a sense of "belonging" which are the essence of the Commonwealth association must be strengthened in order to preserve the special relationship which exists within the Commonwealth and which has served it well in the past. One way of achieving this for Canadians and Australians at the non-official level to become better acquainted. This the Australian-Canadian Association hopes to encourage through planning and co-ordination in co-operation with and working through the established local and national organizations in both Australia and Canada.

The Question of the Saar

The referendum to approve the new Statute for the Saar is to take place on October 23, 1955. If the vote is favourable, as is generally expected, an important experiment in Europeanization will begin.

The question of the Saar has long been a contentious issue. In recompense for German destruction of French coal mines in World War I the Saar was transferred to French use under League of Nations supervision for a period of fifteen years. In 1935 this predominantly German speaking area voted to return to German control; but following the Second World War, in April 1947, the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and the United States agreed to detach the Saar and place it under French economic control. They provided the Saar with a semi-autonomous constitutional government, France retaining responsibility for its foreign affairs and international obligations. Saarlanders subsequently ratified these conditions by an overwhelming majority.

Coal and Steel

Most of the million inhabitants of the Saar derive their living from the production of 18 million tons of coal and 3 million tons of steel per year. For France, this area is of great economic importance, providing over one-quarter of France's share in the European Coal and Steel Community, and contributing a substantial amount to her reserves of foreign exchange. As a people, Saarlanders enjoy a very high standard of living and consequently they are an attractive market for French and German products. This economic attractiveness has made the problem of the Saar a continual sore spot for both French and German governments. Some political leaders in both France and Germany have indicated that the arrangements set out in the proposed Statute may not be acceptable at such time as the German problem is settled, but in the meantime they seem to be fairly satisfactory to all concerned.

In October, 1954 M. Mendes-France and Chancellor Adenauer agreed on the proposed Statute by which, pending a German Peace Treaty, the Saar would continue to enjoy a semi-independent self-governing status under the aegis of the Western European Union Council of Ministers. Under its terms, a Commissioner, who cannot be either French, German or Saarlander, would be appointed by the WEU Council to represent the Saar government at the international level and to ensure that it did not violate the Statute. He would have discretion to suspend legislation pending the decision of the Council and would have the power to conclude international treaties with the approval of the Saar Landtag. He would see that all political expression, except for activity against the Statute, was free. He would represent the Saar on the Council of the European Coal and Steel Community, and act in an advisory capacity to the Ministerial Committees of the Council of Europe and the WEU. The Statute itself is to be presented to the Saar electorate; once approved by a majority it will receive the guaranteed support of the German and French governments.

The two governments further agreed that while the economic union between France and the Saar should be maintained and strengthened, a similar

economic relationship should be established between the German Federal Republic and the Saar. At the practical level such a general statement was bound to create disagreement. As a result of their economic hegemony over the area since 1947, public and private interests in France wield a large measure of control over Saar investment, banking and taxation practices, and there is little desire on their part to relinquish these advantages. The French-Saar Convention on Economic Co-operation of March 21, 1955 reaffirmed the existing economic, monetary and customs union, but provided for equal participation of the Saar in economic negotiations concerning that union.

The last major hurdle in German-French economic negotiations the proposed division of the Volklingen steel works, was settled on April 29, 1955 by M. Pinay and Chancellor Adenauer, after the French Government had declared that this question had to be solved before it would ratify the Paris Agreements. Both Governments agreed to purchase the company on a 50-50 basis, subsequently returning it to private ownership distributed equally between French and German stockholders. The managing director for the first three years will be a Frenchman.

Supervisory Commission

A WEU Supervisory Commission composed of representatives from the Benelux countries, Italy and the United Kingdom has been formed to supervise the coming Saar referendum. This Commission is responsible to the WEU Council to ensure that the vote shall be free of legislative coercion or outside interference aimed at influencing public opinion. When the Saar voters go to the polls on October 23, exactly one year after the original French-German Agreement to Europeanize the Saar, Government sources in both Bonn and Paris expect the Statute to be overwhelmingly endorsed. Eight years of semi-autonomous self-government and economic prosperity have brought to the people of the Saar a growing sense of national identity. They are not anxious to submerge this identity by closer union to either France or Germany, and hence they support Europeanization.

Ratification of the Statute for the Saar should permit a substantial decrease in the difficulties which the status of this area has imposed upon relations between France and Germany, and it is a tribute to the personal endeavours of Chancellor Adenauer, M. Mendes-France and M. Pinay that such a compromise should have been achieved. It would be wrong to expect, however, that all problems are solved. The choice of the Commissioner, subject to veto by Germany, France and the Saar, has yet to be settled. There is still the clash between French and German economic interests for the Saar market, and should a peace treaty for Germany be negotiated the whole question of a permanent status for the Saar will be re-opened. Assuming that the Saar electorate ratify the proposed Statute, their new "European" role under WEU Council of Ministers is a major step forward towards practical European co-operation and integration. Yet within the framework of Europeanization the people of the Saar are realizing a new sense of national identity and self-determination.

External Affairs in Parliament

Statements of Government Policy

The purpose of this section is to provide a selection of statements on external affairs by Ministers of the Crown or by their parliamentary assistants. It is not designed to provide a complete coverage of debates on external affairs taking place during the month.

Statement on the International Situation

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made a statement on the international situation to the House of Commons on July 23 in connection with the passing of the estimates for the Department of External Affairs. The Minister commented on the significance of the Geneva meeting "at the summit", the continuing importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization whose existence, he said, was not up for negotiation so long as there was no better way through the United Nations to guarantee our security collectively, and the achievements of the United Nations in its first ten years of existence.

Mr. Pearson said:

Since I last spoke, indeed since I appeared before the committee on external affairs not very many weeks ago, the improvement in the international atmosphere has, I think it is fair to say, continued. There has been now for many months an easing of tension which has reflected itself in international meetings that have taken place recently. Whether this change—and I have said this before in the House—is merely a matter of tactics on the other side or whether it represents a change in long-range policy, I do not know. Nor do I think it would be wise to attempt to come to any conclusion on this matter. It would, I think, be premature to assume that the danger of conflict which has existed now between the two worlds for many years has been removed, or indeed sensibly decreased.

While we must be careful and must remain on guard, it would also be, I think, very shortsighted and unwise if we did not take advantage of every opportunity—and there have been opportunities recently—to broaden and deepen this improvement in the international situation which has taken place. In the Far East there has been some easing of tension. There has developed in a very dangerous part of the world now, the Formosa straits, what one might call a *de facto* ceasefire. Efforts have been made by governments not committed

to either side in this world controversy, governments which have sometimes been called neutralists—I am thinking of the government of India and the government of Burma, and I am also thinking of the Secretary-General of the United Nations—efforts have been made to mediate certain outstanding differences that have for some time now persisted between the communist government of China and other governments, particularly the government of the United States. But that area of the Far East and the Formosa straits remains a danger area, and no one can rest easily as long as the two Chinese governments face each other in hard and bitter hostility, with forces at grips at and about the off-shore islands, islands that are only a few miles off the coast of China.

Geneva Meeting

In Europe the improvement in the atmosphere which I have been talking about has culminated this week in a meeting at the summit, as it is called, at Geneva, which ended this afternoon. There were very great expectations and hopes aroused by this meeting of the heads of the four governments, and there will be those who will say that those hopes and those expectations have not been realized. But I think everyone who has been following the course of international events in recent

years, and who has been guided by experience and not by emotion in these matters, must have realized from the time this meeting was called that it would be unrealistic to expect important developments out of one meeting at the summit, in the sense that problems would be solved and difficulties removed.

What has happened this week at Geneva—and I think this is something that might give us all cause for real satisfaction—is that problems have been identified, positions have been clarified and machinery has been set up for the diplomatic negotiation of those problems in the months ahead through the foreign ministers of the four great powers.

In that sense the Geneva meeting has been most valuable and encouraging. It has not solved the problems—and I myself never thought it would—but it has taken the first right step on what might become a road along which progress can be made in solving these problems. Any hon. member who has followed what has been going on at Geneva this week will, I know, be struck by the fact that while problems have been clarified to some extent, while machinery has been set up and views have been exchanged, the problems are still there. As far as I can gather there has not been very much alteration in the fundamental policies on the other side in respect of such things as the unification of Germany and the limitation of armaments.

What has happened is that the presentation of the case by the other side—I think we must all welcome this, especially those of us who have been subjected to the other type of presentation—has been more affable. That is all to the good. I think we can take some satisfaction at least from this change of atmosphere which may lead to something more important now that the process of negotiation has begun. Personally I hope for a continuation of this process through the foreign ministers and through other mechanisms inside and outside of the United Nations which may be set up or which have already been set up. I hope that in this process the negotiators will not be subjected to such publicity, exciting publicity, as that which has been reflected by the presence at Geneva this week of between 1,500 and 2,000 press,


radio and television correspondents. I agree, however, that on this particular occasion at a meeting held at the summit one can expect that kind of attention.

In other words, what has happened at Geneva is the beginning of a long process which we hope will in the end result in the solution of some of the problems that divide the world, which if they are not solved will result in danger to all. No one meeting at the summit will solve these problems. A multitude of meetings below the summit, official and non-official, will be required. That process has begun and we are hoping that it will be satisfactorily concluded. It will require on our side, patience and strength and unity.

NATO

Before the Geneva meeting began, just a week ago today, I had the privilege of attending a meeting of the NATO council in Paris at which the 15 foreign ministers of the NATO governments were present. At that meeting—I think this is the process of consultation at its best; it is one of the things we hoped NATO would be used for—the three foreign ministers who were going to Geneva told those representing the other 12 member states quite frankly and quite fully their hopes and their fears about Geneva, their plans and their policies, and gave us an opportunity to express our views.

In no sense did those three act at Geneva for the other 12, as we had our responsibilities to our own parliaments and governments. They could not, of course, be delegated by a NATO council meeting in Paris. But that meeting did give us a chance to hear of their plans and policies, to comment on them, to give them our own views. In that sense it was valuable. It was also an interesting and useful indication of the unity of the countries making up the NATO coalition. On the eve of the Geneva conference I think that may have been wise and of some value because the Geneva discussions have shown that one of the primary objectives of the Soviet Union and its friends is to weaken, or indeed to break up, that coalition. That is why I said last Saturday in Paris that NATO was not negotiable.



U.N. 10TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATED IN OTTAWA

—Capital Press

The tenth anniversary of the United Nations was observed in Ottawa on June 25 by ceremonies on Parliament Hill which included a concert by the band of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

When I said that I did not mean that the deployment, the level of armaments, or the uses to which forces could be put and all that sort of thing were not negotiable. It may be part of the general price we will have to pay for a true peace settlement. That sort of thing can be discussed with anybody at NATO or outside of NATO. But NATO itself as a regional organization for collective security is not negotiable; its existence is not up for negotiation as long as there is no better way through the United Nations to guarantee our security collectively.

At London before and after the NATO meeting I had the opportunity to discuss developments with the foreign minister and other members of the United Kingdom government.

United Nations Anniversary

While I have mentioned the Geneva conference and NATO I would not want

to overlook one other useful meeting in recent weeks, the meeting at San Francisco to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the United Nations. I think that meeting turned out to be a very good and valuable development because it focused, and there was need to focus at this time, the attention of the world on the United Nations and its achievements about which we do not always hear so much, as well as its failures about which we always hear more; about its limitations as well as its possibilities.

The words used most often in the 72 speeches to which we listened at the San Francisco conference—71 in my case. Because I made one myself—were “stock-taking” and “rededication”. We took stock of the past and we looked to the future. Practically without exception, and this also applies to the delegations from the other side of the iron curtain, every statement ended with an expression of support for the United Nations as the indispens-

able and universal agency for the solution of disputes and the removal of difficulties, as the indispensable agency for international co-operation.

If it could only do the work it was meant to do ten years ago when we set it up we would not be talking today about NATO or conferences at the summit, because we would not need them. It may be that one day we will be able to use that world organization at it was meant to be used. Until that time we will be well advised, in so far as political collective security is concerned, to continue our support for regional organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to keep them strong and united, to do our very best to convince those who fear these organizations that they are defensive in character, that they have no aggressive intent against anybody. If conditions improve, if there is more trust and confidence in the world than unfortunately is now the case, then, but only then, we will be able to modify our attitude toward these regional defensive collective organizations, especially if the work which they now do can be done through the United Nations.

On the whole, then, I would say that the last two or three months have given us

cause not for exultation, not for unreasonable expectation, but for sober encouragement. The processes of negotiation between the two worlds have now begun. Some imaginative proposals have been put forward, especially the one by the President of the United States the day before yesterday in respect to disarmament. That is a key subject, as it has been for many years, and it is an evidence of our good intentions.

All this has been hopeful and has been helpful. If we can continue on our side that process which we have begun, not merely relying on our strength and our unity but also on our determination to achieve the one objective which matters most in the hydrogen age, namely peace; if we subordinate everything to that objective and maintain a realistic sense of balance, not being too excited or encouraged when things seem to go right—sometimes dramatically so—and not getting too depressed or downcast when things seem to be going wrong; and if we can maintain the essential unity with our friends which we have built up over these years, then I think we can look forward to the immediate future with more confidence than we could a year ago today.

TENTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Statements made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and President of the seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. L. B. Pearson, made at the Tenth Anniversary meeting of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 24 and June 26, 1955.

Statement of June 24

I am the fifty-first speaker at this commemoration meeting. If my conceit reached as high as the Top of the Mark, I could not honestly hope to add anything new or profound to what has already been said about the United Nations. I may, however, be able to underline and reinforce some aspects of what should be the obvious!

The Abbé Sieyès, in his later days, was once asked what he had done during the French Revolution. "I survived" was his reply.

The United Nations has survived ten years of international tension and "cold war"—no mean achievement in itself. The world—as a Canadian journalist wrote, ironically, the other day—has also survived ten years of the U.N.! My journalist friend then went on to suggest that the observance of our Tenth Birthday in this lovely and hospitable city where the United Nations was born under such expert and co-operative care, should be a "nice mixture of thanksgiving and surprise". I agree.

Indispensable Agency

We can be thankful not only that the United Nations has survived its first years, which were more difficult than in 1945 we thought would be the case, (and which if we have any sanity will not be repeated), but also because, during this time, and notwithstanding its set-backs, our world organization has become an indispensable agency for international co-operation. If this one did not exist we would soon have to build another one.

It is, however, as idle to deny that the United Nations has lost some credit during these ten years as it is to deny that our hopes were too high in 1945. But only the thoughtless or the ill-disposed could believe that it is approaching bankruptcy. Indeed, while we the credit of the United Nations is moving upwards again—and its value is more generally recognized. Otherwise the club would not have such a long waiting list; one which we ought to remove or at least reduce.

The ghosts of past memories which this Opera House evokes, are here to warn us against over-optimism; and against the danger of trying to build—or rebuild—an international structure of peace upon grandiose but

shadowy hopes instead of on hard realities. No man is the poorer—though he may be the sadder—for being shorn of his illusions. We have lost some of ours, about U.N., but not, I hope and believe, our faith, our principles, and our ideals. Indeed if we draw the right conclusions from the experience of the past, we can gain thereby for the future. But experience in itself though a valuable channel to wisdom, is no guarantee of it. You may remember Napoleon's comment when someone recommended one of his officers to him for promotion on the ground that he had been through an exceptional number of campaigns. "My horse", Napoleon is reported to have replied, "has been through even more". Some of us have been through a good many U.N. campaigns. I hope we have learned more than our horses. If, however, we are to benefit from our experiences, the first step must be to draw the right conclusions from them.

May I recall one detail of experience. Ten years ago, in San Francisco, the smaller powers paid a price, by making certain concessions, for a foundation for the United Nations which we hoped would be solid, but which certainly proved to be illusory. This foundation was to be Great Power co-operation. The price we paid was to give these Powers a special position under the Charter.

The Veto

We could not have had the United Nations at all without paying this price. It was not too high and it should not be made an excuse for our failures. The veto, for instance, is not the cause, as I see it, so much as the result of those failures. Other international organizations in which, in effect, all members possess a veto have worked well. Our machinery is adequate; but the will to operate it successfully has often faltered or been frustrated.

Improvement in that machinery—as in any kind of machinery—can, of course, be made. But the remedy for our ills lies not so much in such improvement: as in the desire and determination to make the existing mechanism function better, and for that international agreement on disputed questions. The responsibility for such agreement rests mainly on those members of the United Nations who have the greatest power and the special privileges.

True, the Charter has given us all, great or small, a set of standards of international conduct which it is our duty to follow. The greater the power of a State, however, the heavier is its obligation to exercise this power, in the United Nations and elsewhere, with restraint, with justice and in accordance with the principles of our Charter.

Determination Renewed

This week we renew—in words—our determination to live up to those principles; above all, to rid mankind of the scourge of war. But, if we are to succeed where all previous generations have failed, words alone will be of little avail. It is not enough merely to set up an efficient international organization and lay down an ideal code of international conduct. It is not enough to hoist a United Nations flag with a map of the world, though it may remind us that we are all more directly and vitally interdependent than ever before. It is not enough to meet one another in the Assembly, in the Councils and the Committees of the United Nations, though that should increase mutual understanding. It is not enough to learn to know each other as human beings outside our official contacts, though that also helps. It is not enough to accumulate more knowledge about each other, though that makes it easier to put ourselves in one another's place—something which is essential if understanding is to grow. It is the translation of all these things into political and social action; the application of high principles to individual and collective practice that matters.

As a mechanism for helping us to do this, for bringing us all together, the United Nations, as it exists today, is not far short of what we wished it to become ten years ago. Its doors for discussion and negotiation have been kept open. They may not always have been wide open, but they have never been closed and through them progress has more than once been made in settling conflicts and solving problems. More than one agreement has been worked out in the United Nations which has prevented a war or brought a dispute to an end. There has been more than one instance where the moral force of public opinion working through the United Nations has brought about an honourable arrangement where no basis for a settlement had previously existed. There has been more than one example of the application, in and through the United Nations, of both private and public diplomacy joined together for a good objective which was successfully achieved.

Not all United Nations debates or initiatives, however, have been fruitful. It is easy to retrace, in retrospect, where we have gone wrong during these past ten years. It is not so easy to see how we should try to steer our course for the next ten. We can perhaps admit that we have been carried along by events more than we have controlled them. It may be drift, rather than design, which is now our greatest danger. Yet one of the most hopeful omens for the years ahead is the fact that we are becoming increasingly aware of where events may carry us in this nuclear age, if we do not control them; and direct them away from war and toward a peace that is more than a symbol for propaganda or an uneasy interlude between fighting. To any man, of whatever nation or race or creed or colour, who has looked squarely at the shadow of the hydrogen bomb over his own country, "there is", as President Eisenhower has truly said, "no alternative to peace".

The H-bomb was not written into the Charter; it was not created for peace; it was the product of a desperate anxiety not to be left at an impossible defence disadvantage in a time of fear and crisis. But now, because of this weapon, there stands behind our Charter pledges never to resort to war as a means of settling our differences, a deeper urgency, a more impelling incentive even than that of ten years ago. It is the prospect of mutual annihilation. The balance of terror has replaced the balance of power and that is not a comfortable or strong or permanent foundation for security. Peace rests uneasily on one, even less easily on two, hydrogen bombs. It is the tragedy of our first ten years that peace has found no better resting place.

Agency for Airing Views

The United Nations has another vital role; in acting as an agency through which international public opinion can express itself. Though the United Nations can be and has been misused for propaganda and even for abuse, it has, in my opinion, a legitimate and necessary part to play as a place where opposing views are aired, for the peoples of the world to hear and draw their own conclusions. It is in this sense that the United Nations acts as a kind of "town meeting of the world". Public opinion would, of course, continue to have its effect on all Governments if there were no United Nations, for no Government in these days of mass media of communication can entirely ignore what those in other parts of the world are thinking. No curtain—of any kind or shape or pattern—can completely stop the winds of opinion. But our world organization helps in this regard.

Real Meaning of Peace

It is one of the premises of free and democratic societies that "you can't fool all the people all the time". A great deal can be said about "peace", for example. It is something we all want, but its advocacy can cover other designs. Indeed, if there were more action for peace, there might be less need to talk so much about it. But here in the United Nations, however, governments have to parade not only their words but their policies, before the scrutiny of the international public, who are becoming more skilful in detecting "false fronts". This important function of clarification, of analysis, of education, is taking place all the time; on every day that there is a United Nations meeting anywhere in the world. This is the kind of open diplomacy which can be healthy and good. Its excesses—diplomacy by "loud-speaker" or by insult—are not so good. But even they tend to correct themselves as Governments come to realize that their ends are not attained by crude and tough talk, by name calling or abuse, by legal quibblings or by procedural wrangling; by twisting and torturing the meaning of words.

This last practice particularly has had a confusing and damaging effect on our debates. Too many good words of respectable parentage—democracy, co-existence, freedom, appeasement, human rights, popular, and above all, peace-loving—have been turned upside down and inside out and made to seem what they are not. What we need as we enter our second decade is a Convention for the Defence of Peace-loving words against Verbal aggression!

When the representative of the Soviet Union says—as he did on Wednesday—that "those who pay lip service to the principle of peaceful co-existence sometimes tend to violate that principle flagrantly in practice", I could not agree with him more. But any satisfaction or comfort I secure from that agreement, however, is removed by the certainty that I could hardly disagree with him more on who are meant by "those".

That disagreement, which makes the other agreement of no importance or even indeed of much meaning, arises from the fears and mistrust that keep up apart: fears that may be strong and genuine on both sides. It is these which endanger the world and they will not be removed merely by repetition of the word "peace".

The people of my own country—like those of many other countries—still have this deep

and awful fear of aggressive attack and attack from outside; and by "outside" I do not mean our good neighbour the U.S.A. which we know, from a happy experience respects the rights and honour, the freedom of a less powerful neighbour. To remove the fear, the suspense—and I quote Mr. Molotov again—and with full approval—"what is obviously needed is something more than just verbal recognition of the principle of co-existence and peaceful co-operation between countries with different social structures".

Again unhappily, we cannot agree on how that "something more" can be achieved, or indeed even on what it should be. So the fear of each other persists, and while it does, those countries who believe in coming together for collective security—and who cannot find it at this time in the United Nations—will (let there be no doubt about this) continue to seek it in defensive regional arrangements negotiated and operated in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Our unity in this regard cannot be shaken by untrue and unwarranted allegations that such arrangements are aggressive and provocative. We know that they are not and we will not abandon them. We know that they are not a spearhead — as charged — for attack against one state. They are a shield against aggression from any state. We will not—we dare not—abandon or weaken them until our security can be assured on a broader, and better basis preferably by the United Nations—or until peace rests on something even stronger than force of any kind.

Mr. President, as we look back, let us hope that the need to avoid collective, nuclear suicide will help us to remove these fears and misunderstandings which now haunt and harry us.

It Can Be Done

It can be done; not by the recognition of "co-existence" which is a sterile word, but by active and friendly international co-operation which will convert fear and suspicion into tolerance, understanding, and one day, please God, eventually, into friendship between all peoples. For this essential process, the United Nations exists; valuable as ever, even indispensable.

It is the living symbol of our interdependence, and embodies that emerging sense of international community, going beyond nation and region, which alone can save us in this nuclear age.



—United Nations

UNITED NATIONS 10TH ANNIVERSARY SESSION

Dr. Eelco N. van Kleffens of the Netherlands, Assembly President, declares open the United Nations tenth anniversary session in San Francisco on June 20. On his right is Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General, and on the right, Mr. Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General. Seated at the left of Mr. Hammarskjold is the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson seated behind the President Eisenhower.

We must broaden and deepen this development in the next ten years. For that reason I regret, though I acknowledge, the necessity of holding important conferences outside the United Nations, a practice which has been growing in recent years. This may be the best—indeed in some cases the only—way at this time to resolve some of our biggest problems. Yet it is better, whenever it is possible and as it was intended ten years ago, to tackle these problems inside our Organization. We must work towards that result.

The United Nations is a remarkably flexible and adaptable mechanism. It is led and staffed by a group of able, trained and dedicated men and women whose zeal and devotion will in time deteriorate if we do not make the fullest use of their capabilities.

Let us, then, make more use of the organization we have, not following too slavishly the original blueprint where we find it impracticable or outdated, not aiming to run before we can walk, but aware that the United Nations has unique and unexplored potentialities if we treat it as it was meant to be treated, as an instrument through which our conflicting interests may gradually, one by one, be harmonized, and our mutual understanding may grow. Here, in our world organization—better than at any other place—can we meet the challenge of the nuclear age; co-destruction or co-operation.

If we fail in this supreme challenge, there will be no occasion in 1965 to celebrate our twentieth birthday; or, possibly, to celebrate anything else.

Statement of June 26

The talking—and the traces even of tumult—are over, or almost over. All that could be

said this week about the United Nations and the world in which it must work, has been said.

Our week of commemoration now ends. But our Charter, which is today before us as signed in this place on June 25, 1945,—our Charter remains; as the international Bill of Rights, as imperishable as Magna Charta itself. It enshrines for all time man's hope—so long deferred—that he may live his life in peace and freedom; in dignity and security.

This Charter is, and will always be, the best Declaration of San Francisco, and I suppose no other can add very much to it. It remains also our best peace programme—and others with five or seven or ten points can scarcely do more than repeat it or elaborate on it.

It is the standard of international conduct by which our actions will be measured. We signed it ten years ago and we honour and commemorate that signature today. But we have not yet fulfilled it. Indeed almost before we ceased praising ourselves for what we had done by agreeing on its noble language and its lofty ideals, our actions, became shrouded in the mists of distrust and suspicion that began to envelop the world. Our faith was soon frozen by fear, and our hopes shaken by hatreds. Only now does the sun show some sign of breaking through.

When President Truman spoke at the signing of the Charter, he said this:

"You have created a great instrument for peace and security and human progress in the world. The world must now use it! If we fail to use it, we shall betray all those who have died in order that we might meet here in freedom and safety to create it. If we seek to use it selfishly — for the advantage of any one nation or any small group of nations,—we shall be equally guilty of that betrayal. The successful use

of this instrument will require the united will and firm determination of the free peoples who have created it. The job will tax the moral strength and fiber of us all".

It certainly has and it certainly will.

The fact that today is another anniversary—that of the launching of the war of aggression in Korea—is a grim reminder of how great the gap has been between our pledge and our performance, between debate and deed; of how far short we have fallen of our avowal of "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours".

It is altogether fitting this afternoon—as we celebrate, with solemnity and satisfaction, the signing of our charter of peace—to recall also, with honour and sorrow, the memory of those who have died that it could mean more than words in the search for peace. Their sacrifice is the tragic proof of our failure to understand, and act on the understanding that, in Pascal's words, "strength without justice is tyranny, and justice without strength a mockery". We can retrieve this failure and redeem this sacrifice, but only if we never forget that peace is more than a word or a declaration. It is something determined by the policies of nations. Even more, it is something in the hearts of men. There will be no peace until nations' policies are based on our Charter; above all, until we live our own lives in accordance with its principles.

This week has recalled us to these principles and, because of that, it has, I think, shortened in some small way the distance between a today—with all its alarms and unrest and tension—and a better tomorrow when strength will walk with justice, peace with progress, and the good life will be for all people.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Mr. E. Reid posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, New Delhi, India to temporary duty in the Department and home leave effective May 27, 1955.

Mr. J. Y. Grenon posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Rome, Italy, effective May 31, 1955.

Messrs R. R. Canon appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective June 1, 1955.

Mr. M. P. F. Dupuy appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective June 1, 1955.

Mr. J. G. Harris posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Canberra, Australia, effective June 2, 1955.

- Mr. R. L. Rogers posted from the Canadian Embassy, Tokyo, to Home Leave, effective June 13, 1955.
- Miss H. I. Jones appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective June 13, 1955.
- Mr. R. Duder posted from the International Supervisory Commission for Cambodia to Ottawa, effective June 14, 1955.
- Mr. P. M. Roberts appointed to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, effective June 15, 1955.
- Mr. A. J. Hicks transferred from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Canberra, Australia, to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Wellington, New Zealand, effective June 17, 1955.
- Mr. J. R. McKinney posted from Ottawa to Temporary Duty at the Canadian Consulate General, San Francisco, effective June 17, 1955.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Multilateral

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:

Fourth Protocol of Rectifications and Modifications to the Annexes and to the texts of the Schedules to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, March 7, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 6, 1955.

Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, June 7, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 7, 1955.

Protocol amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, March 10, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 23, 1955.

Protocol amending the Preamble and Parts II and III of the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, March 10, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 23, 1955.

Protocol of rectification to the French text of the General Agreement.

Signed by Canada, June 23, 1955.

Declaration on the continued application of the Schedules annexed to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva, March 10, 1955.

Signed by Canada, June 23, 1955.

Bilateral

Ethiopia:

Exchange of Notes constituting a commercial *modus vivendi* to regulate commercial relations.

Signed at Addis Ababa, June 3, 1955.

Entered into force June 3, 1955.

Japan:

Exchange of Notes respecting the waiving on a reciprocal basis of non-immigrant visa fees.

Signed at Ottawa, June 13, 1955.

Entered into force July 1, 1955.

Spain:

Trade Agreement.

Signed at Madrid, May 26, 1954.

Entered into force provisionally June 1, 1954.

Ratifications exchanged June 30, 1955.

Entered into force definitively June 30, 1955.

United States of America:

Exchange of Notes amending the Exchanges of Notes of November 4 and 8, 1952, and May 1 and July 31, 1953, for the establishment of United States Global communications facilities in Newfoundland.

Signed at Ottawa, March 31 and June 8, 1955.

Entered into force June 8, 1955.

Agreement for co-operation regarding atomic information for mutual defence purposes.

Signed at Washington, June 15, 1955.

Agreement for co-operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy.

Signed at Washington, June 15, 1955.

PUBLICATIONS

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated).

Treaty Series 1952, No. 27:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America constituting an Agreement for the establishment of United States Global Communications Facilities in Newfoundland. Signed at Ottawa, November 4 and 8, 1952. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 12:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America regarding the transfer to Canada of the Three Loran Stations at Port-Aux-Basques, Battle Harbour and Bonavista in Newfoundland. Signed at Ottawa, June 26 and 30, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1953, No. 25:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America amending the Exchange of Notes of November 4 and 8, 1952, for the establishment of United States Global Communications facilities in Newfoundland. Signed at Ottawa, May 1 and July 31, 1953. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 1:—Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national representatives and international staff. Signed at Ottawa, September 20, 1951. English and French texts. (Price 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1954, No. 7:—Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States of America concerning the payment for expenditures on construction of remedial works at Niagara Falls. Signed at Ottawa, September 13, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series, 1955, No. 1:—Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Peru for air services between and beyond their respective territories. Signed at Lima, February 18, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 3:—Agreement on North Atlantic Ocean Stations. Signed at Paris, February 25, 1954. English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

United Nations Refuge Emergency Fund. Financial reports and accounts for the year ended 31 December 1954 and reports of Board of Auditors. A/2900. New York, 1955. 12 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 6 D.

Financial Reports and Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1954 and Reports of the Board of Auditors. A/2901. New York, 1955. 60 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 6.

Resolutions of the Nineteenth Session (1st Part) of the Economic and Social Council, 29 March-7 April 1955. E/2780. New York, 1955. 4 p. ECOSOC Official Records: Nineteenth Session, Supplement No. 1.

The Quest for Freer Trade. E/2737, ST/ECA/31. April 1955. 59 p. Sales No.: 1955.II.C.5.

Scope and Structure of Money Economies in Tropical Africa. E/2739, ST/ECA/34. May 1955. 52 p. Sales No.: 1955.II.C.4.

Report of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

(a) Report of the Council to the Assembly on the activities of the organization in 1954. (Supporting documentation for the ninth session of the assembly, Montreal, June 1955). E/2749, 16 May 1955. 89 p. (Doc 7564, A9-P/2, 27/4/55).

(b) Council's Budget Estimates, 1956 and Information Annex. (Supporting documentation for the ninth session of the Assembly, Montreal, May-June 1955). E/2749/Add.1, 16 May 1955. (Doc 7565, A9-AD/1, 23/3/55) 43 p.

Repertory of Practices of United Nations Organs. Volume I: Articles 1-22 of the Charter. New York, 1955. 742 p. \$3.50 Sales No.: 1955.V.2 (Vol. I).

A Study of the Iron and Steel Industry in Latin America:

Volume I—Report on the meeting of the Expert Working Group held at Bogota. E/CN.12/293/Rev.1, ST/TAA/SER.C/

16. December 1954. 123 p. \$1.25. Sales No.: 1954.II.G.3, Vol. I.

Volume II—Proceedings of the Expert Working Group held at Bogota. E/CN.12/293/Rev.1/Add.1, ST/TAA/SER.C/16/Add.1. November 1954. 449 p. \$4.50. Sales No.: 1954.G.3, Vol. II.

UNESCO

The Builders and the Books (Technical Assistance lends a hand to the progress of the Middle East). Paris 1955. 55 pp.

SIRS-EL-LAYYAN—Light and hope for the Arab world. Paris. 1955. 26 p.

Records of the Inter-governmental Copyright Conference, Geneva, 18 August-6 September 1952. Paris 1955. 415 p. \$3.50.

International Social Science Bulletin, Vol. VII, No.1, 1955. (Quarterly). Social Factors in Personality. 185 p.

Urban Sociology—A trend report and bibliography. (Current Sociology, Volume IV, No. 1. Paris 1955). 52 p. (bilingual).

(b) Mimeographed Documents:

Report of the Latin American Meeting of Experts on the Pulp and Paper Industry, Buenos Aires, 19 October-2 November 1954. E/CN.12/361, FAO/ETA/No 462, ST/TAA/SER.C/19. (E/2697, 17 March 1955) 139 p.

Report of the Eleventh Session of the Commission on Human Rights. E/2731, E/CN.4/719. 4 May 1955. 78 p. & Annexes I to III.

World Economic Situation—Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Latin America (Seventh annual report covering the period from 10 February 1954 to 10 May 1955). E/2756, E/CN.12/AC.26/8/Rev.1. 10 May 1955. 50 p. Appendix, 7 p.

UNICEF—Administrative and Operational Services Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1956 and Information Annex. E/ICEF/L.765. New York 1955. 100 p.

* Printed documents may be procured from the Canadian sales agents for United Nations Publications, The Ryerson Press, 299 Queen Street West, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal, or from their sub-agents: Book Room Limited, Chronicle Building, Halifax; McGill University Book Store, Montreal; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Toronto; University of British Columbia Book Store, Vancouver; University of Toronto Press and Book Store, Montreal; and Les Presses Universitaires, Laval, Quebec. Certain mimeographed document series are available by annual subscription. Further information can be obtained from Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, New York. UNESCO publications can be obtained from their sales agents: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, and Periodica Inc., 5112 avenue Papineau, Montreal. All publications and documents may be consulted at certain designated libraries listed in "External Affairs", February 1954, p. 67.

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 55/19—*Canada Trades with the World*, an address by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe, to the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, at Montreal, May 25, 1955.
- No. 55/21—*Good Neighbourhood*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, before the Golden Jubilee Convention of Rotary International, at Chicago, June 1, 1955.
- No. 55/22—*Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the United Nations*, statements made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and President of the seventh session, Mr. L. B. Pearson, at the Tenth Anniversary meeting of the United Nations, San Francisco, June 24 and 26, 1955.

The following serial number is available abroad only:

- No. 55/20—*Employment and Unemployment in the Canadian Economy*, an address by Minister of Labour, Mr. Milton F. Gregg, to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, at Montreal, May 25, 1955.

ENGINEERING AGREEMENT SIGNED

The Department of External Affairs announced on July 6 that a detailed engineering agreement was signed recently, on behalf of the Canadian and Pakistan Governments, for the provision under the Colombo Plan of a steam power plant, boilers and generators at Hardinge Bridge, East Pakistan. The Canadian Government is also providing certain building materials, including structural steel, for the construction of the power house in his Ganges-Kobadak project. The total external cost is estimated at \$1,800,000. All local costs and labour will be financed by Pakistan. An agreement in principle was signed on March 10, 1955, and during the short time that has elapsed since then, all the machinery for the plant has already arrived from Canada and is being transported to the site ready for erection after the monsoon season.

The steam power plant will provide 10,000 k.w. of energy for use in pumping water from the Ganges River into canals and channels for the irrigation of a large area in the districts of Kushtia, Khulna and Jessore.

The steam power plant forms part of a large irrigation scheme which is an outstanding example of international co-operation. The general plan of the irrigation scheme was worked out by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations under the direction of Mr. Van Blommenstein. Pumping equipment is being provided by the Foreign Operations Administration of the United States. The Chief Engineer, Irrigation, of East Pakistan is in charge of construction of the extensive civil works. The Canadian Government is providing the steam power plant, design drawings and specifications, and building materials not available locally, as well as the technical personnel required for supervising the erection of the power house steam plant, and generators.

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Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin

THE debate on the International Rivers Improvement Act, which was passed by the Canadian House of Commons on June 14, 1955, has served to emphasize the importance of water resources in Canada, particularly the tremendous hydro-electric potential of the Columbia River Basin in British Columbia. The Columbia River is one of the great rivers of the North American continent. It is exceeded only by the Mississippi and St. Lawrence Rivers in the amount of water it discharges annually into the ocean. It has been estimated provisionally that the water resources of this basin when fully developed will warrant an installed capacity of as much as 35 million kilowatts or approximately 30 per cent of the total water power potential of Canada and the United States combined.

Shared by Canada and the U.S.

The resources of the Columbia River Basin are shared by Canada and the United States. Of the total area of 259,000 square miles drained by the Columbia River, 39,700 square miles, roughly 15 per cent, are in Canada and more than 25 per cent of the total annual run-off originates in Canada. Because of the international character of the Columbia River and its principal tributary, the Kootenay, a number of problems have arisen and will continue to arise between Canada and the United States in the exploitation of these waters for industrial, agricultural and other uses. The Canadian Government policy concerning the development of these water resources was set forth in an address by the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Mr. Jean Lesage, before the Pacific Northwest Association in Vancouver, B.C., on May 9, 1955. He said, in part:

The Pacific Northwest has an important common feature: its economic development largely depends upon water resources and the Columbia River System is its main source of water. However, this vast region is far from being homogeneous. It is composed of several political units separated by an international boundary whose political and economic significance cannot be ignored. The region is constituted of several distinct areas which differ both in geography and in natural resources. The distinction between upstream and downstream areas, for instance, corresponds to a basic economic reality.

Up to now, these differences have not generated any substantial diversity of interests within the region. The various areas of the Pacific Northwest have grown along parallel lines, more or less independently of each other. They were in a position to exploit their respective resources and to attract new industries through their own initiative because their energy requirements could be met by developing available heads in the Columbia River System to provide on-site power. This first phase of development did not call for joint enterprise nor create a conflict of interests, with the result that the different parts of the Pacific Northwest appeared unified through complementary relationships.

As the region approaches the end of its first stage of development, it becomes evident that the unity of interest is more apparent than real. As it moves

into the second period of its expansion a new situation will arise where inter-regional relationships are likely to show two contradictory features. First, they will have competitive aspects. All areas depend more or less directly on water resources for their future industrial growth. However, the region's potential of cheap power, although still abundant, is limited in quantity so that the additional amounts appropriated by one area will affect the character, and perhaps will limit, the further economic expansion of the others. Thus, conflicting interests are likely to develop amongst the various areas because they will be obliged to share the same scarce commodity. Second, inter-regional relations will also have complementary features. Only part of the power potential of the Columbia River System can be developed through a series of dams using the available at-site head because there is a great difference between summer and winter flows. The optimum development of the Basin will necessitate the construction of upstream storage facilities to provide downstream power and to keep costs low. Thus, joint action by upstream and downstream areas will in many cases be required to develop the power potential of the region economically.

This complex set of relationships is further complicated by the physical possibility of diverting flood waters from the Kootenay River into the Columbia through Canal Flats and from the Columbia River into the Fraser River System. Canada's right to make these diversions is guaranteed under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.

Article II


Article II of this Treaty deals with this problem in the following terms: "Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial Governments on the other as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters". The article goes on to give to any parties on the other side of the boundary who may be injured as a result of a diversion the same rights to claim damages as if the injury had been sustained in the country making the diversion. The right to object to diversions resulting in material injury to navigation interests is embodied in the Treaty . . .

After discussing the historical background of Article II of the Treaty of 1909, Mr. Lesage went on to say:

Thus, our right to divert flood waters from the Kootenay and Columbia rivers is clearly established as a result of the position taken by the United States in 1909. Now that, in the main area of contention, Canada represents the upstream interests, we cannot be criticized for wanting to assert a right which was more or less imposed upon us in conditions that were then against our national interests.

However, the fact that those diversions are physically feasible and that we have the right to make them does not of itself necessarily mean that they will be initiated. Economic considerations will have to be taken into account in reaching a decision. That is why an investigation is now being made on the feasibility of the Kootenay and Columbia diversion projects. Results of these surveys are expected within a year.

We want to obtain precise data on the benefits to be derived from these diversions and on their cost, including, of course, the possible damages to downstream interests. Once we know the quantity and the cost of power which could thus be made available, it will be useful to compare those data with the cost of



thermal and atomic power. It will be particularly important to make such a comparison with the quantity and the cost of power that the downstream interests would be prepared to give in recompense for storage facilities if the flood waters were not diverted. All the direct and indirect effects of these alternatives will have to be carefully examined before a final decision is reached.

This brings us back to the competitive and complementary relationships existing between upstream and downstream areas in the Pacific Northwest region and raises the complex problem of downstream benefits. Given the strong competitive factors now opposing the two main groups of interests, it is quite understandable that the downstream areas would like to keep for themselves all the downstream power made available through regulated flow and to provide compensation only in terms of money for the damage caused by the upstream storage facilities. It is equally understandable that the upstream areas should refuse such proposals because even adequate compensation for damages does not add to their wealth. They may argue, for instance, that, once the head has been developed, the generation and transmission of power derived from on

peak storage cost very little because otherwise the facilities of the power system downstream would be idle and because unused capacity in a hydro-electric plant does not materially reduce total cost whereas the cost of providing storage may be considerable. They could claim, therefore, that most of the downstream power generated from the released storage should belong to them.

Compromise Needed

It is evident that these opposite views must be reconciled in order to reach a satisfactory arrangement. Some compromise will have to be worked out whereby the upstream areas will receive an adequate and fair share of downstream power. I am convinced that this claim of the upstream interests is perfectly justified. It should be noted that the power made available under those particular conditions is a joint product resulting from the joint enterprise of upstream and downstream interests. The downstream areas provide the head which is certainly a valuable resource, but the upstream areas contribute the storage sites which are required to regulate the flow of water and also may permit flooding above the boundary to increase the head below. It cannot be denied that a topography favourable to storage sites is a very valuable asset which can be utilized in perpetuity. It follows therefore that when downstream and upstream areas decide to use their respective physical assets jointly for the generation of power, they both have a claim on the end-product. Moreover, they both make their contribution in physical terms—even though some expenditures are involved to develop the natural resources—so that they are both entitled to a quantity of the joint product in physical terms . . .

In our country, the doctrine of sharing downstream benefits is in the process of becoming the explicit policy of the Government of Canada which is directly concerned with this problem. According to the Canadian Constitution, works built on rivers in Canada and having an effect outside the country fall under the jurisdiction of Parliament even if they are entirely located in one province. Up to now, the Government of Canada has felt that it was unnecessary to exercise this jurisdiction and to legislate in this field. Conditions are rapidly changing, however, and, as I pointed out, a second period in the development of the Columbia River System is now starting during which important international problems will arise. Special legislation will be needed to cope with these questions and to provide guiding principles of policy designed for the protection of the public interest of the Canadian people. That is why the Parliament of Canada has been asked to enact Bill No. 3, entitled "The International River Improvements Act".

Under this Bill, an "international river improvement" means a dam, obstruction, canal, reservoir or other work the purpose or effect of which is

- (i) to increase, decrease or alter the natural flow of an international river, and
- (ii) to interfere with, alter or affect the actual or potential use of the international river outside Canada.

Such works, unless specifically excepted by regulations or by the Act, would require a licence from the Government of Canada. The Bill would also enable the Governor in Council to make regulations concerning the construction, operation and maintenance of these works for the purpose of developing and utilizing the water resources of Canada in the national interest.

The Government of Canada has already made known the general principles which would serve to interpret the national interest in this respect. They require that a project must be compatible with present and future needs of the country

and with the optimum development of the site and the whole watershed. If no effective use of the water resources can be made in Canada, the improvement executed in Canada to permit downstream utilization in another country must provide for benefits commensurate with the water resources thus made available. Projects involving the storage of water in Canada to regulate the downstream flow must provide for long-term arrangements with the United States or some authority designated on its behalf and for a reasonable share of the downstream power or for a fair return in real terms. If, in order to launch a project in Canada, it is necessary to contract for the sale outside of Canada of a declining proportion of the Canadian share of downstream benefit power, then the sale of that power must be treated as an export of electricity and made subject to similar regulations as those pertaining to the Exportation of Power and Fluids and Importation of Gas Act. I use the expression "declining proportion" to indicate that there is no intention to alienate power permanently.

Not a New Trend

This attitude of the Government of Canada in respect to downstream benefits and to power development in general cannot be interpreted as a new trend in our thinking. It is merely an application to this particular field of a well-established policy. The Canadian Government has always thought that our natural resources should be exploited to the best advantage of our country. This is the position taken in the United States about United States resources, and it is the only responsible position that a government can take. We place special emphasis on energy in view of the fact that it is a strategic factor of industrial expansion in the framework of modern technology. Within the energy field we devote particular attention to water power as one of our most valuable resources. We must put it to its optimum use in Canada. We cannot be expected to make it available outside the country on terms which could hinder our own industrial progress . . .

It must be realized that British Columbia is still in its early period of expansion and that most of its resources are almost untapped. The U.S. Pacific Northwest has reached a much more advanced stage of development. This is not the first time that regions of the two countries show such a difference in timing of development. The Province of Ontario once thought that its power potential was much greater than its needs and that it could make part of it available to the State of New York. Just a few years later it needed that power but could not recover it. It took many years to solve this difficulty. To-day, southern Ontario has almost completely developed the full potential of its water resources and its power requirements are still increasing rapidly. Where there was once a surplus of really cheap power, there will, in the immediate future, be an acute shortage.

Even at the present time, the power requirements of certain areas in southern British Columbia are doubling every seven years. There is no doubt that if British Columbia experiences a normal rate of growth, all its cheap sources of power will be required in the next two or three decades.

If Canada does not want to see the economic future of its west coast area jeopardized, it cannot allow the sale in the United States of on-site or downstream power from British Columbia at a price corresponding to the average cost of power presently available on that market. This power is produced at very low cost because the main projects were built during the depression and part of their cost was assigned to irrigation, flood control and navigation. The real value of power in the United States Pacific Northwest is represented by the cost of producing additional power from the cheapest source now available in the area. Canada cannot be expected to permit the sale of its power on the

United States market at a price much lower than this cost. Is Canada reasonably to be expected to use its own resources in such a way as to encourage new industries to locate on the other side of the boundary where they will have immediate access to the United States market, where they will enjoy tariff protection and get cheap power as well? Our first duty is to use Canadian resources to foster Canadian development. We have always given consideration to the needs of our United States friends, and we always will, but we cannot be expected to do that to our own jeopardy. Since cheap energy is so vital a factor in industrial growth, Canada has for years taken the position that it cannot export power to the United States in perpetuity or even on a long term basis. If it did that, it would sacrifice one of the most significant factors in its industrial expansion. Canada might find itself without cheap power to process its own raw materials and forced to export those as well. Controlled water is simply electricity in storage. The same principle applies there.

Temporary Power Surplus

If the application of this policy results in some region having a temporary surplus of power this is no reason to think the policy is wrong. We can be sure the surplus will be only temporary. Moreover, it is not a surplus of power, but a shortage which creates great difficulties and which brings industrial expansion to an end. A temporary surplus of power is the very condition of economic progress in the age of modern technology. Power projects require several years to be completed but the demand for power may rise suddenly. That is why regions enjoying temporary surpluses possess a great economic advantage and must think twice before deciding to part with it.

As it can be readily seen, the further development of the water resources of the Pacific Northwest will no doubt create problems, difficulties and perhaps conflicts. We might as well face them frankly and realistically. We cannot ignore the fact that even in the Pacific Northwest different areas do not have necessarily the same interests. Instead of refusing to recognize unavoidable divergencies of interest we should try our best to reconcile them . . .


The United States and Canada have a long record of peaceful relations. This does not mean we do not have divergencies of interests or that, when such differences arise, either country sacrifices its interests to the other. The explanation of our friendly relations lies in the fact that we are always ready to iron out our difficulties through direct negotiations and to reach a compromise in the common interest . . .

Only disagreements and uncompromising attitudes can impair the brilliant economic future guaranteed to the Pacific Northwest by its immense natural resources.

Soviet Agriculturalists Visit to Canada

THE Soviet agricultural delegation which recently spent six weeks in the United States arrived at Montreal on August 25 to begin a two weeks' tour of Canadian farming areas. The nine-man delegation, led by Vladimir Matskevitch, Acting Minister of Agriculture for the U.S.S.R. was met at the airport by S. J. Chagnon, Assistant Deputy-Minister of Agriculture, and other government officials. The tour conducted by the Department of Agriculture began with a visit to the Eastern Townships in Quebec. After spending a day in Ottawa, the visitors enplaned for Regina and since Mr. Matskevitch had expressed a desire of spending as much time as possible studying large-scale farming their stay in that district was extended to four days. Among their hosts during the visit to Saskatchewan were the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. James Gardiner, the Premier of the Province and Mr. L. B. Thompson, head of the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Organization. The last day was spent at Swift Current where research on dry land farming is done by the P.F.R.O.

On the return trip to southern Ontario a short stop was made at Winnipeg for a visit to the Board of Grain Commissioners. After arrival at Chatham the group examined corn growing methods and the purchase of a considerable quantity of seed was made. Before returning to Ottawa a day of relaxation was enjoyed in the Niagara Peninsula. A day's bus ride brought the delegates back to Ottawa where they spent four days studying more farming methods, sight-seeing and attending several receptions held in their honour. On September 10 they had their last look at Canada before boarding a plane to begin the long flight home.



—Capital Press

SOVIET AGRICULTURALISTS VISIT THE FARM NEAR OTTAWA OF DR. H. H. HANNAN

Left to right: V. V. Matskevitch, Dr. J. G. Taggart, Deputy-Minister of Agriculture, A. A. Ezhevski, A. S. Shevchenko, B. P. Sokolov.

International Trade Unionism

IN CANADA, as in most industrialized countries, trade unionism has a day-to-day impact on the lives of most people which gives rise to a general awareness of unionism as a domestic institution. There is, however, less consciousness of trade unionism in the international field. To the public at large, international unionism presents a vague and apparently insignificant picture.

Yet international unionism is important. It plays a noteworthy part in international affairs and affects or may be affected by events throughout the world. Canadians have a special interest in international unionism. Few countries have had as long a relationship with international unionism as Canada.

Eighty Per Cent Membership

Canadians have been members of and participants in international unions for over a hundred years. Belonging to and taking part in the affairs of international unions is now the rule rather than the exception for organized workers in Canada. Out of a total of more than a million and a quarter Canadian trade unionists, some eighty per cent belong to unions whose headquarters are outside Canada.

Canadian interest in international unions began in the days of the free border between Canada and the United States. Those were the days when passage to and from the two countries was a casual affair, unimpeded by rigid immigration inspection, or by the need for passports or border-crossing cards. Much of the continent was of a frontier nature: labour was extremely mobile and the "tramp" worker was common. A worker might be in Canada one day and a week later in the United States. Workers were constantly on the move and were not too conscious of the name of the country in which they worked. The whole continent was their workshop. With industry and, consequently, unionism having an earlier start in the United States than in Canada, United States or international unionism became the instrument to be used by migrant United States and Canadian workers to improve wages, working conditions and living standards generally.

"Tramp" miners, printers, construction and building workers and railroad "boomers" carried their union cards and unions with them into all parts of the continent. International unionism thus took root in Canada.

As the years passed, the industrial base was widened and expanded. This development brought about a decline in the mobility of labour, and workers settled down. Their unions evolved into permanent institutions. With the growth of permanent communities in the two countries, branches of United States unions were formed all over Canada. Belonging to the same union became the accepted thing for both Canadian and United States workers.

The flow of United States capital into Canada added an inducement for Canadian workers to become and remain members of international unions. Often working for the same employer as United States workers, Canadians concluded that their economic position would be strengthened if they also

belonged to the same unions as their American fellow-workers. Their unwritten motto was in many cases, "The same employer; the same union."

The participation of Canadians in international unions on a continental basis has assumed such large-scale proportions that policy decisions by the unions affect many people in Canada as well as in the United States. Policy is laid down at annual or biennial conventions to which the local unions of both countries send delegates representing the membership. Policies affecting workers in both countries are arrived by majority decision.

It comes about, therefore, that a local union in Canada will be following a policy similar to that of a local unit of the same international union perhaps three thousand miles away in the United States. In the earlier days of international trades unions on the continent, union policies largely ranged around improvement of the immediate conditions of life. Betterment of wages and working conditions, known to unionists as "bread and butter problems", was the chief motivation for union activity.

With the improvement of wages and conditions, however, came a greater social awakening of union membership, and international union policy broadened out into new areas of interest. The enactment of social legislation began to absorb the attention of unionists, and it may be said that much of the social legislation in the statutes of Canada and the United States had its origins in the discussions in local union halls and the conventions of international unions. The adherence of close to a million Canadians to international unions has, therefore, considerable influence on the political and economic life of Canada.

A Personal Relationship

This mass form of Canadian activity in international unions has something more than economic or political implications. It has created a personal relationship that brings together on a day-to-day basis a fellowship of tens of thousands of people of Canada and the United States, thereby enriching the life of the two countries and making for mutual understanding of each other's problems. In this fellowship lies a great contribution to the continuing peace between the two neighbours. North America is something of a continental economic unit. Because of this, it is easy to understand why Canadians of many interests join with their fellows in the United States in mutual organization.

What is not so easy to grasp is the interest and activity of Canadian unionists in world organizations and in their numerous regional or subsidiary bodies. Yet Canadian unions have had a participation of years standing in the bona fide organizations of world trade unionism. The motivation of Canadian activity in world trade unionism is basically similar to that of joint activity with United States workers. It is mutually of interest and purpose, backed by a realization that, directly or indirectly, what happens in any part of the globe has some sort of impact on the lives of Canadians generally, and Canadian workers in particular.

Canadian workers are affiliated to two world labour organizations. Canadian unions with international connections in the United States are associated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The unions in the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour are affiliated with the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions.

The two world federations represent the free workers of the world and both are actively anti-Communist. They take their stand against Communism on the ground that the all-powerful state is the enemy of freedom, including labour freedom. They are also agreed on the need for lifting the living standards of people everywhere, which they consider is the best means to counter Communist propaganda, tyranny and oppression.

Why Two Unions

A puzzle to some is why the two world anti-Communist federations of trades unions remain divided, if both are united on the basic principles of freedom and security. The origins of the division go back a half century into a Europe, unthreatened by Communism, when two vigorous schools of thought—the religious and the secular—debated the status of man and his mode of participation in human organization. The trade unions became involved in the debate and there resulted the establishment of two international federations of trade unions. However, within recent years there has come a recognition inside both groups that the mortal enemy of both internationals is world poverty, and the Communism that feeds upon human misery. Out of this recognition is developing a climate which should permit closer association between and, perhaps, unification of the two world organizations to conduct a concentrated world struggle against poverty and Communism.

The instrument of international Communism in the labour field is the World Federation of Trade Unions. This world body came into being in the closing days of the Second World War when there was not only a general weariness of war but an apparent desire in all countries to get together and work for the good of all mankind. The governments of the world were joining together in the aspiring United Nations and it was, therefore, believed by most free unions throughout the world that, if governments could find common ground for work on international problems, workers could also unite in one world trade union body to serve a common cause. The result was the formation of the World Federation of Trade Unions to which most unions of all beliefs, Communist and non-Communist alike, adhered. Inside a year, however, it became obvious that the attempted fusion of opposites would not work. Free trade unionists realized that the Communist unions were not primarily interested in helping the workers of the world but in furthering the interests of communism and, by 1948, most of the free unions had left the new federation. Out of this departure of free trade unionists from the World Federation came the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions with the slogan of "Bread, Peace and Freedom". With virtually all the free unions having left the World Federation, that body is today largely representative only of what goes by the name of trade unionism in the Communist countries.

Communist unions are not free institutions dedicated to the welfare of workers. Inside Communist countries, unions are but organs of the state, used by the government to speed up production and strengthen the economy. Unions have no voice in bargaining for wages or working conditions: they must accept the wage levels and production norms set by the state. In free countries, unions controlled by Communists have as their basic function the propagation of Communist theory. The World Federation of Trade Unions, under Communist domination, is, therefore, an instrument of Communist propaganda abroad and of subjection of the workers in the Communist countries themselves.

Of the world anti-Communist trades union bodies, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions is the stronger. This body has a world membership of roughly fifty-four million members from about seventy-five countries. In the federation are men and women of all religions, faiths and political beliefs, apart from Communism.

The Confederation meets in world session every two years in different national capitals. Delegates to the biennial meetings are selected in each country by the national affiliates. Canadian international unions, with approximately one million members, send eight or nine delegates and advisers to these conferences.

At the biennial world meetings the whole condition of man is reviewed, debated and dealt with by conference decision. World economic conditions, living standards and the state of man's freedom are high on the agenda of discussion. World trading conditions, rearmament, the atomic bomb and the Communist conspiracy and infiltration are also discussed. Between the biennial meetings, the decisions of the Confederation are administered and applied by its officers and the standing executive or an emergency committee. Canada is represented on the executive body and its representatives are held in high regard for their unselfish contributions to the work of the world organization.

Regional Organizations

Below the world level, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions is subdivided into regional organizations, whose work is to translate decisions of the world body to the needs of the individual countries coming within their regional jurisdiction. Canada is actively represented on the regional organization covering the Americas.

The work of the regional organizations lies in organization of unorganized workers in countries where such help is needed; the strengthening of weak trades unions; the advocacy of better laws; the establishment of educational facilities to train and educate future leadership of free unions.

In the European regional organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions not only is there an active and alert interest in workers' affairs. A continuing attention is also given to the need for European integration and to the administration of the European Coal and Steel Community on which the free unions of Europe are represented.

In addition to the decentralization of the world body into continental or regional organizations, there is a further sub-division of organization into specific trades and crafts. Out of the world organization comes the individual trade or craft organizations which meet regularly and deal with their particular problems. Individual Canadian unions are also members of and active workers in these trade units of the world body.

From this type of organization, opportunities are provided for discussion, decision and work on a world, area and individual trade basis. This process of decentralization and integration enables the world body to give attention to the needs and problems of workers in every country. The pattern of organization translates interest and activity from the world level down through the union centres in each country to the local level.

Beyond this active and continuing interest in the problems of the workers in each country, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has permanent observers at meetings of the United Nations and its many branches. At this vantage point the Confederation is able to bring attention to world problems. It was from the representation of the Free Trade Unions at the United Nations that there developed such a world knowledge and consciousness of the existence and condition of slave labour and prison camps in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

The International Federation of Christian Trade Unions is smaller than the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The membership of the Christian International is estimated at some three million members. The main bases of its membership are in Europe, notably Belgium, France and Holland, while from Canada the Catholic Confederation of Labour contributes roughly one hundred thousand members. There is also a scattered membership of the Christian Federation in some Latin American countries and in the Far East.

The structure of the Christian Federation is basically similar to that of the Free Trade Unions, although the disparity in numbers, and limitation of membership to Christians, tends to limit the effectiveness of the body to areas having a common spiritual affinity. In countries like Belgium, France, Holland and Canada, the Christian unions have, however, an impact of some consequence. The Canadian and Catholic Confederation is widely represented in the work of the international Christian trade union body.

Useful Contribution

The long apprenticeship, which Canadian unionists have served in the international unions of North America, has enabled them to make a useful contribution to the work of the free world labour movement. Canadian labour shares the belief in the interdependence of peoples in the modern world that is the basis of the action of the Government of Canada in representing all Canadians in the United Nations, or of Canadian farmers who are active associates in the International Federation of Agriculture or Canadian businessmen who play their part in the International Chamber of Commerce. Canadian unionists readily accept the truth that in today's world "no man is an island" and they realize that they will prosper to the extent that they contribute to the well-being of the workers of all nations.

Meeting of Parliamentarians from NATO Countries—Paris, July 1955

THE idea of establishing closer relationship between NATO and national legislatures has received considerable support, both in official and unofficial circles, since the creation of the Organization. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Dr. Lange, raised the matter as far back as the Ottawa session of the North Atlantic Council in 1951 and during the last two years parties of parliamentarians from Denmark, France, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom have visited NATO Headquarters in order to inform themselves of the problems faced by NATO and the progress it has achieved in various fields of activities. What it is hoped to accomplish through these visits is to widen the base of public support for the Organization and, particularly, to develop useful contact, at the parliamentary level, between North American and European members of the Alliance. The value of these aims was particularly recognized by the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, formed on May 14, 1954, by members of both Houses of the Canadian Parliament, irrespective of party affiliations.

The new element, however, contained in a resolution adopted this year by the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association shortly after the opening of the Canadian Parliament, was to organize concurrent visits to NATO Headquarters of Parliamentarians from all NATO countries. As a result of this Canadian proposal, which was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General of NATO on January 18, the Chairman of the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Committee, who had been issuing invitations to a number of NATO countries to send Parliamentarians to a meeting in Paris in the spring or early summer of 1955, decided to co-ordinate arrangements on behalf of the Norwegian *Storting* with the Chairman of the Canadian group, Senator W. McL. Robertson, and it was finally agreed that only one meeting of Parliamentarians would be held in Paris commencing on July 18, the date suggested by the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. Invitations were accordingly issued to all NATO Parliaments or Parliamentary Associations to send representatives on that date.

II

It is against this general background that about 175 Parliamentarians, representing the fifteen NATO countries, met at the Palais de Chaillot in mid-July. The first problem that had to be met before the Conference convened was to set up the necessary administrative machinery to enable it to function harmoniously and with the maximum efficiency. No precedent, of course, existed in this respect since Parliamentarians visiting NATO Headquarters had hitherto been mostly concerned with obtaining a greater knowledge about the Organization and its accomplishments. The proposed Conference, on the other hand, wished to initiate a discussion of NATO affairs and the role that might be played by Parliamentarians in furthering the work of the Organization. From the outset it was recognized that, the Conference having been called by the Parliamentarians themselves and not by the Organization, the actual conduct of the Conference was the sole responsibility of the Parliamentarians. On the other hand, in accordance with its policy to encourage visits from Parliamen-



NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS PALAIS DE CHAILLOT PARIS

A group of 122 Parliamentarians from the 15 NATO countries photographed in the main lobby of the NATO Headquarters—the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. Seated from left to right on the front row of this picture are the members of the Continuing Committee; M. Pierre-Olivier Lapie (France), Vice-Président et Député; M. Van Cauwalaert (Belgium), Président; Hon. Senator Wishart McL. Robertson (Canada), Chairman of the Meeting; Mr. Finn-Moe (Norway), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee; The Rt. Hon. Walter Elliot C.H., M.C. (U.K.), Member of Parliament; Mr. J. J. Fens (Netherlands), Member of the Second Chamber.

tarians to NATO Headquarters, it was decided that the Secretariat should make available to the Conference its administrative facilities in order to assist in any technical way possible. A Conference Headquarters was therefore established to help the Conference in administrative and informational matters. This group distinct from the NATO Secretariat, consisted of an official of the Canadian Parliament, a representative of the Norwegian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council, and a representative of the French Parliament, assisted by appropriate officers from the NATO International Staff. Each national delegation to NATO was in turn asked to designate an officer to serve as a liaison point. The NATO International Staff, in addition, undertook the responsibility of furnishing a verbatim record of the discussions held in plenary sessions in either French or English and to make available translators as well as stenographic assistance in these two languages. The Conference itself elected its own "Steering Committee", which was entrusted with the task of establishing the agenda and the rules of procedure for the Conference debates. Because of the nature of the meeting, it was unanimously agreed that conclusions reached during the discussions should be communicated to the National Governments and not to the NATO Council.

III

In order to take full advantage of the relatively short time that the Parliamentarians were able to spend in Paris, it was agreed that the programme,

during the first two days of the meeting, should provide for briefings on NATO at the Palais de Chaillot and at SHAPE, while the three last days would be left open for the Members of Parliament to have discussions together.

The briefings at the Palais de Chaillot were extensive. The Secretary-General of the Organization spoke to the group on the organizational aspects of the Alliance, while the Standing Group Liaison Officer dealt with the military organization of NATO. The Conference also heard the Head of the Production and Logistics Department of NATO on problems relating to the Annual Review and Defence Production. A briefing was also given on the theme of civil defence, the role of parliaments and the role of NATO by Sir John Hodsoll, the Senior Civil Defence Adviser to NATO. In his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, the Permanent Delegate of Canada on the NATO Council, Ambassador L. Dana Wilgress addressed the group on non-military co-operation within NATO. The briefings at SHAPE Headquarters included discussions on SHAPE Organization by Gen. Brisac, on NATO air defence plans by Air Marshal Dawson, and finally an address on the wider implications of the NATO defence programme and strategy by General Gruenther.

IV

The Parliamentarians held four sessions devoted to the exchange of views on matters of common interest, the sessions taking place on the morning and afternoon of July 20, on the afternoon of July 21 and the morning of July 22. The morning session of July 20 was devoted to general statements, many of them enlarging on points which had emerged in the briefings on the previous two days. It is perhaps worth referring here to a statement made by the leader of the United States Delegation, who pointed out that the limited representation of the Congress of the United States in no way reflected a lack of interest in the meeting, but rather was an unfortunate consequence of the particularly heavy legislative schedule with which the Congress was confronted at the time of the meeting. Almost all of the general statements expressed approval of the purposes underlying the meeting, and supported the view that further meetings of NATO parliamentarians to exchange views on questions of common concern would be of great value both to the parliaments of Member countries and to the Organization itself.

This theme was developed more specifically at the afternoon session on July 20, when resolutions were introduced by the Canadian, French and United Kingdom Delegations, designed to ensure that a further meeting of the same general type should take place, perhaps in about a year's time. A Resolutions Committee was set up to seek to prepare an agreed text combining the significant points in the three national drafts mentioned. The report of this Committee was considered at the session on Thursday, July 21, at which time certain proposed amendments were put forward. The Committee met again to consider these amendments, and presented a final report at the session on July 22. This final report was unanimously adopted, and the text of the resolution was approved. At the same time a resolution calling in general terms for closer unity within the Atlantic community was presented by the French Delegation and approved by the meeting.

At various stages there were suggestions from one quarter or another for somewhat more specific resolutions on particular subjects of NATO interest,

but in the result, such suggestions seem to have been a little premature. This first meeting of NATO parliamentarians perhaps fulfilled its most useful purpose in providing an opportunity for personal contacts and the exchange of ideas among representative groups of parliamentarians from all the NATO countries. While it was obvious that most of those attending the meeting had given a good deal of thought to the major questions facing the Alliance, it was probably true that many of them had done so within the framework of their own national interests and attitudes. The meeting thus provided an opportunity for parliamentarians from the various countries to obtain for the first time a direct impression through personal contact of the points of view on NATO problems which are held in other Member countries. As a result, their consideration of such questions in the coming months can profit from the broader perspective which this meeting has helped to reveal.

For the reasons which have been mentioned, it would certainly be untrue to say that the only accomplishments of this first meeting were in matters of organization. Nevertheless, the majority of those attending were unwilling to run the risk of proceeding too hastily, and they were therefore content for the present to confine their decisions to the organizational field. The meeting in itself constituted an important new development for NATO, and it would be rash at this early stage to predict the ultimate results of this constructive experiment. Yet this first meeting was undoubtedly a success, and there can be little doubt that the contacts established and the increased understanding of different points of view held by parliamentarians from the various countries will bear fruit in future years.

RESOLUTION ON FUTURE MEETINGS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM NATO COUNTRIES

THIS MEETING OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM NATO COUNTRIES:

Recalling that the aim of the North Atlantic Treaty is both to ensure the defence of member countries and to contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of the peoples united within the framework of the Atlantic community;

Considering that achievement of the latter aim would be facilitated by closer relations between the members of the representative assemblies of the different countries and considering that this is particularly desirable in the case of the legislative branches of the member states who have by solemn treaty pledged themselves to the mutual defence and welfare of their respective peoples through the far-reaching initiative in international relations that is NATO;

Believing that these discussions between members and the NATO authorities and between members themselves have already been of great value;

Invites the Speakers of the various Parliaments concerned, according to the procedure which they think appropriate, to send delegations to a similar meeting each year;

Expresses the wish that the Governments of the countries here represented facilitate through the NATO Council further meetings;

Considers further that before we separate a Continuing Committee should be selected composed of the present officers and other members of the Steering Committee, fifteen in number, to include one from each NATO nation and with the right of substitution to make arrangements for the next meeting."


This meeting further considers that such a Continuing Committee would require some secretarial assistance of its own. This should be, for the time being, on a part-time basis. The necessary finance, which should be quite small, should be provided by the participating Governments or Parliaments concerned on a basis to be mutually agreed.

THE MEETING OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM NATO COUNTRIES:

Convinced of the vital need for developing as a matter of urgency the political, economic and cultural bonds now uniting the Atlantic community,

Considering that the solidarity of the Atlantic nations should be used to further their interests both in the Atlantic area and in all other parts of the world,

Invite their governments to explore all possible means of uniting the Atlantic peoples for the dual purpose of resisting all threats of dissension among them and of progressively achieving ever closer unity.



CANADA CONTRIBUTES TO THE EXPANDED PROGRAMME OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Dr. R. A. MacKay, left, presents a cheque in the amount of \$1,500,000 (U.S.) to the Director-General of the Technical Assistance Administration, Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. At Dr. Keenleyside's left is Mr. Bruce Turner, Comptroller of Finance of the United Nations. This sum represents Canada's contribution to this year's expanded programme of technical assistance. Canada has now contributed \$5,322,727 to the programme since its establishment in 1950.

The San Francisco Meeting

(The Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the United Nations)

The full texts of Mr. Pearson's speeches delivered at San Francisco were carried in the July-August issue of "External Affairs". The following is a survey of the speeches made at the tenth anniversary meeting.

There was general agreement in the course of the commemorative meeting on the following points:

- (a) the United Nations is an indispensable organization;
- (b) while in the political field it has been less successful than in dealing with economic, social and humanitarian projects, its record over the first ten years is one of impressive accomplishment;
- (c) because of its flexibility, great hopes are warranted for the future and it should receive full and determined support.

In addition, the various speeches made disclosed some views on the part of many member states as to the operations, procedures, and structure of the organization: an attempt will be made to summarize them in this paper.

A Forum for Solving Disputes

While a good many speakers stressed the point that the United Nations has failed to provide security, it is interesting to note that, for many, the chief purpose of the organization is not so much to provide force to curb aggression as to become a forum where disputes can be solved. Thus Mr. Macmillan states: "the statesmen at San Francisco ten years ago saw that it would be unrealistic to try to fashion the United Nations as a kind of World Government. The world was not ready for that. Nor could it be a sort of projection of the Grand Alliance of war. They saw clearly that if a World Government was not to be set up, the United Nations would have to rely on persuasion, discussion and conciliation in order to settle disputes. For no sovereign state can be compelled by force." The same view was expressed very clearly by Mr. Eban of Israel: "a disservice may have been done to the United Nations by the unrealistic emphasis originally placed upon the coercive powers. We have become a forum for conciliation and not as originally conceived, an instrument for the enforcement of security by collective action." Representatives from Pakistan, the Netherlands, and Lebanon spoke in the same vein.

Except for Mr. Skaug of Norway, who cautioned against a tendency to by-pass United Nations machinery, many spoke in favour of allowing full scope to other forms of adjustment. As long as the principles followed were in harmony with those of the Charter, the outcome could only be favourable to the achievement of U.N. objectives. This line was followed, for instance, by Messrs. Van Kleffens, Macmillan, Munro, Spender and Entezam. There was no inclination, it seems, to suggest that the United Nations should monopolize attempts to promote compromise or substitute itself for older and still useful forms of diplomacy. It was perhaps natural that such a point should be made on the eve of the Geneva meeting.

As could be expected all were agreed that the relative lack of success in the field of security was due essentially to the failure of the larger powers to reach agreement: many speakers applied themselves to this crucial problem and suggested that means had to be found somehow to promote confidence and understanding, to develop, in the words of Mr. Spaak "an international spirit" which would make co-existence possible. Many Western representatives seemed to accept this Communist slogan and to express thus their recognition of the need for "two worlds" to get along together as opposed to the old crusading policy. There was, however, general agreement that the international atmosphere was improving and many supported the views expressed at the outset by Mr. Van Kleffens and by the Secretary-General that the anniversary meeting might make a contribution in this regard.

Regional Security

If the United Nations has not been successful in establishing collective security, it was, nevertheless, recognized that it had made important and significant contributions in this field through the cease-fire agreements, the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, and, particularly, through intervention in Korea. The discussion centred, however, on the question of regional security and the following features may be of interest:

- (a) many of the NATO Representatives maintained with Mr. Pinay that genuine security could only be provided through regional arrangements;
- (b) both NATO and Soviet representatives made the point that the regional security arrangements, to which they belong, were defensive and fully compatible with the Charter;
- (c) Messrs. Pinay and Dulles drew attention to the fact that regional arrangements provide security even to countries which are not parties to them.

Mr. Dulles in particular stressed that "every one of these arrangements also gives added security even to the non-participants. There is less armament, because multiplication of armament is avoided when the force that protects one equally is at the service of many. Also the military powers and facilities of a coalition tend to become distributed and not within the control of any single nation. In international affairs, as in domestic affairs, the sharing of power is the best safeguard against its abuse."

Reference was often made to disarmament as one problem which offered hopes of settlement and which, if solved, could facilitate the solution of many other issues. In this regard, it was thought that the International Scientific Conference and the proposal for the peaceful development of atomic energy presented most encouraging prospects. If progress could be made in this field, the ground would be prepared for further advances in other directions. The underdeveloped countries were also quite optimistic as to the possibilities for economic expansion inherent in such a scheme.

There was the usual and expected controversy regarding the veto. While a number of countries argued that it should be eliminated or that its use should be restricted, other countries felt that the veto represented a fair compromise

between the ideal requirements and the dictates of realism. (Netherlands). The Soviet bloc representatives claimed that the United Nations should accept the principle of "co-existence" and that this involved the recognition of Security Council unanimity. Thus, according to Mr. Molotov, "the United Nations is inconceivable without the recognition and implementation of the principle of co-existence and joint settlement of international affairs by countries with different social structures, and this finds most vivid expression in the Charter provisions relating to the Security Council." The same point was made by nearly all the satellite representatives; for instance, the Byelorussian stated that "the tendency to sidestep the Charter found expression in attacks on the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council." The repetition of this point in nearly all the Communist speeches suggests that on the issue of sovereignty, the Soviet Bloc may not yet be quite ready inside as outside the United Nations for concessions to the will of the majority.

As to the General Assembly, a few speakers urged the need for more restraint in discussion. Mr. Entezam, in particular, suggested that more energy should be devoted to conciliation, rather than to debate. This was supported by Israel. The South African representative and his colleague from Venezuela were almost alone in condemning United Nations intervention in domestic affairs.

Membership Issue

The membership issue was one of the most popular ones. All felt that the deadlock should be resolved soon and a surprisingly large number of representatives came out in favour of universality. (Pakistan, India, Greece, Indonesia, Peru, Norway, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Venezuela, Cuba). The speeches disclosed acute interest in this matter and suggested that strong pressure will develop at the next Assembly to solve the problem. The Soviet Representatives, as could be anticipated, took the opportunity to urge the admission of Red China.

No very clear indication of a definite trend was disclosed concerning Charter revision. Mr. Macmillan felt that "the United Nations, as it stands today, represents the highest common factor of agreement that is possible among the nations". Mr. Uden (Sweden), while recognizing that the Charter is not a perfect instrument considered that "the Charter as it stands at present does not prevent the United Nations from fulfilling its tasks providing that the member states really wish to act in accordance with the principles of the Charter". Others, the Pakistan Representative for instance, were prepared to consider sympathetically suggestions for revision. Chile had some interesting amendments to suggest but admitted that the time was not yet ripe for Charter revision. No strong and general desire for early revision was expressed at San Francisco.

While most representatives recognized that the best United Nations work had been done in the Social and Economic fields, those from the Asian, African and Middle East countries were unanimous and outspoken in their praise for the operations of the Specialized Agencies and the accomplishments of the organization in promoting social and economic wellbeing. The point is not particularly original, but the references to this subject were so numerous and apparently so deeply felt that from a mere reading of the speeches, it appears

that for many of its members, the United Nations symbolizes very high hopes for social and economic progress both as an end in itself and as a means of eliminating causes of aggression.

The Asian, African, and Middle East Representatives were equally articulate and united in urging progress towards independence for non-self-governing peoples; to them this seemed to be one of the main United Nations objectives and a major means of removing a strong incitement to aggression.

The Asian, African, and Middle East Representatives, as we have just indicated, insisted very much on colonial and economic development issues. Nearly all referred at some length to the Bandung Conference, to the need to enlarge the United Nations membership. In general they expressed interest in the Scientific Conference and in the security and economic implications of the peaceful development of atomic energy.

While the NATO and South American speeches did not follow a particular pattern, the Soviet Bloc generally stressed the need for the United Nations to recognize social diversity, to practice co-existence and therefore to accept the veto; the need to admit Red China into the United Nations; support for the Malik-Molotov proposals; the peaceful character of the Warsaw Treaty. Messrs. Dulles and Pinay answered in very firm terms the usual Soviet charges that tension had been caused by Western war propaganda, rearmament and military bases.

General Agreement Achieved

Many of the speeches made at San Francisco expressed general agreement on the following points, in addition to those outlined in paragraph one above:

- (a) there has been an improvement in the general atmosphere and consequently in United Nations prospects;
- (b) there may be hope for agreement on the key disarmament issue;
- (c) security functions are now being satisfactorily discharged by regional agencies and the United Nations should provide a forum for discussion and act as an agency for conciliation;
- (d) United Nations membership should be increased;
- (e) the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is one of the most encouraging prospects both in its security and economic implications;
- (f) the United Nations should develop its work in the social and economic fields and press on with the emancipation of dependent peoples;
- (g) there was no general feeling that Charter revision should be undertaken as an urgent task;
- (h) except perhaps for those delivered by the Cuban and the Chinese Representatives, most speeches were conciliatory; those made by the Soviet Representatives were still propagandistic and along orthodox party lines.

The Centenary of the Visit of *La Capricieuse*

A HUNDRED YEARS ago this summer, a corvette of the French Navy, *La Capricieuse*, paid an official visit to Canada. It was the first occasion on which a French naval vessel had entered a Canadian port since the signing of the Treaty of Paris of 1763, under which France gave up its claim to New France. Everywhere during their visit to Lower and Upper Canada, the ship's commander, Captain Belveze, and his crew were greeted enthusiastically. Captain Belveze wrote of the voyage up the St. Lawrence River:

The arrival of *La Capricieuse* was known in advance and crowds gathered on the shores to greet it with cheers and bursts of musketry; along the magnificent Ile d'Orleans despite pouring rain, the people—all of French origin—saluted the ship from the shelter of their homes or, braving the inclement weather, ran along the waterfront in order to watch the corvette's passage as long as they could.

On July 8-9, 1955, the centenary of this historic event was marked in France at La Rochelle, Rochefort, Marennes and Brouage in the Department of Charente-Maritime by a series of Franco-Canadian celebrations. *La Capricieuse* had sailed from the port of La Rochelle, the former capital of Aunis which was the home of many of the settlers of New France. Today, Rochefort, is the seat of the maritime prefecture. It is a town of some 25,000 people while La Rochelle has more than 50,000. Marennes is a small town but is known the world over as a centre of oyster-breeding. The romantic, little, walled village of Brouage has a particularly close connection with Canada as the birthplace of Champlain, the founder of Quebec.

Original Idea

The celebrations in Charente-Maritime were the result of the initiative of a number of people in France who were particularly interested in the history of Canada and in the advancement of economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The idea was first put forward by M. Charles Braibant during the visit of the Prime Minister of Canada to the National Archives of France in February 1954. M. Braibant showed Mr. St. Laurent the original report of Captain Belveze and thought how appropriate it would be to commemorate the centenary of the voyage of *La Capricieuse* by organizing an exhibition at La Rochelle of documents and museum pieces bearing on the history of the two countries. As work on the project went forward, it gave rise to plans for other events to mark the centennial including the issue of a special postage stamp.

The opening of the exhibition at La Rochelle and the celebrations throughout Charente-Maritime were attended by the Minister of National Education of France, M. Jean Berthoin. Canada was represented by its Ambassador to France, Mr. Jean Désy, and by the Minister of Labour, Mr. Milton Gregg, V.C. The programme of the first day of the celebrations included a reception at Rochefort (where the official party was shown the rooms which had been



—ADP
Postage stamp issued by the Government of France commemorating the centenary of the voyage of "La Capricieuse".

occupied by Napoleon before his embarkation for St. Helena), lunch at Marennes and the presentation of the keys of the town to Mr. Désy at Brouage. The second day was spent at La Rochelle where a Franco-Canadian Exhibition was opened by M. Berthoin.

The exhibition comprised 427 items relating to Franco-Canadian history from the discovery of Canada and the settlement and growth of New France to the visit of *La Capricieuse* in 1855. A masterpiece of organization, it included the document by which Francis I granted 6,000 livres to Jacques Cartier in 1532 for his expedition to the St. Lawrence and the marriage contract of Samuel Champlain. There were numerous documents on emigration to Canada and shipping departures from La Rochelle and other ports. The exhibition also illustrated the social customs and economic pursuits of the settlers of New France as well as plans for the defence of the colony and the withdrawal of France in 1760.

The significance of the visit of *La Capricieuse* was described by Mr. Désy at La Rochelle on July 9, 1955, in these words:

When in 1855 a France naval vessel from La Rochelle came to renew official ties between your country and mine, it performed a necessary mission. This symbolic gesture, however, served only to consecrate by deed a spiritual state of affairs that had never ceased to exist. It is this fact of uninterrupted relations on the higher level of the spirit that I wish to invoke in bringing you the fraternal greetings of your Canadian colleagues.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. E. A. Côté reassigned to Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, effective July 1, 1955.
- Mr. D. V. Lapan posted from Canadian Embassy, Washington to Ottawa while on loan to the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, effective July 4, 1955.
- Mr. J. H. Taylor posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions Indochina, effective July 7, 1955.
- Mr. A. B. Roger posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Ciudad Trujillo, effective July 8, 1955.
- Mr. D. B. Wilson posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Lisbon, effective July 9, 1955.
- Mr. P. Reading posted from San Francisco to the Canadian Legation, Helsinki, effective July 11, 1955.
- Mr. R. Duder posted from International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective July 11, 1955.
- Mr. A. C. Smith appointed Canadian Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission for Cambodia, effective July 17, 1955.
- Mr. D. M. Cornett posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner, Canberra, effective July 25, 1955.
- Mr. J. W. O'Brien posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, effective July 28, 1955.
- Mr. S. A. Freifeld posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Mexico, effective July 28, 1955.
- The following were appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers Grade 1:
- Miss E. L. Hill, R. M. Middleton, R. A. Jenness (July 4, 1955); A. O. Guerin (July 18, 1955); A. D. Small (July 18, 1955); J. R. Sharpe (July 21, 1955).

STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

(Obtainable from the Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada)

The following serial numbers are available in Canada and abroad:

- No. 55/23—*The United Nations—Review and Preview—1945, 1955, 1965*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, at a panel discussion sponsored by non-governmental organizations interested in the United Nations, at San Francisco, June 22, 1955.
- No. 55/25—*The Achievement of Hemispheric Solidarity*, an address by the Minister of
- National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, to Colgate University, Hamilton, N.Y., July 11, 1955.
- No. 55/27—*The Challenge of Inter-Dependence*, an address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the World Convention of Churches of Christ Toronto, August 18, 1955.

The following serial numbers are available abroad only:

- No. 55/24—*Development of Industrial Relations in Canada*, a speech by the Minister of Labour, Mr. Milton F. Gregg, made at the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 15, 1955.
- No. 55/26—*Future Plans for Canada's Salk Vaccine Programme*, a statement made
- by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, July 20, 1955.
- No. 55/28—An address by the Governor General, His Excellency the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, to the Rotary Club, St. John's, Newfoundland, August 22, 1955.

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

A SELECTED LIST

(a) Printed Documents:

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. A/2902 & Add.1. N.Y. 1955. 37 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 11.

Budget Estimates for Financial Year 1956 and Information Annex. A/2904. N.Y. 1955. 94 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 5.

Report of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. A/2908. N.Y. 1955. 37 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 16.

Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1954 - 15 June 1955. A/2911. N.Y. 1955. 123 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 1.

Report of the Committee on South West Africa to the General Assembly. A/2913. N.Y. 1955. 50 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 12.

United Nations Staff Pension Fund. Annual Report of the U.N. Joint Staff Pension Board. A/2914. N.Y. 1955. 25 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 8.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. First Report to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly. A/2921. N.Y. 1955. 40 p. G.A.O.R.: Tenth Session, Supplement No. 7.

Commission on the Status of Women. Report of the Ninth Session, 14 March - 1 April 1955. E/2727, E/CN.6/271. June 1955. 22 p. ECOSOC O.R.: 20th Session, Supplement No. 2.

International Survey of Programmes of Social Development. E/CN.5/301/Rev.1, ST/ SOA/21. N.Y. 1955. 219 p. \$2.00. Sales No.: 1955.IV.8.

International Tax Agreements. Volume V: World Guide to International Tax Agreements. N.Y. 1954. ST/ECA/SER.C/5, 29 September 1954. 480 p. \$3.00. Sales No.: 1954.XVI.3.

The Population of South America 1950-1980. Future population estimates by sex and age - Report II. ST/ SOA/SER.A/21 (Population Studies Series) N.Y., May 1955. 139 p. Sales No.: 1955.XIII.4.

The Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in Selected European Countries. ST/ SOA/ SD/6. April 1955. 156 p. Sales No.: 1955.IV.12.

GATT—Basic Instruments and Selected Documents. Third Supplement: Decisions, Resolutions, Reports, etc. of the Ninth Session.

Geneva, June 1955. 296 p. Sales No.: GATT/1955-2.

ICJ—Application instituting proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court:

May 4, 1955—*Antarctica Case* (U.K. v. Chile), 81 p. (bilingual).

June 2, 1955—*Aerial Incident of October 7, 1952* (U.S.A. v. U.S.S.R.) 55 p. (bilingual).

ILO

(ILO publications may be secured from Canada Branch, ILO, 95 Rideau St., Ottawa 2, Canada.)

Safety in Coal Mines. Volume II: Legislation. Geneva, 1955. 647 p. \$3.50 (Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 33).

UNESCO

Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut. The Incoherence of the Incoherence. Translated from the Arabic with Introduction and Notes by Simon Van Den Bergh. (UNESCO Collection of Great Works, Arabic Series) 2 volumes. Printed at the University Press, Oxford, for the Trustees of the "E. J. W. Gibb Memorial" and published by Messrs. Luzac & Co. London, W.C. 1. 1954.

Other Men's Ways. UNESCO Programme for Study Abroad. (UNESCO and its Programme—XIII). Paris 1955. 21 p.

Nuclear Energy and its Uses in Peace by Gerald Wendt. (UNESCO and its Programme—XIV). Paris 1955. 76 p.

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CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD

Country	Designation	Address
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Australia.....	High Commissioner.....	Canberra (State Circle)
“	Commercial Secretary.....	Melbourne (83 William St.)
“	Commercial Counsellor.....	Sydney (City Mutual Life Bldg.)
Austria.....	Minister (Absent).....	Vienna 1 (Strauchgasse 1)
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Belgian Congo.....	Trade Commissioner.....	Leopoldville (Forescom Bldg.)
Belgium.....	Ambassador.....	Brussels (35, rue de la Science)
Brazil.....	Ambassador.....	Rio de Janeiro (Avenida Presidente Wilson, 165)
“	Consul and Trade Commissioner.....	Sao Paulo (Edificio Alois, Rua 7 de Abril, 252)
Ceylon.....	High Commissioner.....	Colombó (6 Gregory's Rd., Cinnamon Gardens)
Chile.....	Ambassador.....	Santiago (Avenida General Bulnes 129)
Colombia.....	Ambassador.....	Bogota (Edificio Faux, Avenida Jimenez de Quesada No. 7-25)
Cuba.....	Ambassador.....	Havana (Avenida Menocal No. 16)
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Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	Trade Commissioner.....	Salisbury (Dolphin House, Union and Moffat Sts.)
Finland.....	Minister (Absent).....	Helsinki (Borgmästarbrinken 3-C. 32)
	Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	
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“	Head of Military Mission.....	Berlin (Perthshire Block, Olympic Stadium (British Sector) B.A.O.R.2)
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“	Trade Commissioner.....	Bombay (Gresham Assurance House)
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Ireland.....	Ambassador.....	Dublin (92 Merrion Square West)
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New Zealand.....	High Commissioner.....	Wellington (Government Life Insurance Bldg.)

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“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Cape Town (Grand Parade Centre Building, Adderley St.)
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	Ambassador.....	Moscow (23 Starokonyushenny Pereulok)
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“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Liverpool (Martins Bank Bldg.)
“ “	Trade Commissioner.....	Belfast (36 Victoria Square)
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“ “	Consul General.....	Chicago (Daily News Bldg.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commis- sioner.....	Detroit (1035 Penobscot Bldg.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Los Angeles (510 W. Sixth St.)
“ “	Consul and Trade Commis- sioner.....	New Orleans (215 International Trade Mart)
“ “	Consul General.....	New York (620 Fifth Ave.)
“ “	Honorary Vice-Consul.....	Portland, Maine (443 Congress Street)
“ “	Consul General.....	San Francisco (400 Montgomery St.)
“ “	Consul General.....	Seattle (Tower Bldg., Seventh Avenue at Olive Way)
Uruguay.....	Ambassador (Absent)..... Chargé d'Affaires a.i.	Montevideo (Calle Colonia 1013, piso °7)
Venezuela.....	Ambassador.....	Caracas (2° Piso Edificio Pan-Ameri- can, Puente Urapal, Candelaria)
Yugoslavia.....	Ambassador.....	Belgrade (Proliterskih Brigada 69)
North Atlantic Council.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (Canadian Embassy)
*OEEC.....	Permanent Representative.....	Paris xvi (c/o Canadian Embassy)
United Nations.....	Permanent Representative.....	New York (Room 504, 620 Fifth Avenue)
“ “	Permanent Delegate..... Deputy Permanent Delegate	Geneva (La Pelouse, Palais des Nations)

*Organization for European Economic Co-operation.

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Octobre 1955

CANADA

AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES



CANADA

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Vol. 7 N° 10

• Sous le titre **AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES**, le ministère des Affaires extérieures publie chaque mois un compte rendu de son activité ainsi qu'une documentation abondante sur le rôle du Canada dans le domaine international. Cette publication peut être reproduite entièrement ou en partie, de préférence avec indication de source.

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La collaboration inter-scandinave

LES cinq pays de l'Europe du Nord qu'on désigne aujourd'hui sous le nom collectif de Scandinavie ont développé entre eux, grâce à un vigoureux sentiment de parenté et de solidarité, un régime de collaboration sans parallèle dans le monde. L'unité des populations du Danemark, de l'Islande, de la Finlande, de la Norvège et de la Suède plonge de profondes racines dans la géographie, l'histoire et les traditions ancestrales et a favorisé la collaboration de ces pays sur presque tous les plans de l'activité humaine, tant économique que sociale, culturelle, technique ou politique. Jusque dans le bas moyen âge, la Scandinavie était restée à de nombreux égards une unité homogène, non fragmentée comme elle l'est aujourd'hui. On retrouve encore le visage de cette unité dans la ressemblance des structures politiques, des institutions et des modes de pensée, fondement essentiel de la collaboration inter-scandinave aujourd'hui.

Il faut reconnaître néanmoins que de profondes différences séparent d'autre part les pays nordiques et leur font suivre en bien des occasions des chemins divergents. La Finlande, d'abord, parle une langue totalement étrangère à celles des autres pays scandinaves, dont les populations se comprennent entre elles. Même si la Finlande connut très tôt l'attraction culturelle de la Suède, elle dut traverser plus tard un long siècle de domination russe et n'accéda à l'indépendance qu'à l'époque de la première guerre mondiale, ce qui n'a pas laissé de la différencier de ses voisins. L'Islande, devenue partiellement indépendante en 1918 et complètement en 1944, s'est vue empêchée par l'isolement maritime de développer aussitôt qu'elle l'eût voulu sa collaboration avec les autres pays nordiques. La Norvège s'est montrée un peu moins empressée à la collaboration que le Danemark ou la Suède, sans doute en raison de la longue lutte que lui a coûté la conquête de son indépendance, obtenue d'abord du Danemark, puis de la Suède, et parachevée seulement en 1905. Ces conditions particulières, pourtant, n'ont pas arrêté le développement des intérêts communs entre les pays et les peuples. On peut même dire qu'au contraire la collaboration s'est trouvée nécessitée par les différences qu'il fallait surmonter.

Formes prises par la collaboration

Les pays scandinaves ont établi progressivement un système de collaboration dont l'ampleur et les bienfaits ne cessent de s'accroître. Grâce à de fréquents échanges de vues sur les plans gouvernementaux ou non gouvernementaux, chaque pays profite de l'expérience de ses voisins, l'initiative de l'un dans un domaine nouveau servant fréquemment de modèle aux autres. Dans bien des cas, la collaboration a été organisée positivement, par l'institution d'organismes internordiques au sein desquels on discute, on étudie, on décide en commun. Dès 1863, il y eut un congrès économique de Scandinavie, au cours duquel on examina diverses questions de douanes et de transports maritimes. En 1872 eut lieu une réunion des juristes de Scandinavie, qui se répéta par la suite et devint une institution permanente dont l'influence est constante dans le sens d'une évolution parallèle du droit dans les pays scandinaves. Sur le plan politique, les premiers contacts de pays à pays vinrent de l'initiative des mouvements ouvriers, qui occupaient le pouvoir partout. Dès avant la pro-

mière guerre mondiale, il fut institué un Comité de coopération scandinave, formé de représentants politiques aussi bien qu'ouvriers. Il fut fondé en 1907 une union interparlementaire scandinave. Peu après la première guerre mondiale, les sociétés « Norden » furent créées. Elles ont pour objet de « renforcer le sentiment de parenté des pays nordiques, développer leurs liens culturels et économiques et favoriser la collaboration entre eux ». Cette idée était née de l'intime coopération politique et économique à laquelle la guerre avait donné lieu et du désir qu'éprouvèrent ceux qui l'avaient vue en œuvre,—professionnels, hommes politiques, dirigeants ouvriers,—de perpétuer cette coopération et de lui ouvrir de nouvelles voies. Il a été établi des associations Norden dans tous les pays scandinaves; elles exercent une influence considérable sur les rapports de ces pays entre eux.

Entre les gouvernements et les administrations, il s'est établi de même une collaboration qui est devenue parfois extraordinairement étroite, en particulier lorsque la situation politique mondiale resserrait les liens mutuels des pays nordiques. L'un des traits caractéristiques de la coopération scandinave réside dans l'absence de tout formalisme rigide, ainsi que dans la simple recherche des solutions que réclament les problèmes au moment où ceux-ci se posent; on évite d'établir des organismes à programmes trop ambitieux. A l'occasion, les gouvernements désignent des experts pour étudier des problèmes déterminés; si le besoin s'en fait sentir, les chefs de service se réunissent ensuite. Les ministres des Affaires étrangères, particulièrement, se réunissent à intervalles réguliers, depuis trente ans, non seulement en Scandinavie, mais au cours des conférences internationales qui ont lieu à l'étranger.

Longtemps les pays scandinaves ont ignoré, dans leurs efforts de rapprochement réciproque, la méthode des institutions permanentes de coopération. Après la seconde guerre mondiale, toutefois, le temps sembla venu de recourir à des méthodes ambitieuses. On établit graduellement des organes scandinaves mixtes ayant un caractère plus défini. Il fut institué des comités mixtes pour le bien-être social, pour la culture et pour l'économie, tandis qu'une commission parlementaire étudiait la levée des restrictions nuisant aux déplacements de pays à pays ainsi que l'établissement d'une union nordique des postes, télégraphes et téléphones. En 1948, en raison de la tension internationale, il fut formé un comité politico-militaire chargé d'envisager l'établissement d'une alliance défensive entre le Danemark, la Norvège et la Suède. On renonça cependant à cette idée, à cause surtout du refus de la Norvège de cesser toute collaboration pratique avec les autres alliances défensives des démocraties occidentales. Cet insuccès ne ralentit cependant pas la coopération scandinave; on s'efforça plutôt de lui donner une impulsion encore plus grande dans les autres domaines; sur l'initiative d'un groupe de parlementaires, il fut créé un Conseil parlementaire scandinave.

Le Conseil nordique

Le Conseil nordique ne fut institué officiellement qu'en 1951, mais le projet en existait depuis qu'en octobre 1938 le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Danemark avait proposé que fût formé un organisme mixte de consultation entre les pays nordiques. L'organisme en question eût réuni les premiers ministres, les ministres des Affaires étrangères et certains autres membres des parlements nationaux. Cette proposition danoise avait rencontré l'agrément de tous les pays scandinaves à l'exception de la Norvège, dont les représentants s'oppo-

sèrent à l'idée de réunir régulièrement et des membres des gouvernements et de simples membres des parlements.

Peu après, la seconde guerre mondiale empêcha les pays scandinaves de poursuivre l'étude de la question, mais l'idée d'un Conseil nordique, restée vivante dans l'esprit de plusieurs législateurs, fut lancée de nouveau par le Danemark une fois le conflit terminé. En 1951, à Stockholm, où siégeait l'Union interparlementaire du Nord, feu Hans Hedtoft, premier ministre du Danemark, proposa la création d'un conseil parlementaire nordique. Le projet danois ayant rallié cette fois l'approbation générale, on commença aussitôt à élaborer les statuts du nouvel organisme, lesquels furent approuvés définitivement en décembre 1951, au cours d'une session ultérieure, par les représentants de tous les pays nordiques, sauf ceux de la Finlande. Cet État déclara n'être pas en mesure de participer aux travaux du Conseil. Au printemps 1952, les assemblées législatives du Danemark, de la Norvège, de la Suède et de l'Islande ratifiaient la décision de leurs représentants.


De par ses statuts, le Conseil nordique est un organisme consultatif interparlementaire chargé d'étudier les questions intéressant la collaboration entre les pays scandinaves. Ses cinquante-trois membres, dont seize délégués pour chacune des assemblées législatives du Danemark, de la Norvège et de la Suède, et cinq pour le parlement islandais,—parmi lesquels diverses opinions politiques sont représentées,—tiennent des réunions de caractère purement délibératif. Le nouvel organisme a pris des dispositions en vue de l'adhésion éventuelle de la Finlande.

Normalement, le Conseil siège une fois par année; cependant, à la demande de deux gouvernements ou d'au moins vingt membres, il peut convoquer des sessions extraordinaires. Il s'est déjà réuni trois fois: à Copenhague en 1952, à Oslo en 1954 et à Stockholm en février 1955. Les décisions de ses membres n'engagent pas les gouvernements, puisque le Conseil, qui tend à coordonner les diverses entreprises de coopération intergouvernementale mises sur pied avant sa création, se borne au rôle d'un organisme où les membres peuvent exposer les idées nouvelles et étudier leurs possibilités d'application. Ayant pour principe de résoudre les difficultés à mesure qu'elles se présentent, le Conseil se garde d'énoncer des buts de caractère général et se refuse aux discussions portant sur la création d'organismes supranationaux. La mise sur pied du Conseil demeure la dernière réalisation du mouvement de collaboration plus étroite entre États scandinaves.

La question de la participation éventuelle de la Finlande demeure délicate. L'abstention de ce pays est sans doute attribuable à l'hostilité de l'URSS à l'égard du nouvel organisme, manifestée si souvent dans les journaux soviétiques officiels. L'amélioration du climat politique sur le plan international modifiera peut-être l'attitude finlandaise. Déjà, deux des candidats à la présidence du pays se sont prononcés ouvertement en faveur de la participation de la Finlande, où des élections auront lieu prochainement.

Réalisations

Sans aller jusqu'à supprimer les frontières, le Conseil nordique et ses devanciers ont obtenu tous les succès désirables. L'accord de coordination législative conclu par les États scandinaves n'a entraîné aucune perte de souveraineté.



Assemblée du Conseil nordique au Parlement norvégien

—Norsk Telegrambyras

C'est probablement dans le domaine des mesures sociales que la collaboration est la plus avancée. Chaque pays de la communauté nordique doit traiter tous les Scandinaves comme ses propres ressortissants: tel a toujours été l'un des principes fondamentaux de l'entente scandinave. Les autorités des cinq pays n'ont cessé de tendre vers l'institution d'un vaste régime de sécurité sociale comportant, entre autres mesures, des régimes de pensions et des assurances contre la maladie et le chômage. C'est ainsi que tout Scandinave, s'établissant ou séjournant dans un autre pays de la communauté nordique, peut généralement y faire transférer à l'organisme correspondant le service des prestations auquel il a droit.

Sécurité sociale et hygiène

Depuis longtemps, les cinq pays étudiaient avec beaucoup de soin les moyens de coordonner par une convention leurs régimes de sécurité sociale. Dans le cadre du régime de « réciprocité et de compensation » en vigueur jusqu'à dernièrement, tout Scandinave pouvait, lorsqu'il s'établissait dans un autre pays de la communauté nordique, s'y prévaloir des seuls droits que les

ressortissants de celui-ci obtenaient dans son pays d'origine, les prestations ainsi versées faisant l'objet de compensations entre les organismes intéressés des deux pays. Le 15 septembre dernier, les cinq ministres de l'assistance sociale ont signé une nouvelle convention mettant de côté le régime de réciprocité et de compensation. D'après cette nouvelle convention, tous les Scandinaves, quel que soit leur pays d'origine, jouiront d'un traitement uniforme à l'intérieur de chaque pays, en matière de sécurité sociale. Ainsi, en séjour dans un autre pays de la communauté nordique, ils bénéficieront des avantages accordés aux ressortissants, qu'eux-mêmes aient droit ou non à ces avantages dans leur propre pays. La nouvelle convention porte sur les principales mesures de sécurité sociale: allocations aux vieillards et aux veuves, assurance contre les accidents du travail, le chômage et la maladie, aide pécuniaire aux femmes enceintes et aux accouchées. La ratification de la convention fera disparaître, en matière de sécurité sociale, les frontières intérieures de la Scandinavie. Cette mesure revêt du point de vue pratique une grande importance étant donné le nombre d'habitants de la communauté nordique qui résident dans un autre pays scandinave que le leur. C'est le cas, d'après des statistiques récentes, de plus de 30,000 Danois et un nombre légèrement supérieur de Finlandais, qui se sont dirigés surtout vers la Suède, les chiffres en ce qui concerne les Norvégiens et les Suédois s'établissant respectivement à 15,000 et à 10,000.

Le programme englobe le domaine médical. Congrès et périodiques assurent depuis longtemps d'étroites relations entre médecins et savants scandinaves. En matière d'hygiène, on ne cesse de travailler à la coordination des services existants. On est à dresser les plans de deux écoles conjointes d'hygiène, dont l'une sera destinée à la marine. Certains domaines spécialisés ont fait l'objet d'importants travaux; les lois sur l'inspection des denrées alimentaires ont donné notamment des résultats concluants. De plus, on progresse vers l'adoption d'un système de statistiques médicales uniforme pour toute la Scandinavie.

La collaboration sur le plan de la sécurité sociale et de l'hygiène a pris une importance accrue depuis 1954 alors que le Danemark, la Finlande, la Norvège et la Suède concluaient une entente relative à l'établissement d'un marché collectif du travail. Si ces pays ont pu en arriver là, c'est qu'ils souscrivent tous à l'idée d'un contrôle étendu de l'État et suivent une politique économique fondamentalement identique qui envisage le plein emploi comme l'un de ses buts principaux. En principe, tout ressortissant scandinave peut maintenant faire une demande d'emploi dans l'un ou l'autre des pays parties à l'accord. De plus, on songe sérieusement à simplifier les formalités pour les Scandinaves qui désirent entrer en affaires dans l'État de leur choix.

Les années d'après-guerre ont vu disparaître un autre obstacle sérieux au rapprochement entre les pays nordiques, grâce à l'adoucissement apporté dans les restrictions aux voyages. Peu après la fin des hostilités, on abolissait en effet la nécessité des visas pour les déplacements d'un pays à l'autre. Puis, en 1951 un accord entre le Danemark, la Norvège et la Suède venait faciliter pour les Scandinaves la naturalisation dans l'un quelconque de ces États. L'année 1952 marqua la fin des restrictions en matière de passeports, de sorte que les formalités régissant le passage des frontières sont maintenant réduites au minimum. Devises et douanes posent encore des problèmes mais la situation a été grandement simplifiée, et l'on tend présentement à dispenser du passeport même les non-Scandinaves voyageant dans les limites du groupe nordique.

Dans le domaine juridique, l'uniformité règne à un haut degré non seulement parce que les pays scandinaves possèdent à ce point de vue une tradition commune mais parce qu'ils se sont constamment efforcés d'adopter autant que possible des lois identiques. De fait, le droit commercial, le droit privé, le droit familial et les lois sur les successions se rejoignent sur plus d'un point. Il en va de même de la législation dans les matières suivantes: achat, obligations, chèques, lettres de change, assurance, procurations, marques de commerce, circulation aérienne et autres questions analogues. De plus, en vertu de conventions mutuelles relatives au droit criminel et civil, on reconnaît la validité des jugements rendus dans les autres États scandinaves et on leur donne force exécutoire.

Activités culturelles

Sur le plan culturel, la parenté linguistique a naturellement donné lieu à une interinfluence s'exerçant depuis l'enseignement primaire jusqu'aux études et aux recherches avancées et se retrouvant dans les arts et la littérature de toute la Scandinavie. Ce phénomène s'étend même à la Finlande qui, tout en possédant une langue très différente, utilise généralement le suédois dans ses relations officielles avec ses voisins. On s'applique constamment à faire connaître chez soi l'histoire, l'évolution et les modes de vie des nations sœurs. Des commissions mixtes se chargent de cette campagne d'éducation grâce à laquelle tombent bien des préjugés qui sont souvent des ferments de rancunes. La publication en commun de périodiques, l'organisation de congrès et les échanges de professeurs ont resserré sensiblement la compréhension mutuelle. Comme complément aux initiatives privées, on a créé il y a quelques années la Commission culturelle scandinave. Cet organisme composé de députés, de représentants du gouvernement et de personnalités éminentes du mode artistique et scientifique s'applique efficacement à coordonner les activités culturelles et à planifier les recherches scientifiques et industrielles.

Si dans tous les domaines dont il vient d'être question les organisations coopératives travaillent ferme et ont à leur crédit des réalisations importantes, les efforts pour résoudre le sérieux problème de l'intégration économique n'ont pas encore connu le même succès. En dépit du fait que l'activité commerciale et la politique économique des pays scandinaves, notamment celles du Danemark, de la Norvège et de la Suède, possèdent plus d'un trait en commun, on a montré jusqu'ici beaucoup de prudence et de réserve pour ce qui est de l'unification économique du groupe scandinave. Le développement technique dont les deux ou trois dernières décennies ont été témoins place cette question au plan de l'actualité. A certains égards, les pays scandinaves constituent des unités distinctes qui sont trop petites pour soutenir la concurrence des autres nations sur le marché international. Ayant compris cette difficulté, le Danemark, la Norvège et la Suède ont fondé ensemble après la seconde guerre mondiale une compagnie aérienne, le *Scandinavian Air Lines System*. Non seulement le SAS assure un service entre les pays scandinaves, mais il a organisé des vols réguliers vers cinq continents, en se servant de matériel tout à fait moderne qu'il entretient avec le soin qui caractérise toujours les Scandinaves. Le SAS s'est distingué récemment en établissant le premier vers la côte occidentale de l'Amérique du Nord, un service régulier qui passe au-dessus des régions polaires. La belle réputation que cette compagnie s'est acquise dans toutes les sphères de son activité pendant son existence relativement courte offre un exemple frappant de la collaboration scandinave dans les affaires.

Union douanière

Après la création du Conseil nordique, l'idée d'un marché commun ou d'une union douanière entre les trois mêmes pays scandinaves a pris plus d'importance sur le plan de la politique pratique. Un comité mixte a été formé sous la direction de trois ministres (un de chaque pays), dans le dessein d'étudier la possibilité de relations économiques plus étroites et de faire des recommandations à cet effet. Le Danemark et la Suède souhaitent vivement un marché commun, mais la Norvège se tient sur la réserve et semble éprouver quelque appréhension. Les Norvégiens préféreraient une collaboration économique limitée qui permettrait le lancement de projets communs dans des domaines particuliers, et ils ne favorisent pas l'idée d'un marché commun illimité. Ce point de vue découle non seulement de réserves purement politiques, mais aussi du fait que, sous bien des rapports, l'économie de la Norvège est moins développée et par conséquent moins compétitive que celle du Danemark et de la Suède, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les industries secondaires. Cette situation résulte en grande partie de la seconde guerre mondiale et de l'occupation du pays.

La collaboration sur le plan strictement politique et international est déterminée dans une grande mesure par la situation particulière de chacun des cinq pays scandinaves. La Finlande doit tenir compte de ses relations spéciales avec l'Union soviétique, le Danemark, l'Islande et la Norvège, de leur adhésion à l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, et la Suède, de sa neutralité. La Finlande n'est pas membre d'organisations internationales telles que les Nations Unies, le Conseil de l'Europe et l'OECE. Dans ces organisations, toutefois, les pays scandinaves collaborent étroitement entre eux et adoptent presque toujours la même attitude à l'égard des problèmes importants qui se présentent. Cela a eu pour résultat de donner plus de poids dans les assemblées mondiales à l'influence du groupe scandinave.

Par le succès de leur collaboration dans les divers domaines de leur activité, les peuples scandinaves et leurs gouvernements donnent un bel exemple au monde. Ce que cinq pays ont accompli en obéissant au simple bon sens devrait encourager d'autres nations dans les efforts qu'elles tentent pour atteindre le but moins ambitieux mais hautement désirable qu'est la coexistence pacifique.

Après Genève: une plus grande tâche pour l'OTAN*

par le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. L. B. Pearson

Il semble que le « sommet » ait été à Genève plus confortable et reposant, pour une réunion, que les « sommets » n'ont coutume de l'être. Les résultats obtenus à cette réunion ont été justement accueillis dans le monde comme indiquant le début d'un effort entrepris par les grandes puissances des deux blocs pour résoudre par la discussion et les négociations leurs conflits d'intérêts nationaux et d'idéologies, qui divisent et angoissent le monde depuis dix ans.

Cette conférence, pourtant, n'a pas été une fin, mais un commencement (un bon commencement, il faut le dire), et il serait insensé, peut-être même dangereux, d'en tirer des conclusions hâtives et trop optimistes. La paix ne se fera pas par une seule ni par deux ou par trois réunions au « sommet », mais par de très nombreuses réunions et beaucoup de travail pénible, mais concret et utile, à des niveaux moins élevés. Ce sera un travail de négociation, bien inauguré déjà par les hommes d'État du plus haut échelon et qui devra être poursuivi en dehors du tapage de publicité qui vient d'entourer (il ne pouvait en être autrement, et sans doute était-ce mieux ainsi) la conférence de Genève. S'il importe de voir un lien entre les résultats acquis ou probables de la réunion de Genève et la situation internationale actuelle, il importe davantage encore de choisir la ligne à suivre dans le nouveau climat international, moins glacial, que la conférence a fait naître.

Les entretiens de Genève ont eu sur l'OTAN des répercussions particulières et immédiates. L'Organisation atlantique y a joué un rôle à la fois de cause et d'effet. La puissance collective, tant politique que militaire, que nous avons édifiée dans les cadres de l'OTAN a peut-être été la plus importante des forces internationales qui ont rendu possibles les récentes discussions; au même titre que l'appréciation de plus en plus claire, par les chefs et soviétiques et occidentaux, des dangers et conséquences redoutables de la guerre nucléaire les rendaient indispensables.

Une grande protection

Il est indiscutable que la puissance collective de l'OTAN a été une grande protection pour l'Europe contre une agression. Sans l'OTAN et la volonté commune de défense qu'elle représente, les successeurs de Staline ne seraient peut-être pas venus tout souriants à Genève travailler avec nous à réduire les risques de guerre et alléger l'écrasant fardeau des armements que la politique menaçante de Staline a imposé à tant de peuples, y compris le sien. L'OTAN, qui fut créée, avant toute autre considération, à cause des craintes qu'inspirait l'immense puissance militaire de l'URSS placée au service de l'expansion du communisme, ne pourra que se ressentir profondément de toute atténuation, apparente ou réelle, de la menace soviétique.

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La conciliation des intérêts nationaux en conflit, dont nous avons lieu d'espérer qu'elle est désormais entreprise par les grandes puissances, est absolument conforme, il va de soi, avec l'objectif principal, constant et permanent de l'Organisation atlantique, qui est de prévenir la guerre sans sacrifier la liberté et la sécurité de ses membres. Notre but lointain est toujours d'éliminer complètement le recours à la force pour des fins nationales en instituant le système de sécurité collective générale désiré par la Charte des Nations Unies et en développant notre action dans le cadre de l'organisation mondiale. Ce n'est qu'alors que l'OTAN, comme instrument de sécurité, pourra sans risque s'effacer et disparaître, comme l'État dans une société communiste pure. (Cette analogie ne laisse pas d'être décourageante.) Tant que les craintes, les ambitions et les idéologies agressives diviseront le monde en blocs de puissance, ce qui rend irréalisable la sécurité collective universelle, la meilleure voie qui nous restera ouverte sera celle d'un système de sécurité régionale fondé sur l'unité et la puissance défensive des pays qui s'y joindraient; cette méthode est absolument compatible avec les buts et principes de la Charte des Nations Unies.

Le danger doit être réduit

Personne, cependant, aucun pays, aucun groupe de pays ne peut envisager avec beaucoup de plaisir une paix mondiale sauvegardée principalement par la crainte qu'inspirent une puissance militaire collective et une unité politique régionale. L'inquiétude que fait naître une telle situation devient une angoisse profonde lorsqu'on songe au développement fantastique des armes nucléaires, qui sont déjà dans les arsenaux de quelques grandes puissances et seront dans beaucoup d'autres bientôt. Il devient de ce fait plus nécessaire que jamais, tout en gardant une bonne puissance militaire, de réduire par tous les efforts possibles le danger de guerre et de rendre inutile, peu à peu, le maintien de la puissance. Il n'y a pas d'exemple dans l'histoire du genre humain d'une paix sauvegardée longtemps par la seule protection des armes. La puissance défensive de l'un devient la faiblesse de ceux contre lesquels il veut être prêt à se défendre. Sa sécurité à lui devient leur insécurité à eux; dès lors ils s'efforcent de s'armer davantage. On voit s'engendrer ainsi un cercle vicieux qui a toujours causé des ravages et des souffrances sans nombre et qui peut maintenant, si nous n'arrivons pas à le rompre, détruire la race humaine. Ce n'est donc pas encore la bonne solution que d'édifier une force collective suffisante pour notre défense. Le but lointain à rechercher, c'est une paix fondée sur une base plus durable que la force.

Au surplus, et cela n'est pas pour alléger nos craintes, il est plus difficile pour les gouvernements, dans un moment de peur et de tension internationale croissantes, de distinguer sûrement entre les menaces réelles à des intérêts vitaux et celles qui n'ont pas ce caractère. L'homme qui a peur tire souvent le premier. C'est pourquoi il importe d'atténuer les tensions, afin que la guerre ne survienne pas par accident ou faux calcul. Fait paradoxal, la connaissance des effets destructeurs de la guerre nucléaire semble déjà constituer la meilleure des sauvegardes contre la guerre. Elle a inspiré pour une grande part les entretiens de Genève et nous conduira peut-être plus loin encore dans la voie de la paix. Les rapports entre les puissances se sont forcément adoucis lorsque chacun a pu se rendre compte que toute agression risque d'allumer une guerre totale, qu'une agression lancée à fond l'allumerait sans le moindre doute et que l'agresseur ne saurait espérer, même à la faveur d'une attaque massive et soudaine, échapper pour sa part à la dévastation nucléaire.

Le recours aux armes nucléaires pouvant avoir pour résultat une catastrophe mondiale, les puissances qui possèdent ces armes ont, plus que les autres, le devoir de se contenir dans leurs relations internationales et d'user le moins possible de la menace d'intervention armée. Elles doivent exercer un effort suprême pour résoudre les conflits d'intérêts nationaux et les empêcher de mener à la guerre. Les négociations du genre de celles de Genève devraient rendre les puissances nucléaires encore plus conscientes de ce devoir qu'elles ont de résoudre leurs conflits, non seulement dans le sens de leurs intérêts propres, mais dans celui des intérêts de toute la communauté internationale. C'est une raison de plus pour laquelle les membres de l'OTAN, comme tous les autres pays pacifiques, accueillent avec joie les négociations de ce genre.

Nous devons nous garder néanmoins de prendre nos vœux pour les réalités et de tirer prématurément des conclusions agréables. Il est vrai que sur le plan diplomatique nous avons retrouvé une certaine liberté d'action. Nous pouvons même entrevoir des victoires qui serviront la paix. Mais il y a aussi des dangers, comme dans toute situation fluide. Nous allons avoir besoin plus que jamais d'un juste mélange d'imagination et de circonspection. Et surtout, dans le climat plus supportable qui s'est établi, nous devons nous garder résolument contre tout relâchement de notre vigilance et contre tout abandon de nos efforts de défense. Céder à pareille tentation avant que soient aplanis les conflits profonds qui divisent les deux blocs serait nous exposer au plus grand péril. L'OTAN a assumé à l'égard du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité des obligations particulières dont elle a pu s'acquitter sans que retentisse le bruit de nos armes. Ces responsabilités nous interdisent d'autre part de mettre nos armements de côté et de donner ainsi à croire aux agresseurs éventuels qu'ils pourraient impunément mettre la paix en danger.

Revision de la stratégie de l'OTAN

Nous n'entendons pas réduire les forces de l'OTAN; rien ne nous empêche cependant de reviser la stratégie qui en détermine la fin et l'utilisation. En raison des changements survenus depuis la signature du pacte atlantique, cette revision est de plus en plus nécessaire. Certains observateurs bien renseignés ont soutenu récemment que l'impasse où s'était engagée la course aux armements atomiques et l'équilibre des forces qui en découle peuvent être considérés comme les principaux éléments de protection de l'Europe occidentale. S'il en est ainsi, la stratégie de l'OTAN, où la présence d'effectifs classiques considérables en Europe continentale tend à occuper une si grande place, devrait être soumise à une revision.

Personne ne niera que ces effectifs soient utiles ni que, pour de justes motifs politiques et militaires, ils doivent comprendre des contingents nord-américains. La défense de l'Europe exige également que nous découragions l'agression en protégeant les régions du continent américain d'où partiraient, au besoin, les représailles atomiques. On peut donc affirmer à cet égard que l'Amérique du Nord peut constituer une région de l'OTAN tout aussi importante pour la défense de l'Europe qu'une ligne de défense ou d'obstacles érigée sur place.

Avant que la nouvelle attitude soviétique se soit traduite par des faits concrets, ou, du moins, que nous ayons constaté que l'URSS ne cherche pas uniquement à faire disparaître chez nous la crainte de la guerre sans en suppri-

mer les sources, nous ne pourrions servir la cause de la paix en réduisant nos forces ou en laissant s'affaiblir notre solidarité. Efforçons-nous de distinguer, si difficile soit cette tâche, les fruits de nos pénibles démarches et de nos négociations diplomatiques, d'une part, et les concessions de forme commandées par les impératifs de la guerre psychologique, d'autre part.

C'est la première fois, depuis plusieurs années, qu'avec la conférence des Quatre se présente une aussi belle occasion de vérifier jusqu'à quel point sont véritables les changements apportés à la politique internationale de l'URSS. Les chefs soviétiques pourront en faire autant à l'égard des propos et des attitudes de nos dirigeants occidentaux. Voilà qui suffit à justifier ces négociations et à les rendre souhaitables.

Jusqu'ici cependant nos conflits d'intérêts et nos divergences politiques ne se sont pas encore aplanis; la sécurité de l'Ouest ne s'est pas foncièrement améliorée non plus. On a établi et précisé la nature des problèmes qui se posent aux Quatre Grands et à nous tous, sans cependant trouver aucune solution. Si vous me permettez de transposer la situation dans le domaine de la météorologie, je dirai que l'humidité est disparue, mais que le froid demeure, même si nous y sommes moins sensibles. En pareilles circonstances, il serait donc prématuré de renoncer à nos précautions contre le froid, mais légitime de compter sur des jours plus cléments où nous pourrions le faire.

Voici maintenant une autre question très importante qui se rattache à celle que je viens de traiter. Si la détente internationale actuelle, qui provient surtout de ce qu'on s'est rendu compte de la puissance de dévastation infinie des nouveaux engins nucléaires, nous amène à conclure que la guerre est improbable ou du moins d'une probabilité très lointaine, qu'adviendra-t-il de l'OTAN et des relations entre ses membres?

Motifs de solidarité

D'abord s'accroîtra sans doute la tentation, déjà évoquée, de relâcher nos efforts tant collectifs que particuliers et de réaliser de la sorte de sensibles économies. Le danger d'une agression nous paraissant s'éloigner, nos craintes, qui nous ont poussés à créer l'OTAN, tendront elles aussi à s'atténuer. Notre organisation aura alors perdu une bonne part du puissant facteur de cohésion auquel elle doit son maintien. C'est là une éventualité sur laquelle d'aucuns tablent certainement. Nous avons donc le devoir d'envisager ces périls et de maintenir notre puissance défensive et notre solidarité, même si nous n'y sommes plus poussés par les mêmes mobiles. Il faut par conséquent créer entre nous des liens plus forts que ceux d'une crainte commune. Si les menaces que les peuples communistes font peser sur nos institutions libres allaient prendre de nouvelles formes tout en restant exemptes de tactiques et d'actes de nature à déclencher la dévastation nucléaire, l'OTAN devrait s'appliquer à faire naître de nouveaux motifs de solidarité entre ses membres sans rien sacrifier des moyens de défense collective nécessaires.

La peur ne suffira pas à assurer la survivance de l'OTAN; cet organisme demeurera incapable de créer une véritable communauté atlantique, si sa structure reste conçue uniquement en fonction des menaces de guerre dont il est issu. Imprimer une nouvelle impulsion au développement non militaire de l'OTAN constituerait la meilleure réfutation aux accusations soviétiques selon lesquelles l'OTAN serait un organisme exclusivement militaire, orienté vers l'agression et dirigé contre Moscou. L'OTAN pourrait poursuivre cet objectif

notamment en organisant entre ses membres des entretiens périodiques sur la politique économique de chacun; cette initiative pourrait s'inspirer de nos fréquents et profitables échanges de vues en matière de défense et de politique étrangère. Peut-être serait-il avantageux également d'avoir des entretiens officiels et francs sur les questions qu'abordent normalement d'autres organismes internationaux, non pas en vue d'adopter une orientation commune pour l'OTAN,—ce qui ne serait ni souhaitable ni praticable,—mais afin de mieux comprendre les points de vue différents et d'éviter tout conflit entre ceux-ci et les intérêts des autres nations du monde.

Il s'ensuit que l'OTAN, tout en résistant à la tentation de relâcher son effort de défense collective à cause simplement de l'atmosphère plus cordiale qui a suivi la conférence de Genève, doit aussi élargir la base de la collaboration entre ses membres dans les domaines non militaires. L'OTAN doit prouver à ceux qui lui attribuent un caractère agressif qu'elle n'a d'autre but que la défense ni d'autre intérêt que le règlement des graves problèmes internationaux, de manière à établir une sécurité véritable.

Un problème de ce genre est le conflit d'intérêts entre l'Union soviétique et les puissances occidentales au sujet du droit qu'aurait une Allemagne réunifiée de s'associer avec l'Ouest en devenant membre de l'OTAN, si son peuple décide librement de le faire. Or, de toute évidence, la politique suivie par l'URSS en Europe depuis la guerre a été élaborée, et appliquée avec opiniâtreté, en vue d'empêcher tout règlement qui permettrait à une Allemagne réarmée de se ranger du côté des puissances occidentales. Cette politique était apparemment fondée sur la conviction que le renforcement de l'OTAN par la puissance militaire, politique et économique de l'Allemagne menacerait gravement la sécurité soviétique et augmenterait considérablement les moyens dont dispose l'alliance occidentale pour résister aux pressions directes et indirectes.

Négociation d'un compromis

Assurément, devant la nécessité première d'éviter une guerre dans laquelle les deux camps possèdent assez de bombes atomiques pour s'anéantir, un moyen sera trouvé pour régler même un conflit d'intérêts aussi important que celui qui existe en Allemagne si nous cherchons à négocier un compromis grâce auquel l'unification de l'Allemagne puisse être conciliée avec la sécurité soviétique et européenne. Un tel compromis ne sera pas réalisé, cependant, si l'Union soviétique et ses amis restent résolus à affaiblir et, finalement, à détruire l'OTAN, et à chasser d'Europe les membres d'outre-mer. A cet égard, il ne devrait pas exister l'ombre d'un doute. L'OTAN ne pourra être supprimée sans danger que lorsque son rôle défensif aura été assumé par une Organisation des Nations Unies capable d'assurer la sécurité de chaque pays par l'action collective.

La crainte principale inspirée par l'Allemagne au Gouvernement soviétique serait-elle la menace qu'elle pourrait constituer à l'avenir plutôt que les mesures politiques et militaires qu'autorisent les clauses limitatives et restrictives des Accords de Londres et de Paris? Si c'est vrai, des assurances et des garanties pourraient être élaborées en vue de dissiper de telles craintes. Ces sauvegardes pourraient se rapporter à des questions telles que les frontières orientales de l'Allemagne ou l'importance, le déploiement et l'équipement des forces de l'OTAN et des forces dressées contre l'OTAN en Europe centrale. Il y aurait lieu de procéder à des négociations, ou à du marchandage si vous voulez, au sujet de concessions réciproques de ce genre, pourvu qu'il soit compris claire-

ment que l'Allemagne et les autres membres de l'OTAN seront libres de choisir la sorte d'association internationale dont ils ont besoin pour la protection collective de leur sécurité.

Afin de rendre relativement acceptables pour Moscou les sauvegardes nécessaires, nous devons convaincre le Gouvernement soviétique que la participation d'une Allemagne unifiée à l'OTAN et à l'Union de l'Europe occidentale n'est pas à l'heure actuelle, ni ne sera à l'avenir, un encouragement à l'agression allemande, mais constitue au contraire un moyen efficace de limiter la puissance et de surveiller l'activité de l'Allemagne. En fait, par le développement de ses relations et de ses rouages consultatifs, l'OTAN limite et surveille les activités non seulement d'un de ses membres en particulier mais de tous ses membres. Il s'ensuit que l'importance de nos effectifs offre plus de sécurité, même pour l'autre camp!

Nos diplomates ne seront-ils pas capables de convaincre les nouveaux chefs soviétiques qu'une Allemagne unifiée et incorporée dans l'OTAN constituerait à la fois un moyen de défense et un règlement justifiable du problème allemand? Un tel règlement n'est-il pas préférable, à tous les points de vue, à une Allemagne indépendante et armée, libre d'agir à sa guise en Europe centrale, ou à une division de l'Allemagne qui ne peut être permanente mais, qui, aussi longtemps qu'elle durera, rendra impossibles la sécurité et la stabilité de l'Europe?

D'ailleurs, si l'Union soviétique réussissait à détruire l'OTAN, par sa politique à l'égard de l'Allemagne ou de quelque autre manière, la sécurité soviétique en serait-elle vraiment renforcée? Au contraire, les tensions qui existent entre les deux géants en seraient accrues, car les États-Unis, leur puissance nucléaire intacte, seraient plus résolus que jamais à maintenir cette puissance et se retrancheraient derrière leurs remparts continentaux. De cette position, leur capacité d'exercer des représailles avec une puissance écrasante resterait énorme, voire décisive. Mais la crainte d'avoir à recourir à cette capacité en serait accentuée.

En face de cette situation l'Union soviétique se sentirait-elle plus en sécurité qu'en face d'un système défensif de contrôles et de contrepois groupant dans le cadre de l'OTAN un certain nombre d'États, dont les États-Unis et l'Allemagne? Si, cependant, Moscou s'attache à sa propre solution du problème allemand et tient à demeurer implacablement hostile à l'OTAN, déterminé à tout mettre en œuvre pour briser cette alliance, il sera certes difficile de faire en sorte que « l'esprit de Genève » aboutisse sur le plan diplomatique à des réalisations pratiques et durables au cours des réunions prochaines au second échelon.

Sens des proportions et sain réalisme

Ces vues paraîtront sans doute fort sombres si l'on tient compte des espoirs nouveaux qui se sont fait jour et de la détente que nous avons connue en ces dernières semaines. Ce n'est pas l'impression que j'entends créer, mais je suis d'avis que nous n'avons rien à gagner et éventuellement beaucoup à perdre en nourrissant l'illusion que Genève a résolu nos problèmes ou que les dangers qui menacent la paix se sont dissipés grâce au sourire de quatre hommes devant quarante caméras. Le sens des proportions et un sain réalisme se révéleront plus utiles dans les mois à venir qu'un optimisme prématuré, si nous voulons que les progrès récents se continuent jusqu'à ce que nous ayons trouvé une paix représentant quelque chose de mieux que la simple coexistence.

Nous avons eu la preuve concrète, et il y a lieu de nous en réjouir, que les dirigeants soviétiques sont maintenant plus disposés à discuter les questions en litige. Voilà une situation que nous avons toujours souhaité de réaliser parce qu'il n'existe pas d'autre moyen acceptable de régler les différends dans l'âge nucléaire que nous vivons. Mais cela ne signifie pas nécessairement que les lignes de conduite et les objectifs fondamentaux des leaders soviétiques aient changé, pas plus d'ailleurs que ceux de l'Ouest.

Il est également bon de se rappeler que l'imposante puissance militaire des Soviets demeure intacte et que les méthodes communistes d'infiltration et de subversion politiques, qui ont fait leurs preuves, sont toujours prêtes à servir. Et rien ne prouve encore vraiment que les communistes aient renoncé à étendre leur domination par des moyens non militaires au fur et à mesure que l'occasion s'en présente. Il est à souhaiter que des preuves convaincantes nous soient bientôt fournies dans ce sens. Sinon il nous faudra fatalement envisager une limite ultime à la *détente* dans les relations entre l'Ouest et l'URSS.

Dans ces conjonctures, je le répète, ce serait une folie pour l'OTAN de ne pas rester sur ses gardes, forte et unie. On a coutume de dire que la liberté s'achète par une vigilance incessante. Dans l'âge nucléaire où nous sommes plongés, nous ne survivrons qu'à ce prix. L'OTAN doit éviter en même temps toute action ou attitude provocatrice susceptible de justifier l'impression qu'elle constitue une menace d'agression contre ceux dont la politique et les agissements ont provoqué sa création. Un moyen de dissiper cette impression consisterait à convaincre les Soviets que nous nous rendons compte de la puissance relative des armes; qu'une réduction générale et équitable des armements ne diminue pas la puissance de qui que ce soit mais augmente la sécurité de chacun pourvu, bien entendu, et c'est là une condition essentielle, qu'on ait foi en l'efficacité des mesures destinées à assurer l'exécution des engagements contractés.

La limitation des armements, voilà une cause que tous les hommes de bonne volonté peuvent appuyer, mais il faut nous méfier des propositions qui feraient naître des injustices et des déséquilibres. Nous devons nous rappeler aussi qu'il ne saurait y avoir de désarmement général effectif tant que ne règnent pas une certaine sécurité et une certaine confiance. N'oublions pas non plus que même si les armes sont réduites, si la sécurité s'accroît et si la guerre froide se dissout sous le soleil de Genève, certains conflits fondamentaux entre le monde communiste et le monde non communiste persisteront. Une tâche s'imposera quand même aux hommes d'État: résoudre ces conflits sans recourir à la guerre.

Coexistence et émulation

N'oublions pas que si nous approchons de la coexistence pacifique, celle-ci va s'accompagner d'émulation. Dans cette compétition, qui n'est pas nouvelle, mais qui prendra désormais plus d'importance, l'OTAN et chacun de ses membres auront à démontrer que leur système de société libre ne se défend pas seulement sur le plan militaire mais se justifie par le fait qu'il apporte à l'individu plus d'avantages que le communisme ne saura jamais lui assurer. En définitive, cette épreuve signifiera pour l'OTAN et pour le monde non communiste le succès ou l'échec. Comme facteurs de succès, l'expansion économique, le plein emploi, la justice et le bien-être social de même qu'un commerce inter-

national aussi libre que possible compteront tout autant que les bombes atomiques et les avions à réaction.

Par l'emploi ordonné et collectif de ses ressources non militaires aussi bien que militaires, l'OTAN est appelée à étendre son influence au delà de son effectif immédiat. Cet effectif limité à une zone géographique restreinte englobe cependant les nations occidentales les plus puissantes, lesquelles possèdent des intérêts ou assument des responsabilités à l'échelon mondial. L'OTAN se heurte fatalement au reste du monde. Ses membres sont en droit de souhaiter que les motifs qui l'inspirent de même que sa politique ne seront pas mésinterprétés même ou surtout par ceux qui pourraient croire sincèrement et pour des raisons qui leur paraissent convaincantes que les divers systèmes régionaux de sécurité ne tendent pas à favoriser la paix.

Voici, en terminant, comment j'envisage la politique la plus efficace que puisse suivre l'OTAN après la conférence de Genève. L'Organisation atlantique doit évoluer vers plus de souplesse. Elle doit s'adapter aux problèmes nouveaux qui se poseront si nous entrons, par bonheur, dans une période de coexistence fondée non seulement sur la paix mais sur la concurrence; de plus les gouvernements des États membres devront l'utiliser davantage dans ce sens. L'OTAN ne peut se permettre aucun affaiblissement ni relâchement. Il lui faut au contraire redoubler d'effort pour réaliser toutes les promesses du Pacte atlantique. Après s'être révélée une institution efficace dans la mise sur pied d'une coopération défensive capable de faire face à une menace militaire, l'OTAN doit maintenant resserrer la cohésion et la collaboration parmi ses membres pour la poursuite d'objectifs communs sur les plans politique, économique et social.

Il est essentiel de multiplier les consultations au sein de l'OTAN afin que son unité ne s'effondre pas devant la cordialité qui règne parmi les Quatre Grands. Rien de surprenant si c'est en matière de politique étrangère et de défense qu'on a organisé le plus d'entretiens. Pour les pays qui ont pris l'engagement de se soutenir mutuellement si l'un d'eux est attaqué, il est logique de se consulter pour éviter toute politique qui pourrait provoquer une telle attaque. Toutefois le maintien d'une économie en expansion et de saines structures sociales doit sûrement s'envisager comme une question d'intérêt commun pour tous les membres au même titre que le maintien des mesures de défense commune. L'harmonie entre les gouvernements dans le domaine économique et social se révèle donc presque aussi importante que la coordination en matière de politique étrangère et de défense.

Nous devons non seulement nous persuader de la valeur permanente de l'Organisation pour le maintien de la force collective nécessaire à notre sécurité, mais nous convaincre de son utilité comme moyen de développer des relations politiques, économiques, culturelles et sociales plus étroites, propres à accroître la vitalité de la communauté atlantique et celle même de la communauté des Nations Unies. Il nous incombe de démontrer au monde entier que nos espoirs d'une paix durable et les plans que nous élaborons dans ce sens reposent sur quelque chose de plus que la crainte d'une dévastation nucléaire. Nous avons à démontrer par des actes la valeur de l'OTAN comme organisme international efficace, fondé sur les principes démocratiques, et comme gardienne de notre liberté, de notre civilisation et de notre héritage communs, capable de rivaliser avec le bloc communiste au cours de l'ère de coexistence qui s'ouvre. De rudes épreuves attendent l'Organisation; si elle faillit à la tâche, les conséquences déborderont de beaucoup les cadres de l'OTAN.

Le Canada et les Nations Unies

Dixième session de l'Assemblée générale

LA délégation du Canada à la dixième session de l'Assemblée générale, qui s'est ouverte à New-York le 20 septembre, se compose des personnalités suivantes:

Représentants

- M. Paul Martin, ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social (président de la délégation).
- M. J. J. McCann, ministre du Revenu national, et M. Roch Pinard, secrétaire d'État (successivement).
- M. R. A. MacKay, représentant permanent du Canada auprès des Nations Unies à New-York.
- Le sénateur J.-G. Turgeon, de Vancouver.
- M^{me} Jack Houck, de Brampton (Ontario).

Représentants suppléants

- M. W. G. Weir, député de Portage-Neepawa, et le sénateur W. M. Wall, de Winnipeg (successivement).
- M. Maurice Breton, député de l'Assomption-Montcalm.
- Le lieutenant-colonel Oscar Gilbert, président du *Soleil*, journal de Québec.
- M. J. W. Holmes, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures.
- M. Patrick Conroy, attaché du Travail à l'ambassade du Canada à Washington.

Les conseillers de la délégation sont fournis par le ministère des Affaires extérieures, le ministère des Finances et la Délégation permanente du Canada auprès des Nations Unies à New-York.

Élections

L'Assemblée générale a élu M. José Maza, du Chili, président de la session à l'unanimité des 60 voix. M. Maza succède à M. van Kleffens, des Pays-Bas.

Les présidents de commission suivants ont été élus par acclamation pour la dixième session de l'Assemblée générale:

Première CommissionSir Leslie MunroNouvelle-Zélande
Commission politique spécialeLe prince Wan WaithayakonThaïlande
Deuxième CommissionM. Ernest G. ChauvetHaïti
Troisième CommissionM. Omar LouftiÉgypte
Quatrième CommissionM. Luciano Joubanc-RivasMexique
Cinquième CommissionM. Hans EngenNorvège
Sixième CommissionM. Manfred LachsPologne

Les sept vice-présidents suivants ont été élus, tous au premier tour de scrutin: États-Unis, Éthiopie, France (53 voix chacun), Royaume-Uni (52 voix), Union soviétique (50 voix), Luxembourg (49 voix), Chine (41 voix).

Représentation de la Chine

Peu après l'ouverture de la séance, le délégué de l'URSS a soulevé la question de la représentation de la Chine aux Nations Unies. Il a déposé un projet de résolution aux termes duquel l'Assemblée générale déciderait « que les représentants de la Chine tant à l'Assemblée générale que dans les autres organes des Nations Unies sont les représentants désignés par le Gouvernement central du Peuple de la République populaire de Chine ». Le délégué des États-Unis a proposé aussitôt que l'Assemblée décide de n'étudier, à la dixième session ordinaire, pendant l'année en cours, aucune proposition relative à la représentation de la Chine. La proposition des États-Unis a été adoptée, lors d'un scrutin par appel nominal, par 42 voix (dont celle du Canada) contre 12 (Biélorussie, Birmanie, Danemark, Inde, Indonésie, Norvège, Pologne, Suède, Tchécoslovaquie, Ukraine, URSS, Yougoslavie) avec 6 abstentions (Afghanistan, Arabie saoudite, Égypte, Israël, Syrie, Yémen).



—Nations Unies

REPRÉSENTANTS DU CANADA À LA 10^e ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE

Voici la délégation du Canada à la dixième session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. De gauche à droite: M. Paul Martin, ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social, président; M. J. C. McCann, ministre du Revenu national, vice-président; M. Michael Starr, observateur parlementaire; le lieutenant-colonel O. Gilbert, représentant suppléant, et M. M. Breton, député, observateur parlementaire. (Deuxième rangée) M. Marshall A. Crowe, du ministère des Affaires extérieures, conseiller; M. J. W. Holmes, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures; M. P. Conroy, représentant suppléant; le sénateur G.-J. Turgeon, représentant, et le sénateur W. M. Wall, représentant suppléant.

Déclaration de M. Martin

Le débat général s'est ouvert à l'Assemblée le 22 septembre. Le président de la délégation canadienne, M. Paul Martin, a pris la parole pour sa part à la huitième séance plénière, l'après-midi du lundi 26 septembre. Suit le texte intégral de sa déclaration:

(Texte)

En ma qualité de participant à ce débat général qui n'en est encore qu'à ses débuts, permettez-moi, monsieur le Président, de vous présenter, au nom de la délégation du Canada, nos plus chaleureuses félicitations à l'occasion de votre élection à la présidence de la dixième Assemblée générale des Nations Unies. Je désire aussi vous assurer de notre entière coopération dans l'accomplissement de vos difficiles et importantes fonctions. Il y a trois ans, le distingué secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. Lester B. Pearson, avait le privilège d'occuper le siège de président de la septième Assemblée. Grâce à cette expérience, nous sommes en mesure de savoir combien cette charge peut être onéreuse tout en étant réconfortante.

Par votre intermédiaire, je tiens à rendre un témoignage de reconnaissance à votre compétent prédécesseur, le Dr. van Kleffens, qui présida avec si grande autorité nos débats de l'an dernier.

(Traduction)

Tous ceux qui sont réunis ici se rendent pleinement compte, je le sais, de l'importance extraordinaire que revêt cette dixième session de l'Assemblée générale. Il y a dix ans, à San-Francisco, où nous avons signé notre Charte de la Paix, la Porte-d'Or semblait ouvrir sur la perspective lumineuse d'un avenir sans conflit. Puis cette porte s'est rétrécie tout à coup et un monde déjà las de la guerre a dû endurer dix autres années de discorde et de difficultés.

Mais encore une fois, dix ans plus tard, nous avons l'occasion d'établir ici, dans cette île Manhattan, une tête de plage d'espérance.

On a dit tant de choses, ici et ailleurs, au sujet de la nouvelle atmosphère et du nouvel esprit qui règnent dans le monde que j'hésite à en reparler. Il y a peut-être quelque danger que l'esprit dit de Genève ne perde de sa vitalité s'il devient une

expression trop rebattue, une conception vague qu'on sort pour nous griser, pour obscurcir les problèmes difficiles auxquels nous avons encore à faire face ou pour dissimuler de multiples péchés, d'action ou d'omission.

Ce serait bien dommage, parce que, de mon avis, il y a je ne sais quoi de vivant dans l'esprit de Genève, ou tout au moins un germe qui pourra croître s'il est cultivé un peu. Bien qu'il soit trop tôt pour affirmer que la confiance a été rétablie,—peut-être devrait-on dire « établie », car la confiance internationale serait une chose tout à fait nouvelle dans l'histoire du monde,—on peut dire au moins qu'on voit clairement une recherche de la confiance, un effort de compréhension mutuelle qui n'existait pas auparavant.

Motif d'optimisme

Ma délégation est d'avis que, pendant les années sombres que nous venons de vivre, le sentiment d'impuissance et de désespoir découlait moins des problèmes à résoudre que du manque de tout souci véritable de les régler. Notre plus grand motif d'optimisme à l'heure actuelle est non pas que ces problèmes aient été résolus,—bien que leur solution soit plus proche,—mais que les personnalités dirigeantes, celles des grandes puissances surtout, semblent à présent chercher à préciser les problèmes, à comprendre les points de vue les uns des autres et, si c'est possible, à prévenir les objections.

On peut trouver que ce n'est pas là un bien grand progrès, mais au moins c'est un premier pas dans la bonne direction. Nos façons mêmes de penser ont été faussées par la spirale ahurissante de la propagande et de la contre-propagande, tant ici même qu'à des échelons moins élevés. Nous avons été si profondément enlisés que ce simple retour à l'honnêteté et à la sincérité dans nos rapports mutuels prend à nos yeux l'aspect d'une régénération fondamentale.

Devant le spectre effrayant du désastre, le monde s'est calmé au dernier moment.

Du moins l'espérons-nous. Sans en être sûrs. Il s'agit de savoir si ceux qui ont travaillé le plus à détraquer les relations internationales, en manipulant la vérité à leurs propres fins et en tournant le dos à l'éthique traditionnelle du monde civilisé, ont enfin renoncé à leurs habitudes et à leurs méthodes. Malheureusement, au cours des brèves années de l'existence de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, les appels à la raison et à la conscience des peuples du monde, qui sont le mode légitime d'action des Nations Unies, n'ont été trop souvent qu'un honteux effort de tromperie et de séduction des masses.

La prudence s'impose

L'heure n'est pas aux récriminations, mais la prudence ne s'en impose pas moins. Je ne veux pas dire que c'est à un seul État ou encore à un seul et même groupe d'États qu'il faut attribuer toute la responsabilité de l'abaissement moral et des divers insuccès des Nations Unies. La propagande a inévitablement appelé la contre-propagande, laquelle a tombé dans l'erreur d'adopter servilement la technique de l'adversaire.

Il me semble que l'aspect le plus encourageant de la session actuelle réside dans le désir qui se manifeste, tant ici même que dans des organes de l'Assemblée aussi importants que le sous-comité du désarmement, d'exposer en toute franchise des positions auxquelles on tient sincèrement, au lieu de rechercher des avantages de propagande et des succès d'argumentation. Continuons sur ce pied et il n'y a pas de limite à ce que nous pourrions faire de positif dans le cadre des Nations Unies.

Ce que j'en dis, croyez-moi, je le dis en toute humilité. Aucun membre, aucun groupe de membres des Nations Unies ne serait justifié d'abandonner toute réserve. Il ne convient pas non plus que nous rejetions sans cesse la responsabilité de nos erreurs sur les grandes puissances et nous contentions de réclamer de leur part un changement de méthode. Ce sont en effet les grandes puissances elles-mêmes, et particulièrement ceux de leurs dirigeants qui se sont réunis à Genève en juillet dernier,

qui nous ont donné l'exemple, nous ont portés à parler de l'existence d'un esprit nouveau et à souhaiter qu'il se répande. Nous devons tous reconnaître,—et nous le faisons tous, j'en suis sûr,—la grande dette de reconnaissance que nous avons envers ces hommes qui ont regardé en face les réalités brutales et ont décidé qu'il ne fallait pas permettre à l'homme d'éteindre lui-même son espèce alors qu'il pouvait se sauver par un peu d'intelligence.

C'est là, de l'avis de ma délégation, le point le plus important à nous rappeler pendant la présente assemblée.

Les grandes puissances nous ont montré la voie à suivre pour arriver à la détente. Il incombe à l'Assemblée générale de se montrer à la hauteur de la situation. A leur modération, à leur retenue doivent répondre notre modération et notre retenue à nous. Réalistes comme eux, nous devons tenir compte sans cesse de la complexité des problèmes, et aussi de ce que la vérité n'est l'apanage exclusif d'aucun d'entre nous. Nous devons trouver en nous l'infinie patience qu'exige tout progrès.

Désarmement

Il est hors de doute que la question de réduire les armements et d'en contrôler l'usage est celle qui conditionne le plus profondément la détente et le retour à la paix. Nos espoirs sont plus grands à l'heure actuelle qu'ils ne l'ont été à aucun moment depuis dix ans, mais les problèmes qui restent à résoudre sont immenses.

Il me semble que mon pays, parce qu'il participe avec les Quatre Grands aux travaux du sous-comité du désarmement, représente d'une certaine façon de nombreux autres pays, membres ou non de cette Organisation. Depuis le début, nous sommes particulièrement conscients des terrifiantes responsabilités dévolues aux grandes puissances pour le maintien de la paix mondiale. Une seule décision mal inspirée pourrait être un désastre, non seulement pour elles, mais pour nous tous de même. Et ce que j'en dis ne part que de la connaissance des terribles moyens nucléaires actuels, abstraction faite de ceux dont on disposera peut-être ultérieurement. N'oublions pas, d'autre part, que plus nous tarderons à nous mettre d'accord en vue du désarmement et plus les pays

dépourvus d'armes nucléaires seront tentés d'en entreprendre eux aussi la fabrication.

Nous ferons bien de toujours nous rappeler la solennité de cette obligation lorsque nous formulerons des plaintes ou jetterons le blâme. Ce n'est pas que les autres puissances doivent s'abstenir de toute critique ou de toute suggestion. Nous ne nous sommes jamais privés de critiquer lorsque nous estimions avoir lieu de le faire, ni de présenter des suggestions lorsqu'elles nous paraissaient pouvoir être utiles. Nous espérons bien qu'au cours de la présente session tous les membres pourront exprimer librement leurs vues, le sujet les concernant autant qu'il concerne les grandes puissances. Toutefois, nous espérons aussi qu'ils prendront une attitude aussi positive que possible et qu'ils s'attaqueront directement aux dilemmes précis que les grandes puissances, à mon avis, s'efforcent résolument et audacieusement de résoudre en ce moment.

Je me rends fort bien compte que nous sommes, tous les membres de cette assemblée, parfaitement conscients des difficultés qui devront être surmontées avant tout accord général sur une importante réduction des forces armées et des armements classiques ainsi que sur l'interdiction des engins atomiques. Réductions et interdictions devront être coordonnées et échelonnées de telle sorte qu'aucun pays ne puisse à un moment quelconque avoir de bonnes raisons de craindre pour sa sécurité. Au cours des réunions de notre sous-comité, nous avons fait quelque progrès dans le sens d'un accord sur cette très importante question de l'horaire, pour ainsi dire, ou du programme des réductions et interdictions.

Toutefois la question d'une entente effective garantissant le respect d'une promesse quelconque d'interdire les armes atomiques doit être examinée maintenant en fonction du fait, admis par tous les intéressés, qu'il serait possible, d'après ce que nous savons présentement, de violer secrètement tout accord visant l'interdiction totale des engins atomiques, si rigoureuses que puissent être les mesures de contrôle et d'inspection. C'est en partie pour résoudre les difficultés que soulève ce problème capital du contrôle et de l'inspection qu'un certain nombre de pro-

positions nouvelles ont été présentées à la conférence de Genève.

Nouvelles propositions

Le Premier ministre de France, M. Faure, a proposé un plan en vertu duquel des contrôles budgétaires seraient établis en vue de réduire les frais de défense et les économies réalisées grâce au désarmement serviraient à venir en aide aux pays insuffisamment développés. M. Eden, Premier ministre du Royaume-Uni, très versé dans les questions internationales, a fait part d'un projet pilote dont l'application nous vaudrait une expérience précieuse en ce qui concerne le fonctionnement d'un dispositif d'inspection et de contrôle. De son côté, le Premier ministre de l'URSS, M. Boulganine, soumettait un plan qui s'apparente de près à la proposition présentée par la délégation soviétique au sous-comité. La formule tient compte de certains progrès importants réalisés en matière de contrôle, mais du point de vue de mon Gouvernement, les dispositions relatives à l'inspection et au contrôle demeurent insuffisantes.

Échange de renseignements

Finalement, le Président Eisenhower a présenté à Genève une mesure, qu'on pourrait adopter immédiatement, en vue d'écartier la possibilité d'une attaque surprise d'envergure et de préparer la voie à un programme de désarmement général. Nous arriverions certes plus aisément à une entente dans ce sens si nous pouvions d'abord dissiper la menace d'une attaque surprise. Mon Gouvernement s'est dit vivement intéressé au plan du Président des États-Unis tendant à un échange de renseignements militaires et à une inspection aérienne réciproque. Nous voyons là un geste marqué au coin de la foi et de l'imagination qui caractérisent un grand homme et le pays dont il dirige les destinées. Nous Canadiens connaissons bien les Américains et, même si nous nous trouvons souvent en désaccord avec eux, aucun d'entre nous ne doute de la bonté et de la sincérité foncières de leurs intentions. Nous avons donc applaudi à l'hommage rendu par M. Molotov au Président Eisenhower et nous pouvons fournir au ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'URSS l'assurance qu'il ne fait pas fausse route en

accordant confiance à la sincérité de cette proposition américaine.

J'ai noté avec regret, cependant, que M. Molotov dans sa déclaration lors du débat général du 23 septembre semble avoir mal interprété les observations faites la veille par M. Dulles sur le rapport nécessaire qui existe entre un sentiment d'insécurité et de crainte d'une part et une possibilité de désarmement d'autre part. Je me permets de rappeler à la délégation soviétique qu'un point de vue tout à fait semblable à celui de M. Dulles a été exprimé dans les propositions soumises le 10 mai par l'URSS au sous-comité du désarmement.

Du texte de ces propositions distribué aux membres sous forme de document des Nations Unies j'extrais le paragraphe suivant :

« D'autre part, la cessation de la guerre froide entre les États contribuerait à réduire la tension internationale, à créer un esprit de confiance indispensable dans les relations internationales, à dissiper la menace d'une nouvelle guerre ainsi qu'à établir des conditions qui permettent aux peuples du monde de vivre dans la paix et la tranquillité. De là naîtront les conditions nécessaires pour l'exécution d'un vaste programme de désarmement et l'établissement du contrôle international que cela implique ».

Ne ressort-il pas clairement de ce paragraphe que l'URSS se rend compte elle aussi que les perspectives de désarmement sont inévitablement fonction de l'insécurité et de la menace de guerre ?

Nous pensons que le plan du Président aussi bien que les autres systèmes préconisés à Genève ne sont pas nécessairement incompatibles avec les propositions déjà formulées au sous-comité et sur lesquelles on devrait après de longues et difficiles négociations aboutir à une certaine entente générale. Il n'y a pas lieu de croire que ces propositions s'excluent l'une l'autre. On ne voit pas pourquoi, une fois modifiées peut-être, elles ne jalonnent pas la route qui mène au désarmement.

Nous devons démarrer rapidement sur cette voie, sans oublier qu'il nous faudra traverser des périodes de tâtonnement dans la recherche d'un esprit de confiance

sans lequel le désarmement ne se conçoit pas. Pour aboutir, cette recherche suppose qu'on s'entende au préalable sur un système de contrôle. La mise au point d'un pareil système va exiger de longues et minutieuses études de la part de nos spécialistes en matières techniques et constitutionnelles. On ne saurait donc s'attendre que des décisions interviennent à brève échéance.

Représentant de mon Gouvernement aux entretiens du sous-comité depuis leur reprise à New-York le 29 août, je tiens avant d'en finir avec ce sujet à rendre hommage à l'esprit de coopération amicale dont toutes les délégations ont fait preuve sur le plan des relations et celui du travail. On a bien l'impression que tous les membres du sous-comité sont fermement déterminés à réaliser un accord pratique et mutuellement acceptable en ce qui touche le désarmement.

Énergie atomique

L'énergie atomique tient de plus en plus la vedette dans nos discussions. Il n'y a là rien de surprenant. Nous avons fait la découverte révolutionnaire d'une source d'énergie dont l'exploitation va entraîner des conséquences encore incalculables. La puissance nouvelle dont il dispose est susceptible de modifier et peut-être de faciliter les rapports de l'homme avec son milieu, ce qui implique des répercussions dans presque tous les domaines.

La présente Assemblée aura à examiner un certain nombre de points se rapportant directement à l'énergie atomique et en premier lieu le rapport du secrétaire général concernant la Conférence internationale sur l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie atomique, tenue à Genève du 8 au 20 août. L'opinion publique a vu dans ces entretiens une réussite remarquable; il y a lieu de nous en féliciter puisque ce sont les Nations Unies qui les ont organisés. Je tiens à rendre un hommage spécial au zèle déployé par le secrétaire général. Celui-ci et le Secrétariat n'ont fait que démontrer une fois de plus leur compétence et leur esprit d'initiative. Cette conférence a permis de donner une suite pratique à la résolution adoptée unanimement à la neuvième session de l'Assemblée générale concernant la coopération internationale pour

l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie atomique. J'ai la conviction que, loin de constituer un événement isolé, les discussions de Genève seront suivies de réunions et de travaux s'inspirant des principes qui doivent désormais nous guider dans cette entreprise de paix.

On me permettra sans doute de rappeler ici que le Canada a joué un rôle qui n'est pas négligeable dans les recherches qui ont abouti à la mise en valeur de l'énergie atomique. Quand le moment en sera venu, j'exposerai à la Commission ce que le Canada a réalisé dans le domaine de l'utilisation industrielle et agricole des isotopes radioactifs et de leurs applications médicales, tel l'emploi du Cobalt 60 pour le traitement du cancer, de même qu'en matière de détection des radiations y compris ses aspects sanitaires.

Grâce aux travaux considérables poursuivis chez lui sur l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie atomique, le Canada est maintenant en mesure de venir en aide à d'autres pays. C'est ainsi que nous avons pris récemment les dispositions pour doter l'Inde d'une pile atomique. Ce fut un motif de vive satisfaction pour le Canada de pouvoir partager ses ressources avec un pays auquel il est si étroitement uni par les liens d'une amicale association. Nous nous réjouissons également à la pensée que ce réacteur va servir également à d'autres nations amies d'Asie, puisque le Gouvernement indien entend permettre aux savants de pays voisins d'utiliser ces installations.

Désir de coopération

Le Canada souhaite coopérer dans toute la mesure du possible aux vastes mouvements d'évolution dont sont témoins le sud et le sud-est de l'Asie. Le sentiment d'admiration que nous entretenons à l'égard des populations de ces pays s'est sans cesse accentué grâce aux relations directes établies, entre elles et nous, dans le cadre des Nations Unies, du Plan de Colombo et plus récemment au sein des Commissions internationales pour la surveillance en Indochine. Je salue spécialement les populations du Laos, du Cambodge et du Vietnam pour lesquelles tant de Canadiens n'ont pas manqué depuis un an d'éprouver une affection et un respect profonds et qui, nous le souhaitons vivement, sauront bientôt occuper la place qui leur revient dans

nos conseils. Nous estimons injuste que tant de ces pays asiatiques aient été empêchés arbitrairement de se joindre à nous dans l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

Ceux qui douteraient du rôle que les pays d'Asie peuvent jouer dans cette Assemblée feraient bien d'étudier les délibérations de l'importante conférence qui s'est déroulée à Bandoeng le printemps dernier. Cette impressionnante réunion de représentants éminents de deux continents a valu un prestige considérable à ceux qui en avaient pris l'initiative. Même sans souscrire peut-être à toutes les conclusions de la conférence, nous rendons hommage à la sagesse et à la modération de ces hommes d'Etat qui ont su garder le sens des perspectives et des proportions en des temps marqués par les changements révolutionnaires et les conflits passionnés. Ce fut un puissant motif d'encouragement pour ceux d'entre nous qui croient profondément que l'Est et l'Ouest peuvent travailler ensemble pour le bien commun.

Admission de nouveaux membres

... Si je ne me trompe, vingt et une demandes d'admission à l'ONU sont encore en suspens. Ma délégation estime que l'exclusion prolongée d'un aussi grand nombre de pays constitue une grave lacune. Je sais que dans l'esprit de plusieurs délégués de sérieuses difficultés d'ordre juridique et constitutionnel empêchent d'en arriver à quelque solution pratique du problème. Préoccupés nous aussi par ces difficultés, nous ne reconnaissons pas moins qu'il faut faire face aux réalités politiques si on veut surmonter l'impasse qui persiste depuis si longtemps.

Tout en comprenant que les grandes puissances, en raison des responsabilités qu'elles assument sur le plan mondial, puissent s'inquiéter de telle ou telle candidature ou groupe de candidats, je demeure convaincu que cela ne devrait pas les amener nécessairement à s'opposer au désir d'une majorité importante des membres de cette Assemblée qui souhaitent voir l'ONU progresser aussi rapidement que possible vers une participation universelle.

La réalité politique fondamentale que nous ne pouvons ignorer c'est que, si elle ne représente pas véritablement la grande

majorité des pays du monde, notre Organisation sera incapable de contribuer pleinement à la solution des problèmes mondiaux.

De l'avis de ma délégation, nous devrions tous consentir à examiner soigneusement la possibilité d'admettre en même temps une très forte proportion des candidats en instance. Des difficultés particulières se posent dans le cas des pays temporairement divisés, mais il y a lieu croyons-nous d'envisager pour de bon l'admission prochaine des autres candidats.

Puis-je faire respectueusement observer à M. Molotov que, contrairement à ce qu'il affirmait vendredi, le nombre des pays sollicitant leur admission à l'ONU s'établit non pas à 16 mais à 17, selon les calculs de la délégation canadienne, lesquels ne comprennent pas les candidatures des pays partagés. Nous comptons donc que M. Molotov fera la rectification qui s'impose.

Revision de la Charte

Conformément aux dispositions de la Charte, la question de la revision de celle-ci, et partant de la convocation d'une conférence à cette fin, se pose maintenant à nous.

A moins que tel ne soit le vœu général des délégations, nous ne croyons pas devoir préconiser la tenue d'une conférence de revision. Il nous semble qu'il vaudrait mieux attendre que nos divergences politiques soient aplanies dans une certaine mesure. D'ailleurs, la conférence en question pourrait-elle, dans les circonstances, accentuer le mouvement de détente? Ce n'est pas non plus que la Charte nous paraisse parfaite, mais sur les bases solides qu'elle constitue un meilleur climat politique nous permettrait, croyons-nous, d'élaborer un instrument plus efficace.

Quelle que soit notre décision à ce sujet, il nous importe d'étudier les propositions fort utiles et judicieuses où, dans son rapport annuel sur l'activité de l'ONU, le secrétaire général a recommandé qu'on mette mieux à profit le dispositif de l'Organisation pour diminuer la tension internationale. Ces propositions sont nettement en harmonie avec l'atmosphère plus sereine qui baigne notre assemblée.

Questions coloniales

L'ordre du jour de la présente session comprend plusieurs questions qu'on a pris l'habitude de qualifier de coloniales. Mon compatriote, M. Pearson, a désigné l'an dernier quelques-unes de ces questions par l'expression « hardy perennials ». Comme il l'a fait observer avec beaucoup de justesse, « après avoir persisté sept fois en sept ans à discuter la même question, on n'est pas nécessairement sept fois plus près de la résoudre ». Quelques-unes de ces questions figurent depuis moins longtemps à l'ordre du jour, il est vrai.

Mon pays ne se pique d'aucune compétence spéciale pour discuter les questions coloniales; cependant il a été en mesure de constater que les débats de l'Assemblée générale qui leur sont consacrés ne sont pas toujours fructueux et qu'ils peuvent même avoir parfois des effets préjudiciables.

Je ne voudrais nullement laisser entendre qu'il convienne d'étouffer les discussions dont le but est d'exposer de légitimes griefs. Le Canada a souvent affirmé que l'Assemblée générale doit se prêter à la discussion de toute question d'intérêt international. Il reconnaît cependant que parfois, en certaines circonstances, il n'est ni sage ni utile d'aborder certains sujets.

Il se trouve parmi nous un grand nombre d'hommes politiques, tous fiers de leur profession, j'aime à le croire. Quelle que soit l'expérience particulière à chacun, nous avons tous appris que la politique est l'art du possible et qu'une bonne part de cet art consiste à savoir agir au bon moment. Certaines mesures ne sont en soi ni bonnes ni mauvaises. Souvent elles ne valent que si elles arrivent à point. Qu'on me comprenne bien et qu'on ne me prête aucune intention réactionnaire, aucun manque de sympathie à l'égard de ceux qui s'en prennent à un ordre établi.

Dans bien des cas, sans mettre en doute le bien-fondé de certaines propositions dont est saisie l'Assemblée, nous formulons des réserves sur leur opportunité. Notre opposition n'est ni absolue ni définitive. Nous ne voudrions pas que l'ONU s'engage dans la voie de la soi-disant Sainte-Alliance, qui barrait la route à toutes les réformes, sous prétexte qu'elles n'étaient jamais proposées au bon moment.

Aide aux pays économiquement sous-développés

Parmi les questions que l'Assemblée générale pourra le plus utilement étudier se trouvent, comme par le passé, celles qui ont trait à l'activité économique et sociale de l'ONU et intéressent notamment les régions économiquement sous-développées. En ce domaine, l'utilité et l'efficacité du travail de l'ONU s'accroissent de plus en plus.

Nous ne voudrions pas voir restreindre cette activité créatrice de l'ONU, car l'ignorance, la maladie et la pauvreté, en quelque point du globe qu'elles sévissent, mettent en danger la stabilité de la paix lorsqu'elles ne sont pas combattues. Plus que jamais nous sommes convaincus qu'aucun peuple ne peut rester sain et prospère en un monde affligé par la maladie et l'indigence. La difficulté cependant tient à ce qu'il faut aux pays de l'ONU des garanties de paix et de sécurité pour s'engager totalement dans la lutte contre les maux économiques et sociaux. Bien qu'ils souhaitent apporter tout leur concours aux régions peu fortunées, certains pays doivent souvent restreindre leur aide pour des motifs de sécurité et en raison des fortes dépenses que leur imposent les nécessités de la défense.

Raison de plus pour espérer que le désarmement se poursuivra et libérera des ressources plus fortes, en faveur de la grande œuvre de coopération internationale dont l'objet est d'assurer une vie meilleure à tous les habitants de la terre.

Peuples sous dépendance et autonomie

L'acheminement progressif de certains peuples vers l'émancipation et l'autonomie pose peut-être chaque année les problèmes les plus compliqués que nous ayons à étudier. Les obligations de l'ONU à cet égard découlent essentiellement de la Charte et celle-ci prévoit une avance ordonnée vers les objectifs qu'elle formule. Ce point de vue est conforme aux conceptions canadiennes, qui s'expliquent elles-mêmes par notre histoire.

Si nous en jugeons par notre propre passé, c'est en s'associant et en collaborant avec les puissances établies que les peuples sous dépendance, de quelque race qu'ils

soient, peuvent le mieux s'initier à l'art de se gouverner eux-mêmes. Le Canada, de même que les autres membres de l'ONU et les puissances administrantes elles-mêmes, n'a aucun intérêt à retarder sans nécessité l'exercice des droits fondamentaux que la Charte prévoit pour chaque peuple; il reconnaît en outre qu'on n'a pas le droit de sacrifier les intérêts des peuples sous dépendance à ceux des puissances administrantes. D'autre part, précipiter la réalisation de ces louables objectifs serait peut-être desservir les peuples sous dépendance eux-mêmes.

Il est vrai que du fait de la tension internationale, l'émancipation ordonnée des peuples sous dépendance comporte des complications. La détente hâtera sans doute l'évolution de ces peuples vers l'autonomie et l'indépendance. Il importe d'autant plus que notre intervention dans ce domaine contribue à alléger la tension plutôt qu'à la prolonger.

Conclusion

Voilà notre point de vue sur la façon de résoudre, dans certains cas précis, les problèmes qui se poseront au cours de la dixième session. Puisse aucune délégation juger nos propositions comme de nature à réfréner ou à contrarier indûment les desseins et les aspirations des peuples qui s'estiment intéressés au premier chef par les problèmes dont la solution incombe aux grandes puissances.

Si nous admettons que l'avenir de l'ONU est intimement lié à la réalisation d'une paix durable, il faut aussi reconnaître que les membres de l'ONU doivent, tant individuellement que collectivement, consentir tous les efforts possibles et ne jamais laisser passer une occasion favorable, lorsqu'il s'agit d'avancer la cause de la paix. Si les grandes puissances réussissent à mettre fin aux tensions internationales qui durent depuis neuf ans et à s'entendre sur un programme de désarmement et de collaboration internationale plus étroite, nous devons alors être tous disposés à les suivre.

Si nous atteignons ces buts, comme nous l'espérons fort aujourd'hui, et que tous les camps partagés par divers conflits internationaux suivent eux aussi la voie tracée par les grandes puissances, un avenir

extraordinaire s'ouvrira devant l'ONU. Les buts vers lesquels tendent les diverses activités de l'ONU, conformes d'ailleurs aux aspirations de l'humanité entière, deviendront effectivement réalisables. Il faudra que se multiplient les gestes généreux, tels ceux de nos collègues brésiliens qui ont offert d'accueillir les prisonniers coréens si longtemps confiés à la garde du Gouvernement indien.

Nous avons tous pris pour acquis et même soutenu parfois que l'harmonie entre les grandes puissances, l'un des principes à la base de la Charte, est une condition de l'efficacité de l'ONU. La situation actuelle justifie notre confiance à cet égard. Il ne faudrait pas cependant qu'un tel point de vue incite l'ONU à attendre passivement que les grandes puissances se soient enfin mises d'accord. La conjoncture favorable où nous nous trouvons maintenant exige de tous les membres qu'ils soient conscients de leurs obligations, qu'ils acceptent de bon gré une discipline internationale et qu'ils apportent à l'étude des questions internationales de la modération, des dispositions pacifiques et un esprit de collaboration. Peut-être jamais encore, dans la courte histoire de l'ONU, ces exigences n'ont-elles été si pressantes.

Conscient des lourdes responsabilités qui nous incombent à tous, je tiens à recommander instamment à tous les délégués ici présents de s'unir dans la poursuite

des grands buts que je viens d'évoquer et de faire leur possible pour que l'ONU, sachant mettre à profit la situation plus favorable, contribue spontanément et généreusement à de nouveaux progrès.

Permettez-moi, monsieur le président, de terminer en rappelant qu'il y a exactement deux semaines cet après-midi, j'avais le plaisir d'inaugurer à Cobourg, en Ontario, un cairn commémoratif du premier concours mondial de labourage qui s'y était déroulé deux ans plus tôt. Ce qui me pousse à vous faire part de l'événement, c'est que le cairn en question était surmonté d'une charrue d'or portant en lettres délicatement tracées l'inscription suivante: « That man may use the plough to cultivate peace and plenty ». (Puisse l'homme mettre la charrue au service de la paix et de l'abondance !) Le trophée miniature, décerné tous les ans au vainqueur, va d'un pays à l'autre, emportant son message de paix et évoquant l'espoir et l'abondance. Comment pourrions-nous symboliser plus éloquemment nos espérances et notre commune détermination de contribuer à la réalisation de la prophétie biblique:

De leurs glaives ils forgeront des socs
de charrue

Et de leurs lances, des faucilles.

Aucune nation ne lèvera plus l'épée
contre une autre,

Et l'on n'apprendra plus la guerre.

Comité canado-américain pour le commerce et les affaires économiques

LE Comité canado-américain pour le commerce et les affaires économiques, qui s'était déjà réuni à Washington en mars 1954, a tenu sa seconde réunion à Ottawa, le 26 septembre 1955. Les États-Unis y étaient représentés par M. John Foster Dulles, secrétaire d'État; M. George M. Humphrey, secrétaire au Trésor; M. Ezra Taft Benson, secrétaire à l'Agriculture; M. Sinclair Weeks, secrétaire au Commerce.

Le Canada était représenté par M. C. D. Howe, ministre du Commerce et de la Production de défense; M. J. G. Gardiner, ministre de l'Agriculture; M. L. B. Pearson, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures; M. W. E. Harris, ministre des Finances.

Outre les membres du Comité, M. Douglas Stuart, ambassadeur des États-Unis au Canada, et M. A. D. P. Heeney, ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis, ont pris part aux entretiens.

Symbole de relations étroites

Cet organisme a été institué par le Gouvernement des États-Unis et celui du Canada afin de permettre à ceux de leurs ministres dont relèvent les affaires économiques et commerciales de se rencontrer périodiquement et d'examiner ensemble les affaires présentant pour eux un commun intérêt. L'existence même de ce Comité constitue un symbole des relations étroites et amicales qui existent entre les deux pays, et manifeste l'intérêt que porte chacun à de nombreuses et fort diverses questions économiques de portée mutuelle. Les réunions de cet organisme complètent et développent les échanges quotidiens qui ont lieu entre représentants officiels et entre particuliers des deux pays.

A cette réunion, les échanges de vues ont porté principalement sur la politique générale du commerce, sur les progrès que marque le règlement des grands problèmes du commerce et des paiements internationaux ainsi que sur la politique commerciale en ce qui concerne les produits agricoles.

Le Comité a souligné qu'il importe de favoriser entre le Canada et les États-Unis des échanges commerciaux amples et croissants en même temps que profitables aux deux pays. Il a étudié les difficultés auxquelles ces échanges ont donné lieu de temps à autre. De l'avis de tous les membres du Comité, ces échanges s'accroîtraient de la façon la plus satisfaisante s'ils se produisaient dans le cadre d'un régime général de libération plus accentuée du commerce et des paiements. Alors les échanges multilatéraux contribueraient à établir sur une base saine et durable les rapports entre le Canada et les États-Unis, de même qu'entre ces deux pays et ceux du reste du monde avec lesquels ils entretiennent des relations. Le Comité a reconnu que toute politique et toute mesure qui tendent vers de tels objectifs influent considérablement sur la prospérité et la sécurité des deux pays.

Le Comité a fait observer que, grâce à la situation favorable de l'emploi et à une grande activité économique dans la plupart des régions du monde, le



— *Dominion-Wide*

RÉUNION DU COMITÉ CANADO-AMÉRICAIN POUR LE COMMERCE ET LES AFFAIRES ÉCONOMIQUES

A l'issue de leurs entretiens, les membres du Comité canado-américain pour le commerce et les affaires économiques se sont réunis à la résidence du Premier ministre, M. St-Laurent. De gauche à droite: M. George M. Humphrey, secrétaire à la Trésorerie (États-Unis); M. L. B. Pearson, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (Canada); M. John Foster Dulles, secrétaire d'État (États-Unis); M. St-Laurent; M. Ezra Taft Benson, secrétaire à l'Agriculture (États-Unis); M. J. G. Gardiner, ministre de l'Agriculture (Canada); M. C. D. Howe, ministre du Commerce (Canada); M. Sinclair Weeks, secrétaire au Commerce (États-Unis), et M. W. E. Harris, ministre des Finances (Canada).

volume des échanges internationaux s'était en général bien maintenu au cours de l'année écoulée. Bien qu'il y ait eu progrès, dans plusieurs pays, en ce qui concerne l'abolition des restrictions et la diminution des mesures discriminatoires, il reste beaucoup à faire dans ce domaine.

Le Comité a reconnu que de grandes accumulations, en plusieurs pays, de certains produits agricoles posaient des problèmes aigus mais, il faut l'espérer, temporaires. A défaut de solutions prudentes, ces problèmes peuvent nuire au commerce de ces produits et même avoir de funestes répercussions sur le commerce international en général. Tous les membres du Comité ont eu l'occasion de se faire part de leurs vues sur ces questions. Ils sont convenus que, pour résoudre ces problèmes, il y a lieu de tenir des consultations plus étroites afin de ne pas perturber le cours normal des marchés commerciaux.

L'idée de créer le Comité, a-t-on rappelé, a été lancée en 1953 au cours de conversations entre le Président Eisenhower et le Premier ministre M. St-Laurent, fait qui traduit le vif désir qu'ils ont toujours manifesté de créer une meilleure compréhension et d'affermir les relations entre les deux pays.

NOMINATIONS, MUTATIONS ET RETRAITES DANS LE SERVICE DIPLOMATIQUE DU CANADA

L'honorable major-général L.-R. LaFlèche, ambassadeur en Argentine, se retire du service diplomatique le 11 juillet 1955.

- M. D. M. Johnson est nommé commissaire canadien à la Commission internationale pour la surveillance et le contrôle au Vietnam, le 5 août 1955.
- M. H. O. Moran, ambassadeur en Turquie, est affecté provisoirement à l'administration centrale le 10 août 1955 et revient en congé au Canada.
- M. J. J. Hurley, haut commissaire à Ceylan, revient en congé au Canada, le 25 août 1955.
- M. O. W. Dier, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 1^{er} août 1955 à la délégation du Canada à Copenhague.
- M. A. F. Hart, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 2 août 1955 à l'ambassade du Canada à Belgrade.
- M^{lle} C. S. Weir, de l'administration centrale, est affectée le 2 août 1955 à la légation du Canada à Varsovie.
- M. R. E. Branscombe, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 3 août 1955 au consulat général du Canada à Chicago.
- M. J. G. H. Halstead, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 3 août 1955 à l'ambassade du Canada à Tokio.
- M. J. A. Cadwell, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 5 août 1955 à la Commission internationale pour la surveillance et le contrôle au Cambodge, au Laos et au Vietnam.
- M. F. M. Tovell, en mission à Copenhague, est affecté le 8 août 1955 à l'ambassade du Canada à Washington.
- M. G.-H. Blouin, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 8 août 1955 au consulat général du Canada à San-Francisco.
- M. W. E. Bauer, de la légation du Canada à Varsovie, est affecté le 11 août 1955 à la Commission internationale pour la surveillance et le contrôle au Vietnam (Hanoi).
- M. E. D. Wilgress, de l'ambassade du Canada à Rome, est affecté le 11 août 1955 à l'administration centrale.
- M. E. G. Smith, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 12 août 1955 au consulat général du Canada à New-York.
- M. G.-W. Charpentier, du haut commissariat du Canada à Canberra, revient en congé au Canada, le 13 août 1955.
- M. E. H. Gilmour, de l'ambassade du Canada à Washington, est affecté le 15 août 1955 à l'administration centrale.
- M. W. A. MacKay, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 15 août 1955 à des fonctions hors cadre à la Commission royale d'enquête sur les perspectives économiques du Canada.
- M. D. V. Smiley, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 20 août 1955 à la Commission internationale pour la surveillance et le contrôle au Cambodge (Phnom-penh).
- M. L.-V.-J. Roy, de l'administration centrale, est affecté provisoirement au haut Commissariat du Canada à Colombo, le 21 août 1955.
- M. F. C. Finnie, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 23 août 1955 à la délégation permanente du Canada à l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (Paris).
- M. J. O. Parry, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 23 août 1955 à la légation du Canada à Helsinki.
- M. L. Houzer, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 27 août 1955 à l'ambassade du Canada à Moscou.
- M. E. P. Black est affecté le 29 août 1955 à l'administration centrale, après un congé au Canada.
- M. I. W. Robertson, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 30 août 1955 à la délégation permanente du Canada auprès de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (Paris).
- M. G. S. Murray, de l'administration centrale, est affecté le 31 août 1955 à la délégation permanente du Canada auprès des Nations Unies (New-York).
- Sont entrés au Ministère à titre d'agent du service extérieur, classe 1: M^{lle} A. M. Matheson, MM. A. O. Chistoff, D. W. Fulford, le 2 août 1955; M^{lle} M. E. Kesselring, le 8 août 1955; M. J. W. Rogers, le 22 août 1955.

LES TRAITÉS

Faits courants

Multilatéraux

Accord entre les États Parties au Traité de l'Atlantique Nord sur la coopération dans le domaine des renseignements atomiques, fait à Paris le 22 juin 1955.

Signé par le Canada le 22 juin 1955.

Accord entre les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, du Canada, de l'Australie, de la Nouvelle-Zélande, de l'Union Sud-Africaine, de l'Inde et du Pakistan, d'une part, et du Gouvernement du Japon, d'autre part, au sujet des sépultures militaires du Commonwealth en territoire japonais.

Signé à Tokio, le 21 septembre 1955.

Bilatéraux

Ceylan

Échange de Notes, complémentaire à l'Échange de Notes du 11 juillet 1952, relatives au développement économique coopératif de Ceylan.

Signées à Colombo, le 5 juillet 1955.

En vigueur le 5 juillet 1955.

Danemark

Accord tendant à éviter les doubles impositions et à prévenir l'évasion fiscale en ce qui concerne les impôts sur le revenu.

Signé à Ottawa, le 30 septembre 1955.

Israël

Échange de Notes portant renonciation, sur une base de réciprocité, aux droits perçus sur les visas de non-immigrants.

Signées à Jérusalem et à Tel Aviv, les 7 février, 2 et 15 août 1955.

En vigueur le 1^{er} septembre 1955.

Japon

Échange de Notes donnant effet, à compter du 20 juillet 1955, à l'Accord relatif aux services de transports aériens, signé à Ottawa le 12 janvier 1955.

Signées à Tokio, le 20 juillet 1955.

États-Unis d'Amérique

Accord relatif aux dispositions financières pour le ravitaillement et les services portuaires fournis, à l'occasion de visites, aux navires de guerre de l'un ou l'autre pays.

Signé à Ottawa, le 21 juillet 1955.

Échange de Notes donnant effet, à compter du 21 juillet 1955, à l'Accord de coopération concernant les emplois civils de l'énergie atomique, signé à Washington, le 15 juin 1955.

Signées à Washington, les 21 et 22 juillet 1955.

Échange de Notes donnant effet, à compter du 22 juillet 1955, à l'Accord sur la coopération dans le domaine des renseignements atomiques aux fins de défense mutuelle, signé à Washington, le 15 juin 1955.

Signées à Washington, les 22 et 25 juillet 1955.

Échange de Notes relatives à l'aménagement et à l'utilisation d'un pipe-line pour le transport des pétroles entre le quai de l'Aviation militaire des États-Unis d'Amérique à Saint-Jean et la base aérienne de Pepperrell à Terre-Neuve.

Signées à Ottawa, le 22 septembre 1955.

En vigueur le 22 septembre 1955.

Publications

(On peut obtenir ces documents de l'Imprimeur de la Reine au prix indiqué).

Recueil des Traités 1954, N° 9: Constitution du Comité intergouvernemental pour les migrations européennes. Adoptée à Venise, le 19 octobre 1953. Textes anglais et français (prix: 25c.).

Recueil des Traités 1955, N° 2: Accord entre le Commonwealth Britannique et l'Égypte relatif aux sépultures militaires. Signé à Alexandrie, le 8 juin 1952. Textes anglais et français (prix: 25c.).

Recueil des Traités 1955, N° 4: Accord de commerce entre le Canada et le Portugal. Signé à Lisbonne, le 28 mai 1954. Textes anglais et français (prix: 25c.).

Recueil des Traités 1955, N° 6: Protocole d'accession au traité de l'Atlantique Nord de la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Signé à Paris, le 23 octobre 1954. Textes anglais et français (prix: 25c.).

Recueil des Traités 1955, N° 7: Convention sur la présence de forces étrangères sur le territoire de la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Fait à Paris, le 23 octobre 1954. Textes anglais et français (prix: 25c.).

Recueil des Traités 1955, N° 8: Échange de Notes (le 5 mai 1955) entre le Canada et les États-Unis d'Amérique régissant l'établissement d'un réseau lointain de guet avancé en territoire canadien. Signées à Washington, le 5 mai 1955. Textes anglais et français (prix: 25c.).

DOCUMENTS DES NATIONS UNIES SUR DES SUJETS D'ACTUALITÉ*

a) Publications imprimées:

Rapport du haut-commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés. A/2902 et Add.1. New-York, 1955. 38 pp. Documents officiels de l'Assemblée générale: dixième session, supplément n° 11.

Rapport annuel du Secrétaire général sur l'activité de l'Organisation, 1^{er} juillet 1954 au 15 juin 1955. A/2911. New-York, 1955. 131 pp. Documents officiels de l'Assemblée générale: dixième session, supplément n° 1.

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Résolutions de la vingtième session du Conseil économique et social, 5 juillet - 5 août 1955. E/2795. New-York, le 15 août 1955. 26 pp. Documents officiels de l'ECOSOC: vingtième session, supplément n° 1.

Le travail pénitentiaire. ST/SOA/SD/5. Juin 1955. 112 pp. Numéro de vente: 1955.IV.7.

UNESCO

Le financement de l'éducation. (XVIII^e Conférence internationale de l'instruction publique, Genève, 1955). 295 pp. \$2. UNESCO, Paris/BIE, Genève, 1955. Publication n° 162.

L'enseignement des arts plastiques dans les écoles primaires et secondaires. (XVIII^e Conférence internationale de l'instruction publique, Genève, 1955). 330 pp. \$2. UNESCO, Paris/BIE, Genève, 1955. Publication n° 164.

L'énergie nucléaire et ses utilisations pacifiques, par Gerald Wendt. (L'UNESCO et son programme—XIV). Paris 1955. 83 pp.

Écologie végétale. Actes du colloque de Montpellier. (Recherches sur la zone aride). Paris 1955. 124 pp. (bilingue). \$3.

Le théâtre dans le monde. Volume IV, n° 2: Le théâtre en Suède. 87 pp. iTi. Éditeur: Elsevier, Bruxelles.

* On peut se procurer les publications imprimées en anglais à la Ryerson Press (299 ouest, rue Queen, Toronto; en français à Periodica Inc. (5112 rue Papineau, Montréal); agents de vente des publications des Nations Unies au Canada. On peut également les obtenir en anglais des sous-agents suivants: Book Room Limited (Chronicle Building, Halifax); Librairie de l'Université McGill (Montréal); University of Toronto Press and Book Store (Toronto) et Librairie de l'Université de Colombie-Britannique (Vancouver); en français, de la Librairie de l'Université de Montréal (Montréal) et des Presses universitaires Laval de Québec. Certains documents photocopiés sont fournis contre abonnement annuel. On peut obtenir d'autres renseignements en s'adressant à la Section des ventes et du tirage, Nations Unies (New-York). Les maisons University of Toronto Press (Toronto) et Periodica Inc. (5112 rue Papineau, Montréal) distribuent les publications de l'UNESCO. On peut se procurer les publications de l'Organisation internationale du Travail au Bureau canadien de l'OIT, 95, rue Rideau, Ottawa. Publications et documents peuvent être consultés aux bibliothèques dont la liste apparaît à la page 72 du numéro de février 1955 d' "Affaires Extérieures".

DÉCLARATIONS ET DISCOURS


On peut se procurer à la Division de l'Information du ministère des Affaires extérieures, à Ottawa (Canada), les textes suivants diffusés au Canada et à l'étranger:

Politique étrangère du Canada, allocution du ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social, M. Paul Martin, au dîner de clôture de la Conférence canado-américaine, Université de Rochester (New-York), le 1^{er} septembre 1955 (n° 55/29).

Extraits d'une allocution du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. L. B. Pearson, au Women's Canadian Club, Vancouver (Colombie-Britannique), le 25 août 1955 (n° 55/30).

The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway, allocution du président de l'Administration de la voie maritime du Saint-Laurent, M. Lionel Chevrier, au Canadian Club d'Edmonton, le 6 septembre 1955 (n° 55/31).

Déclaration que M. Paul Martin, ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social et président de la délégation canadienne à la dixième session des Nations Unies, a faite au cours d'une séance plénière de l'Assemblée générale, le 26 septembre 1955 (n° 55/32).



AIDE FOURNIE DANS LE CADRE DU PLAN DE COLOMBO

Une brève cérémonie a eu lieu le 1^{er} août à Montréal pour marquer le début du chargement d'un envoi d'appareils et de matériel de construction lourde valant \$2,500,000 et destiné au projet d'aménagement hydro-électrique et d'irrigation de Warsak, que le Canada entreprendra dans le cadre du Plan de Colombo.

En présence du haut commissaire du Pakistan au Canada, Son Excellence M. Mirza Osman Ali Baig (au centre), du sous-secrétaire d'État associé aux Affaires extérieures, M. R. M. Macdonnell (à gauche), et de M. R. G. Nik Cavell, une expédition symbolique de marchandises en caisses à claire-voie, portant sur une large banderole la mention: « Canada-Pakistan, Colombo Plan », est chargée à bord du « City of Doncaster » au quai n° 15, peu après midi.

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Imprimeur de la Reine et Contrôleur de la Papeterie, 1955

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Department of External Affairs

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CANADA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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Mr. Pearson's Visit to the U.S.S.R.

THE Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, was a guest of the Government of the U.S.S.R. from October 5 to 12. Given below are the texts of statements made by Mr. Pearson relating to the visit, and of the joint communique issued on its conclusion.

Statement Made by Mr. Pearson at Moscow on October 5

I should like to express my pleasure at being here and my sincere thanks for the very cordial reception which has been given us on arrival.

Mrs. Pearson and I are grateful for this opportunity of visiting Moscow and some other parts of this vast land. We also hope to be able to see something of the life and work of the peoples of the Soviet Union who were our courageous allies in two world conflicts, and who know as few peoples have ever known, the cruelty, devastation and tragedy of war. I am also, of course looking forward to an exchange of views on world problems with Soviet leaders. This will, I hope, enable us better to understand each other's points of view.

In its international relations, my Government, strongly supported by the people of Canada, has worked steadfastly for the establishment throughout the world of peace and justice, freedom and welfare, for all people. We have no other purpose in our hearts or minds. But the pursuit and achievement of these aims require not only effective co-operation between governments but better understanding between peoples. This can be assisted by greater knowledge of each other; by the exchange of visits and of views.

There are special reasons why such co-operation and understanding is desirable between the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Canada. We are neighbours across the North Pole. Though you are much greater in numbers than we are, we have common problems in our vast distances; in the variety and, indeed, the severity of our climate; in the extent and nature of our material resources and the crying need for their peaceful development in the interests of the people. It seems to me, therefore, important that we should come, to know one another better and more clearly understand our respective problems and points of view so that we can work together to avoid a war which would engulf and destroy

It is my strong hope that my present visit will contribute in some small way to this great purpose of peace with justice between peoples.

Joint Communiqué

A joint communique was issued as follows in Moscow on Wednesday, October 12, on the conclusion of Mr. Pearson's visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

From October 5 to 12 as a guest of the Soviet Government, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Lester B. Pearson visited the U.S.S.R.



ARRIVAL AT MOSCOW

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, left, is met by Mr. V. M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., centre, and Mr. Yakushin, Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R.

During his stay in Moscow, Mr. Pearson met leading statesmen of the Soviet State and had discussions with the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., Mr. V. M. Molotov; the Minister of Foreign Trade, Mr. I. G. Kabanov; and with the acting Minister for Culture of the U.S.S.R., Mr. S. V. Kaftanov.

In discussions during these meetings there took part on the Canadian side the following persons accompanying Mr. Pearson: the Associate Deputy Minister for Trade and Commerce, Mr. M. W. Sharp; the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. J. W. Holmes; as well as Mr. J. B. C. Watkins, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Canada to the U.S.S.R.

On the Soviet side there took part in discussions the Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., Mr. V. A. Zorin; the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R. to Canada, Mr. D. S. Chuvakhin; and the Chief of the Second European Department of the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R., Mr. V. Y. Yerofeyev.

These meetings and discussions took place in a cordial atmosphere and ranged over a wide variety of subjects, including matters of specific concern to their two countries as well as others of major international significance. The exchange has resulted in a clearer understanding of each other's point of view which should assist in promotion of good relations between the two countries.

It was recognized that there were no problems between nations or group of nations which were incapable of solution by peaceful means if goodwill and a sincere desire for strengthening peace and friendly relations between nations were present. Mr. Molotov and Mr. Pearson expressed their satisfaction at the fact that the points of view in the United Nations sub-Committee on disarmament of which the U.S.S.R. and Canada are members had come closer together and it was established that both sides had common views with regard to the necessity to facilitate early solution of the disarmament problem. It was agreed that for such an achievement the development of confidence and trust between nations and growth of a sense of security was vitally important. This end should be served by measures directed at further relaxation in international tensions. It was noted with satisfaction that the decisions of the conference of Heads of Governments of the Four Powers in Geneva in July last had facilitated relaxation of tension in international relations although many problems still remained to be solved.

In connection with Mr. Molotov's co-Chairmanship of the Geneva Conference and Canada's membership in the International Supervisory Commission for Indochina an occasion for discussion of problems of Indochina was presented. It was agreed that in spite of difficulties, the object of implementation of the Geneva Agreements while maintaining the truce and avoiding further hostilities should be pursued.

Possibilities of Trade Agreement

Advantage was also taken of Mr. Pearson's visit to explore the possibility of concluding a trade agreement between Canada and the U.S.S.R. on a mutually beneficial basis with the most favoured nation principle being observed. The desirability of measures directed towards removal of barriers to international trade generally was recognized by both Ministers. There was a sufficient measure of agreement to warrant resumption of negotiations shortly in Ottawa which were started in Moscow and which will, it is hoped, produce positive results of benefit to both countries.

In the course of the discussions held, it was agreed that mistrust and misunderstanding could be to some measure dispelled by greater exchange of visits, both official and unofficial. It was agreed that every effort should be made to remove obstacles to the freer flow of information and views and to develop as much as possible cultural, scientific and technical contacts. It was agreed in the first place to consider means of scientific and technical co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and Canada in industry, transport, and agriculture and an exchange of information on scientific research in Arctic regions.

It was also agreed that visits by Parliamentary Delegations could contribute to better mutual understanding between the U.S.S.R. and Canada and strengthen the ties between them.

The Foreign Ministers recognized that their governments' differences of approach to political and economic problems should not be a hindrance to co-operation on many practical subjects on the basis of mutual interest and desire to promote peace and good neighbourly relations. Such co-operation would be based on the principle of noninterference by each country in the domestic affairs of the other and would be inspired by a desire by both to



VISIT TO AGRICULTURAL EXHIBITION

Mr. and Mrs. Pearson visit the Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow on October 7 and receive a gift from the Chairman of the Exhibition. Left to right, front: Mr. V. N. Tsitsin, Chairman of the Exhibition, and Mr. G. Ignatieff, of the Department of External Affairs.

work together for the establishment of international peace and ensuring of security.

Before leaving the U.S.S.R. Mr. Pearson visited the Crimea where he was received by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., Mr. N. A. Bulganin, and by the member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R., Mr. N. S. Khrushchev.

Statement Made by Mr. Pearson at Stalingrad

My colleagues and I are very glad to have this opportunity of visiting Stalingrad. The name of this city will always stand for the outstanding courage and prowess in arms of the Russian people and of her armed forces. We have also heard of the heroic feats of reconstruction carried out here, which makes Stalingrad a symbol of achievement in peace, as well as victory in war.

Stalingrad marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Allies in the last war. It was as crucial in this respect in the Eastern front as the landings on the Normandy beachheads were on the Western. From Stalingrad onward, the great Soviet armies passed from the defensive to the counter-offensive which swept them on to final victory. Likewise on the Normandy beachheads, where Canadian troops from three thousand miles across the sea, had partici-

pated in hard fighting, the Western allies moved forward until eventually they clasped hands with their Soviet allies over the ruins of Nazi tyranny.

It is therefore with sincere feelings of admiration that I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the war heroism and sacrifice of the Russian people symbolized in this city. It also gives me pleasure to recall the victorious co-operation in war between the Soviet Union and Canada which is evoked by the memory of the great battle which was fought here. It is my hope that this co-operation can also take place in the effort to establish and maintain a secure and just peace and to promote the welfare of peoples. May that struggle also end in victory.

Press Interview at Basra on October 13

Bearing in mind that we were official guests of the Soviet Government, enjoying generous hospitality; that we therefore saw only one side of the picture and that our impressions are accordingly bound to be somewhat superficial, the chief impression from the visit was one of massive collective energy, strength and wealth, along with individual deprivations.

A group of strong and able men are in charge in the Soviet Union, who profess no other desire than to be left in peace to build the country and solve their problems, of which they admit they have a good many.

It is difficult to doubt the sincerity of the ordinary people of the Soviet Union in their protest against war; the fear of war must be very real in places like Stalingrad.

As regards Canada-Soviet relations, the fact that we are neighbours was constantly emphasized by the Soviet leaders together with their desire to increase mutual contacts, especially in trade.

There was a good deal of talk about the "Spirit of Geneva", but the Soviet leaders do not underestimate the difficulties that lie ahead in translating that spirit into action.

The Soviet leaders stated their views on the international situation with frankness, and I replied with equal frankness in giving the Western point of view.

The visit, as a whole, was not only very interesting but also very worthwhile, as I feel that I am in a better position to understand the sources of Soviet power and the nature of Soviet policy. I hope that in turn the Soviet leaders might have learned a little bit more about Western views; particularly that, in or out of NATO, the West is not, and will not become aggressive or war-mongering; that the West is as vitally concerned, as Soviet leaders told me they were, with peace and security.

Khrushchev said to me in the Crimea, "We are not going to attack anybody and you say that neither the U.S. nor anybody else in the West will attack anybody". Then he added, "So we will work things out somehow". After this visit, short and specialized though it was, I hope more than ever that "We will, and in the right way".

The Colombo Plan

*The meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee held in Singapore
October 17-21, 1955.*

THE annual meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee was held this year in Singapore from October 17 to 21. The chairman of this year's meeting was Mr. David Marshall, leader of the Singapore delegation. Mr. Marshall is also the first elected Chief Minister of Singapore. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson was the leader of the Canadian delegation.

In addition to reviewing progress under the Colombo Plan and defining the task which lies ahead, the Committee this year decided to continue the Plan to June 30, 1961. The period covered by the original Plan would have ended on June 30, 1957.

Progress in the Area During the Past Year

As at previous meetings of the Consultative Committee, an opportunity was taken to review the progress in co-operative economic development throughout South and Southeast Asia during the past year. The basis of these discussions was furnished by each country's survey of its own development. These surveys together with the Committee's assessment of the problems of the area as a whole, were incorporated in a draft report prepared by officials at their preliminary meeting for the consideration of the ministers. After full discussion, agreement was reached on the text of the Fourth Annual Report which became available for publication in the capitals of member countries late in November.

The period which was reviewed at this year's meeting represented the fourth year of operation of the Colombo Plan. Most of the countries of the area have been able to maintain and a few surpassed their previous rate of economic progress. In general the Asian countries were able to show noticeable increase in national income and output particularly in industrial and mineral production and power generation. Favourable world economic conditions created an increased demand during the year for the products of the area and made it easier for developing countries to obtain the capital equipment they need. However, it was recognized that the prices of some commodities such as rice have fallen, and countries dependent on the export of these commodities have had special difficulties.

Because of the special conditions which exist in this area, it is not easy to gather precise statistical data. However, it is perhaps worth noting some of the improvements which have been shown by the economic indicators as taking place in various sectors of the economy of the area. In the industrial sector remarkable progress has been achieved. Expansion of electric power capacity, frequently an integral part of multi-purpose schemes, has been a major development goal. All of the countries show an increase over the past year in their electric power capacity, with very significant increases in both India and Pakistan. The increase in electrical capacity for the area last year

was estimated at 13 per cent over the previous year. Other aspects also showed marked improvement. For example, cement production increased by 17 per cent and the output of steel by 12 per cent and the manufacture of jute, a staple for some of the countries of the area, by 6 per cent.

During 1954-55, the countries of the area were able to devote over \$2,100,000,000 to development expenditures in the public sector as compared with expenditures of \$1,417,000,000 in 1953-54. More than two-fifths of the expenditure was directed to agriculture, one-quarter to transport and one-quarter to social welfare. Most of the countries are hopeful that they will be able to achieve an even higher expenditure in 1955-56.

The Committee recognized that the substantial amounts of capital made available over the past five years by the contributing governments, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and by other institutions has assisted the countries of South and Southeast Asia in furthering their development programmes.

The Task Ahead

While it was recognized that the Colombo Plan has made a significant and lasting contribution to the economic welfare of South and Southeast Asia, the Committee emphasized the problems which remain. The Colombo Plan, of course, is not in itself a blueprint and has no centralized control over development programmes. However, each year by discussing their mutual problems and by reviewing personal contacts, the ministers and officials from member countries are in a position to appraise the needs of the area and determine the adequacy of available resources. It is to help meet these needs that external aid is made available by the more developed member governments to their Asian partners.

The general views which emerged from the review of the situation at the recent meeting may be summarized as follows:

- (a) Recent experience, in a period when not all countries of the area benefited from world economic conditions which were generally favourable to the economic expansion of the area as a whole, has brought out once again the wide differences that exist in the economic situations of the different countries.
- (b) Considerable progress has been made and some of the earlier plans are now bearing fruit, but much more still has to be done and some of the tasks ahead will be even harder.
- (c) While the need for capital from outside the area remains, the close-linked problem of mobilizing domestic resources is of paramount importance. This is true both for public and private capital, and for development in the public as well as the private sector.
- (d) The many common economic problems calling for the co-operation of all countries in the region, possibly in new ways, have been thrown into sharper focus.

One of the most complex problems still facing the countries of the area is the difficulty of maintaining adequate levels of food production in the face of



—Standard

COLOMBO PLAN CONFERENCE AT SINGAPORE

The Secretary of State for External Affairs and leader of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. L. B. Pearson, addressing a meeting of the Colombo Plan Conference.

a rapidly increasing population. In the Annual Report, the Committee summarized this problem in the following way:

When the progress achieved so far, not only in food production but in economic development generally, is compared with the fundamental problem of raising the living standards of a rapidly increasing population, it is clear that much remains to be done. Current levels of per capita food consumption are substantially higher than in postwar years but are lower than before the war and below accepted standards of nutrition.

At the same time the population of the area as a whole is estimated to be increasing by about 10 million persons a year. This rapid growth, deriving from an increasing birth rate and from the less often recognized phenomenon of a falling death rate, is a fact of singular importance for the future development of the area and the improvement of its living standards. . . In practically every country of the region under-employment, especially in rural areas, is common and in some countries unemployment has become a serious issue . . . Development plans have, therefore, both a current and long term problem to meet, if opportunities for employment in activities beneficial to the economy generally, are to be created at a rate sufficient not only to keep up with the annual increase in the labour force, but to overtake it.

The review also brought out the difficulties experienced in a number of countries in expanding their domestic budgetary resources. Since there is usually a time-lag between the investment outlay on large scale projects and

the return in the establishment of increased output and incomes, tax receipts in many cases have been slow to rise at a time when considerable increased investment is becoming necessary. In these circumstances a number of governments have found it useful to improve the structure and revise the general level of their taxation and in some cases resort to judicious credit creation. Many of the countries of the area rely on external trade not only for foreign exchange but also in a large measure from import and export duties for external budgetary revenues. A fall in export earnings which some of the countries experienced, coupled with necessary restrictions on imports, contributed to a fall in budgetary receipts. This set up what the Report describes as "a vicious circle with development checked for lack of financial resources while resources remain low for lack of development."

To offset this problem the Report emphasizes the need for greater development in the private sector. It was recognized that only limited financial resources were available in the countries of the area, for private firms to draw on. However, this situation is to some extent being remedied by setting up financial institutions with government support for the undertaking, in the private sector, of approved investments which fit in with the planned programme development.

Need for External Capital

Throughout the meeting it was stressed by representatives of individual countries that the need for external capital remains as a crucial supplement to the direct efforts being made by the Asian countries. In view of the normal ratio of foreign exchange requirements to the local costs of development in Asia a given amount of external capital could be expected to facilitate investment some three to five times its value in monetary terms. In order to secure this beneficial result, strenuous efforts will be required on the part of the countries of the area to mobilize their internal financial resources.

The Committee recognized that external capital may come from friendly governments, international institutions and private investors. Capital from governments and international institutions such as the International Bank has been made available at an increasing rate and many governments in the area are devoting greater attention to the needs of utilizing their external aid as rapidly and as efficiently as possible. The Committee also recognized the importance of maintaining an increased flow of private capital to the area. With this in mind a number of governments are adopting policies designed to help increase foreign capital. It is expected that the International Finance Corporation to which Canada has pledged over \$3 million as its contribution, will be useful in helping to finance private undertakings in this as well as in other parts of the world.

Prominent also is the need for greater technical skills which, at least as much as finance, are the key to economic progress and social welfare. Under the various technical assistance schemes nearly 7,200 places have been found for trainees outside their own countries, of which some 2,200 places were found in the past year. Similarly some 1,200 experts were provided during the year to the countries of South and Southeast Asia, bringing the total to 3,700. The Consultative Committee recognized that this type of contribution is of great

significance. They also considered means of extending the scope, increasing the volume and improving the operation of the technical assistance programmes.

The Report concludes its analysis of the task ahead with this summing up:

This outline is necessarily brief and such conclusions as it seeks to draw are inevitably provisional. If it seems to lay undue stress on problems and difficulties, this is because it is the business of the Consultative Committee to consider such matters, and by the sharing of experience to help towards finding solutions. This should not obscure the solid achievements recorded and the great efforts that have gone into securing them. The idea of co-operative effort, both within each country and between countries, is spreading ever more widely and deeply. The concept of international economic co-operation embodied in the Colombo Plan is of special significance in world history, and as the Plan enters its fifth year its members may take courage from all that has been accomplished and prepare themselves to meet the challenge of the task ahead.

Role of Atomic Energy*

At this year's meeting considerable attention was devoted to the important role which the development of atomic research and nuclear energy might play in the economic development of South and Southeast Asia. Mr. Pearson informed the Conference of the announcement made in September that the Indian and Canadian Governments were embarking on a project in which Canada would provide a high-powered and versatile research reactor to India under the Colombo Plan. This research reactor will be similar to the NRX reactor now in operation in Canada at Chalk River. Mr. Pearson indicated that the external costs of the proposed reactor would be financed by Canada in such a manner as not to reduce the amount of aid which otherwise would have been made available to other Colombo Plan countries, including India, for more conventional projects. For its part, the Indian authorities have agreed that they will make this reactor available for use by scientists from other countries including those in the Colombo Plan area.

During the Conference the United States Delegation suggested the establishment under the auspices of the Colombo Plan of a centre in South and Southeast Asia for nuclear research and training. The United States Government would be prepared to contribute substantially towards such a centre, which would supplement existing facilities for basic training in the various fields relating to the peaceful application of atomic energy. The United States delegation emphasized that their offer and the Canadian offer to India mutually complemented each other and multiplied the potential benefits to be derived from atomic energy research.

Future Contributions

All of the delegations represented at the Conference were unanimous in their desire to continue the Plan beyond June 30, 1957. Mr. Pearson and the Canadian delegation actively supported the extension of the Colombo Plan until 1961 with the understanding that the future of the Plan would be further examined in 1959.

* See also page 300.

During the Conference several delegations indicated that they proposed to maintain or increase their contributions next year to the Colombo Plan. Mr. Pearson outlined Canada's intentions for next year in the following words:

So far as next year's activities under the Colombo Plan are concerned the Canadian Government proposes to ask the next session of Parliament to make a significant increase in Canada's contribution above the amount of \$26.4 million which we are making available this year. The bulk of the increase would be for the purpose of meeting that part of the costs of the proposed atomic Reactor arising next year and for covering the increase in costs occurring in that year for certain other large projects already under way such as the Warsak project in Pakistan. In addition I am hopeful that with this increase we shall be able to begin some modest but very worthwhile projects particularly those involving technical assistance and equipment in those countries which have not been receiving much assistance from Canada in the past but with whose needs we are becoming more familiar.

During the Conference Mr. Pearson indicated some of the steps which were already being taken to provide aid to those countries in the area which had not yet received much assistance from Canada. He told the Conference that a Cobalt beam therapy unit would be made available to Burma and that necessary training for Burmese technicians would be provided under the technical co-operation scheme. He also informed the Conference that a Mission from Canada would shortly visit Indonesia with a view to determining how Canada might assist that country in developing its engineering training facilities; and this same Mission would also examine the desirability of Canada providing some assistance for a resources survey. Many other possible projects in these and other countries of the area including Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were discussed by the individual Asian countries with the Canadian delegation at Singapore.

International Control of Narcotic Drugs

By Kenneth C. Hossick, Director, Division of Narcotic Control, Department of National Health and Welfare, Ottawa, and Canadian Representative, United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

The control of narcotic drugs, a matter of vital concern to Governments, to many professions, and to individuals, has been the subject of international consultation and co-operation since early in this century. From 1909, when the first International Meeting on Opium was convened in Shanghai, until 1953, when an Opium Conference was held in New York, there have been concluded a number of international treaties, agreements and protocol relating to narcotic control, to which Canada has become a party. In this article I examine the workings of the highly complex international machinery of narcotic control and its relation to Canadian narcotic law. I will also try to demonstrate that the problem of narcotic drugs is in no sense a problem confined to Canada alone, or even to our so-called Western civilization. It is in every sense an international and a world-wide problem.



Mr. Kenneth C. Hossick


In itself, the legitimate use of narcotic drugs, if properly handled, is neither dangerous nor harmful. Indispensable to modern medicine, narcotics are used the world over to alleviate pain and restore health. Thus used, they bring great benefit to suffering humanity: abused, they can cause havoc and misery. The social dangers of drug addiction are well known and need no further elucidation.

Dual Nature

This dual nature of narcotic drugs—stress-relieving and addiction-causing properties—has made it necessary that they be subject to the most stringent international control. Consequently, in the general interest of the world community some seventy governments, parties to international treaties on narcotics, have agreed to renounce certain prerogatives of national sovereignty, and have accepted a system of international narcotics control. Formerly confined to opium, coca alkaloids and *cannabis sativa*, this control is now extended to cover recently discovered synthetic drugs such as Demerol, (*Pethidine*) and Dromoran (*Levorphan*). The international agreements which have been concluded are designed to ensure that the manufacture, trade and consumption of narcotic drugs are devoted to legitimate needs only.

The Organs of International Narcotic Control

The chart which follows shows the organs of international control of narcotic drugs, as at present constituted.



As shown in this chart, the 15-member Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) is the governing body entrusted with the overall supervision of the implementation by governments of the International Treaties on Narcotic Drugs. This body must consider and, where it sees fit, approve recommendations of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, a technical commission which meets once every year and reviews data on narcotic drugs collected and presented to it by the Narcotic Division of the United Nations Secretariat. It is a Commission function to recommend, by means of resolutions submitted to the Economic and Social Council, that governments take certain action with regard to international control of narcotics and implementation of treaties. One of the most important continuing tasks of the Commission and the United Nations Secretariat has been to draft a single treaty encompassing the essentials of the nine existing narcotics treaties (including the United Nations opium protocol, which has not yet entered into force). The Commission and the Secretariat have been working on this project for several years.

The Economic and Social Council may accept or reject a proposal of the Commission by a majority vote; alternatively it may refer it back to the Commission for further study before making any representations to governments.

When approved, resolutions of the Council dealing with narcotics control are transmitted to member governments of the United Nations to be referred by them to the narcotics control agencies in their countries.

Col. C. H. L. Sharman, CMG., CBE., ISO., who retired in 1954, was Canadian Representative to the Narcotic Drugs Commission for more than 20 years.

The Permanent Central Opium Board is composed of eight persons appointed in an individual capacity and for a term of five years by the Economic and Social Council. Established by the Convention of February 19, 1925, the Board is charged with the continuous surveillance of the licit movements of narcotic drugs with a view to preventing licitly produced drugs being diverted into illicit channels. It receives from parties to the Conventions of February 19, 1925, and July 13, 1931, statistics on imports and exports of narcotics, including stocks, seizures, manufacture and trade; from this data, the Board prepares an annual report to the contracting parties and to the Economic and Social Council. The Board is empowered to take semi-judicial measures against countries which fail to carry out their obligations under the international narcotics treaties or are in danger of becoming centres of the illicit traffic.

The functions of the Drug Supervisory Body are described below.

The World Health Organization, a Specialized Agency of the United Nations, with headquarters in Geneva, has been entrusted with the specific responsibility of extending international control to new drugs and, in particular, of estimating the properties of these new drugs and determining whether they should be classed as narcotics or not. This work is carried out with the co-operation of the United States Government at the Bethesda, Maryland, clinical centre for pharmacology and chemistry and at the Lexington Drug Addiction research centre. The Drug Addiction Committee of the National Research Council of the United States also gives great assistance to the World Health Organization.

Approach to Narcotics Control in Various Countries

It is interesting to note the differences in many countries in the type of governmental agency which control narcotic drugs. In Canada, which is a non-manufacturing and non-producing country, the Narcotic Act is essentially criminal law, the administration of which is the responsibility of the Division of Narcotic Control of the Department of National Health and Welfare, with the criminal side of the Act being enforced by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. However, in the United States of America, which is primarily a narcotic-manufacturing country, narcotic legislation is in the "nature of a taxing measure designed to have the effect of regulating the domestic trade and distribution of narcotic drugs". It is, therefore, not purely criminal law as in Canada. The United Kingdom, like the United States, is also a manufacturing country and control of "Dangerous Drugs" in that country is treated in a somewhat special way, i.e., as a national problem arising out of international obligations. The United Kingdom Minister responsible for the administration of the United Kingdom Dangerous Drugs Act, 1951, is the Secretary of State for the Home Department (the Home Secretary).

In France, the control of narcotic drugs is based on legislation and regulations which are essentially of a preventive nature, and are based on a most

simple principle: "no narcotic drugs—no toxicomaniacs (addicts)"; the control and enforcement of the regulations are centralized at the Central Pharmacy Services, Ministry of Public Health. India, one of the largest producers of opium in the world, has one of the most complete methods of control. In India, narcotic control is the responsibility of the Minister of Finance (Revenue Division) since opium is classed as a revenue-producing agricultural product.

Regardless of whether a country is a narcotic manufacturer, a producer of primary natural products, or, like Canada, a consumer, all narcotic legislation has one essential principle in common—to control very closely any narcotic substance from its origin until it is legally consumed, and thus to prevent it from being misused at any stage in this process.

Control Procedures in Canada and Internationally

The control of narcotics in Canada is governed by the Narcotic and Opium Drug Act and Regulations, the last important amendments to which were adopted by Parliament in 1954. Since it is a matter of prime importance to control drugs from their origin to their consumption, the Regulations include detailed provisions for the maintenance of accounts of narcotic transactions. Under these Regulations, wholesale druggists in Canada (who number approximately 160) are required to submit monthly reports on sales of all narcotic drugs. The Division of Narcotics Control maintains on individual cards a record of drugs received by all hospitals, physicians, dentists, veterinary surgeons and retail druggists. As many as 14,000 entries are made monthly, indicating the number of transactions which go on between the various professions in one month.

Wholesalers also submit reports on the quantities of drugs on hand at the end of each year. These statements, together with import and export data, are used to prepare estimates of Canada's narcotic requirements for medical and scientific purposes. The yearly estimated requirements are then sent to the Secretariat of the Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory Body, which, as indicated in the chart above, function independently of the Narcotic Commission (although they are represented on the Commission).

Every year the Supervisory Body assesses the requirements in narcotic drugs of each country and territory throughout the world. Since the quantity of raw material for the manufacture of these drugs is known, and its importation can be adjusted to the requirements for authorized manufacture, it is therefore possible to adjust effectively the legitimate manufacture of narcotics to legitimate world demands. All channels of distribution, national and international, are subject to control and all commercial transactions, national and international, are recorded, with statistics being transmitted periodically to the Supervisory Body. The functioning of this system is constantly being supervised and co-ordinated by the international organs concerned.

There remain, of course, many loopholes yet to be closed up. A solution of the problem of over-production of raw material, with its consequent entry into the illicit market, was one of the main objectives of the 1953 Opium Protocol, which is designed to limit the production of opium strictly to medical and scientific needs. Although ratified by a number of countries, including Canada, the Protocol is not yet in effect.

To sum up, the narcotics industry now operates to a great extent according to an internationally conceived and enforced plan. One fact is perhaps worth emphasizing—social and humanitarian reasons, and not economic or financial ones, led to the establishment of international regulations. In the general interest of the community of states, governments fully consented to limit their own freedom of action and to transfer certain powers to international organs, also conferring upon them the power to apply sanctions against an offending state.

Scientific Research on Opium in Canada

The magnitude of the problem of controlling narcotics is indicated by the fact that in 1954 over 35 tons of illicit opium was seized throughout the world. Had it not been seized, this opium would otherwise have been converted into 140,000 ozs. of heroin with a value in illicit world markets of about one billion dollars, i.e., about one quarter of Canada's national budget in the last fiscal year. Canada has, therefore, a vital and self-evident interest in the effective control of production and distribution of opium. In collaboration with at least fifteen other countries, work in this field has been carried on in Canada since 1949 under the direction of Dr. Charles G. Farmilo, head of the federal narcotic laboratory in the Food and Drug Directorate at Ottawa. The work of Dr. Farmilo and his colleagues has been of great importance in establishing that the origin of seized samples of opium can be determined by scientific methods. Canada can well be proud of the achievements of its narcotic research scientists who have gained international recognition for their work in this field.

Conclusion

I have tried to show how the work of creating and setting in motion the machinery of international control, the methods employed, and the results obtained, are in the nature of a laboratory experiment with the world as its test tube. Social research has, with patience and imagination, led to results which may eventually have an unforeseen and far-reaching influence on society, far transcending the sphere of narcotic drugs. If I may in conclusion quote from the speech of Senator de Brouchere, President of the 1931 Conference for Limiting Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs:

This is an immense piece of work—nothing of the kind has ever been attempted before . . . If a similar system could be established for far more dangerous drugs and far more murderous weapons, humanity would have made a considerable advance.

In 1955, these words are of even greater significance. If the principles on which are based international treaties of narcotic control could be applied to atomic weapons, peace would be within our reach.

Canada and the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The International Agency for Atomic Energy

On October 27, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted without dissent an eighteen-power Resolution recommending the early establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency, whose primary function will be to encourage and assist world wide research on, and development of, the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The resolution also recommended that a second international conference for the exchange of technical information regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be held under the auspices of the United Nations in two or three years time.

Canada, besides co-sponsoring the joint resolution, was one of the eight countries which drew up the draft statute for the Agency which was distributed to Governments on August 17 last for their consideration and comments. Under this draft statute the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and Canada will become members of the Agency's first Board of Governors in virtue of their status as "the most important contributors of technical assistance and fissionable materials."

Canadian Statement

On October 10 during the general debate in the First Committee on the item "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", Mr. Paul Martin, Minister of National Health and Welfare and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, referred to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the following words:

At the ninth General Assembly Canada had the honour to be one of the co-sponsors of the resolution, adopted unanimously, which dealt with the proposed establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency. What progress has been made in carrying out the terms of the resolution? If I may borrow a saying from my medical friends, "Slower than hoped for but much better than expected."

The drafting of a constitution which will ensure the establishment of the Agency on a sound foundation, so that it will be able to fulfil its role with maximum effectiveness and with the greatest measure of support from potential member nations, has admittedly been complex and difficult. However, by the time of the conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in Geneva last August, the work had advanced to the point where the United States representative was able to announce that the eight nations (including Canada) which had been discussing the possible establishment of the agency had reached agreement on a draft statute and that this draft statute would be distributed to member countries of the United Nations.

It is our hope that the draft statute will find general favour and that it will be implemented at an early date, so that the Agency will be in a position as soon as possible to get on with its important work of aiding in the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy throughout the world, and in doing so,

will provide a basis for peaceful co-operation in our time as perhaps nothing else can or will,

All State members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies have received copies of the draft statute and, undoubtedly, will have constructive comments to offer. Last year, in this Committee, it was generally accepted in the debate—and tacitly acknowledge in the resolution—that the detailed negotiation on the Statute must be left to a small group of states. The resolution suggests that when the agency is established it shall negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations. Mr. Pearson, in his statement to the last General Assembly, said that “this is one field in which the United Nations should not, and I am confident will not, be by-passed.” My Government continues to be strongly of the view that the Agency, once established, should negotiate an appropriate form of agreement with the United Nations.

For the present it would seem to be most advantageous to follow the procedure envisaged in the resolution and the one which I am sure will lead most quickly to the establishment of an agency; the resolution provided in fact “that the views of members which have manifested their interest be fully considered.” Each nation can therefore assist by submitting comments on the draft statute as soon as possible. The Canadian Government as one of the negotiating states, for its part, will welcome all these comments and consider them most earnestly in reviewing the Statute which will ultimately be submitted for individual approval.

It will have been noted that the draft statute as it now stands makes careful provision for the representation in the structure of the agency of the various interests involved and in particular of the major areas of the world. Special account has been taken of the under-developed countries and of their requirements. We hope that countries from other areas than those which are now or potentially the major contributors will examine the draft statute and offer suggestions to ensure that the agency is so devised that it can serve adequately their present and future needs. We for our part are anxious that the agency should be the instrument of the common goal and that like other United Nations Agencies it should play an important and ever increasing role in fostering the establishment of conditions of greater equality in opportunities between all countries. We note with approval the decision of the Soviet Government to support the proposals to set up the international agency. My Government may wish to comment on the various detailed suggestions put forward in this connection by the Soviet Government when there has been an opportunity to examine them.

Revised Resolution

When Mr. Martin made the above statement, the Canadian Delegation had not yet associated itself as a co-sponsor with any of the draft resolutions which had thus far been introduced during the debate in the First Committee on “Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy”. However, the Delegation eventually asked to be listed as a co-sponsor of a substantially revised version of the draft resolution on the Atomic Energy Agency which had originally been tabled on October 6 by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States. Commenting on this revised resolution, Mr. Martin made the following statement in the First Committee on October 26.

This cumulative effect of debate, submission of alternative resolutions and of amendments, and of informal discussions among delegations is clearly ap-

parent to anyone who compares the text of the present draft resolution, of which Canada is a co-sponsor with the text of the original draft.

Major Alterations

Among the major alterations, all relating to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, are the following:

1. The resolution now refers to a conference of all members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies to consider the final text of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Substantial progress has been made already towards the establishment of this Agency and the draft statute has been circulated to governments for their consideration and comment. We sincerely hope that much further progress will be made along these lines and that governments will not delay in forwarding their comments as requested. However, we also welcome the intention now embodied in the draft resolution to launch the agency at an international conference which will be even wider in its membership than the present General Assembly and which will have the final say on the text of the Statute of the new international Agency. Whatever may be the interpretation on this point, I cannot too strongly say that the conference is not intended to be a ritual merely to approve something previously conceived. There is a danger that advantage will not be taken of opportunities to make suggestions and to provide improvements to this statute so that the final document will be the best conceivable instrument to launch into being this most significant act of the United Nations.

2. The resolution now requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee, to study the question of the relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations and to transmit the results of this study to governments before the conference which I have mentioned above is convened. We all know and welcome the intense interest of the Secretary-General in the development of international co-operation with respect to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Our draft resolution records the Assembly's appreciation of the Secretary-General's work in preparing and organizing the Conference on Atomic Energy held in Geneva. The question of the proper relationship of the new agency to the United Nations has naturally attracted a good deal of attention in this debate and has been thoughtfully analyzed by several delegations. If I may do so without implying any lack of appreciation of the merits of other statements on this subject, I will single out the important statement made on this subject by Mr. Sandler, the distinguished representative of Sweden, at our meeting on October 18. I think, therefore, that we all have cause for satisfaction that the Secretary-General and his Advisory Committee are expressly requested in the present draft of the resolution with which my Delegation is associated, to study this question. I am sure that, if this resolution is approved by the Assembly, we shall have no cause to regret having placed this heavy responsibility upon our Secretary-General.

3. The resolution now refers to the invitations which have been extended to the Governments of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the U.S.S.R., to participate, as governments concerned, with the present sponsoring governments in negotiations on the draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I very much hope that these governments will find it possible to join with the group of countries, of which Canada has been one, in further negotiations which, we trust, will quickly lead to the establishment of this Agency.

4. Another important addition to the draft is the recommendation that the governments concerned should take into account the views expressed on the agency during the present session of the General Assembly and that they should

take all possible measures to establish the agency without delay and bearing in mind the provisions of this resolution. The views expressed in this session of the General Assembly have already had a marked and proper influence on the drafting of the resolution of which I have been speaking. I can assure all members of this Committee that so far as my Government is concerned, the views expressed here on the draft Statute will be given careful and sympathetic consideration.

In its final form the operative part of the eighteen-power resolution relating to the Atomic Energy Agency:

- (a) *Welcomed* the announced intention of governments sponsoring the Agency to invite all members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies to participate in a Conference on the final text of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- (b) *Further welcomed* the extension of invitations to the Governments of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the U.S.S.R. to participate as governments concerned with the present sponsoring governments in negotiations on the draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- (c) *Recommended* that the governments concerned take into account the views expressed on the Agency during the present session of the General Assembly, as well as the comments transmitted directly by governments, and that they take all possible measures to establish the Agency without delay bearing in mind the provision of this Resolution;
- (d) *Requested* the Secretary-General to study the question of the relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the United Nations.

International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

In the same resolution which proposed the early establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on October 27 also placed on record an expression of satisfaction with the results of the First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy which was held in Geneva from August 8 to August 20, 1955. This Conference, which was universally acclaimed as being of historic importance, brought together scientific delegates from 73 nations, including the Soviet Union, and representatives of eight Specialized Agencies, in detailed and technical discussions of power reactors, the physics and chemistry of nuclear energy, and the uses of atomic energy in industry, agriculture, and medicine.

The Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy stemmed directly from a resolution adopted unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 4, 1954. As stated in this resolution, the purpose of the Conference was to study the peaceful uses of the atom in such fields as biology, medicine, radiation protection and fundamental science. It was organized by the United Nations Secretariat in such a manner as to promote free discussion and exchange of scientific knowledge while ensuring that political considerations would not enter into the discussions.

Canada, one of the countries which sponsored the General Assembly resolution of December 4, 1954, took a very active part both in the preparations for the Conference and also in the Conference itself. Dr. W. B. Lewis, Vice-President of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, was appointed, along with



—Atomic Energy of Canada

CANADIAN EXHIBIT AT ATOMIC ENERGY CONFERENCE

A view of the Canadian exhibit at the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in the Palais des Nations, Geneva.

leading scientists from Brazil, France, India, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, to an advisory committee which assisted the United Nations Secretary-General in organizing the meetings. Dr. Lewis was also appointed one of the six Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

Under the Presidency of Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India, the Conference was organized on the basis of an initial series of plenary sessions, a concluding plenary session and three parallel series of section meetings dealing with technical and specialized

matters. These were supplemented by a series of public evening lectures by a number of eminent scientists. The Canadian delegation, led by Mr. W. J. Bennett, President of Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited, consisted of scientists from Atomic Energy of Canada, economists, university professors and representatives from several Canadian firms interested in the industrial applications of atomic energy. Twelve scientific papers were presented at the Conference by members of the Canadian delegation from which several of the chairmen for panel discussions were also chosen.

Canada, along with Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, the U.S.S.R. and the United States also sent a scientific exhibit to Geneva in conjunction with the Conference. The Canadian exhibit, which contained models and photographs of Canada's two atomic reactors, NRX and NRU, featured two beam therapy units used in the treatment of cancer schematic diagrams of the Nuclear Power Development reactor (sometimes called NPD), which will be the first reactor built specifically for producing electricity; and a display depicting the uses of radioactive isotopes in forestry, industry and medicine. The exhibit also contained a large number of photographs, including a series describing the production of Cobalt 60 and another series illustrating the work of decontamination and reconstruction of the NRX reactor after it developed a "leak" in December 1952.

Benefits of Conference

In his statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 10, 1955, Mr. Paul Martin said that the Conference was "one of the largest and most successful scientific meetings ever held." Mr. Martin added that the principal benefits of the Conference were:

- I. The release to the public domain of a great mass of scientific information which had hitherto been secret;
- II. The opportunity for scientists and engineers from all over the world to learn at first hand of the work of their confreres in other lands, and to discuss common problems.
- III. The focussing of public attention not only on the role which atomic power is expected to play in the future, but also on the formidable problems which must be overcome before it can be exploited to economic advantage throughout the world.

The United Nations Secretariat plans to publish a set of volumes containing a complete record of the Conference and all the scientific papers presented. These volumes will include much material of use to scientists and should also be helpful in planning future conferences on this subject.

The Conference has opened new vistas for people in all countries by turning the world's attention from the destructive potentialities of atomic energy to its constructive possibilities, and by revealing the tremendous strides many countries have already made in harnessing atomic energy for the welfare of mankind. A most important aspect of the Conference was that at its sessions the veil of secrecy which has shrouded atomic energy for many years was in large measure torn away. To this fact, and to the more hopeful atmosphere in international relations associated with the meeting of heads of government at

Geneva earlier in the summer, can be attributed much of the credit for the success of the Conference. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his report to the General Assembly,

The formal sessions of the Conference were supplemented and elaborated by numerous informal discussions among groups sharing common interests which took place outside the scheduled meetings. These significant spontaneous activities, which could find nourishment only in a friendly and trustful atmosphere, merit special mention.

Canadian Atomic Reactor for India

The Governments of India and Canada on September 16 announced jointly that Canada had offered an NRX Atomic Reactor to India under the Colombo Plan, and that this offer had been accepted by India.


In the original message in which this offer was made to India, Prime Minister St. Laurent, expressed the hope that such a reactor would serve India as well as it had served Canada in research and in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. In accepting the offer Prime Minister Nehru indicated that his government would be prepared to allow accredited foreign scientists including those from other Colombo Plan countries in South and Southeast Asia to use the facilities that will be available at the atomic energy centre in India where the reactor will be located.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, gave further details of this project at a Session of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Meeting in Singapore on October 20, 1955. The relevant part of Mr. Pearson's statement was as follows:

The centre of our own atomic activity has been our so-called NRX Reactor at Chalk River, Ontario, which some of you or your officials visited when you were in Ottawa last year. This high-powered and versatile Reactor is serving us well in our research and experimental work. The manufacture, installation and operation of this type of unit present numerous problems and involve rather heavy costs and require a considerable number of very scarce experts. Nevertheless we have concluded that we should try to arrange to set one up in the Colombo Plan area.

Therefore as was announced jointly by the two Governments last month, the Indian and Canadian Governments have reached agreement in principle on such a project and the details are now being worked out. We plan to meet the external costs of this Reactor in such a manner as not to reduce the amount of aid which would otherwise have been made available to other Colombo Plan countries including India for more conventional development projects. We have also indicated to the Indian authorities that we would be agreeable to their using counterpart funds arising from earlier Canadian aid to finance local costs relating to the Reactor.

It has been agreed that this Reactor should be made available for the use of scientists from other countries including those from countries in the Colombo Plan area. Such joint participation by the Indian and Canadian Governments in a project which aims to improve mastery of this new-found source of energy for constructive purposes for the benefit of and with the participation of scientists from other countries as well as reflects, I think, the common purpose which we all share in the Colombo Plan. It is, I believe, right that we should look well ahead and plan to bring the latest as well as the most ancient methods



—Atomic Energy of Canada

NRX REACTOR

Examining a model of the NRX reactor, of the type offered by Canada to India under the Colombo Plan are, left to right: Mr. A. G. Ward, Head, Reactor Physics Branch; Dr. R. F. S. Robertson, Development Chemistry Branch; and Dr. W. B. Lewis, Vice-President, Research and Development, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., one of six scientists appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, to act as vice-presidents of the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

into service in raising living standards and strengthening our economies. It is well to remember, however, although this reminder is scarcely needed in this company, that progress in economic development will continue to require old-fashioned toil and a careful use of resources. Atomic energy is by no means the magic answer to all our problems. Our main efforts will have to continue to be directed to the age-old tasks of irrigating and enriching the land, cutting the timber, bringing up the ore from below the ground, improving the means of transport, generating energy from all available sources, building up sound and productive industries and combatting disease.

In addition, Mr. Pearson stated, as noted on page 288, that Parliament would be asked to make a significant increase in Canada's contribution above the amount of \$26.4 million which is being made by Canada this year, and that the bulk of the increase would meet part of the cost of the atomic reactor.

Canada and the United Nations

Tenth Session of the General Assembly

Adoption of the Agenda: Withdrawal of France.

The General Assembly on October 3 completed work on its agenda and decided to consider sixty-six questions at its current session. With few exceptions, items recommended for consideration by the General (Steering) Committee were adopted without discussion. In both committee and plenary meetings, however, strong opposition arose against inscription of three items: the Algerian question, the question of self-determination of the people of Cyprus, and the status of Western New Guinea (West Irian).

The request of thirteen Arab and Asian Nations that the question of Algeria be discussed in the General Assembly was opposed by France in the General Committee on the ground that it was a matter which, under Article 2 (7) of the Charter, fell exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of France and outside the competence of the United Nations. The General Committee by a vote of 8 to 5 with 2 abstentions finally recommended against inscription of the item. However, the General Assembly did not approve this recommendation and on September 30 decided by a narrow vote of 28 in favour, 27 against, including Canada, and 5 abstentions, that the item should be included on the agenda. This decision was taken after a debate in which most of the Afro-Asian sponsors of the item delivered statements in support of their contention that a denial of the right of self-determination to Algeria is a potential source of international friction. The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Belgium were among those who spoke in favour of the French position and voted, as did the representative of Canada, against inscription. After the vote, Foreign Minister Pinay, leader of the French Delegation, declared that the United Nations, and not France, would have to face the consequences of this clear violation of Article 2 (7), that France would refuse to accept the decision of the majority, and that it would consider any recommendation made by the Assembly as null and void. The following day the Delegation of France was withdrawn from the General Assembly; France did not, however, completely sever its relations with the United Nations and announced it would remain on the Security Council and the Sub-Committee on Disarmament.

Strong Opposition

As indicated above, there was also strong opposition in both the General Committee and the General Assembly to the inscription of the items on Cyprus and West New Guinea. The Cyprus item, submitted by Greece for the second successive year, was not adopted for consideration. The Assembly however endorsed the General Committee's recommendation that the question of West New Guinea be inscribed.



—United Nations

CANADA PLEDGES \$1,800,000 FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Sixty-one nations promised the equivalent of \$28,031,536 to finance operations in 1956 of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies. Lt. Col. Gilbert, of Canada, signs the Final Act of the Conference, pledging \$1,800,000. Looking on are Mr. Mehdi Vakil, Secretary of the Conference, and Mme Georgette Ciset, of Belgium, President. Standing at the right is Mr. David Owen, Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board.

Increased Canadian Contribution to the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance

As announced by Mr. Pearson at the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee Meeting at Singapore on October 20, the Canadian Government proposes to seek Parliamentary approval for a contribution of \$1,800,000 to next year's United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance. Representing an increase of \$300,000 over the Canadian contributions of the past two years, this amount was formally pledged at the Sixth United Nations Pledging Conference at New York on October 26 by Lt. Col. O. Gilbert, the Canadian representative to the Conference. Col. Gilbert said that the Canadian Government's decision to increase its contribution represented an expression of Canada's continuing support for a programme which contributes appreciably to a better understanding among peoples and governments, and provides continuing evidence of concerted international co-operation in the economic field. He added that in order to help establish the Expanded Programme on a firm administrative foundation, and to ensure that projects may be planned on a long term basis, the Canadian Government has decided, subject to annual Parliamentary approval, to make contributions in 1957 and 1958 of the same general order of magnitude as that for 1956.

The United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance coordinates technical assistance activities of the United Nations itself and of the Specialized Agencies in such varied fields as public administration, agriculture, health, education, fisheries, vocational training and social welfare. Last

year seventy-one countries pledged a total of \$27.9 million to this programme. Canada's total contribution since the inception of the programme in 1950 has totalled \$5,400,000.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries

In a statement on October 14 during the general debate in the Second Committee, the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Paul Martin, emphasized the growing importance in world affairs of the part played by the United Nations in assisting in the economic progress of the less-developed countries. He noted that the agenda of the Committee focussed attention on the financing of economic development and on the Technical Assistant Programmes. Referring to his earlier statement in the General Assembly, Mr. Martin emphasized how important it was that the United Nations function harmoniously and that its discussions reflect a genuine sense of concord. Unless political questions are dealt with moderately and constructively the prestige of the Organization will suffer, and its work in the field of economic development is bound to be adversely affected. Speaking of the benefit of collective effort as a developing force, he noted that there are many projects which can better be dealt with on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis, and cautioned against attempts to force the pace.

Discussing the report of the Economic and Social Council, Mr. Martin commended ECOSOC for focussing its discussions on the world economic situation and the possibility of expanding world trade. He expressed wholehearted agreement with the observation of other representatives in the Second Committee that the best way to achieve and maintain international economic equilibrium is to work towards the re-establishment of a multilateral trade and payments system, and also concurred in the view of those representatives who had warned against tendencies of governments to turn their efforts towards making themselves self-sufficient and arranging closely-knit preferential trading areas.

Mr. Martin went on to speak of Canada's support of President Eisenhower's initiative in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy and noted that Canada was one of the sponsors of the resolution last year on the establishment of an internal agency. He hoped that the less-developed countries would examine and make any necessary amendments and improvements of the Statute drafted by Canada and the other sponsoring countries.

Outlining the steps taken by Canada to increase the flow of private capital to under-developed countries, Mr. Martin underlined Canada's support of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Finance Corporation. He also announced that Canada would make another substantial contribution to technical assistance, and at the same time direct attention to the assistance being rendered by Canada outside the United Nations, both on a bilateral basis and through collective plans such as Colombo Plan. Speaking of the connection established by the Charter itself between the preservation of peace and the improvement of social and economic conditions in the world, Mr. Martin concluded: ". . . . we do not fail in our solemn obligations when we try to contribute to the maintenance of peace, not only in attempting to solve political problems, but in supporting

to the limit of our ability and capacity the hopes and aspirations of all peoples for a life of security, dignity and justice."

Canada Elected to ECOSOC

Elections to fill six seats on the Economic and Social Council were held on October 19 and 20. Canada was elected on the first ballot, together with the United States of America and Indonesia. On subsequent ballots, Yugoslavia, Brazil and Greece were elected to the remaining vacant seats.

Disarmament

The United Nations Disarmament Sub-committee which had reconvened in New York on August 29 last, concluded its discussions on October 7. The Sub-Committee, which meets, in private, is composed of representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. The New York talks represented the second part of the round of discussions which began in London February 25.

In New York the delegations of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. reiterated the proposals which the Heads of their governments had put forward during their Geneva conference last July. The United States tabled detailed proposals of the Eisenhower plan for the exchange of military blueprints between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and for the aerial surveys of the territories of the countries; the United Kingdom restated its proposal for a system of joint inspection of the forces confronting one another in Europe in a specified area to be agreed upon; and the French delegation submitted an extended version of M. Faure's plan for the control of military budgets and the earmarking of savings resulting from disarmament for economic development programmes. The Soviet Union simply tabled the text of Premier Bulganin's Geneva programme, which is essentially a repetition of the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 insofar as they relate to disarmament.

In addition to the above, the United Kingdom and France each put forward proposals on the structure and powers of the international control organ which they considered should supervise any disarmament programme.

There were useful exchanges of views on the various papers tabled in the Sub-Committee and, in particular, on the Eisenhower proposals, which were welcomed by Canada and other Western delegations as a first step towards a more comprehensive disarmament programme of which they would form a part. No decision was, however, taken on any of the plans put forward. On October 7 the Sub-Committee submitted a non-committal report to the Disarmament Commission (which is composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada) reviewing the work of the Sub-Committee and indicating that it may hold further meetings and submit a supplementary report. It was indicated that one of the reasons for the adjournment of the Sub-Committee at that time was that disarmament was to be discussed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference which opened in Geneva on October 27.

Although the Western delegations had been under the impression that the Soviet delegate had agreed to the Western time-table whereby the Disarmament Commission would be meeting only after the "Big Four" talks in

(Continued on page 308)

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT SIGNED



Seated left to right: Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to the United States; Mr. Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank; Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, Canadian Ambassador to the United States; and Mr. J. H. Warren, Canadian alternate executive director at the International Bank.

Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, signed the Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation in Washington at 12:30 P.M., Tuesday, October 25, 1955. The Ambassador also deposited Canada's Instrument of Acceptance with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, thus completing the requirements for membership in the Corporation.

Parliament has made provision in the current year's estimates for an expenditure which will enable the Canadian Government to purchase 3,600 shares in the International Finance Corporation at a value of \$1,000 (U.S.) per share.

The International Finance Corporation will have an authorized capital of \$100 million available for subscription by members in amounts proportionate to their subscriptions to the capital of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Corporation will come into being when at least \$75 million has been subscribed by at least 30 governments to the capital of the Corporation.

The basic objective of the International Finance Corporation will be to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in its member countries,

(Continued on page 308)

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. E. M. Reid, High Commissioner, returned to New Delhi from home leave, effective September 12, 1955.
- Mr. P. A. Bridle appointed Canadian Commissioner, International Supervisory Commission for Laos, effective September 19, 1955.
- Mr. G. H. Heasman, Ambassador, returned to Djakarta from home leave, effective September 26, 1955.
- Mr. L. Mayrand, Canadian Commissioner, posted from the Canadian Delegation to the International Supervisory Commission for Laos, to home leave, effective September 28, 1955.
- Mr. A. Rive appointed Ambassador of Canada to Ireland. Proceeded to Dublin on September 29, 1955.
- Mr. L. P. Picard Q.C., appointed Ambassador to Argentina. Departed from Ottawa October 20, 1955.
- Mr. E. Turcotte, Ambassador to Colombia, posted to home leave, effective October 28, 1955.
- Mr. W. G. Stark appointed Consul General of Canada, New Orleans. Proceeded to New Orleans on September 1, 1955.
- Mr. A. R. Boyd posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, effective September 2, 1955.
- Mr. A. R. Kilgour posted from home leave to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 6, 1955.
- Mr. T. B. Wainman-Wood posted from home leave to the National Defence College, Kingston, effective September 6, 1955.
- Mr. C. H. West posted from the Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, to Ottawa, effective September 6, 1955.
- Mr. A. R. Crepault posted from the Canadian Delegation to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, to Ottawa, effective September 7, 1955.
- Mr. A. C. Anderson posted from home leave to Ottawa, effective September 12, 1955.
- Miss M. E. Kesslering posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Consulate General, New York, effective September 14, 1955.
- Mr. T. M. M. Pope posted from Ottawa to the London School of Oriental and African Studies, effective September 22, 1955.
- Mr. W. G. W. Olivier posted from home leave (Washington) to Ottawa, effective October 3, 1955.
- Miss B. E. McGregor posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, effective October 5, 1955.
- Mr. J. C. J. Cousineau posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective October 7, 1955.
- Mr. J. G. Maranda posted from home leave (Indochina) to Ottawa, effective October 24, 1955.
- Mr. J. M. Harrington posted from home leave (Belgrade) to Ottawa, effective October 24, 1955.
- Mr. S. G. LeFeuvre posted from Ottawa to the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, effective October 24, 1955.
- Mr. J. M. J. Hughes posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy, The Hague, effective October 29, 1955.
- The following officers were appointed to the Department of External Affairs as Foreign Service Officers Grade 1:
- W. F. S. Beattie. J. M. Hunter (September 6, 1955); Miss M. T. A. L. Saint Pierre (September 30, 1955).

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

Multilateral

Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, approved by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on April 11, 1955.

Signed by Canada, October 25, 1955.

Canada's Instrument of Acceptance deposited October 25, 1955.

Mexico:

Bilateral

Exchange of Notes respecting air services.

Signed at Mexico, October 28, 1955.

Entered into force October 28, 1955.

United States of America:

Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries,

Signed at Washington, September 19, 1954.

Ratifications exchanged at Ottawa, October 11, 1955.

Entered into force October 11, 1955.

Exchange of Notes respecting financial arrangements for furnishing supplies and port services to visiting naval vessels of either country.

Signed at Ottawa, July 21, 1955.

Entered into force October 19, 1955.



CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

(Continued on page 305)

Geneva, the Soviet Union asked that the Commission be reconvened on October 17. At this meeting which was finally convened on October 21, the representatives of New Zealand, Belgium and Peru all objected that the voluminous documentation of the Sub-Committee had become available only that day and that the countries not represented on the Sub-Committee had had no opportunity to study it; they considered, therefore, that a disarmament debate at this stage would serve no useful purpose. This stand was supported by all the Western members of the Sub-Committee, including Canada, and, over Soviet objections, the Commission decided to adjourn on October 31 and to hold its next meeting at a time to be fixed by the next Chairman, bearing in mind the desirability that the Commission take full account of the deliberations of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva.



INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION

(Continued from page 306)

particularly in the less developed areas of the world. The Corporation will invest in undertakings in co-operation with private capital. In general the corporation will seek to help create conditions which will stimulate the flow of both domestic and international private investment for enterprises in its member countries.

The representative from Canada who serves as a Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will also become a member of the Board of Governors of the International Finance Corporation.

Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the Queen's
Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationery, 1955.

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CANADA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CANADA

December 1955

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Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Canada

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The Growing North in the Growing World

By R. A. J. Phillips*

THOSE readers who persist through the estimated fifteen minutes required to read this article will find themselves in a world grown larger by some 857 people than it is now. Should the reader of *External Affairs* put aside this article for another year, the rate of population growth is likely to be even greater.

These thirty million people by which the earth's population grows each year, these thirty million more people who are born than who die each year, are perhaps the single biggest reason why the north of Canada is bound to become an area of the greatest consequence not only to Canadians, but to men and women in virtually every part of the world.


These thirty million people require not merely the food, clothing and ordinary necessities of life, but the accoutrements of a fuller life. The world's need for resources is growing not merely in proportion to its growing population, but in relation to the steadily rising individual demand for a better standard of living. The demand can in part be met by higher productivity, but ultimately it can be satisfied only by the discovery or exploitation in vast measure of resources which until now have been unknown or unused.

Undeveloped Resources

One of the greatest potentials of undeveloped resources in the world is the Canadian north. The surprising, and perhaps heartening fact, is that Canada's economic strength and prosperity, her reputation for vast mineral and other natural resources, has so far been built almost entirely on the natural wealth of the southern fringe of the country. Beyond it, to the north, lies a million and a half square miles containing some of the most promising mineral-bearing rocks in the country. It is scarcely touched. It lies waiting for the miner's drill in something of the way the rich prairie wheat fields awaited the plough three quarters of a century ago.

The minerals of the north are unlikely to lie fallow very long, for real as the difficulties of their extraction often are, the demand for their use must in time transcend the barriers that climate and—much more serious—distance impose. The overwhelming demand, though not necessarily the most articulate demand, will probably come from the people outside North America in their desire to share the benefits of modern technology. The measure of the potential demand can be seen in a comparison of consumption in the United States and outside. For instance, in 1954 the per capita consumption of zinc in the United States was 11 pounds and in the rest of the world it was 1.4 pounds. The per capita consumption of lead was 9.4 pounds in the United States and 1.2 pounds elsewhere. A similar disparity exists in most other raw materials. If the rest

* Executive Officer, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, and formerly of the Department of External Affairs.



—Northern Affairs and National Resources

SPRINGTIME ON THE YUKON RIVER

of the world moved only a minute distance towards the consumption levels of the United States, the need for resources would rise tremendously.

Something of the world's growing need for minerals was forecast by the Paley Commission in the United States 3½ years ago. In 25 years, the Commission estimated, the U.S. demand for lead would increase 39 per cent, the demand of the rest of the world by 61 per cent; the demand for copper by 43 per cent and 54 per cent; the demand for nickel 100 per cent throughout the world. The United States by 1970 or 1980 would need 1,845 per cent *more* magnesium than in 1950. The list could become tedious. Let it merely be noted that deposits of most minerals are known in the Canadian north, and deposits of almost all are considered likely by geologists, with the exception of those produced by surface action in tropical conditions, e.g. bauxite.

The Wealth of the North

What is the wealth of the Canadian north? Some minerals have been known since earliest exploration. Some have been developed commercially for more than half a century. Others have more recently been brought into production, or are soon to be. Extensive geological surveys have been made over almost the entire north. In the longer settled regions, the surveys have been relatively intensive; in the lesser known barren lands they have been designed merely to point the way to areas which appear promising to the prospector. All this is by way of saying that we cannot generalize: a few examples may help.

The original wealth of the north was in fur, in search of which traders became explorers and explorers became traders. It was fur which saved the north from limbo after the search for the Northwest Passage became, commercially at least, a hopeless quest. But by the Second World War white fox was falling behind minerals and the main export of the two northern Territories. In 1898 the whole world heard of gold in the Klondike and raced to find elusive fortune. When most of the adventurers returned from the Yukon they left in their wake a sense of anti-climax but they had formed the foundations of the future development of the Territory.

Great Mineral Potential


Today gold still comes from creeks which half a century ago were lined by men with hopeful pans, but now the operation is carried out by dredges on a scale typical of the new approach to northern mining. Gold is no longer as important to the Yukon as lead, zinc and silver. Production in the leading mine, which only nine years ago was less than half a million dollars, now approaches 14 million dollars. The potential, however, is undoubtedly greater than the realization. Other highly promising deposits of lead-zinc, of silver-lead, of nickel-copper, and of asbestos have been found. An area of 12,500 square miles in the northern Yukon is under active exploration by a private company seeking oil and natural gas.

The importance of these mineral deposits is heightened by a staggering potential of water power, part of whose benefits will be available to the Yukon. Present plans for the upper Yukon River and its tributaries envisage the production of 4,500,000 horsepower, that is, one quarter of the present developed capacity in all of Canada.

The Yukon has some good merchantable timber, not enough for significant export, but useful for local needs. In agriculture, too, production may be expected to satisfy part of the requirements of the population. Now between 500 and 1,000 acres are under cultivation, less than one-fifth of one per cent of the estimated arable land.

Less in detail is known of the Northwest Territories whose tremendous expanse, though completely mapped, has known detailed geological exploration only in very small part. The present mining industry is centered around Yellowknife on Great Slave Lake where gold production (based on ore of extraordinary high grade) increased five fold from 1939 to \$10 million in 1954. Gold was not the first important mineral development. Uranium was produced on Great Bear Lake in 1933, and since the War this area has been one of the world's most important sources of uranium. Oil was first extracted on a commercial scale from Norman Wells on the Mackenzie River in 1920; after a greatly increased production during the War, this field is now used to serve the needs of the Mackenzie Valley.

The record of mineral production in the Northwest Territories is less spectacular than its future. The first big name is Pine Point on the south shore of Great Slave Lake where there is an indicated zinc-lead ore potential of something over 60 million tons. Much of it would be available by open-cut methods, all of it is easy to treat. A list of other promising areas reads like a minor gazeteer of the Northwest Territories. Proved mineral deposits within the



—Northern Affairs and National Resources

GIANT YELLOWKNIFE GOLD MINE

Largest Gold Mine in the North, Yellowknife, N.W.T.

relatively tiny fraction of the north so far carefully investigated include (besides gold, uranium, lead and zinc) copper tungsten, iron, coal, tantalum, beryllium and lithium.

Possibly the pace of things to come is best indicated by one figure: in just seven years between 1946 and 1953, mineral production in the Canadian north increased 1,000 per cent.

Climate and Distance

Here, then, is much of the wealth the world needs. What are the problems of getting it? They are considerable. The first one which comes to any mind is climate.

Climate is not, however, as serious a factor as most people think. In the first place, in the area of Great Slave Lake where mining activity is now, and for some years is likely to be, centered, the harshness of the climate is often exaggerated. The winter temperatures are a good deal colder than in the cities of the south—Yellowknife winter temperatures average 17 degrees F. below those of Winnipeg. In the summer months, however, Yellowknife is pleasant and has an average temperature of 57 degrees, only about seven degrees cooler than Winnipeg and only three degrees cooler than Edmonton. And, though the summer growing season is short, the long hours of sunlight permit the rapid growth of plants.

In neither winter nor summer does climate present any insuperable obstacles to living or to industry. Houses require good insulation, consumption of fuel oil is high. But the only real problem of cold is paying for it.

Distance is a more serious problem than climate. Transportation increases production costs more than any other single factor. The Yukon has good roads linking development areas and connecting them with the highway network of the south, and it has a railway to tidewater. The Northwest Territories, however, has only one main highway from the south and it ends at Great Slave Lake. For the rest transportation is by water, dog sled, tractor, train or air. The Mackenzie River transportation system is extremely important, but it has the disadvantage of being ice-free only three or four months a year.

Transportation, serious a problem as it now seems, can be met by man. A railroad has been proposed to link the rich Great Slave Lake area with Canada's trans-continental railway network. The effect of such a railway, its proponents point out, would be not only to open up the most extensive zinc-lead deposits in North America near its terminus: it would also hasten the development of many other mineral resources now awaiting the approaching day when costs (largely transportation costs) can be reduced to the point where the operations are not only commercially profitable, but even more profitable than other mineral developments far to the south. It would, in fact, open up the 530,000 square miles of the Mackenzie District.

Other Factors

It would be both unrealistic and unfair to think of the place of Canada's growing north in the growing world merely in terms of the material wealth which it is about to yield. The north has importance to Canadians in other ways. It is a defensive zone used to warn of the approach of hostile aircraft, a zone used to protect the settled areas of the south from their onset. Colourful and dramatic as the building of radar lines across the Arctic and sub-Arctic are, their importance to the future of the north is largely confined to the transportation routes which they encourage as well as for the knowledge of northern conditions to which their construction and operation will undoubtedly contribute. The north of Canada is not being developed for defence, nor does the development of the north depend upon defence. It is, however, an activity which might, if worst ever came to worst, make the free world even more grateful for the existence of the Canadian Arctic.

The north is also important because of its people, the 10,000 Eskimos who inhabit some of the farthest and bitterest climates of the earth. They are people watched carefully by their fellow Canadians for they are now facing difficult problems of adjustment as the south moves at an accelerated pace into their homeland. With their closely-linked problems of health, education and new economic outlets to replace traditional ways, the people of Canada are closely concerned. This is neither charity nor condescension. They are important citizens of Canada, citizens who, particularly in the light of their numbers, have had a unique impact on the art world through the quality of their remarkable stone carving. They are also the people who know the High Arctic best, and upon whom Canada and the rest of the world will have to rely for its progressive development.

Across the Pole

Canadians are not alone in their appreciation of the potentialities of northern development. Canada's next door neighbour across the Pole has been actively exploiting the wealth of the north for at least a generation. The best of many of the Soviet Union's mineral reserves lie in the sub-Arctic and these have for some time been contributing to the national wealth. Like Canada, the U.S.S.R. faces problems of climate and transportation. Soviet successes in developing the Northern Sea Route are well known. Railways have long reached into the European Arctic and supplementary networks have been developed both in western and eastern Russia. Regular air routes cross much of the Soviet north.

It is not surprising that the north in the Soviet Union has reached a later stage of development than in Canada. Canadians, with their limited population and relative national youth, have been deeply pre-occupied in their short history with the opening of regions closer to the old and settled parts of the country. They have had no population pressures, no shortages of raw materials to lead them north, and only recently have they had the economic strength, the freedom from pre-occupations with other frontier building, the peace and prosperity to enable them to turn to the north.

The longer experience of the Soviet Union in northern affairs, the professed desire of its leaders to promote closer relations through the exchange of information and of visits, has led naturally to proposals for the sharing of northern knowledge. The idea was discussed with Mr. Molotov on Mr. Pearson's visit to Moscow last autumn. The success of such exchanges with the Soviet Union could be much more than a test of the good relations of the two coun-

(Continued on page 316)



—NFB

SHAMAN WITH DRUM, TYPICAL OF ESKIMO
STONE CARVINGS

Admittance of Palestinian Refugees to Canada

THE Department of External Affairs announced on December 2 that the Canadian Government has tentatively decided to admit a limited number of Palestinian refugees as immigrants to Canada. This decision has been taken in view of the requests received from Palestinian refugees for immigration to Canada and in the context of Canada's continuing desire as the fourth largest contributor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to do what it can to promote the welfare of refugees.

The immigrants would be chosen from amongst English or French speaking refugee applicants in Lebanon or Jordan who have certain specified trades or skills which would enable them to find employment in Canada. Prospective immigrants and their families must also meet certain health and other requirements.

Because of the lack of Canadian immigration facilities in Lebanon and Jordan, the Canadian Government has requested UNRWA to assist with pre-selection of refugees applicants who have the necessary qualifications and UNRWA has been kind enough to agree to provide this assistance. The final choice of immigrants, however, will be made by Canadian immigration officials who will visit Lebanon and Jordan in the near future for this purpose. Because of the limited number of applicants to be accepted, the Canadian officials will make a selection from amongst applications submitted by UNRWA.

THE GROWING NORTH IN THE GROWING WORLD

(Continued from page 315)

tries: it might well be positive contribution to the early development of the Canadian north.

The North and the Rest of the World

Canadians no longer look upon their north as merely frozen wastes. Neither do they look upon the north as the repository of fantastic wealth ready for the taking. They look upon it as an opportunity and as a problem. For them it is both. For the rest of the growing world it is an opportunity, one of the most hopeful of the second half of this century.

Franco-Tunisian Relations


ON July 3, 1955, a series of Conventions were signed by the Prime Ministers of France and Tunisia setting forth a new relationship between the two countries. The Conventions were later ratified by the French and Tunisian Governments and the instruments of ratification were exchanged in Paris on September 1, 1955. The conventions envisage an enduring and close communion between the two countries. Within this framework a large measure of local autonomy is transferred immediately to Tunisia and authority in other spheres is to be assumed by the Tunisians in specified stages extending over a period of 20 years. However, throughout this period France will remain responsible for the defence of Tunisia and for the external relations of the territory. This important event opened a new era in Franco-Tunisian relations. It was the climax of a process of constitutional evolution which commenced when Tunisia became a protectorate of France.

The French protectorate of Tunisia was established by the Treaties of Kassar Said (or LeBardo) and La Marsa of 1881 and 1883 respectively. The subsequent development of the country was governed by the clause in the Treaty of La Marsa under which the nominal head of state, the Bey of Tunis, undertook "to make such administrative, judicial and financial reforms as the French Government considers advisable". In the years that followed, a French administration was grafted to the traditional Tunisian institutions: modern communications were introduced; agricultural and mineral resources were developed; and modern health practices were introduced. Many thousands of European colonists settled in the protectorate.

The rise of nationalism in Tunisia may be said to date from 1920 when the Destour or Constitution Party was formed. The programme of the Destour called for a number of political reforms including the establishment of a deliberative assembly elected by universal suffrage and of government responsible to this assembly, elective municipal institutions and the appointment of Tunisians to posts in the civil service. A number of administrative reforms were adopted by the administration but these did not satisfy the nationalists. Following a series of incidents in the early thirties the Destour was dissolved by the authorities. Its place was soon taken, however, by the Néo-Destour (New Constitution), a movement with modernistic tendencies and organizational methods, which sought not only political objectives but also the raising of the standard of living of the Tunisian people. Labour troubles and political unrest led to the proclamation of martial law in April 1938, the dissolution of the Néo-Destour and the arrest of many of its leaders.

Postwar Developments

By the end of the Second World War the Néo-Destour had become a popular symbol of the growing Tunisian desire for self-government. Progress was made towards this goal in successive reforms which were granted by France with a view to the development of representative institutions. In 1949 a Tunisian cabinet was set up under Prime Minister Mohammed Chenik. In April 1950, the French Government responded favourably to a seven-point



point of view of the world's population. The world's population is increasing rapidly, and this is a major factor in the world's economic and political development. The world's population is increasing rapidly, and this is a major factor in the world's economic and political development. The world's population is increasing rapidly, and this is a major factor in the world's economic and political development.

programme for the Tunisian autonomy which was put forward by the leader of the Néo-Destour, Habib Bourguiba. The Chenik cabinet was broadened to include members of the Néo-Destour and other nationalists and the negotiation of reforms commenced. Some progress was made and initial reforms were proclaimed in February 1951. However, further negotiations ended in deadlock because the Tunisians were unwilling to accept the principle of co-sovereignty, under which the French and Tunisian residents of the protectorate would have had equal political, administrative and economic status. The failure of the negotiations caused a breakdown of Franco-Tunisian collaboration. Serious rioting early in 1952, marked the beginning of a period of unrest which continued for more than two years.

Discussion in the United Nations

After the dismissal of the cabinet of Mohammed Chenik in March 1952, and the arrest of many Tunisian nationalists, a number of Asian and African states asked the Security Council of the United Nations to intervene. The Security Council voted against putting the question on its agenda and the African and Asian states then requested a special session of the General Assembly in June 1952. This move was not successful but the African and Asian states did succeed in having the Tunisian question inscribed on the agenda of the regular session of the General Assembly in 1952. Canada supported the resolution which was adopted and which expressed the hope that the parties would continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government in Tunisia, and appealed to them to refrain from any act likely to aggravate the situation. The General Assembly began its eighth session in 1953 towards the end of another year in which physical force rather than political negotiation had dominated the Tunisian scene. The Assembly agreed without debate to include the question of its agenda but did not adopt a resolution.

Franco-Tunisian Negotiations 1954-55

Earnest efforts were made by the French Government in the winter of 1953-54 to bring about a greater degree of Tunisian participation in the affairs of the country. In March, 1954, the Bey of Tunis signed six decrees establishing the basic institutions of the new regime and appointed Salah M'Zali as Prime Minister. Neither the Néo-Destour nor any of the French settlers in the protectorate were satisfied with the reforms and their opposition, together with acts of terrorism by Tunisian fellaghas brought about the resignation of the M'Zali government in June 1954.

Such was the situation when M. Mendes-France became Prime Minister of France. In July 1954, he paid an unexpected visit to the Bey of Tunis and announced that France was prepared to recognize the internal autonomy of Tunisia, reserving only the control of defence and foreign affairs. M. Mendes-France suggested the formation of a Tunisian Government which could enter into negotiations with France. A new Tunisian cabinet was formed of independents and members of the Néo-Destour with Tahar ben Ammar as Prime Minister, and French Assembly approved in broad outline the proposals which the Government intended to make. In order to create an appropriate climate for negotiation the legal status of the Neo-Destour was restored and the state of siege in large areas of the protectorate was lifted. M. Bourguiba, the leader of the Néo-Destour, described these French policies as courageous and bold.

The negotiations, began on September 11, 1954, in a spirit of mutual confidence and with a clear objective in mind. Considerable progress had been made by the time the United Nations General Assembly reached this item of its agenda and the Assembly decided to "postpone for the time being the further consideration of this item."

The Government of M. Mendes-France was defeated in February 1955, when the French National Assembly expressed lack of confidence in his North African policies. Terrorist acts again disturbed the peace in Tunisia but before the situation deteriorated seriously, the new Prime Minister of France, M. Faure, declared that his Government would pursue the objective of an autonomous Tunisia. Negotiations with the Tunisian leaders were resumed and although agreement was reached on most major points, a temporary impasse developed on the question of the future association of the territory with France. Prime Minister Faure broke the deadlock on this point by calling in M. Bourguiba, then in exile, who persuaded his colleagues to accept a compromise.

Consequently, a *protocole d'accord* was initialled on April 22, 1955, and was expanded into the series of Conventions which will henceforth be the basis of Franco-Tunisian relations.

The Provisions of the Agreement

The Conventions, six in number, with the Annexed Protocols establish the relations between the two countries on the basis of mutual consent deriving from free and equal associations. France recognized the internal autonomy of Tunisia and renounced the right which it obtained under the Treaty of La Marsa of 1883 to introduce administrative, judicial and financial reforms. Tunisia is free to choose its own political and administrative institutions and the decrees of the Bey (i.e. Tunisian laws) will no longer require the approval of the French representative. On the local government level, the *caids* or local Tunisian authorities are no longer to be under the tutelage of French civil controllers. Within the Tunisian Government, the French directors who have headed the department of finance, public works, public education and communications (P.T.T.) have been replaced by Tunisian ministers. (This completes the gradual transfer of cabinet portfolios from France to Tunisia which began in 1945 when only two departments—Justice, and Local Affairs and Religious Foundations—were headed by Tunisians). The Resident-General of France in Tunisia has been replaced by a High Commissioner who will act as intermediary between the French and Tunisian Governments in all questions of mutual interest and will exercise those powers still belonging to France in Tunisia.

The transfer of powers relating to law and order will be made by specified stages over a period of 20 years. Jurisdiction in cases involving Tunisians becomes the responsibility of Tunisian courts upon the entry into force of the Conventions. The competence of French courts in questions involving a Tunisian and a non-Tunisian will gradually be reduced in favour of Tunisian jurisdiction; courts of mixed composition are to be established within five years and are to have a life of 15 years.

The Tunisian Government was given complete responsibility in internal financial and budgetary affairs but the economic and commercial interests of

the country continue to be closely associated with those of France. Tunisia remains in the franc area and will form a customs union with France. French financial and technical assistance is provided to assure the continued economic and social progress of Tunisia. An annual programme of capital investments will be prepared by agreement of the two Governments.

Although France retains control of Tunisian defence and foreign affairs, the Conventions provide for a significant degree of Franco-Tunisian co-operation in these fields. A high committee for defence will be set up under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Tunisia. The committee will include the officer commanding French troops who will serve as the Bey's Minister of Defence. Frontier security is the responsibility of France. The French Army remains in the military installations in the Bizerte-Ferryville area and will occupy the frontier zone in the southern part of Tunisia bordering on Libya and Algeria. With respect to foreign affairs, France has agreed to consult and inform the Tunisian Government on questions affecting Tunisian interests. France will sponsor Tunisia's candidacy for membership in international organizations including, specifically, UNESCO and the International Labour Organization. Tunisian trade officials will be assigned by the Tunisian Government to serve with French commercial representatives abroad.

Rights and Interests

A number of provisions in the Conventions deal with the rights and interests of the 200,000 French nationals who live in Tunisia and of Tunisians residing in France. French nationals retain their own personal status and their interests will be protected by the High Commissioner of France. The French are free to continue to practice their religious, cultural and commercial activities but their participation in public life is restricted to municipal affairs and the mixed Chambers of Commerce. A French Cultural Mission is responsible for the direction of educational institutions and cultural organizations of the French Government in Tunisia. French and Tunisian nationals may travel in both countries, establish residence and earn their living with full freedom in accordance with labour and security regulations.

The Franco-Tunisian Conventions were approved with large majorities in the French National Assembly and the Council of the Republic and were greeted with enthusiasm in Tunisia. Prime Minister Tamar ben Ammar described the agreement as marking the full restoration of Franco-Tunisian friendship and expressed the conviction that a new age of happiness, prosperity, and liberty had begun for Tunisia. The successful conclusion of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations is of great significance not only to the future relations between the two countries but also to the tranquility and security of the Mediterranean area. The calm in Tunisia which has contrasted so sharply with the outbreaks of violence during recent months in the neighbouring North African territories of France, is a tribute to the constructive policies and moderation of the French and Tunisians. It is an example of the progress that can be achieved through an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process of development in dependent territories.

The Tunisian Government has announced its intention of establishing a constitutional monarchy under the Bey of Tunis and of calling elections for a

(Continued on page 330)

Canada and the United Nations

Admission of New Members

A portion of the statement by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, is found on page 328.

When the tenth session opened, no new members had been admitted to the U.N. since Indonesia became the 60th member in 1950 and there were 21 pending applications for membership. In the past, the 7 applicants favoured by the U.S.S.R. (Albania, Outer Mongolia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, North Korea and North Vietnam) had not been able to obtain the necessary affirmative votes of 7 members of the Security Council. The 14 favoured by the non-communist members (Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Cambodia, Laos, South Korea and South Vietnam) had all been vetoed by the Soviet Union. A 22nd candidate, Spain, presented its application only after the opening of the session and the Security Council had not yet considered it.

Canadian Resolution

In an effort to break this deadlock, Canada took the initiative at this session in obtaining support in the General Assembly for a resolution looking to



NEW MEMBER OF UNITED NATIONS

—United Nations

The Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, left, congratulates Mr. John Conway, representative of Ireland, on the admission of his country to membership in the United Nations.

the admission into the U.N. of all outstanding applicants other than the temporarily divided countries of Korea and Vietnam. According to the draft resolution, which was co-sponsored by 28 states,

The General Assembly, . . . *believing* that a broader representation in the membership of the U.N. will enable the organization to play a more effective role in the current international situation . . . *Requests* the Security Council to consider in the light of the general opinion in favour of the widest possible membership of all those 18 countries about which no problem of unification arises; *Requests further* that the Security Council make its report on these applications to the General Assembly during the present session.

Acting on a report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, the General Assembly approved the 28 power resolution on December 8 by a vote of 52 in favour, 2 against with 5 abstentions. China and Cuba voted against the resolution stating that they considered its "package deal" form to be in contravention of the relevant Charter requirements and that they opposed the admission of the 5 communist candidates (China voiced particular opposition to the application of Outer Mongolia).

The Security Council considered the admission of new members at meetings on December 10 and 13. On the latter date the Council voted on a resolution enumerating the 18 applicants and Nationalist China used its veto against Outer Mongolia. Thereupon the U.S.S.R. vetoed the 13 non-communist applicants and the resolution as a whole was defeated.

The following day, the Security Council reassembled to consider a Soviet draft resolution calling for the recommendation of all those applicants on the previous list except Japan and Mongolia. The U.S. Delegation then proposed an amendment adding Japan and this received 10 favourable votes and one negative vote cast by the U.S.S.R. and constituting a veto. The U.S.S.R. resolution was then voted on and, after each of the 16 applicants had been approved individually, the resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 8 in favour, none against, and 3 abstentions (Belgium, China and U.S.).

At an emergency plenary session that evening, the Assembly approved by large majorities the recommendations of the Security Council and a draft Assembly resolution to the same effect (submitted by 30 powers including Canada). As a result the following states became members of the U.N.: Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain".

Korea

The debate on the Korea item occupied the Political Committee from November 10 until November 22. It was evident from the beginning that the Communist bloc powers were as firmly opposed as ever to the United Nations objective of a unified democratic Korea. In the face of their insistence on unacceptable provisions for the holding of all-Korean elections, the debate reflected the opinion of the majority that the time had not yet arrived for substantial progress to be made on the basic question of unification. It therefore followed familiar and expected lines.

As was the case a year earlier, the Committee dealt first with the question of which non-member states should be invited to participate in the debate. Two

resolutions were tabled on this subject, one by the United States for the seating of a representative of South Korea, and one by Syria for the seating of representatives from both the North and the South. The United States resolution was adopted by a vote of 44 in favour (including Canada), 5 against, (the Soviet bloc), and 9 abstentions. The Syrian resolution was defeated by 14 in favour, 34 against, and 10 abstentions, (including Canada).

Question of Unification

The subsequent debate on the question of unification was based on a draft resolution sponsored by the United States Delegation. This resolution which started the broad objectives of the United Nations, provided as follows: it noted the report of UNCURK; recalled that in approving the report of the 15 nations participating for the United Nations in the Geneva Conference of 1954, the General Assembly had expressed the hope that it would soon prove possible to make progress toward a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government; noted that the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 would remain in force until it had been expressly superseded by mutually acceptable amendments or by an agreement reached at a general political conference; reaffirmed the Assembly's intention to continue to seek an early solution to the Korean question in accordance with United Nations objectives; and urged that continuing efforts be made to achieve these objectives. Finally, the resolution requested the Secretary-General to place the Korean item on the provisional agenda of the Eleventh General Assembly.

Speaking in favour of the United States draft resolution, the Canadian representative, Mr. Paul Martin, said that while Canada was disappointed that more progress on the unification question had not been achieved, it was necessary to recognize that quick solutions could not be expected. He pointed out that the fundamental difficulty regarding the conduct of free and democratic elections as part of the unification process could be traced to the system of government in North Korea. It had to be recognized that so long as totalitarian Communist principles obtained these in undiluted form, it would be extremely difficult to arrange free elections—the essential act in the formation of truly representative government. He did not wish to imply, Mr. Martin said, that it was impossible to unify by free elections countries in which one part was under Communist domination, but only to point out that it would be inadvisable to ignore the difficulties that arose from the nature of the situation in divided countries, and to establish positions which did not take the existing realities into consideration. Canada stood by the position which it took at the Geneva Conference in 1954 but was prepared to examine the problem with an open mind, and stood ready to consider any new proposals which might be advanced by either side in the dispute. Mr. Martin thought some distinction could and should be drawn between conceptions of the United Nations as the organizer of the armed defence of Korea and that of the United Nations as a peacemaker. It would not amount to the condoning of aggression for the United Nations to take into account the position of both sides in its endeavour to bring about unification.

Another draft resolution, which was submitted by India, was concerned with the problem of the resettlement of ex-prisoners of the Korean war. This

resolution noted that a number of the ex-prisoners remained temporarily in India, and that the Governments of Argentina and Brazil had offered to resettle as many of them as wished to go to those two countries. It requested that other member governments accept for resettlement those not covered by the Brazilian and Argentinian offers, and that the Government of India report again to the eleventh General Assembly on this problem.

In the voting which took place on November 22 the United States draft resolution was adopted by 45 in favour (including Canada), none against, and 11 absentions. The Indian draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 50 in favour, none against, and 6 abstentions.

Charter Review

The Charter Review question was considered by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 109 of the U.N. Charter which provides that (a) if a General Conference for the purpose of reviewing the present charter has not been held before the tenth session of the General Assembly, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session and (b) the conference shall be held, if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

Canadian views on this subject have been based on two premises: (1) Failure to arrange a conference (which under proper circumstances could make useful studies and recommendations) might cause widespread disappointment but, on the other hand, an acrimonious and unproductive conference could have even more serious consequences; (2) A conference would not be likely to achieve success until international tensions are relaxed. Hence, while not opposed to the holding of a review conference, Canada preferred to see it postponed to a sufficiently distant date to permit adequate preparations for it and, perhaps, a substantial easing of East-West differences.

Accordingly, Canada agreed to co-sponsor a 7-power draft resolution reflecting these views which had been worked out mainly by the United States and United Kingdom. This resolution provided for a decision in principle by the General Assembly that a Charter Review Conference "shall be held"; it also provided for the appointment of a committee to consider, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the question of fixing a time and place for the conference and its organization and procedures. By giving the committee two years to study the question before reporting to the twelfth session, the resolution provided for a lapse of time during which Canada and others hope there will develop an atmosphere more congenial to the holding of a successful Conference.

The original proposal called for the establishment of an 18-member committee but, after some discussion, it was decided that a committee consisting of all members of the U.N. would best meet the situation and the resolution was amended accordingly. The resolution was approved by a large majority even though the Soviet Union and other communist members opposed it and announced that their delegations could not take part in the work of the Committee or in any action aimed at revising the Charter.

Withdrawal of South African Delegation from Assembly Delegation

On November 9 the South African Government recalled its Permanent Representative and its delegation from the tenth session, following the approval by the Ad Hoc Political Committee of a resolution expressing concern over the continuation of policies of *apartheid* and calling upon the United Nations Commission on the racial situation in the Union of South Africa to keep the matter under review and report back to the eleventh session. Thirty-seven countries voted in favour of the resolution, seven against (Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom) and 13 abstained.

The South African delegation maintained that the activities of the Commission constitute intervention in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union, in direct violation of Article II (7) of the Charter. This view was supported by the majority of the countries which opposed the resolution. The Canadian position was, however, based primarily upon the principle that it was undesirable to continue a commission which was unable to discharge the responsibilities assigned to it, and that there was risk of damage to the prestige of the United Nations if courses of action were decided upon which were not capable of producing workable results.

Return of the French Delegation to the General Assembly

Following the withdrawal of the French Delegation from the General Assembly on October 3, 1955, in protest against the inscription of the Algerian item on the agenda,* there was considerable informal consultation among delegations regarding a compromise which would allow the French to return. The members of the United Nations remained divided on the question whether the Assembly was competent to discuss Algeria (which, the French claimed, lay essentially within their domestic jurisdiction). However all United Nation members eventually accepted the view that, without prejudice to existing differences of position with respect to competence, it was not expedient to discuss Algeria at this time, especially in view of the recent improvement in the North African political situation.

Taking advantage of this favourable atmosphere, the Indian Delegation introduced a motion to the effect that the General Assembly would not consider further the item entitled "The Question of Algeria" and that it was therefore no longer seized of this item on the agenda of the tenth session. On November 25 the Assembly adopted this resolution without objection and many of the 22 delegates who gave explanations of their vote appealed to the French Delegation to return speedily and also expressed confidence that France would promote a peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem. All those speaking made it clear that there had been no change in the views they had expressed in the earlier debate on the subject regarding the General Assembly's competence to discuss the Algerian item.

The French Government immediately announced that France would return to the Assembly and its Delegation resumed its seat on November 29.

* See *External Affairs*, November 1955, p. 302.

Atomic Radiation*

In the summer of 1955 the United States Government suggested that at its tenth session the General Assembly should take steps to establish procedures for the collection and the distribution of information on the effects of atomic radiation. In making this proposal the United States recognized the widespread interest throughout the world in the possible effects of the use of atomic energy on human health and safety. Many studies were being made by governments and national scientific bodies on this complex problem and the need for assembling and making available on an international basis the results of these studies was being increasingly felt.

The General Assembly readily concurred in the United States suggestion and on December 3, 1955, adopted unanimously a United States resolution, also sponsored by Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, establishing a Scientific Committee to study the effects of atomic radiation. This Committee will be composed of scientists representing the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. Under its terms of reference the Committee will receive and assemble radiological information furnished by states members of the United Nations of its Specialized Agencies on (1) levels of radiation and (2) scientific observations and experiments concerning the effects of ionizing radiation upon man and his environment. Yearly progress reports will be made by the Committee which is also called upon to develop by July 1, 1958 or earlier, if this is warranted, a summary of the various reports received. From time to time, the Committee will transmit as it deems appropriate documents and evaluations on information received to the Secretary-General for publication and dissemination to states members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies. The Committee will recommend uniform standards with respect to sample collection and radiation counting procedures; at the same time it will furnish indications of research projects which might require further study.

Human Rights and Self-Determination

The Committee on Human Rights, one of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council, decided at its second session in December 1947, that the task of drawing up an international bill of rights should be carried out in three stages: A "Declaration", a "Covenant", and "Measures of Implementation". The first stage was completed on December 10, 1948 a day since known throughout the world as Human Rights Day when the General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which had been prepared by the Commission, by a vote of 48 in favour, none against with eight absentions (the Soviet bloc, Saudi Arabia and the Union of South Africa). Between 1949 and 1954 the Commission on Human Rights devoted six sessions to the preparation of two draft covenants, one on economic, social, and cultural rights, the other on civil and political rights. All participating governments were consulted, and the final drafts were submitted to ECOSOC, which at its 18th Session in 1954 transmitted them to the Assembly without taking any decision on their substance.

* See statement by Mr. Martin, p. 336.

(Continued on page 337)

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

Statement by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, and Minister of National Health and Welfare, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the Ad Hoc Committee, December 1, 1955.

... We are not asking the agreement of the other members of this organization to a proposal which is without difficulties. There are reasons why we should have preferred not to take this course but in this imperfect world it is often unwise to refuse to take any action unless that action is open to no possible objection or criticism from any standpoint. It seems to us that the course we recommend is best, on balance. To delay longer would be to perpetuate injustices. We doubt the wisdom of such an alternative.

After long consideration it has seemed to us that the worst course would be to allow a considerable number of countries to languish in frustration outside the United Nations. Most of the applicants are countries with much to contribute to or gain from our organization. They are in many cases countries with ancient traditions and great cultures. Some are countries with governments newly instituted which are anxious to establish their international relations within the ordered framework of the United Nations as the organ of the community of nations.

In particular—and I mention this as an ex-

ample—I have in mind the case of Italy, a country which culturally has been one of the main creative forces within our Western civilization and one which, for instance, in the field of law, for thousands of years literally has made a constant and inspiring contribution. It is hardly conceivable that our organization should continue any longer to operate without being able to list among its members a country like Italy which is one of the recognized founders of the very family of nations of which this organization seeks to be the expression.

Some applicants are controlled by regimes or are following policies which we do not like. Some dwell in such isolation and obscurity that we know little about them. This is far from a satisfactory situation but the question remains whether admission of these members will on the whole make it better or worse. We think that the edge is more likely to be taken off intolerance and misapprehension within the United Nations than in barren isolation.

We do not agree with the tendency to look upon admission to membership in the United



—United Nations

SIXTEEN NEW NATIONS ADMITTED TO UNITED NATIONS

At a meeting of the Security Council on December 15, sixteen new countries were admitted to membership in the United Nations.

Nations, or for that matter, upon recognition of states as the conferring of a favour and to forget that it is also in some respects the performance of an international duty and the imposing of a discipline. Admission to membership means the bringing of countries under the obligations of our organization and these are obligations which go far beyond those which are normally incumbent on members of the international community under the law of nations. We may disapprove of the regime or of the policy of some of the applicants but are they not likely to become more acceptable members of the world community as part of this organization, when they are committed to its purposes and subjected to its rules. There is an obligation upon members of this organization to behave in accordance with definite principles and to observe insofar as possible the decisions of its various bodies. While no member could pretend that his record has been impeccable—and I am certainly not suggesting that ours is, and certainly the record of some have left much to be desired—the noble principles of the Charter remain for all of us, to a greater or less extent, standards by which to measure ourselves. They are not yet fully attained but they inspire our conduct and we can say that being accountable to this great organization has had a beneficial effect on our behaviour. The same is bound to happen to these countries which are now outside, when they subscribe to principles and join an organization which we strongly support.

No Violence to Principles

We are all, of course, deeply concerned to preserve and to respect the principles of the Charter. We are convinced that the action we propose here does no violence to these principles. The Charter is not a law with a precise interpretation for every article. It is a document which has to be interpreted with understanding and with moderation. Being the product of many different civilizations and schools of thought, it would be presumptuous for any of us to insist upon interpretations which would be inevitable only in terms of our own education and concepts. This is no plea for taking a light or expedient view of the Charter but a request that we should recognize that there may be legitimate differences in its interpretation.

Let us face frankly the principal concern of those who fear, for instance, that the admission of some of these states would be contrary to the terms of Article 4 (1). Can we say that these states are "peace-loving", an essential requirement for membership? How can we interpret exactly the meaning of this term "peace-loving"? It does certainly not mean

"pacifist", because virtually all member states, including my own, maintain armed forces and believe that we must be prepared to fight if necessary to defend our principles and our way of life. Perhaps it is easier to understand this term if we contrast it with its antonym, which would presumably be "war-loving". We have known war-loving states in the past. The United Nations was itself founded in the association of countries fighting together against states controlled at that time by men who loved and glorified war for its own sake. There remain perhaps some individuals in the world who share this degenerate attitude to war, but I doubt if there is any state in the world today which now does so as a national policy. This is the age of the hydrogen bomb. To me it is inconceivable that states, whatever they may consider their national interests to be, should not now live in horror of war. It remains true that there are states—and I do not exclude some of the present applicants for membership—whose policies, if not altered but pursued in the extreme, could provoke war, but I am prepared to believe that they are not seeking war as an objective or instrument of national policy and that they would in fact go to considerable lengths to avoid it. This it seems to me rather than compliance with certain subjective structural or policy tests, should be the criterion to be applied in relation to Article 4 (1).

Some objections have been made to the admission of certain applicants on the grounds that they might not fully qualify as states and that they might not be able to carry out their obligations as members of this Organization. We are entering here a field where there is bound to be controversy. Unless there is willingness to compromise to take a moderate view, again the prospects of progress are likely to be jeopardized indefinitely. For our part, we consider that new candidates should not be required to meet stricter standards than those which have been applied in the past in dealing with this problem.

I submit that we must interpret the Charter in a spirit which is compatible with the Organization as it exists and as it has developed since its foundation. The United Nations is not and it never has been the preserve of countries all of whom are inclined to give similar interpretations to Article 4 (1) or any other. We could of course have formed a United Nations of this kind with membership exclusive to those who see alike on most things. When we rejected such a conception of the United Nations we accepted by implication a broad interpretation of the terms of the Charter.

In the view of my Delegation there has never been any doubt as to the infinitely greater value of a United Nations which embraces all the major traditions and contemporary philosophies of government than of one confined to those who are unlikely to quarrel with each other over anything serious. Having accepted this view as one more likely to bring about peace and harmony in the world, we are obliged, I think, to accept its implications. One of those implications is that we ought not to use the Charter to bar from membership countries whose policies and points of view resemble closely those of other states which are Charter members.

It is by the principle of ensuring the broad representative character of the United Nations that we have justified the position taken in our draft resolution. It may be thought that this is a principle which is contrary to the strict letter of the Charter. If one accepts, however, the argument that I have put forward above, I do not think that there is a contradiction involved. My argument is that the principles of the Charter must be interpreted in the light of the intended world-wide nature of our membership. If the United Nations were confined entirely to peoples of one tradition, then we might be justified in a more limited interpretation of Article 4. Given the fact, however, that it includes members of many different traditions, that it is in a sense, therefore, virtually universal, we must understand its provisions in those terms.

Members of the committee will have noted that the draft resolution refers to the pending application for membership of all those countries about which no problem of unification arises. It will be understood that the

resolution refers to unification for purposes of membership in the U.N. only, and that it is not intended to exclude from membership, now or later, applicants which have problems of this nature in other contexts . . .

It will be obvious also, as we indicated in our statement in the general debate, before Spain submitted her application, that in submitting our resolution we had in mind that the Security Council should consider the other 17, and now as a result of the Spanish application, the 18 other outstanding applicants. In our view, the admission of 18 new members remains the target. For our part, we are prepared to receive favourably all the recommendations which will be made by the Security Council.

Our support of the draft resolution is based on a philosophy of the United Nations as we see it, a United Nations which is as near universal as possible. We are aware of the fact that the expansion of the United Nations will introduce more voices, perhaps in some cases discordant voices, into a community where there is already much discord. We realize that by bringing in these members we may be swelling the opposition occasionally to measures which we shall undoubtedly be supporting. Unquestionably it would be easier to sit back and prolong the present situation indefinitely out of fear of unknown consequences but in our view to do so would be a sterile attempt to preserve a restricted arrangement which is bound to be swept away sooner or later. We cannot ignore the nature of the world as it exists. If the United Nations is to survive and if it is to play the great role intended for it, then it must reflect the real world, not a partial world of our contriving.

FRANCO-TUNISIAN RELATIONS

(Continued from page 321)

national assembly which will prepare a democratic constitution for the new nation. The influential leader of the Néo-Destour, M. Bourguiba, who returned from exile in France following the conclusion of the Franco-Tunisian Conventions, described the future of his country in these terms:

le français restera toujours le lien qui reliera la Tunisie à la civilisation occidentale . . . une Tunisie . . . solidaire du monde arabo-musulman par son âme et sa culture et résolument tournée vers l'occident dont elle fait partie . . .

SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

Statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the Third Committee, October 27, 1955.

The Canadian Delegation would like to take the opportunity afforded by the Third Committee's discussion of Article 1 of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights to express some views on the question of self-determination of peoples and nations. I should perhaps explain that we wish to make these views known now rather than at a later stage, because they are of a fundamental nature and have a direct bearing both on Article 1 of the draft covenants and on the various proposals to be considered under the next item on the Committee's agenda.

I should like to refer first to the comments of the Canadian Government on the Draft Covenants on Human Rights, which are to be found in Document E/CN.4/694/ Addendum 6, dated March 10, 1954. Paragraph 8 of that document refers specifically to the self-determination articles in the two draft covenants. The Canadian position, as stated there, is that self-determination is a collective matter rather than an individual human right. We believe that this distinction is fully justified and we attach such importance to it that we find it necessary to adhere to our view that reference to self-determination of peoples is inappropriate in an international instrument dealing with individual human rights.

Views Shared

We share the view of those Governments which look upon self-determination more as a goal than as a right. In this connection, I should like to emphasize that we continue to believe that the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"—recognized in the United Nations Charter—is a matter of the greatest importance and deserving of the fullest respect and support.

While this is still the guiding factor in our thinking, we have become conscious of the need for a fuller analysis of self-determination in the light of views expressed by other governments in various organs of the United Nations in recent years. We have been greatly concerned to find that our understanding of this provision in the United Nations Charter is somewhat different from that of some other governments. In fact, it has become increasingly clear to us that the nation—if I may call it that—of self-determination is susceptible of a number of varying interpretations. The dis-

cussions concerning self-determination in the Commission on Human Rights and in this Committee have merely served to emphasize these differences in interpretation and have not resulted in the universal approach which we believe to be essential before any further progress can be made in this field.

It is important, Mr. Chairman, before proceeding any further, to clarify one or two points so that there can be no possible misinterpretation of the position of the Canadian Delegation—and perhaps that of some other delegations who, it seems to me, share our views in this matter.

Division of Opinion

Given the nature of our organization and the obvious division of opinion on the subject of self-determination, I am led to ask very earnestly whether any group of nations represented in this Committee considers that further progress in finding an acceptable solution will be facilitated by an attempt to formulate or define so-called rights or principles which another group of nations is—for reasons which I will mention later—not prepared to accept. Is it not more in keeping with the spirit of our organization and, I would add, more practical and sensible to recognize that there are differences in approach to the subject? Would it not be better to attempt to seek solutions or arrangements which will narrow these differences and—without impairing the all important goodwill and understanding which should inspire our deliberations—make it possible for all of us to advance, agreed step by agreed step, towards mutually satisfactory arrangement?

Now I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that those who regard self-determination as a right take their stand as a result of deep conviction—often in the light of bitter historical experience and under considerable and understandable pressure of public opinion. Is it unreasonable to appeal to fellow members of this organization, to approach differences with moderation and with a willingness to seek reasonable compromise; to consider that other countries which do not share their view on this particular subject are also motivated by the same high purposes, guided by long-established national traditions and a most earnest desire to do only what is right and fair?

This leads me, Mr. Chairman, to the crucial point. The members of this organization, when

they signed the Charter or adhered to it, have repudiated, one and all, the idea that any human being—and, even more, any group of human beings—should be held in political subjection or be the object of any kind of exploration. The very principles of our Charter proclaim in the most solemn fashion that alike in the relations between individuals and between nations or peoples, the golden rule is one of service, of dedicated and generous assistance. It is not helpful to suggest, therefore, in anything we say here that some members of our organization are not prepared to abide by these principles and are influenced by any purpose other than those which have enshrined in the Charter. It is not better to assume that in all this the main difference between us is not one of principle but perhaps one of method, not one of goals but rather one of approach. All of us here should seek what will be most beneficial to those peoples or areas which are not self-dependent or self-governing. We are all of us committed under the Charter to enlarge as far and as fast as possible the area of freedom in the world, in a manner which is consonant with the provisions of the Charter as a whole.

If we approach the issue facing this Committee with these thoughts in mind, our task will remain formidable but I am confident that it will be much more easily manageable. It is our hope that, through calm and friendly discussion among Member Governments, many of the question-marks resulting from the various understandings of this provision in the Charter will be permanently removed by working out generally agreed answers to the questions.

No General Agreement

What are these questions? They have been asked before, but I take the liberty of repeating them. First, "what do we really mean by the term 'self-determination'?" Second, "what do we really mean by the term 'peoples and nations'?" Mr. Chairman, I am sure that no member of this Committee would pretend that there are generally agreed answers to these questions. There is, for example, no general agreement whether political self-determination is achieved when self-government, or autonomy or full internal and external sovereignty have been concerned. Similarly, there is no general agreement on who is to enjoy self-determination — whether racial, religious, geographical, cultural and economic units are to be invited to determine their fate *and, if so, what tests are to be applied to ascertain whether such a unit is seeking expression of an articulate desire in this respect.* Besides, how many countries have no minorities? There is also the question of timing and

of selecting the arbiter. Who will say when a certain unit has reached the necessary degree of maturity? This raises problems which may not be essentially different in nature from those involved in the question of recognition of states. It seems to us what the very notion of who is entitled to self-determination and what it means—or when and how it should be asserted—is still too loose, too vague, to be defined with the desirable accuracy. In these circumstances, we find it impossible to declare our unreserved acceptance of self-determination, either as a right or as a principle. It is already clear that there are many other governments represented here which find themselves in very much the same position.

More Specific Questions

Mr. Chairman, I have mentioned a few questions of a general nature which have been troubling us. Since the generality of these questions may make them seem not too difficult to answer, I should like to mention briefly a number of more specific questions which I think will bring out the very real difficulties inherent in any attempt to implement self-determination.

First, self-determination must be examined in relation to Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter. If it were to be suggested, for instance, that the General Assembly ought to determine when self-determination should be applied, intervention in domestic matters might be involved and nothing less than an amendment of the Charter might be required.

Second, the preamble to the Charter states that one of its purposes is to promote respect for the obligations arising from treaties. To accept self-determination as a right might have far reaching effects on existing territorial arrangements. Acquire rights under valid international treaties might also be affected.

Third, the provisions in Chapter XII of the Charter recognize that self-determination is not an absolute right and that, in their own interest, certain peoples need the protection and support of other countries and that in such matters "the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples" must be taken into account.

Fourth, the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter imply that self-determination is not to be interpreted in such a way that it would be inconsistent with the obligations and rights of the administering countries. Admittedly, this is a contentious subject but even so, my government is of the opinion that any action which might have the effect of urging interpretations which are unacceptable to a number of members of the United Nations is

a matter for concern and should not be disposed of precipitately.

I have mentioned only four specific points which we believe must be examined carefully before a decision can be reached on the precise implications of self-determination. There are doubtless many other questions of equal or perhaps even greater importance which the General Assembly should study. I should like to say with all sincerity that the Canadian Government is (and has always been) ready and willing to play its part in finding the answers to these questions.

Dual Traditions

Finally, I would like to recall that our historical experience in Canada has been one of evolution tending to free and equal association. Our Nation, among others, encompasses peoples of many racial origins with varying religious beliefs and cultural heritages. We live freely together, and each citizen is free to think according to his own conscience and to act as he sees fit within the limitations imposed by the law. It would be a serious matter indeed if, through a decision of the United Nations, member countries were placed in a position of being morally and even perhaps legally bound to grant to these minority groups the right to determine their own institutions without consideration for the wishes of the community as a whole. For historical reasons our nation bears the dual stamp of Anglo-Saxon and French traditions. We have inherited from the old French tradition a true appreciation of the importance of formulating and codifying the rights and obligations of individuals throughout the world. Who can deny that Frenchmen have been in the vanguard of those who have sought to express in unequivocal terms the rights of the individual persons? From the Anglo-Saxon tradition we have inherited a cautious approach to the formulation of broad and theoretical principles. Because of this, we feel that there is a danger that premature formulation of principle may introduce an element of contention and rigidity in the field of self-determination when the emphasis should, in our view, be on specific cases and on flexibility. This is especially true in an age when all nations are becoming more conscious of their interdependence rather than of their separateness.

Mr. Chairman, I think I have given sufficient indication of the way in which my Delegation views, at this stage, the question of self-determination. In closing, therefore, I should merely like to emphasize that we have a keen interest in the whole subject, that we are prepared to study it carefully and to sup-

port any practical, concrete suggestions which will not involve contradictions with other Charter obligations and which appear to us to be politically advisable in their flexibility and timeliness. Whether in the context of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights or in any other context, our attitude to self-determination will be fully in accordance with our political traditions and what we may consider to be the best interests of the peoples concerned and of the United Nations. We have no other considerations in mind. We sympathize with those governments which are genuinely anxious to find a generally agreed definition of self-determination and also appropriate measures to implement it, once defined. Our aim is that all that is feasible in this field should be done with as little delay as possible. Because we are determined to live up to our obligations we are *not* prepared, however, to subscribe to broad and imprecise statements relating to hypothetical situations. We are willing to accept solutions which will be effective and which will positively contribute to the cause of freedom in the specific situations which have to be dealt with in the very concrete world in which we live and in which this organization has to operate.

Sovereign Equality

While we believe that the United Nations can and should help to solve this problem, we do not delude ourselves that our organization will have the final word. We do not forget that the organization is based on the principle of "the sovereign equality of all its members" and that in matters of such fundamental importance as "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and nations" there can be no really effective action without the consent of all the parties concerned. We do not look upon "self-determination" as a new idea because, as we see it, many countries, including our own, owe their existence to the practical application over a period of time of this very idea. That is why we can have no objection to its application in the future—under generally approved safeguards.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that I have made it clear that our purpose is not to delay or to oppose constructive action, but rather to help build firmer foundations for developing friendly relations among nations, as envisaged in Article I (2) of the Charter.

I have thought it desirable to speak in rather general terms at this time. I would like, however, to reserve the right of my Delegation to intervene again when the Committee reaches the stage of considering the various proposals that have been made for further study of this problem in the United Nations.

THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

Text of the talk by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, for the "Special Speakers Series" of the CBC on November 27, 1955.

Since returning from my visit to the Soviet Union, I have often been asked: Why did you go there? And what were the results, if any?

I went to Russia primarily to exchange views about current international issues, particularly those of direct concern to our two countries, in the hope that such an exchange might assist in some small way in the resolution of differences; or at least give me a clearer understanding of what these differences were. Certainly no one can be happy about them when you realize that the price of failure to establish a durable peace might easily be the unimaginable devastation of a nuclear war.

In my talks with the Soviet leaders I did what I could, and whenever I had the chance, to correct misunderstandings or misapprehensions about the policies by which we in Canada, in concert with our Allies, seek to protect our security and ensure peace.

I tried to make them realize—and I did not have the impression that this was labouring the obvious—that we of the West are as vitally concerned as the Soviet leaders told me they were, with peace and security and the removal of the causes of war. But I likewise made it clear to them that we were not prepared to scrap our collective security arrangements or weaken our defences merely because of what has been called the "Geneva Spirit";—especially when as the recent Geneva conference has shown, that "Spirit" as a subject for toasts is one thing; but as a basis for negotiations is something else. It is not enough to talk in general and friendly terms about "Reducing International Tension", while leaving unresolved the basic difference which cause these tensions.

No Secret

During my visit to Moscow and to the Crimea we talked of many things—of Ski's and shoes and sealing wax, and cabbages"—and NATO. Mr. Khrushchov, a very blunt and outspoken person, who does not waste time on the niceties of language or protocol, and the more subtle and sophisticated Mr. Bulganin (these two seem very close together at the "summit", of Soviet affairs) made no secret to me of their determination to weaken and destroy our North Atlantic Organization as an aggressive, anti-Soviet Bloc.

I told them that NATO was no such thing; that it was formed only after the United Na-

tions had proved ineffective to guarantee our security against the dangers that threatened us; that strong support for it would remain a principle of Canadian foreign and defence policy until the international situation or the United Nations made regional security pacts unnecessary.

I also did my best to convince them that the United States had no intention of attacking the U.S.S.R. or trying to use NATO for that purpose. I pointed out that if the United States were the aggressive military, imperialist state they claimed it to be, there would be no Canada today, except as an American satellite, and that, as they should know, we were not.

The Soviet leaders also talked a lot about Germany. They stated bluntly that they would not permit that country to be unified unless she withdrew from NATO.

We should not force Germany to remain in NATO, said Khrushchov. I replied that all we asked was the right of a Germany united by free elections to decide what her future course would be.

Frank Discussion

But there would be no such elections—or no such unification—Khrushchov warned me—until a European security system of the kind proposed by his government had replaced NATO.

Well, that was the kind of frank discussion we had, and I think it was useful—and revealing.

Such a forthright talk, however, did not affect in any way the friendly welcome we received. Our hosts could not have done more for our comfort and entertainment. The warm and generous hospitality for which the Russian people have been noted—and long before the Communist revolution—seemed, and I think was, genuine. It was difficult to doubt the sincerity of the rank and file when they protested their passion for peace. But the people of all nations want peace. Their desire in this regard is only politically important when they can bring it to bear effectively on the policy of their Governments.

For Canada, specifically, those with whom I talked expressed high regard; respected our achievements in war and peace. They are not unaware, I may say, of our strategic location as their neighbours across the Pole. Mr.

Khrushchev, for instance, averred that if there were ever another world war, Canada would have no geographical immunity from attack. He thought that this should make us all the more anxious to be on good terms with *both* our neighbours.

I replied that we were well aware of our strategic position, and also of the fact that we could never feel really secure if either of our two neighbours were hostile to us—or to each other.

I made it clear, however, that in coming to Russia to explore the possibilities of understanding in issues on which we differ; or the prospects of trade and increasing contacts, we had no thought in any way of loosing our historic and friendly ties with nations with whom we have been so closely associated as proven friends over the years.

What did I gain by my visit?

For one thing, a better understanding of the great gap of ignorance and misunderstanding which, divides the Communist world from ourselves.

Lack of Understanding

This ignorance and misunderstanding is not, of course, all on one side. But on their side it is colossal; almost pathetic, and certainly dangerous.

Western—and especially American—policy and purpose is judged on the basis of cabled newspaper stories which give only one side and the most lurid side of life in free countries.

It seems quite impossible to convince Soviet leaders—who seem to base their alleged fear of us on such information—that these stories are distorted and unrepresentative.

I told Mr. Khrushchev that we found the truth out of the clash of varying opinions—all of which could and must be expressed. It didn't make sense to him.

Similarly when I argued (he had been talking about the threat from American bases) that a Communist party in any country was a source of fear as a Russian base, his immediate and natural reactions was that this was purely domestic matter; that if we didn't deal effectively with what we considered to be a menace—as they would certainly do in Russia—then that was our affair. That a group should have the right to express views detested by the vast majority was quite beyond his comprehension — as it would be to any Communist leader.

In the face of all this, what should we do? We should stand firm against tactics of divide, weaken and destroy — through threat or through blandishment.

But equally, we should do nothing—by provocative word or policy—to increase that fear of the West as a threat to peace—which they claim, genuinely or not, to feel.

We should also remember that to the Soviet rulers, peaceful co-existence means competitive co-existence—and that in this competition, which they expect to win, they are bound only by their own rules.

That is why I was ready to believe Mr. Khrushchev and the others when they told me, as they often did, that they wanted peace, or, if you like, a peaceful interlude.

In addition to the compelling reason that the alternative of war may be universal destruction—and these men are not suicidal Hitlers—there is their conviction—as Mr. Khrushchev has candidly admitted—that in a more peaceful international climate the free peoples will lose the competition, because they will not accept the sacrifices that prolonged defence preparations involve. Their coalitions — particularly NATO — will therefore fall apart. Communists, I was assured, could stand up better to sacrifices than we could—are tougher, more disciplined, and more patient in the long pull than we are. Communist society would therefore be superior to our capitalist society, in peaceful but competitive co-existence.

Certainly I am satisfied, from what I saw and heard, that there is great power in the Soviet Union—based on total control and iron discipline. We would be making a big mistake if we interpreted recent tactical and amicable advances as dictated by weakness. Mr. Khrushchev was emphatic about this and I suspect that he is right.

Strength Based on Free Man

But our strength can be far greater—for peace as well as for defence—if we wish to make it so—because it is based on the free man.

The Communists think that this freedom of ours, by encouraging laziness and licence, will be our undoing. We know that—rightly used—it is our greatest source of strength.

It is up to us to make it so, and thereby we win the struggle, and it is going to be a long, and hard, and costly struggle, for a free and peaceful world.

EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION

Excerpts from a statement by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, and Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the tenth session of the United Nations, Mr. Paul Martin, made in the First Committee, November 1, 1955.

The Canadian Delegation agrees with the proposal of the United States for the establishment of a special Technical Committee to co-ordinate information relating to the effects of ionizing radiation because it is conscious of the primacy that must be accorded to human values in the development and application of nuclear energy.

There is no need to re-state in this body all that has been said about the cataclysmic effect for our civilization of the release of nuclear energy. Like all such forces, it has incalculable possibilities of good and evil. It would be cowardly in the extreme to renounce the prospects of good because of the fear of evil. Nor could we now, even if we wanted to do so, exercise the new force we have liberated. We have no alternative but to behave like civilized human beings in the face of this magnificent and terrible challenge. To save ourselves we shall need discipline and intelligence of a high order. We must also be fearless in our pursuit of truth. This is too dangerous a matter to allow us the luxury of personal or national pride and prejudice. It is necessary that we work together on this subject.

The health problems associated with radiation have increasingly engaged the attention of officers of my own Department of National Health and Welfare and of a number of other government agencies since the development of our atomic energy programme. In addition to the protective measures taken by the authorities at our Atomic Energy project to ensure the health and safety of their own workers, extensive precautions are required to safeguard the health of persons working with radioactive isotopes in research laboratories and industry. Medical uses of radioactive isotopes are subject to review by physicians specially experienced in this field.

A broader problem is presented by the undoubted fact that in recent years there has been a slight, though appreciable, increase in radiation all over the world. The health implications, for our own and succeeding generations, of this increase the most sober and thorough consideration. Already significant studies are being pursued in a number of countries, with the result that a body of scientific literature in this field is rapidly developing. It must be acknowledged that some conflicting views have been expressed, but the consensus of the best scientific evidence available seems to be that no significant im-

mediate or long-range harmful effects of serious proportions will result from the increased radioactivity that has occurred.

Nevertheless, it would appear to me as a layman that there remain a number of unanswered questions, particularly in relation to possible genetic effects, which underline the need for the compilation and co-ordination of existing information by a body such as the proposed technical committee and which call for continuing research by competent scientists.

A Study of Genetic Effects of Radiation

Experiments on certain rapidly-breeding lower forms of life, such as bacteria, plants, insects and small mammals, have established the fact that genetic changes can be produced by exposure to radiation. By analogy it is assumed that the same phenomenon will occur in humans, but it will take many generations to assess the magnitude of the problem.

I am told by my medical and technical advisers that, in determining genetic effects on man, there are two principal difficulties. First, most mutations will remain hidden until one individual receives the same mutated gene for both parents. Secondly, naturally occurring genes for recessive defects and abnormalities are already numerous in the population. Neither these naturally occurring mutant genes nor those that might be induced by radiation are likely to produce a significant effect in the children of the individuals carrying them unless the parents have received the same defect from a common ancestor.

The genetic problem is exceedingly complex; the important factors are not known and our scientists are attempting to carry on useful investigations in this field. A great deal of study has gone into this question, and a long range programme is now being developed for the collection and study of human data that will aid in the assessment of this problem.

I should like to call the Committee's attention to the terms of reference of the special body to be established. It is suggested, quite appropriately in our view, that the special committee will undertake what will in effect be a survey. This is the logical first step to enable governments to assess the situation in the light of the facts as they will have been established. The Governments will then have

information on the levels of a radiation through the whole world instead of just in their respective territories as at present and will thus be in a position to determine the hazards involved on the best and most authoritative available information. The Committee should do more than circulate reports. It should organize systematically the materials received, putting the various contributions in proper perspective. Perhaps its most important work will be to tackle the difficult problem of recommending a research programme to answer the questions which now beset us. In this understanding it will of course be essential to proceed on the basis of information received from national committees.

The Canadian Delegation agrees that it is important to have some sort of deadline in order that, on the one hand, the report will not be unduly delayed, and, on the other, that

we should not be pressed into bringing in a report prematurely on the basis of insufficient data. I should like to make it clear, however, that in our view, a report delivered by 1958 should not be regarded as final and conclusive, particularly in relation to genetic effects, the study of which may well extend over many years and, indeed, several generations.

Through the ages, each new scientific and industrial advance has brought with it new problems. We have only to think of the airplane. While the airplane has done a great deal to bring people and communities closer together, it has created a whole new set of problems relating to such matters as the regulation of international air routes, safety and health standards. Nuclear energy is, in a sense, unique among scientific discoveries in that preventive action against the hazards it may create is now being taken well in advance of its actual widespread development.

CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

(Continued from page 327)

At the current session detailed examination of the covenants was opened in the Third Committee. The preamble was approved, subject to final review, but Article I, which deals with the right to self-determination, proved highly controversial. This article reads as follows:

1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

2. The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.

3. All the states parties to the Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing and trust territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter."

The Third Committee concluded its debate on November 29, and approved the inclusion of the article on self-determination as Article I of both covenants, over the objection and negative votes of 12 countries, Canada among them.

In the course of the debate the Canadian representative pointed out that self-determination was a collective matter rather than an individual human right and therefore had no place in an international instrument dealing with such rights; that it was to be regarded more as a goal than as a right; and that a comprehensive study of the whole question was needed before constructive action to assert a right of self-determination could be undertaken. The full text of the statement made by the Canadian Representative, Mr. Paul Martin, will be found on page 331.

APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS IN THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

- Mr. H. O. Moran, MBE, Ambassador, returned to Ankara from home leave, effective November 21, 1955.
- Mr. J. J. Hurley, OBE, High Commissioner, returned to Colombo from home leave, effective November 11, 1955.
- Mr. C. J. Small, transferred from the Department of Trade and Commerce to the Department of External Affairs as a Foreign Service Officer Grade 3, effective October 1, 1955.
- Mr. G. S. Levey resigned from the Department of External Affairs, effective October 17, 1955.
- Mr. D. W. Munro transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Dublin, to the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, effective October 24, 1955.
- Mr. G. W. Charpentier posted from home leave (Canberra) to Ottawa, effective November 1, 1955.
- Mr. R. W. Murray posted from home leave (Indochina) to Ottawa, effective November 7, 1955.
- Mr. J. C. Langley transferred from the Canadian Embassy, Brussels, to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective November 12, 1955.
- Mr. D. H. W. Kirkwood, posted from home leave (Paris NAC) to Ottawa, effective November 14, 1955.
- Mr. M. C. M. Gauvin, DSO, posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective November 17, 1955.
- Mr. M. D. G. Baudouin posted from Ottawa to the International Supervisory Commissions, Indochina, effective November 23, 1955.
- Mr. J. A. Donald, posted from the Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, London, to Ottawa, effective November 25, 1955.
- Mr. T. H. W. Read posted from Ottawa to the Canadian Embassy Havana, effective November 28, 1955.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Action

Bilateral

France

Exchange of Notes respecting modification of the 1950 Air Agreement.
Signed at Ottawa July 30, 1954 and October 29, 1955.
Entered into force October 29, 1955.

Japan

British Commonwealth—Japan War Graves Agreement.
Signed at Tokyo September 21, 1955.

Union of South Africa

Exchange of Notes respecting the tariffs on wool, molasses and unmanufactured hardwood.
Signed at Ottawa, September 13 and October 26, 1955.
In force from April 1, 1955.

United States of America

Exchange of notes respecting the relocation of Roosevelt Bridge crossing the Cornwall South Channel.
Signed at Ottawa November 16, 17, 1955.

Venezuela

Exchange of Notes renewing the terms of the Commercial *modus vivendi* of October 11, 1950 for a period of one year.

Signed at Caracas, September 19 and October 11, 1955.

Publications

(Obtainable from the Queen's Printer, Ottawa, at the price indicated).

Treaty Series 1955, No. 5: Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India and Pakistan and the Government of Italy relative to the Graves in Italian Territory of Members of the Armed Forces of the British Commonwealth, English and French texts. (Price: 25 cents).

CURRENT UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS*

A SELECTED LIST

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WHO—*Executive Board, Sixteenth Session, Mexico, D.F., 30 May 1955: Resolutions.* Annexes. Geneva, August 1955. Official Records of WHO, No. 65. 21 p.

(b) Mimeographed Document:

The Stabilization of the Olive Oil Market. (E/CONF.19/1). FAO 55/8/5405, Rome, Italy, August 1955. 91 p.

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