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POLICY SEMINAR ON FOREIGN

AND DEFENCE ISSUES

VAL MORIN, QUEBEC

AUGUST 20-22, 1983

WORKING TRANSCRIPT

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CHAIRMAN:

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen
Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs

POLICY SEMINAR ON FOREIGN
AND DEFENCE ISSUES


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NOTE: This document outlines as faithfully as possible the
proceedings but is not a formal transcript.

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PROGRAM

Chairman: Hon. Allan J. MacEachen
Moderator: Tom Axworthy

OPENING SESSION: THE POLICY SETTING

How has the international security environment changed since 1970? In what directions is it likely to evolve over the next fifteen years? Do these changes suggest a need to re-examine Canada's security policy?

David Steel, Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Commentator - Franklyn Griffiths
Rapporteur - Philippe Garigue

SESSION A: THE NEW GLOBAL BASIS OF SECURITY

How do we assess the present state of East-West relations? Are there new signs of flexibility on either side? How do regional instabilities bear on the global security environment? How should international institutions be strengthened?

James R. Schlesinger, Robert Ford, Maurice Torrelli

Commentator - Seyom Brown
Rapporteur - John Holmes

SESSION B: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

What are the prospects for success in the different sets of negotiations (INF, START, MBFR)? What is the role of the smaller powers, such as Canada? How do economic considerations come into play in questions of arms control and disarmament?

4. Eugene Rostow, Helen Caldicott

Commentator - J. Alan Beesley
Rapporteur - Harriet Critchley

SESSION C: CHOICES FOR CANADA

What are Canada's options in the area of collective security and the improvement of East-West relations? What are our options in the area of disarmament and arms control? In what directions should Canadian policy and practice be moving?

Albert Legault, Walter Gordon, John Harker

Commentator - John Halstead
Rapporteur - Michael Tucker

CONCLUDING SESSION

Rapporteurs

BACKGROUND PAPER

POLICY SEMINAR ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE ISSUES

Canadian security policy can be defined very broadly to include three elements:

- (1) Participation in collective defence and deterrence through our contribution to NATO and NORAD;
- (2) Active cooperation in efforts to achieve equitable and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements;
- (3) Support for peaceful settlement of disputes and the collective effort to resolve the underlying economic and social causes of international tension.

Collective Defence

NATO's strategy is to preserve security through deterrence. Defence has been based on a triad of forces: intercontinental strategic nuclear forces based in the United States, intermediate and shorter range nuclear forces based in Europe, and conventional forces.

Through the 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union reached a position of rough parity in their strategic forces. This was codified in the SALT II agreement of 1979. SALT II has not been ratified, but the main provisions are still being observed by both sides. Although the agreement provided limits on the aggregate number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to an initial total of 2400 each, it did allow for their modernization subject to agreed rules. Both countries are carrying out programs to renew their forces accordingly.

NATO's conventional forces in Europe have been lower than those of the Warsaw Pact in terms of numbers of men and increasingly of major items of equipment, such as tanks. The extent of this imbalance and its military significance are the subject of controversy. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has concluded that "the overall balance continues to be such as to make military aggression a highly risky undertaking...the consequences for an attacker would be unpredictable, and the risks, particularly of nuclear escalation, incalculable".

At the point when it was reaching agreement with the United States on a balance of strategic weapons, and already had conventional superiority in Europe, the Soviet Union began to introduce a new intermediate-range nuclear missile, the SS-20, with much greater range and accuracy and more warheads than its obsolescent SS-4s and SS-5s. Several Western European

governments feared that the Soviet Union intended to threaten European NATO members and split the defence of Europe from the defence of North America. In December, 1979, NATO Defence and Foreign Ministers accordingly took two parallel decisions. They agreed to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missile launchers and 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles to replace an equivalent number of short-range systems. Secondly they proposed negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States to limit or eliminate land-based intermediate-range missile systems on both sides. Unless there are concrete results in the negotiations, the first missiles will be deployed in Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy at the end of 1983.

Arms Control and Disarmament

There are several sets of arms control and disarmament negotiations now underway: the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Talks (INF), Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) and within the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament.

In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks the United States and the Soviet Union have each made modifications to their initial negotiating positions to take into account objections raised by the other. The Soviet position is based on the model of SALT II, with further reductions of about 25% proposed in the number of delivery vehicles - missiles and aircraft. Under the Soviet proposal, the number of warheads could, however, increase. After initially proposing a ban on Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, the Soviet Union would now permit 120 bombers equipped with ALCMs. It has also withdrawn proposed limits on submarines which would have had the effect of allowing Soviet but not US fleet modernization. The US set out to reduce the threat posed by Soviet heavy Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with multiple warheads which it diagnosed as the most destabilizing factor in the nuclear relationship. It initially proposed deep cuts in the numbers of warheads on missiles, the numbers of missiles themselves and their total throw-weight (an indirect measure of their destructive power). The Soviet Union objected that the US proposals would have the effect of imposing a much greater change in the Soviet than in the US force, and would exclude consideration of bombers in the first phase. The US has now indicated that it will consider a higher number of missiles, while retaining the same ceiling on warheads, will accept other means of limiting the throw-weight, and will negotiate about bombers and cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles.

Although START positions are beginning to converge, major areas of disagreement remain. Success in any case may depend on the outcome of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Talks. The United States initially proposed eliminating all

intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles everywhere in the world. After consultations with NATO allies, it put forward an interim proposal last spring which would allow the Soviet Union and the USA an equal number of warheads on missiles of this class. Although agreeing to warheads rather than missiles as the unit for negotiations, the Soviet Union has insisted that French and British strategic forces should be taken into account, that nuclear capable medium-range aircraft should be included, and that missiles deployed outside of Europe should be excluded. NATO allies have expressed their hope that agreement can be reached in Geneva in the near future. They have made it clear, however, that negotiations could continue even should the deployment of Western missiles be necessary later this year, and that these could be removed if a satisfactory agreement is reached.

In the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna, both sides have put forward new comprehensive proposals during the past year. Eastern acceptance in principle of more stringent verification measures has been an encouraging development but there is still no agreement on how many Warsaw Pact troops there are now in Central Europe and hence on how many would have to depart if both sides were to be left with equal numbers.

At the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which convened in Madrid in November, 1980, agreement has been reached on a mandate for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe which will focus initially on negotiating a regime of confidence and security building measures. It is expected to start in January 1984 in Stockholm.

In the Committee on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, a number of Canadian priorities are being pursued including a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a ban on chemical weapons and the increasingly important subject of arms control and outer space. Progress has been disappointingly slow except for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, established in 1980, which has accomplished useful work under a Canadian chairman.

Reduction of International Tensions

East-West relations have seriously deteriorated over the last few years. The two superpowers have tended to view international problems primarily in the light of how the balance of power between them might be affected, so that disputes in Africa, Asia and Central America have all taken on an East-West dimension. Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the USSR's continuing arms build-up and its support for surrogate forces in extra-territorial adventures have all served to weaken confidence that the Soviet leadership is in fact serious in

its repeated protestations for improved understanding and cooperation. On the other side, American rhetoric about the Soviet Union as the focus of evil in the world has given rise to doubts about the extent to which the United States has been interested in improved East-West relations. Fortunately, there have been signs in recent weeks that both have been prepared to take a more pragmatic approach to dealing with the differences between them.

Canada's Role

Since 1949, Canada has considered it would most effectively ensure its own defence by membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Since the 1971 White Paper, Canada has contributed only conventional forces in Europe. With the phasing in of the CF-18 aircraft, it will give up its nuclear role in the air defence of North America. Canada has provided facilities for operational training of both nuclear capable and conventional forces of our allies, and has recently agreed to the testing of unarmed cruise missiles in this country.

The Canadian Government believes that NATO and Warsaw Pact countries should be able to achieve undiminished security at lower levels of arms through fair, verifiable agreements. Canada has joined in the formulation of the Western position in the INF negotiations through consultations in NATO and bilaterally with the United States. It has played an active role in the MBFR talks, and will have a delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe when it begins as expected next year. Canada has played an active role in the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva. In recent years, Canadian expertise has been applied in the ad hoc group of seismic experts which is developing an international seismic data exchange, a verification mechanism which will form part of the provisions of an eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Internationally Canadian expertise in defensive measures has been applied in the negotiations on a treaty banning chemical weapons. On the subject of arms control and outer space, Canada initiated a working paper last summer and this year called for the establishment of a working group.

Canada is committed to a policy of promoting peaceful cooperation and enhanced understanding between the two super-powers. The Government believes it is important to keep open the lines of political dialogue between East and West both on a bilateral basis and in multilateral forums. Canada has been interested in expanding East-West trade, and has supported initiatives within the Western Community to ensure that economic relations with the USSR are developed methodically and based on Western political, economic and security interests. Canadians have traditionally attempted to strengthen the role of international organizations, and particularly the United Nations, in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

External Affairs Canada
Government of Canada
August 15, 1983

POLICY SEMINAR
ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE ISSUES
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

ANDERSON, JOHN is Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) in the Department of National Defence. He previously was Chief of Policy Planning, Director of Program Analysis and Director of Finance in the department. Mr. Anderson is a member of the Canadian Historical Association and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and is an associate of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He received his M.A. in Modern History from the University of Toronto.

AXWORTHY, the Honourable LLOYD is Minister of Transport and Member of Parliament for the Manitoba riding of Winnipeg-Fort Garry. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1979 and has served as Minister of Employment and Immigration. Mr. Axworthy was Professor of Political Science and Director of the Urban Studies Institute at the University of Winnipeg. He was the Leader of the Liberal Party of Manitoba and represented the riding of Fort Rouge in the Legislature from 1973 to 1979. A graduate of the University of Winnipeg, Mr. Axworthy received his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Princeton University.

AXWORTHY, THOMAS is Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister of Canada. He has also served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister and as Special Assistant to the Ministers of National Revenue and Urban Affairs. Previously, he was with the Canada Consulting Group. He is a member of the American and Canadian Political Science Associations, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Oxford Union Society. A graduate of the University of Winnipeg, Mr. Axworthy received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Queen's University and did post-graduate studies at Nuffield College, Oxford.

BEESLEY, ALAN is Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament. He previously was Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, Canadian High Commissioner to Australia and, concurrently, Ambassador to Austria and Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Mr. Beesley has also served abroad in Tel Aviv and Geneva. A lawyer, he is a graduate of the University of British Columbia.

BLAIS, the Honourable JEAN-JACQUES is Minister of National Defence and Member of Parliament for the Ontario riding of Nipissing. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1972 and has served as Minister of Supply and Services, Postmaster General and Solicitor General of Canada. A lawyer, Mr. Blais is a graduate of the University of Ottawa. He received his law degree from Osgoode Hall Law School.

BROWN, SEYOM is Head of the Consortium for North American Affairs at Harvard University and Professor of Political Science at Brandeis University. He previously was Senior Fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution and adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Dr. Brown is a member of the International Studies Association, the Council on Foreign Relations and the United Nations Association. He has written several books including The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (1968) and The Crisis of Power: Foreign Policy in the Kissinger Years (1979). A graduate of the University of Southern California, he received his PH.D. from the University of Chicago.

CACCIA, the Honourable CHARLES is Minister of the Environment and Member of Parliament for the Toronto riding of Davenport. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1968 and has served as Minister of Labour. He studied at the Liceo Scientifico Vittorio Veneto in Milan and at the University of Vienna.

CALDICOTT, HELEN is the President of Physicians for Social Responsibility in the United States. She previously was Director of the Cystic Fibrosis Clinic at the Children's Hospital Medical Centre in Boston and Instructor in Pediatrics at the Harvard Medical School. Dr. Caldicott is a Diplomat of the American Board of Pediatrics and is a member of the American Medical Association and the Royal Australasian College of Physicians. She is the author of several publications including Nuclear Madness: What You Can Do (1978). Dr. Caldicott received her Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery from the University of Adelaide Medical School.

CRITCHLEY, HARRIET is Program Director of Strategic Studies and of Northern Political Studies and is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary. She is a member of the Executive Committee of the Canadian Military Colleges Advisory Board, the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies and the International Institute for Strategic Studies and serves on the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council of Canada. Dr. Critchley was a member of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978-79 and in 1982. A graduate of the University of New Brunswick, she received her Masters and Ph.D in International Relations from Columbia University.

FORD, ROBERT is Special Advisor on East-West relations to the Department of External Affairs. He was Ambassador of Canada to the U.S.S.R. from 1964 until 1980. He also served as Ambassador to Columbia, Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic and as Head of the European division of the Department of External Affairs. A graduate of the University of Western Ontario, Mr. Ford received his M.A. from Cornell University and his D. Litt. from Western.

FRANCIS, ROSS is Director of the Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs. He joined the foreign service in 1954 and has served in Laos, South Africa, Indonesia, the United Kingdom and as Canadian High Commissioner to Malaysia. Mr. Francis is a member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. A graduate of the University of Manitoba, he received his M.A. from Corpus Christi College at Oxford University.

GARIGUE, PHILIPPE is Principal of Glendon College at York University in Toronto. He was previously Dean of Social Sciences at the University of Montreal. Dr. Garigue is a Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute and a member of the U.S. Strategic Institute, the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. He is the author of several publications including Guerres, Stratégies, et Sociétés (1979). A graduate of the London School of Economics, he received his Ph.D. from the University of London and his Diploma of Defence Studies from the National Defence College in Kingston.

GORDON, the Honourable WALTER is Chairman of the Canadian Institute for Economic Policy. He was the Member of Parliament for the Toronto riding of Davenport from 1962 to 1968 and, during that period, served as Minister of Finance and President of the Privy Council. A former partner in the Woods Gordon consulting firm, Mr. Gordon was Chairman of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects in 1955. Mr. Gordon is the author of several books including A Choice for Canada - Independence or Colonial Status (1966) and What is Happening to Canada (1978). He is a graduate of the Royal Military College in Kingston.

GRIFFITHS, FRANKLYN is a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Toronto, where he has also served as Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Affairs. He is a member of the National Council of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Arms Control Association and the Canadian Pugwash Group. Dr. Griffiths is the author of a number of publications including The Dangers of Nuclear War (1979). A graduate of Trinity College, Toronto, he received his M.A. from the School of International Affairs at Columbia University and his Ph.D. in Public Law and Government at Columbia.

HALSTEAD, JOHN is a consultant and a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He has also served as Permanent Canadian Representative to NATO and as Ambassador of Canada to the Federal Republic of Germany. Mr. Halstead is a member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Atlantic Council of Canada. A graduate of the University of British Columbia, he received his B.Sc. from the London School of Economics.

HARKER, JOHN is Director of International Affairs of the Canadian Labour Congress. He previously was Executive Director of the Professional Association of Canadian Foreign Service Officers and Research Officer for the Professional Institute of the Public Service. Mr. Harker is a member of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation and is a substitute member of the Executive Committee of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. A graduate of Liverpool University, he received his M.A. in Political Science and Public Administration from Dalhousie University.

HOLMES, JOHN is Professor of International Relations at the University of Toronto and Counsellor of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. He has also served as Assistant Under-Secretary of State and Head of the U.N. Division in the Department of External Affairs. Mr. Holmes is a member of the Board of Directors of the International Peace Academy and served on the United Nations Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. He is the author of several books including The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957 (1979). A graduate of the University of Western Ontario, he received his M.A. from the University of Toronto and did post-graduate work at the University of London.

KAPLAN, the Honourable ROBERT is Solicitor General of Canada and Member of Parliament for the Metropolitan Toronto riding of York Centre. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1968 and has served as Chairman of the Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs Committee and as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministers of National Health and Welfare, and Finance. A lawyer, Mr. Kaplan is a graduate of the University of Toronto.

LAMARRE, BERNARD is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Lavalin and President and/or Director of a number of Lavalin subsidiaries. He is a member of the Engineering Institute of Canada, the Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada, the French Chamber of Commerce of Canada and several other business and professional organizations. A graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique de Montréal, Mr. Lamarre received his M.Sc.Eng. from the Imperial College of Science and Technology in London and did post-graduate work at the Société STUP in Paris.

LAMONTAGNE, the Honourable GILLES is the Member of Parliament for the Quebec riding of LangeIier. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1977 and has served as Minister of National Defence and Postmaster General of Canada. Mr. Lamontagne was Mayor of Quebec City from 1965 to 1978 and is a former Vice-President of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. A businessman, he received his B.A. from Jean-de-Brébeuf College.

LEGAULT, ALBERT is a Professor of Political Science at Laval University and Director General of the Centre québécois de relations internationales. He is also a Special Advisor to the Department of National Defence and Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Mr. Legault has served as Assistant Director of the International Information Centre on Peace-Keeping Operations in Paris, and as a Visiting Professor, Chair of Strategic Studies, at Queen's University. He is co-author of The Dynamics of Nuclear Balance (1974). A graduate of St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York, Mr. Legault received his M.A. from the University of Chicago, his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Institute for International Studies, Geneva, and his Ph.D. from the University of Paris.

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MARCHAND, de MONTIGNY is Deputy Minister for Foreign Policy in the Department of External Affairs. He previously was Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) and Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) in the Department of Communications. A lawyer, Mr. Marchand is a graduate of the University of Montreal and received his M.S. in Communications from Boston University.

MASSE, MARCEL is Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. He previously was President of the Canadian International Development Agency, Clerk of the Privy Council, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet for Federal-Provincial Relations and President of the Council of Ministers of the Government of New Brunswick. A graduate of the University of Montreal, he received his LL.L from McGill, his B.Phil from Oxford and diplomas in External Relations, German, Italian and Economics from the Ecole des hautes études in Montreal.

MATHEWSON, ARTHUR is Chief of Policy Planning in the Department of National Defence. Since joining the Public Service in 1953, he has held a number of positions in Ottawa and abroad including Director of the Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs and Minister with the Canadian Embassy in Bonn. A lawyer, Mr. Mathewson is a graduate of McGill University and Cambridge University.

PEPIN, the Honourable JEAN-LUC is Minister of State for External Relations and Member of Parliament for the Ontario riding of Ottawa-Carleton. He represented the Quebec riding of Drummond from 1963 until 1972 and returned to Parliament in 1979. Mr. Pepin has served as Minister of Transport, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce and Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. He was Chairman of the Anti-Inflation Board from 1973 to 1975 and Co-Chairman of the Task Force on National Unity from 1977 to 1979. He received his Diploma in Higher Studies of Law from the University of Ottawa and did post-graduate work at the University of Paris.

PITFIELD, MICHAEL is a member of the Senate of Canada. He served as Clerk of the Privy Council from 1975 to 1979 and from 1980 to 1982, and was the Mackenzie King Visiting Professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Mr. Pitfield has also served as Deputy Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Senior Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and as Secretary of the Royal Commissions on Taxation and Publications. A graduate of St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, he received his law degree from McGill University and his DESD from the University of Ottawa.

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ROSTOW, EUGENE is Sterling Professor of Law and Public Studies at Yale University. He was formerly Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs and President of the Atlantic Treaty Association. Dr. Rostow is the author of several books including The Pursuit of Peace (1968) and Peace in the Balance (1972). A graduate of Yale Law School, he received his M.A. from Cambridge University.

SCHLESINGER, JAMES is a member of the staff of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and is Senior Advisor to Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. He has also served as United States Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defence, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. Schlesinger is the author of The Political Economy of National Security (1960) and is co-author of Issues in Defence Economics (1967). He received his M.A. and PH.D. from Harvard University.

SONNENFELDT, HELMUT is a Visiting Scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He has served as Counsellor and Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the USSR and Eastern Europe in the United States State Department and was a senior staff member of the National Security Council from 1969 to 1974. He has also lectured at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and is a member of the Royal Institute for Strategic Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute for Stratetic Studies. Mr. Sonnenfeldt received his M.A. from Johns Hopkins University.

STEEL, the Right Honourable DAVID is Leader of the Liberal Party of the United Kingdom and is the Member of Parliament for the riding of Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles in Scotland. He was first elected to Parliament in 1965 and became Liberal leader in 1976. Mr. Steel was formerly a broadcaster and journalist with the BBC, Scottish Television and Granada Television. He recieved his M.A. and LL.B. from the University of Edinburgh.

positive post-December policies for trying to get negotiations with the Soviet Union on a much more widespread basis. It seems to me that by historical accident we are left with three sets of negotiations which are described in the working paper in our folders, the INF, the START and the MBFR and that the very splicing of these negotiations into these three areas is itself a mechanism for slowing down the pace of negotiations, because so much of the negotiations are not actually negotiations at all, but arguments about definitions of different weapon systems and into which negotiations they ought to be. We ought to be looking beyond the present run of talks to the possibility of getting these pulled together, and I would argue that we ought to be giving much more political attention to the MBFR talks in Vienna. Because from the European point of view what we ought to be trying to do is to raise the nuclear threshold and so far in Europe we are behind the Soviet Union in conventional defence capabilities and that is one of the reasons why we are becoming overdependent on nuclear defence. The MBFR talks are in a sense, in my view, dragging on and on. We ought to be looking to the possibility of a Freeze as an opportunity for re-organizing the various forms of arms negotiations. Secondly, we in Britain and our colleagues in France cannot go on pretending that our independent missile systems should be kept ever out of the calculations. We may not actually want to put them into the negotiations in the sense of wanting them in the present run, but we cannot pretend that they can simply be ignored. For our part in the Liberal Party and the Alliance in Britain, we have opposed the Conservative Government's determination to go for a new generation of independent missile capability in purchasing the Trident system from the

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POLICY SEMINAR ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE ISSUES,
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CHAIRMAN: The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen,
Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary
of State for External Affairs

OPENING SESSION: THE POLICY SETTING

Chairman: This is the third in the series of policy seminars that will have been conducted under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office. There have been two previous seminars which have brought together government and non-government people to explore new policy approaches, if such are possible, in particular areas, and this particular seminar, which will continue tonight, tomorrow and Monday morning, will deal with the question of security. The broad issues that are involved in that overall question and Canada's national security will be very much in our minds. In the course of our discussions we will be examining the foundation, the principles that have been at the root of our security policy, and asking whether the changing world environment might not cause us to adopt new approaches. That question will certainly be on our minds, but before launching into the discussion of this evening I would like to ask Mr. Tom Axworthy, the principal secretary of the Prime Minister, who has attended the two previous seminars, to outline to us the format and the process that we will be following tonight, tomorrow and Monday morning.

Tom Axworthy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to join Mr. MacEachen in welcoming you all to Canada, to Val Morin, especially the visitors from abroad. We found that in our past sessions that the mixture of different points of view

both by persuasion and geography are a very heavy mix, and I look forward to the same spontaneous combustion this weekend.

I will be very brief and just speak on two points. The first, the ground rules for these sessions, and the second would be just a very brief summary of the previous seminars so you can have some idea of what has preceded us here. First of all, on the ground rules, the discussion is to be informal and off the record, and all participants are equal here which includes experts, ministers and officials, so our officials from the government of Canada have the heady experience of being able to disagree with their political masters in public, but with no attribution, and I encourage them to do so. We have divided the sessions into a format with lead speakers followed by a commentator and a rapporteur. The rapporteurs have a dual function. One is to make an assessment of their particular sessions, and our concluding session consists of the reports of the rapporteurs who try to draw together what has happened in their session, vis-à-vis the total seminar. Lead speakers, commentators, rapporteurs and members may speak any time and on any subject. So please feel free to engage in conversation and discussion at any point.

One word about the press who began by taking the press photograph. We ask you to have the same rules here as govern most international conferences, that is there will be official spokesmen, ministers who will meet the press in the evening to give them a view of what has transpired, so there is no need for any of the participants to speak to the press if they do not wish, for ministers have been assigned to carry out that task. However, you may feel so inclined to

Speak to the press - if you do, we ask the participants to follow the rule that one can report on his own statement and views, but not on the reports of others. One can make his own point of view, but not give a discussion of what the other speakers have said. So you are responsible for your own remarks and interpretations, but we will be meeting the press officially at the end of each evening. Those, Mr. Chairman, are the ground rules.

Let me just briefly report on the previous sessions. Mr. MacEachan has reported that this is the third of a series. The results of these think tank seminars will be reported to Cabinet and to the caucus of our party, which are meeting in September when we begin our planning season for the next Speech from the Throne and other events. The purpose of these seminars has been two-fold. One is to engage in the widest possible discussion of ideas on central issues which may have a reflection on the government's future planning. The second is a broader objective, though closely tied to it, and that is we hope through these seminars and other activities that the government will be carrying out on the wider policy issues of the 80's to define the agenda for the 1980s and 1990s. The first two seminars dealt with economic subjects, the first on economic growth and inflation and the macro-view, the second more on micro-policies, industrial strategies and full employment issues. There was a discussion of the international dimension of the economy, which may have some relevance for this seminar. In our discussions of the world economy, there was a view that the recovery was real, though perhaps fragile, and that the main dangers to the recovery were in fact international. A consensus was very clear that the single most worrisome aspect would be an international

financial failure. In particular the problems of Third World debt and disparity in wealth between the developed and non-developing nations was one of the great elements of insecurity which would affect the economic recovery and the general stability of the West. The second was a tremendous worry about protectionism, and closely allied with the discussions we had on Third World issues, that the continuing economic pressures that we were faced with in the West would lead nations in general, and the United States in particular, to adopt a highly protectionist stance. This was felt to be the second potentially great danger to the recovery and to the security of the West. The third that I mention is of the general problems of the Third World. So, Mr. Chairman, there was a large part of our discussion, particularly in the first seminar which dealt with macro issues which focussed in on the international dimensions of the world economy, and perhaps has relevance for this session. I would just conclude by saying that Mr. McEachan has said that when we are trying to define both the short term stance of the government vis-à-vis security issues and the longer term, our office felt, and the Prime Minister felt, that foreign policy and security policy were crucial components.

The questions have been put before you for each of the various sessions, but behind them all is one major one, and that is how can a small nation like ourselves make a contribution to world peace and security. I think nobody around the table would disagree with those goals of ensuring peace, more prosperity for all. We differ on how to achieve it. A larger goal is clearly before us: how do we make this a better and more secure world and, in particular, how can we in this part of North America with this country's

assets, history and capabilities make a contribution. So that is an essential purpose before us and I look forward joining with you in the discussion in the days ahead.

Chairman: May I just add the further hope that each of us will get to know the others around the table in this relaxed setting. I hope that we can conduct the meetings in an informal way - that we will indeed have a true exchange of views and that any idea that is on the table that needs to be attacked or supported, that there will be an opportunity for others to do that very thing. So it is my purpose to give maximum opportunity for participation within the limits of the agenda and the time available.

National security policy is obviously a composite of a lot of elements drawn from foreign policy, defence policy, aid policy and even domestic economic and social policy. It would certainly embrace attitudes to international economic institutions and questions of trade, finance and human rights. Canadian security policy has not been subjected to a full scale review for quite some years. Certainly the assumptions and policies or principles which we have been following have not been addressed in the form of a review. I believe these principles and assumptions have generally served Canada well, but certainly it is prudent to re-examine from time to time these assumptions and principles and, of course, we have to ask ourselves how the international security environment has changed in the last ten or more years. It certainly has changed and the speakers obviously tonight will be attempting to tell us in way it has changed.

It seems to be the case that since 1970 the super powers have each gained in absolute military strength, but their relative political, economic and ideological weight seems to have declined. The risks of East-West conflict remain as high or higher as each sees the hand of the other in any turn of events. The ability of others to control events or even to influence events has lessened. Not only is that true of the super powers, but it is true also of lesser states, at least that is how it appears to me. Tonight, presumably, our speakers will want to address such questions as the strategic balance, what is the present strategic situation, what is the current strategic doctrine, how has it evolved in the last number of years, how will it evolve in the future. They will not only be touching on some of these questions, but they will be introducing new ideas of their own.

The first lead speaker is Mr. David Steel, the leader of the Liberal Party of the United Kingdom. I thought I had his constituency in my head before I came into the room, but I found that the boundaries have been changed and he has a new designation for his constituency on the border of Scotland and England - I haven't had time to master the designation, but he has been a Member of Parliament for quite some time and has recently taken part in a very exciting election in Britain.

David Steel: Thank you first for the invitation to be here. I am looking forward very much to these two days of discussion. I have been on holiday for the last month or so and negotiations about this were conducted by my office and when they told me I was required to speak in this opening session, I protested because I don't know anything about

Canada's security policy, but the answer came back that was precisely why I was asked to open (the benefit of ignorance they supposedly thought to be advantageous). Combine that with jet lag as I arrived just an hour ago from Scotland and I think you can excuse any idiocy which you are about to hear. But I would like to speak very much not as an expert at all, though there are plenty of experts at this table, but as a practicing politician dealing with the democratic problems of operating any kind of security policy. I think that we are, not just here in Canada, but in the United States and in all the NATO countries, coming up to a really difficult period within 6 months, with time running out on the 1979 deployment decisions. Therefore, I think it is going to be a very important topic in all of the Western countries, particularly in the next few months.

My first observation is that the security of our peoples in the real sense of the word has been decreasing, not increasing, over the years because of the increase in both the number and power of nuclear missiles. Also because of the increased sophistication over the last two decades of nuclear weaponry, political control over their deployment and potential use is now much more difficult. For example, it is argued in Britain that decisions about the use of cruise missiles, if we have them in Britain, cannot be satisfactorily covered by the political agreement between the United States and Britain which dates from Mr. Atlee and President Truman. Now it is self-evident that a political agreement designed to cover the use of the bombers stationed in Britain is rather different, I would have thought, from the split-second decisions required on the firing or not firing of cruise missiles. It seems to me that, because of these factors, the political debate, public

debate on the development and deployment of nuclear missiles is more essential precisely because of the difficulties of political control. And I think that the public in our countries is in fact aware of my basic opening statement and that their own individual security and their children's security have not by our collective wisdom been increased over the last couple of decades, but that it is in fact decreasing. And that is one of the reasons why we see the growth of the various peace movements in our countries.

I think that, as practicing politicians, or those of us who are, we have not been very successful in the handling of these peace movements or the handling of this wave of public concern. There is no doubt in my mind, certainly if I may speak for a second of the British political scene, that those who advocate the sort of unilateral solution are a tiny minority of public opinion and that was demonstrated during the general election because the Labour Party in Britain committed itself to just such a policy. In other words, they say that if we are elected the government we will not have cruise missiles in Britain whatever the outcome of the Geneva negotiations. And that was one of the main reasons why the Labour Party went down the plug hole in the election. That policy is not accepted by the broad mass of the population. However unpopular or uneasy people regard the future of having missiles stationed in the country, the fact is they are not prepared to renege on the 1979 major decision. We stuck by that in the Alliance parties and we pulled up to 25%, Labour went down to 27. What is interesting is that in the Labour leadership election, which is going on at the moment, the candidate who is advocating standing by that Labour policy of unilateralism is the one who is going to win and the Labour Party has

continued to go down. The latest Gallup Poll, monthly poll, published just the other day puts us into second place now at 29%. The momentum of the election is in fact carrying on after the general election and the supposed official opposition, the alternative government, is committing itself to a policy which the public is rejecting. So, although I say we've handled the peace movement badly, I don't want to give the impression that we want somehow simply to go along with its demands. I think what we have to do is to demonstrate that we accept the public's anxiety about its increased insecurity as legitimate, and that we ought to be seen to be bending our efforts more effectively to securing a reduction in the arms race.

Now where does this put NATO powers like Canada and the United Kingdom, who are not in the forefront of these negotiations. Obviously, we would be very interested to hear from Eugene Rostow later on. But when I last talked to him in Washington three hours before he was fired, and when I talked to Mr. Nitze, I got the impression that they were men who were determined to try and make a success of the current rounds of negotiations with the Soviet Union. Without naming names, I did not find that that was a universal impression left in my mind by the various members of the Administration in Washington, and I think this poses a problem for the allied countries like our two countries and without interfering in internal United States politics, I think we have got to be seen to be identifying with those in the United States Administration who are pressing for success in these negotiations and seem to be publicly irritated or concerned about those who are taking a rather cynical view of the present round of discussions with the Soviet Union. I think, too, we ought to be looking at

positive post-December policies for trying to get negotiations with the Soviet Union on a much more widespread basis. It seems to me that by historical accident we are left with three sets of negotiations which are described in the working paper in our folders, the INF, the START and the MBFR and that the very splicing of these negotiations into these three areas is itself a mechanism for slowing down the pace of negotiations, because so much of the negotiations are not actually negotiations at all, but arguments about definitions of different weapon systems and into which negotiations they ought to be. We ought to be looking beyond the present run of talks to the possibility of getting these pulled together, and I would argue that we ought to be giving much more political attention to the MBFR talks in Vienna. Because from the European point of view what we ought to be trying to do is to raise the nuclear threshold and so far in Europe we are behind the Soviet Union in conventional defence capabilities and that is one of the reasons why we are becoming overdependent on nuclear defence. The MBFR talks are in a sense, in my view, dragging on and on. We ought to be looking to the possibility of a Freeze as an opportunity for re-organizing the various forms of arms negotiations. Secondly, we in Britain and our colleagues in France cannot go on pretending that our independent missile systems should be kept ever out of the calculations. We may not actually want to put them into the negotiations in the sense of wanting them in the present run, but we cannot pretend that they can simply be ignored. For our part in the Liberal Party and the Alliance in Britain, we have opposed the Conservative Government's determination to go for a new generation of independent missile capability in purchasing the Trident system from the

Americans because we believe that represents a positive increase in the Western side of the arms race.

Looking at military expenditures as a whole, in the last four years, world military expenditures have increased by 4% per annum, whereas in the previous four years it was running at about 2% per annum. I think we ought to be concerned about that escalation, much of which is represented by the sale of quite sophisticated conventional weaponry to Third World powers and two countries have had their comeuppance in this policy. First of all, we ourselves in Britain, in the Falklands episode, parts of the Exocet missiles which did so much damage to our naval forces are made in my constituency, not something I like to talk about, but that is a fact. Our French colleagues again are fighting in Chad. There they are ranged against the weapons they sold to Libya. I think ideas have been put forward in the past, perhaps by Genscher from Germany, of at least starting by getting a UN register of arms sales, have made no progress at all, and if we don't even know what arms are being sold to who, then there is very little hope of going on to second stage which is trying to get some kind of control over the ever-increasing sale of sophisticated weaponry.

Now this brings me lastly to the three policy lines I would like to suggest for your consideration. The Brandt Report, like the Pearson Report before it, has been pretty largely ignored by world governments, but I think that there is a particular role for the NATO powers other than the United States in being able to link up with the Third World countries in persuading them that we have a common interest in trying to get the super powers to reduce

the amount of the world's resources that are devoted to armaments. We have a common interest in that and at the moment we seem to allow the Soviet Union to make all the running in the Third World Countries and we have been remarkably unsuccessful in pointing out that the Soviet Union itself is spending a far greater proportion of its own resources on armaments than say the United States or NATO collectively. I think that a more aggressive policy along the lines advocated by the Brandt Report would bring dividends first of all in terms of aid as he argued, but more important, I think, in getting ourselves more involved in the politics of the Third World. This means taking stances I am afraid which sometimes may be unpopular with our American allies, for example, on Central American policy. In all the press that I read in Britain it seems that in the United States a parallel is drawn between the present Administration's approach to Central America and previous Administrations approach to Vietnam, but I think a more interesting parallel can be drawn between the dangers of the Reagan policy on Central America together with the dangers of British policy in Central and Southern Africa of about twenty years ago where we really missed the boat and almost did ourselves enormous damage by failing to identify with the aspirations of the countries there and failing to recognize that often more leftist governments than we ourselves would wish on mature democracies are almost a necessity given the scale of the crisis in these countries.

Secondly, I think we ought to do more internally in the Soviet Union. This may strike you as surprising. The fact is the Soviet Union does spend two to three times more of its Gross National Product on military purposes than we do in the western democracies, and they have economic

problems as we have, but they have problems of low living standards, they have people who have aspirations and we now live in an age of satellite communication and it ought to be possible have a far more effective public debate inside the Soviet Union through information that we ourselves can provide. This does not strike me as the right time, for example, to be reducing the budget of the BBC Overseas Broadcasting services, which is one of the cuts being made in public expenditure in Britain. I would have thought that we could in the course of arm twisting negotiations with the Soviet Union threaten that we would use the satellite systems that we have to spread much more information to the ordinary people of the Soviet Union but it's more difficult dealing with a country like the Soviet Union where the politicians are the generals. At least in our countries we have some balance between the demands of the military for ever increased expenditure and the political decisions which our treasuries then take, but, when the dialogue between us and the Soviet Union is barely non-existent, we have got to try and provide some of that.

And, third and last, I don't believe that Britain, Canada and the other NATO powers should leave all the dialogue with the Soviet Union to the United States. The actual negotiations being carried out by the United States on our behalf - well, that is right. But beyond the negotiations, there is a desperate need for much more political dialogue to try and reduce the atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion against which the actual hard negotiations are taking place. I find it astonishing that no Foreign Secretary in Britain, and no Prime Minister in Britain, has been to Moscow for serious political discussions for five years, and that seems to be entirely wrong. We have a new

regime there and we ought to be continually trying to engage them in political dialogue and discussions in order to try to ease those tensions which lie back of the arms race. So these are the three areas I would like to throw into the start of this informal discussion. Thank you very much.

Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. David Steel. No doubt we will be returning in the course of our discussions to quite a number of the issues you have put forward. The next speaker on our program tonight is Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institute in Washington. He has served as counsellor and director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the USSR and Eastern Europe in the United States State Department and was a senior staff member of the National Security Council for some years. I am pleased to welcome Mr. Sonnenfeldt because I used to see him quite frequently when I was in this job in the 70s, when he and I met frequently at international meetings. I had the pleasure of noting his presence on the program, and I am sure that he will make a very interesting analysis as he approaches these problems from a more detached vantage point than he did in his earlier period in the State Department and working as he did so closely with Mr. Henry Kissenger.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am almost tempted by Mr. Steel's comments not to be detached (or some of them at least), but I will try and stick to the three broad topics in the program. I do want to make one opening observation. This past week, there was a thirtieth anniversary of something that was not noted much if at all, and that was the first explosion of a workable hydrogen bomb -- by the Soviet Union. Something that wasn't done by the

United States until a considerable time later. A good many people at that time believed or thought it likely that, given the hostilities in the post war period, that we would be unable to avoid a major confrontation or war with the Soviet Union, and that particular event right after Stalin's death in August 1953 stimulated that fear and yet here we are thirty years later well into the nuclear age and really running against the probabilities historically as regards of the likelihood of conflict among great powers.

It is a rare time in history that we've had four decades without a major conflict. There are many arguments about why that may have been the case. Of course, there have been many other conflicts, many hundreds of thousands of people have been killed and maimed during this period, but the big frightening catastrophic conflict has not occurred. And yet, as Mr. Steel has said, there is and has been in recent years a mounting sense of insecurity in the western public especially. I am not sure that the same is true in the eastern communist world or in the Third World, but in parts of the western world this has been true. I don't want to engage now in a sociological and psychological analysis of why this may have been happening over the last several years, but I would make only make the sad comment that a great many of the propositions that are put forward, out of this fear and in this mood of anxiety that are supposedly designed to make the world safer and more stable, would almost certainly make it less so if they were implemented, and sometimes even the mere making of them and the political theatre associated with the making of them is likely to make the world less stable than it is. We cannot disinvent nuclear weapons. We have inherited them and we are therefore required to live with the problem of

deterrence and war prevention, and I would say if we can manage to make it thirty years at a time for as far as we can see, we are doing damn well in the nuclear age. That's not a cause for complacency at all, but it is a bit of perspective on what we have in fact managed to do, compared to what we might have had if the fears and the anxieties of thirty years ago had turned out to be correct.

Now, your first question in our program is how has the international security environment changed since 1970. I would say that it has in fact changed both for better and worse. The good news, relatively speaking, is that there is no Vietnam war. That particularly concerns my country, but it concerns a lot of countries as well. That was a terrible war for many reasons. It killed people and it destroyed a country and many innocent victims, and it tore apart American society and it had within it the potential seeds of a major conflict. That war is finished. It wasn't a glorious finish for the United States, but it was, in some ways, a release and a relief for the United States. For all the domino effects that were widely feared from that war, while some of them did occur - did not occur to nearly the extent that was widely expected. The formation of Asean and some of the other developments in the region of the war are, on the whole, good news in terms of the international security environment today as compared to thirteen years ago. Secondly, 1970, if that is a rough date, as I am sure that is what it is intended to be, was a time of turbulence in the Sino-Soviet conflict. In 1969 the United States actually gave thought in operational terms as to what might happen if the Soviet Union attacked China. That could have been a cataclysmic event in itself. That has dissipated. There remains a Sino-Soviet conflict which has both positive

and negative aspects in terms of the international security environment, but the danger of open warfare that existed at that time has passed for now. Just while looking at that part of the world, since both our countries have an interest, it is worth noting as well that, for a variety of reasons, the confrontation between India and Pakistan has declined substantially. It could recur but again compared to the late 60s and early 70s, it has subsided.

The Middle East, much as it disturbs us and continues to worry us is, in my view, in the net a less unstable place than it was in 1970 in the midst of the war of attrition between Israel and Egypt. There is now a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and it is very difficult to see an Arab/Israeli conflict along the lines of the ones which occurred in 1967 and 1973. We're far from out of the woods, obviously. There is much concern about Lebanon, the presence of foreign forces in Lebanon, the unsolved issues of the West Bank, the future of the Palestinians and the very exposed Soviet presence in Syria. Nevertheless, compared to what one could look forward to in 1970 with the Yom Kippur War yet to come, I think we are mildly better off than we were at that time. The Iran-Iraq war, bloody as wars are in that region, is in its own perverse way a factor for some mild stability in the region. If you want to dispute that we will talk about it later.

A curious phenomenon that while the surface aspects of American/Soviet relations today are sometimes worse than they were in the early 70s, there has been a curious restraint in the way both super powers have actually gone about dealing with a real crisis, not the verbal crisis, not the prospective crisis, but the real ones. The

war in the South Atlantic involving the British, the Lebanese conflict, Israeli/Lebanese/PLO conflict, the Iraqi/Iran war, and we'll see about Chad - there has been a good deal of caution in the way the super powers have conducted themselves. Again a matter which we can discuss. I am talking only about today, not about tomorrow or next week. Those are some of the better bits of news looking back at 1970.

The not so good news is that the military balance between the West and the Soviet Union has shifted adversely from the western standpoint. It isn't correct, by the way, that as far as the United States is concerned, the size and number of nuclear weapons has constantly increased. They have constantly decreased but their sophistication has increased. The question of whether sophistication makes those weapons less likely to be used is an open question - not just philosophical - but the very size and the destructive capacity of American weaponry has declined. That has not been the case with the Soviet Union. We tend to think, and your paper in your package tends to imply, that there is a virtue in nuclear parity. While there may be some virtues in nuclear parity, whatever that means precisely, but one thing nuclear parity does not do is to sustain the strategy the West has employed for the last thirty-five years in the defence of Europe. Reference was made to the problems of reliance on nuclear weapons, a product, no doubt of American nuclear advantage in the 50s, in the 60s, but that's gone, and consequently some important pillars of western strategy with respect to the defence of Europe, not just in war time but the defence of Europe in the psychological and political sense, are very much open to re-examination, and this is not some law of nature, it is

due precisely to what the Soviets have done systematically over the last twenty years with their own nuclear forces. That parity may be not even parity in certain respects, has accentuated the endemic disadvantages that the West has around the periphery of the Soviet Union, including in Western Europe, because it was the nuclear weapon that was supposed to offset those disadvantages when the Cold War began. One effect of this is that parts of western Europe are today more intimidated vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than they were in 1970. I don't want to use slogans like Finlandization, and words of that sort, because Finland may be in some way the least Finlandized of the European countries. Nevertheless, it is a fact that, among European statesmen and political leaders, the power balance admitted or not, is constantly being calculated and is constantly being factored into decisions whether to make preferential loans to East Germany or to raise questions about postponing solemnly-made decisions by the North Atlantic Alliance concerning weapons deployment or decisions by exposed NATO members not to have foreign forces on their territory and so forth. There is a sense of intimidation which affects the cohesion of the Alliance. I am using a crude word, but it is much more complicated than that. That sense of intimidation adds to a problem in the Alliance which is at once a problem and a strength in the Western Alliance in that it is a pluralistic alliance - made up of pluralistic democracies each of which has to be accommodated within this remarkable experiment in international institution building for which there is no precedent historically since we have never had sixteen pluralistic democracies forming an alliance in peace time. Compared to 1970, there is now much more uncertainty in the Western Hemisphere concerning the security situation than there was at that time. This too

has many reasons, but one of them undoubtedly is that thirteen more years have passed since 1970 in which Cuba has been to all intents and purposes a Soviet military base, although there have been complications in Soviet/Cuban relations, Cuba is not a satellite, and the military power that the Soviet Union has in Cuba is not invulnerable. The Soviet posture in the Western Hemisphere is not without its risks and its vulnerabilities. The threshold of American tolerance and I may say Canadian hemispheric tolerance of Soviet involvement, that threshold has been raised year after year. We'll see in December if NATO proceeds with the implementation of its decision, whether the Soviets think that it can be raised yet further by tampering with the fringes of the Kennedy/Khrushchev agreements of 1962.

It is hard to say when skipping around the globe on a Cook's Tour whether Africa is today more or less unstable than it was fifteen years ago, but here we again have a decade in which Libya through Kadaffi has become a major source of external instability in the African continent supported in large measure by the Soviets but not controlled by them. But time marches on; I don't know what will happen, what Kadaffi's ambitions may be with respect to Central Africa but if anybody doubts the importance of what is now Chad, I suggest they read up about the Fashoda incident and recognize how close the world came to war because of what emanated from equatorial Africa to the headwaters of the Nile. Sometimes history is amusing and sometimes it is instructive. So there is cause to be concerned about that, as there is about the continued Cuban presence in South-West Africa and East Africa.

To say these things and not to make one's bow to the tensions within these societies and to the injustices to which they have been subjected and not to make one's bow to the Brandt Commission's proposals on North/South Relations is to stand accused of fitting everything in the world into an East/West conflict context. It is actually rather curious that the Reagan Administration, which is supposed to be the epitome of this, steadfastly refused to do so when the American media desperately tried to do it in the Falkland's War and in the Chad war and even in the case of the Israeli operations in Lebanon. But, in any event, if we are going to talk about the international security environment, it is very hard not to fit a lot of things into the problem of the central power balance in the world and that central power balance is essentially the power balance that exists between the East and West and between the Soviet Union and the United States, and it is on this issue that public attitudes in our countries, this one, ours and in Western Europe, have become sceptical and often uncomprehending. That, it seems to me, is one of the major changes despite the convulsions in the United States in 1970.

Now you wanted to talk about the directions that the security environment is likely to be evolve in the next fifteen years. I'll be very brief. Soviet military power is going to continue to grow, even if the annual expenditure rate increases at only two or three percent in real terms, as the CIA and others seem to think at the moment is the case. That still doubles it, unless Mr. Andropov or probably the next Soviet leader that will follow him decides otherwise. Brezhnev managed to double it in the eighteen years that he was there. What that means is that the

problems that we already have in western defence in looking after our physical and military security are going to be subject to continuous debate, controversy and adaptation. It is said that we must raise the nuclear threshold. Indeed, we have no alternative. But what is the alternative in fact. The alternative in fact is to have a credible detente and that presumably then requires a different sort of mix between nuclear and conventional forces than the one we have been living with and surviving with for the last thirty-five years. How will we pay for that? Do we even know what we are talking about? How to dispose of those forces? What kinds of forces are the ones that would really raise the threshold? How high in the end do we really want to raise the threshold? It was the Germans who spoke out first against the article in Foreign Affairs by some former American leaders who argued for non-first-use of nuclear weapons, Germans more vehemently than some Americans, so how high does the nuclear threshold go and what do we really mean by "strengthening the conventional forces"? Is it really true that the Vienna negotiations, by talking about lowering the numbers and changing the dispositions of conventional forces, would be compatible with a strategy of raising the nuclear threshold. What indeed is the content of those Vienna negotiations, which in fact in the last couple of months have made more progress than in the last six years. We still don't really have a coherent Western posture to relate those negotiations to the problems of strategy and defence imposed upon us by the changed configuration of the military balance.

I must say that I do not see the next fifteen years producing arms control agreements that will make a major difference in dealing with our real military pro-

blems. I hope I am wrong, but if I look at the last fifteen or twenty years of arms control agreements, they are marginal agreements. I don't on that account repudiate them or denounce them. They have value, they have importance. But let no one think that there is going to be a magic wand that will solve our military problems at the negotiating table. We may be lucky if we can make some marginal progress, but we would be deluding ourselves if we think we can get away from national military policies and alliances by going to the Soviets and asking them to help us. It is not in their interest and they have their own interests and there is a parallelism of interest on which one can attempt to build and from which one can derive certain agreements. I am all for it, but we shouldn't think that this could solve all our military problems in this Alliance and facing what we face.

Alliance cohesion in the next fifteen years is going to be under greater rather than less strain than we have already faced. There are many reasons for this and I don't want to take any more time except that John Holmes has written a marvellous article about this in Foreign Policy. We must be a pluralistic alliance. We must be an alliance to which all our allies with their different histories, their different geographies, their different economic conditions, can subscribe or we don't have an alliance. We cannot have a hegemonic system, because we are democracies. It is a peacetime alliance. That means under the regime of deterrence, you must have large and expensive military forces or you don't deter. That means you need public acceptance and public acceptance in our democracies is hard to come by, and it isn't always in synchronization from country to country. These are problems that are not going to go away by 1995 or however far you want to look ahead. I

cannot see a Third World that is likely to be a whole lot more stable than the Third World that we see today, but we can chip away. Maybe a Zimbabwe here and a Namibia there. I am still relatively hopeful, despite the problems, that there might be some answer to the Namibian-Angolan problem. At some point India/Pakistan relations may look better. I would only point out in regard to the Third World that much as I emotionally and spiritually favour the notion that we have a distinct ...(power failure).....when this is put side by side with the military factors, but the Soviet empire remains an unnatural empire in Eastern Europe and thus it is likely to be subject to enormous pressures. I wish I could see a Soviet leadership that would have taken my advice of eight years ago or so concerning their relationship with the Eastern Europeans, and I stand by virtually everything that I said, not what was said I said, because I think it is the most sensible way for the West to go at it, which is to say to encourage the Soviets by stick and carrot to make those relationships more natural than they are at present. I don't believe Mr Andropov is the kind of guy that will do that.

Well, I could go on and on but I won't; I will quickly turn to Canada. I have some things to say about China and Japan, but I won't for the moment, except to say that the best contribution any of us can make to security in the Pacific is to contribute to a viable balance of power in the Pacific area in which China and Japan and Asean in its own way and the United States and other littoral states on the Pacific Ocean can make their contribution.

Does Canada need to re-examine its security policies in the light of all of this? Yes, I don't think Canada will escape it, it hasn't been able to escape it. Canada's basic security problem is, I believe, to contribute as best as it can to the preservation of a super power balance, the balance composed not only of military forces, but of all the paraphernalia of power, including dialogue. Canada is unable, I believe, to avoid its association with the United States. It lives where it does, and it cannot do otherwise. Canadian security is inextricably tied to American security. Canada's principal danger to itself comes from the same place where the United States' principal danger comes from and that in the foreseeable future will remain the principal, but sole, threat. That means, it seems to me, that Canada should in its own interests continue to pursue a policy of forward defence. NATO is Canada's guarantee, to the extent there is anything like a guarantee in the contemporary world, of keeping the wolf from the door and therefore Canada's second association is its European association, through NATO and through the other institutions that have gone up in the Western world. Canada, therefore, will be inextricably tied up with NATO's debates about strategy and military disposition. I think there are some things that Canada can do more efficiently than it is doing now with its forces in Europe and with the forces that it has earmarked for Europe. I don't want to take time now to give you that free advice. We'll participate in a discussion about that later on. I have already said that Canada has a stake in a stable Asian balance for defence. Canada, I suppose, will continue its sense of dilemma, its sense of trying to find the right balance between its wider international role and its Alliance role. I don't consider those to be in conflict with each other any more than they

are for the United States or for any other countries. They can become conflictual if they are driven to extremes. My own feeling is that if they are driven to extremes then Canada is faced with choices. Its in-group is its alliance and its priorities need to be with its alliance but that is an extreme case. There should be ample room for a Canadian contribution to other aspects of international security than the central aspect that is the concern of the North Atlantic Alliance. You yourself, Mr. Chairman, have referred to Canada's national security policy. That raises the question of Canada's identity and how national Canada's policies are. They are old fashioned but it is a fact that the loyalties in this day and age that still rule among people by and large that is a national loyalty and governments are still in operation and politicians still function in order to get the widest measure of national consensus for what they believe national well-being requires. So, Canada's sense of identity, Canada's sense that it is pursuing its own interests even if it sometimes addresses those obvious global interests, Canada's sense that it is pursuing its own interests, will continue to have to be, as it is elsewhere, the basis for national support of what it is doing.

But this problem of identity and of Canada's ability to have a national policy isn't simply the question of Canada as a small neighbour in terms of population and GNP, next to this American elephant that is in the same boat with you. Canada has other problems concerning its identity and its nationhood that are not related to the size and to the proximity of the United States and therefore in this country, as in every other democratic country, the question of safeguarding your national security begins at home, because it cannot be done without a national sense of

purpose and a sense of broad working consensus within party politics, and that takes it back at least to one of your sessions before this one.

Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Sonnenfeldt. I have now to call on Professor Griffiths from the University of Toronto who is listed as the commentator. That covers a very wide swath, and I will give Professor Griffiths the opportunity to cut that swath after I tell you that he is Professor of Political Economy with the University of Toronto. He has served as Director for Russian and East European Affairs. He is author of a number of publications, including one which is entitled 'The Dangers of Nuclear War'.

Franklyn Griffiths: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We should perhaps be emphasizing a little more than Hal did the political dimension where Soviet/American relations are concerned and maybe I'll pick up on some things that David Steel said that we should not leave it to the United States to deal with exclusively or excessively with the Soviets, and I say too that there is much to be said for stressing the political dimension of international security affairs. We don't have many chips and/or weapons or men at arms. If we are going to talk solely military strength, I think we tend to deal ourselves out of the international security game. On the other hand, I think it is politically where I believe we have a contribution to make. The problem of any real progress in dealing with the threat of nuclear war, the cost of defence preparedness and all the other things that come from it, I think really lies in focussing on the Soviet/American relationship and I would really look at this first. And look at the political relationship and what we

as Canadians might do in some way to alter this relationship.

I would say, first of all, that it is a cyclical relationship. There is a cycle in Soviet/American relations. It isn't a very rhythmical one, it is an arrhythmical one, in fact. We see repeated over the years since 1963 movement into and out of détente. We have had several détentés in fact, though one's time horizon may be shortened and if you will look back there have been détentés in '55, '59, '63, '72 and each of these have been followed more or less rapidly by a return to policies of greater tension, confrontation, acrimony. I think there is no real problem in identifying why these troughs have occurred, but it is rather more difficult to point to the interest in détente which keeps cropping up. Why this cycle again? Obviously, there is a mutual interest on both sides in reducing the costs and risk of the relationship of competition they have. Another fact that enters into this, and that is US Presidential election politics. If you look at all of the détentés, you'll see that they occur in US Presidential election or pre-election years without exception. In addition, in 1968, although there was no détente, President Johnson sought to get something going, but it didn't really work.

We have though, if you look at these past thirty years, beaten the odds, and I will agree with Hal on this. We have a self-stabilizing relationship that has worked on the whole fairly well. It is one that avoids excessive cooperation and excessive conflict or confrontation as well. I would avoid the excess of euphoria, on the one hand, and the sense of fear and dread on the other, and it

is spontaneous, it is not a regulated relationship in any way. It operates at considerable cost, as I have said, and I think there are great risks in it and in its continuation. Détente phases, as I see them, are openings for a movement in international security affairs, in arms control in particular, and I think we should have an interest in these phases in particular. I see tension phases, though; they undo a great deal but not all is done in the détente phase. The habit of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. I think has become established over time, and it is in these phases of détente that additions have been made to this habit. Basically, though, it seems to me not a great deal will change in the international security environment in the years ahead so long as this cycle continues. I think the cycle has to be addressed or to be altered in some way, but I look ahead to the second item, and we are moving rapidly here on the agenda, that is the evolution of this particular aspect of the security environment in the next fifteen years.

I can see at least three options, or two, anyway. One of them is the cycle might be broken by both sides going to a kind of Cold War relationship. They remain steadily on a level of high tension. This to me is not very likely for reasons we could discuss and I won't consider it further. What is more likely is a continuation of what we have had, more of the same, in and out. Détente in '84, some kind of agreements and then back in '85, '86 to a more severe competition which will undo to some extent what has been done in '84. I think this is a projection for the evolution in the next couple of years and beyond. What would be best, in my view, would be a counter-cyclical policy, a kind of strategic Keynesianism, in which an attempt is made to get

hold of this cycle and to bring it onto a plane pointing upwards towards higher level of cooperation. I think this is a basic task, one that goes beyond the discussion of various kinds of arms controls and regional security. One has to get at the dynamic of the Soviet/American relationship, and I think it is a very tall order. Both the Soviet Union and the United States eventually working together in some way to regulate this relationship and bring it into a new direction. One of the implications for Canada in all of this again is the politics rather than the military dimension of what's going on. Getting at the political underlay of the international security contacts, then, putting our policy or orienting it to these concerns. I think we can alter perceptions those have of international security setting and that there is a need and there is some use perhaps as well -- real use -- in putting resources in this. Thinking our way through to a new concept of what actually is happening. What is this wave on which all of the arms control and the defence and alliance projects seem to ride upon? How can we do something with it? We need, therefore, first to have greater knowledge and understanding of this cycle. We need, second, I think, to try and promote an awareness on the parts of the Soviet Union and the U.S. of what has been happening. To get them to think beyond the next four years, the next electoral cycle, or the next party congress, and to start looking at the larger oscillation which has been taking place. I think Canada in particular should pursue and hold very fast to the NATO two-track policy. The two-track policy I think, if properly practiced, is a counter-cyclical policy. It avoids swings in either direction or excessive concessions and an interest in agreements, nor does it, I think, allow for an excessive or imbalanced emphasis on strength. You do the two. I

think there is a lot to be said for the Alliance's policy in this regard. Canada, in my view, should be doing more in both areas, more defence and a greater defence effort, and we should be, simultaneously I think, more active on the other side of the street, that is an international diplomacy of peace. A greater and more vigorous defence effort poses a very real problem for this country and I think it is something we should have. It probably involves some curtailment of our military defence commitments, and we do the ones we do do excellently and with great effect. On the diplomacy of the international security and arms control side, I think I might venture a criticism of our policy on cruise missile testing. It does not seem to me to be as even handed as it might be. I do not see the arms control collaries in it, particularly air launched cruise missile (ALCM) control, or perhaps an attempt to bolster defence limitation or the construction of ALCM defences by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. More could be said about this, perhaps I shall be challenged on it as well.

In addition, I suppose what I am saying is that we should try to go against the wind in making emphasis on whether we stress strength or collaboration at any one moment. When the cycle seems to be moving in the direction of excessive euphoria, cooperation, people expecting much, the Canadian government and I think those who were following policy, should probably be working in the other mode trying to establish and maintain a sense of reality and long-lasting commitments. And one would work in the other direction when it seems as there is now an excessive emphasis on tension, though perhaps in fact in this month of August we may be seeing a turning point in Soviet/American relations, and it may be starting to move in the other

direction. Broadly I am saying there is something to be said for giving more attention to political factors in Canadian security policies, national security policies. Also to relying on indirection, oblique methods of trying to influence the security policies of these two vast and great countries, the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

I can see, for instance, a number of possible proposals for areas in which we could be active. To the extent that the emphasis is probably still thought now to be on tension in the Soviet/American relations, it might well make sense now for the Prime Minister to take up the Andropov invitation to visit. I say it might and I think this is something we should discuss here. It politically could be rather interesting if there were to be a détente and Canada were to be in first with a visit to Moscow and the Canadian government could well take credit in its small fashion, for something that was going to happen anyway. And there may be, I think, there may be some serious business to talk about when Andropov and Reagan meet. Not about what they should be putting on the table, because again we do not, I think, benefit ourselves by getting into numbers games. We should be talking to them about how they see each other and explaining as best we can the United States as we see it to the Soviet Union, and vice versa. This is probably a drop in the bucket to the Soviet Union and the Reagan Administration, but we should do our bit. A basic factor in the political relationship of the Soviet Union and the United States is its susceptibility to local and regional crises and numerous of them have already been mentioned. I think in 1972 the two countries, the Soviets and the Americans, achieved an interesting agreement that should be followed up upon. The basic principles governing

Soviet/American relations, "rules of the road" in other words as to how they should conduct their rivalry. I wonder whether it is possible for Canada to encourage greater thought and maybe further discussion by the two superpowers on this matter.

Another thought that occurs, is that in the United States and I think in the Soviet Union there is a great deal of uncertainty about the opponent's military doctrine. Should there not be an exchange of testimony, should not one way of doing it be to invite to Canada representatives of the Soviet General Staff and the U.S. Joint Chiefs and to hear them out, and I suppose both would have the right not to incriminate themselves in some way. You would, also I assume, have some television arrangement, although the details could be rather complex. It would allow this kind of thing to be broadcast in the Soviet Union, to the Soviet public, as well as in North America and elsewhere. More things could be said, but I think the essence of our problem in discussing and devising a national security policy that meets the needs of the '80s and '90s is to stress political factors, to try to influence as best we can the Soviet/American political direction of greater moderation and perhaps by the early part of the next century to create or have done our best or part toward the development of a Soviet/American political relationship that is sufficiently out of whack with the continued acquisition of weapons that someone begins at last to ask basic questions about arms control.

Chairman: Thank you very much, Professor Griffiths. The discussion is now upon us, and I have Mr. MacGuigan and then Mr. Gordon and Mr. Pitfield and I will call on Mr. MacGuigan

and if anyone else wishes to participate, you can help the Chair by standing your card up.

Mark MacGuigan: Mr. Chairman, I think we all should try to brief at this stage because of the hour. I am sorry that Mr. Sonnenfeldt left just as I was about to say that he had I think established the military and more narrowly the security side of our problem almost beyond the need for further discussion. He is quite right that we have had many advances in the last or at least improvements in the last ten years. We must continue to remain strong because of the kind of problems that he developed, and I think it is not a criticism, but rather a praise to say that I think that the discussion really has to go on from there to deal with other aspects, especially the political aspects as Professor Griffiths was saying and really what Mr. Steel was saying as well. I guess there is no better proof of that than the fact that there is in democracy a kind of built-in difficulty in keeping us focussed on a single course for a long period of time, and it is no advantage to us if we're able to meet the challenge at the military and security level and are not able to continue to persuade our own people that is the course that we should follow and that is a very serious danger because of the way in which the general relationships between East and West are being handled at the present time.

We have the most inept American administration in memory in terms of handling the Soviet Union. It is an administration which is torn between its emotions and sometimes reason. On one hand it either wants to punish the Soviet Union because it is seen as source of all evil in the world, or it naively thinks the Soviet Union is about to collapse. We know it has real internal difficulties, but I

think it is very naive to think that's what we are on the verge of, but whether this is a basis of a naivety or a punitive theory, I don't know. I think that even varies from time to time, but if that kind of internal lack of purpose on the part of the U.S. Administration continues, we will never have any kind of western leadership which will be acceptable even to the people in the West, let alone to the people of the rest of the world. And we have to manage the East/West relationship, we have to know what we are about and manage that relationship in such a way that we can continue to command the support of our own people, and I think, to be brief, I think Mr. Steel has given us some very good suggestions in that regard. The margin of influence obviously that Canada and other non-nuclear powers have and even the nuclear powers other than the two super powers have over East/West relations is obviously limited, but we have to try to do what we can. We will be talking about much of this in the course of our discussion, but I think we can't stand idly by and see the relationship in the state in which it is and the danger, I think, in the present situation is not because of the fact, as Mr. Sonnenfeldt has indicated, we have even made some progress in the last ten years. The danger is in the reaction of our own people to the incompetent management and the lack of a clear goal which possesses the foremost administration on the side of the free world. That is a very serious problem in a form to which we have to try to make a contribution.

Walter Gordon: There won't be too many people here who agree with what I will have to say, but there may be more outside. I was impressed with what Mr. Steele said that no U.K. Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary had visited the Soviet Union in five years. I think that is extraordinary.

Here we are in a situation where the world is ready to blow itself up and we don't talk to the other side. I came back from Moscow two or three weeks ago and reported to Tom Axworthy at your suggestion. I went to see the Prime Minister and said that he was highly respected by the people that I had met in Moscow, and they hoped that he would accept Andropov's invitation to go and visit them. I said that I thought he should. Some people would think that's a little presumptuous on my part, but I pointed out that I was a Member of the Cabinet when he was brought in as a junior member and so thought I could speak that way and he certainly made it clear that it was O.K. with him. I said I thought he should go and he should accept this invitation and that it should be made clear with Washington before he went that he was going, and on his return he would see President Reagan and give him his impressions of what the Soviet leadership had said to him. I hope he does, Allan, and I hope you urge him to go. I think it is very important that anybody in any position who is invited to go one of the other super powers and listen to them, and has any chance of being able to interpret what they say so the others should take advantage of that. I did it even as a private individual. I didn't want to go to Moscow. I have been there before. I'm tired of travelling and as you pointed out to me, gentlemen, just a few minutes ago, I'm pretty damn old for travelling, but I went and I was glad I had gone, and I agree with Frank Griffiths this is an opportunity not only for the Prime Minister, but for this country to do something possibly to mediate between the viewpoints of the two leaders of the superpowers who may one of these days blow us all up. Now, whether anything come of this or not, I don't know. I haven't got anything else to say except, Frank, I liked what you had to say about testing

the cruise in Canada; I don't think it should have been done. Thank you.

Chairman: Thank you, Walter. You raised the interesting question of the visit of the Prime Minister to Moscow. I would ask, what was the impact of the visit of Claude Cheysson to the Soviet Union and what were the objections of Helmut Kohl and Genscher. When they both went to the Soviet Union, they had a clearer objective in going and it wasn't to mediate. Mr. Cheysson had, how shall we put it, as you say, his mind clarified, and I think we ought to have a clear idea about what we intend to achieve before we recommend to the Prime Minister that we go to the Soviet Union, and I am ready to hear that. Michael Pitfield, and then Mr. Schlesinger.

Michael Pitfield: If I may, I don't have any comments. I would like a sort of ruling from about three questions, though. It seems to me that our speakers so far are taking a rather restricted view of the topic and maybe that is what is intended, but shouldn't we also include in our discussion the international economic situation and its implications, because it seems to me that, in terms of the instability in the western world at the moment, the economic situation is a significant part of what is bothering the statesmen of the world. So the question is, do we include the international economic situation? Secondly, if we could have some discussion of really how far Canada can go in playing at the margin, because my experience of the last three years in particular and maybe it was just losing my naiveté or maybe it is the Reagan government's which Mr. MacGuigan refers to, but I had the impression that really there was a great deal more impatience in Washington at seeing us playing on the

margins, and not really all that welcome, we were not really all that welcome, when we tried to carry messages back, there was even, it seemed to me, a sense that maybe we were losing our reliability or maybe our touch and that, compounded again with the economic situation and the very strong hand that is occasionally but erratically played and hard to interpret in the Reagan Administration, makes me raise this second question. How much margin will the Americans allow us to play before they start mixing our attitude on the multilateral scene into our relations on the bilateral scene? I have the impression not much. The third question, which is probably way out, is we could take advantage of this extraordinary group to discuss the problems of the domestic politician a little bit, the Foreign Affairs Minister, the Minister of Defence and so forth, in trying to carry with him the public and the democracy on issues like, let us say the nuclear issue. I have the impression this is a highly esoteric field that even amongst the elite around this table, for example, no, I won't say around this table, a little bit less elite than this table, the ins and outs of that are difficult to comprehend even with their battalions of experts. They're very dependent upon the expertise and that makes it all the more difficult for them to communicate to their colleagues, much less to communicate to their caucusses or for the caucusses to communicate to the people. That is the issue in areas, let us say disarmament and therefore it makes it exceedingly difficult for a democratic leader to be able to play on the international scene with a certainty that his people at home are going to understand and support what he is doing. So, I just raised those three questions and wonder whether or not in some measure they are included in the terms of reference of your discussion.

Chairman: Well, I had expected that the discussion would range widely this evening. I think it has. I see no difficulty in having any comments on any one of the three, particularly how to help these beleaguered ministers carry on their work. I would appreciate any guidance.

James Schlesinger: My first comment is a preliminary one. I was impressed with what Professor Griffiths said but want to enter one qualifier and that is with regard to the U.S. Presidential elections. If the elections disturb the international environment, and because of the weight and power of the United States to disturb, even to contaminate, the international environment, but not in any clear pattern. In 1956 just prior to the presidential election, the Soviets threatened to drop rockets on London and Paris and in the run up to the election, the United States was not talking detente. In 1960, just prior to the presidential election, there was the shooting down of the U-2, the blow-up of the meeting of Mr. Krushchev and Mr. Eisenhower -- that was not an atmosphere of détente. In 1972, Mr. Nixon chose just at an opportune moment to bomb Hanoi - that also was not consistent with the politics of détente. So I think that these surges that occur in the international scene because of the American elections are something to be conjured with, but I wish it were as simple as simply a reinforcement of détente in those forerunning years.

I offer, on the basis of what I have heard, several observations. I detected some uneasiness with the United States, if I hear rightly, I have heard the current Administration described as the most inept in memory, and a reference to superpowers that will blow us up - I am not clear who the "us" is, whether it includes the superpowers

or not there is a denial of that. So let me make three observations - first, Sonnenfeldt has laid out very clearly the trend with regard to the balance of power. A lot of our difficulties today reflect the fact that there is a lesser degree of security given the rise of the Soviet military power. He did not differ in this respect from his Soviet friends and colleagues who would lay out the "correlation of forces" in precisely the same manner. In regard to the structure, the balance of power, it seems to me to be in the interests of all the democracies, including Canada, to reinforce the United States in the maintenance of that military balance. Canada and the European democracies are part of the West, and their security depends on it. It was suggested that we can make a greater use of politics to lean against the winds as Mr. Griffiths has said, but leaning against the wind is as difficult as conducting an agricultural stabilization program. There is a tendency to cheer on the United States as it moves toward the Soviet Union in those periods of euphoria and not to lean against the wind at that time. At least in the early '70s I do not recall hearing many suggestions from Canada that the United States had gone too far in its euphoric embrace of détente. So if the policy is to lean against the wind, it must be a policy consistently applied. I think it well advised for allies recognizing that they must reinforce the United States on the balance of power issues to lean against the wind on the political issues in large degree because the United States is a big country with highly volatile politics. The United States does swing from one extreme to another and the opinions of the allies serve as a moderating influence. I can do no better in that regard than to point to the arms control discussion since the start of the Reagan administration. There was a difference between what the

President said in November of 1981 with regard to missile forces in Europe and what the administration has said in its early months. That was reflected in recognition, perhaps too slowly dawning, that if the United States continued its course, we were going to manage to destroy the Alliance. The same goes for economic issues, where the impact of the USA's policies has to be pointed out. Our going against the wind then is desirable on these political things in order to reign in these enthusiasms that do characterize the great amount of democracy. I would not be then, Mr. Griffiths, too oblique. Obliqueness and indirectness tends to escape notice in the United States. I would not like to go so far as to suggest that on these political matters that you have to hit the Americans over the head with a two by four. That would not be appreciated, but being too oblique would certainly not get the attention that is warranted. Now, on this point, I think that you should recognize the immense, even if unstated, influence of the Alliance, on American policy. The Administration's policy on matter after matter has wheeled around 180° because of this influence of the Allies and the recognition on the part of the American government, that preserving the Alliance of the democracies is the ultimate, is and should be, the ultimate goal of the American policy.

Economic issues, I agree with Mr. Pitfield, are of the greatest importance. The penalties of Reagonomics will have been happily not paid for by the American people but by those outside of the United States. Therefore it would seem to me to be in the interests of those outside the United States to point out the consequences of immense budget deficits on interest rates, the implications of international indebtedness, and the like. I think that it

is your duty, that it will be less resented than comments on politics, but I think also that there will be less attention paid to such observations.

Chairman: I thank you, Mr. Schlesinger. Mr. Beesley, Mr. Allan Beesley, and then Mr. Ford. Then I have to think of on the rapporteur to summarize and tell us what really was said. I always thought it interesting to detect the differences between the report and the actual occurrence and I look forward ...

Allan Beesley: Mr. Chairman, I want to make a very brief comment and then ask a question. My comment relates to the role, influence, place, whatever, of Canada. It is hard for us to sometimes come to grips with this problem, whether we can climb inside the skin of the American policymaker and imagine the importance to the U.S.A. of a friendly Japan or a friendly Australia or even a friendly New Zealand then get hold of a friendly Germany or a friendly Italy or even a Belgium. I think it can readily be concluded that Canada may be taken for granted but can't really be taken for granted, and shouldn't be, and I think there is scope for influence and scope for leverage and I do think, indeed, that some of this can be proven out in the last six to eight months, but those are things we can get back to when it is my turn to talk.

What I would like to do is something similar to what Michael Pitfield did. I'd like to suggest at least for the next session that we broaden the scope historically. Because I deal regularly with members of the disarmament movement, I am entitled to raise questions that sound naive and pretend that they came from them. My naive question is

this. If we think back of the history between, for example, France and Germany, over the last hundred years, would any of us have imagined in 1945, the kind of relationship that now exists, in spite of a divided Germany? Would we have really imagined the Common Market, yet alone the NATO Alliance? We might not have imagined the Warsaw Pact and the NATO alliance but, whatever the mistakes of Yalta would we have imagined that major transformation in the relationship between two countries which had been traditionally hostile? Now, my question is a simple one to pose and a much more difficult one to answer. Why has there been 65 years of virtually uninterrupted suspicion, hostility, mistrust, threat, or perception of threat between these two countries which now happen to be the two super powers? But the relationship goes back a long ways, and it has been that kind of relationship. We take for granted that this hostility is there and therefore we talk about a balance of power, strictly military power, although we are talking about economic power. I am not suggesting that a discussion around the table in the next session or the one after will dissipate this hostility, suspicion etc. But I think without considering that kind of issue, we are simply taking it for granted that the only way to attack the problem is to count the arms and see whether it is a good idea to level off or move upward or downward and the reason that I think that this is so asinine, to put it bluntly, is that the League, which was founded after all on the concept of reductions of armament, didn't work, and the Charter was founded on a totally different concept of collective security and it is assumed that it has not worked. At least in the terms which we are discussing, open conflict between the super powers, it hasn't worked so badly. I'm not suggesting Canada can erase that problem or lessen it single-handedly.

But if we don't address that issue, then we are talking about symptoms rather than causes.

Robert Ford: We should be indebted to Helmut Sonnenfeldt for his outlining so succinctly and so well the basic problem which we are here to discuss - and that is military security. I won't go into it any more because I will be speaking at greater length tomorrow. The second comment is about the question of Canada as a mediator. It would be presumptuous of me to comment on whether or not the Prime Minister should go to Moscow but I think we should be very clear in our minds. Canada doesn't really have a role to play as a mediator. The superpowers don't really need a mediator. As Mr. Pitfield said, the Americans would hesitate to suggest that we should do that and wouldn't want it and I am perfectly sure the Russians don't want a mediator between them and the United States. The third comment that I would like to make is simply what David Steel said. But I think he made a very dangerous suggestion and that is that we should attempt to go over in the offensive ideologically in the USSR, particularly on security issues. The Russians are already perturbed by the implications of ideological warfare in the part of the West. And if we try to do that and use our technological ability to penetrate through the barricade of Russian censorship to influence Soviet public opinion on that particular issue, I think it would be very dangerous. It not only would be dangerous but it would also present the Russians with a very good opportunity to play up the one thing which we should avoid them doing and that is portray the West as trying to run down and degrade their military forces, of which all Russians are very proud.

Thank you.

Chairman: I now call upon Mr. Philippe Garigue, Principal of Glendon College at York University in Toronto, to act as rapporteur.

Philippe Garigue (translation): I shall try to do something which is very difficult, namely how to obtain a consensus and give the main points in the debate. I first design, or give you, a model in which at one level is the question of international security and insecurity and the cause of this insecurity. Our speakers here have all stressed the impossibility of accepting a concept in which this security will by itself increase. The long term factors, the main trends either economic or financial, democratic trends, East-West relations, North-South relations. They all prevent us from thinking that security will increase. Therefore, they ask us the question, which we haven't considered, namely what are the causes of insecurity? Why is it that the world in itself, that is without considering the actual measures of politicians of governments, the fact remains the world is a world of insecurity and perhaps increasing insecurity. Michael Pitfield asked us to come back to this question. I must say that the debate did not cover this question. Around the table we avoided this question. In fact, this is the main question and we know that it is very difficult to say and we want things to improve. But it is very difficult to say that things will get worse and it seems that in fact this is the psychological basis of the viewpoint of most of the people speaking here. You are all pessimists here, it seems. I think that this point must be stressed.

Now comes the second aspect - nuclear weapons, which to some extent crystallized the opinions of many people here. Separating the problem of nuclear weapons from problems of insecurity, of increasing insecurity, as if nuclear weapons were the cause of this insecurity but as we all know here - around this table, is not the case. It's not the nuclear weapons which cause insecurity in the world. The cause of insecurity in the world stems from other factors. Nuclear weapons are the response. They try to stabilize the confrontation between the major powers. Therefore, they are not the cause of the insecurity but rather one of the consequences of insecurity.

We forgot nuclear weapons very quickly once people stressed this point. Can we in fact find other ways of acting in relations between the superpowers? If it does exist, it can be used. We don't have any answer at this point. Nobody tried to answer this question. Mr. MacGuigan opened the door to us by saying basically the solutions are political solutions and not military solutions.

Therefore the question arises, would we fall in the same trap as Great Britain and other countries at that time by separating the ability to act militarily from the ability to act politically? You said that Russia does not want a mediator nor the United States. When there is any action to be taken, they will do it themselves. It is because we don't have any military capacity, therefore nobody takes us seriously.

Canada is a wise country. It doesn't threaten anybody. Therefore, we can use Canada to prepare international reports and international documents. Is that what we

want to be? Do we just want to be the wise people of the world preparing documents? Once important questions arise, Canada is asked to leave the room and leave the important people in the room to discuss important problems. I want to be provocative here because I don't want the rest of the two days here just to revolve around these questions. I am deliberately provoking here because I would not like to remain at this point to discuss how our Cabinet can change its government policy in this way without dealing with the question of how we can obtain security through national action within the country. This was pointed out by some people but there wasn't any answer. There is no answer to international security if we don't first have our own ability to act within Canada itself. How can we develop our capacity for action - that is the question. Politically, how political leaders present this problem to the public so the public will support its government in action to increase security. If we begin with our national problem, and then look at our international capacity in real situations, and I think if we do that, then the conference here will have made some contributions.

Chairman: You have made the foundation for continuing our work tomorrow morning. You have pointed out where we have failed the subject quite rightly and you have given us some opportunities to retrieve our situation when we meet tomorrow morning. Thank you very much for that concluding contribution.

POLICY SEMINAR ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE ISSUES

Val Morin, Quebec, August 20-22, 1983

Chairman The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen,
Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary
of State for External Affairs

SESSION A: THE NEW GLOBAL BASIS OF SECURITY

Chairman: Let us bring this morning's session to order please. Before calling upon the first speaker this morning, I would like to make two points: One is that there are a number of members of the Government around the table whom I would like to introduce, as well as a number of officials, particularly from the Department of External Affairs. I make their presence known because if we are to benefit from this particular effort, then it will be through the impact of our discussion upon Ministers and officials who ultimately will be making the recommendations or suggesting alternatives or modifications to current policy.

Mr. Blais is Minister of National Defence. Mr. Caccia is Minister of the Environment. Mr. Jean-Luc Pepin is Minister of State in the Department of External Affairs and, although a recent arrival in the Department, one of the most senior members of our Government. Mr. MacGuigan is Minister of Justice and former Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Roberts is Minister of Employment and Immigration, having served in several portfolios until the change that was made a week ago. The chief public servant in my department is Marcel Massé, who is the Under-Secretary, Mr. de Montigny Marchand is the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Policy. Mr. Francis is head of the Defence Relations Division. We have others present from the Department of National

Defence whom I may introduce later.

That is the first point. Second, I want to suggest to them what they take a more activist role in this morning's discussion. I thought yesterday was quite successful but maybe a bit too formal. Perhaps we ought to have some interjections and some on the spot questioning. Therefore, may I suggest that after each speaker makes his main presentation there be an opportunity for a very short question period, the intent of which would be to draw out important points or, indeed, to seek clarification or to make differences of opinion even more evident. I think that is necessary if we are to get the maximum benefit from these discussions. I should mention before I move on, that Mr. Lamontagne is with us. He is the former Minister of National Defence, who has left the portfolio in excellent shape. Both the portfolio and the former Minister are in excellent shape! I also have around the table Senator Michael Pitfield, the former Clerk of the Privy Council.

The discussion this morning is on "The New Global Basis For Security", and the agenda raises several questions on this subject. The first speaker is Mr. Jim Schlesinger. We are pleased to have Mr. Schlesinger with us this morning. He will speak from a very broad experience in governmental matters and the private sector. As you know, he has served as U.S. Secretary of Defence and U.S. Secretary of Energy and is now performing many useful services, one of which is to visit Ottawa from time to time and stimulate us with his provocative comments. He has agreed to do that again this morning. We welcome him.

James Schlesinger: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Had you not informed me that my duty was to be provocative, I would have thought that I was to provide reassurance on this bright and sunny day. The first question that we are to address is, how do we assess the present status of East-West relations? I start with the observation that things are never as good or as bad as they seem. On the surface, relations between the Soviet Union and United States have been tempestuous. The Americans have pointed out that the Soviet Union is the "Empire of Evil" and that all evil stems from there - from the foreclosure of the mortgage on the range, to cattle-rustling. The Soviets are probably bewildered by all of this. They have long characterized the behaviour of the "capitalist dog" in his death frenzies, but they rather expected American Presidents to be like Jimmy Carter, or Richard Nixon and relatively easy to deal with, rather than tempestuous.

But that is only on the surface. Beneath the surface there continues to be an underlying stability in East-West relations. We have the traditional, what I will call the exaggerated alarms. One which always occurs is when we are deploying or considering deploying new strategic systems in the United States: that the Communist threat is the Soviet bolt from the blue; that some bright day, the Politburo decides it is time to attack the Americans' strategic forces. That is an event of such low probability that it approaches zero. The second is the all-out, conventional assault against Western Europe and that too, I think, is a very, very low probability event. What is more worrisome would be the gradual erosion of conditions in the Persian Gulf, because on those conditions depends the performance of the economies of the Western nations due to the need for

access to oil. While I admired last night Helmut Sonnenfeldt's succinct summary, I did not entirely agree with his observation that the Iran-Iraq War is altogether a stabilizing element from which we can draw reassurance.

But there is an underlying stability, despite substantial changes in the military balance. A high degree of military equilibrium exists given the fact that the Soviet Union has been over the years our basic adversary power.

I have mentioned tempestuous and stable as adjectives to apply. Another adjective might be preoccupied. The Soviet Union, at the present time, is preoccupied with its activities in Afghanistan and with the developments that have been going on in Poland for two years. Maintaining the internal cohesion of the Soviet condominium is the principal objective of the Soviet Union and, when there are internal disturbances that they must deal with, within the framework of the socialist community, that will claim most of their time. As a result of Poland and Afghanistan, the West has been granted a substantial amount of time that we might not have expected some years ago.

The basic question is whether we make effective use of the time we have been granted. The probability is that we will, to a large extent, fritter that time away. The United States is also tending to become preoccupied with developments elsewhere rather than with the central, strategic relationship with the Soviet Union. The 1970's were a period in which the military reputation of the United States declined world-wide - partly because of Vietnam, partly because of instability in political decisions which was reflected, for example, in Angola, and partly because of the episode in the Iranian desert.

Another basic question that we might ask ourselves is whether in the 1980's the military reputation of the Soviet Union will decline, if not equivalently, then to a considerable extent, reflecting once again the performance of their weapons systems in the recent clashes in the Middle East and the performance of their forces in Afghanistan. If that is so, it provides, if not an end to military bi-polarity, considerably greater leeway for political activities on the part of third parties.

Let me continue by observing that the Alliance should remain central to the concerns of all the democracies, the United States and Canada included. The survival of what accurately can be called the free world (in which I am not including all the nations from Salvador to South Korea, but the inner-core of the free world which is the Western democracies, some 20-25 in number), will not be determined by what happens in Salvador or Namibia. It will be dependent upon a continued cohesion amongst these democracies on the basic political requirements of dealing with the East in a way that reflects some degree of common interests.

The Alliance remains unduly dependent upon nuclear weapons, as was pointed out last evening by Helmut Sonnenfeldt and others. Since the early 1950's, and indeed since 1945, the West has leaned upon a nuclear crutch to compensate for its deficiencies in conventional forces, particularly around the periphery of the Soviet Union. As the years have gone by, we have found it harder and harder, even as we have come to recognize the need to dispense with that nuclear crutch, to actually give it up. We all recognize I think, the need for strengthening the conventional deterrent. There is only a reluctance to pay the

painful costs, both economic and political, to do so. The decline of the overwhelming position of the United States has resulted in part on strains within the Alliance. Those strains have been eased by the arrival of the Kohl government, which tends to be more supportive of Washington than its predecessor and by the strong support offered to Washington by the Thatcher government. But nonetheless those strains are there and they are reflected more in public opinion in the European nations than they are in hostile comments by governments. So let me stress that the cohesion of the Alliance is critical to the survival of a democratic world. This is even more true of Western Europe, which depends on that cohesion to a greater degree than we do in North America.

Preserving the cohesion of the Alliance is more important than the deployment of individual weapons systems, the attitude taken by members of the Alliance towards Nicaragua and the like. The policies of all should be directed to the preservation of the cohesion of the Alliance. Enough on that, save to observe that I agree with Mr. Steel, that it should be an objective of the Alliance to point to, and achieve, concrete reductions of conventional forces on the Soviet side. It is a premise that Canada will be supportive of the United States, if not in Third World issues, on the basic question of the East-West military balance. Canada cannot afford, and does not wish, to be neutral in genuine confrontations between the democracies and the authoritarian world. Therefore in Europe the objective should be to achieve conventional restraint on the part of the Soviet Union, step-by-step with strategic arms limitations. It is only in that way that we will be able to maintain the overall military equilibrium.

Enough on Western Europe, the Alliance and the like. We are looking at a changed global environment. We are now concerned with the global basis of security and the Soviet Union is now a global power in a way that it was not in the 50's and 60's. That breakout occurred in the 1970's. It reflects the growth of a blue water navy on the part of the Soviet Union, the capacity to put small forces at long distances from the Soviet Union, even if those forces are not in a position to challenge the United States militarily in war-fighting capabilities, if I may use that term. They are in a position to raise serious problems with regard to the political orientation of nations in the Third World. We are going to have over the course of the decades ahead more Third World problems as a consequence. The decline of the policemen, the world policemen, means anarchy as Gilbert and Sullivan and others have told us. I want to stress that. But we should not exaggerate the importance of unruliness in the Third World. That is a subject to which I will return. At present, let me emphasize, however, that the fact that we have more concern at the moment about the problems of Namibia and Salvador and Nicaragua is a tribute to the underlying stability between East and West, both in terms of the political stability of Western Europe, which was our preoccupation in the late 40's, the 1950's and the 60's.

The second question is, are there signs of flexibility? Here in Canada, which has had the pleasure of dealing with the United States in a more intimate fashion than other nations, I need not point out that there is such a thing as a separation of powers in the United States. Recent experience for example, with the Fisheries Treaty would underscore that. Separation of powers in the United States is the basis of a rising flexibility with regard to strategic issues dividing East and West. Senator Sam Nunn, one of the more profound of our observers in the US Senate

observed recently, indeed a year ago, that Jimmy Carter laboured year after year to try to create a constituency for arms control and failed signally. Ronald Reagan achieved that goal in his first six months in office. I mention that because the nature of the separation of powers is a kind of perversity on the part of the US Congress. They will lean against the wind, to borrow a phrase that we employed last night. In a Carter era, when there is concern about the weaknesses or perceived weaknesses of the President, the Congress will become increasingly belingerent, add to the military budget, and take a grim view of arms control and the SALT-2 treaty. Under circumstances in which the concern runs the other way - that the President is insensitive to arms control and too inclined to militarize problems, Congress moves in the opposite direction.

That applies not only to issues such as arms control. It applies also to what some of us would regard as a lesser problem, such as Acid Rain, in which the administration has created an astonishing constituency for the control of Acid Rain, I am happy to report, here in Quebec. The Scowcroft Commission was designed in large degree to acknowledge this budding distrust in the Reagan administration on arms control issues and to harness the strong feelings about arms control on the Hill in support of a consensus position on strategic military deployments. But the Scowcroft Commission is also, and has been, a force pressing the administration towards greater flexibility. So I think your answer to your second question, is there greater flexibility, is indeed, yes. Perforce because the original rhetorical bent of the administration raised questions in Congress amongst our allies and in the general public, that has led to a redress on the part of the administration of its initial positions.

We are also facing the run-up to the election, as Mr. Griffiths observed last night. Once again elections are designed so that Presidents or Presidential candidates can prove that they are not the men they seem to be. Gerry Ford in 1976 dropped the word "détente" from his vocabulary in the run-up of the election to prove that he was hard on the Russians. Carter dropped the SALT-2 agreement and called for a substantial increase in the military budget in order to prove once again that they are not the men that they were perceived to be. Ronald Reagan will move in the opposite direction in order to reassure the public, which is very disturbed, according to public opinion polls, about the arms control strategies of the administration and this is particularly prominent amongst women. There is now a 17 point gap between the approval of Ronald Reagan by men and women. Amongst women, approval rates for Reagan have recently dropped to 34% which is the low point at the bottom of the recession. All of this will force the administration, whether it desires it or not on theoretical grounds, to be more flexible.

How do regional instabilities, our third question, bear on the global security environment? That depends on the question of whether we are looking at the psychological effect or the physical effect. I do not want to dismiss or diminish the importance of Central America, but Nicaragua, in terms of population, in terms of basic military strength, in terms of its gross national product is not equivalent to West Germany. From the standpoint of the Super Power, of the United States, it may appear to be more equivalent in size and power to Albania. One should recognize, therefore, that changes in Central America pose great psychological problems to the United States and that the swing of Salvador or Nicaragua from one side of the political spectrum in the world to the other is not going to change the overall strategic balance.

That brings me to the Pitfield conundrum. The Pitfield conundrum is how much leeway do the Canadian political leaders have to express their views without bringing about bilateral retaliation from the United States. I put it less gently than he did last night. I think that there is considerable leeway. It depends of course on the administration. It depends on the circumstances and it depends on the timing. One does not challenge new administrations at the height of their triumph, neither the Carter administration in 1977, nor the Reagan administration in 1981. But as the enthusiasm of the initial honeymoon period disappears and a sense of reality sets in, opportunities for raising questions arise. So long as Canada remains unquestionably on the side of the democracies, supportive of the military balance in Western Europe, supportive, reinforcing, as I said last evening, of the United States on questions of preserving military equilibrium, there is latitude, it seems to me, for questioning on other matters. Canadian policy on Cuba and China has never been synonymous with American policy and that has come to be accepted. And, I think, there will remain greater latitude with regard to other areas of the world.

One need not agree with the American government that the withdrawal of Cuban forces is a necessary prelude to any settlement in Namibia or need one necessarily agree with the American government that the present social arrangements in Salvador are building blocks for the future of democracy. Questions can be raised on those points, it seems to me, so long as it is plain that on the basic issue amongst the North Atlantic community, the Atlantic Alliance, the Canadian government is supportive.

I close briefly with the final question, how should international institutions be strengthened? I am perhaps a poor person to address that question too, because I am not a notorious enthusiast for international organizations. They cannot deal with the East-West problem. Increasingly they have been dedicated to dealing with Third World problems and, if I may say so, Third World bombast! There is a growing disinterest in the United States in the political aspects of international organizations. I do not believe that is likely to be reversed quickly. What is more important, however, is the international financial organizations that can play a critical role in preventing default, which would upset the international financial structure, in preventing an excessive growth of protectionism, and in providing the necessary aid for development of those countries that can be developed. The United States has been equivocal, in recent years, in its support of these international economic organizations which can be much more usefully strengthened than can the political arms of the UN. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman: Thank you Mr. Schlesinger. Mr. Massé, a very quick question.

Marcel Massé: Mr. Chairman. First, I wonder if we have dealt enough with the concern that was expressed last night that we were describing the global basis of security or insecurity in dealing with the super powers, but not going deeply enough into the causes of the insecurity. I think it is especially important to answer the questions that we have this morning, because unless we try to ascertain why it is that the USSR reacts the way it does, and why it is that the Americans react the way they do, then it becomes very difficult for us to define what is the role of Canada in all this. If the purpose of foreign policy or

Jean-Luc Pepin: The main contribution of the speaker is to tell us that we have some freedom, somewhere, but we must contest the basic American positions. I would like you to spell it out. What is it that we can change, while stating immediately of course, that we don't challenge a number of things. I would like you to spell it out.

Walter Gordon: I thought that what Mr. Schlesinger had to say was very useful because he was so blunt and direct. He did say a couple of times what Canada could do if, as Jean-Luc Pepin just said a minute ago, we toed the line on the basic issues and supported the United States.

Mark MacGuigan: I hope that others besides me are sympathetic with Walter's way of putting it because I think what Mr. Schlesinger was saying to us was that if we wanted to retain our influence with the United States we have these limitations. But I guess I was responsible for the statement of the Pitfield conundrum yesterday by my talk about playing on the margins. It is even more difficult than Mr. Schlesinger presented it as being. He said that as long as Canada supports the basic US policies in the East-West area, we have freedom on other issues such as Cuba and China, and he's quite right. But in fact, Mr. Schlesinger it is even more difficult, because where we need some freedom right now is precisely with respect to the East-West problem. If we believe that the US is mishandling that, and we have to walk the tight-rope of saying, well we are really with you fundamentally, but maybe think you're doing a very bad job with this, that is touching much closer to the bone.

Chairman: Thank you Mark. I just have one or two more questions I am reviewing rapidly, whether this is a good idea or

not because they seem to be turning into speeches. Alan, will you try to recover the ground I have lost in the last couple of minutes by really asking a question?

Alan Beesley: My only speech is to say that I agree with everything the Chairman has said. My questions are whether, and to what degree, we are or are not toeing the line in East-West relations when we adopt a position on the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty which differs from that of the USA, at least in terms of degree of urgency of negotiations? When we differ with the USA on the question of the demilitarization or non-demilitarization of outer space? Again, it may be partly a question of urgency, but there it's more serious. When we differ with the USA on chemical weapons, the distinction is between negotiating and drafting. Now these may seem like peripheral questions, but to a disarmament expert, they go to the heart of the problem especially when we get into the verification issues. So although I'm neither agreeing nor disagreeing with Mr. Schlesinger's excellent presentation, I am simply saying, how do we toe the line by declining to deploy the cruise missile but agreeing to test it? I think it would have been very clever to have the USA request us to deploy, think about it and then say no but we will of course test it. We didn't do it that way. That would have been my advice but it wasn't asked. But even in East-West relations it is not so simple to maintain cohesion and solidarity when by running on the spot, staying in the same place continuing to press the policy that we have pressed for years, we find a gap developing between us and the USA as it moves away from us. So it would be very hard to maintain cohesion by simply marching along in a different direction being led by the United States.

Helen Caldicott: I would like to ask Mr. Schlesinger, why should Canada or any other Western democracies toe the line with the United States?

James Schlesinger: I have heard of late such things as "toe the line", "marching along with the United States" and so forth. So let me underscore in response to the last four or five questions or comments that indeed I do not see any reason why Canada should toe the line or march along with the United States on East-West relations. I'll come back later to the Third World issues which were our initial questions. What I said was that the basic issue is the need for a military equilibrium and that Canada is on the side of the democracies as it is on the side of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The maintainance of an equilibrium can come about in various forms. I would urge, and I trust this does not seem to be too extreme a position, that Canada take a responsible position on these issues. Since the 1950's and the time of the new-look, NATO has supported a strategy of nuclear response to a conventional westward thrust by the WARSAW Pact. That is NATO's strategy. The United States has since 1961 with a brief intermission during the early Nixon years (picked up by me later), strongly urged the building up of a conventional capability so that we would raise the nuclear threshold and possibly dispense with the need for a nuclear threshold. I urged that there be a responsible trade-off along the lines that Mr. Steel laid out last night, that if you press the Americans - and I did not suggest that Prime Minister Trudeau abandon his long time enthusiasm support for arms control - but if you press the Americans on that issue there should be an equivalent pressure on the Soviet Union to reduce its conventional forces which overhang Western Europe.

I have been observing these matters for many years or Back in the 1950's the question used to be, why do the Soviets maintain this immense conventional force hanging over Western Europe? The answer was that this was their offset to American proponderance in nuclear weapons, that this was the balance. It was by holding Western Europe hostage by these conventional forces, it was said that they maintained a deterrent against the Americans. That may have been a plausible reason in the 1950's. By the late 1970's and early 1980's, when the Americans no longer enjoyed nuclear superiority in any form, the maintainance of this immense conventional balance of force structure by the Soviets could not be defended on the same basis as in the 1950's. When and if Mr. Prime Minister Trudeau goes to the Soviet Union, I would hope that at the same time he addresses the American administration and points out that they have been too inflexible on strategic arms issues, if that is his judgement, and that he would also raise these kinds of questions with the Soviets, because since 1945 the basic question for the West, reinforced by the loss of American strategic superiority, is the insecurity in Western Europe in front of these major Warsaw Pact forces. I do not think that Canada need toe the line, march along with the United States. I have noticed no inclination on the part of Canadians to abandon their enthusiasm for a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. I have not suggested that, but I do suggest that the position must be one of basic support for the security of the West of which Canada is a part. This requires an equilibrium and if there are growing reservations on nuclear weapons then the Canadian voice should point to the need for conventional forces in the West and the need for réduction of conventional forces in the East.

I have stressed in the NATO Council that it is the United States that has historically said "let us back away from overreliance on nuclear weapons". It has been most fiercely resisted by the continental powers and not the Dutch or the Canadians. Others who share those reservations about nuclear weapons have been particularly forceful, from the days of Adenauer to the days of Kohl, in saying to the Germans that the threat of nuclear retaliation may be an impressive threat but is it one you would really care to implement? These problems are much more severe today because of the loss of American strategic superiority and, I freely concede, by incautious remarks by the members of the current administration in Washington. The German view on nuclear retaliation is quite complex and when the administration comes forward and in effect says that the German role in nuclear war should be "to win one for the Gipper", this does cause some disquietude in Germany.

I hope I have responded to the question of where you can challenge the Americans. Basically it seems to be anywhere, except that the fundamental loyalty of Canada to the preservation and security of the Western democracies should not be taken for granted on details, on the CTB, on arms control, on everything else. Recognizing what is implicit in the Pitsfield conundrum, that Canada's bargaining power in dealing with the United States has its limits and that if the United States' policy is going to be challenged on everything, Canada's voice will be effective on nothing, so choose the places. Let me see. What are the sources of insecurity? Why did we have a struggle for 150 years over the reformation and counter-reformation? That is the kind of question we are dealing with. The Soviet Union grew up with a certain lack of sympathy from the Western world, perhaps deserved, perhaps undeserved. Forces were landed at Archangel and other

places. Mr. Churchill, at the time, thought we should wipe out the Soviet Union. President Wilson at least partially agreed. Throughout the 20's and 30's there was certainly an attitude of hostility on the part of the capitalist world towards the Soviet Union.

Whether the Soviet Union is looking at that real evidence of years ago or whether it has become somewhat paranoid is a question I leave to each individual to decide. But the Soviet leaders (it is unfashionable to say these things these days) do remain Communists and they have their own view of the world. Part of that view of the world is that the outside world is hostile to the Soviet Union. They also have a feeling of inferiority with regard to the West. Western technologies are better than their own and they tend to exaggerate that. We sometimes exploit their tendency to exaggerate their sense of inferiority on technical matters and as a result they may be inclined to build up their armed forces as a compensation for their inferiorities, real and imagined. They also regard the Soviet military establishment as the ultimate instrument of state power and they have never shirked from providing resources for the military establishment. While we may understand that psychologically, on a military front we do not feel any more secure because of that psychological tendency.

The Americans, whom you all know well, tend to be highly volatile in their judgements. In this year we are saving the world for democracy, making the world safe with democracy, launching a campaign for four freedoms around the world, waiting for all mankind to enjoy that American model which we established on the North American continent in the 18th and 19th century, which was to be the model for all mankind. In periods of

enthusiasm, we assumed that everyone wants to follow us and become Jeffersonians or whatever. In other periods we withdraw, we discover that the rest of the world consists of rascals, then we become isolationists. The world be damned; they're not worthy of the American model! Now the Americans do oscillate in these ways. Jimmy Carter came into office with, I must say amongst us, some of the most naïve views about international politics that can be imagined. Ronald Reagan's views are not of that form of naïveté, but one can argue that they are of another form of naïveté, that the Soviet Union is dominated by something that he refers to as the 10 commandments of Lenin, whoever Lenin was. But I think it is for that reason that there is great value in Mr. Griffiths' comments of leaning against the wind (if you are truly leaning against the wind), preventing this American exuberance from getting out of hand. But I do not think that you are going to cure the sources of insecurity quickly. The Soviets have a doctrine which suggests that they better look very warily on the capitalist world, and the Americans by their history and by their inclinations, oscillate between two views which are that all the rest of men are good men and just like Americans at heart, if they only knew it, and the discovery that that ain't true. During that latter phase they tend to exaggerate the menace. We are presently inclined to exaggerate the menace just as we were inclined to understate it during the 1970's. The Soviet Union is a powerful military adversary, but from a military standpoint, and not from a political standpoint, I am not desperately concerned about the Soviet Cuban war machine in Central America.

The final issue was the Third World as put by Mr. Harker. I agree entirely with the last half of his observations. The last half of his observations went briefly along the line that,

given the temperaments of the idealistic democracies, Canada, perhaps foremost the Dutch, the Scandinavian countries - and putting aside the cynical realpolitik of the Germans, the French, the Italians, and what have you - if the Americans go around and say that El Salvador is the first line of human freedom, that we are going to have restlessness amongst our sister democracies because it is a proposterous position. And therefore, the Americans, I think, should be very selective about their commitments in the Third World. They should be told to be selective by their allies, simply because it will break up the cohesion of the Alliance if the Americans seem to be supporting every gang of thugs because they are anti-communist. That will break up the cohesion of the Alliance. As I indicated, I worry about more the cohesion of the Alliance than I do about the long run strength of the insurrection in Salvador.

The other half of your comments, Mr. Harker, I did not entirely agree with. The Third World is weak economically, and its total resources are not that profound, even if we could take that apocalyptic state in which they all moved away from the West out of repugnance for the United States and its tendency to militarize quarrels. Although it would be a substantial change in the world configuration, that would not in itself put all that much by way of resources on the other side.

But it is not going to happen that way in any event. There are all of the unsatisfactory aspects of human nature at work in the Third World including distrust, envy, and dislike of neighbours, so that the movement in Nicaragua in one direction is likely to lead Honduras in another direction. The Third World is not going to become a cohesive force, save in rhetoric directed against the developed world. It is going to remain in large

degree anarchic and weak. I do not think therefore the Third World is going to drift collectively in a direction which will challenge the West. For that reason I think that we can afford to be tolerant, even more tolerant than the American government is inclined to be, of changes in the Third World. I do not want to dismiss them, but I do not regard them as fundamentally altering the balance of power. Therefore, because of that need for tolerance, the Americans should not get on to the domino theory carried to the nth power which is that if Andorra goes communist, Western Europe is irretrievably lost because of the infection in Spain and in France that is spreading throughout Western Europe. And the same is true of Salvador. The Americans have got to learn to live with a good deal of restlessness in these regions and not expect everyone to rally around the flag of freedom. But this is true for our partners, as well, including those partners who are more idealistic. There is a split between the democratic nations that believe in realpolitik and those that believe in a more idealistic foreign policy. Those idealistic partners ought not to feel the reverse domino theory - that unless the Americans behave themselves, there is going to be a cohesion around the world of the third countries all directed against the Western democracies and that the salvation of the free world is to get the Americans under control. I think I have dealt with those questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman: Thank you very much. May we now turn to Mr. Ford who will further develop this general theme. Mr. Ford is adviser to the Department, now resident in France but for a long time served as Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and established himself as a solid commentator and observer and analyst of Soviet affairs and East-West relations.

Robert Ford: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I thought I would address primarily the question of signs of flexibility and that means signs of flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union, both in the short term and the long term and also the question which Marcel Massé raised on causes of insecurity. An examination of this whole question of national and global security issues can only really be made sensibly if we have a basic idea of how the Soviet Union is going to develop in the next decade. What kind of country is it going to be? What kind of leaders are we going to have to deal with and what is going to be their concept of East-West relations? In my opinion, the Andropov régime is strictly a transitional one. He is the last of the line. He is the last of the leaders that they are likely to have, unless he drops dead tomorrow, who was born before the revolution, who was brought up under Stalin, served in the war and is of that generation. After him, they will jump to the people of a new generation in their early 50's or even younger perhaps. Now, in the short term it is not a very strong régime and it is not likely in my opinion that Andropov in the short time before him will be able to establish a very strong political base, a political base which would enable him to take any really important decisions departing from the present Soviet line on both internal and foreign affairs. His strength lies in the military and in the police and those two institutions have to be pleased. He has had great difficulty in strengthening his position in the party and opposition to him still exists. Furthermore, he is in poor health. It took Brezhnev five or six years to establish a really strong political position. It took Krushchev three or four. Andropov does not have that time. You can say that Breznev survived very serious illness for about five years but he had already established a position of considerable strength inside the country and the people around him had an

interest in propping him up and keeping him going. I do not think that is the case at the present time, but at any rate, as far as flexibility is concerned, I do not think that it is going to be very likely that Andropov will be able to depart very much from the present line.

The next succession, the next people who are going to take over for the Soviet Union will be quite a different group. They will be tough, urban, not from peasant backgrounds, well educated, much more sophisticated technologically, probably with rather more knowledge of the West than their predecessors, Russian nationalists, aggressive, proud, in fact we are not going to get any joy out of them. But they will also have come up through the party apparatus, so they are going to share basically the same aims and the same perceptions of the world and the Soviet Union and of the interest of the present generation. These people have accomplished a great deal in their own terms. They have made the Soviet Union a very important country. They have personally achieved great influence, prestige and wealth in many cases and they have every interest in continuing to maintain that position. In many ways this is an advantage for us because it is quite obvious that they are not going to want to risk what they have achieved in a war with the West. They are a risk - averting people.

But at the same time they are going to have an economy and a society in very great trouble, with no solution in sight because the radical reforms needed to really solve the problems of the USSR would strike at the very heart of the whole régime. They feel an overwhelming need to establish their credentials as communists, their legitimacy in the system. It seems to us perhaps absurd, given the enormous power which they have in

their hands, that they should feel this almost sense of inferiority, but this is a fact that has to be taken into consideration. This makes them highly conservative. It is almost impossible for us to imagine just how hidebound they are and how difficult it is to take even the smallest departure from established policy, both on internal and in foreign affairs, but above all in economic matters. It is hardly a system that is going to collapse, but it is not a healthy one. It is getting more unhealthy all the time. The most extraordinary features are now becoming apparent. There is the unbelievable drop in nativity, particularly by the Russians, which is extremely disturbing. The Russian race is going to disappear in another 50 years unless they do something about it. At the same time there is the considerable increase in the Moslem or Asian peoples and some of the lesser minorities as well, the drunkenness, the drop in life expectancy in male and female Russians, let alone others and their inability really to establish any great enthusiasm on the part of the young people for the system.

The recent incident in Washington, is vivid proof of the problem with the youth. When you look at it that way, the figures of the growth of the GNP recently which look impressive, have to be counted against the inability to increase the standard of living. For a very long time, up to about 4 or 5 years ago, they managed to keep the average Russian reasonably satisfied because there was a visible increase every year. Not very much, 2 or 3 percent, but a visible increase in the standard of living. Since they didn't have any standard of comparison with the outside world they could only compare it with what it was like 5 or 10 years ago and it seemed to be getting better. The average Russian was more or less satisfied, but this is no longer the case. Already about two years before I left Moscow in 1980,

it was quite clear that the standard of living had more or less stabilized and it has actually declined in many areas since then. There is no great danger to the régime from this at the present time, but it is something which disturbs the Russians and is going to keep them preoccupied for quite a long time.

Politically they have a very great interest, I think, in trying to improve the standard of living, in trying to find more money for investment in consumer goods and to increase the amount of capital invested in consumer industry, and they only have one or two possible ways of doing it. If you exclude the likelihood of their trying to return to the 1970 type of détente and to get massive technology from the West (which in any case would simply be a gimmick as far as the basic problems are concerned) they could introduce economic reforms, but they need radical economic reforms which they are not going to do. It is practically impossible for them to do this because of the political implications, because it opens the gate of demands on the part of the people and the party itself for political reforms as well as economic reforms.

So when you look at the situation, and they must look at it day in and day out, it would appear to them that the only way they could increase the amount of money devoted to increasing the standard of living, increasing the civilian economy, is of course diverting some of the money devoted to the military to the economic area. Even at the present time, if the percentage of the budget devoted to the military remains stable, it means that the standard of living has to decline, so that if the amount of the budget devoted to the military increases, it would be quite obvious that they are going to be in very serious economic trouble. I don't see any way to bring them to take the decisions which are required to improve that situation. Of course

theoretically they should take the next step in trying to make agreements with the United States and with the West for arms reductions and control in order to at least not increase the military budget. But then you run immediately into the problem of the military, who are certain they have an enormous influence in the present régime, and I think it would be extremely difficult for them to agree to anything which would seriously decrease the amount of financing, the amount of resources, which go to the military.

There are in the short term as well, in my opinion, a number of very serious permanent obstacles to any great flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union in its relations with the West, even if it is with the best will in the world on both sides to try to improve relations. These issues are first: human rights; second, the continued and never-ending activities of the KGB abroad, which at any given time can suddenly cause a crisis in relations between the Soviet Union and any member of the Alliance, to wit the recent expulsion by France of 47 Soviet diplomats, our own experiences and, of course, of other countries; the problem with Afghanistan which I don't think we should ever forget, because it was a serious departure from the norm of behaviour of a super power or at least of the Soviet Union in the post-war period, as a military extension of its power outside of the Soviet bloc; Eastern Europe, above all Poland; the question of support of national liberation movements which is an ideological imperative on the part of the Russians and incidentally is specifically excluded from their interpretation of peaceful co-existence and is indeed one of a few ways in which they can justify their Communist credentials; and, finally, the excessive arms build up. None of these problems is going to go away and even if we wanted to ignore them I think in many cases public opinion would

not permit us to do so. There remains a sad fact that the nature of the Soviet system makes the East-West relation inevitably confrontational. This is their choice, not ours. It just isn't possible to treat the USSR like any other country, and one of the errors in evolving détente was the failure to understand the nature of peaceful co-existence, although the Russians certainly made no secret of what they meant by it. But this confrontation doesn't mean conflict and the Soviets certainly do not want one. Nor is it simply a choice between détente and confrontation. There will always be areas and periods when cooperation of a sort can be arranged and must be worked out, above all in the question of arms control, in trade, scientific and cultural exchanges ... areas in which we have something to gain as well as the Soviet Union.

I think the tragedy of the last 6 or 7 years lies in the inability of each side to understand the other's intentions. The Russians make it extremely difficult but we have to try to understand what they are trying to do and we have to try to make it clear to them what our basic aims are. In this connection, I would like to recommend the basic theme of the Final Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, of which I was a member, which is the recognition of a common need for security is the very first step toward hard-headed solutions of mutual benefit. I think we have to be more subtle in our approach to the Soviets. We are strong enough to do so. Above all, to shift the competition away from the area the Soviets have chosen, the military one, the only area in which they are comparable to the United States, and move it to areas where we have a real advantage, politics and economics.

I would like to take up a point made by Mr. Steel and also by Mr. Gordon in a different way and that is the question of the dialogue. I have always been in favour of maintaining contact, maintaining a dialogue of some sort or other with the Russians. It is absolutely essential that we do so, but it has to be hard-headed, it has to avoid glossing over the issues, glossing over, for example, these six points which I have outlined. In this connection I commented last February on the visit of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russia that he did the West a very great service by going there at that time and not avoiding these issues, by bringing them up both with Andropov and Gromyko. Of course he got a totally negative and frosty answer on every single issue but it was a very good lesson to us, to the West as a whole, about the great difficulty of attempting to budge the Russians at the present time when they do not want to be budged, or when they are incapable and find it impossible to do so.

Finally, just one small comment about some of the questions that were asked to Mr. Schlesinger. I was a little disturbed about some of the implications of these questions. I don't think the question is a loyalty to the United States that we are talking about. I don't think that's the question at all. It is a question of loyalty to basic assumptions of Western democracies that we share. That is, the basic thing we cannot depart from and in effect if we did so we would considerably weaken our position vis a vis the Soviet Union. We can question, certainly, some of the ways in which these issues are handled, but it should be a question of the common interest of all the countries of the West, not of toeing the line with Washington, not of jumping if Washinton says to do this and that with regard to the Soviet Union. When the question seems to be raised as to whether or not

we really belong in this camp or this group then I get very disturbed.

Chairman: Thank you Mr. Ford. Mr. de Montigny Marchand and David Steel, Mr. MacGuigan and Mr. Massé and others if you wish. Please remember this is not a speech making session.

de Montigny Marchand: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the last speaker could elaborate a bit on what he meant when he referred his view that the confrontation basis of the super power relationship is of the Soviets' choice and design. I would be interested in him elaborating on that.

David Steel: Could I ask Mr. Ford to expand on what he was saying about the younger generation in the Soviet Union being frustrated, what prospect does he see in there being a kind of revolt, not necessarily being a political revolt, but a cultural revolt of the younger generation against the military dominance, given the increased exposure now of the population to comparisons outside the Soviet Union. I referred yesterday to satellites and so on, but my impression on the basis of a brief visit last year is that over the years the Russians are now much more exposed to consumer goods, to films, radio broadcasts, discs, and everything else and does he see any hope that there might be internal pressures in the Soviet Union even on a parallel with those in Poland.

Mark MacGuigan: Mr. Chairman, it is always a great pleasure to listen to Mr. Ford. I don't think there is anyone else on the national scene who understands the Russians better and speaks about them in terms that can give us an understanding of how to deal with them. I think that perhaps the most important

suggestion Mr. Ford made in policy terms for dealing with the Soviets is to try to shift confrontation from the military to other areas and I guess that this is the direction in which a number of people's comments from the beginning have been aimed. What I want to ask him is how much margin does he think the Soviets have for moving in this direction, given the fact that the maintenance of their satellite empire probably depends almost exclusively on this factor. If the Soviets were to considerably diminish their forces, especially their conventional forces, wouldn't they lose or fear losing all control over the satellites and given that constraint how far is it realistic to think that we can shift the ground on confrontation?

Marcel Massé: Mr. Chairman if, as Mr. Ford says, one of the causes of instability is the internal weakness, especially the economic and social one, in the USSR, is it in our interest or how far is it in our interest to help the USSR to develop in an economic way? For instance should we encourage transfers of technologies, e.g. oil exploration technology, to the USSR? Should we have trade treaties with them trying to increase their ability to improve the state of their technology?

Alan Beesley: Ambassador Ford, as you may or may not recall, I have had the unmitigated joy of spending some 7 years working on the principles and codification of peaceful co-existence, and almost co-terminous with that another 7 years overlapping with some of these exercises in the UN on the definition of aggression. I am fascinated with that one reference you made to co-existence and in particular I would like to know whether something has evolved to replace peaceful co-existence.

Franklyn Griffiths: Mr. Ford, I was wondering too about the question Mark McGuigan drew attention to and that is the possibility of getting them to shift from competition in the military to other areas. They see this to some extent as to their advantage as well. I think that they see it as a kind of change in the forms of competition. I wonder whether you see yourself any signs of that and whether there is evidence within the Soviet Union of a readiness to, as it were, modify the competition with the West and whether we can play on this; that is as we might also feed into the American political process supporting some against others as it suits us, can we have any option of doing this kind of thing where the Soviets are concerned?

Robert Ford: Well, I will take these questions seriatim. First de Montigny in the confrontational basis, you ask if that is the obvious choice. I will combine this with the question of Alan Beesley. It is because it is rooted in the communist doctrine, in the question of peaceful co-existence. There was a favourite theory, in the 1950's I think, that there was going to be a convergence in due course, in fact Mr. Kissinger I believe also believed that we could draw them into a network of relationships that would make them evolve into a different kind of country. They never believed that. Convergence is a dirty word for them. They are determined that for their own ideological and other political survival they have to have this confrontational approach to the West. I say confrontational as opposed to what we would hope and many did hope in the years of détente could be transformed into a more cooperative relationship in which we could sit down a friendly way and control crises, control arms, develop trade which would be of mutual benefit and so on but their concept of peaceful co-existence made this

absolutely impossible in the long run. Détente in my opinion was simply a kind of maximum form of peaceful co-existence, an intensive form in Soviet terms, which has served a certain specific purpose at a certain specific time. I don't think that theology has evolved at all. It is nothing new, it went back to Lenin, it was revived by Khrushchev, refined by Brezhnev who added his own little bit of the Brezhnev doctrine and then added even further to the Brezhnev doctrine after the invasion of they know that it is the only way to get ahead. How dangerous it is for the régime I don't know. The people that really count, those who are going to be the future leaders come up through the party. They probably don't think much of the ideology but that's the way to the top. That's the way to become an influential, important person in the Soviet Union and it's a cheap price to pay politically.

I got into some trouble with the Russians at the time of the publication of the atomic commission report by saying that the last country in the world they could ever disarm would be the Soviet Union for precisely the reason that they have to maintain a huge standing army in Eastern Europe or that empire would collapse immediately. There is no question about that. It is also very important internally, it becomes even more important internally as the Moslem populations of Central Asia become more numerous and more restless. They have to maintain large armed forces there. Then I go to what Mr. Griffiths said about the possibility of shifting from the military to see if there is an advantage there. I have not seen anything to indicate that the Russians want a concentration on the military side. They simply go ahead and build up their concentration. We have to counter that on the Western side so as not to give them an enormous advantage. But when I say shifting to another form of

competition I mean that I don't think it is necessary for us to feel that we have to meet the Russians gun by gun as long as there is sufficient assurance in Moscow that if they start something they are going to be in real trouble. I don't think they are going to risk a conflict, I remember having a conversation with Arbatov a couple of years ago in which he said he simply could not understand why the Americans thought it was possible for the Russians to start launch a first strike. He said theoretically, I suppose you figure out that it could happen that we could make a first strike and then the Americans would say well lets give up there is no point in continuing this because we are all going to be massacred. He said but that is not the way we think. If there is the slightest change in their calculation that the Americans would retaliate then the choice would be not to take that risk; anyway that is what I meant about moving away from the question of military competition.

Mr. Masse, the causes of instability in the economy. This is going to be an increasing problem, and, I think, in their relations with the West, when the next generation comes to power, 4 or 5 years from now, lets say, where their problems are going to be even more acute than they are right now. I never believed in the usefulness of blockades and I remember the first example of that was in 1946 when the Swedes were at a point of making a big deal with the Russians, 1946 or 1947, to sell them ball bearings and they were persuaded not to go ahead with the deal. As a result the Russians were forced to set up their own ball bearing plant and they did it and eventually they produced it. It has cost them a lot of money, it was a great effort at that time, but they can do it. It is a great mistake to underestimate their ability to produce things in the areas of what is important

to them, above all military, but they can do that. The transfer of technology of course is the easy way for them to get around their problems of modernizing their economy. in the long run I don't think excepting strictly military areas - that it makes that great a difference. In many ways it prevents them or discourages them from getting to work and actually producing themselves the machinery which they are importing from the West. If they couldn't get it from us they will go out and steal the plans or they will concentrate a group of their scientists in their research centres to produce themselves, but I think that it is going to become a cause of dissent among the Alliance in the years to come because it will always be the dispute "do we or do we not help the Soviet military machine by helping the civilian economy?"

Chairman: Thank you very much, I think that has been a very useful effort. I want to call upon the next speaker on this particular subject, Professor Maurice Torelli who will probably give us a new insight speaking as he does from a European vantage point. Mr. Torelli is professor of International Relations in the faculty of Law at the University of Nice, and I am sure he has listened with a lot of interest to the comments that have been made mainly by North Americans and he has now the opportunity to straighten us out. I now give him the floor.

Maurice Torelli (translation): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have been asked to present to you very quickly the North-South relations dimension in considering international security and I think that it might be useful to remember that since the beginning of the 1970's tensions between the North and the South, in the oil crisis for example, and also in terms of the demand for a new economic order, have been described as North-South

conflicts. I think that this term seems an appropriate one since these tensions between the North and the South have taken the form of various kinds of conflict, be it an economic conflict, economic war between OPEC and industrialized countries and also a conventional war in South-East Asia or also a diplomatic war which has taken place since 1974, particularly in the United Nations. Nevertheless I think that it is necessary to consider today whether this term "North-South Conflict" is an appropriate. In other words it seems to me essential to determine to what extent the Third World is an actor in international relations, largely as I wonder here whether we are faced with a new international mystery.

The Third World as such is not an actor. If you prefer, the North-South conflict is perhaps just a mirror reflection of the East-West conflict and the hypothesis which I would like you to consider here is the following: The Third World is not an actor as such, it is simply a reflection of the East-West conflict and the tension resulting from this situation has a result that the Third World should become autonomous from the East and the West and the second question here is to determine how the third world can become autonomous. It is difficult to envisage the emergence of an autonomous Third World. However, there may be new thoughts about a new approach which has been hidden somewhat and which we are discovering somewhat today through a regional approach. Therefore I now present this hypothesis. Imagine a South, an undeveloped South which in terms of raw materials could impose on the developed North (which lacks raw materials) a basic restructuring of the international system. If we examine this possibility of raw materials or resources in general I think that this idea has to be abandoned because in all areas it is the North that would benefit, be it in energy, raw materials or even

more so in the case of food. I think that everywhere in the future the North will acquire increased power in relation to the South. This is for various reasons: first, the location of raw materials, the second technological supremacy and financial capacity. The North American continent and the USSR seems privileged in the future subject to its ability to develop its resources.

The second observation I would like to make, which is inherent in this North-South conflict is from the fact that when we talk about the North and South in conflict, it should be obvious that the North and South are not homogeneous. After ten years of observation therefore, I think that we can say that the North, or at least the West, doesn't exist as such. Today the Third World is fragmented and for various reasons: There are, for example, differences in development. Today we can talk about oil exporters, newly industrialized countries and also less advanced countries. There are also ideological differences or geographical differences. The Third World therefore, in the context of security problems, does not in fact play the role which many people thought it might play or maybe wanted to play. The Third World is not a protagonist. It is important for the Soviet Union for the prospect of revolution, and important to the United States only insofar as it might prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union.

If we accept this analysis, I propose that we consider that a decrease in East-West tensions might imply the emergence of a south or two souths, which will be far more autonomous. Is this emergence possible? I would propose to you that the emergence of an autonomous Third World as such is impossible. However, in the context of a regional approach it is possible to show that there

are various "third worlds" which are in themselves more autonomous. Now why is it impossible for the South to emerge universally speaking? Well, the new economic order was still born. It was a very interesting attempt because it was pragmatic but nobody wishes to talk about this any longer. It seems to me, therefore, that the Third World has never been as vulnerable as it is today. International security is increasingly threatened by localized conflicts and by economic destabilization. We should also remember the obstinacy of the Soviets, who have always refused to assume any responsibility for disorder in the Third World, but what is even more important and even more worrying is the indifference of the United States. As Dr. Schlesinger pointed out, this attitude does not seem to have changed and doesn't seem likely to change in the near future. Another problem is a lack of serious negotiation. I think the international institutions are not really geared or suited to this purpose, be it the United Nations or be it GATT, where people negotiate but largely between developed countries. There is one possibility which should be explored, namely regionalism. I think regionalism might make it possible to have a real dialogue between the North and South or more exactly between the North and various souths. Obviously this idea is not new. We have been talking about this for quite some time but this has been somewhat hidden in part because of the discussions on the new economic order. This regionalism can be begun in two ways: the first is a North-South dialogue, which is very fashionable. The second possibility is the method used by the European Economic Community its relations with with black Africa. This policy is covered now by the Lomé Convention, which at present covers 63 countries, or half the countries in the Third World. It progresses because the institutions which have been set up allow the African and Carribean countries to exert a constant

pressure on the Community and they can therefore defend together their own points of view. Will this model facilitate the emergence of a more autonomous South?

The countries of the Lomé Convention now constitute a group which is different from other groups in the Third World. The second question which is also important here is whether this policy will lead to a reduction in tensions. Obviously the answer is a very delicate one because the policy is very limited, given the Economic Community, and given that the Economic Community obviously cannot provide security in military terms. Nevertheless I think we can make a positive judgement of this because one of the characteristics of this policy was that it granted community assistance or community benefits to all these countries whatever their ideological viewpoint. Therefore it seems to me this is a factor which could possibly reduce tension. Secondly, I think that a benefit of this policy is that it removed somewhat from Africa both the United States and the USSR. A final observation which seems to me important is that bilateralism is difficult given the characteristics of other states and other regions. I am convinced also that there is no question of replacing regionalism by universal mechanisms. However, I do believe that regionalism is a necessary step to try and strengthen and make possible negotiations eventually on a universal level. Now as regards the future of the international organizations, I agree with Dr. Schlesinger, that they are okay as they are and if we just leave them as they are they might be useful in the role they play and it would be illusory to consider any improvement in them.

Marcel Masse (translation): Before asking my question I would like to have 30 seconds just to express an opinion. I think that the position of the Asian countries is very different from that of the African countries with respect to us and if we look at the next fifteen years we need a policy here in cooperation with the Asian countries in our interest which is very important because of their proportion of the world population and also in the role in the economic field. That is the only comment I am going to make. There are two questions which I would like to ask to the speaker. First does he think that there is any trade-off or interrelationship between the defence budget and the development assistance budget, particularly in the case of Canada? The second question is what type of aid policy should Canada have, should we try to strengthen the governments in place so as to decrease political instability and therefore increase our troubled security or should there be a policy of economic development primarily?

Maurice Torelli: Mr. Masse is quite right. I think that Asia generally is very important and therefore we should not neglect this in the Community and have increasing negotiations, commercial negotiations with Asia. Traditionally the members of the Community haven't had historical links of this type and this largely explains the relations between the Community and Africa. The real question which was asked is a very difficult question because the trade-off between the budget for defence and for development assistance, when financial capacity is limited, is very difficult. I don't think that the budget for defence and the budget for development assistance should be related to one another. They have tried to do this in the United Nations by making a link between disarmament and development. I think that this is a bad approach because if we wait for disarmament before

development then really we have to wait a very long time and. Also, it is not at all obvious that transfers and reductions from military budgets would in fact be made or given to development.

The question is what type of aid could Canada give. Generally I can say that all countries, beginning with the United States, should promote and help regional organizations in the Third World. They should have a policy which would not be bilateral with a particular country because they have a strategic interest or economic interest. Rather the policy should be to encourage these countries to group together. This is what Europe has always done and will continue to do, noting that this approach is an important one. But this assistance, in my view, should not seek to strengthen the governments in place. This is one of the other controversies which I mentioned. When the Community negotiated with Russia, we gave food or butter. It was argued that we were giving food or butter as others were giving guns and it was said that this food or butter was used to help the Soviet Army and this was mentioned during Mr. Poniatoski's visit. Mr. Poniatoski went there to see if this food was in fact being used by the Soviets. I think rather that this assistance should be used for development as we might define it today, namely development which would be maintained by the people themselves, which would be used by the people themselves, and which would not just be the result of bilateral assistance which we had during 1960's.

Philippe Garigue (translation): I would like to ask Mr. Torrelli if he could elaborate on the difference between the mythology about a unified Third World and the need to assist regionally certain countries in the Third World because of the impact and the total insecurity of this world. Could he indicate to us if in fact we do have a misunderstanding of the problem or should we accept, for example, the theory which points out that

if we don't do something in this area, then it is possible that there will be a fundamental change in the security of the world. In other words, a world revolution and that will break-up the world system or is this also a myth?

Maurice Torrelli (translation): I think it is totally illusory to imagine a unified Third World. This doesn't exist. If you want to negotiate with a unified Third World, the result will be failure. It is not a unified Third World. Following your question, I must criticize the position of Dr. Schlesinger, because what I find particularly worrying in the American attitude is that the Americans don't need the Third World. Nevertheless you can't deny the reality of this Third World and the dangers of de-stabilization which are involved. For example, if we consider what might happen in the Persian Gulf or Iran, if we consider what might happen in Africa, I think that if we leave these people, then there is a prospect of insecurity in Asia and Africa. I think rather we should lead, we should contribute to the emergence of more stable countries. I would also add that we must consider that this notion of the relations between North and South does not exclude the possibility of mutual interest. It is not a question of financial altruism. Mr. Cheysson, when EEC Commissioner said bluntly, we have to help them or otherwise they would just disappear and if they did disappear then who would buy our products? This is a question of necessity, of an agreement on the basis of mutual interest. If the Third World continues to nationalize wealth on its territory and internationalize the wealth which is outside its reach, the interests of the North would be endangered. This is all I wanted to say in answer to the question of Mr. Garigue.

I'd like to make one observation because the European situation is not clearly understood in Canada or in North America. Unlike North America, Europe is very strongly dependent

in respect of all materials. We should remember that raw materials don't come from the South but rather from industrialized countries. Nevertheless, this dependence is very real, particularly as regards commercial outlets, and I think Europe needs to develop this type of relationship because the developing countries are also dependent on the outside. This is necessary for Europe because Europe has to try to improve its relations to provide a certain security of supply.

Robert Ford: I wonder if Professor Torrelli could develop a little bit more the problem of the interrelationship between development and the arms trade. In the Palme Commission we spent a good deal of time on that, and we were trying to organize a joint meeting between the Brandt Commission and the Palme Commission to discuss precisely that. But there is a strong feeling that it was an illusion to think that if there could be reduction in arms budgets there would be any increase in trade to the Third World, and that in any case the Third World is going to go buy arms no matter what the situation was. Now, France plays a very important role in the trading of arms to the Third World, and I wonder if you could comment on that, and also comment whether or not, when you mention in a rather slighting way the role of the international organizations, there isn't really some way in which the U.N. cannot get into this, at least in the matter of registering arm sales which is one of the elements, one of the suggestions which is being made.

Chairman: Before I ask Professor Torrelli to reply, may I get one or two more questions on the table and give him an opportunity to deal with them together, Mr. Pepin?

Jean-Luc Pepin: Mr. Torrelli spoke about the regionalization of North/South relations in Africa. Therefore, I'd like to ask you how do you see the role of Canada in Africa.

Harriet Critchley: He has spoken about rescuing Third World countries from their instability, and at the same time avoiding acting as a prop to the current regimes. I would like very much if he could elaborate on how, given the poor infrastructure for distribution of goods and information in many of these poor countries, one could get aid to the people themselves to help themselves without simultaneously propping up the regime.

Alan Beesley: I recall from discussions in Geneva of what I think is still called the Geneva Group on aid questions as they rose in the specialized agencies that France was in the forefront of those basing a policy on needs as determined by the developing countries in question and not as seen by donor countries. Since then, I recall in Vienna learning of the Swedes and the Germans having had considerable success in aid programs by linking bilateral and multilateral aid. In this way they manage to retain some national control but at the same time get away from the pejorative connotation of the bilateral aspect and get the benefit of a multilateral regional office, etc. They were tempted to do this in UNIDO when UNIDO wasn't really even functioning; it worked quite well in some cases. I would be interested in his comments on either of these aspects, where the determination should be made and the aid requirement and how best it should be channelled.

Chairman: Would Professor Torrelli also comment on the question of the Group of 77 and his view that there is no unity or no homogeneity in the Third World. How does he see the functioning of the Group of 77 in that context, and in particular how they managed their efforts to have a dialogue with the developed countries. What role does he see for the United Nations, in sponsoring global negotiations so-called. Does he have any comments on whether the latest UNCTAD meeting contributed adversely to the prospect of dialogue and is there

any reason why he seemed to have omitted from his discussion of the Third World the concept of interdependence put forward in the opening address which I thought was rather a concept we could support. I will give the floor to any other questioners before I ask Mr. Torrelli to reply to that galaxy.

Maurice Torrelli: Thank you, I must say that that galaxy of questions is quite a galaxy. The first question concerned the interrelationship between development and the arms trade. We have to understand one thing, namely that the arms trade will continue. I should be cautious about this as a public statement, but we can see that the new Socialist Government of France, which criticized the sale of weapons to Third World and to Argentina, nevertheless does provide certain weapons itself. For economic reasons, I don't think that there is any question of a decrease in the world sale of weapons. However, I do think that there is one point which you must keep in mind, namely that the Third World is becoming a large producer of weapons itself. There are now a number of countries producing weapons, and when we talk about limitation and checking control of the sale of weapons, then the governments of the Third World are in the name of their sovereignty going to react very vehemently, not just China but also countries like Morocco. Here we have the problem of international reality, namely the structure of the international system and the problem of sovereignty, because this sovereignty would be compromised and this is the problem in trying to achieve anything. I know that my answer is very general in comparison with that of some of the specialists around this table. I really don't have any specific knowledge regarding this question.

The second question which is very difficult is that of the presence in Africa of Canada. Of course, this is appreciated by France. There is a competition which we must accept. I think that the participation of Canada is very important, is very

useful. I think that we cannot have closed preferential areas if we wish to contribute to an improvement to the situation. The assistance and the cooperation of all governments is essential, and when I mention financial problems of the European Community you must understand that these are very serious problems. For example the STATSEX system, to stabilize export revenue is a success, it worked to well. But the member states, despite certain financial problems, are not considering improving this security mechanism. Therefore, what could be done if we talked cooperation. So long as the relations between Europe and Canada are not firmer there will be further misunderstandings. As long as these misunderstandings are not cleared up, then it will be very difficult for Canada to play a role which is not a traditional role for Canada in this area.

You talked about the regimes which are already in place there. I would just like to add one point to show the limitation of these dimensions which you mentioned earlier. You mentioned the question of human rights. It is a question of pushing régimes to evolve towards greater democracy, and you know that Europe was very committed to this. In the last convention, they tried to include a declaration on human rights with the possibility of linking this to measures in the area of assistance. There was a great protest about this. They said that it was an offence against African dignity, against sovereignty, against those countries who ratified the charter and whenever you talked about this question to the Africans themselves, they always have exactly the same reaction. Since 1980, they have an African charter of human rights. I think, therefore, this is the basic limitation here. If we are to take this reality into account, then we cannot have any direct influence on development, particularly in the area of multilateral relations.

Ambassador Beesley talked about the problem of choice of methods in granting aid. I'd like to make an observation which is already being made on the difference between multilateral and bilateral assistance. In the European context, bilateral assistance is still very important and is distributed in a conventional way according to each country's interest. However what is interesting in the context of international structures, as well as the European context, is the attempt to de-nationalize European assistance. It is not German assistance, French assistance or English assistance. And this aid is granted according to objective criteria which can be improved according to various methods. The requesting states themselves are increasingly associated with this. I think it is very difficult to imagine transposing the model of the EEC to other institutions.

The Chairman asked me a question also, which is a very difficult question, concerning the reality of the Group of 77. I really question the reality of this group because I think that the Third World will continue to project on the international scene a rather negative image, not a very united image. I would just point out also that this ideology of non-alignment, though it might seem to have a stabilizing effect, is in fact an ideology which seems to be questioned by French people today. With President Castro as a leader of these countries then obviously there will be even more serious confrontations.

You stressed the importance of interdependence and I agree with you very much. I think that the world is very interdependent except in the case of the United States. The reason why I mentioned in particular the relations of Europe is the dependence of Europe on external markets. This covers about 25% of its needs. The important thing here is how to handle this. This leads to the question of mutual interests which was

included in the Charter of Rights and which tends to be forgotten somewhat. The problem is not just a theoretical problem. It is a problem of management and it is a problem of institutions, of specific institutions. In 1983 what is the success that will be achieved globally speaking, universally speaking through the techniques of negotiation which have been used? What has resulted from these? Well the answer is absolutely nothing. I think that, that given the overall failure of this universal approach, a regional approach would be the only type which is particularly beneficial even if it is far from being fully satisfactory. I don't have answers for all your questions. I know that I have not answered perfectly.

Gilles Lamontagne: I would like to ask just one question to Professor Torrelli. You mentioned the question of the sale of weapons by France and you said that the sales are for economic reasons. I'd like to ask you a general question. Once again, in your view, is there a link between this policy and the slowness of progress, the lack of progress in arms limitation? Is there any link between these two questions, the sales of a weapons and the lack of progress on arms limitation?

Maurice Torrelli: Personally I don't believe in disarmament, I think it is a utopia. It is just an old myth which we have been talking about for years, I think it is also a dangerous utopia. Consider the collective measures of security provided for under the Charter, for example. The United Nations cannot implement these, cannot take any action, any real action. And secondly, I don't think that disarmament will lead to peace necessarily or improve the climate for stability or development. I am not sure, as I say, that there might not be an improvement but I am not sure this will result from disarmament. I think that we should also note that demand is largely due to the military nature of many of the régimes which are in place. Personally I

don't see how we could limit this. There are other experts here, perhaps they can answer it.

James Schlesinger: Commenting on that last issue, I agree with Mr. Torrelli. There is however a distinction between disarmament and restraint, and we should keep in mind the distinction between, on the one hand, selling arms reflecting the indigenous decisions of the countries that we cannot and whetting appetites on the other. As a practical matter, these sovereign nations will decide that they wish to buy weapons and that those weapons will be available from one source or another, unless they are highly advanced weapons, but there is also the practice of going around the world and whetting appetites in Third World countries and that is something on which greater restraint is possible. Thank you.

Eugene Rostow: Could I say a word in response to that very interesting and important question? I don't disagree with what has been said on the subject by Professor Correlli and Mr. Schlesinger but I think it puts the cart before the horse. The arms trade and manufacture of arms is the leading industry in the world today, not because salesmen go around selling arms but because the world's political system is collapsing. The increased demand for arms on the part of all sorts of countries, for more and more sophisticated arms, arises from growing fear, from insecurity about the behaviour of other states. I think that we fall into an extremely important, familiar and dangerous trap if we approach the problem of peace by assuming that it can be solved through agreements on the sale of weapons or any other forms of arms control whatever they may be.

Alan Beesley: I wanted just to express our reservation, perhaps minor, to what was just said. I've noticed some very curious decisions emanating from developing countries. One

recalls that so many have military governments, and I think that military governments may view the acquisition of weapons differently from civilian governments, particularly civilian democratic governments. I don't know, for example, I literally don't know what the posture of Nigeria is since they have made this tremendous experiment in trying to become a non-military democratic government. On some issues in particular, the reactions of various developing countries were quite startling on military issues where we thought there would be opposition to some of the super power demands. Increasingly it became evident that there was no opposition because it was military people viewing the decision and seeing these issues through that perspective. So I'm sure that there must be much truth in what Mr. Rostow has just said that they fear one another, but many of them see arms as just a natural way of life that goes with their whole view of the world, including the internal maintenance of their own power.

Chairman: I now intend to call upon the commentator, if I may. Professor Brown, who is head of the consortium for North American affairs at Harvard University and Professor of Political Science at Brandeis University. I have noticed that he has written several books, the titles of which are interesting: The Faces of Power, Constancy and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson and the Crisis of Power Foreign Policy in the Kissinger Years. Obviously, Professor Brown has dealt with the subjects many times in the past, and it would be valuable for us now to have his informed commentary on what we have all heard this morning.

Seyom Brown: Thank you Mr. MacEachen. The job of commentator and also the rapporteur's job becomes progressively more complicated. Everything becomes a bit more complex and nuanced and less categorical. My commentary, therefore, will be in the nature of reflections on what we have heard so far but

principally reflections on the American views as they have been expressed and represented by Mr. Schlesinger and perhaps some anticipation of what you may yet hear in more detail from Eugene Rostow and Helen Caldicott. Your media, I think, have not caught up with this diversity of views, if their activities last night were any indication. They seem to want to portray the U.S. debate on this issue as between two extremes, who have a symbiotic relationship, each reinforcing the significance of the other in order not to diminish the cogency of their own views. I think Jim Schlesinger made a parallel comment indicating the effect of the disarmament movement on Reagan's policy on the disarmament movement. But I'm pleased that I am not commenting last night, and that I have had a chance to hear the latest views of Jim Schlesinger because that allows me to point out even with more empirical evidence the range of views in the U.S. policy debate today.

What some presented as self-evident propositions or as the dominant viewpoint within the United States quite clearly are only a segment of that spectrum. At the risk of over simplifying, but perhaps as a useful handle for characterizing some of the positions in this debate, I would say that Mr. Sonnenfeldt's views are those of a conservative power-romanticist viewpoint, that the views that you heard from Mr. Schlesinger this morning are almost classical realpolitik views and the views that I am going to characterize as having not yet been expressed sufficiently, which I identify with, I would call the liberal-realist view. What Helen Caldicott will say we will have to wait for, and also Eugene Rostow. Now you've heard, I think, just a few minutes ago, Jim Schlesinger's views, so I don't really want to recapitulate them for you. I find that they were closer to my views; that is, the "realpolitik" views and the liberal realist views are rather closer together, at least this weekend. But I do want to just make one minor observation on a prediction that Schlesinger made. This is because he seemed to

represent his views as probably in the ascendant today and perhaps beginning to characterize the views of the Reagan administration, Reagan being forced by electoral politics into somewhat of a more pragmatic stand rather the ideological stand that he came in with in the beginning. I think that is maybe wishful thinking. It is possible that as an electoral tactic there may be that kind of accommodation but suppose Reagan does win again, I think that it just as likely, and I would venture 50/50 probability, that freed from the need to seek re-election he will reassert the pure ideological and somewhat strident foreign policy views that he entered with. I don't see any sign that he has modified those views. I think that they are perhaps the real Reagan, and the adaptation will then have been rendered as being little more than a public relations tactic. That's my more pessimistic reading, as I say. I am not confident of that but I think that at least there is an equally plausible reaction that that is what we are witnessing today rather than the ascendancy of more "realpolitikal" view represented here today by Mr. Schlesinger.

Let me pose this conservative power-romanticist view against the liberal-realist view of the issues before us today. On the one hand you have the view that in the security field the dominant reality is the Soviet-American military power balance. Since in international relations force is the ultimo ratio determining who gets what, when and how, other kinds of activity - economic, everyday politics and so on - must be subordinated to the objective of maintaining at least a not-disadvantageous balance of military power against the Soviet Union. Now this is the essence of the security problem as Mr. Sonnenfeldt indicated last night. Sure there are other things, but we are talking security. We are concerned primarily with the U.S.-Soviet military balance for if the Soviets were to gain sufficient advantages in the military balance of power we would be no longer

be able, in the words of the American Constitution, "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity". Consequently the trends of recent decades that obscure this fundamental appreciation of what the stakes are and what the threat is, the trends are not happy ones, and he lamented them. They included the prominence in international relations of non-security issues; the reassertion by allies and non-allied countries of national interests that diverge from the United States and that are not focussed on the Soviet threat. The fear, domestically in a lot of countries of nuclear holocaust, and the conversion of this fear into opposition generally to military programs that would be necessary to balance the Soviet military build-up. In the view of Sonnenfeldt and those who think like him, all of these trends have to be resisted and the Canadians as loyal members of the coalition also have to join in this resistance, resisting efforts by the Soviet Union to exploit these various trends to become for the first time the dominant world power. As the Canadians have a role to play in helping resist these trends. an East-West mediating role for the Canadians would be pernicious. Although Sonnenfeldt does not think that the issue of the Prime Minister going to Moscow is terribly significant, he does speak with some disdain in anticipation of a mediating role since there is equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in the contest neither with respect to intentions nor capabilities as roots of the problem, and therefore there has to be loyal criticism from within the Alliance and a responsible position for Canada - not to mediate between the two.

Now I think that there is an alternative way of looking at the questions While the Soviet-American military power balance is to be sure a central reality of world politics and must be tended to with adequate arms programs and prudential arms control agreements, it is not and should not be regarded as the sole

prevailing determinant of who gets what, when and how, even the sole prevailing determinant of the basic international security relationship. For if we were to do that, given the proven determination and ability of the Soviet Union to essentially pull equal with the United States in military power, it would mean that we are eventually looking forward to consigning a good half of the world to the Soviet sphere of influence. If the military disposition of power really determines the larger power constellations, that's what we are going to be headed for, whereas if in addition to maintaining a basic military balance we focus more and more on those aspects of power in which the United States and the West have a comparative advantage, then there is a possibility of reducing the determining effect of the military balance of power on the overall balance of power in the world.

On the overall correlation of forces, the Soviet Union could claim less than the 1/3 as a sphere of influence if the appeal of the West and the know-how of the West and the natural inclination of most of the countries in the world to deal with the West were what determined who aligns with whom, who is on whose side, what form of governments they have and so on. But if we are to make the military balance of power the most salient determinant in everyday political not simply the ultima ratio but the proxima ratio of diplomacy, then it seems to me we are leading from weakness and not from strength. To be sure, we must keep up with the Soviet Union and maintain an equilibrium and here I don't differ from that basic prescription of Schlesinger, but it appears to me that the security problem cannot be reduced to that. Rather the security strategy of the United States should be to keep the Soviet-American balance removed from the everyday business of world politics in so far as this is possible, to delegitimize the role of military force in international relations, not simply when the Soviets are quick to jump to reliance on military force and saber-rattling in order to

influence a political situation but also on our own side, a stressing of the importance of keeping military force as the last resort, not bringing it forth early to show American power in various situations.

To that extent I believe that the activities of the Reagan administration in Central America cannot be decoupled from the overall security relationship that we are talking about, which has to do with the extent to which military power becomes the determinant on an everyday basis of the alliance of people in the world. Rather we should back up, we should build up the capability of ourselves or our friends and of neutrals in the world not to be subject to intimidation and subversion by the Soviet Union. Build them up as much as possible to be viable societies. Other tools therefore, other elements of international power and influence, have to be emphasized much more. A grand strategy for security must focus on the larger array of factors affecting the overall balance of power, of what the Soviets call a correlation of forces and must therefore recognize that many of the trends of recent decades which Sonnenfeldt says are adverse and lamented last night, many of these can be adapted to positively rather than lamented and resisted.

With this alternative prospective Canada's role might also be seen in a substantially different light than that regarded by some previous speakers. What, for example, might be the alternative, the third alternative to Canada of either pursuing a role of mediator or a role of loyal critic within the Alliance. For Canada and other countries, it appears to me, can contribute to the basic international security relationship which is a function of the larger balance of power, not simply the military instruments of power, by pursuing her own self-interest. This is particularly so in the non-NATO areas where the attempt by the

United States to be the coalition leader for the anti-Soviet forces is often a non-starter due to the legacy of post-war policy and also to the rather reflective marxism-leninist propaganda in recent years that branded the United States as the vanguard of the imperialist forces. There are countries which have the luxury of not being immediately branded that way, and Canada is one of them, but by becoming an active and catalytic agent in these other areas of world, they can make a contribution to the basic security interests of limiting Soviet power, and particularly not having the military balance of power determine the disposition of political influence in the world.

What are the issues, then, that are on the table, if we take this various spectrum of views and philosophies and apply it to what has been said before. I think the issues on the table reflect the debate in Washington and what should be the debate between Americans and Canadians and generally within the Alliance. There is one issue, it appears to me, that is not resolved, but is very much highlighted by Secretary Schlesinger's comments. To what extent can we decouple from the prime central military power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, to what extent can we decouple the issues in the Third World, the controversies over what is going on in Latin America? To what extent can we set up a special category calling it the "central balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union", meaning that that definition of power tends to be primarily a military definition of power? To what extent can we extract that, disembody it from the issue of the larger grand strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union? Questions that have been raised by other speakers on, commerce and trade, particularly in high technology matters, the overall philosophy of détente versus a kind of a confrontationist containment policy toward the Soviet Union. It seems to me that we can't really decouple the central military equilibrium and how we treat that

from those other issues. To what extent can we decouple the central military equilibrium, that is an objective to maintain and I share that objective, from Soviet powerplays and presence in the Persian Gulf, Africa, Latin America, East Asia, Southeast Asia? Secretary Schlesinger picked on those countries, such as Nicaragua and others, as being analogous to Albania but certainly there are many countries within the Third World and many constellations of countries that are significant. There alignment is significant for the overall global balance of power or what the Soviets call the correlation of forces. This was recognized, of course, by Secretary Schlesinger in proposing that we have a selective strategy, but it wasn't quite clear what the criteria of selectivity ought to be. There was an implication - a strong implication - that it ought to be a rather narrow, traditional realpolitik criterion of selectivity, and that is: What weight in the military balance of power does any particular country play? And to downplay the so-called psychological or soft considerations. But I think that's a basic issue in grand strategy.

Of course, the Reagan administration, when it wants to justify intervention in Nicaragua and is embarrassed by simply relying upon the domino/psychological balance of power, brings out arguments to the effect that another country, particularly in Central America, that is part of the Soviet alliance system, will be in a position to interdict essential lines of communication, military lines of communication. So there is an attempt to reach for the hard calculations of power, even when we are dealing with the so-called Albanias in our own sphere of influence. But these are larger issues of grand strategy, it appears to me, which cannot simply be addressed at the level of generality. We have to get into the criteria of what this activity means.

There are issues concerning the role of the United States in these instabilities, and that was certainly the subject of some of the remarks of the immediately previous speakers, particularly those that are manifested in Marxist Leninist movements and are exploited by them. And what should be the grand strategy here? Is Secretary Schlesinger saying that we should be essentially ideologically blind? There are ideological/political/economic questions that are involved in our relations with the Third World and, under the assumption that the Third World conflicts cannot be decoupled from the central balance, we have to get into the ideological issues, including the ideological issues that are inextricably intertwined with NIEO and similar controversies.

What should be in the grand strategy of the United States and the Alliance, the role of military shows of force, military assistance, military sales in affecting the balance of power regional and local when there are civil wars in various countries? What do we really have to say about what is prudent and effective policy toward many of those issues?

Another type of issue which is on the table it appears to me and still up for a lot of debate, is within the shared premise of maintaining the military equilibrium, these would be the Soviets. Everybody agrees apparently that that is an objective that should be shared by the Canadians and the Americans and every other member of the Alliance though we haven't heard directly on that from Helen Caldicott, but if we do agree that this is an objective, what are the legitimate issues within that objective? That is important for the Canadians and the Americans to debate. The conventional option was mentioned as something that has been neglected, but I would suggest respectfully that that a kind of a "bomb fog" objective, brotherhood of man, fatherhood of god, everybody in the Alliance with the exception

of some Germans (that's a big exception I understand) does want to provide the West with a heftier conventional option and therefore, to raise the nuclear threshold. But there are many questions that remain with respect to how to do that, there are questions over deployments and doctrine for the strategic and other near nuclear forces, prior to our ability to raise the nuclear threshold. The alliance has been trying to raise the nuclear threshold, but we haven't yet been able to redress that and it appears to me that the prospects are not near for redressing the conventional imbalance. There are things that can be done. What about the way we handle nuclear deployments and nuclear doctrine? That becomes an important issue and a related part of that issue is of course what separates Mr. Schlesinger from some of his colleagues in the Washington policy community. To what extent does military equilibrium, an effective military equilibrium with the Soviet Union require the United States to emulate Soviet war fighting capabilities and doctrines? Not exactly emulate them but to emulate them with respect to providing ourselves with effective silo busting capabilities in relationship to Soviet strategic force deployments. To what extent should the United States in reaction to Soviet INF deployments, such as SS-20s and so on, provide ourselves with comparable war fighting capabilities in Europe in order to shore up deterrence? There is considerable debate over these issues and what I am asking is which of these issues is to be regarded as legitimate. I am sure that Secretary Schlesinger would encourage debates on those within the Alliance, but not everyone would. And then what is the substance of the arguments, because we haven't really heard those today, perhaps we will hear them this afternoon as we get into the specifics of the INF, START and MBFR negotiations. Another issue is what should be Canada's role in world politics vis-à-vis the United States. I alluded to a third conceptualization of that which departs from the mediator

versus loyal critic options, one of independent action in the international system, being a member of the Alliance yes but also preserving for itself perhaps even in the security field a substantial independent and active role.

Chairman: Thank you Dr. Brown. Unfortunately equal time is not available for all. We have to hear from John Holmes, who is the rapporteur before we conclude and would like to conclude in ten or fifteen minutes, which is running overtime but I will call upon Mr. MacGuigan, Mr. John Halstead and Mr. Gordon and Mr. Griffiths.

Mark MacGuigan: Well I'd just like to explore very briefly the mediatory possibilities for Canada and similarly placed countries. Dr. Brown raised this with considerable force but he veered off it a little bit. Some seem to imply that there was no role for Canada as a direct mediator between the United States and the Soviet Union, or that on many of these matters the Soviets didn't want us to play that kind of role. I must say I agree with them. I don't see our role as being one of traditional mediator but I think that there is a positive role that we could play, for instance, to take one brief example, if we could persuade ourselves that what the Reagan Administration had in mind was oriented to preserving balance of power including nuclear parity, and not aiming for nuclear superiority. If we believe that we could play a very useful role in persuading the Soviets and alleviating their fears it seems to me, in that sense, we could play an extremely important role on the Moscow side. We could equally play an important role on this side, perhaps by helping the U.S. to that position but I am not sure that that's an adequate expression of how far we can go and I would welcome any further light that Professor Brown could throw

on this.

John Halstead: I agree in substance with Robert Ford when he said that the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the East-West relationship is bound to be antagonistic, and even confrontational but those two terms bother me a little. I think it would be better, more positive, and indeed more realistic to say that they are bound to be antagonistic but needn't be confrontational, because I think confrontation in the nuclear age is not something that reassures public opinion in the West. Although that may sound like playing with words, I think there is more to it than that. I think the West for its part should avoid doing anything to confirm Soviet assumptions, ideological assumptions, about the West. And that means avoiding adopting a mirror image of the Communist ideological approach. I think that's important, not only in terms of Soviet perceptions, but also in terms of Third World perceptions of the contest. And I think that has a direct bearing on the sort of policy the West should be following, and the United States in the first instance, toward conflicts and instabilities in the Third World. If we are to make a constructive approach to this question of the terms of rivalry, there is certainly a need for more dialogue, more East-West dialogue, but more dialogue also on our side within the Alliance. And here I think there is a very real role for Canada. We can't cure the East-West conflict or eliminate the ideological content of Soviet policy, but we can surely urge, while remaining, as others have said, basically loyal to the West, the diminution of the ideological content on the Western side. But if Canada is to play a role, it will have to be credible and that, in my view, involves not only fundamental loyalty to the West, but also a practical contribution in line with our capabilities to the collective defence and not on role-playing. This, of course, is a subject we are going to go

into in more detail this evening.

Walter Gordon: I didn't put my hand up, but I was glad that you looked my way. Many, many years ago, it was my great opportunity to engage in some pretty strenuous debates with George Ball, who was then Under-Secretary of State. I had heard that he might be here today and I was certainly looking forward to seeing him, not only because we became friends - are friends - but because I think we both enjoyed our differences of opinion and they were certainly not mild. I felt a little better having heard Secretary Schlesinger speak because it seemed to me that he could well become a successor to George Ball in any discussions we might have together. And I would like to start off by saying that it seemed to me that he was telling Canadians what to do. He kept on - well he repeated more than once that our role was to be loyal, that we mustn't do anything to upset the Atlantic Alliance. I think that's for us to decide. Apart from that, Mr. Chairman, I know you did decide that for us in the statement just before we met when you said that Canada is not going to do anything that would be upsetting to NATO. I wondered what the purpose of this gathering was all about. I happened to see the Prime Minister last week, thanks to his Principal Secretary here, and he asked me if I had had a chance to talk to you about certain questions I've got on a recent trip to Moscow and I said no, but I was looking forward to seeing you it here. Well then, I wasn't really sure what my role should be here. Was it to disagree with established policy or upset boats, which I quite often rather enjoy doing? Well, on occasion, gentlemen. Only when I feel strongly. Well, so I tried to get you, Mr. Chairman, on the telephone with the great help of your assistant over there who was extremely helpful and kind, but you were lost in the wilds of Cape Breton.

Chairman: I know my way around.

Walter Gordon: Well, you may not have been lost, but the reports came back that you were lost and that nobody knew where you were, so I thought I could put it off till we met and not get too excited about it. I wanted to talk about one other thing and that was the questioning by some people of the idea that Mr. Trudeau should accept Andropov's invitation to visit Moscow. I had an opportunity of meeting Michael or Mikhel, or whatever his name is, Gorbachev. I didn't see him in Ottawa because I don't live there anymore and I wondered how I would start. So I went in and I said to him that I had been in Ottawa just after he had left. See, here's a chance for me to build you up because I think it was you and some others in the department who have said he had made quite an impression. And I said, "They were pretty impressed by what you had to say and by your general attitude and so on. I wondered whether perhaps you had given enough thought to staying on in Ottawa and perhaps a vacancy might occur in one political party or another and you might file for it". Well, it all had to be translated which makes those sorts of quips difficult for protocol. But he got it in the end and he started to laugh. He said, "Don't forget, I've got a pretty important job right here." Well, he didn't write it off. Now, he thought, he hoped that Trudeau would go to Moscow on the grounds that they look upon him as one of the more sensible leaders of the West. They like the sort of things he says. You might say he didn't like the decision to test the cruise missile in Canada, but we passed over that. So, I thought I had an obligation to pass this message back. It wasn't a message, but he had agreed with what I had said. I said to Trudeau that I had told Gorbachev that if I did see him when I got back, I would urge him to go. I thought it was a useful thing to do; I thought he should inform the people in Washington that he was going ahead of time, and that he

should go out of his way to see President Reagan on his return. And that's what I personally think should be done.

Now, naturally, there are a lot of other considerations, including some political ones I think might be inappropriate for me to mention here, although Toronto is an area of the country that I know something about politically, and he did raise one group there who are not as friendly as they might be to the present government - they never have been and, in my opinion, they never will be. They're not convertible. And that's all I wanted to say except that I hope I have a chance to enlarge on some of these thoughts tonight.

Chairman: I have noticed that it's five minutes to twelve and that we were expected to rise at a quarter to twelve and I think that I am not going to recognize any privileged speakers. I will recognize them later because those who have their hands up have already spoken and they will have an opportunity again, but I am going to make an exception - it is not an exception, because Mr. Axworthy wants to make a few comments. He has not had the floor earlier. We will recognize him and then Mr. Holmes. Is that alright with you, John?

John Holmes: Yes, but I was just going to say, Mr. Chairman, that as I am expected to make a report tomorrow morning, perhaps I could put off what I was going to say until then? It has been a rather rich morning and to try to pull it together I think would take more than two minutes.

Chairman: Well, I would agree to that. So, Tom, do you want to make the wind-up comment.

Tom Axworthy: Well, I'll be very quick to accommodate Mr.

Gordon and others. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make combined comments and questions. David Steel talked last night about the insecurities rising around the world and particularly in Europe. Marcel Massé today began by saying, "Look, can't we focus in at the source of the insecurity and look at the basic causes as opposed to symptoms". And therefore I want to raise a question to people more experienced than I am and particularly the Europeans here. It seems to me that there are two basic insecurities in Europe. The first is the question of tactical nuclear weapons in the Alliance and the real feasibility in using those weapons of destruction as a means of defence. It also has struck me from those other issues. To what extent can we decouple the central military equilibrium, that is an objective to maintain and I share that objective, from Soviet powerplays and presence in the Persian Gulf, Africa, Latin America, East Asia, Southeast Asia? Secretary Schlesinger picked on those countries, such as Nicaragua and others, as being analogous to Albania but certainly there are many countries within the Third World and many constellations of countries that are significant. Their alignment is significant for the overall global balance of power or what the Soviets call the correlation of forces. This was recognized, of course, by Secretary Schlesinger in proposing that we have a selective strategy, but it wasn't quite clear what the that one of the sources of insecurity has been the prospect of relying upon that particular weapon to overcome the disadvantages in conventional forces. Therefore, my question one, dealing with the essential insecurity of Europe, is "What realistically can be done to increase conventional forces, conventional defence, and reduced independence of the NATO alliance on tactical nuclear weapons?". That to me is issue one.

Issue two is related and it's this: since the start of NATO, we have tried a variety of palliatives to meet the security

needs of the Europeans - the doctrines have been (and I am probably forgetting several), the trip wire, Kennedy's espousal of the mixed fleet, flexible response, and now, after the urging particularly of the Germans, of the Europeans, a modernization and introduction of intermediate-range missiles to counter the Russian SS20's. Largely because of the urgings of the Europeans, the United States and Canada, the North Americans, have changed the doctrines and have sought to alleviate the insecurity by different forms of nuclear strategies which have changed over time. Now we're facing the crux of the issue on the introduction of intermediate-range missiles into Europe. It seems to me that DeGaulle probably had the right insight a long time ago when he said that Europe will only be secure when it can defend itself. I wonder, therefore, if that is not one of the basic aspects of insecurity - saying to our European colleagues, "Look, what are you going to do to defend yourselves?" It's a pretty rich area - it's very different from 1947. And that, to me, is an essential issue, not arising from any forms of isolationism but I wonder, Mr. Schlesinger, whether we in fact need less alliance solidarity, not more - less alliance solidarity in the sense of the United States and Canada looking to Europe and saying, "What are you going to do about yourselves?". One could have a carrot and stick approach, saying, "We will put more into conventional if you put more into conventional, but I have often wondered whether there might have been some utility in the Mansfield amendment and so on, saying, "Look, we're going to pull out, and you have to defend yourself". And Europe is capable of doing it. And that might start to end the insecurity. So I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if at some point - perhaps over lunch hour - I can be enlightened by those who know the situation better. If we're really going to get at the source of it, we have to start in Europe - Europe has been the fulcrum of world politics since the War - I mean there has been Asia and so on - but essentially it

has been a European problem, and we've focussed all our attention on the United States. I think we have to focus a little more on the Europeans themselves.

Chairman: Thank you very much, Tom. I am sure that these questions that you have raised will be dealt with either at lunch or later. I found the dinner last night a very useful forum for discussion.

POLICY SEMINAR ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE ISSUES

Val Morin, Quebec, August 20-22, 1983

Chairman: The Honorable Allan J. MacEachen,
Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary
of State for External Affairs

SESSION B: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Chairman: We are in the afternoon session, entitled Arms Control and Disarmament. It is bound to be a serious and lively discussion. The first participant this afternoon is Mr. Rostow, no stranger to the discussions up to the present and no stranger to those who have followed the course of arms control discussions in the United States. Mr. Rostow is now Professor of Law and Public Studies at Yale University. He was formerly Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and President of the Atlantic Treaty Association. We are pleased to have Dr. Rostow with us and look forward to a very interesting presentation.

Eugene Rostow: Thank you for asking me to come to this extremely interesting meeting because I have found it of absorbing value, especially in the easy and informal revelation of the attitudes that prevail among your colleagues and within the Canadian government. I think it has been worth the trip simply to get that series of vivid impressions. I should say a word about what I am about to say and of the classification that Professor Brown put forward this morning in his valuable and lively analysis. I wonder how he is going to classify me in that classification system he had - conservative power romantic, conservative realpolitik, liberal-realist? I make it a point - and I think it's a point worth stressing - that foreign policy is a

subject which does not lend itself to classifications, differences, distinctions between conservatives and liberals. It's a subject, it seems to me, in which you can have wise and a prudent, or a foolish, reckless foreign policy or no foreign policy at all, you can have a pacifist one or a belligerent one, but you cannot, I think, have a conservative or a liberal foreign policy. I think there's two wonderful words in the tradition of Gilbert and Sullivan - we love to classify everything as either a little liberal or a little conservative - they don't apply to this area.

Before I address the topic of arms control and disarmament negotiations and agreements, I would like to make a few preliminary points by way of putting the issues involved in the arms control area into their broad political context. The first preliminary point I make, which won't surprise those among you with whom I have worked so happily in the past, is that I will not say a word about the main theme of the conference, namely, whether new approaches to Canada's policy for protecting its national security are possible and desirable. I have spent much too much of my life in and near the State Department to be drawn into comment about another country's foreign policy and especially a country so closely and so deeply bound to the United States as Canada. All I can say with propriety, I think, is that the problem for Canada - and it is a question only Canada can answer - is whether Canada wishes to be a protector or a partner and ally of the United States and its other allies and associates around the world. The political independence and territorial integrity of Canada are not only a vital Canadian interest, but also of vital interest to the United States, the other NATO countries, and many other members of the western coalition, both in the Pacific and in the Atlantic. And this is true for reasons not only of sentiment and consanguinity and cultural affinity, but for geo-

political reasons which cannot be altered. We should protect that interest - we in the United States should protect that interest and I hope and believe the United States will do so. But in the nature of American history and the American culture and of our historical memory, we can do so better and more comfortably and more surely as allies and partners than in any other posture. To some Canadians, it may seem attractive to escape from the turmoil of modern politics by adopting a policy of quasi-neutrality, and I heard some echos that suggested that this thought was in a number of Canadian minds. Being even-handed between the super powers and impartially advising them on the folly of their respective ways. After all, that was the posture of the United States between 1815 and 1917 and again during the dismal decades between 1919 and 1939. The United States lived as a neutral country, protected at least in the earlier part of that period by the concert of Europe, blissfully unaware of the fact that we were protected by the European balance of power and by the British fleet. The difficulty of that course for Canada now, however, despite its manifest attractions, is fundamental. During the early 20th century at least, the European powers were clearly committed to carrying out a foreign policy which could and did protect their shared interest in a reasonably stable world order conducted by well understood rules. The situation today is profoundly different, because the United States is also flirting with the idea of getting off the world and going somewhere else. There's a strong group in the United States, or rather two strong groups in the United States irked by the burdens and expense of leading turbulent tiresome alliances in the Atlantic and the Pacific and they advocate a withdrawal of our forces, the abandonment of our commitment - very much the posture to which you referred this morning, Mr. Axworthy - and their views draw renewed strength and indeed intensified strength from the anxieties about nuclear weapons and the changing nuclear bal-

ance which is a profound political force throughout the West. The safest counter for that factor in the evolution of American policy is the strength and solidarity of the Alliance system, as Jim Schlesinger said.

There was a good deal of fascinating discussion - fascinating to me, anyway - about the Pitfield conundrum - should the Canadians contemplate being mediators and taking an independent line, or being generally loyal and confining themselves to the interior of the Alliance. I want to urge Canadians to accept what David Steel and Professor Griffiths and others have said. Don't leave the Soviet-American relationship entirely to us. Don't leave any aspect of Allied policy to us, and don't worry about reprisals and losing out on some economic bilateral negotiation as a consequence. After all, the NATO alliance survived General deGaulle and his policies very happily and the security of France was not altered as a result and, in any event, I know Canada isn't contemplating anything as dramatic as that, but it's not a serious problem in any way. I know the United States is probably the most tiresome government in the world to deal with. I have often felt sorry for the foreign ministries of our allies in that regard. We're a pluralistic, free-speaking democracy, as you may have noticed around this table, and that's true of the United States government, too, and always will be true, and it's our greatest strength. There's no use saying we're going to see to it that everybody in the Defence Department, the State Department, the Arms Agency, and so on sings to the same tune. It'll never happen. And you know that and don't worry about and go on and be independent, but by that I certainly don't mean that the allies should confuse themselves and everybody else by pretending to be mediators.

The history of NATO and the multilateral diplomacy generally since 1945 is full of episodes, where very important contributions were made by representatives of the smaller powers. Middle East, for example, and the formation of Europe. All I have to do is to recall names to you like Spaak and Pearson and Harmell and many, many others. So the rule, I think, in these affairs, is, when in doubt, do the right thing. But, there's a corollary to that principle, the rule to which David Steel referred yesterday. The responsibility of politicians. And I would generalize beyond politicians. It extends to officials, professors, journalists, anyone who addresses public opinion and indeed to citizens. After all, democracy is dialogue and debate. These are extremely difficult issues. We can expect a new state of public opinion to emerge only after full debate conducted courteously, seriously, and, above all, responsibly. That is to say, with scrupulous respect for the facts and we are not going to get that kind of public opinion unless our leaders are willing to lead and, by that I mean that they are not going to determine what they say in terms of the latest Gallup poll about public opinion. Public opinion will be enormously influenced by the speeches they make and the votes they cast in the House of Commons and in the Congress.

Yesterday both Alan Beesley and Professor Garigue said that the discussion thus far had avoided the fundamental questions - that is the question of what's the source of the pervasive sense of insecurity in the Western World and how it should be dealt with. Professor Garigue indeed accused us of the sins of pessimism and defeatism and of falling into the trap in to which he said Britain and France fell before 1914 and 1939. Well, I welcomed his fresh and lively intervention. I would make a small footnote of correction there. The sins were much greater on the British side than the French side, who and were in effect

defeated by their inability to persuade the British to move in time to head off both wars. However, I agree that these forms of evasion are there, they're natural, they're widespread and while we should certainly try to overcome them, we should, I think, regard these habits with some sympathy because the realities are so very unpleasant.

It's easy to understand why people prefer to talk about arms control agreements and comprehensive test bans than to talk about some of the really central problems. And therefore, I accept the charge that we must address these central issues and I shall do my best to do so, at least as I see them. Are things getting worse? Is the security situation of the western allies and of the industrial democracies as a group getting worse? Has it gotten worse since 1970? Yes, I agree with David Steel that our security has been declining since 1970 but I am not in the least a pessimist. Someone once said that things will have to get worse before they can get better. And given the deep roots of our our resistance to the nature of our security problems, the process is nearly indispensable, I suspect, before we can in our great majorities, agree on the simple altogether feasible policies which could in my view restore our security, policies which are well within our economic capabilities if we simply agree on what they are and believe in what we conclude.

What is the problem? It's not as David Steel implied - we are not feeling insecure because of the increase in the number of nuclear weapons on both sides. That's a very important and interesting formulation but I think it's quite wrong. If we want to look at the weapons side of life alone, we are feeling insecure because of the changes in the nuclear balance adverse to the West which have taken place in the last ten years and what that change implies and makes possible for the Soviet foreign

policy of expansion through the aggressive and illegal use of armed force, through what Ambassador Ford reminded us, is the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence - a most extraordinary doctrine indeed. There was no wave of nuclear anxiety in the West when the United States had a nuclear monopoly and then a great nuclear superiority. Quite the contrary. And that, I think, is one of the weaknesses of the policy paper we were given and, while I don't criticize a foreign government, indeed my own government abroad, that rule doesn't apply to papers that have been submitted for our consideration. And the third element of Canadian security policy presented in that paper is support for a peaceful settlement of disputes which is absolutely sound in my view. And the collective effort to resolve the underlying economic and social causes of international tension. Well, I don't think the causes of international tension are economic or social, in the main. Of course, we want to do what we can to improve economic and social conditions because they are worth improving. But if we don't acknowledge that the essential issue here is something quite different, I think we miss the boat entirely.

The source I submit to you, of the pervasive sense of insecurity throughout the West is the Soviet policy of expansion, indefinite expansion, backed by its extraordinary military buildup and especially by its buildup in nuclear weapons. That policy of expansion has been pursued without change since the War and during the War. There has not, in my opinion, been any détente or any cycles of détente or any change in that policy. There have been, as Professor Griffiths contended yesterday, there have been changes in style and in the manner of speaking about foreign policy, but they have continued steadily to pursue programs of expansion, taking advantage of every opportunity to expand and then developing influence throughout the Third World.

And that process has now gone so far as to touch very sensitive nerves throughout the world, nerves concerned with the balance of power, and provoked a response. It has also had another effect on the world political system: the habit of aggression has spread out from the Cold War area beyond it. The Falkland Islands dispute, the war between Iraq and Iran. People have simply seized on opportunities for aggression on the grounds that, if they can get away with it, well why can't we?

The Secretary General of the United Nations issued a report last year on this subject in which he warned that the world was moving rapidly into a state of anarchy that the rules of the United Nations' Charter with respect to the international use of force were being violated on a very large scale without effective redress and he called on the nations to recommit themselves to the principles of the Charter, especially those regarding the international use of force. Except in what Alan Beesley said, I have heard no reference to that report in our discussion so far and that was only an indirect one and without much emphasis. I submit to you that it's of profound importance, important in itself as a reflection on the course of events during the last fifteen or twenty years and important in a totally different sense because it offers the West an important political weapon which would permit us to focus on the real issues which are causing insecurity in the world. And to identify for ourselves and our own public opinion. This is only practical and effective way out, the only guide for the future of our foreign policy. The norms of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to the international use of force are not utopian dreams imposed upon us by Wilson and other impractical idealists. They have a profound history. They represent the crystalization from that experience of the last two centuries of ideas that go back much further but have become political realities and indeed rules of law since the

Congress of Vienna in 1815. They were broken, they broke down irreparably in 1914 and 1939 but there was, in 1919 and in 1945, a strong effort on the part of the nations to restore that system and to strengthen it, to take full advantage of the experience of the period between the wars to develop a Charter for the United Nations which would be stronger and more positive than the Covenant of the League of Nations. Now what this represents I think, is that we have no alternative if we are to do more than stumble along and muddle through but to return consciously and publicly to the concept of the rule of law. You may say that for the shoemaker there is nothing like leather and for a law professor there is nothing like law. But this is a conclusion that I think I have reached and that has been more and more deeply confirmed for me by not only my experience in government but especially the effort of the last two or three years to try to think systematically about the nuclear weapon. And as Ambassador Ford knows, I urged him and Mr. Palme to keep the Palme Commission going in the hope that the Palme Commission would address this set of issues, of the relationship between the drift toward anarchy or the slide toward anarchy in world politics and the future of the nuclear weapon.

Let me start by saying what the nuclear weapon is. It is, in my opinion, a political weapon and not a military weapon. No one can guarantee that nuclear weapon would not be used, of course. I mean, all kinds of accidents could occur and, furthermore of course, the secret is out of the lab and the nuclear weapon might become - is now available to any moderately industrialized state or indeed any moderately rich state. Every step along the way was reasonable when a group of scientists came to President Roosevelt led by Einstein and said that Hitler, unless something was done, was going to acquire the nuclear weapon. President Roosevelt had no real alternative but to go ahead with

it. And so every step in the evolution of the thing seemed to be reasonable at the time. Who was ahead in the hydrogen bomb race, etc., etc. And yet the result is insanity. It is an insanity that has a paralysing effect on both the super powers and others and sets some limits to their hostility. But it is nonetheless an insanity and nuclear war as such is surely unthinkable.

How do we eliminate that threat of nuclear war? My answer is that it cannot be done at all unless we make an effective effort to enforce the rules of the Charter against conventional war. I don't agree at all with my friend Jim Schlesinger in eliminating the Third World from the equation and confining our concern to the industrialized world. I am not even sure it can be done at all that way, but the same people, the same fallible people subject to the same passions, conduct conventional war and have power over nuclear weapons and there is no way at all that I can see to guarantee that a war or conflict would not become nuclear unless we return to the effort to achieve collective security against war itself, conventional war as well as nuclear. Now where? What we all say and everybody says, "We must have a balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. We must have a military equilibrium". And most of the speakers have agreed with that proposition. But we haven't yet begun to discuss balance of power for what? Deterrence of what? Are we interested in deterring nuclear attack only on the United States? Only on the United States and Canada? Only on the United States and NATO? Only on the United States, NATO, and Japan? China? Certain key countries? The Persian Gulf area, New Zealand and Australia, because they're New Zealand and Australia? Where, given the nature of Soviet strategy, with a policy of indefinite expansion which is called the policy of peaceful coexistence, can we eliminate any areas of significance which happen to be significant in the context of Soviet programs

of expansion? And I think we've seen over and over again in the last forty years, from the Korean adventures to the current situation in Afghanistan, the risks to the Persian Gulf, that peace really is indivisible and I think in the phrase that the Soviet Prime Minister used a generation ago and that it is the nuclear weapon that forces that conclusion.

My answer to the question that was raised - What is the source of this anxiety? - is this: the Soviet program of expansion based on enormous threat of force and the use of force when necessary. It is so pervasive, the world has become so small, so dangerous and so interdependent that nothing short of a return to that policy of general collective security and general enforcement of the Charter will do. Now, when you tell this to Soviet interlocutor, he says, "You're asking us to give up a foreign policy rooted in our nature as a society and a state". That's very much what Ambassador Ford tells us this morning. That it would be almost impossible or inconceivable for the Soviet Union to give up support for revolutionary wars throughout the world aimed at spreading their control. And yet, I think this is the indispensable step - that is to say that the Soviet Union has to be brought to accept the rules of the Charter against the international use of force. They have to accept it by a restoration of the policy of containment and collective security based on Alliance solidarity and deterrent power and very effective Alliance diplomacy both in the Pacific and the Atlantic and by efforts - what is called dialogue or discussion - with them. Now, what's happening? The reason I said that the nuclear weapons are fundamentally political is that, if you begin to look at them, not in terms of actual military scenario, but as to what's happened - what we all know is happening around us - the rise in neutralist sentiment in Europe and the rise in neutralist sentiment in the United States and Japan, you see that

Helmut Schmidt called the subliminal effects of the nuclear balance profound and very powerful. There is anxiety in Europe about the threat from the intermediate range nuclear weapons, tremendous anxiety. At the same time, there is increasing doubt about the availability of the American nuclear guarantee. When you have President Nixon and former Secretary of State Kissinger saying in public articles that no American president could today do what Kennedy did during the Cuban missile crisis, or even what he, Nixon, did during the October 1973 crisis in the Middle East - that is to say, make an implicit threat of possible nuclear response, then we see that the issue in this set of nuclear problems is really whether the United States can have a foreign policy at all or whether the changes in the nuclear balance that have been achieved by the Soviet Union in the last ten years and their political impact are forcing the United States back into Fortress America and abandoning all that has been achieved since 1945. That, I think, is the agenda for the nuclear arms control efforts now going on in Geneva.

We have two kinds of arms control agreements on our agenda. Some of them - the nuclear arms control talks are, I think, fundamentally important to the very possibility of deterrence. Some of them have some importance but many of them are political theatre. I don't say that in a pejorative sense necessarily. It's not a reproach: politics is, in large part, theatre; we have to project and dramatize ideas for our public. But it had better be good theatre and effective theatre from our point of view. And, above all, we must not confuse it with reality with something genuinely serious. We must know what we're doing and not pretend that the effort, we'll say in MBFR, is more than theatre. I was the fellow in the State Department who proposed that approach at a NATO meeting because we were being bedevilled by the Mansfield resolution to which you refer. We said, for

heaven's sakes, we can't pull the troops out; if there's going to be any withdrawal, it must be on a mutual basis and so on, and that gave rise to this incredible charade of ten or twelve years' of effort.

Now what is it to reduce the troops to an equal level in certain countries of forward disposition? It's not a bad idea; it might even be a little useful, except that the Russians outside the area affected by the agreement have an indefinite array of troops that they could move forward in a few minutes and we don't. Our troops, if we have any, are in Colorado or Texas or Georgia or some such place and we can't get them there that fast. I suppose it isn't so important because Jim Schlesinger said they're very unlikely to come charging over that frontier at least so long as there's any deterrent left, but if people are conscious of the risk, it will affect, it does affect political attitudes, especially in sensitive parts of the Third World - the Persian Gulf, the Middle East generally, or the Far East. So I think we've got to be extremely careful with all those secondary arms control problems. We've now created a new one. I've commented to our government that they have one virtue: this proliferation of arms control negotiations provides employment for a lot of Ambassadors who can't otherwise be placed, but it all reminds me of a question that was put to me by a brilliant ambassador of an allied nation - not Canada, I hasten to add - who asked me in Geneva, in the Committee on Disarmament negotiations, "Why can't you be more cynical?"

I said the United States wasn't very good at being cynical. We can never get away with it. And we were talking then about the comprehensive test ban to which I know your Prime Minister is deeply attached. He and I have talked about it at great length and I won't say anything here that he and the Foreign Minister

haven't heard me say before. But it is a cynical posture, the comprehensive test ban - the whole notion that, by eliminating tests we can eliminate the risk of nuclear weapons. Nobody knows how long they'll remain weapons. Thirty years? Forty years? We have weapons in our arsenal, so do the Russians, that are quite old, and we think they might still go off if anybody applied the right combination of electric signals to them. And how can, therefore, a comprehensive test ban within any range of time really eliminate nuclear weapons, without going beyond the nuclear weapons to the question of war itself.

I turn finally to the nuclear, the two nuclear weapons negotiations in Geneva, those about intermediate range and those about strategic range weapons. Mr. MacGuigan suggested we are mismanaging our relationship with the Soviet Union terribly and somehow or other if our management systems were better or if we had more sense, we might make more progress with the Soviet Union in those talks. I'm not going to get into the question of whether we are mismanaging our relations with the Soviet Union. No doubt, there are many things that are not very well handled, but I think those arms control talks are being handled on the basis of a highly professional and analytically correct approach, and I don't think the problems there are the kind that can be dealt with simply through better management. I am always for better management, of course, but they're real issues, they are very clear and they are very simple and they are issues of policy, and I suggest that they cannot be overcome, to recall words that were used in our discussion, by more aptness on the part of the United States or more subtlety. No doubt, we are not very apt, but on the other hand, these are real questions.

What has happened is this: the source of the nuclear anxiety which is now sweeping through the western world is the

Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missile, both intermediate range and long range. The United States has allowed that Soviet advantage to develop in the last ten years - these are the weapons which are very swift, very accurate, extremely destructive and can't be reached by any known system of defence. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union had approximately the same number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and today the Soviet Union has more than three times as many warheads and missiles in that class. Not only number of warheads but the throw-weight advantage, the capacity, the large capacity of the Soviet weapons is at least four times greater than our own. And this says nothing about the intermediate range weapons, the SS20's and so on which are causing so much concern both in Europe and in Japan and are the basis of the whipsaw effect that creates anxiety in Europe through a threat to Japan, through a threat at a time when our capacity to respond, our willingness to respond with strategic nuclear deterrents, a strategic nuclear response is in great doubt. The political element of that, the political consequence of that posture is visible all about us in the American isolationist movement and withdrawal movement more generally and in the European pressures for neutralism. Soviet advantage in the ground-based ballistic missiles can only be overcome through an arms control agreement or through modernization of the American forces. That's the thinking behind the famous two-track decision of 1979. And it's the thinking behind the struggles of the administration to modernize our nuclear weapons to make them somewhat more credible or less incredible as a deterrent. Now, in the talks in Geneva on INF, the United States started, as you know, with a proposal to abolish the whole category of intermediate range weapons and when it became clear after an extended period of time and many probes that the Soviet Union was not interested in that, but rejected it out of hand, a suggestion developed from the two ambassadors with

my concurrence and some modification that each side reduce - have any equal number of intermediate range weapons, both in and near Europe and in the Far East.

I said once to Ambassador Kvitsinsky, our brilliant Soviet Ambassador with whom we were dealing on these things, "It's very simple, really. We can have an agreement in five minutes." He'd asked me whether I had come from Washington with a formula to break the deadlock. I said, "Sure, well I've got it right here in my sleeve. But, actually, it's awfully simple. We can have an agreement in five minutes if you accept two principles." "Well, what are the two principles?" "Well, one is that the earth is round. You can't make a contribution to peace by moving a security problem from Europe to the Far East. And the other is that, while, as I say, all nuclear weapons are destabilizing, some are more destabilizing than others." So he grunted and he said, "Alright, I accept your formula, your principles, if you accept one of mine." What's the principle he put forward? "All instructions are perfect." I said, "Of course, all instructions are perfect, I know that and I accept that, no problem. But I will add simply that I have never been much interested in an ambassador unless he was willing to change - to propose changes in his instructions from time to time. Well, of course, he was and he did and that's in itself extremely interesting, because the question is whether in the end that kind of an approach will be acceptable to the Soviet Union in these negotiations.

So far, of course, they have made no move toward accepting the principle of equality between the United States and the Soviet Union in intermediate range weapons and of course, what's done in the INF talks will be an important precedent for the other. They're trying desperately to preserve their advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles. Will they move sooner or

later? I think they probably want an agreement, the best agreement they can get, because they have done so well under the regime of nuclear arms agreements since 1972. Absolutely transforming impact on the world and on American policy and on NATO policy, the goal being always the same, and Mr. Andropov has said it more clearly than anyone else. In fact, he is the only person I think in the Eastern bloc who has ever put the goal of détente as he has, which is that the model for détente in their vocabulary is the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland. And a very happy cooperative relationship exists between Finland and the USSR and Finland stays out of world politics. Now, will they move toward the position of accepting parity, Soviet-American parity, as a contribution in itself, a relationship especially with regard to the ground-based ballistic missiles that ought to eliminate the possibility of nuclear blackmail and enormous political pressure emanating from the nuclear weapons while permitting deterrence. I know that's the real question and we'll have to see, but it will depend upon the evolution of our own position.

There are, as many spokesmen have said around this table, political pressures within the United States arising from the election next year and there are political voices advocating an agreement with the Soviet Union as valuable in itself, whether it's good, bad or indifferent. It's very hard to understand how people can take that position after what has happened in the last ten years and the experience we've had under SALT I and SALT II, but many people do. For example, I've brought along a recent article in the New York Times by one of their best editors. He says that in the arms control talks, unfortunately, the White House is still demanding that the Russians dismantle two-thirds of their heavy missiles, which is implausible even as a bargaining position. Mr. Reagan should be proposing that both

super powers gradually shift from big multiple warhead missiles to small single warhead weapons and that, in the meantime, they ratify the SALT II treaty which both sides are observing with the lower force ceilings that are now under discussion. Well, you see, this is the yearning for an agreement for its own sake and the whole position that we've taken rests on an analysis of what the political and diplomatic significance of these weapons is an analysis which everyday experience of this subject confirms more and more deeply. First of all, it's not true that our proposal is that the Soviets dismantle two-thirds of their heavy missiles. The proposal is that each side reduce its missiles, ground-based and submarine-based, to an equal number of warheads, and at the same time reduce the throw-weight of the missile arsenals to an equal level. No more than half of each side's arsenal could be in ground-based ballistic missiles under our proposal. Yes, you can say that this addresses, this would require a greater reduction on the part of the Soviet Union in ground-based ballistic missile warheads than the United States. On the other hand, the United States would reduce its submarine-based warheads by the same amount, so that the Times analysis here is very partial and very misleading. And secondly, there's nothing really wrong with asking one side to do more than the other. In the Washington naval talks of the 20's, we sank more tonnage than anybody else. I didn't think it was an immoral, unthinkable thing to do. In other words, the goal of equality, especially in these most destabilizing weapons, is the one step that would produce, would make the nuclear arms agreements worthwhile and it ought to eliminate the threat of political coercion. Now, will the Soviet Union come to that position? I don't know.

There's going to be an enormous pressure in the United States to compromise - that is to say, for making an agreement,

for the wrong reason. It might be a good occasion for Professor Griffith's recommended behavior on the part of Canada, might be very good for a Canadian spokesman to warn the United States against a deceptive agreement emanating out of Geneva. But, in the end, I think we have to recognize that there can be no serious arms control without collective security as well as the counter proposition, that there can be no serious collective security without arms control. And that we should be focussing on the Secretary General's absolutely fundamental report in trying to put together that system and making arms control agreements only if they are compatible with the notion that both sides have to comply with and live up to the Charter.

Now, can such a policy prevail. Ambassador Ford argues that the Soviet Union can never accept such a policy - can never accept the notion, that is to say, of giving up its support all over the world for what it calls movements of national liberation. I call it a policy of expansion based on the aggressive and illegal use of force. If you look at it historically, you can say, Well, the Soviets are still in the imperial mood which the people of the West have given up and are still pursuing the kind of 17th and 18th century imperial adventures which we have abandoned with relief. Will the Soviet Union, can the Soviet Union come around to the German and Japanese view of militarism and imperialism, that it's a Mug's game and that they can do much better for their people within a stable world order pursuing economic advantage rather than military conquest? I don't know why that insight should be denied to brilliant and able Soviet observers. What is there about the Russian mind or the historical commitment to Communism that would prevent them from accepting, in the end, those rules? Though I think those rules are fundamental to the possibility of our own security, and that we must renew our commitment to their

fulfillment. We have the power to do it and we have the interest in doing it. Can such a policy prevail? I think, in the end, this is the promise of the nuclear weapon to which Jim Schlesinger referred. It may be the force that Nobel talked about in vain two generations ago. You remember Nobel thought when he invented dynamite that dynamite was so dangerous it would force the governments to realize they had no alternative to peace.

I think the pressure, the destabilizing pressure of the nuclear weapon threat and the changes in the nuclear balance with which we are now living ought to persuade the Soviet Union, as well as everyone else, that this is a necessity, that this is the consequence of what's been happening. Now, when I say it ought to be so, will it be so? It's not going to be achieved by persuasion, it's not going to be achieved by well-meaning intervention at the verbal level. It can be achieved, if it's going to be achieved, only by a determined, collective foreign policy carried through on the basis of clear understanding on the part of the people who are doing it. We tend to think that the machinery of ordinary life is immortal, that if the mails run, if water comes out of the faucets, that the facade of society will survive. But we've often seen in this century that the structure of everyday life has turned out to be a facade, a stage set which has collapsed under the pressures of war. The Austro-Hungarian empire, the Russian empire had very long histories and they vanished. What we must persuade the Soviet Union, I think, at all costs, and what must be the central theme of our foreign policy is that there is no hope of salvaging society in any recognizable form or any civilized form unless they give up the imperial dream and accept the rules which have evolved so painfully and so slowly out of our common experience of war, accept them as we want to accept them. That means that

the fundamental norms of the state system must become the central feature of our concern here.

Chairman:

Thank you very much for your presentation. Can we return to the practice of this morning more resolutely applied? So that we can have all points of view on the table and give Mr. Rostow an opportunity to comment, that will be to the benefit of all of us. So I call on Mr. Harker, Mr. MacGuigan, Mr. Steel and Professor Griffiths.

John Harker:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rostow, towards the end of your remarks, you seemed more positive about the views on arms control negotiations than I thought you were going to be in light of the way you characterized the causes of insecurity and I'd like to ask a question about it. You said initially that people felt insecure because of the lack now of U.S. nuclear superiority and that, when there was such a superiority, there wasn't this feeling of insecurity...

Mr. Rostow:

In the West...

Mr. Harker:

In the West, of course, I'm not able to speak about insecurities in the East, but you went on to say the essential source of insecurity is this policy of indefinite expansion of the U.S.S.R. and the buildup of its nuclear weapons. Well, if

that is the case, and I'm not disputing that that is a factor, why is there in the demonstrations in that the West on the issue, so much bitterness and it really does amount to bitterness. I recall trying to get a rally in Canada to focus on the SS20 as well as the Cruise and got very severe abuse for trying to do so. There's all this bitterness against the U.S. and its policies. Now, would this recede, and would the way in which that has fanned insecurity recede, if the U.S.S.R. declared that it was ending its policies or declarations. Also, would it come to an end if the U.S.A. made a major effort to regain the past period of superiority? I don't think so at all, and it seems to me unlikely to tell us if there are ways in which the position of the West and its behaviour in the arms control negotiations could be better geared to making publics in the West feel less insecure. Because by categorizing insecurity the way you did, I don't know that you've given us an insight.

Mark MacGuigan:

I have no fault to find with Dr. Rostow for his interpretation of my remarks of yesterday, because I guess they were open to that interpretation, but I wanted to ensure him that he has misinterpreted me. I was not talking about the conduct of the negotiations behind closed doors. I have no doubt that there the negotiations were conducted very well; certainly to the extent that Dr. Rostow was involved, I would have great confidence in what was being done. I was talking about ineptitude at the level of publicly stated policy, at the level of explaining to our own people what is being done. He says that the source of insecurity in the West is Soviet expansionism and objectively taken he is right, and that's known to the cognoscenti, but the people in the street are not protesting against the Soviets, they are protesting against Reagan. They

are protesting because they believe he is the warmonger come to life and that's the problem that we have. That's where the ineptitude is found, I think, and it's found because of a lack of clarity on the part of the administration in stating actually what it's about. When the Prime Minister and I met Dr. Rostow a couple of years ago, he assured us that what the Americans had in mind was only nuclear parity, it was not nuclear superiority, and from that time on, I've never had any question in my mind that that's what Dr. Rostow was for. But, maybe that's why he's no longer with the U.S. administration. And certainly, one doesn't get that interpretation of American policy from what is stated publicly, and so that's why I was talking about the ineptitude, as I say, that people weren't protesting against Rostow in the streets, but protesting against Reagan.

David Steel:

I wrote it down. Public opinion in Europe, you said, was roused now because the United States no longer had nuclear superiority and I do beg strongly to differ on that view. Certainly, it is not true a bit, and it might conceivably be true of Germany, but it's not true, I think, of European public opinion as a whole. Public opinion is roused in Britain because of the sight of the nuclear ladder going up and up and up the whole time, regardless of who is responsible for it. The fact is that we want to see people taking a step down off the nuclear ladder. We've spent very little time, and Dr. Rostow mentioned it in passing, about the question of nuclear proliferation. When you talk about the rule of law and that we should all hold firm to it, that's fine, but we are faced with a shocking list of countries who have either got the political desire or the technological means or the money to acquire nuclear weapons. And if you look at the list, Colonel Khadafy, Ayatollah Khomeini,

Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentine, Pakistan, none of these exactly strike you as being Rule of Law motivated countries. And I think that this is the anxiety that public opinion has and that's why in the end of the day, we throw the ball back to you because it's not Canada, it's not Britain that can get us off the nuclear ladder, it is the United States and the Soviet Union. And that's why there is such public pressure in Europe - this plethora of talks to produce something more than nothing.

Eugene Rostow:

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it would be useful to answer these first few questions while fresh in my mind anyway, rather than accumulate a long list of others. No? I bow to the rulings of the chair...

Chairman:

I will permit you to answer now, but I thought it might save time if you forgot about some of them. Please.

Eugene Rostow:

Well, we're talking about sources of insecurity in the West. Why is there so much bitterness against the United States in these demonstrations? And would that sense of insecurity be better if the United States went for nuclear superiority, asked Mr. Harker, hoping, of course, that the answer to the latter question would be No. And Mr. Steel's closely related question. And Mr. MacGuigan's too. The same sort of issue, that is, are we, should we, consider going for nuclear superiority in an unquestioned form of the kind we had, we'll say, at the time of

the Cuban missile crisis twenty years ago? What I meant to say was that there was not nuclear anxiety in the United States, in the West in general, during the period of American nuclear monopoly or nuclear superiority. I was not advocating a return to that position, because I don't think it's available and probably not even desirable. If we had any chance of persuading the Soviet Union that Article 24 of the Charter is a serious matter and not a mere nothing. Furthermore, I don't really believe that anyone can show that the American budgets proposed or past would give anything like American nuclear superiority. All that is being sought by the President and approved by Congress is, hopefully, something that would restore the credibility of our deterrent. There is a lot of reference here to warfighting and enthusiastic rhetoric, warmongering rhetoric and so on. I've never been able to find that when I went looking looking for it, and I agree the myth is often more important than the reality, but the ultimate reality is what is proposed to Congress by the American military budget and we're not seeking, as far as I know, whether in the field of intermediate range weapons or strategic weapons, anything like a return to even numerical equality in the field of ground-based ballistic missiles.

I think the two-track decision as far as the INF weapons are concerned for Europe is the best example of what we are seeking. There's no quest for numerical equality there. There is a quest for something that we think, or NATO as a whole thought, in 1979 would be enough to deter any conceivable use of the Soviet weapons or, even better, to eliminate any sense of political anxiety about the Soviet disparity. Now, I appreciate what Mr. MacGuigan said about me, and he wasn't criticizing the U.S. for ineptitude at the professional level, but at the rhetorical level. Well, if people are protesting in the streets against

Reagan, the warmonger and the man who is seeking superiority, I think there is a question, of course, of the effectiveness and credibility of what we say. I think of all these speeches I worked so hard on that were published in the State Department Bulletin and other magazines of mass circulation. I recognize the truth of what the Minister is saying. On the other hand, I really want to come to a point ... I don't want to be misunderstood on this point. When I said that all of us professionals, officials, professors, journalists, everybody who writes to the public, participates in the evolution of public opinion should exercise the most scrupulous democratic responsibility for what he says. I have in mind this kind of problem because, after all, our opponents do try to exploit these pictures and myths and if the governments of allies can say with conviction that this is the American position and not that, it lends all kinds of credibility to that process. Now, we're not. When I was in Germany in the fall of 1982 going around and meeting the allies on the talks and their outcome, I gave a direct press conference. The net result was a wave of stories throughout Germany on American handling of this issue and the way in which it was being done, and that was enormously helpful to the state of public opinion in Germany.

I think we have to decide, all of us, what can be done to be helpful about that and if you're not satisfied with the American position, reason with us as hard as you want, as hard as you can. But I don't think there is any objective way of saying that the United States is out to try to restore anything like the position of nuclear superiority it had at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. There is nothing in our budgets as compared to the Soviet budgets that would justify any such charge. We are trying to restore the credibility of our deterrent posture. We must, if there's to be any kind of extended deterrent beyond the

shores of the United States. Canada is automatically included in that but nonetheless I think Canada has an equal interest in seeing to it that the extended deterrent for the American alliances and other vital American interests in many parts of the world remains a plausible policy.

Now why are people protesting in the streets against Reagan the warmonger? Well, that a good question and no doubt the President has some responsibility for the answer. And on the other hand, so do others who are very much interested in achieving the goals of quite a different foreign policy, a foreign policy in which we would be split from our allies and in which we would not modernize our forces, but allow the Soviets to continue to have what has proved to be so destructive an advantage, namely an advantage in the ground-based ballistic missiles. Now Mr. Steel says public opinion is roused by the loss of American superiority. I was simply commenting on the way which this phenomenon has appeared. I do think that in European public opinion, of course it protests in the streets against American policy, the anxiety exists because people do understand the implications, political implications of the changes in the nuclear balance which have occurred.

As far as nuclear proliferation is concerned it remains a very strong interest to the United States, that is cooperation in nuclear proliferation. As many of you around this table know very well, in July of 1981 the President issued a revised statement on the subject, which I thought was a pretty good one, and I would still strongly defend. I think that the problem is again a function very largely of the state of world public order. That is if the world political system, the state system, is allowed to continue to erode as it has, then a great many

countries which are threatened with destruction or think they are threatened with destruction are countries which have predatory premonitions of one kind or another, are going to make the gamble, they are going to feel very uncertain. And they will follow, I think they are now following a pretty much the Israeli posture, that is they have the potential, they are close to the edge, but they haven't actually done it. The Indians probably haven't even done it. The Paks are moving very hard, of course I haven't seen any intelligence recently, so you are well ahead of me on all that. But, it's a tremendously important area, and in it the Soviet Union has the same interests that we have. It's an area in which we ought to be able to cooperate. And we have been trying to get some cooperation from the Soviet Union on that subject and they've offered some and they've talked very well, but you'll notice the Cubans haven't yet signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco and we will see whether that happens or not.

It's I started by saying that these three propositions are fundamental in our view to the whole nuclear question. First, that the secret has escaped from the lab, therefore, we're never going to be able to get rid of nuclear weapons. We will always have to have some to deter a Khadafi or an X, because it's possible for some of the irresponsible characters in world politics to get them one way or another. The second is, since nuclear war is unthinkable really and the greatest success we can attribute to our policy since 1945 is that no such war has occurred. We are going to have to draw the necessary conclusions for that in trying to eliminate all of the war and I'm glad to note that this proposition, which I regard as fundamental and which I think is fundamental to the Secretary-General's report, also appears with appropriate emphasis, I think, in the statement of the American Catholic bishops on nuclear weapons. I don't

agree with all of it and I think some of it might be misconstrued, but on that fundamental point I welcome any statement that is made. And I think that it represents the positive element in the impact of the nuclear phenomenon on our thinking about world order.

Now how do we stop nuclear proliferation? There has to be cooperation among the Western powers. China has to be brought in. I noticed in the paper just the last few days that China has agreed to join the IAEA I think, I couldn't tell from the newspaper account exactly what is involved. But I think it is not a lost cause and it is not a hopeless proposition and I would assure Mr. Steel that the U.S. Government, as far as I know how it reacts, fully agrees.

Chairman:

Could I permit two questions to Professor Griffiths and Mr. Holmes? Then we will move on because I want to give the next speaker an opportunity.

Franklyn Griffiths:

Thank you. I will try to be brief. I guess my question is: "How does one achieve or obtain sustained domestic support for an international security policy that includes arms control when you are scaring the hell out of people by telling them that the Soviet Union pursues a unilinear expansionist imperialist policy? I guess this is what you are saying. It is an imperial expansionist not to be trusted, or a country to be resisted. I think that this really) undercuts the case for arms control. It undercuts the case for a two-track policy. It does so especially when you sell grain to the Russians, when you are open new

consulates, when you are doing a number of other things that we all do. We are all in fact engaging with the Soviets in a variety of cooperative ventures. The people of our countries I think recognize this to some extent. To deposit security policy on a monolithic aggressive Soviet Union, an undifferentiated Soviet threat is, I think not to ring true, people see through this. They see that there is more to the relationship than some think, dealing with Soviet Military threat. They see that there and some other things going on there, wheat sales and the rest. And I think one has therefore to put forward a rather different assessment of the Soviet Union and I would say it has to be dualistic one and not a unilinear one. One must allow for the Soviet Union being able to cooperate and exercise some restraint.

John Holmes:

I don't want to divert us from arms control, I would just like to ask one question. I was delighted that Mr. Rostow talked about the United Nations, talked about Perez de Cuellar's report, the need to return to the principles, what he said about the Charter being a very sophisticated instrument, also the fact that what is at stake are rules internationally, all we have been building up for centuries. I cannot refrain, however, from noting that no reference whatsoever was made to the United States position on the Law of the Sea, which in the view of many of us, ofcourse is one of the most important efforts to develop international law, and which was suddenly and brutally rejected by the United States. Is the attitude of the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York, for example, one which one might at best, I think call inept if I may point out the word. Is this actually supporting the cause that you have in mind?

Chairman:

Well, Mr. Rostow you have two stacked questions to answer

Eugene Rostow:

I will answer them shortly. I am in favour of as sophisticated and monolithic a definition of the nature of the Soviet Union as our most sophisticated analysts can produce. A different perception of it. And if you accuse me of a monolithic interpretation, well I deny that of course, it is a terrible insult to a professor to say monolithic. I am well aware of the fact that all manner of things occur in Russian culture and in Soviet culture and that there are many strands. But the fact of the matter is, as Ambassador Ford confirmed in his analysis, that the Soviet Union has been committed and is committed, to a policy of expansion. This has been true for a very long time and it is supported in the anecdote that I told you which concerns the very very high Soviet official and in which he says, "You are asking us to give up policies needed in the nature of our society, in the State." Now you can't be clearer than that in claiming immunity from the rules of the Charter.

It is, however, a picture of the Soviet Union and the international environment that corresponds to their behaviour in one absolutely critical area: the international use of force. And with regard to the international use of force, they show absolutely no hesitation about using force or threatening to use force and indeed in the last two years. in Afghanistan, for example they use their own forces, rather than proxy forces. So of course every other aspect of life is involved and we have cultural exchanges and we have travel scholarships and so on. But we still have this process of expansion going on and that means that the threat to peace is in that area. Mr. Holmes'

question about the Law of the Sea, well, it wasn't my beat. On the other hand I felt that the claim with regard to the ownership of the nodules and other metals on the sea beds was unjustified and very threatening. I thought that ought to be treated the way we treat the problem of fish. That is whoever catches them owns them. I think we did, and we are reconsidering that posture and I wouldn't be surprised to see if the Reagan administration came up with a new position for the discussions at the UN somewhat closer to the prevailing majority. But I wouldn't be too sure about it, I don't think for a moment the Secretary of State is an amateur to this. I heard him give an analysis of the problem early on in 1980, I guess, or early 81 and he knows a good deal about it and have very strong views but we will see. I would say, "is our position a great contribution to the evolution of the Rule of Law?" Well, it depends on many other things. I would have to delete that amount from your time as a commentary. I will have no opportunity to compensate for the time that Mr. Rostow will take to reply.

Alan Beesley:

Assume that there might be another reason for widespread fear in the West, such as the fear of the magnitude of the numbers and potential destructive power of nuclear power in existence. Without for the moment putting the finger in either direction, the question that I would like to raise is this. Is it his view that the NATO nuclear deterrent is no longer credible? That is implicit in what he said. And then if so, is the USSR taking advantage of this in some way, as one would have expected to be the case? Is that why Afghanistan has occurred, if it did not follow a different course, as if there were other reasons? It is such a fundamental conclusion to postulate that the NATO deterrent is no longer credible, but I think it is

important to know if that really is your view: that deterrence is no longer credible.

Eugene Rostow:

No, it is not my view at all. My view of the NATO nuclear deterrent is that it is still credible or can still be made credible, as part of an overall frontis piece of deterrence and collective security. And I have criticized the former President Nixon and former Secretary of State Kissinger over and over again at some length in public on that score. This is not a necessary conclusion at all from the changes in the nuclear balance. It is not in my opinion why Afghanistan occurred and don't think the Soviet Union believes that as yet the change in the nuclear balance gives it total immunity. I think they moved in Afghanistan for other reasons.

Chairman:

May I now turn to the next speaker, Helen Caldicott. Helen Caldicott is the President of Physicians for Social Responsibility in the United States. She was previously Director of the Cystic Fibrosis Clinic at the Children's Hospital Medical Centre in Boston, and an instructor in Pediatrics' at the Harvard Medical School. She is the author of several publications including "Nuclear Madness, what can you do?" Dr. Caldicott.

Helen Caldicott:

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I speak to you today as a physician and as an Australian who lives in the United States and I guess I represent the gender gap to which Secretary Schlesinger referred. So I speak from that position, I am obviously a

woman. I also represent, I could say, the peace movement. I have been one of the main forces of the peace movement in the United States and indeed in much of your country and I think I know how they feel. The fact is that this planet is terminally ill; it's about to die. To say that it is terminally ill doesn't necessarily mean to say it will die. When a patient comes in to the emergency room you don't say that such a patient is terminally ill and take them straight to the mortuary and put them in the ice box. We work on them day and night intensively and occasionally the patient survives. And that is exactly where the planet is now. It is about to die, it probably will, but there is a chance, if we work hard on it, we may survive.

Nuclear war could occur any day right now, by accident or by design. The computers in the Pentagon are OK but they need updating, they have got the wrong computers, wrong computer systems and in an 18 month period they made 151 errors. Many of them not too serious. Several were very serious. In one of them a man plugged a game into the fail safe computer in November 1979 and the computer made an error. The world went on nuclear alert for six minutes, at the seventh the President was to be officially notified but they could not find him, Jimmy Carter. I suppose he was in the bathroom or somewhere. They reassured us that it couldn't happen that the controls are safe enough. But forty minutes for me is too close for comfort. The fact is that weapons are being made right now which are going to reduce that time of thirty minutes warning down to maybe six. Certainly, the submarine launched weapons can reach Washington or Soviet Cities within about fifteen minutes. An ICBM take thirty, if it can reach Moscow and some say it can, give or, take six minutes, to reach Moscow. It may take a little longer, but it is not much longer. In that time, by the time the satellites detect the early warning of the attack, there is not enough time for human

intervention which means that the Soviets and maybe the Americans, because of the submarine launched missiles, might use the system for launch on warning where computers decide to launch nuclear war and there is virtually no human input. As we all know computers make mistakes because they are made by human beings and human are as mistake-prone as are the computers they design. And the whole problem that we are talking about today and tomorrow is the nature of human beings. We are not rational. We think we are rational but we are run by our emotions. We use this huge cortex to justify what our emotions push us to do. We got anger, hostility, jealousy whatever from our childhood. Much of what motivates us is unconscious.

We are almost certainly, in the nuclear age, destined not to survive, indeed since Reagan has been elected with his provocative statements about the Soviet Union. In fact, he stated in the House of Commons last year that America would reduce the Soviet Union to the ashes of history. That obviously increases the danger of nuclear war with his ships down in the Carribean right now intercepting Soviet ships. aircraft carriers armed with nuclear weapons with the stated fact, from I don't know if it was the State Department or Pentagon, that they would attack Cuban bases if necessary. A situation down there could exist to trigger a thermonuclear war. I doubt if the Russians would participate but they could, in fact. Nuclear war could start by wars in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf, in Europe, by accident or by design. I met with the President for one hour and a quarter alone with his daughter. I found it to be a very clinically alarming meeting. I won't give you my clinical estimate of his IQ. But he did say to me that he believes that the Russians are totally evil, godless Communists and I said have you ever met one and he said no.

That is clinical paranoia. He also said "I truly believe in preventing a nuclear war. But our ways of preventing differ, I believe, in building more bombs".

I came away from that meeting clinically shocked. As the number of weapons increases, so the probability of the risk because there are more and more people handling the nuclear weapons, mostly men. The U.S. has presently about twenty-six to thirty thousand, I don't know exactly, nuclear weapons. Twenty-six to thirty thousand, the Soviet Union has approximately twenty thousand, so in numbers the United States is numerically superior. The United States has approximately nine thousand five hundred strategic weapons that can reach the Soviet Union within half an hour and the Soviet Union has seven thousand five hundred. In that category the United States is numerically superior. America plans to build seventeen thousand more nuclear weapons in the next ten years. Nuclear weapons which are extremely lethal. At these, the neutron bomb would number about four thousand, I think, I may not be correct, but it is about that. The neutron bomb which falsifies the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons is an enhanced radiation weapon - a type of nuclear weapon which the military think they possibly could use against invading tanks and it may produce a tripwire to produce a nuclear confrontation.

The MX is a first strike weapon. The D-5 or Trident 2 is a first strike weapon. The Trident 2 which is also a first track weapon to be used according to the defence guidance plan for decapitation of the Soviet command system in the Soviet Union and the Cruise missile which although may be not a first strike weapon is a strategic weapon and extremely accurate which flies underneath radar and can't be detected as it approaches its target. Now, some of those weapons will replace some old ones.

But it will certainly increase the total power of the United States of America.

According to the latest report by a man called Richard Delare (?) who is the senior scientist in the Pentagon the Soviet Union is behind in nineteen of twenty important weapons systems. The Soviet Union is behind the United States. In other words the United States is ahead in, om nineteen. The only thing that the Soviet Union is ahead in weapons, is the conventional weapons. So to actually talk about superiority when you are talking about nuclear weapons is a myth and I will get on to that in a minute.

As far as Russian expansionism, I'll say as an Australian and I identify with Canadians, I feel very much that both (superpowers) are expansionist. In the past several hundred years America practiced manifest destiny, exporting its revolution in economic terms throughout the world and in so doing has instituted the Monroe Doctrine, the open door policy in China, took over the Philippines, Vietnan was fought and Korea. It is now moving in Central America, I think incorrectly. Of one hundred and fifty nations in the world, the US supplies weapons to a hundred and thirty. The Soviet Union controls seventeen nations in the world. I think America is much smarter on the international scene than the Soviet Union, which is clumsy and evidently doesn't do too well. In the last few years in fact the Soviet Union has lost China from its sphere of influence, as well as Egypt and Indonesia and in fact controls very few nations in the world. Of the total bases in the world, and I can't remember the exact numbers I have just put in my books, so I am just giving you ball park figures, America has a lot of bases in the world over two hundred, over which she has control. The Soviet Union has very little control over her bases, in fact she has access but no control because nations won't give it control,

because I don't think they like her very much and she has access to...it's less than thirty, but I can't remember the exact numbers. In terms of expansionism and imperialism, America is doing much better than the Soviet Union and I repeat that they are mirror images of each other to an external observer. Now nuclear weapons are the symptoms of the problem and the problem is psychological, the weapons are the symptom.

What I would like to do is explain briefly the medical consequences of nuclear war to bring us right back to what we are actually talking about around this table and so that you feel what it really means to have a nuclear war from a medical perspective. I am going to drop a bomb on Montreal and it is a big bomb, it's a twenty megaton bomb, of which the Russians have about two hundred. They probably won't use it on Montreal, probably on Washington, New York. Certainly America has targetted a lot of bombs on one target, a lot of small bombs and you do more damage by blast by having small bombs than using one big bomb. But in order not to go in all the theoretical physics of that, I will use a simple one single twenty megaton bomb.

Now a twenty megaton bomb, to give you an idea, is equivalent to five times the collective energy of all the bombs dropped in the Second World War. That is the sort of energy we're talking about. When we talk about nuclear weapons, we are talking about star wars, literally star wars on earth. Such a blast would create a crater three quarters of a mile wide and 800 feet deep and convert the buildings and people and the earth below to radioactive fallout, which would just be injected into the mushroom cloud. Within six miles, every person would be killed. Many of them would actually be vaporized, because our body is composed mostly of water and when it is exposed to the heat of the sun, we just turn into steam and disappear. We know

that at Hiroshima, because there are photographs of shadows of human beings, that is all they left behind them.

This is a much bigger bomb than that bomb, which was a little fire-cracker in comparison. At a radius of twenty miles every person would be killed or lethally injured. The injuries are very specific because there are winds of up to five hundred miles an hour. Hurricane Alicia had winds of about one hundred and twenty miles an hour. You saw the damage done by that, but five hundred miles an hour is just extremely powerful and these winds literally suck people out of buildings, reinforced concrete buildings and the furniture and turn them into missiles travelling at one hundred miles an hour. They pick human beings off the streets and turn them into missiles. They enter the respiratory tract through the nose and the mouth and rupture the lungs producing immediate death. They rupture the tympanic membranes producing deafness. They popcorn the windows and the windows turn into millions of shots of flying glass which will enter the human body at one hundred miles an hour creating shocking lacerations, hemorrhage, decapitations etc. And as human beings hit buildings as they fly through the air, there will be fractured skulls, compound fractures of the bones, organ injuries etc. Then there will be the burns, thirty-five percent of the energy of the bomb is released as heat and there will be hundred of thousands of the most severe burns.

In Hiroshima people were burnt so that they turned into chalk-like statues. We only have about one to three thousand acute burn cases in all of the US because a burn patient is one of the most difficult we ever have to treat. We may spend six months treating a burnt patient, skin grafts every couple of days, hundreds of units of blood and fresh frozen plasma. Often then the patient still dies, or he is grotesquely deformed. A

bomb on one city would just absolutely overwhelm all the medical facilities of the United States. After twenty-six miles your clothes will spontaneously ignite, all dry objects, and you'll become a walking flaming torch. Forty miles away if your glance at the flash, you can be instantly blinded. The whole area of fifteen hundred to three thousand square miles, then can be overwhelmed with a firestorm. So if you got into a fallout shelter, the fire sucks the oxygen out of the shelter as it fills with carbondioxide and monoxide and you will be asphyxiated and the blast and heat will convert the fallout shelter literally into a crematorium. So that is one bomb on one city.

Now there is a report done by the Swedish Academy of Sciences and they just took half the arsenals of the super powers that they will have accumulated by 1985 - and they used over 10,000 megatonnes and they couldn't find enough countries really to target, couldn't find enough targets. They targetted cities of population of more than 100,000 in the U.S.A., Canada, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R., Japan, North and South Korea, Vietnam, Australia, South Africa and Cuba and cities with half a million in China, India, Pakistan and the rest of South East Asia. With such a conservative nuclear estimate, only half the arsenals, they estimated that only 1.3 billion people lived in the Northern hemisphere's urbanized population, 1.3 billion, that's all of us. Immediately 750,000,000 would be killed from blasts alone, 340,000,000 so seriously injured they would die, so from blasts alone, excluding fire and firestorm, the things I am about to describe. That conservative nuclear war estimate would kill 1 billion people. Now the world has an organization, W.H.O. which has just produced an excellent report on nuclear war and they say such a war would kill in the Northern hemisphere from blast, fire and fall-out 2 billion people which is half the world's population. Incidentally this was presented at the world

organization recently and the United States voted against it. It is a medical report on the medical consequences of nuclear war. The doctors representing the United States were told by the State Department to vote against this report and they strong-armed some NATO countries to vote against also. As a physician I consider that medically unethical.

Now there are other affects of nuclear war, long-term effects, you see, such a nuclear war would create. Not everyone would be vaporized and the cities around the world would be filled with millions of dead, decaying corpses, animal and human alike. As they decayed, the bacteria and viruses would multiply in the dead flesh that produce decay. And insects, would proliferate in the trillions because insects are very resistant to radiation but the birds who eat the insects are very sensitive and they would probably be killed out in the Northern hemisphere. So with insects everywhere they would become the vectors of disease and would transmit the disease from the dead to the living. To the living whose immunity mechanisms to fight infection have been compromised by high levels of radiation. So there would be epidemics of diseases we know control like polio, black plague, encephalitis, rabies, tuberculosis and many other diseases. Diseases with which we in the Western countries haven't built up immunity Because we haven't been exposed to these diseases, we haven't had an opportunity to develop immunity. There will be very few if any doctors left. All the medical facilities almost will be totally destroyed because we happen to work in targetted areas.

What's more, there will be famine, most of the food supplies will be destroyed and I am going to explain this in a minute. The National Academy of Sciences in 1975 did a study, if a large number of the nuclear explosions were one megaton or above - and

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there are a lot of one megaton bombs - they would create nitrogen oxide in the atmosphere which would rise up in the stratosphere and destroy the ozone layer or much of it - a large percentage in the northern hemisphere. Now the ozone layer prevents the ultraviolet light getting into us from the sun. The ultraviolet light causes burning when you go to the beach. If the ozone, a large part, is destroyed it could produce such destruction to the eyes that many people on the planet and animals and birds will be blinded by the light. It could also produce such severe sunburn that if you stay out for one hour in the northern hemisphere you could receive such a sunburn you would die. So you would have to live underground in the shelter until the ozone reaccumulated, which according to the National Academy might take up to ten years.

But the ozone destruction could also damage most plants, certainly in the northern hemisphere, that are very sensitive to UV light, that would destroy their photosynthesis. We couldn't grow crops anymore, probably not. The bacteria in the soil that form the base of the pyramid of life that man stands on are totally dependent upon the bacteria in the soil, are very sensitive to UV light. Should they be destroyed by such an occurrence, so would obviously the pyramid of life with man at the top. Also according to the report the plankton in the upper levels of the ocean which rise up to replenish the ozone through photosynthesis are also terribly sensitive to the effect of UV light. Right now, should it increase, the plankton could be destroyed and maybe the ozone would not reaccumulate for a long time. It is thought that there could be such severe photo-chemical smog created by burning or refineries and the tremendous fires created by that, that those fires could blanket the United States, in particular if the attack was in the summer. As well, there would be millions of tonnes of material

injected into the atmosphere from ground bursting. There could be virtual darkness over the planet for about 3 to 6 months a year, who knows, which could destroy most crops. I suppose some would come back, we really don't know what these effects would be. The only way to find out is to do the experiment and have a nuclear war but there will be very few people left to write it up should that occur. If the temperature of the earth cools because of this darkening effect and the ozone destruction by 1 to 2 degrees farenheit, it is thought by meteorologists, it could induce another ice age and as a pile of ice moves down they themselves reflect more heat back into the atmosphere because they induce more cooling.

If you put all these effects together it is possible, according to scientists at this time, that we could in fact destroy most life on the planet. If we have a nuclear war today, next year, 1985 or beyond. I haven't even mentioned the radioactivity, which could create in the northern hemisphere alone, 15 million, 30 million more cancers in the northern hemisphere but that is a very conservative estimate. If in fact, people are surviving, how could they grow food? Well there would be no fertilizer, no insecticides, there would be no fuel for the tractors, people would have to work the soil by hand. But for years would receive such a (radioactive) dose from working the soil that it could produce aspermia of which means that people may not be able to reproduce at all. Will people feel like reproducing? They are going to be so depressed many of them psychotic, seriously disturbed from such an event, they may not even feel like making love. We are not really sure how many people will survive.

Now, having laid this out as a physician, and I am only concerned with the health and well being of the people of the

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world, I don't care if they are Communist or what. They are people, they all happen to be the sons and daughters of God. What is the effect upon our children? There have been recent surveys done by the American Psychiatric Association. They studied a thousand children in Boston and to their horror they found that most of those children believe that they are not going to grow up, that there will be a nuclear war. Now, you might say that they are only kids. I am a pediatrician and I work with children who die from genetic disease called cystic fibrosis. Kids are very smart but they haven't the defense mechanisms to reject unpleasant facts that we develop as we become adults. They take it all in, kids have said to me, six years old, I am going to die tonight, when clinically it was not obvious and they do.

Jesus said that out of the mouth of babes and sucklings comes the faith. Little children write to President Reagan and they say President Reagan you have lived your life, I haven't finished playing yet. A little child said the other day at a conference, "Nobody likes to be given a broken present at Christmas, that is how I feel about my life". Incidentally that is how I feel about life since I went to "On the Beach" when I was fourteen, in Australia. Totally unprotected by the adults. And it is obvious that if we continue on this path there will be a nuclear war. And I am amazed there hasn't been one yet.

I did leave something out, if all the nuclear reactors were targetted with just one megaton bomb, if they targetted the nuclear reactors, most of America and Europe would become uninhabitable by normal radiation standards for many years, just from bombing the reactors, and from the levels of fallout just from the reactors. There are conventional weapons called cluster bombs which will take out a hundred city blocks, they are

call "neo-nuclea", there are "smart weapons", precision guided weapons, which are very very accurate with huge explosions. The blurring between conventional and nuclear war is becoming very indistinct and the fact is with nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors, man can't fight I mean a conventional war in Europe is a myth. If the Second World War had been fought today with Europe covered with nuclear reactors, Europe would still be uninhabitable 38 years later. So the simple fact is what Einstein said "the splitting of the atom changed everything, also man's mode of thinking, thus we drift towards unparalleled catastrophe".

Now what is the ideology of this cause? It is man's mode of thinking. I say "man", I'll get to that. I think that what's happened is that when we lived in tribes, it was necessary for men to be war-like, strong, hairy, muscular and to kill a sabertooth tiger, to protect us when we had our infants, and that was appropriate and that's how man evolved. We could hold the weapons with our opposable thumbs, it was a very important evolutionary development, as was this incredible neo-cortex that we developed so fast. We however still think, I think, in architypal tribal terms. America is a tribe, the Soviet Union is a tribe, and this thinking is anachronystic in the nuclear age. It is pre-nuclear thinking and unless we evolve in a Darwinian way fast enough emotionally that our thinking is anachronistic, we will destroy ourselves. It's a fair enough question to ask is man an evolutionary abberant, were we not meant to survive? That is quite possible but with us we will take everything else, the birds, the fish, the flowers and everything we love most dearly. What we do in a tribal way, we project our dark side out, we project it for the moment on the Russians but some time ago we projected it on the Chinese, the Red Chinese, the Reds, that is why we fought the Vietnam war partly, the domino theory. They

were going to come down to Australia, the horde, and take us over, a billion Chinese but one day we started playing ping-pong with them and Nixon went to China and by God we made friends with them, they are not our best friends but we trade with them, they are allies. I believe America still has them targetted, I am not sure why.

But what we have to do is stop projecting the dark side, this is primitive, this is primitivel We have to learn what conflict resolution is, and we did it with China and it is not too difficult. The fact is that the superpowers are married to each other. We live on the same planet, and unless we live together with mutual respect we will die together in a short space of time. The Russian aren't so different from us, they are people with the same sort of emotions, they have a different system, they don't worship money as much as the Americans. So what? Actually true Communism is like Christianity, they believe in helping each other, but it has been subverted and it is a lousy system, the Soviet Union, they need another revolution. And I hope that they have time to do that and that we don't kill each other before that happens. But nations act together like people. They act with the mass psychological response and it is very much easier to mobilize the dark side as Hitler did, than it is to mobilize the side that will do good. That is very hard work. People feel better when they are doing good and helping each other but it is much harder to do than jazz up this dark paranoid aspect.

" I must say that I am very worried at the moment about the man called Bill Clark who is now the Foreign Policy Advisor for the United States. Bill Clark didn't pass his law exam, there was an article about him last week in the New York Times magazine, he failed part of his law exam, he did pass his, what

is it called? He was admitted to the bar, but President Reagan liked him so much that he made him a judge in California and he had senate confirmation hearings and when he did, he didn't know his facts. He still admits almost total ignorance of foreign policy, he is the President's main national foreign policy advisor now and he doesn't like the Russians, as the President doesn't either. That worries me a lot. How have we gone as far as we got? Where we are about to blow up the world and everything we hold so dear. We have done it through a process of what is called psychic numbing, we have blocked off the reality of what we are doing, we have been doing it the whole weekend, we have been talking around the periphery rather than getting to the guts of the issue and we do it because it is too hard to contemplate. How many of us have really contemplated our own death? You don't do it. If a doctor says you have leukemia, your prognosis is about nine months and then you start going thru the stages of grief and the first stage is shock and disbelief; and, the next stage is profound depression so much so that you almost rather be dead than feel that; the next is stage is anger; and, the next stage may be acceptance of death and that is what we try and move people through so that they die eventually at peace with themselves and they make if they have time. But the process is so painful that people avoid it and it is called psychic numbing.

To face nuclear war is more than facing our own death, it is facing the death of your immortality because we need some sense of immortality psychically to survive. For me I live on through my children; most of us do. Others live through the books we have written, the papers we have written, the buildings we have created, some live on spiritually but it is a very important psychic concept and to drop the sense of immortality is almost unbearable psychically so we avoid it. And by avoiding it we are being suicidal. We are practicing passive suicide and a suicidal

"atient is sick. Wehospitalize suicidal patients. They need help. I think women are moving on this very strongly and the gender gap is very significant and the reason is that women deny less their emotions, they are more in touch with their intuition and their emotions. Some people say it is inappropriate to be emotional about this issue, on the contrary I would say, it is inappropriate not to be emotional about it. If I were have to have two parents in my office and I told them their child has leukemia and they show no emotional response at all, I get them a psychiatrist because they need help.

As we approach the end of life on earth, and the destruction of maybe the only life in the whole universe, to be rational and unemotional about that is a sign of mental illness, collectively. There are psycho-sexual overtones I think in this arms race. One just needs to examine the language that is used, and some of it was used this morning, "hard lines", "soft lines", missile erector, deep penetration, soft lay down, I mean it is all there. There is a feeling that men need to be strong, to fight. Now I am not denigrating men for that, I think that in an evolutionary perspective that was necessary. But now we need to redefine courage for men and for many women, the strong man is the man who has the courage to show his emotions and admit his mistakes in public and to say he is wrong and to be human because that takes courage for men to do it and a weak man is a man who shows no emotion, and hides behind his defense mechanisms and builds missiles. One could call it a case of "acute missile envy". The security of this world depends on conflict resolution. Women are good at that in a marriage, say we have a fight and the husband doesn't talk for three days often it is the women who will move forward and say "what is the matter, honey why aren't you talking to me, haven't I washed your socks lately?" or whatever.

Conflict resolution means moving towards a person and capitulating when necessary, making unilateral moves, taking the risk to do that. There is no greater risk than building nuclear weapons and having a nuclear war, we have nothing to loose but to move toward the opposite partner as we did with China, as the President arranged at Camp David. There are recent examples of this diplomatically and this can done. In fact, the solution I believe is simple and humanitarian, if one has the correct motivation to do that for the sake of our children and all the children on the earth.

We need to put ourselves in the frame of reference of the Soviet Union as Mr. Ford said this morning. We need to understand how they feel, they lost 20 million people in the Second World War. They are surrounded by enemies. Does the Soviet Union have any allies? Not really, I mean if they invaded Western Europe would the war so packed fight with them. Well, you have to maintain a huge standing army to keep their Warsaw Pact in order. The war so packed would fight against them. There are a billion people in China armed with nuclear weapons. There are six nuclear nations in the World, five of them have their weapons targetted on the Soviet Union and I found as a physician it is medically counter indicated to threaten a paranoid patient.

The Soviet Union believes our panel and they are frightened and for reason. I would be if I were in their shoes. And if you frightened a paranoid patient they'll often hurt you or themselves. The way you treat a paranoid patient is to get in his frame of reference and try and understand how they think. The Russians think totally different from us. They're rigid, they are uncompromising but have reasons to be like that. But they are human beings and they don't want nuclear war because

they understand what it will mean, far better, in fact, than the people in North America or in Australia who have never really suffered in their lives. When I was in the Soviet Union, my guide said to me: "My grandmother has seen people eat people twice in her lifetime." I find that as I travel around speaking to hundreds of thousands of people in the United States, in Canada and in Europe that the physiological instinct that we have for survival is more powerful than the instinct we have to hate and as I drop a bomb on people and really get them in their guts, they said "My God! how can we learn to live with the Russians"; that's their immediate response, therefore if the motivation is there, we can do it and it is a survival instinct. We have to live with them, we have to work with them, we have to respect them, we have to understand our own dark side and accept it and learn before we can accuse them of having a dark side.

Jesus said, and I believe he is one of the greatest psychiatrists, who ever lived. "See not the mote in the other person's eye: look instead for the mote in your own eye", then you will be able to work with the other person because we are all capable of evil, all of us. The fact is that 92% of the people in the world do not live in Russia or America and they are about to die too, and that is why there is a movement against this madness. And this is the only way you can describe it, madness. And Canada is one of those countries, and Canada is highly respected on the world scene. She has a Prime Minister who is a statesman, a very intelligent, good man. And Canada could lead out and become a symbol for the people of the world and the other countries. The superpowers, I believe, are like nine year old little boys in a sandbox. They need to be disciplined. And we talk about proliferation, lateral proliferation, it is a terrible worry. And incidentally, I would just like to say that recently the Reagan administration has decided to sell heavy water to

Argentina which will help them make nuclear weapons. And she by-passed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and allowed India to be sold nuclear fuel which will help in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the super powers can moralize when they have behaved indiscriminately and in a juvenile fashion. In a totally irresponsible fashion, they tell all the countries they can't have nuclear weapons, we are the only ones who are responsible enough to have nuclear weapons. That is total hypocrisy, and unless they behave themselves and follow the rules as set down on the NPT signed in 1968, when they agreed that they would both stop arming, unless they do that they don't have a moral leg to stand on. And if they did, they could become a policeman of the world, I don't mean military policeman, I would mean moral policeman with a strong moral voice and an economic voice, both of them. . The world spends \$600 billion on arms and it is true there are many military governments in the world who are interested only in power and not in their people and they are buying these new sophisticated god awful weapons which will kill people.

Why do we have to kill? My life is valuable, everybody else's life is as valuable as mine. How many leaders of the world have ever witnessed the miracle of the birth of a baby? How many leaders of the world have helped a child to die and supported the parents in their grief before and forever after? We are talking about human beings, all over the world. We are not talking about spheres of influence and whether the Third World is important to the United States or not. The Third World is composed of human beings who need to live and be fed and educated, have birth control. Two-thirds of the world's children right now are malnourished and we have the technological schools and the medical knowledge to help most people on the planet right now. The world by the year 2000 is pretty well terminal. We will

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have polluted the water, the air, there will be very few forests left, there will be no clean drinking water, or very little, all over the world. There will be 6 billion people in the world instead of 4.5 billion. And there will be a lot of countries who will have nuclear weapons and the arms race will have escalated totally out of control both in the conventional area and in the nuclear area. I don't know why we have to be so suicidal. Why don't we really dig into our souls and decide to help each other. I believe there must be bilateral nuclear disarmament, it is clinically indicated and I mean disarmament. I know that the secret is still there in man's mind, but we used to have slavery, we used to have cannibalism, dueling. We have civilized ourselves over time, we used to live in caves, look what we have done, look at what we are capable of doing. That's what separates us from the animals. And I believe along with bilateral nuclear disarmament there should be a non-intervention treaty where the super powers get the hell out of the rest of the world. Not all countries have the privilege of behaving as America did with its Declaration of Independence, having their own revolutions, deciding how they want to run their own countries without being included in sphere of influence by these two big global bullies. The fact is that we live on a lifeboat, a tiny little lifeboat hurtling through space and the dictum says that if you don't like the guy at the other end of your lifeboat, you don't drill a hole at his end.

Chairman:

Mr. Torrelli wants to ask a question, I believe. I believe he wants to make some comments on this area and I think that this is your intention, Mr. Torrelli I think I should, before I permit you to do that, permit some questions, as we have done with the previous speakers, then I will come back to you.

Maurice Torelli:

(translation)

You asked me to speak as a European, this morning, Mr. Chairman. I must say that I am from Europe and I am a Mediterranean and I am very skeptical. First I'd like to make one observation about the present tendency, which consists in attacking only the nuclear deterrent. I know we can debate this question I'd just like to say that the present all countries which have the nuclear deterrent have escaped nuclear war. Everywhere else in the world, wars continues to increase; I wonder whether this spectre of nuclear war is really a luxury which we have. I'd like to make three other observations very quickly. First, I'd like to stress that in my view, have to distinguish two types of pacificism, when pacificism is useful to the U.S.S.R. I am not trying to be provocative here, I don't agree with Marxism and I have a great respect for everyone who fights for peace, who struggles for peace. Nevertheless there are two questions here. First, is there a leader here, is there manipulation of the pacifist movement? Secondly, what are the mistakes which can be identified as a result of the pacificism? With regard to manipulation, it is very difficult to prove this, nevertheless there appears to be a synchronization from the outside. According to the documents of NATO and most European nations, the U.S.S.R. has given \$60 million in order to finance the Movement. All demonstrations in the U.S.S.R. are strictly forbidden; this I think is because history shows that pacificism in fact increases the possibility of war in that it calls into question the will of people to defend themselves.

I'd like to make one other observation here, I would like to speak about the famous expression "better dead than red". What worries me is not the individual choice but the doubt this raises

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about the values of democracy. This means that the values of the Soviet system, Communist system, are equivalent and acceptable but not those of the democratic system. That seems to be the case in West Germany and also in the Netherlands. I think that this phenomenon should not be underestimated. First it is difficult to appreciate the real impact on people of the peace movement because there is a great diversity in motivation and organization which also varies from country to country. It seems to be more structured in the North and the Protestant North rather than the countries of the South. In the southern countries, there are stronger Communist tendencies and this makes the Catholic Bishops (stronger). But the point I'd like to stress here is that if the peace movement in its militant form can be considered a marginal movement, what is far more fundamentally serious here is that activism and militarism in European countries. And in most European countries, the fact is the people in those countries no longer want to fight or defend their countries.

There was a poll which was conducted by a commission of the European Community to determine European public opinion and you have a list where peace is at top of the list. 77% of the people in France give peace as being the supreme priority, in 6th position you have the defense of the country. Only 28% of the people are ready to defend their countries. In the Netherlands, the equality of the sexes is above defense of the country. I think that this is very important. It is a type of moral disarmament which is taking place in Europe.

I will be very brief with my other observations. I just wanted to say that in fact the Americans have some of the responsibility for the development of the peace movement in Europe. It is said that the Reagan government is a dangerous

government. I have heard this here and I think that many Europeans believe that the United States has not been governed since 1974 and this is a very serious problem. The Europeans don't want to fight and the Americans are not going to endanger people who don't want to fight. Therefore, as regards the defence of Europe, I think that we are not the only people to be protected by the Americans. We are all in the same situation, but the advantage of this missile crisis is that for the first time in Europe and a long time, Europeans are rediscovering the possibility of discussing European defense, not totally autonomous or independent, but an increase in European defense; this is being discussed for the first time in a long time.

Chairman:

I think there was a bit of a misunderstanding between myself and Mr. Torrelli but he has made his contribution and we can include it in our reflections. To give an opportunity to have the dialogue with Dr. Caldicott that we have had with the other speakers, I would like now to call to anyone who wishes to direct a question to Dr. Caldicott.

Walter Gordon:

I don't know how many people here saw the film "If You Love This Planet" but Dr. Caldicott took a very prominent part in that and it was very effective. Afterwards I saw an early viewing of the film and I said I would like everybody in Canada to have the privilege of seeing it. I feel the same way about the remarks she has made to us today and I just want to say I disagreed completely with Professor Torrelli.

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Albert Legault:

(translation)

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I partly agree and partly disagree with what was said by Dr. Caldicott. I think that there is a refreshing pessimism there but from her arguments we can draw conclusions which are really contrary to those she does indeed wish to defend. I think that she is right to criticize what I would call the arrogance of scientists. One day there will be a nuclear accident. I am convinced of this personally. You only have to look what was said about three-mile island, the various statements made, to realize that in fact that to make a mistake, an error is human and that one day there will be a mistake. There is also the scenario mentioned in Boston by Thomas Shelling in which he states and in which he hoped that, in fact, a nuclear bomb would explode in order to remind people of the horror of nuclear war, so the people would realize that it is necessary to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But there is a contradiction here. We talked about the survival instinct but it is because there is survival instinct that we have a deterrent. I go even farther than this, I would say that if you had progressive disarmament, and if the super powers disarmed considerably, to the extent they were no longer able to provide credibility for themselves, then this soon or later will in fact lead to nuclear proliferation. I think that we can draw various conclusions from this.

Another point which seems to me important and I think this was referred to somewhat by the people speaking here, is the following: Since Dr. Schlesinger was acting for the defense in the United States, Americans have invented something else, "nuclear war is hell", but it is hell or is it suicide? Since Dr. Schlesinger we have invented a new term now which can

probably be called purgatory, if not the hell, which is the possibility of a selective limited nuclear war. And this is where the problem emerges, because I think that the Americans have invented this doctrine essentially for national security reasons and also because this coincides with technological evolution. But this is misunderstood by Europeans who have become schizophrenic. They don't want a limited nuclear war, neither do they want conventional war. And, as they don't want conventional war they are not ready to make a considerable effort to strengthen the conventional weapons because they say: "Well nuclear weapons will in fact deter the Russians from conventional war". And on the other hand they accuse the Americans who, for elementary strategic reasons don't intend to create a nuclear war. They also criticize us for not defending the Europeans and the Europeans believe that probably it will be necessary (for the U.S.?) to strengthen forces in Europe.

Michael Pitfield:

I don't know whether I can do justice to what I want to try and say, given the time strictures I know you are going to put on me. But it seems to me that we have here just for a moment a glimpse of the dialogue of the deaf that haunts this subject. We have a whole table of people filled with good faith and it would be interesting if we can end this dialogue of deaf for a moment. We have on the one hand the experts who have pleaded essentially a) we have so far avoided nuclear conflict; and, b) it is so irrational it probably won't happen. I think that really this is the essence, if I may, of the case on the side of Jim Schlesinger and so forth. Then along comes Dr. Caldicott, and says, "but what if?" It seems to me that it is not for her to have to answer the question in its ultimate. It is for those of us who are in government to answer the question in the ultimate. We have to

return to the diagnosis of the situation. I suggest: one that in a true democracy if very aggressive, we really believe in the rights and liberties of man and we want to bring it to everyone. You have only to cope with the problems that we had on Poland, for example, in this government to understand the pressures that can be brought on to do stupid things in the immediate term, in order to justify our faith in democracy. On the other hand, we have a conflict I think between two points of views that were espoused. Bob Ford I don't think said that the Russians are expansionist. I think he said that they are a regime which can only survive by maintaining a degree of confrontation.

We have to ask ourselves whether, with all the expertise around this table, we are really satisfied that the Russian regime is essentially expansionist in the sense which democracy tends to give the term. Because, if it is, then we have one problem that if the problem is confrontation rather than expansion then it seems to me that we have enough. Thank you.

John Halstead:

Thank you Mr. Chairman. This follows on very much on the last two interventions. Dr. Caldicott said that she was amazed that there hadn't been nuclear war so far. I wonder how she explains that, I am not suggesting, by posing that question, that we can safely assume that since there hasn't been one so far, there won't be, but I do think that as others do, that to understand where we are and how we go from here in a sensible direction we have also to understand how we got here. I think this needs a more in-depth analysis of East/West relations since the last war that we've had. I perfectly agree with Dr. Caldicott that nuclear weapons are symptoms and that we should be dealing with the causes why they are there. As for the

management of East/West relations, which I suggest is the way at getting at those causes, it tends from my observation to appeal mainly to fear. It concentrates on the weapon and on the weapons and the destructive powers. It concentrates on the symptoms, rather than leading people to analyze the causes of those symptoms. Here I'd like to introduce a discretionary look at what we are talking about when we are talking about the Soviet Union. Mr. Rostow described the Soviet Union as an expansionary power and said the Soviet Union shows no inhibition about the use of force. I think it would be difficult if those two propositions are true to explain the paradox that while the balance in military power has been moving in the Soviet favour in the recent years, effective Soviet influence has not been expanded but in fact has been receding. You can find plenty of examples of this in Africa, in the Middle East, in Asia, even in Latin America. I suggest that Soviet influence, Soviet and Cuban influence are not expanding and certainly not in Eastern Europe. So I make a plea for a closer look at the evolution of East/West relations in connection with a more rational look as to why there hasn't been nuclear war so far in order perhaps to find some clues as to where we should go from here.

Chairman:

Thank you Mr. Halstead. I want to ask Dr. Caldicott whether she wishes to make some comments. My understanding was we would create an opportunity for questions to which the speaker could reply as Mr. Halstead did. I think that has changed slightly into a series of additional short speeches and I take responsibility for that, but I would like to ask you whether you would like to comment now or whether to hear three other speakers and then comment. I have also the responsibility of calling upon Mr. Beesley, who is the commentator. I don't want to call him at

such a late point in the day that all the comments will have been made, so I am turning to you first and ask you if you want to make some comments now. Then I will call on Mr. Beesley, then on to the others, please.

Helen Caldicott:

Dr. Legault, I'd like to answer him first. Deterrence has always been said to prevent nuclear war and in the name of deterrence, we have gone from two nuclear weapons to 35,000 on one side to 20,000 on the other. The children say, why build more bombs? It is going to obviously increase the risk of nuclear war, that is illogical. People say we haven't had a nuclear war yet, because of the nuclear weapons. I am reminded when I worked in casualty in 1961 and a man came in with his neck broken. He is about 60. He said "I've been driving for 30 years and I have never had an accident". He had one that night. My kid rides a bicycle all the time without a helmet, I am scared stiff. The other day the fifteen year-old daughter of one of my closest friend, a physician in Seattle, was riding a bicycle to the stables. She got hit in the back by a pick-up truck and she is dead. Human beings are fallible. We break under stress. Everyone breaks under stress. I've seen normal businessmen develop acute symptoms under stressful situations. We do things that aren't quite appropriate. We make mistakes. We are not really whole that day. We may initiate a nuclear war.

President Reagan is an old man. He probably has hardening of his cerebral vessels. This is very reasonable to assume but not so obvious that the people around him recognize it. He could do something that was not appropriate. Who made sure that President Nixon couldn't go to extremes in his last days? Was this not true? So we have experienced situations like that one.

Breshnev was a sick man for many years, I think he was treated with cortozone steroid. Steroids can produce acute side effects. Medically you never know which patient is going to develop it. So we are talking about faillible human beings.

I don't know why for years before Russia had any nuclear weapons and even after she had, the policy was to bomb Russia flat should she do anything that America didn't like her doing. Before Russia could respond with nuclear weapons, it was called the "Sunday Punch", bomb her flat. And you know some of those generals had to be restrained by the Presidents because they really wanted to do it. One of them and I forget his name, said that at the end of a nuclear war if there are two Americans and one Russian left we have won. And that has been the attitude of America for a long time. They haven't done it, but they have talked about it for a long time. And the Soviet Union has an attitude, her plans are, she says, she wants to use nuclear weapons first. I don't know if she means it or not, but she says should one be used against her, she is going to bomb the whole of the United States totally flat. I think she means it.

To talk about, as Professor Torrelli did, defense in the nuclear age is pre-nuclear thinking because it was true before nuclear weapons that more weapons you had, the more planes you had, the more bombs you had, the safer you were. You could bomb your enemy into oblivion and rebuild yourself from the rubble. This is not true anymore, it is mutual suicide. Suicide for the planet, pre-nuclear thinking and when I said that we had to evolve mentally to understand that, I meant that very seriously from a medical prospective. The defense guidance being produced by the Pentagon calls for the capability of America to fight and win a protracted nuclear war. It was said that this is not misunderstood by the Europeans and I think that it is not

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misunderstood, I think they understand it very clearly. That frightens a lot of people, never before has America really had that stated policy. It may have been, insinuated, I think but it is very clear now. War is no longer medically possible, not even conventional war, I stress that again, we can't fight. With nuclear reactors everywhere in the Western world, genetically we can't fight, we will produce devastation of the land, radiodevastation so people won't be able to live there anymore. They will all die of acute radiation illness with their hair falling out, vomiting and bleeding to death, or they will die of leukemia five years later, or cancer some 10, 20 or 30 years later. War is anachronistic, man can't fight, certainly in the western nations.

Mr. Pitfield, there is an aggressive belief that democracy is the only way, I don't believe that democracy is the only way. There are some countries in the world where people are born in the gutters and die in the gutters and they never have any food in their bellies, or enough food from the day they are born to the day they die. Those countries don't necessarily need an American form of democracy, they may need socialism for a while. They may need people to come and really help them and feed them. Is democracy the right way to go, well that's their decision to make. We sound like missionaries imposing our themes and schemes on everybody else. I don't think that's appropriate. We have got a lovely system, it works well for us but many other people don't want it. It wasn't Mr. Ford that said that the Russian were expansionist, it was Mr. Rostow. Mr. Halstead, explained the theory that nuclear war hasn't occurred yet. I think I have answered that. The interesting thing when you look at the American attitude towards Russia, is that during Democratic administrations, the hostility towards Russia was often more overt than during Republican administrations, when the

defense budget decreased. Often during a Democratic administration it increased because the right wing Republicans were against the internal liberal domestic policies and in order to placate them they had to be tough and hard and strong. The Reagan administration is an exception. So a lot of the attitude internationally towards the Soviet coming from the United States has been domestically oriented.

As to fear, you say that it is not appropriate to frighten people. I find as a physician, if you don't really make a person understand the significance of their diagnosis, they will not - and they take this into their soul-stop the grieving process that I described. They will not participate in very unpleasant therapy which may help their illness and may help them to survive. It is fear that motivates the instinct for survival. When you are frightened, there is a little gland above the kidney called

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the adrenal gland that pumps out adrenalin and pushes up the blood sugar level, raises the blood pressure, turns on the neurons so that you start thinking and working out how you're going to survive. Fear is an appropriate survival mechanism and it's my experience as I speak widely around this country and the States that many people, when they hear the message, say their lives have been changed and as they start working, they feel really excited - they're still frightened but it's an appropriate fear. Not to be frightened is a form of psychic numbing or displacement activity. If you put rats in a cage, and you threaten them with a lethal situation, they tend to run away into something totally irrelevant to that which threatens them. That's in fact what we do every day - we deny reality and that's the suicidal mechanism. Not being frightened. Fear is appropriate to the situation - it is mentally healthy and it does stimulate people to become active and constructive using a democracy.

Chairman: I wonder, Dr. Caldicott, if I could address the dilemma I have - namely the time is 4:15. We were due to conclude at 4:00 and we haven't heard yet from Mr. Beesley, who is on the program as the commentator. So may I, with your permission, call upon Mr. Beesley, and if we have time and through consensus, we may stay on a bit longer when Alan finishes.

Mr. Beesley: Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you Dr. Caldicott. I will be briefer than I intended to be, partly because some of the issues have been discussed. I did intend to do the traditional role of the commentator and try and comment on what has been said by each of the speakers before offering some further comments of my own. I will have to abbreviate that to some extent.

I think that whether or not there is consensus in this room, that the source of the pervasive insecurity, and I'm using direct quotes of Dr. Rostow's comments, is "the continued expansionist policy of the USSR" or not, there is at least agreement that there is a considerable feeling of insecurity. Now we've also heard it suggested that the USA is not wholly blameless. I doubt if Professor Rostow would argue that everything the US has ever done had measured up to a model of perfection, and I don't think that we need follow that line of thought much further. I do think it important to bear in mind, however, that rhetoric emanating from the US administration is very definitely a major factor in the motivation and thinking of the peace movement in other countries, including Canada. I will come to that point in a moment.

I was very struck by Dr. Rostow's broad approach. He used language that I had been tempted to use at one of our policy advisory groups meetings when I said to Ambassador Ford that I would try to come up with a better model for relations between east and west than detente, since peaceful coexistence seems to have gone the way of other previous models. The only approach I could come up with was the Rule of Law, and I didn't think that it would be an acceptable formula. We've now heard from a very high authority that the Rule of Law is not only an ideal but, in terms of the Charter obligations, the concept exists in concrete terms and we don't need to create a lot more treaties to lay down the law. They exist. What we need to do is begin to apply the law and we're not doing that.

I might reiterate the comment I made earlier - perhaps our fault lies in the drafting of the Charter, because the League, which came to a sticky end, did lay tremendous emphasis on disarmament. The Charter did not. The drafters of the Charter didn't think that armaments per se were the causes of

war. Now rightly or wrongly, that is the situation we've lived with. The collective security system hasn't worked because the five policemen didn't work together as was envisaged. That's the first point I'd like to make.

Turning to the rhetoric that frightens people, let me just give you two examples, in an attempt to be evenhanded without suggesting I hope, that that means we should get out of NATO and join Sweden as a non aligned or neutral. This is a quotation from a recent writing of the then Soviet Chief of Staff; "Should the Soviet Union be thrust into a nuclear war, the Soviet people and armed forces need to be prepared for the most severe and protracted trials. Soviet forces will have definite advantages in such a war which creates subjective possibilities for them to achieve victory." That quotation is cited by Mr. Adelman, present head of ACDA, as showing how outdated Mutually Assured Destruction is as a concept, in an article, which was not referred to in the congressional hearings, called "From Mad to Nuts". What follows is a quotation from Adelman: "The US should be prepared and be seen to be prepared to put our strategic forces into limited play in a limited crisis that may arrive in the wider world, such as the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and Middle East War of 1973. US forces should not be fashioned solely for the most remote crisis of all, that of an all out US/USSR conflict. Unless the United States has, and is seen to have, strategic forces, ample enough to respond in balanced measure, the allies can only discount the nuclear umbrella. That needless to say, would be a most unwelcome development." That is a quotation from Mr. Adelman, the present head of ACDA. These quotations are the kind that frighten people, including me.

I'd like to say now a brief word about the peace movement. Again, by not using my own words. This is what James Reston wrote; I found it interesting enough to include in a

speech I gave in February in Moncton: "There are two emerging dangers in the present nuclear arms debate. First, the militarists will want too many nuclear weapons, and second, the pacifists will want too few or none at all. Yet if either side should prevail, the Western alliance which has avoided a third world war for two generations, would probably be shattered. This of course has been the one clear objective of Soviet policy for the last 37 years. On the one hand, if Washington pushed the arms race beyond the tolerance of public opinion in Europe, it will surely lose the support of the allied governments it needs. On the other hand, if the peace movement persuades allied governments to reject Washington's efforts to maintain a nuclear balance on the ground in Europe, it will undoubtedly lose the support of the United States." This was a statement directed largely to INF at a time when it looked as if the election might go either way in Germany and the UK.

Now I'd like to turn for a moment to the Canadian peace movements, because I think it's relevant in the light of the comments that we've heard from Dr. Caldicott. I haven't been able to cover the whole country, but I have met members of the peace movements in Ontario, four times, in New Brunswick on one occasion, in Manitoba on one occasion, in British Columbia on three occasions, in Alberta on two occasions, (Calgary and Edmonton), in Saskatchewan on one occasion, Saskatoon. Recently, in Vancouver, I met with representatives of forty separate peace movements; in Saskatoon, with a lesser number but equally active, equally committed. These people are concerned, they are frightened, but they are also, in many cases, knowledgeable. They can trade facts and figures. The one thing that they all agree on is that there are too many nuclear weapons, and something must be done about it.

Now I would like to say as briefly as possible what I intended to say about Canada's part in this whole arms control exercise. We're talking as if there were a vacuum and it's time somebody thought about filling the vacuum, in so far as Canada is concerned. Well, there is no vacuum. Let me mention a very recent incident briefly, namely the Williamsburg Conference. As far as I know, that very high level of influential group of statesmen and world leaders would not have focussed on arms control and disarmament at all but for the Canadian input. This shows that something can be done by a country of Canada's standing, when there is enough determination and enough skill and effort exerted. I was concerned yesterday several times by comments to the effect that nothing is going to be achieved in arms control or disarmament over the next fifteen years. I have just emerged from a fifteen year negotiation of a treaty, which was rejected by President Reagan. (I'm quite sure Professor Rostow wouldn't have rejected it, having just heard his commitment to the rule of law.) In any event, it was rejected after all those years of negotiation by a series of Republican chairmen of American delegations, which always negotiated incredibly skillfully. They were a problem solving delegation, from start to finish. So where do we stand, in the light of such a setback to the Rule of Law? I would say as follows.

Canada has made an impact, in the case I've just mentioned, namely the Law of the Sea. We can do it in the UN, on a number of issues and in a number of ways. Of course it's becoming more and more difficult. One of the reasons, -- and I say this as the Chairman of the Barton Group, which is the Western Consultative Group on arms control, (named after Bill Barton) -- it is becoming difficult on some of the real issues, -- which have just been referred to as peripheral or even as a cynical pretense of leaning towards disarmament -- relates to the CTB, (Comprehensive Test Ban).. The Comprehen-

sive Test Ban (or nuclear test ban), has been accepted Canadian policy and Western policy -- for some years. It was nearly brought off relatively recently in negotiations amongst the UK, the US and the USSR. It didn't quite happen. Now, however, just by continuing to maintain that same position, our relations are becoming more and more difficult in the arms control field with some of our major allies, especially the USA, because the USA no longer supports that position; it may eventually support it, but it certainly doesn't like the way we present it, or Australia presents it or the Netherlands presents it or New Zealand or the Scandinavians. (The NATO Scandinavians presents it). It's one example of how difficult it is now to work with our close friends and allies in trying to maintain Alliance solidarity. The US delegation took positions in the First Committee of the UN which created complications for three Western resolutions. This is a fact of life that I wouldn't speak of publicly, but in this informal group, and "off the record", I think it necessary to do so.

What happened as a result is that the Japanese, of all people, in a very atypical fashion, asked a group of Western delegations to get together. And five delegations, including nine ambassadors, descended on poor Jean Kirkpatrick and talked to her about the way the negotiations were going in the First Committee of the UN. I don't regard that committee as the most effective negotiating body in the world. It negotiates the framework within which the more concrete negotiations go on in Geneva. In any event, we managed to get through some seventy resolutions before we were finished, in many cases two, sometimes three resolutions on the same subject, thereby ensuring against any effective action. Every group had its favourite resolutions. I was shocked at the cynicism being displayed. When we went in to see Mrs. Kirkpatrick, it was made clear that it was really the US position that we were there to complain about. A number of the delegations had gone

public on one resolution, in criticizing a group of UN experts which almost turned the vote against us, on a chemical weapons resolutions, -- and Canada had stuck its neck out on this issue -- and then we had to fight a legal battle. The US delegation also, on the very day of a vote, announced that the USA would be the only country in the UN to vote against a Western resolution on a Comprehensive Test Ban, which we had been days and days and days negotiating on in the Barton Group, moving further and further away from our respective positions towards the US position to try and keep the US with us. We lost the USA at the last minute and we were the ones who ended up in an embarrassing position because we were co-sponsors and we felt very badly and also very foolish. One might think we didn't learn from the experience, because just a few weeks ago the Disarmament Commission was meeting in New York and we had spent the whole of a long weekend drafting and redrafting a paper on the nuclear arms race. When the meeting was ending, the final meeting before we were going to table the document, the American delegate said, "Oh, by the way, I just had instructions to ask for a few changes." The changes were fundamental, in the view of several delegations, including the Canadian, which could not accept them, so the paper was tabled by only one sponsor, the British, who were the only ones willing to speak up on it. A strange precedent, something novel in my experience, where the Western Alliance was hard at work, trying to show solidarity in public. It was embarrassing. I said, as chairman of the Barton Group, "we're going to look foolish, people are going to say 'who originated this paper? Who are the sponsors?'".

The British said they would pull it off. They were cross-examined, however, and not one other Western delegation sponsored this paper which we worked so hard on, because, at the last minute, the USA pulled away from it again. I think this kind of diplomacy is very counterproductive, akin to what

was done in the law of the sea, and it can pose a danger to all of us, but particularly to the USA, to the UN, and to the rule of law. Even friends and allies of the USA look with jaundiced eyes on occasion now when told "we'd like just this little change, or that little change".

On other issues, such as outer space, and the nuclear arms race, there may be very sound military reasons why the USA doesn't want urgent action, but there are problems when other members of the Western group are trying to get action. When the USA is saying no on certain issues it can make it easy for the Russians to look good. On chemical weapons, we thought that with Vice-President Bush himself introducing the framework paper, we had a negotiating situation that was going to lead to something concrete. Only near the end of the session did we learn that the USA was willing to "negotiate" but not "draft". Now what does that mean? I was the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Law of the Sea Conference. It means a willingness to talk but not get near to any kind of commitment.

I have given these various examples for one reason. We must maintain western solidarity while we try to make progress through the arms control and disarmament process, but it's becoming increasingly difficult. The question has been raised as to what Canada can do. I think what we're trying to do is maintain solidarity in public, while being fairly frank privately. I think that our Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State did this when he went to Geneva. He went there for certain stated purposes, and I believe he achieved them. He went there to be seen as opting into negotiations which everyone had tended to think of as none of our business. He met with the negotiators, both the USA and the USSR negotiators, on both INF and START. He set a precedent; others have followed suit. There was no question of Canada being a mediator,

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or seeking to change the world, but singlehandedly, it was made clear that the two super-powers were negotiating about our fate, as well as theirs, that we are involved and that we care. It was our view that Canada was opting into those negotiations, to the extent possible, and was seen to be opting in, and if that wasn't clear, it was then so stated to a press conference.

What else was done in Geneva? I won't go through the whole list, but the Secretary of State spoke of two concepts, and stressed them, -- concepts worth thinking about for some time to come. The whole speech was founded on the concept of mutual security as the only possible basis for a viable approach to arms control and disarmament. The other major aspect of the policy statement was that Mr. MacEachen firmly rejected the concept of the winable nuclear war. (This was reported by Agence France. The Quebec papers carried it but hardly any others did.) Nevertheless, this was a major foreign policy pronouncement by Canada's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. In addition to that, he went through a series of important issues about to be negotiated. I won't list them in detail but these included CTB, outer space, chemical weapons, and nonproliferation. Unfortunately, there has been so much stalling that almost nothing was achieved in Geneva, except for the working group on chemical weapons chaired by Canada's Ambassador McPhail.

Clearly there is cause for concern about progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. However, I do think that it is clear that the Canadian voice is being heard. There may be more that we can do, for example on some aspects of the strategy of suffocation, but we can't get much support on that if we have a very new approach. We can get our resolution through provided it's the same old tired resolution that doesn't upset anyone. It's a very tough row to hoe right now.

As for the USSR position, I think the Russians have never been more skillful in the propaganda exchange than under Andropov. It's as if they were taught by Madison Avenue everything it had learned and forgot, whereas President Reagan isn't attempting to use this kind of persuasive approach on the Russians. I do think something has changed, however. I think Canada is "into the act" far more than we were. There may be more that we could do, but it's just too defeatist and too inaccurate to assume that nothing is being done by Canada, that no attempts are being made. Canada's voice is being heard, and I believe it is being heard with a certain amount of respect.

To turn now to the statements of the two panelists, there is much in what Dr. Caldicott said that we should brood about and think about, because what she's talking about is what is going to happen if things go wrong, not because necessarily some policy decision is made to nuke them, because even of a computer error. And the rhetoric from both sides is not very reassuring. I think that kind of rhetoric should be cut off and I don't think anybody would lose one iota from so doing. I think also Professor Rostow should pursue his Rule of Law approach and have President Reagan talk about the rule of law. I do think that we have scratched the surface of the underlying causes of tension. I think it's a kind of mutual paranoia. The USA and the USSR have had this sixty-five year history of mutual suspicion, of hostility, of mistrust, and each of them is equally convinced that its system is the only right one, and why can't the other see the light, since the other one is inevitably going to fade away and crumble. As to whether the Russians are being expansionist, while I don't think they've been too successful at it, it is implicit in their peaceful coexistence approach, although it is an emphasis more on the peaceful side of things except for the little exception of wars of liberation.

On the other hand when we hear some USA rhetoric it sounds like the kind of system one can't find anywhere in the world anymore. If the free market approach is the only right one. The world by and large, is governed by mixed economies now. I think the rhetoric could be changed and policies could be improved. Canada could, perhaps do more with more resources, but the fact remains there isn't a vacuum, insofar as Canada is concerned. We're every bit as solid a NATO ally as we ever were. It's the major reason for the decision to test the cruise missile. Our major allies are making certain problems for us and for their other allies, but when it comes right down to it, no matter how solid we are in NATO, there is a larger, more important problem. Defence and arms control go side by side in terms of security policy. It's in the discussion paper, although not everybody agrees with it. We are committed to international security, and the two pillars, the two track approach if you want, for Canada, consists of keeping our guard up on the one hand, while really trying by every means we know how to get action on arms control and disarmament. Whether or not all or none of us agrees with Dr. Caldicott, I welcome her presence here because she frightens me with her description of the effects of a nuclear war and I think that's not a bad thing. I wish she could only talk to adults, because when children don't sleep at night, and when children don't think they have any future, then I feel that is going too far. It's heavy stuff that need not be done that way. Psychiatrists should know how to do such things better. It should be programmed differently. Frighten the governments more, frighten the officials more but if it can be done without frightening the children, then they might grow up with a more positive attitude, a more upbeat attitude, willing to take the difficult decisions necessary for a more peaceful world. Thank you very much.

Helen Caldicott: The children aren't frightened by us so much. They are frightened by President Reagan when he goes on television and he talks about naming the MX the "peace-keeper" and being able to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe without pressing a button. They are too smart to understand that. We find the only way to give children emotional security, because they are very smart, they watch the news, and watch the television, and they see the stuff all the time, they've analysed it themselves, is for their parents to give total priority to this issue to make sure the kids are going to grow up and stop worrying about college and good jobs and stuff. That is what gives children emotional security -- that their parents, their mom and dad are working on it. The thing is, I'm not an ambassador, or a diplomat, while my brother is. Why do you have to keep this so secret about what the United States is doing? I think the world needs to know that.

Chairman: It's 4:45 and we were supposed to end at 4:00. I apologize for that and also apologize for the fact that there are a number around the table who wanted to get in on this and they haven't gotten in. I can only assure them when we come back tonight I'll give them the opportunity of participating.

POLICY SEMINAR ON FOREIGN AND DEFENCE ISSUES,
VAL MORIN, QUEBEC, AUGUST 20-22, 1983

CHAIRMAN:

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister
and Secretary of State for External Affairs.

SESSION C: CHOICES FOR CANADA

Chairman: The subject tonight is "Choices for Canada" and you will see on the printed program a number of questions beginning with, what are Canada's options in the area of collective security? What are our options in the area of disarmament and arms control? In what direction should Canadian policy and practice be moving? Indeed, these questions come to the point in the sense of the discussions we've had today and last night. The background has been laid-out and now we can focus on options for Canada. To begin the discussion I will call upon Albert Legault, Professor of Political Science at Laval University and the former Director-General of the Centre Quebecois de Relations Internationales. He has been an advisor to the Department of National Defense and Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. So I will ask Mr. Legault, Professor Albert Legault, to begin his presentation.

Albert Legault: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have been asked to speak in French so I hope you will forgive me if I follow this advice, of expressing myself in the first official language of Canada first, so having no priority connotation but historical significance.

(simultaneous translation follows)

As I'm asked to do I'm going to speak primarily about the questions concerning collective security, East/West relations, and problems or choices with respect to arms limitations. I won't cover the third problem which is what the policy of Canada should be because I feel once I've covered the first two points, then by that time I will have spoken quite enough. Before talking about collective security options I'd like to give a brief historical summary. I think that the first goal of Canada since 1945 has always been to escape somewhat from the pervasive influence of our neighbour to the South. I think this is a constant factor in our policy and this largely explains the interest of Canada in international organizations namely the creation of the United Nations and also our commitment to regional collective security institutions such as NORAD, NATO and also our commitment to sectoral bodies of an international nature be they cultural, economic or financial. I think that this is a constant factor in our policy. We shouldn't ignore this and it largely explains also the publication in 1972 of the White Paper on Canadian/ American relations or rather the publications dealing with the surge of the Third Option with respect to foreign policy. In 1981, I think it was in 1981, you can correct me Mr. Chairman if I'm mistaken, if it was 1980, there was a wish by the Cabinet to stress the bilateral relations of Canada with certain other selected countries abroad; that we should try to find new allies in the area of foreign policies so as to diversify our relations and to escape somewhat from the omnipresence of our neighbour to the South. I will now link up with some other points. I think that our bilateralism policy particularly could be defined as an open line policy. One which is selective, which seeks relations with other countries. But I think that this policy should involve also in my view, a certain neutrality by Canada with respect to basic questions, the most obvious example of this is the Middle East, where systematic-

ally Canada has always refused to take one side, either the Arabs or the Israelis. I think this is an historically constant factor in our policy. I don't think it's because we don't have anything to say on this. Rather I believe, on the contrary, that Canada is trying to protect the openness of its links with other countries and, therefore, this is a subcategory of this open line policy. I think this policy also involves a will to distance oneself politically from the super powers. I'm not going to give historical background to this but I think the Canadian position with respect to the recognition of China or to Cuba, even to the USSR more recently, is characteristic of this policy which expresses an independent will and diversification. On the main international questions, we don't take a clear position. Now this is the context, namely the diversification of foreign policy in relations with other countries. I think this policy has come up with two major problems. First, its an economic problem, that is what the economists call the economic drift of continents. When we thought of the Third Option of Europe, to diversify relations, we quickly realized that it was Japan and the newly industrialized countries, the ASEAN countries, who became more and more priority in nature, whereas our relations with Europe were in fact decreasing in importance. The second fundamental reason and this is a problem of Canadian policy at the present time, is that at the same time as we had an economic and strategic decline in the importance of Canada with respect to the United States, the United States was becoming even more important for Canada. Therefore, the problem for Canada is how can its independent influence help in East/West relations or with the United States, while at the same time we were becoming more dependent on the United States and therefore even less important for them. This is true strategically. I don't have to talk about the development of NORAD here and the threat of intercontinental missiles and, as a result, the decline of Canada's importance with respect to the

international security of Americans. This is true also in that we are slowly moving even more into a type of continentalism and we can't associate ourselves with the American market, whereas the Americans themselves represent, in terms of their external trade, an even smaller share than we occupied ten or fifteen years ago. I think that these two phenomena are very important, namely, diversifying our relations while we are in a context of even tighter continentalism. From there I would like to talk of the options with respect to collective security. I'd like to mention briefly that the United Nations has not provided what the founders of the Charter hoped it would provide, largely because there was a change in the alliances; that is the allies of yesterday became the enemies of today or of tomorrow and at the same time the enemies became the friends. And largely because there was a veto right in the security council. But I don't think this is the most important problem. I think Anthony Bevin in 1946 said that the (un)collective security system was stillborn because of the appearance of the atomic bomb and two changes made in the (un)collective security system. First, you had article 51 and the birth of the alliances and then later, thanks largely to the genius of Canadian policies, peacekeeping forces which came under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations. There is not much use in discussing Canadian policy without a defence force, an Icelandic policy (only a police force). I think this appears to be contradictory for a variety of reasons, because of reasons of internal security, the problem of Quebec, and without an army if Canada decided to get rid of its nuclear forces. And I'm quite convinced that Quebec would be very glad to take back its Francophone forces in order to say that the policy could not be dissociated from military problems. The Icelandic solution seems to me quite unthinkable for Canada. Therefore, what have we got left. Well we can see what is happening with the present system. There is NATO, we're all quite familiar with

this. It's one of the main problems that the Trudeau government had to deal with in 1968. There are two components here. First the European sector and then the Northern Flank. And if you consider this in terms of options, there are about ten possible options here which could be chosen by Canada in order to best rationalize its situation, in order to specialize in its responsibilities with respect to its activities in Europe. I think that John Anderson could develop this question. He's already sent a Memo to the Cabinet on this problem. We can say there are three basic possibilities here for Canada. To become a specialist with respect to its aviation forces, the air force in Europe. Or it could completely take away its air force and contribute only land forces in the centre of Europe. Or, the third possibility could be to stress completely its role in the Northern flank. These three possibilities are not incompatible nor necessarily uncomplementary; rather we should just see what we could do in this area. I think the problem might arise one day if only because of changes in the economic and political situation in Europe. I think Eugene Rostow talked about this, this afternoon -- the concept of Fortress America. In the United States at present, I think there is increasingly a political system which makes it increasingly difficult to accept that the United States is sure to be the potential guarantor of security in Europe simply because the political systems are moving in a different direction, the opposite direction. That doesn't mean that the question won't arise in five years or ten years and it might well be the source of considerable problems in Europe. Another political factor is the increased regionalization of European security problems. We just have to look at the situation of the beginning of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The appearance also of new Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and the possibility of greater French/German cooperation with the setting up of bilateral commissions. There are various examples which indicate that there's a regionalization

of military problems in Europe and this might be the opportunity for Canada in the future to become more specialized in its responsibilities. Another economic problem I'd mention is that unlike what happened in the 1960s, when neither the French nor the British wanted weapons to be an exact copy of American weapons, there was an important decision by the Gaullist government to produce its own independent nuclear force. I think that now the cost of defence in Europe, at least nuclear defence, can no longer be of a national character or at least, in the next ten years, can no longer be simply national. The Germans have to pay more and more. The British and the French and the Germans will have to consult together on these problems and since we're talking about security of the 1980s, this also must be considered within the context of the scenario which in my view will lead to a number of problems in the Alliance. Whatever the solution that Canada might adopt or might choose not to adopt, we might just remain with the status quo in NATO. Nevertheless there are three basic principles which we have to consider here. Namely, the relation between human resources and technology. Canada is a highly technological country. Even the Canadian Armed Forces, which are not large in number, only two-and-a-half times the size of the police force in New York -- there are 35,000 policemen in New York and 83,000 people in the Canadian Armed Forces -- therefore, we have a country which has a military contribution to make but which is mainly important because of its technology. And if there is a speciality of functions, then this relationship between technology and human resources must be taken into consideration as a guiding principle. Because in my view, we can make a European contribution, but if the equipment is destroyed, then obviously you can't produce in one week, a hundred and fifty planes, whereas a commitment to human resources would oblige you to replace a brigade within 7 days and therefore the commitments here are completely different. And these com-

mitments should be seen within the perspective of the commitment of a highly technological country. Also we have to look at the question of the contribution of Canadian and European forces. We could send an armored division of Leopard tanks. However, you could take the opposite attitude also and say that if you had forces in Europe, you would also have to take into account the principle of a certain balance between the various weapons and therefore you have to become more specialized in land forces. In any event, the problem is now open, today, and I think that our presence in NATO is an essential commitment and for a number of reasons. For example, just those resulting from a need for NATO. NATO is necessary against a break-up or a problem -- revolution in Poland or Eastern countries or something which might happen in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere. I think if we didn't have NATO then this might have considerable risks and therefore you could say that NATO is an insurance policy. It is also a place for negotiations, on East/West issues, I will talk later of the codification of East/West relations. It is also necessary as a source of information. It's increasingly obvious that NATO deals with problems, external, outside its region, for example problems in the Persian Gulf or the role which other countries might have to play. Therefore, as you can see, there are many options within NATO. I think this is a basic fact and there is a lot of room for maneuver here, for different course of conduct. What matters is that we must be prepared beforehand and we have to determine what corresponds to the interests both of the Alliance and of Canada. I don't make any distinction between the priorities be they the Northern Flank or central Europe. I think they're both beyond the front line. Norway could even be invaded, for example, before a Soviet invasion in central Europe. There could be a movement in the centre of gravity towards the north, to the Scandinavian countries because of talk over the evolution of technology and the Soviet strategy, just because they are a

peninsula. And new American strategy, which is recommended by the subsecretary of the Navy, Lehman, for deployment to the North Sea. And this leads to a particular problem for the Norwegians. This is an example I'd like to come back to later because there is an analogy here with Canada. Now lets look at NORAD and the options with NORAD. There is the withdrawal from NORAD. I think that the dividends or benefits which might result from that for Canada would really be very meagre in comparison with the disaster or the effect that this would have in the United States. Personally, I'm not embarrassed about the fact that a treaty exists or does not exist. I think we could have exactly the same cooperation with the Americans without the formal existence of a treaty. In practice, it would mean much because you need mixed teams or cooperative systems which would be similar to those that exist at the present time. Therefore, whether NORAD is a treaty or something that is done following a unilateral Canadian decision, it doesn't really change very much. What is far more important is to be within NORAD and to meet the needs which arise, for example the need for the maintenance of nuclear deterence. There is also the status quo which is doing not more than we are doing now. That is another possibility. I don't think we could really do less than we are doing now and we could do a lot more. If we did do more, there is outer space we could look into. I think the Cabinet is very aware of this problem. This hasn't been noticed by journalists. It's now called North American Aerospace Defence not North American Air Defence. Journalists didn't see this obviously. Canada could do more of this. And decide really whether, in the future, it would commit itself to protective systems which would be based in space. And if we do have these, then in that case Canada will have to study the costs involved and also the benefits which might arise in comparison to the investment which it would have to make. Or it might not be involved in that part of the protective space and radar

systems, or laser systems, and just adhere to the present radar system with a study of the costs involved in maintaining or modernizing these systems in comparison with the benefits which we would obtain if we committed ourselves to space. I think with Canada this is really a problem of cost and technology and the development of its own industry and I think often we tend to forget this aspect. If its marginal and peripheral, then the reasons which might lead us to commit ourselves to space are less important. There might be other spin-off benefits, other types of interaction, in the area of communications, for example, information which might result from this. Therefore we have to have a cost analysis, cost/effectiveness analysis of this. Frankly, I think the economists could give a better judgement of this than I could. That's one problem which bothers me. Concerning interception itself, simply speaking, I don't have any documentation or information on this point, for example, following the development of cruise missiles by the Soviets. I think the process is underway. You just have to read the American reports in this area. The Americans and consequently Canada would we be obliged, given the development of the cruise missile by the Soviets, to have a more advanced defence in the north so as to intercept Soviet bombers before they launch their cruise missiles. This is a fundamental problem. I can't give any answer to this problem. I really don't know what the American defence plans are with respect to this possible threat. I'm convinced that the United States are going to have detection systems in space. They're also considering having interception systems in space which might make it possible for them to do this interception themselves. Or would the interception be done through interceptors themselves which would be landbased? And would they then be in Alaska, would they be in Greenland, or would Canada participate? I can repeat only what I said, namely that I don't have any solution to this problem because I don't have

any information or documentation on what the American intentions are. Maybe in the next ten years this problem will arise. I think we also have to be aware of the principle or the analogy which was mentioned here earlier. That the Norwegians are considerably bothered by the Russians and by the Americans. Ten years ago, Norwegian defence policy sought to keep the Americans and the Russians as far as possible from their bases and the Norwegian Sea. This has changed very much now. The Americans have adopted forward deployment with respect to their sea strategy. They hope to destroy initially if there was a nuclear war, the Kola Peninsula. Therefore there is a considerable intensity in Soviet maritime activities and American activities also in the region. And in more immediate terms this is a problem for the Norwegians. It puts the Norwegians on the first line of fire in the case of a war in Europe. The same problem might arise in Canada. I don't have any answer to this. The problem might be less important, less serious. But if there is no agreement on cruise missile limitations, and if there is a limited war, for example in the Gulf, in the Middle East, with bombers moving in, with cruise missiles, then this might put Canada in a difficult position. I think that Canadians should be very aware of this. Whatever we do with the changes in uncontrolled technology, then we won't just be paying for this. Rather we will be involved in this, despite our own wishes, in increased cooperation with the Americans and I think in my view, this is not necessarily an evil. Nonetheless we should be aware of the problems. As regards the maritime component now, I've not so much to say on this. We have two Maritime commands on the East and the West coast. The East coast; the problem is slightly different here. This is part of SACLANT and the Canadian admiral in time of war could wear his SACLANT hat and we have to realize that maritime defence can only be understood within the present strategy of the super powers. We could call it a double-lock system. The allies in Europe

have to control the Mediteranean and the Baltic and the "double dam" system. That is, the people who create the first dam between Norway (and Greenland?) and the second dam which is the Dew Line and it is within these two lines that Canada operates. And we have to realize that this is in the prospect of integrated maritime activity with a geographical delineation of responsibilities. There Canada has a role to play. If we don't play it, the Americans will have to deal with it and then we'll have American boats along our coastline together with other clandestine activities which might take place. I think that the components in the future will not change very much. There will still be a need for anti-submarine activities against nuclear submarines, and maritime convoys in time of hostilities. I don't think this will change very much in the future except on one point to which I will return. Therefore, in the East there aren't too many problems because here the Maritime components are consistent with our commitments to NATO. On the West coast the problem is to determine whether we should increase the perimeter of our activities. Should we go even further? Should we cooperate with other navies? For the moment, I think our navy is so weak that it would be rather premature to consider an increase of activities along the West coast. And the strategic conditions are different there anyway. One other problem which might arise -- and this comes back to the specialization of responsibilities -- obviously after the Falklands crisis, the maritime area itself is not the only priority element. We also have to control the air and I think that considerable modernization is required with respect to Iceland in NATO in order to enable the NATO countries to have significant air cover against Backfire bombers or any other Soviet systems which might be carried by air. And this might in the future lead to the stationing of F-18s in NORAD, be it in Labrador or in cooperation with Iceland or in Greenland or somewhere else. And I think we have to be aware of this

possibility. The maritime threat is not just maritime. We have to realize there are two theatres of war here - air and sea. One other operation which seems to be somewhat less important is mining operations. The Canadian navy - does it really need mine sweepers? I think this is less important because we already have responsibilities. In time of war, we would look at the problem somewhat differently from the way that we look at it now. If we exclude these commitments and these options within these commitments, then we could consider now what are the other options. Well there is the possibility of new alliances. The one we think the most about would be for example, the ASEAN countries. For the moment I don't think there is any question of this as they are. They don't have any designated enemies. There are so many countries within this alliance who are fearful of each other. Among the members there is no designated obvious enemy as there is with NATO, which is the USSR. I really don't think at the present time that we should study this option. However, there are ad hoc alliances which could be considered given the events in the Gulf. The Americans could have asked the Canadians to contribute or to send a boat, a destroyer to the Gulf. This would probably have been done. The Americans didn't ask for this but I think they might ask for it in the future. And then we might talk about an ad hoc alliance of multilateral groups. And this would be consistent with the concerns of NATO in the areas which are not their traditional areas. I think there are two areas where we could do more without taking a lot away from the budget. The first would be the maintenance of peace and our position as a privileged international speaker. We might train foreign troops on Canadian soil for foreign peace-keeping activities or, if we took this a little bit further, within the military training assistance program. We could have not just the training of officers in national defence colleges but also the training of the soldiers or cadets from foreign countries in Canadian

institutions. I think this has never been fully developed. It might even be disguised under peacekeeping. I think this is a responsibility or a function which has not been historically palatable but which is not inconsistent with Canadian tradition. But the effect of this would be to have long term contacts between developing countries and Canada. And as there are coup d'etats regularly in these countries, regimes follow one another quickly, I think it is always wise to have an open line policy with these countries and to stress the bilateral aspect. This is another option and I present this to you. If we move now to East/West relations, which in my view encompasses nuclear arms control, I think there is one option that seems to be obvious. In fact it's not just an option, it's a right. The right to speak up, to say what we think. I don't think that Canadian policy or the Canadian government necessarily has the means to say aloud exactly what it's thinking. I think that for the Minister of External Affairs, or any other minister or even the Prime Minister, it's always rather sensitive to make difficult statements when one doesn't agree with an ally and/or with the United States. But first I'd like to make a proposal which is also an option which could be considered, namely the creation of what I would call a permanent council or a standing council, an advisory council on foreign policy questions or security questions. It's really just an advisory or a consultative board which could express views and which could in my view, provide better coordination in foreign policies with respect to security in Canada. In any event, Canada could appear to speak with more authority on the subject. Obviously, when the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington publishes a report, then it's not the American President but rather the authorized opinion of the American government. We don't have anything of this type in Canada and I think this type of thing would be very useful in order to express out loud just what one is thinking. I think it would also avoid the type of long drawn

out discussions to which Ambassador Beesley was exposed when negotiating in good faith, and then being told at the last minute that the Americans changed their minds. I think this would make it possible for Canada to have its voice heard. Personally, I would see such a body attached to the office of the Prime Minister, for example, because any other organ, any other body with a little tolerance, would probably then be at the service of the Minister and you could say it's like the problem with the Centre of Analysis in the Quai d'Orsay. It all depends on whether the Prime Minister is interested in foreign policy. If he is, then he will take an interest in this. If he's not, someone in External Affairs will take an interest in it. This sort of problem is inevitable but there is nothing we can do with political reality. The second option we've talked about here is the arms trade. I think this is a priority area where Canadian work could be done. But I think it should be done differently from the way it's been done at the present. I think we could use the setting up of a group of supplier countries, rather like the London group of nuclear suppliers. I really don't see why the Western countries are often at "daggers drawn" in order to sell their weapons. There is fierce competition between them. I really don't see why these countries couldn't consult as a group in order to establish, as the London group has done on nuclear equipment, new ground rules, new rules of the game in order to determine which of the regions, for which of the countries, we shouldn't export arms and what types of arms. There is a double benefit here; you could avoid fierce competition between the Western countries and also you could establish new ground rules. Canada is not a supplier of weapons. Heaven only knows that our exports are very small, and the studies that I've conducted on this show that the export of Canadian weapons, even if we take into account Canadian/American cooperation agreements, is less than 1% of our exports. Therefore, it would be ridiculous to talk about Canada as a

supplier of weapons or arms. But I think that Canada would be in a good position, because it is not actually a manufacturer or a supplier, it would be in a good position to propose to the Western countries a better policy with respect to standards and conduct in the area of the transfer of arms race. I think that before there was a Soviet/American committee on weapons. And there have been consultations between the Americans and the Soviets on this, which were broken-off because all the Soviets wanted was to know to whom the Americans wanted to sell their weapons. I think we have to inform the Western countries about this in order to establish rules which might have a snowball effect. I'm sorry for taking more time than expected, Mr. Chairman. My last point is the role of Cabinet and the resolution of conflict. I think this could be possible only insofar as there is a combination of various means. I think an open line policy is a criterion which would make it possible for Canada to express its views without necessarily agreeing with what the Americans do or say. If the Prime Minister wants to go to Moscow, we don't have to consult Washington about this. He has the right to go to Moscow and discuss what he wants to discuss. I really don't see why this discussion arose earlier except, that is, because on the negative effect of the alliance in periods of tension. But if there was an open line policy, a minister could simply visit the opposition in Nicaragua, for example; a Parliamentary committee could go to Latin America or the Caribbean without having to ask the permission of the United States. I think this is quite normal and this is one advantage to keeping open all the lines of communication. This is something the Germans and the French do far better than the North Americans, and it is something that the Soviets do much better than we do because they can play on the conference of the communist parties of the countries concerned, they can play with the alliances, etc. At least they have lines open and they can therefore see what is happening and what changes

there will be in the situation. I therefore think that an open line policy is very useful. And this could be combined with what the Cabinet is already trying to do, namely to improve our bilateral relations with certain countries. I think this is very important, even if the people to whom we talk are not identified in public. I think there is a combination of ways here, I think also that as Mr. Schlesinger told us, and most of the parties here seem to agree, we have to look at our commitments within NATO and NORAD, particularly in the period of economic continentalism which is becoming tighter with the United States. Its obvious that only by assuming our responsibilities in the areas of defence that, as the American colleagues pointed out to us, we could have the right to speak frankly and to express frankly what we are thinking. And I think that somebody mentioned yesterday, and this meets with the wishes of the public, if we say out loud what we're thinking, that we might change somewhat the style of foreign policy in Canada. I think that Canada is one of the most secret countries in the world with respect to foreign policy. I don't know any other country in the world more secret in policy. We know what is happening in France, in Germany, everywhere else. But when we want to know exactly what is the motivation or the reasons that motivated a minister to make a certain statement, then there are very complicated explanations and it is very difficult to know exactly who does what to whom, why and how. I think that, therefore, if there is a change in the style of foreign policy which we could make, this would meet with the wishes of the population and even with the wishes of the students who are into the subject of foreign policy. I used to teach Canadian foreign policy and I can tell you that students don't find this to be very funny or very humorous. And therefore I think we would have better informed people, better public opinion. This is therefore one of the ways which, together with the other means, would make it possible for us to ensure support for policy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman: Thank you Professor Legault. I want to turn now to Mr. Gordon so that we can get all our speakers out of the way, on the record. I don't think I need to introduce Mr. Gordon except to say he is the Chairman of the Canadian Institute for Economic Policy. He has had a political career in Canada. He's been head of an important royal commission and has taken lively interest in Canadian public policy, economic and foreign. Mr. Gordon.

Walter Gordon: Thank you Mr. Chairman. We heard today the views of some previous officials of the United States about the Soviet Union and its ambitions. And some of us, including some Canadians, said that they were not in favour of people like Mr. Trudeau accusing the Russians. Now I had some interesting conversations in Moscow a few weeks ago and my impressions were somewhat different. The people I met were intelligent, apparently very frank and with plenty of humour. They were frightened of the United States and its intentions and were preoccupied with their own problems of security. They referred to assertions from the Pentagon that the US should plan for a restricted nuclear war which the US could win. They, that is the Soviets that I talked to, said no one could win such a war, with which I agreed even before listening to that moving address by Dr. Caldicott this afternoon. They were indignant about President Reagan calling them evil people. They said he wanted them to change their social system which they would not do, and, after all, they have always had an authoritarian government, first under the czars and then under the communists. As to the question of visitors who do Russia, my own impression was that the more contact there could be between representatives of the west and the east, the better. As I said earlier, they expressed admiration for Pierre Trudeau, despite his agreement, to allow the cruise missile to be tested here, which incidently, they didn't like at

all. They said they hoped Trudeau would accept Andropov's invitation to visit Moscow. Now secondly, Schlesinger said this morning that there is latitude for Canada to differ from the US on most important issues so long as Canada continues to support the Atlantic Alliance. Two others said more or less the same thing. I think we should be grateful to these participants for speaking frankly, because it's useful for us to have the US points of view. I personally expect Canada will remain in the Alliance but I hope in a somewhat different form. However, the decisions must be made by Canadians, not by anyone else. I think this should be underlined. I should explain perhaps that I helped with the reorganization of the Department of National Defence at the time of NATO and like most Canadians, I have supported the idea of collective defence ever since. But times have changed. There can be no defence, collective or otherwise, against nuclear war. If you don't believe me, ask Dr. Caldicott. And despite what my neighbour Alan Beesley had to say, I suggest that no real progress has been made on arms reduction or disarmament over the years. The resumption of cold war rhetoric between the super powers is frightening. It is to me anyway. Canada has no effective say anymore in major policy matters and I expect that Schlesinger would agree with this statement if pressed a little bit. If there should be a nuclear exchange between the super powers, Canada would be right in the middle. It would be the end of us. Now in these circumstances, I think I ask myself, and I'm sure others do too, is there anything Canada can do to break the log jam in the disarmament discussions? I'm thinking of something other than just pursuing the established line and the established policy. If you remember back in the late 1940s, Prime Minister St. Laurent and Lester Pearson, who was Secretary of State for External Affairs, took an active part in promoting NATO. In the late 1950s, or the middle 1950s, Mr. Pearson produced the formula for stopping the war in the Middle East, for which he won the Nobel Prize.

Is there some new initiative Canada could take in present circumstances? I suggest there may be. To begin with, I think we should eschew the use or the possession directly or indirectly of nuclear weapons. This would mean abdicating the Defence Production Sharing Agreement with the United States, it would mean refusing the manufacture in Canada of parts and components for US nuclear weapons. They are produced at the moment by the plants of Litton Industries. It would mean cancelling the umbrella agreement with the United States and the agreement to test the cruise missiles in Canada. And probably it would mean our withdrawal from NORAD. However, I do not think it should necessarily mean our withdrawal from NATO. We weren't asked to withdraw from NATO when our government reduced quite substantially the number of Canadian troops in Europe and decided not to supply our airforces there with nuclear weapons. At the time, if I remember correctly, we were urged not to do this on the grounds that the Europeans would be worried about it. They were concerned if we did these things, the United States might follow our example and do the same, and they certainly didn't want that to happen. At the same time, that we would decide to give up anything to do with nuclear weapons, which I would remind you was part of the policy program approved by the Liberal Party prior to winning the election in 1963. At the same time Canada should declare itself to be a nuclear free country. And we should ask the United States and the Soviets to agree to respect that decision. I discussed this with everybody I met in Moscow and their Deputy Foreign Minister, was receptive but he pointed out that there were certain problems involved because he said if for example, a country should launch in their direction, it would be in the interests of the Soviet Union to knock those missiles out before they landed on Soviet soil. I think that is a problem, I don't think it is insurmountable, and, having thought about it, I think there are some modifications that could be made that would overcome that difficulty to quite a

considerable extent. I think that having done this, Canada should then take the lead in urging other countries to follow our example. That is assuming that the United States and/or the Soviet Union would agree to respect our decision to declare this country a nuclear free country. If enough countries did this, followed our example, then I suggest we collectively should be in a better position to bring pressure on the super powers to destroy their nuclear weapons. If, I don't know how many people would go along with this proposal, it would be bound it seems to me, to be able to exert quite a lot of moral, not physical but moral, suasion on the super powers. A move along these lines would I suggest to any politicians who might be present this evening, something to be proud of and perhaps apart from that, save some lives, although I've always said, and I've spoken along these lines, that if there was a nuclear holocaust, I expect we would all be better off dead at the beginning than sometime later. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman: Thank you Mr. Gordon for your comments and also for your commendable brevity. Mr. Harker is our next speaker and he is Director of International Affairs of the Canadian Labour Congress. He previously was Executive Director of the Professional Association of Canadian Foreign Service Officers and Research Officer for the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada. Mr. Harker.

John Harker: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'd like to offer a few proposals for choices whereby Canada could contribute not only to global security but also to the avoidance of nuclear war by accident or by default. In the process, I'd like to hope that I can help stimulate much more Canadian debate on all of these issues than we've seen in this country in the last couple of

years. During her presentation, Helen Caldicott mentioned a profile that was recently published of William Clark and he told the reporter that he dealt with these issues with a certain trepidation. Not because of lack of experience or background in number of years, but in consideration of the gravity each of the issues. On both grounds, I feel a certain amount of trepidation in making suggestions, partly for that reason, my suggestions are more prosaic than they are earthshaking, if that is not in bad taste. The very first of our speakers, David Steel, mentioned in his opening remarks the work in these areas of Hans Deitrich Genscher. I don't know if Schlesinger would call Genscher an idealist or a realpoliticker but then he offered a fairly comprehensive view of the issues exclusive of the military aspect because other Germans had done that not long before him. He mentioned that the danger now is not primarily of an attack on Europe in the form of a great war but rather the danger to our security lay in the gradual shift in the balance of power. So I was heartened to read his remarks that he was very much in favour of a realistic policy of detente, by that trade and other social contacts with the Soviet Union, but accompanied with a firmness which I think Bob Ford endorsed and he mentioned, for example, that proceeding on the basis of their idea of freedom and with the view to security and peace in Europe, Western democracies must not and cannot remain silent in the face of suppression of freedom in Central and Eastern Europe. They must call for the realization of human rights and he did that in the framework of the Helsinki Final Act. The first proposal I'd really like to make is that concerning the Helsinki Final Act, I think that the government ought to be sure in preparing for the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, a very serious effort is made to consult, perhaps through the mechanism of the consultative group on arms control and disarmament, which has not met, I'm very displeased I have to say, since March of this year. Another outcome of the Helsinki review meetings looks to be a possible

meeting in Ottawa, concerning the human rights aspect. I'd like to suggest that the government do what it did back in October of 1980 in preparation for the Madrid meeting when a parliamentary committee held a number of meetings on the subject. I think that ought to be resorted to in preparation of an Ottawa meeting. To help with such a meeting and to generally stress more assertively the role of human rights considerations in Canadian foreign policy, I think these do relate to our security. I think the government ought to respond to suggestions made in the last years in appointing an ambassador of human rights. Genscher dealt of course with the Third World and I know its not a homogeneous entity. He made it very clear that in providing assistance we would be attending to our security needs as well as doing the right thing, as Eugene Rostow has said we should do. He did say we should not attempt to export our own political, economic and social models to the Third World and he emphasized that we must not allow ourselves to be misused as protectors of outused, unjust structures. This morning Marcel Masse raised questions as to what kind of aid, how does it relate to defence questions. I think these are the kinds of questions that the Canadian government ought to see discussed at interagency meetings of development agencies. Concerning the work of our own aid agency, I think to ensure that development assistance does improve our security, and for a variety of other reasons I've proclaimed before on many other occasions, I think that the budget of CIDA must be turned around greatly. Much more assistance must be given to NGOs and recipient countries through the mechanism of Canadian NGOs. This of course goes without saying that there are enough providers already or could be to ensure that the aid wasn't to provide AK47s or to train guerilla insurgencies, a wealth of difference between those two points. One part of the Third World that I'm very concerned about at the moment is obviously Central America. As an illustration, if we're really concerned about our

security, we could try to ensure that all democracies in having dealings with that part of the world, remain true to their own ideals in the way they dealt with developments there. An American writer who deals with Latin American has said that over the last few years, the United States has become satanized by the Soviet Union, satanized in the eyes of the publics in our democracies and, for that reason if no other, I think it's incumbent on Canada and other countries to start taking initiatives even at the risk of incurring displeasure with our American neighbours. For example, we must, even though the Kissinger Commission may try to go beyond its mandate and arrive at a consensual American foreign policy and seek to pre-empt the work of the Contadora Commission, we must, in Canada give a great deal of support to the efforts made by Latin Americans themselves to resolve conflicts in Central America. There is a debate going on about our relationship to OAS. I would very strongly urge that this government make sure in a variety of ways that it strengthens the programs of the OAS irrespective of the question of membership, especially in its emerging work in two areas, one, human rights and secondly, on the very important aspect of creating jobs in Latin America. Concerning Latin America, while I'm still on it and in light of our real need to strengthen regional attempts at securing peace in the areas of the countries concerned, I understand David Steel's friend, Mrs. Thatcher will be coming here in the next couple of months. I think it not at all improper for the Canadian government to very strongly urge Mrs. Thatcher to move away from Fortress Falkland and look to an internationalized solution to that conflict. Now all of this I suppose could be said to stem from the kind of approach elaborated by Genscher. It obviously goes back long before and it's interesting to me to note that Ambassador Ford is here and has said many of the same kinds of things, because George Kennan when he wrote a work on American foreign policy in the early 50s, spoke about these

issues and emphasized that democracies had to be much more true to their own ideals and values in dealing with the outside world as a result of the emergence of Soviet power. We ought to bear that stricture very much in mind. Kennan made it very clear that democracies had to remain true if they wanted to develop their own security through their values in terms of how they dealt with aspects of their own societies. And I'd like to say that this government has to keep this in mind when it manages its relationship to organized labour. I was very heartened recently when for example, Government Ministers sent cables to the Government of British Columbia protesting about that governments attempts to take away human rights legislation in that province and protesting their treatment of their own public employees. There are great difficulties in managing relations with organized labour but I think the government ought to bear in mind that this also has some bearing on our security. It's interesting that organized labour has an ally recently in terms of its own economic policies in this country - an ally in the form of the churches. It's now precisely the churches and the unions which are now making up most of the organized element of the peace movement and the major concern, in fact the only focus at the moment, is the Cruise Missile. Prior to the outcry about the Cruise Missile, we had helped develop along with other trade movements in an organization representing a hundred million men and women, a series of policy proposals about all of these security and disarmament issues and quite frankly, we've been told to forget about pursuing these and concentrate only on the Cruise. I would like to say that maybe Canada can ensure that the next time the NATO Foreign Ministers get together for one of their informal meetings similar to the one you hosted here, they should perhaps try to ensure that the leaders of this international trade union body which include the leaders of the trade union movements of the United States, Germany, Britain and Canada are invited to

discuss with those Ministers, exactly their more comprehensive views on these issues. But it is the Cruise that concerns us at this time, and I was interested to note that when Chancellor Kohl spoke to the Austrian paper Die Presse over a week ago, he talked about the coming deployment. I'd never once mentioned the Cruise Missile, of course, he mentioned the Pershing missile of what we hear nothing in Canada. In fact what we do hear primarily is that the Cruise Missile is a first strike weapon. All of us know, this is not the case, but that image has been left in the minds of many people in this country and it goes back to the causes of insecurity that we discussed this morning. I wonder if a different use had been made of the consultative group over this last year, perhaps that impression would not have been so visibly left. I think it would be useful for the future that there be an annual meeting between the consultative group on disarmament and a parliamentary committee. It can be an informal, but I think there ought to be that airing of views and I think that now that Alan Beesley has given away the fact that he's off to Geneva before very long, it might be an appropriate time to think in terms of recasting the role of Ambassador for Disarmament from the role he's played so very well and to try to involve the public much more in this issue by looking to the public to provide an Ambassador for Disarmament. Now I've mentioned the fact that the consultative group may have helped us abuse this notion of the Cruise as a first strike weapon. But had it dealt with it much more thoroughly, it would certainly have emphasized the fact that the Cruise is seen as not being subject to verification. Although, in some forms, it may be. I think that it should be a major goal of Canadian policy over the next few years to seek every possible effort we can, every possible way of making a major contribution to improving verification. This follows on pretty well from the Prime Minister's address at the Notre Dame Convocation and to the UN General Assembly. I can think of two ways that this

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ought to be done. I'd like see the Government make it possible and make it attractive to the Canadian Institute for International Affairs to host a symposium on verification with Eastern European bodies, have it conducted more or less in public to try to generate some, not only visible concern for verification, but some real ideas. And also, I think that it's perhaps timely that the government give some consideration to a unilateral implementation of what was called at one time the Waldheim Proposal, where a certain proportion of a country's defence budget would be a marked peace resource, and I think it should be made available primarily to groups such as universities and trade unions to work on this question of verification. I said that unions in Canada are strongly at this time against Cruise testing. I understand the justification for the testing decision was largely based on our adherence to the NATO two track policy. Can that hold for developments such as the Stealth Cruise? I don't really think so. The government should make it very clear that no more will we test any nuclear delivery systems in Canada. I think this should be done very emphatically. I know that it's only part way to being a nuclear weapons free zone, which some people would decry as being only a little bit pregnant, but incrementalism is sometimes the only steps we've got available to us. That would have to be accompanied by some very firm steps in favour of collective defence. By that I'd like to emphasize that we should now make it very clear that we want to see a denuclearization of the North Atlantic Alliance. By that I don't mean dismantling all nuclear weapons. I think we should join very emphatically to push for raising their nuclear threshold in Europe. Sonnenfeldt, before he left, said well who knows what kind of mix is involved here, how do we go about it? Again, let's try to bring together the protagonists, perhaps the Americans who contributed their paper on foreign affairs and the Germans who responded to it. Why don't our Ministers of External Affairs and National Defence have them

here and lets have a serious discussion about just what the fears are and just how far we can go to raise the threshold because if we're not seen to be concerned to do it, we will never allay the fears that we need to allay if we are able to move on to the kind of world which Helen Caldicott has called for so graphically. I'd like to see that done. And by the way, I don't think it's that difficult to point a way in which this mix can be arrived at. Even General Rodgers has made it fairly clear that there are certain things that should be done, as has a body called the Union of Concerned Scientists. This is another trade union effort to be involved in the issues, these people aren't trade unionists, they are scientists who have come together to deal precisely with what kind of conventional defence could the Alliance bring together to avoid early use of nuclear weapons and, hopefully, any use of nuclear weapons. Here maybe we have a national contribution to make. We are said to be very proud of our microelectronics industry. I don't know to what extent it's engaged in military production. But maybe our microelectronics industry could be in some way put to use in trying to help improve the command control and communications systems which are said now to be so essential for conventional defence. And part of the guidance system being developed for the Cruise Missile being built in this country, could we not try to ensure that the work of Litton and other organizations be devoted more to working on these precision guided munitions. I know that Helen Caldicott was against them and we've got to be against the use of all weapons, but maybe if we work on them, it can again be a Canadian contribution to raising this nuclear threshold. That deals with weapons and communications, but obviously there is this fourth imbalance which experts here have talked to, and I was interested by Helmut Sonnenfeldt saying that the last few months have seen progress in the MBFR. I've talked to a few officials here and none of them

know to what he was referring. Maybe there is no progress whatsoever. Walter Gordon mentioned the word logjam, a good Canadian word, and maybe Canadians ought to try some steps which could break logjams in this area although I begin to suspect there are many people to don't want to break any logjams in this whole series of talks. Maybe if one of the problems is inspection of forces to determine for example, numbers of forces, could we in Canada not suggest that the United Nations be invited for example, to look at our Canadian contingent. And make an open report on its strength and disposition. Now I know very well that Machiavelli said its an error for princes to come together in their persons to consummate what their envoys had failed to do, but our ministers of the crown are not yet enjoying that exalted rank and maybe one of them could lead the Canadian delegation to the MBFR or one of the other negotiations in an effort to assure the public that we are trying to break any logjams that currently exist. The last point I want to make concerns this question that Walter Gordon has raised. I've moving up from ministers towards princes. We come to the Prime Minister. I don't think there were many voices around this table who said the Prime Minister should not go to Moscow. I did hear it expressed that he should not go there as a self-professed mediator. I think that is entirely appropriate. I think the Prime Minister should go to Moscow but I would like this to be done only when the Government had made it very clear in practical ways that we were trying both to emphasize collective defence and to denuclearize Europe. I think that once this is firmly in the minds of the Canadian public, perhaps it could be after the Prime Minister went to New York, and emphasized the inviolability from our point of view of the UN Charter, could he then go to Moscow and make it clear that he was trying to make a real contribution and not acting in a role which we are totally unfitted to play because I don't think that we should do things at this time that would

indicate a neutralist bent. I think that is entirely out of place. That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman: I'm going to join the discussion at this point and then we can have a general round of questions or comments. Before we conclude, John Halstead is presently a consultant and a distinguished visiting professor at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. Before John obtained these very important titles, I used to know him as a member of the Department of External Affairs and our permanent representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels and later as our Ambassador to Bonn but I am glad to see him in his new emanation as a distinguished visiting professor.

John Halstead: Thank you for that distinguished introduction Mr. Chairman. With your permission I'd like to use this opportunity first to comment on some of the remarks made by the previous speakers, if it would be appropriate, and second to put forward some ideas of my own on the subject of choices for Canada. You won't be surprised I think to hear that I agree very substantially with Albert Legault's presentation. Many of the options and suggestions he has made are ones that I think are worthwhile examining and I have very little to add to his presentation. I have to say however that on the other hand I disagree with a good deal of my neighbour's presentation, not certainly with that part that suggests that we should be active in East/West relations, that Mr. Trudeau should take the opportunity at the right time to visit Moscow, that we should have our own dialogue with the Soviets, but I have great difficulty with his concept of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear war and what we can do about it. He

said that there can be no defence against nuclear war. Our purpose, I suggest, should not be to defend against nuclear weapons but to make sure they are never used. Our purpose is not to fight a nuclear war but to avoid one. And I think the way to do that is to make sure that any potential aggressor makes the calculation that he would lose far more than he could possibly gain by the use of force, the use of any force, because, in the world as it is, the use of any force by a nuclear power is not going to be controllable, is not going to be limited to conventional weapons. I think Canada should be concerned to make what contribution it can to this objective of preventing nuclear war, but I don't think it can best do that by attempting and I use the word attempting advisedly, to withdraw Canada from its new political situation. The Russians, I suggest, in their reaction to a suggestion of a nuclear free, making Canada a nuclear free zone, recognized that, and I think that to declare Canada a nuclear free country and to do some of the other things Mr. Gordon suggests, rather than enhancing security and enhancing the likelihood of better controlling and possibly reducing nuclear weapons, would increase insecurity because it would imply a renunciation of the NATO policy of deterrence and deterrence is designed to do what I described a moment ago, that is to ensure that no one calculates that the use of force could pay off and I don't really see how Canada could take a step like declaring itself a nuclear free country with growing support for present NATO policy, whether that would necessitate Canadian withdrawal from NATO at that point, I think, becomes irrelevant. Because we would have opted out. I found many of Mr. Harker's suggestions very interesting and constructive. I certainly agree with him on the need for more Canadian debate on these issues and on the need for a better dialogue, if I understood it properly, between the Government and Parliament and the public on these issues. I believe some of his suggestions in that regard merit serious consideration. I also agree very much with

the ideas he picked up from German Foreign Minister Genscher. I think those are ideas which are indeed being considered in the NATO Alliance. He suggested as I understood, that we should pay greater attention to human rights. I agree, but with a serious cautionary note because I think human rights must not be handled by the West either in such a way as to create such an impression either that we see it as a stick with which to beat the Soviets or regimes with which we don't agree, particularly the Soviets, or more seriously to undermine the Soviet regime. That will simply stiffen their resistance to coming to grips with, as they must, in my view, sooner or later, with the internal demands for more respect for human rights. So I think we need to eschew the self-satisfaction of making a declaration on the subject in favour of more effective, moral pressures which avoid this impression that I have suggested. Also in connection with the Third World, we need to avoid the impression of preaching, of knowing better how they should handle their affairs. I think there are some interesting suggestions about initiatives we could take in the arms control field; verification is certainly an issue that deserves more serious study. I agree also with the idea of raising the nuclear threshold. I will say a word in a moment myself. I find the phrase "denuclearization of NATO", though, an unfortunate one because it suggests perhaps wrongly, but suggests that we are going to wish as an alliance and indeed that we are going to wish that nuclear weapon somehow out of the world, and I don't think that is realistically possible. Now what are Canada's options in the area of collective security and of improvement of East-West relations. Incidentally, it puts the question in the right way because, in my view, effective security policy must combine defence and foreign policy, so I like the combination of collective security and improvement of East-West relations. It's always been difficult to find a Canadian security policy, defence policy and Albert Legault referred to this because of

our view of the political situation. We're between two super-powers but there is no military threat to us, as such, apart from the threat to the United States. The defence of our own territory by our own forces alone is clearly impossible and therefore I suggest the neutrality option is not a real option. That leaves in my view, only two possibilities. Either to do nothing, Albert Legault's Icelandic option, I suppose, which in my view would be incompatible both with our sovereignty and with our self respect. Or contribute to our own security in cooperation with others. And that is the option we have followed and it is an option which has given us far more than we have contributed, not because we have not contributed enough but because the sum of the parts is greater than the whole. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts, I mean. And also it gives us the right to a voice in the councils of war and peace. That point may not be decisive, it clearly can't be from a country like Canada, but at least it gives us a voice. It then becomes a question of with whom and how we cooperate. Well, we cooperate at the moment and have been cooperating with the United States in North America to protect the nuclear deterrent. And with the NATO allies in the North Atlantic and in Europe to maintain the conventional deterrent. And, incidentally, this reinforces our political economic and cultural ties with those countries which happen to be our closest and most important partners. A difficulty is of course and it always has been that the Canadian contribution can only be small in proportion to the total and can never be decisive. So it's hard to get a high degree of satisfaction from this sort of effort. But I suggest that that doesn't make it any less important or necessary. If we were to think of leaving this collective framework that we're in, I suggest we would lose far more than any conceivable gain. There are other options within that framework which could well serve Canada's interests. Theoretically of course, there are the two big options:

(i) concentrating on a contribution in North America; or (ii) concentrating on Europe. From my part, I don't believe either of those two options would be in Canada's best interests and I will say why. One would deny our transatlantic vocation and indeed our stake in deterring war in Europe which is one, such a war is the most likely, trigger, still the most likely trigger, for nuclear war between the super powers. The other option would neglect our own defences and our stake in the ultimate nuclear deterrent. The fact is that we are caught between the United States and Europe - that is our position and we can't move the country. Now with regard to North America, North American defence, the problem for Canada now and in the immediate future is to find the most effective form of contribution for us in what is a newly evolving strategic situation. A situation in which I think, as Albert Legault mentioned, Canadian territory as such is less important because of the changing nature of the threat from bombers to missiles, but where our stake in being involved in and having a voice in, having information about, the defence of North America. Is it anything greater rather than less? Because of the sort of weapons and Cruise Missiles, Soviet Cruise Missiles, that could come into play. In that situation, I think we should have a serious look, for example, at how we can enhance our contribution both to the interception task and to the early warning. To have the warning of the radar task, and I'm thinking here particularly of AWAC aircraft. There are also possibilities of making a more active contribution through transatlantic understanding and cooperation, in my view. We have a role as an interpreter, not as a mediator. I agree with that distinction and whoever said earlier that there is no mediating role for Canada because the other powers don't need that role. I agree entirely with that, but I do think there is an interpreter role because of our unique position in understanding the Americans and having a special relation with them on the one hand and on the other sharing

many of the perceptions of the Europeans. And sharing many of the problems of being the allies of a super power. So I would like to see us pursue that role more actively, more vigorously. I would also like to see us stress the interdependence between North America and Europe, between North American security and European security and I'd like to see us push for measures that would reflect this and by that I mean specifically, that NORAD should be brought within the NATO framework. I think that would do an enormous amount to demonstrate that the Alliance is for the defence of both North America and Europe and not for a North American contribution to the defence of Europe only. And I think this is becoming an increasingly important psychological factor in the matter of Alliance solidarity. I know that there are objections to this in Washington, have been in the past, but I think it is time to suggest that this question be re-examined in light of the present and future problems of Alliance solidarity and other relevant factors. In any case, it is surely in Canada's interest because it is in the interest of transatlantic solidarity that we put this idea forward. I also think that we should suggest that Europe make a contribution, the European countries, or some European countries, make a contribution, if only symbolic to North American defence, by which I mean specifically, North American air defence. I think although that may not come as the most welcome idea that the Europeans had ever heard of, that is no reason not to put it forward. How to put it forward, just when and how, is the matter for serious consideration. But there again, I think this could make an enormous contribution, psychologically, to Alliance solidarity at this time in terms of course of demonstrating to the Americans that the Europeans recognize that the Alliance is for the defence of North America as well as for the defence of Europe. Now I think Canada can only do things like this if our own defence effort is substantial and credible. I think the steady increase has been made in the

Canadian defence budget in the last few years is praiseworthy but it did start from a very low base. I think that in terms of our having the sort of influence it is clearly in our interest to have with our allies and first and foremost with the United States, in these matters and in other matters of foreign policy which I'm going to come to in a moment. It is of great importance that we not only maintain, but, I would suggest, increase further our defence efforts. Then we would have the option of also making a greater contribution, to raising the nuclear threshold. This suggestion has been put forward by many people and I think it has much to be said for it. I think that a Canadian contribution to raising the nuclear threshold would be fully consistent with the sympathies of the Canadian public and the interest of the Canadian people in reducing the danger of nuclear war. We could do this by strengthening or perhaps more effectively, offering, making a conditional offer to strengthen our conventional forces in Europe. If there were general Alliance agreements that conventional forces generally of NATO in Europe should be strengthened. In connection with our forces in Europe, it has often been suggested and here again Albert Legault dealt with this, that we should consolidate our force commitments in Europe. Again by concentrating either on the central front or on the northern flank, on the defence of Norway. I have to say that I think either of those options would create a greater political sacrifice in terms precisely of our credibility of our defence efforts and any military gain. I have another variant in mind myself, which wouldn't do that but perhaps would square the circle by moving the air group back to Canada where it could strengthen North American air defence and also be available if necessary for the northern flank commitment. And move the last brigade group from Canada to Germany where it would be more readily available for the northern flank commitment and would also serve the purpose, at the same time, of strengthening conventional forces on the cen-

tral front. That I think would serve the objective of greater specialization, consolidation and also make a very positive political impression. With a more credible defence effort, Canada could also make a more vigorous effective and contribution to the political dimension of East-West relations. I agree with those who have said that there has been a growth of global insecurity. But I disagree that the basic public concern either about nuclear weapons as such or about the shift of the power balance against the West. I think the public uneasiness embraces much wider questions about defence and foreign policies of the West in general and of the United States in particular. Questions such as deterrence versus war fighting capability, military equality versus superiority, confrontation with the Soviet Union versus accommodation. In other words, what foreign policies is the military strength of the West designed to serve? In the last analysis, it poses the question of confidence in the leadership of the United States. I think that the management of East West relations is basic to this and the greatest need and the most urgent need is for an agreement and coherent Alliance strategy to deal with East West relations. We should of course, acknowledge the rivalry and the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the West, but we should try to minimize the danger of confrontation and Canada could make the useful contribution to this by proposing in the proper way and at the proper time, what I would call the new western approach, perhaps not new but newly articulated western approach. I think we should advocate an approach which is realistic, non-ideological, non-provocative, positive and consistent. By realistic, I mean that we shouldn't make the Soviets either larger or smaller than they really are in life. That we can recognize not only their strengths but also their weaknesses. We should also make a greater effort to understand the way the world looks from Moscow. By non ideological, I mean not that we should ignore our own ideals and values but that we should avoid adopting a

mirror image of the Communist ideological approach. By non-provocative I mean that we should not give in to Soviet pressures and demands. That we should choose very carefully where we will be firm and make sure our firmness is related to clear boundaries of unacceptable behaviour, clear and clearly defined boundaries of unacceptable behaviour. By positive, I mean that we should constantly keep in view the possibility of a more constructive and more reciprocal relationship with the Soviet Union if the Soviets are prepared to meet us half-way. And most important of all perhaps, we should be consistent in applying both incentives to good behaviour and deterrents to bad behaviour. This is important not only to reduce East-West tension and the danger of East-West confrontation but also to construct a framework in which the changes which I, for one, think are going to come sooner or later in Eastern Europe, can take place with the least threat to East-West balance and stability. An improvement in East-West relations is essential, also in my view, to real progress of any kind in the field of arms control and disarmament. I think it's self evident that you can't expect that minimum degree of mutual confidence in a situation of deteriorating East-West relations. Not that the Soviets should feel too confident, they should feel insecure enough to want an arms control agreement but not so confident that they don't need it. We don't need to wait to improve East West relations, we should press the sort of approach which I outlined, but we don't need to wait for that to press for a more vigorous effort to pursue the arms control negotiations now in process. But realistically, I think it most unlikely that the Soviets will see it as being in their interest to negotiate seriously, and they have not been negotiating seriously in Geneva. They will not see it in their interest to do so until they are convinced that NATO will go ahead with deployment of missiles and after that we probably should look to a combination of the start and not an end of negotiations. I think Canada should continue to press for complete test ban

and control of weapons in outer space and I also think that although the idea of no-first-use is a dangerous and unacceptable one. I don't see why we shouldn't consider seriously some form of declaration of no-first-use of any force, not just no-first-use of nuclear force but of any force. I think the West lost an opportunity when it simply ignored and brushed off the Warsaw pact proposal, or non-aggression pact. Not that I think we should have accepted that as such but I think we should have used the opportunity to say that indeed there is scope here for a reinforcement and a reaffirmation of what is after all a basic UN principle. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman: Thank you Mr. Halstead. I have two participants who wish to speak. It's twenty to eleven and we have just about used the two hours that we had assigned to our work this evening and I don't intend to keep you here very much longer because the meeting begins tomorrow morning at eight thirty and it would be foolish to stay here too long. But I will hear Mr. Caccia and Professor Griffiths, who indicated their interest. Then I will call the meeting to a close. Tomorrow morning, on the agenda, we have reports from the Rapporteurs and, as you have noticed in this particular session and the earlier two, we have not had reports from John Holmes and Mrs. Critchley and I had arranged that they would present their reports tomorrow morning. I will expect the Rapporteur for this particular session also to report tomorrow morning and I would hope in the light of the time pressure, that these reports would not exceed in length 12 or 15 minutes each. At twelve minutes I will be looking with a beady eye, and at fifteen I think will be asking for conclusions so that I can provide some hour and a half or so for participation, particularly on the area of discussion that we have hardly discussed, namely

choices for Canada. I don't think we have time tonight to do it fully. If we save an hour tomorrow we could do our work between eight thirty and eleven and if that is agreeable, I will call upon Mr. Caccia and Professor Griffiths.

Charles Caccia: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will attempt to answer briefly if I can, the last question of choices for Canada, which reads as follows: in what directions should Canadian policy and practice be moving? I will premise that attempt, which will be short, by indicating that I start from the following premises. One: that it seems to me that we contribute a hell of a big chunk of geography to the NATO alliance. Two: that, in addition, we are located between the super powers. Three: that for reasons of good political management, we have a good credit both in Washington and in Moscow. Four: that, these are of course personal conclusions based on experiences that I will spare you now because of the late hour, that peaceful coexistence and the search for a modus vivendi is too important to be left to the super powers and finally, that in my perception of public opinion, a process of which I am a student, more of a consumer than a producer, and I speak with the blessing of a limited knowledge of it because that is what keeps me in politics, because it's always so private. That there has been a shift in fears from fear of one enemy or the other to a fear of it - it being the ultimate nuclear explosion. I do pledge my full commitment to western democracies and to the values that we hold. But at the same time, and I don't want to sound irreverent, I'm deeply disturbed by the political capital that our enemies can make when they look at us in our relations to South Africa, the political capital that our enemies can make when they can point at us and at our system which allows some 32 million unemployed in the western democracies, and to the racial struggles some western democracies have witnessed, namely the

United States in the twenty and thirty years. Yes it is true that Afghanistan was bad or is bad. So was Viet Nam, with the only difference that Afghanistan was at the doorstep of the one of the super powers. Yes it is true that the H bomb is bad, so is the neutron bomb. There is however, a shift in population thinking namely, for those born after the years 1940 or '45 are gradually becoming larger in the electoral polls, who do not look in the same way as most of us that we've heard until now, in the tradition of confrontation between the two systems and the two powers. When in 1978 Canada put forward at the United Nations the gradual suffocation policy and again in '82, it was possibly one of the most ingenious proposals that unfortunately did not see the light of day, but which certainly reflected an attempt in the long term to bring to a slow halt the long term investments which then pay out in nuclear increases in weapons. I'm constantly drawn to this issue when reading as you do in either reports or newspapers, comments by a dying President Eisenhower or retiring admirals or generals when they make comment upon the trend in the weapon industries and the trend within NATO or other systems. Why do they say that at that time? and why do they say it at all? Evidently if there is something that bothers them, it evidently bothers us as well. Evidently there is a hopelessness in the nature of the escalation process. And I ask myself how we can forever keep on believing that one of the super powers will accept or negotiate with the other in a position of equality or inferiority. I wouldn't nor would you. We couldn't accept it. I don't know what the answer is and this is why I'm saying it is too important a business to be left to the super powers to resolve. I also ask myself if there is political will. From my experiences in Madrid and in Geneva, the lack of political will remains deeply embedded in my memory. Just one month ago, I will just quote a short paragraph, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in Madrid on July 17th,

in addressing the heads of the delegation of state of the CSC says: "We're also aware that controversy exists in the wording of a sentence designed to "encourage efforts to implement the final act". Since the words "genuine and positive" used to describe those efforts appear to be duplicative, we urge the compromise that the words "genuine" be permitted to remain in the text and the reference to "positive" be dropped." It is an interesting and revealing document that is available to anyone and I don't dispute that to decide to suggest to drop the word positive may have very serious implications but somehow for the uneducated, unwashed onlooker as I am, this is a symbol of something broader which one would call lack of political will. As to all of you, I'm sure this is a very serious situation and it is a very dangerous game in which we are all engaged. I sense also that the people in Canada somehow are looking to us in answer to the final question of course, to us desperately looking for the government take and play a certain role in the world. Some of it has said along with other things, that Canada is facing a dilemma in this respect and perhaps he's right, politically we are. I hope however that we will overcome this dilemma and that in the months preceding Stockholm, which is now scheduled as a conference emanating from the CSCE accord, that a country like Canada would perhaps take an initiative in this field, prepare the ground in the time preceding this particular conference. And that this initiative perhaps could be taken with a country in the Eastern bloc, such as Hungary perhaps, which has established itself as being rather in good compliance with CSCE principles. And maybe with some selected nations of the non-aligned group. Perhaps a joint effort of this kind might then indicate to the superpowers that there is a broader base for an initiative that would reflect what seems to be a growing willing public opinion. I believe that our participation in NATO, Mr. Chairman, is a good thing because it gives us a greater voice than we would have otherwise if we were an out-

sider, but we have to use our participation as a leverage for the purpose of achieving if not disarmament, difficult as it is of course, but at least a form of peaceful coexistence. Sometimes, and I will conclude with this, I have an impression that there is a deliberate calculation in Washington, and I will defer of course for a final conclusion to Robert Ford who is our goalie in this matter, that there is a deliberate calculation in Washington to bring the Soviet economy to its knees through arms competition but I fervently hope that this is not the case.

Franklyn Griffiths: Our policy choices won't stick unless we get our domestic act together. The Cruise testing debate has been a dog's breakfast. We don't have the capacity to define security issues for ourselves, so I have two suggestions. First, the press reporting on security issues is a shambles and a disgrace. If we want to get the newspapers in this country to report decently, it's going to take money. I would suggest that if the government of this country is serious about defence and foreign policy, it would provide tax incentives to newspapers, select newspapers across the country, to hire defence and foreign policy correspondents for a short while and we'll get it going. I'd say secondly, the Department of Defence over the years has been dishing out money to regional centres of expertise at the universities. I'd say this money has been wasted by and large. We need, I think, in this country, a place, if not a Rand Corporation, an institution where we would have people gathered together and you would have a weight of opinion and a capacity to interact and produce. I'd ask you really to consider, how much value did DND get for its money from these various centres in the Cruise Missile discussions? What input has come, public input? I'd like to hear about it.

Chairman: Let's adjourn. It's four minutes to eleven. We'll see you at eight thirty.

SESSION C: CHOICES FOR CANADA (Cont'd)

John Holmes: ...I think that you and Mr. MacGuigan will be happy to know that in political science theory now, Canada has turned from liberal internationalism to neo-complex realism. I'll give you his book so that you understand it. I am an unregenerate liberal internationalist but I have a somewhat dated nostalgic perspective. After listening to Mr. Schlesinger yesterday and Mr. Gordon, I thought I'd like to call myself a liberal internationalist realist because I found his very pragmatic approach, his functionalist approach, very much in keeping with my thinking and I think in keeping with the general Canadian tradition. I was a little less happy about his attitude on international institutions in general and I would like to draw to his attention and yours the fact that what he did was stress the importance of an international institution - that is NATO - because I think we ought not to think simply of the U.N., but of a great complex of international institutions, a galaxy, all of which fit together and ought not to be too closely centralized. I am glad that Robert Ford and John Halstead and others straightened out what I think was a misinterpretation of what he said. That is, of course not a question of Canada having to maintain loyalty to the United States or tow the American line; it is a question of Canada maintaining its commitment to the concept of collective defence within NATO which was of course an original Canadian decision.

As pointed out, Canada is an undefendable country, especially by just our population, and we ourselves opted some years ago for collective defence. Not to defend the United States, but in the defence of Canada. And this is a kind of basic commitment. I think one of the great troubles, and I think what's distorted so much of our debate about defence here, has been that people have been losing sight of the fact that this was an original Canadian decision. We can opt out of it, we can say we no longer believe in collective defence, we are perfectly free to do that and I think it is an option we should keep looking at, but provided we accept all the consequences. One of the

troubles I think, of course, has been the distortion of NATO by the media, and by others - I think of political leaders, professors and others, especially now.

NATO, in very much the Canadian concept, was a community of states. We stress that very much. It was a community of fourteen or fifteen countries. It was not a bilateral relationship between a mythical creature called Europe and a mythical creature called America. For us, NATO as a community of states is a tremendously important area. It is, it has been, frequently stressed here as really about the only place where we can hope to have some influence. It is only through - that is why I remain as an internationalist - particularly for Canada, it is really only in international institutions that we can make ourselves felt. There is very little that we can do on our own. I think we've had a little too much stress perhaps on the importance of the single Canadian initiative but we also need to restore our confidence. The idea, the distortion and the concept of NATO as something the United States invented and has run ever since and the rest of us to have to obey, I think undermines our grasp of the issues. I think the United States is partly responsible for this by its unilateralism, but on the other hand I think we also have to remember that we have ourselves really asked for this kind of American leadership - we have accepted it, we've expected it - when the five powers were not able to do what the charter wanted them to do for collective security, the United States has quite often unilaterally decided to carry the buckets; it's taken the leadership. Sometimes we don't like it.

Now this does not mean, what I am saying, that we have to agree with all NATO decisions. I wish, I think our cruise missile testing debate has been distorted both by the "pro" and the "anti" who keep discussing it as if this was a question of our doing something as a favour to the Americans whom we expect to defend us. The Americans do not defend us, we are defended by NATO. But we have to make our own contribution to it and, when I say that, I think that one has to

look at this concept of collective defence in starting anything like the cruise missile. I don't think that automatically means that we favour the testing of Cruise missiles. It's just that this is a context in which I think it should be debated. If I might suggest, Walter, I think those who don't like our tight military alliance with the United States ought to say so, rather than attacking NORAD. NORAD is not a treaty with the United States. The only alliance we have with the United States is NATO. NORAD was a special kind of an arrangement for the defence of North America if the balloon went up. The reason that I make this point is that, I think, if you want to do away with a relationship you have to go back to Ogdensburg when we sucked the Americans into helping us with our war. Or you have to go back to the agreements of 1947. But if we are going to have a defence arrangement with the United States, let's for heaven's sake have NORAD, because what NORAD does is to protect the Canadian role, to make sure that you haven't got the United States simply moving in and doing everything. I think if we are going to have relationships which are inevitable with the United States, it's a good idea to have something like this which sets out and protects the Canadian position.

I was a little less happy about Mr. Schlesinger's general comments about international institutions. I also think the importance of financial institutions, and we've certainly seen that and the necessity of having something like the IMF and international bankers move in swiftly. The IMF may be an imperfect organization. It certainly is, but nevertheless something has to work. It's just my view and I think this is why I later took some issue with Mr. Rostow. I think this is all knitted together. I don't think that you can pick and choose quite that much between financial institutions and others. What is at stake it seems to me, and I go back to something my old boss Hume Wrong wrote from Geneva in 1939, that, in the clash of arms, the will, the expectation, to have international agreements of any kind is threatened and I think this is what we face now. It isn't Communism that's the danger, it's energy. There is such cynicism about international institutions and

I think this is one of our Canadian roles, to do something about it. I am particularly disturbed about the attitude of the United States towards the U.N., and I think this is one area, in spite of all the difficulties Allan Beesley pointed out yesterday in doing something about it, I really think that this is what we have to keep on trying to do. I'd like to think that what is happening in the United States now, is an aberration. It is not in tune with the great American tradition of leadership in the development of international institutions. I would like to see the Americans get their come-upance over the Law of the Sea, but on the other hand there is not much comfort in that.

Let me just cite briefly, I think a fascinating article, by Lee Ratimer in Foreign Affairs. He was a - I don't know if he was a leader - but of the American delegation - and he's a conservative who says he doesn't much like the Law of the Sea as it is, but he ends up saying "and when the United States does eventually join, the rules of the game will already be set and our industrial competitors will be operating in the seabed and will have gained by then major political and economic advantages in the work of the new institution". But this is food for thought: "Our senior foreign policy makers should understand that once leadership is abdicated and the world finds that it can proceed without us, it will not be easy for the United States to reclaim its influence." As I say, it would be nice to see these people get their come-upance but I do not look forward, and I don't think we should, to a United Nations without United States leadership. But what we have to do, somehow or other, is to hang on to them, help them out as we can. I know Americans find this unbearably patronizing, but I really do think this is what we have to try to do, especially around the U.N. because it is important for us.

The whole trouble of the League of Nations was that the United States was not a member. We don't want to go back to that. Now, we have this marvellous talk from Robert Ford and I'm not going to pretend to summarize it. It reminds me incidently of the superb review he did in 1954 which I had the occasion to look up and which I

think had a great influence on Canadian thinking about the Soviet Union, and it still looks awfully good after thirty years. I would just like to point out several things, or ask questions of things which have to do with the international institutions. One has to contemplate, in a sense, the failure of the functionalist hope. The hope that by getting the Soviet Union more involved in world trade and economics, back to the functionalist concept, that then they would recognize a responsibility, they'll recognize the importance of international institutions. I think there is still some hope here, but certainly Robert's cool interpretation did not leave much room for hope. I would like to ask him, on the other hand, what is the Soviet attitude of what I would call international service institutions, the utterly indispensable, the things that we forget when we say the U.N.? What about the World Meteorological Organization, for goodness sake? If it weren't for the world weather watch, no plane would get off the ground. The Universal Postal Union - all this is part of a complex thing and that's why I think we have to hang on to all of it and not think that the United Nations is simply a noisy General Assembly. Do not the Russians also depend on that? The satellite countries - I shouldn't use that term - but the Eastern European countries some of them are finding GATT of importance to them.

In any revival of the Security Council there isn't a great deal of hope here, although frankly it seems to me that in many ways it's the Third World that is a little more of a problem about rational use of the Security Council or even the General Assembly. You still have, I would think, what the Charter, which Mr. Rostow so well explained yesterday, did depend on - this deep basic belief that the five great powers did have some common interest. And they do have that one common interest still, which is the fear of nuclear war and that you do have this restraint which several people pointed out in Soviet policy at the present time.

Well, Mr. Torrelli on international institutions I thought, was fascinating. It's wonderful to hear the French in their process of demystification and I thought he demythologized the Third World very well. I would just remind him that Tiers Monde of course was a French invention in the first place. They're quite right also in that, in a sense, we invented it because at that particular point we needed a troika. The idea was that you want a third force and there it is. But it seems to me the concept probably has outlived its usefulness. The idea of Argentina and Chad being part of a group! It would be hard to convince them of course that the group of 77 is not still an important tactical negotiating weapon for them. On the other hand to carry the group of 77 unanimity to things like Afghanistan or Israel, doesn't seem to me - and of course they don't do it in spite of what we say - to be helping the General Assembly or the Security Council. But also this idea of somehow or other breaking down and regionalizing international institutions, I think there is a lot to be said for it.

I am thinking also about something that Hal Sonnenfeldt said the other day. He said, about international institutions and other things that perhaps some of the things we were planning for the Third World weren't really acceptable to them or us. In being a dedicated believer in international institutions, I think it's important to shake down our expectations and the pretensions. I'm glad we got rid of the totally unworkable concept of universal collective security which we dropped fairly quickly because it was quite unrealisable. I find the new international economic order somewhat worrying. I worry a little also about - I can see the tactical reasons for our arguing with the Americans to accept Global Negotiations - but I must say Global Negotiations worry me somewhat. But the idea of "sud/sud" negotiations and more responsibility for the Third World I would think is entirely wise.

I might just touch quickly on regional organizations. I refer to the permanent question of whether or not Canada should join the

Organization of American States. I've always thought that the important thing was for the United States to resign from the Organization of American States; not because I think it's a bad influence, but because it can do no good, as President Kennedy found. Anything it does is wrong and I think the United States has become a scapegoat. Latin Americans can't organize themselves, they can't run themselves and they can always blame American interference. So I would like to see them pull right out and leave the Latin Americans to look after themselves. That's an over-statement, to make a point.

Chairman: John, you're coming close alright.

John Holmes: I will now wind up. Just to say to Mr. Torrelli, I think you cannot write off the United Nations, the hopes that are there; you cannot abolish the Security Council; you cannot abolish the General Assembly. They are there and they are there to stay and so are all the rest of them. And the worst thing, I think to do, is to sit cynically on the sidelines and wash your hands of them. You've got to do something. You've got to work for this purpose. Well, I'll just end up by saying that I think there are several other things I could talk about - if anybody wants to raise the question. We didn't talk much about human rights and the question of sanctions and if one judges by the questions in the House, the only thing that interests Canadians is our Foreign policies, our positions on El Salvador and South Africa. I wish we had a little time to look at that. But let me repeat again that I think that our job is largely in reviving and working in international institutions. We need international regulation, we need GATT. I'm so glad that when the Americans want to take us to GATT over FIRA we said, certainly, that's the civilized way of doing it and I hope we agree on both sides to the recommendations to strengthen international institutions.

I think one of the real paradoxes that we have to accept, if I can borrow the title of a book that Michael Tucker contributed, called

"An Acceptance of Paradox". One has to live with these paradoxes. There is a strong desire and I entirely understand it; people want great Canadian action - Canadian initiatives, Canada doing something. We have to live with that. On the other hand, all the things that I can think we are doing is our good old fashioned quiet diplomacy. Now this is where we can pull our weight and we do have to. I'm all for telling Margaret Thatcher that the U.N. is the only way out of her inevitable dilemma in the South Atlantic, but you can't do it in headlines. If it's announced in advance that when she comes to Ottawa Mr. Trudeau is going to tell her that, it's lost. This is too bad, but I think it's just one of the many paradoxes we have to live with. I'm sorry, Mr. Minister.

Chairman: Thank you very much. Harriet Critchley, please.

Harriet Critchley: I was asked to report on the session on arms control and disarmament and I think my first reaction to that session is that it was quite remarkable in that the presentations almost entirely avoided discussion of the thematic questions that were printed on the program.

Professor Rostow did address the first question: "What are the prospects for success in the different sets of negotiations?", and I'll return to this in a moment. He tactfully, more or less, excused himself from the second: "What is the role of the smaller powers such as Canada?" and he did not consider the third: "What economic considerations come into play in arms control and disarmament?". Dr. Caldicott avoided all three, except in the most indirect and implicit fashion. And instead, we got a current example of a long-standing and fallacious reason for the cause of war. That is human nature. While the other gave a current example of a long-standing, and to date unsuccessful recipe for peace, and that is enforced world order. Professor Rostow in his recipe for peace, or at least less international anarchy, recommends a clear, determined, cohesive policy to get the Soviets to give up their imperial dream and accept

fundamental norms of the State system as expressed in the U.N. Charter. While he suggests that the Soviet desire for stability may lead them gradually to this position, there remains, to my mind at least, the clear implication for a requirement to force them to do so, especially in light of Soviet views on what international law consists of and their views on the legitimacy of wars of liberation. With respect, Professor Rostow, I submit that this particular recipe for peace requires an enforcer. Who will that be? Will it be the U.N. and its fractious Third World as characterized by Professor Torrelli? Will it be the West as a whole, or the U.S.? Will it only work if the Soviet imperial dream is replaced by an American or a Western imperium?

Dr. Caldicott has argued that the cause of war, especially nuclear war, is man's mode of thinking or human nature, at least the male half of it. But that mid-brain mode of thinking and reacting is responsible for Mozart and criminals and philanthropists and literary geniuses. With respect, I submit that a factor like human nature which explains everything per force, ultimately explains nothing about the cause of war. On the level of instinct as opposed to thought, it's probably true that the instinct for survival is stronger than the instinct for hate, at least in many cases. I have no expertise in this area so I can't really comment on it except to say that the instinct for survival also leads to self-defence, arming and war. And indeed, perhaps the answer to Mr. Halstead's question, "How do we explain the absence of nuclear war for past thirty-odd years?", is maybe the instinct for survival. Professor Rostow talked about the "political theatre" aspect of arms control using such terms as incredible charades, and cynical postures. Dr. Caldicott treated us to some political theatre. A note perhaps about your audience may be in order. I'm quite sure that everyone in this room agrees that the outbreak of nuclear war would be a catastrophe of unimaginable dimensions. Many of us are quite familiar with the destructive effects of nuclear weapons and indeed some of us, yours truly included, teach it on a regular basis. For future reference for

Canadian audiences, you might like to know that I prefer a one megaton explosion, an airburst of five hundred feet. That's more likely to fall on us through malfunction from either the United States or the Soviet Union and it's more impressive and realistic in terms of the statistics for destruction of Canadian cities given their relatively small size.

On reflection, I found the presentations and the commentary extremely disturbing for an evaluation of present Canadian arms control policies and priorities as well as an attempt to generate fruitful options for arms control and disarmament policy in the future. Canadians in general, and Canadian Governments, have taken some pride in our arms control and disarmament efforts in the post-war years. And I'm beginning to wonder whether that pride is misplaced or misguided. The Mutual Balance Force Reduction talks, a long series of negotiations in which we've been actively involved, is labelled as an incredible charade by Professor Rostow. He's also labelled the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, another priority item on our arms control agenda, as a cynical posture. What disturbs me is the nagging idea that Professor Rostow may indeed be characterizing these two efforts correctly. Dr. Caldicott recommends scrapping our whole arms control and disarmament agenda in the various national and international fora for two items: one, bilateral rapid nuclear disarmament and, second, a non-intervention treaty signed presumably by the superpowers. What disturbs me about these recommendations is that, first, we have only two to three years in which to accomplish it - if I heard Dr. Caldicott correctly about the prognosis of death of the world - and, on the subject of a non-intervention treaty, it raises the question, what do the super powers do about their allies and friends? Do they simply cut them adrift? If so, I have serious doubts that such a treaty would promote peace and stability of either the nuclear or the conventional variety. I might also add that perhaps the bilateral nuclear disarmament idea - and as I say presumably this was in reference to the super powers - may be welcomed for a variety of reasons in the United Kingdom, France and

China as it might restore them to world power status just as rapidly as disarmament proceeds, not to mention the slightly longer time frame for world power status for the near-nuclear states.

Ambassador Beesley's comments were equally disturbing in yet another way. He reports that others of our currently cherished arms control attempts - that is of policies and mechanisms such as the Barton Group, particularly in the UN context - have become a source of American displeasure and consequently a further manifestation of the lack of Alliance cohesion. I submit that this development is a matter for the most serious consideration on the part of those in the United States, Canada and elsewhere in NATO who place a premium on maintaining Alliance cohesion. And if I may add another personal note, I agreed with Ambassador Beesley that the Canadian peace movement is concerned and frightened, but again, with respect, I would disagree on characterizing many of their members as knowledgable. Dr. Caldicott's misuse of the term, "first strike", in her references to the increases in the numbers of first strike weapons is a case in point. Mr. Harker mentioned this matter, and the consultative group of the Department of External Affairs, how those meetings helped to clear up that particular confusion. But his call for initiating verification studies in the universities and within the trade unions combined with his lack of reference to the very important and influential work that Canadian government officials have given to this matter indicates to me at least that there are many important facets of the factual situation which are misunderstood, or not known by many elements of the Canadian peace movement despite the fact that these facts are readily available in the public domain.

To return to Professor's Rostow's presentation, he also mentioned INF and the START negotiations. Both, again, are areas where Canada has a less direct role, but to which the government assigns a considerable importance. The American START policy, according to Professor Rostow, involves significant dismantling of both American

and Soviet current strategic systems that are already deployed. Such dismantling, if it indeed were to occur, would be a first in post-war arms control. And while many may hope for such a success, I think the short term possibility for success in dismantling current deployed systems is probably negligible. With respect to INF, and here I'm taking the liberty of combining the views of Professor Rostow and several of the seminar participants. Success again appears to depend on some combination of dismantling existing modern systems and the potential efficacy of public relations ploys for the temporary goal of winning presidential elections. It seems therefore the short term prospects for success in INF are negligible. When we combine this roster of disturbing information, with the recognition of difficulties with arms controls as an intellectual concept itself, arms controls is a form of intellectual seduction. It's a simple and elegant solution to an extremely complex problem that has bedevilled us throughout history - the problem of preserving peace and security. We think that by controlling arms, by reducing arms, we either promote peace or have less war at the very least. But we should remember that that whole logical chain of thought is based on a theory that is highly selective in its historical data - that the increase of arms promotes the advent of war.

To summarize the apparent results of our combined analysis at this seminar, there is a pervasive feeling of lack of security or a fear of lack of security connected with a pervasive recognition of change over the past decade and a half, or two decades, of change in the strategic military balance to parity. There is public misunderstanding and mistrust of some of the fundamental concepts that have been the motivating factors for Canadian and indeed Western and NATO defence policy. There is a feeling, for example, that the "two track" decision is bankrupt, that it will not achieve serious Soviet efforts of negotiation, that therefore ground launched Cruise missiles and Pershings will be deployed and consequently the Soviet Union will follow through with its threat to deploy yet other new system. And we're right back to square one. There is also a public

misunderstanding and mistrust of the foundation of much of our policy in deterrence theory. People have difficulty understanding why, when we recognize how catastrophic use of these weapons are, we build them, and stock-pile them to prevent their use. There is a logical disjuncture there which the public at large has a great deal of difficulty with, and that our governments are not addressing either in terms of.... (incomplete)

It seems to me that we've gotten ourselves into a first class mess, intellectually and in a policy sense. Dr. Schlesinger was referring to how we are dependent upon a nuclear crutch, with the implication being that we'd prefer not to be. Others have talked about raising the nuclear threshold by increasing our conventional armament without addressing the very next question as to where are we going - the resources and the political will required to raise a nuclear threshold. If Canada was, for example, in my mind with considerable effort, to triple the size of its armed forces in general or those in Europe, this would be regarded as almost a revolutionary change in the proportion of the defence budget in the priorities of Canadian government policy given to defence, as opposed to social policy and economic policy. In spite of the risks of such a revolutionary change on the part of the government, what difference would it make to NATO if they had fifteen thousand Canadians instead of five thousand Canadians in Lahr? So we have to address, I think, some of these rather serious questions. I think we've gotten ourselves into a first class mess that is of dangerous proportions. As dangerous for peace and security in Canada as in the Alliance. It's dangerous because of the discrepancy between the government's perception of the national interest and the public's perception of the public interest, Mr. Marchand. And it's also dangerous. And something that hasn't come up in our discussions; the lack of attention to the fundamental shifts that are occurring in Canadian and Western societies in terms of their industrial and employment structures and how these may affect our national security and peace relationships. I realize we're very short of time. I wouldn't indeed have the presumption of

suggesting answers to these questions, I would only like to highlight the fact that I think they are serious and fundamental questions and they merit our focussed attention, hopefully this morning. Thank you.

Chairman: Thank you very much indeed; Mr. Tucker.

Michael Tucker: I looked over my notes, from last night's session at approximately 12:30 am, my time. I found myself puzzled, amazed. What I found were areas of agreement between all three speakers and the commentator, Mr. Halstead, on certain fundamentals of Canadian security policy. I never anticipated that Albert Legault, Walter Gordon, John Harker, and John Halstead would agree on certain fundamentals, although there are differences of reason, approach or emphasis. It may of course have been the late hour or wishful thinking, or it just may be all very Canadian, which is well and good. I have a fear of course that some of last night's speakers may want to pounce on me for what I am about to say in emphasizing these curious areas of agreement and this may mean that I've done my job as rapporteur very badly or very well. At any rate, I thought I would just list briefly, if I may, these areas of agreement.

First and foremost, I think, was the seeming consensus or emerging consensus on the need for our maintaining our distinctiveness from our giant neighbour to the south. I think for this reason, perhaps largely for this reason, all of the speakers supported our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Clearly all shunned neutralism as a possible option in Canadian security policy. What this suggests to me - and I suspect there is probably fairly widespread support for this around this table - is that the Alliance for the next decade or so should be the first priority in Canadian security policy. Albert emphasized what he saw as a drift towards continentalism; the United States becoming more important for Canada in both strategic and economic terms as a key reason for emphasizing and re-emphasizing the NATO commitment. Two of the speakers last night explicitly stressed the value of the

Alliance as a stabilizing factor in Europe, which is our first line of defence. And, as far as Canada is concerned, the most likely area of the outbreak of war. Two clearly stressed the value of the Alliance for intelligence-gathering purposes. Two mentioned the value of the Alliance for Canada, not as a mediator, but as an interpreter, that was John Halstead's distinction, I think it's a very important distinction, and I think it's the line of thought that we might want to pursue in our discussions this morning. Is it real? On what grounds?

Three of the speakers emphasized the degree of flexibility for Canada's options under the umbrella of a firm NATO commitment. Two of the speakers detailed more their personal analyses of Canada's force structure roles in the Alliance over the next ten years or so. The degree of specialization is between the central front and northern flank roles and associated political and logistical problems. I simply pose the question, if we want to look at this dimension of the Alliance relationship this morning as an aspect of Canadian security policy. Three of the speakers, and I found this intriguing, noted the necessity of increased attention by Canada to Alliance options in terms of a Canadian technological role, especially in the domain of conventional defence. I could not decipher in any of the talks last night, any opposition to an increased Canadian conventional commitment to NATO Europe. Three emphasized the need for the Alliance, and for Canada as a member of the Alliance, to move away from a heavy emphasis on nuclear weapons by raising the nuclear threshold, reducing thereby the likelihood of nuclear war in Europe.

And two of the speakers, if I remember correctly, suggested that this would have a salutary effect upon Canadian and, more broadly western, public opinion because it is this fear which has in large measure stimulated such phenomena as the peace movement. I'd hasten to add, Mr. Chairman, that this is, I think, perhaps a subject that we might like to take a look at very closely this morning since I think there

is considerable support here for this notion, that it is an idea which I used to support very strongly. I found it appetizing, I found it morally appetizing, and I found it intellectually appetizing. I still find it morally appetizing. It may indeed reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. The problem I have with it, well, I can see that there are economic and logistical problems and Harriett certainly mentioned the economic side to this, but I just might mention the possibility of an arms control problem with this concept. The original and primary aim of arms control was to reduce to likelihood of nuclear war. The problem I have with the conception of raising the nuclear threshold is that it may make nuclear war more likely. To raise the nuclear threshold ipso facto puts increased emphasis on conventional defence, and I ask, do we want to put increased emphasis on conventional defence in a war-prone continent like Europe? Might we simply not tempt fate? Might we not have the development of thinking, very serious thinking in certain quarters in both in East and West, about a return to war as a useful instrument of policy? The dilemma here of course, is that we are not going to get rid of nuclear weapons in Europe, not altogether. There is no way. There is no way that I see this occurring. Not in the near, perhaps in the distant, future. To talk of war in Europe is inevitably, I think, to talk about nuclear war in Europe simply because of the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe. To talk about limited nuclear war in Europe is, in my estimation, inevitably to talk about major nuclear war; because the nuclear systems in Europe surely will act as they are suppose to act, as a tripwire to the central strategic systems. Be that as it may. I think that was one very important area of what I detected as consensus emerging from the discussions last night that we should look toward raising the nuclear threshold.

The second area of agreement was the need for more nuclear arms control as a key priority in Canadian security policy. As Albert said succinctly "This is not an option but a right". Implicitly or explicitly, it was felt that we had a right to speak up more,

especially but not exclusively within the Alliance, on arms control matters. If I may, I'd just like to deviate from this for a second, partly for purposes of stimulating a bit of discussion on this point. Where can we go in the arms control realm from here? I'm entirely supportive of the concept of speaking up provided that it is appropriate. But I'd simply like to suggest that that is not the only course for Canada and I think that Canadian practice bears this out. Its not necessarily the wisest course, not always, not in the first instance. Two or three of the speakers last night emphasized greater attention still to what has been, as Harriet noted rightly, a serious area of Canadian arms control activity; the area of verification studies. There has been much work done in Canada on this and I hasten to add that we've received considerable respect for our work in this domain in international quarters, in New York, in Geneva and in Brussels and I should add, too, in Vienna in the MBFR talks. I would like to broaden this a bit.

When we talk about verification, we are talking about expertise. We're talking about technical expertise, and what I suggest to you is that in my studies of Canadian approaches to arms control - particularly but not exclusively nuclear arms control, and I guess I would include chemical weaponry considerations here too - it seems to me that where we have had our greatest influence is in areas in which we have been able to bring to bear expertise, of a legal, of a scientific, of a technical kind. It has certainly been true in the CTB, the Test Ban talks, with our work on seismic verification. It has been true in non-proliferation debates where, as a consequence of our expertise on the technical side of peaceful nuclear activities, we have in a small, but important, measure been able to shape a non-proliferation régime as it emerged during the 1970's. It has been true of our activity with CBM's in both the CSCE and the MBFR context. What I would suggest, and I'm thinking here of possible ways in which we might be able to have some sort of influence on the INF and START talks I suspect these two will merge.

What could we offer? I think what we have to look at here are the sorts of weapons systems which are likely to be developed and be deployed say, over the next decade or so, and try and make some sort of assessment as to which of these systems are likely to confer stability. Which of these systems are likely to be possibly destabilizing? Which of these systems are likely to enhance the deterrence? Which of these systems are likely to reduce deterrence? What I'm suggesting is that I think on a technical plateau Canada could make, if indirectly, a useful contribution to these discussions by doing a study of weapons systems and their attributes in terms of their stabilizing and destabilizing qualities. Speak up, yes, but I think we have to do more than this. Expertise, technical expertise, legal expertise, is a very important medium for influence in arms control talks for middle powers such as Canada.

Sorry to deviate, Mr. Chairman, but if I could come back to this second area of agreement which I detected last night. This strikes me as a point that we might want to look at a bit more closely this morning, by implication at least. And I think that a couple of people were very explicit on this point. The Soviet Union was not seen as an implacable foe. The tenor of the discussions last night suggested a recognition of the possibility, the necessity, of reaching accords with the East in order to reduce tension. John Halstead mentioned the need for us in the Alliance, to probe more Soviet proposals even if these appear at first glance to be manifestly unacceptable. I think all four of the speakers would agree with John Halstead that we should be firm with the East, but that we should also be pragmatic and even candid. By implication also I sensed a consensus last night that much of the fear in the West stems not from doubt primarily about malignant Soviet intentions but from loose, if not dangerous, talk in Washington about nuclear warfare capabilities.

The third area of agreement: Three of the speakers last night spoke more or less explicitly of the need for more openness in Canadian

security policy, in Canadian security policy-making, for an increased dialogue between the various sectors of government on the one hand and the sectors of the attentive public on the other.

Area of agreement number four: This was an area where Mr. Gordon and Mr. Halstead thought that they disagreed, but I don't think they did.

Chairman: Mr Tucker, will you try and wind up pretty soon.

Michael Tucker: I think Walter Gordon's comment on defence against nuclear war was consistent with John Halstead's; that we must focus on deterring war. A common ground, to me, is clear - that we cannot think in terms of nuclear war as a useful act of policy.

The fifth area of agreement, Mr. Chairman: Every speaker suggested that we take initiatives in the domain of international affairs. By implication the time is right in international affairs for Canada to take initiatives. A council on foreign policy questions; a group, akin to the London Suppliers Group, to monitor arms trade; the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Canada as a basis for pressuring the super powers toward nuclear disarmament; the appointment of an Ambassador for human rights, to focus our attention more on the sovereign rights of Latin American countries; the bringing of NORAD into the NATO framework to help Alliance cohesion. The differences, where they did exist, were not that stark. I detected only two real differences, one related to our role in NORAD. I felt that two of the speakers would be happy if we edged out of NORAD; two of the speakers would be less happy. And the second area of potential disagreement, if I could call it that, was in the area of human rights where Mr. Harker emphasized a Canadian commitment, the need for a Canadian commitment, to press human rights in international relations. This I think is clearly a legacy of our CSCE involvement. In order to reflect Canadian democratic ideals in its foreign policy, in our foreign policy, Mr. Halstead - and in my opinion wisely - counselled against undue pressure. Perhaps

especially against the Soviet Union because this could rebound in terms of making the Soviet régime more suspicious of the West. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman: Mr. Garigue has been one of our rapporteurs, and he asked if he could come in for a few minutes now and then. Following that I would like to suggest we proceed with our discussion. Mr. Garigue.

Philippe Garigue: (translation): Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. My observations concern my work as rapporteur for the first session as regards policy-setting, and particularly the impact of changes on the way in which Canada will take its decisions and therefore how to re-examine the security policy of Canada. The problem with which we are faced is that, despite the fact that this question was to be discussed in the first session, it wasn't actually discussed. I'd like to come back to it immediately because it was mentioned a number of times during the other sessions but not during the first. And this concerns what we call today the dialogue between governments and the Canadian people.

Now in Canada there is a new dimension with what we could call the political clientele, if you will, of the Department of External Affairs. Normally the political clientele of these people were organisms interested either in international activities or problems of defence, such as associations of defence which the Minister (of National Defence) addresses, every year. But now, in Canada as in all other western countries, there is a new clientele, or a new constituency, which could be called peace movements and which are represented here by Dr. Caldicott. What I'd like to point out here is that the growth of the political clientele of these people through the birth of the social movement is a very a fundamental factor, and I think it's a very important factor. Its as important as the emergence of unions, for example, in Europe, or the emergence of the ecological movement a few years ago in Western countries and elsewhere in the world. That is to say that, for the first time in

history, two departments which were normally considered to be closed in themselves with very little opening towards the population are affected now by a social movement which poses the question of peace and security of the people. That is not about the actions of a government, but rather what the government is doing for the population, for the people and for the security of the people. Therefore we should examine how, in democratic countries, basic social movements which are vitally important for the existence of democratic countries can now be integrated into the decision-making process of these democracies.

We cannot ignore such important social movements as those which we've mentioned - such as unions - be they ecological movements, or, now, peace movements. Therefore the zone of political activity has been created in all democratic countries. This effects the government in its relations with other countries and the legitimacy of its action towards other countries on the international scenes which depends on the attitude of the population. I would just like to point out what happened in the Vietnam war, for example, within the United States, where we can say that the United States did in fact lose. Not militarily; they didn't lose any of the important battles in Vietnam. But they did lose the strategy of the war within the country itself, within the United States. Therefore, historically, we have to take into account this social movement.

And the question now is what are the means, the organizational means or structural means, for consultation which have to be developed so as to allow governments to consult the people on questions which were previously secret within ministries, which were previously questions of secret diplomacy, which were confidential matters of security committees, which we could call, if you will, the secrets of war. I think the question is such a basic one, such a fundamental one, that we should try and broaden the debate here and look at what might happen without the departments. As you know, when the problem of wages, the problem of working conditions, and the problem of

conflicts between employers and employees became systemic in western democracies, governments didn't just create new departments, labour departments, they also set up advisory labour boards. And employers and employees now sit together in advisory boards which make it possible to assess government policies with respect to labour. As a result, the employers and the unions leave the area of opposition and they try and adopt a position of cooperation within the economic growth of each country.

And the same problem occurred with respect to the environment. And I'd like to remind Mr. Caccia here, who is within the Canada Department of the Environment, that a new effort at consultation was developed and this is rather unique in the world. Canada developed cooperation with environmental movements. This removes the hostility which exists in many other countries between the government and these movements. Canada was the only country, or almost the only one, of the western countries where the environmental movement did not create a social struggle or an open conflict. In fact the opposite was developed through environmental councils. There's regular consultation and the possibility of establishing standards of action in order to ensure that the will and the needs of the people are reflected in government legislation. Therefore, each of these councils or boards show that there are ways of operating and innovating in western democracies so as to find solutions for social problems. Therefore the subject which was raised by Albert Legault, about a consultative committee with the Prime Minister for international defence matters, this is not a subject which we can simply ignore or which we could consider as just being the wish of a few experts.

(incomplete)continued or just being a recommendation from certain individuals who would like to take part in the debate and who wouldn't want to be isolated or cut off from this. I think that in fact the question is at a more important level, a very important level. How in the future of humanity, can democratic societies adapt to conditions of survival of war through mechanisms which will make it possible for their population to identify the problem? And while identifying the problem, how can they direct the policy of their government in the most rational way, in the most reasonable way, according to their perception of the needs of the population and according to the need for survival in a very hostile world? I think the recommendation of Mr. Legault is very important and, if he has no objections, I would like to second it and I would ask the government representatives here around this table to consider very clearly what Mr. Legault and myself wish to propose. Because, if the government of Canada misses the boat on this question, then it might be in a very difficult position, as difficult as if it had missed the boat in the case of labour relations, for example, or in the case of environmental problems.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would simply recommend, on behalf of Mr. Legault and myself I hope you will agree with me on this that a Task Force be set up between the two departments, that is External Affairs and National Defence, and the Privy Council, and that certain people should be invited to work on these task forces, and that they should produce a report for the Prime Minister. This is I think the most appropriate mechanism in Canada for developing consultation with the people, with the peace movement, so as to influence and to inform the Canadian government in the development of a foreign policy, a defence policy which would receive the support of the population. I think that if this can be done, Canada would then be setting an example. It would be taking historic steps of vital importance, which would show that democratic countries can, unlike the Soviet countries, adapt to changes in an open way, in a way which would also ensure our survival. Thank you.

Chairman: Gentlemen, we have just a little better than an hour to wind up the discussion, and I certainly want to thank the rapporteurs for their work. I think that it has been a splendid effort on their part to present to us the implications of the discussions. I know that it will be impossible to deal with all the issues that have been raised in the last day or so and certainly in the reports this morning. But there are a number of items that certainly I would like, if possible, for participants to take into their comments later. Out of the reports from Harriet Critchley and Richard Tucker, there was considerable reference to the notion that has been developed around the table of raising the nuclear threshold through increased support for conventional forces. That notion has acquired considerable status in our discussion and it seems to me, if possible, we ought to examine it a bit more carefully as to whether it is indeed a viable option for the Alliance, for Canada, and particularly, what are the cost implications, as was mentioned by Harriet Critchley, and what does it do to the overall fiscal effort of the government and its relative priorities in the overall budget? Maybe you could throw some further light on this particular question.

Secondly, I must say that as I prepared to come to this conference I had very much in mind the question of arms control, and particularly what additional initiatives the Government of Canada could reasonably take in this particular field, in the critical period that lies ahead. It has been pointed out from the very opening session that 1983 and the beginning of 1984 will be extremely critical, particularly with the deployment of the SS-20 and the Pershings in Europe, and the impact that that has had and will have on public opinion. What further can we do, what further steps can we take to facilitate arms reductions, particularly to achieve some results in the INF? And whether, indeed, we ought to be reviving publicly the notion that Mr. Rostow referred to yesterday in the famous "walk in the woods" is that a viable option to be pursued in the field of arms control? And verification was raised: I just want to raise that as

an area of deep interest and concern. Finally, I must say I had a certain amount of sympathy for the comment made by Harriet Critchley when she said that we seemed to be in a mess intellectually and policy-wise. I think that the discussion revealed a bit of the anarchy that we ascribed to the world. Maybe the discussion reflected that anarchy. Is it a defective policy? Are the theories behind our policies inadequate or irrelevant, or obsolete? Do we have to find new principles or assumptions, or have we failed in communicating to the public what really we are doing? I think that in our discussions, we have to address the concerns and the anxieties of the public more effectively than we have. And I wonder if in your comments you might pick up any one of these items; namely, the raising of the nuclear threshold; the next phase in arms control, what can we do effectively, and finally, how do we deal with the whole question of public opinion and democracy? So I just make this invitation in the form of questions. There were other important items that were raised in the discussions that are of equal interest, but I wanted to at least suggest a number that might be the basis for a comment when the rest of you participate.

Seyom Brown: I did want to address the raising of the nuclear threshold issue, without addressing Canada's resource problems, or other countries' resource problems, and to react to Mr. Tucker's paradox that it might cause an arms control problem in itself. I think this is something that has to be worked out, perhaps among yourselves, as to how strong Canada ought to be on this. But I think that there is a rejoinder - an important rejoinder, to his observation or to his suggestion that raising the nuclear threshold may make nuclear war more likely, by putting increased emphasis on conventional defence. Here, he's picking up the German critics on this raising of the nuclear threshold, who say that it may allow the adversary to control the risks, to predict the risks more, and then perhaps it might indeed make nuclear war more likely because war can start, and if a war starts, it could escalate into nuclear war. I think that the rejoinder to this, and it is not simply a debating

point, is that the act of war in central Europe is so cataclysmic, and it will so shatter all of the preconceptions and structures, that any actor contemplating starting a war has to contemplate whether the nuclear threshold is low or high, whether events will be set in motion that could very well lead to nuclear war. So I don't think that raising the nuclear threshold, reducing the automaticity of a nuclear response, if indeed a war starts in Europe, is going to reduce deterrence. I think that that is an argument that in theory perhaps makes sense, but if you analyze how governments actually act in these situations, it appears to me that that benefit of reducing the automaticity, - automaticity, by the way, tempts fate, because people can make mistakes, and they can start wars - is not overcome by the slight risk that there might be a little more predictability. And I just want to close here with one comment on some of what has taken place, one brief comment.

I think that there is a danger of cynicism, and that it is reflected in the notion that this is a mess. It's also reflected I think in the comments by Professor Rostow about the charade of arms control, and this was picked up of course by Harriet Critchley, in indicating perhaps that there was a sort of political theatre. I think that the danger is that we will retrieve from this kind of discussion how difficult it is or how impossible it is, rather than focusing on the very real concerns and the limited progress that can perhaps be made. I think just as one famous justice of the Supreme Court said, Professor Rostow, it is dangerous to cry fire in a crowded theatre, it is also dangerous to cry theatre in a crowded fire. And, we don't want to become Nero's who are fiddling and simply cynically indicating that all of this is theatre when the very real threats - that I think we have to retain from Helen Caldicott's presentation - those very real threats are alive, and human beings do make mistakes, and the world is increasingly anarchic.

Walter Gordon: Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of his remarks, Professor Tucker said he hoped the participants of last evening wouldn't all pounce on him. Well I certainly want to reassure him that this particular participant not only will not pounce on him, but I would like to express my thanks for his effort to include all four of us together and suggest that we agreed on a lot of things. I don't think we did, and I think it's unfair for the others to be swept in with me, even in direction.

About thirty years ago I was chairman of a Royal Commission, and as is quite common in this Country when we issued our reports everybody pounced on us. Our reports were repudiated by the then Prime Minister, Mr. St. Laurent, who shortly afterwards was defeated in an election. The reports were then pounced on by his successor, Mr. Diefenbaker. Well, not only that, but, we made some 56 recommendations in our reports, and I checked up on them the other day, and fifty of them have been implemented. Not too bad a percentage. If we have the same luck under our distinguished Deputy Prime Minister with some of these suggestions, that will be pretty good. Now I would hope, looking forward, that a little more attention will be paid to a suggestion that I made last night, within the next thirty years. And I think of thirty years particularly because if your successors in this department thirty years from now decide that maybe there's something in the suggestion that I made last night, that'll be good in itself. But even better, it will mean that we are all still alive, and I think Dr. Caldicott would think that if we were around here, not necessarily at a similar gathering, but if we were still extant thirty years from now it would be quite a success.

Eugene Rostow: Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to respond to your three questions very briefly, as you suggested. First I'd like to comment if I may on two or three points of Dr. Critchley's brilliant, candid and extremely useful report. First, she said that my prescription for peace, that is, generally enforcement of the rules

of world public order which have evolved from the last two centuries and which are now codified in the UN charter, had never worked. And secondly, she asked who the enforcer of those rules would be. Well, first I should say that such an approach to the problem of world public order has indeed worked. It worked pretty well for a long and fruitful century between 1815 and 1914. That system of peacekeeping has not a very good name in our memory, but nonetheless, in retrospect, it worked so well and to such a degree, that it makes the architects of Europe, Metternich, Talleyrand and so on, look like giants compared with their modern successors. Secondly, who should the enforcer be? Not the turbulence of the General Assembly, I quite agree. My answer to that, based on our experience of the last forty years, would be regional coalitions and collective security in the various regions of the world, not all on the model of NATO, but with NATO in mind. And the United States, because of the importance of the nuclear question, would necessarily be a participant in all those regional coalitions, at least until the Soviet Union, let us hope, comes around to cooperating with the system rather than fighting it.

Secondly, she spoke extremely well, I thought, on the intellectual difficulties of arms control and simple solutions for very complicated problems. And we've gotten into a dangerous mess, as you, Mr. Chairman, have remarked. Yes, I agree with that I think she's right, I think you're right, and that the mess is intellectual, but I think it's very simple and that there is a solution for it. The problem is I think, that for reasons which are very natural and understandable, we regard arms control as a substitute for foreign policy. It isn't, it can't be. We focus on the intricacies of arms control in order to escape from the dismal problem of peace itself. It's become an obsession like bridge or chess, as a defence against thinking about episodes like Korea and Vietnam. My own suggestion is that we make a determined effort to insist on thinking about arms control only in relation to the problem of peace and the problems of enforcing the charter. If we make our motto that we won't talk about disarmament without also talking about its twin, collective security,

we'll be able to answer your question and dig our way out of this particular mess.

Third, raising the nuclear threshold. There's been a great deal of talk about raising the nuclear threshold, and on all sides of this table and of course everyone wants to do that but there is absolutely no point in making the world safe for conventional war. Conventional war is infinitely destructive too. The fire bombing of Dresden and Tokyo was awful. The destruction of society during both the First and the Second World War giving rise to Fascism and Bolshevism and all sorts of other troubles is quite bad enough.

Now there's a much more technical reason for it. We can't do it, it's nothing we can do unilaterally as Bob MacNamara pointed out in his first conference after the publication of that famous article about no first use pledges.

We cannot know that the Soviet Union would follow suit. Their doctrine is to the country, their equipment is to the country. So all we would do in that sort of way is to reduce uncertainty and deterrence is uncertainty. There's no point of it. I don't mean that we shouldn't increase our defense forces, our conventional forces, of course we all know we have to do that. But it's an illusion to think that by doing that we are really changing the nuclear threshold.

Yes, as Jim Schlesinger said, we shouldn't rely on the nuclear crutch at least if we can help it, but I think there's a great deal of loose and self righteous feeling about it.

Now third, Arms Control, what can we do to yield results in INF? The Foreign Minister asks, should we revive the proposal of the Walk in the Woods, a compromise proposal? Is that a viable option? Well, we'll have to see whether that's a viable option, the United States has of course revived it - the President has made a public

announcement that we're willing to accept an interim solution based on the notion of equality and parity at levels which are above zero between us and the Soviet Union on a universal basis, including the Far East. Now the point is that so far the Soviet Union has resisted the notion of Soviet-American parity in these intermediate range weapons by bringing in the British and French systems and that's a very very important point. It is of course a totally false point for a number of reasons. For the Soviet Union to claim a right, that we should recognize through a treaty its right, to nuclear forces equal to the sum of everybody else's nuclear forces is not a claim for parity and is not a claim for deterrence. It's a claim for hegemony. It's a claim for the capacity to intimidate everybody in sight. Now we have to recognize that while the proposal for a compromise along the lines of the celebrated formula of the walk in the woods is extremely promising from our point of view and would make a useful precedent for START, the other side has so far shown no sign whatsoever of accepting it. They may accept it for the reasons I mentioned yesterday in the end. But we have to be calm, firm, steady, resolute and understand what we're dealing with.

Now, Mr. Chairman you asked "What is our failure, what is the cause of this mess?". I think the failure is that for reasons that we all know very very well in our own experience we've been trying to get away from the pains and aches of containment and collective security to see if there isn't a cheap and easy answer through arms control agreements. I think if we adopt the celebrated principle that there's no such thing as a free lunch and take the consequences we'll get out of the mess all right. This is not a cynical or pessimistic position I'm sure, Professor Brown. I'm a strenuous idealist and believe in taking the bull by both horns and so on. But I think we've got to talk sense to everybody, to our own people and I think that, if I may make a simple suggestion, I like very much Professor Tucker's point about Canada's contribution to the intellectual life of the Alliance and public opinion. I've broadened it. Let Canada talk sense to everybody. Of course all governments and all academies

should be doing it but a great many of them don't and if Canada sets a very good example in this regard, it would have an enormous impact on world public opinion and Alliance public opinion.

Let me conclude Mr. Chairman, by saying a word about the thesis which has been heard in many forms here that the source of fear and the spread of fear throughout the Alliance and throughout the West in recent years is not the Soviet threat to the balance of power and all that flows from it, but loose talk in Washington about the possibility of limited nuclear war. Now I find this a psychological phenomenon and of the greatest interest and importance. It's particularly important because of course it's without any factual foundation. What's true I think about the United States government is not that it lusts for a bully little nuclear war somewhere else - that's nonsense - the United States knows perfectly well that there's no protection against nuclear escalation and the taboo against the nuclear weapon works in the United States exactly the same as it works everywhere else. But the difficulty I think is that the United States government (and no other government, this is not a criticism of my own government particularly) has not yet articulated or achieved a consensus either within the country or within the Alliance on what our enlarged military forces are for. If it is a general agreement throughout the Alliance that we have to match somehow or other the rapid increase in Soviet forces of recent years by building up our conventional forces and modernizing our nuclear forces, that's a consensus.

But there is no consensus in the aftermath of the Vietnam experience as to what our foreign policy should be and what use if any we should make of those enlarged forces.

Now the danger I mentioned yesterday, and I want to underline it again today, the danger is of the revival of American isolation, the danger that would be the response not only to the burdens of foreign policy over the last two generations but to the nuclear threat. The

change of the nuclear balance has led a good many very responsible people in the United States to say that our nuclear guarantee is worthless, it couldn't possibly be used, we should pull our troops home and in effect give up having a foreign policy. That's a suicidal menace that we must all keep in mind and fight against, and there's a good deal of sort of angry anti-foreign unilateral muscle flexing going on in the United States, old fashioned nationalistic isolation. Now I think this is the next great task for Alliance Foreign Policy and for everyone else. The government has rejected of course the policy of Fortress America and reiterated that our guarantees are good but they're clouded and in doubt and in the next period I think all of us together are going to have to try to articulate a foreign policy and a security policy which will take into account both the experiences of the past and the nature of the nuclear environment.

Chairman: I have Mr. Halstead, Dr. Caldicott, Professor Griffiths, Mr. Tucker, Mr. Beesley, Mr. Steel now. If there are any others would you please, let me, ... there's Mr. Legault and Mr. Ford. I just want to make sure that I ...there's Mr. Beesley, well, so the reason I'm asking for the numbers is so that I can apply some discipline if we have only two speakers for the rest of the morning then it's a leisurely cantor that each of you can take but if I have this long list

So I would ask Mr. Halstead to set the model by speaking for three minutes and if I begin to put on my light John you'll know that it's just that I want you to stop. Nothing personal.

John Halstead: All right Mr. Chairman. I'll try to meet your wish, I shall not repeat comments I made last night but I would like to address specifically and briefly this question of raising the nuclear threshold by increasing conventional forces and particular the reservations about that raised by Mr. Tucker and Mr. Rostow. I think that we must be very clear what we're talking about here. We're not talking about doing away with the ultimate nuclear deterrent. We are

not going to do away with nuclear weapons. The nuclear deterrent will remain. What we're talking about is raising the nuclear threshold by reducing in relative terms, our dependence on the nuclear deterrent as against our dependence on the conventional deterrent. And I think it's important to recognize that there are two kinds of deterrents. There's not just one kind of deterrent. There's a nuclear deterrent, and that obviously remains the ultimate deterrent but that there is a conventional deterrent and that's the one that's the front line deterrent so to speak and by increasing our conventional forces on the front line in Europe surely we are raising the deterrent. We are helping to dissuade any calculation by the Soviet Union that they could gain by launching conventional war but that doesn't eliminate for the Soviet calculations the ultimate nuclear deterrent, I suggest.

One last comment, if I still have a moment, on Mr. Rostow's talk about the danger of the emergence of U.S. isolation. I submit that that is not the danger. I don't think the U.S. can ever be isolationist again. It is in the world, and it will stay. The danger is of U.S. unilateralism. Of playing a part in the world without its allies. And I agree very much that that is what we have to address ourselves to and we have to be careful in doing so to strike a balance between sensible, reasoned criticism, and continued basic loyalty.

Helen Caldicott: Yes, I just want to reinforce what Mr. Tucker said, that increasing conventional weapons and so-called raising the nuclear threshold is again pre-nuclear thinking. I emphasized yesterday that it is medically contra-indicated to have a war in Europe, even a conventional war because of the nuclear reactors. You should all understand what a meltdown means, it could kill hundreds of thousands of people, with just one reactor. You only have to explode one nuclear bomb high above a country to develop EMP and probably knock down many of the reactors. So war is anachronistic, we must stress this, we must stop thinking about weapons, we've got

to think of conflict resolution. And I think yesterday Mr. Rostow stressed that war is anachronistic.

What does conflict resolution mean? It means getting into the other people's frame of reference. The INF proposal is not getting into the Russian's frame of reference. They are threatened by many countries with nuclear weapons, we must understand how they feel. No wonder they want to count the French and British weapons. It doesn't matter where the bomb comes from, if it hits Moscow, it destroys Moscow. We're not including in the INF proposal the American Forward Based Systems, nor the missiles allocated to NATO in the American submarines. That's not fair. We're still posing an enemy image. Russia need not be the enemy. China was once the enemy, Germany was once the enemy, Japan was once the enemy, we have cyclical enemy images. Which is a psychological problem. And it's very facile and it changes fast, in terms of evolution.

We claim we must match the rapid increase of Soviet forces, I stress again that America has thirty thousand nuclear weapons. Russia, has twenty, but when you're talking about superiority in the nuclear age, its said that Russia can overkill every American twenty times and that America can overkill every American (sic) forty times. It doesn't matter what the figures are, but those terms of superiority in a nuclear age are ridiculous.

I think that what Philippe Garigue said about the peace movement is terribly important, they should be included in policy making, the people after all, are the essence of democracy and if you don't listen to them, they're going to create a big fuss because they're truly concerned about survival. They are ignorant. Why are they ignorant? They're ignorant because of secrecy in the defence department. They haven't been told the truth. People have used this crazy sort of mumbo jumbo defence talk, and people havent't understood it. We've done that in medicine for years, we've been arrogant. We've used terms that people didn't understand so they

died in ignorance. Now we've learned that we have to de-mystify medicine so people understand what's wrong with them. We have to de-mystify this too. Its not hard to understand all this mumbo jumbo stuff, if you bring it down to lay language, which is what we do in medicine every day and we have to stop doing it with our people.

Franklyn Griffiths: One thing that strikes me about this meeting is, I think, the consensus that we all have, that an active defense effort and an active effort on behalf of peace are not mutually exclusive but they are complementary. I haven't heard more, and even trying to read between the lines, any strong feeling of a doubt on this score, and I think that to me this is rather interesting. I draw from that some hope that in this country we will be able to do more of both, in fact. We'll be able to have a more vigorous and active defence effort and that simultaneously, and this is what I would like to see at this phase of the cycle of Soviet-American relations and American domestic politics, a more active Canadian peace effort in particular. I think we are looking at a dual policy, a two track policy, which a Canadian government should be able to make readily understandable, to the Canadian people. I think they would like to see more done - certainly more on the side of the peace effort. But I would think that there is a constituency in favour of a more vigorous defense effort. Should there be, I put this as a question, a new White Paper on defense? To raise the public level of discussion perhaps an alternative would be the Royal Commission that was suggested, though that seems less appropriate.

On the matter of raising the nuclear threshold, I would think that question can only be solved from a Canadian point of view as to what we do here, once we've got our missions and roles arranged for the next few years. Are we going to have a presence in the Central front - an active long term one. If you don't really know what's going to be happening in the Central front in Europe with Canada, I don't think you can really talk about the nuclear threshold at all. It's not a question for us. Do we really make a decision unless we just

go on doing what we've just always been doing.

A last point has to do with arms control and the politics of it. It seems to me there is a lot to be said, as Helen Caldicott has stressed, for getting into other people's frames of reference. I would say, acting in the role of interpreter not mediator at all, interpreter, whether it's in Nicaragua, in our relations with the Soviet Union and Soviet-American relations.

Mr. Chairman, last thing of all, I would like to delete from the records some remarks I made last night about DND's strategic studies programs at Canadian universities. I think they are valuable. I won't go into the details, I would say simply though we do still have a need in this country for some kind of institution which would allow people to have security clearances to come in and really see things from the inside and then go back out and be able to inform and enliven the public discussion.

Michael Tucker: ...I was attracted to Mr. Rostow's phrase "Why make the world safe for conventional war?", I might rephrase that for my purposes and say "Why make Europe safe for conventional war"?, especially if there have to be nuclear weapons around. I don't want to be categorical on this point. The point that I would like to make or emphasize however, is that when we we're talking about raising the nuclear threshold and thinking in terms of strengthening conventional capabilities, there are new weapons options available. I think Helen Caldicott mentioned these yesterday - some potentially devastating. But nevertheless, the development and the deployment of these particular systems could have an effect on thinking, on military thinking, on political choices. Weapons capabilities do at times inform intentions and I think this is a clear danger. I am not suggesting that the Canadian government shun this concept of raising the nuclear threshold or supporting it in Alliance councils. I think it involves a bit more than our own particular weapons choices because it is a matter for discussion within the Alliance at various

levels. I think that should be remembered. What I am suggesting is caution, perhaps extreme caution, in choosing this as a possible concept or basis for Canadian security policy. The other point which I may mention very quickly, Mr. Chairman. I was a bit taken back by the way you phrased the introduction to this discussion: What are Canada's choices in the arms control and I would presume disarmament field? As I understood your comment, you seem to be suggesting that somehow or other we should consider these in light, perhaps primarily, of public reaction. I don't think we should. I think in considering what Canada's choices in the arms control field should be - our primary concern should be how can we help the people in Geneva. I don't think Canadian public opinion is our first constituency here. In the past, in various discussions with government officials and others, I've tried to emphasize what I see as a very important distinction between arms control and disarmament. And I think Canadian public is primarily concerned with disarmament measures - nuclear disarmament measures - I don't think we're going to get these in the short term, and I don't think there is any real way that we can please Canadian public opinion in the short term. Our concern should be primarily with arms control as a means of stabilizing the balance of power.

David Steel: Can I try to make three quick points in the three minutes because you invited us here to try and contribute thoughts to Canadian policy? The first is I would like to re-emphasize the point made by many speakers in the course of the last two days about the potential role for Canada in political dialogue with the Soviet Union. I still believe that there is a desperate need for other powers to try to reduce the basic tensions between East and West which is a role that is not open to the United States. It is a role open to the rest of us while the United States conducts the actual negotiations and I think that that is a very important one for Canada. Accepting Mr. Ford's strictures on some of my earlier suggestions, nevertheless I do think still that part of that dialogue must be continuing to try to inform Soviet public opinion on the

expenditure, the use of resources of the Soviet Union on military build-up in the hope of at least influencing minorities, influencing the young and in particular, influencing the Third World.

That brings me to my second point, because here is an area again where Canada can play a distinctive role. Somebody said the Third World is not going to become cohesive. I disagree. I think the trouble is it's becoming cohesive in a troublesome direction. I was reminded of this by a conversation with some Ministers in Kenya, a few months ago, just come back from the Non-Aligned conference in Delhi. They found they had to keep their heads down over the relatively minor agreement which has been reached between the government of Kenya and the government of the United States for an air base. The fact is that Soviet propaganda throughout the Third World has been far more effective than it ought to be and we have allowed it to happen. And I agree very much with Eugene Rostow that we have got to try to counter the USSR penetration by stressing our commitment to democracy, the values of freedom and the rule of law. And it is again, difficult perhaps for the United States to do that when the present administration has a tendency to support every bunch of thugs that happen to be anti-Communist. The fact that the United States administration may do that does not mean that the rest of us in NATO are under a similar obligation. And I think we have got to be free to pursue these values with the Third World and Canada, I think is in a unique position to help do that. That was my second point.

My third is concerned with Dr. Rostow's point about isolationism. The trouble is that isolationism is becoming mutual. The isolationism of the United States and the isolationism of Europe feed on each other and here again is a role for Canada with its Franco-British heritage, that you can help to act as a bridge. Now frankly, in Europe, in public opinion and I would even say in Parliamentary opinion, the perception of NATO is that there is Europe there and there is the United States there and Canada, to be blunt,

is forgotten and that is largely your fault. I think that we and Europe need you to remind us of your existence and of your particular role in the NATO Alliance and you've got to up your profile very strongly. I think that can help counter the isolationism both in Europe and in the United States, if you will do that. I think that you have to open up the debate on the imbalance of conventional forces. We've got to stop MBFR being a charade. We've got to try to get Soviet reductions in that area, if not then we have got to contemplate in Europe what we can do to increase conventional forces - does that mean in the United Kingdom, for example, that we have to contemplate the reintroduction of conscription?

I think that you in Canada can be a candid friend to us in Europe. You have set an example by being a non-proliferation country. We in Britain, set the wrong example in the 1950's, we became the first nuclear power outside the two super powers, closely followed by France. I believe that you can tell us that to embark on an update of that on a great expansion of independent capability through Trident is wrong. I agree with those who say that, by all means, try to tell Mrs. Thatcher that fortress Falklands is not only wrong but is a diversion of British defence effort. I wish you luck in that role. The last person who tried to do that was the British Foreign Secretary and look what happened to him. As an aside, and don't take this out of my three minutes you know, we have a new British car made by British Leyland which has got a series of recordings on the tape deck and a female voice tells you when your seat belt isn't fastened or when your brake is on or when your door is open and Hal MacMillan just got one of these. A friend of mine went to see him last week-end to do a recording for his ninetieth birthday and he said he's called the car Mrs. Thatcher because it speaks to him and he can't speak back to it...

But my last point, as a post-script, is I do disagree with the point that Eugene Rostow just introduced about the British and French nuclear deterrents. I'm of course not blind to the fact that the

Soviet attempt to introduce these now is a ploy, but I do believe that there is a serious issue longer term here beyond the immediate INF negotiations. I don't see how we in Britain and France as NATO members can say, well we wear one hat as NATO members and therefore we support the United States in their negotiations on the balance of weaponry, but we have other hats that we wear as independent powers and we can have our own deterrents greatly escalating into the D-5 system targetted on the Soviet Union without them taking that into account. That does not seem to be a sustainable position and I would therefore say to Canada don't be dismayed if we in Britain or some of us in Britain (and David Owen and I have not yet decided what our line will be on the actual vote, parliamentary vote, on Cruise missile deployment,) but it may be, to adopt the phrase of this conference, that we have to lean against the wind and because of the refusal of Britain, of the British government, either to contemplate to entertain at any future point the elimination of the British independent deterrent or count to even it in the East-West balance and the refusal to contemplate any new political agreement with the United States on the dual-key mechanism for Trident, for Cruise for example, that we may be forced to vote against. I wouldn't worry about that. But my last point is: let Canada act much more openly as a bridge between Europe and the United States.

Albert Legault: I would like to pick up on a point which has been developed by David Steel which reminds me of a comment John Holmes made when we reviewed our policy in '69. Maybe we would have to withdraw our troops from Europe to remind Europe that they are still there.

Just two quick interventions on some of the questions which have been raised. I agree with Frank Griffiths. I don't think that the issue for us is to settle the problem of whether or not the nuclear threshold can be raised. I mean I have a great sense of uneasiness about this particular question because as an expert I've been discussing this question since 1958. Maxwell Taylor was the first

one who proposed flexible response. It was adopted officially by MacNamara and wasn't accepted within NATO until 1967 because the French didn't concur with the policy of flexible response. And the problems, as I have said yesterday, is that the European countries have a schizophrenic approach to it. They don't want to have a limited nuclear war and therefore they feel the need for conventional forces because they want to prevent a quick reaction by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they don't want to wage a conventional war either and therefore they feel they need the tactical nuclear weapons as a credible response. And there is no way to settle that debate. Substantively speaking if Tom had told me that this was the purpose of the conference I could have pressed a button in the Social Scientific Index computer in Laval and come up with three thousand articles on the subject. You know, I think myself that the real problem for Canada is how best can we contribute to collective security and how best can we specialize. That's my first point and I thought that this is what I was trying to make quite clear yesterday.

The second point is on arms control. Those problems can not be settled quickly and if we want to speak up on the subject we have to speak up with authority. And we mention that we have a lot of technical expertise in a number of areas and obviously, when yesterday I made a suggestion for the establishment of a permanent advisor body in Foreign Policy and Security issues, this is the body I had in mind and you would need experts. I don't think that those experts should feel responsible before public opinion which doesn't mean that they should negate the present, current, public opinion but that they should come up with a policy paper on the subject. Everybody knows that there may be a crisis before or after the deployment of the cruise in Europe. If we have something to say about it, we should have said it three or four years ago. We should have said it last year. And if we have something to say about it, it will take at least a year or two before the people can find out what the real problems are, what the alternatives and the options are. And I think that this is a very serious problem, and I don't think

that we as experts feel responsible for this lack of policy within the government about those particular issues. I think it is the responsibility of the government to do something about it, but I don't think the government has taken the means to do it.

Robert Ford: I'll try to direct my comments first to the suggestion of Mr. Legault yesterday and skillfully developed by Mr. Garigue this morning, of the importance of reaching the public, not just the peace movements, but the general public and to explain a little better our stand and issues. There is obviously a great deal of misinformation about a great deal, a lack of facts. I was impressed by Dr. Caldicott's presentation yesterday; it's necessary for us all to know the effects of nuclear war. It's interesting perhaps that the Palme Commission started out in its very first session with a witness who gave very much the same kind of presentation and a whole chapter in our report is devoted to the effects of nuclear war. But, we went on from that to then say how can we stop this, making practical proposals. Where I depart from Dr. Caldicott is that her presentation, and I make this suggestion constructively, is intended, presumably to push us into more concrete and more specific negotiations with the Russians and it doesn't help if all the blame is put on the United States for the present situation with regard to nuclear weapons, and it doesn't help to equate the United States and U.S. expansionism. I simply say that constructively, because if we are going to get anywhere in trying to eliminate the danger of war, it has to be done by negotiations with the Russians. There is no other way we can do it. And it doesn't help to weaken the Western position by giving the impression that the Russians are totally blameless in this. They are not by far.

Then to take up again Mr. Steel's suggestion, I entirely agree the dialogue with the USSR has to continue. We do have a role to play on that, and I was perhaps misinterpreted when I suggested we didn't have a role to play as an intermediary. That I still believe. But we do have a role to play as an interpreter but that role will only

be valid and helpful if we have something sound and sensible to say, and we have to straighten out our own thoughts on this subject before we can suggest, that a suggestion can be made, that we have something to say to both the U.S. and the USSR. And as far as Mr. Steel's other point is concerned concerning propaganda, we are very much remiss, all the Western countries about that, just on such a simple thing as the radio broadcasts. In France, I can pick up radio Moscow in about five different languages with the greatest of ease. I very often have difficulty getting the voice of America, the BBC is somewhat stronger, I can never get the CBC at all and I never could pick up the CBC in Moscow. I think we're just wasting all our money on Radio-Canada unless we are prepared to pay a little bit more money to produce a technical system which can get our ideas across. And there is a great deal more that we can play on that. I still think that your original suggestion was wrong but so many of the ones that you have developed since are quite right, that we can present our case a great deal better to eastern Europe and the USSR and indeed to Europe as a whole.

Mr. Steel: On that last one, let me interject. There is no international link-up on these radio networks and BBC is trying to find money to expand its networks and it sounds as though you would like CBC to do the same. There ought to be much more cooperation in that area.

Mr. Ford: I entirely agree but I just make a point, a practical point, we aren't getting through even to western Europe let alone to eastern Europe anyway.

Alan Beesley: I'll just try to summarize in point form some of the thoughts that have been going through my mind over the last year relating in particular to some of those which have been raised here today. Firstly, it's increasingly clear to me there is no panacea, there is no single move that Canada or anyone else can make. There are a lot of things that could be done and need to be done and we've

heard some extremely useful suggestions today. But one of the first I believe, to pick up a point of John Holmes, and perhaps even of Eugene Rostow, a point I make frequently, is that we have to try and strengthen the UN institutions, not reform them, but strengthen them, and that includes talking back when we hear denigration of the UN. In many ways we can do this constructively without giving offence. I'm one of those who hopes that there will be an important Canadian policy statement on that subject, either domestically or in the UN, or both. Its essential to defend and strengthen the UN because otherwise, to put it in my own words, I fear the UN could go the way of the League.

Secondly, to go the other extreme in a sense, turning to technical input by Canada, a point made by Professor Tucker, I think it is an area where we've traditionally made that very kind of special input of expertise which relatively few other countries seem to be able to do or prepared to do. Anywhere where we can do it more we should be doing it. We are, already, of course doing a good deal on seismics and chemical weapons and elsewhere and I heartily endorse that suggestion. On the "walk in the woods" idea, it's interesting, and I hope there is some way we could try and find out from both sides whether its still a possibility. We have to bear in mind, however, that vis à vis at least a segment of the Canadian public, it includes the deployment of Cruises. The negotiators didn't seem to worry about the Cruise, because, of course, they don't regard it as a first strike weapon, but nevertheless the acceptance of Cruise development would be one of the disadvantages of the "walk in the woods" approach from the point of view of one segment of the Canadian public.

Another issue that will eventually arise, I feel certain, is the merging of INF and START. It may be the only way of handling this question of the UK and French independent deterrent, because its possible to see both sides of the coin, to see both points of view. From the Russian point of view, if they can't add up everything threatening them by everybody then they're not protecting

themselves. Since only the USA is negotiating with the USSR, it's a bilateral negotiation and nothing more. Something has to be done, however, to "take into account" the French and British deterrent, I believe.

On a relative point, I hope someone is giving thought to the phasing in of deployment in such a way so that the process of gradualism might make it possible to maintain the dialogue with the Russians and pace it to the point where we might even reach an arms control agreement by that means. By contrast a sudden cutoff point, on negotiations - "it's on, it's done", could have the opposite effect. I think Canadian statements are inclined towards the idea of there being no cutoff point, that we can always go on negotiating. I think a study on phasing so as to co-ordinate it with the negotiations would be very useful. (Editor's note: the NATO plan is in fact to phase the weapons in over four years.)

On Canada's possible role of interpreter, I heartily endorse that idea. I'm aware of the constraints but I think that Canada has something to say to both sides and things that they evidently in present conditions aren't able to say to each other, at least in terms that are going to be acceptable or believable. There's a heightening of the hostility, etc.

I think on practical proposals, we do need something in the field of arms control similar to the Institute of Strategic Studies, - a kind of parallel to it. Indeed there is pressure for some type of arms control or Peace Institute, whatever we call it. Thought is being given to this idea I think it would fill a need.

In the light of comments made by Mr. Harker on the consultative committee which already exists, it's a very difficult committee to make work beyond its consultative mandate because it has such a spectrum of views. Its members obviously can't agree on many issues. It could help perhaps, if that committee did meet together with the

parliamentary committee, the House of Commons Standing committee, if the procedural difficulties could be overcome. I think that would be a way of at least moving part-way towards the demand that it become an advisory or executive decision-making body, to have this cross fertilization input from parliament to these experts (and many are experts) and an input back again the other way.

On other, somewhat lesser points, I would find it fascinating to see a study made of a "limited freeze" approach, - a popular move if you wish - but a freeze that would be confined only to strategic arms and one that would be coupled with verification: in actual fact it would be tantamount to a negotiated agreement, but it is worth noting nonetheless that that aspect of the freeze movement is not on the same basis as an overall freeze which would include INF weapons and conventional forces.

On the cutoff of fissionable material, the strategy of suffocation - it is said that it just never got off the ground. It is true that we are having problems with some of our allies on such things as CTB, and with the Russians on such issues as reduction of military budgets; - they are stonewalling, they have no intention of agreeing. So the strategy of suffocation is a marvellous concept, but we're having a hard time transforming it into practical reality. Maybe we should give some thought to the idea of another type of resolution on the cutoff of fissionable material.

One point I should have made, especially to John Holmes, is that Canada has already taken a lead in attempting literally to "reform" the First Committee, where all the debates go on in the UN on disarmament. We have talked to a lot of people; the Norwegian Ambassador is the Chairman of the First Committee, and something is moving. How far we'll get with it I don't know, but we can't continue the process of every group having its own little resolution, with the virtual guarantee that nothing will happen.

My final point is that I tend to see the US position not as one of isolationism but one tending towards global unilateralism. I think that is the danger, and our dialogue with the USA and the dialogue of the Europeans with USA can help Canada contain it.

The last point I would make is that in talking to the Canadian peace movements I ask one thing of them always, to try and be even handed without being neutralist if they want to have any impact on anybody. If they're not even handed, it just sounds slanted, prejudiced and counterproductive.

Eugene Rostow: Would it help if I said one sentence about the British and French weapons systems and their roles?

It's come up and I sympathise with those who don't want to be unfair, beastly to the Soviets although they speak of the British and French systems with open contempt and treat it entirely as a ploy. But you should all know that in the minds of the American negotiating team, while our political position is and must remain, because of the positions of the British and French governments at least for this round, absolutely implacable and clear, know perfectly well, that in Salt I and Salt II, we took the British and French systems into account and, as Paul Nitze has said "Of course we take them into account, we paid for them five times and this time we'll only pay once God Dammit!"

John Holmes: Thank you, I appreciate that. I just would like to get on the record something I would have liked to have discussed and that is the question of economic sanctions, which is a very important aspect of security and we haven't touched on it at all. And you're faced with this paradox. The Charter suggests of course that one goes to economic sanctions, first in Chapter 6 before you go on to Chapter 7. Whatever the Charter says, it's the normal thing to think. When the Soviet Union does what it did in Afghanistan you have to do something, you can't sit back and say it doesn't really

matter. You have to protest. I won't discuss the human rights aspect but people have the same feeling about South Africa or Chile, or other countries. But on this particular question you've got to do something and what we do is economic sanctions. The United States, because of its anachronistic constitutional system makes a unilateral pronouncement, demands loyalty from the allies. It doesn't work, it gets us into trouble. Nothing has done more to disunite the Alliance than the question of economic sanctions. I don't know quite what to suggest. It's related to the whole question of economic warfare. Marcel Masse really put some questions yesterday, and I hope we pursued it in this context. It's all interrelated now, and you now have also the question of sharing technology for purely economic reasons that have nothing to do with security. We're at loggerheads on this, especially in a period of acute economic competition in the world. I'd love to get John Halstead to talk about this because I'm always pinching ideas from him. One of them was the argument that one of the things Canada could do in NATO, maybe this has already happened, is to try to get some kind of agreed understanding about not simply economic sanctions, but all these related questions so we could have some kind of common front, and not this terrible disarray we had over Siberian pipelines and various other things.

Tom Axworthy: I want to conclude by, first of all on behalf of our office, in thanking you all for attending this session, giving up your Saturdays and Sundays to come and help us work our way through some of these major problems. The purpose of this think tank and others which preceded it was not necessarily to arrive at consensus within. Our purpose was to have wide and diverse points of views presented for the benefit of the Ministers and the officials who were here, on all the subjects which we have addressed and that has been in my view achieved in spades by the work of the people in this group. We have had a plethora of ideas on a variety of fronts, I think probably breaking down into three main schools, Mr. Chairman. The first has been the ideas that you raised this morning, and others have addressed. That is Canada taking a hard look at our stance on

defence, at the issue of Nuclear weapons in Europe, whether we can contribute singly as a country or in combination with the Europeans in changing some of our basic strategic stands. This is not to say that this will happen, but that it should be examined and then examined within the government. Vis-à-vis the economy and our social priorities and the other elements that Harriet Critchley talked about, certainly there have been a variety of ideas directed on that front which we will have to ponder. The second is the school, the traditional one, which John Holmes reminded us of. The hard day-to-day slogging and working at the nitty gritty of diplomacy, our stance on behalf of international organizations which is hardly glamorous but something essential which Canada has done, and a whole series of ideas in this area from Halstead talking about perhaps a European contribution to North American defence, Robert Ford's analysis of the Soviet Union, many other speakers who I can mention on the specifics of INF and arms control, all coming up with a series of ideas and suggestions in this element of our approach that we should look at seriously.

The third school, if I may say, is a school of public opinion and involving of people, citizens in our democracy, in this vital issue. Professor Rostow made the distinction in his opening remarks, I believe, that there is no such thing as a Liberal or a Conservative foreign policy. That may be right, but certainly there have been some great liberals who have had a distinct foreign policy approach. I'm thinking of Gladstone, Roosevelt, Wilson, involving public opinion at home in a creative way, both to energize the peoples of the countries and to use it as a force for good in the world. That's a very strong small "l" liberal tradition in foreign policy, and one which was represented here too, when we talk about the need for every citizen to educate themselves about the horrors of war in general and nuclear war in particular and the need to get Canadians involved in this issue as much as possible. That school has been represented and eloquently so.

And though it may be surprising, I think perhaps for the others, the Europeans and the Americans in our group, the fact is that Canadians sometimes have not engaged our full national energies into this kind of issue. In setting up these seminars, the main question we had to answer to our press corps is why would you have a meeting, a think tank, on foreign policy and defence. This was the first round of press questions. Why would you even bother? We simply said because it's probably the most important issue in the world. Now I don't know if that would be reflected in any of their copy, but that's a rather traditional Canadian response. That these problems are other people's problems, not this country's problems. We disagree and hence this seminar. So I want to thank you all for your diversity and richness of views. It gives us much to ponder.

Thank you very much.

Chairman: Thank you Tom, for your contribution. It remains for me to conclude the meeting by saying two things. First of all, that it would be certainly my intention and the members of the department to examine all the views that have been expressed and all the ideas. I certainly don't feel that, even though I have listened very carefully, I have fully absorbed all the ideas and certainly haven't felt yet in a position to relate one to the other and to draw from the very rich series of comments, any personal conclusions or any final conclusions, except that there have been some underlying themes in the meeting around which all or almost all participants have converged. I think that has been to me a valuable observation that there hasn't been total disarray or a total mess. There have been some strong themes around which almost all, if not all, have converged. Thank you very much for what you have done, how diligent you've been, how serious you've been, how careful you've been about your presentations. We will examine all of it and I believe that out of the comments there have been, there will be some impact on Canadian policy.

Mr. Blais is the Vice Chairman of this meeting and I hadn't found it necessary to call upon his able services. Maybe it would have benefitted greatly if I had done so, but if you want to make a comment or two, JJ.

Jean Jacques Blais: Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

I simply wanted to repeat the comments that you've made and adopt them as my own. I was appointed to this particular position but nine days ago. Therefore this context was one in which a neophyte was being educated and I thank you very much all of you for your very clear and very informative contributions. I simply wish to indicate to you as well that the comments that you've made have given me personally considerable food for thought and have made my job much easier. I'm leaving from here to attend with John Anderson a briefing at DND and I know that John in his innermind is saying "I wonder what the hell this is going to do to my Minister in terms of what trouble he's going to cause me or what support he's going to offer". I want to tell you that whichever it is, John, I would hope that it would be in the national and international interest.

Thank you very much.

Chairman: Thank you JJ. I just want to conclude by thanking the Europeans, who have come here and also our American friends. Their presence has been extremely valuable because they have brought a perspective that has helped us. And of course the Canadian participants have been also very much to the fore in our discussion, so I thank you all very much.

VAL MORIN POLICY SEMINAR

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