

THE SENATE OF CANADA



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**MEETING NEW CHALLENGES:
CANADA'S RESPONSE
TO A NEW GENERATION OF PEACEKEEPING**

Report of the
Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs

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TO A NEW GENERATION OF PEACEMAKERS
CANADA'S RESPONSE
MEETING NEW CHALLENGES:

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Extract from the *Minutes of the Proceedings of the Senate*, Tuesday, February 18, 1992:

"Resuming the debate on the motion of the Honourable Senator Stewart, seconded by the Honourable Senator MacDonald (*Halifax*):

That the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs be authorized to hear evidence and to examine and report on matters relating to national security and defence and the future roles of Canada's armed forces;

That the membership of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs be increased to twenty (20) members and that Rule 87(1)(h) be suspended in relation thereto; and

That the Committee present its report no later than March 31, 1993.

After debate,
The question being put on the motion, it was adopted."

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Gordon L. Barnhart
Clerk of the Senate

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Report from the Minister of the Interior, Tuesday, February 18, 1953.

Resolving the debate on the motion of the Honorable Senator Stewart, seconded by the Honorable Senator Macdonald (1953).

That the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs be authorized to call evidence and to examine and report on matters relating to national security and defence and the future role of Canada's armed forces.

That the membership of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs be increased to twenty (20) members and that the Senate be requested to re-appoint the members.

The Committee present its report on the above motion (1953).

After debate, a question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Gordon L. Barber
Chief of the Senate

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FOREWORD

This report, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping*, represents the conclusions of a study undertaken by the Senate Subcommittee on Security and National Defence. The Subcommittee reports to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. It was established by that Committee on March 31, 1992 and authorized "to hear evidence and to examine and report on matters relating to national security and defence and the future roles of Canada's armed forces."

Since then, the Subcommittee has pursued its mandate seriously, hearing from a wide range of witnesses in Ottawa and New York (listed in Appendix B), under the general theme of Canada's contribution to international peacekeeping. From the beginning of the study, the emphasis was on Canada's role and on the Canadian perspective on issues surrounding peacekeeping. The members of the Subcommittee recognize that they have not had an opportunity to explore certain related avenues.

It recognizes, for example, that it has not examined the views and experience of other countries that have engaged in peacekeeping operations. It would be valuable to discuss our views with parliamentarians from troop-contributing countries, which over the years have adopted an approach similar to that of Canada (e.g., the Nordic countries, Australia, and New Zealand) as well as those of countries which recently have taken an increasing interest in contributing, such as France and the United States.

Nor does the Subcommittee discuss in this report the various proposals it heard concerning fundamental reform of the United Nations. These proposals include reform of the Security Council and of the central organs of the UN Secretariat. The Subcommittee may want to return to some of these issues either on an occasional basis or as part of a more formal study. The Subcommittee plans to continue monitoring new developments relating to the second generation of peacekeeping as well as appropriate Canadian responses to those developments.

The Subcommittee has been conscious that it is following in the path blazed by its predecessors: first, a previous incarnation in the subcommittee of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs established in 1981, which produced reports on *Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces* in 1982 and on *Canada's Maritime Defence* in 1983; later, a Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, which completed reports on *Canada's Territorial Air Defence* in 1985, on *Military Air Transport* in 1986 and on *Canada's Land Forces* in 1989.

The Subcommittee wishes to express its gratitude to two Ministers of National Defence; in particular, the Honourable Marcel Masse, who was Minister during most of the time the Subcommittee was conducting its study. The Subcommittee also expresses its gratitude to the senior officers of the armed forces, the various civil servants, retired diplomats, learned experts, and other interested parties who willingly appeared before us and gave us the benefit of opinions based upon their extensive knowledge and expertise.

A particular word of thanks is reserved for the hard work and good counsel of Mr. Patrick Savoie, the Clerk of the Subcommittee, and of Mr. Gregory Wirick, of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the Principal Research Advisor to the Subcommittee. Over the course of the study, Mr. Wirick was assisted in his research by Ms. Katherine Baird and Mr. Mark Glauser, also of the Parliamentary Centre.



James Balfour
Chairman


Subcommittee on Security and National Defence

February 1993

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|-------------|---|
| CF | Canadian Forces |
| CFB | Canadian Force Base |
| DND | Department of National Defence |
| CSCE | Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| DPA | Department of Political Affairs (UN) |
| EC | European Community |
| FOD | Field Operations Division (UN) |
| ICCS | International Commission of Control and Supervision |
| ICSC | International Commission of Supervision and Control |
| MINURSO | UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara |
| MTAP | Military Training and Assistance Program (Canada) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NCO | Non-Commissioned Officer |
| NDHQ | National Defence Headquarters |
| OAS | Organization of American States |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| ONUC | UN in Congo |
| ONUSAL | UN Observer Mission in El Salvador |
| OPO | Office of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) |
| OSGAP | Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan |
| PICC | Paris International Conference on Cambodia |
| SWAPO | South West Africa Peoples Organization |
| UNAMIC | UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia |
| UNAVEM | UN Angola Verification Mission |
| UNAVEM II | UN Angola Verification Mission (phase two) |
| UNDOF | UN Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights) |
| UNEF | UN Emergency Force (Sinai) |
| UNEF II | UN Emergency Force Two (Sinai) |
| UNFICYP | UN Force in Cyprus |
| UNHRC | UN High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNMOGIP | UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan |
| UNIFIL | UN Interim Force in Lebanon |
| UNIKOM | UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission |
| UNIIMOG | UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group |
| UNOSOM | UN Operations in Somalia |
| UNPROFOR | UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia) |
| UNPROFOR II | UN Protection Force Two |
| UNSF | UN Security Force (West New Guinea) |
| UNTAG | UN Transition Assistance Group (Namibia) |
| UNTEA | UN Temporary Executive Authority (West New Guinea) |
| UNTSO | UN Truce Supervision Organization (Middle East) |
| UNYOM | UN Yemen Observer Mission |

UN Yearn Change Mission
 UN Trust Supervision (Interim Middle East)
 UN Temporary Executive Authority (West Bank/Gaza)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Lebanon)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Cyprus)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Golan Heights)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Kashmir)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Korea)
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 UN Truce Supervision Agency (South Africa)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Mozambique)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Madagascar)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Mauritius)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Reunion)
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 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Mayotte)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Comoros)
 UN Truce Supervision Agency (Seychelles)



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I A New Era: What Does It Mean for Canada?

The world has entered a new historical era -- an era of more mobile action and alignment -- which is being shaped by certain key trends: the diffusion of power; the crisis of the state; the rise of aggressive ethnicity and religion; the expanding meaning of security; and the increasing resort to multilateral principles and organizations.

(1) The Diffusion of Power

The bipolar world has been replaced by a much more complex world in which power has been diffused. Different spheres of world politics have different distributions of power -- some of them multipolar, some as much influenced by private actors as by states, and some spheres, such as nuclear weapons, remaining largely bipolar in distribution. In economics, multipolarity appears to be the trend, with new regional blocs emerging.

(2) The Crisis of the Nation State

The principal challenge of the new era may be the crisis of the nation state. A state is a legal entity in which the "peace" or status is maintained ultimately by a unitary or federal government. Nations are vaguer: groups of substantial numbers of people who share a culture, a language, a religion, a history, or all four. Most large countries are multinational states.

The current crisis has its roots in the proliferation of states which followed the Second World War. At the end of that war, there were barely 60 states. Through decolonization, that number increased to almost 160 by 1988. With the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the number is over 180 and climbing.

Whether all the most recent creations will be capable of sustained self-governance is moot. During the Cold War, a number of states survived largely because of infusions of aid from their former colonial masters or from one or the other superpower as the price of alliance. In the new era, with less generous subsidization and with the advent of internal pressures ranging from ethnic conflict to drug trafficking, their political viability is doubtful.

(3) The Rise of Ethnicity and Religion

The issue of the nation state takes on revived significance because of the (re)emergence of ethnicity and religion as political forces. Ethnic groups are essentially synonymous with the "nation" -- people sharing a culture: traditions, language, sometimes religion. Ethnic and

national groupings have never ceased to exist; yet, during the Cold War, they were largely ignored or actively suppressed because of the superpower rivalry. In the current era, many groups have begun to reassert their identities, often with highly political objectives and violent methods.

(4) The Expanding Scope of Security

The Cold War approach to security was to determine as well as possible both a state's military capabilities and its intentions. In the post-Cold War era, the definition of security is expanding -- in part, because of the way the world perceives conflicts or threats of conflict. The communications revolution has magnified the impact of such strife everywhere. Consequently, the increasing **visibility** of these issues may be as salient as the issues themselves.

Among the new issues to emerge as security concerns has been humanitarian aid. Increasingly, the international community appears to recognize the welfare of suffering people and the urgency of their plight. Moreover, there are fewer ideological or geostrategic barriers to intervention. The major inhibition now relates to states' willingness to use their resources for this purpose.

Another set of issues are human rights and democratic development. However, although the Subcommittee accepts that democratic development may be a laudable long-term goal, it notes that in Western societies institutions of civil society preceded the advent of democracy or even democratic values by generations. The emphasis should be on good governance, which admits of both diversity and power-sharing, and on securing the rights of minorities rather than on early elections as a panacea, a general cure for all the political ills of mankind.

Other emerging security issues are (a) the vast problems associated with refugees and other displaced peoples and (b) a complex range of economic and environmental factors.

(5) Multilateral Diplomacy

Inevitably, the new, broader security agenda will encourage an increased emphasis on multilateralism. Three main reasons may be cited. First, the proliferation of states has increased their interdependence. Second, the past few years has seen an upsurge of problems that require collective action and international cooperation. Third, no state alone either can or will be able to afford the costs of providing all the necessary support and assistance, whatever the problem may be.

Canada's Interests

Collective security is a chief pillar of Canada's foreign policy; peacekeeping acts as a buttress to that pillar. Although such a policy certainly contains elements of altruism, it is anchored in two quite pragmatic considerations. First, widespread respect for the rule of law makes the

world safer and more predictable. Second, Canadians will be more secure if Canada is a stable and prosperous society within a community of stable and prosperous societies.

In addition, as the Canadian military presence in Europe diminishes, Canada will be seeking new opportunities to play a role and influence events on the world stage. Canada's expertise in peacekeeping is an obvious asset in such a strategy.

Canada has special reason to emphasize a multilateral approach in its international diplomacy. Acting alone, Canada has only a limited capacity to achieve its goals. However, when Canada acts in concert with a group of middle powers, Canada can both influence the goals of that group and contribute to the resources and weight of the group.

Moreover, Canada always has been concerned to create countervailing ties to offset American influence. The conviction has been that in multilateral forums, Canada will find, among other states, allies for its positions, and as a group they, in turn, can influence U.S. policies.

Especially at a time of increasing American participation in multilateral institutions of peace and security, it is in Canada's interest to increase its own involvement in order to take advantage of American resources, while at the same time ensuring that American participation does not overwhelm the legitimate interests of middle and smaller powers.

Peacekeeping raises Canada's profile and strengthens our position across a broad range of international diplomatic negotiations. It also has become an important element in shaping the Canadian identity.

Nevertheless, the Subcommittee is convinced that hereafter Canada must take greater care when deciding to assume peacekeeping responsibilities -- as demands for Canadian involvement multiply, when missions may require larger forces, when the risks are greater, and when the complexity and nuances of the various missions have all significantly increased.

In the past, there appears to have been a proclivity on the part of successive Canadian governments to participate in every peacekeeping mission. The decisions increasingly came to be taken in a context in which Canada's record and reputation were never far removed from the minds of the decision-makers. The Subcommittee seeks to set forth factors which ought to be taken into account as the Government strives to achieve a policy to guide Canada's participation in peacekeeping in the complex new era in which we live.

II Peacekeeping During the Cold War

Peacekeeping was a development of the Cold War era. It was not intended to resolve conflicts; rather, it was a "confidence-building measure" -- a method of constraining or deterring any new

outbreak in hostilities, as well as of helping to implement the agreement negotiated between the parties to the conflict.

Peacekeeping began as "third party conflict control," with **observer missions** whose fundamental characteristics were objectivity, impartiality, and non-violence. Their primary role is to observe and report events and/or functions. **Peacekeeping forces**, in contrast, consist of lightly armed infantry units, with the necessary logistic support elements. The forces are placed between belligerents, and mandated to monitor and to enforce, to a certain extent, truce agreements. Their weapons are only for self defence; rules of engagement, the guidelines for soldiers' use of force, are especially restrictive.

The UN set up 13 peacekeeping and observation missions by 1978, followed by a hiatus of ten years. For the most part, those missions were filling post-colonial vacuums and have been compared to "sheriff's posses," which provided a safety net and an alternative to active confrontation between East and West. Their prerequisites were as follows: a workable mandate; consistent support from the Security Council; cooperation of the parties in the conflict; readiness of the member states to make personnel and resources available; a geographically balanced and representative force; effective and integrated UN command; and, adequate logistical and financial support.

From 1948 to 1988, some 80,000 Canadian Forces (CF) personnel participated either as unarmed observers or as armed peacekeeping forces in 21 international peacekeeping operations mounted either by the UN or outside the UN framework. An overview categorizes these operations into: (a) UN observer missions; (b) regular peacekeeping or interpositional forces; (c) peace enforcement; and (d) non-UN operations.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping developed into a tested and proven method for dispute containment and, at times, for dispute resolution when accompanied by successful peacemaking (i.e., diplomacy designed to bring parties to a lasting peace). But the inherent limitations on peacekeeping imposed by its Cold War origins restricted its wider use. The removal of these limitations in a new era presents the possibility of peacekeeping becoming a more sophisticated and flexible tool for the maintenance of international peace and security.

III Peacekeeping in Transition

Several UN officials referred to "a new paradigm of peacekeeping," the main characteristics of which are as follows: a large civilian component; often the organization and conduct of elections; an important information component; usually a police component; usually a human rights dimension; time-limited (with a timetable for implementation); usually concern internal conflicts; often involve intervention into the affairs of sovereign states; and a requirement for a more effective military component. Troops are being used to protect humanitarian supplies,

which entails greater risks and falls closer to peace enforcement (directed against one party, by definition) than to traditional peacekeeping (involving the consent of the parties).

Recent UN Operations

Since 1988, 15 new operations have been created, all but one under UN auspices. At the end of 1992, Canada had participated in all the new operations established during this period, contributing a total of 5,000 personnel.

The first true example of the new generation of peacekeeping operations was that of the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. A year-long operation, it successfully carried out what the UN itself called "the largest decolonization exercise" in its history. UNTAG's lessons are highly relevant to other potential missions that seek to combine elements of peace-making and peacekeeping, civil and military elements within a single mandate.

Since then, several highly complex missions have been established, though none of them have been successful to date. They have included the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR, as well as UNPROFOR II), and the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).

An Agenda for Peace

On July 17, 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented a report, *An Agenda for Peace*, which had been requested by the summit of leaders of member states of the Security Council, concerning the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.

The Secretary-General defined **preventive diplomacy** as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."

A more innovative proposal was for **preventive deployment**, whereby the UN would anticipate conflicts and step in, before violence escalates or even begins, with security forces, humanitarian aid, or simply assistance in the conciliation process. Preventive deployment could take place in a variety of circumstances: in conditions of crisis within a country, when the government requests, or all parties consent to, a UN presence; in inter-state disputes, where both parties agree to a UN presence; or, more problematically, in cases where one nation anticipates an imminent cross-border attack.

The Secretary-General defined peacemaking as action aimed at bringing "hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations." If peaceful means fail, the Security Council has the option of

using sanctions or even military force to restore international peace and security, under Chapter VII of the Charter. The sole occasion on which the Security Council did authorize military enforcement was during the Korean War; during the Gulf crisis, the Council allowed member states to take measures on its behalf.

The Secretary-General has argued that it is now time to take Chapter VII more seriously, in particular, Article 42 which outlines the use of military force. To do this requires the realization of Article 43 "whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council...on a permanent basis" so as to respond to outright aggression quickly and effectively. Such a permanent force -- or **standing UN army** -- would serve either as a deterrent or to meet threats posed by a "military force of a lesser order."

The Secretary-General also recommended that member states make available, on call, **peace enforcement units**. These troops would volunteer for such service, be more heavily-armed than peacekeeping forces, and would be specially trained within their national forces. They would remain distinct from those raised under Article 43: Article 43 forces would be used in cases of enforcement action under Chapter VII, while peace enforcement units apparently would be used for the new forms of UN intervention -- something between traditional peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement -- such as securing elusive ceasefire lines and assisting in the delivery of humanitarian relief.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada consider the advisability of commissioning a study, perhaps in conjunction with like-minded members of the United Nations, to explore the feasibility of the establishment of a multi-national peace force. These troops, to be drawn on a volunteer basis from among both regular or reserve personnel, would be adequately equipped and could undertake a variety of tasks ranging from providing protection for humanitarian relief work to securing ceasefire lines. (p. 50)

The Subcommittee further recommends that the Government initiate negotiations with the Security Council, as discussed in Article 43 of the UN Charter, with the object of signing an agreement to make available a limited number of personnel to the Security Council, on its call, to form the basis, as well as a precedent, for the establishment of a multinational force. (p. 50)

Extra-military Measures

Two other levers have gained new prominence in the field of peacekeeping: the rule of law and the use of sanctions. A UN commission has been convened to investigate alleged atrocities in the conflict raging in the former Yugoslavia, the first such commission since World War II. The commission will release a preliminary report in mid-1993 and, based on its findings, the UN will decide whether or not to establish a war crimes tribunal.

Sanctions have become a fixture in the process of imposing and escalating pressure on states in an effort to alter behaviour that the international community finds unacceptable. However, while a panoply of sanctions on items ranging from oil and weapons to certain foodstuffs was declared against Iraq in 1990 and Yugoslavia in 1992, both the ease by which those orders are carried out, and the relative effectiveness of sanctions to change behaviour, have come into question.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada, through its membership in the UN and a variety of regional organizations, urge these bodies to consider sending commissions of inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international law such as gross human rights abuses. These commissions could operate in conjunction with peacekeeping missions. (p. 51)

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada urge the UN to conduct a study, perhaps in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, on the difficulties associated with implementing and monitoring sanctions, and on the effectiveness of sanctions in halting unacceptable behaviour. (p. 51)

Command and Control

The new international context has made demands on the United Nations increasingly burdensome. The Secretariat is being called on to engage in fact-finding, observation, mediation, peacekeeping, and peacemaking in almost every part of the world. Yet, despite the assumption by the UN of such large and grave responsibilities, the UN Secretariat lacks facilities for handling so many and such complex initiatives.

The lack of military structure and of a 24-hour, seven-days-a-week, on-call capacity at UN headquarters illustrates what appears, in general, to be an absence of a sense of urgency. This is not a situation that Canada or any other member state of the UN should tolerate.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada consider proposing the creation of a subsidiary organ of the UN based on Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, to act as a military advisory commission. While coordinating with the appropriate Under Secretaries-General, it would also have its own chief of staff who would report directly to the Secretary-General. This would bolster the military capability of the UN Secretariat in its pursuit of international peace and security. (p. 53)

The Subcommittee also recommends that the Government of Canada make clear to the United Nations Secretariat the urgent necessity for certain minimal standards of command and control, specifically, the creation of a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week, on-call command centre and a crisis or situation room, available to handle more effectively the expanded demands currently imposed on the Secretariat. (p. 53)

The Management of Peacekeeping: A House Divided

The UN's **chain of command** is divided. Different branches within the Secretariat handle various aspects of peacekeeping and report to different chiefs. The arrangements seem needlessly complicated and bureaucratic.

Logistics may be the single most difficult element in any UN peacekeeping operation because of the gross inadequacies and anomalies of the UN supply system. By and large, the UN procures materiel on the world market and transports it to the area of operations. This leads to a variety of problems, including: (1) lack of quality control at source, which leaves those receiving the supplies with a choice between rejecting them and having their troops endure lengthy delays or accepting plainly unsatisfactory goods as better than nothing; (2) the frustrations of an antiquated and inflexible system of procurement regulations and procedures; and (3) inadequate staffing arrangements. An effective logistic system would require a trained staff, sufficient facilities for storage, and adequate financing.

There also is a need for greater **standardization of operations**. The first few weeks of a peacekeeping mission are said to be the most important phase. Yet frequently this phase is marked by serious confusion and inadequacies. The UN must attempt to ensure regional balance in assembling any given peacekeeping force. This leads to wide divergences in the operating methods of different national military contingents within each force. There is also a tendency to "over-rank and over-staff at the headquarters level to make sure there is equal representation at the headquarters level."

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada consider using its position on the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to focus attention on the inadequacies of the UN supply system and to advocate that sufficient funds and resources be allocated: (a) to the establishment of a trained and experienced logistics staff at UN headquarters; and (b) to the maintenance of adequate storage facilities. (p. 57)

The Subcommittee urges the Government of Canada to suggest to the leading military powers that a valuable contribution to UN peacekeeping would be for their military establishments to offer logistics support on a regular basis. (p. 57)

The Subcommittee also urges the Government of Canada to make the case forcefully within the United Nations, particularly in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, for standardization of UN military operations, based on the established continental staff system used by the majority of troop-contributing countries. (p. 57)

The Financing of Peacekeeping

The financing of peacekeeping operations involves two separate sets of issues: revenues and expenditures, the latter including reimbursements to troop-contributing countries. All these issues are complicated and politically charged.

UN peacekeeping operations generally are financed through special assessments. Each operation has its own special assessment; percentages absorbed by each state can vary from one assessment to another as a result of the negotiating process. However, the establishment of a special assessment for a particular operation does not guarantee that each state will pay its assessment. Some states refuse on principle to pay for a particular operation, while other states simply claim financial hardship. As a matter of long-standing principle, Canada consistently has paid all its general and special assessments in full and on time.

Among the principal expenditures of peacekeeping missions are the reimbursements to states for their participation. Table 2 provides the estimated historical costs to Canada of UN peacekeeping operations since 1964.

There are many difficulties with the financing of peacekeeping, not least the tortuously complicated formulas the UN has had to devise to smooth over the political unwillingness of various member states to meet their obligations and yet still obtain sufficient funds to cobble together the required forces. Several of the proposals advanced in *An Agenda for Peace* seek to overcome the cash flow problems generated by the high level of unpaid contributions and the lack of reserves on which the UN can either draw or earn interest.

The Subcommittee recommends:

(a) that the Government of Canada provide full support to the efforts of the Secretary-General to improve the current financial situation of the UN, particularly the proposals advanced in *An Agenda for Peace*;

(b) that the Government of Canada, at every appropriate opportunity and at the highest levels, urge those countries that have accumulated arrears on their assessed contribution to the general operating budget of the United Nations, and especially on assessed contribution to peacekeeping operations, to pay up; and

(c) that a clear and detailed account of the costs incurred as the result of participation in peacekeeping operations, and of the money recovered from the United Nations or other organizations as a result of these activities, be provided to Parliament on a regular basis by the Department of National Defence and External Affairs and International Trade Canada, perhaps with the yearly estimates, in order to aid parliamentary oversight of the maintenance of this aspect of Canada's security. (pp. 63-64)

Regional Organizations

In *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General argued that greater cooperation between the two levels of organization would produce important benefits. What is striking is that, despite such cooperation, there also has been a notable lack of progress and considerable in-fighting in several cases between the UN and the various regional organizations.

At a meeting in November, 1991, the heads of government of the North Atlantic Council agreed that NATO allies could "be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions." Given that NATO has changed its mandate to encompass participation in UN missions and that it is the only credible multilateral military organization in the Western world:

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada urge NATO members to take the appropriate steps in order to act more decisively in support of UN missions. (p. 66)

IV Canadian Efforts

A consistent theme in Canadian defence policy has been that participation in peacekeeping operations is not a primary role of the Canadian Forces but a derived task. The armed forces have stated that they are able to provide highly trained, experienced, and self-sustaining forces - trained as "soldiers first" -- capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military activities.

The Minister of National Defence told the Subcommittee about DND's interest in limiting the scope and magnitude of intervention, perhaps by focussing participation on the initial phase of missions which call for logistical and communications expertise. In other words, Canadian troops would prepare the field and then leave it to other countries to take over.

The concept is a good one, and the Subcommittee wonders whether it should be taken further. It is not in Canada's interest to provide only specialized skills such as logistics or communications: this dilutes needed skills in the CF and it limits Canadian involvement, which adversely affects the morale of those excluded. As a general rule of thumb for all peacekeeping engagements, Canada could deploy its combat, support, and service support arms for the initial phase of an operation. This would imply a fairly mobile force with the transportation capacity necessary to permit rapid deployment.

By deploying such a contingent quickly and in the early stages of a conflict situation, initial stability would be provided, allowing the UN time to prepare and organize a more permanent force. The Canadian policy predisposition would be to withdraw its force at that time.

One of the reasons Canada was able to interject forces quickly during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia was that troops were stationed at CFB Lahr in Germany, where they, together with their equipment and logistical support, were near the deployment area. This will not be possible once Lahr has been closed as a CF base in 1994. Lahr also provides advantages as a staging post for Canadian troops going to Cyprus, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Canadian Government consider providing a staging area in Europe, preferably in Germany. This would provide a logistics and transportation centre for peacekeeping forces so as to facilitate the movement of troops to areas of conflict in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. (p. 70)

Training

An internal DND study on peacekeeping recently concluded that, "the tools of soldiering are the tools of peacekeeping ... training them for war trains them for peace." Thus, the best peacekeeper is a well-trained soldier, sailor, or airman, one who knows his or her trade.

However, while the Subcommittee accepts that the military training Canadian peacekeepers receive is of exceptional quality, it is persuaded that it could be improved by adding to the curriculum certain subjects which are not necessarily military in character. The entire thrust of this report is that the world has entered a new era, and peacekeeping a new paradigm. We need to adapt to new circumstances and at least make an effort to learn something of the new skills that may be required. Mediation, for example, is not a soldierly skill; it is not warlike or militaristic. Especially with soldiers trained for war, it needs to be encouraged and stimulated: they need training in it.

The Subcommittee supports the Canadian Forces' contention that well-trained peacekeepers require general purpose combat capabilities and believes that this type of training is of primary importance. (p. 74)

The Subcommittee recommends also that, within the general curriculum of the Canadian Forces at military staff colleges, officer training programs and the like, more emphasis be placed on dispute settlement and conflict management programs, as well as on the United Nations, regional organizations and peacekeeping history and practice. Once CF personnel or units are assigned to a specific foreign locale, they should be specifically instructed in the history, tradition, and culture of the country to which they are being sent. (p. 74)

The Subcommittee recommends that the Canadian Forces continue to assist nations that lack experience in peacekeeping training through seminars and by setting up national training programs. (p. 74)

The Subcommittee recommends that teams involved in providing international assistance on peacekeeping within the Department of National Defence should work, in cooperation

with United Nations headquarters, to develop training standards for the UN, based largely on the experience of Canada and other nations which have made a significant contribution to UN peacekeeping. (p. 74)

The Subcommittee recommends that the Department of National Defence expand its existing database to include a peacekeeping database or inventory that would include Canadian military, constabulary, and civilian personnel who have taken part in peacekeeping and observer missions. (p. 75)

The Reserves

Although reserves are trained to the same standards -- general purpose military combat capability -- they do not put in the same amount of time as members of the regular force, nor do they necessarily have access to the same quality of equipment. The troops and young officers can be as good as any regulars, but there is a consistent problem with the more senior ranks (sergeants and above among non-commissioned officers -- NCOs -- and captains and above among commissioned officers), who almost universally lack the depth of experience and professionalism that is one of the strength of Canada's peacekeeping forces.

During the Persian Gulf war, the United States Army experienced serious problems in trying to mobilize its "total force" combat arms reserve units for service. These units were unable to come up to a combat-ready condition despite having trained for years on full sets of first-line equipment. The fundamental reason for their inadequacy seems to have been the lack of depth and experience among senior NCOs and officers.

Similarly, in the CF, militia sub-units in Cyprus have only been viable with substantial augmentation by regular force NCOs and close supervision by the regular force leadership. These considerations, coupled with the fact that peacekeeping missions tend to occur on short notice, support a policy of forces-in-being with a high level of training and readiness.

On the other hand, the United States also found during the Gulf War that their reserve specialist and logistics units out-performed the regular units. This was because they were specialists -- whether in trucking or supply management or helicopter flying -- since their speciality often related to their civilian work and, in these types of units, facility in the trade is more important than soldierly skills.

This leads the Members of the Subcommittee to ask whether there is untapped potential for creating reserve units based on logistics, transportation, communications, and engineering functions, units which could be used in non-war fighting roles such as peacekeeping. Canada may want to consider augmenting the number of its logisticians and its communications specialists by just such a method as this. As well, the CF might consider using more Air Force and Navy logistics personnel in traditional Army logistics trades.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Department of National Defence undertake a comprehensive inquiry into the possibility of creating reserve units based on logistics, transportation, communications, and engineering functions, which could be used in peacekeeping, as distinct from wartime actions. (p. 77)

V Meeting the Challenge

In the new era, there are likely to be many occasions for Canadian involvement in different kinds of peacekeeping operations, many of which will be much more complicated and dangerous than any in the past. Canada will not be able to do all that it did in the past; for example, it will not be able to participate in every mission that is requested of it. Indeed, it ought not to be involved if its interests or resources dictate otherwise.

Moreover, in what Canada does undertake, it will have to alter its approaches: (1) Canada should help to define how peacekeeping is to be practised in this new era; (2) Canada should define its own interests clearly; and (3) the CF needs new responses to changing situations.

The world has changed dramatically and one of the changes has been that peacekeeping has moved from being a relatively peripheral affair to being front and centre in the conduct of international relations. Yet, despite its greater importance and despite the explosion of new operations, the institutions and infrastructure of peacekeeping remain much the same.

First, Canada ought to help improve the institutions and infrastructure of peacekeeping and of peace and security as a whole. Central to this are more resources which translate into better financial arrangements at the UN. Canada should press for a command and control system and a military presence at the UN that inspires respect. It should strive for a revamped support system to replace supply and logistics arrangements which often have resulted in poor supply flow and inadequate stocks. It should insist on the standardization of UN military operations around the world.

Second, Canada also should do better at defining its own interests. Only if the Government delineates a clear set of criteria -- a set of criteria that takes into account the complexities of the new era -- will it be able to defend its choices.

One criterion should be whether the conflict has direct implications for Canada's security. A serious threat in the Middle East, for example, probably would meet that criterion. Another would be whether the conflict affects a significant trading partner or, if not, whether it has implications for any other of Canada's trading partners and whether they might respond favourably in other ways -- if the appropriate linkages were drawn -- to Canada's participation. Still another factor should be humanitarian concerns, but only if there is a clear indication that humanitarian ends really can be achieved.

Third, the CF should alter its approach. Today, in a new era, Canada should be prepared to employ its troops on a regular basis in peacekeeping pursuits, provided the criteria for participation are clear and are applied rigorously. It should explore the idea of a rapid reaction force which could be deployed with alacrity in order to lay the groundwork for a successful operation, whereafter it would be withdrawn. It should also reconsider the way its armed forces are trained.

Canada should behave as a committed realist. When the possibility of rethinking some of the basic concepts and techniques of the United Nations is at hand, our presence and participation is welcomed. The answers we give could have profound implications for the shape of Canada's armed forces, the practice of future peacekeeping, and the evolution of the United Nations.

I A NEW ERA: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR CANADA?

The world has entered a new historical era. The Cold War, which for 40 years provided a grim structure to the conduct of international relations, has been swept away with the death of communism in the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Soviet empire. The prayers of the western alliance have been answered; the consequences, however, have surprised many of the West's policy makers and left them searching -- not always very effectively -- for new ways to deal with the aftermath of tyranny and empire.

One challenge relates to the nature of this new era. President George Bush of the United States was bold enough to predict a new world order. His bravado has been met with considerable scepticism, especially from more pessimistic analysts of international affairs, who have grumbled, sometimes cogently, about the greater likelihood of world disorder.¹ Ian Smart, a former executive director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Britain, has suggested that the decades between 1950 and 1980, when East-West confrontation and the balance of nuclear terror imposed stasis on international relations, amounted to a holiday for diplomats. But, he adds, "the holiday is over. We are reverting to a world of more mobile action and alignment."²

The members of the Senate Subcommittee on Security and National Defence prefer to remain cautious about labelling the new era. At the very least, however, the Subcommittee agrees that it is a period of profound transition. Already, the world has experienced a sweeping restructuring of alliances. Currently, it is witnessing various efforts to forge new or better international instruments to grapple more effectively with a complex of demanding challenges.

In seeking to understand the transition -- and what Canada's responses should be -- it is relevant to review the more obvious trends in contemporary world affairs, which are shaping the contours of the new era. These trends can be summarized as follows:

- first, the diffusion of power;
- second, the crisis of the state;
- third, the rise of ethnicity and religion;
- fourth, the expanding meaning of security; and
- fifth, the increasing resort to multilateral principles and organizations.

¹ Earl C. Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment", *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1990-91; Theo Sommer, "A World Beyond Order and Control", *Guardian Weekly*, April 28, 1991; William Pfaff, "Redefining World Power", *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World, 1990-91; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992.

² Ian Smart, "The World in Flux", *Behind the Headlines*, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1990, pp. 3-4.

Among the most significant consequences of these trends are the demands they create for the exercise of collective security. As a tool of collective security and international diplomacy, peacekeeping is changing to meet some of these demands. Peacekeeping has entered its second generation and, as the following chapters demonstrate, the new generation promises to be very different from the first.

Accordingly, Canada ought to use this transition to rethink its cherished commitment to peacekeeping. The proposal that this be done in no way reflects on the value of peacekeeping as it was practised during the Cold War, nor does it reflect on the abilities of the Canadian Forces; they were demonstrably good at a good thing. But the world has changed, so Canada must change. Canadians must reflect even on what is good -- Canada's contribution to international peacekeeping -- to discover both whether it is still relevant and, if so, how it might be improved. In order to do this, it is important to consider the five major trends of the new era outlined above.

(1) The Diffusion of Power

The foremost currency of international relations has always been power. Power, at its most basic level, is the ability of one party or actor to get other parties to behave in a certain way. To do this, states exercise a vast array of political, economic and military levers. The bipolar world of the Cold War saw power put to use in an intense contest of wills between the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, when every international event was either influenced by their rivalry or filtered through its lens.

That bipolar world has been replaced by a much more complex world in which power has been diffused. Different spheres of world politics have different distributions of power -- some of them multipolar, some as much influenced by private actors as by states, and some spheres, such as nuclear weapons, remaining largely bipolar in distribution.³ In economics, which is gaining increasing significance as a factor in assessing power, multipolarity appears to be the trend, with new regional blocs emerging. Several of these blocs enjoy, or are in the process of developing, competitive industrial bases. Each of them has its own dominant powers, all of which are pursuing influence and, in some cases, hegemony.

The end of the Cold War has not been marked by a concentration of power in the United States. Yet arguably the United States remains a superpower by virtue of its overwhelming military might, its continuing economic strength and diversity, its immense cultural appeal in the broadest sense of that word, as well as because of more intangible factors such as the prestige of having led the Western alliance during the Cold War, and the simple yet subtle expectation on the part of both Americans and foreigners that it will continue to offer leadership.

³ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power", *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1990, pp. 156-59.

Nevertheless, the United States is retrenching and reconsidering its global interests, with an urgency heightened by domestic pressures.

(2) The Crisis of the Nation State

The second trend, which may be the principal challenge of the new era, is the crisis of the nation state. The term itself, as one witness before the Subcommittee observed, has always been a misnomer since over 90 percent of the states in the world are multi-ethnic.(9:15)⁴ A state is a legal entity with one status (or internal peace or order) maintained ultimately by a unitary or federal government. Nations are vaguer: groups of substantial numbers of people who share a culture, a language, a religion, a history, or all four. Most large countries are not unitary nations but multinational states. Some nations -- like the Kurds, Palestinians, Armenians, Basques, or the Crees -- have no state. Only in a very few countries, like Japan, do the limits of the nation coincide with the frontiers of the state.⁵

The frontiers of most of Africa's 50-odd states were drawn by the great powers at the Berlin Conference in 1884 with little concern for the ethnic, linguistic or cultural affinities of the Africans. The borders of most of the modern Middle East are equally artificial, derived from the division of spoils between the French and British after the Ottoman Empire crumbled during World War I.

Yet, as the British political theorist Lord Acton wrote in 1907:

The greatest adversary of the rights of nationality is the modern theory of nationality. By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilisation in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence.⁶

The current crisis has its roots in the enormous proliferation of states which followed the Second World War. Fully two-thirds of the contemporary roster have been established since

⁴ *Proceedings of the Senate Sub-Committee on Security and National Defence*, November 25, 1992, Issue 9, page 15. Hence forward all references to the Proceedings will be bracketed in the text itself as shown above (9:15).

⁵ Glenn Frankel, "Decline Of The Nation-State", *The Guardian Weekly*, December 2, 1990.

⁶ Lord Acton, "Nationality" from *The History of Freedom and Other Essays*, pp. 192-93.

1945. At the end of World War II, there were barely 60 states, 50 of them signatories to the UN Charter. Through the process of decolonization, that number increased to almost 160 by the end of the Cold War in 1988. More recently, with the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the number is over 180 and climbing.

Whether all the most recent creations will be capable of sustained self-governance is moot. During the Cold War, a number of states survived largely because of infusions of aid from their former colonial masters or from one or the other superpower as the price of alliance. In the new era, with less generous subsidization and with the advent of a number of internal pressures ranging from ethnic conflict to drug trafficking, their political sustainability is doubtful. The results could be debilitating both for the citizens of those states and for the international community, faced with the tasks of providing peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and of coping with refugees. Already, some observers have been moved to write:

From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnants of Yugoslavia, from Somalia, Sudan and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a disturbing new phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.⁷

Somalia is an especially apt illustration of the phenomenon. William Millward, an Arab studies expert who testified before the Subcommittee, described Somalia as a nation in search of a state, noting that the country is "relatively homogenous ethnically, linguistically, religiously, and culturally...."(9:14) Nevertheless, Somalia has not had a functioning central government since early 1991.

The breakdown of central authority has brought virtually the entire population of Somalia into conflict in one way or another. A vicious cycle of insecurity and hunger is at work in Somalia. Lack of security prevents the delivery of food, while food shortages contribute to the level of violence and insecurity. Meanwhile, refugees from the senseless killing and the famine have exported the problem to the neighbouring states.(9:14)

The situation is similar in Ethiopia, where the destiny of the region of Eritrea has been the focus of an extended and violent clash, and in Sudan, where famine and the government's relentless attacks on minority rights are together propelling that country toward anarchy. Throughout the Horn of Africa, political instability, the collapse of central authority, inter-ethnic or internecine conflict and rampant militarism, combined with prolonged drought, are creating conditions of mass starvation and chaos.

⁷ Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States", *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1992-93, p. 3.

(3) The Rise of Ethnicity and Religion

The issue of the nation state takes on revived significance because of the (re)emergence of ethnicity, nationalism and religion as political forces. Ethnic groups exist everywhere; indeed, everyone belongs to at least one such group. They are essentially synonymous with the "nation" -- people sharing a culture: traditions, language, sometimes religion. Although dynamic, ethnic and national groupings have never ceased to exist. Yet, during the Cold War, they were largely ignored or actively suppressed because of the overriding, intense superpower rivalry.

In the current era, many groups have begun to reassert their identities, often with objectives that are highly political. Unfortunately, as Allan Kagedan, a Soviet nationalities expert, told the Subcommittee, "the politicization of ethnicity often leads to violence." (9:16) Political ethnicity or nationalism can be seen as a basic need:

the need is to belong together in a coherent and stable community. Such a need is normally satisfied by the family, the neighbourhood, the religious community. In the last century and a half such institutions all over the world have had to bear the brunt of violent social and intellectual change, and it is no accident that nationalism was at its most intense where and when such institutions had little resilience and were ill-prepared to withstand the powerful attacks to which they became exposed.⁸

Some ethnic groups seek self-determination or autonomy within a multinational state or simply rights of expression and political participation equal to those of other citizens or groups. They use legal or constitutional mechanisms to that end. One such example would be the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic. Following a fair and democratic referendum, the two republics have decided that their futures lie apart.

Yet other groups have demonstrated ugly and unsettling objectives, allowing long-simmering hatreds to boil over and permitting vengeance to govern the means and ends of political life. Dr. Kagedan told the Subcommittee:

eastern Europe and central Eurasia, freed of communist control, have fallen prey to a history of ethnic enmity which has left the region strewn with conflicting territorial claims, tales of massacres, hostile ethnic stereotypes and contemporary scores to be settled. (9:17)

The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Ngorno-Karabakh is being waged with the echoes of the 1915 Turkish massacre of Armenians still ringing in the ears of combatants on both sides, while some of the historical echoes in the desperate struggle raging in the former

⁸ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, London, 1960, p. 101.

Yugoslavia date back to the 14th century. In the latter case, some groups, employing a practice known as "ethnic cleansing," have been forcibly expelling others by terror and murder. When hatred of this intensity is combined with political will and powerful weapons, the results are disastrous.

Yet such intensity argues more strongly for forbearance and early efforts at conciliation - - "preventive diplomacy" -- by the international community; qualities which were not much in evidence in the early stages of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Professor Edith Klein, an authority on Yugoslavia at York University, has noted that "the intense pressure put on the international community" to extend early recognition to Slovenia and Croatia" preempted setting in place any kind of conflict resolution procedure."(6:27)

Hence, the blame for the difficulties of effective peacekeeping at this juncture in ex-Yugoslavia should really be affixed to the inadequacies of earlier diplomatic efforts -- when the domestic political considerations of various foreign states overrode the process of reconciliation. The peacekeeping efforts now being made in the former Yugoslavia are a direct result of that failure and an object lesson for other cases where ethnic conflict threatens the viability of multinational states.

(4) The Expanding Scope of Security

The fourth trend of the new era is the expanding scope of security. Preserving and promoting security means fostering those conditions that create and maintain stability, while still allowing legitimate change. Threats to security, therefore, are those which disturb or impede the necessary conditions.

The Cold War approach to security was to determine as well as possible both a state's military capabilities and its intentions. The overwhelming emphasis was on issues related to the military balance between the superpowers. The root causes of conflict were perceived to be superpower rivalry and the arms race.

In the post-Cold War era, the definition of security is expanding. Issues that were of concern during the Cold War, such as nuclear proliferation and arms races, still carry great weight -- witness the anxiety about the command and control of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. However, security no longer is considered an exclusively state-based concept any more than national armies are perceived as the only instigators of serious conflict. Military issues still matter, but no longer are they the paramount factor which they used to be.

Yet the end of the Cold War alone does not explain the enlarged scope of security. The fact that disparate and often non-military conditions may serve as catalysts of tension or trigger actual conflict is not a new phenomenon. What has changed is the way the world perceives such conflicts or threats of conflict. The communications revolution -- the phenomenon of the "global village" -- has magnified the impact of such strife everywhere. Consequently, in the discussion

of emerging security issues that follows the most salient factor may well be the increasing **visibility** of all these issues as much as the issues themselves.

One of the new issues to emerge as a security concern has been humanitarian aid, especially to areas affected by conflicts or natural disasters. The international community no longer finds it easy to ignore the fate of large numbers of suffering humanity -- even when the causes are due to internal conflict. Moral rectitude and public pressure have influenced decision makers to make at least some effort to alleviate suffering. UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, told the Subcommittee of a new concept of "the solidarity of people in need" as a means of balancing the diverging claims of national sovereignty and international interference.

The decision by the UN Security Council, on December 3, 1992, to send a U.S.-led force to Somalia to create a "secure environment for humanitarian relief operations" marks, according to some observers, a landmark in the development of humanitarian law.⁹ For the first time, a Security Council resolution stated that "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia" by itself constituted "a threat to international peace and security," justifying outside intervention.¹⁰

Increasingly, the international community appears to recognize the welfare of suffering people and the urgency of their plight. Moreover, with the Cold War abated, there are fewer ideological or geostrategic barriers to interceding. The major inhibition now relates to states' willingness to use their resources for this purpose. Nevertheless, it is difficult to limit intervention to humanitarian affairs without addressing in some way the underlying political conflict. Indeed, it probably is vital that the causes be dealt with, once a decision on international intervention has been taken, for the alternative may simply be a recurrence of the problems in an even graver form.

Another set of issues of increasing concern within the international community, which are being described more often as a security matter, are human rights and democratic development. In a speech to the 47th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, described "three fundamental weaknesses" within nation states "that can cause disputes that go beyond their borders: (i) the absence or abuse of fundamental human rights; (ii) the absence of a developed

⁹ Paul Lewis, "First U.N. Goal Is Security: Political Outlook is Murky", *The New York Times*, December 4, 1992.

¹⁰ Paul Lewis, "Painting Nations Blue", *The New York Times*, December 9, 1992.

system of democratic values and institutions; and (iii) an inability to make responsible choices in the management of public policy."¹¹

Unfortunately, the Minister was unable to meet with the Subcommittee to discuss in greater depth the weaknesses she had outlined. The Subcommittee does not find itself in entire agreement with Ms. McDougall. While the Subcommittee accepts that democratic development may be a laudable long-term goal, it notes that in Western societies institutions of civil society preceded the advent of democracy or even democratic values by generations. It may be, rather, that democratic institutions can operate effectively only after a foundation of law and order has been established and accepted by the society as a whole. Indeed, too heavy and impatient an emphasis on democracy may prove to be counterproductive both to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the achievement of viable democracies. A senior UN official recently observed indirectly to another parliamentary committee,

Many people have accepted a game -- democracy -- which, when it comes right down to it, they don't want to play. In many parts of the world, people think they cannot afford to lose and so when the results of democracy are unacceptable they demand their own country or state where they are sure to win. In the former USSR, everyone wants to be sovereign.¹²

At the same time, the Subcommittee believes that Western governments should be concerned to encourage the legal and institutional basis for healthy and sustainable civil societies elsewhere in the world. Such a basis is crucial if a more tolerant approach to diversity is to be followed in states, the great majority of which are likely to remain multi-ethnic rather than unitary in composition. The emphasis, therefore, should be on good governance, which admits of both diversity and power-sharing, and on securing the rights of minorities rather than on early elections as a panacea, a general cure for all the political ills of mankind.

A third emerging security issue is the vast problem associated with refugees and other displaced peoples. This issue has been brought to the fore by several of the trends described above. The lot of refugees is seen as an unacceptable deprivation of the security of person with the potential to create destabilizing situations which, by definition, will involve other countries. Moreover, the countries most affected by refugee issues have gained new voices and new leverage within the international community.

Finally, security is also now being seen to include a complex range of economic and environmental factors. That widespread economic distress can lead to political instability and

¹¹ *Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall to the 47th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 24, 1992, 92/46, pp. 3-4.*

¹² Robert Miller, "Recent Visit to the United Nations," *Memorandum to Members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade*, November 17, 1992, p. 5.

even to international conflict is not a particularly new concept. More recent is the recognition that environmental decline can also occasionally lead directly to conflict -- for example, when scarce water resources must be shared. Generally, however, the environment's impact on nations' security "is felt in the downward pull on economic performance and, therefore, on political stability."¹³

(5) Multilateral Diplomacy

Inevitably, the new, broader security agenda will encourage an increased emphasis on multilateralism. Three main reasons may be cited:

First, as noted above, the number of states is increasing and thus the number with a stake in any issue area. The effect of this fragmentation actually has been to increase the interdependence of states. But although more states are demanding to be included in the process of negotiation and decision-making, "interdependence does not mean harmony; rather, it often means unevenly balanced mutual dependence." Nevertheless, states will search "for the forum that defines the scope of an issue in the manner best suiting their interests."¹⁴

Second, the past few years has seen a proliferation on the international agenda of issues, that cut across national boundaries and require collective action and international cooperation. These include environmental concerns such as global warming and acid rain, debt crises, health epidemics, the drug trade, the protection of human rights, refugee movements, and terrorism.

Third, in the new era, no one state alone either can or will be able to afford the costs of providing all the necessary support and assistance, whatever the issue might be. In order to create a pool of resources big enough to accomplish all the tasks that are agreed upon, a significant number of other states and organizations will have to be involved.

Given that diplomacy increasingly will be practised in a multilateral context, the United Nations will become a leading forum of discussion and negotiation and, less certainly but most likely, an important vehicle for providing aid and resources. Regional organizations also may play more important roles.

Aleksandr Belonogov, Russian Ambassador to Canada and former Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, told the Subcommittee that the Cold War held the effectiveness of the United Nations in check. With its passing ends "a state of semi-paralysis in its most important but politically most delicate sphere of international security." (5:6) Already, the new-found consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council has spawned a series of

¹³ Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1989, p. 166.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power", *Foreign Policy*, p. 158.

initiatives in several regional conflicts that previously had been impervious to progress. These have included the decolonization of Namibia, mediation efforts throughout Central America, and the movements toward peace in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique.

Canada's Interests

Changes in international relations over the past few years have been dramatic. The obvious question which these changes raise for Canada is whether Canadian policies should change as well. What are Canada's interests in this new period of transition?

Historically, Canada has justified its activity in peacekeeping as an expression of an overarching policy of helping to maintain international peace and security. In the discussion above, it was noted that security now encompasses stability and economic well-being, as well as more traditional military considerations. Although striving to promote international security certainly contains elements of altruism, it is anchored in two quite pragmatic considerations of fundamental importance to Canada's own security. First, widespread respect for the rule of law makes the world safer and more predictable. Second, Canadians will be more secure if Canada is a stable and prosperous society within a community of stable and prosperous societies.

Collective security, in principle, means creating and maintaining international peace and security by regulating and enforcing appropriate international relations through the rule of law and by encouraging the prosperity of individual states within that framework. Accordingly, collective security is a chief pillar of Canada's foreign policy; peacekeeping acts as a buttress to that pillar. William Barton, former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, summarized this position for the Subcommittee: "Canadian participation in peacekeeping has made a substantial and valuable contribution to the attainment of international peace and security and thus to our foreign policy goals and the national interest." (5:11)

Professor Harold Klepak of the Collège militaire royal de St-Jean observed that, as the Canadian military presence in Europe diminishes, Canada will be seeking new kinds of opportunities to play a role and influence events on the world stage. Canada's expertise in peacekeeping is an obvious asset in such a strategy.

From a military point of view, particularly now that we have withdrawn from Europe to all intents and purposes, peacekeeping is the only major area of Canadian military activity that is not continental....peacekeeping is what we do that is not with the United States and therefore may provide a role in terms of keeping our forces abreast not so much with modern technology as with what is happening in the world in cooperative efforts on a multilateral basis. As multilateralism is the basis of Canadian interests historically, that is an important point.(3:11)

Professor Klepak's final observation is an accurate characterization of the period since 1945. Multilateral institutions provide channels for the pursuit of many of Canada's foreign policy objectives. As a middle power, Canada frequently has interests similar to those of other middle powers. Acting alone, it may have only a limited capacity to achieve its goals. However, when Canada acts in concert with a group of middle powers, Canada can both influence the goals of that group and contribute to the resources and weight of the group.

Moreover, Canada has had a special reason to emphasize a multilateral approach in its international diplomacy. As a middle power with innumerable ties to the United States, Canada always has been concerned to create countervailing ties to offset American influence. The conviction has been that in multilateral forums, Canada would find, among other states, allies for its positions, and as a group they, in turn, could influence U.S. policies. This notion of a countervail is a tradition in Canadian foreign policy, and should be maintained, not for its sentimental value, but because it remains a rational direction for policy given the unique constraints that Canada faces.

However, especially at a time of increasing American participation in multilateral institutions of peace and security, it is in Canada's interest to increase its own involvement in these institutions in order to take advantage of American resources, while at the same time trying to ensure that American participation does not overwhelm the legitimate interests of middle and smaller powers.

There are other reasons for Canadian involvement. Professor David Cox of Queen's University suggested that Canada has achieved certain side benefits from the practice of peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping has helped Canada to establish itself as a leading proponent of cooperative approaches to international security....peacekeeping, and with it the image of a responsible internationalist state, raises Canada's profile and strengthens our position across a broad range of international diplomatic negotiations.(6:6)

The Subcommittee accepts this argument, but it questions whether either Canada's politicians or its diplomats are making full use of the leverage Canadian activities could provide. A generation in Cyprus and intense involvement in Yugoslavia must surely indicate our ongoing contribution to European security. Perhaps more credit, and therefore more benefits, could be gained from these activities in various multilateral and bilateral dealings.

Professor Cox remarked also that peacekeeping had become an important element in shaping the Canadian identity:

[P]eacekeeping, which is really the most visible manifestation of Canada's international diplomacy, identifies Canada to Canadians. It makes us aware of

our international orientation, of an orientation that is distinctively and perhaps uniquely Canadian.(6:6)

The final traditional Canadian interest in pursuing an active profile in peacekeeping was the benefits it provided the military. A predecessor of this Subcommittee, the Senate Special Committee on National Defence, heard from General Paul Manson, the Chief of Defence Staff in 1987, that "there is no question that we welcome the opportunity to send our people to the United Nations peacekeeping operations." He went on to explain that the training that peacekeeping offers is difficult to provide in an artificial setting, and he especially emphasized its importance for junior leaders in the Canadian Forces.¹⁵

This point was reconfirmed on more than one occasion during the Subcommittee's proceedings, but Major-General Clive Milner, the former Commander of the UN Force in Cyprus, may have put it most succinctly when he said:

There is nothing like the completion of a six-month or one-year assignment to a United Nations mission by a Canadian officer or soldier to raise his morale, because he feels that he has done something for himself, for his unit, for his uniform, for his country and for the world at large. There is a tremendous feeling of satisfaction when that young man or young woman comes home and is able to say, 'I helped keep the peace. I may have helped save lives. I helped people in distress, people who were much worse off than I am....' As an individual it raises morale. Collectively as a unit it certainly does, and therefore it contributes to the well-being of the Canadian Forces at large.(10:14)

The foregoing provides a summary of the main reasons for Canada's active participation in international peacekeeping over the years -- Canada's interests in peacekeeping. This report will seek to explore, along with what has changed in the world since the end of the Cold War, what changes Canada should adopt with respect to its peacekeeping activity.

We have mentioned the Subcommittee's conviction that, in trying to assess this question, the inherent virtue of the activity or even our abilities at it are not sufficient reason to warrant its continuation. Alex Morrison, of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, who has a great deal of peacekeeping experience, suggested that Canada contributed to peacekeeping: "because it was good."(7:20) While this may have been an adequate response during the initial phase of peacekeeping -- the phase which bears a distinctively Canadian stamp because of the efforts of statesmen like Lester Pearson and Howard Green and Paul Martin to make it work -- it no longer is adequate as we move into an era when demands for Canadian involvement multiply,

¹⁵ Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, *Canada's Land Forces*, October 1989, p. 83.

when missions may require larger forces, when the risks are greater, and when the complexity and nuances of the various missions have all significantly increased.

In the past there appears to have been a proclivity on the part of successive Canadian governments to participate in every peacekeeping mission. They did not decide to participate lightly, without weighing the relevant factors, but the decisions increasingly came to be taken in a context in which Canada's record and reputation were never far removed from the minds of the decision-makers. A Canadian military historian, J.L. Granatstein, has made this point; he quotes the late distinguished scholar of Canadian foreign policy, John Holmes:

'Ours is not a divine mission to mediate. Our hand is strengthened by acknowledged success, but it is weakened if planting the maple leaf becomes the priority'. Too often Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has had some of this 'planting the flag' idea about it, a sense that we must maintain our record as the country that has served on more PKOs than any other - whether or not those operations made sense, had much chance of success, or exposed our servicemen and servicewomen to unnecessary risks in an unstable area of the world.¹⁶

The Subcommittee also notes Professor Granatstein's admonition that "for too many Canadians peacekeeping has become a substitute for policy and thought."¹⁷ In this report, we seek to set forth factors which ought to be taken into account as the Government strives to achieve a policy to guide Canada's participation in peacekeeping in the complex new era in which we live.

¹⁶ J.L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" in *Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, ed. by John English and Norman Hillmer, 1992, p. 223.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

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II PEACEKEEPING DURING THE COLD WAR

Origins and Principles

Peacekeeping was a development of the Cold War era. It was an effort by the international community to operate imaginatively within the parameters the Cold War imposed. Its effectiveness was curtailed, however, by the limitations of those parameters. As it developed, peacekeeping came to mean the insertion of military troops in an area of recent hostilities where a ceasefire has been accepted by all the parties to the conflict. Peacekeeping itself was not intended to resolve conflicts; rather, it was a "confidence-building measure" -- a method of constraining or deterring any new outbreak in hostilities, as well as of helping to implement the agreement negotiated between the parties to the conflict.

Peacekeeping was an innovation; its invention was neither provided for nor foreseen in the UN Charter. Meeting immediately after the Second World War, the authors of that document were preoccupied with conflict between states. They foresaw two pillars safeguarding the world against another Hitlerian scourge: first, the pacific settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, arbitration and judicial procedures under Chapter VI and, second, if that failed, enforcement (military means) under Chapter VII.¹

Peacekeeping began as "third party conflict control," with **observer missions** in Palestine and Kashmir in 1948. Its fundamental characteristics were objectivity, impartiality, and non-violence, with military observers going unarmed since it was believed that personal weapons would prove more dangerous to the possessors than to anyone else. Observer missions "consist largely of officers who are almost invariably unarmed...[although] sometimes reinforced by infantry and/or logistic units, usually for a specific purpose and a brief period of time."² Their primary role is to observe and report events and/or functions. However, these missions can have a broader mandate, which include such activities as monitoring a ceasefire and reporting on the human rights situation.

Peacekeeping forces, in contrast, consist of "lightly armed infantry units, with the necessary logistic support elements," but they may be assisted in their mission by observers.³ The forces are "interpositional," that is, placed between belligerents, and mandated to monitor

¹ John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992, p.2.

² *The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York, United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990, p.8.

³ *Ibid.*

and to enforce, to a certain extent, truce agreements. Their weapons are for self defence only; rules of engagement, the guidelines for soldiers' use of force, were especially restrictive.

Although peacekeeping has come to be associated with the United Nations, that world body does not have exclusive rights to the practice. Other international or regional organizations also have engaged in peacekeeping from time to time. But it was under UN auspices that peacekeeping was developed and it has been the UN that has most consistently employed it.

The first true peacekeeping force was organized in 1956 in the Middle East -- "a tribute to the vision of 'Mike' Pearson," in the words of Brian Urquhart when he met with the Subcommittee in New York.⁴ Lester ('Mike') Pearson was Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs at the time. When the British, French and Israelis sought to wrest the Suez Canal from Egypt's control, the Security Council was unable to act because the British and French vetoed every proposal. So the General Assembly simply took over by adopting a resolution creating the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I). According to William Barton, a Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN:

The trouble was that some countries argued that the General Assembly went beyond its authority and therefore any assessments that were made to pay for this were not binding on them. As a consequence, in effect, although it was supposed to be by assessment, some countries were paying and some were not.(5:21)

This difficulty was the first of many with respect to the financing of UN peacekeeping operations. Such difficulties continue to plague the world organization.

Despite these and other difficulties, the UN managed to set up 13 peacekeeping and observation missions by 1978, followed by a hiatus of ten years. For the most part, those missions were filling post-colonial vacuums and have been compared to a "'sheriff's posse', mustered at the last minute to prevent the worst." As such, they provided "a safety net and an alternative to active confrontation between East and West."⁵

Throughout the Cold War, the prerequisites that were developed for the UNEF operation applied to all the missions. Colonel Michael Houghton, the Director of Peacekeeping Operations at the Department of National Defence, summarized them for the Subcommittee as follows:

⁴ The preceding paragraph draws largely on comments by Sir Brian Urquhart, now Senior Fellow at the Ford Foundation, but for many years the U.N. Under Secretary-General responsible for peacekeeping. A U.N. official since the 1940s, he has written several books on related topics, including a major biography of U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, and he is currently at work on a biography of Ralph Bunche, the American Under Secretary-General, whom Urquhart also credits with an enormous influence on the evolution of peacekeeping.

⁵ Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'sheriff's posse'", *Survival*, May/June 1990, p. 197.

- . a workable mandate;
- . consistent support from the Security Council;
- . cooperation of the parties in the conflict;
- . readiness of the member states to make available personnel and resources;
- . a geographically balanced and representative force;
- . effective and integrated UN command; and,
- . adequate logistical and financial support.(3:13)

A Review of Canada's Involvement in Peacekeeping

During the Cold War, from 1948 to 1988, some 80,000 Canadian Forces personnel participated as either unarmed observers or as armed peacekeeping forces in 21 international peacekeeping operations mounted either by the United Nations or outside the UN framework.⁶ The following overview categorizes these operations into: (a) UN observer missions; (b) regular peacekeeping or interpositional forces; (c) peace enforcement; and (d) non-UN operations.

(a) UN Observer Missions

Canada participated in the first two observer missions established by the United Nations. The first was the UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to which Canada reluctantly agreed to send four observers from the reserve army upon its creation in 1949.⁷ Canada continues to provide a Hercules aircraft to assist in the twice yearly moves of UNMOGIP Headquarters between India and Pakistan. The UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) actually had been established earlier, in 1948, to maintain the general armistice agreements between Israel and its opponents in the Middle East. However, Canada began contributing observers -- a few officers -- to UNTSO only in 1954, although it has continued to attach personnel ever since. Canada contributed also to the UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) in 1963-64.

(b) UN Regular Peacekeeping or Interpositional Forces

The first peacekeeping operation that involved the interposition of armed forces between warring factions was the UNEF I, created to supervise the ceasefire which followed the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt. The UNEF I remained in place until 1967, when it was withdrawn at Egypt's request, thus helping to precipitate the Six-Day War.

⁶ General Paul D. Manson, "Peacekeeping in Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, August 1989, p. 7.

⁷ J.L. Granatstein, "Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make A Difference? And what Difference did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?" in John English and Norman Hillmer. *Making A Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order*, Toronto, 1991, p. 225.

There have been a series of forces in the *Middle East* since then. A second force (UNEF II) was interposed at the end of the October War, in 1973, and remained until 1979. As well, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was stationed in the Golan Heights in 1974 to monitor the Israeli-Syrian ceasefire following the October War. Canada continues to provide logistics, communications, and technical support to that UN force. In 1978, Canada provided the initial communications, and logistical support for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after the Israeli invasion.

The same difficulties which Ambassador Barton described in regard to UNEF I applied even more forcefully to that of *the Congo* in 1960.

[B]oth the French and Soviet delegations, for varying reasons, did not want to pay for it. That produced a crisis over the question of the application of the principle of Article 19 of the charter, which says that if a country is two years in arrears it cannot vote. The UN was going to invoke this provision against the Soviet Union and France, two of the permanent members of the Security Council. In the final analysis the UN backed off from doing that, with reason, because it would have meant the end of the UN.(5:21)

A former senior UN official, F.T. Liu, told the Subcommittee in New York that the UN organization reached its nadir during the Congo crisis, which makes him optimistic about the current challenges the organization is facing, if only by comparison.

Of the Cold War operations, the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, ONUC) was the only one to presage certain contemporary operational problems. These resulted from its broad scope (it encompassed both military and civilian elements in a vast effort to fashion a new African state) and the problems it encountered on the ground, which included constant internal conflict and the collapse of the country's entire political and administrative infrastructure.

ONUC almost bankrupted the UN and it demonstrated the difficulty of mounting operations when influential states have conflicting views. On the other hand, the operation saw UN soldiers helping to relocate refugees, providing medical and humanitarian assistance, shipping food and medicine to needy provinces, and maintaining law and order. Its large civilian component of 2,000 personnel advised the Congolese government on social and economic planning and trained people to fill abandoned public service positions following the flight of most of the Belgians who had administered the area before independence.

When the last UN troops were withdrawn in 1964, the country retained the borders it had had at independence, in spite of three major secessionist movements, at least one of which had the material support of the Soviet Union. Brian Urquhart has written:

We had gone into the Congo at a time of anarchy and collapse to secure the territorial integrity of that country and to help its newly independent government to take over responsibilities for which it had had no preparation whatsoever. Our presence had also prevented the East-West struggle for the Congo from actually taking place on the ground.⁸

The situation in *Cyprus* vividly illustrates the difficulty of trying to keep peace in a society which itself is simply unable or unwilling to make peace in a lasting way. Since 1964, Canada has contributed peacekeeping troops to the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established that year in response to persistent violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, following the island's independence from Britain in 1960. Later, an invasion by Turkey, in 1974, severed the island, and UN troops began patrolling an established ceasefire line separating the Greek and Turkish communities.

Since the beginning of the conflict, little progress has been made toward a resolution. This lack of progress has spawned an ongoing debate over whether the peacekeeping mission is contributing to peace or helping to prevent it. Some critics maintain that the situation has been worsened by the dependency of both Cypriot communities on the peacekeepers; neither side is eager to disrupt the status quo, the artificial peace preserved by peacekeeping. Others have argued that maintaining UNFICYP is less costly than the lives that would be lost if the force left and fighting broke out between the two sides. Among the latter is Professor H.A. Klepak, of the Collège militaire royal de St. Jean, who said to the Subcommittee:

I am not sure to what extent Canadian public opinion would approve of what might be seen as simply washing one's hands and allowing a blood bath in an area where we have had such a lengthy connection.(3:29)

Alex Morrison reiterated these concerns: "...we may have to accept that in certain areas of the world United Nations forces will be deployed forever because the result of withdrawing UN-deployed forces may mean a renewal of hostilities and the killing of more people."(7:35)

Certainly, as Major-General Clive Milner made clear to the Subcommittee, there has been no lack of effort to resolve the Cypriot problem by a succession of Secretaries-General and their staffs.(10:17) Cyprus typifies the dilemma described by one of the UN secretariat's wiser heads some years ago:

...we have to face disputes where the parties do not want to reach accommodation, where accommodation is extremely difficult given the present situation and the present interests of the parties. We have to think not so much

⁸ Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, New York, 1987, p. 195.

in terms of solving a dispute "here and now," because it often cannot be done, but in terms of exercising conflict control.⁹

UNFICYP operates under a renewable six-month mandate which tasks the force with preventing a recurrence of fighting, contributing to law and order, and assisting in the return to normal conditions. The mandate, which has an accumulated debt of almost \$200 million, was last renewed in December 1992. UN members are supposed to reimburse about 10% of the cost (U.S.\$1 million a year) for the Cyprus force; yet they are 10 to 12 years behind in payments to Canada and other countries that send troops. The Canadian government estimates that it is owed U.S. \$15 million. At the time of writing, Canada fields approximately 575 soldiers in Cyprus, in a sector which includes the capital city of Nicosia, at a cost of \$14 million a year.

After reviewing its commitment, the Canadian government announced on December 11, 1992, that, beginning in June 1993, it would be withdrawing its soldiers, with the last returning home in October, 1993. This is not a precedent. Five years ago, Sweden withdrew most of its peacekeepers in the face of escalating costs and the lack of progress in solving the dispute. Denmark began total withdrawal of its forces on December 15, 1992, and Britain and Austria have announced small cutbacks. The Government's view, as we understand it, is that after almost thirty years, Canada has done enough. It is time for the load to be shared by other member states of the UN, which have not suffered the frustration of participating in the UN's longest standing peacekeeping force.

(c) Peace Enforcement: the Korean War Precedent

The Korean War was both a precedent and an anomaly. For the first time in its history, the UN authorized peace enforcement, in accordance with the Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"). This episode was the lone precursor in UN history of the Persian Gulf operation. In June, 1950, North Korea launched an attack on South Korea and, within two days, the Security Council recommended that UN Members furnish the necessary assistance to South Korea. On July 7, 1950, the Security Council authorized the formation of a unified command under the leadership of the United States, to which 16 nations, including Canada, contributed troops. Five others supplied medical units.

The operation was also a departure from Cold War patterns. There was a rare opportunity for consensus on the Security Council since, at the time, the Chinese seat was held by Taiwan and the Soviet Union was boycotting the Council in a demonstration of communist solidarity. The mission stood, until 1991, as the lone example of "collective security enforcement," which has been described as a number of nations joining together to repel an act

⁹ George Sherry, "The Role of the United Nations in Resolving Conflict Situations," Department of Public Information, Non-Governmental Organizations Section, DPI/NGO/SB/83/6, 11 March 1983, p. 2.

of aggression and thereby maintain international peace and security, as envisaged by the founders of the UN in Article 1 of the Charter.¹⁰

(d) Non-UN Operations

Canada has participated also in most non-UN initiatives: the International Commissions for Supervision and Control (ICSC) from 1954 to 1974, and the International Commission for Control and Supervision in 1973, both in Indo-China.¹¹ Canada helped in monitoring the implementation of the Geneva agreements on Indo-China. As well, since 1985, Canada has contributed personnel to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai peninsula to help monitor the security arrangements set out in the 1979 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt.

An Imaginative Stopgap

The rigidities of the Cold War made the development of some kind of instrument to help in the maintenance of international peace and security the only alternative to the diplomatic equivalent of a straitjacket. The result was peacekeeping -- an innovative stopgap measure, although inferior to the collective enforcement measures that the UN Charter had prescribed, but which could not be utilized because of the divisions within the Security Council.

Nevertheless, peacekeeping developed into a tested and proven method for dispute containment. It also provided fertile ground for dispute resolution when accompanied by peacemaking, that is, diplomacy designed to bring parties to a lasting peace.

But the inherent limitations on peacekeeping imposed by its Cold War origins restricted its wider use. With the removal of these limitations in a new era, the second generation of operations presents the possibility of a more sophisticated and flexible tool for the maintenance of international peace and security.

¹⁰ Article 1 of Chapter I of the UN Charter states in its opening lines that the purposes of the UN are "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace...." It is concerning such threats to which Chapter VII is later devoted.

¹¹ The *International Commissions for Supervision and Control* (ICSC) were created in 1954 to supervise and report violations of the 1954 Geneva Accords. These Commissions (one each for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), which had Canada, Poland and India as commissioners, reported to Britain and the Soviet Union, the co-chairs of the Geneva Conference. Canadians were mainly deployed in Vietnam and totalled approximately 150.

The *International Commission of Control and Supervision* (ICCS) had to monitor the cease-fire in South Vietnam as agreed in the Paris Peace Accords. The Commission also supervised the exchange of prisoners and ensured that no military buildup occurred. The 1,160 members of the Commission came from Hungary, Indonesia, Poland and Canada (which itself sent 240 military personnel and 50 officials from External Affairs).

of aggression and the body of this instrument... of the UN in Article 1 of the Charter.

Article 11 of the Charter... the Security Council... the General Assembly... the Economic and Social Council... the Trusteeship Council... the International Court of Justice... the Secretariat.

As a result of the... the Security Council... the General Assembly... the Economic and Social Council... the Trusteeship Council... the International Court of Justice... the Secretariat.

The Security Council... the General Assembly... the Economic and Social Council... the Trusteeship Council... the International Court of Justice... the Secretariat.

The Security Council... the General Assembly... the Economic and Social Council... the Trusteeship Council... the International Court of Justice... the Secretariat.

The Security Council... the General Assembly... the Economic and Social Council... the Trusteeship Council... the International Court of Justice... the Secretariat.

III PEACEKEEPING IN TRANSITION

Second-Generation Peacekeeping

The 13 peacekeeping operations set up during the Cold War were almost exclusively military in character. Since then, peacekeeping has become more complex. There is now what several UN officials have referred to as "a new paradigm of peacekeeping." The main characteristics of this new paradigm, in its present evolution, were described to the Subcommittee by Marrack Goulding, then the UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, as follows:

- (1) new operations usually have a large civilian component;
- (2) they often involve elections -- their organization and conduct;
- (3) usually involve an important information component, especially concerning democratic institutions;
- (4) they often involve a police component;
- (5) they often involve a human rights dimension, going beyond the supervision of police by intruding deeply into the judicial and penal systems;
- (6) they are time-limited -- most new operations have a timetable for implementation, which has been good for the troop-contributing countries; and
- (7) more often than not, the new operations are dealing with internal conflicts.

Mr. Goulding noted also that, more and more frequently, the UN by its operations is offending against Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, which forbids intervention into the affairs of sovereign states; on the whole, this trend had been accepted by the member states. Canada's Ambassador to the UN, Louise Frechette, offered an interesting gloss on this observation by pointing out that, for the time being, any effort to codify peacekeeping in a strict sense could be counterproductive since several countries would be obliged to offer very restrictive interpretations on what the UN should undertake. For example, most developing countries desired humanitarian intervention in Somalia, but would have been obliged to oppose it if a precise principle as to when humanitarian intervention might take place were to be sought. The lack of clear policy today may be a good thing, she suggested, insofar as it allows for a new paradigm to evolve during this transitional period.

Yet another characteristic of the new peacekeeping operations is the requirement for a more effective military component. This has been emphasized both in Bosnia and in Somalia, where troops are being used to protect humanitarian supplies, an operation involving much greater risks than traditional peacekeeping, in part because the troops cannot be impartial about their task. Marrack Goulding told us that the protection of convoys falls closer to peace enforcement (which is directed against one party, by definition) than to traditional peacekeeping (involving the consent of the parties).

In many respects, the term "peacekeeping" has worn out its usefulness; however, it is difficult to replace it with another term that is any more precise. That is why this report refers to peacekeeping in transition or to second-generation peacekeeping, which may be the most accurate designation of the "new paradigm" to which diplomats at the United Nations hopefully refer. In order to consider this new generation of peacekeeping more thoroughly, it is important to review some of the most important recent operations.

Recent UN Operations

Since 1988, when the Cold War had abated, 15 new operations have been created (some of them now concluded), all but one under UN auspices.¹ Several additional operations are currently under consideration. At the end of 1992, Canada had participated in all the new operations established during this period, contributing a total of 5,000 personnel. This was in addition to the forces Canada continued to contribute to on-going missions established during the Cold War.

(i) Observer Missions

At the low end of the scale in terms of intensity have been several observer missions or groups. The first of these was *the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP)*, which was created in 1990 to provide the Secretary-General's Special Representative with a military advisory unit. As of September 29, 1992 its strength was 10, including one Canadian.

The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) became operational on April 24, 1991, following the Gulf War, in order to monitor the ceasefire and provide a demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border. At its peak, the total strength was 1,440 personnel drawn from 34 nations. Canada sent a contingent of 301 field engineers, whose responsibilities included clearing mines and dismantling fortifications; only 45 personnel remain.

The United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) is monitoring both the ceasefire along the demilitarized zone and the human rights situation in the country, as well as helping to create a domestic police force in El Salvador. The mission has had two stages, the first beginning in July 1991, and the second in February 1992, with the mission scheduled to end May 31, 1993. Canada deployed 55 military observers to the region beginning in January 1992; that number has since been reduced to six. In the spring of 1992, ONUSAL took on the responsibilities of United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), the civilian/military operation created to facilitate a peaceful end to internal and transborder armed struggles in Central America. This mission's mandate has been extended to May, 1993,

¹ The lone non-UN operation to date has been the EC Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia (ECMMY). Other organizations, such as NATO and WEU, have contributed to UN operations.

although the peace process is in jeopardy because of the El Salvador government's difficulties in cleaning up an armed forces accused of rampant human rights abuses.

(ii) *The UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)*

The ten-year hiatus, between 1978 and 1988, in the setting up of UN operations was broken with the deployment of UNAVEM in January, 1989, to supervise the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola following the peace accords of December, 1988, between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. A second phase in the mission (UNAVEM II) began in June, 1991, with a mandate to verify the ceasefire and demobilization arrangements in the Angola Peace Accords which had been signed May 31 by the Government of Angola and the opposition Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), bringing 16 years of civil war to an end.

Elections were held on September 29-30, 1992, and were declared to be free and fair by UN observers. But UNITA, the losers in the elections, refused to endorse the result and pulled their forces out of the united army. Because the two parties were not completely disarmed prior to the elections, each has the capability to resume warfare. As a consequence, the operation is being extended from month to month as the UN attempts to broker a new deal; local ceasefires are being reached and broken in many areas. Canada has withdrawn all its observers from the mission. The Secretary-General has drastically reduced its size and has warned that the current mandate, which expires on April 30, 1993, should not be renewed unless the civil war is halted.

(iii) *Namibia (UNTAG)*

The UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia is the first example of the new generation of peacekeeping operations that are the offspring of the Cold War's demise. A year-long operation, the goals of which were chiefly political, it successfully carried out, under extremely tight deadlines, what the UN itself called "the largest decolonization exercise" in its history.²

The tasks were complicated and numerous. The South African military structure in Namibia had to be dismantled and the confinement of the guerrilla forces of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to their base in Angola had to be monitored. The South West Africa Police had to be brought under effective monitoring. Discriminatory and restrictive legislation had to be repealed, political prisoners and detainees released, an amnesty for returnees proclaimed, and the many thousands of Namibian exiles, including political leaders, had to be enabled to return.³ Above all, UNTAG had the task of ensuring that a major change in political atmosphere took place so that a free and fair election campaign culminating in fully democratic elections could occur.

² Clyde Sanger, "Namibia: The Black Man's Burden," *Behind the Headlines*, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Volume 48, No. 4, Summer 1990, p. 2.

³ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of Peace-keeping*, New York, 1990, p. 368.

To accomplish all this, UNTAG assembled a team which, at maximum deployment during the elections in early November, 1989, consisted of almost 8,000 drawn from 120 countries: just under 2,000 civilians (including international personnel), 1,500 police, and approximately 4,500 military personnel.⁴ It was the first time that a UN peacekeeping operation had involved election supervisors and civilian police on a large scale. This massive display of strength -- and particularly the efforts of UNTAG's information service which provided Namibians with relevant and objective information about what was happening -- helped the UN to build public confidence in the process. The fact that voter turnout in the November, 1989, elections was 97.3 percent gives an indication of that confidence.

UNTAG's lessons are highly relevant to potential missions that seek to combine elements of peace-making and peacekeeping, civil and military elements within a single mandate. Among the most important lessons was the danger of late deployment of the military units (because of bickering in the Security Council and General Assembly over the size of the military component and the budget).⁵ This resulted in a bloodbath of SWAPO fighters by South African security forces at the very outset of the mandate on April 1, 1989. SWAPO personnel had crossed the border from Angola and were viewed as hostile by the South Africans; unfortunately, there was no effective UN presence there at that early date, to deter the worst from happening. It was an unpropitious debut, which could have jeopardized the entire mission. It could have been avoided had the major member states in New York been less stingy.

(iv) The UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (known as MINURSO, its French acronym)

MINURSO was launched in April, 1991, with the first hundred observers deployed in September. It was created to enforce a ceasefire between Morocco, which occupies the disputed territory and has settled 350,000 people there since 1975, and the Polisario Front, which seeks to create an independent state and is backed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It was also to organize a referendum offering residents a choice between integration with Morocco and independence. But neither side has held to the ceasefire agreement, the referendum has been delayed by a dispute over whether the Moroccan settlers should be included on the voters' list, and the operation has received scant attention at the UN -- all of which has eroded the operation's credibility. Although Canada was to have sent 700 CF personnel, they were never deployed. Because of the prolonged elections deadlock, Canada is considering withdrawing its 30-odd observers. The Secretary-General has indicated that the mission may soon be terminated.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 342 and 354.

⁵ *The Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

(v) *The UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)*

These operations were established in late 1991 and early 1992 to oversee a ceasefire between warring factions and to organize the election of an assembly to draft a new constitution. Their genesis lay in the comprehensive peace accord signed on October 23, 1991, by all warring parties at the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC). Canada was a signatory and co-chaired the PICC's First Committee, which dealt with peacekeeping arrangements. The UN has also taken over five of Cambodia's ministries -- foreign affairs, defence, finance, public security, and information -- in order to ensure a fair electoral process.

UNAMIC has been in Cambodia since November, 1991, with an advance party of 200 military and civilian observers mandated to oversee the ceasefire and provide security for the return of Prince Sihanouk. Its full deployment totalled almost 400 personnel from 23 countries, including 95 Canadians. Canada already had deployed eight personnel as part of a monitoring commission to help supervise the withdrawal of 50,000 to 70,000 Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

UNTAC was created on February 28, 1992, with a mandate limited to 18 months and an estimated price tag of U.S.\$1.8 billion; general elections are scheduled for 1993. It involves 22,000 peacekeepers; just under 16,000 troops will be deployed in 12 infantry battalions drawn from more than 20 countries to monitor the ceasefire and to disarm all military forces. A 3,600-person police force will supervise law and order in the country, and a civilian contingent of 2,400 personnel will act as civil administrators (with 1,400 of them assisting in the election process, along with 56,000 Cambodians). As of February, 1993, 213 Canadian personnel were in Cambodia.

The peace process started by the PICC continues along a rocky path, trying to follow the principal document of the Paris Peace Accords: withdrawal, ceasefire, disarming and related measures; elections; repatriation of refugees and Cambodian displaced persons; the principles of a new constitution. But "implementation of every provision will require good faith on the part of all" the factions -- a very tall order.⁶

The Khmer Rouge, which were supposed to share power with the three other factions, have refused to cooperate until their demands for increased power within the Cambodian Supreme Council are met. They have refused also to turn over their weapons to the UN. The other factions, which had been complying with the ceasefire and disarming provisions of the peace accords, have stopped turning over weapons. They have indicated that they will resume disarming when the Khmer Rouge begin to cooperate. Some reports, including sources within the Thai military, indicate that the Khmer Rouge are planning a renewed military campaign. There have been many clashes between the factions and attacks on the UN personnel, both

⁶ Gerard Hervouet, "Rebirth of the Cambodian Nation," *Peace & Security*, Winter 1991/92, p. 15.

military and civilian. The terrain in Cambodia makes both the supervision of a ceasefire and the enforcement of economic sanctions all but impossible. The operation's resources are strained, the morale of its personnel is low, and doubt is growing about the possibility of holding free and fair elections in the spring of 1993, as required by the mission's mandate.

(vi) *The UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)*

UNPROFOR was approved by the Security Council on February 24, 1992, to monitor a ceasefire between Croatia and the Yugoslav army, to permit that army to withdraw into Serbia, and to separate the warring factions into protected areas. Deployment of 14,000 personnel from 31 countries (including 1,200 Canadians from 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade based in Germany) began on April 5. Among the many contentious issues was the decision to base the headquarters for UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, some 400 kilometres forward of the front line. Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, the first Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR, told the Subcommittee that the military expressed reservations about the idea when the plans were being developed in New York.

The thought was that the placing of the European community military monitor headquarters in Zagreb [in Croatia] had compromised their impartiality. Even if they were impartial, the perception was that they were somehow pro-Croatian. [The UN] did not want us in Zagreb or Belgrade. A number of us suggested Slovenia.... But Sarajevo was relatively quiet at the time, although the prospects were that fighting would break out.... But when things started to become active in Sarajevo, we had no mandate to deal with them other than to assist on a humanitarian basis.... [W]e had no mandate for Bosnia-Herzegovina.... It was preventive deployment. It was hoped that the United Nations presence would cool the situation. What the military personnel on the [reconnaissance] said, may be just the opposite. As soon as we put our flag up in front of the headquarters in Sarajevo we will become a lightning rod for every problem in Bosnia.(8:9)

Because fighting continued among Yugoslavia (composed only of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia, and Bosnia, the UN imposed sanctions on all trade to Yugoslavia except food and medicine on May 29. On June 29, Security Council Resolution 761 authorized UN forces to take over and reopen the Sarejevo airport for the purpose of accepting relief flights to help the starving Bosnians. An observer mission had been sent in a few weeks earlier under Major-General MacKenzie to verify that appropriate conditions existed to reopen the airport. The operation to reopen the airport itself was also led by Major-General MacKenzie and was carried out for the first few months by 850 Canadian and 50 French troops. Since being reopened, thousands of flights carrying many thousands of tonnes of food have landed at the airport.

Because of obstacles encountered in the distribution of humanitarian relief, including attacks by both regular forces and guerillas, the UN adopted Resolution 770, authorizing the expansion of the operation into *UNPROFOR II*. Its mandate is to escort and ensure the safe

delivery of humanitarian relief within Bosnia, using force if necessary to defend the convoys. Deployment of four battalions of 6,000 peacekeepers, including 1,200 Canadians, began in November, 1992. However, the Canadian battalion was the only one which was to deploy to Serbian-held territory in Bosnia. Since the Serbs reneged on an earlier agreement, the Canadians were confined to two holding camps in Croatia, until February 1993, when they were re-deployed to Sarejevo to assist in humanitarian relief operations.

The UN operations continue to evolve, with questions of the efficacy of continued or expanded action, the intransigence of the parties, and the treatment of civilians all becoming prominent issues. Major-General MacKenzie told the Subcommittee that both in Yugoslavia and Somalia (see below), the rules of engagement were less restrictive than in most other UN missions. In most missions, self-defence is permissible only if the attacker is identified and if the defender himself returns fire. In these two cases, however, if one member of the team is fired on, the entire team can return fire.(8:36) Indeed, in Bosnia the UN has broadened the operation's mandate so that it now can use force against anyone trying to stop it from carrying out its mission.⁷

On November 16, 1992, the Security Council voted to impose a naval blockade on Yugoslavia for the first time adding enforcement provisions to the trade sanctions that had been adopted in May. Yet, in spite of these efforts, some seven months after Serbian forces first laid siege to Sarejevo, the UN has been barely able to get in half the food the Bosnian capital needs to support its 380,000 inhabitants.⁸

Meanwhile, former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, negotiating on behalf of the UN, and former British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, negotiating for the European Community, devised a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would turn it into a loose federation of 10 autonomous provinces along ethnic lines. Serbs would receive the most territory (about 42 percent), but would not be a separate state. Croats would receive a portion, situated in the southwest, adjacent to their state, plus an isolated sliver in the north. The Muslims would have more than what they had been reduced to, but less than what they had before. The formula of the negotiators was an attempt to capture the realities on the ground at the moment rather than to return to conditions before the fighting broke out.⁹

That approach left the negotiators open to charges that they were rewarding "ethnic cleansing" or other provocations -- charges that seemed to resonate with key policymakers in the new U.S. administration. At the time of writing, the U.S. administration is attempting to draw

⁷ Paul Lewis, "U.N.'s Top Troop Official Sees No Need for War Room", *The New York Times*, December 27, 1992.

⁸ Paul Lewis, "UN in Bosnia War", *The New York Times*, November 20, 1992.

⁹ John Darnton, "Croatia Offers a Grim Precedent for Bosnian Peace," *The New York Times*, February 7, 1993.

up its own alternative to the Vance-Owen proposals. However, there does not appear to be any solution satisfactory to the conscience of the international community, however, that does not entail a sizeable infusion of additional force from Western states, which, inevitably, implies substantial U.S. involvement.

The Secretary-General estimated that the cost of the mission would be U.S.\$612 million for one year. The General Assembly could not agree on this figure, however, and voted instead for a first instalment of U.S.\$250 million.

(vii) The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM)

UNOSOM was authorized by the Security Council on April 24, 1992, with Somalia in a condition of virtual anarchy: several years of internecine violence and famine had destroyed any semblance of civil order. The operation began by sending 50 military observers to monitor a fragile six-week truce between warring factions in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, with the hope of allowing deliveries of food. Through the World Food Program, the UN began air-lifts, and promised to send 72,000 tonnes of food within a year.

The widespread looting of food supplies by various groups led in late August, 1992, to a UN announcement that a force of 3,500 blue berets would be sent to guard food supplies, convoys, and relief workers. Canada agreed to send 750 troops to northeastern Somalia to protect famine relief operations. But deployments were delayed and missions complicated because of difficulties in securing agreements with clan chiefs, who controlled important areas such as the port and the airport.

On December 3, 1992, following an offer from the United States of a large contribution of troops, and frustrated by the various obstacles to delivering aid, the UN Security Council authorized an expanded mandate that would allow the United States to spearhead a major intervention for the purpose of creating a secure distribution system for relief throughout Somalia, and permitting the use of force if necessary to achieve that goal. This operation was called UNITAF (Unified Task Force). On December 9, 1992, the first of over 20,000 troops (the vast majority to be supplied by the United States), landed at Mogadishu to implement the expanded mandate, augmenting the 500 Pakistani troops and many relief workers already present. Although personnel from only a few states, including Canada, were deployed in the beginning of this new stage, 22 states deployed personnel in the first phase.

The Canadian contribution to UNITAF was 1,350 personnel, drawn from the land, maritime and air forces. The then Chief of the Defence Staff, General de Chastelain, stated that the Canadian participation would be limited to one year, after which period Canada would be forced to withdraw due to the exhaustion of its resources. Canada has neither offered nor declined as yet to contribute to UNOSOM II, which will replace UNITAF with the withdrawal of most U.S. troops.

(viii) *Other Operations*

On December 7, 1992, the UN Secretary-General asked members of the UN to authorize a force of up to 10,000 soldiers and civilians in *Mozambique* for the purpose of preparing for and overseeing free elections, as set out in an agreement that ended 14 years of civil war. The estimated cost of such a force would be in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Canada is considering contributing a few observers to this operation.

On December 11, 1992, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to send approximately 700 peacekeepers to the former Yugoslav republic of *Macedonia* to prevent the Balkan war from spreading into that area. An "advance team" consisting, among others, of a company of about 180 troops from the Canadian battalion that remains idle in Croatia (see above) was deployed in January, 1993, to establish contacts, camps, and patrol routines.

There are other places that may soon be pressing for UN intervention, for humanitarian relief, for ceasefire supervision, or for aid in implementing treaty provisions, such as elections. In the first case, *Sudan*, may soon see a Somalia-like operation; in the second, *Liberia* or *certain republics of the former Soviet Union*, in the midst of civil wars, may seek UN services; and any or all may seek assistance in making the transition to more peaceful and stable political arrangements. Given the increased interest in participating in peacekeeping on the part of members of the UN Security Council, it may be that these and other operations will receive consideration.

An Agenda for Peace

The summit of leaders of member states of the Security Council in January, 1992, appeared to recognize the challenges of the new era when they called for better organized and more effective UN multinational operations. In order to hasten such a process, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was requested to prepare "an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping."¹⁰ On July 17, 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented to the Security Council and General Assembly his report, *An Agenda for Peace*.

The report owes a considerable intellectual debt to the writings of Brian Urquhart. He had described certain mechanisms which aim at maintaining international peace and security, namely: (1) diplomacy; (2) peacemaking (which he referred to as "the good offices of the Secretary-General"); (3) peacekeeping; and (4) collective action or enforcement. Urquhart argued that these mechanisms should be treated as a kind of seamless web or continuum, one leading automatically to the other.

¹⁰ Quoted in *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping"*, A/47/277, June 17, 1992, p. 20.

For example, if a peacekeeping operation gets run over by a government, like for example, the peacekeeping forces in South Lebanon did in 1982, in the mandate of that peacekeeping operation that should automatically trigger collective action from the Security Council.... If they got trampled on, they would become a tripwire.¹¹

(a) Preventive Diplomacy

The Secretary-General defined preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur."¹² He cited a number of traditional measures such as the systematic exchange of military missions; formation of regional "risk reduction centres"; free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements; fact-finding missions and contacts between member states; early warning systems, aimed in particular at monitoring economic and social developments that may lead to instability; and demilitarized zones on either one or both sides of a border.

(b) Preventive Deployment

A more innovative proposal was for "**preventive deployment**," whereby the UN would anticipate conflicts and step in, before violence escalates or even begins, with security forces, humanitarian aid, or simply assistance in the conciliation process. Preventive deployment could take place in a variety of circumstances. In conditions of crisis within a country, when the government requests, or all parties consent to, a UN presence, preventive deployment could control violence and alleviate suffering. However, the Secretary-General did point out that the UN still must respect the sovereignty of the state in such situations.

In inter-state disputes, where both parties agree to a UN presence, preventive deployment would be fairly straightforward. It would be more problematic in cases where one nation fears an imminent cross-border attack. But *An Agenda for Peace* commented that preventive deployment should take place "if the Security Council concludes that a United Nations presence on one side of the border, with the consent only of the requesting country, would serve to deter conflict."¹³

Already, the Security Council has provided, in December, 1992, a clear example of preventive deployment: at the request of only one party, 700 troops are being sent to Macedonia to prevent the spread of the Balkan war. Both the proposal and the subsequent authorization represent a radical departure. Once again, they bear the stamp of Brian Urquhart who earlier

¹¹ "What Kind of World and Whose Order?" *Peace and Security*, Spring 1991, p. 4.

¹² *Agenda for Peace*, p. 5.

¹³ *Agenda for Peace*, p. 9.

had suggested a third category of UN intervention -- something between traditional peacekeeping and large-scale collective enforcement action.

It would be intended to put an end to random violence and to provide a reasonable degree of peace and order so that humanitarian relief work could go forward and a conciliation process could commence. The forces involved would be relatively small, representatively international and would not have military objectives as such. But, unlike peacekeeping forces, such troops would be required to take, initially at least, certain combat risks in bringing the violence under control. They would essentially be armed police actions.¹⁴

(c) Enforcement Action

In *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General defines peacemaking as action aimed at bringing "hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations."¹⁵ Chapter VI, entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," provides the means for peaceful intervention by the Security Council and appropriate Council inquiry and recommendations. When peacemaking succeeds, it is often followed by the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation to the area in question to oversee the implementation of whatever agreement had been reached between the belligerents.

On the other hand, if peaceful means fail, the Security Council has the option of using sanctions or even military force to restore international peace and security, under articles in Chapter VII of the Charter. The sole occasion on which the Security Council did authorize military enforcement was during the Korean War; during the Gulf crisis, on the other hand, the Council allowed member states to take measures on its behalf.

The mechanisms for enforcement action were clearly found wanting during the Gulf crisis. Sanctions, though almost universally demanded, appeared to their principal sponsors to be ineffective in obtaining a quick resolution to the crisis. This angered critics who protested that the Security Council made no real effort to ascertain whether sanctions actually were having an impact before it allowed military action. This shortcoming has prompted some observers to call for a reassessment or refining of the blunt instrument of sanctions -- the development of "smart" sanctions.¹⁶

As for military enforcement, Urquhart has summarized the inadequacy of UN arrangements.

¹⁴ Brian Urquhart, "Who Can Stop Civil Wars?" *The New York Times*, December 29, 1991.

¹⁵ *Agenda for Peace*, p. 6.

¹⁶ Bernard Wood, "From the Director," *Peace & Security*, Winter 1991/92, p. 16.

Forty years of cold war have meant...that the steps outlined in the Charter for providing the Security Council with standby forces to enforce its decisions have never been taken. No agreements have been concluded with member states under Article 43 to make assistance and facilities available to the Council armed forces.¹⁷

The Secretary-General had argued that it is now time to take Chapter VII more seriously, in particular, Article 42, which outlines the use of military force since its potential use "is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security." To do this requires the realization of Article 43 "whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council...on a permanent basis" so as to respond to outright aggression quickly and effectively.¹⁸ Such a permanent force -- or **standing UN army** -- would serve either as a deterrent or to meet threats posed by a "military force of a lesser order."

Appearing before the Subcommittee, Russian Ambassador Belonogov agreed with the concept of a permanent force under the direct control of the UN. Based on his experience as the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Belonogov referred to the weeks and months of dickering the Secretary-General was obliged to pursue with various member states:

...the Secretary-General, having received instructions from the Security Council to send peacekeeping operation forces, was unable to do so because he had to negotiate with dozens of governments -- which of them will supply helicopters, which will supply airplanes, which will give police contingents, who will contribute what and under what financial conditions? So our point of view is that it will make the United Nations much more effective if the Secretary-General were to have...designated units and equipment offered by member states.(5:32-33)

However, other witnesses were doubtful about the idea of readily-available UN permanent forces. Former diplomat Geoffrey Pearson said that technical points -- where the forces would be based, how they would be trained and the like -- could be resolved with some political will, but acknowledged that financing and command and control of these forces could cause difficulties.(5:16) He was supported in this by William Barton, a former Canadian ambassador to the UN, who told us:

¹⁷ Brian Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf," *The New York Review of Books*, March 7, 1991, p. 34.

¹⁸ *Agenda for Peace*, pp. 12-13. Article 43 of the UN Charter states that all member states should "undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." The Article goes on to state that the agreement(s) should be "concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

Both on political and financial ground[s] I am sceptical. Some governments, including Canada, have earmarked forces for peacekeeping but they are not about to surrender the right of decision about participation in any individual force.(5:12)

The Secretary-General also expressed concern over the ability of peacekeeping forces to restore and maintain ceasefires, considering them often ill-equipped for such a task. Accordingly, he recommended that member states make available, on call, "**peace enforcement units.**"¹⁹ These troops would volunteer for such service, be more heavily-armed than peacekeeping forces, and would be specially trained within their national forces.

The Secretary-General stressed that these troops would remain distinct from those raised under Article 43. While Article 43 forces would be used in cases of enforcement action under Chapter VII, peace enforcement units apparently would be used for the new forms of UN intervention described to the Subcommittee by Marrack Goulding -- something between traditional peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement. For example, they would secure elusive ceasefire lines and assist in the delivery of humanitarian relief. Some analysts have suggested that these forces would also be perfect for preventive deployment, although *An Agenda for Peace* makes no explicit link.²⁰

The Secretary-General has called for the setting up of such a military unit through the negotiation of special agreements with various member states in accord with provisions prescribed in Article 43. He has written that for the first time "since the Charter was adopted, the long-standing obstacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail."²¹ The Secretary-General considered that such a permanent force "would serve as a means of deterring breaches of peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response."²²

A point of historical interest that is highly relevant to this debate was raised by Geoffrey Pearson, who told the Subcommittee that, in 1946, Canada offered to earmark forces for permanent UN service. The Security Council declined because it was not ready to accept such offers. He suggested that it might be ready to do so now. Mr. Pearson also noted that the first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, had suggested that volunteers with a military background be recruited on an individual basis directly from member states.(5:15)

¹⁹ *Agenda for Peace*, p. 13.

²⁰ Maxime Faille, *The UN Secretary-General's Report on Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. An Analysis from the Perspective of Parliamentarians for Global Action*, July 1992, p. 12.

²¹ *Agenda for Peace*, pp. 12-13.

²² *Ibid.*, p.13.

The Subcommittee is interested in these various suggestions. It recognizes the value of some sort of UN peace enforcement capability, which would enable the UN to deal more effectively with situations like those in Bosnia or Cambodia where the current forces are obliged to hope for the best because they would not be capable of restoring law and order if a serious incident should occur.²³

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada consider the advisability of commissioning a study, perhaps in conjunction with like-minded members of the United Nations, to explore the feasibility of the establishment of a multi-national peace force. These troops, to be drawn on a volunteer basis from among both regular or reserve personnel, would be adequately equipped and could undertake a variety of tasks ranging from providing protection for humanitarian relief work to securing ceasefire lines.

The Subcommittee further recommends that the Government initiate negotiations with the Security Council, as discussed in Article 43 of the UN Charter, with the object of signing an agreement to make available a limited number of personnel to the Security Council, on its call, to form the basis, as well as a precedent, for the establishment of a multinational force.

Extra-military Measures

Two other levers have gained new prominence in the field of peacekeeping: the rule of law and the use of sanctions. In *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General stressed the relevance of the International Court of Justice to many of the issues facing the international community and the need both to use that body in a systematic way and to respect its decisions. Building on this admonition and on the historical precedent of war crimes trials, which were employed in the aftermath of World War II, a UN commission has been convened to investigate alleged atrocities in the conflict raging in the former Yugoslavia. Information is being collected from various sources, including reports from governments and various other organizations. The commission will release a preliminary report in mid-1993. Based on their findings, the UN will decide whether or not to establish a war crimes tribunal. This is the first such commission since World War Two; one Canadian has been appointed to the five-member body.

Noting the presence of that commission in the former Yugoslavia, Major-General MacKenzie suggested to the Subcommittee that the presence of a team mandated to monitor human rights abuses and other breaches of international law "could be a positive factor, providing all sides agreed they would open themselves to the investigation.... I have to say, yes, it would be a very important [arrow in the] quiver to have if you could use it."(8:32-33)

²³ Mackinlay and Chopra, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

Sanctions have become a fixture in the process of imposing and escalating pressure on states in an effort to alter behaviour that the international community finds unacceptable. Sanctions have been brought to bear in numerous instances, the most visible recent examples being those implemented by the UN Security Council against Iraq in 1990, and against the former Yugoslavia in 1992. However, while a panoply of sanctions on items ranging from oil and weapons to certain foodstuffs was declared in each case, both the ease by which those orders are carried out, and the relative effectiveness of sanctions to change behaviour, have come into question.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada, through its membership in the UN and a variety of regional organizations, urge these bodies to consider sending commissions of inquiry to investigate alleged violations of international law such as gross human rights abuses. These commissions could operate in conjunction with peacekeeping missions.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada urge the UN to conduct a study, perhaps in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, on the difficulties associated with implementing and monitoring sanctions, and on the effectiveness of sanctions in halting unacceptable behaviour.

Command and Control

The new international context has made demands on the United Nations increasingly burdensome. The Secretariat is being called on to engage in fact-finding, observation, mediation, peacekeeping, and peacemaking -- in almost every part of the world -- as a matter of course. Large peacekeeping operations appear likely to occur with greater frequency than in the past and to run concurrently (Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Somalia). These place far greater stress on the UN system than any number of discrete observer missions, which require neither a large deployment of troops nor the range of services that characterize the others.

Yet, despite the assumption by the UN of such large and grave responsibilities, the Subcommittee grew increasingly distressed -- as it listened to various witnesses and when it visited UN headquarters in New York -- by the absence of facilities within the UN Secretariat for handling so many and such complex initiatives. A simple but telling illustration is the complete absence of a crisis or situation room at UN headquarters, such as all military establishments have as a matter of course.

There appeared in general to be an absence of a sense of urgency -- despite the good intentions, hard work, and exceptional abilities of many individuals within the Secretariat -- at least insofar as such urgency can be expressed in organizational terms. For example, Major-General MacKenzie referred several times in testimony to the lack of a 24-hour, 7-days-a-week, on-call capacity at UN headquarters. He mentioned communicating with New York on various

occasions to receive assistance or guidance of one kind or another, only to be told that the relevant official would get back to him in the morning.(8:13) This is not a situation that Canada or any other member state of the UN should tolerate -- particularly since it has been pointed out to UN officials on numerous occasions.

The Subcommittee accepts the argument that for many years the arrangements for peacekeeping were quite adequate. But if the UN is engaged in the creation of a new paradigm of peacekeeping, as senior UN officials with whom the Subcommittee met clearly believe, then it should put its own house in order so as to be taken seriously by troop-contributing countries. The UN clearly is in desperate need of a better system of command and control. Its military capability is, as Professor Cox told us, and others such as Colonel Ethell and Major-General MacKenzie confirmed, amazingly fragile and ill-developed.(6:28; 7:11; 8:6,13)

There is, in fact, no overarching military structure within the world organization. Theoretically, the Military Staff Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council, is supposed, according to Article 47 of the UN Charter, to "advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements...." It is also said, in Article 47 (3), that the Military Staff Committee, "shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council." In fact, throughout the Cold War period, the Committee conducted purely token meetings. It remains a largely inactive body.²⁴

The Canadian position always has downplayed the value of the Military Staff Committee for reasons that a number of witnesses before the Subcommittee made clear. William Barton pointed out:

I have one problem with a body, which purports to be military but is highly political, running a war. It is operation by committees. Maybe there is a role for the Military Staff Committee but I think the concept in the Charter, where it was in effect going to be the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is a very dubious one.(5:34)

Professor David Cox of Queen's University was also skeptical regarding the potential role of the Military Staff Committee, given the Security Council's composition.

If you go the Military Staff Committee route you are really strengthening the hand of the permanent members of the Security Council. As you know, if we did that we could get involved in the question of the current legitimacy of those five states as the permanent members, and if not then what?(6:28)

²⁴ Brian Urquhart, "Learning from the Gulf", *op.cit.*, p.34.

Nevertheless, Geoffrey Pearson explained that the Committee could serve a useful purpose, with some modifications.

It may have to be expanded in the sense that there could be other countries, or it could create sub-committees the membership of which would be troop contributors. You cannot expand its membership without amending the Charter and that would be difficult, but there are other ways within the Charter that would give it more strength.(5:16)

One method of adapting the Charter without amending it would be by resort to Article 29, which stipulates that "the Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions." Such an approach would circumvent the provisions of Article 47 to establish a more broadly representative type of Military Staff Committee. The new organ -- which Professor Cox proposed would consist of 20 to 30 people who would report directly to the Secretary-General and then to the Security Council -- would certainly help to bolster the military capability of the Secretariat.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada consider proposing the creation of a subsidiary organ of the UN based on Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, to act as a military advisory commission. While coordinating with the appropriate Under Secretaries-General, it would also have its own chief of staff who would report directly to the Secretary-General. This would bolster the military capability of the UN Secretariat in its pursuit of international peace and security.

The Subcommittee also recommends that the Government of Canada make clear to the United Nations Secretariat the urgent necessity for certain minimal standards of command and control, specifically, the creation of a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week, on-call command centre and a crisis or situation room, available to handle more effectively the expanded demands currently imposed on the Secretariat.

The Management of Peacekeeping: A House Divided

The upsurge in activity experienced by the UN has exposed a number of shortcomings. The new demands and pressures have found the Secretariat wanting in many respects, both in structure and method of operations. Increasingly, the UN had become unwieldy: before 1992, no fewer than 27 Under Secretaries-General and as many more Assistant Secretaries-General were all reporting directly to the Secretary-General. The congestion at the top was entirely predictable, with an unmanageable load of appointments and meetings placed on the UN's top executive officer.

An attempt has been made by the new Secretary-General to initiate reforms, partly in response to a considerable lobby from the member states. A group of 30 member states, including Canada, prepared a series of proposed reforms in the fall of 1991, noting that, in large part, the UN Secretariat was the "result of a series of ad hoc responses over the course of 40 years to specific problems of the time and of General Assembly resolutions approved in circumstances very different to those of today." It proposed that the major activities of the Secretariat should be grouped on a functional basis, which it claimed would improve the Secretary-General's control of the organization, streamline and focus decision-making, reduce duplication, and enhance the coordination of activities in the same sector.²⁵

The new Secretary-General responded in February, 1992, with a revamped structure for the Secretariat. Three "super" departments were created: Administration and Management; Political Affairs; and Economic Development.²⁶ Nevertheless, despite these changes, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that more needs to be done.

(i) *A Divided Chain of Command*

The major change affecting peacekeeping was the creation of a new Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and its relations with the already-existing Office of Peacekeeping Operations (OPO), both of which are headed by Under Secretaries-General. DPA is now responsible for the peacemaking component of UN operations. It monitors emerging conflict situations, in close collaboration with the executive office of the Secretary-General. Both are directly involved in crises in the stages that precede the actual insertion of a peacekeeping force - i.e., diplomatic negotiations and peacemaking -- and they signal the appropriate time to undertake peacekeeping operations.

At that time, the OPO is supposed to swing into action. Among its tasks is initial political and military planning and the recruitment of military personnel for each mission. The Secretariat strongly emphasizes civilian control, especially in the larger, more complex operations involving both civil and military components. In these operations, which have wider political objectives going beyond military considerations, civilians are appointed to lead the operations (Special Representatives), instead of the military commander. This approach reflects a "judgment that the future of peacekeeping lies in facilitating political transitions, and that such operations must consistently demonstrate military subordination to civilian control."²⁷

²⁵ Mission of Australia to the United Nations, *Secretariat Reform: Background Memorandum*, November 29, 1992, pp. 1-3.

²⁶ William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, eds., *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in an Emerging World Order*, The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington, D.C., March 1992, p.66.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.76

Unfortunately, the chain of command remains divided. The OPO shares the organization of peacekeeping with the Office of Human Resources Management, which recruits the civilian elements for peacekeeping operations, and the Field Operations Division (FOD), which is responsible for the administrative and logistical aspects of the missions. However, the FOD does not report to the OPO, since it falls under the Secretariat's Department of Administration and Management; accordingly, while the force commander reports to the OPO, the chief administrative officer reports to the FOD.²⁸ Moreover, according to Major-General MacKenzie, the personnel policies of the UN's civilian staff have made it impossible to obtain the required number of volunteers for places such as ex-Yugoslavia.

We were to have over 300 civilian staff, and three months into the mission we had barely 30, working their tails off, but making little progress for a force of 14,000.(8:7)

Once a military commander has been selected, the commanders of national contingents within the larger force may be brought to New York for a week so as to become acquainted with the commander-in-chief and with UN officials. But national contingent commanders normally do not meet with logisticians from FOD or the civilians who are charged with the administration of the operations in the field. The same situation holds for the civilian-side of peacekeeping operations. Civilians "like the military, receive a mission plan drafted by someone whom they do not know, and they will not meet the people whom they are to lead until they reach the mission area."²⁹

(ii) *Inadequate Logistics*

Logistics may be the single most difficult element in any operation because of the inadequacies and anomalies of the UN system. The chief administrative officer and staff of the Force Secretariat, along with the military logistics staff, is responsible for logistic support including finances, procurement of equipment and supplies, communications between the mission and UN headquarters, and direction and coordination of personnel and troop movements in the mandated area.³⁰ However, the UN appears to have a grossly inadequate supply system. To provide for some equipment needs, the UN has a storage depot at Pisa, Italy, which acts as a way-station for equipment bound for active missions. Most goods stored at Pisa are non-perishable items, such as uniforms, and items used by the UN's Disaster Relief Office, including tents, blankets, buckets, and plastic sheeting.³¹ Among the goods it does not store are vehicles and maintenance

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.71.

²⁹ Durch and Blechman, *op cit.*, p.74.

³⁰ Robin Hay, "Civilian Aspects of United Nations' Peacekeeping", *Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Background Paper No. 38*, October 1991, p.1.

³¹ For a more detailed analysis of UN equipment needs see Durch and Blechman, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-80.

and communications equipment. At times, Canadian peacekeepers have purchased equipment locally or relied more heavily on Canadian Forces equipment.

By and large, the UN procures materiel on the world market and transports it to the area of operations. This leads to a variety of problems, which one experienced military officer summarized as follows: (1) a lack of quality control at source leaves those receiving the supplies with a choice between rejecting them and having their troops endure lengthy delays or accepting plainly unsatisfactory goods as better than nothing; (2) the frustrations of an antiquated and inflexible system of procurement regulations and procedures; and (3) inadequate staffing arrangements.³² An effective logistic system would require a trained staff, sufficient facilities for storage, and adequate financing.

Major-General MacKenzie expressed the hope that the United States' new interest in becoming more involved in peacekeeping might provide the kind of help the UN most needs.

Their tremendous logistics capability would not only resolve the UN's main peacekeeping problem, it would provide the Americans with an audit trail to monitor their contribution.(8:7)

(iii) Standardization of Military Operations

The first few weeks of a peacekeeping mission are said to be the most important phase. Yet this phase is frequently marked by serious confusion and inadequacies. Colonel Donald Ethell told the Subcommittee:

Where there is a problem is at the force level, the mixing of the various nationalities. There is usually confusion and disorganization, at least in the early stage of the operations.(7:11)

Colonel Ethell told the Subcommittee that there is an "obvious need for standardization of the staff systems and of course, the command and control, particularly for the United Nations missions."(7:11)

The UN must attempt to ensure regional balance in assembling any given peacekeeping force. This leads to wide divergences in the operating methods of different national military contingents within each force. There is also a tendency, according to Colonel Ethell, to "over-rank and over-staff at the headquarters level to make sure there is equal representation at the headquarters level."(7:13) This has the effect of lowering the standard of operations. Hence Colonel Ethell recommended:

³² Colonel J.D. Murray, "The Military Requirements of Peacekeeping: Regular vs. Reserve," in Calvin Bricker, ed., *Canada's Reserves and Peacekeeping*, York Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1988, pp. 42-51.

The peacekeeping missions need standardization of operations based on a proven staff system.... [T]here is a need for a peacekeeping international standard, which could evolve in part from standardization of training for all the contributing nations. This standardization should be accomplished by the UN headquarters.(7:17)

One means that could be used to advance proposals and methods of standardization of UN operations is through the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations -- better known as the Committee of 34 because 34 UN member states sit on it -- on which Canada plays an important role. It was revitalized in 1989 to help develop training, financing, and standardized procedures for peacekeeping operations. Some of its proposals have included: that member countries provide information regarding forces and equipment available for future operations; that an inventory be provided which includes information on police forces, communications and logistics personnel, and elections experts and observers. New technological areas are also being explored to reduce manpower requirements and increase effectiveness through the use of satellites, aerial surveillance equipment, and sensors.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada consider using its position on the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to focus attention on the inadequacies of the UN supply system and to advocate that sufficient funds and resources be allocated: (a) to the establishment of a trained and experienced logistics staff at UN headquarters; and (b) to the maintenance of adequate storage facilities.

The Subcommittee urges the Government of Canada to suggest to the leading military powers that a valuable contribution to UN peacekeeping would be for their military establishments to offer logistics support on a regular basis.

The Subcommittee also urges the Government of Canada to make the case forcefully within the United Nations, particularly in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, for standardization of UN military operations, based on the established continental staff system used by the majority of troop-contributing countries.

The Financing of Peacekeeping

The financing of peacekeeping operations involves two separate sets of issues: revenues and expenditures, the latter including reimbursements to troop-contributing countries. In UN parlance, revenues are generated by "assessments," while states are reimbursed for their participation through "recoveries." All these issues are complicated and politically charged.

(1) Assessments

(a) General Assessments

The UN generates revenue for its normal operations (i.e., other than peacekeeping) through general assessments. Each state receives an annual general assessment indicating the amount it owes the UN; payment is an obligation of membership. Assessments are calculated by a formula that is based on "capacity to pay," using each state's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a starting point. Many other factors, such as high external debt and low per capita income, are also taken into account.³³ The formula, therefore, is slightly skewed in favour of less developed countries. The formula is used to generate a scale, which gives the percentage of the total budget each state must pay.

These percentages are then adjusted slightly through a process of negotiation among all states. The currency of negotiation is "mitigation points," which are 1/100 of a percent of the UN's budget. Once established, these percentages apply for a three-year period. In the current period, due to the government's domestic fiscal restraint policies, Canada has declined to pick up any mitigation points. Its current general assessment percentage is 3.11%, which in 1992 amounted to U.S.\$30,662,414. In the last three-year period, Canada had picked up two mitigation points from some of the less developed countries, which meant that Canada's general assessment increased by U.S.\$190,000.

(b) Special Assessments

United Nations peacekeeping operations, for the most part, are financed through special assessments.³⁴ The two significant exceptions to this rule are discussed below under *(c) Exceptions*. For each peacekeeping mission, states receive a special assessment over and above the amount of their regular general assessment. Each operation has its own special assessment; percentages absorbed by each state can vary from one assessment to another as a result of the negotiating process. One possible explanation for separate special assessments would be that states retain the option of not supporting a particular operation. Peacekeeping is the only UN activity financed in this fashion. The high cost of operations and the inherent inability to forecast when operations will be required or approved make their financing from the UN's general revenue fund impossible.

Special assessments are calculated by a different formula. The special assessment scale for peacekeeping reduces the amount less developed states are assessed by 10% and 20% for Categories C and D states respectively. That reduction requires that 6% of the total assessment be redistributed, which is entirely absorbed by the permanent members of the Security Council. This is done on the assumption that the permanent members of the Security Council have a proportionally bigger role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security. At

³³ For UN assessment purposes, states are divided into four categories: A, B, C, and D. Category A are the five permanent members of the Security Council, category B are the developed non-"permanent five" states; category C are the better off developing countries, while category D includes the least developed countries.

³⁴ Some very small missions have been financed from the UN's general revenue fund.

present, the United States' special assessment is 30.6%, much higher than its general assessment of 25%.

However, the establishment of a special assessment for a particular operation does not guarantee that each state will pay its assessment. Some states refuse on principle to pay for a particular operation, while other states simply claim financial hardship. Table 1 indicates the total of special assessments contributions from selected major contributors outstanding as of November 1, 1992. The arrears of the republics of the former Soviet Union can be attributed to their economic hardship. In the case of the United States, it is more a matter of policy and budgetary convenience. For example, the U.S. fiscal year begins on October 1, at which time a substantial payment was made. The majority of U.S. arrears is attributable to two operations, UNIFIL (Lebanon) and UNTAC (Cambodia), which are owed about U.S.\$65 million and \$45 million respectively. However, the United States made significant payments to each operation in the fall of 1992, almost U.S.\$90 million for UNIFIL, and almost U.S.\$200 million for UNTAC. The seven states listed below, with a combined bill of arrears of U.S.\$518,955,000, account for 80% of the outstanding contributions for special assessments.

TABLE 1

**Current Arrears of Selected UN Member States in Support of Peacekeeping
U.S. \$('000)**

| STATE | Arrears Prior Years | Assessments For 1992 | Total | Collected in 1992 | Amount To be paid |
|------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Belarus | 3,366.6 | 6,230.0 | 9,596.5 | 1,341.9 | 8,254.7 |
| Czechoslovakia | 7,120.2 | 10,558.0 | 17,678.2 | 8,370.6 | 9,307.6 |
| Germany | 17,248.8 | 165,517.8 | 182,766.6 | 160,780.8 | 21,295.8 |
| Japan | 75.0 | 219,433.3 | 219,508.3 | 168,576.1 | 50,932.2 |
| Russian Fed. | 126,773.4 | 184,707.9 | 311,481.2 | 49,977.6 | 261,503.6 |
| Ukraine | 12,477.2 | 21,928.7 | 34,405.9 | 5,082.8 | 29,323.1 |
| USA | 145,905.8 | 566,775.7 | 712,681.5 | 575,032.8 | 137,648.7 |
| Total of Above | 312,967.0 | 1,175,159.0 | 1,488,117.0 | 969,162.0 | 518,955.0 |
| Total All States | 373,679.0 | 1,841,144.0 | 2,184,721.0 | 1,534,917.0 | 649,804.0 |

Source: UN Secretariat, *Status of Contributions as of October 31, 1992.*

(c) Exceptions

The UN Force in Cyprus has always been financed by voluntary contributions and has always been in a state of chronic debt. William Barton provided the Subcommittee with the explanation for this peculiar arrangement.

UNFICYP was set up at a time when the UN was in a constitutional and financial crisis over the financing of UNEF and the Congo force. In particular the Soviet Union and France were challenging the legality of assessments for those operations. So the Security Council approved UNFICYP ... only on the basis of voluntary financing. Underlying the need for UNFICYP during the years of the cold war was that an almost inevitable consequence of abandonment would be war between Greece and Turkey with all that would mean for peace in Western Europe and the unity of NATO. Unfortunately that did not translate into a general acceptance by Western European countries that they should pick up most of the financial burden. To the best of my knowledge France has still not contributed a single sou.(5:12)

UNPROFOR II in Bosnia is financed by only the participating nations. This was done in order to get the operation off the ground quickly, but as Under Secretary-General Goulding acknowledged to the Subcommittee, it sets an undesirable precedent because it lets some very wealthy countries, like the United States, Germany, and Japan, off the financial hook.

(d) Canadian Policy

As a matter of long-standing principle, Canada consistently has paid all its general and special assessments in full and on time. Not surprisingly, Jeremy Kinsman, then Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs within the Department of External Affairs, told the Subcommittee: "one of the things important to us is that members of the UN pay their bills, and pay them on time. If possible, pay them early."(4:7)

(2) Recoveries

Among the principal expenditures of peacekeeping missions are the reimbursements to states for their participation, known to the Department of National Defence as "recoveries." Historically, the UN has provided for: the cost of troop pay and allowances at UN rates (currently U.S.\$1130.75 per person, per month); return transportation of personnel; costs associated with any UN-approved reconnaissance missions; painting of vehicles to/from UN colours; heavy equipment rental for loading/unloading; movement of material to and from the theatre of operations; the cost of supplies provided to the UN; depreciation of vehicles and equipment at UN established rates; and the sustainment of the contingent to UN standards. Canada absorbs all other costs, such as the National Command, Control and Information System, and supplementing UN rations when they do not meet Canadian standards.

Since UNIIMOG (Iran-Iraq) in 1988, Canadian recoveries have been based on an invoicing system, a financial agreement referred to as a "note verbale," negotiated by Canada,

through DND, and the UN. It is based on the UN "Guidelines to Troop Contributing Nations" and the UN budget document related to each mission. It also includes other arrangements specific to Canada which may not have been referred to in the UN documents. In addition, the UN will on occasion submit to Canada a "letter of assist," requesting additional goods or services not covered by other agreements. These requests are similarly invoiced.

Often there are time lags between the date an invoice is sent and when it is paid by the UN. Delays may concern questions that the UN has related to specific charges, or because the UN has no record of receiving an invoice. In the latter case, DND simply cancels the old invoice and issues a new one. Table 2 provides the estimated historical costs to Canada of UN peacekeeping operations since 1964.

(3) Reforming Financing

There are many difficulties with the financing of peacekeeping, not least the tortuously complicated formulas the UN has had to devise to smooth over the political unwillingness of various member states to meet their obligations and yet still obtain sufficient funds to cobble together the required forces. "It is easy to vote for the setting up of a peace operation," then UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar observed in 1989, "but what has to be understood is that such a vote has to be accompanied by contributions to the effort that the members of the Security Council are themselves asking."³⁵ Mr. Perez de Cuellar also pointed out:

The current financial arrangements are not only dangerously limiting during the period in which a complex operation is being mounted; they also put an inequitable financial burden on troop-contributing countries. In addition, they tend to diminish the perception of collective responsibility, which is psychologically essential to peace-keeping operations.³⁶

What is notable is the relatively small amounts involved, despite the fact that, because of the plethora of new missions, the UN's peacekeeping bill has expanded rapidly: it is expected to approach U.S.\$3 billion in 1992 compared to about U.S.\$730 million in 1991. But whereas the peacekeeping budget may reach U.S.\$3 billion, the rest of the UN's administrative budget amounts only to U.S.\$1 billion. Brian Urquhart told the Subcommittee that, although there are anomalies in the assessment system (for example, the fact that several wealthy Gulf states are assessed at very low rates), the problem would be manageable if governments simply paid their bills on time.

³⁵ Thalif Deen, "UN head: we need money not applause," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 30 September 1989, p. 636.

³⁶ "Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1*, September 1989, (A/44/1), p. 10.

TABLE 2

**United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Estimated Historical Costs to Canada
from FY 1964-65 to FY 1992-93 (Thousands of Canadian Dollars)**

| OPERATION | Recoverable Cost (5) | Recovered | Outstanding 11/92 |
|------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| UNFICYP (1) | \$24,873 | \$9,216 | \$15,657 |
| UNDOF (2) | 53,639 | 52,826 | 813 |
| UNTSO (3) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UNIKOM | 4,200 | 3,082 | 0 (6) |
| UNAVEM | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MINURSO | 643 | 290 | 353 |
| ONUSAL | 40 | 40 | 0 |
| UNTAC | 6,800 | 530 | 0 (6) |
| UNPROFOR I | 26,800 | 2,426 | 0 (6) |
| UNPROFOR II | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OSGAP | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UNMOGIP | 1,125 | 1,104 | 21 |
| UNSCOM | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| UNOSOM | 18,000 | 0 | 0 (6) |
| UNIIMOG (4) | 7,470 | 7,362 | 108 |
| UNTAG (4) | 7,480 | 3,179 | 4,301 |
| ONUCA (4) | 8,457 | 8,457 | 0 |
| | \$159,527,000 | \$88,512,000 | \$21,253,000 |

- Notes:
- (1) UNFICYP invoices have not been paid since June 1980.
 - (2) UNDOF figures are only available since FY 80-81.
 - (3) UNTSO figures are only available since FY 75-76
 - (4) UNIIMOG, UNTAG and ONUCA are redeployed.
 - (5) Recoverable amounts include troop cost reimbursements and all invoices forwarded to the UN for recovery.
 - (6) An invoice was forwarded to the UN in December 1992 to recover costs for Canadian participation in UNIKOM. Invoices have not yet been prepared for UNTAC, UNPROFOR I or UNOSOM. Actual amounts are currently being researched.

Unfortunately, the UN has no reserves on which it can either draw or earn interest. Accordingly, several of the proposals advanced in *An Agenda for Peace* seek to rectify this limitation. To overcome the cash flow problems generated by the high level of unpaid contributions and the insufficient working capital reserve, the Secretary-General suggested the following measures:

- charging interest on unpaid assessed contributions;
- increasing the Working Capital Fund to \$250 million and bringing the fund to a level equivalent to 25% of the annual assessment under the regular budget;
- establishing a temporary Peacekeeping Reserve Fund of \$50 million in order to cover the initial expenses of peacekeeping operations;
- allowing the Secretary-General to borrow commercially, if other sources of cash be inadequate;
- creating a Humanitarian Revolving Fund of \$50 million to be used for humanitarian crisis situations (this proposal already has been implemented); and
- establishing a UN Peace Endowment Fund of \$1 billion for conflict resolution measures and peacekeeping.³⁷

The Secretary-General was particularly keen about the immediate establishment of the revolving peacekeeping fund of \$50 million. In addition, he urged that one-third of the estimated cost of each new peacekeeping operation be approved by the General Assembly as soon as the Security Council decides to establish the operation, and that the Secretary-General be given the authorization, under exceptional circumstances, to place contracts without competitive bidding.

The Subcommittee recommends:

(a) that the Government of Canada provide full support to the efforts of the Secretary-General to improve the current financial situation of the UN, particularly the proposals advanced in *An Agenda for Peace*;

(b) that the Government of Canada, at every appropriate opportunity and at the highest levels, urge those countries that have accumulated arrears on their assessed contribution to the general operating budget of the United Nations, and especially on assessed contribution to peacekeeping operations, to pay up; and

³⁷ *Agenda for Peace*, p.20. The latter fund could be a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions from governments, the private sector and individuals. The proceeds of such a fund would then be used to paid for the initial cost of peacekeeping operations. Other measures which have also been mentioned, yet not proposed by the Secretary-General, include a levy on arms sales, a levy on international air travel, authorization for the United Nations to borrow from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

(c) that a clear and detailed account of the costs incurred as the result of participation in peacekeeping operations, and of the money recovered from the United Nations or other organizations as a result of these activities, be provided to Parliament on a regular basis by the Department of National Defence and External Affairs and International Trade Canada, perhaps with the yearly estimates, in order to aid parliamentary oversight of the maintenance of this aspect of Canada's security.

Regional Organizations

In *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General made no attempt to set forth a framework or division of labour which would govern the relationship between the UN and regional organizations. He did argue, however, that greater cooperation between the two levels of organization would produce important benefits:

[R]egional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.³⁸

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, titled "Regional Arrangements," does not offer definitions, leaving the UN with maximum flexibility. Such regional organizations could include treaty-based organizations, organizations for mutual security and defence, for regional development, or any regional grouping created to deal with specific political, economic and social issues. However, the organizations' activities must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter in order to cooperate with the UN.

Recently, the UN has cooperated extensively with regional groups on specific problems. The UN has dealt with the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States on Somalia. It cooperated with the Association of South-East Asian Nations and with individual states to bring the various Cambodian parties to the Paris Conference. Concerning Nicaragua, a complex effort involving individual states, groups of states, and the Organization of the American States helped bring peace. Concerning Yugoslavia, the EC, CSCE, and NATO have all attempted to work with the UN to restore peace.

What is striking is that, despite such cooperation, there also has been a notable lack of progress and considerable in-fighting in several cases between the UN and the various regional organizations. This problem became acute over the handling of Yugoslavia, after the Security Council on July 17, 1992, accepted a cease-fire accord negotiated by the European Community. The Secretary-General reacted angrily because of the extra burden the agreement would have

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.18.

placed on the UN. He feared the additional pressures on the limited capacities of the organization and the apparent over-emphasis on European troubles at the expense of the even more desperate predicament of Somalia. Mr. Boutros-Ghali remarked that "regional organizations are at the service of the United Nations"³⁹

In testimony before the Subcommittee, Geoffrey Pearson suggested that the OAS and NATO should provide "greater participation and greater willingness and greater preparation for peacekeeping in regional conflicts -- especially NATO." (5:17) Jeremy Kinsman commented that Canada was "pushing for a strong role for regional organizations, such as the CSCE in Europe, as the political authority for peacekeeping operations." He also added that Canada's External Affairs Minister, the Honourable Barbara McDougall, was "the first to begin to explore the relationship between the CSCE and NATO's assets and resources as being a foundation for peacekeeping intervention in Europe." (4:6)

At a meeting in November, 1991, the heads of government of the North Atlantic Council agreed that NATO allies could "be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions."⁴⁰ At their most recent meeting in Helsinki in July, 1992, leaders of the CSCE formally designated NATO as its peacekeeping and peacemaking arm, drawing on the right to call itself a "regional conference" under the UN Charter. Although it remains unclear precisely how NATO will fulfill its new role, it is fair to assume that the Canadian Forces will be implicated.

It is to be noted that Colonel Donald Ethell sounded a cautionary note by pointing out some of the dangers of involving inexperienced regional organizations in peacekeeping operations. With respect to the EC operations in Yugoslavia, he commented:

If there is a classic example of how not to mount a peacekeeping operation, the European Community Monitoring Mission is it. It has very poor command in [sic] control, remembering that the mission is headed up by an ambassador from the country which is providing the European community presidency They have very poor equipment. Vehicles are provided by a number of countries, not including Canada, and communications, once they got into Bosnia-Herzegovina, were terrible. The military monitors were at risk. (7:14)

³⁹ Patrick E. Tyler, "U.N. Chief's dispute With Council Boils Over" *The New York Times*, August 3, 1992. For more on the dispute between the Secretary-General and the Security Council see the weekly edition of the *Manchester Guardian*, August 2, 1992.

⁴⁰ *NATO Review*, December 1991, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," p. 30.

He added:

The participation of the EC in the Balkans states makes it awkward from the operational level of the monitors or observers, in that the EC is allegedly biased towards Croatia. In fact, it is obvious that the German support for Croatians and the French involvement in the Ukraine and the Greek support for Serbia caused problems for the EC monitors and put them at considerable risk.(7:15)

Given that NATO has changed its mandate to encompass participation in UN missions and that it is the only credible multilateral military organization in the Western world:

The Subcommittee recommends that the Government of Canada urge NATO members to take the appropriate steps in order to act more decisively in support of UN missions.

IV CANADIAN EFFORTS

Canadian Resources for Peacekeeping

After roughly 45 years of participation in peacekeeping, the total Canadian contribution at the end of 1992 reached approximately 100,000 personnel in over 30 missions, within and outside the United Nations. The annual statement of the Minister of National Defence, issued in April, 1992, like the Defence White Papers of 1964, 1971 and 1987, confirmed that peacekeeping remains one of the key missions of the Canadian armed forces. It also acknowledged that, as a result of the UN's renewed legitimacy, Canada "could be asked more frequently than in the past to provide personnel to maintain or restore peace."¹

In fact, Canada has been called upon to assist in all the current peacekeeping operations, a fact which led DND to remove its longstanding upper limit of 2,000 personnel to allow for this expanded peacekeeping mandate, according to Major-General John MacInnis, then Chief of Operational Planning and Force Development at NDHQ.(3:16) The then Chief of Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, told the Subcommittee that, with the sending of a contribution to Somalia in December 1992, Canada's current contribution will reach 4,500 personnel.(9:39) This represents approximately 10% of the total of all peacekeeping troops currently deployed anywhere in the world.(9:40)

The commitment of 4,500 troops also represents about six percent of Canada's current regular forces of 80,000. However, the actual burden on Canada and its soldiers is far greater. In addition to the 4,500 troops actually deployed in peacekeeping missions, there are an equivalent number of troops training in preparation for rotation with the troops deployed, and another equivalent number who have returned and are completing post-operational leave and reorganization. Most, although not all, of these troops are drawn from Land Force Command, which numbers only 19,000 regular force personnel.

The upshot is that some infantry and combat support units are serving almost steadily on one peacekeeping tour or another. Engineer units have been especially stretched meeting demands in Kuwait, Croatia, and other missions. Units in Cyprus now normally have an ad-hoc company comprising reservists. While such adaptability is impressive, it strains unit cohesion and is costly in terms of training, integration, and effectiveness.

A consistent theme in Canadian defence policy has been that participation in peacekeeping operations is not a primary role of the Canadian Forces but a derived task. With a small regular force, the CF finds it difficult to meet all defence-related commitments. The army portion of

¹ *Canadian Defence Policy 1992*, April 1992, p.4

the CF -- soldiers in the combat arms, combat support arms, such as engineering and communications, and the combat service support arms -- from which peacekeepers are mainly although not exclusively derived, comprises roughly 19,000 troops.²(9:38) The armed forces has stated that they are able to provide highly trained, experienced, and self-sustaining forces - - trained as "soldiers first" -- capable of dealing with the widest range of potential military activities. Major-General MacInnis testified to this professionalism before the Subcommittee:

The strengths we have are the experience and the operations in all aspects of the units, staff and command. There is not a mission that the UN or other organization run where you do not see Canadians either assigned into areas of responsibilities or command, or they end up in that position...Canadians are professional; they have the equipment.... They have excellent national support, governmental support and departmental support. We Canadians are the envy of all other countries regardless of what parent organization we work for. Other observers and other units would love to receive the support we receive from Canada.(7:16)

Nevertheless, in *Defence Policy 1992*, the government stated that it could not predict specific peacekeeping requirements from one operation to the next.

Canada can remain a credible potential peacekeeper only if it maintains an array of trained personnel and operational units covering the spectrum of possible peacekeeping functions. To this end, the Canadian Forces will maintain a contingency battalion, an air transport element and a communications element as UN standby forces.³

Some Senators expressed concern over the fact that the new emphasis on peacekeeping would dilute the forces and reduce their ability to perform other functions. Major-General MacInnis explained that more resources could be devoted to peacekeeping as a result of the end of the Cold War. He assured the Subcommittee that "we do not have to deploy everything we have on peacekeeping missions. We can produce a credible and meaningful response to UN requests by helping them do the planning and then interjecting the type of force that we want to produce for that particular mission."(3:16-17)

² The land forces are a system of integrated parts. These parts, also known as arms of service, are usually grouped into three categories: (1) the combat arms (also known as "teeth arms") such as armour, infantry, artillery and air defence; (2) the combat support arms, such as signals, engineers, surveillance and aviation; and (3) the combat service support arms (also known as the "tail"), such as medical, supply and maintenance.

³ *Defence Policy 1992*, April 1992, p.34.

This idea was clarified somewhat when the Honourable Marcel Masse, then Minister of National Defence, told the Subcommittee about DND's interest in limiting the scope and magnitude of intervention:

Perhaps we could increasingly focus our participation on the initial phase of missions which call for logistical and communications expertise, among other things. In other words, Canadian troops would, so to speak, prepare the field. Then, having established that the mission is feasible, we would leave it to other countries to take over in time.(9:37)

To this way of thinking, the Canadian contribution to the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was ideal in that it was a quick "in and out" experience for the Canadians. A CF signals unit set up the initial communications system and was removed within six months.

The concept is a good one, and the Subcommittee wonders whether it should be taken further. As this report already has indicated, it is not in Canada's interest to provide only specialized skills such as logistics or communications to peacekeeping operations. This dilutes needed skills in the CF and unduly limits Canadian involvement, a situation that adversely affects the morale of those excluded. The Subcommittee sees benefit in adopting the same kind of approach with respect to combat arms. In other words, as a general rule of thumb for all peacekeeping engagements, Canada could deploy its combat, support, and service support arms for the initial phase of an operation. This would imply a fairly mobile force with the transportation capacity necessary to permit rapid deployment. The Canadians would establish the basic infrastructure of the operation either on their own or in cooperation with professional forces from other countries. In more dangerous operations, the combat arms component could be more heavily armed than in traditional peacekeeping operations as a deterrent to potentially troublesome elements. Colonel Donald Ethell described a kind of precursor to this approach:

[I]n the early days of UNFICYP in Cyprus, there was a type of force which is not in vogue now in our UN operations; the deployment of the Sabre force, which was a show of force, the deployment of the reserve rifle company, the light-armoured organization, the mortars, or the anti-tank platoon. There was a show of force in contentious areas in Cyprus ... providing some intimidation to the locals who may have caused a problem. The UN and other organizations have gone away from that type of force.(7:11)

In any case, by deploying such a contingent quickly and in the early stages of a conflict situation, initial stability would be provided, allowing the UN time to prepare and organize a more permanent force. The Canadian Forces should consider such a force -- a mobile, rapid reaction force more heavily armed than those used in traditional operations. Once this force had established the basic groundwork for the operation, the Canadian policy predisposition would be to withdraw it. In addition, however, such a force could form the core of the Canadian

contribution to the multi-national peace enforcement force about which the Subcommittee made recommendations earlier in this report.

It should be borne in mind, however, that one of the reasons Canada was able to interject forces quickly during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia was that troops were stationed at CFB Lahr in Germany, where they, together with their equipment and logistical support, were near the deployment area. This will not be possible once Lahr has been closed as a CF base in 1994. Major-General MacKenzie testified to the convenience of Lahr, since troops were able to be sent quickly from Germany.(8:48) Lahr also provides advantages as a staging post for Canadian troops going to Cyprus, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union. If Canada is to assume an expanded peacekeeping role, its armed forces should be able to move troops quickly into a new operation and to ensure that they are adequately trained and equipped.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Canadian Government consider providing a staging area in Europe, preferably in Germany. This would provide a logistics and transportation centre for peacekeeping forces so as to facilitate the movement of troops to areas of conflict in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Training

In the new era, there is likely to be a much greater demand for peacekeeping assistance from Canada and other countries. Thus a major theme which has emerged in recent UN discussions on peacekeeping operations has been the need for training for peacekeeping. Over a year ago, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations issued a report setting forth a number of recommendations, most of them related to peacekeeping training. They asked that member states organize their own national peacekeeping training programs and that members with such programs include cross-cultural education in existing training. They requested also that member states provide other states with access to their training programs and that member states consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres.(9:72)

Canada was one of six countries to co-sponsor these recommendations before the UN General Assembly, which endorsed them in December, 1991. It is interesting to note the contrast between these recommendations and current Canadian practice.

Time and time again, witnesses before the Subcommittee commented on the high quality of the Canadian Forces' military training for peacekeepers.(3:7, 3:15, 6:17, 7:9, 7:18) Their views were based on Canada's proven peacekeeping record, as well as on comments expressed to them by representatives of other nations, either involved directly in peacekeeping or indirectly at the UN.

The theory of the Canadian Forces is that peacekeeping, as a low-intensity operation, can be conducted without substantially restructuring ordinary training. An internal DND study on

peacekeeping recently concluded that, "the tools of soldiering are the tools of peacekeeping ... training them for war trains them for peace." Thus, according to the Department of National Defence, the best peacekeeper is a well-trained soldier, sailor, or airman, one who knows his or her trade.

Major-General MacInnis warned the Subcommittee of the dangers of exclusive peacekeeping training at the expense of training for a general purpose capability: "[S]hould a military force attempt to train exclusively for peacekeeping operations", he said, "that force would be at a level of capability below that of most erstwhile belligerents, thereby creating a situation that would at the least be unstable and in my experience dangerous."(3:8)

The Canadian Forces does recognize a need, however, to provide their members with some specialized training prior to a peacekeeping operation. For example, a battalion selected for duty in Cyprus undergoes a period of training at its home garrison before departing for the UN Force in Cyprus. Such *specific-to-mission* training lasts for varying periods, depending on the urgency of the operation and the nature of the task. It is structured in accordance with UN Training Guidelines. Other types of peacekeeping training are:

Contingency Training -- conducted annually by the UN standby force in different parts of the world. The timing and location varies from year to year.

Replacement/Reinforcement/Rotation Training -- designed specifically for personnel posted to the CF Logistics Unit in the UNDOF in the Golan Heights. Conducted quarterly and involving about 100 personnel each time. It is of one-week duration at CFB Montreal.

Military Observer Training -- conducted annually over an eight-day period at CFB Montreal for officers with postings to existing missions, in accordance with UN Training Guidelines. It is also conducted, as required, intensively over three days at NDHQ in Ottawa for officers with short-notice peacekeeping assignments.

As well as training its own members, the Canadian Forces helps to train peacekeeping personnel of other countries, usually by a presentation at a staff college, defence ministry or peacekeeping college. In recent years, Canadian teams have responded to requests from around the world. Also, the CF Military Training and Assistance Program (MTAP) provides general training in Canada for military personnel of developing countries, although few of these countries are potential contributors to peacekeeping operations.

While the Subcommittee accepts that the military training Canadian peacekeepers receive is of exceptional quality, it is persuaded that it could be improved by adding to the curriculum certain subjects which are not necessarily military in character. An anecdote which Carleton University Professor Harald Von Riekhoff related to the Subcommittee provides an illustration:

[A] young major who had been a combat engineer in UNIKOM, the peacekeeping mission in Kuwait, said that, just by accident, two or three days before he was shipped out to his unit, a professor ... was brought in. He was a real expert in the culture and history of the area and he gave them a two- or three-day crash course.... When he arrived there he had to be able to observe the right customs in order to identify the different groups and problems. An introductory course of this type was an absolute lifesaver, and it would have been much more difficult for him and his unit to operate without the benefit of this particular training.(6:17)

The example is reassuring insofar as it shows that some kind of cultural orientation was provided. Nevertheless, the Subcommittee is concerned by the apparently *ad hoc*, last-minute approach to something as fundamental as the ability to act effectively within a political/cultural milieu entirely different from Canada's.

Yet a more fundamental issue is at stake. The entire thrust of this report is that the world has entered a new era, and peacekeeping a new paradigm. The skills that served us well during the long years of the Cold War may still serve us well today, but we should not count on this. In other words, we need to adapt to new circumstances and at least make an effort to learn something of the new skills that may be required.

Brigadier General Clayton Beattie (Ret'd), who was Canadian contingent commander in Cyprus at the time of the Turkish invasion, remarked to the Subcommittee:

I think if we look at the general condition, most things can be done better. I have found that if people want to get together and look at a situation, a problem area, they can usually find a better way to do something. However, spending only an hour and a half in the staff college school year teaching a subject as important as peacekeeping says something to me.(9:84-5. See also 9:81)

He noted that as base commander at Borden, after he returned to Canada from Cyprus, there were 12 schools under his command, including schools of signals, administration and logistics, and nuclear biological chemical defence.(9:82) Yet there still exists no training on such vital subjects as conflict resolution and mediation, despite the fact the Colonel Michael Houghton, the director of peacekeeping operations at NDHQ, told the Subcommittee that "the trend is clearly to more involvement in conflict resolution."(3:14)

To be sure, mediation and negotiation are not subjects that lend themselves as easily to quantification or abstraction or to an "objective" scientific approach as some other skills training does. Yet surely that is all the more reason to pursue them more thoroughly and to try to encourage greater rigour in subjects that may all too often be left entirely to chance or intuition.

The Canadian Forces has been adamant that training as a soldier to use force is precisely the training needed to be a good peacekeeper. But mediation is not a soldierly skill; it is not warlike or militaristic. It is the opposite of those attributes. Especially with soldiers trained for war, it needs to be encouraged and stimulated: they need training in it.

There are other subjects in which the new peacekeepers should be trained. Both Brigadier General Beattie and Peter Langille of Common Security Consultants mentioned some. These include: an introduction to the UN system and the UN Charter; UN command and control structures; an overview of peacekeeping activities; mission security and defence; emergency procedures; how to conduct oneself in a multinational force; neutrality; impartiality; and cultural sensitivity.(9:81)

The Subcommittee believes that programs of this sort should be mandatory for all CF personnel and that additional training in the cultural, historical and political context should be provided to any out-going CF unit or personnel, preferably a week's program rather than only two or three days.

One means of improving Canadian peacekeeping training which has been suggested would be to create a specific peacekeeping centre in Canada. Alex Morrison, of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, described an initiative of his institute to establish a Canadian International Peacekeeping College (CIPC) to address "all aspects of peacekeeping ranging from personal discussion and negotiation through inter-governmental and diplomatic conflict solving mechanisms, to the more traditional areas of contemporary international peacekeeping."(7:8) Another proposal has been the alternative use of the training and recruitment base at CFB Cornwallis in Nova Scotia. But even Brigadier General Beattie and Peter Langille, who at one time worked as consultants to develop the Cornwallis proposal, acknowledged that conceivably other bases would be equally satisfactory.(9:75) Brigadier General Beattie, however, did note that Cornwallis would permit naval, air and land operations to be run from the same base.(9:77)

The Subcommittee supports the idea of some kind of training institute which focuses on aspects of peacekeeping, especially in the areas of conflict management and dispute settlement. However, considering the Department's current difficulties in attempting to rationalize military infrastructure and spending, it is sympathetic to Colonel Ethell's remark that the creation of such an organization should be in the private domain and should "not come out of the DND budget."(7:30)

On the other hand, the Subcommittee would not want to shift the entire burden of such training -- which it regards as vital to the well-being and effectiveness of Canadian peacekeepers in this new era -- to the private sector. It may be possible to combine public and private funding in a joint approach. The Department of National Defence might want to consider some kind of amalgamation of its National Defence College program with such an institute. There are many possibilities which are worthy of exploration and the Subcommittee itself may want to revisit this subject at a later date.

The question of standardized training also deserves serious attention. At present, the UN Secretariat must consider the geographic distribution of troop-contributing countries in addition to military competence when requesting peacekeepers. Thus the quality and competence of its contingents tends to vary widely. There is an obvious need to standardize training among officers and units to be deployed by the UN. Colonel Ethell noted:

[T]here is a need for a peacekeeping international standard, which could evolve in part from a standardization of training for all the contributing nations. This standardization should be accomplished by the UN headquarters.... [I]n New York, home countries or, as is happening now with the Canadian forces, where Canadian forces teams are visiting those countries that request the assistance of teams and expertise from the Canadian forces to develop that kind of a package.(7:17)

Witnesses before the Subcommittee generally agreed that Canada should be applying its peacekeeping expertise more widely in assisting other troop-contributing countries.(5:18, 7:7) This too could be done more easily and effectively within a peacekeeping training institute.

The Subcommittee supports the Canadian Forces' contention that well-trained peacekeepers require general purpose combat capabilities and believes that this type of training is of primary importance.

The Subcommittee recommends also that, within the general curriculum of the Canadian Forces at military staff colleges, officer training programs and the like, more emphasis be placed on dispute settlement and conflict management programs, as well as on the United Nations, regional organizations and peacekeeping history and practice. Once CF personnel or units are assigned to a specific foreign locale, they should be specifically instructed in the history, tradition, and culture of the country to which they are being sent.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Canadian Forces continue to assist nations that lack experience in peacekeeping training through seminars and by setting up national training programs.

The Subcommittee recommends that teams involved in providing international assistance on peacekeeping within the Department of National Defence should work, in cooperation with United Nations headquarters, to develop training standards for the UN, based largely on the experience of Canada and other nations which have made a significant contribution to UN peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping operations have expanded to the point that civilian "peacekeepers," such as election observers and officers, human rights monitors, and civil administrators, are also required to be familiar with the workings of the UN and the cultural background of specific operations. UN operations in Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia, among others, testify to the importance of civilians involved in "peacebuilding" alongside military forces. Some consideration needs to be given to how troop-contributing countries can meet this demand. As Professor Von Riekhoff pointed out, this is both a "challenge and a real administrative nightmare because we have no stand-by police forces."(6:16) It might be feasible to create a "ready-made identifiable pool" of persons with peacekeeping experience, which would serve as a personnel inventory or database.

The Subcommittee heard a number of proposals in this regard, notably from Professor David Cox, who suggested the creation of a civil equivalent of a UN standby force by the federal government in cooperation with the provinces.(6:9) Professor Von Riekhoff suggested that an inventory could "take account of anyone who has served, either in a military, constabulary or civilian peacekeeping role, to leave some record of his or her impressions of that role."(6:24) This would become part of a computer base and would be "the first step toward creating a broader pool of possible persons from which to draw on very short notice."(6:24)

The Subcommittee recommends that the Department of National Defence expand its existing database to include a peacekeeping database or inventory that would include Canadian military, constabulary, and civilian personnel who have taken part in peacekeeping and observer missions.

The Reserves

The 1987 Defence White Paper announced that the future Canadian Forces structure would be based on a Total Force Concept, a concept which would see the distinction between regular and reserve personnel greatly reduced. Despite the many changes which have taken place in the strategic situation and the funding for the Canadian Forces, the Total Force Concept continues to be the basis on which the Forces are being restructured. This was most recently reaffirmed in the April, 1992, Defence Policy paper.

Over the longer term, the Regular Force will be smaller than it is today. In this context, implementation of the Total Force will become even more important. The objectives are to achieve greater integration and a more effective partnership between the Regular and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces. For the most part, tasks will be assigned to the Canadian Forces as a whole, rather than specifically to Regulars or Reservists. Structures will be adopted to enable the use of a combination of Regulars and Reservists as circumstances dictate,

depending on the type of unit, readiness requirements and skills required to accomplish the mission.⁴

Under the Total Force structure, reserves are to be more closely integrated with the regular forces and are to be relied upon to carry out the same roles. To this end, emphasis within the Canadian Forces and, specifically, the Militia, has been to provide reserves with better resources and training facilities and more opportunities to participate in operational roles.

In 1978, under National Defence Headquarters Policy Directive P26, Canadian reserves were tasked "to provide personnel for peacekeeping duties." Since then, a number of reserves have taken part in peacekeeping operations. Major-General MacInnis expanded on the role of Canadian reserves in peacekeeping operations before the Subcommittee:

For peacekeeping missions we have a policy to include reservists in greater or lesser number. For example, 2 RCR from Gagetown took with it a full company of reservists from Atlantic Canada. The first regiment, the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, on its way to Cyprus in September [1992] will take a full company from western Canada. In preparing for the rotation into Yugoslavia, we expect to incorporate a large number of reservists, probably a company plus, into the rotation battalion. In order to prepare them and integrate them into the unit involved, we require them to come out on full-time service, from some three months to six months on full-time training with the unit that is preparing itself to go to Cyprus.(3:18)

Although reserves are trained to the same standards -- general purpose military combat capability -- they do not put in the same amount of time as members of the regular force, nor do they necessarily have access to the same quality of equipment. According to Alex Morrison, who has both regular and reserve experience, "it does take a bit of training to bring a reservist from the level of the local armoury up to the level where he or she can participate in peacekeeping."(7:22) The troops and young officers can be as good as any regulars, but there is a consistent problem with the more senior ranks (sergeants and above among non-commissioned officers and captains and above among commissioned officers), who almost universally lack the depth of experience and professionalism that is one of the strength of Canada's peacekeeping forces.

During the Persian Gulf war, the United States Army experienced serious problems in trying to mobilize its "total force" combat arms reserve units for service. These units were unable to come up to a combat-ready condition despite having trained for years on full sets of

⁴ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy*, April 1992

first-line equipment. An important reason for their inadequacy seems to have been the lack of depth and experience among senior NCOs and officers.⁵

Similarly, in the Canadian Forces, militia sub-units in Cyprus have only been viable with substantial augmentation by regular force non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and close supervision by the regular force leadership. Reservists employed in other theatres have been integrated as individuals, not as sub-units. These considerations, coupled with the fact that peacekeeping missions tend to occur on short notice, support a policy of forces-in-being with a high level of training and readiness -- the kind of forces that have earned Canada its reputation for the effectiveness of the professionally trained officers and soldiers in its peacekeeping forces.

On the other hand, the United States also found during the Gulf War that their reserve specialist and logistics units out-performed the regular units. This was because they were specialists -- whether in trucking or supply management or helicopter flying -- since their speciality often related to their civilian work and, in these types of units, facility in the trade is more important than soldierly skills.

This leads the members of the Subcommittee to ask whether there is untapped potential for creating reserve units based on logistics, transportation, communications, and engineering functions, units which could be used in non-war fighting roles such as peacekeeping. This issue is significant because many troop-contributing countries, owing to inadequate financing, depend on countries like Canada for equipment, material supplies, and transportation during peacekeeping operations.⁶ Canada often is asked for logistic, maintenance, and communications tradespersons who cannot be provided by developing country troop contributors. If this continues to be the case, it could place strains on the ability of the Canadian Forces to fulfill other duties. Canada may want to consider augmenting the number of its logisticians and its communications specialists by just such a method as this.

The Subcommittee recommends that the Department of National Defence undertake a comprehensive inquiry into the possibility of creating reserve units based on logistics, transportation, communications, and engineering functions, which could be used in peacekeeping, as distinct from wartime actions.

⁵ John G. Roos and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "The Desert Storm Bares 'Roundout' Flaw but Validates Army Modernization Goals," *Armed Forces Journal International*, April 1992, pp. 14-15.

⁶ Indar Jit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsback, eds., *The Future of Peacekeeping: The United Nations and Peacekeeping*, New York, 1990, p. 181.

first-time participants and experienced participants for the experiment. Some of the data from the first two days and experience among other factors.

On the other hand, the blind data are found during the GAT. For the first two days, specialists and regulars were separated in the same way. The way to separate the two specialists, whether in terms of regulars or specialists, is to separate the two specialists. The regulars and specialists work out in the same way of work. The specialists more important than regulars. The regulars are more important than specialists.

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V MEETING THE CHALLENGE

A distinguished critic once wrote, "The most a critic can do is to sort out those aging ideas that get encrusted round past creative achievement and clog the proper working of the imagination in changing times." It is in this sense that the Subcommittee has approached its work. Whether our efforts will be regarded as helpful, we leave to historians. But we do hope that this report will serve as a cogent critique of current international efforts in peacekeeping and, in turn, prompt action, or reaction, by policymakers as they assess Canada's future role in international peace and security.

In concluding this report, the first major point the Subcommittee wishes to emphasize is that, in the new era, there are likely to be many occasions for Canadian involvement in different kinds of peacekeeping operations, some of which will be much more complicated and dangerous than any in the past. In responding to these opportunities, Canada will not be able to do all that it did in the past; for example, it will not be able to participate in every mission that is requested of it. Indeed, it ought not to be involved if its interests or resources dictate otherwise.

Moreover, in what Canada does undertake, it will have to alter its approaches. First, regardless of participation in actual operations, Canada should help to define how peacekeeping is to be practised in this new era. Second, it is time for Canada to define its own interests clearly. Third, the record of the Canadian Forces has been good, but the situations faced are changing so that new responses are needed.

In the first instance, the Subcommittee was impressed by evidence which suggests that the world has changed dramatically and that one of the changes has been that peacekeeping has moved from being a relatively peripheral affair to being front and centre in the conduct of international relations. Yet, despite its greater importance and despite the explosion of new operations, the institutions and infrastructure of peacekeeping remain much the same.

There are, however, still more fundamental issues which need to be addressed. The principal threat to peace now is nationalist aggression or national disintegration. But the politically confused situation confronting the West is producing, as one analyst of international relations put it, "a confusion in values."

At the moment there is some consensus with regard to the rights of states in relation to each other, that is, nonaggression, and with the rights of individuals in relation to states, that is, basic political liberties. But there is growing confusion with regard to the rights of groups in relation to states and in relation to each other.¹

¹ Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World", *Foreign Affairs, America and the World*, 1991-92, p. 30.

It may be, as another analyst has suggested, that a compass will be found in the Holocaust's enduring lesson, namely "that sovereignty in a seamless new world no longer allows a regime to destroy its own citizens with impunity or indifference and that a truly peaceful planet must outlaw aggression within borders as well as across them."²

Certainly, there needs to be a concerted effort by the international community to forge a new system of collective action to redress such outrages. At the same time, there must also be a recognition of "the complexity of such intervention, of external culpability in tragedies such as Somalia, and of the dangers of neo-imperial aggrandizement."³ Canada has a role to play in these debates, and it is an important role.

Consider the first of the complicating factors -- the complexity of intervention. Even where the intervention is strictly humanitarian -- without any direct strategic advantage, such as in Somalia -- the complexities may yet prove to be too great for the international community to resolve. John Watson, the executive director of Care Canada, observed at a recent meeting:

Somalia is not an anomaly; whole areas of the world could revert to tribalism and chaos. In these situations, humanitarian aid is the most that can be managed. The trouble is that far from being a peacemaker, aid can act as a catalyst of conflict.

But once intervention takes place, the world is immediately faced by two serious problems: (a) how is it possible to intervene without becoming embroiled in local conflicts and, (b) how is it possible *not* to address in some way the underlying political conflicts that gave rise to such misery?

A distinction needs to be drawn between humanitarian efforts which are little more than palliative and designed chiefly to make people in the West feel better and more effective operations. It may be Canadians need to fortify themselves against the argument that something should or even can be done in all the conflict situations around the world. That would be tantamount to making policy by television. The Arab studies expert, William Millward, reminded the Subcommittee:

[W]e have to be careful here not to give ourselves an exaggerated sense of mission; that our mission really is to transfer from our own domestic experience to other parts of the world that are so radically different culturally, the same measures, standards, institutions, and values.(9:22)

² Roger Morris, "A New Foreign Policy for a New Era", *The New York Times*, December 9, 1992.

³ *Ibid.*

Moreover, in some situations, involvement would not only be pointless, it could be counterproductive because it could put Canadian soldiers and civilians at risk, while making a bad situation abroad worse. Sadly, we may have to face the fact that there is tragedy in the world every day and that there is not always a great deal that we can do about it.

What Canada must do is to help improve the UN's capacity to identify prospective horrors like Somalia before they become running sores on the conscience of the international community. It is clear that help is needed when Canadians are treated to stories on CBC television about negligence and "historic failure" on the part of the UN with respect to Somalia itself. It is dispiriting to hear people such as Canada's former Ambassador to the UN, Stephen Lewis, charge that, although the Secretary-General obtained a "first-class" person in Jan Eliasson to head the new Department of Humanitarian Assistance, he has not permitted him any of the additional people needed, so that the department is a "disaster."⁴ Nor did the UN heed the many warnings about impending disaster, including those of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun. But when Mr. Sahnoun dared to criticize the world body's shortcomings publicly, he was summarily dismissed by the Secretary-General.

This is the kind of example that undermines the UN's credibility at a critical stage in its history. There is no other organization like it. It cannot be reinvented. But what Canada, a long-time and ardent supporter, must do is to insist on a full inquiry concerning the UN's role in the Somali crisis in an effort to find out what can be done to improve the early warning mechanisms of the UN so that the kinds of gross oversights the CBC exposed are not repeated.

A great deal more must also be done to improve the institutions and infrastructure of peacekeeping and of peace and security as a whole. Precisely because, for the foreseeable future, much of the world will remain beyond order and control, the need for effective multilateral institutions is vital. At critical moments, they could make the difference between a complete breakdown in security in entire regions of the world.

Here is where the world's interest and Canada's coincide: it is in Canada's interest to encourage a strong multilateral system and, particularly, a revitalized United Nations. Much of the new optimism surrounding UN institutions has resulted from the end of the Cold War and the waning of ideology as a major factor in international politics. In a less ideological age, Canada's traditional pragmatic approach offers a political version of comparative advantage.

First, Canada should continue to press for strengthened UN capacities in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Central to this are more resources which translate into better financial arrangements at the UN and a keener appreciation among great powers like

⁴ "UN bungling and delays blamed for suffering in Somalia", Prime Time News, CBC Television, December 15, 1992.

the United States of their financial responsibilities for maintaining the peace as fervently as they pursued the Cold War. Canada should press for a command and control system and a military presence at the UN that inspires respect. It should strive for a revamped support system to replace supply and logistics arrangements which often have resulted in poor supply flow and inadequate stocks. Canada should encourage attempts to ensure the effective coordination of large operations with diverse components. It should insist on the standardization of UN military operations around the world.

Canada should also do everything in its power to strengthen the various regional organizations, to make them more effective in coping with breaking emergencies. The CSCE is one example, but to date a very imperfect one. In a recent address to the CSCE, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Barbara McDougall, indicated Canada's compassionate concern for the plight of the people of the former Yugoslavia, while firmly rebuking the states of the CSCE for idleness:

The 1992 Helsinki Document weighs about half a kilo but does not even mention the torment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the weeks that our officials negotiated and bickered over the political statement, thousands were killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵

Second, Canada also should do better at defining its own interests. It will be impossible for Canada to participate in every peacekeeping operation. The Government will have to choose and will have to justify its choices to a knowledgeable and concerned Canadian public. There will always be a clamour from one group or another for Canadian involvement -- such are the dynamics of a democratic and multicultural society. But only if the Government delineates a clear set of criteria -- a set of criteria that takes into account the complexities of the new era -- will it be able to defend its choices.

One criterion should be whether the conflict has direct implications for Canada's security. A serious threat in the Middle East, for example, probably would meet that criterion. Another would be whether the conflict affects a significant trading partner or, if not, whether it has implications for any other of Canada's trading partners and whether they might respond favourably in other ways -- if the appropriate linkages were drawn -- to Canada's participation. Still another factor should be humanitarian concerns. The complication here is that situations involving mass sickness and starvation may arise because of socio-economic collapse or political strife. When deciding whether or not to intervene in such situations the government should determine whether it aims to provide only short-term treatment for the symptoms or whether it aspires to correct the underlying socio-economic and political circumstances.

⁵ *An Address by The Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Summit in Helsinki, Finland, July 9, 1992, p. 1.*

Regardless of the particular arguments for engaging in "peacekeeping" in any situation, one question always ought to be asked: what is the likelihood of achieving the specified goal within a reasonably period of time? While recognizing that any major action entails some uncertainty, the Subcommittee believes that Canada ought to resist participating in undertakings with unspecified goals or where failure seems almost inevitable.

Third, the Canadian Forces should alter its approach. Canada has had an exemplary record in peacekeeping. In fact, it is the sole military activity which Canadians fully support. It identifies Canada to the rest of the world. But what has worked well in the past will not necessarily serve us well in the future. The Canadian Forces do not want to be caught in the position either of fighting the last war or planning for the last peacekeeping expedition. Since the founding of NATO, following the Second World War, the *raison d'être* of Canada's land forces has been its European commitment. This commitment, in turn, has provided the justification for maintaining a general purpose force. Today, in a new era, Canada should be prepared to employ its troops on a regular basis in peacekeeping pursuits, provided the criteria for participation are clear and are applied rigorously. It should explore the idea of a rapid reaction force which could be deployed with alacrity in order to lay the groundwork for a successful operation, whereafter it would be withdrawn. It should also reconsider the way its armed forces are trained.

Canada should behave as a committed realist. Canadians cherish their record of being present at the creation of the United Nations and active participants in finding ways and means to help the organization function more effectively. Today, when the possibility of rethinking some of the basic concepts and techniques of the United Nations is at hand, our presence and participation is welcomed. The answers we give could have profound implications for the shape of Canada's armed forces, the practice of future peacekeeping, and the evolution of the United Nations.

APPENDIX A

"PEACEKEEPING" OPERATIONS: 1947 TO PRESENT

| <u>MISSION</u> | <u>DATES</u> | <u>AUTHORITY & MANDATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>MAXIMUM PERSONNEL</u> | <u>CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION: Maximum Personnel & Type</u> |
|--|--------------|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| DOMREP (Representative of the Secretary General in the Dominican Republic) | 1965-66 | UN Security Council. Observe ceasefire and withdrawal of OAS forces. | Dominican Republic | 3 | 1: Observer |
| ECMMY (EC Monitoring Mission in Yugoslavia) | 1991- | EC/CSCE. Monitor withdrawal of Yugoslav army from Croatia and report on the implementation of the ceasefire. | Former Yugoslavia | 300 | 12: Monitors |
| ICCS (International Commission for Control and Supervision) | 1973 | Paris Peace Treaty 1972. Monitor ceasefire and return of prisoners. | South Viet Nam | 1,200 | 248: Observers |
| ICSC (International Commission for Supervision and Control) | 1954-74 | Geneva Agreement of 1954. Supervise withdrawal of French forces, monitor cross-border infiltration. | Cambodia, Laos, Viet Nam | 400 | 133: Observers |
| MFO (Multinational Force and Observers) | 1986- | Camp David Accords 1979. Prevent violation of peace treaty and verify adherence to treaty provisions. | Egypt (Sinai) | 2,700 | 140: Air Unit, Staff |

| <u>MISSION</u> | <u>DATES</u> | <u>AUTORITY & MANDATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>MAXIMUM PERSONNEL</u> | <u>CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION: Maximum Personnel & Type</u> |
|---|--------------|--|---|--------------------------|--|
| MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) | 1991- | UN Security Council. Monitor ceasefire, events leading up to and supervision of referendum. | Western Sahara | 375 | 33: Observers |
| ONUC (UN in Congo) | 1960-64 | UN Security Council. Maintain law and order in transition to post-colonial era. | Congo (Zaire) | 19,828 (1961) | 421: Signals, Air Unit |
| ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America) | 1989-92 | UN Security Council. Verify compliance of Esquipulas Agreement. Operation roled into ONUSAL in 1992. | Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua | 1,098 (1990) | 175: Observers, Air Unit |
| ONUSAL (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador) | 1991- | UN Security Council. Investigate human rights violations, develop a process leading to military reform and elections. | El Salvador | 87 | 11: Staff and Liaison Officers |
| ONUVEH (UN Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti) | 1990-91 | UN General Assembly. Observe elections in December 1990. | Haiti | 65 | 11: Observers |

| <u>MISSION</u> | <u>DATES</u> | <u>AUTHORITY AND MANDATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>MAXIMUM PERSONNEL</u> | <u>CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION: Maximum Personnel & Type</u> |
|---|--------------|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|---|
| OSGAP (Office of the Secretary General in Afghanistan and Pakistan) | 1990- | UN Secretary-General. Military advisory unit to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. | Afghanistan, Pakistan | 10 | 1: Military Advisor |
| OTN (Observer Team Nigeria) | 1968-70 | Observance of ceasefire. | Nigeria | 12 | 2: Observers |
| UNAVEM II (UN Angola Verification Mission) | 1991- | UN Security Council. Monitor ceasefire. | Angola | 350 | 15: Observers |
| UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) | 1974- | UN Security Council. Supervise ceasefire and redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces control of buffer zone. | Syria (Golan Heights) | 1,450 | 230: Signals, Logistics |
| UNEF I (UN Emergency Force) | 1956-67 | UN Security Council. Secure and supervise cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces. | Egypt (Sinai) | 6,073 (1967) | 1,007: Reconnaissance Squadron, Signals, Engineers, Logistics, Air Unit |
| UNEF II (UN Emergency Force Two) | 1973-79 | UN Security Council. Supervise ceasefire and redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces, control of buffer zone. | Egypt (Suez, Sinai) | 6,973 (1974) | 1,145: Signals, Logistics, Military Police, Air Unit |

| <u>MISSION</u> | <u>DATES</u> | <u>AUTHORITY & MANDATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>MAXIMUM PERSONNEL</u> | <u>CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION: Maximum Personnel & Type</u> |
|--|--------------|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|--|
| UNFICYP (UN Forces in Cyprus) | 1964- | UN Security Council. Assist in maintenance of law and order, return to normal conditions. | Cyprus | 6,411 (1964) | 1,126: Reconnaissance Squadron, Infantry Battalion, Signals, Military Police |
| UNGOMAP (UN Good Offices Mission Afghanistan and Pakistan) | 1988-90 | Geneva Accords 1988. Confirm withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, non-interference of parties. | Afghanistan, Pakistan | 50 | 5: Observers |
| UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) | 1978- | UN Security Council. Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces, assist in return to normalcy. | Southern Lebanon | 7,000 | 117: Signals, Movement Control Units |
| UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group) | 1988-91 | UN Security Council. Supervise ceasefire and withdrawal of forces. | Iran, Iraq | 845 | 525: Signals, Observers |
| UNIKOM (UN Iraq - Kuwait Observer Mission) | 1991- | UN Security Council. Monitor demilitarized zone, deter violations of boundary, observe, and report hostile actions. | Iraq, Kuwait | 1,440 | 301: Observers, Engineers |
| UNIPOM (United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission) | 1965-66 | UN Security Council. Supervise ceasefire. | India, Pakistan | 200 (1965) | 112: Observers |

| <u>MISSION</u> | <u>DATES</u> | <u>AUTHORITY & MANDATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>MAXIMUM PERSONNEL</u> | <u>CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION: Maximum Personnel & Type</u> |
|---|--------------|---|-------------------|--------------------------|--|
| UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan) | 1949-79 | UN Security Council. Supervision of ceasefire between India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir. | Kashmir | 102 (1965) | 27: Observers, Air Unit (twice yearly airlift of HQ) |
| UNOGIL (UN Observer Group in Lebanon) | 1958 | UN Security Council. Ensure no infiltration across Lebanese borders. | Lebanon | 591 (1958) | 77: Observers |
| UNOSOM (UN Operations in Somalia) | 1992- | UN Security Council. Distribution of relief supplies. | Somalia | 40,000 | 1,300: Staff Officers, Infantry Battalion, Force COS, Air Support Elements |
| UNPROFOR I & II (UN Protection Force) | 1992- | UN Security Council. Observation patrols and mine clearance in Croatia and humanitarian assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. | Former Yugoslavia | 20,000 | 2,300: Infantry, Engineers, Military Police, Staff Officers, Force COS |
| UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia) | 1991 | UN Security Council. Monitor ceasefire and establish a mine awareness programme in Cambodia. Monitor disarmament and cantonment of factions. | Cambodia | 21,000 | 213: Staff Officers, Engineers, Transport Company, Naval Observers |
| UNTAG (UN Transitional Assistance Group) | 1989-90 | UN Security Council. Assist in transition to independence of Namibia. | Namibia | 4,493 (1989) | 301: Logistics, Air Unit |

| <u>MISSION</u> | <u>DATES</u> | <u>AUTHORITY AND MANDATE</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>MAXIMUM PERSONNEL</u> | <u>CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION: Maximum Personnel & Type</u> |
|---|--------------|---|---|--------------------------|--|
| UNTCOK (UN Temporary Commission on Korea) | 1947-48 | UN General Assembly. Observe and supervise elections in South Korea. | Korea | 30 | 2: Observers |
| UNTEA (UN Temporary Executive Authority) | 1962-63 | UN Security Council. Maintain peace and security. | W. New Guinea (West Irian) | 1,576 | 13: Air Unit |
| UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) | 1948- | UN Security Council. Supervision of General Armistice Agreements of 1949, ceasefires in the Suez and Golan Heights and assistance to UNIFIL and UNDOF. | Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria | 572 (1948) | 22: Observers |
| UNYOM (UN Yemen Observer Mission) | 1963-64 | UN Security Council. Observe and report on cessation of Saudi Arabian support and withdrawal of Egyptian forces. | Yemen | 189 | 50: Air Unit, Observers |

APPENDIX B

LIST OF WITNESSES

| Name of Witness | Issue | Date |
|---|------------------|----------|
| Colonel Nils O. ALSTERMARK Military Counsellor Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-29 |
| William BARTON Former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations Ottawa | 5 | 92-06-02 |
| Brigadier-General (ret'd.) Clayton BEATTIE President Stratman Consulting Inc. Ottawa | 9 | 92-11-25 |
| His Excellency Aleksandr M. BELONOGOV Ambassador of Russia to Canada Ottawa | 5 | 92-06-02 |
| Professor David COX Department of Political Science Queen's University Kingston | 6 | 92-06-09 |
| From the <i>Department of External Affairs and International Trade</i> Ottawa | | |
| Jeremy KINSMAN Assistant Deputy Minister Political and International Security Affairs Branch | 4 | 92-05-19 |
| Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. ANDERSON Head, Peacekeeping Section Defence Relations Division International Security, Arms Control and CSCE Affairs Bureau | 4 | 92-05-19 |

| Name of Witness | Issue | Date |
|---|-----------------------|----------------------|
| From the <i>Department of National Defence</i> Ottawa | | |
| The Honourable Marcel MASSE, P.C. Minister of National Defence | 9 | 92-11-25 |
| General A.J.G.D. de CHASTELAIN Chief of the Defence Staff | <i>In camera</i> 9 | 92-05-19 92-11-25 |
| Kenneth J. CALDER Assistant Deputy Minister Policy and Communications | 9 | 92-11-25 |
| Major-General J.A. MacINNIS Chief of Operational Planning and Force Development | 3 | 92-05-12 |
| Major-General Lewis MACKENZIE Commander, Land Force Central Area | 8 | 92-11-24 |
| Major-General Clive MILNER Former Commander-in-Chief UN Force in Cyprus | 10 | 92-12-02 |
| Colonel Donald ETHELL Former Head of Canada's Contribution to the European Cooperation Commission Observer Mission in Yugoslavia | 7 | 92-06-16 |
| Colonel M.J.R. HOUGHTON Director Peacekeeping Operations | 3 | 92-05-12 |
| Mrs. Lynda KYLE Director International Policy | <i>In camera</i> | 92-05-19 |
| Lieutenant-Colonel Ray LEVASSEUR Director Peacekeeping Operations | <i>In camera</i> | 92-05-19 |

| Name of Witness | Issue | Date |
|--|------------------|----------|
| Jan ELIASSON Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-29 |
| Dr. Mohamed Norman GALAL Deputy Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-29 |
| Marrack I. GOULDING Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping at the United Nations New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-29 |
| Allan KAGEDAN Institute for Soviet and East European Studies Carleton University Ottawa | 9 | 92-11-25 |
| Professor Edith KLEIN Department of Political Science York University Toronto | 6 | 92-06-09 |
| Professor Harold P. KLEPAK Royal Military College of St-Jean Richelain | 3 | 92-05-12 |
| Peter LANGILLE Common Security Consultants Hull | 9 | 92-11-25 |
| F.T. LIU Senior Fellow International Peace Academy (IPA) New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-30 |
| William MILLWARD Middle East Authority Ottawa | 9 | 92-11-25 |

| Name of Witness | Issue | Date |
|--|--|----------------------------------|
| Alex MORRISON Executive Director Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies Toronto | 7 | 92-06-16 |
| Alejandro H. NIETO Political Counsellor Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-29 |
| Geoffrey PEARSON Former Executive Director Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Ottawa | 5 | 92-06-02 |
| From the <i>Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations</i> New York | | |
| Ambassador Louise FRÉCHETTE Permanent Representative | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-28 |
| Ambassador David MALONE Deputy Permanent Representative | <i>In camera</i> <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-29 92-10-30 |
| Colonel Douglas A. FRASER Military Counsellor | <i>In camera</i> <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-28 92-10-29 |
| Major Stewart JEFFREY Deputy Military Counsellor | <i>In camera</i> <i>In camera</i> <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-28 92-10-29 92-10-30 |
| Vladimir PETROVSKY Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs at the United Nations New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-29 |

| Name of Witness | Issue | Date |
|---|------------------|----------|
| Grzegorz POLOWCZYK Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-29 |
| James SUTTERLIN Yale University New Haven, Connecticut | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-30 |
| Sir Brian URQUHART Former Under Secretary-General of the United Nations for Peacekeeping Operations Currently a Senior Fellow with the Ford Foundation New York | <i>In camera</i> | 92-10-28 |
| Professor Harald VON RIEKHOFF Department of Political Science Carleton University Ottawa | 6 | 92-06-09 |

Name of Witness Date

| | | |
|---|-----------|----------|
| Gregory FOLOWCZYK Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations New York | in camera | 92-10-29 |
| James BUTTERLIN Yale University New Haven, Connecticut | in camera | 92-10-29 |
| Sir Brian BROUHART Foreign Under Secretary-General of the United Nations for Resolving Operations Currently a Senior Fellow with the Ford Foundation New York | in camera | 92-10-29 |
| Professor Heinz VON WEICHOFF Department of Political Science Catholic University Ottawa | in camera | 92-10-29 |
| WALTER BROWN Permanent Representative | in camera | 92-10-29 |
| Deputy Permanent Representative | in camera | 92-10-29 |
| Colonel Douglas A. ... Military Councilor | in camera | 92-10-29 |
| Major Stewart ... Chief Military Councilor | in camera | 92-10-29 |
| General ... Under Secretary-General for Military Affairs at the United Nations New York | in camera | 92-10-29 |

02-05-02

Director, National Security Agency
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02-05-02

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