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# The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Dept. of External Affairs  
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## On to Budapest

### Ottawa Conference Concludes with Draft Treaty Text



Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark (centre) with American Secretary of State James Baker (right) and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (left) at the Open Skies Conference held in Ottawa from February 12 to 27, 1990.

"We are exactly where we thought we would be coming out of the Ottawa Conference," said John Noble, head of the Canadian delegation to the Open Skies Conference, at the close of the Conference in Ottawa on February 27. "There are a series of outstanding issues, but none of them are unresolvable provided there's a spirit of give and take on both sides."

The February 12 to 27 meeting between representatives of the 16 members of NATO and seven members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was the first of a two-stage process to negotiate an Open Skies treaty, which would provide for regular, short-notice overflights of each other's territory using unarmed surveillance aircraft. The second stage of the negotiations will be held in Budapest from April 23 to May 12, 1990.

Foreign ministers from all 23 of the NATO and WTO countries were present in Ottawa for the first two days of the Conference. As this was their first meeting since

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the dramatic political changes that swept Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, it afforded a timely opportunity for high-level discussion of the changing face of Europe and the future development of East-West security relations. As the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, observed in his address to the ministers, "we are meeting not as old adversaries, but as new partners," committed to building a durable peace in Europe.

### Ministerial Agreement

By the end of two days, the Conference had produced a ministerial commitment to an Open Skies regime based on maximum openness, agreement on the reunification of East and West Germany, and agreement on large cuts to the number of Soviet and American troops stationed in Central Europe. The ministers also agreed to hold a summit-level meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) later this year.

Officials from the 23 countries remained in Ottawa for two weeks following the ministers' departure to begin negotiations on the Open Skies treaty itself. Work was divided among four groups, dealing respectively with the following items:

- aircraft and sensors, inspection of aircraft and equipment, and the role and status of observers on board aircraft;

- quotas, combined parties (i.e., the right of a country to join together with another country or countries for the purpose of accepting or carrying out observation flights), scope and limitations;

- flight mission, air safety rules and transit;

- legal issues, such as entry-into-

force provisions and air crew immunities.

Canada and its allies tabled a draft treaty text early in the proceedings, which the WTO states agreed to use as the basis of negotiations. On February 24, the Soviet negotiators submitted formal amendments to that text, and by the end of the Conference the two documents had been integrated into a composite text.

Agreement was reached in several areas, including on many of the procedures for carrying out inspections of aircraft. It was also agreed that there should be no signals intelligence equipment onboard aircraft, and that any data obtained during an overflight should stay on the aircraft until the



plane lands, and not be transmitted to the ground, to another aircraft or to a satellite. The negotiators also reached agreement on important legal issues, such as the creation and functions of an Open Skies Consultative Commission to oversee implementation and operation of the eventual Open Skies regime.

### Outstanding Issues

Large portions of the composite text remained in brackets, i.e., unagreed, at the close of the Conference. The key outstanding issues are listed below.

1. Whose aircraft should be used to carry out the overflight and who should make this decision?

Canada and its allies insist that the right to decide which aircraft will be used should rest with the country that

wants to overfly, not with the country that is being overflown, because the purpose of Open Skies is to create confidence in the eyes of the people carrying out the overflight. The Soviet Union has suggested that the country being overflown should have the right to decide which aircraft will be used, leaving open the possibility of the overflown country supplying the aircraft and sensors.

2. Should there be restrictions on sensors other than the prohibition on signals intelligence?

The position of the NATO countries is that there should be no such restrictions. The WTO states have suggested that there should be a common sensor package, although there are differences within the WTO on what sensors should be included in that package. As a general rule, the NATO countries are prepared to permit the use of a much more intrusive level of sensor technology than is the Soviet Union.

3. Who should process and have access to the data acquired from overflights?

NATO has suggested that each country process its own data and decide for itself with whom it wants to share, again because the purpose of the exercise is to build confidence on the part of the overflying state. The Soviet Union has suggested that data be processed at a common facility by the overflown and overflying country together, and that the information from this processing should be available to all states participating in the regime.

4. How many overflights should each country be allowed to conduct and required to accept?

The quotas suggested by the Soviet Union are much lower than the numbers NATO countries have put forward.





NATO and WTO foreign ministers listening to chairperson Joe Clark (centre) at the Open Skies Conference.

5. Should there be restrictions other than for air safety?

The NATO countries say no. The Soviet Union has suggested that certain areas of its territory be off-limits to Open Skies overflights.

### **Canada Pleased with Results**

Despite these unresolved issues, the Canadian delegation was pleased with the results of the Ottawa Conference. In clarifying where the parties stand, in identifying the key elements of contention, and in drawing up a bracketed treaty text — a process that usually takes months or even years — the delegates made tangible progress toward the creation of an Open Skies regime. Mr. Noble noted that none of the negotiators expected to leave Ottawa with agreement on all of the major issues. According to him, "the real negotiations start now, on the road to Budapest, and at the Budapest Conference itself, but I remain confident the end result will be a successful treaty of the type that Canada has been proposing since last May."

Noble stated that one of the fascinating things about the Conference was the

extent to which the six other members of the WTO disassociated themselves from many of the positions taken by the Soviet Union in a way that has not been evident during previous arms control negotiations. "It was not a bloc-to-bloc negotiation," he said. "It has been a negotiation among 23 countries."

Noble also emphasized that the basic issues remaining to be resolved are not technical, but political. What is required for success at Budapest is a "new injection of political will," of the sort clearly expressed by all 23 foreign ministers during the opening phase of the Ottawa Conference.

There will be close diplomatic consultations among the parties involved right up to the Budapest Conference, with Canada and Hungary being asked by the other delegations to monitor whether it would be useful to have an inter-sessional meeting. The Budapest Conference will open at the level of officials. If an agreement is reached, the NATO and WTO foreign ministers will assemble in Budapest on May 11 and 12 to sign it.

Open Skies is designed to build confidence between East and West by al-

lowing all members of the two alliances to see that no state is carrying out activities that threaten the security of the others. It will allow countries that do not have surveillance satellites — such as Canada — to monitor for themselves areas of particular interest or concern. Open Skies will also set the climate for further progress in arms control talks. With major agreements on both conventional and nuclear arms expected in the near future, far-reaching confidence-building measures such as Open Skies, which can also help fulfill verification requirements, will play a key role in future security arrangements. ■

## **Acronyms Used in this Issue**

- ACD — arms control and disarmament
- CD — Conference on Disarmament
- CFE — Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
- CSBM — Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
- CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
- CTBT — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
- FOFA — follow-on forces attack
- HLTF — High Level Task Force
- IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
- ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile
- INF — Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
- NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- NNA — neutral and non-aligned
- PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
- SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
- SLBM — sea-launched ballistic missile
- UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
- UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
- WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization ■



## Prime Minister Gives Opening Address at Open Skies Conference

The following is the text of the address to the Open Skies Conference delivered by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister, on February 12, 1990.

We are living in remarkable years in world history. The Berlin Wall is down, Nelson Mandela is free, and a new age is born.

Throughout Eastern Europe, governments are grappling with the unfamiliar challenges of democracy and economic change. They are trying to accomplish in months what it has taken others decades, and even centuries, to achieve. Fulfilling the dreams of a nation for democratic government and satisfying the expectations of a people for new opportunity and prosperity for themselves and their children are historic tasks. They demand time, patience and a great resolve.

Nobody, as far as I know, has the necessary experience to prescribe a way to certain success for these governments that would make it possible for them to avoid either great national difficulties or considerable individual sacrifice. New national structures and economies are built slowly and with difficulties, but all nations have a stake in the success of the new governments and an interest in responding constructively to their needs.

Canada stands ready to do its part. Fully 15 per cent of Canadians have their origins in Central and Eastern Europe. These Canadians are schooled in the management of government in a bilingual nation and a multicultural society, and they are experienced in the conduct of international business in a free enterprise world. Canada is committed to cooperate in the rebuilding of Eastern Europe.

Canada is also ready to play its part in building a new international order. For almost half a century there has been



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (left) with Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark at the Open Skies Conference.

half a peace, based on distrust and built on deterrence. Confidence was impossible while basic values were in conflict. But the confrontation of ideologies has at last subsided. We are no longer hostage to the frozen political meteorology of suspicion and animosity. The Cold War is over. And today, in Ottawa, former adversaries work together to ensure that such a long and bitter winter never comes again.

The conditions exist now to make a new start on building a better world. The infernal nuclear legacy of the past

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### *"The Cold War is over"*

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remains. Unresolved issues and ancient conflicts, forgotten for a while, are exposed now by the sunlight of the perestroika thaw.

But, in recent months, much common ground has also reappeared. These developments raise profound questions about the most effective means of reinforcing political and economic progress in Central and Eastern Europe; about the evolution of the European Community and the unification of Germany; about the risk to stability of dormant

conflicts re-awakening; about the future of our alliances and about the nature of the relationship that will exist between North America and Europe; about what sort of wider world we want to see.

What is needed now is a new concept of security rooted in universal, democratic values. What is also necessary is the genius to give constructive expression to our rediscovered sense of shared purpose.

Newspaper headlines are filled with a new lexicon of diplomatic architecture — expressions such as a common European home, concentric circles, confederation and so on. These ideas reflect the need to create new instruments of cooperation, to breathe new life into existing organizations and to bring greater definition to our common political vision of a new European future.

The new Bank for European Reconstruction and Development is one creative response to these needs. It is needed to complete the unfinished business of European economic reconstruction. It will have a very important role for the spirit of enterprise which is beginning in Eastern Europe. It will also be important for the integra-



tion of the countries of Eastern Europe into the global economy. We are participating actively in this constructive and beneficial initiative and are ready to contribute time, money and expertise to aid its success.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is also a vital piece of that architecture. For almost two decades the CSCE has been an extremely important instrument for countries in both East and West. It has served as the bridge, often the only bridge, from sterile disagreement to fruitful cooperation. It has facilitated in many ways the quite extraordinary changes of the past year. And it is the only institution that comprises all of the countries directly engaged in European security.

A costly lesson of the history of this century is that European security and North American security are indivisible. None of us is secure when any of us feels threatened. We support the call for a summit-level meeting of the CSCE later this year and believe we should begin preparations immediately. We believe that we should all strive to be in a position at that summit to sign an agreement on reducing conventional forces in Europe. Further, we would like to see the CSCE transformed into an institution of ongoing economic, social and political cooperation between the countries of East and West.

In these days of torrential change and telescoped timeframes, stability and predictability in security arrangements are at a premium. For 40 years, NATO has embodied the commitment of North America to European security. NATO, with its trans-Atlantic membership, has a central role to play in facilitating the orderly transition from armed confrontation to more normal and productive political and human relationships.

NATO's arms control agenda is being pursued with the same seriousness of purpose as has been applied to maintaining an appropriate military balance between East and West. And NATO

provides a basis for going beyond arms issues to verification and confidence-building.

Openness is a pre-condition of confidence and, therefore, of stability. An agreement on Open Skies is in concert with these times; it will help to consolidate the dramatic improvement in relations between East and West that has occurred over the past year. By opening our territories to virtually unrestricted surveillance by air, we will be showing the world that we have nothing to hide and less to fear.

In concluding this Open Skies agree-

ment we will make a statement of enlightened political will, capitalizing on the current climate of achievement and building on a record of recent success.

When this idea was first proposed in the fifties, the times were not right. However, a spirit of leadership and catalytic change, which we are in now, have ensured that this concept — a helpful, confidence-building measure — will receive, for the first time, fair and thoughtful consideration today. I invite all present to pursue this agreement with vision and vigour for the future well-being of mankind.

## Who Was There

### From NATO:

#### Country

Belgium  
Canada  
Denmark  
Federal Republic of Germany  
France  
Greece  
Iceland  
Italy  
Luxembourg  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Portugal  
Spain  
Turkey  
United Kingdom  
United States

#### Foreign Minister

Marc Eyskens  
Joe Clark  
Otto Moller\*  
Hans-Dietrich Genscher  
Roland Dumas  
Antonis Samaras  
Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson  
Gianni de Michelis  
Georges Wohlfart  
Hans van den Broek  
Kjell Magne Bondevik  
Joao de Deus Pinheiro  
Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez  
Mesut Yilmaz  
Douglas Hurd  
James A. Baker, III

### From the WTO:

#### Country

Bulgaria  
Czechoslovakia  
German Democratic Republic  
Hungary  
Poland  
Romania  
USSR

#### Foreign Minister

Boyko Dimitrov  
Jiri Dienstbier  
Oskar Fischer  
Gyula Horn  
Krzysztof Skubiszewski  
Sergiu Celac  
Eduard Shevardnadze

\* representing the Minister of Foreign Affairs



Quarrels and competition between East and West have had a profoundly negative influence on many areas of the world. Perhaps most significant, the Cold War distorted the functioning of the United Nations, stunted the development of multilateral cooperation and inhibited genuine opportunities for dialogue and progress. The prospect of real peace in Europe at last provides us the opportunity to return to the unfinished business of building a modern and effective multilateral system.

The challenges we face as dynamic societies go well beyond orthodox definitions of national security. The global natural environment is threatened and the international institutions to protect it are clearly inadequate. The scourge of drug abuse is felt around the world, north and south, and yet we have found no satisfactory collective means to curtail it. The burden of debt is a prejudice to the future of middle-income countries around the world. And hunger and disease are too often the

fate of the world's poorest countries mired in economic hopelessness and social despair.

And so this meeting in Ottawa has, in my judgement, two main tasks: first, to concentrate diligently on the work at hand so that an agreement on Open

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***"The challenges we face go well beyond orthodox definitions of national security"***

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Skies will be achieved when the delegations reassemble in Budapest; and, more generally, to seize this unprecedented moment in recent history to replace the Cold War and its incalculable costs in economic wealth, misspent human genius and wasted social opportunity, with a new ethic of cooperation based on peace and prosperity and common purpose.

We who are gathered here in this room today bear a heavy responsibility to our nations and to history because the opportunity is given to few people to help shape a new era in world affairs. We carry the hopes and the prayers of people from Vladivostok to Vancouver, and from countries far removed from the old East-West axis of conflict.

So let us work together to multiply the gains that we have made in relations between the countries of East and West. Let us dedicate ourselves to building a world that the Cold War made illusory and unreachable for all countries and all peoples. Let us broaden our horizons and open our skies to peace and prosperity for all.

Ladies and gentlemen, the world is watching all of you in high expectation. Grasp the opportunity that is open to you now. On behalf of all Canadians, who are proud of your presence here and grateful for your leadership, I wish you all good luck. ■

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## ***Clark Calls on Ministers to Put Political Will into Practice***

*The following is the text of the address to the Open Skies Conference delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on February 13, 1990.*

I believe this past day and a half have marked an important beginning in the construction of a new framework for political and security relations among our countries. This has been a unique occasion.

It is the first time that foreign ministers of our countries have gathered together since the dawning of the new age of democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe. We are meeting not as old adversaries, but as new partners in a new task, the task of building a durable peace in Europe.

We also have a new type of challenge before us. That challenge is not so

much to initiate change; it is to channel it, to ensure that it remains permanent and stabilizing in its consequences. In effect, the challenge before us as ministers is to keep up with change.

In breaking new ground, I detect much common ground. That common

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***"In breaking new ground, I detect much common ground"***

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ground goes beyond specifics. It relates also to a shared sense of purpose and mission.

Allow me, as Chairman, the luxury of summarizing what I see as the common elements of this shared purpose.

First, I think that all of us accept that we have entered a new era in relations between East and West. It is an era where the terms East and West are themselves beginning to lose meaning.

Second, I detect a consensus that we must act quickly. We must act quickly to consolidate the gains that have been made thus far and to ensure that future change proceeds in a way that enhances our common security rather than detracts from it.

Third, I believe there is agreement that there is an overriding requirement to be guided by the dual goals of stability and predictability. We must act in such a way as to smooth the bumps on the road ahead and to maximize the predictability of change.

Fourth, I also detect a shared belief that a guiding principle of our future





*The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs (left), with Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn during talks at the Open Skies Conference held in Ottawa from February 12 to 27. Hungary will host the second stage of Open Skies negotiations in Budapest from April 23 to May 12.*

security framework should be the reduction of military forces to the lowest possible level consistent with national security requirements.

Fifth, I believe that there is agreement that we must broaden the definition of security and act upon that broader definition. That broadened definition of security relates to confidence-building, verification and the legitimization of borders and frontiers.

Sixth, I think we all share the view that a new framework for relations in Europe requires the continued clear involvement of North America in the various councils of the continent.

Those are broad issues where I, as Chairman, see little, if any, difference between the 23 ministers sitting around this table. That in itself is grounds for optimism.

There also seems to be a measure of agreement on specific negotiations or institutions that have been the focus of our discussion so far. There is a strong consensus among us regarding the desirability of Open Skies. An Open

Skies agreement will solidify the gains in mutual confidence we have already achieved and allow us to move forward to a new era of confidence-building.

Open Skies will allow each country represented here to see that no one of us is carrying on military activities threatening to the security of the others. It will assist in the verification of future arms control agreements, and it will help to create the climate that encourages signature of those agreements.

Most important, we are agreed in our expressed readiness to come to an early agreement that we can sign in Budapest in May.

How do we put our political will into practice? What sort of aircraft will be used? How many flights will each country be allowed? What are the operational details of an Open Skies regime?

Questions such as these are sometimes called technical questions. We should not let that label mislead us into thinking that they are somehow simple questions with ready solutions or that

political considerations do not intrude on them. Rather, we should regard them as the challenges that they are. We should be prepared to work diligently to come up with solutions. And, should we reach a point where agreement seems difficult, I would urge us to look back on what we have said here, to bear in mind our shared purpose, and to reaffirm our determination to move forward.

I pledge the full support of the Canadian delegation in this endeavour. Canada's unflagging support for Open Skies is well-known to all of you. It stems from our strong interest in verification and from our commitment to East-West confidence-building.

I believe it is fair to say that the approach of all of us to Open Skies is based on four criteria:

- first, simplicity;
- second, cost-effectiveness;
- third, flexibility;
- fourth, equity.

The Open Skies concept is, by its very nature, a very simple one. In building a structure to embody this concept we should not look for complexity where none need exist. We should keep restrictions to a minimum. We should ensure that openness means openness. We should create a regime that, in principle, is subject to no limitations save those imposed by flight safety considerations and rules of international law.

Open Skies should be cost-effective. Open Skies need not be expensive. The technology exists and is well within the reach of all participants. Cost-effectiveness also means we should avoid unnecessary bureaucracy.

We should construct a regime that is as flexible as possible in meeting the varying needs and requirements of the signatory states.

Equity allows all participants to



benefit from the regime. No doubt there are differences as to what equity means and how it can be achieved.

NATO countries have put forward their conception of Open Skies in their Basic Elements Paper. We have just had tabled a paper from Warsaw Treaty countries. We have heard, today and yesterday, from the various foreign ministers of both alliances. Mr. Shevardnadze has introduced the notion of equality, which I take to mean equitable access to benefits. This is a concern that we need to take seriously.

In general, there appears to be a fair amount of common ground in our approaches. It is our task now, as ministers, to identify that common ground in a communique, so that these negotiations will advance quickly, so that Open Skies can become a functioning element of East-West confidence-building as soon as possible.

I am greatly encouraged by the pace with which events have progressed so far. It has been less than a year since President Bush re-launched Open Skies in his speech in Texas, yet here we are ready to commence detailed negotiations on a treaty text with the evident desire to sign an agreement a few months hence. Those of you familiar with the history of arms control negotiations will see this as a record.

I am encouraged also by the rapidity with which Canada's trial overflight of Hungary was put into play. I want to emphasize the outstanding cooperation we received from our Hungarian and our Czech colleagues in conducting the trial. The results of our joint experiment were discussed in detail at the Budapest preparatory meetings for this Conference. I believe this has cleared away a lot of the technical questions that

might otherwise hamper these negotiations. This test of the nuts and bolts of Open Skies demonstrated that if our will to cooperate remains strong, the concept can be made to work.

As we go into our closed session, I believe it is useful to outline the key issues with which we will be dealing:

- whether aircraft will be nationally or collectively operated;
- determining the types of sensors to be allowed onboard Open Skies aircraft;
- determining the number, or quota, of overflights each participating state will be obliged to receive or permitted to carry out. I believe a compromise can readily be found on this issue using a

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***'We can make the term  
East-West synonymous with  
good will and cooperation'***

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formula that takes into account as its basis the realities of geography, geographic size and population;

- determining the structure and language of an Open Skies treaty text.

In an effort to expedite the negotiation, Canada, in conjunction with its allies, has prepared a draft treaty text that we hope can serve as the basis of discussions over the next two weeks.

Let us move as far as we can towards agreement in Ottawa, so we can reconvene in the spring in Budapest to sign a final treaty text.

Let us make Open Skies our first step onto the uncharted ground of our future security in Europe. We face an

enormous challenge, but we also face unprecedented opportunity. By putting our political will into practice we, together, can make the term "East-West" synonymous not with confrontation and rivalry, as it has been for the last 40 years, but synonymous, instead, with good will and cooperation.

We have also spoken today and yesterday about the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Some have spoken about the reunification of Germany, which we all acknowledge as a matter for the German people to pursue, and which we welcome, confident that those aspects that are of interest to others will be discussed in the appropriate forums.

The CFE negotiations are tremendously important. We are all greatly encouraged by what we have heard from Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in these past days about the reduction of troops in Europe. All speakers believe that we have the basis for proceeding rapidly to the conclusion of a CFE agreement. Let us do so in time for signature of a treaty at a CSCE summit meeting this year. Then let us move towards further measures to increase conventional stability.

We are all agreed that there should be a summit-level meeting of the CSCE in 1990. The potential of the CSCE is enormous. Mr. Dienstbier spoke of the CSCE as a comprehensive framework for pluralism. It is the one body that has, in its composition and in its mandate, the ability to act as a framework for the construction of a new peace and prosperity in Europe.

How should we prepare for a summit? Some have suggested that we should do it at Copenhagen in June, or at the second Open Skies meeting this spring in Budapest, or at a separate meeting of foreign ministers. Those are questions to be decided.

## ***Moving?***

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It is clear that a preparatory meeting will be needed involving not just the 23 nations represented here, but all 35 countries of the CSCE. But we need to discuss here what we believe should be the purpose of the summit itself beyond signing a CFE agreement.

Is it to create the political setting for the 1992 follow-up meeting? Or will it also have a broader agenda, setting in motion a process of activities ranging

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***"Today we are all  
politicians, in the best sense  
of that word"***

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through economic, social, environmental and humanitarian cooperation, as well as security affairs?

Today we are all politicians, in the best sense of that word. We are responsible to our publics for our actions. We must, therefore, be sensitive to those responsibilities on the part of others. We must be mindful, constantly, of the need to keep our efforts coordinated so that change is not purchased at the price of stability.

Under normal circumstances this would be a recipe for slowness, but we cannot afford delay. We must be present, at the political level, during all phases of this process, to ensure success that is quick and sure.

As we pursue our discussions today in closed session, I am confident that we will continue to apply the same openness to each other and to new ideas as is embodied in the concept of Open Skies itself. ■

***Students: see page  
18 for Focus***

***Do arms control and  
disarmament prevent war?***

## ***Open Skies Communiqué***

*The following is the Communiqué on Open Skies issued on February 13, 1990 by the 16 NATO and seven WTO foreign ministers present at the Open Skies Conference.*

At the invitation of the Government of Canada, the Foreign Ministers and senior representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America met in Ottawa February 12-14, 1990 to begin negotiation of "Open Skies." Also present at the Ministerial Session were observers of other CSCE states.<sup>1</sup>

The Ministers welcomed the accelerating trend toward openness and the reduction of international tensions. In this context, they noted that although an "Open Skies" regime is neither an arms control nor a verification measure *per se*, its successful implementation would encourage reciprocal openness on the part of participating states. It would strengthen confidence among them, reduce the risk of conflict, and enhance the predictability of military activities of the participating states. Finally, it would contribute to the process of arms reduction and limitation along with verification measures under arms limitation and reduction agreements and existing observation capabilities. The Ministers noted further that the establishment of an "Open Skies" regime may promote greater openness in the future in other spheres.

Believing that an effective "Open Skies" regime would serve to consolidate improved relations among their countries, the Ministers therefore agreed on the following:

- the "Open Skies" regime will be implemented on a reciprocal and equitable basis which will protect the interests of each participating state, and in accordance with which the participating states will be open to aerial observation;
- the regime will ensure the maximum possible openness and minimum restrictions for observation flights;
- each participating state will have the right to conduct, and the obligation to receive, observation flights on the basis of annual quotas which will be determined in negotiations so as to provide for equitable coverage;
- the agreement will have provisions concerning the right to conduct observation flights using unarmed aircraft and equipment capable in all circumstances of fulfilling the goals of the regime;
- the participating states will favourably consider the possible participation in the regime of other countries, primarily the European countries.

The Ministers expressed their gratitude to the Government of Canada for organizing this Conference and welcomed the invitation of the Government of Hungary to a second part of the Conference to conclude the negotiation in Budapest this spring.

1. Those present as observers were Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Monaco, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Turkey reserves her position on the status and representation of Cyprus. ■



## Noble Sums Up: Canada Wants Meaningful Regime

The following is the text of the statement to the press made by Mr. John Noble, head of the Canadian delegation to the official portion of the Open Skies Conference, at the close of the Conference in Ottawa on February 27. Mr. Noble is Director General of the International Security and Arms Control Bureau of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC).

In recent years, a new word has entered the English language. Like so many, it comes from another language. That word is glasnost. The emergence of this word into common usage, and the concepts behind it, represent the fundamental changes that have led to the improvement in East-West relations. Initially, some of us in the West spent a lot of time debating whether the term meant openness or transparency, and that debate seems rather odd now, since glasnost has come to be a much larger concept. It is only when all societies practice glasnost that we can hope to have a world in which we can truly say there is peace.

First, and above all, democratic ideals demand that glasnost exist between a government and its people, but peaceful international relations demand that glasnost also exist among and between governments. We have already noted the effects of glasnost in international relations — improved communications, honesty, openness. Tangible results include the progress we have made in arms control, the democratic elections taking place this year across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the rapid progress we have made toward the construction of what we call the "new European home."

It was the Canadian conviction that it was possible to put into practice the spirit of glasnost that led us to become such fervent promoters of Open Skies. We believe that the time has come to create a confidence-building regime of a much greater scale than anything tried



Mr. John Noble briefing the press at the close of the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa on February 27.

in the past. The Open Skies regime that we have supported is much more open than what we have accomplished up till now in the framework of the CSCE. This regime would apply to an area three times larger than the territory covered by those CSBMs. Putting into place such a regime would be seen, without a doubt, as a large step forward.

We have an expression in the English language that says "you cannot be a little bit pregnant." Similarly, in international relations, you cannot, in any meaningful sense, be a little bit open. Canada joined with the other nations of NATO in developing and putting forward a regime for Open Skies that is based directly on the understanding that restrictions on openness serve only to undermine confidence and build distrust.

We proposed, therefore, that sensors be capable of operating in all weather, day or night. We proposed that territorial restrictions be limited only to those necessary for air safety. We proposed also that each nation fly its own aircraft, thus taking upon itself, to the largest degree possible, the responsibility for the successful implementation of its overflight. In this way we will

avoid creating situations where the host country can be blamed for failures.

It is a clear principle of openness and confidence-building that the greater the degree of control left to the host country, the greater the perception that the regime is limited and based on distrust. It is by symbolically opening our doors as wide as possible that we will build a regime that fully achieves its potential.

In practical terms, if this negotiation is to succeed, we must have an early commitment by all participants to the following essentials:

- (A) no limitations to the territory overflown, except as required by air safety;
- (B) a high frequency of overflights to provide full coverage of the territory of the overflown country;
- (C) the use of sensors capable of operating in all weather, day or night;
- (D) full control over the aircraft and sensors by the overflying country.

Since the opening of this Conference, Canada has sought to demonstrate the kind of flexibility necessary to achieve a meaningful regime. We have listened with care to the concerns put forward by various nations that the principles of equity must be respected.

In his opening speech, the Right Honourable Joe Clark promised to take the concerns about equity expressed by the other foreign ministers seriously. We remain committed to that promise, but I must say that equality in an insignificant regime is hardly a goal worth pursuing. Equity in an Open Skies regime that brings openness to our military activities in the broadest sense will engage the fullest efforts of the Canadian delegation, both in the coming weeks as we prepare for Budapest and at the Budapest negotiation itself. ■



## Communiqué on CFE and CSCE

*The following is the Communiqué on the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) issued on February 13 by the 16 NATO and seven WTO foreign ministers present at the Open Skies Conference.*

The Foreign Ministers and senior representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Ottawa at the invitation of the Government of Canada, gathered on the margins of the Open Skies Conference on February 13, 1990 to review progress in the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Ministers welcomed this meeting as an opportunity to review and assess progress in the negotiations and provide impetus to their successful conclusion. They welcomed in particular an agreement reached in Ottawa between the USA and the USSR on the reduction of their stationed forces in Europe.

Convinced that a CFE agreement would strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, the Ministers agreed that the negotiation in Vienna should proceed as expeditiously as possible. For this purpose, the Ministers also agreed that negotiators in Vienna should be encouraged to develop solutions designed to overcome remaining obstacles, especially in those areas where new elements have been put forward recently:

- aircraft;
- regional limitations, differentiation and storage;
- helicopters;
- tanks and armoured combat vehicles.

The Ministers recognized that the essential elements for a CFE treaty are now on the table in Vienna, though much remains to be done, in particular to develop an effective verification regime.

The Ministers expressed their willingness to give simultaneously impetus to the CSBM negotiations. They emphasized their shared commitment to achieving a CFE agreement as soon as possible in 1990, and agreed on the principle of holding a CSCE summit meeting this year. They stressed the need for timely and thorough preparation for such a meeting through appropriate consultation among the 35 participating states.

They affirmed their interest in continuing the conventional arms control process, taking into account future requirements for European stability and security in the light of political developments in Europe. ■

## Canada and the Future of the CSCE

A new European political architecture is taking shape in which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will have a prominent place. Canada has played a leading role in the CSCE from its inception. We are deeply committed to playing a creative role in its further development.

The CSCE comprises all the countries of Europe except Albania, plus Canada and the United States. It deals with all the interrelated issues essential to security and cooperation in Europe: confidence-building and disarmament; economic cooperation; environmental protection; science and technology; human rights; human contacts; information; culture; and education.

It has an enviable record of success. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was a milestone in the era of detente. The Stockholm Document of 1986 established important confidence-building measures that opened the way for serious discussion of conventional arms control in Europe. The Vienna Concluding Document of 1989 contained ground-breaking commitments and follow-up activities that are now advancing the CSCE process in every area.

The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures are building on the work of Stockholm. The Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (not a CSCE conference but within the CSCE framework) will make major breakthroughs in reducing levels of forces and armaments.

At the Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment, held in October and November of 1989, participating states agreed to negotiate conventions in important areas of environmental protection.

The Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, held from



March 19 to April 11, 1990, brought together for the first time officials and business people to consider measures to further trade and industrial cooperation, and to take the first steps toward integration of the countries of Eastern Europe into the global economic system.

The ongoing Conference on the Human Dimension has been an important factor in securing progress in human rights. Its next meeting in Copenhagen will aim to broaden the European consensus on the right to free elections, the rule of law, representative institutions, minority rights, religious freedoms and many other fundamental human rights.

Other CSCE meetings have dealt with, or will address, information, culture and the Mediterranean before the next Main Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki in March 1992.

This is a busy schedule. Yet such has been the pace of events that there is now a general desire among participating states for a special CSCE summit this November to mark the signing of a CFE agreement, assess the impact of rapid changes, consolidate achievements to date and plot a course for the new Europe.

The Right Honourable Joe Clark has expressed Canada's strong support for a CSCE summit. "A leading role for this institution in the design and implementation of a new order in Europe is vital," he said. "For Canada, the CSCE is the most important forum for discussions relating to building a new peace and prosperity in Europe."

The place, date and agenda of the summit will be the subject of intense consultation among the 35 participating states in coming weeks. Canada wishes a summit to begin the process of institutionalizing the CSCE. We envisage a mix of regular activities in all main subject areas, high-level political consultations and enhancement of existing institutions, to draw Europe together and to broaden cooperation among all

participating states. Full and constructive participation by Canada and the United States in this process is essential.

Since 1973 Canada has worked in the CSCE to build security and confidence and to promote the freer movement of people, information and ideas. We now begin the task of creating a new European architecture that will be sound, permanent and secure. ■

## CFE Update

Recognizing that the Ottawa Open Skies Conference would provide an opportunity for foreign ministers to exchange views on broader issues of European security, Western CFE negotiators concentrated their efforts in the run-up to the Conference on identifying issues that required resolution at the political level. This process led to a series of Western initiatives in Vienna in early February, including revised proposals on US and Soviet stationed forces, on tanks and armoured combat vehicles, and on combat aircraft and helicopters.

This preparatory work proved useful, as ministers in Ottawa were able to agree on a proposal that would limit US and Soviet forces stationed in the European central zone to 195,000 each. The agreement would also permit the United States to station a further 30,000 troops in Europe outside the central zone.

In addition, the Open Skies Conference launched the "two-plus-four" mechanism for dealing with the process of German unification. This means that CFE negotiators now face the difficult challenge of structuring a treaty capable of taking into account significant changes in Central Europe and a possible realignment of countries within existing alliances.

Partly because negotiators are wrestling with this challenge and partly be-

cause of developments within the Soviet Union, the pace of CFE Round Six, which opened on March 16, has not matched that of previous rounds. Negotiators are confident, however, that the high-level meetings scheduled for this spring and early summer, including the Budapest Open Skies meeting and the Gorbachev-Bush summit in June, will help to ensure that the target of an agreement this year is met.

## CFE Organization and Canada's Role

The following paragraphs explain the mechanics of how Canada and its allies develop comprehensive proposals and participate in the CFE negotiation.

Using the objectives outlined in the CFE mandate and taking instructions from their respective capitals, NATO representatives meet twice monthly at the High Level Task Force (HLTF) in Brussels to develop positions that will be tabled in Vienna. The HLTF was established in 1986 to develop initiatives in the area of conventional arms control. Canada is represented at HLTF meetings by a senior EAITC representative.

Reflecting the complexity of the negotiation, the HLTF has established a number of specialized sub-bodies, called teams, to help in the development of proposals. These sub-bodies deal with Verification (Green Team), NATO and WTO Data (Red Team/Blue Team), CSBMs (White Team) and Treaty-Drafting (HLTF Deputies). Canada participates in meetings of each sub-body and is especially active in Green Team work. When the HLTF reaches agreement on a Western position, the position is transmitted to Vienna where it is tabled by Western negotiators.

The CFE negotiation itself is structured to allow East and West to negotiate simultaneously on different aspects of the treaty. Tabling of new proposals usually occurs in the weekly plenary sessions with initial views being



exchanged at that time. Each proposal is then assigned to one of a number of working groups for further detailed examination and negotiation. Depending on the complexity of the proposal, a working group may decide to establish informal "contact groups," which allow representatives of the 23 countries involved in the negotiation to meet and exchange views informally. While working and contact group meetings take place among the 23, Western negotiators also meet several times a week to help coordinate their approaches to CFE.

Canada participates actively in all Western caucus meetings and in all meetings of the 23. Reflecting our expertise in verification, Canada chairs the informal contact group on that subject. The Canadian delegation in Vienna, which is dually accredited to CFE and to the CSBM Negotiations, consists of three officials from EAITC, two military advisers from the Department of National Defence and an Ambassador, who is Head of Delegation for both negotiations. ■

## Last UNDC Meeting Under Old Format

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) will hold its annual session from May 7 to 29 at UN Headquarters in New York. The session will be a transitional one because, beginning in 1991, the UNDC will operate under a reformed format intended to improve the effectiveness of the institution.

The 1990 session will address a range of disarmament issues, all of which have been carried over from the 1989 session, with one exception. This is the item entitled "Objective Information on Military Matters," which last fall's UN General Assembly Resolution 44/116E, co-sponsored by Canada, requested be included on the UNDC's 1990 agenda. Items that have been carried over from previous sessions include nuclear disarmament, South Africa's nuclear capability, the UN's role in disarmament, naval arms, conventional arms and the Third Disarmament Decade.

The UNDC reforms coming into effect in 1991 are expected to be based on

a document entitled "Ways and Means to Enhance the Fashioning of the Disarmament Commission." This document was annexed to the 1989 UNGA resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission" (44/119C), adopted by consensus. Included in it is a recommendation that the UNDC make every effort at its 1990 session to conclude all of its agenda items, with the exception of the single new item.

Canada is a strong supporter of UNDC reform and will play an active role in trying to bring to a satisfactory conclusion as many of the items on this year's agenda as possible, so that the UNDC can begin to examine new issues at its 1991 session. Being a firm advocate of the concept of objective information on military matters, Canada expects to assume an active role in the consideration of this item. However, due to the special effort to conclude older agenda items at the 1990 session, objective information may not receive in-depth consideration at this time. ■

## Canada Chairs Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space at CD

Canada is acting as the chair of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament's 1990 session. The position of chair rotates annually among a member of each of the Socialist Group, Western Group and Group of 21 (neutral and non-aligned countries). Canada is chairing as the Western Group's candidate.

The CD is the only multilateral body mandated by the UN to negotiate arms control and disarmament issues. It meets twice yearly in Geneva for spring (February-April) and summer (June-August) sessions. The decision to establish an *ad hoc* committee to deal with the issue of arms control and outer space was taken by the CD on March 29, 1985, in conformity with a consensus resolution adopted by the

UN General Assembly during its 39th session on December 12, 1984.

The mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for 1990, agreed by the CD, is to "continue to examine and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space."

In his address to the *Ad Hoc* Committee at its first meeting of the year, on March 13, Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Mr. Gerald Shannon, noted that "Canada has for many years manifested considerable interest in and has contributed significant resources to the work of this Committee. That interest has not waned despite the difficulties that we have had in agreeing on how, in concrete terms, we should prevent an arms race in outer space. The reason why it has not waned, despite such

frustrations, stems from our recognition of the long-term importance of the issues involved."

Mr. Shannon observed that in an immediate perspective, the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space is closely related to strategic stability on earth. He also stressed the longer-term importance of the question, noting that "none of us...can say with any degree of confidence or indeed omniscience what the real political, economic, cultural and intellectual ramifications of our species venturing into space will be...[However,] it is probably impossible to underestimate that importance." He called on the Committee to take a long-term and responsible view of the genuine substantive differences expressed within itself, and to adopt a positive perspective on its work. ■



## East, West and European NNA Discuss Military Doctrines

*From January 16 to February 5 in Vienna, senior military leaders from the 35 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Vienna to discuss their countries' respective military doctrines and strategies. The Military Doctrine Seminar, which was the first of its kind, came out of a Western proposal at the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).*

*Four broad themes were addressed:*

- military strategy against the background of national security policy;*
- military structure and posture;*
- military activities and training;*
- military budgets and planning.*

*The seminar was a venture into a relatively unexplored approach to security problems. By providing a forum for dialogue among Eastern, Western and European neutral and non-aligned nations about doctrines and strategies, it attempted to promote understanding of the intentions lying behind military force structures and activities. The seminar was expected to enrich the material under discussion in the CSBM Negotiations.*

*Canada was represented at the seminar by Mr. David Peel, Canadian Ambassador to the CFE and CSBM Negotiations; General John de Chastelain, Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces; Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire, Canadian Military Representative to the Military Committee at NATO Headquarters, Brussels; and Major-General Brian Smith, Commander Canadian Forces Europe, based at Lahr, the Federal Republic of Germany.*

*The following are Lieutenant-General Evraire's impressions of the seminar.*

The Military Doctrine Seminar was a very positive experience that took place in an atmosphere of courtesy, coopera-

tion and openness. Much of the material presented was already well-known, with the possible exception of the rapidly-evolving doctrines of the Eastern Europeans. In these circumstances, the process of exchanging views and positions between NATO and the WTO on important military matters became more important than the actual substance of the presentations.

The WTO presentations tended to place heavy emphasis on the new defensive doctrine of their forces. In many respects, it was obvious that these declared doctrinal changes had not yet been fully implemented in a revised force structure, although numerous

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### *Exchange of views important in light of rapidly-evolving doctrines of the Eastern Europeans*

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changes were underway. Nonetheless, it was heartening to note that this process of change is being hastened in many Eastern countries by an increased civilian control of the military.

The most interesting portion of the seminar was the presentations by the non-Soviet WTO nations. There was a general lack of clarity in their statements. This was perhaps deliberate, given the rapidity of political change these nations had undergone immediately prior to the seminar, particularly Romania. The clearest statements came from Hungary, addressing the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the redeployment of national forces within their country. Poland was relatively cautious in its statements and the Czechs were preoccupied with the question of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from their territory. The GDR representatives still hewed to a relatively traditional line.

The main concerns of the WTO centred around what they considered to be offensive aspects of NATO's doctrine, which they felt were not in keeping with the Western alliance's stated defensive nature. These included questions on follow-on forces-attack (FOFA), naval forces, flexible response, forward defence, rapid deployment forces and the purpose and meaning of deterrence, both conventional and nuclear. In response, NATO provided substantive justification in every case, while admitting that some concepts, such as FOFA, may have to evolve to keep up with changing circumstances.

The neutral and non-aligned (NNA) nations placed heavy emphasis on the defensiveness of every aspect of their military posture. In several cases, they seemed to be promoting their structure and doctrine as models for the future of Europe, ignoring the geostrategic reality of NATO neighbours which makes their neutrality possible. The NNA also attempted to put forth the idea of a set of criteria against which the defensiveness of a national military posture could be evaluated. This proposal did not meet with universal acclaim, as it was felt that any such criteria would not provide an equitable standard for evaluation due to the considerably different security requirements of each nation.

In the case of NATO, while there were considerable differences in style and emphasis, there was also a remarkable degree of solidarity and fundamental consistency among the national presentations. The Western alliance provided solid evidence of its defensive orientation, although it did so by including certain offensive capabilities as an integral part of that defence. NATO's main concerns with the WTO presentations centred around the still-tenuous link between the declared new defensive intentions and a revised force structure, as well as the status of Soviet stationed forces in other WTO nations.



The Military Doctrine Seminar was a valuable exercise in openness but one into which we should not read too much. There remain considerable differences, even in understanding of concepts, between the WTO and NATO, which will not easily be bridged.

One suggestion, advanced by Canada, to develop a glossary of concepts in order to alleviate problems with terminology and translation, may be worth pursuing. As far as further meetings in this vein are concerned, the European

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### *Seminar a valuable exercise in openness*

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situation should perhaps stabilize to a further degree in order to make such gatherings worthwhile. At the very least, an initial CFE agreement should be successfully completed. Otherwise, there is the risk that this type of seminar will become a forum for polemical debate. ■

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## **PTBT Amendment Conference**

A series of informal consultations at UN Headquarters has resulted in agreement on the dates and venue of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Amendment Conference. The Conference will be held in New York from January 7 to 18, 1991 and will be preceded by an organizational meeting, also in New York, from May 28 to June 8, 1990. The organizational meeting will deal with administrative matters, such as how the Conference will be financed. These dates have been unanimously accepted by states that are party to the Treaty.

The Conference is the result of an initiative by some 40 signatories to convert the PTBT, through an amendment, into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While the proposed amendment enjoys broad support among non-

aligned countries, Western countries do not support it.

Canada's opposition to the initiative is based on several concerns.

First, the original parties never intended the PTBT to be used for the purpose of achieving a CTBT. In Canada's view, attempting to do so could undermine the PTBT and result in a loss of confidence in existing disarmament processes, causing some countries to be skeptical of initiatives to negotiate future multilateral arms control treaties out of fear such treaties could be similarly misused.

Second, the declared opposition of some of the PTBT's depositary governments to converting the Treaty into a CTBT means that the initiative has no real chance of success, as each depositary government (namely the

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### *Canada will attend Conference and participate in a constructive manner*

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United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom) has a right of veto over any amendment. Furthermore, amendment of the PTBT would not place any nuclear testing limitations on those nuclear weapon states that are not party to the Treaty (i.e., France and China).

Despite its opposition to the amendment, Canada will attend the Conference and participate in its deliberations in a constructive manner, as announced by Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, in her October 20, 1989 opening statement to the UN First Committee. Ms. Mason will lead the Canadian delegation to the Conference. While conditions are not conducive to concluding a CTBT there, it is Canada's hope that the results of the meeting will give impetus to ongoing efforts at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

toward the realization of a CTBT, including, as a first step, the establishment of a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee on a nuclear test ban. ■

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## **Arms Transfer Experts Group Meets**

The UN Group of Governmental Experts on International Arms Transfers held its first meeting from January 22 to 26 in New York.

The Group was established as a result of Resolution 43/75I, adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 1988 session, which requested the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of governmental experts, a study on "ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis." In preparing the study, the Group is to take into consideration the views of UN member states, as well as other relevant information, including information on the problem of illicit arms transfers. The Secretary-General will submit the results to the General Assembly in the fall of 1991.

The Group consists of experts from 19 countries. Canada is represented by Mr. Ernie Regehr, Research Associate and Lecturer at the University of Waterloo's Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and Research Coordinator for Project Ploughshares. Mr. Regehr has written extensively about the international arms trade.

Discussion at the January meeting focused on determining the scope of the study and on defining key terms in the Group's mandate, such as "arms," "transfers" and "transparency." The Group's next meeting is scheduled to take place in New York in July. ■



## Consultative Group Discusses Non-Proliferation Policy Options



*Mr. Ben Sanders, Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, Mr. Don McPhail and Professor Ashok Kapur at the Consultative Group meeting held in Cornwall on January 11 and 12, 1990.*

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met in Cornwall, Ontario, on January 11 and 12 to discuss "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Options for Canada." The Consultative Group is a group of approximately 60 Canadians that meets periodically under the chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament to advise the government on its arms control and disarmament policies. Its membership comprises academics, private researchers, former government officials, peace activists and others who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues.

The topic for January's consultation was chosen with the upcoming Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in mind. Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason — who will head the Canadian delegation to the Review Conference, which begins on August 20 in Geneva — noted in her opening remarks that the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of Canada's highest arms control and disarmament priorities. She asked the Group to identify and evaluate a range of policy op-

tions that Canada might consider pursuing in three areas: safeguards and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; encouraging universal adherence to the NPT; and adjuncts and alternatives to the NPT.

To set the context for its workshop discussions, the Group heard from three speakers about the NPT itself. Mr. Don McPhail, head of the Canadian delegation to the 1980 NPT Review Conference and now Special Advisor to the Privy Council Office in Ottawa, suggested that while the NPT is an imperfect instrument, it has helped to circumscribe proliferation and remains an essential contributor to international security and stability in the nuclear age. Dr. Ashok Kapur, of the Political Science Department at the University of Waterloo, presented a contrasting perspective, arguing that the NPT has done little to curb the activities of those states determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability and, as such, should not be given much prominence in Canadian policy. Mr. Ben Sanders, New York-based Chairman of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, contended that a world without the NPT is unthinkable.

While the Treaty has not lived up to all expectations, it has served useful purposes and has a bright future if it is effectively defended.

After much deliberation in both workshop and plenary sessions, the Group offered a number of policy options, the majority of which fall into six broad themes.

First, the Group called for greater recognition of the underlying incentives states have for developing nuclear weapons, and for the development and application of policies to reduce those incentives. Proposals for regional security arrangements, nuclear-weapon-free zones and the application of regional confidence-building measures reflected such thinking. So, too, did suggestions for augmented Canadian and UN roles in fostering regional security, particularly through peacekeeping.

Second, the Group felt that Canada should promote the creation of incentives and disincentives to encourage adherence and discourage non-adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Suggestions were widely voiced for the use of current nuclear trade arrangements, development assistance and debt relief as forms of leverage to promote greater compliance with regime principles and practices.

Third, the Group urged Canada to press for more consistent behaviour on the part of states that supply nuclear materials. Many participants argued that Canada should vigorously promote policies aimed at encouraging greater acceptance by suppliers of safeguard requirements over the provision of nuclear material and technology.

Fourth, the Group observed that strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is crucial to the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime. It was suggested that Canada support policies aimed at increasing the



financial and human resources of the IAEA, improving its mandate and authority, and extending the coverage of its safeguard provisions.

Fifth, the Group suggested that Canada do more to encourage accelerated progress in arms control and disarmament. Some urged that particular attention be given to measures aimed at curbing vertical proliferation, so as to ensure fulfilment by nuclear weapon states of the *quid pro quo* the NPT offers for nuclear abstinence by others.

Finally, while many participants were supportive of efforts aimed at promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, others advocated de-emphasizing nuclear power in favour of the study and development of other, potentially safer, energy alternatives. Some suggested that Canada eventually cease all promotion of the uses of nuclear energy and encourage other countries to do the same.

Discussion at the meeting was enhanced by the presence of several experts in the non-proliferation field from Canadian universities, research centres and the Atomic Energy Control Board. Officials from EAITC, Energy, Mines and Resources Canada and the Department of National Defence also participated in the consultation. ■

## Four Views of the NPT

**Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason:** "Canada attaches the highest importance to maintaining and...strengthening the NPT, including striving toward the goal of universal adherence. The NPT not only represents the best guarantee against the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons; it is also the best guarantee that conventional arms control, chemical weapons control and the control of the nuclear powers' nuclear weapons will proceed apace...[S]tates will be willing to sign other arms control agreements only if they know that parties to those agreements will be inhibited from acquiring nuclear weapons by a strong non-proliferation regime. Commitment to arms control and disarmament must, almost by definition, mean commitment to the NPT."

**Mr. Don McPhail:** "[T]he NPT is a truly essential treaty for the world in the nuclear age. Without it, proliferation dangers would magnify, and nuclear commerce and cooperation would be less fruitful and less secure. The NPT is a balanced instrument in encouraging both international nuclear cooperation and disarmament. But its overriding value lies in creating legal barriers against horizontal proliferation, a normative presumption in favour of curtailing the further spread of nuclear weapons and broad obligations relating to the application of IAEA safeguards."

**Dr. Ashok Kapur:** "The most important action that national leaders can take is to relax their position on the nuclear proliferation issue and to put it on the back burner...The NPT is a freak event in modern international relations. Non-proliferation has lasted for a while because non-proliferators were able to create a mirage of future international security and a great world bargain between the nuclear-haves and the have-nots. This approach rested on workable misunderstandings of the 1960s which are no longer available."

**Mr. Ben Sanders:** "I contend that the NPT has indeed helped to deter the spread of nuclear weapons...[E]ven if the Treaty has not yet met each of its initial purposes as effectively as might have been hoped originally...it has certainly served some of its intended purposes and has come also to operate in ways that might not have been foreseen in the beginning. The NPT is the only multinational instrument now in place pursuing those aims. In the foreseeable future there is no way to replace it by anything more effective and more acceptable to the international community at large without jeopardizing all that has been achieved so far." ■

## Canada Marks NPT's Twentieth Anniversary

March 5, 1990 was the twentieth anniversary of the NPT. The Treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. To mark the occasion, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark strongly affirmed Canada's continuing support for the Treaty. "The NPT remains an agreement of major importance because it provides for legally binding commitments to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and facilitates international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy," stated Mr. Clark. "It also encourages parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations aimed at reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons."

Canada, one of the earliest signatories of the NPT, is a major advocate of universal adherence to the Treaty. "I call upon all states that have not done so to formally accede to the NPT," said Mr. Clark. "Strong support by the international community for this important Treaty remains critical, particularly in the current climate of unprecedented change around the world."

Some 141 countries are currently party to the NPT. However, a number of states with advanced nuclear capabilities have declined to sign the Treaty. ■



## Focus: On the Relationship Between Arms Control and Disarmament and Peace

*Focus is our column for secondary school students. We welcome your comments and suggestions for future topics.*

Here at External Affairs and International Trade Canada we frequently receive letters from students asking what we are doing for peace.

When writing back, we describe Canada's involvement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping through the United Nations. We are also sure to mention our research in arms control verification and our extensive participation in arms control and disarmament discussions and negotiations. We assume, like most people, that there is a relationship between arms control and disarmament on the one hand and peace on the other hand. But what, precisely, is that relationship? Do arms control and disarmament prevent wars? If so, how?

### Definitions

First, some definitions.

The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" are often used interchangeably but, strictly speaking, they are not the same thing.

*Arms control* refers to measures that limit the growth of or otherwise regulate weapons, military forces and/or their supporting activities. Such measures can include restrictions on numbers, types, testing or training, stationing, acquisition and use. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963, which bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, is an example of an arms control agreement. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that don't already have them, is another example. The terms "arms limitation" and "arms regulation"

are sometimes used instead of arms control.

*Disarmament* refers to the actual reduction or elimination of weapons and/or military forces. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, under which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to get rid of all their nuclear weapons with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, is an example of a disarmament agreement.

If weapons or equipment have to be dismantled or destroyed, or troops returned to civilian life, it is disarmament. If not, it is arms control.

### Relationship

One might think that the relationship between arms control and disarmament — abbreviated as ACD — and peace is straightforward. If countries have no weapons, they cannot make war. But, as we have seen from the definitions, ACD agreements do not always get rid of weapons; they may just limit them. Besides, short of banning all sticks and

arms race between Great Britain and Germany in the years before World War I probably helped to cause that war. If Country A sees Country B building up its military forces, Country A may fear that it will be attacked, and may decide to attack Country B first to prevent this.

### What ACD Can Do

ACD can help make war less likely in a number of ways:

1. By increasing certainty about military capabilities and intentions.

Country A may not know for sure that Country B is building up its military forces or by how much. The fears on which it bases its attack may be unfounded. ACD agreements that provide countries with more information about other countries' force levels and military intentions can reduce unnecessary suspicions. Also, by putting limits on both sides' force levels, ACD can make countries more confident about the course of future military developments.

2. By ensuring a stable military balance.

ACD can create situations where countries have roughly equal numbers and kinds of military forces. Countries are less likely to go to war if there's a good chance the war will end in a costly stalemate.

ACD can also limit or reduce weapons that are "destabilizing," that is, weapons that contribute to the danger of surprise attack or of early attack in a crisis situation. It has been suggested, for example, that intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) based in silos on land are more destabilizing than ballistic missiles based on ships or submarines (known as SLBMs), because they are easy targets. In a crisis, a

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
### Do arms control and disarmament prevent wars?

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stones, it seems reasonable to assume that countries determined to go to war can find some means to do so regardless of restrictions on weapons. Even the United Nations' concept of "general and complete disarmament" allows countries to keep enough military forces and weapons to maintain internal order. Does this mean that ACD has no relationship to peace?

Not exactly. Weapons are not the sole cause of war, but they can contribute to its likelihood. Increases in military strength can create suspicions and tensions that may lead to war. The naval





US soldiers at a base in Mutlangen, West Germany, dismantle the radar section of a Pershing II missile, being withdrawn under the terms of the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty is an example of a disarmament agreement.

US Information Agency photo 88-1219-C

country might be tempted to fire its ICBMs first, fearing if it didn't "use them" it would "lose them." Many people argue that agreements that encourage countries to base their long-range missiles at sea rather than on land contribute to stability. For example, the SALT agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union froze the number of those countries' ICBM and SLBM launchers at existing levels, but permitted an increase in SLBMs if an equal number of ICBMs or older SLBMs were dismantled.

3. By reducing the probability that accident or crisis will lead to war.

ACD agreements that restrict destabilizing weapons will do this. In addition, there are a number of arms control agreements designed to prevent incidents that might lead to crisis or war, and to improve communications between countries in accident or crisis situations. One example is the "accident measures" agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, which provides, among other things, for improvements in both sides' safety procedures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

Another example is the "hot line" agreement between these same two countries, which makes sure that a quick and reliable communications link exists between the US and Soviet leaders in the event it is needed. Canada and the Soviet Union recently signed an agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea, to prevent accidents involving their navies.

4. By encouraging communication.

There is a lot to be said for just plain talking. Negotiations among countries on almost any important issue tend to make war less likely. The two sides have a chance to understand each other's concerns and motivations more clearly. A sense of cooperation may develop as the two sides move towards the common goal of an agreement. Once an ACD agreement is signed, regular communication and cooperation between the parties is usually needed to make sure that the terms of the agreement are being lived up to.

### Conclusion

ACD can thus help to prevent wars, by lessening tensions and uncertainties

## Forecast

*A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, May through September, 1990.*

**April 23 - May 4:** Third NPT Preparatory Committee, Geneva

**April 23 - May 12:** Open Skies Conference, Budapest

**May 7 - 29:** United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York

**May 17:** CFE Round 7 opens, Vienna

**May 21:** CSBM Negotiation Round 7 opens, Vienna

**May 28 - June 8:** PTBT Amendment Conference Organizational Meeting, New York

**June - August:** CD summer session, Geneva

**August 20 - September 14:** Fourth Review Conference of the NPT, Geneva

related to weapons and military forces themselves. However, some types of wars, such as revolutionary struggles, are less easy to control through ACD. Other methods must be used, in addition to ACD, to deal with wars that are more directly the result of conflicting ideas or of rival claims to resources.

Also, not all proposed ACD measures are likely to lead to peace. Measures that are one-sided, or that leave out important military powers or categories of weapons, can increase the likelihood of war. To be effective, ACD measures should be negotiated among all of the countries directly affected. There should also be an agreed way of checking that the other side is in fact doing what it has said it will do. This last concept is known as verification and was discussed in "Focus" in *Bulletin* No. 10.

So, when we are asked what Canada is doing for peace, it is fair to point to our ACD efforts. But it is also important to remember that ACD can only encourage, not guarantee, peace, and that our efforts to deal with other, underlying causes of tension and war are just as important.



## Disarmament Fund Update

### Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, Fiscal Year 1989-90

(April 1, 1989 — March 31, 1990)

#### CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Canadian Federation of University Women — student essay contest: "What I am prepared to do for peace"	\$500
2. Dr. Jules Dufour — preparation of a university course on arms control and disarmament	\$1,900
3. Voice of Women — orientation tour of the UN Disarmament Commission	\$6,050
4. Peace Education Centre — Youth for Global Awareness Conference	\$4,000
5. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — Ballistic Missile Defence study	\$19,760
6. Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	\$3,000
7. Centre de Ressources sur la Non-Violence — research on non-violent civil defence and common security	\$7,000
8. Polish-American Parliamentary Debate Institutes Canada — lecture tour of Poland	\$2,500
9. Inuit Circumpolar Conference — participation in Fifth Inuit Circumpolar General Assembly, Greenland	\$4,000
10. David Cox, Queen's University — peacekeeping workshop	\$18,000
11. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — conference on Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation	\$20,000
12. United Nations Association in Canada, Montreal Branch — UN General Assembly simulation	\$2,000
13. Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba — "End of the Cold War? Prospects for East-West Security in the 1990s" Conference	\$4,500
14. North American Model United Nations — simulation of the UN	\$6,000
15. Canadian Disarmament Information Service — publication of a special issue of <i>Peace Magazine</i> on common security	\$3,000
16. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University — conference on naval arms limitations and maritime security	\$12,778
17. Canadian Council for International Cooperation — directory of Canadian women specializing in global issues	\$6,000
18. International Institute for Strategic Studies — program of publications	\$11,308
19. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies — seminar on "International Security in a Changing Global Order"	\$1,104
<b>TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS</b>	<b>\$133,400</b>

#### GRANTS

1. Dr. Michael Mepham — Language and Ideology: a study of the nature of the peace movement's participation in the arms control and disarmament debate	\$7,000
2. Canadian Student Pugwash — chemical weapons workshop at annual conference	\$9,488
3. William Epstein — participation at Pugwash Symposium, Dublin, Ireland, May 5 to 7, 1989	\$320
4. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies — publication of proceedings of seminar on "Nuclear Strategy in the 90s: Deterrence, Defence and Disarmament"	\$7,500
5. Canadian Peace Alliance — preparation of Canadian peace catalogue and database	\$15,000
6. Project Ploughshares — preparation of manual on common security issues	\$17,000
7. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research — research on verification	\$10,000
8. International Institute for Strategic Studies — program of research and publications	\$38,692
<b>TOTAL OF GRANTS</b>	<b>\$95,000</b>

#### TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS


**\$133,400**

**\$38,400** ■

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