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
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
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
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CANADA AND THE NAVY.

IS THERE AN EMERGENCY?

Conflicting Opinions Examined in the
Light of Facts.

WHICH POLICY SHOULD CANADA ADOPT?

THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY—An immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

THE LIBERAL POLICY—A Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

Issued by the Central Information Office
of the
Canadian Liberal Party, Ottawa, Canada.

(Publication No. 6)

1913

THE TWO VIEWS.

When in March 1909 the subject of Canada's share in naval defence was first discussed in the House of Commons, and during all subsequent discussions, both political parties were agreed that as respects any action Canada should take, it was necessary to distinguish between an "emergency" and a "permanent" policy; that the action to be taken by the Canadian parliament should differ according as there was an emergency or not. The circumstance that after debate in 1909 the House unanimously passed a resolution approving of "any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service," and voted nothing for purposes of an "emergency," is evidence sufficient that parliament at that date, was not prepared to sanction an "emergency" policy, but was united on the wisdom of putting a permanent policy of a Canadian naval service into effect. At that time, however, a difference in the attitude of mind of the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties in Canada towards existing conditions in Europe asserted itself. There was no difference in their point of view as to what Canada's duty would be should an "emergency" exist, but on the question of fact as to whether or not there was an "emergency", there was according to what was expressed, a real difference.

MR. BORDEN'S ATTITUDE IN 1909 AND 1910.

The Hon. George E. Foster who proposed the first draft of the resolution respecting naval defence, said in introducing the same on the 29th of March of 1909, (nearly four years ago) "to-day, peril stands at the gateway. It is not for me to say how great it is, but I cannot hush it aside. To-day it impresses itself upon the greatest Statesmen of the old country; today it appeals to Australia until public subscriptions are taken, and the government is being importuned to do even more than its settled policy to meet the emergency; today little New Zealand gives one Dreadnought and offers a second, and today, Canada faces that position of peril, that imperial emergency. Let me say to my Right Honourable friend (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) that if after careful consideration he proposes to this parliament a means for meeting that emergency adequately, by the gift of Dreadnoughts, or the gift of money, this side of the House will stand beside him in thus vindicating Canada's honour and strengthening the Empire's defence."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1909, page 3503.)

Speaking in the House of Commons on January 12th, 1910, the Right Honourable R. L. Borden, at that time, the Leader of the Opposition, referring to the debate on March 29th, 1909 said, "My Hon. friend from North Toronto (Mr. Foster) said in that debate with my concurrence—"Today, peril stands at the gateway," and then Mr. Borden quoted in full the above extract from Mr. Foster's speech.

Mr. Borden then went on to enlarge upon the emergency and to repeat the proposal of an offer of dreadnoughts or money as a means of meeting it. He did so in the following words :

"Has the peril passed? No, Sir, we are nearer to it by nearly a year. Has Germany's policy been modified in the meantime? No, on the contrary, Germany has put forward the greatest Naval Budget in her history."—

"It is idle to assure us that there will be no war. The war has already begun, the war of construction, the victory will be as decisive there as in actual battle. Does the dissolution of the Empire signify nothing in Canada and her people?—

"When the British Empire goes the British North America Act goes also and with it there departs every constitutional guarantee which it contains. All beyond is chaos and darkness. —

"I say to my Right Honourable friend the Prime Minister, so far as my words have any weight with him : Go on with your naval service. Proceed cautiously and surely. Lay your proposals before the people and give them if necessary opportunity to be heard, but do not forget that we are confronted with an emergency which may rend this empire asunder before the proposed service is worthy of the name. In the face of such a situation immediate, vigorous, earnest action is necessary. We have no Dreadnought ready; we have no fleet unit at Land. But we have the resources and I trust the patriotism to provide a fleet unit or at least a Dreadnought without one moment's unnecessary delay. Or, and in my opinion this would be the better course, we can place the equivalent in cash at the disposal of the admiralty to be used for naval defence under such conditions as we may prescribe."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, January 12, 1910, pages 1799, 1815, 1816, 1817, 1818.)

SIR WILFRID LAURIER'S ATTITUDE IN 1909 AND 1910.

This was in March, 1909, and January 1910. What was Sir Wilfrid Laurier's attitude at that time? It was what it is today. A full recognition of the rights and duties of Canadians as British subjects, but an unwillingness to allow Canada to be stamped from a settled and approved course, by spectacular action, because of jingo appeals. Speaking on March 29th, 1909, Sir Wilfrid said—and his words then were prophetic with reference to the present situation, "We are British subjects; Canada is one of the daughter nations of the Empire, and we realize to the full the rights and obligations which are involved in that proud title. It has been, it is, it shall be our unalterable determination to meet and to carry out every duty which is implied by that title. I think, I make bold to say, that we will rise to every sacrifice that may be needed in order to maintain unimpaired the rank and status which is occupied by Canada in the British Empire, and the rank and status which is occupied by the British Empire throughout the world. But, Sir, I may say that we are not to be

carried away, we are not to be stampeded from what has been the settled policy and deliberate course which we have laid down, by any hasty, feverish action, however spectacular such action may be. It behooves us as free men to look at our position calmly and deliberately to ascertain where we are, and to determine whether we should alter or whether we should persist in the course we have adopted long ago."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1909, page 3505.)

"For my part I do not think the danger is imminent..... We knew that the British nation is not unduly alarmed..... I have no hesitation in saying that if the day should come when the supremacy of Britain on the high seas will be challenged, it will be the duty of all the daughter nations to close round the old motherland, and make a rampart about her to ward off any attack. I hope that day will never come, but should it come, I would deem it my duty to devote what might be left of my life and energy to stump the country and endeavor to impress upon my fellow countrymen, especially my compatriots in the Province of Quebec, the conviction that the salvation of England, is the salvation of our own country, and therein lies the guaranty of our civil and religious freedom, and everything we value in life. These are the sentiments which animate the government on this occasion."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, March 23 1909, pages 3511, 3512.)

Again on February 3rd, 1910 speaking on the second reading of the Naval Service Bill, Sir Wilfrid said "For my part, I do not see any cause of danger to Great Britain at the present time, let me say further that if Great Britain were engaged in such a contest, a wave of enthusiasm to assist her would sweep over this country, and all other British countries..... I was impressed by one statement of my hon. friend the leader of the Opposition, though I do not know the basis for it. He said that if war came between England and Germany, it would come within the next three or four years. I have not been able to get any satisfactory answer to this query, what is the reason for supposing that war from Germany is to come within the next three or four years?"

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, February 3, 1910, pages 3050, 3051.)

A CONTRAST IN LEADERSHIP IN 1912.

These statements are sufficiently clear as to the attitude of the leaders of the two parties on the question of an emergency three and four years ago. An interval of time of this length having elapsed without any of the alarmist prophecies being justified, or anything being done by the Conservative party since its accession to power to relieve the alleged "emergency," Mr. Borden, for these as well as other reasons, has found it necessary to abandon the word "emergency", though in some of his speeches he has tried to convey the impression that an "emergency" still exists to an extent, which will justify a departure from the policy

of a Canadian Naval Service as outlined and unanimously agreed to in the resolution of March 29th, 1909, and be a sufficient warrant for an immediate expenditure of \$35,000,000.00 for the three most powerful battleships in the world, as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later. In this connection he has not hesitated to use language as extravagant as that made use of in January 1910, when he said to parliament "the war has already commenced". Here are Mr. Borden's concluding sentences in asking parliament for the \$35,000,000 on December 5th, 1912. "Today, while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster. Almost unaided, the Motherland, not for herself alone, but for us as well, is sustaining the burden of a vital imperial duty, and confronting an overwhelming necessity of national existence."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, December 5th, 1912, pages 714, 715.)

In contrast to this language of panic and consternation, the calm and dignified utterances of Sir Wilfrid Laurier in replying to Mr. Borden stand out in reassuring relief as did his statesmanlike admonitions against spectacular and alarmist proposals in 1909 and 1910. On December 12th, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, "I insist once more on what is stated in the Memorandum; there is no emergency, there is no immediate danger, there is no prospective danger. If there were an emergency, if England were in danger—no I will not use that expression: I will not say if England were in danger, but simply, if England were on trial with one or two or more of the great powers of Europe, my right honourable friend might come and ask, not \$35,000,000 but twice, three times, four times \$35,000,000. We would put at the disposal of England all the resources of Canada; there would not be a single dissentient voice—I do not believe the Empire is in danger, I do not believe it can be cemented by the means suggested by my right honourable friend. I believe the relations of the different parts of the Empire to the Mother country are not perfect, but that essentially they are perfect. You can discuss problems of improvement: there is no occasion to discuss problems of existence."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, December 12th, 1912, pages 1059, 1068.)

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SIR WILFRID LAURIER AND MR. BORDEN.

Here then is the difference between Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mr. Borden. Sir Wilfrid Laurier denies that there is an emergency, but contends that Canada ought to go on with the permanent policy of a Canadian Naval Service, already commenced in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons in March 1909. Mr. Borden will not say that there is

an emergency, but to avoid bringing down a permanent policy, either the same as, or different from that to which parliament unanimously agreed, has felt it necessary to make it appear that an emergency exists and that Canada should present to Great Britain the three largest ships of war in the world at a cost of \$35,000,000 and then work out a permanent policy. Who is right? There are among others, three ways of determining.

(1) A consideration of the facts.

(2) A consideration of the declarations of responsible Ministers of the Crown in England.

(3) A consideration of the attitude of Mr. Borden and Canadian Ministers.

A CONSIDERATION OF THE FACTS DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY.

It was March, 1909, that the German scare arose, and it was declared by Mr. Borden and others that peril was imminent. This is 1913 and nothing has taken place. In the interval, the people of the United Kingdom who are the ones immediately concerned have had ample opportunity to consider the situation. Has their action been of a kind which bespeaks a nation in a state of alarm? Are not the following facts and circumstances incontrovertible evidence that the people of the United Kingdom have no belief in an emergency?

THE ELECTORATE OF BRITAIN ARE NOT CONCERNED.

There have been two general elections in the United Kingdom since it was stated in the Canadian parliament that there was an emergency. One in January 1910, and one in December 1910. In these elections the questions discussed were the Budget Social Reform, Tariff Reform, Reform of the House of Lords, and Home Rule. The question of an emergency was scarcely mentioned in public discussion. Is it conceivable that a Government and a nation could believe itself in danger, and the subject not be uppermost in the minds of the people at a time they were being appealed to for support by rival political parties?

There have been several by-elections in Great Britain and Ireland since 1909. In not a single by-election has the German menace, or the existence of an emergency been the subject of popular discussion. Is it conceivable that this could happen if the people of Great Britain and Ireland really believed that there was not adequate protection for the British Isles and the Empire? If invasion were really feared, if an emergency existed, would it not be the one topic of discussion on the occasion of every appeal to the people?

The Parliament of the United Kingdom is at present in session in Great Britain and not only has no statement been made by any responsible ministers justifying a belief in an emergency but it has been specifically denied that an emergency exists. The

Parliament of the United Kingdom has not been asked to make any appropriation to meet an emergency. Why should the parliament of Canada? It has been questions of Home Rule, of female suffrage, of education and other domestic problems that have been the subjects of primary interest in the British parliament. Does Canada know more about Britain's affairs than Englishmen themselves?

**THE DECREASE OF PUBLIC DEBT OUT OF SURPLUS REVENUES
IS CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF NO EMERGENCY.**

What would a nation do that has a surplus revenue and believes in an emergency? Would it not obviously use this surplus towards ensuring its security? Would it not borrow if need be? What has the United Kingdom been doing? Since the present Liberal government assumed office in Britain there have been surplus revenues many years just as there were in Canada after the Liberal government assumed office in this country subsequent to 1896. So secure has England felt that she has devoted a large part of her yearly surpluses not to making provision for an "emergency", but towards wiping off some of her public debt.

Speaking in the House of Commons at Westminster on June 24th, 1912, the Rt. Hon. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer said "I want to state exactly what the government will have done, including the provision made this year for the reduction of the debt. The total reduction of the debt effected by the present government, inclusive of the £1,000,000 will be £78,184,000 (or at the rate of \$4.87 to the £—\$380,756,080) that is for seven years. That is a net reduction of debt.....What has the reduction of the debt by the present government up to the end of last year been? It amounted to £63,000,000 (or at the rate of \$4.87 to the £—\$306,810,000).....In addition to that we have provided for an increase during the last three years of £13,500,000 on the Navy estimates. We have borne on the estimates the cost of dock construction and ship building, items which abroad are financed out of loans. So we have paid £63,000,000 in addition to the £13,500,000 added to the Navy Estimates, without negotiating any loan for that purpose.

"This is a purely net reduction of the amount of the indebtedness of this country. If you pay off debt with one hand and borrow with the other that is not a reduction. I am dealing with the net reduction of the indebtedness of this country and I say that no government that has ever existed in this country was ever near to this government in the reduction of debt."

(British Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1912, Vol. XL, pp. 54-57.)

The reduction in the British National Debt year by year since the Liberal administration assumed office in the United Kingdom has, according to the statistical abstract for the United Kingdom 1912 been as follows:

At Close of the Fiscal Year ending March 31st	Gross Reduction in Pounds.	Gross Reduction in Dollars (calculating the pound at the average exchange of \$4.87.)
1906	11,852,132	57,719,882.84
1907	13,714,432	66,789,283.84
1908	18,029,680	87,804,541.60
1909	8,787,968	42,797,404.16
1910	10,442,489	50,854,921.43
1911	28,012,949	136,423,061.63
1912	10,487,892	51,076,034.04

Reduction during 6 years \$333,475,665.

Average rate per year \$55,579,277.

Mr. Borden's proposal is that Canada should increase her national debt by borrowing from England \$35,000,000 to present a gift to Britain to relieve her of an emergency at a time when Britain is actually reducing her public debt on an average of over \$55,500,000 per year.

THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IS EVIDENCE OF NO EMERGENCY.

Since the supposed emergency is in reference to Germany what is the relative strength of the German and British fleets? Here is the statement of the Rt. Honourable Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, given in the House of Commons at Westminster on Monday, July 22nd, 1912, in the course of an explanation of the scope and character of the New German Navy Law and its effect.

"Thus we shall have available during 1914, and onward 5 battle squadrons comprising 41 battleships of which 4 squadrons will be in full commission, and one on the basis I have described, and all of which will be manned by trained active service ratings without calling upon the Reserves, and we shall endeavor to arrange matters so that 4 out of these 5 will always be available at short notice. Very often in the ordinary course of events, and at any time when there is anxiety, the whole 5 will be available. It is necessary, however, to notice that besides her 25 battleships in full commission, the Germans have 4 parent ships of their reserve division which are fully manned with active service ratings, and on an emergency these might conceivably be employed. Thus we shall have at the end of 1914, a minimum of 33 and a maximum of 41 battleships fully manned and in full commission against which the comparable German figure is 29....it is after a full and minute examination of the qualities of the ships and

the squadrons that the Admiralty are able to announce that they are satisfied with the margins proposed so far as the next two or two and a half years are concerned. . . . I hope it will be sufficient for me to say that the arrangements proposed will, in the opinion of the Admiralty, be adequate for the needs of 1914 and 1915."

In the face of such a statement as this how can Mr. Borden and his followers with any pretence of justification contend there is an emergency at the present time, or even the likelihood of one in the immediate future? Elsewhere in the same speech Mr. Churchill refers to what could be done "at any time when the Admiralty consider that there is an emergency," clearly indicating that the Admiralty has no belief in any emergency at the present time.

There is the further statement contained in the Admiralty memorandum on the general Naval situation communicated to parliament by Mr. Borden on December 5th, 1912, which contains in section 6, a statement of the relative strength of the British and German ships. The section in this connection reads as follows:

"It is now necessary to look forward to the situation in 1915.

"In Home Waters.

"In the spring of the year 1915—

"Great Britain will have 25 'Dreadnought' battleships and 2 'Lord Nelsons'.

Germany will have 17 'Dreadnought' battleships.

"Great Britain will have 6 battle cruisers.

"Germany will have 6 battle cruisers.

With this relative proportion in 1915 of 27 to 17 of the largest ships of war where is the need for the immediate presentation by Canada to Great Britain of \$35,000,000, for "the three most powerful battleships in the world" to save Great Britain in an "emergency"?

THE DECLARATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE MINISTERS IN ENGLAND DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY.

So much for facts. Consider now the official statements of Members of the British Cabinet, who by their oaths of office are sworn to the truth and to the safeguarding of the welfare of the nation. It is a fact, which seems to have escaped the notice of those who are seeking to alarm the Canadian people, that since the Borden government assumed office never once has a responsible Minister of the Crown in England so much as hinted at an emergency whereas the British Ministers have repeatedly explicitly denied its existence and have as frequently commented upon the very friendly relations existing between the United Kingdom and Germany. Who is to be believed in regard to a matter of

such grave concern to the United Kingdom ? The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith and his Ministers, who form the Government of England, or Mr. Borden and his Ministers in Canada ? If Mr. Asquith and his Ministers, then here are some of the declarations of the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom made (1) prior to Mr. Borden's visit to England, but after he had taken office; (2) during Mr. Borden's visit to England; and (3) since Mr. Borden's visit to England, and his return to Canada.

**OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE BRITISH MINISTERS
PRIOR TO MR. BORDEN'S VISIT TO ENGLAND.**

On Naval defence the statements by the First Lord of the Admiralty are of first importance. He is the responsible Minister of the Crown whose duty it is to keep the country informed of the efficiency of its navy and the nation's strength in comparison with possible rival powers, and in particular the need, if any, of increased armaments and equipment. For the purpose of considering any existing emergency, Mr. Churchill's speeches delivered during 1912 are sufficient. In not one of them is the idea of an emergency put forth. On the other hand they contain repeated assurances of England's security and repeated protests against sensational and violent departures from existing methods.

Speaking at Glasgow as the guest of the Clyde Navigation trustees, on Friday, February 9th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said.

"I can give you a very good account of the British navy. In ships it is possible to match every other type of ship in the world and show clear superiority ship for ship.....The rumors which have filled some of the papers during the last few months that the navy was last year unprepared, are absolutely baseless.I am glad to be able to tell you that there is no need at all for alarm, there is no need for the raising of any excited panic and there is no need for disparaging the resources of our country. We may face the situation with great composure because it is just and true to say that on every point and on every detail, we have had it well in hand.....We were never in a better position and the country was never more united in its resolve to see the supremacy of the British Navy maintained.....

"It might be supposed by reading the accounts from the great organs of both parties that financially Great Britain was in a tottering, weak and perilous condition. But of course as you know, that is all our talk. The resources which the British Chancellor of the Exchequer can command are amply equal to all requirements of the day.....

"Our credit has been sustained during the past 5 or 6 years by repayment of debt and reduction of capital liabilities on a scale unexampled in the history of this or any other country.....

"I learn from the newspapers that there is a considerable body of opinion in this country which favors the flotation of a

great naval loan. I cannot help thinking that that suggestion is put forward by persons who have not had an opportunity of properly apprehending the problem of British naval supremacy as it now presents itself. It would no doubt be perfectly easy for the British Government at the present time to float a loan of fifty or a hundred million pounds for naval purposes.....But what would be the use to the navy of such a step? We have to build for the navy enough ships to secure us the effective mastery of the seas. It is sheer waste to build more ships than are necessary for that purpose in any one year.....

"What is wanted is steady building on a regular plan. No sensational or violent departure from our existing methods is required or will be required.....

"We are under no anxiety about money. Whatever is needed for the safety of the Empire will be asked for by the Government and granted by the representatives of the nation with universal assent. (Cheers).....

"There is no chance whatever of our being overtaken in naval strength unless we want to be.....

"Whatever may happen abroad there will be no whine here. No signals of distress will be hoisted, no cries for help or succour will go up. (Cheers).....If there are to be increases on the continent of Europe we shall have no difficulty in meeting them to the satisfaction of this country."

(Times, London, February 10th, 1912.)

Speaking in the British House of Commons on March 18th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said:

"We possess more Dreadnoughts than any other two powers in the world today and if all the Dreadnoughts in the world were sunk tonight our naval superiority would be greater than it is at the present time. We can not imagine the course of a naval war which would not tend steadily to increase the relative fighting value of the large resources we possess in pre-Dreadnoughts, until, as time went on, quite old vessels would come out and play an important part.... It is wrong and wasteful to build a single ship for the Navy before it is wanted..... It is an ill-service to the Navy and to the State to build a single ship before its time..... What I might venture to call "the more the merrier" argument is as detrimental to efficiency as to economy. The only safe rule which the British Admiralty can follow is to maintain the minimum consistent with full security..... I should like to make it clear, that as a result of the measures taken by my right hon. friend the Home Secretary, there is no cause whatever for alarm or despondency. The Admiralty are prepared to guarantee absolutely the main security of the country and of the Empire, day by day for the next few years, and if the House will grant us what we ask for in the future, that prospect may be indefinitely extended..... The Germans will be no gainers so far as Naval power is concerned over us, by any increases which they may

make, and no losers for the basis I have laid down by any diminution.....I am pleased to say that we can build, arm and equip great ships each year—and continue the process year after year—upon a scale largely in advance of any other single power in the world, according to its present resources. **The House may take it for certain, therefore, that there is absolutely no danger of our being overtaken unless we decide as a matter of policy to be so.**"

"I am glad to be able to assure the House that no difficulty will be experienced in making arrangements to retain our relative position in the near future and to secure as nearly as we need them, adequate margins of safety. I am glad also that these measures will not involve any excessive or disproportionate expense."

(House of Commons Debates, March 18th, 1912.)

Again when the House was in Committee on the Naval Estimates on March 20th, Mr. Churchill said :

"The Hon. member for Chester has asked me why we are taking so little for battleships this year (1912). We calculate when we shall lay down each battleship according to the actual dates at which we think we shall require them. If we thought we should need one of these ships at an earlier month than that which we have fixed in our minds as necessary, there would be no difficulty in laying down the vessel a little earlier. The true policy is to wait till the last minute you can with full security in order to get every advantage of design at a time like this when Naval science is moving on from week to week."

Later Mr. Churchill said that Britain's most urgent need at the present time was an increase in her number of torpedo destroyers, and referring to mention by other naval authorities in the House to the strength of the British fleet added "Both of them have a knowledge which far exceeds anything I have been able to acquire in the short time I have been at the Admiralty. I recognize very gladly the statements they have made that our position at the present is a thoroughly satisfactory one, and I do not think there is any chance of it becoming unsatisfactory in the future."

(Times, March 21st, 1912.)

Speaking at the Shipwright's dinner in London on May 15th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said :

"Naval supremacy consists in our being in possession of Naval forces sufficient to overcome in war the strongest fleet or fleets which any reasonably probable combination of powers may bring against us. That we should be always in a position to do : that we believe ourselves to be now and in the immediate future in a position to do.....At present of course, and for some years to come, we are not only able to maintain a sufficient margin within Home waters at the decisive points, but we could, by making special arrangements, by effecting partial mobilization, we

could if the need arose, fit out and despatch strong squadrons to the aid of any of our colonies or dominions across the sea whose vital interests were menaced or attacked.....That we can do now, next year and in the years which are immediately before us." (The Times, May 16th, 1912.)

On July 2nd, Lord Crewe, speaking for the government in the House of Lords said, "So far as our existing position in any part of the world is concerned we are not afraid to declare that we consider the security of the country is achieved.....Taking March 31st of this year, we find that we have 16 battleships and battle cruisers of the Dreadnought type, as against 15 possessed by all the other Powers in European waters. Next year we shall have 24 ships of this type as against 21 possessed by all the other Naval Powers in Europe. These battleships represent a distinct margin over the two power standard." (Times, July 3rd, 1912.)

OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE BRITISH MINISTERS DURING MR. BORDEN'S VISIT TO ENGLAND,

Mr. Borden left Canada for England on June 25th, arriving in Bristol on July 4th.

Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who is better informed than any other statesman in the British Empire on England's foreign relations, said in the House of Commons July 10th, with reference to Germany "Our relations with the German Government at the present moment are excellent. We are perfectly frank with each other about all questions of mutual interest and I believe both governments are convinced that their mutual interests can be perfectly reconciled." (Times, July 11th, 1912.)

On July 22nd and the days immediately following a debate took place in the House of Commons at Westminster on the Navy Estimates. According to the London papers, Mr. Borden was present in the gallery of the House and heard what was said. Here are the views of some of the British statesmen as expressed on that occasion.

The Rt. Hon. Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, after discussing the scope and character of the new German law said :

"Cool, steady, methodical preparation, prolonged over a succession of years, can alone raise the margin of Naval power. It is no use flinging millions of money about on the impulse of the moment, by a gesture of impatience, or in a mood of panic. Such a course only reveals your weakness and impotence. Those who clamour for sensational expenditure, who think that the kind of danger with which we are faced needs to be warded off or can be warded off in that way, are either ignorant themselves of naval conditions or take advantage of the ignorance of others. The strain we have to bear will be long and slow, and no relief

will be obtained by impulsive or erratic action. We ought to learn from our German neighbors, whose policy marches unswervingly towards its goal across the lifetime of a whole generation.....

"It is after a full and minute examination of the qualities of the ships and the squadrons that the Admiralty are able to announce that they are satisfied with the margins proposed so far as the next two or two and a half years are concerned. I hope I shall not be pressed to enter into any process of comparison..... I hope it will be sufficient for me to say that the arrangements proposed will, in the opinion of the Admiralty, be adequate for the needs of 1914 and 1915..... (and referring to the disposition of British ships elsewhere) I am content to say, leaning myself, as I must do, in these matters, upon the advice and opinion of the naval authorities on whom the Government rely, that we consider the arrangements described, not only the best possible in the circumstances, but satisfactory in themselves so far as the next two or two and a half years are concerned. The time has not yet come to provide for the latter part of the financial year 1915-16."

(House of Commons Debates, 22nd July 1912, Vol. 41, No. 102 Official Report.)

On July 24th, in the course of the same debate, Mr. Churchill expressed the "absolute confidence" of the government in the adequacy of their programme, and laid particular stress upon "the great material advantage of never laying down a ship till the last moment compatible with full security" in view of the rapidity with which the types of ships become obsolete. "That," he said amid the cheers of the House, "is my answer to the hon. gentleman below the gangway who is urging the immediate construction of the new ships before the moment when the best designs can be completed."

Proceeding to details as to the government's programme for the construction of Dreadnoughts, Mr. Churchill said :

"We expect in the fourth quarter of 1913 to have 18 Dreadnought battleships by the time that Germany has 13. In the fourth quarter of 1914 we shall have 24 and Germany will have 16 according to our calculations. In the fourth quarter of 1915 we shall have 27 and Germany 17. I am leaving the cruisers out, I am not counting the two Lord Nelsons, although those vessels are counted as Dreadnoughts by the French, and certainly are vessels of very great merit and power." As to battle cruisers Mr. Churchill later said, "We shall have 8 battle cruisers when Germany has 4 in the fourth quarter of 1913. In the fourth quarter of 1914 we shall have 9 when Germany has 5, and in the fourth quarter of 1915 we shall have 10 when Germany has 6 and those are the total figures."

"Look at new construction. This year Germany has laid down 2 new ships : we are laying down 4. Next year we are

told Germany is going to lay down one extra ship : we are going to lay down 2 extra ships. Is that nothing ? This year Germany has laid down 2 small cruisers : we are laying down 8, not quite so large, but much faster, we are accelerating the construction of these 8 vessels. It is true that this year Germany is accelerating the construction of 12 destroyers : we have accelerated the construction of 20 destroyers. In the course of the next 18 months it is expected that the German fleet will be reinforced by 21 destroyers. We shall be reinforced by 43 destroyers in the same period.

"The main principle of the German Navy law is the creation of a third battle squadron which will be gradually developed and become perfected towards the end of 1914. We have already created our new squadron. It is in full existence. We are told that is foreseeing the danger but taking no steps to meet it. Such statements defeat themselves. I do not think extreme statements are at all likely to serve the cause of methodical, steady and tireless naval development, which is the cause I stand here to plead.....

"We have the situation well in hand. There is no need whatever for panic or alarm. It is entirely our own fault if we are not able to produce at the different dates in future the margin necessary for our security. We believe if our recommendations are accepted by the House, and the ample provision we are asking for is granted by the House, we shall have an adequate margin of security for our purposes in 1914, and in 1915 we shall be no worse off than in 1914. In 1916 there will be a slight upward tendency in the proportion of ships we shall have. No new development which can affect 1914 can take place now, and any new development which affects 1915 or 1916 can be dealt with effectively when it makes itself known."

(The Times, July 25th, 1912.)

The Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Herbert Asquith, in the same debate said, "I deprecate anything in the nature of panic or scare. I do not think there is the least occasion for it..... There never has been a moment and there is not now when we have not been overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which can reasonably be anticipated.....

"I have maintained the opinion in this House and elsewhere, that it is a very great mistake in such a shifting art as naval ship-building.....to make your provisions too far in advance, or you may find you are left with ships that are obsolete, out of date, and which are not really fit for the growing requirements and exigencies of naval warfare, in which case you will have lost your money, and will have to spend it over again in having to provide substitutes. There are many illustrations of that in our past naval history, and I should be sorry that we should repeat that experiment."

(Times, July 23rd, 1912.)

Speaking in the Commons on July 25th, Mr. Asquith said :
 "Our relations with the great German Empire are, I am glad to say, at this moment—and I feel sure are likely to remain—relations of amity and goodwill."

(Times, July 26th, 1912.)

On July 24th, Lord Crewe, speaking on behalf of the government in the House of Lords, said :

"If you are to consider every possible country as our potential enemy and scarcely one as our probable friend, it seems to me impossible to argue on that basis. Putting the case in that way you produce the most bloodcurdling combinations which could possibly be conceived.....

"If you hurry on your programme to the utmost extent you lose the benefit of the continued improvements possible in design and almost certain in construction and armaments.

"There is another thing, if you come forward with a great splash of a programme, you help to bring about the particular evil which you wish to avoid, because the people to whom you announce that you are building against them are positively spurred on to the acceleration, and possibly to the enlargement of their programme, to that extent you tend to defeat your own object.....

"I cannot conceive a condition of affairs for dealing with which the margin of time is not sufficient for our purpose."

(Times, July 25th, 1912.)

Mr. Bonar Law, Leader of the Opposition, following Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, on July 26th, said :

"I am quite sure that if this country really believed that there was danger, they would refuse no possible sacrifice which the government could ask. (Cheers) But in spite of all that has been said, does the country, do the House of Commons, do any of us really believe that there is danger, any vital danger? (Cries of "No, No.") I confess that I have the greatest difficulty in believing it myself—(Ministerial Cheers)—I confess it."

(Times, July 26th, 1912.)

The Rt. Hon. Arthur Balfour, former Conservative Leader of the Opposition, said :

"Looking at it from the naval point of view, it seems to me that the fleets of the triple entente are not inadequate now, and are not going to be inadequate, to any strain that is going to be placed upon them."

(The Times, July 24th, 1912.)

In the face of statements such as these delivered by responsible Ministers of the Crown and the Leaders of the Opposition in the British Parliament during Mr. Borden's stay in England, what can Mr. Borden's estimate of the Canadian people be, when

he seeks to alarm them into supporting his proposal of an immediate gift of \$35,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world by saying, "Today, while the clouds are heavy, and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster." ?

A LEADING CANADIAN CONSERVATIVE'S POINT OF VIEW.

Summing up the gist of these and other public utterances of responsible Ministers in Britain, Mr. C. H. Cahan, a leading Conservative barrister in the City of Montreal, in a letter to the Editor of the Montreal Gazette, dated Montreal, Oct. 3rd, 1912, and published in the Gazette of Tuesday, Oct. 8th, 1912, says :

"The positive official declarations which I have quoted above categorically affirm :—

- (1) That the political relations between Great Britain and Germany are excellent.
 - (2) That, even if those relations were not relations of amity and good will, Great Britain enjoys "enormously superior power" upon the North Sea ; and moreover is, to use the words of Prime Minister Asquith, "overwhelmingly superior in naval force against any combination which could reasonably be anticipated."
 - (3) That an increasing superiority of British naval strength is now assured till 1916.
 - (4) That the British Government, in next year's naval estimates will supply all the moneys that the British Admiralty think necessary to fully and adequately safeguard British interests.
 - (5) That "a great splash of a programme" is not only not necessary, but would "help to bring about the particular evil which you wish to avoid."
 - (6) That to make greater haste in construction must result in waste of public funds ; and that even the British Government cannot conceive a condition of affairs for dealing with which "the margin of time is not sufficient for our purpose."
 - (7) That, in fact, the British Government has the situation well in hand and "there is no need whatever for panic or alarm."
- "Such", says Mr. Cahan, "are the pronouncements of the highest officials of the Government and of the Admiralty of Great Britain. Is it any wonder that the people of Great Britain refuse to take alarm at the suggestion of politicians out of office, who are unable on the floors of parliament to make good their querulous complaints ? The people of Great Britain are confident that their Government has made, is making and will make adequate provision to maintain British naval supremacy. That Government is exclusively responsible to the electors of Great Britain."
- Mr. Cahan concludes in words the common sense of which is apparent.

"So long as the British electorate is content with their Government's conduct of foreign affairs, and with the ample provision made by their Government for their naval defence, why should Canadians attempt, by free gifts of their public funds, to express want of confidence in the British Government, which is not responsible to us, or seek to make up an alleged deficiency in British naval construction, when the British Government and their experts of the Admiralty so positively declare that no such deficiency really exists ?....."

"It is inconceivable that any of the facts made known to the Canadian Ministers should be inconsistent with the official statements above quoted. If so, there is no reason for immoderate haste ; and there is every reason why any contribution that Canada may undertake, while commensurate with our wealth and consistent with our self-respect, should also be made on a basis that shall ensure popular approval in this country and regular and continuous Canadian support for the maintenance of the naval supremacy of the Empire, of which we form a part."

(The Gazette, Montreal, Oct. 8th, 1912.)

OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE BRITISH MINISTERS SINCE MR. BORDEN'S VISIT TO ENGLAND.

Since Mr. Borden left England and returned to Canada, responsible British Ministers have on many occasions made reference to existing conditions, and one and all have been most emphatic in what they have said as to the friendliness between Great Britain and Germany, the absence of any emergency and the sufficiency of the land and naval forces to meet existing needs.

A Canadian Associated Press cable, dated London, Oct. 25th, had the following despatch which appeared in most of the Canadian papers :—

"The Rt. Hon. Walter Runciman, President of the Board of Agriculture, a member of the Asquith Cabinet, speaking at a meeting tonight said he deplored Lord Roberts' Manchester speech. He did not believe that an Anglo-German war was inevitable, and a statement like that of 'Bobs' was not only deplorable, but pernicious and dangerous. The rivalry between Germany and Great Britain was mere commercial than military, and the only persons who wished to turn it into military were a small group of journalists, a few soldiers and makers of armaments, and a small section of the people who believed the dignity of the nation was raised by irritating its neighbors."

"It's about time," he added, "that the industrial and commercial classes expressed their opinions in a thoroughly organized manner upon this important subject."

On November 9th, two important speeches were delivered at the Mansion House in London, one by the Rt. Hon. Herbert Asquith, the Prime Minister of England, and the other by the

Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. In the course of his speech, Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister said: "It is a satisfaction to be able to assure you, that so far as this country is concerned its relations with other powers have, without a single exception, never been more friendly and cordial."

Mr. Churchill in responding to the naval forces, said, "It is with a greater authority than last time I was here that I invite you to place your full confidence in the solid efficiency of our naval organization." Referring to Germany he said, "the relations have steadily improved between the two countries during the year." Also, "We have no reason to apprehend trouble of any kind, but my advisers at the Admiralty are satisfied that the number of fleets and flotillas in home waters is by no means unequal to any task that might be imposed upon them."

(The Times, Nov. 11th, 1912.)

Col. Seely, the Secretary of State for war, speaking on Dec. 5th, 1912, at the presentation of prizes to the London Scottish, said, with reference to the military and naval forces of the United Kingdom:

"I feel bound to add this, that after the most searching enquiry, and taking the position at its worst for us at every stage of the investigation, the Committee of Imperial Defence have it as their considered opinion that with our military and naval forces as they stand, the danger of invasion may be faced without fear, and this too, while leaving a great expeditionary force free to safeguard our vital interests overseas."

(The Times, Dec. 6th, 1912.)

THE ATTITUDE OF MR. BORDEN AND CANADIAN MINISTERS DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY.

It was March 29th, 1909, that the Hon. George E. Foster, with the concurrence of Mr. Borden, said in the Canadian House of Commons, "To-day peril stands at the gateway,.....to-day Canada faces that position of peril, that imperial emergency." It was January 10th, 1910, that Mr. Borden, then leader of the Opposition, repeating these words added, "Has the peril passed, No Sir, we are nearer to it by nearly a year.....It is idle to assure us that there will be no war. The war has already begun, the war of construction, the victory will be as decisive there as in actual battle.....When the British Empire goes the British North America Act goes also....all beyond is chaos and darkness.....do not forget that we are confronted with an emergency which may rend the Empire asunder."

On October 10th, 1911, Mr. Borden was chosen Prime Minister. From that moment he had it in his power to have Canada take some immediate action to meet an emergency if any such really existed. Is it conceivable that if Mr. Borden really believed in an emergency, such as his own words had described,

he would have allowed Parliament to assemble, and the speech from the throne at its first session to be delivered without so much as an allusion to it? Would he have permitted the whole of a session to pass without requesting some authoritative statement from the Admiralty? Would he have allowed more than a year to pass without devising some means of helping to meet a situation so critical?

OVER A YEAR OF OFFICE AND NOTHING DONE.

As Prime Minister, Mr. Borden had it in his power to request the Admiralty for a memorandum on the day of assuming office. Belief in an emergency would have led him to take immediate action. His actions and those of the members of his government were all of a nature to indicate that if they entertained any beliefs they were quite the reverse. They avoided, on every possible occasion an answer to every overture that was made to secure a statement of their views on the naval situation, and their intentions as to naval policy; they endeavored to create the impression that it was their intention to repeal the Naval Service Act which Parliament had passed in 1910; they declined to proceed with the construction of ships for a Canadian Naval Service, though the unanimous resolution of March, 1909 approving of this construction, and containing Mr. Borden's own insertion of the word "speedy" before construction, remained a mandate from Parliament unrepealed, and tenders for construction were in their possession; they discouraged recruiting for the Naval Service and tried to make it appear that ships which had been secured for training purposes only were "the Laurier Navy." They did absolutely nothing, and only when the pressure from parts of the country became so great that it was irresistible, fourteen months after the assumption of office, dreading a second session of Parliament with no policy, they fell back upon the emergency device as a means of escape from their difficulties and an expedient for retaining office. In the face of behaviour such as this, will the Canadian people believe that during all these months of office Mr. Borden was haunted by the awful presentiment disclosed to Parliament when in asking for \$35,000,000 as a gift for the three largest battleships in the world, he said to the House, "To-day, while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until any impending storm shall have burst upon us in fury and with disaster"? If these words are not true and yet are believed they are not the utterances of a statesman, but of a man with an hallucination. If they are true, and Mr. Borden really believes them, and they are part of the belief expressed in 1909 and 1910, when Mr. Borden said the war had already commenced, how can Mr. Borden justify the lack of any action on the part of himself and his government from the date of assuming office in October, 1911, up to the presentation to Parliament of his Bill asking for \$35,000,000 in December, 1912? It is kinder to Mr.

Borden and his followers to assume that his actions, rather than his words or proposals, are an indication of his real beliefs.

TWO SESSIONS OF PARLIAMENT AND THE BRITISH PREFERENCE WITHIN A YEAR.

It is idle to say that being a new administration time was required. The question was not new, it had been freely and fully discussed ever since March, 1909.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier was sworn in as Prime Minister on July 11th, 1896, after the Conservative administration had been in power over 17 years. He called his first Parliament together on August 19th, 1896, and held a brief session for the purpose of securing the necessary supplies, the House proroguing on October 5th, 1896. Immediately after the House rose Sir Wilfrid and his colleagues actively prepared for the carrying out of their tariff programme. Exhaustive investigations were made into the general conditions of trade, and the best method of revising the tariff both in the interests of Canada and Great Britain, a Commission of several of the Ministers being engaged in this work. This was completed early in the following year, and on March 25th, 1897, Sir Wilfrid Laurier again called Parliament, and on April 25th, just one month later, the Hon. W. S. Fielding, Minister of Finance introduced the famous Fielding Tariff, which included a very considerable readjustment of the whole series of Customs schedules, while its main feature was the introduction of the British Preference, one of the most important measures affecting the British Empire ever enacted by an administration of any Overseas Dominion. The introduction of the British Preference was received with great enthusiasm, both throughout Canada and Great Britain, involving as it did an immediate reduction of 12½% on British goods and a provision for a further reduction to 25% on July 1st, 1898.

Then while Parliament was still in session, Sir Wilfrid Laurier left for England on June 3rd, 1897 to represent Canada at the Queen's Jubilee, and also took a prominent part at the Imperial Conference of that year, at which a discussion of a system of inter-empire Tariff Preferences, along the lines originated by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, was one of the most important subjects dealt with.

On June 29th, 1897, the second session of that Parliament was prorogued, and the royal assent given to the British Preference and other tariff changes. It will be seen that all this was accomplished within a year of the time Sir Wilfrid Laurier had assumed office. Mr. Borden had this example and this precedent before him when he came to power in October, 1912, either he was unwilling or incapable of following it, or did not deem that the situation was urgent enough to demand like expedition. Will not his own followers prefer to believe it was the last of those alternative situations?

LIBERAL MINISTERS WERE TOLD OF NO EMERGENCY—CONSERVATIVE MINISTERS HAVE DISCLOSED NONE.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier and colleagues attended the Imperial Conferences of 1907 and 1911, and members of his cabinet, Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence, and Hon. L. P. Brodeur, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, attended meetings of the subsidiary conferences on Military and Naval defence in July and August 1909 and in June 1911. They were on all these occasions given the fullest confidence of the British Ministers and the Admiralty, and no grounds of any emergency were disclosed to them.

Mr. Borden and the colleagues who accompanied him to England during the summer of 1912 have given Parliament no evidence which in any way discloses that the situation has changed since the Conference on Military and Naval defence in June 1911. In the absence of any new disclosures, is it not reasonable to assume that in reality no change has taken place and that no emergency exists?

RESIGNATION OF HON. F. D. MONK, MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS IN BORDEN CABINET, AN EVIDENCE OF NO EMERGENCY.

But there is even stronger evidence than the silence of Mr. Borden and his colleagues; there is the resignation on Oct. 22nd, 1912, and the reasons for the resignation, of the Hon. F. D. Monk, Minister of Public Works in Mr. Borden's cabinet. Mr. Monk as a member of the Administration, heard in the most intimate confidential relationship all that Mr. Borden and his colleagues were in a position to disclose. Having listened to everything, Mr. Monk was unable to see any necessity for the course Mr. Borden was proposing to take, and has since taken, and resigned from the Cabinet rather than be a party to it.

In connection with Mr. Monk's resignation it is important to have in mind the following statement made by Mr. Borden, as Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on November 20th, 1911, in defending his action in taking Mr. Monk into his Cabinet after Mr. Monk had taken a stand in Parliament that nothing should be done in the way of Naval assistance to Britain till the people had been given an opportunity of pronouncing upon it. Mr. Borden said, "It is true that the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Monk) and I did not see eye to eye, but the point that divided us at that time was not a question of policy, but a question of fact. Because the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Monk) had said over and over again that when any emergency confronted this Empire he and those who think with him would be prepared to do their duty."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Nov. 20th, 1911, page 60.)

There are two very obvious deductions to be drawn from this statement; one is that when Mr. Monk left the Cabinet he

left it on a question of fact. Having heard everything the Prime Minister and his colleagues were in a position to disclose he saw no existence of any "emergency confronting the Empire," and the other, that when Mr. Monk was taken into the Cabinet in Oct. 1911, and during the year he was in office, the fact of an emergency must have ceased to exist even in the mind of Mr. Borden.

Either Mr. Borden must have, in order to gain the support of Mr. Monk and his Nationalist allies at the time of the formation of his Cabinet, been prepared to sacrifice for the sake of office, the interests of Canada and the Empire at a time when, to use his own words, we were "confronted with an emergency which may rend this Empire asunder"; or, he must have believed that this emergency no longer existed. Indeed, Mr. Borden himself clearly saw, that his action in taking Mr. Monk and his Nationalist allies into the Cabinet was capable of only one construction or the other, and in defending his position virtually admitted that he had been wrong when he previously differed from Mr. Monk on the fact of an emergency, and virtually conceded that, at the time of taking Mr. Monk into his Cabinet he was rather of Mr. Monk's own mind, that an emergency did not exist. Here are his own words in further defence of his position :—

"I have no fault to find with the Rt. Hon. gentleman (Sir Wilfrid Laurier) for calling attention to the fact that my Hon. friend the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Monk) when this matter was under debate two sessions ago, did not see eye to eye with me on the question of emergent conditions which at that time I thought confronted the Empire. Those conditions appealed to me in that way at that time by reason of very grave declarations that had been made by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty of Great Britain. I am ready to admit, in fact we were afterwards taunted in this House by Hon. gentlemen opposite with the fact that these declarations were to a very considerable extent, modified by subsequent statements made in the British House of Commons by the advisers of the Crown, by the Prime Minister himself, I think, and also by the First Lord of the Admiralty."

(Hansard, House of Commons Debates, November 20th, 1911, page 60.)

In view of this apologetic attitude, and in the absence of a single statement by himself or his colleagues, to show wherein a new emergency has arisen since he came into office, can Mr. Borden expect that the people of Canada will regard as a sufficient justification for a departure from the unanimous resolution of March 1909, and for a vote of \$35,000,000 for the three largest battleships in the world, his impatient and alarmist pronouncement : "To-day while the clouds are heavy and we hear the booming of the distant thunder, and see the lightning flashes above the horizon, we cannot and we will not wait" ? Something

more authoritative and convincing is necessary where others fail to see the clouds, or lightning flashes and are unable to hear the booming of the distant thunder. The statement is so extreme as to be ridiculous.

THE RIGHTS AND THE DUTY OF THE PEOPLE OF CANADA.

The question of an emergency being disposed of, it should be for the people of Canada to choose between the two policies.

THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY of an immediate expenditure of \$85,000,000 for the three most powerful battleships in the world as part of a permanent policy of contribution, or in addition to some other policy to be announced later.

THE LIBERAL POLICY of a Canadian Naval Service in accordance with the unanimous resolution of the House of Commons of March, 1909.

Copies of this pamphlet may be had on applying to the Central Liberal Information Office, Ottawa, Canada.

