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Interpersonal and Cultural Dimensions of Canadian Development Assistance in Egypt

Daniel J. Kealey, Ph.D.





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CIDA Forward

This document presents results of a special research study. Research findings, conclusions, and recommendations for action all derive from the research data collected as part of this study. The document does not necessarily represent the views or policies of the Canadian International Development Agency or the Government of Canada.




TOGETHER WE CAN DO MORE

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I would like to acknowledge the support and enthusiasm of two research colleagues who worked on this project. Cathy Blacklock undertook to manage and analyze the substantial data base which evolved from this project, conducted interviews with returned advisors and spouses, and prepared written reports summarizing findings from interviews. Mariam Ahmed organized the data collection which took place in Egypt, conducted interviews with Egyptian managers, and prepared a written report summarizing findings from interviews.

Within CIDA, my collaboration with Marilyn Cayer, North-Africa and Middle East Division, and Kate Preston, Centre for Intercultural Training, has been tremendously supportive and encouraging. The interest and support provided by CIDA staff and the Embassy in Cairo, the Field Support Unit, and Sana Hafez, Coordinator of In-Country Training, was simply superb. Finally, to all those who responded to questionnaires and interviews both in Canada and Egypt, your cooperation has been much appreciated. It should also be noted that CEAs and Egyptian management personnel responded to this research effort with genuine interest and openness.



Guide to the Reader

This document presents research findings of a study focused on understanding the interpersonal and cultural dimensions of Canadian development assistance in Egypt. The research took place between 1993 and 1995. The report is composed of four sub-reports which were completed at different time periods over the last three years. The summary report (1996) presents a resume of the key research findings. Report one (1994) presents an empirical profile of the successful advisor in Egypt. Report two (1995) presents findings from the survey questionnaires completed by Canadians and Egyptians. Finally, report three (1996) presents findings from interviews conducted with Canadians and Egyptians.

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



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Introduction

In the fall of 1993, the Egypt desk in CIDA in collaboration with the Centre for Intercultural Training (formerly the Briefing Centre) decided to undertake a study of the personal and social dimensions or factors which influenced its ISAWIP project (Integrated Soil and Water Improvement Project). The essential aim was to derive lessons for the future planning and delivery of projects in Egypt. The ISAWIP project had been a long-standing (8 years) and large-scale undertaking between Canada and Egypt. Although acknowledged as an overall success, it was a project characterized by on-going conflict and distrust among all the partners involved. In undertaking this special study, an effort would be made to understand how ISAWIP evolved as it did and to explore how better collaboration could be established in the new planning under-way with the Government of Egypt (GOE) and Canadian Executing Agencies (CEAs). Although the study initially set out to look only at ISAWIP, a decision was made early on to include coverage of other projects that were on-going in Egypt. More specifically, the main project goals were threefold:

- i) by reviewing people's experience of living and working in Egypt, to establish a set of "lessons learned" which could help CIDA establish improved relations with CEAs and the GOE towards the goal of enhancing development success.
- ii) to establish an empirical profile of the effective development advisor in Egypt.
- iii) to document the differing opinions of individuals and groups with respect to the planning and delivery of Canadian technical assistance to Egypt.

The study focused primarily on understanding the personal and interpersonal dimensions of project success. The aim was *not* to evaluate the technical success or economic returns of projects in Egypt. Rather, the aim was to gather information on these personal and social factors that would improve future project planning with Egypt.



Methodology

The methodology for conducting the study included the design of research questionnaires and the conducting of interviews both in Canada and Egypt. 94 interviews (44 in Egypt and 50 in Canada) were conducted and over 150 research survey questionnaires were completed by participants in the study. Although primarily focused on a study of the Integrated Soil and Water Improvement Project (ISAWIP), personnel involved in all other CIDA-sponsored projects in Egypt participated in this research investigation. The number of people interviewed for this project are well representative of all those who were involved with the implementation, management, and/or monitoring of Egypt projects over the past several years.

The following outlines more specifically the overall scope of the methodology which guided the conducting of this special study.

File Review

Over 100 central registry files document the planning and implementation activities of ISAWIP. Files were reviewed, including the Audit

and Evaluation reports, with a view to identifying difficult project phases, how they evolved, and how issues were resolved.

Special Survey Questionnaires (see Appendix A)

Three survey questionnaires were designed to collect standardized and comprehensive data on the key factors associated with project success and failure in Egypt. They are the following:

- *Interpersonal and Cultural Dimensions of Development Assistance* (for completion by CIDA officers and CEA managers)
- *Living and Working Overseas: Field Follow-up Questionnaire* (for completion by advisors and spouses who worked in Egypt)
- *Field Survey Questionnaire* (for completion by Egyptian Project staff and managers)

The survey questionnaires focused specifically on identifying the key personal and cultural dimensions of project success/failure such as,

- Personal and family difficulties in adapting to Egypt
- Interpersonal and cultural barriers to working effectively with Egyptians
- Specific habits and practices of Canadians which interfere with establishing cooperative relationships with Egyptians
- Specific habits and practices of Egyptians which interfere with establishing cooperative relationships with Canadians
- Customs, traditions, and behaviour, both personal and professional, which promote effective and cooperative working relationships between Egyptians and Canadians
- CEA personnel (headquarter managers and field advisors and spouses)
- Egyptian Project Staff and Managers
- Consultant personnel, such as, Auditors, Monitors, and Evaluators

Testing and Appraisal

An effort was made to identify advisors in Egypt who were highly effective and who had succeeded in establishing good relations with Egyptians, and also to identify a number who were not very effective in Egypt. In addition to interviewing these advisors, they were also tested in order to establish a data basis for developing an empirical profile of success in Egypt. A new screening tool, the Overseas Effectiveness Inventory (Kealey, D., 1993) was administered. This inventory attempts to measure personal, social, and cultural skills and knowledge associated with development success. In order to identify successful and unsuccessful personnel, performance ratings were obtained (on a completely confidential basis) from CIDA officers, Egyptian managers, and other selected people.

Interviews

(see Appendix B for list of interviewees)

Interviews to discuss issues related to living and working effectively in Egypt were conducted with the following groups:

- CIDA managers and sector specialists
- GOE personnel
- Embassy personnel



The Key Research Findings

Preamble

The discussion of research findings presented in this paper is intended to summarize the main issues and assess the evidence arising out of this special Egypt study on the personal and cultural dimensions of development assistance. Given the large number and variety of personnel that took part in this study, it was not surprising that there were quite a few differing perceptions and opinions. To reiterate, the aim of the study was to increase our understanding of what it takes for development projects and personnel to be effective in Egypt, with the focus on individuals and how their interaction influenced outcomes. Although there was a need to understand the technical goals of projects, the institutional constraints and pressures, etc., the aim here was primarily to try to understand how these influenced the attitudes and behaviour of individuals involved in the implementation of development projects in Egypt.

In order to appreciate the full array of findings emerging from this research, it would be advantageous for the reader to consult three

other project reports which present and discuss the research findings in more depth. These reports are the following:

Report One: The Technical Advisor in Egypt: An Empirical Profile of Success

This report presents research findings in the form of identifying the key skills, knowledge, and behaviour of the highly effective technical advisor in Egypt.

Report Two: Comparing Perceptions on Development: CIDA, CEA, Egypt, Advisor, and Spouses (Survey Questionnaire Results)

This report presents an analysis and discussion of responses to survey questions in which respondents were asked to identify and assess the importance of various factors influencing the overall outcomes of development projects in Egypt.

Report Three: The Experience of Individuals and Groups in Egypt (Findings from Interviews)

This report presents the findings of interviews and other open-ended questions asked in the

survey questionnaire. The aims were primarily to describe the experience of those participating in CIDA-sponsored projects in Egypt; and to

present the views of the different partners in CIDA's development projects in Egypt.

Note:

The following discussion of the key findings takes into account all CIDA projects that were active in Egypt during the spring of 1994. The results as presented attempt to reflect a mix of hard data (e.g. personnel performance ratings) and participant opinion; and, as well, to present some assessment and draw some conclusions with respect to the research data. With respect to recommendations for action, these are contained in the three separate reports mentioned above.

The Key Findings

Lack of Trust and Communication

Generally speaking, Egyptians were very upset when they perceived that some Canadian advisors were making little effort to understand Egyptian ways, trying to control the project, and looking down on their Egyptian counterparts. Given that both Canadians and Egyptians identified the ability to work in a team and good communication as the most important factors for ensuring successful development outcomes in Egypt, this was a serious problem and one that was not adequately dealt with by either side. In the case of ISAWIP, it is unfortunate that substantial

distrust, misunderstanding, and poor communication characterized relations among all the key partners from the very outset of the project and seemed never to cease. Although the majority of Egyptians and Canadians interviewed described ISAWIP as a success, it was not a success in terms of relationship building and ensuring a sustainable transfer of skills and knowledge. Indeed there remains, both in Canada and Egypt, a very significant level of resentment and hostility as a result of the project experience with ISAWIP. If the establishment of good relations between Canada and its developing partners is considered an


important aspect of development cooperation, there is a need to look carefully at future planning in order to avoid the danger of creating another project environment similar to that of ISAWIP. Further discussion on this issue and recommendations for resolving it are contained in the three other research reports forming part of this final project report.

Management of the Development Project


Most of the Egyptians did not feel adequately consulted by CIDA in terms of planning and decision-making. Several senior managers compared the USAid system to CIDA's approach and stated that they preferred the American approach because it involved them more as an equal partner.

Essentially, their experience with USAid is more joint and more collaborative, where they feel consulted and part of the decision-making. They work closely with the resident USAid manager to co-manage the projects and the American consultants working on different projects take directions from both Egyptians and the USAid managers. From their perspective, this approach provides for them a greater sense of ownership and control. Their

CIDA Model (A)
(as intended)



CIDA Model (B)
(as experienced by Egyptians)



experience with CIDA, particularly in the case of ISAWIP, was frustrating. They felt the CEA dominated them, neglected to collaborate, and abused their power. In the CIDA system, with decision-making and control at Headquarters, CIDA was experienced as distant with never enough presence in Egypt to communicate with them and to help direct and limit the power of the CEA. For them, it was confusing to understand CIDA's operation and they expressed frustration at not feeling more an integral part of their own development challenge. What is important to point out about the foregoing is that CIDA as an organization plans and implements projects using a partnership model similar to the USAid model. But in the case of ISAWIP, the feeling of partnership never emerged. In fact, roles and responsibilities became distorted, and the inability of CIDA and its partners to deal with personnel management and related issues led to a state of distrust and poor communication, and inevitable poor development management. The diagram attempts to illustrate graphically the difference in approaches, the first model as intended by CIDA (and desired by Egypt), and the second model as experienced by Egyptians on ISAWIP.

CIDA, like most donor countries, supports a partnership model of development (model A)

whereby they jointly plan and control the implementation of the project with the host country (high control/high partnership), and where the CEA supports and takes direction from the primary partnership (low control/high partnership). But, in the case of ISAWIP, the exact opposite to what was intended was experienced by Egyptians (model B). They experienced the CEA as having control and not collaborating (high control/low partnership), and they experienced CIDA and themselves as out of control and distant (low control/low partnership).

It should be noted that the EEA Project was not faulted in this regard. The Egyptian managers in the Electrical Authority felt involved right from the start and identified this early involvement with CIDA and the CEA as the key to the success that evolved with their project.

The Reality of Isolation

Despite the fact that both Canadians and Egyptians emphasized the critical importance of building social relationships for ensuring project success, only minimal amounts of social interaction took place. Although this varied depending on the project and its location, generally speaking Canadians were perceived by Egyptians as being socially distant, and

many Canadians themselves did also acknowledge that their limited participation in Egyptian society prevented them from getting to know better Egypt and its culture. Undoubtedly living in El Maadi, an expatriate suburb of Cairo, did not serve to promote contact with Egyptians. And there is no question that a greater effort on the part of both Canadians and Egyptians to connect socially must be made. Without this contact, misunderstanding and distrust tends to build up between the two sides which, in turn, tends to impact negatively on project success, particularly success at the task of transferring skills and knowledge.

The Effectiveness of Canadian Technical Assistance Personnel

Advisor performance was rated on a 1 to 10 scale (1 = very ineffective, 10 = very effective), and each advisor was rated by at least 6 managers from CIDA and GOE. Of the 39 Canadian advisors whose performance in Egypt was rated by both CIDA managers and Egyptian colleagues and supervisors, three groupings with respect to effectiveness emerge.

Group One (30%): Highly Effective

This group of Canadians received scores between 8 and 10 (from all raters) on their

ability to establish effective working relationships with Egyptian colleagues and to transfer skills and knowledge.

Group Two (44%): Average Effectiveness

Although individuals in this group received an average effectiveness rating of 5 to 7, all received a wide array of ratings from extremely low to extremely high. Given this finding, it is difficult to really know whether or not their presence made any significant impact on the individuals and institutions within which they worked. This group appears to have gained the respect of certain Egyptians while at the same time alienating other Egyptians.

Group Three (26%): Ineffective and Disruptive

The last group of advisors received performance ratings of 4 or less and additional comments from raters indicate that these advisors were not only ineffective but disruptive and often disrespectful to their Egyptian colleagues.

Comparing these findings to those published by CIDA in 1990 (see Kealey, D., *Cross-Cultural Effectiveness*, CIDA, 1990), more Canadian advisors (30%) in Egypt are rated highly effective than the number (20%) rated highly effective in the 1990 study of Canadian advisors

working in 20 developing countries. On the other hand, the 26% of advisors in Egypt who were judged to be both ineffective and disruptive is significantly higher than the 15% identified in the 1990 study.

It should be noted that there is a difference between evaluating the effectiveness of technical assistance personnel and evaluating the impact of technical assistance projects. The presence of highly effective technical advisors does not by itself guarantee success of the technical assistance project as a whole, particularly with respect to achieving sustainable institutional development. Unless organizations commit themselves to human resource development and organizational change and establish the conditions and incentives needed to support these development goals, individual advisors can have at best only limited impact. But it remains vitally important to recruit effective advisors for they represent the initial building blocks for promoting effective development and harmonious relationships.

The Need to Screen People for Intercultural Effectiveness

Without exception, all those interviewed agreed that a number of non-technical skills are

required for a foreign advisor to be successful in Egypt. The evidence, however, indicates that (with the possible exception of the personnel selection process put in place for the EEA project) there was no rigorous screening of personnel on personal and behavioural skills and attitudes. Accordingly, the finding that 26 percent of advisors posted to Egypt were not only ineffective but also disruptive and disrespectful should perhaps come as no surprise. Although this number represents a minority of the advisors, the distrust and misunderstanding which characterized the overall project environment was, in part, caused by their presence.

In the field of international personnel recruitment, there has long been a belief that the best person to send to a foreign country is an expatriate of that country. Data from this research project does not support this conclusion in the case of Egyptian Canadians. Egyptian Canadians face particular obstacles in becoming accepted by and effective in working with Egyptian colleagues. For example, local Egyptians often resent the higher social and economic status of Egyptian Canadian experts, whom they consider "no better" than themselves. Also, the returning Egyptian is often very frustrated, personally and professionally, with local conditions and intolerant of Egyptian

professional practice and customs which they judge to be both inefficient and ineffective. The conclusion of this research on advisors in Egypt is that it is likely more difficult for an Egyptian Canadian to succeed in Egypt than it is for other non-Egyptian Canadians. Accordingly, the profile of skills and knowledge outlined in Report One should be applied as rigorously as possible in assessing future Egyptian-Canadian advisors being considered for postings in Egypt.

Research findings confirm that not only the selection of the Canadian advisor is of critical importance for ensuring development success, but also that the selection of the Egyptian counterpart is vital. This was acknowledged by both Canadians and Egyptians with many Egyptian managers expressing a desire to be more involved in the actual screening and selection of Canadian personnel destined to work in Egypt.

The Need for Understanding and Tolerance

Although most Canadians expressed a good deal of personal and family satisfaction and reported little difficulty in adapting to living and working in Egypt, their understanding of and

tolerance for Egyptian customs, values and practices was less than what was needed for achieving success in this culture. Although Egypt (particularly Cairo) may be relatively easy for Canadians to adapt to in personal terms, it is not an easy culture for expatriates to work in. The reasons for this are many but the pervasive influence of Islam, hierarchical management systems and bureaucracies resistant to change, and the high expectations of Egyptians with respect to advisor competence were those mentioned most often. Those Canadians identified as being most effective in Egypt made the point that one can easily be "be-guiled into thinking you're effective". The ease of interacting on the job (most Canadians are able to work in English) quickly translates into assuming that one understands Egyptians and is accepted by them. This, however, is not the case. And more is needed than just short pre-departure briefing programs on Egypt. To be effective in Egypt, advisors require new kinds of knowledge and skill, such as negotiation skills across cultures and cross-cultural teaching and management skills. Also, exposure to adult education methods, institutional analysis, management of change, and networking theory as they apply to the Egyptian context would serve to enhance the advisor's capacity

to contribute to institutional development. Finally, a deeper sociological and political knowledge of Egypt would be useful as a means of achieving higher sensitivity to cultural realities in Egypt.

CIDA and Project Management

Although CIDA was identified by many as being primarily responsible for failing to provide direction, control, and leadership for the development efforts in Egypt, there was a vast difference of opinion on where specifically to lay the blame. Several CEA managers expressed particular frustration with CIDA, alleging in particular that CIDA is guilty of a lack of clarity, inconsistency, and constant and inappropriate interference in project implementation. Egyptian management, particularly on ISAWIP, felt inadequately consulted and an unequal partner with CIDA in project planning and decision-making. Within CIDA, the most dramatic differences of opinion and difficulties occurred between CIDA headquarters personnel and field staff. In this respect, there was clearly no common vision or united front to present to either the CEA or Egypt and this served to fuel the flames of frustration and misunderstanding. The readiness

of the partners in the ISAWIP project to point the finger at each other when problems arose can at least be said to confirm the following: that all partners in ISAWIP really had little understanding of each other. They appear to have acted not as a team, but as individuals who represented different organizations, reported to different bosses, and had differing expectations, demands, and agendas about the goals and operation of the project.

The CEA as Partner in Development

As discussed above, several CEA managers expressed substantial frustration with CIDA as their client and the manager in charge of the development project. In assessing their own competency, they expressed the view that they understood development and that they would have been more effective in Egypt had CIDA supported them more and interfered less. They always felt trapped in trying to please two masters: CIDA and the GOE; and they resented being held accountable for progress when they were not given the authority to get things done.

Interestingly, more than 50% of advisors recruited by CEAs to work in Egypt felt that CEA

management really did not understand development and did not adequately support the attainment of institutional development goals.

Overall, the results of this research suggest that CEAs, although technically competent and experienced, lack adequate knowledge of development issues and complexities, cultural constraints, and the developmental requirements to train Egyptians to do the job rather than doing it themselves. The fact that CEAs complain about a lack of adequate authority to get things done indicates a certain blindness or unacceptance of aid delivery constraints. That is to say that the challenge is to gain the trust and confidence of local managers so that collaboration for meeting development goals takes place. Given the increasing reliance on CEAs to deliver technical assistance, it is critical that CIDA educate prospective CEAs about development and their policies and expectations in that regard.

Establishing the Conditions for Sustainable Success

Although many Egyptian managers expressed frustration with what they perceived as a lack of a genuine partnership attitude on the part of Canadians in these projects, several

senior Egyptians did acknowledge that their own pressures and constraints often served as a barrier to achieving successful development in Egypt. For example, a desire for hard deliverables (such as, financial resources and equipment) and outputs (such as, increased agricultural production for ISAWIP) often conflicted with the goal of sustainable institution building. It would appear that the engineering goals of ISAWIP took precedence and success of a sort was achieved. But the sustainability of that success is questioned by both Egyptian managers and Canadian advisors.

In the case of ISAWIP, the Government of Egypt felt it was excluded from its own development process. It perceived CIDA as distant and resented the CEA for what it saw as a usurpation of financial and technical control over the project. Not surprisingly, there was very little feeling of partnership and collaboration from the Egyptian perspective. But the Government of Egypt was also part of the problem. There is a need for all partners to better identify and establish the organizational and structural conditions for enabling technical assistance to become an effective vehicle for promoting sustainable institutional development. Further discussion of this issue and recommendations for establishing a partnership approach to development are contained in Report Three.

Advisors as Change Agents

It was the view among many in Egypt that about half the Canadian advisors were either not committed to teaching and learning, or lacked the skills to teach and exchange with Egyptians. As noted previously, personnel performance ratings overall indicated that 30% of Canadians were considered effective and 26% were considered ineffective and disruptive. Interestingly, of those that failed, there was a tendency to blame inefficient Egyptian bureaucratic practices and lack of Egyptian counterpart commitment for the limited development impact. Of those that succeeded, there was a tendency to view Egypt and Egyptians in a much more positive light. Rather than being overwhelmed by the obstacles, they experienced Egypt as a challenge and they were driven by a need both to understand and to motivate their Egyptian colleagues.

But it is important to also acknowledge that improving the intercultural skills and commitment of Canadian advisors will not be enough to ensure a sustainable institutional change. What is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the research findings is the view expressed by many of the most successful advisors that their "successes" will not be sustained in the future because of the lack of adequate organizational

commitment and incentives. Essentially, the concern is that upon the departure of the Canadian advisors many Egyptians will be unwilling to take responsibility for continuing to learn and innovate and to push for change in their organizations.

The Key Role of Spouses

Spouses in Egypt confirm the findings of other studies that international transitions are the most difficult and stressful for non-working spouses. In the case of Egypt, this stress was exacerbated when families had to live in a more rural part of Egypt and/or when advisors had to establish commuting arrangements. Spouses who adapted best reported feeling connected with and supported by other spouses on the Project Team (as well as being those not in need of their own career outlet). Since managing a household involved them in contact with a variety of Egyptians from different social classes, it is not surprising that spouses are the group that emphasized most the need to learn Arabic. While spouses also reported experiencing culture shock in adapting to Egypt, most felt they had gained much personal satisfaction and growth from their experience in Egypt. It is clear from the research that spouses act as the key player in establishing family stability and

satisfaction. And without family stability, the potential of the advisor to succeed professionally is seriously jeopardized.

Although spouses have substantial contact with Egyptians, these acquaintances are primarily in a service role and rarely lead to the establishment of friendships. Previous research has shown that contact with nationals and

involvement in the host culture is directly related to project success. Findings from this Egypt study would suggest that greater project success would have occurred if families had been more involved in Egyptian life and more socially connected with Egyptians. Incentive strategies to get families more involved in the future should be considered.



Conclusion

Although the personnel-related problems which occurred in the planning and delivery of CIDA's technical assistance projects to Egypt were substantial, there was also a significant degree of success achieved through the efforts of many individual advisors and managers. Report One highlights what has been learned from this project about the requirements for effective development work in Egypt.

It must be emphasized, however, that certain individuals who worked on CIDA-sponsored projects in Egypt served to damage Canada's reputation as a partner in development. It would appear that screening people for their ability to adapt to and to be interculturally effective overseas is done neither thoroughly nor professionally. The focus in Egypt was on hard deliverables and it was forgotten that

unless trust and goodwill are established among all partners, it is unlikely that any sustainable development can be ensured. With the increasing contracting out of CIDA's aid program, there is a danger that both CIDA and CEAs will ignore the need to give priority and time to the skills required to build relationships in the host country. Rather than focussing just on material outputs or tangible deliverables, there may be a need to contract for "soft" results or "process outputs". Such outputs might include: advisors having gained the confidence and respect of local Egyptian colleagues; the development of a practical strategy for institutional development in the country and the identification of indicators for success in this regard; and the existence of a commitment to the transfer of skills and knowledge. These should be major goals for both CIDA and the GOE, and their attainment should be carefully monitored.



*Interpersonal and Cultural
Dimensions
of
Canadian Development Assistance in Egypt*

Report One:
The Technical Advisor in Egypt:
An Empirical Profile of Success



Daniel J. Kealey, Ph.D.
1994

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



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An Introductory Note

The empirical profile of knowledge and skills of the successful technical advisor in Egypt was derived from extensive interviewing with i) Canadian advisors and spouses (who were posted to Egypt), ii) CIDA officers (both managers and technical specialists), iii) CEA managers in Canada, and iv) Egyptian managers and counterparts. Parts of the profile are also based on the analysis of two specially-designed research and testing instruments: the Overseas Effectiveness Inventory and the Living and Working Overseas Field Follow-up Questionnaire. As part of the study, highly effective and ineffective advisors were identified through the gathering of performance ratings from CIDA and Egyptian managers. Test results for each group were then compared to derive some key differences between successful and unsuccessful advisors.

It is hoped that this profile can serve to guide the recruitment, selection, and preparation process for future advisors being posted to Egypt. With the increasing emphasis on partnership and more demanding roles for technical advisors as change agents for institutional

strengthening and development, there is a need for a more careful screening and selection of development advisors. In the words of one advisor, "at all costs, Canadian advisors must avoid thinking of themselves as Western experts coming to Egypt to teach the locals how to do things". The challenge now is for partnership and collaboration and this profile of skills and knowledge identifies some of the key characteristics of an effective cross-cultural collaborator for Egypt.

In reviewing the profile of the successful technical advisor in Egypt, it is important to remember the following:

- The profile identifies the key *non-technical* skills required for success (that is, it focusses on the personal qualities and skills needed to be effective).
- The profile is a composite of the best qualities identified through the testing and interviews. No one individual could ever be expected to be strong in all aspects of the profile. Accordingly, there is always a need

to weight or prioritize the various criteria depending on the particular demands of the technical advisor position in Egypt.

- Meeting the requirements outlined in the profile does not guarantee success in Egypt. An individual advisor's success in Egypt will greatly depend on external

factors, such as, the organization of the project, the commitment of the host institution, the availability of Egyptian counterparts, etc. The profile, however, can be said to address one of the fundamental ingredients for success in Egypt, that is, getting the right people selected to go to Egypt.



The Indicators of Success: What Successful Advisors Do in Egypt

Before identifying the profile of knowledge and skills required to be a successful technical advisor in Egypt, it would be useful to describe briefly what it is that successful advisors actually do or achieve during their assignment in Egypt. There appear to be five major outcomes experienced by successful advisors in Egypt. They are the following:

Personal Satisfaction

Successful advisors express enjoyment and satisfaction in living and working in Egypt (although they may initially experience difficulty or stress in adjusting to Egypt). The indicators of successful personal adjustment include the following:

- engaging in enjoyable activities in Egypt
- expressing satisfaction with overall living and working conditions in Egypt
- avoiding any stereotyping of Egyptians

- no idealizing of Canada and judging Egypt against Canadian standards
- expressing satisfaction as a family unit (for those posted with spouse and children)

Professional Satisfaction

Despite acknowledging frustrations with a different managerial and professional style in Egypt, successful advisors tend to express overall positive regard for their Egyptian counterparts, and are challenged by both the technical and cultural realities they confront. They also report that they do not feel constrained by either personal or professional conditions within Egypt. Other indicators of professional satisfaction include the following:

- feeling that one's technical expertise is useful to Egypt
- understanding of Egyptian technical conditions and Egyptian ways of operating in the specific technical area

Trust and Confidence

Ultimately, the advisors who are rated most effective in Egypt succeed in winning the confidence, trust, and respect of their Egyptian colleagues. One advisor recalled vividly the day that his Egyptian counterpart, on his own initiative, came into his office to discuss ideas for improving project success. For this advisor, this was an indicator that he had finally been accepted by the Egyptians and their level of comfort with him enabled them to initiate contact. Other indicators of having succeeded in winning the trust and respect of Egyptians include the following:

- regular interaction with Egyptians socially on and off the job
- expressing interest in and using some Arabic on and off the job
- demonstrating factual knowledge about Egypt and the role of Islam
- mutual personal self-disclosure and exchanging greetings as friends in the Egyptian way

Transfer of Skills and Knowledge

Successful advisors express substantial commitment and try their best to teach and train Egyptian colleagues in their field of expertise. Success in this regard is often demonstrated by:

- the advisors reporting that they actually receive more from contact with Egyptian colleagues than being able to give to them
- developing a strategy or plan on how they will try to transfer skills and knowledge and fighting the tendency "to take over" and become operational
- never giving up on trying to help their Egyptian colleagues develop new skills and techniques

Sustainable Institutional Development

Finally, the advisors identified in this study as the most successful expressed a strong awareness of the need for development to encompass an institutional focus and be

sustainable. The successful advisors expressed greater awareness of the more macro-level factors affecting the potential success of their work. At times they became discouraged about any of the Canadian projects having a sustainable impact, but their commitment to contributing to Egypt's development remained strong. Advisors concerned about sustainable development also tended to demonstrate the following:

- substantial tolerance and openness toward Egyptian culture and conditions
- strong desire to collaborate and connect with a broad spectrum of personnel in the host institution
- readiness to get involved in activities beyond their specific job responsibilities
- interest in learning about the experience of other aid projects in Egypt



The Skills and Knowledge Profile: The Requirements for Success in Egypt

Five categories of personal skills were identified as critical for success in Egypt: personal adjustment skills, professional task skills, interpersonal skills, transfer skills, and organizational skills. This skills profile can serve as a guide for the recruitment, selection, and preparation of personnel for Egypt. Although many of the skills identified can be said to constitute deep-seated or innate personality traits, there is no question that most people can be helped to improve their level of skill through specialized training and education courses. Finally, in reviewing the skills profile, it is important to focus on each identified skill rather than the category, as some of the skills identified could arguably be placed in different categories.

Personal Adjustment Skills

These skills are the most directly associated with one's ability to cope with the living and working conditions in Egypt. Essentially, these skills enable successful advisors to develop a

sense of well-being, of comfort, of feeling "at home" in Egypt. Many advisors reported that their initial adjustment to Egypt was difficult, and especially difficult for spouses and children. Cairo and the major cities are easier to adapt to than rural areas but initial difficulties in finding appropriate accommodation, schooling, and recreational facilities can be very stressful and disruptive. Being able to react appropriately in these circumstances is critical for success. There are three skills in particular associated with this capacity.

Self-Confidence

Successful advisors in Egypt demonstrate a strong confidence in themselves both personally and professionally. They report feeling very positive, excited, strong, and determined to succeed. The inevitable frustrations in adjusting to Egypt may disrupt them but their self-confidence and overall adventurous spirit enables them to maintain positive attitudes. On the other hand, unsuccessful advisors tend to

express ambivalence about being in Egypt and question their ability to work effectively in the Egyptian context.

Self-Reliance

As one advisor put it: "if you are always complaining about how well (or how badly) you're looked after it is likely a sign that you are not suited for an international assignment". Clearly, successful advisors have an enormous capacity to take care of themselves and their families no matter what the circumstances. They do not constantly look to others to solve their problems. They are able to do this primarily through drawing on their own resources.

Self-Awareness

Knowing who you are, what your needs are, and how you tend to be perceived by others is associated with making an effective adaptation to Egypt. The most successful advisors and spouses in Egypt tended to be highly self-aware and self-accepting and this seems to enable them to more easily understand and accept Egypt and Egyptians at all levels.

Professional Task Skills

These skills relate most directly to one's ability to derive genuine professional satisfaction from

working as an advisor in Egypt. As such, they are very important as several advisors reported being frustrated professionally, feeling underutilized, or ignored by Egyptians. There are two key skills identified with those who succeed in deriving professional satisfaction from their work in Egypt.

Motivation and Drive

Successful advisors in Egypt demonstrate a strong commitment to their profession and are driven and challenged by their desire to contribute to improving conditions in Egypt. This leads them to work hard at understanding the needs and constraints of Egyptian colleagues as opposed to unsuccessful advisors who were described by one Egyptian official as those "who constantly complain about the lack of resources and commitment and limit their activities to sitting around, being available to answer questions, but doing nothing productive".

Modesty

Modesty in the Egyptian development context primarily means that the advisor does not have an enormous need to be acknowledged for his expertise or work performance. This enables the successful advisors to derive genuine professional satisfaction through

helping Egyptians develop themselves professionally. This includes allowing Egyptian colleagues to gain the credit for producing outputs for which the advisor was mainly responsible.

High-Level Technical Knowledge and Experience

To work effectively in Egypt, there is a need for a high level of technical knowledge and experience. These technical skills are highlighted in this profile because Egyptians were both very critical and demanding with respect to technical skills and knowledge. They feel that too often Canadian advisors come to Egypt possessing no greater skill or knowledge than what already exists within their country. Accordingly, if an advisor is to have any chance at being an effective agent for human resource development, their credentials should be screened carefully and approved by the host institution.

Interpersonal Skills

A wide array of interpersonal skills were identified as critical for advisors to be successful in Egypt. Egypt was described as a country "where relationships are as, or more important than getting the job done" and "where there is

far more emphasis on process than results". In this regard, Canadians were often described as being too task-oriented and impersonal. The set of interpersonal skills listed below are those identified as most important for enabling the advisor to succeed in gaining the trust and confidence of local Egyptian colleagues.

Relationship Building Skills

A belief in the importance of building and maintaining relationships, as well as a trusting, friendly, and cooperative demeanour was found to be highly associated with success. Relationship building is an ability to bring people together in a way that all feel part of something they believe in and become committed to working towards goals together. An ease in socializing and strong desire for social interaction are associated with this ability.

Respect and Tolerance

Respect is the capacity to respond to others in a way which helps them feel valued and treated as colleagues rather than as subordinates. Being attentive, listening, and showing concern are part of this capacity for respect. Tolerance is the ability to accept the behaviour and values of others as valid for them without always judging this behaviour against one's own culture and personal values and beliefs.

Openness to Others

This is the ability to be genuinely open to the behaviour and ideas of others. It goes much beyond respect for and tolerance of differences. It is demonstrated by a willingness to admit one's mistakes, a commitment to actively seek out the views of others, and a readiness to change one's own opinions, decisions, and plans. One unsuccessful advisor in Egypt was described in the following manner: "the type of person who insists on having his way, pushing through an idea without having it reviewed by anyone else - which led to a serious blunder for which his counterpart was blamed".

Transfer Skills

This set of skills are those primarily associated with effectiveness at the task of training and transfer of skills and knowledge to Egyptian counterparts. They build on the previous interpersonal skills which enable the advisor to first gain the trust and respect of Egyptian counterparts.

Personal Integrity

One of the main factors highlighted by Egyptians in explaining the failure of one Canadian advisor was this person's lack of personal

integrity. Not only did this person fail to deal honestly with Egyptians, he was accused of total self-involvement and acting always for his own well-being. He used his position to control and manipulate people and situations for personal gain. Personal integrity is the reverse of this kind of behaviour. It is the ability to be honest with others and to make decisions in the best interests of the development project.

Patience and Perseverance

Success in transferring skills and knowledge demands enormous patience and perseverance. Advisors in Egypt readily discussed their frustrations in trying to train Egyptians. They often felt unaccepted by Egyptians with their credentials questioned as to their relevance for the host institution in Egypt. But despite these obstacles, there are those who do succeed, and their ability to persevere, their conviction and determination, makes them different from those advisors who simply lack such perseverance. In these circumstances, patience is also characteristic of successful advisors. This is the ability to be calm and steadfast despite opposition, difficulties, or adversity. Transferring skills and knowledge in Egypt takes time, energy, and effort. Learning to be patient is critical for success.

Communication

It is crucial to be able to express oneself in a way that permits others to understand us and to read the messages of others as they are intended. This requires that partners genuinely listen to each other and seek to clarify what the other is trying to say. Being able to communicate effectively lays the groundwork for establishing understanding and trust between partners, both critical ingredients for effective collaborative relationships.

Organizational Skills

This set of skills is characteristic of advisors who are concerned about trying to contribute to institutional development in Egypt. It is recognized by most in the Aid community that sustainable institutional development is a long-term and difficult undertaking. In Egypt, an Attrition Study undertaken by the Human Resource Development Officer of the Field Support Unit clearly identified rates of attrition to be a major problem within all CIDA-sponsored projects. Solutions to this problem undoubtedly include the need to address organizational and political realities, particularly the problem with the lack of incentives. On the other hand, this study confirms that the following skills of indi-

vidual advisors can and do serve to enhance the prospects for sustainable institutional development.

Political Astuteness

The ability to assess relations between people within and between institutions, as well as the ability to develop strategies for organizational change and individual learning that will not threaten local officials but rather gain their support, is an important skill for being effective in Egypt. People who are politically astute have well-developed social observation skills, demonstrate social insight, and possess an ability to achieve consensus based on compromise. This skill is particularly important for team leaders who are attempting to serve as change agents for institutional development in Egypt.

Management Vision

Successful institutional development requires advisors who can collaborate with Egyptians in creating a vision for their organization. This means being able to not be overwhelmed by details, by tasks. It means being able "to see the forest as well as the trees", and to be focused on the overall goal of institutional development.

Networking

Successful development in Egypt increasingly requires networking skills on the part of technical advisors. Not only is it important to be able to strategize on how to connect with key people within the host institution, but it is also critical to be able to facilitate the creation of networks between government departments and across non-governmental and public sector institutions. Networking skills include the ability to identify the "power brokers" in an institution at all levels and the capacity to gain access to these people formally and informally. In the case of ISAWIP, networking skills were particularly important as this project required collaboration with two different ministries in Egypt which were historically always rivals competing for resources and power.

Knowledge and Experience Requirements

The knowledge and experience required for success in Egypt is characterized by the need for greater depth of understanding of Egypt, as well as by increased interdisciplinary knowledge and experience. Knowledge of one's area of technical expertise will not at all suffice for being an effective advisor in Egypt. The areas of knowledge and experience listed below

have been identified as critical for success in the future.

Knowledge

There would appear to be four main types of knowledge required for an effective technical advisor in Egypt: international knowledge, knowledge of development, knowledge of Egypt, and understanding of cross-cultural management theory and practice. International knowledge would include a basic understanding of the international economic order and the major forces determining its operation in today's world (e.g. globalization, the knowledge economy, etc.), as well as the role of major international institutions such as the OECD, the United Nations, and the World Bank, and how these impact on Egypt. Knowledge of development should include an understanding of the social, economic, ecological, and political problems of Egypt, the linkages between them, and the theories and strategies for promoting sustainable development within the Egyptian context. Knowledge of development should also include understanding of CIDA's role, expectations, and strategy for Egypt. Knowledge of Egypt would focus on information and understanding of cultural traditions, values, history, and the influence of Islam in the personal, professional,

and institutional realms. Finally, cross-cultural aspects of management theory and practice should be introduced to advisors, that is, the basics of institutional analysis and management of change, the cultural dimensions of such subjects of human resources development, and the role of communication in working effectively in Egypt.

Experience

The desirable personal and professional experience is essentially variety and breadth of experience. That is to say, advisors in Egypt are

likely to perform more effectively if they have worked in both a staff and a management capacity, and if they have been exposed to public, private, and international organizations. Having held positions of leadership, teaching and/or training experience, and working with interdisciplinary teams were also identified as highly desirable background qualifications. Finally, experience in international planning and negotiation and exposure to the political process was mentioned by some as highly valuable, particularly for team leaders working in Egypt.



The Challenge of Assessment

The empirical profile of the successful technical advisor in Egypt outlined in the previous section can serve to guide the future recruitment, selection, and preparation of development personnel destined for work in Egypt. It should be noted, however, that no one individual will ever perfectly match this profile. Each individual assessed against this profile will reveal his or her own unique pattern of strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, the demands of the job and the environment of the host institution should be taken into account in deciding which skills and knowledge are the most important and then assessing the candidate against these high-priority characteristics. For example, requirements for the position of

Canadian Team Leader will differ from those of a Section Chief and both will differ somewhat from a pure Technical Advisor position.

It would be expected that the emphasis placed on organizational skills and interpersonal skills will be greatest for Team Leaders, still important for Section Chiefs, but less important for Technical Advisors. With respect to professional task skills and transfer skills, in most cases these will be weighted most heavily for Technical Advisors, less for Section Chiefs, and least for Team Leaders. The following table is offered as a guide for ranking the overall importance of the various skills and knowledge making up the general profile of success.

| | Team Leader | Section Chief | Technical Advisor |
|----------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Most Important Skills | Relationship Building Political Astuteness Communication Vision | Motivation & Drive Relationship Building Personal Integrity Communication | Personal Integrity Motivation & Drive Modesty Technical Expertise |
| Most Important Knowledge | Knowledge of Egypt Knowledge of Development Knowledge of Cross-Cultural Management | Knowledge of Egypt Knowledge of Cross-Cultural Management | Knowledge of Egypt |
| Most Important Experience | Leadership | Interdisciplinary Team Work | Teaching / Training |

Finally, it is important to point out that the greatest challenge in selecting effective personnel for Egypt is knowing how to assess candidates on the desired skills and knowledge requirements. In order to respond to this challenge, it is intended that certain tools will be designed to assist CIDA managers and others involved in the task of recruiting and selecting personnel for Egypt. One such tool will be the preparation of an interview guidelines form

which will contain optional questions and desired responses for assessing the specific skills and knowledge requirements. For example, in trying to assess an individual's ability to build and maintain relationships in Egypt, an interviewer might ask the candidate: "how would you go about establishing effective working relationships in Egypt?" And in scoring the response, guidelines would be provided in the form of identifying desirable and undesirable responses (both verbal and behavioural).



A Concluding Comment

This profile of the successful technical advisor for Egypt is comprehensive and demanding in nature and will likely necessitate the development and delivery of new approaches to intercultural training and education. As mentioned at the outset, the evolving technical advisor role of change agent for institutional development is much more demanding than the traditional expert-counterpart model of technical assistance. The current CIDA Development Policy Framework for Egypt emphasizes the importance of Canadian transfer of technology in promoting human resource development, institutional strengthening, and overall capacity-building in Egypt. The challenge is formidable and to be successful in the future, advisors in Egypt will need to be much better informed and knowledgeable about Egypt and the Middle East region as a whole. Additionally, knowledge and skill in institutional analysis and management, deeper-than-usual sociological and political knowledge for network management, and an ability to understand how change and decision-making

takes place in the Egyptian context - these will all be important requirements for advisor success in the future.

With respect to the future recruitment and selection of personnel for Egypt, special attention must be given to two issues. First, there is a tendency among those who recruit to emphasize the need for previous overseas experience as a desirable qualification if not a requirement for the overseas posting. Previous research (see Kealey, D.J., *Cross-Cultural Effectiveness*, CIDA, 1990) and the research data out of this Egypt project clearly confirm that previous overseas experience is not predictive of development effectiveness. Previous experience does facilitate a quicker and less stressful personal adjustment to Egypt but it does not guarantee greater levels of success. This is a complicated but important issue. Not infrequently, the most internationally experienced personnel have developed a personal and professional style overseas which isolates them from contact with local colleagues. They may tend to spend most

of their free time with other expatriates and avoid dealing with the personal and cultural constraints to working effectively in another country. For these reasons, their previous overseas experience may only serve to make them personally adaptable but not necessarily professionally effective. And, in fact, some of the most successful advisors in Egypt were found to be on their first international posting. Second, there is a belief among some that the best person to recruit for Egypt is an Egyptian Canadian. Data from this research project does not support this conclusion. Essentially, Egyptian Canadians face particular obstacles in becoming accepted by and effective in working with Egyptian colleagues. For example, local Egyptians often reject returning nationals because they consider them "no better" than themselves, and often resent the higher social and economic status of these Egyptian Canadian experts. Also, the returning Egyptian is often very frustrated, personally and professionally, with local conditions and intolerant of Egyptian professional practice and customs which they judge to be both inefficient and ineffective. The conclusion of this research study on advisors in Egypt is that it is likely more difficult for an Egyptian Canadian to succeed in Egypt than it is for other non-Egyptian Canadians.

Accordingly, the profile of skills and knowledge outlined in this report should be applied rigorously in assessing future Egyptian Canadian advisors being considered for postings to Egypt.

Finally, it should be emphasized that this profile of skills and knowledge can only serve to guide the recruitment and selection process. The first step in ensuring that the right people are sent to Egypt is detailed job analysis. Traditionally, job analysis has focused primarily on the technical skills and experience requirements but the challenge now is to ensure that this Egyptian profile of the non-technical skills and knowledge is factored into the development of job descriptions for Egypt. If the job demands are well specified, this will enable selection personnel to weight or prioritize the criteria outlined in this Egyptian profile. This will further serve to assist in identifying the individual whose skills and knowledge best fit the specific job requirements. Finally, clarifying the expected outcomes of advisor positions in Egypt should permit a more effective monitoring and measurement of advisor success in the future. The aim here is not just to focus on material outputs or other tangible deliverables, but to include as expected outputs from advisors some of the indicators of success outlined in Section 2 of this report. These would include:

- being able to demonstrate having gained the confidence and respect of Egyptian colleagues
- developing a broad strategy for institutional development in Egypt
- demonstrating substantial commitment to transfer skills and knowledge
- building an effective team working atmosphere

Guidelines for measuring advisor success at achieving these outputs will have to be established in the future. Emphasizing both the personal skills and knowledge requirements as well as the expected social and professional outcomes will only serve to enhance the overall effectiveness of CIDA's technical assistance projects with Egypt.

Table #1
Summary Profile of the Successful Advisor for Egypt


| | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| The Key Skills | Self-Confidence Self-Reliance Self-Awareness | Motivation & Drive Modesty Technical Expertise | Relationship Building Respect & Tolerance Openness to Others | Personal Integrity Patience & Perseverance Communication | Political Astuteness Management Vision Networking |
| The Desired Outcomes in Egypt | Personal Adjustment | Professional Satisfaction | Trust & Respect of Egyptians | Transfer of Skills & Knowledge | Sustainable Development |
| The Necessary Knowledge & Experience | | International Knowledge Knowledge of Development Knowledge of Egypt Knowledge of Cross-Cultural Management: Theory & Practice | | Multi-Disciplinary Professional Experience Multi-Sectoral Experience Multi-Institutional Experience | |



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Introduction

This report presents the findings of a survey questionnaire completed by personnel who have been involved in planning and implementing CIDA-sponsored development projects in Egypt. It constitutes one of several reports presenting findings of the research project exploring the personal and cultural dimensions of CIDA's development assistance program in Egypt.

The purpose of this report is to enable CIDA to derive lessons learned with respect to undertaking the critical personal and cultural dimensions of project planning and implementation. It thus aims to contribute to identifying the skills and knowledge needed for project success in the Egyptian context.

One part of the study explored the perceptions of people who, in differing capacities, were involved in the CIDA-sponsored projects. Four major groups of respondents were identified: CIDA, Egypt, CEA (Canadian Executing Agency), and Advisor. In analyzing the data the groups were broken down further for better comparison: CIDA Headquarters, CIDA Field,

Egypt ISAWIP (Integrated Soil and Water Improvement Project), Egypt non-ISAWIP, ISAWIP Advisor, and EEA (Egypt Electrical Authority) Advisor. Also, the perceptions of advisor spouses is included as a separate group.

Three different issue areas were studied by means of a three-part survey questionnaire:

- i) identifying and assessing the causes for difficulties that evolved with the implementation of development projects in Egypt
- ii) evaluating the overall adaptation of Canadian advisors and spouses living and working in Egypt
- iii) identifying and assessing the importance of various technical and personal factors for ensuring successful development outcomes

Overall, 162 people completed the survey questionnaire. Their answers were then statistically analyzed. This report presents a summary of the survey findings.

A Note on Sample Size, Methodology, and Data Analysis

Of the 162 people completing the survey questionnaire, the numbers represented in the various subgroups are as follows:

CIDA (n=12)

| | |
|--------------------|---------------|
| Headquarters staff | 6 respondents |
| Field staff | 6 respondents |

Note: field staff included personnel currently on posting in Cairo as well as those who had previously served as a field officer in Cairo. Although 18 CIDA officers were interviewed for this project, only 12 returned the survey questionnaire.

CEA (n=11)

| | |
|-------------------|---------------|
| Isawip management | 5 respondents |
| EEA mangement | 4 respondents |
| Other management | 2 respondents |

Note: management responses included both headquarters project directors and team leaders in the field.

Advisors & Spouses (n=46)

| | |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Isawip advisors | 13 respondents |
| EEA advisors | 15 respondents |
| Other | 4 respondents |
| Spouses | 14 respondents |

Egypt (n=93)

| | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|
| Egypt Isawip | 67 respondents |
| Egypt other | 4 respondents |
| Egypt senior mangement (Isawip) | 14 respondents |
| Egypt senior management (non-Isawip) | 8 respondents |

All respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement (using a scale of 1 to 10, 1= strongly disagree, 10 = strongly agree) with a series of statements dealing with project difficulties, living and working in Egypt, and the requirements for professional effectiveness in Egypt.

Generally speaking, results were analyzed by computing the average scores, standard deviations, and the various subgroup percentages of agreement/disagreement for each statement in the survey questionnaire. The 1 to 10 scale was further broken down into three categories, with ratings between 1 and 4 being scored as "disagree", ratings of 5 and 6 scored

as "neutral", and any rating of 7 or above scored as an "agree" response. With respect to the sample, it is very important to highlight the substantial number of respondents in this survey. For this reason, the sample represents well the total number of Canadians and Egyptians who have worked together on CIDA-sponsored projects over the last several years. Whether or not one can generalize these findings to other countries with which CIDA is involved is unknown at this time. To determine generalizability and to identify possible regional and/or country differences, the survey research questionnaire would have to be administered to personnel working on other country programs.

Note:

In the tables and figures presenting survey results, sometimes the categories of *Egypt* and *Advisor* are not broken down into subgroups. When this is the case, it means that the differences between subgroups was insignificant for reporting purposes.



Project Difficulties

Respondents were asked to reflect on their experience in Egypt and review a list of 12 possible reasons for project difficulties (see Appendix 1). They indicated their level of agreement or disagreement with each item on a scale of 1 to 10. The list of project difficulties had been identified by Canadian advisors and national colleagues in previous research projects.

CIDA Perceptions

Generally speaking, CIDA staff isolated the following six factors as the most critical in causing difficulty with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of development projects in Egypt:

- poorly selected Canadian advisors
- poorly selected Egyptian counterparts
- poor management at CIDA headquarters
- poor management on the part of the CEA
- CEA inability to understand development

- lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities among PTL, PRO, POST, CEA HQ, CEA Field, GOE

It should be noted that there tended to be a vast difference between the opinions of CIDA HQ staff versus CIDA Field staff. For example, CIDA Field staff disagreed that *poorly selected Canadians*, *poor CEA management*, and *CEA inability to understand development* were sources of difficulty for project implementation in Egypt.

CEA Perceptions

The management personnel from CEA headquarters responsible for managing the development project on behalf of the CEA identified only 2 factors out of the 12 listed as causing difficulty for effective project implementation. Essentially, they blamed *poor management at CIDA Headquarters* and *lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities of the different participants in the aid project* as the most serious sources of difficulty.

Egypt Perceptions

Generally speaking, Egyptians tended to be positive in assessing project difficulties. It should be noted, however, that the Egyptian response showed a wide variability and represented a wide diversity of personnel from “hands-on” technical workers to senior managers. Because respondents were not obligated to identify themselves in responding to the survey it is impossible to identify fully the perhaps differing views of management as opposed to staff. Overall, out of 93 respondents from Egypt over 50% identify *poor management on the part of the CEA and inability of Canadians to understand and respect Egyptians* as serious sources of difficulty in Egypt. A further 60% of the Egyptians responding identify *poorly defined project goals and outputs* as being detrimental to overall project success. Of the 22 managers identified in the sample, 56% identified *the lack of commitment on the part of Egyptians* and 40% *the poor selection of Canadian and Egyptian personnel* as serious obstacles to development progress.

It should be noted that there were differences of viewpoint between Egyptian personnel involved with ISAWIP and those attached to other projects. Generally speaking, ISAWIP personnel were more negative in their overall

assessment of difficulties. But ISAWIP senior managers did not tend to see personnel selection as problematic whereas Senior Egyptian managers working on other projects identified *the poor selection of Canadian advisors and Egyptian counterparts* as the most serious obstacle to development.

Advisor Perceptions

As a group, advisors themselves tended to highlight the following four factors as the most important sources of project difficulties in Egypt:

- poorly selected Egyptian counterparts
- poor management at CIDA HQ
- lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities of participants in the project
- bureaucratic or management obstacles within the Government of Egypt

With respect to group differences, the ISAWIP advisors rated these four factors to be of much more serious difficulty than EEA advisors.

Spouse Perceptions

What is most interesting to report with respect to the viewpoints of non-working spouses in

Egypt is that, as a group, they identify the most factors (8 out of 12) as being problematic in Egypt project success. And they particularly stress the following three factors for being the cause of greatest difficulty:

- poorly selected Canadian advisors
- poorly selected Egyptian counterparts
- poor management at CIDA HQ

Key Findings Overall

1) When all respondent groups are considered, the three most frequently cited reasons for project difficulties are the following:

- poorly selected Canadian advisors
- poorly selected Egyptian counterparts
- poor management at CIDA HQ

2) As a group, Egyptians tend not to perceive serious difficulties in the implementation of development projects, but it is possible that many were hesitant to be more frank in their assessment because they did not wish to appear critical of CIDA's aid program. It is interesting, however, that it was a significant percentage of Egyptians who identified *the lack of understanding and respect for Egyptians* as a

source of difficulty. CIDA HQ staff tended also to concur with this being identified as a major source of difficulty.

3) Generally speaking, CIDA HQ staff and CIDA Field staff often sharply disagreed with respect to assessing difficulties. For example, there was substantial disagreement on seven of the twelve difficulties listed. Whereas CIDA HQ identified *poorly selected Canadian and Egyptian personnel, poor CEA management, CEA inability to understand development, and communication problems between Canadians and Egyptians* as being of substantial difficulty, CIDA Field staff tended generally to disagree with this assessment. Further (as can be seen in Figures 1 and 2), the perceptions of CIDA HQ, Advisors, and Egyptians often contrasted with those shared by CIDA Field and CEA HQ. This is an important finding which will be discussed further in the concluding chapter of this report.


4) Both groups of advisors (ISAWIP and EEA), but especially ISAWIP advisors identified "bureaucratic obstacles within the GOE" as a major difficulty. None of the other groups identified this to be the case.

5) With respect to the CEA, they see little difficulty in doing effective development work.

It seems to be their view that if CIDA were better managed and if the roles and responsibilities of the key participants of the aid project were clarified, then project implementation would become efficient and effective.

Some Interesting Differences


1) The differences between CEA and CIDA HQ opinions are striking. For example, the CEA ranked *poor management at CIDA HQ* as the greatest difficulty whereas CIDA HQ ranked *poor management on the part of the CEA* and *CEA inability to understand development* as two key factors likely to cause difficulty in the project.



2) As seen in Figure 1, *CEA inability to understand development* as an obstacle in development revealed the most marked difference of opinion.

3) Another area of pronounced difference of opinion relates to the frequency of the *inability of Canadians to understand and respect Egyptians* being identified as a serious obstacle to development in Egypt. Figure 2 is illustrative in this regard.

Figure 2
Project Difficulties
"Inability of Canadians to Understand and Respect Egyptians"



Other Difficulties

Respondents were given the opportunity to identify other project difficulties in addition to those listed in the survey questionnaire.

28 people chose to identify additional difficulties and several themes emerged. The most frequently mentioned difficulty was "bureaucratic obstacles within CIDA including the broader Government of Canada contracting regulations". Second in frequency of mention

was "the general conflict of interest, objectives, and goals within and between the major stakeholders: CIDA, CEA, GOE". The third theme built on the second in identifying "the lack of teamwork and the distrust among all partners" as a serious constraint to achieving a sustainable development impact in Egypt.



Living and Working in Egypt

In this section of the survey questionnaire, respondents were asked to assess more generally the overall challenge for Canadians living and working in Egypt (see Appendix 2). They indicated their level of agreement or disagreement with statements on a scale of 1 to 10.

CIDA Perceptions


Overall, CIDA staff who have worked on the Egypt program tend to hold the following views:

- they are not sure that Canadian advisors are well prepared for living and working in Egypt
- they feel that establishing friendship between Canadians and Egyptians does not come easy
- they are not sure about the need to learn local language to make an effective adaptation

Once again, when it comes to comparing the viewpoints of CIDA HQ staff and CIDA Field staff there is substantial disagreement on many

issues. Although both HQ and Field do agree that good communication is vital for project success, CIDA HQ staff are not at all convinced that Canadians make an effective adaptation to Egypt whereas CIDA Field staff are very positive about the capacity of Canadians to adapt to Egypt. Figure 3 serves to illustrate these differences.

Figure 3
Living and Working in Egypt



- Q2.** Friendship between Canadians and Egyptians comes easy.
- Q4.** Canadians isolate themselves too much from contact with the people of Egypt.

- Q5.** It is not easy for Canadians to adapt to Egypt.
- Q9.** It is the responsibility of Canadians to gain the respect of Egyptian staff.
- Q10.** Canadians interact well with Egyptians.

(Questions from Appendix 2)

CEA Perceptions

Just as CEA headquarters management personnel tended to see few difficulties in doing successful development work in Egypt, they also saw their Canadian staff experiencing few problems in adapting to living and working conditions in Egypt. In this respect, their assessment of adaptation indicators are very similar to those completed by CIDA Field staff. The only major difference in their assessment comes from their support of the importance of learning some Arabic as part of one's adaptation process in Egypt.

Egypt Perceptions

Generally speaking, the perceptions of Egyptians with respect to the capacity of Canadians to adapt effectively to their country is positive. But Egyptians are not as "glowing" in their views on this issue as are the CEA and

CIDA Field staff. For example, Egyptians give a very high rating to the importance of Canadians learning to speak and use some Arabic while they live and work in Egypt. As a group, they are also almost evenly split in their opinion (55% positive, 45% negative or not sure) on how well Canadians are prepared for living and working in Egypt.

Advisor Perceptions

When the assessments of advisors are looked at as a total group, it is interesting that the advisors themselves are less positive than are the CEA, Egypt, and CIDA Field staff with respect to their overall success in adapting to Egypt. For example, the following trends emerge:

- they are not sure that they are well prepared for living and working in Egypt
- they are not sure if they really do make enough effort to connect with Egyptians
- in keeping with the previous point, they are also not sure they understand and respect the cultural traditions of Egypt
- with respect to learning Arabic, they rate this as important similar to the way Egyptians do

What is perhaps more interesting in analyzing the advisors' data is the substantial differences of opinion between ISAWIP advisors and EEA advisors. Essentially, the ISAWIP advisors are much more negative about their success at adaptation in Egypt. For example, ISAWIP advisors do not feel well enough prepared for their assignment, admit to difficulties in adapting to Egypt, report limited understanding and respect of Egyptian culture, and agree that they tend to isolate themselves too much from contact with the people of Egypt.

Spouse Perceptions

Overall, spouses paint a very positive picture of their experience in living in Egypt. They see few difficulties in being able to make an effective adaptation to Egypt; and, interestingly, of all participants in this research study, they give the highest ranking to the importance of learning local language. However, a note of caution is necessary in reporting these findings. The majority of spouses completing survey questionnaires for this study were part of the EEA project advisor team. Unfortunately, there were only a few ISAWIP spouses who were able to complete the questionnaire. Not surprisingly, the ISAWIP spouses were not nearly as positive in their assessment of adaptation to Egypt.

Key Findings Overall

1) There was a broad consensus on the importance of the following three factors for promoting project success and effective adaptation:

- project success depends as much on good communication as on anything else
- it is the responsibility of Canadians to gain the respect of Egyptian staff
- some knowledge of the local language is needed for an effective adaptation

2) Generally speaking, CIDA Field staff, CEA management, Egyptians, and EEA spouses tend to be the most positive about Canadians living and working in Egypt. These perceptions are not shared by CIDA HQ staff, nor by ISAWIP advisors.

Some Interesting Differences

1) The CEA and Egyptians tended to agree that *adequate financial resources and technical expertise are the most important factors in project success* whereas CIDA staff (both HQ and Field) and advisors themselves tended more to disagree with this statement. Figure 4 illustrates these differences.

2) Whether *Canadian advisors isolate themselves too much from contact with the people of Egypt* was another topic for which differences of opinion existed (see Figure 5).

3) Finally, opinions also varied substantially on whether or not *it is easy for Canadians to adapt to Egypt* (see Figure 6).

Figure 4
Living and Working in Egypt
"Adequate financial resources and technical expertise are the most important factors in project success"




Figure 5
Living and Working in Egypt
"Canadians isolate themselves too much from the people of Egypt"





Figure 6
Living and Working In Egypt
"It is easy for Canadians to adapt to Egypt"





Professional Effectiveness

In this section, respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 the importance of 11 factors for ensuring successful development outcomes (see Appendix 3).

Given the existence of a broad consensus on the importance of most of the factors listed in this survey questionnaire, there is no need to present findings according to group membership as done in the previous two sections of this report.

Key Findings Overall

1) The three factors rated as the most important for ensuring successful development outcomes are the following:

- ability to work in a team
- clear understanding of project goals
- professional commitment

2) The following additional factors were ranked as important for success by all respondent groups:

- understanding of international development
- person to person communication
- understanding and respect of local culture
- technical and job competence
- management skills

Some Interesting Differences

1) There was mixed opinion on the importance of *previous cross-cultural living experience* for ensuring success on a development project. Figure 7 serves to illustrate the differences.

2) With respect to the importance of showing *interest in and participating in the local culture*, CIDA HQ, Advisors, Spouses, and Egyptians ranked this as important in contrast to CIDA Field personnel and CEA management who rated it as less important. Figure 8 serves to illustrate these differences.

3) In rating the importance of *learning the local language*, a similar pattern to #2 above (although not as extreme) emerged from the data analysis. It should be noted, however, that less than 50% of Egyptian managers consider the learning of Arabic to be an important factor influencing development outcomes. Figure 9 depicts these differences between groups.

4) Finally, a comment with respect to the importance of *understanding international development*. Although most groups saw this as an important factor for ensuring successful development outcomes, CIDA Field officers and CEA management tended to give much lower ratings of its importance. Figure 10 illustrates these differences.

Note:

As discussed in Report One, this author's empirical research measuring the relationship between previous overseas experience and individual professional success overseas has determined that there is no statistically significant correlation. Figure 7 reports only opinion data, i.e. what the viewpoint of the different groups interviewed was with respect to the importance of previous overseas experience for ensuring successful development.

Report Two

Figure 7
Professional Effectiveness

"Previous cross-cultural living experience is an important factor in ensuring successful development outcomes in Egypt"




Figure 8

Professional Effectiveness

"Interest and participation in the local culture is an important factor in ensuring successful development outcomes in Egypt"




Figure 9
Professional Effectiveness
"Knowledge of local language is an important factor in ensuring successful development outcomes in Egypt"





Figure 10
Professional Effectiveness
"Understanding international development is an important factor in ensuring successful development outcomes in Egypt"



Other Needs

In response to the open-ended question about professional effectiveness, several related themes emerged all tending to emphasize the point that professional effectiveness is very

much dependent on the type of person selected for the assignment. Almost exclusively, respondents emphasized factors which relate to personality and behaviour. Technical expertise was not mentioned.

These common themes lend themselves to the construction of an ideal personality type for professional effectiveness:

Respondents perceive that the type of person who will achieve professional success on a development project in Egypt is dependable, mature, patient, and with a sense of humour. This person is motivated to participate in the development project out of a commitment to development. He or she approaches the assignment with a sense of adventure. When on the project this person is most importantly adaptable, demonstrating a capacity to modify his or her thinking and behaviour to fit the demands and cultural context of the situation. He or she is flexible and has a supportive family. An ability for and interest in teamwork and strong interpersonal skills are also characteristic of the effective technical advisor. These "soft skills" enable the person to be effective at the task of transferring skills and knowledge. The advisor approaches the work as a facilitator, enabling others to learn how to "do" rather than always and only being the "doer".



Recommendations

On CEA

CEA headquarters management and their appointed team leaders in the field tend to see few difficulties in implementing effective development projects. Their two main "gripes" are with CIDA HQ management and the lack of clarity with respect to roles and responsibilities. It is interesting to note, however, that the advisors recruited and selected by the CEA do not share many of the same opinions on the key issues and problems facing development assistance projects in Egypt. Finally, the fact that CEA management ranks understanding of international development, knowledge of local language, and interest and participation in local culture as being of little importance in promoting successful development should be a cause for concern.

Recommendation

In the recruitment and selection of future CEAs to implement development projects in Egypt, CIDA management should try to assess the knowledge and attitudes of the CEA towards development and should plan to better educate its CEAs on development and CIDA's expectations in this regard.

On CIDA

What is perhaps most interesting about the CIDA response to the survey questionnaire is the generally wide disagreement between CIDA Headquarters personnel and CIDA Field personnel. CIDA Field staff, similar to the CEA, see few problems and identify CIDA HQ and the lack of clarity on roles, responsibilities, and goals as the key obstacles to effective development in Egypt. CIDA HQ staff, however, tend to identify a wide array of difficulties associated with the implementation of its development projects. Interestingly, CIDA HQ staff and to some extent Egyptian managers, were the only groups which did acknowledge their own role in project difficulties. The CEA and CIDA Field personnel did not include themselves as contributing to difficulties in project implementation.

This targeting of poor management at CIDA Headquarters as the major source of project difficulties may simply reflect the long-standing and deep-seated frustration and distrust among most participants involved in the planning and delivery of CIDA's projects in Egypt (particularly ISAWIP). And in the case of ISAWIP, the

readiness "to point the finger" at each other in laying blame for problems that developed in Egypt only serves to further confirm or illustrate the following: that all partners in ISAWIP really have had little understanding and tolerance of each other as individuals who represent different organizations, report to different bosses, and who have differing expectations, demands, and agendas while participating in the development process.

Recommendation

CIDA HQ management should ensure that at project start-up all key participants in the development initiative (including CIDA HQ, CIDA Field, CEA HQ, CEA advisors, GOE, and Egyptian counterparts) take part in cross-cultural team building exercises aimed at increasing understanding and respect for each other and enhancing the overall ability to communicate effectively.

On Advisors and Spouses

Generally speaking, when rating factors associated with project success and failure, advisors as a group tend to identify the greatest areas of difficulty. The greatest differences among advisors and spouses are between

ISAWIP advisors/spouses and EEA advisors/spouses and their differences of opinion are most acute when assessing the living and working challenges in Egypt. Essentially, the ISAWIP advisors/spouses report substantial difficulty as compared to the much more positive outlook put forth by EEA advisors/spouses. From interview data (which is reported on at more length in a separate report: see *The Experience of Individuals and Groups in Egypt, Report Three*), EEA advisors/spouses overall reported high levels of satisfaction from their experience of living and working in Egypt. ISAWIP advisors/spouses, however, expressed substantial frustration and dissatisfaction with their personal and professional experience in Egypt. The interesting question to pose herein is the following: were the EEA advisors more satisfied because the overall external project conditions were clearer and better managed or was their selection process perhaps more thorough than the recruitment and screening process for ISAWIP advisors? There is some evidence for the latter explanation but it is difficult to draw a more definitive conclusion on this issue. With respect to the survey data, it is clear that the selection of appropriate advisors and local counterparts is considered the key to avoiding project difficulties.

Recommendation

CIDA should ensure that advisors recruited by CEAs are screened against the profile of skills and knowledge established for Egypt (see Report on the Empirical Profile of Success for Egypt Advisors).

On Egypt

As discussed in this report, Egyptians overall reported fairly positive attitudes about project implementation and the ability of Canadians to live and work in Egypt. The greatest differences of opinion, however, and the more negative ratings emerged from the Egyptians involved with the ISAWIP project. It was this group particularly who identified *poor management on the part of the CEA, poorly defined project goals, and the questionable ability of Canadians to understand and respect Egyptians* as important obstacles to development success in Egypt. Also, all Egyptians gave the highest ratings to *the importance of learning local language, understanding international development, and ability to work in a team* for ensuring successful development outcomes.

It is interesting that one of the main findings from the interviews with Egyptians was a feeling

on their part of not being adequately consulted, and of not experiencing a sense of partnership with CIDA.

Recommendation

In collaboration with the key Egyptian managers, CIDA should establish mechanisms for project planning, monitoring, and evaluation that are clearly understood, negotiated, and accepted by both sides (please see Report Three for a related and more detailed recommendation).

By way of summary, it is interesting that *the ability to work in a team and good communication* were the two factors emerging with the greatest consensus and highest ratings on importance in ensuring successful development in Egypt. Despite the practice of selecting personnel primarily on the basis of technical expertise, the "development experts" - those actually involved in all aspects of development work - agree that communication skills and team work are equally important to technical skills and they *most strongly agreed* that project success depends on communication. This finding only serves to support the recommendations on CIDA's making every effort to ensure that CEA advisors are well-selected and well-prepared for undertaking their assignments in Egypt.



A Concluding Comment

Perhaps the most interesting, or at least the most striking, aspect of the survey responses presented in this report is how the opinions of CIDA Field staff and CEA management differ from those of CIDA Headquarters. For example, in contrast to CIDA HQ, they tend to de-emphasize the importance of language and the need for interaction with Egyptians; they see financial resources and technical expertise as the key to project success; and they view CIDA HQ management as the main obstacle to project success. In contrast, CIDA HQ more greatly emphasizes language, local interaction, communication, and good personnel selection as the keys to project success. As discussed in the previous section, these findings can be interpreted as simply confirming misunderstanding and distrust among the key partners in development. But other interpretations are possible, such as the following:

- The overly positive views of CEA and CIDA Field staff may be a defensive position but may also indicate that they are "distant" from really understanding what technical advisors have to deal with in working in

Egypt. It is a fact that the CEA and CIDA Field officers are pressured with duties and responsibilities much beyond the management of aid projects. It may be the case that they simply do not have the time to focus on each development project.

- The more negative views on the part of CIDA HQ may indicate their perhaps very demanding expectations with respect to the roles of Canadian advisors and/or may indicate that their own physical distance from the field leads them to be out of touch with the real problems of implementing projects. The finding, however, that the perceptions of advisors and Egypt as a whole tend to be similar to those at CIDA headquarters questions the validity of the long-standing concern of Headquarters staff being "out of touch" with the realities of the field.

The least that can be said about these findings is that they would seem to indicate a clear lack of any sense of partnership among all the key participants in the development process. This is unfortunate because it is this

author's view that most of the partners are sincere, honest, and well-intentioned about wanting to make an effective contribution to the development of Egypt. Certainly, there is a need for all partners to better understand the constraints and pressures that each works

under, but also it would seem important to review the overall management structures put in place for CIDA's development assistance program, and how projects are planned, implemented, and monitored.



Appendix 1 - Project Difficulties

The purpose of this section is to seek your opinions on the possible causes for the difficulties that evolved with the implementation of development projects. Based on your

experience in Egypt, please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following list of reasons for project difficulties.

| | STRONGLY DISAGREE | STRONGLY AGREE |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|
| Poorly selected Canadian advisors | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Poorly selected Egyptian counterparts | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Lack of commitment on the part of Egyptians | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Poor management at CIDA HQ | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Poor management at Post | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Poor management on the part of the CEA | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| CEA inability to understand development | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Lack of clarity of roles & accountabilities among PTL, PRO, POST, CEA HQ, CEA FIELD, GOE | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Poorly defined project goals, outputs, etc. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Inability of Canadians to understand and respect Egyptians | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Inability of Egyptians to understand and respect Canadians | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Bureaucratic obstacles within the GOE | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Other reasons (please list and rate) | | |



Appendix 2 - Living and Working in Egypt

The purpose of this section is to ask you to assess more generally the overall challenge for Canadians living and working in Egypt. Please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

| | STRONGLY DISAGREE | STRONGLY AGREE |
|--|----------------------|-------------------|
| Canadians are well prepared for living and working in Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Friendship between Canadians and Egyptians comes easy | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Adequate financial resources and technical expertise are the most important factors in Project success | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Canadians isolate themselves too much from contact with the people of Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| It is not easy for Canadians to adapt to Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Some knowledge of the local language is needed for an effective adaptation | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Canadians understand and respect the cultural traditions of Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Project success depends as much on good communication as on anything else | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| It is the responsibility of Canadians to gain the respect of Egyptian staff | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Canadians interact well with Egyptians | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |



Appendix 3 - Professional Effectiveness

Please rate the importance of the following factors for ensuring successful development outcomes:

| | NOT VERY IMPORTANT | VERY IMPORTANT |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Ability to work in a team | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Understanding of international development | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Person to person communication skills | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Technical and job competence | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Understanding and respect of the local culture | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Clear understanding of project goals | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Management skill | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Professional commitment | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Interest and participation in the local culture | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Knowledge of local language | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Previous cross-cultural living experience | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Other reasons (please list and rate) | | |



*Interpersonal and Cultural
Dimensions
of
Canadian Development Assistance in Egypt*

**Report Three:
The Experience of Individuals and
Groups in Egypt
(Findings from Interviews)**



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1996**

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



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Introduction

This report constitutes one of a series presenting results of the study of interpersonal and cultural dimensions of CIDA's development assistance program in Egypt. It presents the findings of interviews conducted with CIDA personnel, CEA managers, Egyptian officials, technical advisors and their spouses, and selected consultants. The report also includes coverage of responses to the open-ended questions which formed part of the survey questionnaire.

The aim of this report is twofold; i) to describe the experience of Canadian advisors and spouses who lived and worked in Egypt, and ii) to present the views of the different partners who were involved in planning and

implementing projects in Egypt. Based on the research findings, some conclusions will be drawn and recommendations for action will be stated.

It should be noted at the outset that the overall point emerging from this study is the critical importance of personal skills and knowledge for ensuring successful development outcomes. Unless technical advisors can adapt to the local culture and build relationships of trust and understanding with their national colleagues, no development results will be delivered. Technical advisors must be carefully selected and prepared for their assignments, and they must be encouraged and supported to take the time necessary to build collaborative relationships with their host colleagues.



An Overview of the Main Issues

Adapting to Egypt: Personal/ Family Dimensions

Canadians tend to express a good deal of personal and family satisfaction with their overall living experience in Egypt. Although most did acknowledge experiencing culture shock, they were not surprised at this and most felt prepared to cope with this experience. It would appear that the most satisfied Canadians were those who were part of a large Canadian team. The social support which they gave to each other enabled them to feel competent and involved. Interestingly, the level of social participation in Egyptian society is limited. Although Canadians generally find Egyptians to be warm and friendly, several people noted that it was very difficult "to break in" and connect socially with Egyptians. In comparing the challenge of adaptation in Egypt to other developing countries, the majority felt that Egypt was about the same or even easier to adapt to. A few, however, made the case that Egypt was more difficult because of the social and religious barriers and a much more formal and complicated bureaucratic system. Finally, it was emphasized that while adaptation to

Cairo presents few difficulties except for the pollution, traffic and noise, adjusting to a rural location in Egypt is very difficult, especially for families with children.

Overall, Canadians tend to express positive regard for Egypt and its culture and genuinely seemed to enjoy their experience.

Adapting to Egypt: Professional Dimensions

The experience of Canadians working in the Egyptian context is much less positive than their overall living experience. Canadians report a substantial amount of frustration in dealing with Egyptian bureaucracy. The following obstacles were highlighted:

- a hierarchical management system with little openness to change and few incentives to learn
- a bureaucracy which seems to foster competition rather than cooperation
- the slowness of decision-making and cumbersome nature of reporting processes

- the lack of any professional performance appraisal system
- the enormous religious influence in institutional and professional contexts
- personal frustration at not understanding the motives, perceptions, and needs of Egyptian counterparts
- a feeling that Egyptian management generally does not want Canadian technical expertise, only equipment and technology
- a feeling among some advisors of not being respected or listened to because their academic credentials were fewer than those of their Egyptian counterparts

The Importance of Personal Skills

In comparing Egypt to Canada in terms of what it takes to be successful, most Canadians interviewed emphasized that similar skills were needed. But many elaborated and argued that interpersonal skills and the ability to communicate and establish social relationships was vastly more important to succeed on the job in Egypt as compared to Canada. The reasons for this were varied but seemed to focus on the fact that the Egypt management style is much

more unstructured, "ad hoc", and social in nature than in Canada. One respondent noted that "relationships in Egypt are as, or more important than getting the job done; there is far more emphasis on process than on results". Some Canadians find this situation difficult. It is for these reasons that many argued that Canadians must be better screened for their non-technical capacities and be prepared to understand better the Egyptian realities and how to cope with them. For a detailed look at the skills and knowledge required for effective performance in Egypt, please refer to Report One: The Technical Advisor in Egypt: An Empirical Profile of Success.

On the Effectiveness of Canadian Technical Assistance

When Canadian advisors were asked to rate their performance in terms of transferring skills and knowledge, most rated themselves as being average or above average. Those who reported having little impact in Egypt tended to blame Egyptian management practices, poorly selected counterparts, or CEA pressures "to produce" rather than "to train" as the main reasons for their limited effectiveness. On the other hand, successful advisors tended to see few obstacles and had few complaints about

Egypt and its culture. As one advisor, who rated his performance as average, put it: "Egyptian management is like a revolving door with the constant disruptions only serving to distract and keep everyone off course".

As discussed previously, a widespread feeling among Canadians was that Egyptian management was really not open to the need for Canadian technical experts and that this presented an enormous barrier in trying to teach and train Egyptians. When Egyptian managers were interviewed, many did indeed make the point that their Egyptian personnel were already very qualified, often more qualified than the Canadian experts. For this reason, they wanted to accept fewer Canadian technical experts and to redirect the use of aid money for the purchase of equipment and the employment of Egyptians. There is also a feeling on the Egyptian side that they do not get "the best Canadian experts" and that too many

Canadians come to Egypt motivated for their own personal gain with little commitment to improving conditions.

It is important to emphasize that there was an enormous variety of opinion among Egyptians on the impact of Canadian technical assistance. For example, although many did acknowledge the overall success of ISAWIP, they did not feel positive about the overall working relationships between themselves and Canadians. They often felt controlled, looked down upon, or ignored by Canadians who adopted a superior attitude to them. Over 50 percent of Egyptians interviewed felt that Canadians needed to be better selected to work in Egypt. This group also acknowledged a need for Egyptian management to select more carefully the counterpart who will work with the Canadian and to prepare them both to work more effectively together.

Note:

It should be noted that these Egyptian perspectives on Canadian technical assistance are primarily dealing with the ISAWIP project. Egyptian managers working with Canadians on other projects (particularly the Electrical Authority Project) tended to be much more positive about the effectiveness of the Canadian experts. Perhaps the strongest point arising out of discussions with both Canadians and Egyptians on this issue of effectiveness is the need for a partnership approach to exchanging skills and knowledge. Generally speaking, there appears to have been very limited success in this regard. The need to build a foundation of trust and understanding between Canadians and Egyptians, although acknowledged by all as critical for development success, remains a challenge for both sides.

On Promoting Partnership

Participants in this Egypt study were asked about how CIDA might promote a more effective partnership with GOE and CEAs. This question evoked a variety of response and considerable consensus. Suggestions included the following:

- CIDA should work more closely with GOE to identify the real problems confronting Egypt in its development process and jointly design projects to meet these needs. More research should characterize the planning stage for project identification.
- Define more clearly and negotiate more carefully the roles, responsibilities, terms of reference, of all partners including monitoring, and evaluation procedures.
- Improve communication and team work between CIDA Headquarters and CIDA in Cairo.
- Educate (train) CEA staff on CIDA reporting requirements.
- Let the CEA manage the project and interfere less. Trust the CEA more.

- CIDA and GOE should select the CEA and screen technical assistance personnel and Egyptian counterparts.
- At Project start-up, undertake team building with the key partners whereby CIDA, GOE, and CEA can learn to understand each other, build a relationship of trust and commitment, and establish common objectives and a common vision for the project.
- Maintain continuity of all staff involved in managing and implementing the project.
- Cross-cultural training and preparation must be provided to all personnel: CIDA, CEA advisors, and Egyptian counterparts. Canadians must understand Egyptians and Egyptians must understand Canadians.
- Identify and establish the conditions needed in the Host Institution to support an effective exchange of skills and knowledge.
- Set up more Canadian/Egyptian committees at various levels to steer, coordinate, and monitor progress.
- Run collective seminars and workshops on a regular basis to bring all partners together to learn and exchange.

On Personnel Selection

As mentioned previously, both Canadians and Egyptians acknowledged the importance of careful selection of Canadian advisors as well as Egyptian counterparts. Seventy percent of Egyptians were of the opinion that GOE managers should be involved in the actual screening and selection of Canadian personnel destined to go to Egypt.

When asked about the selection of Canadians who had worked in Egypt, opinions varied widely. The Egyptians tended to report that about 50% of advisors were excellent while another 50% were of little use. Within CIDA, most of the staff interviewed felt that screening and selection of advisors for Egypt needed to be improved. Among CEA managers, the majority opinion was that Canadian advisors were generally well screened for their posting to Egypt; a few CEA managers, however, did feel that there were too many "mercenaries" and not enough "missionaries" involved in development assistance to Egypt. These managers argued for a much more careful screening process to ensure that selected advisors possess some basic interpersonal skills, strong professional drive, and belief in development.

Although there is substantial agreement among most partners that screening candidates for non-technical skills is important, there is little agreement on how to do this and who should be responsible. There would appear to be four "schools of thought" on this issue as follows:

The "Hands-Off" Approach

This approach is one in which CIDA does not interfere at all in the selection process for advisors. This is solely the task of the CEA. Several officers in CIDA argued that the trend to output contracting means that CIDA must not intervene in the selection process. If CIDA intervenes they become trapped in being accountable for any personnel failures. Output contracting should make the CEA solely accountable for recruiting and selecting advisors who can live and work effectively in Egypt. Not surprisingly, this is the position favoured by most CEA managers who feel that they themselves are the most knowledgeable and competent to make personnel selection decisions. It is also a position supported by about 50% of the CIDA officers interviewed for this project.

The "Arms-Length" Approach

This position argues that CIDA should provide clear and detailed guidelines for personnel selection. CEAs who are bidding on CIDA

contracts should receive these guidelines including the selection criteria for both the technical and non-technical skills required for Egypt. It then becomes the responsibility of the CEA to ensure that candidates are carefully screened against these criteria. Some people extend this position to include providing direct assistance to CEAs in methods for screening and selecting overseas personnel. About 35% of CIDA officers supported this position. Also, about 30% of CEA managers agreed with the first part of this position, that is, with CIDA providing its guidelines and criteria. These managers, however, wanted the freedom to do the actual selection. With respect to screening for personal skills and psychological screening, they were open to the idea provided CIDA would cover all costs associated with undertaking this part of personnel assessment.

The "Partnership" Approach

This position, greatly favoured by the Egyptians, argues that personnel selection should be a joint and direct undertaking of all key partners in the project. Therefore the key management representatives from the GOE, the CEA, and CIDA who will be involved in managing the implementation of the project should work closely together in identifying, screening, and selecting both Canadian advisors and Egyptian

counterparts. This type of joint and direct control of selection would, of course, be modified, depending on the size of the Project, the types of expertise needed, and the duration of assignments.

Most people who support this position argue that, at a minimum, all Canadian Team Leaders and Section Heads and their Egyptian equivalents must be screened in this manner to ensure more effective development outcomes in Egypt.

The “Hands-On” Approach

This approach was favoured by a minority of officers in CIDA as well by a small number of Egyptian managers. This position on selection argues that CIDA must take direct control of advisor selection. Not only should CIDA establish clear guidelines, criteria, and methods for effective screening and selection, they should require that all staff being considered for posting by the CEA be screened and approved by CIDA prior to departure.



Key Findings: The Viewpoints of the Different Partners

CIDA

Perhaps not surprisingly, there are differing viewpoints among CIDA officers on ISAWIP and other CIDA-sponsored projects in Egypt. Although most agree that ISAWIP was a success, they also acknowledge that it was a project characterized by unending conflict, bureaucratic complications, distrust, fear, and suspicion. Some in CIDA support and defend the performance of the CEA and blame CIDA management for "causing" most of the difficulties that evolved in Egypt, especially with ISAWIP. These officers see the need to better support the CEA in the field and to collaborate with them in working with the Egyptians. Others in CIDA would argue that CIDA was simply not united enough in itself to more directly control and monitor the CEA. They feel the CEA Project Manager in Canada failed to manage the project effectively on CIDA's behalf: advisors were poorly selected, reporting and accounting functions were abysmally lacking, and no effective leadership was demonstrated on the CEA's part.

The problem of staff turnover in CIDA and the difficulties in perceiving roles and expectations between CIDA Headquarters and CIDA Field officers were two issues constantly highlighted during interviews. Some officers in CIDA feel that CIDA does not clearly enough explain to CEAs what CIDA expects in terms of the development challenge in Egypt and the role of technical advisors. They worry about the trend to output contracting as it may lead to having a smaller development impact than ever. Experienced development officers in CIDA all acknowledge the importance of taking time to establish relationships in Egypt. The need to build trust and acceptance, which is the foundation for any effective development exchange, may be forgotten or ignored in the future if CEAs are put under tighter time pressures to produce technical results. Many are wondering also about the way results will be quantified and measured. Some see a need to establish new forms of contracting which will measure the success of a CEA at establishing

good relations in the country, at fielding staff who become effective agents of change, etc.

With respect to lessons learned from ISAWIP, most respondents felt that the agency has learned very little. As one person put it: "no one ever stays on a desk long enough to learn or apply any learning". Individual officers did identify a number of "personal learnings" from their experience with Egypt projects, but at the level of the organization there seemed to be little belief that CIDA has learned to do development more effectively as a result of a project like ISAWIP.

CEA

The viewpoints of the CEA are gleaned from project managers resident in Canada as well as from team leaders who were resident in Egypt. It would seem that the biggest concerns that CEA management have are two-fold:

Lack of Direction and Control

They express frustration at CIDA's overall continuing lack of direction and clarity with respect to specifying project goals, lines of communication, and management responsibilities. They feel caught in the middle of a hopeless situation trying to understand and

please CIDA as well as the GOE. Several elaborated that a CEA is often used as the "fall guy" when things go wrong and generally resent being held responsible when they have so little authority to control events.

Pressure and Interference

They feel unfairly pressured by both CIDA and GOE. They experience CIDA as an overly demanding, interfering, and inconsistent manager. As one senior CEA manager put it: "We would have produced twice as much in Egypt if CIDA had not constantly interfered". Some managers particularly resented the excessive reporting requirements of CIDA and experiencing the feeling of always being kept "on a short leash" by CIDA. Several mentioned the endless array of CIDA monitors, auditors, evaluators who visit Egypt to check-up on the CEA. At the field level, this is experienced as excessive and unnecessary disruption of project activities as advisors have to take time to educate and explain their work to these visiting consultants. They feel that monitoring and evaluation roles and responsibilities must be better planned and scheduled by all partners.

On the positive side, CEA managers did seem to realize that CIDA has its own pressures and doesn't intend to be disruptive. However,

they feel on the technical side their knowledge and expertise should be trusted more and that CIDA should retain its role as an expert in development and make clear its expectations in this regard.

In terms of partnership approaches and more effective management, CEA managers felt that more decision-making and control should be exercised in Cairo with the CIDA field officer and CEA team leader collaborating more to manage the project. Others argued that the key here is to agree on role, responsibilities, reporting and monitoring procedures at the start of any project and not to deviate from the agreements put in place for such procedures.

Egypt

As mentioned previously, most of the Egyptians who were interviewed in Egypt were involved with the ISAWIP Project. But other Egyptians involved in other projects were also interviewed. In general, the three issues raised most often by Egyptians were the following:

Management of the Development Project

Most of the Egyptians did not feel adequately consulted by CIDA in terms of planning and decision-making. Several senior

managers compared the USAid system to CIDA's approach and stated that they preferred the American approach because it involved them more as an equal partner.


Essentially, their experience with USAid is more joint and more collaborative, where they feel consulted and part of the decision-making. They work closely with the resident USAid manager to co-manage the projects and the American consultants working on different projects take directions from both Egyptians and the USAid managers. From their perspective, this approach provides for them a greater sense of ownership and control. Their experience with CIDA, particularly in the case of ISAWIP, was frustrating. They felt the CEA dominated them, neglected to collaborate, and abused their power. In the CIDA system, with decision-making and control at Headquarters, CIDA was experienced as distant with never enough presence in Egypt to communicate with them and to help direct and limit the power of the CEA. For them, it was confusing to understand CIDA's operation and they expressed frustration at not feeling more an integral part of their own development challenge. What is important to point out about the foregoing is that CIDA as an organization plans and implements projects using a partnership

model similar to the USAid model. But in the case of ISAWIP, the feeling of partnership never emerged. In fact, roles and responsibilities became distorted, and the inability of CIDA and its partners to deal with personnel management and related issues led to a state of distrust and poor communication, and inevitable poor development management. The diagram attempts to illustrate graphically the difference in approaches, the first model as intended by CIDA (and desired by Egypt), and the second model as experienced by Egyptians on ISAWIP.


CIDA, like most donor countries, supports a partnership model of development (model A) whereby they jointly plan and control the implementation of the project with the host country (high control/high partnership), and where the CEA supports and takes direction from the primary partnership (low control/high partnership). But, in the case of ISAWIP, the exact opposite to what was intended was experienced by Egyptians (model B). They experienced the CEA as having control and not collaborating (high control/low partnership), and they experienced CIDA and themselves as out of control and distant (low control/low partnership).

It should be noted that the EEA Project was not faulted in this regard. The Egyptian

CIDA Model (A)
(as intended)



CIDA Model (B)
(as experienced by Egyptians)



managers in the Electrical Authority felt involved right from the start and identified this early involvement with CIDA and the CEA as the key to the success that evolved with their project.

The Distant Canadians

Several Egyptians at all levels expressed concern that some Canadian advisors who came to Egypt made little effort to understand Egyptian ways, tried to control the project, and tended to look down on their Egyptian counterparts. Egyptians are proud of their country and its history, feel generally confident in their expertise, but are willing to learn more advanced technological methods and practices. They are of the opinion that about half of the Canadian advisors are either not committed to teaching and learning, or lack the skills to know how to teach and exchange. Basically, the Egyptians express a desire to learn and exchange with Canadians but to be treated as equals and to learn by working together and socializing. They find the Canadians "too distant" from them and not knowledgeable enough of Egypt's development needs and cultural and religious traditions.

More Collaboration

In terms of recommendations on how to improve the delivery of development

assistance, many suggestions were given. Overall, most argued that a more careful planning involving CIDA, CEA, and GOE was needed in order to better identify the development needs and the type of assistance that will best respond to the needs in Egypt. Elaborating on this point, many Egyptians felt human resource development is the most important goal of technical assistance programs and that a more careful monitoring and evaluation of technical cooperation must be put in place. Too often Canadians with limited technical skills and/or inappropriate behaviour stay on in Egypt for too long. This is a waste and better and more joint systems for monitoring performance of both Canadians and Egyptians would hopefully solve this problem.

Canadian Advisors

Advisors who were interviewed as part of this study presented a wide variety of opinions but four general themes emerge for which there is substantial consensus among all advisors.

On-going Conflict

Advisors feel strongly that the on-going conflicts between CIDA, the CEA, and GOE resulted in a stressful, ambiguous, and tense project atmosphere which severely hindered

their professional effectiveness. The lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities, the distant management of both CIDA and the CEA, and basic poor communication were identified as the major reasons for this state of affairs. Advisors felt caught in the middle of this partner triangle (CIDA, CEA, and GOE), overly pressured, and unsupported. They tended to become cynical about the domination of political and personal agendas over the development agenda.

Management Direction

Although CIDA is most often identified as the main culprit for poor project management, advisors also include the CEA and GOE in their criticism. Both CIDA and the CEA were "out of touch" with the field and CIDA's reporting requirements and endless, consultant monitoring missions took valuable time and energy away from the real work of the project. Advisors feel that the projects operated in a "crisis mode" of management which works against establishing a long-term, coherent, and common vision.

Developing Relationships

Many advisors felt that CIDA only pays lip service to the "soft side" of development. As advisors, they realize that developing

relationships and building trust are fundamental for project success but the pressures to produce, meet schedules, write reports, etc., interfere with their need to succeed "socially". They feel regarded solely as technical experts and the work they do to create the conditions for project success, to establish an environment of trust and respect, is ignored by both CIDA and the GOE.

Personal and Family Issues

With respect to personal and family issues, advisors generally feel unsupported. Often the social demands of their jobs mean sacrificing time with their families which causes friction. To succeed in Egypt, strong family ties are critical and they suggest that a more careful screening of advisors and spouses needs to be undertaken to ensure more effective development outcomes. Some families simply did not cope well in trying to make the transition to Egypt.

Spouses

(Note: All of the spouses interviewed for this project were female)

Spouses in Egypt confirm the research findings from other studies; namely, that international transitions are most difficult and stressful for non-working spouses. In the case of Egypt, this stress was exacerbated when families had

to live in a more rural part of Egypt and/or when advisors had to establish commuting arrangements. Spouses who adapted best reported feeling connected with and supported by other spouses on the Project Team. But it falls to the spouse to deal with a variety of Egyptians from different social classes, care for the children, manage the home, and create an overall "happy" environment for the family. Given these demands, it is perhaps not surprising that spouses are the group who emphasize most the need to learn Arabic. Spouses also report experiencing more culture shock in adapting to Egypt but most reported gaining great personal satisfaction and growth from their experience in Egypt. In a word, they came to enjoy living in and experiencing Egypt, a fascinating country for most of them.

With respect to marital relationships, several spouses who were accustomed to working outside the home in Canada described the negative impact of the posting on the marriage. The advisor adapts readily because he leaves early each day to do his job, a job which is often more demanding than in Canada. The non-working spouse is left "to manage the home-front", something which was often co-managed in Canada, and thus missing her own opportunity for a professional outlet. She often becomes bored and stressed, her need to connect with her husband escalates but, unfortunately, her advisor-husband is rarely available because of the demands of the development assignment. This dynamic can quickly lead to severe marital problems and spouses urged that it was important to take this into account in screening and preparing couples for assignment to Egypt.



Conclusions and Recommendations

It should be noted that the following presentation of conclusions and recommendations addresses the most pressing issues arising out of this special study on Canadian technical advisors in Egypt. It should be recalled that Canadians and Egyptians offered a wide array of suggestions for change. Many of these were reported in the two sections of this paper dealing with the presentation of research findings.

On Relationships Between Canadians and Egyptians

Although most initially described relations between Canadians and Egyptians as cordial and respectful, a deeper probing revealed that these relationships are better characterized as "distant and distrustful" with both sides wishing that there was a greater friendship and exchange. From the Egyptian perspective, Canadians come to Egypt with very fixed ideas about what needs to be accomplished and how to go about "fixing things". They view themselves as superior and try to control and direct the Egyptians. This is completely

unacceptable as it is the strong view of most Egyptians that the Canadians are there to advise, not "to run things", and that to be good advisors, they must spend more time trying to understand the Egyptian way of life, both professionally and personally. From the Canadian side, many Canadians expressed frustration with Egyptians who were not receptive to learning, who were disorganized and too "ad hoc" in their management style, and who were basically not committed to the development project. Clearly, there is a need to assist both sides in learning about the other.

Recommendation

In preparing Canadians to work in Egypt, it is important to help people understand better the role of Islam, institutional constraints, and Egyptian management styles, and how these influence the behaviour and attitudes of Egyptians. Also, it is highly recommended that Egyptian counterparts and Canadian advisors together take training in cross-cultural communication at the start of any Project and that a method for on-going training in this regard be established. This will only serve to promote a

greater exchange, communication and understanding between Egyptians and Canadians.

Canadians must be encouraged to practice the same social skills which they are accustomed to using in Canada. For example:

- *take coffee breaks and lunches together with counterparts*
- *hold "sandwich" lunches to discuss specific issues*
- *have dinners with families*
- *organize special management workshops/ think tanks to problem-solve together*
- *hold team meetings in advisor's home*
- *give counterpart home phone numbers*

On Partnership

Research findings lead to the conclusion that there is little sense or feeling of partnership among the key actors involved in the planning and implementation of development projects in Egypt. Egyptians were generally of the view that they were inadequately consulted and too much controlled by the CEA. CEA managers felt constantly trapped in reporting to two masters (GOE and CIDA) who seldom agreed

on anything. Not only was there little evidence of partnership, there was also little evidence of any goodwill or effective communication between the key partners. Suspicion and distrust was rampant and clearly hindered project success.

Recommendation

In order to establish a partnership approach to development in Egypt, CIDA must lead the way by involving Egyptians in the initial planning, implementation, as well as the procedures for monitoring and evaluating progress. The CEA and the Egyptian Host Institution must be brought in as partners also but must receive clear direction for their role in the development project from CIDA and GOE who have the lead responsibility for ensuring that effective development projects take place in Egypt.

Special training in the form of Team Building should take place and involve all key partners in the development project. The aim here is to build trust and understanding, establish common goals, agree on all management and monitoring procedures, and clarify roles and responsibilities. Representatives from CIDA, GOE, CEA, Host Institution, Advisor team, and Counterpart team should participate in this process.

Note:

Team building is not a "one-shot" activity, but should be on-going until the end of the project. It will involve various sub-teams who should be supported with incentives for working and producing together.

On the Effectiveness of Technical Cooperation

Although the vast majority of Egyptians and Canadians described ISAWIP as a success, it was not a success in terms of relationship building, and ensuring a sustainable transfer of skills and knowledge. For some, ISAWIP was too "high tech" and too "engineer-driven" and ignored the need to educate farmers, and to change management approaches and overall organizational policies and procedures in Egypt. One Canadian advisor felt that ISAWIP at best served to build individual pockets of expertise, but the lack of any serious management development plan would likely challenge the sustainability of the overall technical success of the project in the future. The evidence seems strong that neither the GOE nor CIDA had a plan on how best to exploit the expertise of Canadian advisors. There did not exist any serious "top-down" commitment to institutional

development, involving succession planning and the creation of a results-driven corporate strategy.

Recommendation

In planning with the GOE to promote a more effective institutional development in Egypt, CIDA should work towards negotiating better conditions for enabling technical assistance to become a more effective tool in support of institutional development. Minimal conditions for success include the following:

- *Clarify the goals of the development assistance, results expected, and how progress will be measured and monitored.*
- *Get a commitment that advisors will be used to train and advise, with Egyptian counterparts being made available to work closely with the Canadians. As a corollary to this, push for the establishment of a formal staff*

training and development plan for the Host Institution.

- *Ensure that Egyptian senior management communicate their expectations for change to all management levels within their organization whereby all staff will have an incentive to learn new methods and contribute to the development of their organization.*
- *Establish a plan for how and when CIDA management should directly interface with senior management in Egypt to ensure that the project meets its goals.*
- *Clarify the role of the Canadian Team Leader, his/her authority, and reporting responsibilities. Ideally, the Team Leader should have a counterpart who will work alongside the Canadian with the two being the joint management team for the project.*
- *Deal with the problem of attrition in Egypt by exploring options that will require employees to stay on in the institution for a time commensurate with the training provided. Also seek for new ways to reward performance and attract commitment.*

Planning and Contracting for the "Soft Side"

Most Canadians and Egyptians acknowledged that the significance of the social and cultural context for development projects in Egypt is forgotten in planning and implementation. The human and social development dimensions and goals of ISAWIP were only paid lip service. The need for advisors to demonstrate "people skills", establish social relationships, and work at training and exchanging skills and knowledge with Egyptians was never adequately supported, monitored or evaluated by CIDA, the CEA, or the GOE. One advisor argued that "project outputs need to be defined so that the emphasis is on changed behaviour by the host institution".

Recommendation

CIDA should explore new ways to contract CEAs for producing "soft" results. Rather than focussing just on material outputs or tangible deliverables, there is a need to contract for "process outputs", such as,

- *advisors being able to demonstrate having gained the confidence and respect of Egyptian colleagues*

- *developing a practical strategy for institutional development in Egypt and identifying indicators for success in this regard*
- *demonstrating substantial commitment to the transfer of skills and knowledge*
- *building an effective Canadian/Egyptian team working atmosphere*

Note:

It is interesting to review studies of successful Japanese international business corporations. One of the findings highlights the fact that the most successful companies in Japan only evaluate and reward the "soft" side of success during the first year of an international assignment. That is to say, Japanese international business personnel are rewarded for their achievements in learning local language, demonstrating an understanding of the culture, and establishing social contacts; it is only in their second year of posting that technical output and product delivery is assessed at Japanese headquarters.

On Personnel Selection

The need to carefully screen and select development personnel for their personal skills and attitudes received overwhelming support from all groups participating in the Egypt study. Interestingly, advisors themselves and spouses were perhaps the most vocal on this issue as they see first-hand the consequences of poorly selected and poorly prepared advisors and spouses. In terms of identifying the skills needed to succeed in Egypt, there was a wealth of information provided with a substantial

consensus on the key skills (please see Report on the Profile of the Effective Technical Advisor in Egypt, D. Kealey, August, 1994 for details). One Canadian team leader spoke at length about the importance of selection: "the role of the human being is vital since collaboration is not the dispatch of technology but the interaction between two cultures. And for Canada to build its reputation and prove its desire for helping Egypt, the right person should be selected. If selection is not good, the whole process turns out to be a catastrophe".

As discussed previously, there were four "schools of thought" that seemed to emerge with respect to dealing with the selection issue. Although many supported the "hands-off" approach, such an approach in practice could lead to embarrassment and hostility if advisors screened solely by the CEA fail to collaborate and interact respectfully with Egyptians. The "hands-on" approach, on the other hand, is simply no longer viable given the administrative pressures within CIDA. The "partnership" approach is perhaps ideal as it would serve to promote collaboration and a sense of ownership and commitment to the project by all parties. But implementing such an approach on a regular basis may simply be impractical given

the distance between Canada and Egypt and the time pressures on managers. Accordingly, it is felt that the best option at this time is to implement a modified "arms-length" approach to selection.

Recommendation

CIDA should provide to CEAs a clear set of guidelines, criteria, and expectations for personnel selection and advisor performance in Egypt. Consideration should also be given to providing CEAs with tools and procedures for ensuring a more effective and thorough screening of candidates for international development assignments.



XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

- 3 (b) In your opinion, is it important for CIDA to exercise a greater influence in the selection of CEA personnel assigned to development projects? How might CIDA do this?
- 3 (c) More generally, what should CIDA do to promote a more effective partnership with CEAs (HQ & Field) and with Egyptians (GOE & Counterparts)? (for example, with respect to project planning, proposal call, CEA selection, training, negotiating with Egyptians, etc.)
- 4 (a) From your experience with ISAWIP, what have you personally learned with respect to your own involvement in development assistance?
- 4 (b) What do you feel CIDA as an organization has learned about the planning and delivery of its development assistance?

Part Two

a) Project Difficulties

The purpose of this section is to seek your opinions on the possible causes for the difficulties that evolved with the implementation of development projects. Based on your experience in Egypt, please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following list of reasons for project difficulties.

| | | STRONGLY DISAGREE | | STRONGLY AGREE | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------------------|---|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| Poorly selected Canadian advisors | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Poorly selected Egyptian counterparts | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Lack of commitment on the part of Egyptians | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Poor management at CIDA HQ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Poor management at Post | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| Poor management on the part of the CEA | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| CEA inability to understand development | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Lack of clarity of roles & accountabilities among PTL, PRO, POST, CEA HQ, CEA FIELD, GOE | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Poorly defined project goals, outputs, etc. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Inability of Canadians to understand and respect Egyptians | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Inability of Egyptians to understand and respect Canadians | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Bureaucratic obstacles within the GOE | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Other reasons (please list and rate) | | | | | | | | | | |

b) Living and Working in Egypt

The purpose of this section is to ask you to assess more generally the overall challenge for Canadians living and working in Egypt. Please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

| | STRONGLY DISAGREE | STRONGLY AGREE | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| Canadians are well prepared for living and working in Egypt | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Friendship between Canadians and Egyptians comes easy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Adequate financial resources and technical expertise are the most important factors in Project success | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Canadians isolate themselves too much from contact with the people of Egypt | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| It is not easy for Canadians to adapt to Egypt | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Some knowledge of the local language is needed for an effective adaptation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Canadians understand and respect the cultural traditions of Egypt | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| Project success depends as much on good communication as on anything else | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| It is the responsibility of Canadians to gain the respect of Egyptian staff | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Canadians interact well with Egyptians | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

c) Professional Effectiveness

Please rate the importance of the following factors for ensuring successful development outcomes:

| | NOT VERY | | | | | VERY | | | | |
|---|-----------|---|---|---|---|-----------|---|---|---|----|
| | IMPORTANT | | | | | IMPORTANT | | | | |
| Ability to work in a team | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Understanding of international development | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Person to person communication skills | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Technical and job competence | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Understanding and respect of the local culture | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Clear understanding of project goals | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Management skills | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Professional commitment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Interest and participation in the local culture | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Knowledge of local language | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Previous cross-cultural living experience | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Other reasons (please list and rate) | | | | | | | | | | |

Living and Working Overseas Field Follow-up Questionnaire

Daniel J. Kealey, Ph.D.

Confidential when completed

Special Note:

This survey questionnaire was originally designed for use with technical advisors currently working in the field. Please complete it as if you were still on your posting in Egypt.

1. For each of the following please indicate whether you agree or disagree:

- a) Based on my experience thus far, I would say there is not much I can do about most of the important problems that this country faces today.
- b) Things are so complicated in this country that I often find it difficult to understand what is going on.
- c) In order to make advances in a country such as this, one is almost forced to do some things which don't always seem right by one's own standards.
- d) In my experience in this country, I find I am not that much interested in cultural activities that most people in the country seem to like.
- e) Thus far, during this assignment, I have often felt lonely.
- f) I haven't really enjoyed much of the work I have had to do since I arrived, but I believe that it is nonetheless important to do in order to insure that my personal and family's long run goals are realized.

2. With whom do you spend most of your leisure time?

Approximate percentage of
time spent

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|
| a) Alone | _____ |
| b) With immediate family | _____ |
| c) With host country nationals | _____ |
| d) With Canadians | _____ |
| e) With other foreigners | _____ |
| Total | 100% |

3. Overall, how difficult has it been to adjust to the foreign country? (Circle one number)

Very difficult 1 2 3 4 5 Very easy

4. Has your adjustment to the foreign country been stressful? (Circle one number)

Hardly stressful at all 1 2 3 4 5 Very stressful

5. How do you feel now about living in the foreign country? (Circle one number)

Very dissatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 Very satisfied

6. Overall, how would you describe your contacts with host nationals? (Circle one on each line)

a) On-the-job

Satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 Unsatisfactory

Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Unpleasant

Rewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Unrewarding

b)Off-the-job

Satisfactory 1 2 3 4 5 Unsatisfactory

Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Unpleasant

Rewarding 1 2 3 4 5 Unrewarding

7. To what extent is knowledge and understanding of the local language important for living and working in the foreign country?

Very important 1 2 3 4 5 Not very important

8. To what degree have you learned the local language? (Circle one)

1. Fully 2. A great deal 3. Quite a bit 4. To some extent 5. Hardly at all

9. How difficult has it been to understand and effectively communicate with nationals?

Very easy 1 2 3 4 5 Very difficult

10. The following items cover various aspects of an overseas assignment. Try not to be influenced by whether or not you consider these skills and activities desirable or not.**scale: 1 - completely 2 - a great deal 3 - quite a bit 4 - to some extent 5 - hardly at all**

- a) To what extent do you demonstrate the ability to communicate with host country individuals through methods other than the spoken word? (Note: Non-verbal communication includes skills such as use of host country gestures, appropriate eye contact, appropriate interpersonal space, etc.)
- b) To what extent do you interact with host country people, and have host country individuals as friends?
- c) To what extent are you interested in this country and take the initiative to get out and see as much of it as possible?

- d) To what extent do you possess knowledge of a factual nature regarding this country? (Note: factual knowledge includes knowledge of history, geography, politics, religion, current events, etc.)
- e) To what extent do you accept this country and its customs as different but valid for the people of this country?
- f) To what extent do you engage in a variety of enjoyable activities here?
- g) To what extent do you understand and effectively communicate with nationals?

11. Overseas posts vary in degree of comfort compared to Canada. For each of the following areas below, indicate how you estimate the degree of comfort compared to Canada.

- scale: 1 - much more comfortable than Canada 2 - generally more comfortable than Canada
 3 - about the same 4 - generally less comfortable than Canada
 5 - much less comfortable than Canada

- a) Housing b) Climate c) Personal security d) Availability of goods/services
 e) Financial situation f) Overall

12. Here is a picture of a ladder. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder (pointing to the value 10) represents the best possible life for you and the bottom (pointing to value of 0) represents the worst possible life for you. Would you please indicate the degree of your life satisfaction by checking a number for each time frame as specified below? (Please check only those time frames that apply to you.)

| |
|----|
| 10 |
| 9 |
| 8 |
| 7 |
| 6 |
| 5 |
| 4 |
| 3 |
| 2 |
| 1 |
| 0 |

- (1) Where on the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time? Step no. _____
- (2) Where on the ladder would you say you stood during the last 1-2 years in Canada prior to your assignment overseas? Step no. _____

- (3) Where on the ladder would you say you stood during the first month in this country? Step no. _____
- (4) Where on the ladder would you say you stood 2-4 months after arrival in this country? Step no. _____
- (5) Where on the ladder would you say you stood 4-6 months after arrival? Step no. _____
- (6) Where on the ladder would you say you stood 6 months after arrival? Step no. _____

13. Overseas jobs vary in the constraints that interfere with effectiveness on the job. Possible constraining factors are listed below. Indicate how much you think each of the factors constrains your effectiveness on the job.

Scale: 1 - completely 2 - a great deal 3 - quite a bit 4 - to some extent 5 - hardly at all

- (a) 1) How constraining is the lack of clearly defined objectives?
- 2) How constraining is the lack of realistic objectives?
- 3) How constraining is the lack of commitment from others?
- 4) How constraining is the lack of support staff?
- 5) How constraining is the lack of facilities?
- 6) How constraining is the lack of equipment?
- 7) How constraining is the lack of clear terms of reference (i.e., in the job description)?
- (b) 1) Does dissatisfaction on your spouse's part affect your performance?
- 2) Does dissatisfaction on your children's part affect your performance?
- 3) Does poor leadership/management on the project affect your performance?
- 4) Does difficulty communicating with nationals affect your performance?
- 5) Do difficulties between Canadian staff affect your performance?

6) Does the lack of adequate support from your employer affect your performance?

7) Has your own sense of disillusionment affected your performance?

Are there other things which tend to limit your effectiveness? Please list.

14. (a) Overall, how satisfied are you with your job conditions?

(b) Has your job on this assignment been more challenging than the job you left in Canada?

(c) Has your job on this assignment been more personally fulfilling than the job you left in Canada?

15. (a) What primarily motivated you to undertake this assignment?

(b) Would you consider undertaking another posting in the future?

Please discuss why or why not.

16. Did you experience any culture shock or stress in adjusting to this foreign country?

Please describe.

17. (a) How important do you consider the transfer of skills from Canadians to Nationals?

Very important 1 2 3 4 5 Not very important

(b) How effective have you been at this task?


Very effective 1 2 3 4 5 Not effective at all

18. Thus far, what has been the most satisfying aspect of your assignment?

19. Thus far, what has been the most difficult aspect of your assignment?

20. Personal feelings


Directions: Place a check on the face which shows how you feel about each of the following six items.



1 - Living in this country.




2 - Yourself, as you live and work in this country.




3 - Getting to know host country people.



4 - Your job.



5 - Speaking another language.



6 - Your health in this country.

21. Project Difficulties

The purpose of this section is to seek your opinions on the possible causes for difficulties that often evolve with the implementation of development projects. Based on your experience in Egypt, please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following list of reasons for project difficulties.

| | STRONGLY DISAGREE | STRONGLY AGREE |
|---|----------------------|-------------------|
| Poorly selected Canadian advisors | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Poorly selected Egyptian counterparts | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Lack of commitment on the part of Egyptians | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Poor management at CIDA HQ | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Poor management at Post | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Poor management on the part of CEA | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |

| | |
|---|----------------------|
| CEA inability to understand development | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Lack of clarity of roles & accountabilities among PTL, PRO, POST, CEA HQ, CEA FIELD, GOE | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Poorly defined project goals, outputs, etc. | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Inability of Canadians to understand and respect Egyptians | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Inability of Egyptians to understand and respect Canadians | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Bureaucratic obstacles within the GOE | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 |
| Other reasons (please list and rate) | |

22. Living and Working in Egypt

The purpose of this section is to ask you to assess more generally the overall challenge for Canadians living and working in Egypt. Please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

| | STRONGLY DISAGREE | STRONGLY AGREE |
|---|----------------------|-------------------|
| Canadians are well prepared for living and working in Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Friendship between Canadians and Egyptians comes easy | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Adequate financial resources and technical expertise are the most important factors in Project success | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Canadians isolate themselves too much from contact with the people of Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| It is not easy for Canadians to adapt to Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Some knowledge of the local language is needed for an effective adaptation | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| Canadians understand and respect the cultural traditions of Egypt | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Project success depends as much on good communication as on anything else | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| It is the responsibility of Canadians to gain the respect of Egyptian staff | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Canadians interact well with Egyptians and Egyptians comes easy | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

23. Professional Effectiveness

Please rate the importance of the following factors for ensuring successful development outcomes:

| | NOT VERY IMPORTANT | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | VERY IMPORTANT |
|---|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|-------------------|
| Ability to work in a team | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Understanding of international development | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Person to person communication skills | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Technical and job competence | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Understanding and respect of the local culture | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Clear understanding of project goals | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Management skill | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Professional commitment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Interest and Participation in the local culture | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Knowledge of local language | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Previous cross-cultural living experience | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Other (please list and rate) | | | | | | | | | | | | |

24. Recommendations

Do you have any additional overall recommendations or comments regarding your overseas experience?

Do you have any additional recommendations or comments which you wish to direct to CIDA?

Field Survey Questionnaire (Egyptians)

Confidential when completed

Part One

Project Issues

1. (a) How important is technical cooperation for Egypt?
(b) Do you see the role of foreign technical assistance changing in the future? How?
2. In your opinion, what is required to make technical cooperation projects successful in Egypt besides technical expertise?
3. How effective has technical assistance been in terms of developing human resources and institution building in Egypt?
4. In your opinion, what are the major obstacles to ensuring a successful outcome for technical assistance?

Personnel Issues

5. Based on your experience, what would you say are the most important personal attitudes or skills necessary for a Canadian to be successful in Egypt?

6. in your opinion, what difficulties do Canadians tend to experience in adapting to living and working conditions in Egypt?
7. a) What might CIDA do to improve the process for selecting and preparing Canadians to work in Egypt?

b) Should Egyptians be more involved in selecting Canadian technical advisors?
Please comment.
8. Of the Canadians you have known, how effective have they been as technical advisors working in Egypt?

Professional Relationships

9. What do you feel are the greatest difficulties for Egyptians in working with Canadians and other foreigners?
10. What do you like about working with Canadians?
11. Are there differences in working style between Egyptians and Canadians? Please describe.
12. What do you feel are the most important requirements for establishing effective collaboration between Egyptians and Canadians? What should CIDA and Egypt do to promote a more effective collaboration?

Part Two

a) Project Difficulties

The purpose of this section is to seek your opinions on the possible causes for difficulties that often evolve with the implementation of development projects. Based on your experience in Egypt, please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following list of reasons for project difficulties.

| | STRONGLY DISAGREE | | STRONGLY AGREE |
|---|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Unsuitable Canadian advisors | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Unsuitable Egyptian counterparts | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Poor communication among all partners | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Management difficulties at CIDA HQ | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Management difficulties at CIDA Post | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Poor management on the part of the CEA | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| CEA inability to understand development | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Lack of clarity of roles & accountabilities among PTL, PRO, POST, CEA HQ, CEA FIELD, GOE | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Poorly defined project goals, outputs, etc. | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Inability of Canadians to understand and respect Egyptians | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Inability of Egyptians to understand and respect Canadians | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Difficult procedures within the GOE | 1 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Other reasons (please list and rate) | | | |

b) Living and Working in Egypt

The purpose of this section is to ask you to assess more generally the overall challenge for Canadians living and working in Egypt. Please circle a number to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

| | STRONGLY DISAGREE | STRONGLY AGREE |
|--|----------------------|-------------------|
| Canadians are well prepared for living and working in Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Friendship between Canadians and Egyptians comes easy | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Adequate financial resources and technical expertise are the most important factors in Project success | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Canadians isolate themselves too much from contact with the people of Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| It is not easy for Canadians to adapt to Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Some knowledge of the local language is needed for an effective adaptation | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Canadians understand and respect the cultural traditions of Egypt | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Project success depends as much on good communication as on anything else | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| It is the responsibility of Canadians to gain the respect of Egyptian staff | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |
| Canadians interact well with Egyptians | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | |

c) Professional Effectiveness

Please rate the importance of the following factors for ensuring successful development outcomes:

| | NOT VERY IMPORTANT | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | VERY IMPORTANT |
|---|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|-------------------|
| Ability to work in a team | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Understanding of international development | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Person to person communication skills | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Technical and job competence | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Understanding and respect of the local culture | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Clear understanding of project goals | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Management skill | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Professional commitment | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Interest and participation in the local culture | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Knowledge of local language | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Previous cross-cultural living experience | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | | |
| Other (please list and rate) | | | | | | | | | | | | |



Appendix B: Participants in: "Interpersonal and Cultural Dimensions of Development Assistance"

List of Interviewees

CIDA

J.M. LaFerriere

Victor Carvell

Frank Mes

Katherine Dunlop

Paul Bertrand

Marilyn Cayer

Al Walden

Kate Preston

M. Lawrence

Aly Shady

Andre Gauthier

Pierre Heroux

Bob Fraser

Christian Tardif

Eman Omran

Gilles LaMontaigne

CEA

Don MacIntyre

John Slater

Don Ramsey

M. A. Farris

S. Colombi

John Metzger

Tom Drolet

Brian McConville

Louann Lynch

Mike Pender

ISAWIP Advisors

Vivian Keough

Elizabeth Wickett

Irv Martens

Kenneth Kress

Mark Miskiman

Remmelt Hummelen

Karim Chirara

Noel McNaughton

Abu El Magd

Chris Taschuk

Bill Aulakh

Yolande Geadah

Consultants

V. Duret

R. Titus

Bob Broughton

G. Goldevin

OHC Advisors

| | |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| Keith Heckley | Helmut Meier |
| Gerry Dewulf | Doug Guest |
| Glen Wedlock | George Whittaker |
| Jim Nagy | Don Rochon |
| Bud Woodfine | Bob Van Aertselaer |
| Eugene Williams | Alfred Woelke |
| John Mayo | Steve Kelley |
| John Joaquin | |

Spouses

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Kathleen Hummelen | Margaret Williams |
| Mary Kelley | Peggy Southin |
| Caroline Fehr | Linda Guest |
| Carolyn DeWulf | Lois Whitakker |
| Jane Wedlock | Irene Rochon |
| Roxanne Nagy | Patricia Van Aertselaer |
| Diane Woodfine | Bridget Metzger |

Other Project Personnel

ELAS

Chris Southin

WIF

Walter Nilsson

RNPD II

Patrice Pelletier

Egyptian Officials Interviewed

| Name | Post | Project |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Eng. Mohammed El Safty | Egyptian Manager | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Hassan El Kadousy | Irrigation Inspector | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Abdel Moneim Hamza | Irrigation Component | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Magdi Yacoub | Aga Plant | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Hassan | Aga Plant | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Mr. Mohamed Fathy | Accountant | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Mohamed Bakry | Automation | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Mr. Elmy Abdel Wahab | Office Manager | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Mohamed Shawky Farahat | Extension Component | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Moneer Fouda | Extension Agronomist | ISAWIP, Mansourra |
| Mr. Ibrahim Gamal | DSCC Manager | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Dr. Ali Bahrawi | Consultant | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Mohamed Makhoulouf | Chairman of PSC | ISAWIP, Mansoura |
| Eng. Ali Abdel Wahab | U/S EALIP | ISAWIP, Cairo |

| Name | Post | Project |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| Eng. Nashaat Lotfy | Soil Improvement, EALIP | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Dr. Salah Mahmoud | Consultant, EALIP | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Eng. Azmy Said | Agronomist | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Mr. Hassan Farid | Ex. Office Manager | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Eng. Sarwat Fahmi | Chairman of PSC | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Eng. Samir Shehata | MOALR Coordinator EALIP | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Eng. Salem Mousa | Chairman of PSC | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Eng. Zaki Arnaout | CADSAC | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Eng. Hosni Mitawlli | CADSAC | ISAWIP, Cairo |
| Mr. Omar Farouk | Manager | ELAS/S.F. |
| Ms. Shadia Yousri | Manager | ELAS/S.F. |
| Eng. Hazem Tambouli | Ex. President of Cairo South Zone | EEA |
| Dr. Bassiony El Baradie | Egyptian Manager | EEA |
| Eng. Gamal Lam'ay | Director-General Training | EEA |

| Name | Post | Project |
|----------------------|------------------|--|
| Dr. Mohamed Amer | EPM | RNPD II |
| Mrs. Ibtissam Hassan | Director | WIF |
| Mrs. Abla Marzouk | Program Manager | CESO |
| Mrs. Sana Hafez | ICOP Coordinator | FSU |
| Mrs. Ibtissam El Abd | Director General | Ministry of International Cooperation |

Note:

In addition to this list of Egyptians, all of whom were interviewed in Egypt, another 60 Egyptians who had worked on ISAWIP completed survey questionnaires. The total Egyptian participants equals 93.

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