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THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF A SYSTEM
FOR THE DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES AMONG
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

A Pilot Study Prepared for the
Policy Analysis Group in the
Department of External Affairs

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Preface

This research project was undertaken from a social science perspective and, as a result, the analysis presented in Parts II and IV relies heavily upon social science methods. However, after having used these methods to establish our findings, we then go on, in Part III, to present a system of application which may be implemented without the use of social science methods, if this is viewed as a more desirable approach. For example, the principal dimensions of priority which are derived statistically in Part II are reproduced in definitional form in Part III and may be employed in this form, with graphic representation, thus avoiding the need for any additional statistical analysis on the part of External Affairs.

Although this report in its entirety is addressed to PAG, we point out in Part I that its various sections will be of interest to different audiences in addition to PAG. Part II will be of greatest interest to those who participated in the general objectives questionnaire. Part III is addressed primarily to senior management within the Department of External Affairs, especially those concerned with forward planning and coordination. Part IV will be of interest to food experts in a number of government departments and agencies, as well as to those concerned with inter-departmental coordination on specific policy issues. Parts I and V, respectively, introduce and summarize the project in its entirety.

*backward
inward
outward*

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PART I

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES PROJECT

This project is intended to explore the feasibility of designing a systematic procedure by which to integrate objectives into foreign policy planning in order to establish greater congruence between Canadian foreign policy objectives and the policy itself. This effort is based on the assumption that the design of a satisfactory procedure will facilitate the achievement of three ends. A comprehensive scheme of foreign policy objectives coupled with a means to link these to policy will (1) help in rationalizing foreign policy choices, (2) serve to guide the allocation of resources to foreign policy programmes, and (3) permit an evaluation of the effectiveness of programmes in meeting the policy objectives of government.

The presence of these aims in the discussions which provided the original mandate of this project played a major role in our selection of a general orientation toward the construction and implementation of an appropriate procedure. We saw as our first task the identification of a comprehensive set of foreign policy objectives. In drawing up such a list, two concerns were paramount. First, we wished to ensure that our set comprised those objectives which policy-makers themselves associated with Canadian foreign policy, rather than those which we as observers were able to identify in some "objective" fashion. This was achieved by deriving our set of objectives from a survey of internal government documents and official public statements on foreign policy. The specific procedures by which this survey was conducted are treated in detail in Part II. Second, we wished to construct a general classification scheme with which to organize the objectives so that they could also be viewed as instances of more general

foreign policy concerns. This we accomplished through the establishment of a three-level hierarchy of foreign policy concerns, consisting of a set of highly general goals, each composed of a number of more specific foreign policy issues, with the very concrete objectives associated with each of these issues located at the base of the hierarchy. This classification scheme is intended to clarify the relationship between broad Canadian foreign policy goals, key international issues of current interest and the much more specific objectives with which we are concerned in this project. This scheme is also described in more detail in Part II.

The second, and perhaps most important stage of the project involved the development of a system by which to establish a hierarchy of priorities among the concrete foreign policy objectives and link these priorities to actual policy. This constituted the most difficult phase of our research since there exists no generally accepted system for discriminating among objectives on the basis of relative priorities. In designing such a system, we required that it provide a method through which to assign an overall priority rating to each objective and that the individual ratings be directly comparable in order to permit a hierarchical arrangement of the objectives in terms of the relative rating of each. In addition, we were concerned that the system should not only provide a reliable and valid hierarchy of priorities but also lend itself to relatively efficient subsequent use by the Department of External Affairs in the reformulation of appropriate priorities. The steps in the development of the system and the research undertaken to evaluate its utility are both presented in Part II. On the basis of this research, we devised a formal system for the identification of priorities and the ordering of objectives. Further, we identified a set

of procedures by which these tasks may be suitably undertaken by the Department itself and the results used to establish a link between priorities among objectives and policy evaluation and planning. These proposals are presented in Part III and may be examined independently of the remaining sections of this report. However, the logic of the derivation of the proposals cannot be understood without a consideration of Part II.

As a final aspect of the project, we desired to explore the relationships among various objectives, not only in terms of their relative priority but also through an examination of the extent to which the pursuit of a specific objective would support or impair the realization of other objectives. In addition we wished to assess the extent to which differing objectives appeared appropriate in light of probable future developments in various foreign policy issues. In order to accomplish these complex tasks we decided to narrow our focus to include foreign policy objectives in one issue only. Through mutual agreement between ourselves and the Department, the issue dealing with the world food situation was selected for illustrative purposes. We felt this issue would provide a particularly useful area for analysis for three reasons. First, the world food situation has become, since 1973, a critical issue in international affairs. Second, it is an issue on which Canada stands out as one of the central actors due to our position as one of the world's primary exporters of essential foodstuffs. Finally, it is an issue on which the establishment of priority objectives and the maintenance of congruence between objectives and policies is particularly difficult due to the involvement of a variety of departments in the issue and the existence of a counterpart food issue in the domestic arena. For these reasons, we felt that an analysis of objectives and policies, and

the relationship between the two, might be especially useful for the issue of the world food situation. The procedures used for the identification of objectives in the food issue and the hierarchical ordering of those objectives are similar to those employed in the analysis of objectives across the full range of foreign policy issues. The major difference lies in the expansion of the application to include not only External Affairs but also a variety of other government departments and agencies concerned with the issue. Thus, we are able to assign priorities to objectives and to compare the order of priorities assigned by each department and agency. We then undertake an evaluation of the extent to which the various orders of priority appear to be appropriate in light of expert forecasts of future developments in the world food situation.

The analysis of the food issue is largely disassociated from the more general analysis of objectives across all issues. It is intended principally to illustrate another dimension of the problem of the relationship between objectives and policies, one which has its roots in the division of responsibility for the determination of policy. It does, however, indicate a partial solution through the identification of the areas of consensus on objectives and priorities between responsible departments and agencies. This analysis and the implications which may be drawn from the results for the food issue are presented in Part IV of this report.

To summarize, the results of this exploratory project are presented in Parts II through IV of this report. Part II describes the procedures followed in the development and testing of our system, Part III presents proposals for the implementation of the system, and Part IV describes its extension to the analysis of inter-departmental priorities on one issue. Finally, in Part V a summary of the project is provided along with a number of conclusions drawn from our experience in attempting to design this system for policy planning.

They should have
used Country program
terminology!

PART II

THE IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND
THE DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES

The design of a systematic procedure by which to integrate objectives into foreign policy planning begins with the identification of a comprehensive typology of foreign policy objectives. This must be followed with the construction and application of a technique through which to assign an overall priority rating to each objective, after which the objectives must be ordered in some way to represent the hierarchy of the relative priorities assigned them. In this section of the report we describe the procedures devised to achieve these ends and the results of our preliminary effort to apply them in the analysis of the foreign policy objectives of the Department of External Affairs.

A Typology of Foreign Policy Objectives

In designing a typology of foreign policy objectives, we identified three distinct levels of foreign policy concerns according to the degree of generality or specificity of the concern. It was our intention to differentiate between broad Canadian foreign policy goals, key policy issues of current interest and more specific operational objectives, and to clarify the relationship among these. In making these distinctions we wished to preserve the general concepts of national interests best represented in broad goals but at the same time to obtain a comprehensive and up-to-date inventory of much more concrete and precise foreign policy objectives associated with a variety of international issues. We did so because the goals are enduring aspects of policy, unlikely to be willingly abrogated by those responsible for policy formulation. As a result, the goals are relatively equal in terms of their importance in foreign policy and any attempt to assign varying priorities among them would have little meaning. The goals are, however, useful in identifying the broad, general concerns of the government. Similarly, while foreign policy issues represent the somewhat more specific concerns of policy-makers, they are still framed at the level of generality which makes priority differentiation among them difficult. At the same time, they do provide

a narrowing focus within which to organize the foreign policy concerns of greatest specificity, these being operational objectives. Policy analysts have criticized governments for the habit of invoking vague concepts of national interest in place of a precise formulation of their foreign policy objectives. These analysts are of the opinion that detailed policy planning requires the prior identification of concrete and precise objectives. We share this view and so directed our efforts toward the development of a comprehensive inventory of operational objectives. In so doing, we wanted to determine how clearly and concretely the Canadian government articulates its foreign policy objectives and also to discover to what extent these are recognized and shared by the community of officials responsible for policy.

At the top of our classification scheme, then, we identify three extremely general foreign policy Goals, representing broad Canadian national interests as they relate to the international environment. The general goals we have termed: Well-Being of the International Community, Canadian Economic Well-Being, and Canadian Policy Control. Conceptually, these foreign policy goals correspond to the six themes (occasionally also misleadingly referred to as objectives) that were identified by A Foreign Policy for Canadians. However we have chosen to apply a somewhat different terminology. Quality of Life and Harmonious Natural Environment, which are somewhat vague, at least in the foreign policy context, Canadian have been eliminated. We prefer the concept of Economic Well-Being to that of Economic Growth, as the aims of protecting a given standard of living or of achieving a better distribution of wealth may be more appropriate than the unqualified commitment to the growth ethic. Well-Being of the International Community subsumes the international expression of Peace and Security and Social Justice and includes a commitment to a co-operative and equitable global economic Canadian order. Finally, Policy Control entails the central element in the protection of Canadian Sovereignty and Independence. Given their extremely broad scope, there seems to be little room for disagreement that these are, indeed, valid Canadian

policy goals; differences of opinion are more likely to arise over attempts to identify an order of importance among the goals and over what specific policies ought to be adopted in attempting to realize them. In fact, the goals are all so important as to defy an attempt at ranking and so general as to be of little assistance in determining appropriate policies. To achieve these ends, greater specificity is necessary.

At the second level we have identified Issues that represent current and significant problems of either global or domestic origin which presently engage Canadian foreign policy makers as they try to cope with or resolve them. The set, consisting of 15 foreign policy issues, was derived by PAG in consultation with other divisions of the Department and ICER Departments and represents problem areas that have been identified as important from the Canadian perspective and which occupy a significant portion of the current working agenda of the government. While opinions about the respective significance of these foreign policy issues tend to vary, there existed substantial consensus on what issues merited inclusion. Table I attempts to indicate the relationship between the 3 goals (identified above) and the 15 foreign policy issues. While it should not necessarily be taken as proof of superior importance, the table does make clear that a greater proportion of today's international problem areas, as perceived by Canadian policy makers, is linked to the Well-Being of the International Community and Economic Well-Being goals than to that of Policy Control.

The third level of the typology is composed of Operational Objectives which indicate the specific and concrete ends sought by the Canadian government in resolving or coping with a particular issue. We identified a total of 77 operational objectives, or an average of 5 objectives per issue, and these are listed by issue in Appendix I. The choice of Objectives was determined by a two-way process. An initial list was drawn up that was based on a survey of internal government documents such as briefing books prepared for a foreign visit by the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State

These goals are silly if the time we could be linked to any of the goals.

TABLE 1

A TYPOLOGY OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES ARRANGED BY GOALS (X indicates a situation where an Issue relates directly to a Goal)

ISSUES	<u>GOALS</u>		
	Well-Being of the International Community	Canadian Economic Well-Being	Canadian Policy Control
World Food Situation	X	X	X
Law of the Sea	X		
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	X		
International Peace & Security	X		
International Trade System	X	X	
International Monetary System	X	X	
International Resource System	X	X	
Immigration	X	X	
Canadian Trade		X	
Marine Environment & Fisheries		X	X
Primary Resource Utilization		X	X
Multinational Enterprise Activities		X	X
Diversification		X	X
Global Economic Redistribution	X		
Human Rights and Discrimination	X		

for External Affairs, instructions to the Canadian delegation at an international conference, or Cabinet decisions on current foreign policy items. This list was then validated with reference to the government's public declarations on foreign policy objectives. A content analysis of official public statements on foreign policy objectives was made independently of the above exercise. The principal sources were Documents of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Statements and Speeches from 1 January 1974 to date. One hundred and eighteen statements were extracted, largely from remarks made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. These were then coded independently and compared with the issue areas and operational objectives identified in the PAG exercise. In some cases wording of objectives was changed to correspond to the public statements. A substantial fit was found between the statements of objectives derived from internal documents and those from the public record. The list is not however exhaustive; a more structured effort could be conducted from internal documents at the Department or by interviews with responsible officials. We do feel that we have a sufficiently accurate and detailed first approximation of current Canadian objectives to enable us to consider this set an adequate typology of foreign policy objectives.

The identification of goals, current issues and operational objectives completes the construction of our classification scheme. We now shift our attention to the assignment of overall priority ratings to the objectives and the identification of the hierarchy of priorities.

The Determination of Priorities

Policy-making entails choice among a variety of objectives which compete either on substantive grounds or for scarce resources which have to be invested in their pursuit. The determination of foreign policy priorities, which involves the construction of a generally agreed upon preference-order of potential policy objectives, should assist governments in deriving an optimum choice. The

Not an either/or situation

You either have to do
or decide certain
things to attain a
goal!

*Critical
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multiplicity of individual and institutional preferences makes the task of fashioning a set of foreign policy priorities an extremely difficult one, a problem that is compounded by the unstable nature of the international environment.

In approaching the determination of priorities within the objectives set, a necessary first step involves the definition of the concept "priority". While the concept is generally understood as an order of significance or value, our assumption here is that the meaning of significance itself is potentially complex when related to the requirements of policy planning. That is, the value of any single objective will reflect not only its general importance in the overall scheme of foreign policy but also such possible additional considerations as administrative necessity, current demands on policy-makers emanating from various environments, and perhaps the extent to which Canada can play a major role in the achievement of the objective.

In order to accommodate these various aspects of the priority concept we decided to proceed, in the first instance, with a multi-dimensional definition of significance through which to evaluate each of the objectives. Five dimensions were selected and they, along with their definitions, are as follows.

1. Importance. The extent to which an objective is central to the realization of a solution to the problems represented in the foreign policy issue to which the objective is related.
2. Urgency. The extent to which there exists a narrow time limit (usually less than one year) within which a Canadian initiative or commitment must be undertaken or in which some policy must be adopted in the pursuit of the foreign policy objective.
3. Canadian Impact. The extent to which the achievement of the foreign policy objective can be determined by a Canadian policy initiative.

4. Reaction to External Events. The extent to which a Canadian initiative to achieve the foreign policy objective will be prompted by or be a reaction to pressures or events originating outside of Canada.
5. Reaction to Domestic Pressures. The extent to which pressures from within Canada will prompt an initiative to achieve the foreign policy objective.

At the outset, we do not know whether individuals are capable of discriminating among the five priority criteria. Clearly, if there is any single objective on which Canada will be forced to react to both external and domestic pressures, which Canada can achieve largely on its own initiative, and which is judged to be both urgent and important, then this objective will be assigned a high priority. However, it is probable that for many objectives some, but not all of these conditions will obtain. In this case, the priority assigned an objective will depend upon the criterion considered if the individual is able to maintain a separation between the evaluative criteria. We feel that the definitions are sufficiently different and precise to permit this discrimination, although we shall subsequently undertake a test to determine whether this is, in fact, the case and at that point will revise the criteria if necessary.

With these five criteria for evaluating priorities identified and defined, the next step in our project involves their actual application in the evaluation of the 77 foreign policy objectives identified earlier. We decided to employ policy-makers in the Department of External Affairs to carry out this evaluation. This was accomplished by constructing a 5-point scale, ranging from very high to very low, for each of our priority dimensions. A detailed questionnaire was formed, consisting of the list of Issues and their respective Operational Objectives and this was circulated to 18 officers of the Department after several pretests and

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output

modifications. In selecting the respondents we applied two principal criteria: expertise in a given field and adequate distribution between the different regional and functional bureaux of the Department. To achieve the former, we approached only directors of divisions or middle-ranking officers with at least one year of experience in their current duties. We sought to satisfy the latter criterion, which is required in order to assess the impact of an officer's current operational duties on his perception of Canadian foreign policy objectives at large, by selecting respondents from each of the four major regional bureaux and from functional divisions such as Defence Relations, Legal, Economic, Federal-Provincial Relations and United Nations Divisions. In addition, the Policy Analysis Group was included ^{the} for/purpose of comparison to determine whether officials who had been directly involved in planning and assessing overall foreign policy objectives would, in fact, have a different perspective from those who normally dealt with foreign policy objectives only from the vantage point of their highly specific regional or functional operational duties. The respondents were asked to rate each of the objectives in terms of each of the five dimensions (Importance, Urgency, Canadian Impact, Reaction to External Events, and Reaction to Domestic Pressures) according to the 5-point scale. In addition, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed that each particular objective did, indeed, represent a current foreign policy objective of the Canadian government. We inserted this particular precaution in order to uncover obvious discrepancies between the government's intentions and the perceptions of foreign policy officials and to identify any of our objectives that might be marginal to Canadian foreign policy.

The evaluations provided by the foreign policy officials permit the assignment of an overall priority rating to each objective and thus enable us to rank objectives in a hierarchy of significance. Our aim here was to encourage these foreign policy practitioners to view foreign policy issues in terms of concrete operational objectives in order to bring their evaluations of priorities closer to the day-to-day concerns which make up a specific area of

responsibility. This should also provide the official with a better understanding of how his particular area of expertise fits into the broader context of foreign policy issues.

We wished to compare our approach to the determination of priorities through the evaluation of operational objectives with one which proceeds without either the specificity of the objectives or the multi-dimensional treatment of the priority concept. In order to do this a section was included in the questionnaire in which the respondents were asked to rank the fifteen Issues (unrelated to the operational objectives) in descending order of their overall importance in the general scheme of Canadian foreign policy. Several officials commented on this specific task by indicating that ranking was a futile task without reference to more concrete definitions as to what determined overall importance. Others noted that they were being asked to combine "chalk and cheese" insofar as there was no obvious relationship between many of the Issues. Both comments tend to strengthen our belief in the necessity of developing explicit operational criteria for the analysis of Canadian foreign policy. It is quite true that there may be no connection of substance between two given Issues, but in the policy sense a connection easily emerges simply because a government has to allocate scarce resources and time in dealing with two or more issues simultaneously. A system of operational objectives that involves explicit criteria allows us to make comparisons between items in terms of relative impact or urgency or on any other dimension and thus creates a common denominator which tends to resolve the chalk and cheese dilemma. A comparison of the results obtained using the two approaches will be presented after a description of the results of the evaluation of objective priorities.

Identifying Priorities Among Objectives

Recall that each respondent was required to assign a priority rating ranging from 5 (very high) to 1 (very low) for each objective on each of the five dimensions of priority (a total of 385 ratings on the 5-point scales). In order to obtain a composite priority score for each objective we first took each respondent's average rating across the five dimensions. We then took the average of these "respondent average" scores across all of the respondents.¹ Thus, the relative priority of the operational objectives may be determined by rank-ordering these "objective average" ratings. Table 2 presents the top 20 objectives as determined by the average composite scores (across the five dimensions). We have used the criterion value of 3.5 as the cut-off point on overall priority-- 5.0 would be unanimous highest priority, and 1.0 would be unanimous low priority, with 3.0 as the mid-point.

Looking at the priorities in terms of the more general issues within which they were originally organized, we can see from Table 2 that objectives within the Marine Environment issue not only lead the list of priorities but also constitute 25 per cent of the top 20 objectives. The inclusion of the third and fourth ranking Law of the Sea objectives raises the marine-related objectives to 35 per cent of the total top 20. This may reflect the recent attention given these objectives, both in the press and in international negotiations. The issues of primary resource utilization, multinational enterprise activities, and diversification each have more than one of the objectives associated with them assigned to this top priority list. Further, the issues of global economic redistribution, international resource system, human rights and discrimination, and the world food situation have none of the objectives associated with them in

1. Only fourteen of the original eighteen individuals completed the questionnaire.

TABLE 2

LIST OF TOP 20 OBJECTIVES

<u>Issues</u>	<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Score</u>
Marine Environment	Upgrade Canadian capability to protect its Fisheries and continental shelf resources against non-military intrusion	4.21
Marine Environment	Prevent depletion of Fishery Stocks through overcatch or destruction from marine pollution	4.12
Law of the Sea	Extend Fisheries jurisdiction of coastal states over a 200 mile economic zone or the continental margin, whichever is greater	4.00
Law of the Sea	Assure that coastal states have adequate powers to protect their marine environment from pollution	3.94
Multinational Enterprise Activities	Make conduct of MNE's operating in Canada consistent with Canadian laws, policies and objectives	3.81
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	Strengthen international safeguards on transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology	3.77
International Monetary System	Reduce worldwide inflation rates	3.74
Diversification	Increase exports to the European Economic Community, Japan and petroleum producing states	3.70
Marine Environment	Improve Canadian-US cooperation in the management of, and control of pollution in boundary waters	3.64
International Peace & Security	Achieve a settlement of Middle East conflict	3.64
Primary Resource Utilization	Establish long range conservation measures governing the exploitation of non-renewable Canadian resources	3.63

TABLE 2 (cont)

<u>Issues</u>	<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Score</u>
Immigration	Retain a stable proportion of French-speaking population in Canada	3.63
Primary Resource Utilization	Assure Canadian energy self-sufficiency for the next decade through development of Arctic and tar sands resources and pipeline construction	3.61
Marine Environment	Seek international endorsement for Canada's Fishery protection and Arctic pollution control measures within the respective zones as were unilaterally established in 1970.	3.58
Primary Resource Utilization	Ensure increased processing of raw materials in Canada	3.58
Marine Environment	Provide optimum balance between unhindered navigation of international waters and adequate safeguards for the preservation of the marine environment	3.54
MNE Activities	Regulate from the outset the role of MNE's in Arctic energy exploration schemes or tar sands development	3.54
Diversification	Establish contractual links with the EEC	3.54
International Trade System	Establish a set of international rules with which to ensure non-discriminatory trade practices	3.54
Canadian Trade	Upgrade the level of processing of Canadian resource exports	3.51

Regional?

this group of 20. Now, not too much significance can be attributed to this absence since our cut-off value in compiling the list is an arbitrary one. However, this absence does reflect the generally low priority ratings assigned to the objectives in these four issues, as we intend to show at a later point in this section. This also reduces our certainty that the high priorities of the marine-related objectives are due to their current "newsworthiness" since the issues of food and resources, particularly, have had a high profile recently.

The average priority ratings assigned to each of the 77 objectives are presented in Appendix I. While the rank-order presents an interesting profile of the priorities among objectives, we feel it is not an appropriate mechanism for the establishment of overall priorities for two reasons. First, the use of the rank-order yields a somewhat artificial hierarchy of objectives with which we find it difficult to work, and we think policy-makers would experience similar difficulties. This is so because the hierarchical arrangement is too specific. It permits us to identify objectives near the top and bottom of the hierarchy and to compare the relative priority assignments of pairs of objectives. However, it does not permit the immediate identification of groups of objectives on the basis of their relative priority locations, and we feel that such groups may provide a more appropriate focus for those concerned with a multiplicity of policy activities. The second reason for our dissatisfaction with this hierarchy is that it is derived from the average priority rating of each objective across the five dimensions of priority. Now we stipulated that each of these dimensions represented a separate aspect of the priority concept. This means that any particular objective may be assigned a high rating on one of the dimensions, but may be low on the other four. The effect of our averaging procedure is to ignore our original differentiation between the dimensions and in the process to ignore the effects of the assignment of a high priority rating on only one or two of the dimensions.

Rather than accept the results of such a procedure, we wish to treat the priority assignments in such a way as to determine the relationships among the five dimensions and preserve the differences in priority ratings which emerge in the use of the different dimensions. We now turn to an analysis designed to achieve these ends.

The procedures used to discover the nature of the relationships among our five dimensions of priority and to permit the identification of different aspects of the priority of each objective are rather complex, although the results are both uncomplicated and satisfying.

First, the priority rating for each of the 77 objectives for each of the five dimensions of priority, treated separately, was averaged across all the respondents. In doing this, we average out the differences which exist between various respondents and derive an artificial "consensus" among respondents. This is acceptable for our purposes since it generates a composite score for each objective on each of the separate aspects of priority--importance, urgency, impact, reaction to external events, and reaction to domestic pressures. Next, we correlated the scores of the objectives on each dimension with their scores on each of the other dimensions. This will tell us the extent to which our respondents link the various aspects of priority together. The correlations between the dimensions are presented below.

	<u>Importance</u>	<u>Urgency</u>	<u>Impact</u>	<u>Reaction to External</u>	<u>Domestic Pressures</u>
Importance	X	<u>.88</u>	.18	.23	.44
Urgency		X	.11	.39	.40
Impact			X	- <u>.59</u>	<u>.67</u>
Reaction to External Events				X	-.31
Domestic Pressures					X

The underlined correlation coefficients indicate those aspects of priority which are most closely linked in the minds of our External Affairs respondents. The aspects of importance and urgency are most closely associated (.88). Apparently those objectives which are important for the realization of a solution to a problem are also those for which there exists a narrow time limit in which to undertake an initiative. Some may feel that this suggests that pressing momentary preoccupations are automatically equated with importance without critical discrimination between what is substantively significant and what is not. However, it may be equally true that respondents feel that those objectives which are important for the solution of problems also must be pursued with some immediacy in order that the solution be achieved. We cannot decide between the two interpretations on the basis of the correlation. The results also reveal that neither of these two dimensions is strongly linked in the minds of our respondents with Canadian impact, reaction to external events, or domestic pressures. Instead Canadian impact and domestic pressures are highly correlated (.67) suggesting that our respondents view those objectives which can be achieved by a Canadian initiative as also likely to be subject to demands from the domestic arena. The absence of a very high correlation here is understandable since we can easily imagine objectives, e.g. the achievement of a settlement of the Middle East conflict, where the Canadian impact will be low no matter how strong the domestic pressure to undertake an initiative. Finally, the correlation between reaction to external events and Canadian impact (-.59) suggests that our respondents feel that the more an initiative to achieve an objective is prompted by events outside Canada, the less will be the impact of the initiative on the achievement of the objective, though the association is only moderate.


This analysis reveals the pattern of relationships among our five dimensions. It shows that importance and urgency are closely linked, while

Canadian impact is associated with domestic pressures and reaction to external events, the latter inversely. Therefore, we know that the priority concept is less complex, in the minds of our respondents, than is suggested by our five separate dimensions, but that it consists of more than one dimension. In light of this, we now would like to reflect this reduced complexity in a new, smaller set of priority dimensions which will represent the associations revealed in the correlation analysis. In order to accomplish this we have employed a technique called factor analysis. Very simply, factor analysis reduces an initial set of dimensions to a smaller set on the basis of the associations among the original dimensions. Each of the factors produced in the analysis represents a new dimension in which one or more of those from the original set will be combined. The results of the factor analysis are presented below.

	Factor 1 (Significance)	Factor 2 (Canadian Control)
Importance	<u>.94</u>	- .10
Urgency	<u>.97</u>	.02
Canadian Impact	.12	- <u>.92</u>
Reaction to External Events	.43	<u>.80</u>
Domestic Pressures	.48	- <u>.76</u>
% of the variation in the rating of all dimensions accounted for by the factor	44.8%	41.2%

These results show that the evaluation of the priority of a foreign policy objective is made on the basis of two essential elements or dimensions. The first, represented by Factor 1, combines importance and urgency in a single dimension which we have called Significance. The second, represented by Factor 2, combines impact, reaction to external events, and domestic pressures and gives the most emphasis to Canadian impact (-.92). For this reason, we call this second dimension Canadian Control.

The factor analysis also shows that these two new dimensions are not related, so that an evaluation of the Significance of any objective will not be related to an evaluation of the extent of Canadian Control in achieving the objective. We now have a much less complex set of dimensions for the evaluation of the priority of objectives. In addition, the factor analysis provides a new score for each objective, one which is a weighted combination of the original ratings assigned for each of the initial five priority dimensions. On the basis of these weighted scores, we can determine, for each objective, whether it is high or low, and to what extent, on Significance and Canadian Control. Further, because these dimensions are unrelated we can represent them as perpendicular axes from which four pure types of priority may be derived. The axes, with Significance on the vertical and Canadian Control on the horizontal, are represented below and a priority-type is associated with each quadrant.



These priority-types are useful in emphasizing the ideal priority classifications which might be obtained in the evaluation of objectives in terms of these two dimensions. Of course the actual weighted scores for each objective range between

very high and very low and so do not fit the ideal groupings represented in the figure just presented. However, one of our purposes in doing this analysis was to construct groups of objectives and differentiate among the groups according to priority. To do this we ^{have} used a procedure called hierarchical grouping analysis in order to cluster together objectives with similar scores on the two dimensions. A total of six groups emerged from this procedure and their placement about the two axes, showing both the approximate location and the spread of individual scores, is represented by the rectangles presented in Figure 1. In addition, the objectives comprising each group are listed below Figure 1.

An examination of these groupings reveals that no group of objectives corresponds to the ideal-type, with very high significance and very high control, which was located in quadrant I of our first representation of the two axes. Instead we find a mix of a range of positions on the two dimensions. Group 1, for example, contains objectives from a variety of issues which are all highly significant, but over which there is only moderate control. For the objectives in Group 2, there is somewhat more control, but also reduced significance. The objectives in Group 3, dealing with immigration and environmental protection, are ones for which there is very high Canadian control but which are also of only moderate significance. Groups 4 and 5 are of equally low significance but Group 4 contains objectives for which there is slightly more Canadian control. Finally, Group 6, which includes by far the largest number of objectives, represents moderate significance but the lowest level of Canadian control.

The construction and placement of these groups in terms of Significance and Canadian Control still leaves the issue of priorities in a somewhat ambiguous state. We do not have the orderly hierarchy represented in ^{either or Appendix I,} Table 2/ but then this analysis has shown that the composite index used to construct that hierarchy improperly combined distinct dimensions of priority. We have managed to reduce the complexity

Figure 1: GROUPS OF OBJECTIVES




Figure 1 (continued): GROUP COMPOSITION

Group 1:

Increase exports to the European Economic Community, Japan, and petroleum producing states

Assure that coastal states have adequate powers to protect their marine environment from pollution.

Extend fisheries jurisdiction of coastal states over a 200-mile economic zone or the continental margin, whichever is greater.

Achieve a settlement of Middle East conflict.

Upgrade Canadian capability to protect its fisheries and continental shelf resources against non-military intrusion

Prevent depletion of fishery stocks through overcatch or destruction from marine pollution.

Strengthen international safeguards on transfer of nuclear equipment, material, and technology.

Reduce worldwide inflation rates.

Group 2:

Upgrade the level of processing of Canadian resource exports.

Establish long-range conservation measures governing the exploitation of non-renewable Canadian resources.

Ensure increased processing of raw materials in Canada.

Seek international endorsement for Canada's fishery protection and arctic pollution control measures within the respective zones as were unilaterally established in 1970

Make conduct of MNEs operating in Canada consistent with Canadian laws, policies and objectives.

Regulate from the outset the role of MNEs in Arctic energy exploration schemes or tar sands development.

Ensure the compatibility of federal and provincial policies toward MNEs.

Maximize the international competitiveness of Canadian secondary processing and manufacturing industries.

Confirm the coastal states' existing rights over mineral resources within an economic zone.

Recognize a 12-mile limit for the territorial sea.

Establish contractual links with the European Economic Community.

Provide optimum balance between unhindered navigation of international waters and adequate safeguards for the preservation of the marine environment.

Group 2 (cont'd):

Assure Canadian energy self-sufficiency for the next decade through development of Arctic and tar sands resources and pipeline construction.

Improve Canadian-United States cooperation in the management of, and control of pollution in boundary waters.

Group 3:

Enlist provincial cooperation in joint development schemes, conservation measures, and environmental protection programmes.

Make immigration policy responsive to provincial needs.

Retain a stable proportion of French-speaking population in Canada.

Ensure environmental protection in primary resource utilization in Canada.

Group 4:

Assist Canadian economic growth by attracting foreign entrepreneurs and skilled labour and expanding Canada's domestic market for industrial products.

Seek foreign investment in Canadian resource industries (under adequate controls).

Improve industrial productivity in Canada by encouraging the licensing of foreign technology.

Establish a mechanism to expedite the admission to Canada of political refugees and members of oppressed minorities.

Maintain the global non-discriminatory basis of recruitment for immigrants.

Develop procedures for provincial participation in international activities concerning human rights.

Group 5:

Ensure better understanding in the US, EEC, Japan and elsewhere of government policies and objectives regarding the role of MNEs in Canada.

Increase trade with Third world nations.

Reinforce and expand diverse institutional links, such as those provided by Commonwealth membership.

Achieve family reunification and greater East-West human contacts within the CSCE framework.

Provide humanitarian assistance to victims of racist regimes.

Expand links with Japan beyond the trade sector.

Establish an international authority for the exploitation of resources of the sea-bed and direct a preferred share of its revenue to less-developed nations.

Establish resource stockpiles to meet emergencies.

Establish agreement on international action to counteract the racist policies of the South African and Rhodesian regimes.

Control conventional arms exports through international agreement on standards and limits of weapons exports, particularly as this affects politically sensitive areas.

Strengthen the role of Third World nations in international financial institutions.

Create an overall price-indexing system to bring industrial goods and raw materials into an equitable relation.

Expand the role of less developed nations in international economic fora such as IBRD, IMF and regional banks.

Group 6:

Establish a set of international rules with which to ensure non-discriminatory trade practices.

Adjust trade policies through multi-lateral trade negotiations.

Liberalize tariff structure and remove non-tariff barriers to trade.

Ensure that energy assistance needs of less-developed nations are reconciled with the need for adequate nuclear safeguards.

Improve access to world markets for processed goods and industrial products from less-developed nations.

Make developed markets more accessible to industrial and processed goods from less-developed nations.

Liberalize international trade in agricultural commodities.

Establish an international authority to exploit and manage the seabed resources and giving particular care to the economic needs of the less-developed nations.

Group 6 (cont'd):

Establish measures for global conservation of raw materials.

Secure stability of prices and adequate supplies of basic raw materials.

Achieve emergency cooperative measures among energy consumers.

Establish commodity agreements between principal producers and consumers combining equitable prices and assured markets for producers with adequate and secure supplies for consumers.

Strengthen world food security through cooperative stockholding arrangements.

Establish international agreement on standards for the conduct of MNEs and procedures for nationalization.

Increase food aid from all donors to the poorest nations and those facing emergency food conditions.

Expand in relative and absolute terms the level of technical assistance given to less-developed nations to increase indigenous food production.

Establish a mechanism through which to recycle petrodollars.

Resolve balance of payments difficulties within a framework of accepted international rules and without resort to competitive devaluation of currencies or to protective trade and currency restrictions.

Increase the flow of bilateral and multilateral aid from industrial nations to the Third World on appropriate concessional terms with particular emphasis on countries most affected by energy costs.

Achieve a general and complete Test Ban Treaty.

Organize increased international efforts to apply science to environmental problems.

Enhance UN capacity for conflict mediation and peaceful settlement (e.g. preserve peace-keeping capability; promote agreement on UN Security Council procedures to authorize and control peace-keeping operations; strengthen peaceful settlement procedures).

Establish Special Drawing Rights as the base of the international monetary system.

Improve standards of aid administration and distribution within governments of receiving states.

Enforce provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and extend the number of signatories.

Preserve East-West stability through the maintenance of a viable NATO deterrent and adequate North American defence.

Achieve East-West detente through MBFR, CSCE, and improved human contacts as well as cultural, industrial and scientific exchanges with the USSR and East Europe.

Seek nuclear arms control and disarmament measures such as progress on SALT and a Complete Test Ban agreement.

Increase capacity for fertilizer production in less-developed nations.

Facilitate unhindered navigation subject to reasonable safeguards for the coastal states' security, and environmental and economic needs.

Direct the Surplus funds of oil producing states to development assistance using IBRD, IDA, and the regional development banks as channels for those funds.

Establish international policies for the control of population growth.

involved in working with five distinct evaluative criteria in the assignment of priority ratings, but we are still left with the need to consider two quite distinct priority dimensions. This is made problematic because our six groups fail to fall into four distinct quadrants. If this division had occurred, then the assignment of overall priorities would have been relatively straightforward, at least in the case of quadrants I (Significance and Control) and III (No Significance and No Control). Instead, our groups reflect a variety of combinations in the extent of significance and degree of control for the clustered objectives. And we believe that both dimensions must be considered simultaneously in any decision about priorities. For example, we might wish to identify the objectives included in Group 1 as those with the highest priority because they have the greatest significance. And yet any decision to commit resources to the pursuit of these objectives must consider the only moderate ability of Canada to achieve them on its own initiative. This raises the possibility that resources will not be put to the most efficient use because of this lack of high control. In the same way, the high level of Canadian control over the achievement of the objectives in Group 3 is tempered by the fact that they are of only moderate significance in comparison with other objectives.

In spite of this problem, a general decision on priorities is certainly facilitated by this analysis. We have three groups of objectives which fall, in part, in quadrant I. To a greater extent than any of the other clusters, Groups 1, 2 and 3 have the minimum quality of moderate, or greater magnitude for both Significance and Canadian Control. For this reason they may be identified as containing those objectives having the highest priority. These three groups together contain a total of 26 objectives ranging across a variety of issues. While this is still a relatively large number, it does represent a 66 per cent reduction in the number of objectives with which we began this analysis. Thus by using a grouping

procedure organized around two dimensions of priority we are able to isolate three groups of highest priority objectives. Once priorities are narrowed in this fashion, the relative value to the policy-maker of significance versus control must be used to further narrow the order of priority among these groups. For example, a balance of significance and control may be preferred, in which case the objectives included in Group 2, dealing with trade, resource utilization, marine environment, law of the sea, diversification, and MNE activities will be selected as the highest priority cluster of objectives. The calculus involved in choosing the appropriate balance between these two aspects of priority is one which will vary according to the particular needs of the individual policy-maker, rather than one for which we can provide a standard formula. However, the procedure outlined above can serve to narrow the parameters of choice considerably. The results of this analysis will be used to suggest a formal approach to the identification of priorities. Before doing this, however, we intend to attempt to assess the overall utility of our highly specific approach to priority evaluation which is based on operational objectives.

Approaches to Priority Evaluation: Objectives Versus Issues

In identifying the operational objective, rather than some more general foreign policy concern such as the issue, as the basic unit on which to carry out a priority rating, we deliberately chose to ensure that the evaluations would emerge from highly discrete judgements. We did so for two reasons. First, we feel that the ability of individuals to differentiate between various orders of priority depends fundamentally on the specificity of the units which are to be evaluated. If the units are pitched at too high a level of generality, combining diverse aspects of foreign policy, then either the diversity itself will render the evaluative criteria inoperative (since a choice cannot be made) or the individual will select only one aspect of the unit as a basis for a general evaluation. An additional reason is that the discrete judgements required in the

evaluation of operational objectives are more likely to reflect a consideration of the operational requirements of policy planning than would be the case for attempts to discriminate between more general foreign policy concerns, such as issues.

We decided to include in our survey a procedure designed to permit us to test, indirectly, the validity of our assumptions regarding the importance of specificity in the evaluation of priorities. The fifteen foreign policy Issues were listed separately from the 77 operational objectives and each of our respondents was asked to rank them in terms of their importance in the general scheme of foreign policy. As noted earlier, our respondents experienced great difficulty in doing this because of the level of generality of the issues. Nevertheless, we did achieve a ranking of the issues from each respondent. Our next step was to calculate the average priority rating which each respondent assigned to the operational objectives included in each of the fifteen issues and to rank the average rating of the issues. Thus for each respondent we have two sets of ranked issues, one based on an evaluation of the issues only and the other calculated on the basis of the evaluation of the objectives included in the issues. Table 3 gives the rank lists of the fifteen foreign policy Issues that were obtained by these two procedures.

The rank-order correlation tells us the extent to which the two orders are similar. The correlation of .26 is small and statistically non-significant, indicating that there is at best a marginal relationship between the two rankings of issues. Thus the evaluation of priorities achieved through the use of highly specific operational objectives is virtually unrelated to that which is obtained when respondents are asked to similarly evaluate more general issues. This is quite in line with our expectations. It is interesting to note that the more intuitive rank order of issues which avoids explicit operational criteria demonstrates a much stronger commitment to global issues, while the application of operational objectives produces a rank order in which more particular Canadian policy concerns

TABLE 3

A RANK LIST OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

I		II	
Rank Order based on Operational Objectives		Rank Order not Utilizing Operational Objectives	
Rank	Issues	Rank	Issues
1.	Marine Environment & Fisheries	1.	International Peace & Security
2.	Law of the Sea	2.	Law of the Sea
3.	Primary Resource Utilization	3.	Nuclear Non-Proliferation
4.	Nuclear Non-Proliferation	4.	Canadian Trade
5.	Multinational Activities	5.	World Food Situation
6.	Canadian Trade	6.	Global Economic Redistribution
7.	Immigration	7.	International Trade System
8.	World Food Situation	8.	Diversification
9.	International Peace & Security	9.	Primary Resource Utilization
10.	International Monetary System	10.	Marine Environment & Fisheries
11.	Diversification	11.	International Monetary System
12.	International Trade System	12.	International Resource System
13.	International Resource System	13.	Immigration
14.	Global Economic Redistribution	14.	Multinational Activity
15.	Human Rights & Discrimination	15.	Human Rights & Discrimination

(Rank Correlation is .26)

take precedence over broader global issues. In the former list all but one of the top 7 issues are essentially problems of global dimensions like international peace and security, world food situation and global economic redistribution, while the majority of the items on the lower half of that rank-order represent issues more directly identified with Canadian interests like primary resource utilization, marine environment and fisheries, immigration, and the activity of multinational enterprises. When issue areas are defined in a specific operational sense, however, the rank order is almost reversed insofar as the primarily Canadian interests (e.g. marine environment and fisheries, primary resource utilization, multinational activities, Canadian trade, and immigration) now occupy the top positions.

This apparent discrepancy might be explained by the fact that officials of the Department of External Affairs utilize the general principles of internationalism and community responsibility to assess importance when they are able to disassociate this assessment from the actual requirements of designing and implementing the elements of a foreign policy strategy. However, these general principles are less useful when foreign policy concerns are defined in the concrete operational context within which policy planning must take place. While the general principles are indispensable in determining a general foreign policy orientation, we would argue that their very generality limits their utility in relating discrete elements of policy to the areas of priority of foreign policy activity. Perhaps their most appropriate representation is to be found not in the priorities of a foreign policy establishment, but in the specific means which are selected to realize priority objectives. The reliability of the ranking of issues derived from the operational objectives is demonstrated when we observe that the rank-order shown in the first column of Table 3 is essentially preserved when we single out those operational objectives which received the highest average score from our respondents,

shown earlier in Table 2. In other words those objectives accorded highest average priority tend to be associated with the highest-ranking issues.

Generally, then, we feel that this comparison indirectly demonstrates the greater utility for policy planning of an evaluation of priorities which is based on objectives defined in such a way as to be congruent with the concrete operational context within which foreign policy officials conduct their major responsibilities. The fact that such a definition assigns priority to foreign policy concerns more directly identified with particular Canadian interests, rather than those reflecting a preoccupation with internationalism and community responsibility, frankly serves to increase our confidence in the relevance of this approach to the evaluation of priorities for policy planning.

One further aspect of the results of our analysis deserves mention at this point. As we indicated earlier, we were interested in determining the extent to which a consensus on the objectives of Canadian foreign policy exists among officials. Our analysis reveals a relatively high degree of consensus among External Affairs officials, though it does not exist for all objectives. Two basic procedures were used to examine the extent of consensus.

In the first procedure, we calculated the average priority-rating assigned to each Issue for each respondent, and rank-ordered the issues for each of the respondents. We then correlated this rank-order for each respondent with the ranking of issues which was operationally-derived for the group as a whole (depicted in Table 3, II). This will show the extent to which each individual agrees with the group as a whole. The results are presented in Table 4. The rank correlations are positive in all 14 cases, which shows that there is general agreement on an overall order of issues. Ten respondents have

TABLE 4.

CONSENSUS OF RESPONDENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

(Rank Order Correlations between Individual Scores and Average Score)

<u>Code Number of Respondent</u>	<u>Correlation Coefficient</u>
1	.80
15	.72
11	.72
7	.70
3	.67
17	.66
16	.60
12	.57
8	.56
10	.52
5	.47
18	.39 n.s.*
19	.30 n.s.*
14	.27 n.s.*

(*n.s. - non-significant)

coefficients exceeding .50, and only three exhibit correlation coefficients that are non-significant in the statistical sense. The latter may at first sight be considered as the "opposition" to the prevailing pattern of perceived importance of issues. This is not the case, however, for a more detailed analysis revealed that the three persons in question were even farther apart from each other than from the average position. Thus they cannot be viewed as an identifiable opposition group.

A second procedure was used to determine the extent of consensus on the foreign policy objectives. This involved an analysis of responses to the section of the questionnaire which asked respondents to indicate whether they agreed that each particular objective did, indeed, represent a current foreign policy objective of the Canadian government. The percentage of respondents indicating agreement with each objective is presented in Appendix I. Of the 77 objectives, only 13 were identified by all respondents as current Canadian objectives. These included 9 which appear among the top twenty objectives, identified earlier. These are: fishery protection; fisheries jurisdiction; protection of marine environment from pollution; nuclear safeguards; increased exports to the EEC, Japan, and OPEC; boundary water management; a Middle East peace settlement; arctic waters control and contractual links with the EEC.

Ten of the 77 objectives received 50% or less agreement, and 19 received 60% or less. These can be seen as low consensus objectives. One reason for low consensus on these objectives may be an apparently sharp and perhaps too narrow distinction in the minds of some respondents between foreign policy objectives and domestic policy objectives. Energy self-

sufficiency, to give one illustration, was generally viewed as a domestic and not a foreign policy objective, despite the fact that it will take foreign policy measures to achieve and is also motivated by foreign policy considerations. These sharp distinctions may be reinforced by a sense of departmental division of labour. Matters which fall primarily or substantially within the bureaucratic purview of a government department other than External Affairs are often not seen by the officials as foreign policy objectives. Objectives dealing with primary resource utilization, food and the international resource environment have relatively low consensus perhaps because of the shared responsibilities with Energy, Mines and Resources; Agriculture; and Industry, Trade and Commerce in these issue areas. On the other hand, the fisheries question which is certainly a shared departmental responsibility heads the list of priority objectives. The issue with the least consensus appears to be the aid area--what we labelled global economic redistribution. There appear to be substantial differences of opinion among our respondents as to the degree of Canadian responsibility for the whole area of aid and development questions. On the whole, both lower priority and lower consensus exist for the multi-lateral global questions (with the exception of law of the sea which has a strong Canadian initiative and interest), such as global economic redistribution, human rights, the international monetary system, the international resource system, and the world food situation.

This completes the presentation of the results of the test application

of our system for objective identification and priority evaluation. We proceed in Part III with the presentation of proposals for the actual utilization of this system in policy planning.

PART III

A SYSTEM FOR THE DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES

AMONG THE OBJECTIVES OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The analysis presented in Part II of this report was intended to permit an assessment of the utility of a particular approach to the design of a systematic procedure by which to integrate foreign policy objectives into policy planning. The design was composed of a number of related stages. First, a comprehensive typology of foreign policy concerns was constructed. This consisted of three general goals which in terms of their generality correspond to the basic themes in Foreign Policy for Canadians, fifteen current issues, and seventy-seven concrete operational objectives associated with the various issues. These operational objectives provided the primary focus for our analysis. Next, a selected group of officials was used in the assignment of a priority rating to each of the objectives. The ratings were determined according to a variety of criteria and the results were used to construct a two-dimensional definition of priority. Finally, using the ratings assigned to each, objectives were located on these two dimensions and groups of objectives were identified and compared in terms of their relative priority in Canadian foreign policy.

On the basis of the reasonable success achieved in the pilot test of our design, we intend, in this section, to put forward a formal system for both evaluating priorities among objectives and monitoring the congruence between priorities and foreign policy activity. In addition

to a description of the stages in the design itself, we will suggest specific procedures through which the stages might be implemented. The system to be outlined below consists of five stages, as follows: identification of objectives; determination of priorities; description of foreign policy activity; assessment of congruence between priorities and policy activity; and, evaluation of policy. Each of the stages will be discussed, in turn.

Stage 1. The Identification of Objectives

The task of identifying a comprehensive set of foreign policy objectives might be undertaken by PAG, in light of its involvement in planning and assessing overall policy objectives. This may be accomplished by first reviewing the fifteen current issues used in this project and then, after making any necessary deletions or additions to current issues, identifying concrete operational objectives for each issue, perhaps based initially on those identified for this project. We stress again our belief that the success of the evaluative system, to follow, depends heavily on the identification of concrete and discrete objectives. The resulting set, while remaining comprehensive, will likely comprise substantially fewer objectives than was the case in this project since PAG is capable of greater selectivity.

After the issue-objective typology has been established by PAG, it might be circulated to the various bureaux and divisions for confirmation or amendment, simply in terms of its content. The final typology will then provide the basis for the remaining stages in the implementation of the design.

Stage 2. The Determination of Priorities

Priorities among the objectives thus identified in the first stage of this system may be determined through a variation on the procedure developed and tested in Part II of this report. We recommend the retention of the two dimensions of priority which emerged from our analysis and the grouping approach which was used to cluster objectives in terms of their relative priorities. The actual procedures involved in the application of these two elements differ from those used in the pilot test.

We propose that each objective be evaluated in terms of two basic criteria of priority. The first, Significance, is defined as


The extent to which the objective is central to the achievement of specific Canadian interests and/or those of the international community which are represented in the foreign policy issue and requires a relatively prompt (approximately within one year) policy initiative or response.

The second criterion, Canadian Control, is defined as

The extent to which the achievement of the objective can be determined by a Canadian action which may be initiated largely without reference to pressures or events originating outside of Canada.


For purposes of evaluating objectives, each of these criteria may be represented as a 10-point dimension ranging from very high to very low. All objectives should first be evaluated in terms of their Significance, with the dimension represented as

Significance



The evaluation should then be repeated for all objectives using the criterion of Canadian Control, with this dimension represented as



Canadian Control




These separate evaluations are designed to preserve, as much as possible, the independence of judgements according to the two criteria. We feel that these evaluations might be carried out most appropriately by the Department's assistant under-secretaries or other senior officials. Meeting as a small group, these individuals could arrive at a rough consensus on the placement of each objective, first on the Significance dimension, and second on that of Canadian Control. We recommend an open discussion in which participants can identify and justify the position of each objective on the two dimensions of priority. Some consensus is likely to be achieved as a result of this discussion. At the end of the session, each participant would be asked to record his judgement by placing each objective along the two dimensions. PAG could then take these recorded ratings and calculate the overall average location of each objective. These results could then be circulated back to the participants and any overall ratings provoking strong dissent could be the subjects of a further group discussion in order to achieve an agreement on location.

After the evaluations along each dimension have been completed, the objectives must be grouped into clusters with varying priorities. This may be accomplished by combining the two dimensions in a manner similar

to that used in Part II. The Significance dimension may be rotated to a vertical plane and superimposed on the dimension of Canadian Control. The ratings assigned each objective may then be plotted on these two axes. For example, if three objectives, called A, B and C have been rated on the two dimensions as,



Then the relative priorities of the three objectives would be determined by combining the two dimensions and grouping those objectives which fall in the same quadrant. This would be represented as follows.



Thus, in this particular example, objectives A and B would form a high priority group, with more than moderate levels of Significance and Canadian Control. Objective C would be part of a separate cluster with a similar level of Canadian Control but less than moderate Significance. Of course, with more objectives, it would be possible to construct separate clusters, even within one quadrant. In this case, objective B might be part of a separate group, distinguished from that of which A is a part by its very high ratings on both dimensions. Generally, then, this evaluative and grouping procedure follows the same logical form as that derived in Part II and will similarly result in clusters of objectives with a rough order of priority resulting from the combinations of judgements made according to the two priority dimensions. In order that these priorities may be integrated into policy planning and resource allocation, it is next necessary to achieve a comprehensive description of ongoing policy activity.

Stage 3. The Description of Foreign Policy Activity


The day-to-day activities which cumulatively constitute a major part of Canadian foreign policy are carried^{out} under the direction of the various bureaux and divisions of the Department. Therefore, a comprehensive statement describing those activities relevant to each foreign policy objective may be achieved by surveying each of these groups.

We suggest that PAG identify those objectives which are relevant to the sphere of competence of each bureau or division. These assignments need not be mutually exclusive since any one objective may fall under the jurisdiction of two, or more groups. The resulting partial lists of objectives will then


be communicated to each bureau or division without any indication of the relative priorities which were determined in Stage 2 above. The bureau or division will be required to consider the objectives communicated to it and to provide two types of information for each.

First, the director will be required to assess the extent of activity concentrated on the pursuit of each objective. Various types of activity may be identified for which the extent of the commitment of activities, in terms of time and number of personnel, will be assessed. This may be accomplished by providing each director with a number of dimensions of commitment on which to specify the extent of the concentration of the activities of his bureau or division. Three such dimensions, represented as 10-point scales similar to those employed in Stage 2, are:


Activity Concentration
(Senior Personnel)



Activity Concentration
(General Staff)




Activity Concentration
(Planning)



In addition, the director will be required to evaluate the adequacy of the resources (time and number of personnel) available to him for commitment to the pursuit of each objective. Once again, this evaluation could be accomplished through the provision of ratings on a scale of adequacy for each of the objectives, as follows

Adequacy of Resources



We are aware that some directors might object to the use of such scales in the estimation of activity concentration. However, the scales have a significant advantage in that the information they yield will be directly comparable with that obtained in the evaluation of priorities. Of course, each division or bureau must be afforded the option of indicating that an objective assigned to it by PAG is not, in fact, perceived as an objective by the director himself and that therefore no activity is devoted to it. At the same time, the director might be asked, for those objectives on which available resources were evaluated as being less than adequate, to estimate the resources that would be required if the objective were to be more actively pursued.

The second type of information which may be requested from each group relates to additional activities which might be relevant to the achievement of each objective. The director can be asked to stipulate, for each objective, any initiatives, not currently being undertaken, which he feels

would enhance the likelihood of successfully achieving the objective. This will permit a review of potential additional policy initiatives in light of the evaluation of priorities derived in Stage 2.

Stage 4. The Assessment of Congruence: Priorities and Policy

The completion of the steps outlined above will permit an assessment of the extent of congruence between Departmental priorities and policy activity. Once again, PAG may be the most appropriate agency to conduct this assessment. The specification of policy activities provided by each bureau or division for each objective in Stage 3 may be matched against the priorities identified in Stage 2. The extent of the activities devoted to the pursuit of any objective should correspond, roughly, to the relative priority of each objective as indicated by its location in one of the various clusters of objectives. The degree to which this is actually the case may be determined for each bureau or division which is devoting resources to the pursuit of the objective. From this assessment, PAG will be able to identify those objectives for which the ^{overall} extent of activity is appropriate to the relative priority of the objectives, and those for which policy activity exceeds or falls short of that which is appropriate. In addition, the extent of congruence between activities and priorities may be established for each separate bureau or division. The results of this assessment of congruence may then be transmitted to those senior officials responsible for the original determination of priorities where it may be used for the final stage in this design, policy evaluation.

Stage 5. Policy Evaluation

The establishment of a link between priorities and policy activities in Stage 4 permits an evaluation of departmental policies in two ways. First, the extent to which a reorientation of activities is required may be determined and linked to specific objectives. Those objectives requiring a greater or lesser concentration of activity may be identified, as may those for which the existing level of activity is appropriate. The specific criteria to be used in determining amounts of increase or decrease in activity will have themselves to be determined at this point by senior officials. Clearly, the highest priority objectives will not be granted all policy activity, nor will those with lower priority be abandoned entirely. As we stated in Part II, we have no standard formula for making such a decision. It will ultimately depend on the relative importance attached to Significance versus Canadian Control for those objectives which fail to score very high on both. The decisions emerging from this evaluation may then be transmitted to the specific bureaux or divisions responsible for the objectives. Second, the information provided in Stage 3 on possible additional resources and policy initiatives which might be undertaken in pursuit of each objective provides a foundation for policy planning. Since the establishment of relative priorities among objectives has been achieved, those objectives with highest priority may be selected for additional emphasis in Departmental policy. Any additional initiatives suggested for these particular objectives by the various bureaux and divisions might be considered by the senior officials, in

addition to others which they themselves select. These could be reviewed as a basis for planning additional policy initiatives for those foreign policy objectives of greatest priority to the Department.

Summary

This proposed system for the determination of priorities and policies may be summarized in the following 14 steps.

Stage 1

1. Identification by PAG of concrete and discrete foreign policy objectives for a variety of issues.
2. Confirmation or amendment of objectives by bureaux and divisions.

Stage 2

3. Evaluation of the extent of Significance and Canadian Control for each objective by senior officials. To be accomplished by (1) discussion of assignments for each objective, (2) recording individual assignments and averaging these, and (3) continuing discussions for final ratings.
4. Clustering by PAG of objectives according to the combined extent of Significance and Canadian Control.

Stage 3

5. Identification by PAG of objectives relevant to the sphere of competence of each bureau or division.
6. Transmission of relevant objectives to each bureau or division, without indicating relative priorities.

7. Evaluation by directors of the extent of various types of activity directed to the achievement of each objective and the adequacy of resources available for the pursuit of each objective.
8. Stipulation by directors of both additional policy initiatives which might be undertaken for each objective and additional resources required for more activity in the pursuit of each.

Stage 4

9. Transmission of information gathered in Steps 7 and 8 to PAG.
10. Evaluation of the congruence between priorities and bureau and division activities by PAG.
11. Transmission of the results of the evaluation of Step 10 to senior officials.

Stage 5

12. Review by senior officials of the results of the evaluation of congruence and decisions on any necessary reorientation in activities of bureaux and divisions.
13. Review of possible additional policy initiatives and/or resources for high priority objectives and selection of additional initiatives by senior officials.
14. Transmission of decisions taken in Steps 12 and 13 to appropriate bureaux and divisions.

This system provides a relatively straightforward approach to the identification of objectives, the determination of priorities, the monitoring the ongoing policy implementation, the review of the congruence between priorities and policy activity, and the establishment of a link between priorities and policy planning.

We now move, in Part IV of this report, to an analysis of the objectives of a variety of government departments in the issue of the world food situation.

PART IV

OBJECTIVES CONCERNING THE GLOBAL FOOD SITUATION

In the previous sections of this report, a system for the determination of priorities among objectives was developed and tested. In order to illustrate further the proposed system for setting priorities among competing foreign policy objectives, the global food issue was chosen. In recent years global food questions have come increasingly to the fore in the wake of declining reserves and of crop failures in the Soviet Union, Africa and Asia. The UN Conferences on Population and Food, which were held in 1974, drew international attention to the deteriorating population-food balance. In addition, rising food prices have contributed significantly to the inflationary rise in the cost-of-living, thereby making it a sensitive domestic issue as well. As the world's second largest grain exporter, Canada has been placed in a leadership role in the international efforts aimed at meeting food emergencies, establishing global stocks, stabilizing prices, and providing technological assistance to improve production in food-deficit countries of the Third World. The problems of coordinating efforts in meeting the objectives that were set by the Rome Conference are mirrored in the difficulties of establishing priorities at home in an area characterized by strong domestic pressures as well as by rapidly changing international demands. The multiplicity of organizations involved and the lack of adequate precedents dictate that particularly careful attention be devoted to the food issue, all the more as planning efforts will be complicated by short-term prediction problems in harvests due to the vagaries of weather and climate.

To carry out the test exercise, we interviewed seven officials in the following departments of the federal government: External Affairs; Agriculture; Fisheries; Industry, Trade and Commerce; Finance and CIDA. All of these officials were chosen on the basis of their familiarity with the food issue and their responsibility for government programmes that relate directly to different facets

of the global food situation. During the course of the interviews, these officials were asked to identify the principal objectives of their respective department or agency concerning the international food situation and to discuss the specific policies which were being conducted, or were anticipated, in pursuit of the respective food objectives. While the interviews proved to be highly instructive, the government food experts generally found it much easier to elaborate on the problems and conflicts concerning their functions than to formulate a set of food-related objectives and to link these with concrete strategies of action. When made aware of this gap, most of our respondents readily admitted that the inability to relate activities to clearly recognized objectives marked a deficiency in the existing policy process.

From the interviews we were able to extract twenty-five concrete and discrete objectives that relate to the international food situation and these are presented in Table 5. Some of these objectives were emphasized by all or most of the officials; others were selected on the basis of identification by only one or few respondents. Given the focus on a single issue, there existed wider consensus among the food experts, as to whether the identified objective was in fact a Canadian foreign policy objective, than among our initial group of respondents whose answers ranged across multiple issues. As a follow-up to the interviews, the same officials were then asked to evaluate each of the twenty-five food objectives on the dimensions of importance, urgency, Canadian impact, reaction to international events, and domestic pressure.¹ Table 5 lists the results. Here objectives are ranked according to the average priority score that was obtained from the seven respondents.

¹A slight modification of the scaling design was introduced in order to allow for more precision. In the original questionnaire dimensions were scaled on the basis of a 1 to 5 range; here the scale ranges from 1 to 9, thus generally doubling the average priority score for each objective.

TABLE 5

LIST OF RANKED FOOD OBJECTIVES

<u>Objectives (Ranked)</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that it is an Objective</u>
1) Meet emergency needs by continuing food aid to disaster areas and to countries facing most severe shortages.	7.20	100
2) Adopt adequate environmental safeguards and conservational practices to control marine pollution and to ensure the survival of heavily exploited stocks of fish.	6.80	100
3) Expand foreign sales of Canadian agricultural and fish products for the benefit of Canadian producers, the Canadian economy at large and in response to global needs for increased supplies.	6.57	100
4) Expand in relative and absolute terms the level of technical assistance to LDCs in order to raise agricultural production and to improve their self-sufficiency in this sector.	6.17	100
5) Secure long-term buyers for Canadian agricultural products who will provide reliable markets even during periods of renewed surplus.	6.14	100
6) Reduce international trade barriers (tariffs, quotas and subsidies) against agricultural products and processed food-stuffs in the context of MTN.	6.11	85.7
7) Strengthen world food security through co-operative international stockholding arrangements and through a global information and warning system on food and agriculture.	6.03	100
8) Fit Canada's agricultural assistance and development programme into an overall policy of maintaining constructive relations with members of the Third World and of reducing confrontations between developed and less developed nations.	5.86	100
9) Support the establishment of an international grain reserve system, provided adequate price protection measures for producer nations are included.	5.83	83.3

<u>Objectives (Ranked)</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that it is an Objective</u>
10.5) Encourage donors to improve co-ordination and harmonization of their respective food aid policies through the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes and through other mechanisms.	5.74	100
10.5) Improve the world food security situation by assisting in the creation of food stocks in LDCs and in the construction of a viable food distribution system.	5.74	85.7
12) Defuse UN confrontation politics and seek to mediate conflicts in order to maintain a viable World Food Programme.	5.66	85.7
13) Avoid cartel formation among food producer nations; instead, seek international commodity agreements that will balance the interests of producers and consumer nations.	5.57	83.3
14) Increase the capacity for fertilizer production in LDCs.	5.54	85.7
15) Replenish depleted grain reserves in Canada.	5.53	50.0
16) Assist LDCs in developing the necessary capacity to manage and harvest the stocks of fish within their economic zone which is likely to be determined by a LOS convention.	5.50	66.7
17) Raise the general standard of nutrition among the population of LDCs.	5.43	85.7
18.5) Promote international commodity agreements on agricultural products in order to strengthen security of supplies and to stabilize price conditions.	5.40	85.7
18.5) Increase the processed component in Canada's food exports.	5.40	85.7
20) Eliminate tariffs on agricultural products (both in raw state and in processed form) from LDCs and encourage tariff reductions in that sector within the LDC group itself.	5.37	71.4

<u>Objectives (Ranked)</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that it is an Objective</u>
21) Couple certain food aid and development measures to OPEC commitments to assist agricultural development in low-income nations.	5.26	85.7
22) Renew international wheat agreement, backed by adequate stocks to allow agreed price ranges to hold.	5.13	83.3
23) Help develop food processing plants in LDCs to stimulate their industrial development and increase returns on their food products.	4.51	57.1
24) Expand Canada's catch of fish by including less common species.	4.45	50.0
25) Reduce food consumption and wastage in developed nations.	4.34	42.9

Applying the technique of factor analysis to the food objectives, we found the same two basic priority dimensions of Significance (including importance, urgency, and reaction to international events) and Canadian Control (including Canadian impact, and domestic pressure) that had emerged from the analysis of the original set of 77 Canadian foreign policy objectives. The results of the factor analysis are presented below.

	<u>Factor 1 (Significance)</u>	<u>Factor 2 (Canadian Control)</u>
Importance	<u>.94</u>	.17
Urgency	<u>.92</u>	.21
Reaction to External Events	<u>.85</u>	.09
Domestic Pressures	.07	<u>.94</u>
Canadian Impact	.25	<u>.91</u>
% of variation in the rating of all dimensions accounted for by the factor	51.2%	36.3%

The similarity of the findings that were derived from two sets of foreign policy objectives - one ranging across all issues and the other focusing on a single issue - and which involved an entirely different group of government officials strengthens our confidence both in the reliability of these two principal elements in determining foreign policy priorities and in the utility of comparing foreign policy objectives on the basis of their location on these two dimensions:

Factor scores for each of the 25 food-related objectives were plotted on the two dimensions of Significance and Canadian Control. The resulting grid, which is shown in Figure 2, reveals a pattern of objectives that fall into four distinct clusters or groups. Instead of using this graphic means of clustering food objectives, one could also use a statistical method called hierarchical grouping analysis which seeks to locate the smallest number of clearly identifiable clusters of items, with a minimum of error. The hierarchical grouping analysis yielded the same four clusters as are represented in our grid, with only one exception (in the former, objective No. 18 on environmental safeguards and on conservational practices to ensure survival of heavily exploited stocks of fish fell into the second group rather than the first one as shown in Figure 2.)

The objectives in Group 1 refer to items which are both high on Significance and high or medium-high on Canadian Control. These refer basically to international coordination and regulation objectives.

Figure 2: GROUPS OF FOOD OBJECTIVES




Figure 2 (continued): GROUP COMPOSITION

Group 1: International Coordination and Regulation Objectives (High Priority)

1. Expand in relative and absolute terms the level of technical assistance to LDCs in order to raise agricultural production and to improve their self-sufficiency in this sector.
4. Meet emergency needs by continuing food aid to disaster areas and to countries facing most severe shortages.
12. Strengthen world food security through cooperative international stockholding arrangements and through a global information and warning system on food and agriculture.
18. Adopt adequate environmental safeguards and conservational practices to control marine pollution and to ensure the survival of heavily exploited stocks of fish.
23. Reduce international trade barriers (tariffs, quotas and subsidies) against agricultural products and processed foodstuffs in the context of MTN.

Group 2: Canadian Food Objectives (Medium Priority)

14. Replenish depleted grain reserves in Canada.
21. Expand foreign sales of Canadian agricultural and fish products for the benefit of Canadian producers, the Canadian economy at large and in response to global needs for increased supplies.
22. Secure long-term buyers for Canadian agricultural products who will provide reliable markets even during periods of renewed surplus.
24. Increase the processed component in Canada's food exports.

Group 3: LDC Aid Policies and International Agreements (Medium Priority)

3. Raise the general standard of nutrition among the population of LDCs.
5. Improve the world food security situation by assisting in the creation of food stocks in LDCs and in the construction of a viable food distribution system.
7. Increase the capacity for fertilizer production in LDCs.
8. Fit Canada's agricultural assistance and development programme into an over-all policy of maintaining constructive relations with members of the Third World and of reducing confrontations between developed and less developed nations.
9. Defuse UN confrontation politics and seek to mediate conflicts in order to maintain a viable World Food Programme.
10. Encourage donors to improve coordination and harmonization of their respective food aid policies through the FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes and through other mechanisms.
11. Couple certain food aid and development measures to OPEC commitments to assist agricultural development in low-income nations.
13. Support the establishment of an international grain reserve system, provided adequate price protection measures for producer nations are included.

Figure 2 (continued): GROUP COMPOSITION

15. Promote international commodity agreements on agricultural products in order to strengthen security of supplies and to stabilize price conditions.
16. Renew international wheat agreement, backed by adequate stocks to allow agreed price ranges to hold.
17. Avoid cartel formation among food producer nations; instead, seek international commodity agreements that will balance the interests of producers and consumer nations.
20. Assist LDCs in developing the necessary capacity to manage and harvest the stocks of fish within their economic zone which is likely to be determined by a LOS convention.
25. Eliminate tariffs on agricultural products (both in raw state and in processed form) from LDCs and encourage tariff reductions in that sector within the LDC group itself.

Group 4: Food Consumption in DC, and Food Processing (Low Priority)

2. Reduce food consumption and wastage in developed nations.
6. Help develop food processing plants in LDCs to stimulate their industrial development and increase returns on their food products.
19. Expand Canada's catch of fish by including less common species like krill.

In our system, they would constitute a group of high priority objectives. Group 2 in the lower-left quadrant is composed of objectives which are high on Canadian Control but low on over-all Significance and would qualify for medium priority treatment. The objectives included here are essentially domestic Canadian agricultural aims concerning tariff policy on food products or exports of Canadian agricultural goods. The international aspects of these objectives are often secondary, and it is merely from the perspective of their international implications, rather than on the basis of their domestic importance, that they are accorded second order priority in our system. Group 3 is centered around the middle of our grid. It is medium on both Significance and Canadian Control. These objectives would constitute a third order priority, although some items which are close to the border of the first cluster might be shifted after a careful review and discussion of their relative standing. Group 4 constitutes our lowest priority objectives, since they are low both on Significance and on Canadian Control. This low priority rating was substantiated by the tendency of several respondents to reject these altogether as objectives concerning the world food situation.

The clustering of objectives enables us to identify priorities, but it does so by grouping the contribution of all respondents together. The map which emerges from this type of analysis indicates the average rating of the group. There are, however, significant areas of dissensus which would be passed over by this particular procedure and which should be analysed as well. This may be done by examining and comparing the individual profiles of our respective departmental respondents that appear in Table 6.

As might be expected, the Department of External Affairs assigned highest priority to objectives that dealt with international cooperation concerning the world food situation, such as those aimed at reducing confrontation between developed and less developed nations, maintaining a viable World Food Programme and improving global responsiveness to emergency food situations. In the priority ranking of objectives, External Affairs appears to be more earnestly committed to the fulfillment

TABLE 6

PRIORITY RATINGS OF DEPARTMENTS ON 25 FOOD OBJECTIVES

(9 & 8 = very high; 7 or 6 = high; 5 = moderate; 4 or 3 = Low;
2 or 1 = very low; n.a. = not answered)

Objective #	ITC (Commodity Agreements)	Agriculture	CIDA	External Affairs	Finance	Fisheries	ITC (Grain Marketing)	Mean Rank
1	6.4	5.4	5.0	6.4	6.0	7.4	6.6	6.17
2	4.4	5.4	5.4	4.6	3.6	3.0	4.0	4.34
3	4.6	5.0	5.8	5.0	4.6	7.2	5.8	5.43
4	7.0	5.6	6.8	7.2	8.2	8.0	7.6	7.20
5	5.8	5.0	6.6	6.2	6.4	4.0	6.2	5.74
6	4.4	4.6	5.0	3.8	4.4	4.8	4.6	4.51
7	4.6	4.4	7.0	5.2	5.2	6.8	5.6	5.54
8	4.6	5.0	5.6	7.0	5.0	8.0	5.8	5.86
9	2.6	4.8	5.4	6.4	7.4	7.0	6.0	5.66
10	3.6	5.8	5.6	4.4	7.0	7.6	6.2	5.74
11	4.6	4.6	6.0	6.2	6.6	3.4	5.4	5.26
12	5.2	4.6	5.4	6.6	6.2	7.6	6.6	6.03
13	5.8	4.6	4.8	6.0	n.a.	7.6	6.2	5.83
14	5.2	5.0	5.0	6.8	n.a.	6.4	4.8	5.53
15	5.2	4.6	5.0	4.6	5.6	7.8	5.0	5.40
16	4.8	5.0	5.6	5.4	n.a.	4.0	6.0	5.13
17	4.8	5.2	5.2	5.6	n.a.	6.4	6.2	5.57
18	6.4	n.a.	6.0	6.0	8.6	7.2	6.6	6.80
19	4.6	n.a.	3.0	n.a.	n.a.	5.2	5.0	4.45
20	4.2	n.a.	5.8	5.0	6.0	7.6	4.4	5.50
21	5.4	8.0	5.4	6.2	8.6	6.0	6.4	6.57
22	5.4	7.2	5.4	6.4	8.6	5.0	5.6	6.14
23	5.2	7.8	6.2	5.2	7.4	5.0	6.0	6.11
24	4.2	8.0	5.4	4.0	8.2	3.2	4.8	5.40
25	3.0	7.2	6.2	4.6	7.4	4.8	4.4	5.37

of the Rome Conference pledges than any other department. This is natural given its central role in coordinating the follow-up measures. External Affairs also tends to have a highly positive attitude toward world food security and stockholding measures and gives higher priority to the objective of replenishing Canadian domestic grain reserves than any other department. Together with CIDA and the Department of Finance, External Affairs recognizes the importance of involving OPEC nations in helping to finance international agricultural development programmes. Despite its obvious internationalist perspective, DEA cannot be accused of being unresponsive to the essentially domestic Canadian food objectives represented in Group 2, for its priority score on these objectives is not below the general average. The only category of objectives where External Affairs appears to default on its fundamental internationalist orientation concerns international agricultural commodity agreements and trade liberalization of agricultural goods (objectives 15, 23, 25) where it falls below the general average and, incidentally, its own assessment during the earlier interview phase.

Another department that demonstrates a strong internationalist orientation on the food objectives is that of Fisheries whose over-all priority scores are higher than those of any other department. Probably this reflects both personal style in answering and a high commitment to respond to the international food problem. Despite its tendency toward high scores, Fisheries scores somewhat lower than External Affairs, and considerably lower than either Agriculture or Finance, on what are predominantly domestic food objectives in Group 2 (21, 22, 24). All of the high priority objectives that make up Group 1 are in fact accorded high priority status by Fisheries, with the single exception of trade liberalization in agricultural products (23) which receives no more than the average priority rating. Where Fisheries differs most noticeably from the general trend, is its tendency to upgrade the majority of objectives within the third Group so that they receive the high priority treatment that we normally associate with the first Group. Only a

very few of the medium priority objectives (5, 11, 25) of the third Group escape this general elevation to high priority status. The picture which thus emerges is one of clear-cut polarization of objectives for the Fisheries Department into high priority objectives which combine Groups 1 and 3 and low priority objectives from Groups 2 and 4. All objectives which fall directly into the domain of the Fisheries Department (18, 19, 20) receive a somewhat higher priority ranking than that assigned to them by other departments, but this does not represent an indiscriminate upgrading of its own responsibilities for items like the expansion of the Canadian catch of fish (19) is rated no more than moderate. In its strong commitment to promote an international strategy that might cope with the global food problem, the Department of Fisheries shows greatest affinity with External Affairs and the Grain Marketing Office of IT&C.

Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce

Because of the diversity of tasks involved, we interviewed two officials from the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, one from the Grain Marketing Office and one from the Commodity Agreements Division. While the emphasis of the two differed somewhat, intra-departmental agreement was generally high (a correlation of .58). The Grain Marketing Office placed high priority on all objectives from Group 1, and in addition attached high priority to objectives like the creation of food stocks in LDCs; maintaining a viable World Food Programme; and cooperation among food donor nations in their food aid programmes. Priority ratings on these objectives were generally as high and occasionally even higher than those given by External Affairs. For the latter three items, the Commodity branch of IT&C displayed a less pronounced internationalist orientation and assigned only moderate or low priority ratings. Objectives which deal with international measures to stabilize food supplies and prices (12, 13, 15, 16) drew comparable, moderate responses from the two IT&C officials, with the Commodity branch assigning scores of 5 and the

Grain Office of 6. Given the basic role of the Department to promote the export of Canadian products, including those from the agricultural sector, one might have expected officials in the Department to concentrate their highest priority ratings on what are basically Canadian food objectives in Group 2. This assumption was not confirmed in our findings, for neither of our experts from IT&C exceeded moderate priority assignments to objectives 14, 21, 22 and 24 and both confined their highest priority ratings to global items from the first and third Groups.

Department of Agriculture

If External Affairs, Fisheries and the Grain Marketing Office of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce may be seen as displaying the strongest internationalist orientation in their pattern of priorities involving the world food situation, the Department of Agriculture was the most pronounced in revealing an essentially domestic preoccupation with respect to the food issue. It gave highest priority to the primarily domestic objectives of Group 2, while assigning only moderate or low priority ratings to the international cooperative measures of Group 1. In fact, Agriculture's priority structure on the global food situation tends to reverse Groups 1 and 2. Given the important and delicate position of the agricultural sector in Canada's economy, this strong domestic predisposition of the Department of Agriculture should not be surprising; nor should it be equated with indifference toward world food problems. Underlying its position is the deeply-held conviction that a healthy domestic agricultural economy is a prerequisite to any meaningful Canadian contribution to a resolution of international food problems. Furthermore, the Department gave high priority to international trade liberalization measures for agricultural products (objectives 23, 25), and its response to controversial issues such as international stockholding arrangements, support for an international grain reserve system and replenishment of Canada's depleted grain reserve was cautious without, however, indicating a clear rejection.

Department of Finance

In its priority determination the Department of Finance combines the essential features of the Department of Agriculture, on the one hand, and of External Affairs and the Grain Marketing Office, on the other. It shares the high priority commitment to the Canadian food objectives of Group 2 and to trade liberalization measures, which characterizes the former, while retaining the high priority treatment of the latter two with respect to international cooperative activities in Group 1. Other forms of international cooperation from Group 3, like assisting in the creation of food stocks in LDCs, maintaining a viable World Food Programme, harmonizing donor food aid programmes and involving OPEC nations in food development projects, also receive a high priority rating from Finance.

CIDA


Two factors stand out clearly in CIDA's assessment of priorities on the food issue: one, a general note of caution and reluctance in its responses; two, the lack of similarity to any other department which answered our questionnaire. Given the importance of CIDA's resource and personnel allocation to food aid and to agricultural assistance programmes, the over-all low priority ratings on food objectives was both unexpected and disconcerting. It is particularly surprising given the fact that two of the five high priority objectives involve CIDA as the principal executive agency, viz., expanded technical assistance and emergency relief. To some extent this may be explained by the unusually low scores which our CIDA respondent assigned to the Canadian impact dimension and moderate scores on urgency, which had the tendency to depress the over-all priority rating. But to a large degree it may be seen to reflect a preference within the Agency for development assistance in the infrastructure sector and the concern lest a more intensive involvement by Canada to help raise ^{food} production in the Third World might jeopardize our performance in the former area.

The other observation that can be made from the pattern of priority assignments to food objectives is the lack of resemblance between CIDA and any other department. Given CIDA's significant role within the government hierarchy on policies which deal with the international food situation, this less than splendid isolation gives some reason for concern. CIDA neither subscribes to Agriculture's high priority rating of essentially domestic food objectives, nor does it display anything like the internationally oriented priority order that we detected in External Affairs, Fisheries or the Grain Marketing Office. Only three objectives from Group 1 (4, 18 and 23) receive moderately high priority scores (in the range of 6.0 to 6.8). From the numerous objectives that fall into the third Group, only 4 receive moderately high or high ratings (ranging from 6.0 to 7.0). These include the creation of food stocks in LDCs, an increase in the capacity for fertilizer production in LDCs, participation by OPEC nations and tariff reduction on LDC food products in raw or processed form. Moderate to low priority ratings are assigned to several other objectives that are generally judged to have an important impact on closing the food gap of LDCs and on stabilizing the global food situation, including such objectives as the increase of technical assistance to LDCs to raise agricultural production; the reduction of confrontations between DCs and LDCs; maintenance of a viable World Food Programme; harmonization of donor programmes; international stockholding arrangements; and the creation of an international grain reserve system.

A summary picture of how departments relate to each other on the international food question can be obtained by correlating all respondents on the basis of their average priority score for each of the twenty-five objectives. Figure 3 gives the results of these correlations.

The core consensual group is a triangle formed by External Affairs, Grain Marketing and IT&C (Commodity Agreements Branch), with the former two also being linked with Fisheries and Finance. The highest consensus occurs between Agriculture

Figure 3: CORRELATIONS OF DEPARTMENT AVERAGES ON 25 OBJECTIVES



and Finance, but the former is unconnected to any other members of the core group. CIDA's representative stands outside the general consensus and is not connected to any other department. When these linkages of agreement are viewed in light of the objective priorities which were previously identified in Figure 2, the need for inter-department coordination (and some of the potential problems of achieving this) is apparent. All of the high priority objectives in the first group involve international conferences: the first three figured prominently on the final report of the Rome Conference; marine pollution and overfishing are on the agenda of the Law of the Sea Conference; and the agricultural trade item forms part of the GATT agenda. Given the basic foreign policy focus of our food objectives and the key role assigned to international organizations and conferences in meeting them, it is appropriate that the Department of External Affairs emerged as part of the core consensual group on the food issue. At the same time, all other participating departments would have major roles in the achievement of this first Group of high priority objectives. In Group 2, the principal executive agencies are Agriculture, Fisheries and IT&C. Group 3 centres primarily on CIDA and External Affairs, although there is a secondary issue involving grain agreements which directly concerns the Grain Marketing representative. The low priority items of Group 4 do not involve the key objectives of any ministry, which indicates that consensus is not achieved at the price of downgrading or excluding any particular department.

Forecasting Food Developments

The current fascination with forecasting is a clear response to the growing requirement for better estimates of those problems which decision-makers are likely to encounter in the future. Estimates about the future are needed if proper policies are to be devised in the present context with a view to minimizing or avoiding altogether anticipated difficulties. Like the energy crisis, the strained international food situation of the mid-70's was brought about, in part at least, as an unintended consequence of government policies pursued earlier.

The respondents for the food component of our project were selected on the basis of their involvement and expertise as relating to certain aspects of the international food situation. It thus seems reasonable to expect that their judgement concerning priorities would be guided by their own estimates of future developments on the food question. No attempt was made here to analyse the exact origin of these estimates. While some of these estimates may have been derived from in-house projections conducted by departmental experts and planners, we assume, given the great complexity of this task, that there has been considerable reliance on some of the principal forecasts that have been published recently and deal with the global food situation to 1985. The FAO World Food Projection which was presented at the Rome Conference is probably the most widely used source for food forecasts and would give our respondents a common basis for future estimates. There have been other major studies of this type which have appeared during the past two years and which have received considerable publicity. These include one prepared by the U. S. Department of Agriculture after the Rome Conference, another forecast by the Iowa State University, and most recently one by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

All of these cited studies employ forecast techniques to derive their projections by establishing a linear trend over time of variables like population, income and technology. The basic variables which affect demand for food are those of population and income. Food production is much more difficult to estimate as it is linked to less stable factors like weather and climate, changes in agricultural technology, farm structure, prices, markets, and the like. The FAO study does not try to estimate these factors but merely extrapolates past production rates, assuming that technological innovations and policies will continue at the same rate as in the past. The other major food forecasts which have been cited here operate under similar assumptions and arrive at their high and low estimates on the basis of alternative projections about rates of population, income and technological innovation.

Despite the use of similar techniques of forecasting, the four studies differ substantially in their conclusions. These differences appear to be related to where the preparing individuals sit in relation to their perceptions of needs and priorities. Given the long history of overproduction problems in North American agriculture, those closest to the North American experience (USDA and Iowa State) are more inclined to expect low demand at home and abroad. The Iowa State projections anticipate a very modest increase in global demand for cereals (with the food-deficit countries having a deficit of 113 to 118 million tons of grain by 1985 due to low production) but a surplus in the developed countries of 170 million tons, leaving a world surplus of 52 to 56 million tons. USDA is somewhat more bullish, anticipating a deficit of 22 to 59 million tons of grain by 1985 in the food-deficit countries and a world surplus of 1.9 million tons. FAO, which has a greater tendency to represent the views of food-deficit countries, anticipates a need of 70 to 85 million tons of grain by 1986 in the food-deficit countries. IFPRI, which uses FAO figures, projects a need for 100 million tons of grain by 1985 as they are less optimistic than FAO about the ability of food exporting countries of the Third World to continue to meet in part the needs of food-deficit other countries of the Third World. The differences in the respective estimates can also be explained by the use of different base years: IFPRI data include 1974 while USDA use 1973 as terminal year. In addition, IFPRI assumes that the rate of increase in food production in developing countries will start to lag in the later years as the problems associated with the Green Revolution will become more pronounced. Their estimates are therefore more pessimistic than FAO as regards food production in the developing countries. The IOWA estimates are still more pessimistic about the prospects of increased food production in the Third World, but they are most bullish about large surpluses in the developed countries.

A basic lesson from each of these major projections is that in developed countries production will greatly exceed demand within the next ten years if current rates of increase are maintained. At the same time, demand will greatly exceed

production in many of the developing countries. The growing imbalance is not likely to be met by trade, given the limited resources of these countries for purchasing the required amounts of grain. The policy conclusion which was therefore drawn at Rome was the urgent need to increase significantly the rate of food production within the food-deficit countries of the Third World.

Expectations about the future may be seen as providing one of the elements in the environment with which policy makers must deal when attempting to establish priorities. The Rome Conference placed considerable emphasis on probable future developments in the production and distribution of food, and the Conference attempted to base policy prescriptions on these estimates of the future. Following this lead, we were interested in our departmental respondents' expectations regarding future developments in the food issue. In addition, we wished to explore the relationship between expectations and the assignment of priorities to policy objectives. In order to accomplish this, we constructed thirteen forecast statements, based on the empirical forecasts discussed above and recent writings by agricultural economists. Each respondent was asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 the probability that a certain development would occur. This information on future estimates provides a tool with which one may monitor the degree of harmony, or the extent of discrepancy, that may exist between the priority order and actual needs as are identified in the forecasts. The forecast statements are presented in Figure 4.

A general impression of the expectations of the departments represented here may be obtained through an examination of the average score of each across the thirteen forecast statements. The average scores of our six respondents (the Finance representative did not respond to this section of the questionnaire) are given below.

6) Japan, Europe and the Soviet Union can be expected to develop a policy of local grain reserves in the next 3 - 5 years.

				DEA	CIDA ITC		AGR	FISH	GRAIN	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability		$\bar{X} = 6.3$			Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

7) A Canadian-U.S. joint commission or other cooperative arrangement will be established in the next 3 - 5 years to coordinate their policies as the two major grain exporters

			DEA GRAIN	CIDA	FISH					
ITC		AGR	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0	1	2								
Low					Medium					High
Probability		$\bar{X} = 2.8$			Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

8) Net grain imports of developing countries are likely to increase to 70-85 million tons annually by 1985.

				CIDA		AGR	DEA FISH ITC	GRAIN		
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability		$\bar{X} = 6.5$			Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

9) Food aid programs are likely to expand on the scale necessary to meet the needs of developing countries during the next 3 - 5 years (at least 10 million tons of grain annually).

			CIDA		ITC	AGR DEA		GRAIN	FISH	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability		$\bar{X} = 6.1$			Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

10) International aid programs for agriculture are likely to increase from \$1.5 billion to \$5 billion annually as prescribed by the FAO Conference within the next 3 -5 years.

			CIDA	AGR DEA GRAIN	ITC				FISH	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability		$\bar{X} = 4.6$			Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

11) An increasing proportion of world grain movements will be supplied on a commercial basis during the next 3 - 5 years.

				AGR DEA FISH						
	ITC	GRAIN					CIDA			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low Probability		$\bar{X} = 4.1$			Medium Probability (50:50 Chance)					High Probability

12) Food deficit developing countries are likely to make considerable progress in reducing their import needs in the next 3 - 5 years.

				AGR DEA GRAIN						
			DEA		CIDA ITC				FISH	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low Probability		$\bar{X} = 5.0$			Medium Probability (50:50 Chance)					High Probability

13) The trend toward increasing meat consumption per person in North America is likely to level off in the next 3 - 5 years.

			DEA	GRAIN	CIDA		AGR		FISH ITC	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low Probability		$\bar{X} = 6.1$			Medium Probability (50:50 Chance)					High Probability

	Average Score	
Fisheries	7.38	Most optimistic
Agriculture	5.54	
Grain Marketing	5.56	
CIDA	5.31	
IT and C	5.00	
External Affairs	4.54	Least optimistic

Generally, these scores suggest that those individuals more directly involved in the North American agricultural experience are the most optimistic about the ability of the world to solve its feeding problems, while those with greater involvement in the international system are inclined toward less optimism. Overall, however, the departmental representatives are, on the average, closer to the middle of the probability scale with little support for the more gloomy projections of some experts in this area.


A more detailed picture of the departmental evaluations may be achieved through an examination of positions on each of the forecast statements, along with the average rating for each of the statements. This information is presented in Figure 4. Inspection of the statement averages reveals that the most optimistic overall response was elicited by the item forecasting the adequacy of a reserve of 60 million tons of food grains ($\bar{x} = 7.5$). This figure represents the present goal of the Rome Conference, although leading agricultural economists, such as Schmitter and Sanderson, use the higher figures of 80 to 120 million tons. This general acceptance of the authoritative estimate of the Conference is understandable, particularly since the costs of any global reserve are likely to fall heavily on the government of Canada. The exception to the relatively high probability estimates on this item is the External Affairs respondent. Though the deviation is most pronounced on this item, External Affairs stands out as the department

with the lowest overall probability estimates. This general pessimism on the part of the External Affairs respondent may be due to the fact that this department, more than any of the others, operates in an environment only marginally subject to Canadian control. The respondents were also reasonably confident that aggregate world grain supplies will be sufficient to avoid general famine ($\bar{x} = 6.5$), that a substantial increase in the net grain imports of developing countries will take place ($\bar{x} = 6.5$), that Japan, Europe and the Soviet Union will develop local grain reserves ($\bar{x} = 6.3$), and that food aid programs will expand sufficiently to meet the needs of developing countries ($\bar{x} = 6.1$). The forecasts which were considered least likely to occur were those which stipulate that an increasing proportion of world grain movements will be supplied on a commercial basis ($\bar{x} = 4.1$), that there will be a significant increase in international aid programs for agriculture ($\bar{x} = 4.6$), and that developing countries will be able to substantially reduce their food import requirements ($\bar{x} = 5.0$).¹

When these two patterns of lowest and highest probabilities of future developments are taken together, a general direction in the responses may be discerned. First, the respondents estimate that the disastrous shortfalls in grain production and consequent widespread famines which were feared in 1973 and 1974 are unlikely to occur. However, they also estimate that the dependence of developing, food deficit countries on foodstuffs supplied on a non-commercial basis is unlikely to be reduced as a result of increased production which might be generated through increased technical assistance in the agricultural sector. Thus, the continuing adequacy of aggregate world grain supplies is anticipated, as is an absence of improvement in the self-sufficiency of developing countries.

¹Item 7 referring to a Canadian-U.S. joint commission is not considered here because we feel that the identification of a formal institutional relationship may have inadvertently biased our respondent's estimates.

As in the analysis of objectives, we wished to explore the extent of inter-departmental consensus on the forecast statements and to identify the pattern of linkages of agreement among the various departments. To accomplish this, responses to the 13 statements were inter-correlated in order to determine associations between departments. The results are presented below.



The core consensual group in this structure is composed of Grain Marketing, ITC, and Agriculture. Agriculture also has links with CIDA and External Affairs. Fisheries is linked to ITC and, less strongly, to Grain Marketing and External Affairs. The central department in this structure is Agriculture with four agreement links. The relative isolation of CIDA and External Affairs may be a function of their respondents' more frequent "deviant" estimates on the forecast statements (items 9, 10 and 11 for CIDA and 4, 5, 6, 12 and 13 for External Affairs).

As the next step in the analysis of future developments in the food issue we wished to determine whether these forecast estimates can be related to the pattern of priorities among objectives in the food issue which were identified earlier. This will be accomplished through two phases, the first centering on the general pattern of responses for all departments and the second through an examination of the relatively more isolated External Affairs and CIDA.

The respondents generally anticipate that world grain production will be adequate to satisfy the growth in world demand and do not anticipate a decrease in the dependence of developing, food deficit countries on non-commercial food imports.

Therefore, we expect that they will assign priority to a continuation of food aid and to international cooperative efforts to improve the efficiency of supply of food requirements. These expectations regarding priorities are borne out by the location, in the highest priority first Group of Figure 2, of objectives 4 and 12 dealing with food aid and world food security, respectively. The general pessimism regarding an increase in the food self-sufficiency of developing countries can be seen to have two contrary implications for objective priorities. On the one hand, this may lead respondents to assign a high priority to efforts to raise agricultural production in the developing countries through an expansion of technical assistance in the agricultural sector. On the other hand, if respondents feel that there is a low probability of increased self-sufficiency, then they may downgrade the priority of any attempt to decrease dependence through technical assistance programs on the grounds that such efforts are unlikely to succeed. The presence of objective 1, dealing with an expansion of technical assistance in the agricultural sector, in Group 1 of Figure 2 suggests that although the effort to increase self-sufficiency is not expected to be highly successful, the effort itself is deemed sufficiently important to warrant high priority.

The relationship between expectations about the future and objective priorities may be investigated in more detail through an examination of individual departments. As we noted earlier, CIDA and External Affairs have been selected for this more intensive examination, primarily because they both perform important executing functions related to the international aspects of the food issue. In order to carry out this analysis, we have identified two subsets of both objectives and forecasts which we feel ought to manifest a relationship. The first subset is composed of those forecasts which centre on world grain supplies and stocks, represented in statements 1 through 5. We then identified a set of objectives which roughly correspond to the emphasis on supplies and stocks in these five forecasts. This set consists of objectives 5 and 12 through 15. The second set consists of forecasts on the condition of developing countries, represented i

statements 8 through 12. The corresponding set of objectives is composed of objectives 1, 3, 7, 10 and 20, all relevant to developing countries. The analysis of the relationship between forecasts and objectives within each of these sets will be undertaken through a comparison of the two departments.

In this comparison of CIDA and External Affairs, we have made a fundamental assumption regarding the relationship between expectations about the future and objective priorities: the less the estimated probability of a department, the higher will be the priority assigned to an objective designed to achieve the development. With this in mind, we turn first to an analysis of the two departments on the question of food supplies and stocks. An inspection of forecasts 1 through 5 in Figure 4 reveals that both CIDA and External Affairs estimate that there is only a medium probability of adequate supplies and that External Affairs is somewhat less optimistic than CIDA on statements 4 and 5. Therefore, we expect that both will assign a reasonably high priority to objectives 5 and 12 through 15, and that the rating of External Affairs will be slightly higher due to its greater pessimism on the questions of per capita supply and reserve requirements. An examination of the two departments' priority ratings on these five objectives, presented below, generally confirms the second expectation, though not the first insofar as CIDA assigns more than moderate priority to only one objective.

Priority Rating

<u>Objective</u>	<u>CIDA</u>	<u>External Affairs</u>
5	6.6	6.2
12	5.4	6.6
13	4.8	6.0
14	5.0	6.8
15	5.0	4.6

The priority ratings assigned by External Affairs exceed those assigned by CIDA for three of the five objectives. More important, however, is the fact that three

of the objectives fall within the top ten priority ratings for External Affairs, while this is the case for only one objective for CIDA. Thus the relatively greater pessimism on the part of the External Affairs respondent concerning the adequacy of food supplies is reflected in the relatively higher priority assigned to the supply-related objectives.

On the question of the condition of developing countries, an inspection of forecasts 8 through 12 in Figure 4 reveals that CIDA is less optimistic than External Affairs on statements 8 - 10 and expects greater emphasis on the commercial supply of grain, though External Affairs is considerably less optimistic on the likelihood of decreased import dependence for developing countries. Generally, then, we expect that CIDA will assign a higher priority to objectives 1, 3, 7, 10 and 20 than will External Affairs. Their priority ratings on these five objectives are presented below.

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Priority Rating</u>	
	<u>CIDA</u>	<u>External Affairs</u>
1	5.0	6.4
3	5.8	5.0
7	7.0	5.2
10	5.6	4.4
20	5.8	5.0

Once again, our expectations concerning the relationship between estimates of future developments and objective priorities are confirmed. The CIDA priority ratings exceed those of External Affairs for four of the five objectives. The one exception, dealing with an expansion of technical assistance in the agricultural sector, will be discussed in more detail below. In addition, four of these objectives also fall within the top ten priority ratings for CIDA, while this is the case for only one objective for External Affairs.

If we assume that this congruence between forecast estimates and priority ratings is not due to chance, and we have no way of determining this, then the results are generally gratifying from a policy planning perspective. For these two departments, the lower the probability attached to the potential for improvement in particular aspects of the world food situation, the greater the priority they assign to objectives designed to achieve such improvements. There is one disturbing exception to this general congruence, however, and it concerns CIDA rather than External Affairs. One of the major recommendations of the Rome Conference concerned the need to increase substantially the amount of international aid devoted to the improvement of agricultural production in the developing countries in order to decrease dependence on food imports. This prescription is represented in our tenth forecast statement on which the CIDA respondent estimated the lowest probability of achievement among our six departments. As a result of this estimate, we might expect that CIDA would assign a high priority to the first of our operational objectives corresponding to this Rome Conference goal, that of expanding in relative and absolute terms the level of technical assistance devoted to the agricultural sector in developing countries. This expectation is reinforced by the fact that this objective constitutes one of the core areas of CIDA's policy responsibilities. An examination of the priorities assigned to the twenty-five objectives by the CIDA respondent reveals that this technical assistance objective ranks only twentieth in priority. In our earlier analysis of objectives, we attributed the low priority assigned to this objective to the desire of the agency to avoid a concentration on agricultural assistance in favour of infrastructure and industrial development. The forecast estimate reveals that the low priority cannot be attributed to complacency about the likelihood of achieving an expansion of assistance in the agricultural sector. Further, the most recent information available to us on sectoral concentration suggests that the low priority rating does not reflect the fact that CIDA has already achieved the level of concentration in the

agricultural sector which the Rome Conference prescription indicates is necessary. The 7.7 per cent of bilateral assistance disbursements devoted to the agricultural sector in 1972-73 was reduced to 6.3 per cent in 1973-74. In addition, the proportion of development assistance devoted to food aid has steadily declined, from 40.7 per cent for the period 1965-1968 to 20.7 per cent in the period 1971-74.² Food aid has undoubtedly increased in the current period as a result of Canadian grain commitments at the Rome Conference. In addition, informal assessments by CIDA officials, unsupported by statistics, indicate that an increased proportion of assistance is now concentrated in the agricultural sector compared with that for 1973-74. However, to the extent that our respondent reliably reflects the agency's relative priorities, it appears that a significant shift of resources to agriculture remains low on the scale of priority objectives for CIDA.

Conclusion

The analysis of the food issue in this section of the report was intended to serve two purposes. First, we wished to extend the application of our system for the determination of priorities among objectives to a variety of government departments sharing responsibility for the selection and implementation of policies in a common issue. In the process, we wished to explore the extent of agreement among the various departments on their priority assignments. Second, we wished to illustrate the role that may be played by forecasting procedures in the evaluation of relative priorities. With respect to the first purpose, we found that the reliability of the two-dimensional definition of priority, which emerged in the analysis in Part II and which was refined in Part III, was reaffirmed in our analysis of priority ratings on the part of the seven government departments included in this section. In addition, we find the extent of agreement among the

²These figures are drawn from an internal CIDA document, Resource Review - A. Retrospective Disbursements.

departments, particularly the core consensual group of External Affairs, Grain Marketing and Industry, Trade and Commerce, on the relative priority assignments for the objectives in the food issue to be a surprising aspect of the analysis. This is so because our initial interviews with departmental representatives indicated that they, themselves, perceived considerable differences in the relative priorities attached to various objectives by different departments. The analysis suggests that there is much more agreement among the departments on priorities in the food issue than is perceived by the departmental respondents. It is our feeling that the management of shared responsibilities among departments is likely to be facilitated by an awareness of this basic agreement on objectives.

As for the second purpose of the analysis of the food issue, we proceeded with the assumption that forecasts may be a useful criterion against which to evaluate the extent to which objective priorities seem appropriate in light of expectations about the likely course of events in one, or more issues. In other words, priorities should be assessed in terms of expectations about future developments, among other criteria, in the area of policy to which objectives are addressed. Our analysis revealed a general congruence between expectations and priorities; that is, the relative priorities assigned to the various objectives appears appropriate in the face of the pattern of probability estimates which emerged. This congruence is possible in the food issue, in part, because of the extensive forecasting work which has been done on this issue. In other words, the congruence in the food issue may be due to an awareness of at least the general directions implied in the extensive forecasting work which has been done on this issue. However, the general congruence is accompanied by a predisposition on the part of our respondents toward moderate optimism about the future of the world food situation and our reading of the expert forecasts suggests that such optimism is for the moment premature. A useful additional stage in this analysis,

which has not been attempted here, would involve demonstrating to the various departments the extent to which their probability estimates correspond to the developments portrayed in the expert forecasts. Obviously, the ability of policy planners to utilize forecasts as a criterion for the evaluation of priority assignments is constrained by the availability of such forecasting work on the range of issues which engage the attention of policy makers. The ability and willingness of policy analysts to engage in forecasting on an extended range of foreign policy issues is currently growing and the use of these forecasts may provide an important additional dimension to policy planning, one which may be usefully coupled with the systematic determination of objective priorities.

PART V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research project was designed to achieve a number of specific ends. Two of our central aims were the construction of a comprehensive typology of foreign policy objectives and the design of an evaluative system by which to assign varying priorities to the objectives. This latter aim required the development of an appropriate definition of the priority concept and the assessment of the objectives in terms of this definition. After this assessment was accomplished, using government officials, the various objectives were grouped together on the basis of the relative priorities among groups. These procedures were then formalized and linked to an associated set of procedures for monitoring and planning foreign policy activity. Further, the system for determining priorities was used to undertake an inter-departmental comparison of priorities on the issue of the world food situation. This was accomplished by once again clustering groups of objectives and comparing various government departments in terms of their relative priority assignments. Finally, an analysis was conducted on the expectations of the various departments concerning future developments in particular aspects of the food situation. The specific methods used to achieve these ends and the results of our efforts are reported in Parts II through IV of this report. However, a general overview of our findings is warranted here.

Generally, we found that a majority of our departmental respondents experienced considerable difficulty when asked to reflect on Canadian foreign policy in terms of concrete objectives, and this was especially apparent in the food issue where the objectives were solicited initially from the respondents. From this we conclude that the type of exercise represented in this project is useful as a means not only to encourage policy makers to relate to foreign policy objectives

but also to provide an awareness of the relative priorities of other departments and agencies of government. In addition we discovered a high level of congruence between the objectives which were derived from internal documents and interviews and those which were abstracted from public statements. This leads us to conclude that relatively little slippage exists between the foreign policy aims articulated by senior policy makers and those recognized by officials who are, in large part, responsible for their achievement.

At a more specific level, we found that the concept of priority could be adequately represented by the two criteria of Significance and Canadian Control. This finding was reinforced in the subsequent analysis of objectives in the food issue. The identification of a reliable two-dimensional definition of priority greatly simplifies the task of assessing relative priorities since it permits the construction of groups of objectives. Although no absolute order of priority is provided in this approach, a rough differentiation among relative priorities is permitted through the grouping procedure. The validity of the use of concrete and discrete objectives in the determination of relative priorities was also demonstrated in a comparison of the assessments achieved in the evaluation of objectives, on the one hand, and issues on the other hand. When our respondents were asked to assign priority ratings to issues, their evaluations reflected an internationalist predisposition in which "community" interests were paramount. However, the evaluation of objectives, when aggregated to the level of issues, resulted in the assignment of highest priority to issues more directly related to specific Canadian interests. While this order of priority may not be acceptable to those who attach primary importance to the interests of the international community, we feel that it accurately represents the policy concerns and perceptions of greatest potential impact of the respondents included in this study. The findings were used as a basis for the system proposed in Part III.

When the focus was shifted to the food issue, we found considerable consensus to exist among our respondents on the question of whether the objectives identified did indeed represent the aims of Canadian foreign policy in this issue, moreso than was the case for the more comprehensive set of objectives. Further we found a core consensual group composed of External Affairs, Grain Marketing and Industry, Trade and Commerce. This was somewhat surprising since, in the initial interviews, departments indicated that they perceived considerable distance between themselves and others on the issue. This distance, however, appears to lie more in the area of tactics than of basic objectives. We find this consensus on objective priorities encouraging because success on this particular issue will require policy coordination at least among these three departments. Equally encouraging was the finding that two of the principal domestic policy departments in this issue, Agriculture and Finance, were not entirely disassociated from the members of the core consensual group. However, the virtual isolation of CIDA from the other departments of government in the assignment of objective priorities is one of the more disturbing findings of this segment of the research, the moreso because the others attach highest priority to objectives which fall within CIDA's sphere of policy responsibility. This finding deserves further investigation. Finally, when expectations of future developments were compared with assessments of relative priorities among objectives, a reasonably satisfactory level of congruence was found to exist. There remains the task of determining the extent to which the expectations of Canadian officials correspond to the future forecasts provided by the experts in this field; this information could provide an additional valuable element for policy planning.

Those responsible for the development and implementation of Canadian foreign policy have three major requirements: the need to identify priorities; the need to select policies appropriate to the realization of priorities; and the need to

coordinate the policies pursued by the various branches of government so as to ensure that they correspond, overall, to government priorities. The system proposed and tested in this project is capable of providing assistance to policy makers in satisfying the first and third of these needs; and, it will further provide them with information of a sort which will facilitate the selection of appropriate policies, though an expansion of the system would be necessary in order to integrate this function. The extent of responsiveness and cooperation which we encountered from the officials contacted for this project suggests that the effort to provide a systematically determined system of priorities will not be rejected by those it is designed to assist; this attitude was especially apparent in the food issue. This suggests that the system might usefully be applied to additional foreign policy issues or even to a foreign policy strategy comprising objectives which cut across a number of issues, such as that represented in the Third Option.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF RANKED ISSUES WITH FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

RANKED WITHIN ISSUE CATEGORIES

LIST OF RANKED ISSUES WITH FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
RANKED WITHIN ISSUE CATEGORIES

(Rank Order was Computed on the Basis of Average Priority Ratings for each Objective)

<u>Issue and Objectives</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that it is an Objective</u>
I <u>Marine Environment and Fisheries</u>		
1. Upgrade Canadian capability to protect its Fisheries, and continental shelf resources against non-military intrusion	4.21	78.6
2. Prevent depletion of Fishery Stocks through overcatch or destruction from marine pollution	4.12	100
3. Improve Canadian-United States cooperation in the management of, and control of pollution in boundary waters	3.64	100
4. Seek international endorsement for Canada's fishery protection and arctic pollution control measures within respective zones as were unilaterally established in 1970	3.58	100
5. Provide optimum balance between unhindered navigation of international waters and adequate safeguards for the preservation of the marine environmental problems	3.54	78.6
6. Organize increased international efforts to apply science to environmental problems	2.91	64.3
II <u>Law of the Sea</u>		
Objectives for an international convention on the Law of the Sea:		
1. Extend fisheries jurisdiction of coastal states over a 200-mile economic zone or the continental margin, whichever is greater	4.0	92.9
2. Assure that coastal states have adequate powers to protect their marine environment from pollution	3.94	100
3. Confirm the coastal states' existing rights over mineral resources within an economic zone	3.50	100
4. Recognize a 12-mile limit for the territorial sea	3.42	92.9

<u>Issue and Objectives</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that it is an Objective</u>
5. Facilitate unhindered navigation subject to reasonable safeguards for the coastal states' security, and environmental and economic needs	3.14	71.4
6. Establish an international authority to exploit and manage the seabed resources and giving particular care to the economic needs of the less-developed nations	3.11	71.4
<u>III Primary Resource Utilization</u>		
1. Establish long-range conservation measures governing the exploitation of non-renewable Canadian resources	3.63	50.0
2. Assure Canadian energy self-sufficiency for the next decade through development of Arctic and tar sands resources and pipeline construction	3.61	71.4
3. Ensure increased processing of raw materials in Canada	3.58	78.6
4. Ensure environmental protection in primary resource utilization in Canada	3.46	78.6
5. Enlist provincial cooperation in joint development schemes, conservation measures, and environmental protection programmes	3.33	57.1
6. Seek foreign investment in Canadian resource industries (under adequate controls)	3.29	85.7
<u>IV Nuclear Non-Proliferation</u>		
1. Strengthen international safeguards on transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology	3.77	100
2. Ensure that energy assistance needs of less-developed nations are reconciled with the need for adequate nuclear safeguards	3.43	85.7
3. Enforce provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and extend the number of signatories	3.29	92.9
4. Achieve a general and complete Test Ban Treaty	3.19	78.6

<u>Issues and Objectives</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that is an Objective</u>
<u>V Multinational Enterprise Activities</u>		
1. Make conduct of MNEs operating in Canada consistent with Canadian laws, policies and objectives	3.81	85.7
2. Regulate from the outset the role of MNEs in Arctic energy exploration schemes or tar sands development	3.54	50.0
3. Ensure the compatibility of federal and provincial policies toward MNEs.	3.46	50.0
4. Ensure better understanding in the US, EEC, Japan and elsewhere of government policies and objectives regarding the role of MNEs in Canada	3.15	71.4
5. Establish international agreement on standards for the conduct of MNEs and procedures for nationalization	3.04	64.3
<u>VI Canadian Trade</u>		
1. Upgrade the level of processing of Canadian resource exports	3.51	85.7
2. Maximize the international competitiveness of Canadian secondary processing and manufacturing industries.	3.47	85.7
3. Improve industrial productivity in Canada by encouraging the licensing of foreign technology	3.05	50.0
<u>VII Immigration</u>		
1. Retain a stable proportion of French-speaking population in Canada	3.63	71.4
2. Make immigration policy responsive to provincial needs	3.36	57.1
3. Assist Canadian economic growth by attracting foreign entrepreneurs and skilled labour and expanding Canada's domestic market for industrial products	3.01	78.6
4. Maintain the global non-discriminatory basis of recruitment for immigrants	3.0	71.4

<u>Issues and Objectives</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that it is an Objective</u>
<u>VIII World Food Situation</u>		
1. Expand in relative and absolute terms the level of technical assistance given to less-developed nations to increase indigenous food production	3.42	92.9
2. Increase food aid from all donors to the poorest nations and those facing emergency food conditions	3.41	100
3. Liberalize international trade in agricultural commodities	3.32	71.4
4. Strengthen world food security through cooperative stockholding arrangements	3.04	50.0
5. Increase capacity for fertilizer production in less-developed nations	2.95	50.0
<u>IX International Peace and Security</u>		
1. Achieve a settlement of Middle East conflict.	3.64	100
2. Preserve East-West Stability through the maintenance of a viable NATO deterrent and adequate North American defence	3.36	100
3. Seek nuclear arms control and disarmament measures such as progress on SALT and a Complete Test Ban agreement	3.21	100
4. Achieve East-West detente through MBFR, CSCE, and improved human contacts as well as cultural, industrial and scientific exchanges with the USSR and East Europe.	3.18	92.3
5. Enhance UN capacity for conflict mediation and peaceful settlement (e.g. preserve peace-keeping capability; promote agreement on UN Security Council procedures to authorize and control peace-keeping operations; strengthen peaceful settlement procedures).	2.92	92.3
6. Control conventional arms exports through international agreement on standards and limits of weapons exports, particularly as this affects politically sensitive areas	2.7	100

<u>Issues and Objectives</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that is an Objective</u>
<u>X International Monetary System</u>		
1. Reduce worldwide inflation rates	3.74	71.4
2. Resolve balance of payments difficulties within a framework of accepted international rules and without resort to competitive devaluation of currencies or to protective trade and currency restrictions	3.38	92.9
3. Establish a mechanism through which to recycle petrodollars	3.18	71.4
4. Establish Special Drawing Rights as the base of the international monetary system	2.93	42.9
5. Strengthen the role of Third World nations in international financial institutions	2.72	50.0
<u>XI Diversification</u>		
1. Increase exports to the European Economic Community, Japan and petroleum producing states	3.70	100
2. Establish contractual links with the European Economic Community	3.54	100
3. Increase trade with Third World nations	3.01	85.7
4. Reinforce and expand diverse institutional links, such as those provided by Commonwealth membership	2.79	71.4
5. Expand links with Japan beyond the trade sector	2.70	71.4
<u>XII International Trade System</u>		
1. Establish a set of international rules with which to ensure non-discriminatory trade practices	3.54	71.4
2. Make developed markets more accessible to industrial and processed goods from less-developed nations	3.20	78.6
3.5 Adjust trade policies through multilateral trade negotiations	3.19	92.9
3.5 Liberalize tariff structure and remove non-tariff barriers to trade	3.19	71.4

<u>Issues and Objectives</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that it is an Objective</u>
<u>XIII International Resource System</u>		
1. Secure stability of prices and adequate supplies of basic raw materials	3.35	71.4
2. Establish commodity agreements between principal producers and consumers combining equitable prices and assured markets for producers with adequate and secure supplies for consumers	3.24	57.1
3. Achieve emergency cooperative measures among energy consumers	3.2	71.4
4. Establish measures for global conservation of raw materials	3.17	71.4
5.5. Establish resource stockpiles to meet emergencies	2.84	57.1
5.5. Create an overall price-indexing system to bring industrial goods and raw materials into an equitable relation	2.84	42.9
<u>XIV Global Economic Redistribution</u>		
1. Increase the flow of bilateral and multilateral aid from industrial nations to the Third World on appropriate concessional terms with particular emphasis on countries most affected by energy costs.	3.26	100
2. Improve access to world markets for processed goods and industrial products from less-developed nations	3.16	78.6
3. Establish international policies for the control of population growth	2.99	42.9
4. Improve standards of aid administration and distribution within governments of receiving states	2.93	57.1
5. Direct the surplus funds of oil producing states to development assistance using IBRD, IDA, and the regional development banks as channels for those funds	2.91	57.1
6. Establish an international authority for the exploitation of resources of the sea-bed and direct a preferred share of its revenue to less-developed nations	2.86	3

<u>Issues and Objectives</u>	<u>Average Priority Rating</u>	<u>% Agreement that is an Objective</u>
7. Expand the role of less developed nations in international economic fora such as IBRD, IMF and regional banks	2.63	57.1
<u>XV Human Rights and Discrimination</u>		
1. Establish a mechanism to expedite the admission to Canada of political refugees and members of oppressed minorities	3.12	35.7
2. Develop procedures for provincial participation in international activities concerning human rights	3.0	64.3
3. Achieve family reunification and greater East-West human contacts within the CSCE framework	2.98	92.9
4. Provide humanitarian assistance to victims of racist regimes	2.81	78.6
5. Establish agreement on international action to counteract the racist policies of the South African and Rhodesian regimes	2.7	42.9

APPENDIX II

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

QUESTIONNAIRE

CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

QUESTIONNAIRE

In the pages which follow, fifteen issues in Canadian foreign policy are presented. For each issue, a number of specific objectives of Canadian policy are listed. We would like you to assess these objectives by answering six questions about each. We are not searching for any particular pattern in your answers, but rather we are simply seeking descriptive information about your assessment of each objective. The six questions are printed below, along with the categories within which we would like your assessment. Following the full statement of the questions, you will find a series of tables, one for each of the issues, with the specific objectives listed down the side. Across the top of each table, six topics are listed corresponding to the full questions printed below. Please use the numbers associated with each category of assessment on the questions to indicate your response in assessing each objective for each question.

The questions are as follows:

Question 1 - Importance

How important do you feel the pursuit of this objective to be for Canadian foreign policy in the context of the issue within which it is included? Would you rate its importance as

5	4	3	2	1
very high	high	moderate	low	very low

Question 2 - Urgency

How urgent do you feel it is that the objective be pursued through early formulation or implementation of appropriate policies in order to achieve this objective, with urgency viewed mainly in terms of the time limits within which some policy must be determined or some initiative or commitment undertaken? Would you rate its urgency as

5	4	3	2	1
very high	high	moderate	low	very low

Question 3 - Canadian Impact

How great an impact do you feel a Canadian policy initiative can have on the achievement of this objective? Would you rate the potential impact of a Canadian policy initiative as

5	4	3	2	1
very high	high	moderate	low	very low

Question 4 - Reaction to External Events

To what extent will Canadian policy on this objective be either a reaction to events outside of Canada or an independent policy initiative on the part of Canada? Would you say that the degree to which Canadian policy will be a reaction to external events is

5	4	3	2	1
very high	high	moderate	low	very low

Question 5 - Domestic Pressures

To what extent will Canadian policy on this objective be either influenced by domestic pressures or be largely free of domestic pressures? Would you say that the extent to which Canadian policy will be influenced by domestic pressures is

5	4	3	2	1
very high	high	moderate	low	very low

Question 6 - Agreement

Do you feel that this is currently an objective of Canadian foreign policy?

Yes = 2

No = 1

Objectives

Make immigration policy responsive to provincial needs.

Assist Canadian economic growth by attracting foreign entrepreneurs and skilled labour and expanding Canada's domestic market for industrial products.

Retain a stable proportion of French-speaking population in Canada.

Maintain the global non-discriminatory basis of recruitment for immigrants.

Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
					Yes = 2 No = 1

Objectives

Improve industrial productivity in Canada by encouraging the licensing of foreign technology.

Upgrade the level of processing of Canadian resource exports.

Maximize the international competitiveness of Canadian secondary processing and manufacturing industries.

Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement Yes = 2 No = 1

Objectives

Achieve a general and complete Test Ban Treaty.

Strengthen international safeguards on transfer of nuclear equipment, material, and technology.

Ensure that energy assistance needs of less-developed nations are reconciled with the need for adequate nuclear safeguards.

Enforce provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and extend the number of signatories.

Importance

Urgency

Canadian Impact

Reaction to External Events

Domestic Pressures

Agreement
Yes = 2
No = 1

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
Achieve a general and complete Test Ban Treaty.						
Strengthen international safeguards on transfer of nuclear equipment, material, and technology.						
Ensure that energy assistance needs of less-developed nations are reconciled with the need for adequate nuclear safeguards.						
Enforce provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and extend the number of signatories.						

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Objectives

Increase the flow of bilateral and multilateral aid from industrial nations to the Third World on appropriate concessional terms with particular emphasis on countries most affected by energy costs.

Establish international policies for the control of population growth.

Expand the role of less developed nations in international economic fora such as IBRD, IMF and regional banks.

Establish an international authority for the exploitation of resources of the sea-bed and direct a preferred share of its revenue to less-developed nations.

Improve standards of aid administration and distribution within governments of receiving states.

Improve access to world markets for processed goods and industrial products from less-developed nations.

Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement Yes = 2 No = 1

Objectives

Direct the Surplus funds of oil producing states to development assistance using IBRD, IDA, and the regional development banks as channels for those funds

Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement Yes = 2 No = 1

Objectives

Increase exports to the European Economic Community, Japan, and petroleum producing states

Increase trade with Third world nations.

Reinforce and expand diverse institutional links, such as those provided by Commonwealth membership.

Expand links with Japan beyond the trade sector.

Establish contractual links with the European Economic Community.

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement Yes = 2 No = 1
Increase exports to the European Economic Community, Japan, and petroleum producing states						
Increase trade with Third world nations.						
Reinforce and expand diverse institutional links, such as those provided by Commonwealth membership.						
Expand links with Japan beyond the trade sector.						
Establish contractual links with the European Economic Community.						

Objectives

Make developed markets more accessible to industrial and processed goods from less-developed nations.

Establish a set of international rules with which to ensure non-discriminatory trade practices.

Adjust trade policies through multi-lateral trade negotiations.

Liberalize tariff structure and remove non-tariff barriers to trade.

Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
					Yes = 2
					No = 1

Objectives for an international convention on the Law of the Sea:

Assure that coastal states have adequate powers to protect their marine environment from pollution.

Establish an international authority to exploit and manage the seabed resources and giving particular care to the economic needs of the less-developed nations.

Recognize a 12-mile limit for the territorial sea.

Confirm the coastal states' existing rights over mineral resources within an economic zone.

Facilitate unhindered navigation subject to reasonable safeguards for the coastal states' security, and environmental and economic needs.

Extend fisheries jurisdiction of coastal states over a 200-mile economic zone or the continental margin, whichever is greater.

Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement Yes = 2 No = 1

Objectives

Make conduct of MNEs operating in Canada consistent with Canadian laws, policies and objectives.

Regulate from the outset the role of MNEs in Arctic energy exploration schemes or tar sands development.

Ensure better understanding in the US, EEC, Japan and elsewhere of government policies and objectives regarding the role of MNEs in Canada.

Establish international agreement on standards for the conduct of MNEs and procedures for nationalization.

Ensure the compatibility of federal and provincial policies toward MNEs.

Importance

Urgency

Canadian Impact

Reaction to External Events

Domestic Pressures

Agreement

Yes = 2

No = 1

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
Make conduct of MNEs operating in Canada consistent with Canadian laws, policies and objectives.						
Regulate from the outset the role of MNEs in Arctic energy exploration schemes or tar sands development.						
Ensure better understanding in the US, EEC, Japan and elsewhere of government policies and objectives regarding the role of MNEs in Canada.						
Establish international agreement on standards for the conduct of MNEs and procedures for nationalization.						
Ensure the compatibility of federal and provincial policies toward MNEs.						

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Objectives

Liberalize international trade in agricultural commodities.

Increase food aid from all donors to the poorest nations and those facing emergency food conditions.

Strengthen world food security through cooperative stockholding arrangements.

Increase capacity for fertilizer production in less-developed nations.

Expand in relative and absolute terms the level of technical assistance given to less-developed nations to increase indigenous food production.

Importance

Urgency

Canadian Impact

Reaction to External Events

Domestic Pressures

Agreement

Yes = 2

No = 1

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
Liberalize international trade in agricultural commodities.						
Increase food aid from all donors to the poorest nations and those facing emergency food conditions.						
Strengthen world food security through cooperative stockholding arrangements.						
Increase capacity for fertilizer production in less-developed nations.						
Expand in relative and absolute terms the level of technical assistance given to less-developed nations to increase indigenous food production.						

Objectives

Ensure environmental protection in primary resource utilization in Canada.

Enlist provincial cooperation in joint development schemes, conservation measures, and environmental protection programmes.

Seek foreign investment in Canadian resource industries (under adequate controls).

Ensure increased processing of raw materials in Canada.

Establish long-range conservation measures governing the exploitation of non-renewable Canadian resources.

Assure Canadian energy self-sufficiency for the next decade through development of Arctic and tar sands resources and pipeline construction.

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement Yes = 2 No = 1
Ensure environmental protection in primary resource utilization in Canada.						
Enlist provincial cooperation in joint development schemes, conservation measures, and environmental protection programmes.						
Seek foreign investment in Canadian resource industries (under adequate controls).						
Ensure increased processing of raw materials in Canada.						
Establish long-range conservation measures governing the exploitation of non-renewable Canadian resources.						
Assure Canadian energy self-sufficiency for the next decade through development of Arctic and tar sands resources and pipeline construction.						

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Objectives

Preserve East-West stability through the maintenance of a viable NATO deterrent and adequate North American defence.

Achieve East-West detente through MBFR, CSCE, and improved human contacts as well as cultural, industrial and scientific exchanges with the USSR and East Europe.

Seek nuclear arms control and disarmament measures such as progress on SALT and a Complete Test Ban agreement.

Control conventional arms exports through international agreement on standards and limits of weapons exports, particularly as this affects politically sensitive areas.

Achieve a settlement of Middle East conflict.

Enhance UN capacity for conflict mediation and peaceful settlement (e.g. preserve peace-keeping capability; promote agreement on UN Security Council procedures to authorize and control peace-keeping operations; strengthen peaceful settlement procedures).

Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement Yes = 2 No = 1

Objectives

Establish agreement on international action to counteract the racist policies of the South African and Rhodesian regimes.

Establish a mechanism to expedite the admission to Canada of political refugees and members of oppressed minorities.

114 Develop procedures for provincial participation in international activities concerning human rights.

Achieve family reunification and greater East-West human contacts within the CSCE framework.

Provide humanitarian assistance to victims of racist regimes.

Importance

Urgency

Canadian Impact

Reaction to External Events

Domestic Pressures

Agreement

Yes = 2
No = 1

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
Establish agreement on international action to counteract the racist policies of the South African and Rhodesian regimes.						
Establish a mechanism to expedite the admission to Canada of political refugees and members of oppressed minorities.						
114 Develop procedures for provincial participation in international activities concerning human rights.						
Achieve family reunification and greater East-West human contacts within the CSCE framework.						
Provide humanitarian assistance to victims of racist regimes.						

Objectives

Importance
Urgency
Canadian Impact
Reaction to External Events
Domestic Pressures
Agreement
Yes = 2
No = 1

Reduce worldwide inflation rates.

Establish a mechanism through which to recycle petrodollars.

Resolve balance of payments difficulties within a framework of accepted international rules and without resort to competitive devaluation of currencies or to protective trade and currency restrictions.

Strengthen the role of Third World nations in international financial institutions.

Establish Special Drawing Rights as the base of the international monetary system.

Issue Areas

Now that you have answered the six questions for each of the foreign policy objectives we would like you to shift your attention to the fifteen more general issue areas which were used to organize the objectives.

1. We would like you to rank these fifteen issues in descending order of what you feel to be their importance in the general scheme of Canadian foreign policy. The issues are listed below.

Simply assign to each a number between 1 and 15 in order to indicate your estimate of their relative importance (with 1 representing the most important).

Please feel free to assign a number of issues the same rank if you feel they are of equal importance. If you should feel after assigning ranks 1 through 3, for example, that the next 3 issues are equally important, then assign the number 4 rank to each of them, and continue on with rank 5 (this means of course that you will not have the same number of rank numbers as there are issues).

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Global Economic Redistribution	_____
Diversification	_____
International Trade System	_____
Canadian Trade	_____
Law of the Sea	_____
Marine Environment and Fisheries	_____
International Resource System	_____
Multinational Enterprise Activities	_____
World Food Situation	_____
Nuclear Non-Proliferation	_____
Primary Resource Utilization	_____
International Peace and Security	_____
Immigration	_____
Human Rights and Discrimination	_____
International Monetary System	_____

2. We would also like you to answer two additional questions about each issue.

First, do you feel that there are any other states or groups of states which are especially important in influencing whether or not Canada may achieve its foreign policy objectives in each issue-area.

Second, do you feel that there are any states or groups of states, other than Canada, for which the foreign policy objectives in each issue-area are especially important.

Please list any states or groups which come to mind for the questions on each issue-area in the tables on pages 21 and 22.

APPENDIX III

CANADIAN OBJECTIVES CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD SITUATION

QUESTIONNAIRE

CANADIAN OBJECTIVES CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL FOOD SITUATION

QUESTIONNAIRE

PART I:

In the following pages some 25 objectives have been identified all of which relate to the global food situation. In Part I of the questionnaire you are asked to answer 6 questions for each objective. The first 5 concern the importance, urgency, possible Canadian impact, as well as domestic and international pressure for each objective. You are asked to place in each cell the numerical equivalent of your respective answer as derived from the following scale:

<u>Very High</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Very Low</u>
9 or 8	7 or 6	5	4 or 3	2 or 1

The same scale values apply to the first 5 questions on each objective. The 6th question seeks to determine whether the objective which we have identified does, in your opinion, actually represent a current objective of Canadian policy. If your answer is yes, code it as 2; if it is no, code it as 1. The following are the questions on each objective:

Question 1 - Importance

How important do you feel the pursuit of this objective to be in the context of resolving or coping with the world food problems. Would you rate its importance as

<u>Very High</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Very Low</u>
9 or 8	7 or 6	5	4 or 3	2 or 1

Question 2 - Urgency

How urgent do you feel it is that the objective be pursued through an early formulation or implementation of appropriate policies. Urgency here is viewed mainly in terms of time limits within which some policy must be determined or some initiative or commitment undertaken. Would you rate its urgency as

<u>Very High</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Very Low</u>
9 or 8	7 or 6	5	4 or 3	2 or 1

Question 3 - Canadian Impact

How great an impact do you feel a Canadian policy initiative can have on the achievement of this objective? Would you rate the potential impact of a Canadian policy initiative as

<u>Very High</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Very Low</u>
9 or 8	7 or 6	5	4 or 3	2 or 1

Question 4 - Reaction to External Events

To what extent will Canadian policy on this objective be either a reaction to events outside Canada or an independent initiative on the part of Canada? Would you say that the degree to which Canadian policy will be a reaction to external events is

<u>Very High</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Very Low</u>
9 or 8	7 or 6	5	4 or 3	2 or 1

Question 5 - Domestic Pressures

To what extent will Canadian policy on this objective be either influenced by domestic pressures or be largely free of domestic pressures? Would you say that the extent to which Canadian policy will be influenced by domestic pressure is

<u>Very High</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Very Low</u>
9 or 8	7 or 6	5	4 or 3	2 or 1

Question 6 - Agreement

Do you feel that this is currently an objective of Canadian policy?

Yes = 2 No = 1

Very high = 9 or 8; high = 7 or 6; moderate = 5; low = 4 or 3; very low = 2 or 1

Importance
 Urgency
 Canadian Impact
 Reaction to External Events
 Domestic Pressures
 Agreement
 Yes = 2
 No = 1

Objectives:

- 1) Expand in relative and absolute terms the level of technical assistance to LDCs in order to raise agricultural production and to improve their self-sufficiency in this sector.
- 2) Reduce food consumption and wastage in developed nations.
- 3) Raise the general standard of nutrition among the population of LDCs.
- 4) Meet emergency needs by continuing food aid to disaster areas and to countries facing most severe shortages.

Comments on Objectives

Very high = 9 or 8; high = 7 or 6; moderate = 5; low = 4 or 3; very low = 2 or 1

Objectives:

- 5) Improve the world food security situation by assisting in the creation of food stocks in LDCs and in the construction of a viable food distribution system.
- 6) Help develop food processing plants in LDCs to stimulate their industrial development and increase returns on their food products.
- 7) Increase the capacity for fertilizer production in LDCs.

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
						Yes = 2
						No = 1
5) Improve the world food security situation by assisting in the creation of food stocks in LDCs and in the construction of a viable food distribution system.						
6) Help develop food processing plants in LDCs to stimulate their industrial development and increase returns on their food products.						
7) Increase the capacity for fertilizer production in LDCs.						

Comments on Objectives:

Very high = 9 or 8; high = 7 or 6; moderate = 5; low = 4 or 3; very low = 2 or 1

Objectives:

- 8) Fit Canada's agricultural assistance and development programme into an overall policy of maintaining constructive relations with members of the Third World and of reducing confrontations between developed and less developed nations.
- 9) Defuse UN confrontation politics and seek to mediate conflicts in order to maintain a viable World Food Programme.
- 10) Encourage donors to improve coordination and harmonization of their respective food aid policies through the FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes and through other mechanisms.

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
						Yes = 2
						No = 1
8) Fit Canada's agricultural assistance and development programme into an overall policy of maintaining constructive relations with members of the Third World and of reducing confrontations between developed and less developed nations.						
9) Defuse UN confrontation politics and seek to mediate conflicts in order to maintain a viable World Food Programme.						
10) Encourage donors to improve coordination and harmonization of their respective food aid policies through the FAO Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes and through other mechanisms.						

Comments on Objectives:

Very high = 9 or 8; high = 7 or 6; moderate = 5; low = 4 or 3; very low = 2 or 1

Objectives:

- 11) Couple certain food aid and development measures to OPEC commitments to assist agricultural development in low-income nations.
- 12) Strengthen world food security through co-operative international stockholding arrangements and through a global information and warning system on food and agriculture.
- 13) Support the establishment of an international grain reserve system, provided adequate price protection measures for producer nations are included.

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
						Yes = 2 No = 1
11) Couple certain food aid and development measures to OPEC commitments to assist agricultural development in low-income nations.						
12) Strengthen world food security through co-operative international stockholding arrangements and through a global information and warning system on food and agriculture.						
13) Support the establishment of an international grain reserve system, provided adequate price protection measures for producer nations are included.						

Comments on Objectives:

Very high = 9 or 8; high = 7 or 6; moderate = 5; low = 4 or 3; very low = 2 or 1

Objectives:

- 14) Replenish depleted grain reserves in Canada.
- 15) Promote international commodity agreements on agricultural products in order to strengthen security of supplies and to stabilize price conditions.
- 16) Renew international wheat agreement, backed by adequate stocks to allow agreed price ranges to hold.
- 17) Avoid cartel formation among food producer nations; instead, seek international commodity agreements that will balance the interests of producers and consumer nations.

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
						Yes = 2 No = 1
14) Replenish depleted grain reserves in Canada.						
15) Promote international commodity agreements on agricultural products in order to strengthen security of supplies and to stabilize price conditions.						
16) Renew international wheat agreement, backed by adequate stocks to allow agreed price ranges to hold.						
17) Avoid cartel formation among food producer nations; instead, seek international commodity agreements that will balance the interests of producers and consumer nations.						

Comments on Objectives:

Very high = 9 or 8; high = 7 or 6; moderate = 5; low = 4 or 3; very low = 2 or 1

Objectives:

- 18) Adopt adequate environmental safeguards and conservational practices to control marine pollution and to ensure the survival of heavily exploited stocks of fish.
- 19) Expand Canada's catch of fish by including less common species like krill.
- 20) Assist LDCs in developing the necessary capacity to manage and harvest the stocks of fish within their economic zone which is likely to be determined by a LOS convention.

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
						Yes = 2 No = 1
18) Adopt adequate environmental safeguards and conservational practices to control marine pollution and to ensure the survival of heavily exploited stocks of fish.						
19) Expand Canada's catch of fish by including less common species like krill.						
20) Assist LDCs in developing the necessary capacity to manage and harvest the stocks of fish within their economic zone which is likely to be determined by a LOS convention.						

Comments on Objectives:

Very High = 9 or 8; high = 7 or 6; moderate = 5; low = 4 or 3; very low = 2 or 1

Objectives:

- 21) Expand foreign sales of Canadian agricultural and fish products for the benefit of Canadian producers, the Canadian economy at large and in response to global needs for increased supplies.

- 22) Secure long-term buyers for Canadian agricultural products who will provide reliable markets even during periods of renewed surplus.

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement
						Yes = 2
						No = 1

Comments on Objectives:

Very high = 9 or 8; high = 7 or 6; moderate = 5; low = 4 or 3; very low = 2 or 1.

Objectives:

- 23) Reduce international trade barriers (tariffs, quotas and subsidies) against agricultural products and processed foodstuffs in the context of MTN.
- 24) Increase the processed component in Canada's food exports.
- 25) Eliminate tariffs on agricultural products (both in raw state and in processed form) from LDCs and encourage tariff reductions in that sector within the LDC group itself.

Any additional objectives that you feel ought to be specified:

	Importance	Urgency	Canadian Impact	Reaction to External Events	Domestic Pressures	Agreement	
						Yes = 2	No = 1

Comments on Objectives:

PART II

ASSESS THE PROBABILITY OF THE FOLLOWING FOOD-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRING DURING THE NEXT FEW YEARS

All developments are to be ranked on the same 0 to 10 probability scale. Simply circle the respective probability level that in your opinion best fits the given situation as you expect it to develop in the specified time interval.

1) Aggregate world grain supplies will be large enough in the next ten years to avoid the serious risk of general famine (more than 1 million deaths at the world level).

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

2) If crops are good for two to three years, and if governments will support farm prices at levels that permit accumulation of stocks, the world's granaries will be replenished by 1977 or 1978.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

3) The Canadian and U.S. Governments are likely to support farm prices at levels that will permit accumulation of stocks by 1977 or 1978.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

4) Additional investment and technological use will increase world per capita grain supply annually during the next 10 years.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

5) A world reserve of 60 million tons of food grains will be adequate to meet the world's need for stability of food supplies.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

6) Japan, Europe and the Soviet Union can be expected to develop a policy of local grain reserves in the next 3 - 5 years.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

7) A Canadian-U.S. joint commission or other cooperative arrangement will be established in the next 3 - 5 years to coordinate their policies as the two major grain exporters.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

8) Net grain imports of developing countries are likely to increase to 70-85 million tons annually by 1985.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

9) Food aid programs are likely to expand on the scale necessary to meet the needs of developing countries during the next 3 - 5 years (at least 10 million tons of grain annually).

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

10) International aid programs for agriculture are likely to increase from \$1.5 billion to \$5 billion annually as prescribed by the FAO Conference within the next 3 - 5 years.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

11) An increasing proportion of world grain movements will be supplied on a commercial basis during the next 3 - 5 years.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

12) Food deficit developing countries are likely to make considerable progress in reducing their import needs in the next 3 - 5 years.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

13) The trend toward increasing meat consumption per person in North America is likely to level off in the next 3 - 5 years.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Low					Medium					High
Probability					Probability					Probability
					(50:50 Chance)					

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