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
WORKING PAPER 36

**CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF
PEACEKEEPING**

**A SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP
PROCEEDINGS
OTTAWA, 9-10 JULY 1991**

by Robin Hay

October 1991



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PREFACE

Working Papers, the result of research work in progress or the summary of a conference, are often intended for later publication by the Institute or another publisher, and are regarded by the Institute to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers — mostly to specialists in the field.

The opinions contained in the papers are those of the participants and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

Robin Hay is a Research Fellow at the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

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INTRODUCTION

On 9 and 10 July 1991, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) hosted a two-day workshop on the Civilian Aspects of Peacekeeping. The subject was especially timely given the successful completion in Namibia in 1990 of the work of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a largely civilian peacekeeping operation, and the imminence of similar new operations in the Western Sahara and El Salvador; and possibly in Cambodia.

With the apparent potential for more and varied civilian peacekeeping missions, the Institute convened a workshop to look at past experiences, but with a view to the future. What have been the contributions of civilians to peacekeeping? What has the international community learned from these operations? What, if anything, is transferable? What institutional innovations have been necessary to accommodate civilian peacekeeping? What further innovations might be required?

The answers to these and other questions were explored by focussing on three of the more obvious aspects of past civilian contributions to peacekeeping — administration, civilian police, and election monitoring — with the intent of keeping in mind and arriving at a list of recommendations for future civilian involvement. This report is a summary of the workshop proceedings. It focusses on the *major* themes of the workshop without remaining faithful to the chronological structure of discussion throughout the two-day agenda. There was no attempt to arrive at a consensus on recommendations during the workshop. The list of themes and recommendations included here are those that generated the most discussion among a highly qualified group of practitioners and academics.

I PEACEKEEPING: TO DEFINE OR NOT TO DEFINE?

While United Nations peacekeeping or observer missions have been with us almost as long as that international organization itself, there has never been a formal definition of peacekeeping. Moreover, as Marrack Goulding, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs at the UN, pointed out, the various informal definitions proffered have tended to emphasize the use of military personnel.

That way of thinking, Mr. Goulding noted, is now outmoded. Since 1988, there have been eleven new peacekeeping operations. Some of these have conformed to the traditional pattern of military peacekeeping operations, but others, such as UNTAG in Namibia, have been composite (civilian/military) operations intended to *implement* a negotiated settlement of a conflict. Mr. Goulding indicated that the plethora of new peacekeeping operations in the last three years, and their often composite nature, has raised anew the question: "what is peacekeeping?"

It has also made that question more difficult to answer. For example, several participants queried whether the United Nations Guard Contingent in northern Iraq, set up as a result of Security Council Resolution 688, could be classified as a peacekeeping operation, civilian or otherwise. While it was agreed that as yet there was no conclusive answer to that question, most felt that the operation did fall into the general category of peacekeeping operations, which Mr. Goulding defined as "a UN field operation deployed in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security."

This line of discussion inevitably led to a consideration of whether it was better to define peacekeeping or leave it undefined. Some felt that there was a need for a definition in order to prevent the peacekeeping community from wandering in different directions with different interpretations of the concept. It was argued, further, that constitutional questions in individual countries and the financial system of the UN demand a definition. As an example of the former issue, it was pointed out that nations such as Japan, which are constitutionally restricted from providing military contingents to peacekeeping operations, need a definition to help them decide what they can contribute and, in aid of this, to explain what peacekeeping is to parliamentarians.

The counter to this argument came in several shades. Alan James, professor of international relations at the University of Keele, did not argue for a strict definition of peacekeeping. He did see the need, however, for a distinction between peacekeeping and other kinds of undertakings, such as enforcement and humanitarian operations, in order to avoid muddying the conceptual waters.

Still others suggested that any strict definition would limit what the UN could do under the rubric of peacekeeping. Imprecision, on the other hand, allowed for greater flexibility in the types of operations that could be undertaken.

II THE HISTORY OF CIVILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING

Roles and Tasks

Professor James noted that while civilian involvement in peacekeeping was achieving a higher profile there was, in fact, ample precedent for such involvement. Both Professor James and Mr. Goulding recalled that civilians from the UN Secretariat have always been responsible for carrying out essential core functions at the headquarters of UN field operations. These include political and administrative tasks undertaken by, for example, the Chief Administrative Officer, the Public and Legal Affairs Officer, and the Public Administration Officer.

Professor James went on to identify the many roles that civilians have played in UN or other peacekeeping operations. At the operational level he distinguished among several different tasks, including: administration of a territory during a transfer of power, undertaken in 1962-63 by the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West Irian (West New Guinea), and in 1920-35 by the League of Nations in the Saar; an executive role, where the operation was responsible for organizing a referendum or election, as occurred in Europe following the Second World War; observation, such as that undertaken in 1979-80 by the Commonwealth Observer Group in Zimbabwe; liaising with the local population of the peacekeeping area in order to pass on information, which was an important task of the UNTAG operation (Mr. Goulding identified this as the political/educational function of UNTAG); acting as an umpire in order to call attention to rule breaking, as was done in 1954 by the International Commission of Control and Supervision in Indochina and in 1975 by the US Sinai Field Mission in the Middle East; and settling work or reconciliation, such as that carried out by UNTAG.

Professor James also noted that civilian Special Representatives of the Secretary-General have played leadership roles in a number of peacekeeping operations, including, from 1988 to 1990, the United Nations Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). Finally, he reminded participants that there had been instances of entirely civilian peacekeeping operations, including the US Sinai Field Mission. He also included in this category recent UN operations such as the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN), deployed in 1989, and the UN security guards sent to northern Iraq in 1991.

Mr. Goulding added to this list the electoral and police monitoring functions carried out by UNTAG in Namibia, as well as human rights monitoring, which will be included among ONUSAL's tasks in El Salvador. In reply to a comment on human rights monitoring, he agreed that it was closely linked to the policing function undertaken by UNTAG in Namibia, but explained that

in El Salvador it would be a much more intrusive operation, involving a composite group that included the military, the police, and specialists in judicial systems and prison regimes.

A number of participants noted that it was important to remember those civilians and civilian agencies involved in field operations related to, but not directly a part of, peacekeeping operations. For example the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) play important roles and the value of civilians in these agencies should not be underestimated. In a related observation, a participant mentioned that the issue of involving peacekeepers in disaster and humanitarian relief is currently under review at the UN.

Finally, one participant suggested that perhaps the workshop overlooked a key task often carried out by civilians: the provision of technical advice and assistance. As an example, it was pointed out that in Nicaragua, Canada was involved in activities ranging from the development and implementation of voter information programmes to the design of ballot boxes.

The Evolution of Peacekeeping

Despite the firmly established precedents for civilian involvement, there was considerable agreement among participants that we are entering a new era of innovation in peacekeeping. Cedric Thornberry, the Director of the Special Representative's office in Namibia during the UNTAG operation, distinguished between the past and the future of peacekeeping. He described past UN peacekeeping as limited strictly to military operations, which he described as the monitoring of a thin blue line and the supervising of an uneasy peace while others attended to the problem. Mr. Thornberry argued that international attention is now focussed on new responsibilities, the full measure of them yet unknown. He concluded, however, that we must adapt the existing peacekeeping framework to meet new international needs and opportunities, pointing out that UNTAG was a watershed peacekeeping operation, marking a change and helping to bring about new change.

Mr. Thornberry envisioned a new era of multifunctional peacekeeping operations, with the military component only one aspect. Indeed, he speculated that there may be future operations devoid of any military component at all, or with a military component on reserve, standby, or seventy-two hours' notice.

Mr. Goulding, in turn, referred to institutional developments in the field that this evolution in peacekeeping has wrought. He identified the role of Special Representative (SR) in charge of composite operations as the most important. In these instances, the SR is responsible for coordinating

all aspects of the entire operation, and the heads of the different components, including the military, are subordinate to him.

In spite of the quickly evolving nature of peacekeeping, several participants advised that there are a number of military functions civilians cannot fulfil. Infantry bearing arms — the peacekeeping force — for example, was the most obvious one.

III CIVILIANS IN PEACEKEEPING: LESSONS FROM NAMIBIA AND ELSEWHERE

There was a general feeling at the workshop that the UNTAG experience was important for at least two reasons. First, it was representative of a new and different kind of peacekeeping mission that had been undertaken in the past. Second, it seems likely to serve as a precursor for similar — though by no means duplicate — future operations. Nevertheless, there was wide assent to the warning that while lessons could be learned from the experience in Namibia, that experience could not serve as a blueprint for future operations. To paraphrase Mr. Thornberry, Namibia could not even serve as a blueprint for Namibia.

UNTAG as a Watershed

Most participants agreed that with the UNTAG operation, UN peacekeeping had turned a corner. The operation in Namibia served, and continues to serve, judging by the nature of the discussion, as a laboratory where the new responsibilities of peacekeepers are being tested and examined.

In differentiating UNTAG from its predecessors, Mr. Thornberry drew attention to the *extremely* political nature of the operation and its multifunctional character. He noted that, in Namibia, the UN was mandated to provide leadership and act as the catalyst for reconciliation, peace, independence, and democracy. One participant wondered whether this was indicative of an expanding UN role from conflict management to conflict resolution. If so, he commented, this would represent an enormous extension of the function of the UN by involving that organization in the internal affairs of a country.

The Namibian operation forced the UN to deal squarely with the issue of what was required for a free and fair election. Mr. Thornberry related that Martii Ahtisaari, the SR for UNTAG, realized that for free and fair elections the situation would have to be both formally and practically equal and that practical change in the political and social atmosphere would have to take place in order to accomplish this. Mr. Thornberry described this as the heart of UNTAG, which made it different from past experiences.

Mr. Thornberry also identified several tangible aspects of UNTAG that in his estimation were novel: those running the forty-two political offices, who were technically part of the SR's office and functioned as UNTAG's political backbone; the election supervisors; the police monitors;

the independent jurist; the UNHCR; and the information team in the SR's office, who served throughout the country in the political education and consciousness-raising effort.

Lessons From Election Observation

Because election observation is not exclusively a prerogative of peacekeepers, the workshop cast its net wider than the UNTAG experience to gather lessons for the future.

One participant noted that the SR's powers of supervision and control, which included the right to stop the process at any time if he did not feel it met his requirements for a free and fair election, could serve as a model for other operations. He compared this arrangement favourably to other approaches such as allowing the election to proceed and identifying problems only afterwards, or scrapping the process altogether. He did question, however, whether it was necessary to allow the South African Administrator-General (AG), who was responsible for overseeing the administration of the election and of Namibia during the transition period, any role in the process.

One participant pointed out that the SR, overburdened with his own duties, felt it would have been a disaster if he had been given the task of running the whole show in Namibia. Still, it was added, the UN was certainly better trained than the South Africans to run the election itself.

Jennifer McCoy, an associate professor of political science at Georgia State University and a senior research associate at the Carter Center, outlined several lessons from her experience in election observation in places as diverse as Ghana, Surinam, and Nicaragua. First, she argued that the major parties involved in an election must be motivated both to participate and to invite observers. This indicates that they are serious about the process and provides the observers with some leverage to ensure that the election is free and fair.

On the issue of leverage, one participant noted that it is often a particular observer group that is sought after by a state engaging in an election. That group — the Carter Center's experience in Guyana was given as an example — can then use the resulting leverage to help create the conditions for a free and fair election.

Second, election observers should maintain a continuous and active presence in the country until the transfer of power. This enables them to reassure the voters constantly, minimize violence, facilitate dialogue, and help resolve disputes. Third, it is important to include private group observer missions along with international organizations. Periodic visits by high-level groups that include prestigious individuals can focus international attention on the election process. These groups can also mediate disputes, restore the confidence of the people, and exert pressure for or reinforce action

by international organizations by making public statements prohibited to the international organizations. Several participants referred to the benefit of observer missions going into an area well in advance of the election, in order to encourage the people and build, or rebuild, confidence in the election process. It will also help the observer mission assess the situation in the country and enable them to follow through in creating a level playing field for the election.

Fourth, Dr. McCoy recommended a parallel vote tabulation, or quick count, during and after the election. This can provide strategic information on election night that can facilitate dealing with an unexpected victory, thus avoiding any violence that might result. It also helps to legitimate a ruling party victory, and convince losers that they have indeed lost.

Finally, one participant noted that some lessons from election monitoring had already been learned from the Namibian experience. In Haiti during the 1990-91 election, for example, the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) learned from UNTAG the importance of setting up an information programme at the beginning of the operation and of using a recognizable logo.

Lessons From Civilian Police

Civilian police (CIVPOL) were not used for the first time in Namibia, but it was widely agreed that this was the first time they had been used to monitor a local police force. Larry Proke, Chief Superintendent of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and commander of Canada's CIVPOL contingent in Namibia, also mentioned that this was the first time the police component was separate from the civilian component of a UN mission.

One participant noted that no reference to police monitors was made in the Settlement Plan for Namibia. Instead, their role was invented in 1978, despite South African protestations, when it became apparent that the South African controlled South-West African Police Force (SWAPOL), the main instrument of political and racial repression in Namibia, would have to be neutralized.

Mr. Proke described in detail CIVPOL's mandate and operation. In essence, CIVPOL was responsible for observing and reporting on the behaviour of SWAPOL and the dreaded Koevoet, a paramilitary group that was supposed to have been disbanded but that, in fact, had been subsumed by SWAPOL. The unarmed CIVPOL, who enjoyed neither powers of arrest nor investigation, were deployed throughout Namibia and set up liaison at all levels with SWAPOL, with what Mr. Proke described as varying degrees of success. If CIVPOL observed improper behaviour by SWAPOL, they were to inform the on-site commander; if the commander engaged in improper behaviour, he

was asked by CIVPOL to modify that behaviour or be subject to report (CIVPOL's mandate forbade intervention to prevent or halt misbehaviour or intimidation). Its other duties included monitoring jails to ensure fair treatment of prisoners and checking legal records to confirm that due process had been followed.

Mr. Thornberry revealed that given the uniqueness of the CIVPOL operation, the feeling in Namibia was that a great deal could be learned from the experience. He stated, for instance, that CIVPOL set a good example for other civilian components of peacekeeping missions by conducting extensive debriefings at the end of the UNTAG mission. These debriefings, which resulted in reports submitted to UNTAG, may be used as a guide for the conduct of future CIVPOL operations.

Perhaps the major lesson of the UNTAG experience, as Mr. Goulding described it, was not to underestimate the need for CIVPOL. The 360 civilian police monitors sent to Namibia at the start of the operation had to be increased to 1,500 by the election in November 1989. Mr. Goulding explained that the UN simply did not take into account, at the beginning, the numbers and the type of police to be monitored.

Aside from these more obvious structural lessons, much of the discussion on CIVPOL centred on operational issues. Should CIVPOL have been given investigatory powers? Should they have had some authority? Should they have had complete executive authority?

On the general matter of whether CIVPOL should have executive authority, Mr. Proke answered that that will depend on the role of the UN in a particular country at a particular time. If the UN is responsible for administering a country, then the civilian police might be granted executive authority. He did not believe, however, that CIVPOL should have been given executive authority in Namibia. Douglas Anglin, adjunct professor of political science at Carleton University, suggested that the gaps in CIVPOL's powers of authority in Namibia might have been attended to by recycling UNTAG troops into a police role replacing Koevoet, and by the SR using his reserve power of self-defence creatively.

One participant admonished that CIVPOL's involvement in any international election cannot hope to answer all problems. The depth of that involvement will depend on the mandate the civilian police are given at the outset of the operation. In conclusion, he pointed out the importance of taking these elements into account when settlement plans are negotiated, but warned that the UN is resistant to giving CIVPOL direct responsibility for law and order.

Regarding the investigatory powers of CIVPOL in Namibia, Mr. Proke revealed that CIVPOL did have an investigative arm, but that the success of its investigations depended on information gleaned from a usually uncooperative SWAPOL. He admitted that these investigatory powers were faulty, suggesting that in similar situations a portion of CIVPOL should be part of a joint-force investigative mechanism. Another participant made the general observation that perhaps ONUSAL's human rights investigative function can profit from the experience of CIVPOL in Namibia.

The Role of NGOs and Private Observer Missions

Andreas Guibeb, a Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Ministry in Namibia, noted that without diminishing UNTAG's role in his country's transition to independence, it was, after all, a team effort. Much of UNTAG was supported by and depended upon contributions made by NGOs including observer missions. He cited, for example, the importance of observer-group press conferences, which maintained the pressure for free and fair elections. Mr. Guibeb also pointed to the vital contribution of the Council of Churches in Namibia in the resettlement, repatriation and reintegration of exiles and refugees.

Senator Alasdair Graham observed that unlike official representatives, NGOs are not in a controlled environment: they can visit the people, unfettered by government interference, and get a true picture of what is going on. He cited the official visit to the Philippines in 1986 of US Senator Richard Lugar whose itinerary depended on the Filipino government. Largely because of that government control, Senator Lugar initially assessed the political situation in the Philippines incorrectly. It was the private observer groups who, free to go where they pleased, got it right.

Similarly, Mr. Thornberry advised that UN operations also have to work under a mandate and therefore must often bite their tongues. The crucial function of the observer missions, he noted, is saying what the UN operation cannot.

Many participants discussed the usefulness of outside observer missions in helping to develop an indigenous monitoring capability, which once developed, lessens the urgent need for outside observers.

Potential Problems

A number of problems were raised regarding civilians in peacekeeping, specifically relating to the Namibian experience as well as to the subject in general.

A general problem anticipated is recruitment. Can civilians be available on short notice and will they be available for long-term postings? Should honoraria be paid to encourage civilian participation and, if so, how much and by whom? Related to this issue is the problem of staffing: large numbers of civilians from the UN Secretariat staffing peacekeeping operations would result in a shortage of staff and would require the hiring of new personnel at UN headquarters.

Selection and training were also considered a potential problem area. How does one train people, one participant asked, given the tremendous variety of requirements made of peacekeepers — medical fitness, driving skills, navigational skills, country briefs, communication skills, UN organizational comprehension? Discipline was also considered a potential problem by some, not in terms of performance but rather in the extent of discipline that civilians bring to the mission.

Proper knowledge and skills was another difficult issue, especially in relation to private observer missions. Harry Neufeld of Elections Canada was not alone in drawing attention to what he called “problem observers.” According to Mr. Neufeld, there were observers in Namibia who were completely unaware of their host country’s environment and ignorant of the UN’s role and the constraints of Resolution 435. There were observers who came largely to confirm preconceived biases, those interested solely in publicity, and those with no clear objectives or plan of action. Some observers reached subjective conclusions and made no attempt to validate them. Others came only for a social visit.

These criticisms did not apply to all observer groups, but Mr. Neufeld advised that some attempt be made to distinguish between serious and frivolous observers. Another participant suggested arranging some sort of communication mechanism so that newly arrived observer groups could benefit from what was learned by preceding groups.

Professor Anglin drew attention to problems that were specific to the Namibian experience but that may have wider application. He noted that peacekeepers, in principle, are supposed to be impartial but that the Namibians did not understand UNTAG’s impartiality on the issues of South African oppression and Namibian liberation. Civilian police monitors without powers were especially confusing to the Namibians. This, in turn, created a credibility problem for UNTAG.

Professor Anglin also targeted the impartiality of the media as a problem that UNTAG did not successfully deal with. It was in large measure a result of UNTAG’s attention only to the programming aspect of the media without attending to those who were responsible for managing those programmes.

The time allotted for voter education — only three weeks — was another problem, according to Professor Anglin. He noted that it was impossible in such a short time to combine education with registration.

Mr. Thornberry pointed out the difficulty of gaining cooperation from the AG, especially on the issues of information and police. The police themselves, Mr. Thornberry noted, were never cooperative and UNTAG was never able to monitor the activities of the "special branch," which, with SWAPOL, tried to undermine the election process.

IV DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ELECTION MONITORING

Mr. Neufeld recommended that to deal with the difficulties and problems experienced by UNTAG during the Namibian election, and to prevent such problems occurring in future transition elections involving international observers, "internationally accepted standards for democratic elections" should be developed. He suggested that one way to develop these standards was to generate "an open and flexible 'model' of the democratic election process."

The Model

Mr. Neufeld proposed the development of a process model that would decompose the different functions involved in an election into their sub-functions. In turn, each of these sub-functions would be decomposed into the many processes involved in executing them. These would also be decomposed until a hierarchic model of the election process is arrived at. The model would present the various activities involved in the election process in successive levels of detail. Improvements and refinements in the model will result from its application in different situations over time, explained Mr. Neufeld, with the clear "potential to provide an international standard for democratic elections."

The notion of developing international standards for democratic elections sparked discussion in two areas: the feasibility of developing international standards for elections; and the criteria the UN should use before deciding to become involved in elections.

Feasibility of Developing International Standards

Many participants sympathized with the idea of developing an international standard for democratic elections. They foresaw several obstacles to that development, however.

Dr. McCoy raised the issue that many parliamentary systems and rules exist and that standards in developing countries might well be different. Along with Rodolfo Cerdas, a professor of political science at the University of Costa Rica, she wondered whether a process model could come up with a set of rules that would still allow for varying contexts, especially given the diverse administrative and financial capacities of individual countries. Similarly, another participant questioned the possibility of developing a model that is truly applicable in a variety of cultural situations.

Dr. Cerdas prescribed caution when talking about models of transitional arrangements. He pointed out that in Central America the situation prompting the move to democracy varied from

country to country, meaning that the transitional process in Nicaragua cannot be compared even with that in Guatemala, let alone with Namibia, Haiti, or Cambodia. Dr. Cerdas concluded that it is not healthy to make generalizations about the role of international organizations in peacekeeping operations. He suggested that one must first develop a methodology to establish the criteria useful for comparison.

Mr. Thornberry stressed that everyone has different ideas on the imperatives for a free and fair election. In Namibia, the feeling was that for a free and fair election it was necessary to level the playing field by interfering in the political and social system of the country to the greatest possible extent. This meant maximizing voter registration and voter turnout, providing equal access to information by all parties, and controlling intimidation. The implication was that, in other situations, this level of interference may not be required.

Mr. Neufeld responded to this account by saying that because no model would be equally applicable in all situations, more than one model may be needed. Or the model would at least need to allow for innovations and choices in different situations. But he maintained that there is considerable agreement on what the fundamental principles of a democratic process are — for example, the time allowed for vote counting. He argued, that what you do in an election functionally does not vary that much.

In support of international standards, one participant mentioned that there is worldwide cultural diversity on the question of human rights, but that we have been successful in developing international standards in that area. Could the machinery used in that process be applied to the development of election standards? Another participant revealed that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as part of the 1990 Copenhagen Declaration, elaborated a model that went beyond the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

It was also suggested that if developing international standards on the scale advocated by Mr. Neufeld appears impossible, then perhaps we should at least be looking to develop absolute minimum standards.

Criteria For UN Involvement in Elections

The discussion of international standards led to a discussion about the minimum standards the UN should demand of a country before accepting an invitation to observe an election. Should the UN get involved in situations where local laws and norms contravene widely accepted standards? For example, should the UN be willing to observe elections in Afghanistan, a country

where women are disenfranchised? Mr. Neufeld responded that in building or using a model of accepted standards you should stick to certain basic principles. Since universal suffrage is one of those basic principles, the UN might not want to agree to observe an election where half the population is disenfranchised.

Similarly, one participant wondered what the UN should do regarding elections that were somewhat skewed. It was mentioned that recent elections in Sri Lanka met all the rules and conditions of the model referred to by Mr. Neufeld, but that a completely government-controlled media ensured that the system was distorted even before observers arrived. The question was asked whether observers should agree to become involved in such a situation. Should they not be willing to leave if a free and fair election seems impossible?

While respondents to these questions acknowledged their validity, the workshop was reminded that election observation is only part of the ongoing democratization process. Senator Graham pointed out that in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections the government controlled the media, but the result was still startling: people voted because the ballot was secret. He also noted that in the Philippines in 1986 and in Paraguay in 1989, the media was totally controlled by the regime in power. But if observers had backed out as a result, the process would have ended. Senator Graham observed that later elections were less flawed because the process had been allowed to develop.

Dr. Cerdas similarly advised placing elections in the process of democratization: the process develops and becomes, itself, an instrument in changing the political system. One participant added in support of this line of reasoning that regardless of the current election standards in a country, the local population may want observers to contribute to improving the process.

It is a regrettable fact of life to have skewed media in most situations, observed one participant. This might change in evolutionary fashion and then you might make it part of the standards you use to decide whether to participate in an election. For the time being, however, this was not possible.

Dr. McCoy sketched two possible strategies for dealing with the problem of standards. One would be to participate anyway, in order to gain experience and chip away at obstacles, thereby providing better conditions for the next election. Another approach would be to make sure of the conditions before agreeing to go.

According to Senator Graham, the determining factor of free and fair elections is the political will of the government to carry them out according to free and fair principles. He cited the

example of Paraguay in 1989, where the regime took concrete steps to improve electoral conditions: the independence of the media was restored, freedom of assembly and association were allowed, and alternative political parties were legalized. While a report of the International Human Rights Law Group concluded that international standards were still lacking for free and fair elections, it cautiously expressed the hope that the May elections might be the first step toward democracy.

In response to Senator Graham one participant mentioned that assessing political will was a complex procedure, but that certain guidelines have been developed. One was prior on-site assessment in the prospective election area by electoral and constitutional experts. Spending at least one week in the country, experts should speak to locals, opposition party members, the media, and diplomats, inquiring about the government's willingness to invite observers and asking precise questions about the mechanics of the election — for example, are they well thought out? This will give them a good indication of the government's sincerity. Also one should look at the track record of the people one is dealing with. A simple way to do this is by reading the history of the country's experience in elections. How the government has performed in past elections can serve as one guideline on future performance.

V RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIVILIAN PEACEKEEPERS

Early in the workshop one participant remarked that other than the purely functional perspective of looking at civilian aspects of peacekeeping, another way to grapple with the issue might be to look at the objectives of the operation, the nature of the mandate, and the political purposes of the mission. This suggestion assumes that as the concept of peacekeeping broadens to include civilians more regularly in an operational capacity, the nature of what the peacekeeper is there to do also changes.

Conflict Settlement and Resolution

Mr. Thornberry observed that the UNTAG operation in Namibia is a manifestation of political change: the UN is no longer limited to keeping the situation in control in a war zone — the traditionally understood role of peacekeepers — but is now exercising a dynamic *resolving* role.

Professor Anglin identified two tasks that UNTAG undertook in Namibia: conflict settlement, aimed at affecting a behavioural change by the parties to a conflict; and conflict resolution, directed at changing the attitudes, values, and goals of the actors — in other words dealing with the underlying causes of conflict. Conflict settlement took place mostly, though not exclusively, before the election in the context of establishing the political conditions for that election. The negotiation of an all-party Code of Conduct was a prime example of UNTAG's role in conflict settlement.

Conflict resolution occurred mostly, though not exclusively, after the election, when the challenge was to consider the shape of a post-independent Namibia. Professor Anglin noted that in this effort UNTAG emphasized nation building and national reconciliation.

Mr. Thornberry agreed that UNTAG was consciously a catalytic agent for political and attitudinal change in Namibia. He mentioned that UNTAG often used the medium of the churches to convey its message, speaking after and sometimes during church services. Gradually, through this and other facets of its information campaign, UNTAG developed credibility and used this to bring together disparate groups. Mr. Thornberry said that the peacekeeping operation in Namibia preached and publicized tolerance and aimed in this way to isolate extremist elements. He stressed that the triumph in the end, however, was the triumph of the Namibians, who were reconciled to each other through the process.

Dr. McCoy affirmed that the functions of conflict settlement and conflict resolution, which Professor Anglin ascribed to UNTAG were indeed the functions of election observers in general.

She noted in addition that conflict settlement entailed ensuring the parties' compliance with the rules of the game and even at times helping to develop those rules. She used Nicaragua as an illustration, where, for example, part of the observer group's job was to ensure that the government followed the rules of the accord on media law.

Election observers can contribute to conflict resolution, explained Dr. McCoy, by mediating disputes and facilitating dialogue among actors. They can help change the perception of local actors so that each side will see the possibility of dealing with each other, will move away from viewing each other as implacable enemies, and will discover real possibilities for negotiation and dialogue. She said that this approach bore fruit in Nicaragua following the election, when the fundamentals of the transition agreement were agreed by all sides and used by President Violeta Chamorro to pursue national reconciliation and negotiation in order to resolve conflict.

Confidence Building

It emerged from the workshop that one of the key duties of peacekeepers, whether election monitors or civilian police, is to make the people unafraid. Mr. Thornberry explained that beyond implementation of the settlement proposal, all activities of UNTAG were aimed at this end. Mr. Proke elaborated on CIVPOL's daily mission of overcoming mistrust and making the people understand that the civilian police were there to look after everyone's interest; in the area of confidence building there is no quick fix.

Gordon Fairweather concurred, relating that one of the observer's main tasks in Zimbabwe was to calm and reassure the participants about the process. He said it was important for the public and the election contenders to know why they were there and to trust their objectivity. Gaining that trust after eleven years of civil war was no easy task he added.

Dr. McCoy emphasized that a major concern in transitional first elections is the lack of confidence in the electoral machinery and those running the election. She defined confidence in this context as the ability of the people to participate in a legitimate election, which may encourage participation beyond that process to continued democratization. According to her, the problem faced by observers is one of deep distrust on all sides. Observers serve to alleviate this distrust by reassuring the government of the continued participation of the opposition in the election and reassuring the opposition through their position as arbiters and judges.

Democracy Building

The building of democracy as a process was an underlying theme of much of the discussion. This theme revealed two aspects. First was the recognition that, in the words of one participant, the election observer peacekeeping mission is only the beginning of the aid these countries need to move toward democracy. Another participant argued that the first election is important, but if democracy is to take hold, the process that follows is equally important. Senator Graham added that the international community has a responsibility to follow up after an election in helping to build the social and economic structures intrinsic to democratic pluralism.

What of the UN's responsibility beyond the election? Mr. Goulding noted that this question raised the general issue of the extent to which the UN can get involved in the internal affairs of a country. He was unsure whether UN participation in election monitoring and democratic development in a situation where there is an international dimension legitimates follow-up involvement when that international dimension has faded. However, he did note that the stipulation of the UN Charter prohibiting involvement in a country's internal affairs had been somewhat eroded over the years vis-à-vis human rights. One participant reminded the workshop that given restrictions on UN involvement in a country's internal affairs, there is still a role for governments and NGOs to play in the aftermath of an election.

The second aspect of democracy building is the enormous responsibility it places on the shoulders of peacekeepers. According to Dr. McCoy, election monitoring represents a broadened concept of peacekeeping: peacekeepers become the guarantors not only of peace but of democratization. This is tantamount to a new form of security in the framework of helping societies resolve internal conflicts while at the same time guaranteeing democratization.

Senator Graham described civilian peacekeepers as the ambassadors of democratic pluralism, sowing the seeds of freedom. He went on to say that the presence of election observers emboldens those living in fear to believe that there is a better way to live and that they have the right to determine the structure of a fair polity. He related that in Paraguay, for instance, there was little understanding of an alternative political path to the Stroessner regime. For this reason, Paraguay had to invent democracy, not restore it. Senator Graham concluded that the major impact of observer missions is to instill in the local people a sense of entitlement.

VI FINANCING: PEACEKEEPING'S BOTTOM LINE

The largely upbeat and optimistic discussion about civilian aspects of peacekeeping was tempered by a sobering discussion of the UN's financial situation. Susan Mills, a Deputy Controller at the UN, talked about UN finances in general, financing arrangements for peacekeeping operations in particular, and the special case of civilians.

UN Finances

Ms. Mills noted that the UN Charter provides for the expenses of the organization to be borne by its Members. Each Member State's fees are assessed according to its capacity to pay, measured largely on the basis of national income. She pointed out that members have a legal obligation to pay their assessed contributions but that the only sanction for non-payment was the little-used and mostly ineffective Article 19, which provides that a member will have no vote in the General Assembly if its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of all assessed contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. Ms. Mills related that as of 30 June 1991, outstanding assessed contributions to the UN amounted to \$1.5 billion, of which the United States accounts for slightly more than half.

Financing And Peacekeeping Operations

The UN's capacity to maintain its peacekeeping operations is profoundly affected by the financial "health" of its regular budget, asserted Ms. Mills. She noted that since 1960, when the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was launched, an operation for which a number of Member States refused to pay, the UN has been in a continuing state of financial emergency. She explained that, for political reasons, some Members have deliberately ignored their legal obligations to pay for peacekeeping, thereby perpetuating the financial crisis.

According to Ms. Mills, from 1956 to the present, the Member States of the UN have attempted, largely without success, to reach a consensus on how expenses for peacekeeping should be met and apportioned. The procedure for each operation over the years has varied. Of the twenty-two peacekeeping operations initiated by the UN during its forty-six-year history, six were or are being financed from the regular budget, two were financed by the parties most directly involved, one has been financed by voluntary contributions, and the remaining thirteen were, or are, being financed by special assessments on all Member States.

Since 1988, Member States have begun to grapple anew with a number of key issues that directly concern the financial aspects of peacekeeping. Ms. Mills elaborated on four issues that she felt deserved particular mention.

The first of these concerned *the absence of cash reserves for peacekeeping operations*. She noted that the Working Capital Fund of \$100 million, which serves as a cash reserve for the regular budget, constitutes a very limited and inadequate resource for peacekeeping because of two problems: 1) the need for adequate cash to meet substantial start-up costs for large peacekeeping operations, start-up costs that are often required until the General Assembly can authorize assessments from Member States and, in turn, Member States pay the full amount they are assessed; and 2) the need for adequate cash to meet significant shortfalls, when assessed contributions are paid with substantial delays or not at all. She pointed out that the troop-contributing countries are forced to bear the effects of such cash shortfalls.

The second issue to which Ms. Mills referred is *the relationship of the UN regular budget to peacekeeping operations*. She explained that apart from the direct costs of peacekeeping operations financed from the regular budget, there are many indirect costs for specially assessed operations that are also met from the regular budget. The question is how to meet these dramatically increasing requirements for peacekeeping operations in light of current regular budget resources and the demands to reduce them.

A third issue concerns *voluntary cash contributions*. Traditionally treated as cash advances to be repaid, it has been decided recently to use such advances in some cases as grants to reduce the costs of an operation. This tends to weaken the principle that the cost of peacekeeping should be collectively shared, and it may lead some Member States to conclude that full payment of their assessed contributions is no longer essential for the financial viability of the UN and peacekeeping operations.

The final issue concerned *voluntary contributions of goods and services, also referred to as "contributions in kind."* These usually consist of major equipment, services, and, most recently, personnel. The problems this raises include the appropriateness of a specific contribution to a particular operation, the method of evaluating the value of the contribution, and the concern that if this method is widely used it might be difficult to obtain adequate cash to meet other costs of the peacekeeping operation.

The "Special" Case of Civilians

Ms. Mills speculated that the contributions by governments of civilians for UN peacekeeping would most likely *not* take the form of contributions in kind, except perhaps to a limited extent. She argued that civilians will be obtained from governments on a financial basis akin to that which has been established for the provision of military observers. That is, the cost of salaries and other allowances for such civilians will be covered by the government providing the personnel, while the UN will pay a mission subsistence allowance and possibly the cost of travel to and from the area of operation. Arrangements such as these were used for the provision of some election monitors and for CIVPOL in UNTAG, Ms. Mills said, and are envisaged for the operations in El Salvador and the Western Sahara.

Ms. Mills concluded that the use of civilians in peacekeeping will not resolve the financial difficulties that plague peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the assessment of whether civilian personnel is desirable in general, or for a particular operation, needs to be made after consideration of a number of factors — for example political and security factors — of which the financial aspect is only one.

VII RECOMMENDATIONS

As the introduction to this report states, the following list of recommendations was not arrived at on the basis of consensus, nor is the order of mention a reflection of the level of importance attributed to them in the workshop. Rather, they are listed because of their relevance and/or the amount of discussion they generated.

Financing

- The Working Capital Fund of the UN should be doubled to \$200 million; surplus money from peacekeeping operations, such as the \$40 million dollar surplus from UNTAG, should be earmarked for the Working Capital Fund.
- A contingency fund for extra equipment should be included in each existing peacekeeping operation so that it can be drawn upon for new operations. This might require putting 10 to 20 percent more into each operation.

One participant pointed out in reply to this recommendation that a proposal by the Secretary-General for reserve stocks had been turned down by the General Assembly. Ideas are not lacking but it is a question of what Member States are willing to do, Ms. Mills noted.

Civilian Inventory

- The UN should create an inventory of civilian volunteers in different categories, such as the Red Cross or retired military officers, that it can draw upon for future operations.

One participant reacted to this suggestion by pointing out that, in classic peacekeeping, the UN needs to work through the permanent missions of member states for recruits.

Another participant also mentioned that Elections Canada maintains an inventory of interested individuals that, after consulting with External Affairs, it can make available to inviting organizations.

Information

- Peacekeepers are in public relations. The UN in its peacekeeping operations must use information efficiently to get its message across, create goodwill, and increase the degree of acceptance of the mission by helping the local people understand what the operation is about. This is important for the recipients of peacekeeping operations, so that they know

what to expect, and for those engaged in observing peacekeeping operations, for example NGOs, so that they understand the nature of this specific operation and are not misled by earlier ones.

Regional and International Involvement

- The UN and regional organizations should consider dividing the labour when it comes to election observation. The UN should get involved in those situations that have an international dimension, such as Cambodia or Ethiopia, and regional organizations should handle the election-monitoring role when it is clearly a domestic affair only.

Rewards

- The UN should institute rewards — certificates or commendations — for civilians in peacekeeping.

Published Reports

- It is crucial that the reports of observer missions be published and made available. This is a basic premise and should be made a condition of NGO attendance. Otherwise it may appear that they have legitimated a flawed election.

Mandate

- In order to gain the confidence of the people, it is important for election monitors and civilian police to take an *active* role and push their mandate as far as they can, while at the same time maintaining the confidence of the authorities.

Encouraging Participation

- Efforts must be made to encourage the willingness of recipient states to invite or accept peacekeepers; the use of civilians in peacekeeping by the UN and national authorities; organizations such as CIIPS to promote civilian participation and to help them prepare for peacekeeping.

CIVPOL

- A portion of CIVPOL should be part of a joint-force investigative mechanism. This would improve its ability to investigate violations by the local security force or by the local citizens.

When settlement plans are negotiated, it is important to take into account the depth of involvement and the type of authority CIVPOL will require.

UN Secretariat

- A special secretariat should be set up at the UN to handle civilian peacekeeping missions. This would contribute to formalizing the process and focussing the effort so that new operations can be coherently organized.
- Similarly, it was noted that the United States, through General Assembly Resolution 110, had proposed the creation of an election unit at the UN. It was recommended that the workshop support this idea and that work should be done toward developing this concept.

One participant observed that this was not an uncontroversial idea, but that the proposal, which talked about an electoral committee and a committee of experts, had been submitted in a report to the Secretary-General.

Research

- It is important to study in greater depth past civilian peacekeeping activity. Study and publication will help to publicize this activity so that it can be better used in the future. To this end, civilians participating in peacekeeping operations should be encouraged to keep records. Research was also deemed important in order to avoid falling into the same trap as military peacekeepers, who have only recently developed a standing operating procedure and a training manual.
- It was also recommended that more workshops be held on specific aspects of civilian peacekeeping, for example, an entire workshop devoted to the police function.

Training

- The UN and Member States should consider setting up an observer training institute or some kind of training system that learns from mistakes made in the past. There is a limit to what

the UN can provide in this respect, so Member States might consider developing some type of sharing arrangements. For example, Canada's experience in elections could be shared with other nations.

Civilian Advisor at the UN

- The UN should consider developing a civilian counterpart to the Military Advisor at UN headquarters responsible for elections and civilian police.

Manual

- There should be an election observers manual similar to the IPA *Peacekeepers Handbook*.

Questionnaire

- In order to evaluate an operation, at its conclusion, an anonymous and unclassified questionnaire for observers should be devised to provide both objective and subjective data.

APPENDIX A

STATEMENT BY ANDREAS GUIBEB

**Social and Political Transformation in Africa in the 1990's and Beyond:
the Responsibility of International Community**

Mr. Chairman,

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Theo-Ben Gurirab asked me to express his deep appreciation to you for the invitation to be the guest speaker at this dinner tonight. He requested me in particular to express his sincere apologies for being unable to be here, because of the need for his presence at the OAU ad hoc Committee in Abuja, Nigeria at the end of this week. As you very well know, the life of a Foreign Minister is divided, often unequally, between commitments at home and abroad, and last but not least, to the family.

As a new country, which is still very much preoccupied with institution building, the commitment to participate in international conferences and through them in the activities of the Community of Nations, to take part in vital bilateral negotiations and to represent the State in ceremonies abroad, all pose a formidable challenge to our President, Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers. My Minister therefore asked me to represent him at this occasion. I shall endeavour to be a worthy substitute. At this junction, permit me to express my personal gratitude to the Canadian Government and Chairman for all the courtesies accorded me since my arrival in Canada.

Before I broach the theme of my statement here tonight, allow me also to convey to the Government and people of Canada and workshop participants, greetings from Namibia. We in Namibia remember with a deep sense of appreciation the constructive role played by Canada during the process leading to the crafting of UN Security Council Resolution 435 (78) and its implementation years later in 1989 with the arrival of UNTAG in Namibia.

We also have fond memories of Canada for being instrumental in having Namibia invited to become a Commonwealth member country, which we did immediately after independence. Commonwealth membership is important to us because in that family of Nations, the concerns of the developing countries are as paramount as the preoccupations of the developed nations. The leadership role of the Commonwealth on globally crucial issues such as international responses to developments in South Africa, environment and development, and international peace and security, is recognized and will be put to the test in the run-up to the next CHOGM in Harare, later this year. Thanks to the contributions of a succession of Canadian Government Representatives such as

Mr. Joe Clark, Chairman of the Commonwealth Foreign Minister's Committee on Southern Africa, we hope to meet that challenge.

Finally, I would like to once again place on record our gratitude for the all-round assistance and cooperation extended by the Government and people of Canada to Namibians, before and after our independence.

Namibia's political independence has now to be complimented by economic prosperity as we believe that politics without economics bears no fruit, inasmuch as economics without politics has no roots.

We are pleased to acknowledge that this conviction is also the foundation of Canada's development assistance policy. Canada's development assistance to Namibia is not only related to government sponsored projects, but also directed at empowering the small person outside the capitals and in the provinces.

There is the typical example of a shoemaker in a small town called Rehoboth. He is over seventy years old. He makes shoes, the quality of which will rank with the best shoes made anywhere in the world. He has a small workshop and as he is advanced in age, his daughter has taken over the running of the shoe factory. Mr. Chairman, I do not know how the Canadian Observer Mission in Windhoek spotted his factory — but they did and gave the proprietor a tidy sum of money to expand his shoe factory. We in Namibia are touched by such concerns — we warmly applaud the generosity and we thank Canadians for sharing their resources with us to develop our global village - planet earth for the benefit of us all.

This brings me to the theme of my reflection tonight, namely, the "Social and Political Transformation in Africa in the 1990's and Beyond: the Responsibility of the International Community."

In the late seventies, a by then little-known American sociologist, Marilyn Ferguson published a book with a misleading title, namely the "Aquarian Conspiracy." In essence, the book deals with social transformation and attempts to illustrate that a paradigm shift is taking place and that one can find evidence of this shift in all spheres of life, i.e. with regard to governance at local, national and international level — with regard to education, health care, the judicial system, the economy, etc.

To cut a long story short, the compelling argument she makes is, that the core of people — like-minded people, if you want — questioning the ethical underpinnings of our conventional approaches to issues such as governance, the economy etc. is expanding at the local/national and

international level. These people are often unknown to each other, yet they are working together towards the common goal — namely to transform our societies, to make them more humane, more just, more tolerant of differences. To move away from majority rule and towards consensus politics as the former had proven itself insufficient in our age of multi-ethnic societies. To move away from representative democracy towards participatory democracy, etc., etc.

Repeated reference is made to fundamental changes that have taken place in the global arena and the impact these events have on our global and national agenda. The thawing of relations between the superpowers, the momentum gained as a result of this development for global disarmament, the political and economic integration of Europe and the social and political transformation in Eastern Europe, the emergence of Japan as a major economic power and the unification of the two Germanys were and are momentous events which will cast their shadow one way or another on the future evolution of our global system in the years to come.

Similarly, this year's historic OAU Summit in Abuja, Nigeria took place against the backdrop of a debate about the future of the continent, characterized by social and political scientists as Afro-pessimism. Thirty years after the independence of the first states, with the exception of a few, African economies are in a shambles: social, health and educational infrastructures have collapsed under the sheer weight of the demographic explosion. Again with the exception of a few outstanding leaders, the collective image and credibility of African leadership at home and abroad has never been as low as at the present moment, because of the scant regard being given to democracy and human rights in our own countries.

Will Africa be able to propel itself out of that vicious circle? Is there hope for Africa? We in Namibia share the conviction that there is hope for Africa and form part of the Afro-optimist movement. Evidence of Africa's revival can be seen in Namibian independence, the strides made towards the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a post-apartheid unitary and democratic South Africa. It is also seen in the hopeful promise of peace which is taking root in Angola and the intensive efforts towards the same objectives in Mozambique. It is also characterized by a tidal wave of democracy movements sweeping over the rest of Africa.

Instead of commenting on important developments in different parts of Africa, I would like to focus on our views concerning some of the responses to this new political wave in Africa. One such view is that democracy movements in Africa are foreign-sponsored — they are hostile to national interests and should be fought against, tooth and nail.

In Namibia, we maintain that this view is intellectually dishonest and that it is contrary to the history of Africa's decolonization process. In other words, the objective of the founding fathers of the OAU was not only to liberate Africa, but also to bring about social justice. Furthermore, calls such as "Africa for the Africans," "come back Africa" and "UHURU" were, in our opinion, only metaphors for the deep-seated yearnings for the well-being and security of the peoples of the African continent.

We also firmly believe that the struggle by the founding fathers of the OAU and the contemporary liberation struggle whose final chapter is now being written in South Africa and Western Sahara, were and continue to be about certain noble ideals such as: freedom; democracy; human rights; political tolerance and the economic empowerment of the masses.

That struggle succeeded because it had been built on people's power and the achievement of political emancipation should have led to social progress benefitting the people. We recognise that this has not been the case in Africa so far. Furthermore, wherever, an African government finds itself at odds with its own people — it is so because it fails to recognize this basic truth.

In other words, African governments must realize that without the people, victory is not possible, just as much as political stability depends on their support. There should, therefore, not be a need for uneasiness about democracy movements in Africa, as the demands are legitimate and a direct consequence of the decay and squalor under which the masses had to languish over the last thirty years of political emancipation in Africa.

In a nutshell, therefore, the ideals of liberty, social justice and participatory democracy being rediscovered today throughout the continent are as native to Africa as the mighty Nile river and lake Tanganyika.

In Namibia, we believe that Africa only stands to gain by heeding the call of its people's demands by promoting cultural and political pluralism. Africa must carry out democratization, because it is right and proper to do so, not because foreigners are saying that we should be doing so. This is the road we have chosen in Namibia.

In Namibia, it was the toiling masses that bore the brunt of the long and bitter struggle for political independence. Without the sacrifices and commitment of the ordinary workers, peasants and villagers, over a long period of time, it would not have been possible to realise the operations of UNTAG and the holding of free and fair elections. It can be said to the credit of the current political leadership, that they appreciated this from the very beginning and responded positively by

adopting a constitution for Namibia, hailed globally as a model constitution. The government also deserves credit for having institutionalized a new political culture of tolerance based on the national guiding principle of reconciliation — a political culture, indicating a clear preference for decisions on the basis of a national consensus rather than by majority decisions.

The Land Reform Conference which has just ended, illustrates at best that new emerging political culture of participating democracy. During the debate on ancestral lands, it was recognized that ancestral lands needed to be restored. But the Conference agreed in a spirit of reconciliation not to pursue such restitutions owing to the complexities in addressing ancestral land claims.

It is fine to pay a tribute to the achievements of the people of Namibia, but what about the challenges they are faced with. It's fine to have imposed democracy and a new code of conduct on its leaders. It is fine to hold out the Namibian constitution to others as a model to be followed and to applaud the political stability and budgetary discipline practised by the new country.

It is clear, that the much praised model of democracy has no chance of survival without the necessary assistance from the developed world. As long as the root causes of conflict such as poverty, the absence of decent housing, health care and education, are not eliminated, there cannot be political stability, nor respect for human rights.

It has now become fashionable to make the granting of aid conditional to the democratization of African countries and the respect for human rights. At the same time, we observe that these countries are left on their own to fend for themselves once the goal of democracy had been achieved.

At a time when African economies require external economic assistance the most, aid has declined drastically and foreign investments have reduced even further. We hope that this is a transitional phenomena and that developed countries will change their policies in this regard. There is certainly no reason why they should not do so where an African government has introduced democracy, where human rights are guaranteed and respected and where a good investment climate has been generated and is being fostered.

Namibia is an example of such a country in Africa which in the words of a recent UNDP Governing Council resolution merits preferential assistance over the next five years. It would give me immense joy to know that this view is also shared in Ottawa, Washington, Bonn, Paris and London.

I thank you.

APPENDIX B
CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF PEACEKEEPING

**Westin Hotel
Confederation Ballroom I**

**9 - 10 July 1991
Ottawa, Canada**

Tuesday, July 9

8:30 Introductory Remarks: **Nancy Gordon**, Director of Public
Programmes, CIIPS

SESSION I: CIVILIANS AND PEACEKEEPING: THE RECORD TO DATE

9:00-10:30 ***The UN and Civilian Participation in Peacekeeping:
Institutional Development***

Chair: **Behrooz Sadry**, UN Field Operations, United Nations

Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special
Political Affairs, United Nations

In the Field: Peacekeeping Operations and the Role of Civilians

Alan James, Professor of International Relations,
University of Keele, England

10:30-10:45 Break

SESSION II: NAMIBIA: A CASE STUDY

10:45-12:30 *The Challenge of Transitional Administration*

Chair: Nancy Gordon, CIIPS

Cedric Thornberry, Director of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, United Nations

Douglas Anglin, Adjunct Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University

2:30-3:30 *Securing Law and Order and Controlling Intimidation:
The Role of Civilian Police*

Chair: Larry Garber, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

Larry Proke, Chief Superintendent, Criminal Operations, "O" Division, RCMP

3:30-3:45 Break

3:45-5:00 *Election Monitoring in Namibia: Lessons From the Ground*

Harry Neufeld, Director, Information Systems, Elections Canada

7:30-10:00 Dinner, Westin Hotel

Chair: Nancy Gordon, CIIPS

Introduction: Wayne Hammond, Canadian High Commissioner, Namibia

Andreas Guibeb, Permanent Secretary, Foreign Ministry, Namibia

Wednesday, July 10

SESSION III: EXPERIENCES WITH TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Chair: Charles Svoboda, United Nations Affairs, Department of External Affairs

9:15 - 11:00

Alasdair Graham, Senate, Parliament of Canada

Rodolfo Cerdas, Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica

Jennifer McCoy, Senior Research Associate, Latin American Programs, Carter Presidential Center

Gordon Fairweather, Chairman, Immigration and Refugee Board

11:00-11:15

Break

SESSION IV: CIVILIANS IN PEACEKEEPING: FINANCING

1:45-3:00

Financial Aspects

Chair: Fred Eckhard, Department of Public Information, United Nations

Susan Mills, Deputy Controller, United Nations

3:00-4:30

Roundtable

Discussion on recommendations for the future of civilians in peacekeeping

Chair: Alan James, University of Keele

4:30

Closing Remarks

Nancy Gordon, CIIPS

ANNEXE C

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Warren Allmand	House of Commons	Ottawa
A.W. Anderson (Lt. Col.)	External Affairs and International Trade Canada	Ottawa
Douglas Anglin	Carleton University	Ottawa
Eduardo Arboleda	UNHCR	Ottawa
Angus Archer	United Nations Association	Ottawa
Al Banner	Banner and Associates	Ottawa
Alojzy Bartoszek	Embassy of Poland	Ottawa
Beatrice Bazar	CIIPS Board of Directors	Montreal
Gen. Clay Beattie (Rtd.)	Former Commander of the Northern Region, Canadian Armed Forces	Ottawa
David Braide (Chairman)	CIIPS Board of Directors	Toronto
Rychard Brûlé	CIIPS	Ottawa
Alex Bugailiskis	External Affairs and International Trade Canada	Ottawa
Rodolfo Cerdas	Universidad de Costa Rica	San José
John Clifford	Amnesty International	Ottawa
Pierre Côté	Élections du Québec	Ste-Foy
David Cox	Queen's University	Kingston
Doug Dalziel	RCMP	Ottawa
Daniel dos Santos	University of Ottawa	Ottawa
Fred Eckhard	United Nations	New York
Gordon Fairweather	Immigration and Refugee Board	Ottawa
Douglas Fraser (Colonel)	Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations	New York
David Gallagher	OXFAM - Canada	Ottawa
Larry Garber	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs	Washington
Daniel George	External Affairs and International Trade Canada	Ottawa
Nancy Gordon	CIIPS	Ottawa
Ron Gould	Elections Canada	Ottawa
Marrack Goulding	United Nations	New York
Alasdair Graham	The Senate	Ottawa
Andreas Guibeb	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Windhoek
Neil Haffey	Former Canadian Observer in Namibia	Ottawa
Sean Haffey	Dalhousie University	Halifax
Wayne Hammond (High Commissioner)	Canadian High Commission	Windhoek

Sam Hanson	External Affairs and International Trade Canada	Ottawa
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