



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

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
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CONFEDERATION

OF THE

PROVINCES OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA.

"We desire free trade among all the Provinces, under our national flag, with one coin, one measure, one tariff, one post office. We feel that the courts, the press, the educational institutions of North America, would be elevated by UNION; that intercommunication by railroads, telegraphs, and steamboats, would be promoted; and that, if such a combination of interests were achieved wisely and with proper guards, the foundation of a great nation, in friendly connection with the mother-country, would be laid on an indestructible basis."—Hon. Joseph Howe to the Hon. George Moffat of Canada.

BY
JOHN GEORGE BOURINOT,
EDITOR LIPAL "REPORTER."

1866

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1866

Re-published from the "HARRIS EVENING HERALD" of the 10th, 13th, and 17th November, 1905.

CONFEDERATION OF THE PROVINCES OF B. N. AMERICA.

The people of British America are now over 700,000 negroes, and the total amount passing through one of those important of their Exports and Imports at \$71,000,000. crises which always occur to every country. The total trade of the provinces of British America may now be put down at \$140,000,000, or nearly double the trade of the United States 76 years ago. A people who have won so noble a heritage within a century prove themselves worthy scions of that stock which has peopled and carried the language, liberty, and energy of Great Britain at last amassed no inconsiderable amount over, so large a portion of the globe. The of wealth, and are able to point to the future destiny of this people cannot fail sent prosperity and vitality of the countries to be a topic of no ordinary interest to the in which they dwell with commendable statesmen and publicists of the British pride. The forest, the mine, the sea, the Empire. Shall British America remain land have yielded to them riches in connected with Great Britain? Or shall it abundance. Bustling communities have follow the fate of the Thirteen Colonies sprung up in every quarter of that extensive and become a separate State? Or shall it range of territory which still remained to be absorbed into the ranks of the ambitious England on the consummation of the inde- Republic on its borders? These are the pendency of her old colonies, which have questions which are now engaging the attention of the best minds of these colonies now become a power of such colossal proportions. A century ago what is now as well as of the parents fate. In a very known as British America only held a population short time, perhaps, an answer to these questions will be given. A few days hence, nearly all bound to England's hereditary there will assemble in London a Convention by ties of a common language, race, and history. This population has now increased to four millions, all animated by a feeling of the most profound loyalty to the Power which has so long matured and protected them, and none more so than the descendants of the men who founded "New France" on the St. Lawrence. Montreal, the "Ville Marie" of the early French, is now one of the finest cities of this continent, and has a population of at least 120,000 persons. In 1790 the population of the Thirteen Colonies was estimated at 3,900,000, including these dependencies of Great Britain.

Before proceeding to enquire into the best means of giving steady development to British America, increasing its ability for self-defence, and perpetuating British liberty and British institutions within its borders, it may not be unprofitable if we turn for a few moments to a consideration of the present relations between these dependencies and the parent state. If the people of British America are animated by feelings of strong affection for the country from which they have sprung, it is mainly because its statesmen have pursued towards them, of recent years, a wise and liberal policy. The history of the old Thirteen Colonies is pregnant with the illustration that free and vigorous communities, possessed of that love for freedom which is the characteristic of the Teutonic race, cannot be coerced in a manner inconsistent with the self-government they may enjoy. The "Stamp Act" was not objectionable because of the burthen it would impose upon the old colonists, but because of its violation of their constitutional privileges. No tax could be constitutionally levied upon the colonies except through their representatives in their own legislatures. But a century ago the relations between the parent state and its dependencies were vague and undefined. British statesmen had to lose one-half of this continent and pass through a good deal of other experience, before they could come to understand the system of government by which colonial dependencies could be made not only more prosperous within themselves, but more valuable to the Empire itself. It was not till a very long while after the Thirteen Colonies had passed from the possession of Great Britain into the position of independent states, that British statesmen awoke to the full appreciation of their obligations to their colonial empire and of the mode by which its attachment to the Crown might be placed on firm and lasting foundations. The unfortunate occurrences that transpired in Canada from 1837-8, had the result of drawing attention to the nature of the defects that existed in the system of colonial government, and to the necessity of providing some radical amendment. From the time of the publication of Lord DUNHAM's famous report, which has exercised such remarkable influence upon this portion of the British Empire, may be dated a new era in the history of these colonies. From that report sprung the system of Responsible Government, which gave the people their proper influence in the management of public affairs. The wisdom of the mother country in conceding this great principle is shown by the feelings of devotion to the Crown that now animate all classes in these dependencies. If British statesmen, a century ago, had as anxiously and thoroughly studied the characteristics of the peoples that inhabited their colonial empire, as have their successors for the past thirty years, the Thirteen Colonies might have long remained connected with the parent state, or, in all probability, would have severed their connection with it in peace and amity.

Nothing can be more paternal or gentle than the rule that is exercised by Great Britain over these outlying dependencies of the Empire. A nominal veto over all acts of an Imperial character, and the appointment of their Governors, are the only privileges which she virtually retains in token of her sovereignty, whilst she affords them the protection of her fleets and armies without a single shilling in return for such services. No communities in the world are freer than these Colonies of Great Britain. They possess Representative Institutions in their entirety, and are left perfectly untrammelled to arrange all matters of trade, even though in doing so they may conflict with the policy and interests of the mother-country. It would be indeed surprising if British America had failed to become vigorous and prosperous under a combination of circumstances so eminently favourable to its development.

What reason exists for disturbing the present state of things? The colonies them-

selves enjoy prosperity and happiness, the ties that bind them to the mother-country are apparently of a most enduring character, and there can be no possible necessity for a change? He must be a very superficial observer of current events, who fails to give the correct answer to such an enquiry as this. Both internal and external causes press upon us the necessity of change, if we are desirous of preserving the privileges we now enjoy as a part and parcel of the Empire. Even Mr. Howe, the most determined and able opponent of the plan of Confederation, does not hesitate to confess that the colonies cannot remain much longer as they are now. In his pamphlet on the "Organization of the Empire" he expresses his belief that "but for external pressure, and danger from without, we might go on as we are without any material change." He suggests a scheme for the organization of the Empire which is wild and chimerical in the extreme, but the fact that he does so, shows quite conclusively that he no more than any other leading mind of British America is able to resist the conviction that some organic change is absolutely required in these dependencies of Great Britain.

Though these colonies lie contiguous to each other, and are dependencies of the same Empire, they are entirely separate states as far as Government is concerned. The only link that now binds them to one another, is the sentiment of attachment each feels towards the Monarch. Each enjoys the privileges of self-government distinct from its colonial neighbour. Each may tax the commodities of the other as it may best suit its own interests. Each has its own currency, its own peculiar laws, its own system of Education. Whilst this Isolation might be excusable and necessary in the infancy of a colony, it becomes absurd and positively injurious when that colony exhibits all the strength and capacity of virility. Commu-

nities isolated from each other, without identity of interest, can never expect to attain that expansion which, in view of their great natural capabilities, they have a right to look for in the future. Not only is commerce and all branches of industry kept within narrow bounds, but colonial intellect is "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd." The division of the provinces into so many distinct governments has only produced political heart-burnings, rancor and faction, and has deprived British America of that wider field of honourable emulation which a Union would offer to its sons. The honours and dignities that can now be achieved in the field of colonial statesmanship are few and insignificant. How many colonial statesmen have won for themselves a name beyond the circle of the countries where they have labored? If a Nova Scotian or a Canadian has gained rank and fame, it is because he has been placed by some means or other in the service of the Empire, and thereby enabled to develop that talent and courage which in the narrow sphere of colonial life he would never, in all probability, have an opportunity of fully displaying. What colonist except Mr. Hincks ever received any substantial reward from the Imperial Government because of his ability in the field of colonial statesmanship? Should a state of things so repugnant to the spirit of freemen, animated by natural impulses of ambition, much longer be allowed to exist? Many years ago Mr. Howe gave utterance to this feeling, which struggles for utterance in every colonial heart, and indignantly exclaimed that he for one was not prepared to have "the brand of inferiority stamped upon his brow."

But the consideration that above all others impels British American statesmen to combine for a change in the present political relations of these colonies towards each other and the Empire as well, is the fact that Isolation is fraught with the greatest peril to their future security and peace. It would now be superfluous to dwell on the

* "THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE." By the Hon. Joseph Howe. London: Edward Stanford, 6, Charing Cross, S. W. 1863.

dangers that arise from the geographical position of British America. The great Power on her borders stands before her in an attitude of constant menace. The abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty—the Fenian organization—the tone of Congress and of American publicists are so many evidences of the danger which threatens British America. When Mr. Howe addressed his first letter to the people of Nova Scotia, last winter, against the passage of the Confederation resolution in our Legislature, he pointed out in the strongest terms the dangerous character of Fenianism, as well as the unfavorable sentiment that prevailed very generally in the United States towards Great Britain, and especially this portion of the Empire. He then wrote:

“At this moment the Cabinet at Washington is involved in complications of no ordinary kind. The great Republican party of the President have been at issue, upon the reconstruction policy, for ten weeks, and one branch has just passed a bill over the veto by a two-third majority. Both parties are appealing to the country for support. The Fenians are said to control a million of votes, and certainly make up a formidable portion of the Democratic party that supports the President. Those who cherish hard feelings against the Province and the British Government control a good many more. Out of these complications no human being, at this moment, can tell what may or may not arise.”

It is unnecessary to tell the observer of current events on this continent that the position of affairs has been much aggravated since Mr. Howe penned the letter from which the foregoing extract is taken. Fenianism has become more powerful than ever, as a political element, in the American Union. The American Secretary of State stands forth as the champion of the Fenian circles, which vow vengeance upon Canada if the men who invaded her soil last winter, and shed innocent blood, should pay the penalty due to their infamous crime. In view of such a state of things, therefore, it is not surprising to find Mr. Howe in his latest pamphlet striking these warning notes:—

“Turning to the United States we find our most formidable commercial rival, and, as matters stand, per-

haps, our *least reliable friend and ally*. I am not without some hope that by prudence, firmness, and good humour, and by systematically setting public opinion right, through American channels of circulation, as to the power, the public sentiment, and the designs of this country, we may yet be able so to inform the masses who control the Government as to make war with Great Britain nearly impossible; but in the present temper of the Republic we have no security for peace, and we may as well then survey with discriminating care the strength and resources of the nation with which we may have to contend.”

MR. HOWE'S SCHEME OF REPRESENTATION IN THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

Recognizing the force of the argument that these Colonies have attained to that stage of development when some change in their political condition is necessary—when a wider field must be opened to the talent of their sons—when they must assume larger responsibilities in respect to self-defence—Mr. Howe comes forward with a panacea which is to remedy all the defects in our constitutional system, just as the advertisements of quack medicines with which the press is filled now-a-days promises to cure all the ills of humanity. We are very much afraid, however, that Mr. Howe cannot legitimately take out a patent for his invention. As far as we have been able to learn only one other public man in British America, besides Mr. Howe, ever seriously promulgated the novel idea of Representation in the Imperial Parliament. It will, of course, cause a feeling of intense mortification to rise in Mr. Howe's loyal breast, when he learns that that man was a leader in the Canadian rebellion of 1837 to which he, in the exuberance of his present devotion to the Crown, so often refers us. Mr. Howe has only resuscitated an old scheme long ago suggested and advocated by no less a person than WILLIAM LYON MACKENZIE. In a letter to the Earl of DALHOUSIE, written in 1828, at the time when he was urging redress for existing political grievances, Mr. MACKENZIE wrote: “I have long been satisfied that if the North American Colonies were rid of these inferior and subordinate Legislatures, which are and must ever be insufficient for the purposes for which

they are intended, due weight would be given to the wishes of their people. Now nearly written, Mr. Howe's scheme of representation is presented in his plan:—

To treat all the Colonies on an equal footing, and where the Colonies are in operation, to give them the same status as Great Britain, and to permit one, two or three Colonies to be represented by one, two or three Members to their respective Parliaments.

The advantage of assuming the Colonies to be correct, is to be correct.

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2. We are to be correct, and to be correct, and to be correct.

3. We would as they would announced the Colonies to be correct.

4. We have about bribery in the Colonies to be correct.

5. We are the best men, because into these Colonies would be sent the intellect of the Colonies to be correct.

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they are intended, and allowed, instead, a due weight in both branches of the British Parliament, it would prove the foundation of their permanent and true happiness."* Now nearly forty years after this letter was written, Mr. Howe revives the Utopian scheme of having these colonies represented in a distant Parliament. Here is his plan:—

To treat all the Colonies which have Legislatures, and where the system of Responsible Government is in operation, as having achieved a higher political status than Crown Colonies, or foreign dependencies, and to permit them to send to the House of Commons one, two or three members of their cabinets, according to their size, population and importance.

The advantages gained by this mode of selection, assuming the principle of any sort of representation to be correct, are various:

1. We get rid of all questions about franchise and the modes of election, which might or not correspond to those which obtain in England.

2. We are secure of men truly representing the majority of each colony, because they would speak in the name and bring with them the authority of the cabinets and constituencies they represented.

3. We would have no trouble about changing them, as they would sit till their successors, duly accredited, announced the fact of a change of administration.

4. We have no contested elections or questions about bribery and corruption to waste the time of Parliament.

5. We are secure, by this mode, of obtaining the best men, because only the best can win their way into these Colonial cabinets, of whom the flower would be selected by their colleagues to represent the intellect and character of each province on the floor of Parliament.

6. We do nothing more in fact, than permit Colonial Ministers to defend their policy and explain their conduct before Parliament, as British Ministers do now, thus training them in the highest school of politics for the better discharge of their duties at home.

Last winter one of the journals in the interest of Mr. Howe and his party touched cursorily upon this scheme, but nobody thought for a moment that it was seriously mentioned. It was not discussed either in or out of the press, but was simply considered as one of those purely theoretical suggestions with which the Opposition press daily teemed in default of having any practical plan to offer for the consolidation of British America. When the

leader of the Government addressed the House of Assembly last winter on the subject of Union, he dismissed the suggestion in half a dozen words, "as a mere *ignis fatuus* which appeared to be dancing before the eyes of some gentlemen." No colonial public man, indeed, who valued his reputation as a practical and shrewd statesman, could stand up in the face of a colonial assemblage and urge such a chimerical scheme upon its attention without incurring its ridicule. We may go further and hazard the observation that British statesmen to whom this scheme is suggested, will look at it in amazement. Political philosophers have invented at one time and another many curious political systems, which were to revolutionize the world. That very excellent man, Sir THOMAS MOORE, has given us his ideas of a perfect commonwealth, which he placed in the imaginary island of "Utopia." LOCKE, the greatest philosopher of the seventeenth century, devised a constitution for the early colonists of Carolina, which was "unlike anything ever seen before, and if any one may venture to say the word, supremely absurd."* Some of the loyal gentlemen figured in this remarkable constitution as landgraves or earls, and others as caciques or barons; but "one may gather that the derision of the vulgar deprived the new titles of their value." LOCKE was a good philosopher, but he could not devise a constitution suited to the requirements of a new country. Now, two centuries after LOCKE gave his constitution to Carolina, a Nova Scotian philosopher makes his appearance and suggests a political scheme, which is equally novel, and equally absurd. It is true that Mr. Howe does not create caciques and landgraves, but then he would manufacture a body of men which would look as novel and out of place in the British Parliament as did LOCKE's dignitaries in "the plantations" of Carolina. He would originate a "Colonial brigade" to

* LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM LYON MACKENZIE AND THE REBELLION OF 1837-8. By C. Lindsey, Toronto, 1862. Page 120.

* EXODUS OF THE WESTERN NATIONS. Viscount Bury. Vol. 1, p. 373.

sit at St. Stephen's. All of us have heard of the "Irish brigade," and of the confusion it created in parliamentary proceedings. It is hardly possible to discuss this scheme of Mr. Howe in anything like a serious vein, but suppose it were carried out, what would be the spectacle presented to the world. We would see a few colonial delegates sitting in a Parliament, where their voices would be drowned by the clangour of over 600 representatives of the British Isles. They would become dissatisfied by the little attention that would be paid to colonial affairs. Many of them, in their zeal to attract notoriety, would make lengthy speeches on colonial topics, too often to empty benches. Count-outs would become the rule when a particularly patriotic delegate would rise with the intention of unburthening himself of some grievance which, interesting as it might be to himself and his constituents, would not have the slightest connection with Imperial concerns. Many of these delegates, would, doubtless, be not inferior, in intellectual vigour and ability, to those among whom they would sit, but being out of place, representing a number of communities thousands of miles distant, with whom British members of Parliament would necessarily have little acquaintance, and therefore nothing in common except a feeling of attachment to one Sovereign, they would be crippled in their exertions, and prevented from effecting any good whatever. Mr. Howe himself proves the absurdity of his own plan when he says: "These men would represent communities wide as the poles asunder, with climates, soils, productions, interests, as varied as the skies under which they were bred. They would know less of each other and of each other's interests than the body of Englishmen, among whom they were thrown, would perhaps know of them all." But, to quote Mr. Howe's own words in reference to representation at Ottawa, "the vaulting ambition of some men would disregard the natural outlines of creation with an audacity which in Europe would be

considered as a wilful temptation of Providence."

Again, Mr. Howe ought to see that his scheme would be perfectly impracticable whilst the Provinces remained in their present condition of Isolation, with separate governments, without identity of interest. Under his plan, each province would send one or two or three delegates "according to their size, population, and relative importance." The delegates would therefore go to the Imperial Parliament, bound only to look after the interests of the particular province which would send them. Local jealousies and antipathies would be reproduced on the floors of the Commons of England. Suppose Mr. Howe were to go himself as one of these delegates: nothing would be more likely than that we would see him frequently getting up and denouncing some imaginary attempt on the part of the Canadian Parliament at Ottawa to interfere with the rights and privileges of Nova Scotia. Prince Edward Island would also air some grievance — perhaps some of the New Brunswickers looked with a jealous eye on its oyster beds. Mr. Howe must see that, supposing his scheme could be carried out, the first step necessary would be a Federation of all the Provinces. If they were ever to have any influence at all in Parliament, a political combination must first exist between them.

An eminent political thinker, Mr. JOHN STUART MILL, writing on the "Government of Dependencies," alludes to the practicability of "a perfectly equal federation between the mother country and her colonies." He says:—

"With this view it has been proposed by some that the colonies should return representatives to the British Legislature, and by others that the powers of our own, as well as of their Parliaments, should be confined to internal policy, and that there should be another representative body for foreign and imperial concerns, in which last the dependencies of Great Britain should be represented in the same manner, and with the same completeness as Great Britain itself. On this system there would be a perfectly equal federation between the mother country and her colonies, then no longer dependencies. The feelings of equity

and conceptions of public morality from which these suggestions emanate are worthy of all praise, but the suggestions themselves are so inconsistent with rational principles of government that it is doubtful if they have been seriously accepted as a possibility by reasonable thinkers. Colonies separated by half the globe do not present the natural conditions for being under one government or even members of one federation. If they had sufficiently the same interests, they have not, and never can have, a sufficient habit of taking council together. They are not part of the same public: they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another; they neither know each other's objects, nor have confidence in each other's principles of conduct. Let any Englishman ask himself how he should like his destinies to depend on an assembly in which one-third was British American, and another third South African or Australian. Yet to this it must come if there were anything like fair or equal representation: and would not every one feel that the representatives of Canada and Australia, even in matters of an Imperial character, could not know or feel any sufficient concern for the interests, opinions, or wishes of English, Irish, or Scotch?"*

It will be seen from this extract that Mr. MILL even considers a scheme far more practicable and generous to the colonies than that of Mr. HOWE, as very absurd. Mr. HOWE would only have one Parliament which would deal with both domestic and foreign affairs, whereas that mentioned by Mr. MILL provides for two distinct representative bodies. No sane man could suppose it possible that a single body composed of such heterogeneous materials, could satisfactorily deal with questions of an Imperial nature as well as of internal policy. Such a body would become, in course of time, a perfectly political Bedlam. Again, Mr. HOWE would only send a very few Colonial delegates, whereas Mr. MILL confesses that the federation between the parent state and its dependencies would have to be perfectly equal in respect to representation.

It is, however, only necessary to read Mr. HOWE's pamphlet to see that he feels all the time he is writing that his plan is impracticable. He raises the doubt whether "the colonists would value this privilege," and "send these members." It is certainly

difficult to see in what way "the conviction that they had the right to send them at all times would add a new element of strength and cohesion to the Empire." So seats in the Imperial Parliament are to be kept open for acceptance or rejection, as the whim or caprice of Colonial constituencies may select. Truly an admirable plan, to consolidate British interests on this continent and give unity and strength to these now isolated Colonies. But the most novel argument used by Mr. HOWE in urging his scheme upon the attention of British statesmen and publicists is, that seats in the British Parliament will enable Colonial Ministers to be fitted "for the better discharge of their duties at home." This argument does credit to Mr. HOWE's ingenuity, if it does not say much for his common sense or understanding. No one except Mr. HOWE ever yet contemplated turning the highest Court of the Realm into a finishing school for Colonial politicians. After this the British public need not be startled at any suggestion he might make for the improvement of their constitution. Mr. HOWE also feels that an objection might be raised that "the introduction of these men by this mode would destroy the symmetry and violate the general principles upon which Imperial legislation is founded." Of course the scheme would be in direct violation of the British constitution. He cannot have the representation he asks for, unless the local parliaments are first done away with. The scheme mentioned by Mr. MILL is a federation, in which the local parliaments would remain whilst there would be a general Parliament for Imperial and foreign concerns. Mr. HOWE, however, coolly suggests an organic change in the British Constitution, but of course that is a matter of little moment compared with carrying out the wishes of the Nova Scotian political philosopher.

In promulgating this absurd scheme Mr. HOWE has given additional evidence that he is not entitled to the character of a sound, constitutional statesman, but is

* CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. Chap. XVIII.

simply a rash innovator and theorist. All his life he has been suggesting theories and plans, but rarely if ever has he attempted to give them practical and definite form. On the contrary, when measures on which he has declaimed in legislative halls and on public platforms, have been brought before him for his advice or co-operation he has turned from them under the influence of some unaccountable whim or some motive of a personal character. For years he advocated the removal of the monopoly held over all our Coal Mines by a London Company, but he never dealt with the question practically, and when the time came when he ought to have promoted its settlement, he was found in opposition. Yet the arrangement of this question which he opposed so violently has conferred more benefits upon the province of Nova Scotia than any other for the past thirty years. For years he urged a Union of these Colonies with all the ability at his command, but the moment the question assumed a practical shape, and he ought to have given it the aid of his voice and pen, he was again found in the ranks of the Opposition to a great political movement. Mr. Howe may have good and valid excuses for pursuing so extraordinary and erratic a policy in respect to these and other public measures, but you search for them in vain through colonial records.

MR. HOWE'S SCHEME OF TAXATION.

But we have not yet done with Mr. Howe's scheme. Having suggested the idea of the representation of the colonies in the Imperial Parliament, he goes on to argue in favour of taxing the whole Empire just as the British Islands are taxed. Well may the people of Nova Scotia look at this part of his scheme in amazement. The men who have been supporting him in his opposition to Union can yet hardly realize the fact that it is their leader who has propounded so remarkable a plan of taxation. But it is obvious that Mr. Howe has one set of principles for Nova Scotia and another for

Great Britain. If one argument has been more frequently used than another by the Anti-Union party with Mr. Howe at their head, it is that Confederation must largely increase the burthens of the people. Nova Scotia would be largely taxed for the defence of Canada. Our young men would be drawn away from their homes by the orders of the Government at Ottawa. By such arguments as these did Mr. Howe and his friends, in and out of the press, incite a spirit of opposition to the proposed Union. No more powerful argument can be used in a political canvass, than the statement that the taxation of the people is to be increased. The politician who can make the people believe such statements, is pretty certain to have a large following at his back. Knowing this, by past experience, Mr. Howe has never hesitated to work, directly or indirectly, on the fears of the people in this way. No doubt, a very large number of the men who signed the petitions which he took to the mother country with him, were chiefly influenced by this taxation argument. But when Mr. Howe goes to England, he feels that the same arguments that were necessary to influence the people of this country, would not do there. He must therefore change his base and propound a scheme of taxation which might well make the people of these new countries stand aghast. We shall not attempt to condense the terms in which this plan is given, but give them in their entirety :—

"Having made this step in advance, I would proceed to treat the whole Empire as the British Islands are treated, holding every man liable to serve the Queen in war, and making every pound's worth of property responsible for the national defence.

Great care should be taken that, in every province, a decennial census should be prepared under every possible guarantee for fullness and accuracy, and the information furnished by these returns should be digested and condensed so as to present at a glance a picture of the Empire.

The census would of course give, as the basis of legislation:

The number of people.

The value of real and personal property.

The amount of exports and imports.

The tonnage owned.

New ships built.

The number of fishermen and mariners employed. The information gathered by the last census may, for present use, be sufficient, and if so:

A bill, making provision for the defence of the Empire, may be prepared to operate uniformly over the whole, and should be submitted simultaneously to all the provinces. It should provide—

For the enrolment of all the men from 16 to 60 liable to be called out in case of war.

For the effective organization and training, as militia, of men between the ages of 18 and 45, year by year in time of peace.

For fixing the quota, which in case of hostilities anywhere, each province is to provide during the continuance of the war, the colonial government having the option to supply its quota by sending regiments already embodied, or by furnishing volunteers from the youth of the country who might be better spared.

For incorporating these men into the British Army with their regimental numbers, but with some distinctive name or badge to mark their origin, as the "Welsh Fusiliers," or "Enniskillen Dragoons" are distinguished. They should be paid out of the military chest, and treated, in all respects, as British troops from the moment that they were handed over to the Commander-in-chief.

For the establishment of Military Training Schools in each Province, and for instruction in military engineering and the art of war, at some seminary within reach of the youth of every group of colonies.

For the enrolment of all sea-faring men from 16 to 60 as a naval reserve, the effective men between 18 and 45 being obliged to serve on board of block ships, harbour defences, or in forts or water batteries, for the same number of days which effective militiamen are obliged to serve on shore."

A little further on he suggests the mode in which he believes the taxation ought to be levied:—

"As respects the mode in which this contribution should be levied, there are many reasons why a tax on imports should be preferred. Direct taxes are easily collected in a densely peopled country like England, where everybody can be got at, and where every acre of land has a marketable value. In the provinces direct taxes often cost more than they come to, because the scarcity of money in new settlements, the distances to be travelled by the collectors, and the difficulty of enforcing payment if there is evasion or resistance, renders this by far the least satisfactory mode of collecting revenue. But, added to their ad valorem duties, the tax for national defence could, if fairly adjusted, be paid by all the colonies without restricting their commerce or being burdensome to their industry."

We are not at present dealing with the question of the amount of responsibility the provinces should assume in connection with their defences,—that is a subject

which shall be touched upon shortly—but what we wish to impress upon our readers is the fact that this elaborate scheme of taxation is advocated by the leader of a party which has denounced the Confederation measure as a deliberate attempt to increase the taxation of Nova Scotia, and to make the bone and sinew of the country liable to be called at a moment's notice to the defence of Canada. In the first pamphlet* he addressed to the British public he dwelt with much earnestness on the strength of the mercantile navy of the Maritime Provinces:

"Here are colonies within seven days' steaming of these shores, floating the flag of England over a noble mercantile marine, and training 60,000 seamen and fishermen to defend it, and yet the House of Commons is to be asked to allow some gentlemen in Ottawa to draw these people away from the ocean, which for their own and the general security of the Empire they are required to protect, that their hearts may be broken and their lives wasted on interminable frontiers incapable of defence. Parliament, it is hoped, will think twice about this proposition, and of the scheme for launching a prince of the blood into the sea of troubles for the glorification of the Canadians."

Now these same men may be ordered away, not only to defend Canada with "its interminable frontiers," but India or Australia or any other part of the Empire to which the British Government may think proper to send them. One would imagine that it would be no more dreadful to waste lives and break hearts in Canada, than in China, Australia, New Zealand, or anywhere else. Indeed most persons would think that Canada should be nearer and dearer to us than any other section of the Empire, for, according to Mr. Howe himself, two years ago, the fate of Canada is the fate of Nova Scotia. "Talk," he stated on a public platform in Halifax, in 1862, "of the fall of Quebec being a source of sorrow to the inhabitants of this province. It would be more. If the St. Lawrence were in the hands of our enemies, we should be compelled to beg permission to pull down the British flag." In 1866 he begrudges lending

* CONFEDERATION CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE INTERESTS OF THE EMPIRE. London: E. Stanford, 6 Charing Cross.

the aid of a single Nova Scotian to Canada, though ever so many thousands of our people may be sent to the extremes of the earth, to waste their lives and break their hearts.

British America is now to become a great naval and military power all at once, though Mr. Howe, in discussing the question of Confederation, has ridiculed the idea of "a new nationality." Armies are henceforth to be drilled, and navies to be equipped, that the colonies may engage in all the wars of the Empire. They are not only to defend themselves on this continent—a work which will task their best energies—but they are to be prepared to march to-morrow to take an active part in any European war that may arise. Mr. Howe can be very severe on the "vaulting ambition" of the men who are attempting to form a Confederation in British America, but what epithet shall be applied to the man who would have these colonies actively interfere in European complications and would place them on the same footing with the people of England themselves.

Sheaves of articles have been written by Mr. Howe's friends to show the enormous taxation that would result to the people of the Maritime Provinces if they united themselves with the Canadas. Perhaps they will now enquire into the effects of his present scheme. The annual expenditure required for the support of the army and navy of Great Britain may be given at £24,500,652* sterling, or \$121,503,260. It is fair to state that, feeling his scheme will be very unpalatable to the people of this country, he endeavors to modify it by saying that Great Britain ought to pay a little more in proportion to the rest of the Empire, for certain reasons which he sets forth. It is very questionable, however, if Mr. Howe would be allowed to work out his scheme of taxation in the least modified form. If the people of these colonies (which cause the most

anxiety to the parent state, in consequence of their proximity to a powerful and ambitious neighbour,) are to be represented in Parliament, and to become immediately connected with the government of the Empire, they must not expect any more favours than are extended to the people of England.

There is a very pertinent enquiry that may be made to Mr. Howe. How will the men of Manchester, of Birmingham, of Sheffield, and other manufacturing cities and towns of Great Britain regard this scheme? We shall endeavour to answer this question from Mr. Howe's first pamphlet, in which the following statement appears:—

"Then certain persons in the manufacturing towns had been disgusted with the high duties which Canada had imposed on British productions. They were angry and did not stay to reflect that if Canada were in error the Maritime Provinces ought not to be punished for her fault, seeing that they had never followed her example. British manufacturers are admitted into them all, under light revenue duties. They all have an interest in fostering equitable commercial relations with the whole Empire, and with foreign countries, far transcending any interest they may have in the consumption of three millions of people in a mere inland country, which their vessels cannot approach for nearly half the year.

"But the English manufacturers did not stay to reflect that by handing over nearly a million of good customers to the Canadians they were doing a palpable injustice to themselves, and to the colonists besides. Up to this hour it is doubtful whether a Canadian can be found who has invested a pound in Nova Scotia, cleared a farm, built a ship, opened a mine, or expended a sixpence in defence of the country. The expenses of its early colonization, and of its protection, have been paid by England; and from this country, and not from Canada, came the emigrants, the capital and the credit, which from time to time have stimulated its enterprises, and quickened its industry. Why, then, should Nova Scotia take blankets, broad cloth, crockeryware, or cutlery from Canada duty free, but tax the manufacturers of Lancashire, Staffordshire, and Yorkshire? and yet this is just what these cunning Canadians are at; and, strange to say, the free-traders of England, who abhor discriminating duties, and will not permit any of the colonies to impose them, even for their own advantage, are quietly permitting one British colony to swing four others out of the fiscal system and common obligations of the Empire, that they may monopolise their consumption, and discriminate against the manufacturing industry of England and in favour of their own."

* Mr. Martin, in the "Statesmen's Year Book" for 1866, gives the total expenditure for the army, as voted by Parliament for the year 1865-6, at £14,948,447, and that for the navy at £10,162,906.

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Now, what are to be the consequences of Mr. Howe's scheme? It will be remembered that he proposes to raise the proportion that the colonies will have to pay for military and naval expenditure, by *duties on Imports*. The amount of Exports from Great Britain to British America in the year 1864 was £6,011,276 stg., or about \$30,000,000. These Exports are chiefly manufactured goods, from which the proportion of the revenue of these provinces is now raised. Canada absorbs the greater part of the Exports from Great Britain, having taken \$21,036,000 worth in 1865. This trade, we are glad to say, is steadily increasing every year. Now it is a grievance on the part of the English manufacturers, says Mr. Howe, that Canada imposes high duties on their productions, and yet what does he propose doing? Simply, forcing the Canadians and the Maritime Provinces to raise their present duties on British products to a very large extent. By his scheme, Canadian manufacturers are to be encouraged; at the expense of those of the mother country. Why Mr. Howe will have certainly done his best to hand over "a million of good customers to the Canadians, by having discriminated against the manufacturing industry of England and in favour of of their own." If the people of England and those of British America are to be placed on the same footing, in respect to military and naval expenditure, direct taxation would be a fairer mode of raising the money than the imposition of Import duties which must be levied on the manufacturing industry of Great Britain. The result of his scheme, some may think, would be the creation of a very valuable manufacturing interest in British America—a desirable consummation, undoubtedly, but one which ought to be attained by some other means than by carrying out Mr. Howe's system of protection.

There is another feature of this question that is worthy of a moment's consideration. By reference again to Mr. Howe's first

pamphlet, it will be seen how very fearful he is that the United States of America would be mortally offended, if British America should be *agitated*. According to him, fearful consequences would ensue:—

"The people of England are to defend these Provinces with the whole force of the Empire, then let them think well of what they are about, for by disturbing old currents of thought, and multiplying the difficulties of the conservative element in the United States, sorely pressed at all times by the turbulent and aggressive, they are increasing the hazards of a war tenfold. The attitude of the British Provinces on the American continent is at this moment one eminently peaceful and sedative. But let this guy of a new nationality be set up, which other people are to pay for and are expected to protect, and every young fellow who has had a taste of the licence of camp life in the United States will be sorely tempted to have a fling at it. Let the provinces assume their accustomed role of peaceful development as outlying portions of a great empire, with which the United States cannot afford to quarrel. She cannot then disturb them without a violation of the diplomatic recognitions of three parts of a century, and without a war, causelessly provoked, and on which neither the civilized world nor the great God of Battles can be expected to smile. Let us, then, fling into the fire the paper constitution, manufactured at Quebec, and Governor Banks's will probably be consigned to the flames immediately after; and then we shall begin to breathe freely again, and can set about adjusting the one or two questions that remain as causes of national irritation, and may look forward to peace for a century, with industrial development on a scale so vast as to make war between the two great branches of the family impossible thenceforward and for ever."

Ever since Mr. Howe returned last winter from the lengthy visit he paid to Washington, he has referred so positively to the feelings of the American Government and people, that most persons are disposed to believe that he is speaking "by authority." Be this as it may, he may well be asked, will not the "old currents of thoughts," and all the dangerous elements that he describes as existing in the United States be fully as much agitated by his present scheme as by that of a simple Federation of the colonies. It is perfectly easy to understand his first argument that the continued isolation of the provinces would be very agreeable to the American Republic. Provinces which are allowed to grow up with increasing diversity of interests, with

out unity of purpose or design, are not at all unlikely to fall, one after the other, into the ranks of the American Union. But does he not see that his present scheme, which, if it were practicable, would place British America in the position not simply of a *defensive* but an *aggressive* power,—since it would give her representation in the Imperial Parliament, make her liable to taxation for Imperial purposes, and, in fact, immediately responsible for the foreign policy of Great Britain—ought to be far more obnoxious to our ambitious and troublesome neighbours than the system of Union devised at Quebec? If ever they wanted an excuse for invading these colonies, they would soon be able to find it under Mr. Howe's admirable plan. He is very anxious, if we are to believe what he says in the foregoing extract, that the provinces should have abundant opportunity "to resume their accustomed role of peaceful development as outlying portions of the Empire." A very natural and praiseworthy wish from a colonist, but is it to be best attained by a Union of the provinces or by Mr. Howe's wild scheme? Let any one of ordinary intelligence study this question, and he will have little difficulty in arriving at the correct solution.

Supposing this scheme of taxation could be carried out, what would be the position of these colonies in the Imperial Parliament? It is true they would have a few representatives in that body,—for Mr. Howe has felt Taxation without Representation would be a principle even he could hardly dare to advocate—but what weight would they have? They might disapprove of some foreign policy which would largely increase the responsibilities of their constituents, but all they could do would be to remonstrate and pay the bills.

Look at this question in what light we may, it is impossible not to see its unfairness and absurdity. Mr. Howe says himself that it is doubtful if it will be acceptable to the people of these dependencies, but nevertheless he wishes that an enquiry

should be made into their feelings on the subject. Is it not very probable that this plan is suggested with a view of deferring the question of Union indefinitely, or till such time as Mr. Howe may be in a position to carry out the political designs he has now in view? It is a matter of notoriety to every one in the Maritime Provinces that the object of the Anti-Union party throughout has been DELAY. A "Remonstrance" recently sent to England by twenty out of one hundred and thirty members of the Canadian Parliament, is simply a plea for delay. Mr. Howe's extraordinary scheme may be only a part of a general conspiracy to defer the question of Union as long as possible. If it be true, as has been stated by many of the most reliable journals in Canada that the Canadian Remonstrance is chiefly signed by men "who are either open or avowed annexationists,"* it is time that all those who value British connection were on their guard.

THE PLAN OF CONFEDERATION.

Having dealt thus fully with Mr. Howe's scheme for the organization of the Empire, we may now proceed to enquire into the duty of the colonists at the present crisis. All of us recognize it as an obligation devolving upon us to assume larger responsibilities in the way of Self-Defence. When these colonies were but poor and struggling communities, it was manifestly the duty of the parent state to assist them freely and gratuitously to the full extent of its power; but when they have outgrown the stage of pupillage and dependence, and exhibit the strength and proportions of manhood, it is time they should assume some of its responsibilities. If there are communities in British America who do not recognize their obligations to the parent state, or, in the words of Mr. Howe, "who desire to enjoy all the privileges and immunities of the Queen's subjects without paying for or defending them," we do not know who they are. If one reason more than another has

* Toronto Daily Leader.

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influenced the statesmen of British America to urge a union of these colonies, it is the necessity of possessing that means of combination which is found all powerful in time of war to repel aggression.

An analogy may be drawn between the present position of British America and that of the Thirteen Colonies a little over a century ago. The old colonists then looked with suspicion and dread upon France just as we do now upon the Republic on our borders. It was a matter of notoriety during the years that followed the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle that France was desirous and was actually making preparations to hem in the British colonies as thoroughly as it was practicable by a chain of posts along the Mississippi. If the war, when it broke out, had found the colonies united as one, the mother country might have been saved a vast amount of annoyance and responsibility. Faults there were undoubtedly on both sides; no common understanding appeared to exist between the parent state and its dependencies; each seemed jealous and suspicious of the other. If the colonies yielded to the demands of Great Britain and granted pecuniary assistance for the conduct of the war against French aggression on this continent, they did so in a spirit that reflected little credit on them. Each colony had its own peculiar views on the subject, and only consented to pass bills for the requisite supplies, that were clogged by unnecessary stipulations—some of them encroaching directly on the prerogative. When WASHINGTON was conducting an expedition against the French who had established themselves on the Ohio, in accordance with their plan of hemming in the colonies, his efforts were rendered entirely nugatory through the want of the requisite aid. Appeals were made to the colonies, but no relief arrived. At last, outnumbered by the French, he was obliged to capitulate, and on the fourth of July, 1854, says BANCROFT, "in the whole valley of the Mississippi, to its head-springs in the Alleghanies, no standard floated but

that of France." In this same memorable year assembled at Albany an important Congress composed of delegates from several of the colonies. At that Congress the deputies came to a resolution that "it seemed necessary to take the most speedy measures to secure the colonies from the slavery they are threatened with, as the French Court have, since the peace, more than ever made this continent the object of their attention." They also came to the conclusion that the danger arose principally from the fact that the French possessed compact organization, whereas the British colonies "never entered into any joint exertions or counsels." "We know well," exclaimed a Frenchman, in the presence of WASHINGTON at the time he was despatched by the governors of Virginia to the Ohio to demand certain explanations of the French, "that you could raise two men for our one, if your assemblies were only united among themselves; but you dawdle over your preparations till the time for action is over." A plan of Union was accordingly drawn up by FRANKLIN, at the Albany Congress, for the better political and military organization of the colonies. This plan of Union, however, came to nothing. "The system," says BANCROFT, "was not altogether acceptable either to Great Britain or to America. The fervid attachment of each colony to its own individual liberties repelled the over-ruling influence of a central power. Connecticut rejected it; even New York showed it little favour; Massachusetts charged her agent to oppose it." If British statesmen in those days had better appreciated the temper of colonists, and could have been brought to look without suspicion upon combinations between them for political or commercial objects, they would have been saved a vast amount of heart-burnings, expense, and bloodshed in the end. The Congress at Albany was an evidence that the Colonies were commencing to appreciate the extent of their dangers and see the necessity of combination between each other. Such a Union as was

proposed might have been "the key-stone of that fabric of independence" * which was eventually set up, but at all events the principal object its framers had in view was that of better securing themselves from the aggression of the French. This scheme of Union having failed, the colonies remained still without combination between each other for defensive purposes. Even after the defeat of BRADDOCK, when it became more necessary than ever for the colonies to unite, the local legislatures continued their policy of opposing the demands of the crown. Some of them actually "assumed the power of sending field commissioners with their armies after the fashion of the Dutch."†

Now in 1866 the British American colonies also stand in the presence of a powerful and uncertain Power, without combination between one another for political or military purposes. Again a Colonial Congress has been held, with the view of affording the means of combination. As in 1754, there is a show of resistance in some of the colonies to the carrying out of this political project. It is satisfactory, however, to know that the relations between the parent state and its dependencies are very different from what they were a century ago. No suspicion or misunderstanding exists as to each other's motives and intentions. Both British and Colonial statesmen are influenced by the desire of promoting the interests of Great Britain and British America at one and the same time.

But will a Union between the provinces afford them that security from aggression which its advocates say it will? It seems almost absurd to argue a point which ought to be obvious to every one. Especially now-a-days when Union is the great lever among peoples, no doubt should be raised on the subject. We have seen the great Power on our borders contending for this very principle. What was it that gave

such power for several years to the Southern States, in their efforts to obtain their independence, but the Union that existed between them? What was it but the same great cause that brought victory finally to the Northern States? Or, if we look across the Atlantic, we see Italy at last, after years of misery, anarchy and tyranny, realizing the great idea of Unity within its borders. And we have just seen the same absorbing idea predominating within the limits of the old and effete Germanic Confederation.

Whilst the old Thirteen Colonies remained without combination, suspicious of the motives of the Crown and of each other as well, they were comparatively powerless. If it had not been for the energy and determination of Great Britain herself, the French might have carried out their ambitious designs on this continent. The moment, however, the colonists became animated by a common purpose, and entered into a common combination, they showed the strength and power that really existed within themselves. Still, in the face of the evidence that the War of Independence gave them, there were not a few persons who contended in favour of the disintegration of the Union that had been formed for the purposes of mutual defence. That admirable collection of political papers known as "The Federalist" was rendered necessary by the existence of the very spirit of isolation that now obtains among certain classes in these colonies. The question which is discussed in these essays is stated to be,—"Whether it would conduce more to the interests of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one Federal Government, or that they should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national government." Politicians then appeared who insisted that "instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to see it in a division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties." Suppose this doctrine had prevailed, a number of confederacies would have grown up on this continent, each jealous of the other. The aptitude of the Anglo-Saxon race for self-government might perhaps prevent the occurrence of such a state of affairs as has characterized the South American republics, but still jealousias

* Chalmers II. 273.

† Lord Bury's EXODUS OF WESTERN NATIONS. Vol. II. p. 245.

and difficulties would constantly arise between the different communities that would exist in North America. By union, on the other hand, the United States have been able to rise to a leading position not only as a commercial but a military power. The authors of *The Federalist* saw the results of the doctrine of Isolation, or Disintegration more properly, and opposed it by arguments which are just as conclusive in favor of the contemplated union of British America. For instance, the following argument, intended to show that the safety of the American people would be best secured by union, is quite applicable to the circumstances of British America :

"Our government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precaution to each. In the formation of treaties it will regard the interests of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defence of any particular point, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments, or separate Confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent bodies. What would the militia of Britain be, if the English militia obeyed the Government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the Government of Scotland, if the Welsh militia obeyed the Government of Wales? Suppose an invasion: would those three Governments (if they agree at all) be able with all their respective forces to operate against the enemy so effectually as the single Government of Great Britain would? We have heard much of the fleets of England, and the time may come, if we are alive, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But if one national government had not so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen—if one national government had not called forth all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their powers and their thunder would never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet—let Wales have its navigation and fleet—let Scotland have its navigation and fleet—let Ireland have its navigation and fleet—let three or four of the constituent parts of the British Empire be under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence.

It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert—an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army: and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the directions of the central authority. . . . Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public defence as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided; which as the centre of information will best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten: as the representative of the whole, will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and which, by the extension of its authority throughout the States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures, by which the common security is to be secured? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the Federal Government the care of the general defence, and leaving in the State governments the effective powers, by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system?"

In the present position of the colonies, they are unable to take those measures for the public defence which would best ensure them from danger of invasion. No combination exists between them: each province has its own internal organization for defence. It would be in the power of any colonial legislature to-morrow to refuse to vote the moneys requisite for defensive purposes. We believe there is now far too much patriotism in these provinces to allow them to imitate the example of the old colonists, in the first half of last century. Yet it would be possible for unscrupulous politicians by raising false issues and otherwise working upon the feelings of the masses, to bring about similar results. The policy of Isolation tends to intense selfishness; it curbs the generous impulses of our nature, wraps us up in ourselves, prevents us looking beyond our own borders; in short, it is antagonistic to the growth of all those feelings and sympathies which would, in the time of war, cause us to rise as one people in the defence of our common rights and privileges. In a word, Isolation is opposed to that spirit of nationality which has in all times preserved many countries from the grasp of tyranny and ambition.

That British statesmen believe that Union will be the means of increasing the ability of the provinces to defend themselves when the hour

of larger comes, we have already had some evidence given us. The despatch from the British Government in 1865, urging the Union upon these provinces, has often been quoted in connection with the present question, and all we intend now to do is to call attention to the following paragraph for the purpose of our argument: "Nor can it be doubtful that the provinces of British North America are incapable, when separate and divided from each other, of making those efficient preparations for national defence which could be easily undertaken by a country uniting in itself all the population and resources of the whole." The Government from which this despatch emanated, is no longer in power, but these are every reason to believe that its successor entertains equally strong opinions on the subject of Union. At all events, all that the advocates of Confederation need ask at the hands of British statesmen and publicists is a fair and candid consideration of a question fraught with such momentous interest to these colonies as well as to the Empire at large. It must certainly require more cogent arguments than any that the Anti-Union party has yet advanced—something very different from the special pleadings or whimsicalities of Mr. Howe, to create the impression in England that the isolation of the provinces is not fatal to their future peace and security, or that Consolidation does not bring with it an increase of strength.

The arguments of the Anti-Colonial party in England must lose their force immediately this proposed Union is consummated. It has long been with them a grievance that the parent state should have to pay all the bills for the defence of dependencies which only give her in return a sentiment of devotion and affection which costs them nothing. No one can deny that this argument has now considerable force and would have far more so, if the colonies continued to throw the burthen of their self-defence upon the parent state. The fact, however, that this Union is proposed with the view of placing the colonies in a position that will enable them to assume a full share of the responsibility that they ought to assume in the matter of self-protection, must have considerable weight with those who have urged a separation from the ties between Great Britain and her outlying dependencies for what are certainly natural but yet upon the less mercenary reasons. These Colonies then, appreciate to the extent of their obligations to the Empire,

and will not attempt to shirk any duty that legitimately devolves upon them. They know that British America is the weak part of England's Colonial Empire, and that it will require all the energy and ability at their command to hold their own in the future, in the presence of a great Power which is possessed of an insatiable desire for the acquisition of territory, or, in other words, is influenced by the absorbing idea "that there shall exist on this continent one Republic great and indivisible." As long, however, as they know that the mother country stands by their side, ever ready to lend them all the assistance in her power when the necessity arises, they can have no fears for the future, but can continue on that path of peaceful development which they desire to pursue, and from which they hope they will never be called to meet in conflict a people to whom they are allied by the ties of a common origin and language, and with whom they have every wish to live on terms of amity.

So much space has been taken up with the discussion of the defence argument, on account of its great importance, that other points of interest must be very briefly touched. Indeed, it is only necessary to look at the relative situations and resources of the provinces that constitute British America, to see how advantageous Union must be to all of them. Each brings to the common fund some capability that the other wants. Nova Scotia finds in the great West that storehouse of food that she requires for the subsistence of her people. Canada, on the other hand, finds in Nova Scotia those mineral riches which she needs to warm the homes, and feed the manufactories of her people. Halifax and St. John give her that access to the ocean, from which she is debarred when the Ice King holds his reign. If we take up the map of America, we see in the far West an immense tract of territory stretching to the Rocky Mountains, rich in natural resources of every kind, but now only inhabited by the servants of a fur-trading company. Here we have the North West Territory, which, in the course of time, must feed millions of souls, and form a part of the proposed Confederacy of British America. Come Eastward, and we see before us the noble colony of Canada, fronted by the great lakes and the St. Lawrence, with two

THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE CIVIL POWER OF AMERICA. BY J. W. DRAPER, M. D., L. L. D., PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY AND PHYSIOLOGY, IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, &c.

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thousand miles of navigation. Next in order come the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, the latter immediately on the Atlantic. No foreign possession or natural barrier intervenes to destroy the continuity of this magnificent range of country, from the Rocky Mountains to the Atlantic. All this country is emphatically *British America*. Then, nestling in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, we see the island of Prince Edward, and to the Eastward huge Newfoundland, as it were a sentinel placed by nature to guard the approaches to Canada. Does not a Union of countries, thus lying in close proximity to each other—each possessing resources that the other wants—seem natural? Yet there are men amongst us who would forbid the bands for what are mere chimeras of their own imaginations. From the farthest West of Canada to the most Eastern point of Newfoundland the same flag floats over our heads. "In the spirit of loyalty to the British Crown," it has been well said by Mr. CARDWELL, "of attachment to British connection, and of love for British institutions, by which all these provinces are animated alike, Her Majesty's Government recognizes the bond by which all may be combined under one government." It has been said—by Mr. HOWE among the rest—that the French Canadian element may prove fatal to the harmony of the Confederation. This argument, however, falls to the ground, for it has no solid foundation. No one can deny that the French Canadians are perfectly happy and contented with their position—that England has no more devoted subjects than they are. One of the collateral descendants of the brave mariner who first sailed up the St. Lawrence, JACQUES CARTIER, of the ancient town of St. Malo, has long occupied a most influential position in Canada, and he, like the majority of his compatriots, always stands ready to vindicate British connection. A sentiment of nationality is not necessarily generated by an identity of race and descent, or by community of language and religion. Switzerland, it has been observed by Mr. MILL, in the work previously mentioned, has a strong sentiment of nationality, though the cantons are of different races, different languages, and different religions, and though there has always been a great weakness in the constitution of the Federation itself. One great argument in favour of a Union of countries situated like Switzerland, is the presence of a common danger. In the

case of the provinces of British America, this argument exists in all its force.

The principal object of the writer throughout has been to consider this question of Union in relation to the interests of the parent state. The supporters of Union are influenced in a great measure by the conviction that this measure will not only be the best means of giving greater development to the provinces of British America, and increasing their ability for self protection, but also of rendering the connection between them and Great Britain far less liable to fracture than if they remained isolated as at present. Any one who takes the pains to read closely the resolutions adopted at the Quebec Conference in the October of 1864, will see abundant evidence that its framers used every means in their power to strengthen the connection between the colonies and the Crown. The third resolution states emphatically that "in framing a constitution for the General Government, the Conference, with a view to the perpetuation of our connection with the mother country, and to the promotion of the best interests of the people of these provinces, desire to follow the model of the British Constitution, as far as circumstances will permit." Here we have the keystone of the edifice that was designed by the Quebec Convention. Defects have been pointed out in some details, but the principal features of the plan have never yet been proved out of harmony or proportion. Not a single practical plan has been suggested to take its place. A good many of the Anti-Union party in the Maritime Provinces have opposed all kinds of Union. Others again desire Union, but have objected to certain details touching the communities in which they are specially interested. But the only public man who has attempted to give a scheme in place of the Quebec Constitution, is Mr. HOWE, and that, we have seen, supposing it is seriously proposed, could never meet the difficulties that press a Union upon British America, but is entirely impracticable.

This constitution is now about being revised by a second Convention in the city of London. Whatever may be the result, it is reasonable to suppose that the leading features of the Quebec scheme will remain entirely unchanged. What alterations may be made must be in deference to the desires of the Maritime Provinces. All of us should be confident that the interests of these colonial communities will be carefully protected by those to whose care they have been delegated. It

would be indeed absurd to suppose that any set of men equally interested with ourselves in the future prosperity and advancement of these countries, would barter away their rights or interests for the sake of some temporary personal aggrandisement. Any measure of Union between these provinces must necessarily be characterised by a spirit of compromise and the concession of individual opinion. Neither Canada nor Nova Scotia can expect to get everything they want, but each must yield to the other, if this Union would ever be consummated. The people of these colonies, so long separated, should learn to have confidence in each other's objects and motives, for we are all animated by the same spirit of attachment to the Sovereign, and have all the same destiny awaiting us in the future. Let us bury all local jealousies and antipathies, for who can tell when we may be called upon to show the depth of the affection we feel for British connection and British liberty.—

Let us not consider this great question of Union in the spirit of the miser who haggles with the market-woman for a farthing of change, but in a spirit of generosity towards each other. For, to quote with a slight verbal change, the words of a British Queen, to the Scotch Parliament, in respect to the Union between Scotland and England, which was opposed just as persistently by certain politicians as the Confederation of British America is now: "An entire and perfect Union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: it will secure your religion, liberty and property, remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and difficulties between your different provinces. It must increase your strength, riches and trade; and by this Union the whole of British America, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interests, will be enabled to resist all its enemies."

