



## STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES

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SPECIAL SESSION OF PARLIAMENTCanadian Participation in the United Nations  
Emergency Force in the Middle East; Hungary

Excerpts from a statement by the Hon. L.B. Pearson,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the Fourth  
(Special) Session of Parliament, on November 27, 1956.

We are facing today a situation of gravity and danger, far too serious a situation to be dealt with from a purely partisan point of view. The hon. gentleman who has just taken his seat talked about Canada being the chore boy of the United States. Our record over the last years, Mr. Speaker, gives us the right to say we have performed and will perform no such role. It is bad to be a chore boy of the United States. It is equally bad to be a colonial chore boy running around shouting "Ready, aye, ready". A well-known Conservative newspaper, the Ottawa Journal, in commenting the policy of the government at the United Nations in recent days, a policy of care and restraint as it was characterized, a policy of consideration for its friends, ended an editorial on this subject on October 31 as follows:

At best, we are going to be in very great danger of all-out war for some time now. We must learn to think before we chatter.

Chattering instead of thinking--if we fail because of idle chatter and not enough thought in our efforts to resolve the problems that face us today in this country and in the world, it will not make much difference who has the halos or who has been humiliated.

Now, Mr. Speaker, we have an amendment to the motion. I might as well say at once--and this will be no surprise to the House--that I think it is an amendment worthy of no support at all. It is unaccurate in its facts, as I shall hope to prove, and it is wrong in its conclusions.

## Hungary

Before I deal with the matters referred in the speech and in the amendment on the Middle East, may I say just one word about Hungary. The Canadian government has already expressed its views in Ottawa and at the United Nations Assembly on this matter. We have witnessed as brutal and as grim a betrayal of a people as history has ever seen, a people who were asking only for freedom from Communist colonial domination and the right to run their own affairs. The recent actions of the Soviet Union in Hungary throw a lurid light on the protestations we have heard that Stalinism is now dead and peaceful coexistence is here. But there has been no more significant exposure of the underlying, and I am afraid enduring, purpose and methods of Soviet power. Soviet tanks and Soviet guns have killed Hungarian freedom fighters, but they did not and they cannot kill Hungarian freedom.

What can we do here in Canada and at the United Nations? Well, we can help the victims of this terror, and we learned last night of what we are doing in that regard. We can keep, through the United Nations as we are trying to do, the spotlight of world public opinion, the conscience of the world, the moral force of world opinion, on the savage actions of the Soviet Union. We can do our best to help Hungarians in that way and to bring the United Nations into Hungary in the role of observers and investigators. We must continue our efforts toward that end; but we would not be helping the Hungarian people--I think we might be hurting them--if we held out promises of liberation by force which at this time we would not be able to fulfil. There is, however, I think, some hope in the growing evidence that eastern Europe is now beginning to free itself from the shackles of Russian slavery and oppression, and that development is expressing itself at the United Nations assembly at this time.

## The Middle East

Now, Mr. Speaker, I come to the Middle East. The debates in this house--and we have been meeting for only a few hours--has already shown that a very real difference on policy has developed between the government and the official opposition. The speeches of the Acting Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra, who has just preceded me, have made that quite clear. The official opposition--and I think we can assume that the speakers in question had the support of all the members of the official opposition; they should have to judge from the applause they received from their colleagues--now apparently support every move made by the United Kingdom and France in their intervention in Egypt after the attack on Egypt by Israel, an intervention brought about with army, navy and air forces after a 12-hour ultimatum. They claim, I have the right to conclude, that we as a government should have approved of those moves at once and should have backed up the United Kingdom and France at the United Nations even on those matters and on those resolutions where not a single member of the United Nations supported the resolutions in question.

Now, Mr. Speaker, we did not follow that particular line of policy in this matter, and I shall try to explain why. To do so it is, I think, relevant to give, as other speakers have given, some background which may help us to understand recent events. It is, for instance, important in order to keep things in perspective to understand the policy of the Egyptian government in recent months. That policy has been unfriendly to the western powers. It was arbitrary and was denounced in this house as arbitrary in the seizure of the Suez canal company. That policy has witnessed a gradual increase of Russian influence in Egypt and the Middle East, and it did culminate in the seizure of the canal. We recall that after weeks of effort and frustrations to bring about an international solution by international means no such solution was brought about.

It is quite obvious--it was quite obvious by the summer--that there was no meeting of minds between Washington and London and Paris in these matters. And of course; the fault was not by any means entirely on the side of London and Paris, and no one on this side of the house has ever tried to take a one-sided view of this situation. The vital importance of the Suez to western Europe is perhaps not appreciated in Washington, and it might have been better appreciated there if this situation could have been related by them to the Panama Canal.

Now, our own attitude in this matter was--and we expressed this attitude in the House of Commons and in a good many messages to the United Kingdom government during the summer--that we did not stand aloof and indifferent, and we did appreciate the importance of this development not only to western Europe but to Canada itself. Our attitude was that this question should be brought as quickly as possible to the United Nations and a solution attempted there; that at all costs there should be no division of opinion, no division of policy, between Washington and London and Paris on a matter of such vital importance, and that there should be no action taken by anybody which could not be justified under the United Nations charter; otherwise the country taking that action, no matter how friendly to us, would be hauled before the United Nations and charged by the country against which the action had been taken. That is something that has happened, and it is something we tried to talk over with our friends before it happened.

It will be recalled that eventually the matter was taken to the Security Council of the United Nations, and it will also be recalled that not long before the use of force by Israel against Egypt certain principles for a settlement of the Suez question had been agreed on at the Security Council. One of those principles which had been accepted by Egypt at that time, was that the canal should be insulated from the policies of any one nation, including Egypt. Therefore at that particular moment, through those conversations at the Security Council, and what is more important through conversations going on in the Secretary General's office, we had some hope that an international solution might be reached which might be satisfactory to all concerned.

At that time, and I am speaking now of a period of only a week or two before the attack by Israel took place, we had no knowledge conveyed to us of any acute deterioration of the situation, nor did we have any knowledge or information about anything which could be called a Russian plot to seize Egypt and take over the Middle East. At that moment, and against that background, the Israeli government moved against Egypt.

### The Threat to Israel

Here also, to put the matter in perspective, it is necessary to understand the background. The people of Israel have lived for years in a state of unrest and insecurity against this threat of extermination by their neighbours. With that unrest on their borders with no stability of any kind, with a military balance changing against them, and in the face of those continued threats on October 29--and it is interesting to realize that that was less than a month ago; events have moved with such bewildering and dramatic speed--the Israeli government took the situation and the law in its own hands and moved against Egypt for reasons which seemed very good to it at the time.

I admit--and I am sure all members in this house must admit--the provocation which may have prompted this move. We in the government tried to understand that provocation; nevertheless we did at that time, and do now, regret that the attack was made at that time and under those circumstances. Then, as the house knows, the United Kingdom government and France intervened in the matter on the ground so they claimed, that it was necessary to keep the fighting away from the Suez canal and thereby keep the canal open. They wished, so they said in Paris and in London to keep a shield between the opposing forces.

That was the only purpose they put forward at that time, or indeed have put forward formally since, to explain their intervention--to stop the fighting and put a shield between the opposing forces. No other purpose was alleged; and when the United Kingdom representative to the United Nations spoke at the first emergency meeting of the General Assembly on Thursday, November 1, he explained the purpose of the United Kingdom and French action in these words:

The first urgent task is to separate Israel and Egypt and to stabilize the position. That is our purpose. If the United Nations were willing to take over the physical task of maintaining peace in the area, no one would be better pleased than we. But police action there must be, to separate the belligerents and to stop the hostilities.

That was their purpose, merely to separate the belligerents and to stop the hostilities.

Well, to carry out that purpose, as we know, the French and British governments sent an ultimatum to Egypt and to Israel, a 12-hour ultimatum that was accepted by Israel whose forces at that time had come within ten miles of the Suez canal, but was

rejected by Egypt which had been asked to withdraw its forces beyond the Suez canal; and following that rejection the United Kingdom and French forces intervened by air and later on the ground.

At that time far from gratuitously condemning the action the Canadian government said through the Prime Minister and indeed through myself, that we regretted the necessity for the use of force in these circumstances; and these circumstances, I confess, included an element of complete surprise on our part at the action taken.

There was no consultation--and this has been pointed out--with other members of the Commonwealth and no advance information that this very important action, for better or for worse, was about to be taken. In that sense consultation had broken down between London and Paris on the one hand, the Commonwealth capitals and--even more important, possibly,-- Washington on the other.

Nevertheless, instead of indulging then or since in gratuitous condemnation we expressed our regret and we began to pursue a policy, both here by diplomatic talks and diplomatic correspondence, and later at the United Nations, which would bring us together again inside the western alliance and which would bring about peace in the area on terms which everybody could accept.

### Canadian Policy

Our policy, then, in carrying out these principles was to get the United Nations into the matter at once; to seek through the United Nations a solution which would be satisfactory to all sides. In adopting that policy it was obviously impossible for us to act at the United Nations Assembly in any way which we could not justify under our obligation as signatories to the United Nations Charter.

Our policy with regard to this matter as a member of the United Nations was to try to stop the fighting through the United Nations. How could we follow any other course without betraying our obligations under the Charter? But we were also anxious, as were many other delegates to the United Nations although not all of them, to avoid the creation of a vacuum of chaos in that part of the world after the fighting had stopped; and we realized if that test as well as the test of stopping the fighting could not be met, the United Nations would have failed.

Also at the United Nations we were anxious to make sure--we mentioned this in our statements down there--that the situation leading up to the aggression should be given due consideration, and that constructive action should be taken to prevent such a situation recurring again, that we should go deeper into this matter than merely into the facts of military action. I hope that will be done quickly at the United Nations Assembly. There are already two resolutions on the order paper for that purpose.

And then, Mr. Speaker, we were also anxious to do everything we could do there to prevent any formal condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors under the charter, any demand that sanctions be imposed against them, and also to do what we could to help repair the lines of communication and contact between Washington, London and Paris and restore some form of continuous friendly diplomatic consultation between the western allies on these matters after its breakdown last October.

It was certainly a matter of urgent and distressing importance, especially to a Canadian, and I expressed this also in public at the United Nations, that the United States should be on one side of this issue and the United Kingdom and France, our two mother countries, on the other. We were especially distressed at this because there were people down in New York, and they are still there, who are gleefully exploiting this division.

Having mentioned the breakdown of consultation, I think it would only be fair to add that this breakdown of consultation and agreement was not the fault exclusively of the United Kingdom and France over the preceding months. No other member, indeed no member of the western alliance, is free of some responsibilities and particularly the United States of America, which is the major and most powerful member of that group. Therefore we felt and we still feel that this is no time nor is this an occasion on which to adopt an attitude of superior virtue or smug complacency over the righteousness of our own position. We felt and we still feel that the thing to do is to get out of this crisis without a war and without violating the United Nations principles and charter, and then to draw the necessary conclusions from the crisis so that the western coalition will not collapse again in the days ahead when other problems will arise, as they are bound to do.

#### Strains on the Commonwealth

Then also, and this was a matter which was very much on our minds, we were anxious to do what we could to hold the Commonwealth together in this very severe test. It was badly and dangerously split. At one stage after the fighting on land began it was on the verge of dissolution, and that is not an exaggerated observation. The hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) is reported as having said on November 17 that Canadian leaders should bend their efforts toward restoring and preserving the moral and physical unity of the Commonwealth which, he went on to say, should have a common point of view on these matters. I could not agree with him more; but if we had followed at the United Nations the policy advocated by the official opposition we would have gone a long way not toward restoring and preserving the moral and physical unity of the Commonwealth but toward breaking it up. I am quite sure this is a purpose which no one in this house wishes to achieve.

In trying to follow those principles of policy how were we, as delegates to the United Nations and as the government in Ottawa, to react to the critical situation which arose? We tried to maintain as objective an attitude as possible having regard to our charter obligations and we certainly did try to maintain as close and as friendly contact as was possible with the United Kingdom and French delegations. We did not automatically support the United States in every move. We thought the United States was wrong at the very beginning of the Assembly in rushing a resolution on the record at the outbreak of hostilities recommending that they should be ended at once. We thought they were wrong in trying to rush that through without sufficient consideration. We did not vote for it; we abstained, as I will explain later.

We thought the United States was wrong last Saturday, the last session of the Assembly which I attended and which in some respects was a depressing session. A resolution was before the Assembly at that time which, with a Belgian amendment, should have received the unanimous support of every member of the Assembly. With that amendment the resolution would have received the support of the United Kingdom, but the amendment was defeated and the United States was one of those who voted against it.

As I have pointed out, we were not able to support the United Kingdom in all the moves it had taken, in all the attitudes it had adopted at the United Nations Assembly. Distressed though we were, we could not support the United Kingdom and French stand on this matter although we did try, as Canadians should and as a Canadian delegation should, to give the most friendly consideration to the United Kingdom and French position.

As to the charge that we have been lining up with the Russians, that is just nonsensical chatter. If a resolution is right down there we vote for it whoever may be among our companions in the voting. That seems to me to be the only possible course for a Canadian delegation to follow.

There are those in this country and there are some whose views have been expressed in this House who feel that we should have automatically supported the United Kingdom and France, either because of the ties of friendship, indeed of kinship with the countries concerned, or because they were convinced the United Kingdom and France were right in the course adopted and in the methods followed. Those who feel that way will be disappointed at the action we have taken. We thought it was the right action for a Canadian delegation to take.

It was an objective attitude, it was a Canadian and an independent attitude. Believe me, the Arab and Asian countries, including the Asian members of the Commonwealth, were watching us as they were watching others very carefully to see if our policy was based on those considerations I have mentioned or whether we were just following automatically any other power. If we had given any evidence that would have justified the impression that we were supporting without reservation the United Kingdom and France in all their tactics and

attitudes toward this matter we would not have been of any help to our friends subsequently, nor would we have been able to play the part which we at least tried to play and which I shall refer to later.

If, for instance, we had voted at the first meeting of the special Assembly against the proposal to put this item on the agenda when no other member of the Assembly voted against it except the United Kingdom and France I think we would have lost any influence which we had at that time and which we may have hoped to use later on for constructive purposes.

Our purpose was to be as helpful to the United Kingdom and France as we possibly could be. Believe me, that attitude has been appreciated in London even if it has not been appreciated by my hon. friends opposite. Far from criticizing us in private or in public in London or Paris for our gratuitous condemnation of their course we have had many expressions of appreciation for the line we have been trying to follow, and which has been helpful in the circumstances to the United Kingdom and France.

#### Sequence of Events in the General Assembly

The sequence of events at the Assembly and our relation to those events will show what we tried to do, and why. I should like to give that sequence, if I may, because I feel it will be useful to the House to know exactly what happened and the attitude we took in regard to every stage of development at the Assembly.

We met on Thursday, November 1, in the first emergency session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution which had been passed in 1950 and which was designed to get around the veto in the Security Council by transferring to the Assembly matters on which the Security Council could not agree because of the veto. When this Assembly was called and this item was put on the agenda it was objected to on legal grounds by the United Kingdom and France, legal grounds which we did not think had very much validity and so we voted for the Assembly meeting.

That was the occasion on which we were attacked by my hon. friend as lining up with the Russians. We lined up with 62 members of the United Nations in agreeing to the proposition that the United Nations should try to deal with this matter. Immediately after that resolution the United States, without very much consultation or very much opportunity for consideration, introduced the cease-fire resolution.

We felt, as I have already said, that this had two defects. Of course it was designed to bring the fighting to an end at once and it was designed to prevent military aid going to either side in the conflict. It was designed, in one of its clauses, to restore freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal for all governments. These purposes we, of course, supported; but we felt that there had not been sufficient time for consideration to force a vote through before others who wished to speak could



speaking. We also felt that it was inadequate for the purpose which we had in mind because it did not recognize the background, the previous problems which had brought about this situation, and made no provision for the absolute necessity of a peace settlement. Nor did it make any provision for a United Nations police force to supervise and secure the cessation of hostilities. We were anxious not to give our support at that first meeting of the Assembly to a resolution which might seem to bring the fighting to an end but to do nothing else, or even to recognize the importance of doing something else. We expressed that feeling in the first statement the Canadian delegate made.

In the first statement we made in New York around 2 a.m. that morning I ventured to suggest that we would not be completing our work at the Assembly if we did nothing about the prevention of a recurrence of the violence which had preceded this outbreak and if we did nothing about the establishment of a United Nations force in this crisis.

This was an idea, Mr. Speaker, that we had discussed in Ottawa before I went to the Assembly that afternoon. Indeed, it had been previously mentioned by the United Kingdom representative in his statement as something that might be desirable in the circumstances, and immediately after I made reference to it the United States Secretary of State took up the matter and asked our delegation if they would put this idea in the form of a resolution. I returned to Ottawa the next day to discuss with my colleagues whether this would be a desirable thing to do, having first had the opportunity of discussing the matter in New York with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

We were anxious to keep in close touch with our friends in Washington and our friends in London on this matter, and as soon as it was decided here the next morning that this might be a useful and helpful Canadian initiative under certain circumstances we cabled London and Washington at once and asked them what they thought about the idea; because, while a good many of these things are desirable in principle, there is not much point putting them forward at the United Nations if they are going to be opposed at once by all of our friends or some of our friends. Therefore we were anxious to get the views of both London and Washington in respect of this particular matter.

Then on Saturday, November 3, Mr. Speaker, after consultation with my colleagues in Ottawa I returned to New York where the Assembly was to meet at 8 p.m. that evening. On that occasion I did produce a Canadian resolution for the setting up of a United Nations Emergency Force for this particular situation. It may be interesting, though it does take a little time, to go into the background of this idea of a United Nations force. Of course there was nothing new in either this idea or in its proposal, and no one on this side of the house, I am sure, wants to take any credit for having put forward a novel and valuable proposal. I hope it was valuable but it certainly was not novel; except in the sense that it was adopted, but in no other respect.

U.N. Security measures since 1946 -

As far back as October, 1946, the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), at the very first Assembly of the United Nations, made a plea for the organization of enforcement procedures under article 43 of the United Nations charter which provides for such enforcement procedures through the Security Council. Nothing was done, as we know, and nothing could be done in the Security Council under article 43 because of the disunity among the big powers.

Then four years later came Korea, and the Canadian response to this challenge to peace and security in 1950 reflected our desire to bring about something more permanent than merely collecting forces for an emergency. As hon. members who were here at the time will recall, a Canadian infantry brigade was made available for United Nations service generally, and I think it was the only force in the United Nations at that time which was offered in those terms, for general United Nations service and not merely for Korea. I do not think any other member of the United Nations went as far as we did at that time. Certainly no one went farther. As I said in the House of Commons when explaining our action in September, 1950:

"We hope that other countries will make their contributions to the Korean force in that form", that is, for use anywhere subject to constitutional procedures, "so that next time this kind of aggression takes place there will be forces in being to deal with it."

On October 11 of the same year I said before the General Assembly:

The action of the Security Council in June showed how unprepared most members of this organization were to implement quickly the recommendations which they accepted. We were frankly not organized for this purpose. We had to improvise. We hope that next time we may not have to improvise.

No progress was made in bringing about this kind of organization for security. The Security Council frustrated all efforts to that end, and that was why in 1950 we passed a Uniting for Peace Resolution which could transfer to the Assembly the responsibility for collective security in these circumstances of frustration and failure in the Security Council. On that Uniting for Peace resolution we had this to say at the United Nations Assembly on November 3, 1950:

It will not be enough for a few countries to take action. We must all, within measure of our capacities, contribute to implementation of this resolution.

Certain other smaller governments took the same stand but over the years nothing was done, and there was no real organization in being when we were faced with this most recent crisis. A collective measures committee was set up by the Assembly but its activities were not very effective.

Then on January 31, 1956, the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) brought up in this house the question of an international police force, and it was a very pertinent question.

Mr. Diefenbaker: Just for the Israeli-Arab situation.

Mr. Pearson: Yes, he was limiting the value of this force at this time to a particular situation on the Israeli-Egyptian border. In response to this intervention--I had just come back a few months previously from the discussions in Egypt--I said this in the house as reported at page 777 of Hansard of February 1, 1956:

As I said the other day, I have had talks with the leaders of the Arab governments and the Israel government, and I had talks with General Burns when I was out there and at the United Nations. I think there is a great deal to be said for trying to bring that kind of police force into existence in this disturbed area at this time as a provisional measure to keep the armies apart while peace can be secured. If that proposal were made--and I know the Secretary-General has been considering it, and from press reports to which my hon. friend has referred I understand that it has been discussed in Washington in the last few days--and if it became a matter for United Nations consideration, I am sure this country as well as other countries would want to do what they could to carry it into effect.

And following that--

Mr. Rowe: In view of that fact, as our representative, did the minister not bring it before the United Nations for consideration?

Mr. Pearson: That is just what I was coming to, Mr. Speaker, I have been looking up the record in the last day or two in order to see what we had been able to do in this matter. We did follow it up. We followed it up with the governments most particularly concerned, namely the Israel government, the British government, the French government and the United States government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and again with General Burns, the truce commissioner.

Mr. Diefenbaker: What date was that?

Mr. Pearson: This began in February and went on for the next two or three months. These were ordinary diplomatic discussions to see whether it could be useful initiative on our part at that time to put forward a proposal for a United Nations force, not a truce commission, to patrol the boundary between Israel and her Arab neighbours in order to try to prevent the incidents which were building up and which had a great deal to do with the ultimate explosion last October. We were discouraged by the response given to this proposal. We received

very little support for it from any governments concerned. Indeed, we received no active support from any of the governments concerned, because they felt it was not timely to introduce a United Nations force of that character into Palestine when the boundaries had not been determined, when a political settlement had not been reached and when the parties to the conflict--and it was a conflict--were opposed to such a force.

Mr. Diefenbaker: What countries raised that objection?

Mr. Pearson: There was not a country with which we discussed the matter that actively supported the idea. When we get into committee I will be able to give more details, I hope, with regard to this matter. Certainly in our view it was important to have a police force of that kind operate with the consent and the active co-operation of the governments most concerned.

That then was the situation, Mr. Speaker, when our United Nations force resolution was introduced, and that is the background to our initiative in this matter. At the time our resolution was introduced the 19-power Asian-Arab resolution had already been introduced, which reaffirmed the earlier United States resolution which had been carried by this time and which insisted on a cease-fire and a withdrawal of troops, and which asked the Secretary-General to report within 12 hours on the compliance with that injunction. That night of November 3 and 4--and the session went on all night--tempers were rather high? The talk was strong and the danger of a rash--as we would have thought it--condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors was very real. The situation was deteriorating and the communists were working feverishly and destructively to exploit it.

In these circumstances and having, as I have said, canvassed the situation carefully with our friends and having studied Sir Anthony Eden's speech, we moved this resolution concurrently with the 19-power Asian-Arab resolution which was an attempt to get British, French and Israeli forces out of Egypt.

It was a very short resolution, and it asked the Secretary-General merely to submit, within 48 hours, something we had been unable to do anything about for ten years, namely, a plan for setting up an emergency international United Nations police force with the consent of the governments concerned. If we had not put in that phrase "with the consent of the governments concerned" we might not have been able to secure a majority for our resolution. As it was, the resolution passed unanimously, as hon. members know. Steps were taken immediately by the Secretary-General to report back what he was able to do in 48 hours in the setting up of this force to supervise and secure a cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the earlier resolution of November 2, one of which was to ensure freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal.

We obtained 57 votes as sponsors for the resolution. There were 19 abstentions. Nobody voted against us. The United Kingdom and France did not find it possible to vote for that resolution at that time but they have indicated, both privately and publicly, their great appreciation of the initiative which resulted in its being adopted and they have also stated their support for it since then. At the same time--and this is related to the first resolution--the Asian-Arab resolution was put to the vote and carried by a large majority, 59 to 5 opposed.

Mr. Churchill: How did Canada vote?

Mr. Pearson: Canada voted for that resolution asking for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of the forces from Egypt. There were 5 opposed. There were 59 in favour, including Canada. Then on November 4 we started to work, and we had something to do with this because we were the sponsors of the resolution and had a certain obligation in connection with helping the Secretary-General carry it out. We started to work on organizing a United Nations police force or at least to form the basis of the organization and report back in 48 hours.

As it happened the Secretary-General, who has played a magnificent part throughout all these difficult days, was able to make a first report within 24 hours. Offers of contributions to the force began to come in within that 24-hour period. That Sunday night when we were working on the establishment of the force the United Kingdom and French ground forces landed at Port Said. The situation at the United Nations immediately began to deteriorate. Things became very tense. The Security Council was called into emergency session and refused to consider a Soviet proposal for Soviet and United States intervention because the matter was before the United Nations Assembly. Then in the midst of rumours of Russian intervention, rumours that there would be a determined demand by the Arab and Asian members of the Assembly to brand the United Kingdom and France formally as aggressors under the Charter and to invoke sanctions against them, the Assembly met on Tuesday morning, November 6. It had before it the Secretary-General's final report on the organization of the United Nations force. At that time he was able to report progress with regard to the composition of the force. He was able to lay down certain principles and functions for that force but not to go into detail, for two reasons. He did not have enough time, in the first place; and in the second place if we had attempted to do it in detail, we would still be arguing about what those functions should be. There was however one important detail, namely that the force should exclude contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council. The significance of that detail is obvious.

A draft resolution was drawn up supporting this report and authorizing the Secretary-General to go ahead on that basis, to discuss participation with other governments. It set up also an Advisory Committee of seven members of the Assembly to help him in this task. Canada is one of the members of that committee.

It is interesting to note in passing that four members of that committee are members of the Commonwealth of Nations. While we were trying to get this resolution through and get it through quickly and with a big majority--it was finally passed unanimously--another resolution, in the atmosphere of the fighting that was going on at that time in Suez, was introduced demanding the immediate withdrawal of forces, and that the secretary-general should report that this had been done in 24 hours. Both these resolutions were being considered together.

In so far as the force was concerned, as I said, the resolution passed unanimously after we had managed to vote down--and it was a very important vote indeed--an amendment to put Czechošlovakia on the advisory committee of seven. The resolution was then passed by 64 to 0, with 10 abstentions.

Mr. Churchill: Would you name the Advisory Committee?

Mr. Pearson: The Advisory Committee in this matter consists of Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Colombia, Norway and Canada, with the Secretary General as the chairman of the committee.

The same evening, Mr. Speaker, a 19-power resolution demanding immediate withdrawal was passed by a vote of 65 with only one opposed, Israel, and with 10 abstentions. The United Kingdom and France did not oppose that resolution, they abstained on it. We voted for that resolution after having stated our interpretation, which was accepted by a good many other delegations, of the word "immediate". If that interpretation had not been stated and accepted by many we would not have voted for it. By "immediate" we said we had in mind that the United Kingdom and French forces would withdraw from Egypt as soon as the United Nations forces had been moved there and were operating satisfactorily. By getting our United Nations force resolution through and by accepting this Arab-Asian resolution of withdrawal, which had in it no element of sanctions, we were able to reject extreme demands which were being made, and which would have led us into grave danger indeed.

We think that the resolutions that night were a wise move, and we think also that they helped the United Kingdom and France in accepting the cease-fire, which they did either just before or shortly afterwards.

Now, Mr. Speaker, there has been a good deal of talk, though not very much in this house as yet, as to whether the United Kingdom and French governments were pressed into the acceptance of this cease-fire by United Nations action, and whether we should not have let them go ahead, not pressed them and resisted moves to press them in respect of this resolution on cease-fire and withdrawal. If we had done that, and the United Nations had kept out of this at that particular moment, it is said the British and French forces would have been able to complete the military job of clearing the canal of Egyptian forces from Port Said to Port Suez.

I suggest with diffidence, because this is a matter which is or primary concern to the United Kingdom and French governments, that they were very wise indeed in stopping military operations at the time they did. After all, they had indicated that they were going into that area to stop the fighting at the canal and to prevent the conflict continuing between Israel and Egypt in such a way that it would interfere with the operation of the canal.

By this time both Israel and Egypt had accepted the cease-fire. Therefore the original reason given by the United Kingdom and French forces for intervening had been removed. If the United Kingdom and French forces had continued fighting at that time, after the Egyptian and Israeli governments had accepted the cease-fire, I suggest that the Commonwealth might not have been able to stand the strain; that the Asian members of the Commonwealth might not have been able to remain in it in those circumstances. There is evidence from New Delhi, Karachi and Colombo to support that statement. I suggest also that a continuation of the fighting, even if it had had immediately successful military results, would have created even a deeper and more permanent split between the western European and Arab world. It might well have led to the occupation of Egypt, which was not an original objective of British-French intervention. It would have been a standing invitation to the Egyptian government to invite in at that time, when the fighting was going on, Soviet volunteers. Whatever the reasons may have been, and I think they were good ones, the United Kingdom and French governments did accept the cease-fire and we entered a new stage of developments.

There were only two more resolutions subsequent to the one I have just mentioned. The one last Saturday asked for withdrawal once again. We did not support it because we felt that the withdrawal had begun. We had confidence in the good faith of the British and French when they told us that the withdrawal would be completed. We felt at that time that to support another resolution of withdrawal would be to assimilate the position of the British, French and Israelis to that of the Russians in Hungary.

Then the final resolution carried Saturday night approved an aide memoire which gave the Secretary-General further authority to organize the United Nations police force. By a very important paragraph in that resolution he was told to get ahead with the clearing of the Suez canal. In spite of efforts by Soviet and certain Arab-Asian countries to hold up the work on political grounds, he has now authority to go ahead with the vitally important work.

#### Functions of the U.N. Force

Now, Mr. Speaker, we have the United Nations force in being and I am sure the house would like me to say something about the functions, operations and composition of that force, and Canada's contribution to it.

The function of this force which is now in being is to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, as I pointed out this morning, and carry out its task in accordance with directions received from the United Nations, not from any one member of the United Nations. The force--and it is interesting to recall that the resolution authorizing this force was passed not much more than three weeks ago--is now in being in Egypt where it will be stationed, or any place else where the United Nations considers it necessary to be stationed, in order to carry out the functions which I have just mentioned. The most important function is, of course, the policing of the zone between opposing forces in Egypt in order to prevent the recurrence, if possible, of the fighting. At the present time the headquarters of the force is along the Suez, but it may of course be moved.

It is not a fighting force in the sense that it is a force operating under, say, chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which deals with enforcement procedures. It is not a United Nations fighting force in the sense that the force in Korea was; it is operating under a different chapter of the Charter dealing with conciliation procedures. Therefore the alarmist interpretation, the alarmist possibility, mentioned last night by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra that Canadian elements in this force might find themselves in conflict with British soldiers is, I suggest merely a figment of his imagination. It is not the purpose of this force to be used in fighting operations against anybody. It is not that kind of force. If the hon. member had read the United Nations document concerning the function and organization of this force, which have already been agreed on, he would, I think, have understood that.

This force will stay in Egypt until the United Nations decides that its functions are discharged, or, of course, until the governments participating in the force withdraw their contingents. It must, of course, not infringe on the sovereignty of the government of the territory in which it is operating. That is obvious. But the exercise of that sovereignty in the case of the government of Egypt where the force is operating now must be qualified by the acceptance by Egypt of the resolution of the United Nations concerning the force. Egypt has already agreed to the admission of this United Nations force to its territory; and it seems to me to be obvious, because it is not an enforcement action of the United Nations under Chapter 7 of the charter that every effort should be made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and by the United Nations itself, to secure and maintain the co-operation of the Egyptian government in the functioning of this force, and the co-operation of the other governments concerned, including the government of Israel.

But that does not mean, as I understand it--and I assure you, Mr. Speaker, this has been made very clear in meetings of the Advisory Committee--that Egypt or any other government can determine by its own decision where the force is to operate, how it is to operate or when it must leave. Furthermore, the right of Egypt to consent to the admission of



a United Nations force to its territory does not imply the necessity of consent to the admission of, or the right to reject, separate units or elements of that force. That is a stand, Mr. Speaker, which the Canadian representative on the Advisory Committee has taken. I have already made it clear to the other members of the Committee and to the Secretary-General, and the Secretary-General has agreed to this statement. I said at the second meeting of the Committee--

I was referring to the government of Egypt.

If their position is that they at any time could decide that the United Nations force had finished its work and should leave, that, I think, would be quite intolerable; and there is also an interpretation of the United Nations resolution which says that the force must be sent to Egypt only with the consent of the Egyptian government which means that the Egyptian government would exercise a veto over every contingent in that force. That, I think, would be equally intolerable, because what kind of a United Nations force would you have? What principle would you be acting on in the United Nations if that country--

I was referring to Egypt.

• e-which the United Nations was trying to assist in organizing and sending forward this force should decide who would take part in it? That is something, of course, that has to be worked out between the Assembly and yourself--

I was referring to the chairman of the Committee.

--as the representative of the Assembly, and the Egyptian government, but to admit for a minute that the Egyptian government will decide that a force from country A is admissible and a force from country B is not is something, of course, that I could not accept.

We have made that stand clear at other meetings of the Committee of seven. That, Mr. Speaker, brings me to the negotiations undertaken by the Secretary-General in regard to the composition of the force and particularly in regard to Canadian participation in it.

#### The Canadian Contribution

The first resolution dealing with this force was passed in the United Nations assembly on November 4. We had already said by the time that resolution was passed--and by "we" I mean the government in Ottawa--that we were in favour of it and that we would recommend a contribution to it. The day after the resolution was passed I met the Secretary-General as the sponsor of the resolutions and discussed with him the question of putting some United Nations troops into the area at once. He considered it to be a matter of the most immediate urgency. So I said I was authorized to state that the Canadian government was willing

to participate, and later in the day I wrote a formal communication to him to that effect, saying that we had decided to make an appropriate contribution subject to the required constitutional action being taken in Canada.

The next day I also talked with the Secretary-General about the force and he was then also emphatic, for the obvious reason that the situation seemed to be deteriorating, that we must proceed quickly. We discussed the nature of our contribution that afternoon, I by telephone with my colleagues in Ottawa, when the question of a battalion came up. Meanwhile General Burns had been appointed as commander of the force and he will do a distinguished job in that position, I am sure, as he has been doing so in that area in the last two years in the face of very great difficulties indeed.

General Burns was asked to come to New York, and those countries that had already announced their desire to contribute were asked to send military advisers to New York to discuss the problem with the Secretary-General, his staff and General Burns. The Canadian Department of National Defense sent three officers down immediately and the next day, Tuesday, November 6, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would offer, and I quote:

Subject to adjustment and/or rearrangement after consultation with the United Nations commander--

--a self-contained battalion group with HMSC Magnificent as a temporary mobile base.

The consultations which we had had in New York up to that time led us to believe that would be a most welcome contribution, and we were urged to press ahead with it. The Secretary-General told me he was most anxious for us to get our battalion to a place where it could be embarked without delay.

General Burns reached New York a little later than we expected because he had to go to Cairo en route. The possibility then was mentioned that one country might provide all the administrative and air support at least in the initial stages. General Burns had found that difficulties were already developing because the infantry that had arrived, mostly from the Scandinavian countries and also from Colombia, were reaching the base without the necessary services and there was no headquarters organized to receive them.

These reports were sent by me to Ottawa. I returned to discuss them with my colleagues over the week end, and while I was in Ottawa the Secretary-General through his executive assistant phoned me on Saturday, November 10, about another difficulty that was developing and which has been referred to already in this discussion, namely that the Egyptian authorities

were concerned about the possibility of Canadian troops being mistaken for United Kingdom troops and that incidents might take place especially if the proportion of Canadian troops to the total force were high as would be the case if the Canadian infantry battalion had arrived at that time.

We in New York, and indeed in Ottawa on advice from New York, felt that these difficulties would be overcome, and in discussing them with the Secretary-General he once again asked us to make no changes in our plans pending further discussions and he hoped satisfactory arrangements could be made. So the government went ahead with the arrangements as originally contemplated.

### Composition of the Force

These difficulties I have been talking about, difficulties of administration and difficulties of composition, were not unique to Canada. Indeed they were not surprising considering the fact that the United Nations was starting from nothing in organizing this force; with the political situation so difficult both at the United Nations and in Egypt, and considering also the fact that under the resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to organize this force he was instructed to work out--the phrase that was used was a "balanced force"--a balanced force militarily for police work and a balanced force, as he interpreted it, geographically and politically if possible.

Perhaps I should interject at this point, in connection with this particular difficulty, that among the countries that have offered contributions are Roumania and Czechoslovakia. Countries other than Canada have made offers of contributions which have not been dealt with, and they are waiting to hear from the Secretary-General also. The problem now was a very difficult and complicated one, all the more so as the greatest need at that time was to get more people to the spot.

Well, then, I think it was on Tuesday, November 13, when back in New York from Ottawa that I had another talk with the Secretary-General in relation to the new difficulties which had occurred, I emphasized to him at that time that we felt it absolutely essential to the success of this effort that neither Egypt nor any other country should impose conditions regarding the composition of the force. I told him that on this matter we would negotiate only with him, the Secretary-General, although we recognized, of course, that it was right and proper that he should discuss these matters with Egypt in order to avoid, if possible, subsequent difficulties.

Nevertheless, on that Tuesday I asked him again about composition in view of the developing difficulties, and whether we should proceed with our plans for moving the regiment. The Secretary-General said--this was Tuesday, November 13, and I quote from his statement to me which I took down, that he hoped we would go right ahead with our plans.

He also discussed with me the question of composition on the next day, Wednesday. Then later we had a meeting of the Advisory Committee on the matter and I have already read from the minutes of that meeting. Following that the Secretary-General flew to Cairo. He left New York in the hope that these difficulties would all be cleared up before he had returned. As we were having diplomatic discussions about them and as it seemed that these discussions might end in a satisfactory way, we did our best, I quite admit, to discourage any premature publicity about difficulties which might be settled and concerning which, if the publicity were inaccurate, we would have even greater trouble in clearing up. Therefore on Thursday, November 15, the Prime Minister said at Toronto:

Units of Canadian contribution to the UN force are ready and the order in council placing them on active service under UN command will be passed and Parliament summoned as soon as we can ascertain from General Burns what elements he needs and cannot get from other countries.

During that week-end when General Burns had reached New York and the Secretary-General was in Cairo I was in touch with the Secretary-General by telephone and cable through our Embassy. I stated to him that I had had word about his discussions with the Egyptians; that while I appreciated the difficulties which had arisen and while naturally we wanted to help the Secretary-General already so overburdened with problems, in any way possible, nevertheless we could not accept the principle that any one government could determine what contribution or whether any contribution would be made by a member state in connection with the United Nations force. I am glad to say that the Secretary-General has taken the same position.

Then we discussed the difficulty on the Secretary-General's return. I know my hon. friends want to have all the facts in connection with this matter. We have had wild rumours and exaggerations which have appeared in the press about Nasser's farce, as the Acting Leader of the Opposition called it yesterday.

As a result of these discussions the Secretary-General had sent a communication to me from Cairo which I shall put on the record:

The question of when and where ground troops shall be used--

That is Canadian ground troops.

--can best be considered when the UNEF can assess its needs at the armistice lines. The present situation seems to be one where it is not a lack of troops for the immediate task but of possibilities to bring them over and maintain their lines of communications.

That was a message from the Secretary-General, not from the Egyptian government. He also emphasized that in sending it neither he nor anyone else was laying down conditions for

Canadian participation because he felt that that would be improper. On his return and after further discussion with General Burns it was agreed that for the time being we should concentrate on getting these other forces to Egypt and hold the infantry battalion in reserve. General Burns himself said he agreed that it was even more important at the present moment to have an air transport headquarters, administration units, signals, engineers, army service, medical units and forces of that type; which were later to be sneered at by some excitable persons as constituting a typewriter army, something that will not I think commend itself to the members of these very gallant Canadian regiments.

We agreed then to this change in plans, although regretting it. It is indeed our desire to fit in our plans with those agreed upon by General Burns and the Secretary-General and keep the rest of our forces available for transmission to the area; and on Tuesday November 20, the order in council was passed to that end. I ask whether we could or should have proceeded otherwise. I am sure that most members of the house will agree that we would have been wrong if we had not made the offer we did in the first instance without delay, an offer which at that time seemed most appropriate and was considered as such by the Secretary-General.

To have made no offers or to have made no plans; to have held back our offer until everything was cleared up; to have permitted no movement of troops of any kind, would I think have left us open to criticism, to the charge that we were dragging our feet in connection with a proposal which we ourselves had put forward. I think also that we would have been wrong to have interfered with our plans until we were certain that their implementation or the timing thereof was to be changed.

When we were asked to make that change, not by Colonel Nasser but by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the commanding general of the United Nations forces, we could have either accepted or rejected the request. The latter would have meant delaying any action or, as has been suggested in a few extreme quarters, we could have withdrawn from the United Nations force completely. I am confident that if we had taken either of those courses, if we had delayed taking any action or withdrawn from the force, in view of the developments we would have been open to grave criticism and we would have got most of it from some hon. gentlemen opposite who have spoken already in this debate. I think the course we took was the right course, and it was considered the right course by the United Nations officials concerned.

It did not seem to me to be the time--I am talking now about the time we were confronted with the necessity of changing our plans, at least temporarily--or the occasion for national pique or peevishness or sneering at this new United Nations force as being Nasser's farce. It seemed to me that the situation was far too serious for that. What was required from every member of the United Nations was to back up the United Nations force to the best of its ability after

receiving the best advice it could. After receiving such advice from the United Nations itself we took that course, and as a result there is not a United Nations force which within between three and four weeks of the resolution authorizing it now includes on the spot--at least this was two days ago and there have been additions since that time--1,700 troops of which 20 per cent or 350 are Canadians. There will be soon more Canadians on the spot. Twenty-three nations have offered contributions to that force and eight of them including Canada, have seen their contributions embodied in the formations on the spot which are now working together under the United Nations blue flag of peace.

#### Immediate and long-term objectives

May this force succeed in its task. If it does we may have started something of immense value for the future. We may have taken a step to put force behind the collective will of the international community under the law. That is our immediate task, to make this force work, to prevent fighting in the area and to establish conditions there through the operation of this force so that the United Nations itself can work out speedily an enduring and honourable settlement for that area, including relations between Israel and her neighbours and the international supervision and control, if that can be done of the Suez Canal.

While that is our immediate objective we have another objective which is just as important and I suggest just as immediate, and that is to restore unity among the allies. The western coalition, which is essential for peace in these disturbed times and which requires close consultation and co-operation among its members if it is to succeed, especially among London, Washington and Paris, has been subjected to strains and stresses in recent months. This has caused all lovers of peace in the free world great anxiety.

May I in conclusion repeat something I said on this point the other night to the American assembly of Columbia University, when I said:

The inability to bring about a reconciliation of interests inside a coalition has resulted in a collapse of western co-operation in the Middle East; a collapse which has brought distress to everyone except those who see in such co-operation the strongest barrier to the attainment of their own imperialist and reactionary power objectives. This collapse is, I am convinced, only temporary; but temporary is too long.

It must be a primary obligation on all of us to speed and make effective the work of repair and restoration. Indeed, we must do more than this. We must strengthen and deepen the foundation for such co-operation so that a collapse will not take place again in the face of the pull between the requirements of national and international policy. At the moment that is the primary task and responsibility of all who believe in freedom and security.

Then I went on to say:

It is less important at the present moment to dwell on the difficulties of the task than on ways and means of avoiding them in the future. A Canadian may, I think, be pardoned for emphasizing that this is particularly true in the case of consultation and co-operation between Washington and London and Paris. It is imperative, in our dangerous and disturbed world, that the lines of contact between these three capitals be repaired and renewed and reinvigorated.

Apart from the actual preservation of the peace, and indeed, related to it, there is no more important objective for western policy than this, and every possible effort must now be devoted, with understanding, with good will and with energy, to its achievement.

### Jordan and Syria

Mr. Diefenbaker: Would my hon. friend allow a question at this time? I have mentioned the matter to him in advance. It has to do with the grave situation that arose today in Jordan and also the even graver situation in Syria. Would he, before concluding, say something with respect to the situation over there which today has become so critical, and also whether in view of what is taking place there the United Nations force will have to be increased over and above the numbers provided for under the present arrangements?

Mr. Pearson: Mr. Speaker, my hon. friend was good enough to tell me before I came into the house that this matter was very much on his mind and that he proposed to ask a question about it. I am anxious not to say anything, without pretty careful consideration, about a matter which is of immediate gravity because, as I understand the reports we have received, this is a matter of immediate gravity. I do not want to be panicky or unnecessarily alarming about it, but there are reports that Russian penetration is going on in Syria to an alarming extent and that there are moves inside Syria which might result in the domestic control of that country by a group which seems quite willing to work with the Soviets in this matter. That is not a prospect that can cause anything but alarm. There are the same elements in other Arab countries, but we must hope that these countries themselves will take some steps to prevent that kind of development.

As for the other part of his question, whether the United Nations force should be increased to take care of a situation of this kind, the numbers of that force are not yet determined. I suspect that before long we will find it very greatly increased over its present number, but it has been set up to deal with a situation arising out of a cessation of hostilities between Israel on the one side and the United Kingdom and France and Egypt on the other, and its present terms of reference would not authorize it to intervene in any other dispute

between any other two countries. But the United Nations Assembly is in session, and if we can set up a United Nations force for one purpose surely we can extend its functions and activities for another desirable purpose. I would hope that if the situation began to deteriorate beyond the point which required that kind of extension it would be done at this Assembly very quickly.

All I wish to say in my closing words is that the question of strengthening co-operation among the western democracies, especially among the United States, the United Kingdom, France and, of course, Canada, is one which must be kept in our minds behind all the present emergencies that have strained and weakened that co-operation. We must do what we can without recrimination to bring it back.

It is in that spirit, Mr. Speaker, that we shall continue our efforts at the United Nations to find solutions to problems which remain difficult and dangerous and have created situations which, if they are allowed to persist, can indeed be a very real threat to peace.

Mr. Nesbitt: Is the Secretary of State for External Affairs in a position to give us any idea as to the extent to which Russian arms were accepted by Egypt prior to the immediate trouble, and also by Syria?

Mr. Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I assume that when we get in committee I will have the opportunity of trying to answer a number of questions of this kind, but on the direct question I might say that we knew, of course, as was mentioned in the house last summer, that Russian arms and Russian equipment were going into Egypt. That was well known. It was also known they were going into Syria, though not in the quantities in which they have been going there in recent weeks. It was our impression at that time that the Russian arms going into Egypt were for the purpose of strengthening the Egyptian army. It is probably also true that Russian technicians went in with those arms. We did not know and we had no reason to believe that these arms were going into Egypt for any other purpose at that time than to strengthen the Egyptian army for use in military operations.

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