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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CHEMICAL WEAPONS — FINAL RECORDS (PV)

1987 SESSION



PV

COMPILED AND EDITED BY:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA, CANADA


FEBRUARY 1988

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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This volume is a compilation of the final records (PVs) of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1987 session relating to Chemical Weapons. It has been compiled and edited to facilitate discussion and research on this issue.



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Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message of the Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament reads as follows: . . .

Nineteen eighty-six also recorded some progress in multilateral forums. The agreement in Stockholm, the two Conventions concluded in Vienna under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the successful conclusion of the Biological Weapons Review Conference and the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament in elaborating the chemical weapons ban are noteworthy examples of a constructive approach towards the issues of disarmament and international security.

. . .

Your negotiations on a global chemical weapons ban have now reached a crucial stage and assumed a growing sense of urgency in the light of present realities. Elements for early success in your negotiations are not wanting. What is needed is the manifestation of a genuine willingness to make the necessary political compromises which would facilitate the conclusion of a convention even this year.

(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)

An area in which the most urgent action is today required from the Conference is indisputably that of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union considers it essential that every effort be made to complete the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons this year. Such a possibility does really exist, whatever those whom it does not suit may say. To drag out this work now, when most of the questions of principle have been solved, would be truly criminal. I have a suggestion to make to the participants in the Conference: let chemical disarmament become the first example of peaceful, rather than military progress in international politics.

The preparation of a convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons would mean a significant increase in trust, including in the military sphere, and would give the lead for the solution of complicated problems of disarmament. It would be a striking confirmation of the viability of the multilateral approach to disarmament and would greatly increase the prestige of the Conference, which bears full responsibility vis-à-vis the international community for negotiations on chemical weapons.

It is gratifying to note that progress achieved in many areas at the negotiations is the result of a series of Soviet proposals and steps made in the Conference on Disarmament last year, as well as of constructive initiatives by many other countries, including the United Kingdom, Sweden and Pakistan.

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(Mr. Vorontsov, USSR)

We are not closing our eyes to the difficulties. Nor do we consider that, having put forward our proposals, we can sleep on our laurels. I should like to inform the members of the Conference that our experts in Moscow are continuing their intensive work on the search for breakthrough on the questions outstanding.

At the same time, the efforts of a mere one country, and even the efforts of a mere majority of countries, are not enough for the drawing up of the convention. We hope that the United States will truly join the search for compromises. Now at the negotiations the time has come when what is needed is the ability to rise above "author's pride" in one's own approaches and to put to the forefront the task of finding a common approach. There is no other way to success. This applies both to the United States and to all other countries, including the Soviet Union.

And yet one further point. There remain in the negotiations few unagreed major questions that require a political solution. However, there are a lot of, as it were, minor technical issues, which as a whole make up a swamp that is difficult to cross. Let's not get bogged down in it, let's take a critical look at whether everything that is now being discussed at length in working groups and sub-groups is really necessary for an effective Convention.

I should like to wish every success to the Ambassador of Sweden, Rolf Ekéus, as the future Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the organization of the final stage of the agreeing of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. May Mr. Ekéus go down in diplomatic history as the last leader of negotiations on this issue.

(Ms Theorin, Sweden)

In Europe, the most over-armed of all continents, the Stockholm Conference achieved militarily and politically significant results. A breakthrough was made for the principle of on-site inspection of compliance with treaties on disarmament and confidence-building. Last September, a successful review Conference of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention was held in here in Geneva. Also at that Conference, progress was made regarding measures to strengthen and enhance the Convention. During the latest session of the General Assembly, the First Committee produced consensus resolutions on such traditionally controversial topics as verification and compliance. In addition to established priority issues in the nuclear field, increased and appropriate attention was paid to the conventional arms race. Several resolutions acknowledged progress made here in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons convention. On the main issue of a nuclear test ban, a development took place that should give the Conference a good opportunity finally to agree on a mandate to deal with all aspects of the matter.

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(Ms Theorin, Sweden)

The international context of the negotiations on chemical weapons gives cause for serious concern. Chemical weapons have been used by Iraq in the war with Iran, disregarding rules of international law. In Europe, very large chemical weapons stockpiles exist and further development, production and deployment of such weapons is under way. Major military Powers have prepared themselves to carry out chemical warfare. The worldwide spread of chemical weapons is a clear possibility, in some cases even a definite probability. There is no alternative to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning all chemical weapons.

After almost two decades of work and negotiation, it has been possible to address most of the elements which are necessary ingredients of a treaty. A structure and the early drafts of the treaty have been developed. We must not allow the steady pace of negotiations, and the smooth functioning of this multilateral negotiating body, to lull us into accepting slow progress and a long-term perspective. If that happens, weapons development will overtake us and ruin our efforts. In order to further the negotiations, all countries producing or considering the production of chemical weapons, unitary as well as binary, should refrain from it during the course of the negotiations. Disarmament can never be furthered through increased armaments. Against this background, any production of chemical weapons is regrettable. My Government attaches the utmost importance to this negotiation and will spare no effort to assure its urgent and successful conclusion.

(Ms Theorin, Sweden)

A number of problems remain and must now be addressed vigorously. One is the régime for declaring and verifying existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. Another is the search for an effective, but not excessive system for international challenge inspections. The general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue. A third major problem is verification of future non-production of chemical weapons. Steps have been taken towards generally acceptable verification régimes applicable to different categories of chemicals. Such a verification system should, of course, not hamper legitimate activities of the chemical industry. Other important problems to be solved are questions related to the functioning of the Consultative Committee and its organs, including the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Committee Chairman during the past session, Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom, for his energetic and efficient performance of this function, characterized by his deep insight in the field. The continued work should be organized in a most effective way, corresponding to the requirements of this stage of the negotiating process. I rest assured that all members of the Conference will actively support efforts to speed up the negotiation to make possible an early conclusion of a convention.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like first to tell you of the profound shock with which I heard the news of the death of Ambassador Don Lowitz, whom we mourn both as a colleague and as a friend. He arrived in this Conference two years ago this week and we admired the courage and skill with which he stepped, at his first meeting, into the Chair which you now occupy to preside with success over the Conference for the month of February. Thereafter we were able to admire the ability and integrity with which he conducted his official function as leader of the United States delegation and we enjoyed friendship with him and with his family. He would have been sitting next to me today and it is with sorrow that I realize I shall see him no more. I should be grateful if the United States delegation would accept my deep condolences and convey them to his widow, Shana, whom we remember with affection and sympathy, and to their children.

I should now like to speak as outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to present the report which was adopted by the Committee on 29 January and which is now before you as document CD/734. This report covers the work carried out during the intersessional period on the basis recommended in the Committee's last report, CD/727, of 21 August, and approved by the Conference on 28 August.

The Conference requested that the Committee should resume its work under its existing mandate for a session of limited duration during the period 12-30 January 1987 on issues under Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX and the parts of Article II relevant to Articles V and VI, that consultations should be undertaken on those issues by the Chairman in the meantime in preparation for the resumed session, and that for that purpose open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee should be held between 24 November and 17 December 1986, including, where necessary, meetings with full services, and that the Committee should report to the Conference on Disarmament on its work during the intersessional period. It is this report that I am giving to you today.

(continued)

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The substantive results of the work in question are before you in document CD/734. The open-ended consultations were very well attended and took place in an atmosphere that demonstrated the keen interest of delegations in this work. Mr. Rowe, of Australia, and Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria, continued their work as Chairmen of Working Group A and Working Group B respectively with great dedication and enthusiasm. The Ad Hoc Committee owes a great debt of gratitude to them for the way in which they pursued during the intersessional period the work they had undertaken in the 1986 session, the results of which are contained in the Committee's previous report, CD/727, of 21 August 1986.

When the Committee met again in formal session, on 12 January, it decided that the progress achieved in informal consultations warranted an updating of the rolling text of the draft Convention to incorporate the addition of common ground identified during the intersessional period. This revised version is contained in appendix I to the document before you, CD/734, with the recommendation, in paragraph 9(a), that this appendix should be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention. Active work was still continuing until the last day. Two other papers of the Chairman of Working Group A were placed in appendix II so that they could be available for further work in the 1987 session.

As Mr. Wisnoemoerti, of Indonesia, who was Chairman of Working Group C in 1986 and who clarified the issues under Articles VIII and IX, left at the end of the most recent session of the Conference, in August 1986, I undertook, in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, extensive consultations with many delegations on the subject of article IX and its relation to the Convention as a whole. I am most grateful to those of you who spent the time to give me the benefit of your perceptions both from your national and regional points of view and from the points of view of any Groups to which your countries belong. As a result of those consultations, I came to the conclusion that it would not at this stage help the Conference's work to attempt multilateral consideration of the text of Article IX. I was, however, agreeably surprised by the extent of common ground which I found. I therefore recorded in the Committee's report that I had detected a convergence of views on four points: firstly, that confidence in the Convention should be built up and maintained by routine inspection of declared facilities; secondly, that provisions under Article IX were needed for any party to give voice to its suspicions that another party was not complying with its obligations and to have confidence that these suspicions would be promptly allayed by agreed procedures; thirdly, that such procedures should be regarded as a fundamental source of confidence in the Convention and recourse to them should be a rare event; fourthly, that once these procedures had been invoked, a very short time for resolution of the issue was essential both for reasons inherent in the nature of chemical weapons as well as for wider political reasons. These points do not, of course, form part of the rolling text, which contains provisionally agreed treaty language subject to reservations expressed by square brackets or footnotes.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

As you will see from our latest version of the text, appendix 1 of the report before you represents a considerable advance on what was contained in the appendix to our previous report, CD/727. In the light of the agreement at the very end of the previous session on a new text for Article IV, Working Group B, under the chairmanship of Mr. Poptchev, has developed an improved and more comprehensive structure for Articles III, IV and V of the Convention, which deal with initial declarations of chemical weapons and production facilities for their elimination. This represents an important step forward and I hope that it will provide a good foundation for further work on this subject, where there are important points remaining to be resolved, including the questions of declaration of location of stocks and of the definition of production facilities. In the absence of a resolution of this last point, it seemed premature to tackle the questions remaining to be resolved under Article II on definitions.

In any case, Working Group A was very fully occupied with work which continued until the report before you went to press. The new text of Article VI developed during our previous session has been further developed under the able and energetic guidance of Mr. Rowe to comprise three schedules of chemical substances of concern under a chemical weapons convention, with corresponding annexes on régimes to deal with them. The Article now provides, for the first time, for an undertaking for each State Party to declare data on the relevant chemical substances and facilities which produced them and to subject the chemicals and facilities covered in Annex II and Schedule 2 to monitoring by data reporting and routine systematic international on-site inspection. This undertaking represents an important step forward. Taken together with the provisions of Annexes 1 and 3 of Article VI, it will make an important contribution to the confidence required for the Convention to be concluded.

This accords with the first of the four points of convergence that I mentioned earlier, namely that confidence in the Convention should be built up and maintained by routine inspection of declared facilities. During the transitional period in which stocks of chemical weapons and their production facilities are eliminated, further measures will be required, and remain to be elaborated, to give confidence that States Parties are complying with their obligations in this respect. As I told you earlier, I also detected a convergence of view that provisions under Article IX would be required to underpin confidence in the Convention we are negotiating. This crucial issue remains to be resolved. The execution of all these measures of verification will require the establishment of an effective organization under Article VIII of the treaty. This task may prove to be as complex as Article VI has proved this year. The development of Article VI so far establishes that this organization will have a long-term, detailed routine task to perform. Further work on this Article in conjunction with Article VIII will be required to ensure that the provisions of the draft convention together provide the necessary confidence in the draft Convention as a whole to enable it to be concluded.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Finally, I should like to express my warm thanks to all delegations for the way in which they have, during my year as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contributed positively and constructively to the common task of negotiating in this Conference, the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, a draft Convention to ban chemical weapons altogether.

Our special joint thanks are due to the Chairmen of the three Working Groups, Mr. Rowe, of Australia, Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria and Mr. Wisnoemoerti, of Indonesia, for their tireless work and for the great contribution they have made to the fruitful result of our year's work. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in expressing our deep gratitude to the United Nations Secretariat for the support and help that they have given to the Committee in its work, especially to the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his staff, who have made a great contribution to the Committee's work, and to all the interpreters and translators, who have enabled us to operate in all the languages of the Conference.

I have now discharged the function with which the Conference entrusted me at the beginning of its last session. In doing so, I am delighted that, as a result of a decision of the Conference in August, I can hand over this task to Ambassador Ekéus, of Sweden. I know that the Chair of the Committee could not be in better hands. I offer my heartfelt best wishes for the forthcoming session and pledge to him as Chairman the co-operation and support of the delegation of the United Kingdom.

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his introduction to the report of the Committee contained in document CD/734 and I also thank him for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I wish to say to Ambassador Cromartie that we all admire his outstanding performance as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and also to thank him for his introduction to the fruitful results of one year's work. I would also like to say that, by his well-known diplomatic ability and his personal charm, he has been instrumental in securing substantial progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

During our informal consultations we agreed that, on 5 February, at our next plenary meeting, I will submit the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference for adoption. At the end of the morning session on 5 February, we will re-establish that Ad Hoc Committee and we will appoint Ambassador Ekéus, of Sweden, as Chairman.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

I now turn to chemical weapons. We have stated repeatedly in this Conference that the Australian Government attaches high priority to the conclusion of a multilateral convention which would ban the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. We believe that such an objective is clearly in sight. There is a new spirit in the negotiations and this was evident throughout the 1986 session of the Chemical Weapons Committee. It was reflected in particular in the process which was recorded in the intersessional consultations during November, December and January. The advances made in the negotiations are reflected in the report containing the revised rolling text of the Convention which Ambassador Cromartie presented this afternoon. This momentum which was generated under the dedicated chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie must be sustained.

In fact we must increase the tempo of our negotiations during 1987 so that the opportunity which clearly exists of concluding a convention this year may be realized. This requires two things: concentration upon resolution of the main outstanding issues, and tailoring of the working arrangements of the Committee in the most effective way. The Committee has concentrated its work during the past year on matters relating to Articles III, IV, V, VI and IX. While all these Articles will continue to require further attention, we consider it is now imperative to focus in a concentrated way on other specific issues.

Four of these are of central importance: declaration and verification of chemical weapons stocks; chemical weapons production facilities; non-production of chemical weapons; and challenge inspection. There has already been a considerable amount of effort devoted to the discussion of these issues and to the formulation of appropriate provisions for inclusion in the Convention, but a solution to all aspects of these issues has remained elusive. They are difficult and complex, but it is not beyond our ability to solve them. Our ability to find solutions was demonstrated in the latter part of the 1986 session, which resulted in progress, good progress being made on Articles III, IV, V and VI.

The subject of challenge inspection is recognized as one of the most important issues needing solution. A range of proposals has been put forward in relation to it, but we believe that an appropriate provision can be arrived

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

at if the issue is taken up in a concentrated way. A solution to challenge inspection would give a significant impetus to the negotiations as a whole. Thus we think that the challenge inspection issue should be given prominence during the 1987 session.

We have mentioned the desirability of focusing our work on specific issues in a concentrated way. This would require an adjustment to the way in which we have organized the Committee's work in the past. We are very pleased that the incoming Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, is envisaging such an approach. We fully support the idea of focused consideration of clusters of issues, providing, of course, that there can be flexibility in relation to when particular issues might be taken up depending on the progress being made. It is through such an approach that we believe that the momentum that has been so much in evidence during 1986 will be sustained and that the objective to which we are all committed will be achieved.

As further evidence of Australia's commitment to this objective, we would like to record that since the last plenary meeting of the 1986 session of the Conference the Australian Government has taken further action in support of its view that chemical warfare is abhorrent. On 26 November 1986, Australia withdrew its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, although a valuable international agreement, is less than perfect. In view of the many reservations to the Protocol, it cannot be said categorically that it prohibits all use of chemical weapons. By withdrawing its own reservation and by its active pursuit of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention, Australia aims to strengthen the international norms against chemical warfare.

Australia has also been concerned about the proliferation of chemical weapons. To ensure that Australia does not inadvertently contribute to the problems of chemical weapon use through chemicals exported from Australia being secretly diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons, eight chemicals which could be misused in this way were placed under strict export controls by us in 1985. The Australian Government has recently decided that an additional 22 chemicals which could be used in making chemical weapons will be placed under Australian export controls, bringing to 30 the number of such chemicals for which export permits will be required. Although Australian Ministers decided in December 1986 that an additional 22 chemicals would be controlled, I have to make clear that the full implementation of this decision, this firm decision, is still in train. The Australian export control list will, we hope, serve as a model for all chemical exporting nations. The measures we have implemented to control the export of these chemicals is intended to reduce the risk of chemical warfare. But export controls, while a valuable measure, are not a substitute for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. So we will continue to give our full support to the maintenance of that important objective, an objective which is in sight and is one of our expectations for 1987.

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

I understand that you have already heard from President Reagan on his tribute to Don. Let us, as the President said, pursue the goals Don pursued and, by so doing, give a living monument to his work here. I would now like to convey to you the President's greetings at the opening of this session; the President's words: . . .

One of the most important tasks facing you is the working out of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. This task is made even more difficult by the fact that capabilities for chemical warfare are increasing and that, contrary to international agreement, chemical weapons are being used in various parts of the world. You have a heavy responsibility. For, as you consider the provisions of a convention, you must make sure that a global ban will, in fact, eliminate the capability for chemical weapons to be used against future generations. An effective convention will require an unprecedented degree of openness on the part of all States.

I reaffirm the commitment made by the United States in 1984 when we tabled our draft convention banning chemical weapons worldwide. The United States delegation will make every effort to work for the total elimination of these terrible weapons and for the verification provisions necessary to ensure that they never again enter the arsenals of the world's armies.

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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

Your efforts in this and in other fields are to be commended. We are committed to working with you in the Herculean task of bringing stability to a still insecure world and in achieving responsible solutions to the problem of reducing the world's arms."

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(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

. . .
Of the tasks before you, my Government, as you know, considers the negotiations on achieving a comprehensive and effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons to have the highest priority. International negotiators have been striving to remove the chemical weapons threat since the late nineteenth century. Here it is 1987. Nearly a century has passed since the Hague Conference prohibited use of chemical projectiles, in 1899.

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

Yet the world finds that the problem of chemical weapons remains; indeed, as the world edges toward the twenty-first century, the chemical weapons danger continues to grow. Shockingly, we have witnessed use of chemical weapons by some nations in this decade and even during the past year.

It is high time that chemical weapons use was rendered a thing of the past. It is high time that these barbaric weapons were banished from the face of the earth. But it is obvious that, if these weapons are to be banned, a thorough and effective mechanism of verification is necessary. My country will just not accept, and no free nations should accept, a ban on chemical weapons without sound machinery of verification.

A chemical weapons ban without confidence of compliance will be no more effective than the Hague Conference's 1899 prohibition on use of artillery containing poison gas, which did nothing to prevent extensive use of chemical weapons in the First World War. The use of chemical weapons, as I remember, produced some 1 million casualties. It will be no better than so many of the misguided disarmament measures of the 1920s and 1930s, which, the great American commentator, Walter Lippmann, said, were "tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament" while permitting aggressor nations to maintain and expand their own arsenals. Until an effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban is in place, the American people will insist, and rightly so, that the United States maintain adequate chemical forces to deter use of these heinous weapons by an aggressor.

While the establishment of procedures for the effective verification of arms control agreements is often extremely demanding both technologically and politically, in the case of chemical weapons, the challenges are especially great. The toxic chemicals which are or could be used as agents of warfare are in general not very different from a variety of substances having legitimate civilian use. Clearly, the chemical process equipment used in their production can be found in the legitimate manufacture of pesticides or corrosives. Chemical agents can be stored in bulk, facilitating transportation as well as concealment. Chemical munitions have no particular characteristics which distinguish them from other types of munitions. They are too small and easily transported and concealed.

Thus, as I mentioned before, the issue of openness goes to the heart of achieving a chemical weapons ban. Article III of the rolling text of the draft Convention on chemical weapons (CD/734) requires each State Party to declare whether it possesses chemical weapons. And yet today the United States is the only country in this room, the United States is the only country in the world, that publicly admits to having chemical weapons and has made public its stockpile locations. That, to me, is astonishing -- especially when so many countries are pressing the urgency of a chemical weapons ban. Some are even criticizing the United States for holding up progress and for developing chemical weapons.

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

The production of chemical weapons is not illegal. The use of chemical weapons is illegal. Since it signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the United States has never used chemical weapons; others have -- others, who do not even publicly admit to possessing chemical weapons, they have used them; others, with representatives in this very room, they have used chemical weapons. The world expects better than this.

The United States openly declares its possession and development of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union, along with other nations, does not. The world expects better than this.

The United States has presented publicly an extraordinary amount of information concerning its binary weapons programme. The details are known to everyone. The Soviet Union has told us nothing about its chemical weapons programme. The world expects better than this.

The United States has invited all members of this Conference to examine procedures for the destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has yet to accept this invitation, which is still outstanding. The world expects better than this.

The United States will devote some \$500 million under the fiscal 1987 defence budget to the elimination of its current chemical munitions stocks. The Soviet Union, apparently, has no similar chemical weapons elimination or demilitarization programme. The world expects better than this.

The United States has maintained a unilateral moratorium on the development of chemical weapons for 17 years. The Soviet Union has never stopped producing chemical weapons and it continues today to expand its facilities and to expand its capabilities. The world expects better than this.

It is because of this sad state of affairs, because of this glaring lack of openness in the realm of chemical weapons, that we are more than ever convinced that confidence in compliance is essential to a chemical weapons ban. We are more than ever convinced that nothing less than an inspection régime institutionalizing the right of short-notice access upon demand to any location or facility suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons will effectively deter non-compliance -- that is, of course, the challenge-inspection provision of Article X of the United States draft convention, CD/500.

But every article of the convention must be designed to contribute to this overall objective of confidence in compliance. And, to be effective, each provision must be clearly and unambiguously defined, written, and understood. It will do little good to have broad agreement on the basic provisions concerning permitted and prohibited activities if inspection procedures are inadequate or if they are imprecise.

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

At present, it is a point of consensus among all our Governments that each State Party will provide international access to its destruction sites, its production facilities to be eliminated, and its facilities for producing permitted chemicals. But the working out of precise procedures for all these tasks had only just been begun by Ambassador Lowitz and his fine delegation. And the vital question of how to ensure confidence in compliance with regard to undeclared sites still remains at issue.

But, again and again, wherever we turn in this negotiation, we run up against the same problem: it is precisely the absence of openness, the absence of glasnost, that is standing in the way, blocking further progress. In the draft Convention, I count no less than 13 different types of declarations that each State Party must be expected to make about its stockpiles and about their destruction, about its chemical weapons production facilities and about their elimination, and about its chemical industry.

Article IV is a key element in this series of declarations -- calling for the declaration of all stockpiles. Everyone agrees that each State Party should declare the amount and composition of its stockpile. Everyone agrees with the basic objective that the complete stockpile should be destroyed. And yet the Soviet Union continues to reject two particular "openness" provisions; each is necessary if we are to have confidence that this objective is fulfilled. One is the early and complete declaration of the stockpile locations and on-site verification to ensure that the declaration reflects reality. The second is on-site monitoring of the stocks until destruction to ensure that some weapons are not clandestinely diverted to undeclared sites before destruction. And it is obvious that we face the serious risk that a State will not declare all its stockpile locations or the entire amount of its stockpile.

The consequences of lack of openness in this realm are unfortunate, and they are not lost on world opinion. I think the 1983 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) identified the problem -- and identified the solution -- as well as anyone did:

"Faced with a high degree of uncertainty about Soviet CW intentions, Western defence authorities have no prudent option but to assume that they pose a threat. If it decided to do so, the Soviet Government could probably find a way for reducing the ambiguities attaching to its CW stance in Western (and non-aligned country) eyes without at the same time jeopardizing Soviet security to the point of net detriment. Yet even though the need for such mistrust-reducing measures is so evidently growing, it seems that Moscow has not chosen to act in such a manner, a failure which is becoming more and more conspicuous and damaging".

And that is from the Stockholm Institute (SIPRI).

Clearly, there is a gap between the way certain States conduct business today and the way they promise they will behave under a convention banning chemical weapons. And it is simply not possible for a nation to yield

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

national control over its own defence to an international agreement -- as we will be asked to do when we have a convention ready for signature -- on the basis of a mere promise of a new and better pattern of behaviour by other States like the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union says it is interested in real openness. Good. But will its deeds in this forum match its words? We hope so. We hope to see signs of real glasnost, here in the CD, in the coming weeks and months, otherwise I fear our work will be even slower and more difficult.

I believe that a turn by the Soviet Union to real glasnost would transform our discussion and sweep away a host of difficulties that have been blocking your progress here. I believe it could remove the barriers that some have attempted to erect to the inspection procedures absolutely essential to make a chemical weapons ban worth the paper it is printed on. Genuine openness, real glasnost, were it to emerge in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Union's dealings with the rest of the world -- nothing could be more welcome to the United States of America. Nothing could do more to make possible progress in the relationship between our two Governments. Nothing would so improve the prospects, not only for real advances in arms control, but for the entire cause of world peace. Nothing would be a better tribute to your dedicated and important work. Nothing could be a better monument to Donald Lowitz's work and to his life.

Mr. BOLEWSKI (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, it gives great satisfaction to my delegation to see you, as the representative of the People's Republic of China, presiding over the Conference on Disarmament during this opening month.

My delegation would like to stress the usefulness of our inter-sessional consultations and regular sessions in November, December and January which have provided us with a number of clarifications and useful discussions. There has been continuous general recognition of the urgent need for a ban on chemical weapons and speakers have expressed their desire for further constructive deliberations.

My Government has emphasized on many occasions that it attributes the highest priority to the negotiations of a worldwide ban on CW. In this context, permit me also to quote from the North Atlantic Council Communiqué of 12 December 1986: "At the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, we seek a convention which meets our objective, the general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles".

The North Atlantic Council further states: "If the Soviet Union is prepared to take a constructive attitude on all aspects of an effective verification régime, such an agreement is within reach. We appeal to the USSR to join us in overcoming the outstanding obstacles".

At this point, my delegation would like to reaffirm the position of my Government on the need for effective verification. Our wish is that agreement be reached as soon as possible on a system of verification which effectively prevents the production of chemical weapons. It must be impossible for any contracting party to evade the inspections required for the attainment of this goal. Of decisive importance is verification especially in areas where there is a danger of chemical weapons production. The inspections must therefore be tailored to the very purpose of the convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

(continued)

(Mr. Bolewski. Federal Republic of Germany)

Our object is and remains, for example, to control super-toxic lethal chemicals which are suitable for CW, not dangerous substances of the chemical industry in general. But even if a total control of the chemical industry were feasible or acceptable -- not only of the commercial industry, but of any chemical industry -- this would not render superfluous challenge inspections, because even such a total control would not mean that there could not be undeclared or unknown facilities and stocks which might present a risk. That is why my delegation insists on the necessity for any challenge inspection not to be limited to declared facilities, but to cover all possible installations and all locations. This, then, in turn will be a factor reacting upon the regular controls.

The pre-condition to make challenge inspection a really satisfying operation is the acceptance of such a demand for control as a rule. But there are other elements on which consensus does not seem to be achieved yet. This concerns, for example, a further pre-condition, namely that the demand of a challenging State should prevail and not be made dependent upon a plebisciterian machinery of any sort. In our view, majority results or minority failures are hardly apt procedures, even if they are called democratic, to solve international security problems -- and this is what we are dealing with here. If a State perceives an imminent danger to its security, then that State -- no State -- will want to rely on a multilateral process to accept or discard its perception. In addition to that, we might run the risk of establishing the right of veto for one or even more groups in the international supervising body, depending upon the qualifications chosen for representation in that body. A right of veto or a blocking minority would be a completely new element in an international convention, the central logic of which is to guarantee all States equal rights to security and equal duties to contribute towards its realization.

As for on-challenge inspections, we continue to regard the British proposal as the basis of a solution that answers the need for stringent verification while taking account of the legitimate interests of the participating countries in terms of protection.

My delegation stands ready to help in any way to ensure that decisive steps towards a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons are taken in 1987.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Speaking as co-ordinator of the Group of socialist States for item 4, chemical weapons, I wish to express our satisfaction over the Conference's adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, together with the substantial annexes reflecting, as they do, the state of affairs in our work on a CW convention. The results achieved are a convincing demonstration of the usefulness and fruitfulness of the work during the inter-sessional period, i.e. of both the informal consultations and the resumed session of the Ad Hoc Committee.

In this connection, I would like to express our thanks to Ambassador Cromartie, of the United Kingdom for his skillful chairing over the Committee's work, his personal devotion and contribution to the achieved results. May I also extend our gratitude to Mr. Rowe, of Australia, and Mr. Poptchev, of Bulgaria, who, also during the January session, chaired Working Groups A and B respectively, as well as to Mr. Bensmail and other staff of the Secretariat and technical services.

The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on which we shall decide later today already in the first week of the session has, in our view, more than just procedural meaning. It points to the willingness of the Conference's members to restart without any unnecessary delay further work on a convention banning chemical weapons. We believe that is also an indication of the feeling that 1987 should bring us to the completion of this task. Indeed, an early finalization of the draft Convention is within our reach, and 1987 is most propitious for concluding the negotiations.

(continued)

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

This no doubt optimistic event at the outset is a good omen for our further work. We are deeply convinced that similar efficiency will be a guiding principle in the Ad Hoc Committee's work throughout the session of 1987.

On the part of the socialist States, I assure you, no effort will be spared in the search for mutually acceptable solutions, as was stressed recently at the Berlin meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of socialist States. We do have our own position, but we also do realize that at the outcome of these negotiations there has to be only one common position based on a compromise.

We expect that the same approach will be taken by others and we appeal to all delegations to contribute their share to the compromise solutions which are sought for. In this connection, let me draw your attention to the statement of the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Yuli Vorontsov, who said:

"What is now required at the negotiations, is to be able to shed 'parental feelings' toward the approaches one proposes and to concentrate on finding a common approach."

The rolling working text of the future Convention represents quite an extensive area of agreements, including most of the fundamental issues.

The time has come to make necessary political decisions which would open the way to a successful solution of some of the outstanding issues. There is no need to repeat what we all know, i.e. what the areas of agreement are, or to point out issues where political solutions are needed. It seems, however, that both last year's session and the inter-sessional period have demonstrated clearly the growing significance of the overall problem of verification, both verification of non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry and challenge verification. We are of the opinion that verification measures should be in the centre of our work. The verification system should provide confidence for all States parties that the provisions of the convention are observed. We should be careful to close all loopholes which may either open the way to re-emergence of chemical weapons or become a constant source of misunderstandings.

The socialist countries will continue their activity and flexibility in search for possible solutions to these important issues, as well as to all other still unresolved questions.

We call on all States participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to join in a common effort toward an early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would contribute to the strengthening of international security and confidence and would enhance the credibility of this body.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Our Group is very pleased that at this very decisive stage of our negotiations the work of the Ad Hoc Committee will be chaired by Ambassador Ekéus, of Sweden, whose contribution to the progress achieved so far is considerable. We support Ambassador Ekéus' intention of giving a strong boost to the Committee's work. We are certain that both the method and the programme of work he is to put forward will serve this goal. His personal experience as previous Chairman of the Committee, and as long-time co-ordinator in the Group of 21 is a good guarantee that the 1987 session will close with a result which would enable the Conference to finalize its work on agenda item 4.

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese): That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none. Then we take up the following items.

As agreed at our last plenary meeting, I shall now proceed to put before the Conference for adoption the draft decision on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the appointment of its Chairman, as contained in document CD/WP.252 which has just been circulated. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision. 1/

It was so decided.

May I, on behalf of the Conference, extend to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, our warm congratulations on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I am sure that all members join me in wishing him a successful tenure in that important office, which he has already held with the utmost competence and person commitment, advancing substantially the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Chinese):

I have requested the secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. You will notice there that the Ad Hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons and on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will start their work immediately. Of course, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On that understanding, and if there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, in the form of a convention widely acceptable the world over, is another item on which we hope to see further progress during the course of this year.

The Ad hoc Committee, in 1986 and January 1987, has identified those substances to be controlled under a future convention and has begun the drafting of the régimes to which these substances would be subject, as well as streamlining the provisions concerning the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. I would like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation of these results and to extend our sincere gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups, Mr. Richard Rowe, Mr. Petar Poptchev and Mr. Noegroho Wisnoemoerti. Many countries called for

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(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

the convention to be concluded in the course of this year, and my delegation for one is certainly prepared to do its share to enhance the work under the new Chairman, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden.

Much time and effort have already been spent on the chemical weapons negotiations, and they are now at an advanced stage. They are very complicated and extensive in detail. As such, they do not lend themselves easily to immediate and simultaneous solutions. I should therefore like to propose that we concentrate our energies on those problems which will require agreements on principles: namely, articles of the convention and some of its annexes, leaving those other problems of a technical and procedural nature for extended consideration by experts.

In the view of my delegation, the priority questions are as follows:

First, the definition of chemical weapons is one of the basic issues of the convention. It is a most complicated and difficult problem. But the definition should, in principle, be understood to be "substances of particular relevance to chemical weapons" and related munitions. In drafting, the focus up to now has been placed on the prohibited substances under Article VI. Would that be sufficient? We should probably also take into consideration those substances as will be declared under Article IV.

In this connection, my delegation thinks that the convention should not create impediments for the legitimate activities of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, and thus feels that due significance should be given to the general purpose criterion. It is therefore imperative that the concept of "permitted purposes" be given careful attention in drafting the definition.

Second, with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons, the declaration of location of stocks, together with the declarations on the entirety of the stockpile and on its composition, should be made at an early point in time following the entry into force of the convention. These declarations should be verified by on-site inspection.

In this connection, my Government welcomed the presentation in July 1986 by the United States delegation of a document in which detailed information on United States stockpiles and plans for their destruction were given. It was a courageous step helpful to the negotiations. If the other countries possessing chemical weapons were to follow suit, during the course of the negotiations, it would greatly contribute to the solution of the problems we now face, in particular, with regard to Articles IV and V.

Third, in Article VI, which deals with the question of permitted activities, we should strive to develop common language on the verification measures to be applied to each of the categories of substances.

There is much work to be done, also, on the issues of thresholds for the control of various chemical substances, the concept of militarily significant quantities, the mechanism for revising lists of chemicals, the cost factor, and so on. We feel however that these problems might be better assigned to the experts for their consideration and advice. It would be more productive

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

for the Ad Hoc Committee to agree on the basic utility of these concepts in implementing Article VI, and then proceed to work out the body of Article VI and its annexes.

With regard to the substances on which there is no agreement as to whether they should be included in a particular list or régime, we suggest that it would do no harm to put them aside temporarily by putting them on a preliminary list, returning to settle the question of the outstanding substances once the régimes to which they would be subject are more developed.

Fourth, as regards the organizational questions in Article VIII, we feel it appropriate to maintain the present draft text for the time being. When the various substantive provisions on the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, régimes for permitted activities, challenge verification, and so forth are developed, there will be a need for a thorough review. The organs of the convention will need to be fully worked out and be in existence by the time of the entry into force of the convention. As they require extensive work, my delegation thinks that these, including the financial clauses, would be another set of problems which we could delegate for expert consideration at an appropriate time.

Fifth, there seems to be common understanding on a challenge inspection régime under Article IX, that this inspection is to be of an exceptional nature to be conducted within a short time scale. However, when we get down to working out the details of its implementation, the divergences seem to be as wide as ever. In order to overcome this impasse, we must develop our thoughts as to whether we are pursuing a rectifying effect as regards possible contraventions of the convention or the restoration of confidence among the parties to the convention, whether our aim is to drive the offending party out of the convention régime, or whether bilateral solutions may possibly be contemplated. We should review existing proposals and engage in quiet and informal discussions to seek a solution to the problem.

I have already said that the chemical weapons negotiations are at an advanced stage. We must organize ourselves to deal with this new stage in a most effective way.

My delegation has advocated a work process where we concentrate on one item for a given week and move on to another, rather than deal with several questions in three separate working groups at the same time. I am pleased to note that the organization of work suggested by Ambassador Ekéus is along the lines of our thinking. We might meet as the Ad Hoc Committee for several days each month so as to assess the situation in the Working Groups, to consolidate areas where there has been progress and give directives where there has been little progress.

Rather than spending day after day in various meetings, we need also to bear in mind the utility of "breathing spaces", so as to allow delegations to develop their thoughts and to consult with capitals. To this end, we may need to reduce the frequency of meetings within the framework of carefully formulated schedules.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

To sum up, we should aim to build substantive agreements one by one at this advanced stage.

Besides the CTB and chemical weapons, we are also expected to make substantial progress, during this spring session, on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

As to item 4, my delegation would like to express its satisfaction with the results achieved by the Conference at its 1986 session and during the inter-sessional period. Under the able guidance of Ambassador Cromartie of Great Britain, the Ad Hoc Committee succeeded in resolving a number of important issues related to the chemical weapons stocks, the chemical weapons production facilities and the activities not prohibited by the convention.

It is gratifying to note that the progress achieved at informal consultations warranted an updating of the rolling text of the draft convention to incorporate the addition of common ground identified during the inter-sessional period.

We share the view that momentum has been generated, and it must be sustained. In fact, it is necessary for the Conference to intensify its efforts by increasing the tempo of its negotiations. We believe that in 1987 our objective should be to finalize the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. While we do not tend to underestimate the remaining difficulties, we think that this objective is not beyond the reach of the Conference. There is no doubt in our mind that the Conference made a very wise decision in giving, at this crucial stage of the negotiations, the steering wheel of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons into the hands of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus.

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(Mr. Morelli-Pando, Peru)

With respect to the established continuity of the ad hoc committees on items 4 and 8 of our agenda, my delegation wishes to state the following. With regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, we once again express our hope that the efforts currently under way to achieve a comprehensive and global treaty in this field may be completed this year, as has continually been requested by the competent international forums and also significantly and recently, by the Second Review Conference of the Treaty prohibiting biological weapons. Recognition should be given to the work done recently by the Ad Hoc Committee under the expert guidance of the distinguished representative of Great Britain, and now entrusted to the distinguished representative of Sweden, from whose guidance we may hope for very good results.

(Mr. Törnudd, Finland)

Since I last spoke from this rostrum one year ago, considerable progress has been achieved with regard to another priority item on the agenda of this Conference, the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons. Although a number of critically important issues remain to be settled, the pace of progress over the past year gives rise to the hope that the remaining problems, too, can be solved in the not too distant future. We wish the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, every success in his important task.

Challenge inspection is undoubtedly the major unresolved issue at this point. We are glad to note that, as last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, noted in his report to the Committee, a convergence of views now exists on at least four points. Enlarging this common ground to the point of consensus -- by working out the appropriate detailed procedures to everyone's satisfaction -- poses a challenge of its own. Perhaps differentiation by types of challenge inspection objects and accumulating experience from on-site inspections might help to solve this problem.

We are heartened by the progress made in developing régimes for the verification of various categories of chemicals relevant to the convention. For the first time, there is now a provisional list of at least nine known chemical warfare agents which will be banned, except for small-scale production for research, medical or protective purposes. Important work has also been done in developing detailed verification measures for such production. We believe that in perfecting these measures care should be taken not to hamper basic research routinely undertaken in university laboratories or elsewhere.

It is clear that effective verification of the chemical weapons convention requires, in addition to data reporting, both on-site inspections and the use of modern monitoring equipment.

Monitoring equipment for verification purposes has been studied and tested by the Finnish chemical weapons verification project since 1972. As part of our continuing effort to help to provide the necessary technical means for assuring confidence in the convention, the Finnish project is hosting, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, a special workshop in Helsinki. The

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(Mr. Törnudd, Finland)

workshop, convened at expert level, will address questions of automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged use, verification of destruction and verification of non-production. The results of the workshop will be communicated to all members of the Conference on Disarmament in written form as soon as they are available.

(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)

... Similarly, as a country situated in the Balkan region, Romania favours and is working for the transformation of that part of the continent into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons and of foreign military bases. At the same time we support the creation of such zones in the north and centre of Europe as well as in other continents. In that spirit we welcome the recent entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.

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(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)

... Romania attaches great importance to the total prohibition and final elimination of chemical weapons, and thus to the preparation by the Conference of a draft convention. The results achieved to date by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the skilful guidance of Ambassador Cromartie to whom we wish to express the Romanian delegation's gratitude, represent remarkable steps towards the elaboration of the text of the convention. Several delegations that have already spoken have stressed the importance and urgency of developing a text of this convention as well as their willingness to exert the necessary efforts for resolving the problems or issues that remain

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(Ambassador Dolgu, Romania)

pending: notably verification of non-production of chemical weapons by civilian industry, challenge inspection, declaration and verification of stocks of chemical weapons and other problems. In all these areas, verification remains the key problem. The agreed measures should be such as to inspire confidence that the provisions of the convention will be respected by all States parties. It is on that aspect in particular that we shall have to focus our attention during the process of searching for generally acceptable solutions. As regards the verification provisions, especially on-site inspection, we suggest using the formulas contained in the document of the Stockholm Conference. In our view, the monitoring system agreed upon should not in any way affect the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, or the enhancement of the technical and scientific potential of each country.

Like other delegations, we hope that under the skilful chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will this year be able to carry to its conclusion the task entrusted to it.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

... The prohibition of chemical weapons figures high among the priorities of our agenda. It is a subject where the Conference could produce a tangible result this year, restoring its worn prestige.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

Last year's work in the Ad Hoc Committee, and complemented by the two rounds of intersessional work, yielded a reliable basis which offers a real possibility for a breakthrough. In saying that, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the able guidance he rendered to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Major issues related to verification in the field of CW stocks and their destruction, CW production facilities and the non-production of chemical weapons are generally agreed upon, and the main lines of methods of verification have been drawn up.

On-challenge inspection has been generally accepted as part of the international verification system. Realistic guidelines have been spelled out for conducting such an inspection. Many delegations, including those most concerned, accepted the British proposal as a basis for work.

In our view all the necessary prerequisites are at hand now to accomplish the work on the convention this year. What is needed is a firm determination, and a good deal of efficient diplomatic professional work. It is encouraging to know that Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden has already made the first steps to gear the work of the Ad Hoc Committee to a higher level of efficiency.

Mr. NAZARKINE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): ...

Referring to the Soviet disarmament initiatives, the Soviet leader noted that none of our proposals attempts to leave out any of our weapons from the negotiations. Our principle is simple: all weapons must be limited and

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(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

reduced, and those of wholesale annihilation eventually scrapped. He stressed, in particular, that the Soviet Union had expressed its readiness to have chemical weapons totally abolished.

Comrade President, negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban have a long history, but only recently did the prospect of a successful conclusion already in the very near future become evident. This is an important result of constructive initiatives and efforts made by many countries including Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Sweden, Pakistan, Indonesia, Great Britain, Australia and other countries, and by the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee and its Working Groups. A breakthrough in the negotiations became apparent last year, when the Soviet Union, building upon the fundamental provisions of the statement of 15 January 1986, put forward several series of proposals which contributed to accelerating the negotiations and reaching agreement on quite a number of sections of the future convention.

I believe there is every reason to regard the current session of negotiations as a decisive one. What we have now is not just the framework for a future convention but also solutions to most of the fundamental issues and, moreover, agreed texts of many provisions of a future convention.

At the same time, a number of questions are yet to be resolved. Among them I would mention declaration and verification of chemical-weapon stocks and challenge inspections. Further work is required on provisions relating to non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, the definition of a chemical-weapons production facility and elimination measures, the scope of the prohibition and various others. The "procedural" articles of the convention too, are not to be forgotten -- the procedure for the signing of the convention and its entry into force, its depositary, etc. We are therefore required to act most promptly and comprehensively so as to reach agreement on all outstanding issues and finalize the text of the convention and open it for signature.

We agree with Ambassador Butler, the head of the Australian delegation, who said on 3 February 1987, referring to the objectives currently facing the participants of the negotiations, that "we must increase the tempo of our negotiations during 1987 so that the opportunity which clearly exists of concluding a convention this year may be realized".

The only way to succeed is to seek mutually acceptable solutions and to negotiate, taking into account each other's legitimate concerns.

The Soviet delegation commends the energetic efforts of Ambassador Ekéus, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, aimed at a successful conclusion of the negotiations.

In the inter-sessional period of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union explored in depth all aspects of the state of affairs of the negotiations; its own position on the outstanding questions and the way other countries approach them. In doing so we looked above all for possible solutions to these questions and instructed our experts to act accordingly.

(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

In today's statement the USSR delegation wishes to present its proposals and ideas on the solution to a number of questions concerning the future convention with a view to facilitating more intensive negotiations and further progress therein.

I have already referred to chemical-weapon stocks. They are the subject matter of Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the draft convention which is now under discussion and negotiation. Agreement has already been reached on a number of important provisions of that article, including those relating to declarations of volumes of stocks, their methods of destruction, and verification of operations of chemical-weapon destruction facilities. So far, however, it has not been possible to come to an agreement on the provisions in the convention relating to declarations of locations of chemical-weapon stocks and to international verification of such locations. Agreement has been hampered by a number of perfectly legitimate national security concerns expressed, for example, by the delegation of France and my delegation. We, for our part, have once again weighed up all the factors, viewed them in the context of the need for speedy progress at the negotiations and the concerns expressed by a number of countries, including the United States, which attach particular importance to finding a solution to this very question as rapidly as possible.

As a result, we have come to the conclusion that with a view to finding a speedy solution to this question it would be advisable to agree to the proposal to provide, immediately after the convention enters into force, access to chemical weapons for the purposes of systematic international on-site verification of declarations of chemical-weapon stocks.

In our view each State party to the convention should, not later than 30 days after its entry into force, make a declaration containing detailed information on the locations of chemical-weapon stocks (storage facilities) at the time of the convention's entry into force, both in its national territory and elsewhere under its jurisdiction or control. Such a declaration, inter alia, would specify the precise location of each storage facility, the quantity and composition of the chemical weapons in each location, methods of storage indicating the name of each chemical, munition types and calibres, etc. A State party should, within 30 days after the convention enters into force, take measures to ensure a closure of chemical-weapon storage facilities and prevent movement of stocks other than movement for their elimination.

For the purposes of effective verification of closed chemical-weapon storage facilities, it is necessary to provide for systematic international verification with permanent use of instruments, including verification of the correctness of declarations, closure of storage facilities, installation by inspectors of devices for this purpose and periodic checks on such devices, presence of inspectors at the time when chemical weapons are moved out of the facility for elimination, sealing of the means of transport, etc. Upon complete removal of all chemical weapons from the facility, an international inspection team would draw up a statement certifying this fact.

We expect that the proposals we have presented will enable us to agree promptly and without delay on the provisions relating to declarations of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

A number of other issues relating to Article 4, "chemical weapons", of the convention, are to be considered in the near future. We express our willingness to reach agreement on all outstanding issues in that article, including those related to the time-frame, order and methods of elimination. Bearing in mind that the proposal that a State party should have the right to divert chemical weapons has caused difficulties, we have carefully weighed up all the pros and cons of the proposal: we now proceed on the assumption that all chemical weapons are to be destroyed.

The Soviet delegation hopes that our flexible approach will make it possible to find solutions to the above-mentioned issue and will help accelerate the negotiations. We also call upon other delegations to join in these efforts and to present concrete proposals for mutually acceptable solutions.

In his statement yesterday, General Secretary Gorbachev, referring to problems of verification, said *inter alia*: "Now that we are coming to consider major measures for actual disarmament affecting the most sensitive area of national security, the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most stringent system of supervision and verification, including international verification. There must be complete certainty that the commitments are honoured by all."

That is precisely why the Soviet Union gives priority to negotiating an agreement on effective international verification of compliance by all States parties with their obligations under the convention. Such verification should not only effectively ensure confidence in the destruction of chemical weapons and facilities for their production but also effectively preclude any rebirth of chemical weapons anywhere and in any country.

The negotiations on verification machinery are based on a general understanding that the basis will be a system of "routine" international inspections. On the other hand, it has also been recognized that such international inspection should be complemented by on-site challenge inspections so that the whole verification mechanism of the Convention may be particularly reliable. Thus challenge inspections would serve above all the purpose of preventing breaches of the convention. Ultimately they would ensure the possibility of implementing international verification with regard to any activities relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. These principles should be taken fully into account in elaborating specific procedures for such challenge inspection.

We cannot close our eyes to the fact that the participants in the negotiations, despite agreement on a number of important aspects, still encounter great difficulty in finalizing agreements on challenge inspection. We believe that basically these difficulties have a perfectly objective and real basis: States may indeed have certain locations and facilities which are not relevant to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Access to such locations and facilities, due to their particularly sensitive nature, is normally prohibited or restricted. One cannot therefore exclude the possibility of a State having the right to refuse a challenge inspection in exceptional cases when its supreme interests are jeopardized. The existence of such areas and sensitive points have by the way been recognized in the

(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In this context we consider that the view expressed by Ambassador Dolgu, Head of the delegation of Romania, was quite justified, namely that it would be advisable to use the provisions of that document at the negotiations on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The participants in the negotiations have different views on solutions to the issue of challenge inspections at the present time. Some propose that the Executive Council be involved. Others, while in favour of providing access to a number of sensitive locations and facilities automatically, immediately upon request, make exemptions for private premises. Moreover the procedure for implementing challenge inspections envisaged under these proposals while securing the interest of the major Powers and members of military alliances, gives a small number of States certain rights of which practically all the other parties to the convention are deprived of. There is also a proposal to the effect that in the event of a challenge, the challenged State should have the right to propose alternative measures which should satisfy the challenging State.

In view of these various proposals and approaches, movement towards agreement apparently might be initiated by defining a number of cases where refusal of an inspection on the requested scale would not be allowed: for example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons, or inspection of locations and facilities declared under the convention. It appears this idea enjoys wide support at the negotiations, and understandably so, for we are dealing with the cases and facilities which are most directly relevant to a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and consequently there should be no reason for refusing an inspection.

As for other cases and other locations and facilities, in elaborating agreement on challenge inspections the idea of using alternative measures, up to viewing the facility from without and collecting chemical samples near the facility, might be helpful. Such a differentiation would, in our view, ensure progress towards agreement on this issue which, while unresolved, hampers agreement on other issues of the convention.

Of course, there remains the difficult problem of what should be done if the alternative measures still do not satisfy the challenging State.

We share the hope expressed by the head of the Swedish delegation, Ambassador Theorin, that the "general narrowing of positions on verification that has been demonstrated lately should help to facilitate agreement on this issue" -- i.e. international challenge inspection. The Soviet delegation declares itself ready to seek actively for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of any positive ideas and suggestions which are on the negotiating table.

We have been asked by a number of delegations to explain what is meant by permanent international verification which the Soviet Union proposes applying to chemical-weapon destruction facilities, specialized facilities for the production of category I chemicals for permitted purposes and to a certain number of facilities producing key precursors. I would like to explain our

(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

understanding of permanent verification. In our view, such verification can be implemented either through the permanent presence of international inspectors at facilities or through visits to facilities by international inspectors in combination with permanent use of control and measuring instruments at facilities, including remote monitoring. As for the order and modalities for the use of such instruments, helpful solutions in our view might be prompted by the experience in the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Identification of "important" (in terms of verification) points at the facilities, sealing of certain units, installation of photo and video equipment, measuring devices in agreed sections of the technological process, maintenance of international verification instruments by international inspectors, etc.

As for systematic international inspection, we propose that their frequency and timing be determined by the Consultative Committee on the basis of the risk posed to the convention by a given chemical or facility. In working out the details of systematic international inspections, we could also draw on the experience and practices of the IAEA, in particular with regard to providing the different types of systematic inspections, (routine and special), the frequency and time-frame of inspections, and the right of the IAEA to determine the facilities to be inspected at a given time. We believe that the experience and practices of the IAEA might also prompt us to the right solutions on other questions of verifying compliance with the chemical weapons convention. They might be drawn upon in working out an agreement on the activities of the inspectorate too, that is the appointment of inspectors, their privileges, inspection procedures, etc.

On the basis of the provisions included in the convention, it would be advisable to elaborate subsequently, along the lines of the IAEA, a model agreement between a State Party and an appropriate body of the Convention which would govern the practical aspects of implementing international verification at facilities (the verification procedure, specific measures for the closure of facilities, etc.)

When the convention is in effect, specific measures of verification with regard to chemical-weapon production facilities and chemical-weapon destruction facilities would be agreed upon by a State Party and the Consultative Committee and included in the relevant plans for the elimination of stocks and facilities.

The emerging prospect of the conclusion of a convention puts on the negotiating agenda the question of interaction of States under the new conditions where chemical weapons have been banned. The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of implementing wide international co-operation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis in the developments of peaceful chemical industry as an alternative to the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. One cannot but agree with the view that without provisions to this effect a future convention would be weakened. A convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons can, in our opinion, become an example of practical implementation of the agreed principles of "disarmament for development".

(Mr. Nazarkine, USSR)

The negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have gained momentum and it is our hope that the proposals we have presented today will contribute towards speedy agreement on the convention. However, we cannot remain impassive in the face of certain statements which are in fact aimed at creating difficulties in the negotiations.

The British magazine, Jane's Defence Weekly, recently published an article on chemical-weapon issues by K. Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- incidentally, this article has been reprinted in our newspaper, Pravda. In that article, Mr. Adelman writes: "To have a chance of achieving that (a chemical-weapons ban), we need to ensure that our negotiators' hands are not empty. Congress, therefore, should fund the Administration's request for binary chemical weapons production". In our view this logic is strange, to say the least. It reminds me of a satirical story by the well-known Czech writer, Janislav Hašek, about the Conference on Disarmament at the time of the League of Nations. That Conference literally blew up as a result of careless handling of a new explosive, "Washingtonite", by a representative of the military business who stood waiting at the entrance to the conference room with samples of his product to offer the participants of the Conference.

It is simply regrettable that the negotiating portfolio of the United States delegation is still being replenished not with compromise proposals but with new types of chemical weapons, which can only poison the atmosphere at the negotiations.

The Soviet delegation has today expressed certain views on ways of reaching agreement at the next stage of negotiations. We intend to continue to work actively for the elaboration of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons this year. The positive effects of the conclusion of such convention would be of great significance, and not only in the military field. Its conclusion would demonstrate that it is practically possible to find solutions to the complex problems of disarmament through the joint efforts of States, and would contribute to creating a more positive political climate. This is the aim of the new Soviet proposals, and we expect similar steps on the outstanding issues from other participants in the negotiations.

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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

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Another forthcoming event which impinges on the work of our Conference is the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988 and its preparatory process beginning this year. The approach of the third special session devoted to disarmament must necessarily lend a sense of urgency to our work. We have within our grasp the completion of a convention on chemical weapons and the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament before the third special session. In addition we can and must show progress in the nuclear issues and especially on item 1 of our agenda, Nuclear-Test Ban.

(Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)

Mr. President, let me now turn shortly to other subjects on our agenda. In our view the negotiations on a world-wide ban of chemical weapons command high priority. In document CD/734 we have the outlines of a treaty which, in important parts, is already well developed. The Conference on Disarmament has before it the task of solving the questions still open, especially in the field of verification, as rapidly as possible.

Concerning the verification of non-production, it is in our view important that the selection of substances which are to be forbidden or controlled should satisfy the criteria of possible use, or better misuse, for military purposes. It would not be a sensible contribution to the solution of that problem if we included in that selection substances which are militarily irrelevant.

As to challenge inspection, we still see in CD/715 the model which could finally satisfy all interests. We appeal to our partners in this negotiation to co-operate in the search of a solution because it is this co-operation which is the true expression of credibility of negotiating partners. Readiness to adopt CD/715, as expressed in principle by formerly hesitant delegations, is welcome as long as the conceptual approach of this proposal is not diluted. We will, in this context, screen carefully what the Soviet delegation has said this morning, which lends itself to the interpretation that the Soviet delegation now accepts the principle of mandatory or obligatory challenge inspections; but as I say, we will have to look at the text very closely and see what the other conditions which go along with it will mean. A procedural arrangement for example prior to an on-challenge-inspection that would put into question the inspection itself, or in any case delay it, is not acceptable to us. We are convinced that an effective verification of a chemical-weapon ban is attainable if the controls on non-production and challenge inspections are adequately formed. What has to be secured is that the Convention can reliably prevent that militarily significant amounts of chemical weapons or their precursors from being produced or stocked secretly. The methods and volume of the controls must be realistic, credible and effective. These are the essentials and we think that within the near future we could make decisive progress in this field. We are ready to co-operate.

My delegation welcomes the long-established Finnish initiative to provide advice for the necessary monitoring equipment and technical means for verification purposes. I understand that the recent special workshop on automatic monitoring in terms of detection of alleged used, verification of destruction and non-production in Helsinki is another step towards the common goal of effective verification. My Government looks forward to the communication of the results of this workshop.

We noted with interest the reference which the Romanian delegation made in our CW negotiations to the Document of the Stockholm Conference which was taken up today. Indeed, the most important aspect of the Stockholm Conference is the agreement on on-site inspections without refusal. Thereby, obligatory on-site inspection has been recognized as an essential element of effective verification for any arms control and disarmament agreement. We think this is an essential breakthrough to which we attach great importance in light of the whole arms control process. But then, Stockholm is not part of the true arms

(Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL, Federal Republic of Germany)

control process. It is a measure of confidence-building measures, and not what we are doing here in the realm of chemical weapons, disarmament measures. As my delegation pointed out in our Plenary Statement of 5 February of this year already challenge inspections should cover all possible installations and all locations -- they all must be "challenge inspection objects", and there we differ from what we have heard this morning.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

We are watching with keen interest and with particular satisfaction the growing efforts aimed at curbing the arms race regionally. One such instance is the ratification of the treaty on the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Inspired by the same principal objective, the German Democratic Republic has proposed regional arms limitation measures in Europe, notably a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe. As for the reduction of forces and armaments in Europe, it is our hope that the current talks between the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO may very soon lead to successful negotiations by the parties concerned.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

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 Considerable headway has been made in drawing up a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, not least thanks to the laudable efforts of the Committee's former chairmen, Ambassadors Turbanski and Cromartie. The goal of finalizing the convention this year -- something that presents itself as the logical consequence of this development -- is very exacting but realistic. We fully concur with Ambassador Ekéus, Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons, that there is a positive chance right now for eliminating chemical weapons from the globe once and for all. It must not be passed up. A new round in the chemical arms race would all of a sudden move to a distant future the attainment of results which we are so close to now. In fact, this is what bad experience has taught us.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Given strong commitment to accommodation and dedicated work, we could well rise to the occasion. The far-reaching proposals which the Soviet delegation has just tabled are of special significance in this context and we welcome them as yet another exemplary contribution to our work. Solving the remaining issues of substance would speed up the negotiating process. This is particularly true of challenge inspection, the locations of stocks and their verification, and matters relating to the non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. Results are possible on the basis of existing proposals.

Once this and other blanks in the text of the convention are filled, it will be a lot easier to work out details. We are convinced of the possibility of an understanding on what is needed now and what could be completed at a later stage.

We support the Chairman's desire to streamline operations of the committee so that it is able to perform its current duties. Apart from the efforts undertaken at the Conference proper, everything should be done to maintain and improve the atmosphere needed for constructive work. The USSR has suggested an agreement under which chemical weapons would be neither produced nor deployed. Such a step would give a fresh impetus to the present negotiations.

My delegation is gratified to note the interests evoked by the seminar on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be organized by the German Democratic Republic's National Pugwash Group next month. The event will focus on the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic is doing its utmost to make that seminar a success.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

We are inspired by the general aim to complete this year the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The course of the negotiations warrants our judgement that this optimism is not built on sand. The inter-sessional consultations last year and the session of the Ad Hoc Committee in January this year have been very productive from the point of view of dealing with several complicated technical questions. Taking this into consideration, and taking into account the recommendation of the consensus resolution 41/58 D of the United Nations General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee could work without interruption to achieve the conclusion of the convention.

And now, in order to turn the possible into the real, and hopes into practical deeds, what is needed, as was very accurately and rightly stated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, in his message to the Conference, are political compromises. An example of this kind of political compromise, of a constructive search for mutually acceptable solutions, is the new and important proposals by the Soviet Union, described by Ambassador Nazarkine in his statement today, to deal with various important questions of the future convention concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons. These proposals, in our opinion, will no doubt encourage further progress at the negotiations to find a way to deal with the outstanding issues. They go a long way to taking account of the positions and the interests of the various partners and reflect the responsible approach of the Soviet Union in expressing new political thinking with regard to the cause of peace and disarmament. We hope that other participants in the negotiations will show the same readiness for compromise, so that, as far as possible, in the very near future the drafting of the convention will be completed.

In our opinion, the Ad Hoc Committee can achieve success in the outstanding issues of principle such as non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industry, procedures for the destruction of the CW production base and the question of challenge inspection, if it avoids wasting valuable time in discussing technical details of a secondary nature. After the questions of principle have been resolved, such technical details could be relatively easily settled.

... (Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

Egypt was one of the first States to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Egypt was at the forefront of the States that signed the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction, although the circumstances prevailing in our region prevented us from speeding up its ratification. From this background and in the framework of the continuity of Egyptian policy, we fully support the current efforts to conclude a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Egypt will not hesitate to exert every effort to achieve this objective. We look forward to a treaty that fully and effectively bans the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction; a treaty that does not, however, impede the peaceful chemical activities. We aspire to a treaty which includes effective verification provisions without such procedures that would exceed the actual requirements of the treaty, or be

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(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

used as an indirect means to threaten the national security of the States parties. We believe that acceding to the treaty will depend to a large extent on the provisions it contains providing for international co-operation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries. In this context we welcome the decision by the Ad Hoc Committee to consider this aspect of the treaty during its current session. Lastly, I would like to mention the fact that concluding a treaty which is acceptable to all parties and to which all would accede is one of the prerequisites for its acquiring universality.

Allow me on this occasion to express my thanks to Ambassador Cromartie, the representative of the United Kingdom, for his efforts during his chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the previous session. May I also congratulate Ambassador Ekéus, the representative of Sweden, on his assumption of the Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in the present session. We all know the role played, and being played, by the delegation of Sweden, particularly by Ambassador Ekéus personally, in the ongoing negotiations to conclude a treaty banning chemical weapons. We wish him all success in his task. We hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will conclude the draft treaty in time to present it to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-second session in accordance with its resolution 41/58 B.

(Mr. Raimond, France)

Today, Europe sees its security assured in a very real way by nuclear deterrence. It cannot, therefore, consider any evolution in the opposite direction, which would make conventional and chemical war once again possible and no doubt probable one day, taking into account the asymmetry in the forces involved, as well as geography. There is, then, no purely conventional deterrence which could ensure the security of our continent.

None the less we consider that, as the Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac, recalled, as long as we are confronted with the overarmament of the two super-Powers at the same time as the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, our security will lie in nuclear deterrence. My country will therefore never accept that its nuclear forces should be included, directly or indirectly, in negotiations in which it does not intend to participate as long as the conditions it has set have not been met. France, through the voice of the President of the Republic, made known in September 1983 and June 1984 the conditions which would enable it to make its contribution to an effective and verifiable process of nuclear disarmament:

First, that the gap between the nuclear arsenals of the two Great Powers, on the one hand, and that of France, on the other, shall have changed in nature. Second, that the great imbalances existing in conventional arms shall have been corrected and the elimination of the chemical threat become a

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(Mr. Raimond, France)

reality. And third, that no new defensive system leading to a destabilization of the present foundations of deterrence and therefore of peace, shall have been brought into use.

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The reason why I have talked at length about the "post-Reykjavik" prospects and nuclear disarmament negotiations is that I know how much attention is being given to these issues by delegations at the Conference. But the Conference equally has its own concerns and tasks, I mean nuclear testing, chemical weapons and space.

...
(Mr. Raimond, France)

The work of this Conference with a view to elaborating an international convention on the prohibition of the manufacture of chemical weapons and the elimination of stocks is certainly one of the most delicate tasks to which it has addressed itself.

The effort made has enabled us to find some significant points of convergence on the shape and a number of important elements of the future convention. It remains true that as the work progresses the real difficulties come to light. This stems from the natural course of negotiations in such a complex field, but it also means that a number of choices have to be made.

First, do we want a convention which, like the one on biological weapons, simply postulates that chemical weapons should be banned, without really doing anything about the effectiveness of such a prohibition and its verification?

Or do we consider that these are weapons whose military effectiveness unfortunately has less and less to be demonstrated and which therefore are likely to become commonplace? Results achieved step by step, and limited not geographically (because the ease with which such arms can be transported would make such an approach utterly meaningless) but in terms of stockpiles, would surely already be a considerable achievement.

Secondly, do we want verification measures to be aimed at putting permanent pressure on any possible cheating, or are we prepared to settle for imperfect verification because nobody will ever know whether clandestine stocks have been reconstituted or hidden?

Third, what links should be established between the future convention and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the use of chemical weapons?

Fourth, should we concentrate our efforts mainly on conventional chemical weapons, those which could be described as "bottom of the range" and accessible to most countries with industrial facilities? Or on the contrary, do we mean to give priority to the most modern chemical warfare agents or even prevent the appearances of future technologies in these areas? Is such an ambition even realistic?

These discussions underly the work of your Conference. They explain their complexity and therefore their inevitable slowness.

(continued)

(Mr. Raimond, France)

My country wishes to achieve results, even if they prove to be limited, in an initial stage, for example, to the progressive destruction of stocks and production facilities during a period to be determined.

This same stage-by-stage approach could be used with respect to the solution to be found for the problem of the lists of supertoxic agents. We know that it is difficult at this stage to identify the possibilities of military use of some of them which are already being used in civilian industry, for example in pharmaceutical products. It should be possible to ask the Consultative Committee envisaged by the convention to determine the régime during a later stage of the negotiations, or during the implementation of the convention. The French delegation will put forward proposals along these lines. Generally speaking, quite obviously, it will spare no effort to ensure that concrete results are achieved, including during this session.

Nevertheless, it is in the light of these uncertainties in the negotiations that France does not rule out the possibility of acquiring a limited and purely deterrent capability in this area. In accordance with the commitments assumed by France when signing the Geneva Protocol of 1925, this would only be used for retaliation and not for a first attack. In any case, the current negotiations, to which we continue to attach very high priority, could not constitute a moratorium for France, nor for that matter for any other country.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

... Our delegation welcomes the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has promptly been re-established under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. This early commencement, as well as a new, purpose-oriented approach, gives us a guarantee that the Conference will try to use its potential fully and that everything will be done so that the CW convention is finalized already this year. Nothing can prevent us from solving the remaining political and technical aspects of the prohibition of chemical weapons providing there is the political will to do so. Just two days ago the Conference witnessed another good example of the required constructive approach when the Head of the USSR delegation, Ambassador Nazarkine, spoke on the problem of location of chemical weapons stocks, on the question of destruction versus diversion, and some aspects of verification on challenge. We consider that all the proposals advanced reveal genuine interest in speeding up our work on the CW convention and should be approached seriously. Any hasty conclusions, especially if they are rather beside the point, are somewhat out of place. We would like to hope that the suggestions made by Ambassador Nazarkine will be discussed thoroughly on an appropriate working level.

We follow attentively the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the problem of non-production of chemical weapons and on challenge verification. During the brief sessions in autumn of last year and in January we noticed that divergencies in the positions of various countries were being gradually

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

reduced. It is a delicate process which should be further pursued in a calm, businesslike manner. We are confident that by the end of this year's session the remaining differences will have been narrowed down sufficiently in order to permit us to formulate what, for the purposes of the convention, could be considered as essentially common positions also on articles VI and IX.

The CW convention is, unfortunately, not yet definitely agreed upon. But it is clear that its basic outline has already evolved and one may already have quite an accurate idea of the basic provisions of its individual articles. Verification will be extensive, covering a large number of activities right from the entry into force of the convention, through the destruction of CW stocks and facilities for their production, as well as with a view to permanent assurance that the convention is fully complied with in the future. Such a wide verification system is a sort of acknowledgement that the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons is an ambitious and difficult task. We consider that it would be fully in compliance with this ambition to try to cover the whole road which substances have to travel before they become chemical weapons. Everyone would apparently agree that the first step to create a toxic substance is a synthesis. The only places where this may happen are laboratories. Let us recall that such first category substances as tabun, sarin or soman were also the results of laboratory research. We therefore support the idea that this first step in the creation of chemical weapons should be recognized and dealt with by the convention. It would be futile to try to control regularly all existing laboratories, but it would be a grave mistake to ignore that new supertoxic lethal chemicals of category I may permanently be synthesized in the laboratories, whether deliberately or by coincidence. The number of relevant laboratories is relatively limited in each country and their declaration, with a possibility of inspection on challenge, should not represent an extraordinarily heavy burden. Smooth application of such procedures could create the necessary confidence and would represent a kind of introduction to the effective verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... The non-aligned countries, since their first Summit Conference in Belgrade a quarter of a century ago, have always considered disarmament a politically comprehensive and priority issue of peace and security. Such an approach dominated their meetings held in the course of last year, in particular the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1986. The more than 100 Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries assembled there have -- in their Political Declaration -- spelt out their views about the issues on the agenda of our Conference.

They urged all States to abstain from any action that could impede an early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

... We expect that the work of the Conference -- which last year proceeded in a very business-like atmosphere on constructive and concrete approaches to individual agenda items, and on substantive and accelerated negotiations as regards the chemical-weapons ban -- will in 1987 become more intensive and meaningful. Yugoslavia, for its part, and in accordance with its views and positions of principle, will make every effort to have the Conference attain these goals.

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

The work on the elaboration of the chemical weapons convention in the course of the 1986 session of the Conference provides, in many respects, an example of how we should proceed on other agenda items. The outgoing Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups deserve the credit for the results presented in the report adopted by the Conference. But despite these significant steps, progress is still very slow on a number of major issues and some key problems remain outstanding. We expect, therefore, that the incoming Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden -- whose ability and competence are well known -- together with all the delegations will make a constructive effort to speed up the negotiations. In my view, the conditions for this do exist, even concerning the most sensitive issues, such as verification. We consider that the proposals presented so far offer a solid basis for negotiated solutions.

We must be aware that expectations are especially high in this field: all the more so, as six decades have elapsed since the chemical-weapons ban was introduced for the sake of humanity and human dignity, and we can no longer make excuses for further delays.

Greater involvement on the part of all of us is an imperative today.

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

...
The Conference should devise ways to assure continuity in dealing with all issues on its agenda in a substantive manner. A phased approach to a chemical-weapons ban discussed during the course of the 1986 session is an obvious example of the evolution of our activities. Practical approaches to substantial issues should thus, in our view, be given priority over procedural discussions on the mandates of the subsidiary bodies of the Conference, i.e. the ad hoc committees. The negotiating mandates of these bodies stem from the mandate of the Conference itself and cannot be questioned. Briefly, the methods of work should be improved in order to enable successful deliberations at the Conference as a whole. In doing so, the Conference should always keep in mind its principal objective: the reaching of a disarmament agreement. The debate on the negotiating mandates should, as appropriate, be replaced by efforts to intensify the work of the Conference by elaborating concrete programmes of work for the conclusion of agreements or for their drafting. That would help bridge the differences and ensure the convergence of views, enhancing the role of our Conference in international dialogue.

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

...
On 5 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Kenneth Adelman, addressed the Conference, conveying a message from President Reagan. In addition to reaffirming our commitment to negotiations on a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, the President stated that the United States is committed to working with the members of this Conference in achieving responsible solutions to the problems of reducing the world's arms. Mr. Adelman discussed the importance of real openness to the success of these efforts.

Three basic themes are contained in the President's message and in the remarks of Mr. Adelman: first, the significance of furthering the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban; second, finding responsible solutions to the problems of reducing the world's arms; and third, the importance of real openness in achieving progress.

Today, I would like to note that the work of the Chemical Weapons Committee is off to a good start under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. It is important as well to express appreciation to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for his efforts in guiding the work of the Committee during the 1986 session. Ambassador Cromartie also gave impetus to an extended period of inter-sessional work last fall as well as during the January meetings of the Committee. His endeavours and achievements were substantial; we commend him and his delegation.

My delegation has taken note of the important statement made at the 17 February plenary meeting by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkine. We judge it to be an important contribution to the work of the Conference, and will return to issues related to the banning of chemical weapons in a future intervention.

(Mr. Afande, Kenya)

... Delegations in the Conference on Disarmament have informally and formally expressed positive projections that the Conference will be able to finalize a draft chemical weapons convention in its 1987 session and be in a position to present it to the forty-second session of this year's United Nations General Assembly. This optimism can only be manifested if all delegations work towards resolving the outstanding issues hampering the drafting of a chemical weapons convention.

The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will indeed hasten the consultations in this very important area. The keen interest of my delegation in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons stems from the conviction that chemical weapons, some of which do not require a sophisticated technological base to produce, and can, indeed, be produced by any country, should for ever be banned from the arsenals of States possessing these horrifying weapons.

My delegation would like to sincerely thank Ambassador Cromartie, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, for steering the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as its Chairman for the 1986 session in a most commendable and satisfying manner. We also take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Ekéus, the distinguished representative of Sweden, on his being appointed as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the duration of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. We have great confidence in his experience and we trust that under his direction the Ad Hoc Committee will be in a position to continue and initiate new approaches to resolve all outstanding problems hampering the conclusion of a draft chemical weapons convention by the end of the 1987 session of the Conference.

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(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

... To further improve the psychological and political environment for nuclear disarmament negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States should be prepared to give a legally binding undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which do not possess such weapons. We make this proposal because we realize that some nuclear-weapon States will probably reject out of hand our previous suggestion that all States should renounce the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The Nigerian delegation still cannot understand, having regard to the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war, nuclear winter and all that, that our proposal was rejected by some Powers, which, none the less, implore the Conference to give priority to negotiating a ban on chemical weapons. And yet nuclear weapons are a greater threat to human survival than are chemical weapons; and there is no choice to be made between death by physical annihilation and death by asphyxiation.

...
(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

Having said that, the Nigerian delegation would like to say how pleased we are to note the amount of progress that has been made in the last year on the convention to ban chemical weapons. We would like to congratulate Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the significant work done in this respect under his chairmanship. We are glad that Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, our dedicated colleague, has been elected to, hopefully, conclude the good work that has been done in this field so far.

The prospect of a chemical weapons convention in the near future is, for my delegation, a source of confidence in the future of our disarmament negotiations. If it materializes, the convention would, in itself, be historic: it would be the first major disarmament agreement. Above all, it would demonstrate, once again, on a multilaterally significant issue, that the major Powers can co-operate intensively in diverse areas, if their national interests, or their perceptions of international problems, converge. It would further confirm our belief that given the political will, the Conference on Disarmament could make rapid progress in other areas.

My delegation would like to reiterate the views we have expressed in the past that the final text of the chemical weapons convention should ensure that the destruction of all stockpiles and facilities would be done in such a manner that the present chemical-weapon Powers would not in any way be in a position to exploit their position during the transition period. Furthermore, it would have to guarantee in no uncertain terms, to the non-chemical-weapon Powers, the right to unfettered development of their budding chemical industries for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Teja, India)

My delegation is pleased to note the high priority attached to item 4 -- Chemical Weapons -- by the members of the Conference, especially the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Encouraging trends were noticed during 1986 and a fair amount of progress was achieved in refining the language of the draft convention. For this, I would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, and also the Chairmen of three Working Groups. We share the optimism expressed by some delegates about the possible conclusion of the Convention by the end of 1987 and are prepared to co-operate fully with the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, the distinguished representative of Sweden, to achieve this goal.

It is already possible to visualize the final form of the CW Convention and it would be no exaggeration to state that it will be the most complex disarmament instrument that we have negotiated to date. Presently, the negotiations are at a delicate stage. It is therefore necessary that we organize our work in a manner that would enable us to deal most effectively with the pending issues. I would suggest that we occupy ourselves with the issues of principles while leaving the experts to iron out the technical and procedural questions. In this connection our delegation has attempted in the following paragraphs to indicate some of the priorities.

The definition of a chemical weapon is a fundamental issue and a complicated one. The present definition based on toxicity has helped the Ad Hoc Committee in its deliberations but it is now widely felt, especially taking into account the consideration of non-prohibited activities, that this definition needs to be refined by incorporating other elements based on characteristics of chemical weapons and, therefore, the danger that they might pose to the Convention. Another area which is related to this issue is the classification of chemical products into different categories and the rationale for doing so. In this exercise, our delegation feels, we must not lose sight of the fact that the Convention is aimed at banning chemical weapons and not inhibiting the growth of chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Accordingly, the importance of Article XI of the Convention cannot be overlooked. It is our strong conviction that provisions for implementing international co-operation for economic and technological development of peaceful chemical industry will only serve to strengthen the Convention and its fundamental objectives.

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(Mr. Teja, India)

The issues relating to organizational aspects and the structure of the authority which will be responsible for the implementation of this Convention also deserve urgent and thorough consideration. Given the unique nature of this instrument, it is necessary to design new solutions to meet the requirements of the Convention.

Finally, while still on chemical weapons, another significant aspect is that of the challenge inspection régime. It is heartening to note that there is now a convergence on the basic concepts underlying this measure and we hope that it will soon be possible to convert it into an agreement on the details of this exercise. An early resolution of this issue will go a long way in strengthening our determination to conclude the Convention by the end of 1987.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

...
 Before I finish I would like to make a short remark on another item of special interest to my delegation, chemical weapons. It has been so far the most advanced piece of work done by the Conference. We are very glad to see the evident progress already achieved during this session.

The recent proposals of the Soviet Union are of great significance to our work. They open new avenues for making headway, clearly demonstrating the constructiveness of the Soviet approach and decisiveness to bring our work to a prompt and successful end. However, a similar approach is urgently needed on the part of others too, and we would like to see it coming.

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(The President)

...
 The Conference had also to consider organizational arrangements for the substantive items on the agenda. We were able to re-establish at the 2nd plenary meeting during the first week after the opening of the session the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, appoint an able Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, for that subsidiary body and continue the negotiating process on that agenda item. During the second week we have also been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and on item 7 "Radiological Weapons". Today, after intensive consultations during the past week, we have also been able to reach agreement on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, under agenda item 5. Consultations are proceeding for the appointment of their Chairmen. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has also resumed its work under the Chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, who has been leading that Committee with his well-known diplomatic competence. The Conference is also engaged in intensive consultations with a view to starting, as soon as possible, substantive work on other items on the agenda. Those consultations show an approximation of positions on organizational arrangements for some of those items. It will be up to my successor to continue those consultations and hopefully to succeed in consolidating agreement on those organizational questions.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

... The negotiation of a global ban on the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, which seems to us one of the most important and urgent disarmament goals, has achieved encouraging progress during the 1986 session. Steps forward have been made regarding a more efficient compilation of Articles III, IV and V; a great amount of work was also accomplished by Working Group A with regard to Article VI, in connection with the criteria and the listing of the various categories of chemicals. As for Article IX, we wish to express our appreciation and thanks to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom and to Mr. Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia: the four points on which Ambassador Cromartie detected a convergence of views constitute, in the opinion of the Italian delegation, a sound basis for a solution of the key issue of on-challenge verification.

Indeed, while not minimizing the importance of other outstanding items, I believe that, after all, the success of our work depends largely on our capability to reach an agreement on a convention banning chemical weapons and that consequently we should aim at conclusive results during this year. The main difficulties lying ahead in this context are still connected with the problem of verification which, indeed, is not simply a technical one. It is a problem having an obvious political dimension; admittedly, verification can also have a confidence-building effect.

By envisaging a verification system for a convention banning all chemical weapons and prescribing their removal from the military arsenals we believe that the Italian delegation is aware that "intrusive" and stringent forms of verification may sometimes be seen by some as restraining national sovereign discretion to a certain extent, or as being prejudicial to the protection of national industrial and commercial secrets. However, we are convinced that such concerns should be overcome through a careful assessment and a better knowledge of the implications of different types of verification, in a spirit

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

of mutual co-operation and goodwill. Moreover, we believe that the elimination of such a hideous category of weapons and the confidence that an eventual ban is being loyally complied with, are priority goals for all countries and, especially, for those, such as Italy, which have long renounced the chemical military option.

It is vital to ensure that prohibited chemicals are neither manufactured in previous production facilities, nor in new ones; that States should not manufacture "single purpose" chemical warfare agents or their precursors and that "dual-purpose" agents or precursors should not be diverted to warfare purposes.

We are convinced that an effective verification system should include systematic inspections and "on-challenge" inspections of a stringent nature. On this question, there are two Western Working Papers on the table: CD/500 by the delegation of the United States and CD/715 by the delegation of the United Kingdom. My Government considers it essential that a verification of compliance should represent a basic obligation. On the other hand States signing the Convention have also the right to demonstrate their compliance with it, when they are faced with a challenge. In this respect the Italian delegation considers that the recent proposals made by the USSR delegation on 17 February last, while still requiring some expansion of their scope, represent an interesting contribution and may hold promise of constructive negotiations.

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Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): On 4 March the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons completed, as you know, the consideration of a cluster of issues relating to chemical weapon stockpiles. This offers an opportunity to take stock of the first results of this year's negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons.

On the whole we are satisfied with the intensive start made in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus. It is our hope that in future this momentum will be maintained in the negotiations.

In its statement in the plenary of the Conference on 17 February, the Soviet delegation, wishing from the outset to give a fresh impetus to the negotiations, outlined a number of proposals with a view to reaching a speedy agreement on the question assigned to the first cluster for discussion. These proposals contained comprehensive provisions for declarations to be made by each State party to a future convention specifying detailed information on locations of chemical weapon stocks (storage facilities) at the time the convention enters into force; for closure of storage facilities and prevention of movement of stocks; and for effective verification of the closed storage facilities on the basis of systematic international inspections along with permanent use of instruments. The positive significance of these proposals has just been noted by the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Until recently, the fact that the question of declarations of storage facilities remained unresolved gave rise to a pessimistic view of the prospects for a speedy conclusion of the convention. In presenting its proposals the Soviet Union proceeded from the interest of finding without delay a solution to this question. We are satisfied that these proposals of ours have made it possible to take a major step forward at the negotiations and we hope that progress on the question of declaration and international verification of chemical stockpile locations will have a positive effect on the work on other subjects and on the whole process of the subsequent negotiations.

Wishing to maintain the momentum in our work, the Soviet delegation is making a proposal for a resolution to the question of a time-frame for elimination of chemical weapons, in view of the situation which has emerged at the negotiations. As you know, the Soviet Union's earlier proposal, motivated by the desire to see the process of chemical weapon destruction initiated as quickly as possible, was that this destruction should begin not later than six months after the convention enters into force. That proposal met with objections, in particular from the United States, which stated that it was not ready to proceed to the elimination of chemical weapons shortly after the convention entered into force. In view of this fact, we are prepared not to insist on our proposal which, of course, remains valid, and we do not object to beginning the destruction of chemical weapons not later than after one year. We are also prepared, taking into account that the convention would provide for permanent international verification of chemical weapon destruction facilities and the full responsibility of States for the way those facilities operate, not to insist that such facilities should in all cases be State-owned. We expect that these additional proposals will make it possible to find appropriate solutions.

As the documents of the Ad Hoc Committee indicate, a number of provisions of article 4 ("chemical weapons") and Annex 4 have not been finalized yet. There are naturally various reasons for that -- objective difficulties and complicated technical issues which have yet to be resolved -- but we cannot ignore the obstacles which might very well not have been there had all delegations adopted a constructive approach.

This applies above all to the question of destruction of chemical weapons. On 17 February the Soviet Union proposed that all chemical weapons should be destroyed. In presenting that proposal we took into account the difficulties referred to by the United States delegation which had for a long time been opposed to the very concept of diversion of chemical weapons for permitted purposes. Wishing to meet the concerns of our partners in the negotiations we withdrew our requirement that a State should have the right to decide on the ways of eliminating chemical weapon stockpiles, although I should point out that our arguments that diversion might be economically justified remain valid. It appeared that since we accepted the United States position agreement was at hand. However, the United States delegation has again blocked agreement and, quite contrary to its previous position, has suddenly begun to insist on diversion of chemical weapon stocks. This fact is of course regrettable. The Soviet delegation reaffirms its willingness to

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

seek a solution to the question of the elimination of chemical weapons. That requires now, above all, that the United States delegation should present concrete proposals on the types and quantities of chemical weapons the United States would like to divert.

One of the most difficult of the outstanding questions is the problem of the order of elimination of chemical weapon stocks. Discussions on the question have shown above all the technical difficulties involved in working out a so-called equivalent unit for comparing various categories of chemicals. In view of this fact and of possible differences in the composition of chemical weapon stockpiles we would like to propose that the following order of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles be discussed. Firstly, the whole elimination period shall be divided into nine one-year periods. Secondly, within each one-year period a State party shall eliminate one-ninth of its chemical-weapon stockpiles in each of the existing categories. Thirdly, a State party may carry out the elimination of chemical weapons at a faster pace than under the agreed order of elimination.

We would be interested to hear the views of other delegations on these questions. The Soviet delegation is prepared, in the course of further negotiations, to seek mutually acceptable solutions on the question of the order of elimination of chemical weapons. It is our hope that by the end of the spring session of the Conference the full text of Article 4 and Annex 4 will be finalized.

The Soviet Union is in favour of achieving, as a matter of principle, the prompt and complete elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production. The Soviet side has made repeated statements to this effect on a number of occasions, including at the highest level. In this context we should like once again to draw your attention to the statement of General Secretary Gorbachev of 15 January 1986, in which it was stated inter alia that "We are prepared to ensure a timely declaration of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and the cessation of their production, and we are ready to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the Convention enters into force, to the elimination of the stockpiles of chemical weapons".

This statement makes it clear beyond any doubt that in pursuing chemical disarmament we do not seek unilateral disarmament of the other side. In case such a convention is concluded chemical weapons and the production base for their manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons, including both the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is now proceeding to the consideration of the cluster of questions relating to non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial (civil) industry. This, if anything, is the most difficult aspect of the convention. In November 1986 the Soviet Union made a series of proposals on the subject which, as is widely recognized, have considerably advanced the negotiations. Today we would like to present some new ideas on this question.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Important work lies ahead in order to finalize the lists for various categories of chemicals which would be subjected to different régimes of limitation and verification. We expect category I, along with super-toxic lethal chemicals possessing a set of properties characteristic of chemical warfare agents and key components of binary chemical weapons, to cover incapacities as well.

The viability of a future convention will be ensured only when it is able to keep pace with the times and the achievements of applied and fundamental chemistry and to prevent the development of chemical weapons. This purpose could be served among other things by basic guidelines for revision of the lists of chemicals which would be initially included in the convention. We propose that such a revision be carried out both on a periodical (annual) basis and at the request of any State party as new chemicals appear, as the production technology for such chemicals develops, and on the basis of the declarations by States of their chemical weapon stockpiles.

One of the possible loop-holes for breaching the convention might be through the commercial production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. Nobody denies the risk to the convention posed by the high level of toxicity of these chemicals, for toxicity is the determining property of a chemical warfare agent. Consequently there should be a general interest in removing this risk.

As you know, at one time the Soviet Union proposed applying most stringent prohibition measures to the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals. This position, however, met with objections from a number of parties to the negotiations, based on commercial consideration, who argued in favour of preserving the procedure and methods of production of these chemicals in the commercial industry existing in their countries. Back in 1985, at the initiative of Western delegations, provisions were developed for a division of super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories: super-toxic lethal chemicals used in chemical weapons and super-toxic lethal chemicals which cannot be used in chemical weapons. At the time this agreement which provided for international on-site verification of the production of these chemicals was welcomed by Western countries as a major success in the negotiations.

In preparing its proposals which were presented in November 1986 the Soviet Union took into account the position of Western countries and agreed to divide super-toxic lethal chemicals into two categories and spelled out specific ideas on a régime for permitted production of such chemicals. The way to work the finalization of the relevant provisions of the convention now seemed open. However, the issue of permitted production of super-toxic lethal chemicals began to slide: one would not wish to believe that in the place of progress towards agreement there might be backward movement on the question which appeared to be ripe for a final solution.

With a view to contributing to the success of the work on the question of non-production of chemical weapons in the commercial industry and in particular facilitating progress towards agreement on régimes for the

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

production of super-toxic lethal chemicals which do not possess a set of properties characteristic of chemical warfare agents, that is category 2 chemicals, we are presenting an additional proposal on the threshold for annual capacity above which facilities for the production of such chemicals are to be declared and subjected to systematic verification. The annual volume of production of each such chemical included into the list for this category would be set at 10 kilograms according to our proposal. The frequency and timing of systematic international inspection would be determined by the Consultative Committee taking into account the risk to the convention posed by a given chemical or facility.

The question of challenge on-site inspection undoubtedly deserves the special attention of the parties to the negotiations. The fact that there is no agreement on this essential element of the verification mechanism of a future convention hampers agreement on quite a number of other issues relating to a comprehensive and total chemical-weapons ban.

The Soviet Union, in the course of negotiations, has presented some ideas which, taking into account the position of other States, are aimed at bringing closer the positions of the parties to the negotiations. Progress towards a mutually acceptable agreement has also been facilitated by the proposals of the United Kingdom, Pakistan and the paper of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Wisnoemoerti of Indonesia. The result has been that it has been possible for the first time to register some areas of convergence on the question of challenge inspections which are outlined in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, document CD/734. In particular, there is general agreement that the procedure for processing a challenge should ensure that inspections be carried out in the shortest time-frame.

It would be fair to say as well that the parties to the negotiations recognize that the locations and facilities to be subject to challenge inspections differ, and that that difference is based not on ownership of such locations and facilities but on their objective relevance to the scope of the convention. No one disagrees that in certain cases no refusal of an inspection to the full extent requested would be permitted -- for example, in the event of suspected use of chemical weapons and inspections of locations and facilities declared under the convention. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that there might be exceptional cases when the conduct of an inspection could jeopardize the supreme interests of a State party. In those cases, carefully considered means are required which, on the one hand, would ensure the integrity of the convention and confidence in compliance with it, and on the other hand would take into account the legitimate interests (political defence, economic, etc.) of a State party. It is our view that in this respect a good balance was struck in the British paper. We believe we should make maximum use as a basis for agreement of the idea of using alternative measures in cases where a State deems access of inspectors to the location unfeasible, an idea contained in that paper.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation is in favour of an active search for mutually acceptable solutions on challenge inspections, and intends actively to participate in this process. We call on all parties to take the same course of reasonable compromise.

The current spring part of the Conference's session is to a large extent decisive for negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. The Soviet delegation will continue to work actively and consistently for overall progress in the negotiations, to seek mutually acceptable solutions and a speedy conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Finally, a few words on chemical weapons. Negotiations on chemical weapons are beginning to take a decisive turn. Due to the patient and painstaking efforts of last year's Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Cromartie, and his staff, we can now work on the basis of a so-called "rolling text", which provides us, in spite of the multitude of square brackets -- and perhaps also because of those brackets -- with an excellent starting point from which the negotiations can proceed. We are grateful to Ian Cromartie for the dedication and insight with which he and his colleagues have guided the work. We congratulate Ambassador Ekéus on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for this year. We know the chairmanship to be in good hands.

Many colleagues have said we should make use of the momentum in the negotiations. In fact, our goal should be to reach agreement before the end of the year. As I myself said in July last year, my delegation indeed hopes that before the end of the year we can break the back of the problems. Recent moves made by the Soviet delegation are indeed encouraging. We hope this sets the trend for further progress.

However, we also wish to voice a note of caution. A variety of important and sensitive issues must still be addressed. A great number of practical issues have to be dealt with at some moment before an agreement be signed. It would not be wise to leave major loopholes in the convention that could later lead to misinterpretation and arouse suspicion on implementation, if not worse.

Three major areas of disagreement have plagued this Conference for many years. They concern challenge inspection, the question how to verify that the civil chemical industry is not misused for the production of chemical weapons and the issue of how to declare and monitor existing chemical weapons stockpiles. Although in particular on the first of those issues, challenge inspection, we still have a long way to go, it is reassuring to note that on each of these issues progress has been made in recent months.

Let me first take the subject on which, in our view, the most significant steps have been made, the declaration and monitoring of stocks. It has now become clear that the Soviet Union is prepared under the convention to make a declaration containing detailed information on locations of chemical-weapon stocks shortly after the entry into force of the convention. We welcome this, because we infer from it that a system of successive declarations, phased out over the entire period of destruction is no longer deemed necessary.

We were also happy to note that destruction, rather than diversion, of CW stocks for peaceful purposes is now the objective, even if the issue of a possible diversion of stocks on a very limited scale is not finally settled yet. A lot of substantive work still remains to be done on the issue of stocks -- I mention only the sensitive issue of the order in which stocks must

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

be destroyed -- but we feel that a good basis is now available for further consultations and negotiations on remaining issues. This work is, as I understand, well under way under the able guidance of the item co-ordinator for Cluster I, Mr. Nieuwenhuys.

In the area of verification of non-production of chemical weapons, the second major issue I just mentioned, the work of the Conference drew great benefit from informal consultations in the inter-sessional period at the end of last year, and from the deliberations at the session in January. In that relatively brief period discussion of hitherto "untouchable" issues appeared to be possible. We hope that the spirit prevailing in that period will continue to inspire us in these weeks when the Committee is dealing with article VI of the convention.

My delegation welcomes Soviet concurrence with the notion of risk in determining the stringency of verification of non-production. In our view, the risk factor -- essentially the risk that a civil chemical plant will in fact violate the convention -- is important in determining the intensity with which the plant in question should be subject to a monitoring régime. The idea of defining a threshold for annual production, to which Ambassador Nazarkin referred in his statement on 5 March, has been under discussion for some time. Such a quantitative criterion would indeed provide us with one of the factors to determine the risk involved.

In the coming weeks we shall have to get down to the level of practical implementation: what factors are relevant to determine the risks various chemical substances and types of production pose and consequently which inspection régime will be applied for each of them? We are encouraged by the constructive suggestions the item co-ordinator for Cluster III, Mr. Macedo, has recently made on this point.

Useful work on the classification of substances has already been done by the former Chairman of Working Group A, Mr. Richard Rowe. Under his guidance three categories of substances were elaborated under article VI, together with a first outline of a régime for each category. While generally appreciative of the progress achieved so far, my delegation realizes that a number of important issues related to monitoring of production of chemicals have hardly been addressed. The still virtually unexplored and very complex area of commercially produced super-toxic lethal chemicals and the risk they may pose to the convention is only an illustration of the many important problems awaiting a judicious solution.

As for on-site challenge inspections, the third outstanding and perhaps most important issue of disagreement, my delegation appreciates that in his latest interventions, Ambassador Nazarkin has made observations that seem to narrow down some of the differences. We acknowledge that the Soviet delegation has identified two important areas where requests for challenge inspections cannot be refused and that it has broadly supported the British approach for alternative solutions in exceptional circumstances.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

However, we are still faced with the essential problem of how to act in case stocks or facilities have not been registered and challenge inspections are refused. Especially in countries with a large territory and with traditionally less open systems of communication, this can present a major problem, if no adequate verification régime is established.

Since this problem goes to the heart of the convention, I think it may be useful to explain what we see as the crux of challenge inspections.

When the convention enters into force the envisaged system of routine inspection will in general give adequate assurances that existing stockpiles of chemical weapons are destroyed and no new stockpiles are built. However, doubts may arise, in particular about places and facilities that are not declared. The root of the problem may in such cases be misunderstanding, perhaps of a technical nature, and it is obvious that a challenge inspection can most effectively dissipate any misgivings.

But the doubts expressed may also be based on suspicion that a State Party is in fact deliberately not properly implementing the convention. Cases such as clandestine stockpiling and production of chemical weapons should indeed also be covered by the convention.

It is of crucial importance that in cases of such malevolent practices no legal, procedural or other obstacle can be put in the way of a justified request for challenge inspection. For the effective functioning of the convention, confidence in its implementation is essential. Confidence can only be instilled if intrusive on-site inspection is, in those cases of supposed malpractices, guaranteed.

The United States delegation has, now three years ago, in its proposal under article X (CD/500) rightly pointed out the way in which we should find a solution. We feel the British approach, as presented in CD/715, building on the United States proposal, to be a realistic one. The British Working Paper advanced the idea that in exceptional circumstances, in particular for national security reasons, alternative measures may be proposed by the challenged State, but those should be to the satisfaction of the challenging State. If the latter State is not satisfied and if the challenged State cannot in time advance other alternative measures, contracting parties will face a situation in which the challenged State may be declared as violating the convention.

It is clear that all parties have an interest that such a crisis will never break out. It could in fact undermine the overall functioning of the treaty as such. It is therefore of the greatest importance that in the coming months we seek a solution which minimizes the risk that such a crisis situation will in fact lead to the breaking down of the convention. But the rule should remain that the complaining party has the right to international challenge inspection on the spot.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Some delegations have suggested that we could make good use of the example of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) that were agreed upon in Stockholm in September 1986, in the framework of the European Disarmament Conference. We agree with those delegations in so far as we should be inspired by the constructive spirit which led to results at the Stockholm Conference. But we believe the parallel cannot be drawn any further because, as Ambassador Von Stülpnagel rightly said, the negotiations in Stockholm served a different purpose.

In Stockholm the objective was to build confidence. Here our more radical objective is the complete abolition of all chemical weapons. We cannot confine ourselves to a system that gives "some" confidence. What we need is a system of verification that gives full confidence.

Full confidence will also require full confidence in the organization we shall establish and in the rules of decision-making we shall draft. I refer in this context to the Netherlands Working Paper CD/445 of March 1984, on the size and structure of a chemical disarmament inspectorate. But there is far more to it. As Ambassador Cromartie said in his final statement as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on 3 February, provisions under article IX, but also under article VIII, of the convention would be required to underpin confidence in the convention. Provisions on a strong organization and on strong rules of decision-making should provide the necessary confidence in the draft convention as a whole, to enable it to be concluded.

A lot of important work is still waiting for us. Differences must be bridged, resistance overcome. Let us assist the President of the Ad Hoc Committee in setting priorities by first focusing on the major issues. I call upon all delegations to contribute to a common effort to bring the convention on chemical weapons to an early conclusion.

Mr. President, a famous countryman of yours, the Cuban poet Jose Marti, said on building a nation a century ago what we today can say about building a chemical weapons convention. Like a nation, a chemical weapons convention "is not a complex of wheels (of fortune), nor a wild horse race, but a stride upward concerted by real men".

CD/PV.397

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Mr. BAKKEVIG (Norway): ●●●

A global, comprehensive and effective ban on chemical weapons is urgently needed. Norway has taken active part in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production

(Mr. Bakkevig, Norway)

stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made significant progress on important questions in 1986.

Difficult problems still remain to be resolved, particularly in the field of verification. However, the momentum in the negotiations has been sustained, and we are pleased to note the progress achieved so far during the 1987 session.

We feel assured that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1987, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, will spare no efforts in trying to find early and satisfactory solutions to the outstanding problems. In particular, it is necessary to work out details for verification régimes, including routine and on-site inspection on challenge of all facilities and sites where violations could occur. No doubt, solving these questions represents a difficult and complex task. We noted in this regard the statement of Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union at the plenary meeting on 5 March, when he said that "chemical weapons and the production base for their manufacture are to be destroyed by all States possessing such weapons, including both the Soviet Union and the United States".

The Norwegian Government attaches importance as well to the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union on an effective and verifiable global convention on chemical weapons. These consultations have already contributed positively to the negotiating process within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

A basic and still unresolved question is the elaboration of modalities for handling requests for on-site inspection on challenge. Norway is of the opinion that the provisions concerning routine on-site inspections should be supplemented by a stringent system for on-site inspections to verify allegations of non-compliance. This would provide the ultimate source of confidence in the convention. Such a system has to satisfy certain criteria, of which the following three are the most essential: firstly, the challenged State must be under the obligation to demonstrate to other States, and especially the challenging State, that it complies with the provisions of the convention. Secondly, an inspection would have to be undertaken immediately after the issue of a challenge. Thirdly, the investigation should be detailed and comprehensive.

Whereas Norway takes part in all aspects of the negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban in the Conference on Disarmament, we have put special emphasis on the question of verification of alleged use of these weapons. In 1981 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated a comprehensive research programme concerning verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This research programme is carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. It is based on field experiments in order to make sure that the findings are as realistic as possible.

We have developed procedures for identification of the contaminated area, sampling, field analysis, transportation and final analysis in a laboratory in order to determine whether chemical weapons have been used. These procedures,

(Mr. Bakkevig, Norway)

which can be used on an all-year basis, are now being tested in field exercises. The results of these tests will be presented in a new research report, which will be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament during the second part of this year's session. We intend also to submit a working paper outlining more detailed proposals concerning procedures for verification of alleged use, which would be relevant to the effective implementation of the convention.

As a further contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the Norwegian Council on Arms Control and Disarmament will hold a symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention in Oslo from 26 to 27 May. Representatives from the three groups and China in the Conference on Disarmament have been invited to present their views on the chemical weapons negotiations.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

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We wish to express our satisfaction at the way in which negotiations on chemical weapons have progressed in the Conference. We wish to express our gratitude to Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom for the major advances made under his Chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We also wish to express appreciation at the way in which Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden has been chairing the Ad Hoc Committee since our work began this year. We are sure that under his able leadership it will be possible to move forward to the final results.

Everything appears to suggest that the conditions are ripe for specific results to be achieved quite quickly. Over recent months there has clearly been considerably more flexibility in the position of the Soviet Union, especially with regard to the régime of supervision and verification that will have to govern the implementation of the Convention when it enters into force.

The Conference is also facing up to the challenge resulting from the decision by the United States Government, and endorsed by the U.S. Congress, to begin producing binary chemical weapons in the autumn of this year if no agreement has been reached by then on the elimination of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. Given this prospect, there is no alternative to speeding up the on-going negotiations both at the bilateral level and within this Conference.

However, we should like to share with the members of the Conference a concern prompted by the negotiations being carried out on the draft treaty for the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is clear that the question of verification is decisive, and the fate of the treaty, or indeed of any disarmament treaty, hinges on it. We have the impression, however, that the endeavour praiseworthy as it may be, to set up a verification mechanism that would be as perfect as possible is leading to the design of a tremendously complex structure, the operation of which would be very costly. We fear that the financial obligations which would derive from the cost of the operation of the verification system for the treaty will be so high that finally very few countries will be in a position to defray them, with the result being that the number of countries willing to be parties to the treaty will be very small, which in turn will limit the effectiveness of the instrument.

It is important therefore to bear in mind the experience of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which to some extent is serving as a model for the verification structure of the future treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The safeguards system is relatively simple to operate. What is more, its field of action is very restricted and it has a special financing mechanism which lightens the burden on the developing countries. Even so, many developing countries have serious difficulties in meeting their financial obligations relating to the safeguards system. The prevailing world economic situation would seem to make it even

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

more difficult to have a viable treaty for the prohibition of chemical weapons if the verification mechanism were to be too costly, as would seem to be the case of the system that is being designed. To give an idea of the reason for our concern, one need only point out that for 1987 the cost of financing the IAEA safeguards system is \$34,362,000, and it is estimated that this cost will rise by about \$2 million a year. Thus for 1988 the estimate is \$36,323,000, for 1989, \$38 million, for 1990, \$40 million, and for 1991, \$42 million.

For a disarmament treaty to be effective, besides being reliable and verifiable it must be universal. In order to be universal it must secure the participation of the greatest possible number of countries, and to this end it is necessary to ensure that the financial burden on the parties is as light as possible.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

According to the time and work schedule of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the CW negotiations are presently revolving in Cluster III around issues pertaining to non-production of chemical weapons.

My Government wishes to demonstrate its political determination to achieve a CW convention as soon as possible by introducing a Working Paper concerning the collection and forwarding of data and other information to verify the non-production of chemical weapons. This paper will be submitted tomorrow and given to the Ad Hoc Committee under the symbol CD/CW/WP.159.

It provides for a two-tier system whereby the national authority collects extensive data from its industry, which it then forwards to the international authority in a weighted manner according to the substances belonging either to category 2 or 3.

The international authority in return should have the right to request clarifications about these data transmitted by the national authority. This right to clarification should be formulated in a business-like manner in order to reserve on-challenge inspections for cases of grave doubts about compliance with the convention.

The total extent of the data and other information required to verify the non-production of CW is determined both by the number of substances listed in Annexes 2 and 3 and by the intensity of the control régime for each category. Of particular importance in this respect is the threshold, still to be fixed, for the exclusion of small quantities which do not pose a military threat and which therefore are irrelevant for CW control purposes; this threshold will have a considerable influence on the number of producers and users who are required to provide information. The question of where this line is to be drawn should be examined separately on the basis of militarily significant quantities.

The Working Paper we are to present is based on the following conception: the submission of the data needed to verify the non-production of chemical weapons is intended to contribute to effective international verification by the international authority. This presupposes selection of the appropriate data. More data does not automatically mean greater security against violations of the convention. The international authority should be given the data it needs in order to keep track of the production, acquisition, use, transfer and storage of the substances listed in the Annexes. The requirements in terms of specific details can and must be greater for the substances listed in Annex 2 than for those in Annex 3. While with regard to the handling of the substances listed in Annex 2 both facility-related figures and aggregate national data will have to be submitted, only the latter data, in our view, need be submitted on the substances listed in Annex 3.

The system of national data collection and transfer as described here, in connection with the right of the international authority to ask for clarification, will guarantee the largest necessary transparency of data handling and the most effective international control. The main work of data

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

collection and processing is to be done at a national level; the international authority obtains an overview, which it can supplement as necessary by asking for clarification. At the same time, we are aware that verification is invariably an international task and that the national authority can therefore only be an instrument with which the individual contracting parties implement the convention.

Let me on this occasion comment on a few speeches made recently in this forum. My delegation recognizes the positive and constructive approach the Soviet delegation has displayed in its latest statements concerning the crucial questions of declaration and elimination of CW stocks and revision of lists of chemicals which are under careful consideration.

In other areas, such as on-challenge inspections, the Soviet view of no refusal of on-site inspections still has to be enlarged in our view to all facilities and sites where violations could occur in order to guarantee a degree of effective verification of compliance acceptable to all.

The constructive spirit of Stockholm should be adapted to our negotiations -- as the delegations of Romania and the Netherlands suggest -- with respect to its support for the obligation to accept on-site inspections and not to its particular restrictions concerning certain areas and sensitive points, because -- as the delegation of the Netherlands rightly acknowledged -- in Stockholm the objective was to build confidence whereas we are faced with the more encompassing task of abolishing an entire category of weapons. Consequently, our solution has to be a more far-reaching one to be effective and generally acceptable.

My delegation welcomes also the constructive approach taken by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 17 March 1987, towards the verification of alleged use of CW by developing procedures for identification of the contaminated area, sampling, field analysis, transportation and final analysis in a laboratory. We are looking forward to the announced working paper incorporating the new research report.

My delegation shared the detailed assessment given by the Netherlands delegation on 12 March 1987. This applies, firstly, to the notion of risk to the convention as a determining factor for the verification of non-production, building on the division of relevant CW substances into three categories with the appropriate régimes. Unless a list of commercially produced super-toxic lethal chemicals of CW relevance is produced, their inclusion in any of these established categories cannot be justified. Secondly, as was pointed out by the Netherlands delegation, the threshold, still has to be fixed for the exclusion of small quantities which do not pose a military threat and which therefore are irrelevant for CW verification purposes.

My delegation, together with many others, remains convinced that essential elements of a global ban on development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of CW as well as in the field of verification can be achieved during this year. It is in this light that my delegation is

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

submitting to the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the Working Paper on collection and forwarding of data and other information to verify the non-production of CW.

CD/PV.399

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The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 399th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins the consideration of agenda item 4, "chemical weapons". Any member wishing to do so, however, may raise any other matter related to the work of the Conference, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call to order the 400th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today is to continue the consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, members who so desire can make statements on any other question related to the work of the Conference. The representatives of China, France and Mongolia are on my list of speakers for today.

CD/PV.400

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(Mr. Wu Xueqian, China)

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China is a socialist as well as a developing country, pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace. Having suffered untold hardships from foreign aggression and the scourge of war in the past, China is engaged in a

(Mr. Wu Xueqian, China)

socialist modernization drive today. The Chinese people hope to approach and catch up with the developed countries in terms of economic development through the hard work of several generations. Therefore, China needs an international environment of durable peace -- peace not only in this century but also in the next century. For this purpose the Chinese Government has been conducting its foreign affairs with the basic objective of opposing hegemonism and power politics, maintaining world peace, developing friendly co-operation with other countries and promoting common economic prosperity. China will not enter into alliance or a strategic relationship with any super-Power. It will endeavour to establish and develop friendly relations in co-operation with other countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Upholding the arms race and promoting the realization of disarmament is an important part of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China maintains that the arms race, nuclear or conventional, on the ground or in space, should be brought to an end. China has always stood for the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and space weapons as well as a substantial reduction of conventional arms. China is in favour of the peaceful use of outer space and is opposed to the arms race in outer space no matter who conducts it and in what form. The development of space weaponry will lead to further intensification and escalation of the arms race and greater tension and turbulence in international situations. The United States and the Soviet Union, the only two countries that possess space weapons and continue to develop such weapons, bear a special responsibility for the cessation of the arms race in outer space. It is our hope that they will heed the voice of the peoples of the world and take immediate and effective measures to halt the arms race in any form in outer space by refraining from developing, testing and deploying space weapons and destroying all existing space weapons.

China, a non-chemical-weapons State, was once the victim of the use of this weapon. China has all along stood for an early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons, and made positive efforts to this end. We are pleased that marked progress has been made over recent years in the negotiations on chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament. We are of the view that the future convention should, as a priority, provide for the thorough destruction of the existing chemical weapons, as well as their production facilities, should ensure the non-production of new chemical weapons without harming or affecting the peaceful development of civilian chemical industry in all countries and should stipulate necessary and effective verification measures.

(Mr. Morel, France)

I should also like to thank all those who gave me such a warm welcome when I arrived at this Conference. I was struck by the spirit of co-operation and friendship here, quite apart from our substantive differences of view. You may rest assured, Mr. President, that I shall always take part in the work of this Conference in the same spirit.

As we know, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is at present working on issues relating to non-production of chemical weapons. The French delegation wishes to make an active contribution to the discussions on a topic to which it attaches great importance, and therefore now has the honour to introduce today document CD/747, entitled "Non-production of chemical weapons", which spells out the details of the preliminary remarks expressed by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jean Bernard Raimond, on this subject a month ago, on 19 February, in this chamber.

The starting-point for our approach is that it has gradually become clear from discussions on article 6 of the convention that it is not desirable to build a convention that would be perfect for the present but which would be threatened with obsolescence in the near future and would therefore become increasingly inoperative. We do not think that it is useful to establish a definitive schedule of substances to be prohibited, with their attendant régimes of verification. The convention must obviously be comprehensive and binding for everything with which we are familiar, but precisely in order to ensure the full observance and authority of the convention we must also be able to make provision for all that at present remains hypothetical, little-known or indeed unknown. How, for example, can we regulate, without harming the legitimate interests of each country, the potential inherent in industries that are producing for permissible requirements substances that could be diverted for weapons purposes? How can the scientific and technological progress which will certainly come about, both in the chemical industry and on the control and verification side, be taken into account? Such questions cannot but convince us that, while we must be absolutely firm in everything relating to the goals, principles and ground rules, flexibility is essential in the application of the convention for everything that is not yet fully identified.

Thus, our document identifies the areas where, taking this evolutionary perspective I have outlined, developments may well occur.

With regard to the schedules of substances to be controlled, the essential and most difficult task is to define the toxicity criterion. Here we have to set aside the idea of attaining theoretical perfection and rather seek agreement on a definition and procedures of acquisition that are acceptable to everybody and could serve as a reference.

With regard to super-toxic lethal chemicals which are not chemical weapons, we do not think that, given their characteristics, it would be useful to draw up an exhaustive list at this stage. What is essential is to establish definitional criteria to assess the possibility of any particular substance becoming a chemical weapon, and to set a production threshold over which its manufacture must be declared.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Finally, we must give thought to monitoring new products and technologies, a major sphere on which the survival of the convention hinges, and which the Committee has not yet discussed.

Quite clearly, some of the tasks I have mentioned could best be carried out by a special body, and that is what is proposed in our document. We suggest that a Scientific Council should be set up, consisting of independent eminent persons, chosen solely for their scientific competence. As stated in our document, this new body would have responsibilities at the following stages: First, following the declaration of stocks, to finalize the lists of chemicals to be prohibited and monitored, for by definition, the exact composition of the stockpiles will be known only after each country has made its declaration, which will happen on the entry into force of the convention.

Secondly, during the administration of the convention. The Scientific Council should inform the Consultative Committee of the appearance of any new substance or new technology which might pose a risk to the convention, and propose appropriate measures and verification procedures.

We attach a great deal of importance both to the independence of the eminent persons selected, and to a precise definition of their powers, so as to avoid any duplication with other bodies. Thus, the Scientific Council would have an advisory role but no power of decision whatsoever. One annual meeting could be scheduled, together with meetings at the request of the Consultative Committee where necessary.

My delegation is today submitting document CD/747 with the intention of breaking new ground while at the same time paying due heed to the need for realism and flexibility. The document suggests some practical measures, which I have summarized, but it also seeks to prompt us to think about how the convention will actually work. Very strict rules are essential, but they will not be enough in themselves. We have also to provide for instruments, tools, criteria for action, and therefore for an administration that is suited to the future circumstances of research and production in the chemical industry. What we are building must not be a great monument that is threatened by time but a living, active, credible institution. This is the spirit underlying our proposals, and of course we are quite open to any comments and suggestions to which they may give rise on the part of member States.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

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I would now like to make a few comments on the question of a chemical-weapons ban. A definite amount of success has recently been achieved in the drafting of the chemical-weapons convention. Many positions of principle and specific technical issues have been reconciled and there is the necessary basis for further progress. Amongst the unresolved questions of principle is the question of on-site challenge inspection. At this stage of the negotiations this is a basic problem of universal significance for the convention.

What is the actual situation as regards the solution of this problem? Several positions have been stated in the negotiations. Each of them reflects the interests of one or another group of delegations or the interests of specific delegations. These interests have to be taken into account and brought into line with the common aim: the elaboration of a convention which can universally and really be implemented.

The socialist countries are in favour of a régime of challenge inspections which would be as effective as possible and, at the same time, would not be detrimental to the higher interests of States. This aim, we feel, is met by the approach set out in the proposal of the United Kingdom contained in document CD/715, and in particular the central idea of that proposal -- the possibility of proposing and applying alternative measures.

It seems to us that the proposal that challenge verifications concerning declared locations and facilities and also in cases of suspicion of the use of chemical weapons should be mandatory is a promising one from the point of view of finding a compromise. Perhaps we should think about those other cases which we could include in the list of those where a refusal to allow full verification to be carried out would not be allowable.

For many years it was impossible to agree on questions of verifying the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and the elimination of their production facilities, as well as the permitted sphere of activities.

The proposals made by the Soviet delegation take account of the position of the Western and non-aligned States and fully remove any obstacle to the elaboration of comprehensive and strict control over chemical weapon stocks, production facilities and permitted activities. On these issues we have practically all the necessary basis for the formulation of articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. Nevertheless, unfortunately, we cannot but note certain negative factors which are delaying the consolidation of the success achieved: for example, the unexpected difficulties which have arisen in resolving questions such as diversion of chemical weapons (the delegation of the United States of America has departed from its earlier position just when the USSR

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

delegation took its preoccupations into account and tried to accommodate them), as well as the elaboration of provisions concerning chemicals in the second category. The singling out of super-toxic lethal chemicals used for pharmaceutical, medicinal, scientific and research purposes, which do not have the set of properties peculiar to chemical warfare agents, is a step towards accommodating the wishes of the Western delegations. Nevertheless, the selfsame Western delegations are not devoting the due energy towards the solution of this issue.

These delegations are also delaying a solution to the question of irritants. The use of chemical weapons based on harmful chemicals against developing countries which do not have the necessary level of protection could be extremely detrimental to their defence capability. In the first place, there would be suffering on the part of the civilian population and damage to the peaceful spheres of activity in those countries. We also need to see a solution to the issue of the use of herbicides for military purposes.

There is nothing insoluble about these issues. All we need is a will to bring about a constructive agreement.

The important problem of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks and the elimination of production facilities has in principle been resolved. On the destruction of stocks, we have not yet achieved agreement on the order for their destruction. However, there does exist a common understanding that the régime for destruction would have to be simple and fair. The discussion of the idea of using equivalence in comparing various categories of chemical weapon stocks has shown that the practical implementation of this idea is going to be extremely complicated. The most simple and realistic way would lie in the grouping of chemical weapons in comparable categories which would have to be destroyed in equal amounts by weight during each period of destruction of stocks.

In the preparation of the convention there are a significant number of separate technical issues which, of course, have to be resolved. We cannot play down the importance of these questions, but I would like to appeal to the parties to the negotiations first and foremost to work for the completion of the provisions of principle. We cannot allow the possibility that progress in preparing and agreeing on the convention should get bogged down in the technical details.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 401st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work the Conference will continue its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure any member wishing to do so may raise any other matter relating to the work of the Conference. Once we have finished the list of speakers for today I will convene a short informal meeting of the Conference to consider a request for participation from a non-member State. We shall then resume the plenary so as to formalize any agreement we may reach in the informal meeting. I have on the list of speakers for this plenary meeting the representatives of Argentina and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

CD/PV.401

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(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

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The negotiation of a convention that would ban chemical weapons is of unprecedented importance. This is a real leading case for the international community, since never yet has it undertaken the drafting of an instrument of such political and technical complexity in the field of disarmament with a view to eliminating weapons of real military significance. The task that has been started implies that national territories will be opened up to international scrutiny. This in itself will be a very important step in the strengthening of international confidence.

It is difficult to imagine the Major Powers open to international inspection to verify the destruction of their arsenals of chemical weapons and production installations. However, all the negotiations are directed towards that aim, and there should be no retreat or vacillation in achieving it.

We have heard so many times delegations from the Great Powers state here that the task of the Conference on Disarmament should be to give priority to the negotiation of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons that we cannot accept at this stage of our work any pretext which would hinder the speedy conclusion of that instrument.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): On 24 and 25 March this year a regular meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty was held in Moscow. The delegation of the USSR, the country which hosted and chaired the meeting, has requested the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament to circulate, as an official document, the decisions which were adopted by the Foreign Ministers Committee session. I am referring to the Communiqué of the meeting, the Statement "For Furthering the CSCE Process and Bringing the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting to a Successful Outcome", and the "Statement by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the Issue of a Chemical Weapons Ban".

The distinguished representatives thus have the opportunity of considering the full texts of the documents adopted in Moscow. Meanwhile, we would like to highlight some aspects since the decisions of the Committee of Foreign Ministers have a direct bearing on the important problems we are discussing here.

The documents adopted at the Committee's meeting in Moscow testify to the continuing vigorous efforts of the States Parties of the Warsaw Treaty to end the arms race, reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, prevent the militarization of outer space, destroy chemical weapons and the industrial base for their production, and bring about deep reductions in armed forces and armaments in Europe. These efforts are a reflection of the unvarying policy of principle of the allied socialist States aimed at building a comprehensive system of international security and creating a nuclear-free, non-violent world.

The allied socialist States believe that a speedy completion of the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and on the destruction of the industrial base for their manufacture is a crucial objective for the world community. They call on all States to do their utmost to conclude such a convention in 1987 so that this year already we could see the beginning of general and complete chemical disarmament. The

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

participants in the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers consider that no country should take any steps whatsoever which might complicate the elaboration and conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 401st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

In accordance with the exchange of views during the informal meeting we have just held, I would like to submit to the Conference the request from Switzerland to participate in the work of the plenary meetings of the Conference and of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The draft decision to this effect has been circulated by the secretariat in document CD/WP.281.

If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

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(The President)

The two Ad Hoc Committees which have been working practically since the beginning of this annual session continued their active search for agreements on questions of substance. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament would have its work considerably facilitated if the Conference itself were able to make headway in its consideration of those agenda items dealing with nuclear issues that we have been examining without results for far too long. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is working on particularly important topics in the search for a convention that would finally prohibit these weapons, and it is clear that considerable progress has been made since the opening of the session.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 402nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I assume the Presidency for the month of April, I should like to read out a message transmitted to the Conference by the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Gustav Husák.

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(The President)

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We deem it especially important to achieve progress on the question of chemical weapons. If an agreement on general and complete prohibition of such weapons and on their elimination was formulated already this year, it would be a practical contribution to the strengthening of mutual trust and an inspiring example proving that multilateral talks on disarmament can produce significant concrete results in the form of real treaties, agreements or conventions.

Guided by our desire to do our utmost to facilitate that process, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic have been actively advocating the establishment of chemical and nuclear-weapon-free zones in central Europe, which would contribute to the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction from that sensitive area. Together with the German Democratic Republic, we have put forward concrete proposals to this end.

(The President)

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 Let me start with the positive. Early in this year's session we managed to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which then immediately resumed its intensive work aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of CW. Further progress has been achieved and there is a practically unanimous view that efforts should continue persistently so that the convention could be finalized as soon as possible, preferably already in 1987. I am confident that the Ad hoc Committee, under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, will do all in its power to speed up progress towards the convention.

Let me remind you, distinguished delegates, that just a week ago a political body of high importance -- the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty -- launched an appeal to all the participants of our Conference regarding the prohibition of CW. In the separate statement on this subject the ministers called upon all States to refrain from all steps that might complicate the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement on the prohibition of CW and not to produce any CW, including binary or multi-component CW, not to deploy them in foreign countries and to withdraw them from those foreign countries where they are already present. The ministers expressed the belief that 1987 can and must be the year of the commencement of complete and general chemical disarmament. The statement I referred to reflects interest in the work of this Conference and the importance of our negotiations on the prohibition and elimination of CW.

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(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Following the same trend of thought, we think that the future convention would be all the stronger if it promoted international co-operation in the chemical industry, and here we must focus on the importance, in our view, of article II of the draft convention.

...
(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

There can be no doubt that the process of drafting a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has entered a crucial phase. The progress achieved at the previous session under Ambassador Cromartie is certainly an encouraging result, as well as a stimulus for the ongoing negotiations. Agreement has still to be reached on significant aspects of the convention, but this should not deter us from our objective of concluding this instrument. A spirit of flexibility and mutual concessions continue to be the best means of overcoming the obstacles to definitive elaboration of a future convention. The proposals made over the past few weeks are, in my delegation's opinion, an example which should be followed if we are to reconcile the various approaches.

Furthermore, we are sure that the competence and experience of the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, will be a great help for making full use of the years of effort invested in the consideration of the various aspects of the draft convention and finding an appropriate solution to the questions which remained outstanding.

The conclusion of an agreement for the complete elimination of chemical weapons would be a milestone in multilateral disarmament efforts. Clearly, such an agreement will be even more significant if it could win the support of all States. To this end, it is essential that the chemical weapons ban should not lead to discriminatory measures or impediments for the chemical industry which, as we are all aware, is of particular importance in the development processes of our countries.

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Following the same trend of thought, we think that the future convention would be all the stronger if it promoted international co-operation in the chemical industry, and here we must focus on the importance, in our view, of article 11 of the draft convention.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

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It is a welcome relief to note that some progress has been made in the negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention. I would like to appeal to all members of the Conference to do their utmost to ensure the early conclusion of the Convention. I do realize that some details still remain to be resolved. However, given the prevailing spirit of understanding and flexibility which is being shown, I am optimistic that a chemical weapons convention is within reach of the Conference. When it does happen, and I hope it will be sooner rather than later, it will be a most welcome breakthrough which should have positive effect on negotiations on other priority areas.

Mr. SCHUURMAN VOLKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, although my Ambassador will do this more extensively at a later stage, allow me nevertheless to congratulate you on the assumption of the Presidency.

I noted that you introduced, in your presidential statement, a quotation from the statement recently made by the Warsaw Treaty Organization Foreign Ministers on CW. I am sure that you were moved to do so by the importance of the subject, and that you did not want to suggest in any way that this subject does not have priority for others. Allow me to recall in this respect the communiqué of NATO Foreign Ministers in December of last year, in which they stated that they seek with determination to reach a convention on CW that will be effectively verifiable.

Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Today I would like to devote my statement to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, the negotiations in the 1987 session are well under way. The organization of work into clusters, as suggested by Ambassador Ekéus, has given new structure to the discussions and seems to have helped them move ahead. The cluster co-ordinators -- Mr. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Macedo of Mexico, and Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic -- are making important contributions, as well, to advancing the complex and detailed work of negotiating the provisions of the Convention.

Clearly, the work on a chemical weapons ban has been intensifying over the last year. In part, this can be attributed to the commitment by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, made at the November 1985 Summit in Geneva, to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. Both the United States and Soviet delegations have helped to turn this commitment into practical progress.

Since the beginning of the 1987 CD session, important changes have appeared in the position of some delegations, and the United States Government is carefully assessing the political and substantive significance of these developments. In this context, I would note that we welcome these developments but emphasize that we will not accept a watered-down, ineffective convention. The negotiation of an effective convention is a complex undertaking in which details are of great significance. The CD must therefore pursue this objective with appropriate care and deliberation.

That said, my statement today contains suggestions and proposals I hope will advance the further work of the Committee in a number of important areas.

Over the course of the chemical weapons negotiations the United States has stressed that effective verification provisions are essential for building confidence in compliance. But, clearly, confidence is not something that

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(Mr. Hansen, United States)

suddenly appears the day the convention enters into force. Unless some degree of confidence among States already exists, it must be created, or reaching agreement will be an extremely difficult task. Thus, the building of confidence must be a step-by-step process that begins well before the negotiations have been completed.

Confidence-building should start with greater openness on the part of all members of the CD. The United States is concerned that some other States participating in the negotiations have been extremely secretive about their chemical weapons programmes. If countries possessing chemical weapons refuse to acknowledge such capabilities during the negotiations, confidence is seriously undermined. Therefore, we must all agree that greater openness is essential for building the kind of confidence States must have before they will be willing to give up their own chemical weapons. The United States has consistently stressed this concern in bilateral negotiations and wishes to make this point clear in the multilateral context.

The fact that the United States maintains a chemical weapons deterrent and retaliatory capability has long been a matter of public record. On 10 July 1986, the United States delegation sought to promote the confidence-building process by unilaterally providing its negotiating partners here with further detailed information about its stockpiles of chemical weapons, including information on stockpile locations and the chemicals in the stockpile. We urge others to follow our example of openness.

On 5 March of this year the Soviet Union finally made an oblique reference to its possession of chemical weapons in a plenary statement. The United States welcomes this small, helpful step by the Soviet Union. We hope it was only the first step towards increasing openness by the Soviet Union and its allies about their chemical weapons programmes. Other States could usefully take similar steps.

In this connection we have also noted the candid statement by the Foreign Minister of France on 19 February that his country is considering endowing itself with a limited and purely deterrent capability in the chemical weapons field.

It should not be forgotten that over the years a number of States, primarily from the Western Group, have made clear in the CD that they do not possess chemical weapons. Such statements can only be welcomed.

Many CD member States, however, have said nothing. Most undoubtedly do not possess chemical weapons; but it would be very useful for them to say so. Unfortunately, it cannot be ruled out that other States participating in the negotiations do possess chemical weapon capabilities. For example, we would welcome clarification by the Iranian delegation of press reports concerning an Iranian chemical weapons capability.

Because of the magnitude of the chemical weapons capabilities possessed by the Soviet Union, the United States has stressed to Soviet authorities the importance of greater openness. But the principle applies equally to other States. Within the CD, we call upon all our negotiating partners to indicate possession or non-possession of chemical weapons and chemical weapons

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

production facilities. It would be useful if the secretariat were to compile all relevant statements, with the assistance of delegations making them. We also call upon the Soviet Union, and any others who acknowledge possession of chemical weapons, to provide more detailed information, as the United States has already done.

Our objective is to rid the world of chemical weapons. This can only happen if all of the States possessing chemical weapons become parties to a future convention. Obviously, this will not happen automatically. The members of the CD need to consider carefully how to promote the widest possible adherence to the convention. It is not too soon to address the question of how to obtain participation in the convention by as many as possible of the 15 or so States that are currently believed to possess a chemical weapons capability. Similarly, States need to consider the risk posed by States which possess chemical weapons remaining outside the convention. What can be done to minimize this risk? These are, of course, hard questions, but they must be faced.

I would now like to address a number of specific negotiating issues relating to the CW Convention.

One useful result of the intersessional negotiations was agreement that article III of the rolling text should include a provision to declare any "facility or establishment" for the development of chemical weapons. However, the discussion showed that the scope of the key phrase "facility or establishment" was very unclear. Thus, a footnote in the rolling text states that more work is necessary. To assist in resolving this matter the United States proposes that the phrase in question refer to facilities or establishments that "specialize" in chemical weapons development. This would provide a practical approach that covers the locations of direct concern. It would avoid covering facilities that may have only an indirect or one-time involvement, such as a wind-tunnel that might on occasion have been used for aerodynamic tests.

Much has already been achieved in Cluster I in developing procedures for the declaration of chemical weapons and for monitoring the declared stocks prior to destruction.

One important step was made when the Soviet delegation announced on 17 February that it could agree to destruction of all chemical weapons and would no longer insist on a right to divert some chemicals to peaceful purposes. This was a constructive step. It was, however, curious to hear the Soviet accusation on 5 March that the United States had then blocked agreement in this area by changing its previous position. At the bottom of this tempest-in-a-teapot was the United States view that such common and innocuous commercial chemicals as sulphur and isopropyl alcohol that were stored for chemical weapons purposes need not be destroyed and might be diverted for civilian use. Apparently the Soviet delegation had failed to notice that the United States adopted this view more than a year ago, in early 1986, as a move toward the Soviet position. To be castigated now for moving to the Soviet position calls into question the seriousness of the Soviet accusation. None the less, since our attempted concession has apparently become an obstacle in the negotiations, we will resolve the problem by returning to our original

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

position that all chemical weapons stocks, including harmless precursors stored for chemical weapons purposes, should be destroyed. There should now be full agreement in this area.

With respect to chemical weapons production facilities, my delegation has suggested that work in Cluster II focus initially in areas where there is broad agreement. We believe it is appropriate for the Committee to examine how a verification system for eliminating such facilities would function. My delegation has introduced an informal outline to assist in this examination. To help these discussions move forward, we are circulating today a paper containing more detailed suggestions for a step-by-step approach to verifying the elimination of CW production facilities.

A clear idea of the verification steps necessary for international assurance that parties are eliminating their chemical weapons production facilities is essential from the beginning. For an effective verification system, we must ensure that the measures for declarations, inspections and on-site monitoring with instruments are carefully integrated with specific verification objectives. Before one can decide what to declare, the purpose of declarations must be clear. Before one can write procedures or determine the frequency of inspection, one must know the objectives of an inspection. Before one can decide on what types of instruments may be needed, one must know what objectives instrument monitoring must satisfy. In our outline, we propose such objectives for each facet of the verification system for chemical weapons production facilities.

In article V we also note that there are still fundamental issues to be resolved about how chemical weapons production facilities are to be eliminated. However, we believe that broad agreement in principle already exists on the general approach to verification in this regard. In our view much important work can be done toward converting this agreement in principle into provisions for a verification without prejudging the remaining issues.

The final issue on which I would like to comment today is challenge inspection. This subject remains one of the key negotiating problems, although by no means the only one. There seems to be broad agreement that quick action is needed to carry out inspections and that in at least two cases inspection will be mandatory. While we regard the evolution of the Soviet approach in a positive light, we view the new Soviet position announced on 17 February as being internally inconsistent and falling far short of what is needed for an effective challenge provision.

Allow me to give two examples of why the Soviet position is internally inconsistent.

In his statement of 17 February the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union said that the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most stringent system of supervision and verification. The USSR has argued for strict routine inspection provisions for the chemical industry. Yet it continues to oppose mandatory challenge inspection, the most stringent system proposed, for the vast majority of plants in the chemical industry that it is ostensibly so concerned about. For under the Soviet approach, only the relatively few plants already subject to declaration would be open to

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

mandatory challenge inspection. Soviet statements about stringent verification and the detailed Soviet position are clearly not consistent with each other.

Furthermore, the Soviet delegation emphasizes the importance and utility of alternatives to on-site inspection. It has suggested such alternative measures as viewing a facility from outside and collecting chemical samples nearby. But it cannot explain, or has not explained, for example, how these or any other alternative measures would be useful in determining whether or not a suspect munitions bunker contains chemical weapons. It seems obvious that only inspection of the bunker itself will permit an inspector to determine whether or not there are chemical weapons inside. But if the Soviet delegation knows of an alternative to inspection that would resolve such questions, such alternative should in our view be thoroughly explained. The United States is not opposed to discussing effective alternatives, but if an alternative cannot be agreed the mandatory right to access within the 48-hour period must remain.

The issue of challenge inspection will be discussed soon in Cluster IV. We welcome the examination of each facet of challenge inspection, as is planned. Such an approach can help to focus on the substantive merit of methods for ensuring effective verification; this, rather than arguments based on authorship, is what is required. The United States delegation will participate actively and constructively in the forthcoming discussion. We will not, however, relax our standards for effective verification.

When a revised version of the "rolling text" is prepared at the end of April, it should demonstrate that much has been accomplished during the Spring part of the 1987 session. But it will also show that much more remains to be done, not only in resolving key issues, but also in working out the detailed procedures required for effective implementation. Much will remain to be accomplished in drafting effective provisions and in establishing the level of confidence necessary to make a chemical weapons convention a reality. That should be a challenge to all of us.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

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As regards the abolition of chemical weapons, my delegation has spoken on this subject on various occasions of late and expressed its satisfaction at the visible advances being made in individual sectors. In its view, the negotiations have acquired a momentum which not only reflects the deep concern universally felt about this scourge facing mankind, but also increasingly testifies to the political obligation to prevent further instrumentalization of this category of weapons. These negotiations simultaneously benefit from

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(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

new expectations and proposals in other areas of arms control, for example in respect of verification problems. The growing momentum of the negotiations in elaborating language must now be fully exploited so as to conclude as early as possible a chemical weapons convention -- a subject to which my Government accords the highest priority.

My delegation's concentration on the main elements of the convention is meant to be a practical contribution. All delegations know the dilemma between the necessary political oversight and decision on one side, and the unavoidable scrutiny of the small print on the other. We must be guided by the principle that the underlying uniform commitments for all countries must first be dealt with politically and then be formulated in no vague terms. For example, only by an adequate verification régime can all countries be convinced that a convention banning chemical weapons worldwide is the most reliable guarantee that they will not be used. Such verification must be both effective and practicable. Striking the necessary balance is a major task for this Conference. We feel that on the central political issue of a chemical weapons convention, that of on-challenge inspections, this balance has been achieved satisfactorily in the British proposal in Working Paper CD/715. We therefore continue to strongly support this proposal.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): . . .

First of all, I would like to make a few comments on the statements we have just heard by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Hansen. I wish to note the positive elements contained in his statement. The United States has declared that it will remove one of the obstacles to the agreement on the question of the destruction of CW stocks. This is undoubtedly a positive development, and I hope that the delegation of the United States will pursue the chemical weapons negotiations in the same positive spirit.

The distinguished representative of the United States raised the question of challenge inspection. That is today one of the most important issues facing us in the chemical weapons negotiations, and the exchange of views on it is undoubtedly essential. Evidently, such an exchange is also appropriate in a less formal situation, and on the whole this is happening. Therefore, it would hardly be correct for me to embark on a detailed discussion of the comments made today by Ambassador Hansen. We will have occasion to do this in other circumstances. I would just today like to point out that, unfortunately, on the basis of the comments made by Ambassador Hansen on challenge inspection, we see that there still remains the position which the United States adopted three years ago, back in 1984, concerning the automatic nature of challenge inspections.

This will not be conducive to progress in the negotiations, considering in particular the fact that many other delegations have made very varied comments on other ways in which the question of challenge inspection could be resolved. Ambassador Hansen, as far as I could see, showed interest in the

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

idea of alternative measures. I would not like to deprive the authors of that idea -- it was put forward as you know, by the United Kingdom delegation -- of the opportunity of justifying their own proposal. But in any case the detailed exchange of views on the nature of alternative measures could well take place during a less formal exchange of views.

I would like to appeal to the United States delegation to give serious consideration to the British proposal and adopt a more positive and constructive view of it, as it enjoys broad support in the negotiations. In fact today we heard support for it confirmed by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the statement of Ambassador von Stülpnagel. I think that on the basis of the British proposal movement towards a solution to the problem of challenge inspection could be achieved.

Now, the matter of confidence. Of course, it is extremely important, and obviously it cannot be built in one day. I noted that Ambassador Hansen made a positive appreciation of the steps recently taken in that direction by the Soviet side. At the same time, I must point out that confidence-building is a two-way process. Ambassador Hansen referred to the fact that the United States has published data on its chemical weapons -- I have the following to say in that connection: of course the publication of some weapons data is evidence of a certain level of openness, but from my standpoint, confidence would be strengthened much more by information, not on armaments or plans to produce binary weapons, but on arms reductions or on the renunciation of plans to develop armaments. Such steps would indeed lead to the building of true confidence. In this connection, I would refer to the appeals made by the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in March this year, not to undertake any steps which might complicate the achievement of mutually acceptable accords in the negotiations or slow them down, and also not to produce chemical weapons, including binary or multi-component varieties. Such measures would in fact help to develop confidence and hasten successful progress in the chemical weapons negotiations.

... (Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The history of the imposed war against the Islamic Republic of Iran shows in the most vivid manner the fact that the present international instruments for the prevention and suppression of acts of aggression fall far short of any effect.

We all know that the most important of all such instruments, namely the provisions of the United Nations Charter, have not been able to have even some mitigating effect. Even commercial navigation and civil aviation have not been spared in our region from systematic military attacks, despite all existing international legal barriers.

After all the international condemnations of the deployment of chemical weapons by Iraq, the use of such weapons has been intensified in the whole course of the past years. The lack of any international guarantee for compliance with and international observance of the present rules and principles has led to the intensification of violations of international law on a world scale.

Here, and for this very reason, I would like to express our full support for the idea introduced in the Forty-first Session of the General Assembly in resolution 41/92 concerning the "establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security".

This is a positive view which merits further elaboration by this Conference in its coming sessions, but I would like to add that a very important step towards the achievement of an effective international peace and security system is to seek and encourage regional arrangements, which proves to be a more feasible task under the prevailing situations. Naturally and inevitably, such arrangements will provide the very necessary regional or global foundations to assure the countries not possessing destructive weapons.

In short, as a result of the experience we have had in our region, we have reached the conclusion that regional arrangements free from the influence of the Eastern or Western camps may in the best and shortest way serve the common task of confidence-building in general and of providing assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States vis-à-vis any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in particular.

The agreement reached last year at the Stockholm Conference reflects the fact that Europe has already appreciated this notion, whereas unfortunately in other regions, especially in the disturbed areas and hot beds of tension, it has yet to be understood as it must be.

I have now to address one of the most important items of the agenda of the Conference, namely, chemical weapons. As a nation which has suffered most from the use of such barbaric weapons, I would like to assert that perhaps we

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

are the most eligible member of the international community in giving a full assessment of the inhuman and devastating effects of the use of such weapons.

I need not embark upon any elaboration of technicalities. The numerous technical and medical reports prepared by United Nations expert missions dispatched to the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to have direct on-site inspections, have been made available to all Members of the United Nations. I would like rather to address some other important aspects of the matter.

First, the intensified, continuous and systematic use of chemical weapons by Iraq after the Security Council's condemnations of 26 March 1986, which unfortunately did not result in any effective international preventive reaction, bears witness, once more, to the fact that repetitious use of these weapons by Iraq has weakened the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to an unprecedented degree.

This fact substantiates the validity and necessity of the view once expressed in this very forum by one of the distinguished members of this Conference, that it is time for all we signatories to that Protocol, through one international announcement, re-express our commitments to this Protocol, as well as our determination to prevent any further violation of it by all international ways and means. I would like to repeat this appeal here to the Conference to consider seriously this very important suggestion which I am confident will reinforce the Protocol.

Secondly, some countries, in particular some of the members of this Conference, have already adopted a measure which in our view have been quite positive and effective. They have put a ban on the export to Iraq of any material which may be susceptible of being used as a chemical agent in chemical warfare.

While I would like to express my appreciation for such measures, I should stress that this must be a collective international practice, otherwise Iraq will find these materials on some other markets. Not only that, but the number of banned items, because of rather simple manufacturing technology, should be substantially increased, and cover all suspicious and potentially dangerous substances. The banning of the exportation of such items should be established through the United Nations as an international obligatory practice, and not be left only to the political will of States.

We expect this Conference seriously to consider this task. Needless to say, such arrangements should not only apply to our case but should also be an established procedure for any occasions of such a nature.

Thirdly, we have fortunately witnessed in recent months that positive initiatives for the total ban of the use, production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons have been introduced, on the regional as well as international scale.

I cannot but express here our satisfaction at the initiative of your own Government, Mr. President, regarding a chemical-weapon-free zone in a part of Europe. I hope that this initiative will soon be realized and thus encourage other countries to embark upon similar initiatives. However, I have to stress

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

that the lack of political will by some States shown in the United Nations General Assembly to adopt a more effective resolution in this connection, will raise doubts regarding the initiatives put forward by both blocs. Here I would like to say that the unilateral and multilateral position of all countries vis-à-vis the use of chemical weapons should once and for all remain independent from bilateral concerns of all countries. I would like to express our appreciation to those members of the Conference who have addressed and expressed concerns on the continuation and intensification of the use of chemical warfare by Iraq during the past CD sessions. Meanwhile we cannot ignore the fact that a few States, despite their international responsibilities, have failed to present any position in this connection.

This cannot be interpreted as anything other than deliberately overlooking the main issues of the work of this Conference at the expense of our common goals. I hope that this regretful practice will not be continued in this forum, and that all members will bear in mind that the world community seizes every opportunity to put our seriousness at test. Here I would like to bring to your attention that the last chemical weapons were used on 19 March 1987 and I would like to repeat, on 19 March 1987, and as a result great damage was inflicted. I hope that this time all members of this Conference will take clear positions against the continuation of such crimes.

Fourthly, the unprecedented level of the use of chemical warfare in recent years has proved beyond doubt that the effective implementation of the international convention on the production, use, stockpiling, transfer and development of chemical weapons is an urgent imperative. Any further postponement of the submission of the draft to the General Assembly under whatever pretext is not acceptable. However, we share the views expressed by those States which attach great importance to the issue of compliance. While an international verification and on-site inspection system is an undeniable necessity, the ultimate confidence in the convention would not be provided unless international punitive measures against any serious and deliberate violations of the convention would also be provided.

The Iraqi practice must always be kept in mind. The United Nations expert teams dispatched to our country to verify the use of chemical weapons have on numerous occasions come out with clear verified cases. At this point we would like to express our appreciation to those States which have, by convening educative international gatherings, enhanced public awareness about the inhuman effects of the use of these weapons.

Such endeavours will undoubtedly have substantial positive effects. Efforts by some of the Nordic countries are also impressive. Research programmes on verification of the implications of chemical weapons are still going on and we are awaiting the results. Similarly, research on the effects of the deployment of chemical weapons on the environment as well as remedies for chemically afflicted people and other research efforts are noteworthy.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Finally, a chronological table and other specifications about the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi régime has been provided in the annex */ for the further knowledge of the distinguished representatives.

I have not addressed the remaining agenda items, not because we do not appreciate the significance of every subject, but rather because the problem of the use of chemical weapons which our nation at the very moment is involved with, has compelled me to devote the main part of my intervention to this very important issue.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

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The Geneva and Reykjavik summits and the various statements which followed them, the developments in the bilateral disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the recent proposals on that subject are all factors whose impact is in the final analysis decisive and determines the way our work progresses.

We must fully grasp the possibilities of progress they offer, although these possibilities vary depending on whether we are talking about nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or outer space, the three major areas on which our concerns are focussed at present.

The current process of negotiation on chemical weapons is the best illustration of the success which the Conference can attain when it is in tune with the basic concerns of the major Powers.

Here my delegation would like to pay tribute to the former Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and to the present chairman, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, for so capably catching this favourable tide in order to speed up and intensify the work of the Committee and its working groups and thus quickly resolve a number of issues and open up prospects for settling many others.

Thus, the principles of on-site verification of the destruction of chemical weapons and of the destruction of production facilities for such weapons have for the first time been set down in the draft treaty.

In the field of challenge inspection, so crucial for the safety of the future convention, the negotiations have taken what we feel to be a promising turn, bearing in mind the earlier fundamental conflicts of views. In particular, the United Kingdom proposal contained in document CD/715 contributed to this favourable development which we hope will continue in the future. There seems to be a more widespread feeling that an ambitious solution is both necessary and attainable. Success in such an unprecedented undertaking as the verified elimination of a whole category of arms justifies unprecedented remedies. Belgium's preference goes to a set of rules which will be no less stringent in the constraints imposed upon any party faced with a request for inspection than the other obligations contained in the convention. Here we must avoid any discrimination amongst the parties depending on the importance of their military or economic potential, the size of their territory or any other reason. An important question facing us all is whether it can be left to a State party, whichever State party it may be, to determine in the final analysis whether a facility located on its territory comes under the convention or not.

(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

In the field of the verification of non-production of chemical weapons, article 6, we have managed to lay the foundations of three verification régimes with lists of products whose production, processing and international trade would be subject to international verification. These are either well-known chemical warfare agents, such as choking agents, blister agents, blood agents, incapacitants or nerve gases, or their key precursors. Some of these products have peaceful applications and are produced by industry for that purpose. We have started to recognize the legitimacy of peaceful industrial activities relating to those chemical products which have a dual purpose and which in some countries are or have been used for armaments purposes. We are especially pleased at this shift towards what we feel to be common sense, which was indeed something whose slow pace was a source of concern to us.

My delegation has very frequently repeated here that total, permanent and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons is one of the main priorities for Belgium in the field of disarmament. His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran has again this morning illustrated the acute, urgent human, moral and political necessity of this by referring to facts which we cannot but condemn categorically.

Belgium would like to see the convention concluded without delay. My country will spare no effort to achieve this, and is happy that its representatives currently have the opportunity of making a specific contribution to this goal, by chairing the working group dealing with chemical disarmament proper, i.e. the elimination of chemical weapons and their production facilities, whose work seems to be promising.

It is our belief that if the Conference manages to maintain the present transparency of the negotiations, the conclusion of a chemical disarmament convention is something we can achieve much sooner than might have been thought.

The realism which is so beneficial in the negotiations on chemical weapons has not been lacking in the Conference in the second area of its concerns, outer space.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

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To turn now specifically to subjects under consideration in this Conference, I should like to start with that of chemical weapons on which the most progress has been made. We welcome the skill and vigour with which Ambassador Ekéus is pursuing his task as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. As he knows, he has the full support of my delegation and my own personal support in his work as Chairman. The same applies to the three Co-ordinators, Mr. Niewenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch, in their

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(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

systematic work. We appreciate the practical contribution that has been made in this field by the workshops held during this session in Finland and in the German Democratic Republic.

The United Kingdom has tabled as a contribution to the negotiations a series of papers on different aspects of the convention, several on the verification of non-production, one on the constitution of the organization that will need to be set up under the convention, and most recently on challenge inspection. The proposals tabled last July by the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Renton, for Article IX of the Treaty, remain firmly on the table. Mr. Gorbachev confirmed to Mrs. Thatcher during her visit to Moscow that the Soviet Union accepted broadly the British approach. We welcome the greater readiness the Soviet Union has shown in this area as in some others to consider effective verification. It is an important step down the road to building the confidence between States that must be fundamental for our convention.

Our work on verification has thrown into relief that further practical work remains to be done in other areas of the draft convention. In particular, we must resolve how to provide for effective administration of the convention. It is becoming clear that the organization to be set up under Article VIII will need to be effective from the moment the convention comes into force. It will need to provide inspectors immediately to conduct initial inspection and evaluation of declarations and to provide effective international monitoring of destruction of stocks and production facilities. Verification of certain sectors of the civil chemical industry under Article VI of the convention will also be required at an early stage. A trained corps of inspectors will be needed to conduct challenge inspection under Article IX. In addition the organization will have an important task of receiving and collating data reported by States Parties. It will be essential to have an effective organization in which all parties will have confidence. To achieve this aim we must consider now how it is to be recruited, trained, equipped and paid for.

Further work is needed on the régimes for the different schedules of substances under Article VI and their relation to the organization. A mechanism for revising schedules will also be essential.

Nor must we lose sight that if our convention is to be effective, it must be global. As the distinguished representative of the United States asked recently, we wonder why more countries have not stated whether or not they possess chemical weapons? My delegation has made its position clear on many occasions but we willingly do so again. The United Kingdom unilaterally abandoned its chemical warfare capability in the 1950s. We believe, as Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Gorbachev agreed in Moscow, that the conclusion of an effective chemical weapons convention is one of the top priorities.

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

We do not share this fatalistic outlook because our experience is in itself a reason for optimism. I am thinking of the fact that bacteriological weapons have been banned and we hope to succeed in banning chemical weapons and that most if not all States, and particularly the Soviet Union and the United States accept the idea that nuclear weapons should be banned. Why then should we not try and break the vicious circle of the arms race with all its sequel of extremely harmful consequences for peace, for growth and for development. Why should we not try to take a short cut by banning this new class of weapons -- space weapons -- before they are developed, before they jeopardize the security, indeed the very existence of each of our countries, before they swallow up vast resources which are so vitally needed today in order to carry out the transition to a new civilization, a civilization based on other technological foundations, on other consumption models, on other forms of behaviour in respect of the environment. Countries which have neither the means nor the ambition to become space Powers cannot remain indifferent to the absolutely catastrophic consequences of this new arms race. In our increasingly interdependent world, its effects will be felt by all peoples, whether large and powerful or small and weak.

The ongoing negotiations show how difficult it is to rid ourselves of chemical weapons and of nuclear weapons. Why leave our successors the difficult legacy of trying to rid themselves of these weapons which in a few decades will have turned the heavens into a real hell. It is infinitely easier, from the technical and political standpoint, to ban something that does not yet exist than something that does exist and is perceived as a threat. This is the very central idea which the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should take as the basis for its work. This also applies to the entire concept of new weapons of mass destruction, including radiological weapons.

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(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

As far as the prohibition of chemical weapons is concerned, like many other delegations we have also welcomed the new positions expressed by the Soviet delegation in the statements of 24 November 1986, 17 February 1987 and 5 March 1987, intended to contribute to finding solutions to certain crucial problems: the declaration of chemical weapons stocks, and their verification, the non-production of chemical weapons by civilian industry, and international on-site inspection including challenge inspection. We also welcome the new measures recently announced by the Soviet Union, particularly the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and the beginning of the construction of a facility for the destruction of stocks. These are important steps which should help confidence-building and facilitate the conclusion of the convention.

We consider that, on the basis of results achieved in the intersessional period, the new proposals which I have mentioned and the willingness of all delegations, remarkable results have been achieved, particularly in the first part of the session. Thus thanks to the personal qualities and the dedication of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, and the Group Co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch, and through the contributions of delegations, sizeable progress has been achieved in the drafting of article IV and its annex regarding chemical weapon stocks, as well as in the clarification of certain elements of article VI and its annexes on non-production of chemical weapons in civilian industry, and article VIII on the Consultative Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

It will be most important to get the green light from our capitals at the earliest possible time for mutual acceptable solutions to problems which have not yet been settled. Equally important is the duty to refrain from any action which at this stage could complicate or slow down the pace of the negotiations and the reaching of agreement on essential substantive elements regarding the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

It would not be reasonable to ask States to give up their security interests. But it is legitimate to demand that certain perceptions of these interests and of how to guarantee them should be given up. If we do not agree as early as possible on the need to take a new approach to security problems, we may arrive at other agreements, undoubtedly useful for the international climate, but we shall not be able to avert the deadly danger weighing upon mankind.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

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The participants in the Conference are aware of our concrete proposals on verification of compliance with future agreements on the prohibition of chemical weapons, on the cessation of nuclear tests, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as well as on other matters. Our concept of verification encompasses the whole spectrum of arms and armed forces. Needless to say, the Soviet Union pays due attention to other States' proposals on verification, and participates in the joint elaboration of the

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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

most effective forms of verification. I repeat that we regard verification as an essential component of effective agreements, if it is a question of the real limitation, reduction and elimination of arms, armed forces or military activity.

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(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The objectives of strengthening European security would also be enhanced by a measure such as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in central Europe, and the Soviet Union supports the appeal addressed by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia to the Federal Republic of Germany on the subject, and would be ready to withdraw on a reciprocal basis all its nuclear systems from such a corridor and guarantee its status. The implementation of the proposals by Bulgaria, Romania and Greece on a nuclear and chemical weapon-free zone in the Balkans would be of great importance.

We believe that in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons the necessary prerequisites have been created to allow us this very year to find solutions to outstanding issues and to draw up an international convention on the subject.

The Soviet Union regards the speedy finalization of negotiations on a general and complete ban on chemical weapons as one of the main objectives of its foreign policy. On this basis, the Soviet Union has recently presented a number of important major initiatives with a view to establishing the necessary conditions to accelerate and intensify negotiations on the convention.

In his Prague statement, General Secretary Gorbachev announced new practical steps on the part of my country in this direction. The Soviet Union has ceased production of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union does not have any chemical weapons outside its borders. Construction of a special facility for the destruction of chemical-weapon stocks has begun in the Soviet Union. The commissioning of this facility will allow the rapid implementation of the process of chemical disarmament once the international convention was concluded. Here I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu, for the high appreciation he expressed today of the steps we have taken.

In making such steps, the Soviet Union proceeds from the firm assumption that the chemical weapons convention will be ready for signature in 1987. This, naturally, requires that States must begin now to take practical measures to prepare for the implementation of the obligation they will take upon themselves as parties to the future convention.

As with other measures for real disarmament, the Soviet Union is seeking to establish the most stringent system of verification, including international verification, regarding the elimination of chemical weapons and the industrial base for their manufacture. On the basis of such an approach, we are prepared to look for mutually acceptable solutions to questions related to compliance with the convention by all parties and to confidence-building among them. I note with satisfaction the positive attitude of the United Kingdom towards our steps in the area of effective verification of compliance with the future convention.

I wish to emphasize once again that the Soviet Union, which is consistently in favour of the speedy elaboration of the convention this very year, will continue to do its utmost to achieve decisive progress towards

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

agreement on the elimination of chemical arsenals. Now it is up to the United States and the NATO countries to show their political will, realism and high sense of responsibility. Then this year, 1987, would see the commencement of general and complete chemical disarmament.

These are the comments our delegation wished to put forward in connection with the distribution in the Conference on Disarmament of the foreign policy section of the statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which contained important new proposals on the limitation of the arms race, disarmament and confidence-building.

Another positive fact in our view is that there has been a dialogue with the Federal Republic of Germany on chemical weapons. Asking it more vigorous and productive would be a promising contribution to the elimination of the chemical threat both in Central Europe and with a view to the universal prohibition of these weapons.

However, one has to see that the process of their elimination cannot be an automatic one. There still exists the risk of the launching of a new dangerous round of chemical armaments.

Our therefore cannot give to the so-called "dual solution" which is one branch demands the elimination of chemical weapons and, at the same time, the deployment of binary weapons. Nor will the necessity of Europe benefit from the industrialist position hiding behind the theory about the allegedly limited and purely deterrent capacity of chemical weapons. Doubts are raised also by the means of a dual inspection regime imposing criteria that are stricter for some countries than for others.

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(Mr. Choussier, Czechoslovakia)

We therefore deemed it necessary to respond to the situation that had been created in a joint appeal by the Committee of Ministers addressed first Moscow in all States as well as to the Conference. Not to take steps that would complicate the conclusion of a Convention. Not to delay chemical weapons on foreign territory and to remove them from where they have already been deployed. This applies to Europe as well as to all other continents. It would, after all, be neither logical nor acceptable if one part were working for the optimum solution of the complex problem of verification and the other were preparing the modernization of chemical weapons and yet further complicating such verification.

...
(Mr. Chňoupek, Czechoslovakia)

Another important statement made by the Soviet leader in Prague was that the Soviet Union had halted the manufacture of chemical weapons, that it did not have such weapons deployed outside its borders, and that it had started the construction of a special plant for their elimination. In this context I should like to emphasize once again before this forum that we attach particular importance to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons and their elimination, which is also one of the key priorities in the negotiations of this Conference. I want to underline that its consideration during the recent session of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States in Moscow was marked by the determination to do everything for the elaboration already this year of a relevant international convention. There are realistic prospects at hand for precisely such a solution. To that end, however, we have to seek other necessary steps, particularly in the sphere of reasonable compromise. We already possess the experience we acquired from the steps we took just a year ago in the initiative for the elimination of the industrial base for the manufacture of chemical weapons. We can furthermore point to the proposals of last autumn for the reliable verification of the non-manufacture of chemical weapons in the civilian sector. We may also draw upon the recently submitted proposals concerning the declaration of chemical weapons stockpiles stating their location and relating to important aspects of verification.

Another positive fact in our view is that along with the German Democratic Republic we have been conducting a dialogue with the Federal Republic of Germany on chemical weapons. Making it more vigorous and productive would be a promising contribution to the elimination of the chemical threat both in Central Europe and with a view to the universal prohibition of these weapons.

However, one has to see that the process of their elimination cannot be an automatic one. There still exists the risk of the launching of a new dangerous round of chemical armaments.

One therefore cannot agree to the so-called "dual solution" which in one breath demands the elimination of chemical weapons and, at the same time, the deployment of binary weapons. Nor will the security of Europe benefit from

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(Mr. Chňoupek, Czechoslovakia)

the individualistic position hiding behind the theory about the allegedly limited and purely deterrent capacity of chemical weapons. Doubts are raised also by the scheme of a dual inspection régime imposing criteria that are stricter for some countries than for others.

We therefore deemed it necessary to respond to the situation that had been created in a joint appeal by the Committee of Ministers addressed from Moscow to all States as well as to this Conference: Not to take steps that would complicate the conclusion of a Convention. Not to deploy chemical weapons on foreign territory and to remove them from where they have already been deployed. This applies to Europe as well as to all other continents. It would, after all, be neither logical nor acceptable if one hand were working for the optimum solution of the complex problem of verification and the other were preparing the modernization of chemical weapons and yet further complicating such verification.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

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The "Statement on the Issue of a Ban on Chemical Weapons" adopted by the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member States as a separate document emphasized that the allied States regard a speedy completion of the talks on a total and global ban on chemical weapons as one of the principal objectives of their foreign policy. The Statement calls on all States to help create the necessary conditions for a speedy conclusion of a convention on the subject.

The initiatives on chemical weapons put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Statement in Prague on 10 April translated this call into practical action. We hope that these steps by the Soviet Union will contribute to building confidence among the States parties to the CW negotiations and expect other States to join this process.

To ensure decisive progress towards agreement on eliminating the chemical arsenals, it is now particularly necessary that all participants in the negotiations exercise political will, realism and a high sense of responsibility.

The line of action of those countries in America and Western Europe, which, while stating their commitment to chemical disarmament and

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

participating in the negotiations in the CD, and fully aware of the advanced stage of the negotiations, develop and adopt plans for CW production, cannot but give rise to grave concern. It can be justified from neither the political nor the practical point of view. One cannot help wondering about the real policy of those States -- are they committed to a convention, or do they seek a CW build-up?

The Soviet Union attaches primary importance to questions of verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. At a time when real disarmament measures are under way, verification becomes one of the major means of ensuring security, as Comrade Chnoupek rightly pointed out in his statement today.

We note with satisfaction that our initiatives on verification, along with other countries' proposals, have made it possible to remove many obstacles to the elaboration of a mutually acceptable system of verifying compliance with the convention. These Soviet initiatives took into account the concerns of our partners in the negotiations, including the United States and other Western countries. In so doing we, among other things, wanted to dispel the mistrust on the part of the West, to invite its representatives to an open and honest dialogue on effective international verification. We note the positive ideas on a number of aspects of a future verification system expressed by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Indonesia and other countries.

The problem of challenge inspections is now the central political problem in the negotiations on a CW ban. It runs through the entire convention and without a solution to this problem it is difficult to envisage a finalization of many of the convention's provisions.

We note with satisfaction that discussions of a ban on chemical weapons with the United Kingdom during the recent visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher revealed that the positions of the two sides are close, and even coincide on some aspects, including challenge inspections. The British proposal, contained in document CD/715, is a basis for reaching compromise solutions and we believe maximum use should be made of it as a basis for an agreement.

In our view, the central point in the British proposal is the idea of the possibility of proposing alternative measures. This approach, we believe, will impart the necessary flexibility to the whole system of challenge inspections, and at the same time meets the general concern that challenge inspections should be an effective means of preventing and detecting breaches of the convention's provisions.

We have noted that in the 7 April statement of the United States delegation it was announced that the United States no longer objects to

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discussing alternative measures. We welcome this change. At the same time, the United States continues to argue that alternative measures are unworkable in some cases, for example in cases of suspicion relating to concealed CW stocks. Ambassador Hansen said on 7 April: "It seems obvious that only inspection of the bunker will permit an inspector to determine whether or not there are chemical weapons inside". He also asked the Soviet delegation to explain what alternatives could be used in such a case.

I can say the following in this connection. In our view, if concealed stocks are suspected, alternative measures providing a satisfactory answer can be found (if, naturally, full access is unfeasible). For one thing, one cannot exclude that the challenging State could be satisfied if provided by the challenged party with information allaying its concern. For another thing, it is well known that one of the characteristics of CW stocks is that they require systematic maintenance, monitoring of the condition of munitions and containers with chemical agents, and preventive and protective measures. CW storage facilities require ventilation systems, special sewerage, air filtering and waste water treatment installations, monitoring instruments, etc.

In this context, observation of a suspicious site from outside to detect activities relating to maintenance of CW stocks and the presence of systems for the protection of the maintenance personnel and the environment can be regarded as a possible alternative measure. Collection of air and effluent samples around the facility's perimeter and in the vicinity of treatment installations can provide definite information about whether or not CW stocks are present. On the face of it, one also cannot exclude the possibility of automatic sampling inside storage facilities. Such methods could be discussed in the negotiations. Possible alternative measures in each particular case may vary. It appears, therefore, that the challenged party will be able to find a way of proving compliance (if, of course, it has not violated the convention) even if it does not agree to let inspectors enter the bunker.

Of course, in the discussion of the idea of alternative measures the question arises as to what the procedure should be if the challenging party and the challenged party cannot come to an agreement on the procedure for inspection or resolve the disagreement in a way satisfactory to both parties. This is the so-called "last word" problem: in the final analysis, who should decide how the inspection should be conducted?

Some delegations believe that it is the challenging party which should have the "final say". We believe such a solution would be too simplistic and, in practice, it would not facilitate the joint search for an agreement and the resolution of a controversial situation. It would be much more appropriate to resolve this problem as envisaged in the British paper, which says that in the event that the challenging State considers the alternative measures proposed by the challenged State to be unsatisfactory, the obligation of the latter to convince the challenging State that it is in compliance with its obligations will continue to apply.

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The inclusion of a provision in the convention to the effect that the "final say" on the inspection procedure should belong to the challenging State does not create conditions for a mutually acceptable solution, for the challenging party will thus have no interest in agreeing on alternative measures. After all, in such a case the challenging party will just have to wait until the time-frame for proposing and agreeing on alternatives expires, and then the inspection will go ahead according to its initial demand. Of course, under these circumstances there can be no serious negotiations on alternatives and the very idea of proposing such measures is called into question.

If it were accepted that challenge inspections are to be completely automatic in all cases, then we would achieve clarity in one respect only: a refusal to accept an inspection would mean violation of the convention. But such clarity can prove misleading, for the main question -- whether or not the suspected State has chemical weapons -- will remain unresolved. After all, this should be our task, and not the purely formal accusation against a State of violating any provision of the convention. In our view, such purely formal accusations, particularly if abused, may weaken the convention and undermine its authority.

In our view, in the event that it proves impossible to agree on alternative measures, all facts relevant to the matter and all proposals of the parties should be submitted for consideration to an international authority to be established under the convention which, having considered all the circumstances, would evaluate each party's case and would be in a position to decide that there is a case of non-compliance by a two-thirds majority. We believe that negotiating alternative measures in good faith should constitute one of the obligations under the convention.

One of the elements of challenge inspections is the question whether it would be appropriate to have in this mechanism a body which would decide whether a particular challenge is justified and whether the inspection should be carried out -- in other words, would act, as it were, as sort of a filter.

We appreciate the concern of those countries which are afraid that without a "filter" there would be a possibility for abuse of the right to make a challenge. Presumably, the Fact-Finding Panel proposed in the United States paper (CD/500) is meant to act as such a "filter". One should think that it is hardly to be expected that a body which is so undemocratic in its composition and method of decision-making could have the support of the participants in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. We would prefer to have the Executive Council act as a "filter". At the same time, in the view of the Soviet delegation, the question as to whether or not there will be a "multilateral filter" in the Convention is not an essential issue. If the participants in the negotiations feel that the convention should not provide for any "filters" at all and that, as provided in the British paper,

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challenge inspections should be carried out by a technical secretariat without the Executive Council getting involved, we could consider such an arrangement as well, provided, of course, that all other issues relating to challenge inspections are resolved.

I would like to emphasize that, for the Soviet delegation, the fundamental point in the challenge inspection procedure, as, by the way, in all other elements of the convention, is the requirement of complete equality of the contracting parties, the absence of any discrimination against the socialist countries and the socialist form of property. We proceed from the belief that the procedure for making a challenge, conducting inspections and evaluating their results should put the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries in an equal position and give them equal rights and opportunities. Any departure from this provision, we are convinced, would lead to diminished security of the party treated in a discriminatory way.

Conditions are now favourable for a speedy elaboration of an international convention on a total and comprehensive CW ban. The necessary preconditions have been created for finding, this year, solutions to the outstanding issues, taking into account the totality of the proposals made in the Conference on Disarmament. We share the assessment of the state of affairs at the negotiations made by Ambassador K. Hacene of Algeria in his statement of 2 April: "agreement has still to be reached on significant aspects of the future convention, but this should not deter us from our objective of concluding this instrument". Quite a number of countries have come out in favour of finalizing the convention this year, including Australia, the United Kingdom, Egypt, India, Kenya, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sri Lanka and others. The Soviet Union, together with other Warsaw Treaty member States, believes that the year 1987 can and must mark the beginning of general and complete chemical disarmament. The real opportunity to eliminate chemical weapons and remove the chemical threat to all mankind once and for all should not be missed.

Here I should like to express full agreement with Comrade Chňoupek's statement to the effect that a "dual" solution, involving the elimination of chemical weapons together with the build-up of binary weapons, is unacceptable. This approach of justifying the alleged deterrent nature of chemical weapons cannot fail to do serious harm to the negotiations.

I wish to refer today to one more question. Yesterday, the Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, convened pursuant to the decision of the Second Review Conference, ended its work. That Convention, prepared in our forum in 1972, still remains the only real disarmament measure that has banned a whole class of weapons of mass destruction.

The work of the Meeting was devoted to negotiating practical measures for building confidence among the States Parties to the Convention and developing co-operation in the peaceful use of the achievements of biology. Overall, we are satisfied with its results, although, in our view, the agreements could have been broader. Nevertheless, the results already achieved -- agreements

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on the exchange of information on the activities of a certain number of research centres, on mutual notification of unusual outbreaks of infectious diseases, on broadening contacts among scientists, on encouraging publication of the results of research -- will all contribute to building confidence among the Parties to the Convention and enhancing its effectiveness.

We intend to continue to work actively towards raising the authority of the Convention, in particular through strengthening its verification system with regard to compliance. Our proposals to this effect, inter alia on the elaboration of an appropriate additional protocol and a special conference for this purpose, as well as the proposals on extensive confidence-building measures and all-round development of international co-operation in the biological field, still stand and we invite other Parties to the Convention to continue the businesslike and productive dialogue.

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Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): . . .

Today, the Chinese delegation would like to make some observations on agenda item 4, "Chemical Weapons".

The prohibition of chemical weapons has always been a matter of great concern to the international community. The countries of the world have made

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(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

protracted efforts for a complete prohibition of this heinous weapon. The United Nations General Assembly has adopted on many occasions resolutions calling on the Conference on Disarmament to work out a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons at an early date. This has reflected the common desire and aspirations of the world's people. However, what arouses concern and disquiet is the fact that since the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical weapons more than half a century ago, incidents involving the use of this weapon have kept on occurring from time to time; while the threat posed by the existing large stockpiles of chemical weapons remains undiminished, the rapid development of science and technology has provided new possibilities for the production and improvement of chemical weapons, and the security of all countries is subjected to even greater threat. All this has added to the urgency of concluding a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament has conducted negotiations on chemical weapons for many years. Thanks to the joint efforts of all countries, many issues concerning the future convention have been solved and some of the provisions have been drafted. Now the work of formulating the convention has entered a crucial stage. If agreement could be reached in principle among various parties on some major outstanding issues, the remaining technical details would not be difficult to work out. In their statements, many delegations have expressed the hope that major progress would be made in this year's negotiations. They are pleased at the resumption of the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee by Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, a distinguished and experienced diplomat working with a spirit of enterprise. We share those sentiments and we appreciate the constructive efforts he has made in promoting the negotiations, and we wish that his efforts will yield positive results. Here I would also like to extend our thanks to his predecessors, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Turbanski of Poland for their valuable work. Our appreciation also goes to the competent Co-ordinators for their arduous efforts.

The fundamental objective of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is to eliminate the threat to the people of the world posed by this type of detestable weapon. Therefore, the priority issue that should be addressed by the Convention is the elimination of all the existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and their production facilities. The States possessing chemical weapons are obliged to declare and destroy their stockpiles and production facilities under international verification. In this regard I would like to welcome the compromise and flexibility displayed by some delegations on certain issues which have long been subjects of controversy. With respect to the order of destruction, the Chinese delegation has proposed that the most toxic and harmful chemical warfare agents be destroyed first so as to ensure the security of all States. It has further introduced the concept of "stockpile equivalent" and its calculating formula as a technical contribution to the early solution of the issues concerning the destruction. In view of its complex nature, this issue undoubtedly calls for further in-depth study and discussion. We hope that specific provisions on the destruction of chemical weapons and its verification acceptable to all parties can be worked out at an early date

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after further consultations and negotiations. Obviously, an appropriate settlement of the issue of destruction will have a favourable impact on the solution of other outstanding issues.

In the process of eliminating the existing chemical weapon stockpiles and their production facilities and after their total destruction, ways should also be found to prevent the production of new chemical weapons. While the States Parties enjoy the right to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for peaceful purposes, they also have the obligation not to use their chemicals for purposes prohibited by the convention. Therefore, the non-production of chemical weapons by the civil chemical industry is yet another important issue to be addressed by the future convention. This has a direct bearing on the States Parties' confidence in the convention and on its effectiveness. In recent years, a series of proposals and working papers on the issue of non-production put forward by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia respectively have been useful to the discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. After the inter-sessional consultations of last winter and the resumed meeting of last January, the Ad Hoc Committee has formulated, on a preliminary basis, lists of chemicals relevant to the convention and their verification régimes. Not long ago, the Ad Hoc Committee further deliberated the issues of the modality of revision of the lists, the frequency of inspections and spot checks. The discussions have resulted in the clarification of issues and the identification of differences and therefore are conducive to our future work. Now I would like to state the views of the Chinese delegation on the issue of non-production.

In our opinion, in order to ensure that civil chemical enterprises do not produce chemical weapons, the chemical enterprises of all States should accept international monitoring, including on-site inspections. The monitoring and verification measures should be effective, reasonable and feasible. By effective, we mean that measures should be sufficient to prevent enterprises from diverting chemicals for weapon purposes so as to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the convention; by reasonable, we mean that the measures should not exceed certain necessary limits so as not to impair the legitimate interests of the enterprises or obstruct their management and development; by feasible, we mean that the measures should be acceptable to all States Parties and that their implementation does not require excessive human and financial resources. In a word, we should strive for the maximum verification effect with minimum cost.

Those basic ideas have been shared by many delegations during our deliberations. It is widely felt that only those facilities whose capacity is above a certain limit and may pose a risk to the objective of the convention should be subject to international verification. It has also been agreed that those facilities producing and using the key precursors contained in the lists should be subject to international routine on-site inspections; whereas those facilities producing chemicals that have extensive civilian uses but that can also be used for chemical-weapon purposes may be subject to a data-reporting system.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

To us, the following situation and factors should be taken into account when formulating specific inspection procedures and determining frequency of inspection of the facilities producing and using key precursors.

Firstly, key targets should be identified so as to avoid an overspread of resources to no avail. Verification should focus on those facilities that pose a greater threat to the objective of the convention because non-production verification covers many aspects as well as numerous facilities. In this way, we could enhance the efficiency of the inspection and improve its cost-effectiveness. To that end, negotiations should be conducted to agree on a "threshold value", taking into account the different chemicals. Data-reporting will be sufficient for the facilities which are below the "threshold value", as they only pose a negligible threat to the objective of the convention, and therefore, could be excluded from the scope of routine on-site inspection.

Secondly, the frequency and intensity of on-site inspection should be determined according to the relevant chemicals produced by the facilities as well as the characteristics of the facilities themselves. As for the chemicals produced by those facilities, their risk to the objective of the convention increases in direct proportion with the level of toxicity of the end products evolved and the closeness of being able to produce compounds prohibited by the convention, i.e. chemical warfare agents. As for the characterization of a facility, it comprises various factors. In order to facilitate the determination of frequency and intensity of inspections, the factors should be classified according to their respective importance, taking the principal one as the basis and the others as points of reference. Among the factors relating to the characteristics of those facilities which produce key precursors, the production capacity is the most crucial element, while for the facilities using key precursors, the consumption quantity is the key factor. Thus, we are of the view that in determining the frequency and intensity of inspections, the level of toxicity of end-products, the production capacity of the facilities and the quantity of consumption constitute the main elements.

Thirdly, due regard should be given to the legitimate interests of enterprises, and steps should be taken to protect commercial and technical confidentiality. This question involves several factors, including both the human factor (inspectors) and the technical factor. In carrying out inspections, efforts should concentrate on setting an appropriate scope, which would cover primarily those parts which are likely to be diverted for the purpose of weapon production rather than going into the technical details of the related enterprises. For enterprises producing key precursors, the scope of verification should be limited to the process which starts with immediately direct raw materials and ends with the output of the compounds concerned; as for enterprises using key precursors, the scope should only cover the sections involving the use of key precursors up to the formation of compounds unrelated to the convention, not the whole process of forming end-products.

With regard to facilities producing chemicals which are used extensively for civilian purposes and which at the same time could be used for weapons purposes, in view of their great number and the large quantity of chemical

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

industrial products produced which do not pose a great threat to the objective of the convention, the data-reporting system should not be devised in an over-complicated manner so as to avoid placing an excessive burden on those enterprises. In certain cases, an enterprise may produce a compound in its production process relevant to the convention, but instead of being separated, the compound is immediately subject to the next step of chemical reaction which would result in a chemical product not prohibited by the convention. In this case, the enterprise would not be required to report the relevant data, for such a declaration would be unfeasible owing to the fact that the intermediate chemical substance thus formed is not separated, measured or stockpiled.

Opinions still differ among various parties on the issue of a "spot check" for facilities covered by the data-reporting system. In our view, as most of the chemicals produced by those facilities are the raw materials of key precursors, the provisions of an effective verification régime governing the facilities producing or using key precursors would suffice to a large extent in forestalling chemical enterprises from producing chemical weapons. Of course, this issue is still open to discussion before a satisfactory solution is arrived at.

In spite of the difficulties involved with the issue of verification of non-production, due to its complexity, we still believe that through our common endeavours a régime which is both effective and not detrimental to the legitimate interests of chemical enterprises could be worked out. Compared with the verification of non-production, challenge inspection stands out as an even more difficult task, because the former only relates to routine inspections under normal conditions, while the latter relates to inspections of a special nature under exceptional circumstances. Up to now, the divergence over challenge inspection has shown little sign of narrowing. It is our hope that with consultations and negotiations in various forms and through different channels, a breakthrough will result on this key issue so as to remove a major obstacle in the way to the convention.

At the present stage of negotiations, the destruction of chemical weapons, the verification of non-production and challenge inspection are the major outstanding issues which call for priority attention. Apart from these, however, some other important issues remain to be addressed, one of which being that of definition. In the course of our negotiations, the Chinese delegation and some other delegations have felt that the definition of chemical weapons as it stands now is deficient and easily leads to conceptual confusions. Therefore, it needs to be further examined. For that purpose, we stand ready to engage in consultations and discussions with other delegations in order to find an appropriate solution.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Thus, a task is formulated in the Final Document which is in perfect harmony with the principle that bilateral and multilateral negotiations must complement and stimulate each other. In order for that task to be tackled in a very practical manner, it appears desirable to define, in a way acceptable to all, what we mean by "nuclear weapon". This definition would also have to cover the relevant means of delivery. What is needed, too, is to solve the problem posed by dual-capable means of delivery. In addition, the term "elimination" must be clarified. In the light of what the negotiations on a CW convention have taught us, it seems necessary to determine whether "elimination" would always be synonymous with physical liquidation or whether conversion to peaceful purposes would be possible as well.

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Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I am taking the floor on behalf of my Ambassador, who is on leave of absence, to inform the distinguished representative present here of sad news we have recently received from Tehran.

The events in question occurred last week, on the same day that our Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressing this very Conference, said:

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

"The intensified, continuous and systematic use of chemical weapons by Iraq after the Security Council's condemnation on 26 March 1986, which unfortunately did not result in any effective international preventive reaction, bears witness, once more, to the fact that repetitious use of these weapons by Iraq has weakened the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on an unprecedented scale."

He went on to say:

"Here I would like to bring to your attention that chemical weapons were last used on 19 March 1987 and as a result great damage was inflicted. I hope that this time all members of this Conference will take clear positions against the continuation of such crimes."

Sadly enough, before the departure of our Minister from Geneva, the Iraqi régime once again used chemical weapons on a large and unprecedented scale. In the Karbala 8 theatre of operation in southern Iran, the Iraqis used chemical weapons in the following instances:

On 7 April 1987: (1) Twelve rockets of mustard agents were dropped by planes. (2) Thirty-two shells carrying blistering agents were fired by artillery in the morning. Six persons were killed in Pentagon defense lines as the result.

On 8 April 1987, the following weapons were used: (1) Two rockets containing blood agents. (2) Two rockets containing blood agents again at night. (3) Three artillery shells of blister type, in the afternoon. (4) Five mortar shells of blister type, in the afternoon. (5) Chemical bombardment by helicopter which left seven persons injured.

On 9 April 1987: a number of chemical shells of mustard gas were used.

On 10 and 11 April 1987, the following weapons were used: (1) Twenty mortar shells of mustard gas at night. (2) Forty rockets during the day and night, leaving 120 persons injured. (3) Fifty chemical bombs and shells were dropped by planes and fired by artillery during the night.

Also on the night of 10 April 1987, a part of the city of Khoramshahr in the south of the country was chemically shelled and as a result 21 municipal workers were killed and a number of other civilians were injured.

In this connection, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his messages to the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the Red Cross, protested against this inhuman crime.

In the message to the United Nations Secretary-General, it is stated that "this is the first time that residential areas in the Islamic Republic of Iran have been subjected to chemical attacks by the Iraqi régime. Furthermore, new substances are being used in recent attacks. Attacks on municipal

(Mr. Mashhadi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

installations and deployment of new substances are new and dangerous developments in the course of numerous crimes committed by the Iraqi régime. The new situation, therefore, demands a more decisive and different approach than before. Continuation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq at a time when the draft of the new Convention is going through its last stages is undoubtedly ridiculing and weakening this valuable international endeavour." The message also calls on the Secretary-General promptly to dispatch an inspection team to probe into the consequences of new chemical attacks.

We hope that this time the international community and the world's conscience will act promptly to condemn such barbaric acts in the twentieth century.

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(Mr. Štejn, Yugoslavia)

The organization and the manner of work adopted in the preparation of the Convention could, however, be a guideline for Conference work on other agenda items. A decisive point in that respect was the fact that we have not exhausted ourselves in endless discussions over procedural questions, and that the Conference and the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have complemented each other in their work.

Much credit for such results goes to the Chairman of the Committee, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekus, and to the three co-ordinators, Mr. Niewuchwa, Mr. Macédo and Dr. Kruttsch.

My delegation hopes that this process will serve to stimulate the Conference not to diminish its activities, to strengthen the spirit of mutual understanding and accord, and to foster awareness of the responsibilities of all delegations at the Conference to reach this goal as early as possible. We trust, therefore, that even on sensitive issues such as on-site challenge inspections or the extent of the convention, adequate solutions will not be hard to find, since they are, in large part, already contained in compromise proposals.

The chemical weapons convention should be not only a code of obligations, but also an instrument for strengthening mutual confidence in international relations, which would, in turn, secure compliance with it. For not even the most sophisticated technical devices are able to ensure control based on mutually recognized interests and trust. This fact should certainly be taken into account when negotiating the extent of the convention.

(Mr. Natwar Singh, India)

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I have been frank in expressing my disappointment at the stagnation of the process of negotiation in this unique multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. This does not mean that we do not see any positive features in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. On the contrary, we value it very much. We do not think that there is any inherent fault in the Conference on Disarmament -- either in its composition, size or procedures. The Conference on Disarmament is an institution of our times and is subject to the policies of the respective Governments that make up its membership. If the Conference on Disarmament has not lived up to the hopes that accompanied its birth, in its present incarnation, in 1978, it is largely a reflection of our individual and collective failings. On the positive side, I would like to mention the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, where some significant progress has been made. I hope that the remaining problems will soon be resolved and a convention concluded at the earliest.

On 3 April 1987: (1) Twelve rockets of mustard agents were dropped by planes. (2) Thirty-two shells carrying blistering agents were fired by artillery in the morning. Six persons were killed in Sontag's defense lines as the result.

On 4 April 1987, the following weapons were used: (1) Two rockets containing blood agents. (2) Two rockets containing blood agents again at night. (3) Three artillery shells of blister type in the afternoon. (4) Five mortar shells of blister type in the afternoon. (5) Chemical mortar shell by helicopter which had never been used before.

On 5 April 1987, a number of chemical shells of mustard gas were used.

On 14 and 15 April 1987, the following weapons were used: (1) Twenty mortar shells of mustard gas at night. (2) Thirty rockets during the day and night, leaving 128 persons injured. (3) Thirty chemical shells and shells were dropped by planes and fired by artillery during the night.

Also on the night of 16 April 1987, a part of the city of Sharamshahr in the south of the country was shelled and as a result 21 municipal workers were killed and a number of other citizens were injured.

In this connection, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his message to the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the United States, protested against this inhuman crime.

In the message to the United Nations Secretary-General, it is stated that "this is the first time that residential areas in the Islamic Republic of Iran have been subjected to chemical attacks by the Iraqi regime. Furthermore, new substances are being used in recent attacks. Attacks on civilians"

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

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The progress made in negotiations on a chemical weapons convention is encouraging. Let us follow it on other items too. We are about to reach common language in this area. The proposals submitted by the Soviet Union during the first part of this year's session paved the way for agreement on some key issues. Overall, with full realism, commitment and political will, it seems that we are on our way to achieving the ultimate goal of elaborating a convention, or at least that we are securing a level of agreement that would thwart possible steps hampering the attainment of this objective in the longer term. Yet we are aware that there are still many outstanding issues, and that it would be dangerous to ignore their complexity.

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(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

The organization and the method of work adopted in the preparation of the CW convention could, however, be a guideline for Conference work on other agenda items. A decisive point in that respect was the fact that we have not exhausted ourselves in endless discussions over procedural questions, and that the Conference and the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have complemented each other in their work.

Much credit for such results goes to the Chairman of the Committee, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, and to the three co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch.

My delegation hopes that this progress will serve to stimulate the Conference not to diminish its activities, to strengthen the spirit of mutual understanding and accord, and to foster awareness of the responsibilities of all delegations at the Conference to reach this goal as early as possible. We trust, therefore, that even on sensitive issues such as on-site challenge inspections or the extent of the convention, adequate solutions will not be hard to find, since they are, in large part, already contained in compromise proposals.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

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But perhaps, above all, we have made some progress in the substance of the items on our agenda. It is clear that such progress is linear, slow, incremental progress, because that is apparently the nature of work on disarmament. Quantum leaps don't come readily in this field. We have made that progress in chemical weapons, in radiological weapons, in outer space and -- yes -- in nuclear testing, where in spite of our extreme difficulties in the last three years, there are more than enough working papers on the table of this Conference to form a fertile basis for further work on nuclear testing. And there has been the splendid work of the Group of Scientific Experts in the field of detection of relevant underground events. And there has been our work towards the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which is I think moving towards a successful conclusion.

So the cynical or dark view of what we have done is not the right view in the opinion of my delegation. More important is to recognize that we have worked in difficult times, sometimes apparently dark times, and we have kept the light burning on the hill.

I would like to look now at four of our agenda items, key areas in which progress is available to us.

The first is chemical weapons. It is widely recognized in the Conference that a convention is at hand, that it is within our reach. It should not take too much longer to bring it to a conclusion. Let no one underestimate the significance of that event to the world, and indeed to the life of this Conference.

Informal consultations in the Conference are focusing at present on the issue of challenge inspection. I think it would be widely agreed that this is an issue that needs to be resolved urgently and satisfactorily so that we can move forward towards the goal of a universal convention. I would like to make a couple of comments on the issue of challenge inspection.

Our approach, the Australian approach, is that such a system is required, that it should be in the Convention. We believe that it should be a mandatory system, but we believe that its application should be at the point of last resort. That should be its main characteristic. The question of the problem

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

of so-called frivolous use of a system of challenge inspection seems to be causing fairly widespread concern. We believe that one should keep this issue carefully in perspective. Let me try and illustrate what I mean.

Surely these are the facts. The basic obligations of the Convention are of fundamental importance. There will be a clear difference between a State which decides to join this Convention and one which does not. Surely, as in other similar treaties, each State will be faced with a choice. Do you want to ban chemical weapons or not? Are you prepared to participate in this system or not?

Having made that choice, and such State will immediately assume some fundamental obligations, and those obligations will be immediately verified. They will have to declare any stockpile they have. Those stockpiles will have to be destroyed, and verification of their destruction made effective. They will have to accept a continuing routine of inspection of the relevant industry to ensure that new supplies of chemical weapons are not produced.

Those are the fundamental obligations, and surely it will be a matter of great importance to see the difference between States that enter into those obligations and those that do not. My point here is that there is some room for good faith in this area, because it is significant to undertake these obligations as against declining to do so. And an element of good faith should be extended to those who have done so as against those who have not.

Further, the Convention itself will surely nurture that good faith and the confidence that is basic to any universal arms control régime. As parties to the Convention increase in number, and our experience grows in applying the daily and routine systems of inspection to ensure that the obligations of the Convention are being fulfilled, so should confidence in the Convention increase.

Now I said that from my delegation's point of view we accept the need for mandatory challenge inspection. Why, in the light of what I have just said about the fundamental obligations of that continuing régime, should this be necessary? Because we must entertain the possibility that, at some stage, there may be a person, a State from within the Convention which would try to avoid its obligations -- what someone else has referred to as the possibility of either an evil person or a mad person seeking to avoid obligations that have been entered into.

Under such circumstances the system of challenge inspection, under which such an eventuality could be brought to notice, would be required. But the development of that system has been questioned on the grounds that it may be open to frivolous use. While this is always possible, that is, the so-called mad person or evil person acting against the system, I think that our concern about that possibility should be kept in its correct perspective. It should not be allowed to come to dominate the other major issues of the Convention.

We should not allow ourselves to enter into a situation in which, when one person calls for a law that says "Thou shalt not kill", someone else points out that it may be broken from time to time, and someone may get

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

killed. If the answer to that situation is to decide not to have a law that says "Thou shalt not kill", the exceptions would be allowed to dominate the fundamental principle. This should not occur.

The way of solving this problem in challenge inspection -- and this is the proposal that we would be grateful if others would consider -- is to consider what rules of evidence need to be developed, what body of practice needs to be agreed, so as to ensure that it would not be sufficient for a State to say "I challenge you", but would have to say "I have evidence that this happened, at this place, on that day. I want to look at it."

Such rules of evidence are common in other fields of law, and could be developed with benefit here. All that that would require is the existence of a body which could ensure quickly that the rules of evidence had been properly applied. I would now like to address the vital issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. No one should doubt the importance of this issue as such and as it relates to the life of this Conference. No one should doubt the right of all of us to be involved in the common goal of preventing an arms race in outer space. No one should doubt either that this is an area in which the Conference will be most closely or harshly judged.

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

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Yesterday was the 72nd anniversary of the first time poison gas was used in warfare. The United States of America deplores the use of chemical weapons in the prolonged war between Iran and Iraq. This tragic state of affairs appears to be duplicated in Kampuchea, where chemical weapons used by the Vietnamese are said to have killed nearly 1,000 civilians. The continued use of chemical weapons demonstrates that an arms control agreement, such as the 1925 Geneva Protocol, cannot rest on solemn vows. In any future chemical weapons ban, there must be legally binding agreements which serve as enforcing mechanisms, which deter States from acquiring such weapons by making the political price of their acquisition too high, and which provide assurance to all States that all other States are in total compliance with the commitments and obligations undertaken. The key to compliance lies in verification.

Secretary Shultz, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and their advisers also discussed the negotiations on a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons being conducted in this Conference. They noted that the United States has facilities for destroying chemical weapons and that the Soviet Union is constructing such a facility. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to have experts visit each other's sites to observe destruction procedures as one step in improving confidence between the States with the largest chemical weapons capabilities. We welcome this move as well as the statement of the distinguished head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Nazarkin, in which he stated a desire to dispel mistrust on the part of the West.

In this context, I am pleased, on behalf of the Government of the United States, to invite Ambassador Nazarkin and appropriate Soviet experts to visit the United States chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele, Utah. This visit would include a visit to a chemical weapons bunker. We suggest this visit be conducted during the week of 19 October this year.

My delegation has also noted the announcement by General Secretary Gorbachev that the Soviet Union has ceased the production of chemical weapons. We make the assumption that in ceasing production, open-air testing of agent stocks and the filling of agents into munitions has also been halted.

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

These actions now being taken by the Soviet Union were taken in 1969 by the United States on a unilateral basis. One need not be well schooled in mathematics to figure out how much agent the Soviet Union could have produced in the 18 or so years which have elapsed since the United States last produced chemical agents. It is also clear that recently manufactured chemical weapons would be technologically more advanced than those produced approximately 20 years ago.

These are some of the considerations which have led the United States Government to reach the decision to modernize its own chemical weapons capability.

Nevertheless, the United States remains committed to reaching an agreement which would lead to the destruction of all the world's chemical warfare capability, ridding humanity of the scourge of these horrible weapons for all time. Such a convention would require agreement on the type of effective verification régime which would both deter violations and provide confidence that commitments freely undertaken were being complied with.

There now appears to be wider recognition in the Conference that effective verification means that doubts about a State's compliance with an agreement must be dealt with through on-site inspection. No one questions that, in the case of allegations of use and doubts about declared locations and facilities, challenge inspections would result in an on-site inspection. There is also movement toward acceptance of similar provisions for making on-site inspection of undeclared production facilities mandatory when a challenge inspection request is made. These are, in the view of my delegation, positive developments which we will study carefully.

In recent days, some discussion has taken place about the utility of alternative measures in dealing with challenge inspections related to undeclared stocks. My delegation has asked how any measure short of entering a bunker could provide assurance that the bunker did not contain chemical munitions. On 16 April, Ambassador Nazarkin attempted to provide an answer. My delegation will of course study the ideas he presented. Nevertheless, air sampling would show that the devices being used did not detect chemicals in the air -- nothing more. Moreover, I would note that the external configuration of a facility may help to define the possible uses of that facility, but it does not define the internal contents. In addition, I would like to observe that storage facilities for chemical weapons stocks in the United States do not always have "ventilation systems, special sewerage and air filtering and waste water treatment installations", of which Ambassador Nazarkin spoke. When he visits our facility in Utah we will be able to demonstrate this fact. All of this leads back to the basic fact that observation of a facility from outside provides no assurance that it does not contain chemical weapons. In a political sense, it seems clear that denying entry completely to the bunker would result in an assumption that it actually contains forbidden materials.

My delegation is not opposed to consideration of alternative measures within the time period allowed before an actual inspection is to commence. Our study and analysis, however, has not led us to discover any suitable

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

alternative to access. And any alternative measure which may warrant consideration must not be used to delay the conduct of an inspection.

In this connection, I would note that general opinion now favours the immediate dispatch of an inspection team to the site to be inspected at the time the challenge inspection request is made. My delegation will also give this recent development its close attention. Similarly, we note a growing trend not to insert any institutional involvement between the inspection request and the conduct of an inspection. The United States position is that a fact-finding panel to deal with the possibility of frivolous inspection requests is necessary, but if the Conference moves toward having no filter at all between the request and the inspection, we shall also give this issue careful study.

No difficulty exists in agreeing with the basic premise voiced by the Soviet delegation on 16 April to the effect that there is a requirement for complete equality of obligation among the States parties to an agreement. I assume that all participants here share that view. The 3 April 1986 amendment to document CD/500 introduced by the United States delegation was intended to reaffirm this principle.

Finally, the negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons on a global scale cannot be reduced to a single issue nor to the concerns of just a few States. If it were so, we might have reached agreement long ago. But each Government represented here must carefully analyse each new idea and determine the manner in which it harmonizes with the policies, principles and national security interests of that Government. We must never forget that the overriding objective is an effective and comprehensive convention which promises greater security for all. The objective can never be just reaching an agreement.

With that thought, I wish to return to where I began. Important events are occurring both within and outside the Conference on Disarmament. The United States will work hard both within and without this forum to promote equitable, verifiable and stabilizing arms reduction agreements. This was the intent of Secretary Shultz's visit to Moscow, which the United States considers to have shown that an agreement on intermediate nuclear force reductions may be possible in the not-too-distant future. This will, of course, still require much consultation and a lot of hard work.

The same holds true for our work in this Conference on Disarmament. The United States delegation sees substantial progress in defining and resolving issues, especially as they relate to the convention on banning chemical weapons, but a lot of hard work remains.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet Foreign Minister, E. Shevardnadze, and United States Secretary of State Shultz, as you know, signed an agreement between the USSR and the United States on co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, providing for joint activities between Soviet and United States scientists in exploration of the solar system, space astronomy and astrophysics, Earth science, the physics of solar-terrestrial communications, and space biology and medicine. There was a productive and substantive comparison of views on other issues of bilateral co-operation which singled out new possibilities for its development and expansion. The visit included a discussion on issues connected with the state of affairs at the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular the question of challenge inspection. The Soviet side pointed out that only a few issues are outstanding at the negotiations, and if we focus our efforts the prospects which are opening up are both real and promising.

Many generations have dreamed of a convention banning chemical weapons, and it would be a serious error to let the existing real opportunity to prohibit such weapons slip by. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has discussed the outcome of the talks with United States Secretary of State Shultz. It was stressed that the conclusions the United States Administration is going to draw from the information given to Mr. Schultz, and the proposals made by the Soviet leadership in the course of the talks, will determine whether it will be possible to find an early solution to major disarmament issues, primarily on medium-range and shorter-range missiles, and to improve Soviet-United States relations and the situation in international affairs. The Soviet leadership is prepared to solve these issues jointly in the same spirit of active dialogue and with the same desire for mutual understanding that marked the negotiations in Moscow with Secretary of State Shultz.

Comrade President, may I dwell on a number of issues in connection with the statement we heard today from Ambassador Hansen on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I listened with interest to his views on alternative measures that could be applied to identify secret stockpiles. These views will undoubtedly be studied by our experts. As I see it, a dialogue regarding alternative

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

measures is very promising from the viewpoint of finding a solution to the problem of challenge inspection. I also noted the flexibility of the United States delegation regarding the fact-finding panel. We welcome the United States delegation's reaffirmation of the principle of equality of obligations for all States parties to the convention. This is important, as previous United States proposals created considerable difficulties in this connection. As regards the United States representative's invitation to Soviet experts to visit the United States chemical weapon destruction facility in Tooele, Utah, in October this year, we are grateful for the invitation; we shall carefully consider it and shall be replying in due course.

I agree that, as Ambassador Hansen said, new chemical weapons are technologically more advanced than those produced 20 years ago. It is because of this that plans for the production of binary weapons prompt concern through the world. It is because of this that we call for chemical weapons not to be produced, including the binary or multicomponent variety. In making this call, we are guided by a desire for the earliest possible completion of work on a convention for the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, and the creation of necessary conditions to this end.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Comrade President, the Bulgarian delegation also wishes to take up briefly item 4, "Chemical weapons".

The negotiations on a total and comprehensive chemical-weapons ban, which have been going on for several years now, have entered a decisive stage. On the basis of a multitude of proposals, our common efforts have led to the drafting of provisions or the outlining of possible solutions on practically all issues within the scope of the draft convention. In this respect my delegation is pleased to note the purpose-oriented and, on the whole, efficient work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons throughout this spring session.

This is to be credited, in particular, to those delegations which tabled new constructive proposals and contributed to arriving at mutually acceptable compromises in key sectors of our common endeavour. My delegation wishes to join those delegations which have already noted the significant contribution of the Soviet delegation, namely its proposals of 17 February and 5 March 1987.

We welcome the patience and skill with which Ambassador Ekéus is pursuing his task as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We also appreciate the contributions of the three cluster co-ordinators.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches major importance to negotiating a chemical-weapons ban. May I recall that my country is not developing chemical weapons, does not manufacture such weapons and has none stationed on its territory. As is well known, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is doing its best to transform the Balkans into a zone free of chemical weapons. This is an initiative promoted jointly with the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania. It is perceived as a partial measure aimed at furthering efforts towards a global solution to the chemical-weapons ban issue.

I would like to inform this body that on 30 December 1986, the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria adopted a decree setting out restrictions on the export of chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes. This measure is in keeping with the need to secure the functioning of the régime of non-production of chemical weapons in the future convention.

We welcome the statement of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev that the USSR has ceased production of chemical weapons. Now that the two militarily most powerful States are not producing chemical weapons, conditions are most favourable for the speedy elaboration of an international convention on a total and comprehensive chemical-weapons ban. My delegation neither underestimates nor overestimates the problems that remain to be resolved. It seems to us, however, that all necessary prerequisites are at hand for achieving compromise solutions to the outstanding issues. Thus, the elaboration of the convention is within our reach. If political realism and a sense of responsibility prevail, the year 1987 may enter into history as the beginning of general and complete chemical disarmament.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

...
Negotiations to arrive at an effective and verifiable convention banning chemical weapons are well under way. These weapons of mass destruction are spreading into several countries, and are currently sowing devastation in the Iran/Iraq war and in Kampuchea. It is therefore of the greatest urgency for the members of the Conference to work actively to overcome the few outstanding difficulties so that a draft convention is submitted to the forty-second regular session of the United Nations General Assembly pursuant to the letter and spirit of its resolution 41/58 B. The convention, while safeguarding the civilian chemical industry and international co-operation in this field should contain provisions designed to achieve the destruction of existing arsenals and ban all super-toxic lethal chemicals and other chemicals used for military purposes.

The violation by some States of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, is an additional reason to conclude as early as possible a convention on chemical weapons which would be complementary to the Convention on biological weapons that entered into force on 26 March 1975, which has been called the first world disarmament treaty and is in fact the sole international legally binding instrument in which the parties have committed themselves to prohibiting and preventing the development, manufacture and stockpiling of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction, and have also assumed a commitment to destroy them or to divert them to peaceful purposes.

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(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

Glancing around the various continents, it is easy to see that Africa is the least well-protected, least secure continent. We are fully appreciative of efforts made to remove the nuclear threat. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco created a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The Treaty of Rarotonga of 6 August 1985 gave rise to a denuclearized zone in the South Pacific. In the Balkans a Declaration has been made concerning a zone which is not only nuclear-free but also chemical-weapons free. These are specific, tangible steps which constitute effective measures to guarantee lasting security and peace for these regions. The Nuclear Powers should logically sign all these instruments. In Africa the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa goes back to 1964. Today this Declaration is defied by the odious policy of the racist puppet Government of Pretoria. South Africa, bolstered by its nuclear capacity, threatens the whole continent with nuclear war. As His Excellency Ambassador Afande of Kenya so properly stressed in his statement on 24 February, South Africa is allegedly preparing Marion Island in the Antarctic for the installation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

If all these conditions were met, the signature of a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa would enjoy better chances of success. Zaire for its part has spared no effort to work towards this objective. Zaire's relations with its neighbours are peaceful, and its policy has always been to maintain good relations with other States in the region, whatever their political colour.

As far as the results of the Conference are concerned, my delegation would like to welcome the re-establishment of the following ad hoc committees in the course of the spring session: the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The United Nations General Assembly expects a full draft comprehensive disarmament programme, as well as a draft convention on the complete banning of chemical weapons, to be submitted this year.

In this connection, my delegation would like to express its sincere gratitude for the tremendous efforts made by Ambassador García Robles, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, who tirelessly continues to chair the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the eloquent Ambassador Cromartie, who last year took over the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the talented and indefatigable Ambassador Ekéus, who has now taken over the chairmanship of that Committee. If the Conference succeeds in submitting these two drafts within the deadlines, it will have shown the world that increasing progress towards general and complete disarmament can be expected in future.

Mr. ASIF EZDI (Pakistan): Mr. President, my delegation has taken the floor today to introduce a proposal on the draft Convention on Chemical Weapons. This proposal relates specifically to the subject of assistance falling under article X of the Convention. We understand that it is being issued today as a document of the Conference under the number CD/752, and as a working paper of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as CD/CW/WP.165.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

Pakistan has always supported a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons, and is therefore gratified at the progress which is being made in the negotiations taking place under item 4 of our agenda. At the same time, we also realize that the conclusion of such a convention would not by itself rid the world of the chemical weapons threat. If universal adherence is too ambitious a target to aspire to in the short term, the importance at least of all countries possessing chemical weapons stocks or chemical weapons capabilities becoming parties to the Convention at an early date can hardly be over-emphasized. As long as such countries remain outside the Convention, those which neither possess chemical weapons nor have the intention of acquiring them would continue to feel threatened, and might justifiably be reluctant to assume the obligations of a State party. Unless something is done about this dilemma, a considerable number of the latter category of States may thus not be in a position to adhere to the Convention.

There is another scenario that presents a similar problem. This would arise if a State party acted in violation of its obligations. In such an event, any other State party which felt threatened as a result could feel compelled to withdraw from the Convention in order to acquire a deterrent capability of its own. Such an act could in turn lead to the withdrawal of other States, thus subjecting the chemical weapons prohibition régime to a degree of strain which it might not be able to withstand.

The problems I have just referred to do not admit of any easy solution. Yet we feel that if appropriate provisions are included in the Convention, a lot could be done to enhance incentives for States to adhere to it and to reduce pressures on a State to withdraw from it because it feels threatened by the chemical weapons capability of another State. This could be achieved in two ways: firstly, by assurances that a State party which feels exposed to a chemical weapons threat will be able to count on assistance from other States parties in resisting that threat; and secondly, by effective sanctions against a State which is the source of a chemical weapons threat to other States.

While we recognize that both these ways of approaching the problem -- assistance to the threatened State and sanctions against the State which is the source of the threat -- are in a certain sense interrelated, it is the former, perhaps the less difficult of the two, which is the subject of the proposal made by Pakistan in document CD/752. Article X of the draft Convention already provides us with the necessary framework.

Our proposal is based on the premise that the existence of a chemical weapons threat anywhere in the world would jeopardize the viability of the CW Convention. It should therefore be a matter of concern for all States which have a stake in the preservation of the Convention, and calls for an appropriate response from them in the form of assistance to the threatened State.

If States are assured that by becoming parties to the Convention they would be able to rely on effective assistance from other States parties in the event of a chemical weapons threat, the incentives for adhering to the Convention would be substantially increased. Similarly, if States which have

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

become parties to the Convention can depend on the support of other States parties in meeting a chemical weapons threat, the pressures to withdraw from the Convention in order to match the chemical weapons capability of an adversary would be considerably reduced.

Besides promoting the universality and viability of the Convention, effective provisions on assistance would by themselves have a deterrent effect upon States which might be considering the production or acquisition of chemical weapons or contemplating their use. If a State still undertakes the production or acquisition of chemical weapons or resorts to their use, an authoritative finding by the Executive Council to this effect would be of great political value. In addition, the assistance which the Executive Council or individual States might extend to the threatened State would hopefully enable it to cope with the situation which it faces.

The language proposed by Pakistan for article X is contained in the annex to document CD/752. It builds on the assistance provisions contained in two earlier multilaterally negotiated conventions, namely the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the ENMOD Convention of 1977. Our proposal seeks to expand and strengthen these provisions, keeping in view the differences in the subject-matter of these three agreements. Relatively few States, it is believed, had biological weapons programmes at the time of the conclusion of the BW Convention, and instances of use of these weapons in the past have been infrequent. Similarly, environmental modification techniques have apparently not been employed on the scale that that Convention prohibits. As against this, the chemical weapons threat is much more serious. These weapons have often been used in this century, and exist today in the arsenals of an increasing number of States. In view of these considerations, we feel that assistance provisions of the kind contained in the BW and ENMOD conventions would not be adequate for a chemical weapons convention, unless they are considerably improved upon.

Under our proposal, the threatened State would be able to call for assistance not only against another State party but also any other State whose activities present a threat to the objectives of the Convention. Such a request would be addressed to the Executive Council, which would in the first instance undertake a factual determination as to whether the requesting State faced a chemical weapons threat. In carrying out this task, the Executive Council would have the power to initiate an investigation or inquiry, including on-site inspection. In the event of a finding that the requesting State did face a chemical weapons threat, the Executive Council would also be obliged to decide on concrete measures of assistance to the threatened State including, in particular, assistance in protective measures. The precise nature and modalities of the assistance to be given would be for the Executive Council to decide in each individual case, depending on the circumstances. In addition to any collective action which the Executive Council might undertake, individual States would also be in a position to assist the requesting State once the Executive Council had determined that it faced a chemical weapons threat.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

Besides the assistance which a State party might request and obtain in the face of an actual threat, the Consultative Committee would be entrusted with the task of initiating assistance programmes to enable interested States to develop a protective capability of their own. Furthermore, individual States would assume the obligation to encourage the free exchange and transfer among States parties of equipment, material and scientific and technological information relating to protection against chemical weapons.

We believe that the proposal contained in document CD/752 is both necessary and realistic. The obligation of providing assistance which States parties would assume would not, in our opinion, be too onerous considering the advantages that would accrue from it for the Convention. These advantages can be summarized in three words: universality, viability and effectiveness.

My delegation welcomes the fact that the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons envisages the commencement of work on article X during the 1987 session. It is our hope that, when this article is taken up, our proposal will receive consideration from other delegations.

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Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French):

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In recent weeks the question of negotiating a convention banning chemical weapons has been the subject of a number of major statements that my delegation has studied with keen interest. Eager to attach all due importance to this discussion, France has produced a number of proposals on the non-production of chemical weapons, notably with a view to creating a Scientific Council. Today we would like to make one or two remarks on three points that we believe crucial to the negotiations: the destruction of stocks, the procedure of challenge inspection and the crucial question of security stocks.

First of all, with regard to the destruction of stocks, my delegation noted with interest the statement made here on 14 April by the representative of the Soviet Union concerning the proposals put forward on this subject

(Mr. Morel, France)

in Prague on 10 April by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev stated that "as far as stocks of chemical weapons are concerned, the Soviet Union has started building a special plant to destroy them". My delegation welcomes this step in the direction desired by all because it deals with a practical aspect of the destruction of existing stocks, an essential element of any agreement providing for a complete ban. We think it would be all the more useful to hear from the Soviet delegation certain clarifications on the following points:

The first question deals with the relationship between the provisions of the draft convention concerning the starting of the process of eliminating chemical weapons on the one hand, and the commissioning of the destruction plant envisaged in the Soviet proposal on the other. More specifically, the draft convention provides that each State party should begin destroying its stocks of chemical weapons a certain number of months (yet to be decided) after the entry into force of the Convention. This time span is therefore relatively short. On the other hand, the Soviet statement indicates that a possibly fairly lengthy period will be necessary for the construction of a disposal plant. Therefore there is a risk that this plant might not be ready to operate when required. There is a possible time lag here, and we would like to have further information about this point.

The same query is also valid for the annual destruction capacity of the facility concerned. The draft convention, as we know, specifies a destruction period spread over 10 years. In this connection the Soviet representative stated here on 5 March that each year each State party should eliminate each year a ninth of its stocks in each of the existing categories. Therefore we think that the additional information concerning the ways and means of operating this destruction facility should lead the Soviet delegation to provide details of the volume that the USSR would have to destroy, and also the annual destruction capacity it thinks it will have to have.

The fact is that we have only very recently received indirect and very incomplete information with regard to the very existence of Soviet chemical weapons stocks. Hence the recent Soviet announcements concerning destruction give us an opportunity to get down to specifics in this fundamental aspect of the convention. It seems to us desirable that all countries participating in the negotiations should be in a position to assess the future relationship between the disposal plant and the stocks themselves. The bilateral Soviet-United States exchange visits proposed recently cannot serve as an adequate source of information for the entire international community.

The question of challenge inspection has recently been the subject of very useful exchanges of views, and we have noted with a great deal of interest the comments that have been submitted to the Conference on this subject. On the basis of the position my country has already set out on several occasions when giving its full backing to document CD/715 submitted by the United Kingdom, we would like to present today one or two comments of a practical nature with regard to the conduct of such inspections.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Generally speaking, we feel that it could be useful to inject a little method into our work, and to that end differentiate between three successive phases that would raise different problems: initiation of the inspection, the inspection process itself, and the final report and results phase.

First of all, we consider -- and it seems to us that agreement could be reached on this -- that all States parties should be able to activate the challenge inspection procedure. Any intervention by a collective body at the beginning of the procedure would in our view create more problems than it would solve. Obviously we cannot overlook the risk of an improper request for inspection: this is a real difficulty but introducing a screening mechanism would run the risk of weighing down a procedure which is designed to be rapid. The process itself will quickly show whether or not the procedure has been abused. Therefore we think that the question of abuse of procedure is a subsidiary matter.

The second phase, the process of inspection proper, is obviously crucial and therefore demands special attention. Two concerns should guide the conduct of this process. First of all, we must constantly bear in mind the trigger, in other words the crisis of confidence between two States as regards respect for the Convention. The primary purpose of challenge inspection is clear: to restore confidence as soon as possible. Secondly, this initiative is of a serious nature because it reflects the concern of the requesting State as regards the chemical safety, and because it could lead to the application of the Convention by one or several States being called into question.

The procedure must therefore be activated and organized between two partners, with the assistance of the corps of inspectors. Within a short time, these should be in a position to halt the procedure if it proves inapplicable, or else to pursue the procedure to completion, in the form of a full and objective report, either by means of direct access to the plant itself or by alternative means.

In any event the requested country remains obliged to satisfy the requesting country. This does not involve what may seem the improper exercise of a sort of privilege, but stems from the obligation for full respect that has been entered into by all States parties.

While observance of the Convention and its corollary, that is to say the restoration of confidence, may not be modified, its implementation may be adapted to circumstances. This is the purpose of the alternative measures: far from offering a loophole, these are other means of arriving at the same result as an alternative to direct inspection, which obviously is still the simplest solution.

We think it is desirable to envisage the maximum number of realistic possibilities as regards alternative measures in order to assess the role these alternative measures could play in the dialogue between the two States. But it seems neither possible nor desirable to codify them in the body of the Convention in circumstances that could rapidly become obsolete or prove too rigid.

(Mr. Morel, France)

The third and last phase deals with the report of the inspectors, and more generally speaking the outcome of talks between the requesting State and the requested State. In every case the report of the inspectors will be passed to the Executive Council, which will have the task of evaluating its findings. We believe that at this stage it is too early to spell out how the Executive Council may act. This being the case, any intervention in the procedure by the institutional bodies set up under the Convention should occur at this stage and not before.

But it must be quite clear that whatever the final outcome of the report and the contacts between the requesting and requested countries, it remains the duty of the latter to respect the Convention strictly.

I have indicated the major importance that my delegation attaches to the question of security stocks, and I would like to make one or two remarks on this topic. Generally speaking we start from the idea that the destruction of existing stocks and production facilities is a lengthy undertaking, one that is technically complex and financially costly. It has been agreed during the course of negotiations that this would be spread over a period of 10 years. This period would be in fact the first phase in the implementation of the Convention. Its proper functioning would be a pre-condition for the next phase: it is clear that the definitive régime of the Convention -- that is to say the total elimination of stocks and their non-reconstitution -- would enter into effect in the second phase only if the first phase had been completed satisfactorily.

The purpose of this 10-year first phase is to bring the effective chemical weapon capacities of all States to the attention of parties to the Convention and allow the verification of the data supplied; to define ways and means and phases for reducing the levels of chemical weapons over the 10-year period; and to test the effectiveness and compliance with the Convention of the concrete proposals actually implemented by the States over this period so as to move progressively towards the objective set for the end of the 10-year period -- the complete elimination of stocks and production facilities.

Since it goes without saying that this Convention will not encroach in any way on the rights and obligations of each State party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 under that Protocol, the use of chemical weapons will obviously remain prohibited during the 10-year period under the conditions stipulated in international law. Nevertheless, this period will give rise to a new situation from the point of view of the security of the States parties, one which must be considered with the greatest care.

It is important to guarantee not only the future security of signatories once stocks have been totally eliminated, but also their immediate security during the 10-year period. However, the issue of maintaining security during this period has not yet been the subject of the detailed debate which is necessary in order that consensus should be established in this area.

(Mr. Morel, France)

In August 1985 France submitted a contribution to discussion on this subject (document CD/630) which elaborated on the concept of balance in security, through the maintenance, over the 10-year period, of a genuine balance which will preserve the security of the States parties. In view of the extreme quantitative and qualitative disproportion in existing stocks, the application of a more or less linear system of destruction could lead only to increased insecurity right from the very beginning of the 10-year period for countries with only limited stocks, compared with States that have very large stocks. Consequently, the French paper CD/630 introduced the concept of security stocks that States would be authorized to hold right to the end of the 10-year period.

I would add that the concept of security stocks does not concern only States that declare chemical weapons stocks in the 30 days following the entry into force of the Convention. All States have an interest in maintaining the balance. If balance is not assured -- or if it is jeopardized either gradually or abruptly, for instance if one of the States parties withdraws from the Convention or refuses to proceed further with the elimination of remaining stocks -- the security of all the States parties could be threatened. We therefore hope that the Conference will look in detail at this aspect of the Convention, and we will shortly be presenting proposals to this end.

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Mr. SHAFII (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, as a matter of principle, my delegation cannot support the request made by Iraq for the very simple reason that Iraq, by its intensified, continuous and systematic use of chemical weapons, has shown disregard for the work and goals of this Conference and also for the views of the international community. I need not embark on any elaboration on the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, since numerous technical and medical reports by United Nations experts confirming the use of chemical weapons by Iraq have been accessible to members of this body, and all distinguished delegates are aware of them. Several members of this Conference, along with many other members of the international community, have voiced their concern and condemnation in this regard.

In the view of my delegation, the participation of Iraq, which has such an undisputable record in the violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, would not contribute to the work of the Conference. Therefore, my delegation would like to register its opposition to the request made by Iraq.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

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With regard to political principles, I wish to point out that the dispute between Iran and Iraq relates to the use of chemical weapons. Iran has accused Iraq of using chemical weapons, and Iraq has made a similar accusation against Iran. In fact, chemical weapons are among the items on the agenda of this Conference, and many delegations have said that this is the item on which we are most likely to reach agreement. Moreover, we all know that membership of this Conference should be regarded as a privilege but not a monopoly of the group of 40 States. In other words, we should give non-member States the opportunity to participate in the work of this Conference in so far as is permitted by the rules of procedure and the resolution of the General Assembly.

Mr. SHAFII (Islamic Republic of Iran): Thank you, Mr. President. My delegation listened with interest to the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt. The distinguished Ambassador of Egypt tried to place his arguments for helping Iraq to participate in the work of the Conference on a legal basis. I am afraid to say that the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt, who attaches much importance to this legal basis, is forgetting one very important violation of one of the most important conventions and protocols that we have, and that is the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In the course of this Conference, in the meetings that we have had, we have been careful to see if the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt or his delegation would say a word about the violation of the Geneva Protocol by Iraq, or not, and -- not to our surprise -- we noticed that no word has been said by the Egyptian delegation in this regard. On the contrary, when the violator of the Geneva Protocol wants to participate in the Conference, not from a sincere desire to help or contribute to the work of the Conference but for its own political ends, the Ambassador of Egypt tries to help him to get into the Conference.

The distinguished Ambassador of Egypt said that if we do not accept the request of Iraq we contradict ourselves. Allow me to say to the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt: "Your Excellency, you are in contradiction with yourself in what you say and in what you do. While you support the legal basis or respect for this law, at the same time you ignore a very important violation of a very important convention."

The distinguished Ambassador of Egypt referred to an accusation made by Iraq concerning the use of chemical weapons by Iran, or he said that Iraq says it has not used chemical weapons. I do believe, Mr. President, that this is an old story, and the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt himself knows quite well that he is not telling the truth. He knows that Iraq has used chemical weapons, and he knows that we have not used them, and while I am speaking here a United Nations delegation is there trying to find out for themselves whether Iran has used chemical weapons or not. But before the results of the investigation come out, let me just tell everybody that we have never used chemical weapons and that it is a very close friend of Egypt, Iraq, which is using chemical weapons consistently.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

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At present the Conference on Disarmament has amongst its most attainable and promising objectives that of the elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons.

Once again we can see the complex nature of a task that should be carried out in order to give an absolute guarantee that the rules laid down will not leave any loophole which will permit the activities of the chemical industry to be diverted to ends not allowed by the Convention. But at the same time we should take care that those rules designed to prohibit the production of chemical weapons do not form an impediment to the development of the chemical industry for civilian purposes.

Nor can we accept that the provisions of this Convention should serve as an excuse to restrict international co-operation and limit the benefits of the development of the chemical industry to a handful of powerful countries that may currently have a monopoly on major advances in the chemical industry, just as in the past they held advantages in the nuclear energy industry in order to create a discriminatory nuclear weapon non-proliferation régime.

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

As the spring session of the CD draws to a close, my delegation would like to share some thoughts on its results. Despite some progress, a better political climate and business-like exchanges of views on many issues, apart from chemical weapons, no visible results have been achieved. This is especially true with regard to the whole complex of priority nuclear items. It must create a feeling of disappointment, especially in the light of developments in other disarmament forums -- in particular the whole range of the Soviet-United States talks. The latest initiatives from the Soviet Union, especially on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, are a further convincing demonstration of new political thinking, a dynamic approach to disarmament. This is also what we need in the proceedings of our Conference, which in general cannot be described as a dynamic disarmament body. So far, it has not sufficiently used its unique mechanism to grasp the existing opportunities, as if it was out of touch with the recent developments.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

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The situation with regard to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is much more optimistic than the overall picture of the Conference's activities, as can be seen from the new "rolling text" of the Convention, reflecting the current stage of negotiations, which has been submitted to the Committee by its Chairman. The new formula governing the work of the Ad hoc Committee -- a cluster formula, a flexible formula, one might say -- has proved its value, and at the same time demonstrated again the Chairman's competence and ability to lead us most efficiently toward our final goal -- a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I wish to thank Ambassador Ekéus and the cluster co-ordinators for their efforts, for their contribution during the spring session of the Committee.

Owing to the active contribution of many delegations during the spring session, new important steps toward further progress were taken, especially in the areas where the Soviet Union came forward with fresh ideas and proposals. The work of the Committee and of the working groups, as we see it, was business-like and fruitful, though one can say that nothing is done until everything is done. That is why we should always have in mind that the ultimate task before us is not only to register progress but to finalize the text of the Convention. In this context, let me again draw your attention to the March 1987 statement of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which reiterated their readiness to destroy these weapons of mass destruction irreversibly.

Looking at the present state of work of the Committee, one can say that almost all important elements of article IV (Chemical weapons) have been cleared up and resolved, the only exception being principles and the order of destruction of chemical weapons. However, in this field too, concrete and useful proposals were put forward by delegations. Finding a mutually acceptable solution seems at this stage to involve not conceptual study or a need to solve a disagreement of principle, but rather realism and necessary compromise.

In the view of my delegation, solving this issue would also have some psychological meaning, as it concerns the very core of the Convention.

The situation is quite similar with respect to article V (Chemical weapons production facilities).

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

It is clear, however, that final agreement on articles IV and V depends on the outcome of work on such definitions as chemical weapons, chemical warfare agents, and chemical weapons production facilities.

Precise definitions of these terms will also be needed in the context of article VI. For these reasons we support the proposal made by the distinguished representative of China, Ambassador Fan, on 16 April, that an effort should be made to define more precisely what we mean by chemical weapons. To avoid ambiguities after the Convention enters into force, we should eliminate all conceptual imprecision in the text both of the convention proper and all its integral annexes.

In our opinion the situation is much more complex with regard to the area of non-production. It seems that the most crucial question bearing on the possibilities of tangible progress is an agreement on relevant threshold production quantities for facilities producing chemicals belonging to categories 2, 3 and 4. The first steps in this direction have already been made. Further progress depends now on an active and constructive approach by all the delegations, without exception.

One of the outstanding issues is that of model agreements between the International Authority and States parties concerned. The concept of such agreements was very usefully considered during this session, but a lot of strenuous work remains to be done. However, the solution of some problems associated with model agreements is hardly possible without precise knowledge of relevant facilities. Though the experience of IAEA might be used to some extent in working out a model agreement, we should not forget the very specific characteristics of the chemical industry.

The series of informal discussions on the concept and procedure of challenge inspection, organized by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, was, we feel, a useful exercise. Together with some plenary statements, especially by the USSR and the United States delegations, it contributed to better comprehension of different positions and demonstrated more clearly points of common understanding.

Many proposals on this subject were put forward by the delegations. They have to be closely examined by the Committee or by the relevant working group. Many delegations, including my own, consider the United Kingdom proposals very interesting and useful, especially the idea of alternative measures. Like every new idea, it has to be developed and then evaluated again on the basis of its own merits.

That is why we would appeal to those delegations who at this stage are not prepared to engage in elaboration of possible alternative measures to join common efforts toward developing the idea, which we believe might help to identify a solution to the problem of challenge inspection.

With regard to the structure and functions of the Consultative Committee there is, in our opinion, a prevailing realistic approach on the part of the delegations.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We think that one of the specific characteristics of the present stage of CW negotiations is the relative ease both of finding rational solutions to many problems and of losing the very essence of the talks in never-ending discussions on technical details, which could be better and faster solved at a later stage. I think there is a growing understanding that we should avoid the second possibility.

In general my delegation is satisfied with the results achieved, though they could have been more meaningful had some delegations not chosen to slow down the pace of work.

There might be different opinions on the significance of progress in the CW Committee, but I think that at this advanced and at the same time complex stage of negotiations, even moderate progress is a valuable achievement.

In short, there seems to be a good basis for optimism for the summer session, which will no doubt be of crucial importance for the fate of the CW convention. We continue to believe that a decisive step can and should be made before the end of this year's session. We also hope that delegations will use the inter-sessional period to prepare the ground for efficient and fruitful work in the summer.

As has already been pointed out by some speakers, an encouraging development has taken place with regard to the strengthening of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. In pursuance of a decision of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention, the Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts has worked out modalities for the exchange of information and data on research centres and laboratories, outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins, as well as the promotion of peaceful co-operation in the field of biological research.

My delegation welcomes the results achieved, though in our opinion the scope of the exchange of international and other measures could have been broader.

Nevertheless, we share the opinion that an important step has been made toward building up confidence among States parties and enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention.

We hope that further steps toward strengthening verification procedures in the Convention will be taken in the near future. Appropriate proposals in this respect were made by the socialist countries during both the second Review Conference and the Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

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Mr. President, before concluding I would like to turn to another issue of major importance, the negotiation of a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons, which remains the most active item on our agenda. Canada is pleased that the negotiating momentum which developed last year and the year before, under two very able chairmen, is being increased at the current CD session under the skilful Chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéyus and we intend to continue our active participation in those negotiations. At the beginning of the summer part of the session the Canadian delegation will, as in the past, be providing to all participants our updated compendium of all CD documents relating to our chemical weapons negotiations.

Statements this week in this forum relating to further allegations of chemical weapon use in the Gulf war are tangible proof of the need to make deliberate haste in these negotiations. They also underline the importance of including in the treaty we are negotiating a provision for an unqualified, verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons going beyond use and including, of course, possession, destruction, etc. Canada commends the recent action of the United Nations Secretary-General in initiating an investigation of these latest allegations of chemical weapon use.

The verification of such allegations of chemical or toxin weapon use is a subject to which Canada has devoted considerable research effort. We have initiated our own investigative activities in relation to certain such allegations in the past. We have drawn on this experience and that of others in making reports to the United Nations Secretary-General. In December 1985 we submitted to the Secretary-General a handbook dealing in a systematic and detailed way with various procedural aspects of such investigations. The handbook was also subsequently put forward in this forum. I want to announce that Canada has continued its follow-up work in relation to other practical and technical aspects of such investigations. The results will be made available to the United Nations very soon.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

The results will be made available not only to the United Nations because Canada's activities in this regard reflect a pragmatic, operationally oriented approach which we consider essential if effectively verifiable agreements are to be concluded. I am not in a position to report on the precise nature of the presentation to be made, but I have no doubt that it will be of interest to every member of the CD. I believe that when we are in a position to report to the Conference in June on the research we have conducted and the practical results which have emerged from it, every member of the CD will find the report of interest and of direct relevance to our own chemical weapons negotiations.

The foregoing comments are intended to illustrate the approach which Canada has tried to follow consistently in the Conference on Disarmament. We have attempted to make concrete contributions through working papers and workshops, in lieu of rhetoric, concentrating on practical problems of verification of the arms control agreement we are together trying to achieve.

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Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): I have asked for the floor in my capacity as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In August, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will have the task of putting together its yearly report to the Conference, which will then be incorporated in the report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Today I wish to draw the attention of all members of the Conference to document CD/CW/WP.167. This document, entitled "Current stage of the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention", reflects the status of the negotiations on a Convention at the end of the first part of the 1987 session of the CD. It is thus not a report to the Conference or to any outside body. The document will be ready tomorrow in all the working languages of the Conference. The secretariat has informed me that it will distribute copies tomorrow in the document boxes of all delegations.

The aim of this document is to register the progress achieved in the negotiations and to assist delegations in the further elaboration of the Convention when the CD begins the second part of its 1987 session. It does not bind any delegation at this stage, but is intended as a useful tool and as a basis for further negotiations.

It is based upon the report of the Committee to the CD on its work during the period 12-30 January (CD/734), and is in this respect an expression of the idea of a "rolling text", which under different chairmen has proved to be helpful for the work of the Committee.

The "rolling text" as it stood in February has been improved upon in important respects. Modifications have been introduced with regard to some articles as a consequence of new positions taken by delegations. Some important new texts developed during the spring have also been incorporated.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Furthermore, in response to complaints by many delegations that the old presentational form with the annexes in the middle of the articles makes the draft convention almost unreadable in national capitals and for anybody who has not actually participated in the negotiations here in Geneva, the existing material has now been re-edited. In CD/CW/WP.167 you will find all the articles at the beginning of the document, followed by the various annexes. I am convinced that this new way of presenting the material will help all concerned.

There is good reason to look with satisfaction on the results of the work of the Committee during the two months and a half of negotiations since the beginning of the 1987 session. Many delegations have worked hard, and this has yielded some important progress in a short period of time.

Having said that, I feel obliged to remind the Conference about the work which remains.

Although there is a clear tendency of convergence of views between delegations with regard to some or most of the outstanding political problems, the task of negotiating solutions to those problems is a complicated and difficult one. Furthermore, the technical and legal problems to be addressed are indeed numerous.

If we are to make real progress towards the goal of a Convention within the foreseeable future, we must address the problems even more vigorously and with greater decisiveness. Delegations should by now, after 15 years of deliberation and more than 3 years of negotiations, be familiar with the problems. There is therefore no reason why delegations should not be in a position, when studying the "rolling text", to anticipate what solutions may be feasible for different problems. Thus the delegations should be able to prepare themselves for the next stage of negotiations, starting in June, and for acting with greater speed and resolve, without sacrificing the prudence which is the absolute prerequisite when dealing with issues of vital national security for States.

Many delegations have asked that no inter-sessional work be organized within the framework of the Committee during the period from now until we meet again in June. They have felt that this time is needed for inter-sessional work in their capitals. The outstanding problems are evident from the brackets, footnotes and blanks in CD/CW/WP.167. I now expect that these problems will be carefully worked on in capitals, so that when we meet again in June delegations will be equipped with sufficient instructions to negotiate generally acceptable solutions. All of the remaining issues, major ones and minor ones, will at one time or another be addressed during the summer part of the session.

As the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee I will make use of our recess for the month of May to consider in what ways our mode of operation can be improved upon so that from June on the Committee will be able to proceed more speedily with the many technical problems and more effectively cope with the limited but major outstanding questions.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The Ad hoc Committee is indebted to the item co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Macedo of Mexico and Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, who have all worked hard and conscientiously. We also have to thank the Secretary, Mr. Bensmail, Mr. Cassandra and Ms. Darby of the secretariat. May I also thank the many delegations which have expressed kind words to the Chairman of the Committee during the session.

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(The President)

Continuing the positive account, I hope I won't over-simplify matters too much in saying that, as far as the CD's work is concerned, almost all positive developments took place in the Ad hoc Committee on CW. One could say that that committee in fact started this year's work last year, during its autumn consultations, when interesting new proposals were put forward and widely discussed. Then, in January and throughout the spring session, the Ad hoc Committee continued its relentless effort under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, both officially and informally in its full composition and in smaller groups, and some of the remaining differences were narrowed down.

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(The President)

There are, in my view, two issues we consider positive. Now we can see clearly and completely what is going to happen with CW stocks right from the entry into force of the convention until their complete destruction. First, declarations are going to be made on the ownership of CW in each country. The exact location of CW stocks and their composition are going to be indicated. The storage facilities are going to be closed. The transfer of CW to destruction facilities is going to be assured. Finally, the CW are going to be gradually destroyed. All activities mentioned above will be verified, including through international on-site inspection. The same basic clarity has been achieved with regard to CW production facilities.

We can now say that, after the latest positive developments, the Ad hoc Committee can move forward toward the final drafting of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and, if good political will prevails, this process need not necessarily be too long. Many delegations expressed the wish that the CW convention should be concluded already this year. I fully associate myself with this call. In any event, it would be rather premature to doubt the feasibility of this task today, when only the first third of 1987 has passed.

The document announced today by Ambassador Ekéus entitled "Current stage of the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention" will certainly help in taking necessary decisions on outstanding problems in national capitals during our recess.

(The President)

I also hope that the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will continue its negotiations during the second part of the session in the same serious and positive spirit that characterized its work during the first part, so that the Committee can deservedly become an example to be followed for all the other agenda items. I have no doubt that Ambassador Ekéus, the representative of Sweden, will ensure this through his capable chairmanship of that Committee.

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(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

I am pleased to note that the negotiations on the conclusion of a convention to eliminate chemical weapons, conducted at the Conference, have entered the home stretch. How soon final success at the negotiations will be achieved depends on the collective wisdom and will of the representatives gathered today at the Palais des Nations.

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Here in the Conference on Disarmament, there should be no reason not to move urgently towards an agreement banning all chemical weapons. The time is ripe. A chemical weapons convention should secure the complete elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. To achieve this is a common priority of all delegations here present. It requires purposeful and speedy action.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

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The foremost challenge today to the Conference on Disarmament is to accomplish the early and successful conclusion of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 has not sufficed to halt a chemical weapons arms race. We have had reports on the use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world, most recently in the Gulf, where its use by Iraq has been effectively substantiated by United Nations experts. Such reports add to a growing concern that chemical weapons are for the present and the future and not only the past. Chemical warfare is a growing danger.

There seems to be universal recognition that the only effective response possible is the creation of an international disarmament régime for chemical weapons. Negotiations in this Conference have made steady progress. The most recent updating of the "rolling text" of late April this year is thus in many respects hardly recognizable compared with the modest first draft of 1984.

The flexible and positive approach of delegations to the negotiations is particularly gratifying for my delegation, as it facilitates the difficult task of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. This approach has brought a number of key problems closer to their solution. Progress has been made in the direction that all chemical weapon stocks should immediately be declared and, within a 10 year period, eliminated by destruction only. The initial declaration of stocks shall be verified and the stockpiles thereafter systematically monitored. What remains to be done is to agree on an order of destruction up to the end of the tenth year after the Convention has entered into force. Consensus on a broad outline of the order of destruction is growing. It is vital for trust in the convention that all States parties to it be obliged from the outset to declare all weapon stocks.

A régime for the elimination of chemical weapon production facilities is also taking shape. Understanding has been reached on the verification of declarations of such facilities and their closure, as well as international systematic monitoring and verification of the elimination of facilities.

To prohibit future production of chemical weapons in a verifiable manner is a major concern. Over the years more negotiating efforts and intellectual energy have been devoted to this part of the convention than to any other problem. It is unavoidable that the chemical industry will be affected by a system of non-production. As the outline of a generally acceptable verification régime is now emerging from the negotiations, it can, however, be stated that the industry, already subject to intrusive environmental and health regulations would assume a modest additional burden when the convention enters into force.

Some differences on details in the régime remain. But they should not be impossible to overcome. Trust in the convention will depend on the means provided to investigate also non-declared activities which could constitute

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

violations of it. A challenge inspection system is indispensable. The core of the system should be international on-site challenge inspection. It would deter violations, if effectively designed.

Informal consultations on this matter during the spring session have been encouraging. Support is growing for the idea that a team of inspectors should be automatically dispatched following the request of a party. There are still differences of opinion as to whether the inspectors should have unimpeded access to the location or facility concerned, in accordance with the original request, also in the event that the requested State proposes an alternative arrangement.

An area where discussions have only recently begun are provisions on assistance and on economic and technological development. And the institutional arrangements of the convention must be elaborated. Outstanding issues must now be vigorously addressed. Progress already made shows that a convention is clearly within reach. Compromises will now have to be made, and even compromises hard to enter into. Crucial decisions will eventually have to be taken, and also decisions difficult to take. As negotiations hopefully draw closer to a decisive stage, I am confident that no member of the Conference will spare any effort to make possible the accomplishment of our common task: an urgently needed chemical weapons convention. With such a convention we should secure that all chemical weapons are destroyed -- once and for all.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

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The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have underlined the need for the earliest possible elimination of chemical weapons. Our conference should complete the pertinent convention by the end of this year. For that reason, the socialist countries will continue to participate actively in the efforts to draw up its text and its annexes. The Soviet Union's announcement that it has stopped producing chemical weapons and that it is building a facility for the destruction of existing stocks has had a particularly favourable impact on the atmosphere at the negotiating table. We trust the other side will respond in kind and refrain from any action likely to hamper the negotiating process.

(Mr. Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

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Secondly, my Government seeks the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons. The negotiations at our Conference on Disarmament are so far advanced that the outstanding matters of verification should no longer be an obstacle to the final world-wide abolition of this category of weapons. It is encouraging that the final communiqué of the Warsaw Pact summit last week reiterated the view that the negotiations could be completed before the end of this year. We all now hope for further flexibility and purposeful negotiating. In view of the state of these negotiations, this is not the time to introduce new or geographically restricted approaches. It is essential to bear in mind Germany's particularly vulnerable position and the special threat which chemical weapons present to us. We therefore expect our primary interest in such a convention to be respected.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

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My delegation would like to make very briefly some points about the work of the ad hoc committees.

In the communiqué issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Berlin recently, the States parties reiterated "their preparedness to complete the preparation of an international convention banning chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons and the industrial basis for their production by the end of this year". In this regard they recalled their Moscow Declaration of 25 March 1987.

The "rolling text" entitled "Current stage of the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention" registers the progress achieved so far. The Ad hoc Committee took the only logical decision: to use the "rolling text" as a basis for negotiations during the summer session of the Committee. My delegation would like neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the problems that remain to be resolved by the Ad hoc Committee. It seems to us, however, that there is a trend towards convergence of views with regard to the outstanding political problems: issues pertaining to non-production of chemical weapons, fact-finding, including challenge inspection, the organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and its organs, just to mention, perhaps, the most important ones. The task of negotiating

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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

solutions to those problems could be carried out provided that there is a clear political will not to artificially complicate the negotiations, not to become bogged down in never-ending discussions on technical details.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, in introducing the French document on the maintenance of a security balance among all the parties to the convention during the 10-year period of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, which will be distributed to members of the Conference under the number CD/757, I wish to emphasize the paramount concern underlying this paper, that is the search for security within the framework of the convention. I will elaborate on the various practical applications before I come to the indispensable complement, that is verification. I now turn to the first part, the security imperative and its consequences.

Having already set out our general concerns at the end of the spring half of the session, on 28 April, suffice it this time for me to recall that in our view the convention, in order to be credible, must guarantee all parties to the convention security from the very moment of its entry into force, and not only a future security once all chemical weapons have been eliminated. The 10-year period must not be a period of diminished security. It is the first phase of the application of the convention, the development of which, in conditions of security acceptable to all, is indispensable in order to reach the second and final phase of the convention.

The order of destruction of stockpiles, as has already been pointed out by many States, is in this regard of decisive importance. But this is not simply a technical problem. The matter is eminently political since it is a question of establishing, for the whole of the 10-year period of stock destruction, a security balance based on security stocks which are limited, homogeneous and verifiable. Let us look more closely at these two concepts.

First of all, security balance. The future convention must be based on strict equality between all parties. No signatory country can claim special treatment at one moment or another. This is indeed the final goal, since the aim is a final ban on possession and production by all the States parties to the convention. But this equality must also be the rule during the 10-year period. Otherwise, in the initial stages, the convention will follow in the steps of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a treaty for the disarmament of disarmed countries, organizing maintained armaments for some and disarmament for others.

The provisions of the convention will play a decisive role in this respect. One must start from two observations which very seriously complicate the smooth course of the 10-year period.

First observation: stockpiles will be declared only 30 days after the entry into force of the convention. The precise state of affairs as regards chemical warfare will not therefore be technically known or politically recognized until after the accession of most States.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Second observation: we already know, but in a very unclear way, in the absence of declarations on the part of the major chemical-weapon States, that the capacities are very unequally distributed and that a single European State alone possesses considerable resources. Whatever the order and volume of destruction of stockpiles, the linear or stage-by-stage schedules which have been contemplated so far would in fact lead, in the early years of the convention, to an oligopolistic situation in stock-holding until the end of the 10-year period, with small stockpiles cut down to insignificant volumes in the very first years.

In our view, this pattern cannot be considered a temporary drawback. Ten years is a very long period for the security of a State. For the sake of the credibility of the convention, and thus in order to ensure full accession by all States, we cannot go from everything to nothing because of an uncertain and profoundly inequitable mechanism.

Nor can one rule out the risk of delay due to technical reasons, or a crisis in the implementation of the agreed timetable for destruction of stocks during this 10-year period. Everything must be done to avoid this, but we cannot altogether set aside the possibilities that could arise. Here again one or two States might be in a position to deal with such a situation, whereas all the others would be taken unawares. In order to remedy this major drawback of lack of balance in the implementation of the destruction programme, and to ensure the fairness and therefore the full credibility of the convention, there is a need to establish a security balance which will enable all States that feel it is necessary to have a minimum chemical weapon capacity. Obviously this would not involve a sort of quantitative levelling out, but, for the period required, 10 years, guarding against any attempt to use or threaten the use of chemical weapons, thus affording a serious guarantee of a smooth transition from the present situation to the final régime of elimination and total prohibition.

Other approaches to the transition could in theory be contemplated to ensure security balance. They are set out in the French document. One would consist of a prior Soviet-United States agreement which would enter into force immediately to bring the stocks held by the most heavily armed Powers into line with those of the others, the entry into force of the convention being delayed correspondingly. The other possibility would be to arrange the 10-year period in such a way that the first half would apply only to the United States and the USSR.

For practical as well as political reasons, the drawbacks of these options are clearly greater than the advantages, if only because they delay the entry into force of the convention at a time when the possibility of chemical weapons becoming commonplace must be seriously considered. We therefore set them aside, and cast our vote for the full application of the convention and recognition of the right to maintain limited security stocks during the 10-year period.

Now to the security stocks themselves. In the document before the Conference today, France suggests that a distinction should be drawn, in the declaration made on the thirtieth day after the entry into force of the convention, between stockpiles other than security stocks, which fall under

(Mr. Morel, France)

the general régime already being developed, and security stocks as such, subject to a specific régime, which would remain unchanged until the end of the eighth year, and would then be destroyed in simultaneous and very carefully defined phases during the two last years of the 10-year period.

These stocks should meet specific criteria, and the following are the main characteristics.

They should be optional: the establishment of a security stock may appear necessary to one party or another to the convention, which might consider at the time the convention enters into force that it needs to ensure security balance vis-à-vis other Powers holding chemical weapons. But it goes without saying that the convention cannot impose this on any party. It is thus an option open to all member States for a period of 10 years, subject to very strict constraints which will be set out in detail later on.

The stocks should be limited; we suggest a level which is very low but still of military significance, that is, in our view, between 1,000 and 2,000 tons. In order for the stocks to remain credible until the last year of the 10-year period, we propose an amount equal to at least twice the minimum volume regarded as militarily significant. The exact level would have to be determined by agreement among the parties before the entry into force of the convention. But at all events the proposed range makes it possible to appreciate the difference between this stockpile and the present capacities of the major Powers, which are measured in tens of thousands of tons on the one side, and hundreds of thousands of tons on the other. This gap on its own is sufficient to show that security stocks can only have a purely defensive role against the possibility of a chemical weapon attack. There is therefore no conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The stocks should be identical for all parties, that is to say at the same level for all countries, in accordance with the reasons just given above.

The stocks should be homogeneous, in other words made up exclusively of munitions containing V-nerve agents. Monitoring would thus be simplified, but also the inevitable maintenance of protection programmes against an attack by chemical weapons during the 10-year period.

The stocks should be verifiable from the entry into force of the convention right up until complete destruction. This particularly sensitive point will be elaborated on in the second part of this statement.

The stocks should be backed up by a single production facility for the countries that so desire. This provision may be surprising in a prohibition convention, but it meets two considerations which stem from technical constraints on the one hand and respect for the convention on the other.

From the technical point of view, provision should be made for maintaining the security stock in condition or renewing a portion of it over an eight-year period: it is not possible to rule out the possibility of storage accidents, defective munitions or, more generally, the need for maintaining the level of part of the security stock. In a broader context, associating a production facility with the security stock should go a long way

(Mr. Morel, France)

towards deterring any party to the convention which might be tempted to cheat, and also persuading non-signatory States that they cannot gain a clear advantage by staying outside the convention.

The corollary of this particular provision is of course that this single production facility must be declared from the date of entry into force of the convention and placed under international control until its destruction at the end of the 10-year period.

The main characteristics of the security stock having thus been set out, I will merely add that our document describes the setting-up arrangements when the two distinct régimes come into force: the régime for security stocks, as just outlined, and the régime for stockpiles other than security stocks, in accordance with the provisions at present being negotiated in the draft convention. It also sets out how, after eight years, when all other stocks and related facilities have been destroyed, a start would be made on the simultaneous destruction of security stocks and each single production facility.

Let me now turn to verification, which is obviously one of the essential elements of the system proposed. Since this is a transitory régime and one which is at odds with the ultimate aim of the convention, it is indispensable to ensure that it cannot be diverted from its final purpose. Verification is of decisive importance for the whole of the convention, but it is of course particularly significant for security stocks.

I will not return here to the production facility which is under permanent international control and which will be closed down during the ninth year and destroyed before the end of the tenth year. This is a relatively simple case of complete verification — "unlimited", one might say -- whereas the definition of the verification régime for the security stock is inevitably a matter of greater complexity. As a matter of principle the security stock must be subject to challenge inspection. But, as can be seen from the current work of the Conference on this subject, access to storage facilities has led to the search for balance between security considerations (and confidentiality) on the one hand, and the need to ensure full respect for the convention on the other. Our latest exchanges of views have shown that there is no ready-made a priori formula, but that it should be possible to establish a régime which is both strict and balanced and which will ensure effective and realistic verification.

We believe therefore that the verification régime for security stocks is simply one special case within the more general framework of verification of the convention, and that it does not merit special treatment. That is why we have refrained in this document from defining a single and therefore final formula, and have set out, together with the formula we prefer, other options which are less satisfactory in our view. The choice to be made between these various options will of course depend on the answers to three major questions.

The first, a particularly sensitive one, is that of location. In our wish to take part in an open exercise which would make it possible to appreciate, before choosing, the advantages and drawbacks of the various possible formulae, we are ready to envisage the declaration of the location of

(Mr. Morel, France)

a security stock as from the very entry into force of the convention. This undoubtedly offers an advantage with regard to verification. But at the same time, we must appreciate the real and serious drawback as regards security, since declaring the location might also encourage a pre-emptive attack in the event of a crisis. That is why our preference falls on the option under which the location would not be declared publicly, but recorded in a sealed envelope which would be opened in the event of a challenge inspection. The possibility of transfer to another location would naturally have to be kept open, but this would then be subjected to the same conditions; that is to say, with the new location indicated in a sealed envelope.

The second question concerns the number of locations for security stocks, whether the location is declared or not. Here again, security considerations would lead us to believe that several locations would be preferable; but if the monitoring is to be effective, agreed limits are required, which we would suggest be set at five locations.

The third difficulty which should be pointed out here is the question of direct access in the case of challenge inspection. I raise this matter here for the record; the solution to be chosen with regard to security stocks will in the final analysis be the same as that decided on for the general régime.

Whatever the final balance determined for the monitoring of security stocks, we must recall that this will be carried out within a strictly defined framework, which will place heavy burdens on all the parties to the convention:

Initial declaration within 30 days of the entry into force of the convention, specifying the volume, composition and location of the place of storage, either publicly or in a sealed envelope;

During the first eight years, régime of challenge inspection which varies according to whether the location is known or not;

At the end of the eighth year, opening of the sealed envelopes where appropriate, and in any case placing of stocks under international control preparatory to phased destruction. The challenge inspection régime thus remains the indispensable instrument for verification.

This very brief recapitulation of the verification mechanisms enables us to emphasize that we do not intend to leave any escape clause in drawing up the régime which will be finally adopted.

There is still one point which can be linked to verification. This is what has been presented -- wrongly -- as the risk of CW proliferation which it is claimed would stem from the approach adopted by France. Some have stated that, by providing for the possibility of constituting a limited security stock for a period of 10 years, this would at least indirectly sanction CW proliferation. This is a complete misunderstanding. The risk of CW proliferation can be defined only in relation to a ban; it necessarily exists in any convention arrangement simply because sovereign States cannot be forced to accede to a convention. Everything which, like the security stocks, will help to enhance the effectiveness, the non-discriminatory character and the equality of all parties in the course of the 10-year period, will

(Mr. Morel, France)

strengthen the credibility of the convention and encourage States to accede. But let me add above all that the provisions related to verification, and the destruction of security stocks and the sole production facility referred to above, clearly show that these provisions do not in any way encourage acquisition of a CW capability. The limited option proposed contains binding and very stringent provisions. Far from encouraging proliferation, the instrument we have suggested introduces clarity and equity in the relations between all the States parties in the decisive period of the first 10 years of implementation of the convention.

Having thus set out the principal reasons which led us to put this document before the Conference, we are aware of the fact that the provisions suggested for security stocks may have certain relatively new elements. But we would also like to recall that France put this question before the Conference for its attention as much as two years ago. To date it has not been possible to embark on a detailed discussion of this issue, and so it is essential to do so today, because the problem cannot be avoided.

We also know that security stocks are not the only important issue that has not been dealt with so far: much remains to be done, for example, in defining super-toxic lethal substances, on guarantees, which have been wisely raised by the delegation of Pakistan, or on the strictly industrial aspects of the convention.

None of these issues in our view is of such central importance in the structure of the convention as that of security stocks. Without constantly assured security there will be no stable, credible and lasting convention. It would be better to deal with this issue before concluding negotiations and do this in an open-minded way, with great clarity of approach, so as to arrive at a workable mechanism which will be the best guarantee of the success of the convention, rather than leaving it until afterwards, in an atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust.

And in order to dispel misunderstanding, in order to avoid the repetition of unfounded allegations such as those that have appeared in the press recently, I would like to conclude by reiterating vigorously that our goal is the complete elimination of chemical weapons, as our Prime Minister recalled recently in Moscow: "The day when there is a verified disappearance of chemical weapons, we will be the first to destroy our own: I can make this formal commitment: we will be at zero level at the same time as the others."

This is the best way to sum up the proposal we have just made, which we hope will be considered by the Conference with all the attention it deserves.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

... I would now like to turn to items 4, 5 and 8 of our agenda. Pakistan has always supported a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons. My delegation is therefore gratified at the progress which is being made under item 4 of our agenda in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Last year and in the inter-sessional period, the Ad hoc Committee was able to elaborate the text of several important parts of the convention under the chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom. Further significant progress was recorded during the spring part of the current session under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, notably in the agreement that elimination of stocks should take place only through destruction, and towards drafting texts concerning verification of declarations on production facilities, their interim monitoring and the verification of their elimination, modalities for the revision of lists under article VI and some details of the institutional structure to be established under the convention.

We are confident that the momentum of the negotiations will be maintained during the summer part of the session. A complete ban on chemical weapons now seems to be within our reach, and we would urge all parties to join in an effort to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion before the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament next year.

(Cont'd)

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

We are not unmindful of the outstanding issues, some of them of considerable complexity, which have yet to be resolved. Foremost among them are the questions of challenge inspection and of non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. At the heart of both these issues lies the same consideration, that of effective verification. There has been no dearth of proposals on the question of challenge inspection. My delegation too submitted one such proposal last year in an attempt to bridge the differences which have prevented an agreement so far. We have been heartened by indications of a gradual convergence of views during the spring part of the session. It is evident, however, that considerable work remains to be done before this convergence is translated into treaty language. The issue of challenge inspection raises two considerations: one the one hand, the need for a stringent verification régime which would make it extremely difficult for any violation of the convention to go undetected, and on the other hand, the right of a State to protect installations of a highly sensitive nature having relevance to its supreme security interests from unreasonable and unjustified scrutiny. In our view, these two considerations are not irreconcilable, and we are confident that it would be possible to work out a mechanism which takes due account of both. One way of doing so would be to entrust the Executive Council with decision-making authority in disputed cases under an appropriate voting mechanism which guarantees that such differences are settled with all possible dispatch.

In the context of challenge inspection, some concern has been expressed about the possibility of what are described as "frivolous" challenges. My delegation feels that these fears are largely exaggerated. We do not subscribe to the view that some States or their leaders act responsibly while others do not. In any event, more harm would be done by placing undue impediments on the right of a State to request inspection than would result from a resort to "frivolous" challenge.

My delegation has consistently taken the view that declarations regarding chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities should be made at the earliest possible stage, and should be comprehensive and detailed in order to be fully verifiable. We therefore welcome the flexibility shown by the Soviet delegation earlier during this session on the question of the declaration of locations of chemical weapon stocks and their verification. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee will soon be able to finalize the relevant provisions of article IV of the convention.

Despite encouraging progress in several areas, a number of important questions remain open besides those I have already mentioned, including questions relating to scope, the definition of chemical weapons, the definition of production facilities and measures to be taken for their elimination, and organizational questions. Nor should we forget articles X and XI dealing retrospectively with assistance and with economic and technological development. The importance of the final clauses (articles XII to XVI) should also not be underestimated. Articles X and XI are of great interest to the developing countries, and we are happy to note that the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee envisages their being taken up during the current session. My delegation has submitted a proposal on the question of assistance which we hope will receive consideration when work on article X commences.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

An important subject to which the Conference should address itself is that of adequate follow-up action to established violations of the convention. In this context, the question of sanctions to be taken against a State which has been found to have acted in violation of its obligations under the convention deserves serious examination. To withdraw from such a State its rights and privileges under the convention can hardly be regarded as a response commensurate with the gravity of an act posing a threat to the objectives of the convention. The States parties to the convention ought to go further and undertake collective action to remedy the situation.

My delegation has noticed a tendency to enter into too many technical and procedural details in drafting the convention. We feel that many of these details could be left to the international authority and its organs which will be established under the convention. In trying to settle all these matters at this stage by including them in the text of the convention or its annexes, we run the risk of unduly delaying its conclusion. There is also a more pragmatic reason why we feel this should not be attempted. It is quite likely that, after the entry into force of the convention and with the benefit of actual experience, a need might be felt to improve some of the technical and procedural details relating to implementation. If all these details are contained in the text of the convention, the necessary modification may be extremely difficult to bring about in view of the obvious difficulties in amending a multilateral international agreement. My delegation therefore does not favour introducing into the convention such an element of rigidity which may not be in the interest of its effective implementation.

Before I pass on to other items on our agenda, may I say that my delegation has been dismayed at the statement just made by the distinguished Ambassador of France. The proposal that parties to the Convention should be permitted to maintain secret security stockpiles of chemical weapons would negate the main objectives of the ban. It would also seriously undermine confidence in the observance of the convention, and only deepen mutual suspicion among States parties with all its perilous consequences. It comes at a particularly inopportune time in view of the progress that is being made in the negotiations taking place in this Conference.

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

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However, in spite of these results, it is by no means certain that those achievements have brought us closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. Most unfortunate is that, after all these nine years, the Conference on Disarmament has yet to realize a single draft treaty on a topic

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(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

on its agenda. Therefore, during the run-up to the United Nations General Assembly third special session devoted to disarmament, my delegation, compelled by its conscience, appeals to all member States to make all the necessary efforts to prove that our Conference is able to live up to its tasks and deliver what is expected by the international community. With this spirit, and if reason dictates that producing agreements on all items in this relatively short period of time is too ambitious a target to aspire to, let us then, at least, exert all those efforts needed to finalize the draft treaty on chemical weapons which we have been negotiating for many years. Hopefully, further steps could be taken that would bring us closer to negotiating draft treaties on other items which we have also been discussing for many years.

As we are aware, at the beginning of the spring session, negotiation on the chemical weapons convention reached a promising stage and gave rise to justifiable optimism. We hope during this summer session the Committee will take up other remaining important issues. At this juncture, I would like to congratulate Ambassador Ekéus and the co-ordinators of the three working groups for their skilful and commendable efforts which have enabled the Committee to achieve remarkable results. My delegation is also very appreciative of the constructive and flexible approach shown by delegations during the negotiations.

The Non-Aligned People's Republic warmly welcomed the results of the regular session of the Multilateral Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which was held at the end of May in Berlin. We note

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

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Our optimism regarding the ability of this Conference to meet the expectations of the international community by negotiating international disarmament agreements is also prompted by the recent stepping up of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, under the presidency of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden.

Chemical weapons have always prompted universal horror, yet their manufacture and stockpiling, and new research for the production of still more dangerous nerve gases, continue. We are aware that current negotiations on an international convention banning chemical weapons involve complex problems, delicate political questions, as well as economic and trade interests. This new interest in this type of weapon is of profound concern to us. We, nevertheless venture to hope that the impetus given to negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on prohibition of the development, manufacture, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons will continue until the final adoption of the treaty in question. Such a treaty would undoubtedly constitute a landmark in the continual efforts of this Conference to discharge its duties.

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(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

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Now I would like to say a few words on the question of a chemical weapon ban. During the first part of the Conference's session, substantial progress was made in agreeing convention provisions on the declaration of stocks of

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(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

chemical weapons, plans for their destruction, international verification of declarations, and verification of chemical weapon storage facilities. This created the necessary conditions for the completion of work on this important problem -- the problem of the destruction of chemical weapon stocks. The final solution depended on the elaboration of an order of elimination.

At the end of the first part of the session, the delegation of Mongolia, guided by a desire to promote the rapid solution of this problem submitted for consideration in the Ad hoc Committee working paper CD/CW/WP.162 on an order of elimination of chemical weapon stocks. The order we are proposing provides for comparison between various categories of stocks on the basis of mass. For this purpose we think that stocks should be grouped in such a way that each group includes categories of like effectiveness. With such an approach it is necessary to give major emphasis to the grouping of chemicals within the categories.

When proposing the inclusion in each separate group of various chemicals which have similar properties as chemical warfare agents, we would at the same time accept that States possessing chemical weapons would have a certain freedom of action when destroying stocks within the groups, as far as the sequence of destruction would be concerned. This takes into consideration the positions of certain delegations on this subject.

Turning to the subject of working out comparative equivalents, in principle and on the whole, we do not reject the idea contained in such an approach. However, careful analysis shows that working out an objective and effectively applicable equivalent, would in practice be extremely complicated and would require a great deal of time. We should obviously bear this fact in mind and try to avoid making the negotiations unnecessarily complicated and perhaps delaying them at a time when efforts to agree on the text of a convention have entered the final stage.

We in no way claim that our proposal for the order of elimination of chemical weapon stocks indicates the only correct solution to the problem. However, it is quite obvious that the order we propose, in essence, is extremely simple, and at the same time, it could be applied very effectively. In proposing this for consideration by other delegations, we are guided by the aim of achieving the rapid development and conclusion of an international convention which would immediately bring to an end the development and production of any chemical weapons, and would provide a timely and comprehensive declaration of all existing stocks and production facilities, as well as placing them under stringent international control and then providing for their steady and proportional elimination down to zero -- the same zero for each State party to the convention, regardless of whether it now possesses chemical weapons or not, because only thus is it possible to ensure real equal security for all States in this area. On the basis of these principles we are ready to co-operate with all interested delegations.

The Mongolian People's Republic warmly welcomed the results of the regular session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which was held at the end of May in Berlin. We note

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

that the documents of the meeting, not only contain a thorough analysis of the basic yet interrelated trends in the world today, and an outline of philosophical approaches to the challenges facing us today, but also put forward a programme of practical steps towards disarmament, the strengthening of confidence and security, and the development of constructive relationships among States in the widest variety of areas.

In our view, one of the distinctive features of the new initiatives put forward in Berlin lies in the fact that they respond to the concerns voiced in the past by representatives of the West, not least here in this room. I am thinking in particular of the readiness expressed by meeting participants to have the imbalance in certain elements redressed in the course of the reduction of military confrontation in Europe. What is important is that this should be done by means of appropriate reductions by the side which is ahead, and not by a further build-up of arms.

We also note with satisfaction that many of the provisions put forward at the Berlin meeting are directly related to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, including such important issues on its agenda as the nuclear test ban and the chemical weapon ban. In our view, the document on the military doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty merits special attention, since it shows clearly that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty and that of each State party, is subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional.

Mr. KRISTVIK (Norway):

For several years, Norway has participated in the work of this important negotiating forum and all its subsidiary bodies. Norway has also been since 1984 the candidate of the Western Group for full membership, and hopes that this question will be solved in connection with the third special session devoted to disarmament. In two areas -- chemical weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban -- we have initiated research programmes which are relevant to the deliberations of the Conference. Today I have the honour to introduce three documents which concern the results of recent research in Norway.

My country is committed to doing its utmost to contribute to the multilateral negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, which would ban chemical weapons world-wide. In 1987, the negotiations are being ably guided by the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus. We highly appreciate his dynamic leadership and his continuous search for solutions to the sensitive political and complicated technical issues still outstanding.

One of the main problems concerns the question of on-site challenge inspection. It is the view of the Norwegian Government that it is absolutely necessary to dispatch the inspection team to the site concerned within 48 hours after the issue of a request for an on-site inspection. The investigation at the site should be detailed and comprehensive. We have taken note of the idea which was presented by the United States at the recent

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(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)

Holmenkollen Symposium in Oslo, that when an inspection takes place, provisions should be made to protect sensitive types of installations and facilities. Norway believes that this notion of "managed conduct" is a way in which to address security concerns related to the challenge inspection issue.

In this context, I should like to point out that on-site challenge inspection would occur only in exceptional circumstances. Thus, it would represent the "safety net" to the convention, which would already contain an elaborate system of routine on-site inspections. In fact, an effective chemical weapons convention will necessitate more comprehensive monitoring systems than any existing disarmament treaty.

The solution to these questions will require the flexibility of all parties concerned. Against this background, Norway welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are continuing their bilateral talks on all aspects of a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. These consultations, which were initiated after the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985, have had a positive effect on the negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament.

My country is of the opinion that both the multilateral negotiations and the bilateral talks should be intensified with a view to solving the main outstanding questions. The international community expects these abhorrent weapons to be eliminated as soon as possible.

Chemical weapons have recently been used in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The incorporation in the global convention of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is therefore necessary. The Norwegian research programme on verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons should be seen against this background. As a result of six years' research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, procedures have been developed for verification of alleged use. Today, I take pleasure in introducing documents CD/761 and CD/762.

The first document summarizes the results of research undertaken in 1986 and 1987, when the procedures were tested in two field exercises. These tests confirmed that the methods we have developed can be used on an all-year basis.

The procedures, which are outlined and described in document CD/762, cover the following phases of an investigation; establishment of the inspection team, survey of the alleged contaminated area, collection of samples, field analysis, preparation of samples for transport to laboratories, analysis in laboratories and preparation of the report of the inspection team. In elaborating this system we have consulted a number of countries, in particular Canada.

Document CD/762 provides that the international inspectors should conduct their mission in the least intrusive manner necessary to accomplish their task. On the basis of the field exercises, my country proposes that on-site inspection should take place within 48 hours after a request has been received by the Technical Secretariat. A proper investigation requires efficient methods for carrying out the inspection, with special emphasis on sampling and

(Mr. Kristvik, Norway)

sample analysis. Within 10 days after the completion of their on-site inspection, the international inspectors should present their findings in a report to the Technical Secretariat.

In presenting these proposed procedures, I should like to stress that the work undertaken at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment during 1986 and 1987 shows that some aspects of verification of the alleged use of chemical weapons need to be further examined. We shall continue our research programme with that in mind, and shall also take into account that some of these procedures could be applied to other situations concerning fact-finding.

Norway's development of procedures for on-site inspection on the basis of field experiments, which provide realistic and reliable data and avoid the artificial conditions of a laboratory, will contribute to the effective implementation of the convention. The wealth of research results will, no doubt, facilitate the work of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. In addition, the general aspects of the procedures should be incorporated in an annex to article IX of the Convention. Canada and Norway will therefore table a joint proposal for such an annex on 7 July.

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(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

... In its statement of 24 February in this Chamber dealing with nuclear deterrence, the United States delegation stressed the absence of general conflict in Europe since 1945; recalled the agreement of General Secretary Gorbachev with President Reagan that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; addressed the role of nuclear deterrence in Soviet military thinking; and spoke of the final essentiality that the international community, over time, find other means to ensure international security. The United States, for its part, understands full well what a tragedy any use of nuclear weapons would be, as it understands what a tragedy the widespread use of conventional weapons, and now even chemical weapons, has been over the past 40 years, and continues to be even today.

At their 12 June meeting in Reykjavik, just 18 days ago, the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a statement that included an important reaffirmation of the policy of deterrence. I quote that document:

"Serious imbalances in the conventional, chemical and nuclear field, and the persisting build-up of Soviet military power, continue to preoccupy us. We reaffirm that there is no alternative, as far as we can foresee, to the Alliance concept for the prevention of war -- the strategy of deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element being indispensable."

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

I would like to conclude today by noting with satisfaction that our chemical weapons negotiations have resumed in earnest. My delegation looks forward to registering real advances, both on the basic issues that remain to be resolved, and on the many key details that need to be worked out. To facilitate understanding of chemical weapons verification issues and to assist our efforts here, the United States has invited the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin, and appropriate Soviet experts to visit the United States chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele, Utah. This would include a visit to a chemical weapons bunker. I want to say to Ambassador Nazarkin today that this invitation remains open, and that I hope he can accept it.

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(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

General Secretary Gorbachev, in a statement made in Moscow on 23 June, noted that the Soviet Union is building a chemical weapons destruction facility. Secretary of State Shultz had suggested, earlier this year, that the two sides exchange visits to the sites of their destruction facilities. These visits would be practical examples of confidence-building in the field of chemical weapons arms control. They would add to other encouraging achievements in confidence-building. One of these is the recent United States-Soviet agreement on a draft joint text to establish nuclear risk reduction centres in their capitals. This agreement, which is a direct result of a United States initiative, is a practical measure that will strengthen international security by reducing the risk of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that might result from accident, misunderstanding or miscalculation.

(Mr. Larijani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

complicated. At the beginning of this tragic period chemical warfare was directed against military objectives and targets mainly, but recently the use of chemical weapons on civilian targets has been increased and intensified.

The pattern of progress among these characteristics should indeed be considered alarming to the human community. Should this horrible trend continue, the day will soon arrive when criminal elements may try to use chemical bombs and explosives against airports and cities of other countries. It seems very unreasonable to watch these developments passively and merely feel content with recommending to the civilian populace to carry gas masks in their handbags during their normal shopping and daily work. We think this is a historic moment in the Conference on Disarmament to be more realistic. There is a point of urgency to the matter.

Thanks to the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General, in March 1984, the United Nations produced its first report on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. In April 1985, a second report confirmed the use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers. A third report prepared in March 1986 concluded that chemical weapons had been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian positions. But the last report of 8 May 1987, prepared by the team of specialists dispatched by the Secretary-General to both Iran and Iraq, shows a new dimension as regards the violation of international law. In this report the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population is explicitly cited. The specialists report that they visited a whole family, including young children as well as old members of the family, injured by such weapons. The same team also reports on their visit to a two-year-old baby, a victim of mustard gas, who died in front of their very eyes. Needless to say, these are only the incidents known to the team. Numerous others have just slept in history; no cameras present, no team to depict the tragedy of their suffering for future generations, not to mention for the future deliberations of the politicians of the world. The state of ignorance on such an important manner seems to be beyond expectation.

Along the same current of events, just two days ago, on 28 June 1987, Iraqi forces attacked the city of Sardasht. Four residential areas in the city were the target of chemical bombardment. The first report shows more than 10 deaths and more than 650 injuries, mostly children who happen to be more vulnerable and defenceless once exposed to the green and yellowish clouds generated by mustard gas.

It is very essential that we should all for a moment imagine how a child would behave when he cries hard for survival, and with each cry, lumps of this lethal gas are pumped into his lungs. We should also imagine what the desperate mother could do -- prevent the child from breathing, I mean suffocate him, or let her dear one die of mustard gas.

Mr. President, please don't recommend that all children should carry a gas mask in their back-pack; don't recommend that children should stop breathing for a few hours. No, Mr. President, we should do something serious, and right now.

(Mr. Larijani, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Nobody should expect a criminal government, a defeated aggressor which recognizes no boundaries to its action, to abide by any law or regulation. But are we justified in leaving the future of our lives to the whims and wishes of such criminals?

I hope I have been able to demonstrate the urgency of the matter, and why we should act right now, for tomorrow is too late. We should embark on some serious concrete and practical ways to deal with such insanity and criminal conduct. Firstly, we should try to strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925, for example through reaffirmation of commitment to the Protocol by the signatory States. Secondly, any and all international responses to any violation of the Protocol should be concrete, strong and prompt. Thirdly, all possible ways and means should be utilized to exert pressure on the violator in order to prevent the repetition of such crimes. This should include, among other things, the imposition of a total arms embargo and a variety of sanctions, as well as suspension of its membership in the United Nations and other international organizations. We are sure that in the present case, if these ideas are materialized and implemented, the aggressor régime of Iraq will definitely be prevented from continuing further use of chemical weapons.

It simply does not make sense that countries crying for humanity, peace and stability are generously arming, assisting and politically supporting such a criminal régime, regardless of its violation of international law and continuation of such shameless crimes. No political ambition can justify this ignorance! Any assistance to the violator with the knowledge of its continuous violations is in itself a crime and constitutes participation in the crime.

Finally, it is our earnest hope that this session of the Conference on Disarmament will produce the necessary machinery and needed modalities for strengthening the ban on the use of chemical weapons, effective implementation of international law and regulations in this field, and safeguarding peace, stability and the future of mankind. Considering the tangible and substantial progress made in the course of the past year in the preparation of the convention on chemical weapons, while hoping that it will be finalized at the earliest possible time, I would like to extend our gratitude and appreciation to Ambassador Ekéus, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and his colleagues in the working groups.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

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One further brief comment in connection with today's statement by Ambassador Friedersdorf, regarding his invitation to me to accompany some experts to a chemical weapon destruction facility in Utah. As I understood him, he stressed that this invitation, this visit is considered as a confidence-building measure. In fact it can certainly only be considered as a confidence-building measure, because if I do go to that facility I'm hardly going to derive anything useful there for the negotiations on banning chemical weapons. In any case our experts say that they have no difficulties with the destruction of chemical weapons. They know how to do it. Consequently, this can hardly be anything other than a confidence-building measure. But I think that there are, in fact, considerably more effective confidence-building measures. As I see it, the main point which undermines confidence at the negotiations on chemical weapons are plans to develop binary weapons. Tell me, why participate in the preparation of a convention to ban and eliminate chemical weapons and at the same time take practical steps to develop a new generation of chemical weapons? Do such steps demonstrate the sincerity of the participants in the negotiations? I think that shelving these plans, these steps, would be a true confidence-building measure.

(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

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My fifth point concerns the trend in arms control towards the complete elimination of whole categories of weapons. The biological weapons convention provides a first example and it will, we all hope, be followed by a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. In the case of chemical weapons we are moving from a prohibition of use to a complete ban on development, production and possession. The example of the Biological Weapons Convention shows that a third phase might be contemplated as well, in which further confidence-building measures, notably the exchange of information on research, might help further to ensure that no development of a certain type of weapons is taking place.

As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, we surely are still far from negotiating these weapons away. However, as I pointed out, we are moving to a possible ban on virtually a whole category of these weapons, and we hope that progress will soon be made on other categories as well.

An important condition for success in arms talks is that the forum one chooses should be well suited for negotiations on the weapon system concerned. This particular forum, the Conference on Disarmament, has a long agenda. A realistic assessment of the agenda, its achievements and prospects shows that chemical weapons offer the best chance of success. The CW negotiations therefore deserve, in our view, the priority they receive in the practical day-to-day work in Geneva.

Agreement on a ban on chemical weapons, would serve as a unique illustration of the role the Conference on Disarmament can play as the single world-wide multilateral negotiating body. Given the long-standing abhorrence of these weapons shared by the world community, the CD now faces the historic task of bringing about a treaty banning the production, possession, development and use of these weapons. This task is a great challenge, but certainly not an insurmountable one. Negotiating history shows great creativity and perseverance toward this end. As in the past, the Netherlands is anxious to make its contribution on that score.

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(Mr. van den Broek, the Netherlands)

Determination should guide us in a joint effort to bring the chemical weapons treaty within sight. In defining the essential characteristics of the treaty, some basic facts are to be borne in mind.

Firstly, the convention must, by its very nature, be detailed so as to cover all essential requirements; on the other hand, we must realize that not every single detail can be foreseen or taken care of. Technological developments will not come to a halt. The treaty should therefore provide for a continuous review, among other things, of the lists of chemicals to be covered under the different régimes of control and prohibition.

Secondly, verification remains a key component of every credible and solid arms control treaty. That applies in particular to the chemical weapons convention. There, verification requires essentially a three fold structure: declaring and dismantling of stocks and production facilities; strict verification provisions including routine inspection of the relevant part of the chemical industry in an equitable but adequate way; and finally an appropriate régime for consultation, fact-finding procedures and challenge inspections.

The effectiveness of challenge inspections is closely related to the efficiency of the routine part of the verification régime -- verification of destruction and verification of non-production. A very stringent system of challenge inspection, and that is what we need, will prove acceptable only if it is reserved for exceptional cases of serious concern about compliance. The first condition for an effective challenge-inspection régime is therefore an effective system for routine inspection. The second condition in my view, is that when a party considers a challenge inspection to be necessary, no obstacle whatever should be able to prevent the inspection from taking place. The third condition is that an inspection should always and under all circumstances lead to a quick and clear answer. The challenged State party should therefore be under a stringent obligation to disprove the allegations contained in the challenge request.

I am perfectly aware that meeting these conditions is not possible without paying the price of a certain openness. I am, however, convinced that, upon close consideration, this price is relatively small and is convincingly outweighed by the common goal of an effective world-wide ban on chemical weapons. Important work on this subject has been done in the recent past, especially by the United Kingdom (see document CD/715) and by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Netherlands will consider making a further contribution to the discussion on this most important subject when appropriate.

Recent reports on renewed use of these horrendous weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq have once again underlined the urgency of our work to bring about agreement on a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention.

The chemical-weapons negotiations surely gained momentum this year. Let us use the remaining two months of the summer session to the maximum, as well as the later part of the year when the CD is not in formal session. Even if the CD is not in session between September and January, this should not prevent us from pursuing the work with vigour.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Warsaw Treaty States regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons is well known. Let me just recall the communiqué on the Session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty States held in Berlin on 28 and 29 May this year:

"The States participating in the session favour the earliest possible elimination of chemical weapons. They reiterate their preparedness to complete the preparation of an international convention banning chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons and the industrial basis for their production by the end of this year."

During the summer session of the Conference the Soviet delegation intends to work resolutely for accelerated progress towards this goal.

At the plenary meetings of the Conference many representatives have also emphasized the need to speed up the preparation of a chemical weapons convention. We note with satisfaction the desire of Norway to do its utmost to contribute to the multilateral negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, which was expressed by Director-General for Security and Disarmament Affairs in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bjørn Kristvik, in his statement on 30 June this year.

The Soviet delegation shares the view expressed early last month by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. M.B. Theorin, that the progress already made in the negotiations shows that a convention is within reach and that compromises will now have to be made and difficult decisions taken. We have studied with interest the analysis of the situation at the negotiations contained in the statement by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Ahmad, on 16 June, as well as his ideas and assessments on specific aspects of the convention which is being drafted. Neither did we ignore the statement by the NATO member States at the June 1987 session of the NATO Council to the effect that those countries are determined to reach in the very near future an agreement on a comprehensive, global, and effectively verifiable treaty providing for a complete destruction of the existing arsenals within agreed time limits and the prevention of continued production of these weapons. We hope that this stated determination will be translated here, at the Conference, into concrete deeds, into real policies, into a search for compromises, into agreements.

It was with particular interest, therefore, that we learned several days ago that the newly appointed head of the United States delegation would address the Conference on 30 June. We expected Ambassador Freidersdorf to outline the United States' attitude towards what is taking place at the chemical weapons negotiations, and to make his own contribution to their successful advancement. I will not conceal the fact that we were a little bit puzzled by his words that the United States was seeking "equitable arms control agreements in the areas of nuclear testing, chemical weapons and conventional forces". Puzzled, because the issue of banning chemical weapons has been put on the same footing as the problem of nuclear testing, towards

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

which the United States Administration's negative attitude is well known. We would like to hope that this formula does not mean that the United States approaches the chemical weapons negotiations in the same way it is approaching the issue of multilateral negotiations on banning nuclear weapon tests.

We were also surprised by the fact that, without reacting to all the numerous questions under consideration at the negotiations, the distinguished United States representative concentrated solely on inviting Soviet representatives to visit a chemical weapons destruction facility in Tooele. Is this really the key to success at the multilateral negotiations on banning chemical weapons? Would it not have been more useful to concentrate on those crucial questions which are currently holding back progress at the negotiations?

On many such questions the United States position still remains unclear. This also refers, in particular, to such a field as challenge inspections. The present United States views, in our understanding, presuppose that a challenge without the right of refusal should cover all sites and facilities on the territory of a State party without distinction as to the form of ownership or the degree of Government control thereof. Such was the United States interpretation of article X of its draft convention in CD/500. And what, in this connection, would its interpretation be of article XI of the same document? Is this article deleted or not? And if it remains, then in what cases does the United States side propose to apply it? Resolving the issue of challenge inspections depends to a considerable degree on the answer to this question.

There is another problem -- that of responsibility for the actions of the subsidiary of a company registered in one of the States parties to the future convention. In this case, two situations may arise: when the subsidiary operates on the territory of another State party, and when it operates in a State not party to the convention. A third situation is also possible: that in which an international company registered in the territory of a State party operates in the territory of such a State. Such transnational corporations sometimes operate on the territory of other countries as a "State within a State", refusing to allow the activities of their subsidiaries to be monitored. The question of which State should be responsible for ensuring that these corporations observe the provisions of the convention is therefore of practical importance. Answers to this question would seem to be called for not only from the United States but also from other States in whose economic systems companies with considerable networks of affiliates on the territory of other States play an extensive role.

I have already touched upon the problem of confidence as applied to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are in favour of confidence. But we do not understand how the goal of confidence-building on the eve of concluding a convention can be combined with attempts to start at all costs the production of new types of chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons. If the conclusion of the convention is considered to be such a long-term objective as a nuclear test-ban, the production of chemical

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

weapons has its own -- although peculiar -- logic. But if the plan is still to conclude it as early as possible, which means that all chemical weapons will be destroyed, then why expand their production? Why waste money and material resources?

Assessing the situation at the chemical weapons negotiations we note not only the encouraging progress recently achieved, in particular at this year's spring session, but also the disturbing fact that at present the negotiations are clearly marking time. The discussion of a number of questions resembles walking in circles rather than moving ahead. Take, for example, article VI (Activities not prohibited by the Convention). When we were leaving in April, a number of participants promised to analyse their positions and come back with concrete answers. But we continue to hear from them nothing but questions. Moreover, attempts are beginning to be made to disavow compromises achieved through arduous efforts, to delay agreement on the convention. Can we not see behind all this a fear of the possible early conclusion of the convention, that has become so obvious of late?

We may be told that, now that a number of major questions of principle have been settled, the time has come for meticulous technical work on certain details. This, I agree, is also necessary. But here too, not all the opportunities are used. For example, a start could already have been made on drafting a concrete text for annex IV, section V, on verification of the elimination of chemical weapons stocks, as was agreed upon in the Group on Cluster I at the very beginning of the session. Unfortunately, there has been no progress here either.

At the same time the main task at the current session of the Conference as far as chemical weapons are concerned would seem to consist in finding solutions of principle to those few issues where there is as yet no general political agreement, and above all the problem of challenge inspections and non-production of chemical weapons by commercial industries. In this context we note with satisfaction the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, who during the spring session organized working meetings and consultations on some of these questions.

The present advanced stage of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons imposes on the participants yet another responsibility. The consensus parts of the "rolling text" -- which, by the way, make up the bulk of it -- are the result of complex, prolonged negotiations and represent a package of delicate interrelated compromises. They lay down the conceptual basis of the future ban on chemical weapons which must be comprehensive and include not only all stocks but also the development and production of such weapons; this ban must be observed in the process of "non-prohibited" activities and must be guaranteed by the most effective controls, ranging from systematic verification to the challenge inspection mechanism.

For these reasons the results of many years of efforts should be approached with care, if, of course, one's basic starting-point is the need for the rapid conclusion of the convention. A very alarming situation has arisen, in our opinion, as regards reaching agreement on the order of

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

destruction of chemical weapon stocks. Article IV of the "rolling text" and its annex contain a set of important provisions which seemed to have received general support. However, the introduction of document CD/757 by the French delegation may, however, cause considerable difficulties in the negotiations.

We naturally proceed from the premise that the order of destruction must be based on the principle of undiminished security of States during the entire destruction process, as has already been agreed in annex IV, section II. However, the specific conclusions drawn from this general premise in document CD/757 lead us neither to the conclusion of a convention, nor to the ensuring of security.

What does the French document actually suggest? It provides that the States parties to the convention will have the right to retain production capacities and manufacture chemical weapons, and also acquire such weapons, for at least eight years and possibly longer after the convention enters into force. Moreover, this right would be granted not only to States possessing chemical weapons but also to those without them. As a result, the States possessing chemical weapons could renew their stocks (within the limits of the "security stock"), while those without could establish such "security stocks". This constitutes, in essence, a call for the legalized build-up and proliferation of chemical weapons. This suggestion leads not to equal security, but to increasing equal insecurity.

The security of the parties to the convention could, in our view, be ensured immediately after its entry into force through the implementation of a number of measures which would safely freeze stocks at current levels until they are destroyed, and would rule out preparations for their use as well as, naturally, their actual use. This would involve, first and foremost, the declaration of all the existing stocks, their placing under systematic international control with the help of on-site inspections and continuous monitoring with instruments, and the adoption of measures to ensure that the chemical weapons are not removed from the store except to a destruction facility. The relevant provision contained in paragraph 2 of article IV of the "rolling text" has been agreed upon by all delegations, and only one delegation has reserved its position. Moreover, the removal of chemical weapons from the store to a destruction facility should be conducted under international control. This provision, contained in the annex to article IV, section V, paragraph 6 (b), has been agreed upon by all participants in the negotiations.

The implementation of the above measures, which would in essence place chemical weapon stocks under "international arrest", would put all parties in an equal position in terms of their security.

The authors of document CD/757 consider that the security of all States parties may be called into question either gradually (e.g. as a result of delays in the timetable for the destruction of the stockpiles as a result of material difficulties) or suddenly (e.g. the exit from the convention of one of the States parties or its refusal to continue with the elimination of the remaining stocks). We agree that theoretically such situations may arise.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

However, the response to them should be different from that recommended by the authors of this document. If a State begins to experience material or technical difficulties in the process of destroying its stocks, it should be granted assistance in order to ensure compliance with the schedule of destruction.

It is another matter when a State refuses to continue destroying the stocks. This is a flagrant violation of the convention, with all the consequences that follow. This problem should be solved by creating an effective mechanism which would ensure compliance with the convention.

Let us suppose, finally, that a State possessing chemical weapons withdraws from the convention and unfreezes its chemical weapon stocks. This will result in an exceptional situation. The paradox of the French proposal, however, lies in the fact that while calling for equal security for States parties to the convention, it may objectively increase the likelihood that such an exceptional situation will arise because the number of States possessing chemical weapons will grow after the convention enters into force. It is one thing when all chemical weapon production facilities are closed and secured, and quite another when even one such facility remains. On the basis of this facility and its infrastructure it will be an easy and rapid task to exceed the limits of "security stocks". Hence, the dangerous consequences of a State's withdrawal from the convention will also increase, since it will possess not only reactivated stocks but also the potential for their rapid build-up, renewal and upgrading.

Approaching the problem of chemical weapons soberly and realistically, one should proceed from the fact that there are States which possess such weapons and States which do not. As was shown above, the conclusion of a convention should eliminate this difference, and this would happen immediately after the convention enters into force. However, document CD/757 is based on the premise that the status quo existing before the convention enters into force can be changed to the advantage of those States that do not possess chemical weapons or would like to increase their stocks, with all the dangerous consequences I have already mentioned.

The French document, in our opinion, runs counter to the essence and spirit of the convention being prepared and the entire consensus approach in chemical disarmament. I will not even mention the fact that the approach contained in this document would seriously hamper the monitoring of chemical weapon stocks. In the final analysis, a contradictory scheme for the legitimizing of chemical weapon industries -- and the most dangerous aspects of them -- is placed in opposition to the concept of consistent chemical weapons elimination.

As a result, not only will there not be an increase in confidence among the parties to the convention, but new sources of concern will appear which may divide the States that have signed the convention. In our view this cannot either ensure security for the parties to the convention, nor encourage them to join it on a large scale.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation considered it essential to set out frankly here the results of its analysis of document CD/757, in order to encourage business-like negotiations and enhance mutual understanding between the participants.

Although the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament has just begun, there is not a great deal of time ahead. We consider that biding time is quite inappropriate at the present stage in the negotiations, and call upon all participants at the Conference to make efforts to expedite the process of drawing up a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mr. KAHILUOTO (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. I am sure that the work of the Conference this month will greatly benefit from your experienced guidance. I am also very grateful for the warm words of welcome which you just addressed to me when giving me the floor.

I shall devote my statement to the issue of chemical weapons. A complete ban on chemical weapons is one of the foremost goals of international disarmament efforts. It is, to us, a priority item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and the subject of intensive negotiations.

This is rightly so. Chemical weapons are repugnant weapons of mass destruction. Innocent and unprotected civilians are at particular risk in the event of their use. Yet, chemical weapons are perceived to be militarily useful. A number of States are believed to possess chemical weapons, although only two States have so far openly acknowledged that they do. Moreover, many States, in the developed and developing world alike, possess the required industrial capabilities to manufacture lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. Clearly, the danger of proliferation exists. Indeed, it will grow unless effective steps are taken.

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(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the use of chemical weapons in war. Yet this fundamental norm of international law is being violated. In the Iran-Iraq conflict, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq has been demonstrated by the team of experts repeatedly dispatched to the area by the United Nations Secretary-General. Persistent reports that chemical weapons may also have been used elsewhere add to our deep concern.

Finland condemns the use of chemical weapons. Their use in the Gulf war threatens to undermine seriously the authority of the Geneva Protocol to the detriment of the security of each and every one of us.

Such a serious breach of international law underlines the urgent need to terminate the Iran-Iraq conflict by peaceful means as soon as possible. Finland supports the efforts by the United Nations Security Council to bring this about and urges the two belligerents to co-operate with the Council to this effect.

Finland has consistently supported a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons on a global basis. At this Conference, we have sought to contribute to the achievement of this goal primarily through our technical expertise on verification of various aspects of the future convention. I shall return to this contribution in somewhat greater detail later on in my statement.

We have noted with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention lately, particularly towards the end of last year and this year. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, for the firm guidance he has given and continues to give to this important and highly complex negotiation.

Despite progress, a number of difficult problems remain to be solved. Some are simply difficult in technical terms. Others require difficult political decisions. We are encouraged by the fact that both major military alliances have, in their recent statements, reiterated their determination to achieve early agreement on a chemical weapons convention.

Let me briefly mention three outstanding issues relating to the convention which we consider to be of major significance.

First, there is the issue of existing stocks and their destruction. There is by now widespread agreement that all chemical weapon stocks and their locations should be declared very soon -- 30 days -- after the convention enters into force for the State party concerned. We welcome this progress. In our view, it is of cardinal importance to the credibility of the convention that all existing stocks be declared from the very beginning, and that their destruction be promptly initiated according to an order of destruction yet to be agreed upon. In our view, such an order of destruction needs to foreclose any possibility for proliferation of chemical weapons once the convention enters into force.

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

Second, verification of the fact that no new chemical weapons will be produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance. Arrangements concerning non-production, unlike those concerning destruction of existing stockpiles, do not have a fixed time-limit.

Arrangements concerning non-production must avoid unduly hampering the legitimate operations of civilian chemical industry. There seems to be general agreement on this point. At the same time, we feel, like many others, that the additional supervision of the industry stemming from the verification régime of non-production will not prove to be too burdensome. The civilian chemical industry is already heavily regulated because of the potential hazards it poses to health and the environment.

Third, challenge inspection undoubtedly remains the major unresolved issue at this point. Sensitive security concerns of States are intimately involved here. It is encouraging, however, that a reasoned dialogue on this issue seems to have begun. Differences are being narrowed. In view of the grave consequences which suspicions of undeclared stocks or production facilities, if not promptly and satisfactorily allayed, would have for the convention and international security in general, an effective system of challenge inspections is clearly a necessity.

It has been quite clear from the very beginning that effective verification of compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention is essential for the parties to have any confidence in it. Verification involves not only working out the necessary procedures in the convention itself, but also development of reliable technical methods and instruments to carry out specific verification tasks that those procedures entail.

It is precisely this latter aspect of chemical weapons verification to which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our research project, conducted by a team of scientists from a number of Finnish universities and funded by the Finnish Government, develops instrumental methods for the detection, analysis and identification of chemical warfare agents. Since 1977, the results of the work have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament (and its predecessor) in the form of handbook-type annual reports, the so-called Finnish Blue Books.

Altogether, 11 Blue Books have been published so far, including this year's report. The latest report (CD/764) was introduced in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this past Friday. It is our hope that once a chemical weapons convention is concluded and enters into force, the Finnish Blue Books will constitute a kind of technical verification data base from which all States parties, and the Technical Secretariat in particular, may benefit.

Let me now briefly summarize the work done so far. The first 10 years of the project were devoted to developing analytical methods for three types of laboratories -- portable detection kits, trailer-installed field laboratories and stationary central laboratories -- as well as for collection of identification data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors, and degradation products. The findings were drawn together in the 1984 report.

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

In the 1985 report, attention was turned to air monitoring of chemical warfare agents. The report describes in detail various techniques for collecting and analysing low-volume, medium-volume and high-volume air samples. The two latest reports describe how these techniques were tested in practice by means of large-scale field experiments. Kilogram amounts of harmless simulants of warfare agents were released into the atmosphere as finely dispersed aerosols. Air samples were then collected as far away as 200 kilometres downwind. At all distances, all the simulants released could be detected and identified.

This is significant in two ways. First, the experiments prove that the techniques developed really work in actual field conditions and are highly selective and sensitive. Second, the experiments prove that even very small releases of chemical warfare agents can be discovered at great distances if a network of detection stations is available.

While verification of compliance with the convention will be primarily based on data reporting and inspections, it is, in our view, important to have available, as a complement, methods which can reliably detect and identify atmospheric releases of chemical agents regardless of source.

Since air monitoring facilities are also needed for surveillance of ambient air for reasons of environmental protection, it would not, in our view, be necessary to establish a monitoring network solely for the purpose of chemical weapons verification provided that the facilities are designed with both purposes in mind. We will shortly present a working paper to this Conference on this aspect of air monitoring.

Another important subject recently addressed by the Finnish Project on Verification of Chemical Disarmament is automatic monitoring. In February this year, the project organized a workshop in Helsinki for the purpose of studying the potential applications of automatic monitoring systems in the context of verifying a chemical weapons convention. Twenty-odd qualified experts from a number of countries involved with the chemical weapons negotiations participated. The proceedings of the workshop have just been circulated to the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/765. They were introduced in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last Friday.

We in Finland appreciate the work done on various aspects of arms control verification in many countries, members and non-members of the CD alike. We have followed with interest the Norwegian research programme of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons since it was initiated in 1981. We are also aware of the important work on this and other subjects of verification carried out by Canada.

May I take this opportunity to thank the Governments of Canada and Norway for the valuable meetings they organized for our benefit among others, in the month of May. We found the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal as well as the Oslo Symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention most informative on the issues concerned.

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

At this advanced stage of chemical weapons negotiations, a certain amount of co-ordination among the various national-level chemical weapons verification projects might be in order. After all, they do have a common goal: the rapid conclusion and effective functioning of a chemical weapons convention. Specifically, we have in mind a division of labour where outstanding technical verification issues would be apportioned among the various interested projects for in-depth study.

The Ah hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons would, in our view, be the most competent body to help to identify such outstanding technical issues for this purpose, perhaps even indicating an order of priority for their examination. Based on such guidance, representatives for the various interested projects could then agree among themselves on which of them would do what.

Against this background, the proposed text of the Convention, which is being discussed in the Conference on Disarmament, should be reviewed in the light of the above-mentioned considerations. It is suggested that the text of the Convention should be reviewed in the light of the above-mentioned considerations.

Any allegation of the use of chemical weapons would, of course, be a matter of the most serious concern to the States party to a convention banning chemical weapons altogether. Immediate on-site inspection, whether at the invitation of the State party in whose territory the alleged use of chemical weapons occurred or at the request of another State party, would be necessary for the purpose of establishing the facts and circumstances, and the Convention should provide for such a procedure. It is suggested that the Convention should include in an annex the text of a protocol for such a purpose. In drawing up this proposal, we have consulted a number of countries.

I cannot go into any detail as to the concrete content of this proposal, but I refer to the text of the proposal, which is being discussed in the Conference on Disarmament, and to the text of the proposal, which is being discussed in the Conference on Disarmament. It is suggested that the Convention should include in an annex the text of a protocol for such a purpose. In drawing up this proposal, we have consulted a number of countries.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway): Mr. President, permit me at the outset to congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July.

I have asked for the floor today to introduce -- and I consider this as a special honour -- to introduce on behalf of Canada and my own country, Norway, a concrete proposal in connection with the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. These negotiations have also just been extensively dealt with by my Finnish colleague, and I am grateful for the positive comments he made on the research made by the two countries. The proposal I have the honour to introduce is contained in document CD/766, of 2 July 1987, which concerns procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

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While verification of compliance with the convention will be primarily based on data reporting and inspections, it is in our view, important to have available, as a complement, methods which can reliably detect and identify atmospheric releases of chemical agents regardless of source.

Since air monitoring facilities are also needed for surveillance of ambient air for reasons of environmental protection, it would not, in our view, be necessary to establish a monitoring network solely for the purpose of chemical weapons verification provided that the facilities are designed with both purposes in mind. We will shortly present a working paper to this Conference on this aspect of air monitoring.

Recent important reports recently produced by the Finnish Project on Verification of Chemical Disarmament, by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, in February 1987, have provided a number of interesting and relevant data for the purpose of such an air monitoring network. The project was initiated in the context of verifying a biological weapons convention. The project has reported from a number of air monitoring stations in the vicinity of weapons negotiation points. The project has also reported on the use of air monitoring in the context of the Convention on Disarmament in 1987. They were introduced in the CD on 2 July 1987.

We in Finland appreciate the work done on verification of arms control verification in many countries, and we are particularly interested in the CD work. We have followed with interest the progress of the negotiations on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons since it was initiated in 1984. We are also aware of the important work in this area carried out by Canada.

May I take this opportunity to thank the representatives of Canada and Norway for the valuable meetings they organized in Oslo, Norway, in the month of May. We found the Oslo Symposium on Chemical Weapons, as well as the Oslo Symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention most informative on the issues concerned.

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

We know that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. That Protocol is adhered to by more than 100 countries. It has, however, no verification provisions. For this reason, an understanding was reached in this Conference in 1983 to incorporate in the convention on which we are now negotiating a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. It is, of course, necessary to see to it that this is done in a way which does not erode the status of the Geneva Protocol, which is one of the oldest arms control treaties. The incorporation of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the chemical weapons convention could, in fact, reinforce the Geneva Protocol.

It is therefore necessary to devise a proper verification mechanism which could be included in the new convention and applied in cases of allegations of use of chemical weapons. In order to contribute to this, both Canada and Norway initiated research programmes on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons in this field in 1981. The results of this research have been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. It follows from the documents which have already been submitted that Canada and Norway have studied all phases of the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, i.e. from establishment of an inspection team and the team's investigation to submission of its report.

Against this background and taking into account the advanced phase of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, Canada and Norway have jointly elaborated a draft treaty text concerning general procedures for the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

Any allegation of the use of chemical weapons would, of course, be a matter of the most serious concern to the States parties to a convention banning chemical weapons altogether. Immediate on-site inspection, whether at the invitation of the State party on whose territory the alleged use of chemical weapons occurred or at the request of another State party, would be necessary for the purpose of maintaining the effectiveness and authority of the convention. Thus provisions in article IX concerning consultations, co-operation and fact-finding have relevance to verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, and the procedures applicable for verifying such an event should be included in an annex to article IX. We have thus elaborated a proposal for such an annex. In drawing up this proposal we have consulted a number of countries.

I cannot here go into any detail as to the concrete content of this proposal, and I refer to the paper, but I would like to mention a few salient points. The proposal requires that, upon receipt of a request from a State party for an inspection, the International Authority shall immediately notify the State party (or States parties) concerned of the requirement to conduct on-site inspection within 48 hours. The State party (or States parties) so notified shall make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the inspection team. The team should comprise a number of International Inspectors with the necessary qualifications, experience and training, as well as supporting staff with special skills or training, who may be required to assist the International Inspectors.

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

The International Inspectors shall be permitted to take with them the necessary equipment and supplies and have unimpeded access to the site or sites. They shall collect enough samples so that a reliable conclusion may be reached as to the allegation of the use of chemical weapons and also interview people who may have been affected by the alleged use.

The samples shall be analysed by at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall draw up a list of certified laboratories, which must be in possession of standardized equipment for the type or types of analysis to be conducted. The Executive Council shall approve this list. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analyses of samples so that these results may be taken into account with the report of the inspection team.

The report of the International Inspectors shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat within 10 days of the completion of the inspection. The report shall be factual in nature and contain the findings of the International Inspectors. The Technical Secretariat shall provide a copy of the report to the State party that requested the inspection, to each State party that received the inspection, to the State party alleged to have used chemical weapons, and to the members of the Executive Council.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to add that the proposal contains a clause which states that the Technical Secretariat, under the supervision of the Executive Council, shall elaborate, and revise as necessary, technical procedures and interview questionnaires for the guidance of International Inspectors in the conduct of an on-site inspection.

The proposal tabled by Canada and Norway is based on six years of research by our two countries in the field of verification of alleged use. Canada and Norway submit this proposal as a basis for negotiations on the text for an annex to article IX concerning general procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We hope that the content of this proposal can be included prior to the beginning of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament in the rolling text, which will reflect the status of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention at that time.

The proposal which I have presented today, should be seen in light of the commitment of both Canada and Norway to contribute to an early conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. It concerns a question which so far has not been dealt with in detail in the negotiations. In fact, the proposal is the first full-fledged text covering all phases of the procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We commend the proposal for your constructive consideration.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

I listened with great interest to this morning's statements by the distinguished representatives of Finland and Norway devoted to chemical weapons. Those statements are still further proof of their countries' deep and active interest in, and important contributions to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. Before I finish my statement, I would also like to touch briefly on the work of the Committee on Chemical Weapons.

My task is easier today as Ambassador Y.K. Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, in his statement on 2 July 1987, gave an evaluation of the present stage of the negotiations with regard to a chemical weapons convention and expressed his delegation's uneasiness at the slowing down of the pace of work of the Committee. My delegation fully shares his analysis and conclusions. In our opinion, if we are to achieve decisive progress this year, as is professed to be the desire of all, we have to concentrate our efforts more on the still outstanding priority aspects of the convention rather than on issues of lesser importance or urgency.

In particular, more goal-oriented and intensive work should and can be done with regard to the finalization of articles IV, V and VI, including the definition of a production facility, the order of destruction of chemical weapons and régimes for super-toxic lethal chemicals remaining outside schedule [1]. Moreover, challenge inspection, usefully dealt with by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee during the spring session, should be taken up by the Committee more vigorously.

We are grateful to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, and to the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Krutzsch, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Nieuwenhuys, for their strenuous efforts, but real progress can only come as a result of the common endeavours of all delegations and their genuine will to make such progress.

Poland, being a country which does not produce, possess or intend to acquire chemical weapons, is doing its best within its power to contribute to the prompt finalization of the convention. The destruction of existing chemical weapons and their elimination from military arsenals for ever will be a long and difficult process, demanding strict and so far unheard-of international control. It is therefore in our common interest to begin the process as soon as possible. We support all initiatives which may be helpful to eliminating chemical weapons, including regional solutions.

On the other hand, we are deeply concerned with some States' activities leading toward the initiation of production of a new generation of chemical weapons. Likewise disquieting are proposals put forward at our Conference which would allow for the production of chemical weapons after the process of destruction has started. Such an attitude, in our opinion, runs against the spirit and the letter of the future convention. Indeed, we hope that the authors of CD/757 will reconsider their position in favour of our common goal -- an effective convention on a chemical-weapons ban.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We strongly believe that the remaining part of the summer session of the Conference, as well as the time available before the beginning of the 1988 session, will, as in previous years, be used to the benefit of the convention. We are glad to note that a similar view was expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency Hans van de Broek. We hope other delegations will be able to demonstrate a similar approach.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, as this is the first opportunity that I have had to take the floor under your presidency, I should like to express, on behalf of Canada, my pleasure and my government's pleasure at seeing you, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, assuming the important role of President of our Conference for the month of July. I would also like to take the opportunity to express my appreciation for the fruitful and constructive work done by your predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi, to move the work of this Conference forward and, although it may seem a little late to be reiterating something I have said before, I hope that you, like Ambassador Alfarargi, will be able to continue to build upon the extremely useful foundations laid by Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia.

The purpose of my statement today is to express the views of the Canadian Government on the current state of our efforts to negotiate a comprehensive, verifiable ban on chemical weapons and to announce our intention to place before this body further results of Canadian research relating to the investigation of allegations of use of chemical weapons. I will also make some brief comments on document CD/766, which proposed an annex to article IX of the draft convention, dealing specifically with procedures for the verification of allegations of use. We have been pleased to join with Norway in tabling this document in the Conference on Disarmament.

The earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive, adequately verifiable ban on chemical weapons remains one of the priority arms control objectives of the Canadian Government. Such a convention should, in our view, provide for the immediate cessation of all chemical weapons production and for the systematic destruction within a specified period of all existing stocks of chemical weapons. The legitimate concern for security should be addressed in a way which ensures that implementation of the convention will not create any new kinds of imbalance which might undermine the security of any State party. However, the convention must not just constitute an arms limitation measure, but be seen from the outset to be a real disarmament measure, involving the complete elimination of an entire class of weapon of mass destruction.

The successful conclusion of such a convention would make a direct and lasting contribution to international security. It would, moreover, go a long way toward reviving public confidence in the relevance and efficacy of the multilateral arms control process in general and the authority of this negotiating forum in particular. This we see as indispensable to the long-term effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament.

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(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

For these reasons, the Government of Canada takes some considerable satisfaction from the serious, constructive and business-like approach to the negotiation which characterized our work during the 1986 session and which has persisted in the present one. Progress, indeed, continues to be made. The presence here this week of a number of industrial experts from several countries, including Canada, indicates the practical emphasis of our current endeavours. I would like to express special appreciation to Ambassador Ekéus for the energetic but sensitive way in which he is presiding over our work. All delegations of the Conference are now working with a seriousness of purpose which augurs well for prospects for continuing and significant negotiating progress.

Such progress is all the more urgent when seen against the distressing fact that chemical weapons continue to be used. Moreover, there is strong evidence that an increasing number of countries have acquired or may be seeking to acquire a chemical warfare capability. The Canadian Government was dismayed at the most recent report of the United Nations Secretary-General which again confirmed the repeated use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran War. Canada abhors and condemns this use of chemical weapons in clear breach of the legal obligations embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which both Iraq and Iran are parties. We again laud the Secretary-General for his initiative in launching an investigation and bringing its results to the attention of the Security Council. It is a matter of regret that, thus far, no effective means has yet been found, not only to prevent the repeated use of chemical weapons, but to bring an end to that tragic conflict. We again call on all parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to adhere to their obligations, and we urge the combatants in the Gulf war to seek, through negotiations, a termination of hostilities in accordance with Security Council resolutions 582 and 588.

The implications of this repeated use of chemical weapons, and of the reported interest of a number of countries in acquiring a chemical warfare capability, are alarming in several respects. They reinforce mutual suspicion and insecurity. They undermine the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. They also constitute an all too tangible reminder that the chemical weapon threat is not confined to one particular region or to one arena of potential conflict. They underscore that chemical weapons are a global problem which must be addressed on a global basis. This should reinforce our sense of urgency and our determination to persevere in the negotiation of an agreement to ban these weapons from the military arsenals of all countries.

It was against this background that the Canadian Government decided that, pending the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, certain practical steps should be taken with a view to limiting the danger of the misuse of chemicals for weapons purposes. Beginning in 1984, and in co-ordination with a number of other countries, Canada has placed export controls on several chemical compounds considered particularly useful for the manufacture of highly toxic chemical weapons. Canada has recently increased the number of chemical compounds whose export is controlled. The Canadian Government has been pleased to note that a number of other countries have acted similarly and have placed controls on the export of certain chemicals. We consider it would be useful if still more countries were also to do so.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

As part of our effort to facilitate these most important negotiations, Canada has regularly assembled and made available to all of the delegations to this Conference compendiums of all relevant plenary statements and working papers. These, I hope, have proven to be of value as working tools in this highly complex negotiation. I am pleased to report today that compendiums comprising the documentation from the especially busy 1986 session are now available and will be distributed to all delegations in the very near future.

If I may interject a personal comment, a number of us have found it difficult to develop an overview of the negotiations in spite of the expertise of members of our respective delegations and in spite of the excellent work of the Chairman of the subsidiary body, and we hope that these compendiums will assist in the process of enabling delegations to develop an overview.

Canada's long-standing interest in the broad issues of verification is by now well known. In the context of chemical weapons, we have devoted special attention, and considerable research effort, to questions relating to the verification of allegations of chemical weapon use. Last year, I tabled in this forum a Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, which had earlier been presented to the United Nations Secretary-General. I am pleased to inform the Conference that we will be shortly submitting to the Conference on Disarmament a report entitled Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples. It was conveyed to the United Nations Secretary-General on 20 May 1987. In his letter to His Excellency the Secretary-General, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, said the following:

"The recent confirmed use of chemical weapons, in violation of international law, underlines the need to add to the body of knowledge which will contribute to the efficacy of a future treaty banning chemical weapons altogether. Such a treaty will, of necessity, make provision for the verification of allegations of the use of these weapons, with a view to deterring their use".

In referring specifically to the portable sensor kit, Mr. Clark pointed out:

"This research project was undertaken as a case-study, to develop a better understanding of the technical problems associated with the provision of appropriate sensors to an investigating team. The speedy collection and subsequent analysis of samples pose many problems to an investigating team. These problems are compounded if the allegation relates to a 'novel' agent, that is, a chemical substance not previously used for or associated with hostile purposes".

The report which I will soon be submitting, while documenting two years of work, still leaves many questions unanswered. Nevertheless, we wish to share this work with other members of the international community who are also concerned with these matters.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

There is general agreement that, in addition to providing for cessation of the production of chemical weapons and for their destruction, the convention we are negotiating should also expressly ban the use of such weapons. The inclusion of such a provision will not only reaffirm the ban on use as set out in the 1925 Geneva Protocol but, by doing so in a context which includes specific provision for the verification of any allegations of use, will significantly strengthen the authority of the Protocol. We must ensure, of course, that nothing in the convention undermines the continuing authority of the 1925 Protocol - the point raised by my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Huslid of Norway, earlier this week and a point which has regularly been raised by the French delegation, to whom we are indebted as the guardians of that Protocol.

Canada was therefore particularly pleased to join with Norway in preparing a proposed annex to article IX entitled "General procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons". It attempts to set out a practical, workable framework for verifying allegations of use. We are indebted to Ambassador Huslid for the clarity with which he introduced this joint proposal for our collective consideration. Norway, although not yet officially a member of the CD, has consistently contributed most usefully to our work over many years. Like Canada, Norway has devoted special attention to questions relating to chemical weapons use. This has proved invaluable in the formulation of the proposed annex to article IX. Yet I suggest that the full value of the Norwegian and Canadian research efforts in these areas, much of which is of a highly technical nature, may come to be appreciated only after a convention is concluded and a technical secretariat has been set up to implement the convention and all its verification requirements. The same point could be made about the valuable work which Finland has shared, over the years, with the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors.

The proposed annex reflects our view that any type of use of chemical weapons would constitute the most serious kind of breach of the convention and that the verification requirement must be of a rigour that reflects the gravity of any such allegation. It takes cognizance of what seems to be an emerging consensus within this forum that the investigation of an alleged use must involve short-notice, on-site inspections. As formulated, the proposed annex aims to include provisions relating to procedures, techniques and allocation of responsibility at appropriate levels of both generality and precision, while allowing for the reality that many procedural and technical details will need to be worked out, by the Technical Secretariat under the supervision of the Executive Council. The annex aims to provide the necessary framework and guidance within which the more detailed procedures and techniques can be devised and effectively implemented. We join with the Norwegian delegation in commending it to the attention of the Conference for inclusion in the rolling text of the convention.

Earlier in my comments, I made a generally positive appreciation of the manner in which our negotiations are now proceeding. I also cited concrete events which underline the importance and urgency of our making progress. In concluding, I would like to register a cautionary note. We are embarked upon some of the most politically sensitive, legally intricate and technically demanding multilateral arms negotiations ever undertaken. If we are

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

successful, this will be the first time in the history of multilateral arms control that a major disarmament agreement has been concluded that also involves the creation from scratch of an elaborate, permanent new institution to oversee the implementation of such an agreement (we might usefully recall that the International Atomic Energy Agency preceded the conclusion of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and that its responsibilities continue to embrace other than arms control questions). Moreover, the implementation of this agreement will necessarily involve an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness into both military and civilian sectors of our societies. We therefore need to proceed with care and deliberation. Several important issues remain unresolved. On the question of challenge inspections, for example, while some considerable progress has been made, we have not yet been able to reach agreement with the required degree of precision. There also remains much detailed work to be done not only on technical questions but also on matters relating to the establishment, operation and governance of the international authority which will be responsible for overseeing the implementing of the convention.

I emphasize these points not for the purpose of inducing pessimism or despair. We have already achieved very much and we should not be daunted by the heavy work-load that remains. It is essential, however that we get it right. No useful purpose can be served, therefore, by the invocation of unrealistic and artificial deadlines. Let us proceed expeditiously, by all means, but let it be with care and deliberation toward the creation of a convention whose authority will be self-reinforcing due to its demonstrable workability and efficacy.

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Mr. de la BAUME (France) (translated from French): . . .

When he spoke on 2 July last concerning the negotiations under way on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the representative of the Soviet Union devoted a very substantial part of his statement to a critical scrutiny of the working paper submitted by the French delegation on 16 June last in document CD/757 and entitled "Working paper on the maintenance of a security balance among all the parties to the Convention during the 10-year period of

(Mr. de la Baume, France)

the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons". The reservations and questions put forward by the representative of the USSR seem to us above all evidence of a certain misunderstanding about the interpretation to be placed on our proposals. It would seem, therefore, that a few clarifications are required.

First of all, in his statement the representative of the Soviet Union said, and I quote, "We naturally proceed from the premise that the order of destruction must be based on the principle of undiminished security of States during the entire destruction process, as has already been agreed in annex IV, section II". And he added, "the specific conclusions drawn from this general premise in document CD/757 lead neither to the conclusion of a convention, nor to the securing of security".

For our part, we proceed from the idea that, to be credible, the convention must guarantee security to all States parties from its entry into force, and not just future security once all chemical weapons have been done away with. The order of destruction of stocks is, everyone agrees, of crucial importance in this regard. But the timetable must not lead to a situation where the countries possessing the greatest quantities of chemical weapons were entitled to keep a stock of such weapons for at least 10 years whereas others would be prohibited from possessing such weapons from the moment the convention came into force.

Moreover, it is clear that nothing guarantees that the States which are the main possessors of chemical weapons will not cease destroying their stocks. Regrettable as it may be, such an eventuality cannot be ruled out. We must therefore bear in mind the consequences that would stem for the security of States parties both from a withdrawal of the aforementioned States from the Convention and from a breach on their part that, if unredressed, would lead other parties to exercise their right of withdrawal.

To avoid such a situation, which would evidently be extremely detrimental to security interests, we, as you know, propose keeping virtually until the end of the 10-year period -- the extension of which cannot, moreover, be absolutely ruled out -- a militarily significant but minimal stock. That stock would not in any event represent more than a very small fraction of the stocks currently held by the countries possessing the greatest quantities of chemical weapons and the convention provides that these will be kept until the tenth year.

Later in his statement, the representative of the Soviet Union said that he saw in our proposals, and I quote, "a call for the legalized build-up and proliferation of chemical weapons". This criticism seems to us to be groundless.

Why? Because, if we analyse the situation, we find that, as the draft convention now stands, there is, in fact, no incentive for countries wishing to keep open the option of a chemical capability to accede to the convention. The fact that stocks would be destroyed only after the 10-year period could even encourage them to defer their own accession for that long.

(Mr. de la Baume, France)

The French document, on the other hand, proposes that a State that continues to possess or wishes to possess chemical weapons for the 10-year period alone should be compelled to say so and to open its entire territory to inspection, with the security stock -- and the production unit -- being subject to more detailed verification.

These provisions, far, as we see it, from encouraging proliferation, should lead all States to forsake ambiguity; that is a restraint on proliferation. In this connection we must reject the idea that our proposals would be tantamount to changing the existing status quo in a manner conducive to proliferation. The current reality is indeed that there exist States which possess chemical weapons on the one hand and States which do not on the other; but nothing proves that, as the representative of the Soviet Union contends, the entry into force of the convention would ipso facto result in the elimination of this difference. We believe that that will be true only when all arsenals and all means of production have been destroyed -- and that, if everything happens as envisaged in the convention, will only be the case 10 years after the convention comes into force.

Those are a few comments that the French delegation wished to make at this juncture.

...
 (Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

I hope that I can begin, and carry with me everyone around this table, when I pay a particular tribute to Dr. Ian Cromartie, who is, of course, as you will all know and sadly, retiring as Head of the British delegation. It is no idle compliment to praise his efforts at this Conference over the past five years, not least his sterling work in the chemical negotiations as Chairman in 1986. He will be much missed by this Conference, and by none more than my own colleagues. The experience and expertise that Dr. Cromartie built up over the years set high standards for the rest of us. I will try to live up to those standards today, when I shall be introducing a new British initiative in the field of chemical weapons.

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...
 (Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

Mr. President, I hope I am not overstaying my welcome and you will not regret your kindness in inviting me to come here, but I did want my contribution to be comprehensive, to set out the totality of our stance and to conclude with an area that I think is well known around this table, is one where we particularly want to see progress made and where we particularly feel that in the United Kingdom we might have a role to play in bringing agreement about, and so it is to chemical weapons that I turn finally and perhaps most relevantly to the concerns of the distinguished Ambassadors around this table.

Chemical weapons are, of course, the classic example of the futility of unilateral gestures. The United Kingdom gave up its chemical weapons capability in the 1950s and the United States stopped making such weapons in 1969. But it was only in April this year that the Soviet Union announced they had finally ceased production. And even if this is so, the West now faces a truly massive Soviet stockpile. Very few countries are prepared to admit their possession of chemical weapons, but the reports of the spread of such weapons are too frequent and too insistent to ignore.

I would like to pay tribute to the valuable work that has been done at this Conference. Our aim for chemical weapons is particularly ambitious. It is not to set limits. It is not to freeze existing levels. It is to abolish them completely, in an effective, verifiable, global ban. You were kind enough, Mr. President, to mention my predecessor, Timothy Renton, and since he spoke at this Conference last year we have seen encouraging progress: substantial areas of agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons and of their means of production; and acceptance of the importance of a verification

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

régime for civil chemical production. The momentum that developed last year under Dr. Cromartie has been maintained under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus and I was pleased to have the opportunity of an informal talk with him yesterday. I am heartened by the warm reception for the British paper on challenge inspection that we tabled last year and many problems of principle seem set for resolution. Nevertheless, as the solutions to some of our differences of principle become clearer, so it becomes more important to think through all the practical implications. Permit me to mention two areas in particular.

In the first place, we all accept the need to verify that chemical weapons are not secretly produced and that precursors made in the civil industry are not diverted or abused. But, at the same time, we recognize the need to reconcile the objectives of the convention with the legitimate concerns of civil industry if the convention is to be acceptable to all. This inevitably means looking at very detailed issues. The seminar held here in Geneva last week for representatives from many national chemical industries gave an opportunity for detailed and practical discussions of this crucial area. We must now build on this experience. We must agree among ourselves such crucial questions as those chemicals we wish to see subject to verifications; those levels of production which should concern the convention; and how to update the overall régime to take account of advances in science.

My second example has perhaps received less attention in the past. Once all the negotiating problems have been resolved, we have to move quickly and effectively from an agreed convention to implementing an actual global ban, which actually works in the way the negotiators intend. We in the United Kingdom have in the past stressed the case for having an international organization able to carry out this all-important task of overseeing implementation. Progress has been made. But we now need to give further thought to how the organization can be set up, so that everything necessary is done in good time.

That is why I am tabling today a new United Kingdom paper, which I think has been distributed, entitled "Making the chemical weapons ban effective". It contains our detailed ideas on what is needed. The paper suggests that some aspects can be left in the hands of a Preparatory Commission. However, the paper also notes that further work is needed here, in the Ad hoc Committee. We must ensure that adequate verification technology is available. And we have to obtain a clearer idea of the likely size and cost of the permanent staff of the organization.

Once more, openness should not mean more rhetoric but more disclosure. What we need is not more speeches, but more facts and figures. We need to know what other Governments have, where they have it and what they do with it. Now is the time, I believe, for all delegations, including those which have declined in the past, to indicate their likely future declarations. Only in this way can realistic estimates be prepared. And only in this way can the crucial confidence in this mutual endeavour be established. The new United Kingdom paper provides the framework within which, we hope, good intentions can be translated into effective action.

(Mr. Mellor, United Kingdom)

Our negotiations on chemical weapons could lead to a treaty of both immediate and historic importance. The use of these weapons by Iraq in the Gulf conflict has emphasized how urgently a total ban is needed. These weapons are a dreadful scourge that threatens the whole international community. Let us get rid of them, once and for all.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President.

I am sure that all members of the Conference have learnt with regret the information given to us by the Minister of State concerning the departure of Ambassador Ian Cromartie, C.M.G. Ambassador Cromartie not only represented his country with outstanding diplomatic ability, but also served this Conference with distinction, having contributed significantly to our work on a number of delicate issues and, in particular, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Conference will certainly miss him. I should like to ask the Minister of State to convey to Ambassador and Mrs. Cromartie our best wishes for their future.

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(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

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Asia and the Pacific remains one of the most turbulent regions of the world. It is where for the past forty years the peoples have never really known peace, but instead have had to undergo a succession of the longest, bloodiest wars such as the Korean War, and especially the Indochina War and the Viet Nam War in which the biggest quantity of bombs and toxic chemicals, including dioxin, was used against the local populations. At present, although Asia and the Pacific on the whole has not as yet been militarized to the extent Europe has, the potential for its militarization is truly immense, and the consequences are extremely dangerous. Major nuclear Powers are situated here. Large land armies, navies and air forces have been built. In this context, the will of the peoples of Asia and the Pacific for peaceful co-existence, co-operation and friendship is growing stronger and stronger. We join many countries in supporting the initiatives of the People's Republic of Mongolia on non-use of force or threat of use of force between the States of the region; we support every effort to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, and South-East Asia, the South Pacific region and the Korean peninsular nuclear-weapon-free zones. Viet Nam strongly supports the initiative of the Soviet Union on the establishment of a general system of security in Asia and the Pacific aimed at consolidating peace, security and co-operation on the basis of equality and mutual benefits among States in the region.

(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

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We have now before us a number of practical and reasonable proposals in the nuclear and other fields to form the basis of the work of the Conference. It is increasingly clear that compliance and verification are no longer

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(Mr. Nguyen Di Nien, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam)

obstacles and should not be used as excuses to hold back or hamper negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty or on a new convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As shown by the past realities, the effectiveness of the Conference and new breakthroughs demand the political will of all the parties involved.

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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

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A little over 15 years ago, on 10 April 1972, in London, Moscow and Washington, the Convention designed to eliminate biological and toxin weapons was opened for signature. In its preamble, the States parties to that instrument placed on record their conviction that the agreement enshrined in it represented only a first step towards the achievement of another, much broader agreement which was to be defined in article IX of the Convention in the following terms, and I quote:

"Each State party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes".

This is a difficult task to which our Conference has justifiably devoted a good part of its time. Thanks to everyone's devotion since, in 1984, we decided for the first time to give the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons an authentic negotiating mandate, the pace of its work has risen appreciably and the political will of its members has enabled obstacles that appeared insurmountable to be overcome. Considerable progress was achieved in 1985 and 1986, when the work of the Committee was led by Ambassadors Turbanski and Cromartie respectively, to whom I should like to express my delegation's sincere gratitude for the work done. At the same time, as regards the second of them, I should like to express how grieved we were to hear the news of his forthcoming retirement for health reasons.

We are now entering a decisive stage in our negotiations, one that has rightly been described as crucial for the success of our work. Hence, it is a source of particular satisfaction for my delegation that the job of presiding over this has fallen to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, who already gave proof of his exceptional diplomatic skill when he occupied the same post in 1984.

To achieve the ambitious goal we have set ourselves, we have decided that the scope of the convention should be as broad as possible. Consequently, we have identified seven basic activities which would be prohibited: the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. In addition to these, we have included the obligation for current possessors to destroy their chemical weapons arsenals as well as the facilities that produced them, thus giving the convention its nature as an authentic instrument of disarmament. There is general agreement concerning these categorical provisions, which is something that my delegation has welcomed with the greatest satisfaction.

In an attempt to cover all possible situations and taking into account the scope of the subject-matter at hand, an effort has been made to draw up all-embracing definitions. Thus, by chemical weapons are meant not only munitions and means of delivery, but also substances which pose a risk for the objectives of the convention, excluding substances produced for permitted purposes in quantities compatible with the ends for which they will be used.

When the convention enters into force -- something we hope will not take too long -- the States parties will have to tell the international authority whether they possess or do not possess chemical weapons and production facilities. The possessors will then have as their first duty to provide data in respect of their arsenals. My delegation deems it essential in this respect that the State should describe the location of chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control so that the accuracy of its declaration can be checked in situ. That is why we welcome the recent Soviet decision to agree to give the location of their arsenals and, while we understand that this involves delicate matters of national security, we hope that the State which still believes that it is not appropriate to provide this information will reconsider its position in the near future.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Once the characteristics of the arsenals are known, the basic obligation that the draft convention imposes on their owners is to destroy them. A period of 10 years is proposed for the total destruction of the chemical weapons currently in existence. My delegation has carefully considered the reasons that have been set forth to justify the length of that period, such as the capacity of destruction facilities and the precautions that will have to be taken to preserve the environment, but, despite that, it believes that the efforts to shorten that period as far as possible should continue. It seems to us excessive to have to wait at least 10 long years after the convention comes into force for the risk of a chemical war to disappear.

There is no agreement as yet on the order of destruction, a matter which is under negotiation by the main possessors of chemical weapons. As a position of principle, my delegation would like to place on record that it would prefer it if destruction began with the most dangerous weapons, so as to do away speedily with the greatest danger, and the least lethal were left till last. Unfortunately, this view is not shared by the possessors of chemical weapons, who want to keep intact until the very last minute their capacity to use the most toxic of such arms. We hope that they will reconsider this attitude, which seems to us a selfish one, and that they will give thought to the fact that confidence in the future convention depends largely on the rapid disappearance of the most significant arsenals.

We regret that it has not yet been possible to reach an agreement on production facilities. We know that the delegations concerned are continuing to hold intensive consultations on this delicate matter, and we hope that very soon they will be able to submit to us the solution they have agreed upon.

I shall now turn to two questions which, in view of their importance, will be crucial to the success of our work: I refer to what is termed "non-production" and to all that relates to verification.

As I said a moment ago, one of the paramount objectives of the convention we are now negotiating is to prevent the manufacture of chemical weapons in future. To achieve this objective, it will be inevitable to impose certain controls on civilian industry, including some restrictions on industries producing substances that might be diverted to prohibited purposes. This is something which will undoubtedly affect all States parties, whether they are possessors or not possessors of chemical weapons, developed countries or developing countries, and it has therefore been playing a preponderant role in our discussions for some time.

The substances of interest have been divided into three basic categories in keeping with the risk they entail. On the basis of this classification, a number of verification systems involving measures of varying stringency have been devised. Thus, the production of substances in schedule 1 -- mostly neurotoxic agents -- in amounts exceeding one tonne per year will be prohibited; the manufacture of compounds in schedule 2 -- key precursors -- will be subject to a strict régime of international inspections to avoid their diversion for prohibited purposes; and, finally, the production and use of the substances in schedule 3 -- those that could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons but are employed on a large scale for legitimate peaceful activities -- will have to be declared as precisely as possible to the international authority.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

To complete this system, we must consider the problem posed by the "commercial super-toxics", in other words, the highly toxic substances that are used in civilian industry, for instance, in the pharmaceutical branch and in the production of pesticides. It would appear necessary to set up for them a special category, one distinct from the three already established, in order to deal with them adequately. However, the differences of opinion that exist concerning the compounds that could be considered and the type of measures that would be applied to them have precluded our finding a solution to this issue -- which, as all parties to the negotiations recognize, is both necessary and urgent.

We all know that the present schedules cannot be exhaustive or definitive. Their first review will take place when States possessing chemical weapons declare the composition of their arsenals to the international authority. Maybe these will include chemicals which have not been considered in the course of negotiations; consideration will then have to be given to the incorporation of those substances in the schedules. Later on, if we want the convention to keep its full force, periodic updating of the schedules in the light of the progress of science and technology will be inevitable. That is why the importance has been recognized of a flexible, expeditious and reliable mechanism for this purpose. It will thus be possible to include a new chemical in the schedules, to withdraw it from them or to shift it from one schedule to another. We have worked to this end during this session and progress has been satisfactory.

My delegation considers that appropriate verification machinery is essential if an international disarmament agreement is to function effectively for all its parties. The convention on chemical weapons, of course, does not elude this general rule. Ambitious in its objectives, the draft which is now being drawn up also establishes a very broad system of verification designed to guarantee full compliance with all its provisions.

An independent international body created by the convention itself would be responsible for these very delicate tasks. This seems to us an optimum solution for ensuring the credibility of the instrument. As you will all recall, that was the course chosen by the Latin American States when, over 20 years ago, they negotiated the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the functioning of the body that was set up has been entirely satisfactory.

The problems posed by the verification of the numerous obligations the convention will impose are obviously considerable. To guarantee, on the one hand, that chemical weapons will not be produced in future and that prohibited activities will not be carried out, while taking into account, on the other hand, the protection of trade secrets and the need not to interfere excessively in national civilian activities makes the design of appropriate verification machinery even more difficult. We are all aware of the great difficulties this involves and we must strive to resolve them. Some sacrifices will be inevitable for the sake of the greater interest.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The main body will be a consultative committee made up of all the States parties. As it is hoped that the convention will have the greatest possible number of adherents, it will not be easy for the committee to take expeditious decisions and to intervene rapidly and effectively in case of crisis. Consequently, it will be necessary to establish a subsidiary body of the committee, of limited membership and called the executive council, which will be formally subordinate to the committee and will discharge all its functions while the committee is not in session.

Serious differences of opinion have arisen in regard to the composition of the executive council. My delegation believes that the only valid criterion for the selection of the members of that body is that of equitable political and geographical distribution. Using this method, as happens in the case of other bodies in the United Nations family, each group will freely select its representatives, taking account of the parameters it deems appropriate.

As for the difficult problem of decision-making, my delegation inclines in favour of adopting the simple and unambiguous procedure of a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. We believe that to demand consensus would seriously hinder the work of the committee and the council as it would give each of the parties a right of veto that it could exercise at any time, to the detriment of the proper functioning of the convention.

The international verification machinery that is going to be entrusted to the consultative committee and its subsidiary bodies contains two elements that will ensure its full effectiveness: on the one hand, a system of declarations and routine inspections that seeks to be as complete as possible and, on the other, a "safety net" for use only in exceptional cases -- challenge inspection -- designed to remedy possible deficiencies in the normal procedure.

In our negotiations, emphasis was, quite justifiably, placed on building a system with no loopholes, a mechanism that would give everybody full confidence that the provisions of the convention were being observed. A whole series of measures to be applied to the activities of States parties has been designed for this purpose, ranging from permanent verification of destruction of arsenals to systematic inspections, without prior notice, of civilian production facilities. My delegation is fully in favour of a strict régime in order effectively to guarantee the complete disappearance of the chemical threat.

"Challenge inspection" constitutes the essential complement to the routine system. My delegation sees such inspection as an exceptional event prompted by serious doubts about compliance with the convention that have not been dispelled through normal channels. In view of the political damage that it will inevitably cause, we do not believe that it will be frequent. However, we do consider that a State's right to request such inspection if it feels it to be necessary must not be limited.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

It has not been possible to reach agreement on reasonable procedures for challenge inspection. The excessive demands of some -- the immediate opening of facilities -- together with the excessive hesitancy of others -- the subjecting of inspection to the consent of the receiving State -- have prevented the finding of an intermediate position that could satisfy one and all. For its part, my delegation remains convinced that the text drawn up in the intensive consultations held by the chairman of the relevant working group last year and which could not even be included in the Committee's report because of the opposition of one delegation constitutes an excellent negotiating basis since it contains realistic proposals and limits to the minimum the possibilities of refusing an inspection.

This is a crucial year in the preparatory work for the convention. We regret that two States members of the Conference, the United States and France, recently deemed it appropriate to take the decision to add new devices of mass destruction to those they already possess, at a time when the negotiations on the convention, in which they play a dominant role, are in their final phase.

As a State which does not possess chemical weapons, Mexico attaches great importance to the conclusion of the convention, which will definitively eliminate this lethal category of weapons of destruction. As we always try to do in similar cases, this interest of ours has been proven through facts, such as the fact that, despite our delegation's being one of the smallest accredited to the Conference on Disarmament, one of its members has this year been devoting almost all his efforts to performing the task of co-ordinator of one of the three working groups that makes up the basic structure established by the Committee in 1985. We have been doing so because we are convinced of the need to step up our efforts in order to be able to transmit to the General Assembly as soon as possible an agreement as important as the convention, whose purpose is forever to eliminate chemical weapons, undoubtedly will be. Let us hope that, in the coming year, our efforts, which began so many years ago in this negotiating body, which then bore the title of Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, will be crowned with success.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 422nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. . . .

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure however, any member wishing to do so may take the floor on any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

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(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

. . . . Now then, on the path leading towards that goal it is necessary to bear in mind the essential considerations of balance and security. This can only be achieved in a gradual process that takes account not only of nuclear weapons, but also of all other weapons, including chemical weapons, and conventional weapons, within the context of global consideration of that balance and, obviously, bearing in mind the fact that the equalizing factor should in principle not be an increase in the strength of the party that is at a disadvantage at a given time or in a given category of weapons, but rather a reduction in principle of the forces of the party that is in the situation of superiority.

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(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

. . . . I am pleased to express our satisfaction at the progress now being achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It is well known that Spain does not possess such weapons today and does not wish to possess them and that it is in favour of the completion as soon as possible of a treaty prohibiting not only the use but also the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons and imposing the destruction of those that already exist.

The 1925 Protocol, to which Spain is a contracting party and which meant a large step in the right direction, none the less reserves the possibility of possessing chemical weapons and the legitimacy of their use as a reprisal. And, although these arms were not used in the Second World War, we have seen with indignation that they have been used in other conflicts, and especially in the conflict raging today between Iraq and Iran. Consequently, only the radical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of these weapons will be an absolute guarantee of the impossibility of their use. Of course, a treaty of this kind requires in its turn rigorous procedures for verifying that its terms are being respected by all its parties and also requires universal participation and, first and foremost, the participation of the great military Powers.

(Mr. Carlos Miranda y Elio, Spain)

Consequently, my country is in favour of rapid, effective and sure verification systems and we believe that the necessary efforts should be made to resolve the greatest problem still outstanding: in our view, the problem of challenge inspection, whether in the case of chemical weapons storage facilities or in the case of production facilities. We welcome the favourable disposition that has been shown in the area of principles and we hope that it will swiftly be transformed into texts that will ensure the necessary rapidity and effectiveness in the functioning of this final "safety net" in the implementation of the future convention. We continue to believe that the proposal by the United Kingdom in document CD/715 provides an excellent basis for this work.

As you know, our delegation is participating actively to that end in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, where, of course it is still necessary to resolve other detailed questions, such as those of the schedules of chemicals to be subject to various verification procedures, the declaration of arsenals, obsolete weapons, the order of destruction, the institutional systems, and also the sanctions or measures to be adopted in the event of proven violations of the future convention. And I should like to stress that, if the possibility of reprisals is excluded, it will be essential to guarantee absolutely that the convention will be respected.

In connection with the order of destruction of existing chemical weapons, the Spanish delegation has submitted a working paper whose purpose is to achieve a reduction through "equal gradients of risk" of each chemical in each annual destruction period, taking as a basis for computation the median lethal dose or the median incapacitating dose, which are the most significant parameters in the military utilization of chemical weapons. On that basis, the equivalent masses of risk of each chemical can be determined, which enables a comparison to be made of the chemicals to be destroyed, or the substances to be replaced when that is necessary because of imperatives relating to the handling of stocks, the capacity of the destruction facility, or any other considerations, including political considerations, that make it advisable to have a solid basis of comparison. Our proposal is compatible with others and we would be prepared to study any combinations capable of yielding the desired result. However, we must point out as of now that we do not deem it desirable to establish provisions designed to permit, even temporarily, chemical rearmament in order to achieve a new equilibrium which today does not exist or provisions that would imply an invitation to countries which today do not possess chemical weapons to acquire them.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 423rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure, however, any member who wishes to do so may take the floor on any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

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(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

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There is, perhaps today, no greater focus of attention among the issues linked to the drawing up of disarmament treaties or agreements than that of verification. For almost two years now -- to be precise, since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 40/152/0 relating to verification, a resolution supported by the two military alliances -- we have undoubtedly been witnessing a real diplomatic competition as to who is more enthusiastic about verification formulae. Verification is today the essential and preliminary step for any disarmament agreement. Very complex formulae are being tested in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and we are all aware too of the situation with regard to the verification of nuclear-weapon tests and to other items such as radiological weapons, negative assurances and so on. Verification in the context of the items we have mentioned should provide a solution to intricate situations such as, for instance, avoiding non-permitted production of substances within an industry as common and widely scattered as the chemical industry. None the less, gradually and with admirable creativity and imagination, verification mechanisms are being worked out.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America):

... Our delegation also bids farewell to our departing colleagues, Ambassadors Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Tonwe of Nigeria. We wish them every success in their new endeavours. In addition, I want to convey to Ambassador Cromartie, through our friends on the delegation of the United Kingdom, our deep regret at the announcement of his departure from this Conference. Ian Cromartie worked long and hard with the delegations in this Conference to advance our shared objectives. The significant progress recorded in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under his able leadership will stand as eloquent testimony to his dedication to the cause of peace. To him and his family we send our heartfelt thanks and best wishes.

Today I would like to devote my statement to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Looking back for a moment, much important and useful work was accomplished during the spring part of the 1987 session under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden. The Ad hoc Committee developed text on the activities of verification and monitoring of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. Additional text was developed outlining the makeup and functions of the technical secretariat, preparatory commission and modalities for revision of lists. Work began on elaborating the composition and tasks of an inspectorate. This new material, along with other texts, was appended to the rolling text to serve as the basis for further discussion. The rolling text itself was updated and revised in April to reflect the work in the spring. This valuable, detailed work, and important changes in the positions of some delegations, generated a sense of momentum. The spring part of the session ended with an air of optimism.

(continued)

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

At the midpoint of the summer part of the session, the atmosphere has somewhat changed. I have begun to hear from a number of delegations that morale is low, and that people are pessimistic regarding the negotiating pace, and unhappy at the amount of time required to achieve a convention. I am concerned that such a perspective will have a negative impact on work remaining to be done. I believe that unexpectedly rapid developments in the spring raised unrealistic expectations that a chemical weapons convention would be in hand by the end of this year. This unfounded optimism masked what remained to be done.

This summer, as the negotiations have delved more deeply into key aspects of a chemical weapons ban, new issues surfaced. Additionally, delegations have begun to grapple with some of the difficult issues which had in the past been set aside for future discussion to allow work on some less controversial areas to proceed. These are natural developments in any negotiation as work progresses from one level to the next.

I do not entirely share the pessimism expressed by others. We have been doing some constructive work this summer. More delegations are participating actively in the discussions. Difficult issues previously put aside are being addressed, and this is a reason for encouragement. However, no one should expect the negotiation of an effective chemical weapons convention to be an easy task. It is a complex undertaking in which elaboration of certain details is of great significance. To have an effective convention, we must thoroughly think through the issues, work out our differences and develop the necessary detail. We must, throughout this process, keep our focus on what we are trying to achieve -- not on artificial deadlines that could only yield a worthless agreement, but on a convention which will provide us with security and a true sense of confidence that the threat of chemical warfare will be removed.

This effort requires constructive suggestions, not polemics. We need ideas, not rhetoric. In this spirit, I would like to respond to some comments made before this Conference on 2 July by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin.

The statement of 2 July mischaracterized my own plenary statement of 30 June to assert that the United States is not committed to the completion of an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons as rapidly as possible. Let me reassure all of the delegations to the Conference that the United States remains committed to this goal. We introduced a comprehensive draft convention in 1984 and have contributed numerous papers and proposals since then to help advance the negotiations. However, development of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban requires careful work and consideration, and we should not and will not be pressed to proceed hastily at the expense of ensuring the convention's effectiveness.

I was disappointed by the critical Soviet remarks about the United States invitation to visit the chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah,

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

a facility which many other CD delegation members visited during our 1983 workshop. I believe that, when Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed in April to an exchange of visits to the American and Soviet facilities, they saw this as an opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to build mutual confidence by exchanging information on the subject of the destruction of chemical weapons. This is, after all, a vital part of a chemical weapons convention. I hope that the Soviet Union will soon respond positively to the United States invitation.

Ambassador Nazarkin's statement also indicated that he felt that the United States position on challenge inspection remains unclear. The United States view that challenge inspection should cover all relevant locations and facilities of a State party without distinction between private property or government ownership was correctly noted. The United States specifically amended its draft convention in April 1986 to make this position even clearer, in response to Soviet concerns. If the Soviet delegation continues to have difficulties, I would suggest that they propose alternative language for consideration.

The Soviet statement of 2 July characterized the Ad hoc Committee's work on Cluster III, concerning the non-production of chemical weapons, as "walking in circles". I cannot agree with this characterization. The Committee has made advances in this area this summer under the leadership of Ambassador Ekéus and Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico. As examples, a successful chemical industry experts' meeting clarified a number of issues and identified areas of general consensus and areas needing further work. Another example: discussions on commercial supertoxic lethal chemicals resulted in a text that will serve as a basis for further discussions. Another example: for its part, the United States tabled a well-received working paper on production capacity.

In the Soviet statement of 2 July, the United States was criticized for planning to produce chemical weapons while negotiations are under way in Geneva. The recently announced cessation of Soviet production of chemical weapons suggests that their production continued during the eighteen-year period since the United States stopped production unilaterally in 1969. Our delegation sees no reason why the long-overdue modernization of the small United States stockpile is an obstacle to successful completion of the negotiations under way here. Chemical weapons negotiations in fact began and continued throughout the period of the large Soviet build-up of chemical weapons stocks. There is no good reason why the negotiations should not continue to progress as the United States responds to the large imbalance that has been created since the United States ceased the production of chemical weapons eighteen years ago. The massive Soviet stockpile of chemical weapons, unmatched by any other nation, puts all our security at risk and requires remedial action until the storage of chemical weapons can be eliminated from all military arsenals by an effective, comprehensive, global ban.

Also on 2 July, the problem of activities taking place on the territory of States not parties to the convention was raised. This is a serious issue that is much broader than the narrow question of multinational corporations. In fact, the United States does not believe that production of chemical

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

weapons by multinational corporations on the territory of a State not a party to the convention is a special problem. Any corporation incorporated under United States law, wherever its activities actually take place, would be prohibited from aiding a non-party in chemical weapons production. In the United States view, the real question of relevance to all parties is activities related to the convention taking place on the territories of States that are not parties to that instrument, regardless of who is conducting them. The source of the problem, in fact, is apt to be the Government of the non-party State. In such a case, political pressure, including pressure to join the convention, would be the appropriate response. The Soviet approach to dealing with activities on the territory of non-party States is not at all clear at this time. Our delegation would ask the Soviet Union to present its own position so that we may study it.

To date, only two countries -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- have stated that they possess chemical weapons. There are approximately 15 other States that are believed to possess, or to be seeking to acquire, chemical weapons. It is of considerable concern to the United States that some of these States might remain outside the convention and continue to possess chemical weapons after States parties destroy their deterrent stocks. Such States would pose a risk to States parties. Clearly, such a situation would affect the United States decision on ratification, and, I am sure, other countries' as well. We should focus our attention here in this forum on measures that can be taken to reduce this risk.

The United States statement of 23 April proposed that confidence-building in this area start with greater openness on the part of all members of the Conference on Disarmament. It expressed concern that some other States participating in these negotiations have been secretive about their chemical weapons programmes, and noted that confidence is seriously undermined when countries possessing such weapons refuse to acknowledge such capabilities during the negotiations.

Several countries have indicated that they do not possess chemical weapons. However, many States members of this body have remained silent on this issue. Our delegation calls upon its negotiating partners to indicate whether or not they possess chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities. We also request the Soviet Union, and others who may acknowledge possession of chemical weapons, to provide detailed information on their chemical weapons capabilities, as the United States has already done. The United States raised this point with the Soviet Union three years ago, but no response has been received. We are hopeful this information and data will be forthcoming during current bilateral talks which began this week. Serious intentions of progress on both sides have been expressed. We believe data exchange can be the keystone of such progress.

Greater openness should also apply to commercial industrial information. As the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Minister of State David Mellor, remarked in his plenary statement on 14 July, "What we need is not more speeches, but more facts and figures. We need to know what other Governments have, where they have it and what they do with it". My delegation

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

supports Minister Mellor's call for the Soviet Union and other States to be more open about their commercial chemical activities, as well as about their chemical weapons capabilities.

Before I conclude, I would like to note that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has yet to take up challenge inspection this summer. As my delegation noted on 23 April, informal discussions in the spring indicated some areas where views appeared to be converging. I look forward to efforts to record and build on these areas of convergence.

Finally, when the report on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is adopted in August, it will likely reflect that much work has been accomplished this year. It may also reflect that much remains to be done, not only to resolve key issues, but also to develop detailed procedures that are necessary to implement the convention. One particularly important result of this summer's work will not, unfortunately, appear in the report. That is the gradual convergence of views of delegations on many issues. Such convergence will serve as the basis for the further development of text. We have made progress this year and we have laid the groundwork for even further progress. We should be proud of this accomplishment. It should cause us to renew our commitment to pursue the work ahead.

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Mr. YAMADA (Japan): At this half-way point in the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the summer session, I wish to make an overview of the current stage of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention and to express the views of my delegation with the hope of contributing to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

In the spring part of this session, under the able and active chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, we adopted a new work formula and achieved many concrete results. Among them are:

(a) Agreement on the destruction of all declared chemical weapons, eliminating the possibility of diversion. Diversion would have complicated verification;

(b) Agreement on the framework of the detailed procedures for destruction of chemical weapons, with the exception of the issue of the order of destruction;

(c) Detailed consideration for the first time of the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, in line with the framework for the destruction of chemical weapons;

(d) Consideration, in the context of draft article VI on permitted activities, of the modalities for revision of lists and of guidelines for schedule (1) chemicals;

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

(e) Consideration, with regard to the organizational aspects, of the preparatory commission and of guidelines on the international inspectorate.

I wish to express the high appreciation of my delegation for these results which have opened new ground, to help us through this complex and advanced stage of the negotiations. I wish to call upon all delegations to maintain the momentum of the spring part of this session and to build upon it, so that we may be able to conclude the convention at the earliest opportunity, thus meeting the fervent expectation of the international community.

As the negotiations get more complex -- as they are at present -- it is all the more important never to lose sight of what the basic objectives of the chemical weapons convention are. These objectives are: first, "destruction", namely the destruction of existing chemical weapons and related production facilities; and second, "non-production", namely the prohibition of the future development or production of chemical weapons. These two objectives of "destruction" and "non-production" are inseparable, as it were the two wheels of a cart. They must occupy balanced places in the convention régime. I must also emphasize that our work is to ban chemical weapons. Nothing else. We must not create impediments to the legitimate activities and development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, which advances the welfare and the standard of living of mankind.

My delegation attaches significant importance to the destruction of existing chemical weapons and related facilities. Japan possesses no chemical weapons and has no intention of acquiring them. By adhering to the convention, she legally binds herself as a non-chemical-weapon State, while chemical-weapon States have 10 years to dispose of their chemical weapons. For the security of my country, it is indispensable that all the existing chemical weapons and production facilities be placed, from the beginning of the entry into force of the convention, under strict international control and be eliminated according to the internationally agreed formula.

As I have already stated, we were able to agree on a framework of the detailed procedures for destruction of chemical weapons in the course of the spring part of this session. I would like to note that we have the following common understandings on this important issue:

(a) The chemical weapons to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location",

(b) All chemical weapons shall be destroyed "beginning not later than 12 months and finishing not later than 10 years",

(c) States parties may destroy their stocks at a faster pace,

(d) Chemical weapons shall be destroyed only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies).

And, with regard to the verification measures:

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

(a) States parties shall take such measures as they consider appropriate to secure their storage facility(ies) and shall prevent any movement of their chemical weapons;

(b) States parties shall provide access to any chemical weapons, destruction facilities and the facilities' storage for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification;

(c) International Inspectors shall have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage facilities and may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection.

My delegation earnestly hopes that, taking due account of these common understandings, we will bring our work to a successful completion.

Security of a State during the entire destruction stage is a legitimate concern which we must attend to. While the procedures for destruction of chemical weapons stocks should start simultaneously for all chemical-weapon States, the mechanism of destruction at an accelerated pace for the State possessing larger stockpiles should be explored in view of the considerable imbalance in the size of existing stockpiles.

I should also like to call upon all chemical-weapon States to announce at an early stage their possession, as well as the composition of, and other factors pertaining to their stockpiles. Such actions on the part of chemical-weapon States, as well as the announcement of non-possession by non-chemical-weapon States, as is the case with Japan, will not only contribute to our work for the solution of the problems facing us, but will also help planning of the verification work at the outset of the Convention. I sincerely hope that other States will follow the example given by the United States in 1986 and provide the relevant information.

The other aspect with regard to destruction is the issue of chemical weapons production facilities. Much has also been developed in the past on the issue. We have the common understandings which we should not undermine. They are:

(a) The chemical weapons production facilities will be declared and destroyed within 10 years;

(b) Such facilities to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons production facilities "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location";

(c) Chemical weapons destruction facilities shall be declared within 30 days, which declaration shall be promptly confirmed through on-site inspection;

(d) States parties shall immediately cease all activity at each chemical weapons production facility and, within three months, close such facility;

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

(e) International systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as possible after the closure of such facility and shall continue until this facility is eliminated within 10 years.

As destruction of chemical weapons stocks proceeds and controls are placed on the civil chemical industry, the prolonged existence of chemical weapons production facilities may increase the potential danger to the convention régime. It is the desire of my delegation to see that such facilities are dismantled at the earliest opportunity.

Next, I should like to deal with the issue of "non-production". I wish to express our appreciation of the work done so far in identifying the chemical substances to be controlled and the régimes to which they would be subject under the convention. The recent meeting of the representatives of the industry was also extremely useful. Despite the detailed discussions which have taken place on this matter, I nevertheless feel that it is important to place the issue in perspective so that the problems may be sorted out and progress made towards final agreement.

The negotiations on the issue of non-production have dealt with two different aspects:

(i) the non-production of chemical weapons per se, and (ii) the monitoring of the production, etc. of certain substances in the chemical industry. The discussions to this date may at times have tended to confuse these two differing aspects. Under article VI, those chemical substances whose production is to be prohibited or subjected to other controls are subdivided into three categories. They are listed in one of the three schedules of the annex, on each of which methods of control are being developed.

Schedule (1) relates to the first aspect, that is non-production of chemical weapons per se, which is the main objective of the convention. On the other hand, schedules (2) and (3) relate to the second aspect, the chemical substances listed in these schedules are intended for peaceful purposes, but are placed under a monitoring régime to preclude their misuse for weapon purposes. The aim is to enhance confidence in the convention régime. We feel that there are distinct conceptual differences between the two.

The lists and the control régimes developed to this date are, in our view, generally reasonable. In order to expedite our work for final agreement, we must have a clear idea of the correlation among the various chemical substances in the schedules. We must also give due consideration to the legitimate concerns raised at the recent meetings of representatives of the industry.

We have not addressed ourselves to the issue of definition for some time now. The existing wording in draft article II was formulated before the recent development in our negotiations. We have now clarified many aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities. We have

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identified chemical substances to be controlled and the régimes to which such substances will be subjected. In the light of these achievements, we should re-examine the issue of definition, bearing in mind the general purpose criterion.

The issue of challenge verification, the verification safety-net, is by its nature a complex and difficult problem. I wish to note that four areas of common understanding identified by Ambassador Ian Cromartie on this issue (CD/734) are very relevant. The interrelated aspects of the procedure for requesting challenge, the time frame for the dispatch of international inspectors, their access to the site and facility, the safeguarding of the legitimate security concerns of both the challenging and challenged States and the necessary follow-up will all require much examination and careful elaboration through businesslike considerations of the various aspects of the issue.

The verification measures envisaged to ensure compliance with the convention will comprise data exchange, routine inspections, the use of monitoring equipment, and challenge inspections, etc. These verification measures will be required to monitor the various declarations concerning chemical weapons stockpiles, production facilities, destruction facilities and non-production, as well as the issues concerning "use", and clandestine stockpiles and production facilities. They will require much manpower, and material and financial resources. I feel that we should keep a realistic perspective in our work on the convention in identifying the substances to be controlled and the extent to which they will be so controlled so that a practical, rational and cost-effective verification régime may be established under this convention.

In the very crowded schedule of meetings at this advanced stage of negotiations, we sometimes fail to see the wood for the trees. Let us always remember the basic and original purpose of our work and the principles which we have already agreed upon. We should also bear in mind that we are aiming to draw up a convention which must enjoy universal acceptance, and which will not be overly difficult to implement and thus not be too complex. The time remaining in the summer part of this session is not too long, but I hope that it will be put to good use in building common and tangible agreements one by one.

In closing, allow me to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, and the three Item Co-ordinators, Messrs. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Macedo Riba of Mexico and Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, for their untiring efforts, and pledge my delegation's commitment to the cause of the early realization of chemical weapons disarmament.

I would also like to pay a tribute to Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom for what he has done for us on our work in chemical weapons. I wish him an early recovery and a life in comfort. I also associate myself with my distinguished colleagues in wishing Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria every success in their new assignments. May I

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

reduction of the Soviet and United States strategic arsenals, establishment of conventional stability in Europe at a reduced level of forces (the opening at the start of next year of a new conference on this matter would make an essential contribution to the development of the efforts already being undertaken in the sphere of arms control); early conclusion of an agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons (at present, this is the main activity and, I would even say, the main responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament). These priorities, which should not be seen in a chronological order, cover all the areas in which efforts at arms control will certainly have to develop further. However, progress cannot be envisaged without first securing the preservation of what has already been achieved. I am thinking in particular of the ABM Treaty, an essential instrument if we wish to prevent the development of an arms race in outer space. The ABM Treaty clearly raises serious problems of interpretation that the parties will have to resolve among themselves. It does not appear reasonable to us to seek to put a veto on thinking about transition to a form of deterrence that would include more of a defensive element than is the case today. It goes without saying that the overall balance must not suffer from it and that stability must emerge strengthened to the benefit of all, if possible at a reduced level of forces.

All these areas -- space, strategic, nuclear and, finally, conventional weapons -- are closely linked, but each also has its own peculiar features and therefore requires specific treatment. Each negotiation should therefore be conducted in parallel as far as possible, without, however, giving rise to disequilibrium such as would challenge the internal consistency of the security system which each State is free to adopt in the light of its own geostrategic context. Substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers, beginning with the elimination of INF, are possible and desirable without challenging that consistency. Similarly, we would all welcome total elimination of the chemical threat. There remains the issue of conventional weapons, which, in a way, is destined to dominate the arms control scene in the coming years, especially if the objectives that I have just mentioned in the nuclear and chemical areas are achieved, as I hope.

The Western defence system is based on an interrelationship between conventional and nuclear weapons. As the balance of forces now stands, for the allies to subscribe to a proposal for total denuclearization would be inconceivable. There is therefore a limit -- which I am not in a position to identify -- beyond which pursuit of reductions in nuclear capability would have the effect of threatening their security. It would, indeed, call in question the bases of the system of deterrence which for 40 years has proven that it continues to maintain peace.

I would now like to touch on issues which directly concern the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the most important of them being, to my mind, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the halting of nuclear tests. Belgium is of the view that the possibilities of progress, even success, are now real.

It is high time, more than 70 years after the first use of chemical weapons on Belgian soil, finally to put aside the mutual hesitations and suspicions which have so far impeded progress towards the concretization of a

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

complete ban on this particularly inhuman type of weapon. Despite significant progress in the negotiations that concern us here, the use and proliferation of chemical weapons remain, sadly, a reality. These weapons are still being used, particularly in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. This has been observed by investigations organized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. An escalation is in progress in which not even the civilian populations are spared. Aware of the growing number of countries that possess chemical weapons, Belgium is participating, together with its European partners and other countries, in an international system for controlling the export of several important chemical substances so as to reverse this trend and make it more difficult to produce such weapons. This system is only a temporary measure aimed at ensuring compliance with the Geneva Protocol pending the appearance of a universal convention.

My country has actively supported the attainment of this objective since it entered the Conference on Disarmament this year. This year, Belgium is chairing Working Group B, which has responsibility in particular for preparing the provisions of the future convention on chemical disarmament, especially the destruction of existing stocks and of chemical weapons production facilities.

The international verification of the storage and destruction of chemical weapons has been accepted as regards its principles and numerous modalities have already been defined. The same applies to monitoring of the closure and elimination of production facilities.

The system for the verification of non-production is also under preparation. The known combat agents and their precursors have been taken stock of and it has already been agreed that they will be placed under international surveillance because they can all be used for peaceful purposes, if only for research. Significant progress has been made in this area that it was essential to cover. We welcome the dispelling of the apparent confusion between chemical weapons and chemical substances produced for non-prohibited purposes. We also appreciate the fact that the need to avoid unduly impeding the development of the chemical industry and of research is now beginning to be recognized by all.

Whatever progress has been or may yet be made in the areas of verification that I have just mentioned, they will none the less be incomplete until a satisfactory solution has been found to the crucial problem of challenge inspection. The very usefulness of the verification of installations coming under the convention depends, in the final analysis, on compliance with the obligation to declare them, whether they be chemical weapons stockpiling facilities or factories making dual-purpose substances. The régimes for systematic verification must, therefore, be complemented and strengthened by an effective and binding régime for challenge inspection so as to form a coherent set of measures to discourage violations by making them detectable wherever they may occur.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

The international organization to be set up will be the spearhead of verification of chemical disarmament. It should be able to begin its activities as soon as possible after the entry into force. We welcome the fact that, as can be seen from the excellent working paper that the United Kingdom introduced here on 14 July last, there has been concrete thinking on the subject. In this regard I am pleased to be able to announce that my country would give favourable consideration to hosting the international organization if the Conference so requested.

The negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament aim at ensuring lasting compliance with the ban on the use of chemical weapons established by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. But it must be stressed that the success of such an endeavour will depend on the support that it gets from the international community in the form of accession and ratification by the greatest possible number of countries. That implies broad participation in the negotiating process. Each and everyone should be able to present his proposals and describe his position with respect to the various aspects of the draft convention.

Universal acceptance of the future convention will be encouraged if we manage to take into account certain concerns. Of these, the need for undiminished security is probably the most important and it should be resolved in the context of the order of destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons. In this regard, it is clear that account will have to be taken of the very marked differences, both quantitative and qualitative, between the stocks that countries hold.

The universal character of the future convention could be jeopardized if the convention is not legally consistent. It will be important for the future convention to be structured logically around the fundamental principles expressed in its first article so that the wording used lends itself as little as possible to dubious or ambiguous interpretations.

Finally, it is essential that there should be no confusion as to the actual definition of chemical weapons. My country advocates a legal definition of the weapon itself and hopes that it will be possible to go beyond a mere enumeration of the material elements of which such weapons may consist. Suggestions have been informally advanced by the delegation of Belgium to other delegations with a view to discussion of this matter.

Belgium has no chemical military capability and has no intention of acquiring such a capability. The obsolete chemical munitions that are to be found in a part of Belgian territory and which date from the First World War pose specific problems. My country insists that the future convention must not uselessly complicate the problems that these old chemical munitions already pose for the countries that have inherited them.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

By way of conclusion, I should like to say that it is heartening to see encouraging progress in our work. Permit me, also, to repeat, for the point is essential, that Belgium considers the definitive elimination of chemical weapons to be an urgent priority and will spare no effort to achieve it. To

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that end, it readily endorses the suggestions that have been made for a possible prolongation of the work outside the official sessions of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should like to make a strong appeal for the elimination, through reciprocal political will, of everything that may still impede the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. The credibility of the Conference on Disarmament and, beyond that, the credibility of all the efforts in the sphere of disarmament are at stake.

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Mr. FORTUNE (New Zealand):

... It is important that the CD fulfil the expectation of the international community that it will negotiate effective measures of arms control, and also complement and support the steps being taken to this end by the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the super-Powers. Nowhere is the need for urgent and effective action more evident today than in the area of chemical weapons. My delegation is reassured by the progress that has been made this year towards agreement on a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, but much remains to be done.

The need for such a treaty is not in dispute. It is only two months since the Secretary-General issued the report of his mission of specialists confirming that chemical weapons were continuing to be used in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. As the Secretary-General noted, the unanimous findings of the specialists -- that there has been repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, that civilians in Iran have also been injured by chemical weapons, and that Iraqi military personnel have sustained injuries from chemical warfare agents -- must add new urgency to the grave concern of the international community.

We cannot too strongly condemn this continuing use of chemical weapons and those repeated violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The message and

(Mr. Fortune, New Zealand)

law of the Protocol is that chemical poisons are cruel and barbarous, and that their use in war can never be justified. That Iranian civilians, including women and children, have been subjected to attacks with chemical weapons is a new and abhorrent aspect of recent reports. It is of profound concern to us that the appeals of the Secretary-General have been disregarded, as have the demands of the Security Council that the provisions of the Protocol be strictly respected and observed.

All this reinforces the need for a new convention that will strengthen and extend existing prohibitions against chemical warfare. The New Zealand delegation looks to the CD to give renewed impetus to its negotiations so that a comprehensive chemical weapons convention can be adopted soon.

Just as there is reason for optimism that chemical weapon negotiations can be brought to a conclusion before long, so are there grounds for hope that negotiations towards the elimination of intermediate range missiles from Europe -- perhaps even global elimination -- may be concluded even sooner. If the outstanding issues can be resolved, there will be a very real prospect of a summit later in the year and the signature by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev of an intermediate range nuclear forces treaty. It goes without saying that this would be warmly welcomed by New Zealand.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

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This is why we welcome and attribute the greatest importance to the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States of America on crucial issues of nuclear disarmament and on preventing an arms race in outer space. This is why we attribute equally great importance to the achievement by the Conference on Disarmament of tangible results on any of the items on its agenda. The possibilities are there. While we recognize the weight of the so-far-unresolved problems, a convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons would be within reach given the firm political determination of all parties concerned. A step towards a CTB would be of paramount importance in curbing the nuclear arms race. And finally, there are specific possibilities in the prevention of the arms race in outer space, a subject I would like to dwell on in some detail. But, before turning to the substance of the matter, I would not miss this opportunity to express our thanks and appreciation to the delegation and, through it, to the Government of Canada for arranging the Workshop in Montreal this May on issues related to outer space.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The world is moving towards arms proliferation and arsenal expansion with accelerated speed. The arms race has been extended from land, sea and air to outer space, which can lead to the extinction of humanity. In the current state of affairs, the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body sheds rays of hopes to prevent the "doomsday scenarios" from happening. The existence of the risk is enough; for the worst only needs to happen once. This is why I am delighted to be here among you once again today to rehearse the information on the issues together.

As a country of great strategic significance, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not only under constant and direct threat from conventional and chemical weapons, but also faces the perils of nuclear weapons indirectly. As a result, we accord special importance to the deliberations and endeavours of

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(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

the Conference. The continued and wide-scale use of chemical and toxic weapons by Iraq at a time when negotiations on a new convention on chemical weapons are under way has drawn our attention to the items being discussed in this Conference.

You should recently have been informed about the terrifying reports coming from the Iranian city of Sardasht, which seem to have numbed us with their repetition. The residential areas in this city were subjected to the most brutal chemical bombardments, causing the death of hundreds of innocent people. This was not the first time that Iran was subjected to chemical weapons attack and it was not the first time that civilian areas and residential quarters were targets of chemical assault. But this was the first time that a city in its totality was poisoned by the Iraqi forces. The use of chemical arms was so vast that even several days later, when the United Nations specialists despatched to the area arrived in the city, the afflicted areas were still highly contaminated. A number of wounded inhabitants are still in European hospitals. I strongly urge you who are directly involved in important negotiations on the new chemical weapons convention to visit these patients and see for yourselves the dreadful effects of these destructive weapons. Among the injured there are individuals who were witnesses to the loss of members of their families while they themselves were chemically afflicted. I am confident that observing such crimes will contribute to the redoubling of your efforts and the reaching of definite and final agreement on a chemical weapons convention.

Despite achievements being made in these talks which have made an agreement closer at hand, the non-compliance with the present instruments reveals grim prospects for the future. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 may be more primitive than the present convention and of less complexity than the present deliberations. The undertakings of countries have, however, given sufficient strength to the Protocol. In the meantime, it has not set concrete measures for verification, compliance or use, which constitute the main part of the new convention. Yet the confirmed use of chemical weapons by Iraq shows vividly that verification can be successfully conducted. But, in the absence of firm political will, prevention of the use of chemical weapons -- which is definitely less complex than prevention of production, development and stockpiling of these weapons -- will not be possible.

We are formulating and preparing a convention in the Conference whose application will in the end depend on the activities of other organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It is, therefore, proper to pose the question whether the Council has been able to reflect the necessary capability and political will vis-à-vis the confirmed reports of the use of chemical weapons. The answer is axiomatic. If the Security Council has been faced with political considerations as regards the repeated violation of the Geneva Protocol by Iraq and has not been able to take effective measures, it is evident that no decisive decision can be expected of this body as regards assuring compliance with the provisions of the new convention.

In the latest report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council, it is declared that "technically there is little more that

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

we can do that is likely to assist the United Nations in its efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons in the present conflict. In our view, only concerted efforts at the political level can be effective in ensuring that all the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 abide by their deliberations and obligations. Otherwise, if the Protocol is irreparably weakened after 60 years of general international respect, this may lead, in the future, to the world facing the spectre of the threat of biological weapons". We can therefore conclude that there is no technical obstacle to a political decision.

The Security Council, in response to this important report, issued a statement on 14 May 1987 which contained nothing more than the statement of 21 March 1986. The Council knew well that the previous statements not only did not prevent Iraq from repeating such barbaric acts but, rather, encouraged Iraq to violate the Protocol more flagrantly and freely. In fact, following the 1986 statement, Iraq celebrated 1987 by generalizing the use of chemical weapons to civilians. The toothless statement of 14 May 1987 proved that the Security Council substantially lacks the capability for "concerted efforts at the political level", despite the open request of the Secretary-General. And the prevailing political atmosphere has prevented the Council from taking any fundamental position, let alone any just decision. We warned the international community at the time that such compromising and weak moves would embolden Iraq to intensify its crimes and we desperately regret that it so happened.

The Iraqi chemical attack on the city of Sardasht was without precedent in the history of contemporary wars. The name of Sardasht should castigate the consciousness of mankind along with the names of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the first city in history whose inhabitants were massacred by poisonous gases. Encyclopedias and history books should record the name of this innocent city as a shame on humanity. Yet the Security Council remained motionless and submissive and, even worse than that, discouraged the Secretary-General from any future action or initiative.

The Iraqi régime, in a bid to justify its crimes, has announced that it will halt its violation of international law only if the war is ended. Ironically enough, the United States, which had previously condemned the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, has now gone so far in supporting Iraq that it even prevents the Council from discussing the subject and receiving the technical report on the genocide of the people of Sardasht. In other words, the United States is condoning deployment of chemical weapons in the war and justifies its control only in peace time. The countries having clear stances on the issue in the past are now following the United States policy, due to their bilateral political considerations.

While the NATO alliance considers a nuclear attack in retaliation to a chemical assault on cities possible, how can this indifference vis-à-vis the Sardasht catastrophe be interpreted? Do not claim that the Council has not ignored the fact and has condemned the use of poisonous gases in its latest resolution. This has been the third consecutive year that such a showcase position has been repeated while the Iraqi crimes are constantly increasing.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The Council has not only refrained from concerted efforts at the political level; it has not even made a binding call to Iraq to end its chemical attacks. It is evident that the weak positions of the Security Council have given carte blanche to Iraq to perpetuate its illegal and inhuman crimes.

It may be argued that these issues are irrelevant to the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament, but that is not so. What I have just stated is an important matter dealing directly with the fate of the activities of this Conference on this subject. I hereby call on the representatives of all countries, particularly those of the permanent members of the Security Council, to pose this question to the representatives at the United Nations, and I quote, "Will the Council have the same approach towards non-compliance with and violation of the new convention?" If that is so, another régime must be worked out to guarantee the implementation of the provisions of the convention, particularly in the field of preventing the use of chemical weapons. If the Council is faced with certain political considerations vis-à-vis naked violations by Iraq, you should rest assured that the same results will be derived from new endeavours and it will be discredited in the same manner as the Geneva Protocol.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is constantly and strongly calling for an effective international régime for compliance with provisions on the use of chemical weapons. Concerted, all-out action for strengthening the present Protocol is a necessary prerequisite for fortifying the new convention. The theoretical views on verification and prevention should be accompanied by practical experiences of violation of the Geneva Protocol by Iraq. We have started compiling these experiences and we hope that we will be able to provide this Conference with the results at a convenient time.

The efforts of the Conference in the field of chemical disarmament are noteworthy. The decisions of the Conference regarding the convention on prohibition of the deployment, development, production and possession of chemical weapons will be a litmus test of how far the Conference has been successful in carrying out its obligations. The plans proposed by various countries regarding the new convention reflect the comprehension by delegations of the urgency and importance attached to the subject.

One of the positive elements in the draft convention is the destruction of the present world arsenals of chemical weapons. We believe that the expressed concerns regarding the prolongation of the time-limit for the destruction of all chemical weapons are justifiable because, during the 10-year period proposed, the possibility of the use of such weapons will continue to exist. Therefore it is advisable that the Conference should consider the reduction of this time-limit to the shortest possible and that during this period of time all the stockpiles should come under international supervision.

In the meantime, progress in the formulation of the chemical weapons convention should not prevent us from progress in other areas of disarmament. If the use of chemical weapons has given an incentive to expedite

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

deliberations on the banning of chemical weapons, we hope that the international organizations will not wait for the same experience to move towards nuclear disarmament.

It is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the initiative of the Chairman of the CW Committee in holding informal open-ended consultations yesterday on the key subject of challenge inspection.

We all recognize the importance of reaching agreement on a challenge inspection regime for inclusion in the convention. Thus a number of proposals and ideas have been put forward by delegations. I believe we are building a solution through a process of careful consideration and discussion of the various component parts which have been suggested. We encourage Ambassador Eskin to continue the initiative which he has taken on this subject.

Important work has also been undertaken during the current session on, inter alia, the important questions of the composition, powers, functions and decision-making of the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Several statements have been made in the plenary recently about the current state of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. Concern has been expressed that the negotiations are marking time, that there has been a change in atmosphere.

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Australia, like other members of this Conference, deeply deplores the fact that chemical weapons continue to be used. The conclusions of the United Nations team of experts that chemical weapons have once again been used recently in the Gulf war is a matter of the deepest concern to us.

Simply, the use of chemical weapons must cease. We also share the view that has been expressed by other delegations that all members of this Conference should indicate whether or not they possess chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities. Several countries, including Australia, have indicated that they do not possess such weapons or facilities, but many member States have remained silent. They should break that silence. It would contribute to the strength of the convention to which we are all committed if each member of this Conference were to frankly state its position. Otherwise, confidence in the convention will be seriously undermined.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

If there has been a perceptible slowing of the pace of the negotiations, we should not be discouraged. The rapid progress which was recorded during the latter part of last year and in the first half of this year naturally gave rise to expectations that the momentum would be sustained. But the convention we are negotiating is a complex one. And progress cannot always be even. Indeed, we have reached a stage now where we have narrowed the remaining issues, but those issues necessarily require careful consideration and discussion in order to arrive at solutions. This is the process we are now engaged in.

It is perhaps most clearly demonstrated by the initiative of the Chairman of the CW Committee in holding informal open-ended consultations yesterday on the key subject of challenge inspection.

We all recognize the importance of reaching agreement on a challenge inspection régime for inclusion in the convention. Thus a number of proposals and ideas have been put forward by delegations. I believe we are building a solution through a process of careful consideration and discussion of the various component parts which have been suggested. We encourage Ambassador Ekéus to continue the initiative which he has taken on this subject.

Important work has also been undertaken during the current session on, inter alia, the important questions of commercial super-toxic lethal chemicals, and the composition, powers and functions and decision-making of the Consultative Committee and the Executive Council.

In addition, a very productive two-day meeting of chemical industry representatives was held which made a significant contribution to our consideration of aspects of the convention relating to the civil chemical industry.

So a lot has been going on, and we have hardly been marking time.

Clearly, the need to conclude a convention as early as possible continues to be of vital importance.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The CW Committee's report for this session will record the substantial progress made so far this year in the negotiations. But it is imperative that the process of negotiation continue after the formal conclusion of the Conference session. As in previous years, we strongly support the carrying out of inter-sessional work, at the very least in the same pattern as existed last year. We cannot afford to let these negotiations falter. Useful work is being done, it must be sustained so that we can achieve the objective of a comprehensive convention as soon as possible.

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, in his plenary statement on 28 July, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran described recent attacks with chemical weapons against his country by the military forces of Iraq. He reminded us at that time that such attacks violate the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Foreign Minister also expressed bitter disappointment that the international community has done little to stop such attacks.

It is extremely unfortunate that these important points were accompanied by charges that the United States "is condoning deployment of chemical weapons in the war and justifies its control only in peacetime". This, of course, is an unfounded statement.

Quite the contrary -- the United States Government has deplored and strongly condemned the illegal use of chemical weapons whenever and wherever it has occurred, specifically the repeated violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol by Iraq. The United States has also established export controls to help curb the flow of chemicals that could be used for weapons.

The reaction of the international community to the use of chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq war has been meagre. This has very serious implications for the effectiveness of any future convention banning chemical weapons. If vigorous action is not taken by the international community when there is clear-cut evidence that people are being killed by chemical weapons, can we expect vigorous action against less dramatic violations, for example, of a prohibition on possession of such weapons? The United States calls upon other nations, especially other members of the Conference on Disarmament, to join in condemning the use of chemical weapons to prevent erosion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and to make clear that compliance with existing agreements is essential to progress in arms control.

The United States will continue to remind others that treaties that can be violated with impunity, offer nothing but a false sense of security. That is why delegations in the Conference on Disarmament must concentrate on negotiating a chemical weapons convention that is truly verifiable, in order that nations can be confident that violations will be detected. The international community must not look the other way when violations are discovered.

The United States has condemned the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war, and has called on the warring parties to put an end to the bloodshed by agreeing to end the war itself. It is in this spirit that the United States supported the recent United Nations Security Council resolution, adopted by unanimous vote, I believe, which, in addition to deploring the use of chemical weapons, includes a call on Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate cease-fire as a first step towards a negotiated settlement.

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(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

In this connection, I refer to comments made by officials of the United States just this week. On 28 July, Assistant Secretary of State Redman referred to the recent Security Council resolution, noting that the United States wants the war to end and both parties to facilitate the Secretary-General's efforts to make the resolution work. He added that the United States welcomes steps by both Iran and Iraq to decrease the tension and the level of violence on land, sea and air. The same day, Assistant Secretary of State Murphy told the United States Congress that while the United Nations Secretary-General works to implement the initial resolution urging a cease-fire, the United States will press for a second resolution containing enforcement measures should either party refuse to comply under the first resolution.

The United States opposes the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, as well as opposing the war itself. Our position is clearly on the side of peace.

In my previous statements I have tried to clarify the content of our proposal, according to which the elimination of chemical weapons should be achieved by banning the production of chemical weapons. Such an order is also necessary to ensure the safety of the population and to prevent the transfer of chemical weapons to unauthorized persons. This approach is also in line with the principles of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which aims to prevent the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of chemical weapons. In keeping with the principles of the Convention, we would like to see the Convention fully implemented by the Conference. We would like to see the Conference and thank for the efforts made by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention, especially the co-ordinating committee on chemical weapons, to ensure the implementation of the Convention. As this is a very complex task, it is necessary to ensure that all possible efforts should be made to find constructive and mutually acceptable solutions to all unresolved problems. It is our hope that the Convention will be fully implemented and that the Conference will be able to achieve its objectives. We would like to see the Conference fully implemented and that the Conference will be able to achieve its objectives.

In formulating our proposal, we proceed from the main principle of ensuring the security of all States during the entire reconstruction period.

(The President)

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Second, on the subject of chemical weapons, I think that all delegations are aware of the importance of the month of August, when we have to adopt the report of the Committee, an important part of the final report, while still as far as possible pursuing work on substance, including the most sensitive items. The Ad hoc Committee, under the very active chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, helped by the three group co-ordinators, Messrs. Nieuwenhuys, Macedo and Krutzsch, has already made considerable progress during this session. Although it may seem that their pace has slowed in recent weeks, this is because we have been able to isolate the main problems which will require very thorough discussions so as to produce solutions that are acceptable to everyone.

We can already weigh up the constructive work that has been done in the negotiation of the various parts of the draft convention. On the essential matter of the procedure for challenge inspection, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee is seeking the necessary clarification. I would add that the recent meeting of industrial experts made a useful contribution to consideration of the aspects of the Convention relating to the civilian chemical industry. As President, I must also remind you that delegations must rapidly take a decision on the possible continuation of work during the period between the sessions, as happened in previous years. This decision is now becoming urgently necessary, if only for practical reasons concerning the scheduling of the resources required.

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(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

••• The Romanian delegation supports the intensification of efforts to develop and strengthen the legal régime to be established by the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in keeping with the principles that have thus far underlain its elaboration by the Conference. We would like to express appreciation and thanks for the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus, and the co-ordinators of the negotiating groups. At this very advanced stage of the negotiations, all possible efforts should be made to find constructive and unanimously acceptable solutions to still unresolved problems, taking care not to jeopardize the effectiveness of the future convention either in the transitional stage or afterwards.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Mongolia, being an ardent advocate of the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the elimination of the industrial base for their production, is eager to make its modest contribution towards the speedy conclusion of an international convention on this subject. We believe that the elaboration of the convention can be successfully completed in the very near future if all the parties to the negotiations demonstrate their political will to reach the accords which are now so essential and not to create artificial obstacles.

One cannot overlook the fact that, during the second part of the current session of the Conference, the negotiations on banning chemical weapons have notably slowed down while there are still many major issues to be tackled. At the very outset of this year's session, my delegation suggested that the Ad hoc Committee on item 4 of our agenda should continue its work without interruption this year with a view to completing the early elaboration of the convention. This is called for both by the present state of the work of the Ad hoc Committee and by the existence of various technical questions with political implications which we will have to solve sooner or later.

The discussion in the Ad hoc Committee on questions related to the order of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles shows that solution of this issue will to a large extent determine success not only with regard to article 4 of the convention but also the elaboration of the convention as a whole. The participants in the negotiations are well aware of my delegation's position on this score, which has been clearly formulated in working paper CD/CW/WP.162.

In my previous statements I have tried to clarify the essence of our proposal, according to which the order of elimination of chemical weapon stockpiles should be determined by comparing chemicals on the basis of their mass within categories which include chemicals of like effectiveness. Such an order solves the problem of what quantities of chemicals are subject to destruction, including both chemical warfare agents of different categories and munitions, devices and equipment. This approach also automatically settles the problem of what should be eliminated first -- chemical warfare agents or munitions, devices and equipment -- since they are all subject to parallel and simultaneous destruction. Therefore the suggested order provides that each State party to the convention possessing chemical weapon stockpiles should in each destruction period destroy no less than a ninth of each category of its stockpiles.

It must be underlined, in this connection, that the comparison of all chemical warfare agents, especially all super-toxic lethal chemicals, on the basis of their mass, within a category or even between categories which include a wide range of chemicals, without taking into account their properties and degrees of filling, is over-simplified. In our opinion, not all super-toxic lethal chemicals are comparable. Therefore such an approach could considerably complicate work on elaborating the order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.

In formulating our proposal, we proceed from the main principle of undiminished security of all States during the entire destruction period.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The convention must immediately put an end to the development and production of any type of chemical weapon, and in accordance with its stipulations all the existing stockpiles should be eliminated by the end of a 10-year destruction period. That is why we, as well as a number of other delegations, consider that the idea of creating so-called security stocks, and even the possible continuation of chemical weapon production after the convention enters into force, are incompatible with the spirit and objectives of the future convention on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

In my previous statements I have tried to clarify the essence of our proposal, according to which the order of elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles should be determined by comparing chemicals on the basis of their mass within categories which include on a scale of like involvement. Such an order solves the problem of the destruction of chemicals on the subject of destruction, including both chemical warfare agents of different categories and munitions, devices and equipment. This approach also automatically settles the problem of what should be eliminated first - chemical warfare agents or munitions, devices and equipment - since they are all subject to parallel and simultaneous destruction. Therefore the suggested order provides that each State party to the convention possessing chemical weapons should include in each declaration period a declaration of the number and category of its stockpiles.

It must be understood that the comparison of all chemical warfare agents, including all agents, toxic, chemical, on the basis of their mass within a category of equal hazard category, which includes a wide range of chemicals without taking into account their properties and modes of filling is over-simplified. In our opinion, not all super-toxic chemical agents are comparable. Therefore such an approach could considerably complicate work on elaborating the order of destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.

In formulating our proposal, we proceed from the main principle of unshaken security of all States during the entire destruction period.

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

... I would like to make a few comments about one long-sought goal which is within reach and which the Conference on Disarmament has almost attained, an event of great significance for all of mankind -- a complete ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles. Two thirds of a century have passed since the first gas attack at Ypres, which marked the beginning of the military use of this barbaric weapon of mass annihilation. Ever since, Governments of many nations and various international forums have sought to devise legal constraints on the production and use of lethal substances, but only now, in our time, is it becoming possible to adopt a historic convention to that effect.

What could stand in the way of this? Only attempts to outline the draft of a future treaty with one hand while assembling canisters of binary chemical weapons with the other.

Need one say how immoral this is, how incompatible with the goal before us?

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(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

The Soviet Union will continue to co-operate actively with all the participants in the Conference on Disarmament so that the long-awaited convention becomes a reality. We did not dramatize the debates and differences that emerged in the process. One thing alone was considered absolutely imperative -- that the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles should be adopted, and as early as possible.

I am instructed to inform you that the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal. This decision is another vivid manifestation of our commitment to genuine and effective verification, in accordance with the principles of new political thinking.

In order to build an atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of an early conclusion of an international convention, the Soviet side invites the participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical weapons and observe the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility. Later we will invite experts to the special chemical weapon destruction plant now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk.

In making this announcement I hope that the participants in the Conference will duly appreciate our desire to untie the most complicated knots that have appeared in the process of drawing up the convention.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish):

... We are convinced that the time has come to make the maximum effort to intensify negotiations to bring about a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons before a new arms race begins in this area. We believe that

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What could seem to be the way of this? Only attempts to outline the draft of a future treaty with one hand while assembling constants of binary chemical weapons with the other.

And one may say how immoral this is, how incompatible with the goal before

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(Mr. Shavarskiy, USSR)

The Soviet Union will continue to co-operate actively with all the participants in the Conference on Disarmament so that the long-awaited convention becomes a reality. We did not discuss the details and differences that emerged in the process. One thing alone was considered absolutely imperative -- that the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles should be adopted, and as early as possible.

I am honoured to inform you that the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make reality the principle of equality of weapons. This position is another vivid manifestation of our commitment to genuine and effective relations, in accordance with the principles of new political thinking.

In order to build an atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of an early conclusion of an international convention, the Soviet side invites the participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to visit the Soviet military facilities to see firsthand items of our chemical weapons and observe the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility. Later we will invite experts to the special chemical weapon destruction plant now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chagayevsk.

In making this announcement, I hope that the participants in the Conference will duly appreciate our desire to settle the most complicated issues that have appeared in the process of drawing up the convention.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

it is quite possible to arrive in a reasonable time frame at a convention that would eliminate the danger of these weapons and strengthen the security of all States and, in addition, would not indirectly create situations of inequality or discrimination that may arise as a result of different levels of development.

In this area it is always essential to highlight the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, better known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as this was the first instrument to prohibit the use of a type of weapon of mass destruction. None the less we should recognize that as a result of the situation created by the right of retaliation, the Protocol has become essentially a "no first use" agreement, and the fact that it is being flouted at present should lead us to think seriously about the convention that is being negotiated in this Conference. Almost half a century went by before the conclusion of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, which marked the first step towards the elimination of a whole category of weapons. This was the first measure containing a genuine disarmament element, not only because it prohibited the development and production of these weapons, but also because it provided for the destruction of stockpiles that then existed. The convention that we are negotiating should complete the process initiated through the 1925 Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention with a view to prohibiting this type of weapon of mass destruction fully and without delay.

The chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal footing once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing production facilities had been completed. At that stage the treaty will serve as a model, because it will be unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, which lays down in law the existence of two categories of States: those that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. In the future convention there will be a single category of States with the same rights and obligations, and an identical verification mechanism applicable for all States, and it will not be a means of allocating world power, like the non-proliferation Treaty, but an instrument with an egalitarian purpose within the international community. Thus we have within reach the possibility of drawing up a treaty that would not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also important, that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and technological viewpoint. In this regard the future convention should not be devised in such a way as to allow for its use to maintain inequalities in the field of trade or technology or to prevent the development or transfer of chemicals, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

During the course of the negotiations, we have noted that time and again the need has emerged to reconcile three legitimate interests of States: Firstly, that of completely eliminating the possibility of the threat of chemical warfare; secondly, that of guaranteeing that a State's security would not be undermined; and, thirdly, that of ensuring unimpeded development of chemical activities for peaceful purposes. Clearly, a strict monitoring régime would offer greater safeguards, but it could affect the development of

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

the chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Conversely, a less strict verification régime would detract from confidence in the convention and would create a lack of security at the international level. Consequently the aspect of security and the aspect of the peaceful uses of chemicals should be properly balanced in the convention. The way in which this question is resolved will determine whether the objective sought through the convention will be successfully attained. When these two aspects are raised, it is the ultimate objective that should guide the negotiations.

This criterion should be reflected, in the first place, in the definition of chemical weapons. We are all aware that article II of the convention is crucial to its effectiveness. The present wording was provisionally adopted in 1984, and should be studied at an appropriate time in the light of progress in our work and the clearer picture we now have of the convention. Progress in the negotiations has also highlighted the need for the toxicity criterion to be determined in a precise and practical manner, and that the concepts used should be uniform throughout the text of the convention.

The establishment of an order of destruction is another of the major tasks before the Ad hoc Committee. Just as the existence of chemicals that pose a greater risk for the convention is recognized, it should also be recognized that there are chemical weapons that are more dangerous than others and, consequently, they should be destroyed first, otherwise we would be jeopardizing the principle of promoting confidence at the start of the destruction phase.

The principle of not undermining the security of any State during the chemical weapon destruction phase is of fundamental importance. The disparity between chemical-weapon and non-chemical-weapon States will be maintained during the period of destruction of stockpiles and even subsequently should there be chemical-weapon States that are not parties to the convention. Consequently, one cannot rule out the threatened or potential use of chemical weapons. To make up for that disparity and make the principle a reality, States parties, particularly those that do not possess chemical weapons, should be assured of the possibility of some capacity to defend themselves against chemical warfare. Bearing in mind that what is involved is defence against a weapon of mass destruction, protection measures should guarantee the safety not only of the military but also, and particularly, of the civilian population.

With respect to the non-production of chemical weapons, monitoring should in no way detract from the inalienable right of all States parties to the convention to research, develop, produce, acquire, transfer and use all chemical substances for peaceful purposes, with the only quantitative restriction applying to a certain limited quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals per year for non-prohibited purposes. Similarly, the provisions of the treaty should not be interpreted or implemented in a discriminatory fashion, as this would affect countries' economic, social, scientific and technological development. Agreement by States parties to the convention to renounce possession of chemical weapons, particularly States that do not possess them, should provide a guarantee of access to the exchange of all chemical substances, equipment and scientific and technological information and international co-operation for peaceful purposes. Just as the undertaking

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

to destroy chemical weapons and existing production facilities, and not to produce chemical weapons, will be subject to verification, commitments regarding assistance and co-operation in the field of peaceful uses should also be assessed. The future convention will set up a variety of bodies which could perform this function.

It should be emphasized once again that the future chemical weapons convention will mark an important milestone in international relations in the area of disarmament, because its significance lies in the mechanisms of verification and monitoring that will be adopted for on-site as well as challenge inspections. It is essential to make progress in sensitive areas such as challenge inspection, counting on the clear-cut determination of the great Powers to resolve those issues on which there is still no consensus, drawing on the guidelines that are being drawn up step by step under the wise guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus. The statement of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that we have heard today will no doubt facilitate a solution to the issues that remain pending in the area of challenge inspection.

We are convinced that the threat of chemical weapons will not be totally eliminated until we have universal accession to the convention. This objective would be facilitated through joint action by States at two levels concurrently: At the world-wide level, through effective and judicious action by military Powers possessing chemical weapons, and at the regional level, through the political handling of procedures for accession to the convention and the responsibilities deriving therefrom. In this way an appropriate and adequate regional balance would be achieved in a world-wide framework of confidence created by chemical disarmament by the countries with the greatest war-making potential.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

The prohibition of chemical weapons has now become the major issue before the Conference on Disarmament, given the continuing possibility of arriving at a comprehensive treaty on the subject in the near future. It is true that progress has not been spectacular, but the important thing is that there is a determination to negotiate. Furthermore, we have observed a commendable effort to find imaginative solutions to unusual problems, with a particularly constructive contribution from the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, who, with dedication, sound judgement and skill, has set an appropriate pace for our work and maintained a high level of enthusiasm.

However, there are a variety of outstanding issues which undoubtedly require a great deal of work. We are thinking first and foremost of on-site challenge inspections, the question of jurisdiction and control, verification

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(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

of destruction and procedures to carry out such destruction, and the use of chemical facilities and products for peaceful purposes, including the strengthening of international co-operation. Furthermore, there is a problem which, even though it is not an urgent one, is none the less relevant to this forum. We are referring specifically to the procedure that will have to be followed once the Ad hoc Committee has successfully completed its work. The disagreeable recollection of the last multilateral instrument negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament leads us to proceed cautiously in this regard. As we are aware, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was opened for signature by States in 1976, despite the fact that there was no consensus in this negotiating forum regarding the scope of the obligations stipulated in article I. The same must not happen in the case of chemical weapons, and we are duty-bound to prevent this from occurring.

Within that context, it would appear desirable to envisage the establishment of a new body open to all members of the international community, whose task would be to give an official stamp to the work of the 40 States which make up the Conference on Disarmament. In a complementary manner, this would make it possible to define more clearly the process of transition that will necessarily take place between the adoption of the new convention, its signing and its entry into force. This would prevent unforeseen situations from arising in the interim period, and would rule out arbitrary procedures that could undermine all the efforts of nearly two decades.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, very briefly, I know the hour is late, but I would like to respond if I might. Our delegation has listened with great interest to the statement of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in which he described proposals for various aspects of the chemical weapons convention. We will, of course, study this statement in depth during the coming days and we will no doubt have more detailed comments in the future. I would like to take the opportunity to welcome this initiative of the Soviet Union, and express our optimism that this proposal will bring our positions closer together.

Of course, our delegation recognizes that closing the gap between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union is but one step toward a CW convention, albeit an important one. There are 38 other equal negotiating partners, whose views must be taken into account. I remarked last month in this Chamber that we have seen, during this session, a gradual convergence of those views. We must acknowledge, however, that significant differences remain on some of our more complex issues, such as monitoring non-production in the civil chemical industry; the organizational infrastructure that will oversee the convention; challenge inspection; and security during the period between the treaty's effective date and the conclusion of chemical weapon stockpile destruction. Then there is a difficult problem of what to do with those chemical plants that do not fall within the present definition of a chemical weapons production facility, but which nevertheless have the capability to produce chemical weapons, or their key precursors. Further, after the Conference reaches consensus on a treaty text, how do we persuade other chemical-weapon-possessing States outside the Conference to accept it? This threat posed by non-parties is a problem we should address in future meetings. The issues I have mentioned are not all the issues remaining unresolved, nor are they necessarily the most important, but they illustrate that there are deep-seated differences, based on national interests, and they illustrate that we still have much work ahead of us. As we move toward conclusion of our 1987 Conference on Disarmament session, and begin preparations for next year, we know that our task is not an easy one, but we also know that, with constructive steps, such as the Soviet Union has taken today, that task will be considerably easier.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Our delegation also welcomes the opportunity to meet with Soviet representatives to gain a further understanding of these proposals mentioned today, before we return to our capitals to begin preparations for our future negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

As the Conference delegations are aware, Vice-President Bush, on behalf of the United States, tabled a draft chemical weapons convention here three years ago, and our delegation has been engaged in concluding a convention based on that proposal and the views of all delegations to this Conference, and will continue to do so.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to say a few words in response to the statements made by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel. First of all, we should like to note Mr. Friedersdorf's comment concerning the ban on chemical weapons, and to assure him and all other participants in the negotiations on this important issue that the Soviet delegation intends in the near future to dwell in greater detail on the initiatives which were contained in the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Shevardnadze, and naturally, it will be available for discussions with all delegations, and will be happy to answer any questions that may arise in this regard, so as to expedite negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons to the maximum possible extent.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

••• The new Soviet initiatives aimed at accelerating the negotiations on banning chemical weapons, which were put forward by the member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E.A. Shevardnadze at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August 1987, are receiving, it seems, very broad support. I would like to express gratitude to those delegations which stated their positive attitude to those initiatives at the 6 August meeting.

In his statement the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR said that "the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal".

It would not be an overstatement to say that this is now the key problem in the negotiations. Progress on a number of other issues also depends on the speedy solution of this problem. We support the efforts being made to solve the problem of challenge inspections by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, R. Ekéus, and several other representatives. Our new initiatives are designed to make a tangible contribution to the early resolution of this issue.

(continued)

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet side stated some time ago that it supported the United Kingdom proposal in document CD/715. We continue to believe that this document could serve as a basis for an integrated solution of the challenge inspection problem. We note the support expressed by a number of delegations for the United Kingdom proposal. Unfortunately, the United States delegation is not among them.

Having considered the existing situation in all its aspects and wishing to facilitate an early agreement, and also proceeding from the need to establish the most stringent verification of the chemical weapons convention, the Soviet Union has decided to go beyond the United Kingdom proposal and adopt the principle of mandatory challenge inspections. As you know, we had earlier agreed that a refusal of challenge inspections would not be permitted in certain instances, e.g. in cases of the suspected use of chemical weapons, as well as in the case of declared locations and facilities. Now we extend this principle of mandatory challenge inspections to all possible cases, making it a universal one.

In our view, the procedure of challenge inspections must reliably ensure that it is impossible for a State to conceal the fact and the consequences of a violation of the convention. We think that no more than 48 hours should elapse between the time of the challenge and the arrival of the inspection group at the inspection site.

The fact that we have adopted the principle of mandatory challenge inspections does not, however, mean that we can disregard the possible disclosure of sensitive data, which can happen during such inspections, especially in cases of abuse. All the misgivings that we previously expressed in this regard obviously remain valid.

Nevertheless, in accepting mandatory challenge inspections we proceed from the understanding that measures should be adopted with a view to minimizing the danger of disclosure of sensitive data, and that all parties must be in an equal position as regards both the right to request a challenge inspection and the obligation to meet such request.

First and foremost we consider that maximum possible use should be made of the central idea of the United Kingdom proposal on challenge inspections -- the possibility for the requested State to suggest alternative measures for conducting inspections in order to demonstrate compliance with its obligations. We suggest that the search be continued for opportunities to elaborate such alternative measures, which may, if necessary and with a view to ensuring that secrets unrelated to chemical weapons remain undisclosed, offer a substitute for complete access to the facilities by the inspectors (for example, visual observation of the facility from the outside, photographing it, analysis of chemical samples, partial access inside the facility, etc.).

It would seem that technical means of international verification using remote control might also serve as a possible alternative measure.

It is our understanding that the possibility of using alternative measures is generally recognized by the participants in the Conference. We

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

note that in its statement on 23 April this year the United States delegation also spoke in favour of such a possibility.

It goes without saying that the time-limits for agreeing on the procedure for conducting challenge inspections must be clearly defined. We would not object if this time-limit does not exceed 48 hours. Whether the suggested alternative measures are satisfactory should be decided, in our view, by the State suspecting non-compliance with the Convention.

Apart from the alternative measures, in our view, attention should also be paid to the development of the so-called "managed conduct" of inspections suggested by the United States delegation. To preclude the possibility that challenge inspections might be used for purposes incompatible with the task of verifying compliance by States parties with their obligations, or for disclosing secrets unrelated to chemical weapons, the convention should, in our opinion, envisage concrete procedures for conducting such inspections. It would seem feasible to devise measures which would effectively preclude any possibility of using challenge inspections for obtaining secret data, and in particular, to ensure that the methodologies and instruments used by international inspectors in the course of inspections strictly correspond to their tasks and that the requested State has access to all such instruments for the purpose of testing them. The instruments used in the course of international inspections should be standard and uniform for all States parties. The technical parameters of such instruments must be strictly limited to the purposes of verifying possible violations of the convention.

Should the right of challenge be abused, the requested State would suffer certain material harm related to both the leak of information and the disruption of the normal operation of the facility or plant. In this connection we consider that thought might be given to the desirability of incorporating in the Convention a provision concerning States' liability, including material liability, for abuse of the right to challenge inspections and for any damage suffered by the receiving State as a result of an unjustified inspection. In particular, States parties to the convention might have the right to raise the question of compensation for the financial loss caused as a result of a halt to the operations of a facility or the disclosure of commercial or other secrets because of the conduct of challenge inspections, if the inspection does not confirm non-compliance with the convention.

Each request must obviously contain the necessary data: which provision of the convention has been violated, where and when the suspected violation has occurred or is occurring, the nature of the suspected violation. It is equally clear that without such basic data no request could be met.

In suggesting measures which would prevent abuse of the right of challenge and the use of inspections for purposes incompatible with the tasks of verifying compliance with the obligations under the convention and the disclosure of secrets which have nothing to do with chemical weapons, we consider that such measures should be elaborated within the framework of the principle of mandatory inspections, and not in opposition to it; they must not weaken this principle or make any exceptions to it.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

We believe that a request for inspection can be made by any State party to the convention without exception. Everybody must have equal rights. Similarly, there should be no discrimination as regards the form of ownership of those locations and facilities for which an inspection is sought. A request for inspection, in our opinion, can be submitted in relation to any facility or location on the territory of a State party, or under its jurisdiction or control, or belonging to any natural or legal person of a State party, wherever they may be situated. This, in our view, is a necessary condition to make challenge inspections a genuinely effective instrument.

We cannot accept the United States concept of a "fact-finding panel" made up of representatives of a limited number of States, which would play the role of a "filter". This concept seems to us to be undemocratic and would not ensure equal rights for all parties to the convention. We understood the United States delegation's statement on 23 April this year to mean that the United States side is ready to consider the possibility of abandoning this concept. We would like to learn the outcome of such consideration.

Furthermore, we are not quite clear about the status of article XI of the United States draft convention contained in document CD/500. In his statement on 23 July this year, United States Ambassador Friedersdorf said in response to our question that in the opinion of the United States side "challenge inspection should cover all relevant locations and facilities of a State party without distinction between private property or government ownership". In so doing he referred to the amendment made by the United States delegation in April last year to its draft convention (CD/685). That amendment, however, concerns article X, which deals with special inspections, and has nothing to do with article XI, which provides for ad hoc inspections. If the United States delegation continues to regard article XI as part of its position, we would like to know in which cases it allows for the application of this article envisaging the right to refuse challenge inspections.

To sum up the above, our view of the challenge inspections provisions is as follows:

Firstly, challenge inspections should be mandatory, without the right for the requested State to refuse such inspections.

Secondly, the period between the time of request and the arrival of the inspectors at the inspection site should not exceed 48 hours.

Thirdly, all States parties to the convention should have equal rights and obligations as regards both submitting a request and accommodating it.

Fourthly, the request should contain the necessary basic data (what, where, when, how).

Fifthly, it is necessary to adopt measures in order to prevent the use of challenge inspection for purposes incompatible with the task of verifying compliance with the convention.

Sixthly, the requested State may suggest alternative measures. Whether they are satisfactory shall be decided by the requesting State.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Seventhly, the time within which agreement should be reached on the verification procedure should not exceed 48 hours (during that same period inspectors arrive at the inspection site).

There is no need to reiterate the importance of confidence-building measures for speeding up the negotiations. Guided by the necessity to improve the atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of the early conclusion of the convention, the Soviet side has issued an invitation to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical munitions and observe the chemical weapon destruction technology at a mobile facility. At present the Soviet delegation is working out practical details in connection with this invitation. We are planning this visit for 7 and 8 October 1987. We intend to invite two persons from every delegation, including observers, participating in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Delegations will be informed of all the necessary details regarding this visit before the end of this session.

Later on, after the special chemical weapons destruction facility now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk has been constructed, we will invite experts to visit it as well.

Some time ago the United States side invited us to visit the chemical weapon destruction facility at Tooele, Utah. On 23 July United States Ambassador Friedersdorf recalled this invitation. We have already informed the United States delegation that we accept this invitation, which we view as a step towards strengthening mutual confidence.

The question of the organs to be established under the convention has recently been the subject of increasingly active and detailed debate. We would like to present our views in this regard.

We believe that after signature of the convention, a preparatory commission should be established, comprising States which have signed the convention. The commission would, in particular, draw up the necessary procedures for the entry into force of the convention and the beginning of its implementation (recruitment of Technical Secretariat personnel, elaboration of the rules of procedure for organs to be established under the convention, financial issues, etc.). Then organs should be established which would become operational after the convention enters into force. In our view both the organ composed of all the parties and the executive body should take decisions on substantive issues by a qualified majority of two thirds of those participating in the voting, and on other matters -- by a simple majority.

It is also necessary to consider such questions as conditions for the entry into force of the convention, who will be the depositary, etc. We think that ratification by 30-40 States is necessary for the convention to enter into force. The United Kingdom proposal for 60 ratifications seems to us somewhat excessive. As for the depositary, it seems appropriate that the United Nations Secretary-General should perform this function.

There is very little time left before the summer session of the Conference draws to a close. We believe that the early completion of work on the chemical weapons convention demands that we make the most intensive

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, this year, the Conference on Disarmament has made sound headway in drawing up the text of a convention banning chemical weapons. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden and the three co-ordinators for their untiring efforts.

The presentation on 6 August by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Shevardnadze, has lent a fresh impetus to our work. My delegation appreciates the USSR's determined endeavours to resolve the challenge inspection issue on the basis of equality, and it considers the invitation to see chemical weapons installations in the Soviet Union as a valuable step to build the trust needed for the conclusion of the convention.

Regrettably, the negotiating pace has slowed down during the summer session. We are asking ourselves whether it is a coincidence that, at this very juncture, preparations for the production of binary chemical weapons have been entering a crucial phase. The attempts on the eve of the conclusion of the convention to increase the weight of chemical arms in military and security planning are bound to harm the negotiating climate, and can in no way be regarded as being helpful in finding solutions to unresolved problems.

We would all enjoy more security if we sought to finalize the convention text as early as possible so that the treaty may come into force soon.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Stability and security at the time when the convention becomes effective also presuppose that the ban on the production, acquisition and use of chemical arms, as well as any other obligation undertaken, are valid, and compliance with them is reliably verified from the very first day on. If all stocks of chemical weapons were placed under "international arrest" until the accord takes effect, we would have a useful additional security measure. No State party will be able, in its storage facilities for chemical weapons, to engage in any activity prohibited under the treaty since those facilities will be subject to stringent international control. The fears of all the sides in question would thus be allayed, including the concerns of those who do not possess chemical weapons, as is the case with my own country.

Let me now talk about some of the aspects of the work to be done during the inter-sessional period. Progress on the jurisdiction and control issue would be instrumental in establishing the responsibilities of States parties, which will have to ensure, for example, that anyone under their jurisdiction and control refrains from activities prohibited under the convention. Furthermore, it would be their responsibility to take appropriate measures guaranteeing that all their natural and juridical persons, even if they are not in the territory of their home countries, abide by the accord. The question of what would be "appropriate" will have to be answered on the basis of the constitutional and legal systems of the various States parties. Once this is recognized as a principle, it ought to be possible to come up quickly with a formula acceptable to everyone.

Negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban have progressed this year to the point where verification has moved out of the realm of non-committal polemics -- hopefully for good -- into the area of serious professional work on constructive solutions. Detailed verification provisions have been drawn up for articles IV, V and VI. A text setting forth guidelines on the international inspectorate has been agreed after thorough deliberations. The most important thing to do now is to lay down the ground rules governing challenge inspection and, in so doing, to put the keystone into the verification edifice. I am sure everyone will appreciate the fundamental significance of the steps which the Soviet Union has taken in this respect, and on which Ambassador Nazarkin elaborated on 11 August. We hope this will induce other parties to make their positions more transparent. If this were the case, we would be considerably closer to a text on the challenge inspection procedure.

In our efforts to solve the on-site challenge verification issue in such a way that the legitimate interests of the receiving State are taken into account, while ruling out any misuse, the functions to be performed by the inspectors are increasingly becoming the focus of attention. It will be their duty to record the facts needed to clarify cases of suspicion. This is exactly what must guide their conduct. They will have to act on the basis of guidelines issued by the technical secretariat. The Canadian and Norwegian studies on inspections in the event of the alleged use of chemical weapons are very useful in this context.

Whenever the requesting and receiving States are locked in dispute over an alternative measure suggested, tried and tested procedures should be available to settle the argument. Thus, objective elements would be added to the procedure, leaving less room for arbitrariness.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The role of the Executive Council in the event of a challenge inspection is a major subject in discussions and negotiations these days. Challenge procedures are of particular interest not only to the parties immediately involved, but also to all other signatories to the future convention. That is why the Executive Council will have a crucial role to play, especially when it comes to assessing the findings of the team of inspectors. It is from those findings that the requesting country will draw its conclusions. However, the organization of States parties will only be in a position to react to the findings, say by taking action against a particular party to the convention found to be in violation of its obligations, if one of its organs -- namely, the Executive Council -- has had a chance to evaluate the inspection results independently. My delegation subscribes to the view expressed in the United Kingdom paper CD/715 that the Executive Council should be enabled to take into consideration the inspection report as well as any other material available and the opinions of the principal parties involved.

At this advanced stage in the drafting process, it would seem a good idea to have a closer look at the issues pertaining to the structure of the organization to be created. The wide range of important tasks to be tackled calls for an organizational framework that measures up to high political and professional standards. It is imperative that the organs to be set up be vested with political authority in order to ensure that States parties fulfil all their obligations. Moreover, in view of the host of details to be coped with in overseeing the operation of the treaty and verifying compliance with it, efficiency is needed. In our search for the most appropriate solution, the following notion is gaining currency: the system of organs to be established in consequence of the convention should have the character of an international organization with a legal status of its own, comparable to that of other international agencies within the United Nations system. The creation of such an organization would also undoubtedly enhance the international status of its officers, including international inspectors.

The powers and functions of the principal organs of the organization to be set up must be developed further on the basis of the concrete tasks defined in the convention. The maintenance of strict democratic principles and the effective use of existing means under a modern and rational style of working require that the responsibilities of the various organs and their interrelationships be sharply delineated. In formulating the provisions concerning the highest organ -- the conference of representatives of all States parties to the convention -- we must ensure that it establishes the organization's general policies and see to it that the process of implementing the treaty is properly overseen and continuously reviewed.

It would then be incumbent upon the executive organ to run the day-to-day affairs of the organization, represent the highest organ when it is not in session and take the decisions required for the work of the technical secretariat and other subsidiary bodies.

Democratic principles, respect for the security interests of all parties to the future convention, political weight and an efficient style of work are high standards which this body will have to meet. This is what must determine the composition and the decision-making procedures of the Executive Council so that it will be able to carry out its duties, essentially through decisions

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

achieved in a process of co-operation, and so that the possibility of its work being stymied or stalemated is largely excluded. For all these reasons, the organ must be composed of a relatively restricted number of members. The various political groups should be represented in a balanced fashion, and due regard should be given to the equitable geographical distribution of seats.

My delegation feels it is time that we conducted more purposeful consultations to solve those important issues. Any headway with regard to the problems posed by article VIII will most certainly have a favourable impact on our negotiating activities as a whole. In drawing up the convention, we are creating an element of the system of co-operation among nations which will ensure their security more reliably than ever before, since a dangerous class of weapons of mass destruction -- the class of chemical weapons -- will be eliminated from arsenals.

At the end of the 1987 session, we are again drawing up a balance sheet and seeking an answer to the question of how the Conference should proceed in the future. Conclusions for the next session of the United Nations General Assembly and the forthcoming special session on disarmament need to be formulated.

This year's meetings of the Conference have been marked by an obvious contradiction. On the one hand, the general climate has improved. On the other, the concrete results attained are lagging far behind what the Conference is supposed to accomplish according to its mandate. This is especially true of the efforts to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament in the nuclear field. I would like to make some observations on this particular subject.

High hopes are being pinned the world over on the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of two categories of weapons of nuclear mass destruction. In fact, those negotiations have also had a positive impact on the atmosphere at this Conference. By including the Pershing 1A nuclear warheads in the number of arms to be scrapped, the main obstacle to the early conclusion of the negotiations can and must be removed, as was so convincingly argued on 6 August by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The "double zero" option would pave the way for radical steps to end nuclear arms competition and arrive at nuclear disarmament. For the Conference to play a more active role, the following would be necessary.

Firstly, a consensus is needed under which the curbing of the nuclear arms race and the attainment of nuclear disarmament would be regarded as practical priority tasks of international politics on the road to peace and the safeguarding of man's existence. Any action based on that consensus would rule out invoking the so-called nuclear deterrence doctrine.

Secondly, recognition on the part of all the sides concerned that bilateral and multilateral negotiations must interact with each other in a meaningful way. Nobody is disputing the particular responsibility which the major nuclear States have. It is impermissible, however, to refer to it in order to prevent the Conference from commencing practical work. Clearly, the issue we are talking about touches upon the vital interests of all peoples and needs to be resolved with the participation of all countries.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

In conclusion, allow me to address a word of goodbye to two colleagues of ours who will be leaving us at the end of this session. My warm thanks go to Ambassador Turbanski for four years of excellent and friendly collaboration. His expertise and dedicated work for progress at the Conference, which became particularly manifest when he chaired the Committee on Chemical Weapons, are truly exemplary. I wish him every success in his future activities.

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(Mr. Teja, India)

... I would now like to turn to the subject of chemical weapons. It would not be an exaggeration to state that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, we have achieved remarkable progress and are within sight of a convention. Difficult issues such as the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, challenge inspection, and the legal liabilities of States parties in terms of jurisdiction, are a few remaining areas, but here too agreement would seem to be close. At this stage I would, however, like to draw attention to the fact that the basic objective of the chemical weapons convention is the destruction of chemical weapons and related production facilities. A related objective is to ensure that these weapons are never produced again. This kind of monitoring is quite unique in the disarmament field, and none of the existing safeguard régimes provide us with a valid precedent. The Ad hoc Committee will need to exercise creativity, rather than look backwards to inadequate precedents. In this connection, I may add that the time has also come for the Ad hoc Committee to focus attention on articles X and XI of the convention. In the light of important linkages between disarmament and security on the one side, and economic development on the other, the CW convention should necessarily include provisions relating to the unhindered development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, with special emphasis placed on the needs of the developing countries. Such an emphasis can be placed in two ways: by ensuring that none of the provisions will be interpreted so as to hamper the development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, and in a positive way, by introducing special provisions intended to promote international co-operation to assist in the development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Naturally such undertakings would also include in-built means of verification.

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(Mr. Teja, India)

We can almost see the light at the end of the tunnel. In view of the widespread optimism, it would be worthwhile to look at our mandate which stops us short of the final drafting of the CW convention. We hope that the positive developments will enable the Conference to provide the Ad hoc Committee with a mandate which will remove the restrictions to enable the Conference to present to the world community a complete chemical weapons convention.

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Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, I feel obligated to respond briefly to my good friend, the distinguished Ambassador from the German Democratic Republic, who laid a major share of the world's problems on the doorstep of the United States this morning. He mentioned the binary production start-up by the United States; he charged the United States with blocking the conclusion of a missile agreement with the Soviet Union because of the Pershings; and he charged that we were blocking a nuclear test ban. These are all old charges, of course, mentioned frequently here in this forum and responded to frequently, but I think I would like to remind my good friend the distinguished Ambassador that with regard to the binary programme, I think he knows that that is a modest response to an overwhelming Soviet build-up in chemical weapons that proceeded for 17 years despite a unilateral United States moratorium initiated in 1969.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 432nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I should like to give a warm welcome to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden Mr. Sten Andersson, who will be addressing the Conference today as the first speaker. Mr. Andersson has long experience in politics, and occupying an important position in Swedish political life as a member of parliament and a minister. His presence among us reflects his personal interest, and Sweden's active role, in disarmament, especially at the present stage of work on the chemical weapons convention. This very active interest highlights more generally Sweden's significant contribution to advancing the objectives of the Conference on Disarmament.

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(Mr. Andersson, Sweden)

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In one area, this Conference has in recent years shown that it is capable of generating considerable progress. The current negotiations on a convention to ban chemical weapons could lead to the first global, fully verifiable, disarmament treaty. Intricate legal and technical problems are tackled at these negotiations. New ground has to be charted. When the convention enters into force a whole category of weapons of mass destruction is to be destroyed and eliminated, together with relevant production facilities.

The political implications of these prospects can escape no one. The early and successful conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons would be a weighty demonstration of the capacity of this multilateral forum to handle politically and technically complex problems. It would strengthen the confidence of Governments in the multilateral approach to security. Momentum must not be lost. Chemical weapons have been used in armed conflict being fought at this very moment. Further, the production and development of new generations of chemical weapons are under way. These facts highlight the urgency of the matter. They also underline the need for a serious effort to achieve universal adherence to a convention.

...
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Here in Geneva, in this Conference, our delegation has welcomed the positive proposals on chemical weapons introduced on 6 August by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

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...
(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

I would like to conclude today by giving our delegation's assessment of the current state of the chemical weapons negotiations.

When I spoke in plenary on 23 July, the mood was somewhat pessimistic. Since then a fresh mood of optimism has appeared. This, of course, may change again. However, we must not become so intent on day-to-day details that we lack a broader sense of how far we have come, and how far we have to go, and what we need to do to reach our common objective. The period since Vice-President Bush tabled the United States draft convention in April 1984 has been an especially productive one. We expect this trend to continue.

Let me suggest two criteria for assessing the current state of the negotiations. First, are the negotiators focusing on the real issues, or are they dwelling on minor points? Second, are the negotiators exchanging the same old views, or are new ideas being put forward? On both counts I believe there is reason for encouragement.

Since early 1986 there has been a pronounced trend toward dealing seriously with the security concerns that underlie these negotiations. This trend is reflected both in the converging of views on a number of the basic verification provisions of the convention, and in the increasing support for other measures to build confidence during the negotiations. The most recent evidence of this trend was the announcement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on 6 August that the Soviet Union supports a mandatory challenge inspection provision, and his invitation to Conference delegations to visit the Soviet chemical weapons facility at Shikhany. We welcome these steps.

During the summer part of the session, a number of new and important ideas were put forward. This makes it clear that the negotiations are not stagnating, and that delegations are searching for solutions to real problems. Let me cite a few examples. In CD/757, the French delegation identified a real security problem faced by States with small stockpiles and proposed possible solutions. Canada and Norway pooled their expertise on the investigation of use of chemical weapons and proposed, in CD/766, an annex on this important subject. The United Kingdom presented a thoughtful analysis in CD/769 of the steps that need to be taken to ensure that the verification system functions effectively from the very beginning of the convention. The distinguished Director for Political Affairs at the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Kahiluoto, proposed in his plenary statement on 7 July that efforts be undertaken to co-ordinate the various national-level CW verification projects that are under way. All of these proposals represent fresh thinking about how to solve the problems that remain before us.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

In the same spirit I would like to draw attention to the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, and the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch. Each in his own effective way has made important contributions to the negotiations. I want to express the deep appreciation of our delegation for their dedicated efforts.

Appendix II of the draft report of the Ad hoc Committee, and the addendum to the report, demonstrate clearly that during the summer an impressive amount of essential work was accomplished by the Chairman and the three co-ordinators. This material will be the basis for substantial additions to the "rolling text" during the inter-sessional period and in the 1988 session.

I have spoken about what has been achieved. Let me now turn to what remains to be done.

First of all, we must continue to focus on the real security concerns of States. We must develop effective provisions for challenge inspection, for monitoring the civil chemical industry, and for ensuring undiminished security for all States during the period for destruction of chemical weapons. We must find an approach that will encourage all States possessing chemical weapons to become parties to the convention, and that will minimize the chances that non-parties will pose a chemical weapons threat to parties.

Second, we must seek to ensure that the provisions of the convention can be effectively implemented. We must clarify the functions and interrelationships of its administrative bodies. We must amplify the detailed provisions that are necessary to implement its complex verification system, and explore the tasks of the Preparatory Commission, starting from CD/769. We must consider both instruments and procedures for inspections.

Third, we must prevent erosion of existing constraints on chemical weapons while we are negotiating. We must support investigation of reports that chemical weapons have been used, and condemn use of chemical weapons when it is established. We must all adopt measures to end the dangerous spread of chemical weapons.

Finally, we must intensify efforts to build confidence among the negotiating States. The United States is gratified that the importance of greater openness about chemical weapons capabilities is being recognized by a number of delegations. The United States welcomes these constructive steps. But there is still a long way to go. Many members of the Conference have not even indicated whether or not their countries possess chemical weapons. The United States delegation calls upon these delegations to make their position clear.

Some of the many complex and difficult tasks I have outlined today can only be resolved between the United States and the Soviet Union. For that reason we have decided to hold another round of bilateral discussions later this year. As I stressed in the Conference on 6 August, closing the gap between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union is an

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

important step toward a chemical weapons convention. However, there are 38 other negotiating partners whose views must be taken into account. Their important role has been clearly demonstrated, for example, in the areas of challenge inspection and non-production. The United States delegation is prepared to work closely and constructively with all other delegations, under the leadership of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, during the inter-sessional discussions and on into the 1988 session, so that a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons may become a reality.

(Mr. de Azambuja, Brazil)

...
In contrast with the difficulties we are facing in the discussions on item 1 of the agenda, progress is evident on item 4. Under the very able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, the Committee on Chemical Weapons is truly addressing itself to very pertinent and important questions in this complex field. The conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons is thus now a tangible possibility, which we deeply believe the Conference should not forego.

Nevertheless, as we strive to reach a final agreement we must also pay careful attention to some points more directly related to economic and technological development. As we have stated in CD/CW/WP.176, the banning of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons by means of an internationally binding instrument would represent a major achievement in the process of disarmament and, by the same token, a significant contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. In the light of the important and manifold links between disarmament and security, on the one side, and economic development on the other, a convention on chemical weapons should necessarily include provisions related to the unfettered development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes, with due attention to the needs of the developing areas of the world.

The convention should do so basically in two different ways. Firstly, in a negative way, by ensuring that none of its provisions will be interpreted or implemented so as to hamper the development of chemical industry for peaceful purposes in any country whatsoever. Secondly, in a positive way, by including specific provisions intended to promote development goals.

Bearing that in mind, we have proposed -- as also indicated in the above-mentioned document -- that it is desirable that article XI of the draft convention on chemical weapons include a separate paragraph which would read as follows:

"Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as establishing any discrimination between States Parties as regards their duties, obligations and responsibilities under the Convention, as well as their right to the development of chemical technology and industry for peaceful purposes".

Accordingly, and allowing for the particular relevance of the matter -- which is to be considered as one that ranks among the basic principles governing the twin purposes of disarmament and development -- the seventh preambular paragraph of the convention should read as follows:

(Mr. de Azambuja, Brazil)

"Considering that the achievements in the field of chemistry should be exclusively used for the benefit of mankind, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis,".

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(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

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During my years at the Conference I have been especially closely involved in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, witnessing both their highlights and everyday work. Substantial progress has been made over recent years. Let me say in this context how much I regretted learning of the retirement of Ambassador Cromartie, whose contribution to the progress achieved is well known and appreciated, and may I, through you, ask the United Kingdom delegation to transmit to him my very best wishes.

If I try to assess the results of this year's session of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I would say that in general the pace of systematic settlement of problems relating to the future convention was kept up. Though the intensity has varied, I feel that progress was being made throughout the whole session.

I wish to express our gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, for his able guidance of the Committee's work, his own and his delegation's strenuous efforts toward finalization of the draft text of the future convention. His deep commitment and devotion, as well as those of the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Krutzsch, were a great help to all of us and have contributed significantly to broadening and strengthening the areas of understanding, thus bringing us closer to the common goal.

The draft report currently under consideration in the Committee does not, in our opinion, fully reflect the present stage of the negotiations. We are more advanced in our work than is shown in the annexes to the report. I have in mind the results of diverse consultations at different levels, as well as declarations and announcements by delegations desiring to contribute to the development of mutual confidence and better understanding. All these assist in attentive and scrupulous preparations for the final stage of the negotiations on the convention and its subsequent signature.

(Mr. Turbański, Poland)

Of special importance in this respect was the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. E. Shevardnadze, concerning the principle of mandatory challenge inspections. This approach by the Soviet Union opens up a new perspective to the solution of one of the most difficult and sensitive problems in the convention. At the final stage of negotiations the importance of confidence-building measures has increased considerably. The Soviet invitation to Shikhan'y is, especially in this context, a step without precedent. Not only the process of destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility, but also standard items of chemical munitions, will be demonstrated. The same goal will be served well by the Soviet invitation for delegations to visit a chemical weapon destruction facility at Chapayevsk, as well as the Soviet delegation's visit to a destruction facility in the United States (Tooele).

We believe these developments will have a strong positive impact on the work of the Ad hoc Committee in the near future.

Though realizing that a lot of work still remains to be done, I feel that the convention is within our grasp. That is why the existing momentum should not be lost before our task is accomplished. For that very reason the Polish delegation considers that maximum use should be made of the inter-sessional period, and fully endorses the proposal for an additional session or an extended session of the Conference devoted exclusively to chemical weapons before the end of this year. This would be quite a new practice for the Conference. But that is exactly what we need -- a new, fresh approach to the work of the Conference, commensurate with the importance of the present stage of the negotiations on chemical weapons. Considerable progress could be achieved before the end of this year, provided all delegations display the necessary will and sense of urgency.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I am sure that I will be speaking on behalf of the Conference when I express our regret at the announced departure of our esteemed colleague Ambassador Turbański, who has represented his country with much talent and diplomatic experience. His personal qualities earned him the esteem of his colleagues in the Conference. I should like to emphasize the important role played by Ambassador Turbański, while assigned to the Conference, as the first President of the Conference on Disarmament, a responsibility which he shouldered in an objective and effective manner. He was also Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and in that capacity made a significant

(The President)

contribution to progress in our work towards a total ban on chemical weapons. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish him all success in his career.

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

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If we can conclude that there has been clear progress in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, we cannot be similarly confident if asked about the date of completion of such negotiations and the preparation of the draft convention. Some of the plenary statements which we have heard during the recent period give the impression that a convention is very near, while some other statements refer to the fact that we still have a long way to go before reaching our objective. If this variance in estimation proves anything, it shows that these negotiations are tied to considerations in many instances beyond the control of the Conference. It follows that we do not believe in the usefulness of holding a special session of the Conference to activate the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as long as the negotiations are subject to considerations that are political rather than technical. If the aim is to activate the work of the Conference, then a special session could be held or the ordinary session could be extended to deal with all the items on the agenda while concentrating on those given high priority by the international community.

It may be appropriate to comment in this context on the subject of mandatory challenge inspection, as long as there is quasi-unanimity on its being a corner-stone in reaching a convention. Adhesion to treaties is an act of sovereignty decided by every State in accordance with its supreme interests. And withdrawal from treaties in the field of disarmament is an accepted principle when the supreme interests of a State are jeopardized. It follows that any State having chemical weapons, or having the intention to acquire such weapons with the intent of using them, will not adhere to the convention. It is true that this will render it liable to moral pressure, but at least it will be freed from the legal responsibility that results from contravening the convention. That is why we do not understand why those considering the subject of mandatory challenge inspection concentrate on the aspect of verification of compliance while ignoring the aspect of abuse of mandatory challenge inspection and its threat to national security and the production of chemical weapons for peaceful purposes. That is why we support the inclusion of detailed provisions on challenge inspection, ensuring that this method of verification would not be abused and that compensation would be forthcoming for any damage resulting therefrom.

(Mr. Alfararqi, Egypt)

This leads me to a second point, which is that at a time when we are interested in verification of compliance by the parties with the provisions of the convention, we should not ignore the implications of some States not adhering to the convention. We have to take care not to repeat the experience of the NPT, where strict limitations are imposed on the States parties to the Treaty, while the non-parties remain absolutely free to develop their nuclear capabilities.

A third point. If there is scope for taking confidence-building measures during the negotiating period, and before the convention comes into force, we believe that such measures should include abstaining from producing new generations of chemical weapons and not seeking to continue to produce chemical weapons even after adhering to the treaty.

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(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

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In contrast to the stagnation in the CD on this question, there is happily a clearer flow and movement in respect of item 4 of the agenda of the CD, on chemical weapons. My delegation's gratitude needs to be expressed for the work carried out in the Ad hoc Committee last year under Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, and the major progress achieved under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden this year. Thanks to their sustained efforts, agreement on a convention on chemical weapons is a distinct certainty. Outstanding issues most certainly remain, such as those relating to verification, including the balance between the demands of a strict, binding verification régime to prevent violations of the proposed convention and, on the other hand, the concern of States to protect vital installations from unwarranted prying. An extended session of the Conference on Disarmament in November this year should be carefully considered if it could accelerate negotiations. Success on this issue would offer a clear example of the capabilities of the CD as a negotiating organ on an issue whose time has come -- an observation also made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Sweden. Confidence-building measures such as the proposed exchange of visits to chemical facilities have contributed to bring success closer. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for innovative initiatives and modalities to speed up work.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

...
The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons registered significant progress during this session under the energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden. This is reflected in the additions that have been made to the "rolling text" on such questions as verification of declarations on chemical weapons and of their destruction, modalities for the revision of lists under article VI, and the technical secretariat. However, the momentum achieved in the spring part of the session was not maintained during the summer. The issues which remain outstanding, among them the questions of the order of destruction, commercial super-toxic chemicals, challenge inspection and organizational matters, are complex and their resolution will not be easy. Besides these politically difficult problems, it will also be necessary to agree on the details of certain outstanding technical matters. It is therefore important that negotiations should be intensified and the opportunity for inter-sessional work fully availed of.

Consultations carried out by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the issue of challenge inspection have led to some narrowing of differences, especially as regards the initiation of this process. However, the crucial question -- how to resolve a situation in which the challenging State and the challenged State are unable to agree how the inspection is to be conducted -- remains. My delegation cannot think of any solution to this problem, except that the matter be entrusted to the Executive Council. As has been rightly pointed out, time is of the essence in challenge inspection, and if doubts about compliance remain unresolved, confidence in the convention would be seriously undermined and its viability put at stake.

My delegation has taken a special interest in articles X and XI of the draft convention dealing, respectively, with assistance and with economic and technological development. We are looking forward to listening to the views of other delegations at the consultations on these two issues which are due to be held before the end of the current session, and hope that further consideration will be given to these two articles during the inter-sessional period. Our proposal on article X is before the Conference in document CD/752. We also support the Brazilian proposal on article XI contained in document CD/CW/WP.176.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Concern has been expressed by a few delegations, including mine, over the possibility that some of the States possessing a chemical weapons capability might not adhere to the convention, or that activities which would undermine the objectives of the convention might be carried out on the territories of non-parties. These are problems that will need to be given careful attention by the Conference. Our proposal in CD/752 seeks to address these concerns by assuring States parties facing a chemical weapons threat from any source, whether a party or non-party, of assistance from other States parties. The question of the responsibility of States parties for the activities of their persons, whether natural or legal, on the territory of non-parties is also relevant in this context. There is, moreover, the wider question of what States parties can do collectively about a State party which violates the convention, or about a non-party which retains or acquires a chemical weapons capability.

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to remind you that, in conformity with the timetable of meetings for this week, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was to meet immediately after the plenary meeting. However, as consultations are under way on the Committee's report, the meeting scheduled for today will be held tomorrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. in room III.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

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There are other encouraging signs, as other representatives in this Conference have already pointed out. The successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference last year, coupled with current prospects for the successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), have contributed to improving the atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament markedly and even, some have suggested, to the quickening of our pace at least in some areas. However, with the exception of the negotiations to ban chemical weapons, progress on the main issues on our agenda is not always evident from day to day or even from session to session. Nevertheless, the global picture appears more encouraging when viewed over a period of four years.

There is no issue which has proven more controversial than that of verification. Even if it is not on our agenda as a separate item, it is omnipresent in our work. During my time, this issue of verification, a long-standing Canadian priority which we have regarded as the key to arms control and disarmament agreements, has gradually come to be universally accepted as the essential requirement for the conclusion of such agreements. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van den Broek, pointed out in his statement to the CD last month, "it is increasingly recognized that asking for on-site inspection" to verify a treaty with important security implications "is reasonable and legitimate". He went on to say that "the growing consensus on the need for strict verification holds the promise of progress with regard to arms control in general". It is

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(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

stating the obvious to say that the Canadian Government fully shares that view. What may not be so obvious is that such a statement could not have been made four years ago.

As I pointed out in my statement last month, verification performs a series of central functions, the most important being deterrence of non-compliance, confidence-building, removal of uncertainty and treaty assessment. The success this year of the working group on verification at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, under Canadian chairmanship, in reaching provisional agreement on several verification principles, further testifies to the emerging international consensus on these issues. This has to be seen as progress. Thus while verification is sometimes portrayed as an obstacle in the way of a solution, for Canada it has always been a central part of the solution.

It is in this context that I welcome and acknowledge the importance of the statement made in this room by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, when he said that "real verification" ought to involve "foolproof, indisputable, reliable and extremely strict and rigorous methods". The specific verification-related suggestions he made at that time in relation to chemical weapons, outer space and nuclear testing will be studied with care by Canadian authorities with these criteria in mind. I should like to come back later to the question of the standards to be sought in verification measures.

When I came to Geneva in the fall of 1983, the framework of a future chemical weapons convention had just been agreed under the chairmanship of my predecessor. Interestingly, in the light of the hours -- days -- weeks we spend on procedural questions related to mandates and subsidiary bodies, that level of progress had been reached in spite of the existence of an ad hoc Committee without a negotiating mandate. I suggest that there is a lesson for us to be drawn from this, particularly in the context of the report of the Group of Seven on our working methods.

The following year the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons adopted a negotiating mandate and developed its first "rolling text" under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus. In the intervening years considerable progress has been achieved, article by article, in large measure due to the hard work, perseverance and initiative of successive chairmen of the Committee -- Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Cromartie -- and also the co-ordinators of the working groups, as well as participating delegations which have contributed dozens of working papers. The process received a boost in 1984 with the tabling of a draft treaty by the United States. More recently, major initiatives by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the difficult issue of challenge inspection have brought us closer to resolving most remaining differences surrounding this problem. That has to be seen as very tangible progress.

We are again this year indebted to Ambassador Ekéus, whose able and dynamic chairmanship has ensured that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has achieved valuable results on key issues. Some speakers have suggested that the pace of negotiations has slowed down after the impressive gains in 1986 and the spring session this year. This is not so, in the view of my

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

delegation; it is inevitable that, precisely because we are making significant progress in the elaboration of a convention, the pace tends to slow down as new gains become harder and the points under negotiation more difficult to resolve. Moreover, Governments require time to reflect on the results obtained and consider the need to adapt their negotiating approaches accordingly.

The recent announcement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that the Soviet Union now agrees to a fully mandatory challenge inspection régime is a most important statement, even when read in the light of the five qualifying points made later by Ambassador Nazarkin in his elaboration of USSR views on this issue. Clearly, certain important details remain to be negotiated in this area, as indicated in Ambassador Ekéus' report on his consultations. Inter alia, there needs to be agreement on the precise manner in which challenges would be initiated.

It has long been agreed that allegations of the use of chemical weapons must be dealt with as promptly as possible, and that the only adequate method of determining whether or not chemical weapons have been used is on-site inspection. Canada has considered this problem in much detail and this year, together with the delegation of Norway, we have provided a paper (CD/766) proposing an annex to article IX on this important subject. We hope that it will be possible for the Ad hoc Committee to give full attention to the important question of the verification of CW use as soon as this is practicable.

We have also broken new ground in the CW negotiations this year in developing an understanding of the type of international organization required to oversee the implementation of a CW convention. Much work remains to be done before this organization can become a reality. It is critical that we thoroughly understand what we expect such an organization to do before we can complete our work on article VIII of the draft treaty. The Canadian delegation intends to contribute substantively to this as part of our work. I suggest, however, that the mere fact that we are collectively now addressing such issues is an encouraging sign and a clear mark of progress.

I now wish to speak on an issue central to the whole CW negotiation. Canada does not possess any chemical weapons, and does not intend to produce or acquire such weapons. Two working papers tabled in this forum (CCD/434 of July 1974 and CD/173 of April 1981) reported that Canadian chemical weapon stocks had been destroyed. It is not in any spirit of polemics, but with the explicit purpose of accelerating the negotiating process, that I make the plea that all other delegations note this declaration and others like it and consider making comparable declarations -- and do so as soon as possible to build up our momentum and make clear to all the world the seriousness of our intent. It goes without saying, in the light of the foregoing, that we have made very important, concrete progress in our negotiations on the chemical weapon convention during the past four years.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

This Conference is often referred to with pride as the single multilateral negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament. Yet many have referred to its meagre achievements since it was established in its present configuration in 1978 at the first SSOD. As we approach the third special session on disarmament we should quite properly ask ourselves if we

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(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

have justified the trust the international community, the Governments and the publics we represent all put in us when this forum was created. The ultimate test of this Conference is its ability to make progress on significant arms control and disarmament measures. As I have attempted to illustrate, the CD has achieved some progress, and in the case of CW, even substantial progress during the last four years since SSOD-II. However, no agreement on any issue has been concluded during the past four years -- indeed the past 10 years.

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(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

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We have seen how even clear-cut and specific verification mechanisms in some multilateral agreements such as the biological and toxin weapons Convention of 1972, which is not merely an arms control agreement but a genuine disarmament agreement, have proven inadequate to dispel suspicions of violations. We have seen in the Gulf War the consequences of the absence of any verification process in the 1925 Geneva Poison Gas Protocol, which is, admittedly, only a non-first-use treaty, but an important one -- of the kind advocated by many for the control of nuclear weapons. We have also seen how evidence derived from the verification mechanisms of some bilateral agreements (such as the ABM Treaty and the threshold test-ban Treaty) can prove ambiguous, and give rise to disputes and suspicion rather than confidence and good faith in dealing with situations suggesting controversial activities.

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

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A chemical weapons ban is still the sole topic on which genuine negotiations are taking place. The Ad hoc Committee dealing with this task has made further progress under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus, to whom my delegation would like to pay special tribute. This progress is reflected in particular in the "rolling text" bearing the symbol CD/CW/WP.167. Nevertheless, some aspects of the future convention remain controversial, and the Ad hoc Committee even marked time during the second part of the session on questions which were thought to be on the point of being settled. Thus it is extremely important that all delegations should show their firm resolve to arrive at solutions on the main issues still pending, and that nothing should further complicate an already complex situation.

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(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Problems related to verification and compliance continue to be the subject of intensive consideration and consultation within the Ad hoc Committee. From experience to date we should draw the lesson that a realistic reply to these undoubtedly important questions lies in the search for a balance between two requirements. On the one hand, the convention must contain provisions which will ensure that all States parties will comply with the commitments they undertake. On the other hand, these provisions should not lead to the creation of situations of needless tension or hamper the development of the civilian chemical industry, particularly in the developing countries. This is why it seems to us especially important to provide for effective procedures and the democratic functioning of the organs of the future convention.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to recall the great importance which it attaches to the development of international co-operation in chemicals under the future convention. We would express the hope that the forthcoming consultations on articles 10 and 11 of the draft convention will make it possible to pave the way for fruitful work on this matter.

In the final analysis, despite the problems which have been encountered, we must highlight the efforts made within the Ad hoc Committee to find common ground on many thorny issues. This good will certainly deserves mention, and should be shown on the other items on our agenda.

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

... The delegations of the Group of Socialist States favour the rapid liquidation of chemical weapons. By their actions they have repeatedly confirmed their readiness to complete as soon as possible the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of such weapons and the destruction of existing stocks and the industrial base for their production. Here I should like to recall the "Statement by the Warsaw Treaty Member States on the prohibition of chemical weapons" which was published on 27 March 1987. The USSR's new proposals, and in particular its initiative on the need to give legal force to the principle of mandatory challenge inspection without the right to refuse such inspections, provide yet further confirmation of the political will of the socialist States to accelerate negotiations on a chemical weapons ban.

Our delegations hold the view that the rapid completion of work on the convention to ban chemical weapons requires the most intensive possible use of the opportunities we have before us. The holding of an additional session of the Conference this year in order to complete the bulk of work on drawing up such an international instrument might be a step in this direction.

The delegations on whose behalf I am speaking consider that the decisions adopted in favour of rearmament with binary chemical weapons are at odds with the aim of strengthening confidence just as we are coming up to the conclusion of a convention. For years to come they map out not only the maintenance but the strengthening of a chemical threat to all mankind.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space for introducing its report, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I will present the Ad hoc Committee's report to the Conference for adoption at the plenary meeting to be held tomorrow.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Ekéus, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, will introduce the report of the Ad hoc Committee, which has appeared under symbol CD/782 and has been distributed.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, as you have just pointed out, I asked for the floor to present the report of the Committee to the Conference on Disarmament, as contained in document CD/782. The report was adopted in its entirety by the Committee on 26 August, and has thus been agreed to by all the members of the Ad hoc Committee.

Almost exactly three years ago I had the pleasure as the then Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to introduce in this forum the first so-called "rolling text" for a convention banning chemical weapons. The report I am introducing today clearly shows how far we have come since then. All should be able to recognize that considerable progress has taken place during the three years of work since 1984. While the first "rolling text" was little more than a broad outline for a future convention, the report I am submitting today contains a largely developed draft convention with most of the elements in place. The document we now have before us clearly shows that the convention is no longer a distant goal but a real possibility.

The report consists of several parts, following the pattern established since 1984. The first part is the technical part. The second part, appendix I, constitutes the so-called "rolling text", the result of our negotiations so far. The third part, appendix II, contains papers reflecting the results of work which, though not yet ready for inclusion in the "rolling text", are made available as a basis for future work. This year we also have an addendum to the report.

I would like to draw the attention of the delegates to the fact that the "rolling text" of the draft convention has been somewhat restructured in comparison with earlier years. The articles of the draft convention have been placed at the beginning of the document, followed by the various annexes. I hope this will help all concerned to get a good overview of the material.

In the final analysis, despite the problems which have been encountered, we must highlight the efforts made within the Ad hoc Committee and the various groups on many thematic issues. This report will certainly deserve mention, and should be shown on the other flags on our agenda.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

In introducing the report of the Committee, I would like to briefly take stock of where we stand on the major substantive elements of the draft convention.

As regards article I, on Scope, only one aspect was addressed during this session, namely the question of "jurisdiction or control", i.e. the legal scope of the convention. From the discussions it appears that the problems are both of a political and a legal nature, and I find it important that delegations now bring this issue back to their capitals for thorough legal and political analysis.

Article II covers definitions. There has been an understanding in the Committee that this article would best be reviewed after agreements have been registered in other parts of the convention, not the least in the context of article VI. I believe that we now have a broad understanding on most of the relevant substantive provisions of the draft convention, and that the time has come to elaborate the definitions of the convention. Therefore I strongly urge all delegations to thoroughly study this article, so that during the inter-sessional work later this year we can bring it up to date and into line with the developments which have taken place since it was first put together.

Article III on declarations, and its annex, are by and large in place. An outstanding issue has been the question of declarations of past transfers. A step forward was taken this summer when we were able to achieve agreement that past transfers of chemical weapons should be declared. It however remains to decide how many years back in time such declarations should cover.

Article IV and its annex deal with measures to be taken as regards existing chemical weapons. In this area much progress was achieved this year. During the spring we were finally able to solve the long-standing difficulties connected with the issue of destruction versus diversion of existing chemical weapons. The draft convention we now have before us clearly stipulates that all chemical weapons must be destroyed. Furthermore, this year generated a very important development when it comes to early declarations of the exact location of chemical weapons. We now find ourselves in a situation where only one negotiating party still has some reservations on openly declaring and accepting verification at all stockpile locations as soon as 30 days after the entry into force of the convention.

With these important steps taken, it was then possible to elaborate very detailed provisions concerning the verification arrangements that will be required to monitor the stockpiles from when they are declared, 30 days after entry into force, up until and including their transport to the destruction facilities. During the summer part of the session some work has also gone into the further elaboration of verification arrangements during the destruction process itself. The work on these latter provisions has not been entirely concluded, but I have good hopes that this can be done during the inter-sessional period.

A major issue under article IV which remains is the question of the actual order of destruction of chemical weapons. This issue, which boils down to fundamental security concerns, was subject to extensive consultations,

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

in particular during the summer part of the session. Some useful steps were taken, but many more are needed before we can register consensus on this politically, militarily and technically complicated issue. I therefore strongly urge all delegations to carefully study the material available in the report and consider ways and means to accommodate each other's interests when we next address the issue.

Article V and its annexes deal with chemical weapon production facilities. During the spring extensive and detailed provisions were elaborated for the verification of declarations and the closure and elimination of chemical weapon production facilities. Other aspects of the article and its annex are still pending, but I have good reason to believe that before too long the Committee will be in a position to constructively address the remaining issues under this article.

This brings us to article VI and its annexes, which cover issues pertaining to future non-production of chemical weapons. Much time and effort have gone into this area, both during spring and summer. The difficulties involved have been great, politically as well as technically. I therefore find it particularly gratifying that political hurdles have been overcome and that substantive progress has been registered with the inclusion of the new annex VI [4]. The compromises made augur well for the negotiations, in that they show that given enough time and effort it is possible to strike a balance between security concerns and other important national and international interests. Notwithstanding the progress made, article VI and its annexes require more work. During the spring important advances were made and registered as regard the modalities for revising the lists of chemicals, as regards the guidelines for including chemicals in schedule [1] and as regards factors that might influence the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections. This work needs to be further developed and completed.

Furthermore, the régime for chemicals in schedule [1] still contains some outstanding issues which need to be dealt with. May I also remind delegations that the various lists of chemicals have not yet been fully finalized.

Article VI and its annexes and the various remaining issues in the field of non-production from an area where work ought to be continued during the inter-sessional period. I therefore ask delegations to carefully prepare themselves and search for ways and means to constructively bridge the remaining gaps.

In the context of non-production questions I would also like to mention another activity which took place this summer, not within the framework of the Committee itself but parallel to it and so arranged timewise that it coincided with the Committee's work in the area of non-production. I have in mind the meeting with experts from the chemical industry here in Geneva on 6 and 7 July. During these two days a great number of experts were given information about the draft convention we are negotiating, and a series of interesting and valuable discussions took place on various issues of relevance for the implementation of the convention. It is my impression that this

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

meeting generated a broader understanding in the world of the chemical industry for the tasks we are trying to accomplish, and also that some concrete ideas emerged which I hope will prove useful to the negotiations when approaching the remaining technical issues under article VI and its annexes.

Article VII on national implementation measures was not the subject of further negotiations during this year. A few questions remain to be settled, but I do not foresee any great difficulties in this regard.

Article VIII deals with the organized framework for the implementation of the convention. Very useful work was done, inter alia, on the question of guidelines for the international inspectorate. Pending further consideration in some capitals, the text of these guidelines has been included as an addendum to the report. I believe that before too long we will be able to incorporate it in the integrated body of negotiated material.

During the greater part of the session delegations felt that further work on article VIII should await developments in other parts of the convention. I was therefore encouraged when, towards the end of the session, delegations agreed that the time was ripe to take up article VIII and to sort out in detail the powers, functions and interrelationship of the various organs of the international authority to be created. Useful preparatory work in this field was done. There now appears to be a general wish to review this article during the inter-sessional period.

Although this is not an organizational question per se, I also want to draw attention to the fact that work has now commenced on the elaboration of so-called "models for agreements" which States parties are to conclude with the international authority as regards specific facilities. One outline for such an agreement is already included in the report, and a proposal for a second was presented to the Committee for consideration after the completion of the report.

Under article IX work focused on the major outstanding question, namely the politically complicated issue of challenge inspection. All through the year I conducted extensive consultations in order to find approaches to the problems involved that would be acceptable to all delegations. Following a gradual and painstaking process, we find ourselves at the end of the session having made real substantive progress on this crucial issue. I am confident that before long we will be able to transform this progress into treaty language under article IX. For the time being the state of affairs as I see it has been included in appendix II in a report by myself.

The remaining articles X to XVI have not been the subject of negotiations during the session. However, I would like to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that many delegations now feel that the time has come to address these articles too, and I do hope that the inter-sessional period of work will provide an opportunity to do so, both with regard to article X, Assistance, and article XI, Economic and Technological Development, as well as with regard to the concluding articles.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

I wish to mention one more issue, namely that of the preparatory commission, which will operate during the period between the signing and the entry into force of the convention. I take it as a good sign that our negotiations have now reached a stage where delegations want to address concrete and practical issues connected with preparing the way for effective implementation of the convention from the very first day of its entry into force. The text on the preparatory commission which was worked out during the spring is therefore a very valuable contribution, and I am very pleased to have it included in the report.

The Committee further recommends to the Conference on Disarmament, in paragraph 13 (c) of the report, that work on the convention be resumed as follows:

Firstly, in preparation for the resumed session, private consultations should be undertaken in Geneva by the Chairman during the period 23-27 November 1987 with delegations present;

Secondly, for that purpose, open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee should be held between 30 November and 16 December 1987, including, when necessary, meetings with full services;

Thirdly, the Ad hoc Committee should hold a session of limited duration during the period 12-29 January 1988.

I would like to thank all delegates who have participated so effectively in the work of the Ad hoc Committee. My presentation, I think, is testimony to the good progress we have made and I think, therefore, we have reason to be optimistic with regard to our future work. I would also like to thank the three item co-ordinators, Mr. Philippe Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico and Dr. Walter Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, for their tireless efforts, and the excellent work they have done during both parts of the 1987 session. I also want to point out that we would not have been able to arrive at a report like the one we have just adopted were it not for the excellent performance of the secretariat, Mr. Bensmail, Mr. Cassandra, Miss Darby and the interpreters. I would like to direct my special thanks to them.

The submission of the report on the full session's work on chemical weapons gives me a good opportunity to bid farewell to Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, who has, over the years, participated so actively and so successfully in our joint efforts to achieve progress towards a convention banning chemical weapons, both in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in 1985 and as a Co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist States. I have personally profited from his advice and constructive approach during the years. We wish him all success in his next assignment in Warsaw. Furthermore, I would like to express to Ambassador Beesley of Canada my wish for success in his new task in Vancouver. His four years with this Conference have been marked by his customary intelligent, constructive and, not least, independent approach to difficult problems. Many of us will also miss the working lunches over which Ambassador Beesley presided in a masterly way, thus often bringing about progress where none was expected.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Finally, as the 1987 session of the Conference is coming to its close, I would like to express to you our gratitude for your leadership during the month of August. Your presidency has been characterized by a high professional standard. The effective, rational and devoted way in which you have approached your task has, to no small degree, helped us all to conclude our work this year with success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing its report, which will be presented to the Conference for adoption at our plenary meeting tomorrow, and I thank him for his kind words.

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(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

We believe that at this advanced stage of negotiations on Chemical Weapons we should do our best to maintain the momentum by means of full and intensive use of the time available. I can assure you that the delegations of our group will be present in Geneva on 23 November 1987 and ready to start further work on the convention under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus.

In concluding I would like once again to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, for his strenuous efforts and able chairmanship during the whole session, and for his efforts at the stage of discussion and adoption of the report which brought us finally to the adoption of the report.

Our thanks go likewise to the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Krutson, Mr. Macho and Mr. Muevunyuva, for their patient, hard work and the skilled manner in which they have performed their duties. Let me also thank the secretariat and the interpreters for their valuable assistance and contribution to the work of the Committee. And with your kind permission and through you, Mr. President, let me thank wholeheartedly the distinguished Ambassador García Robles, the distinguished Ambassador Rolf Ekéus who spoke today, and you, Mr. President, and other colleagues for the very kind, generous words and good wishes addressed to me on the occasion of my leaving the Conference. On my part I wish them and all of you all success in your

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, I would wish to comment briefly, in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist States for chemical weapons, in connection with the report of the Committee just presented by Ambassador Ekéus, its Chairman. We would like, of course, to express our satisfaction at the adoption of the report by the Committee, and we note with pleasure the important progress made during the year, the progress so ably and so clearly presented by Ambassador Ekéus in his introduction. I feel, by the way, that his summary will be very helpful to the delegations in preparation for further work. However, I would wish to say that we cannot be fully satisfied with the contents of the report, either with regard to the substance of the "rolling text" -- that is appendix I -- or the recommendations, in particular the one concerning the inter-sessional work of the Ad hoc Committee.

In our opinion, more valuable material worked out during the session could and should have been included in the "rolling text", but since we work on the basis of consensus that proved not to be possible. We regret this development, and hope that the inter-sessional period will enable us to enrich the "rolling text" before the start of the 1988 session.

The solution which we have reached with respect to the inter-sessional work is not what we had been expecting, and not what we feel is needed at this stage of the negotiations.

The socialist countries were and still are ready for maximum and effective use of the time between the closure of this year's session and the beginning of the 1988 session. The most far-reaching proposal to that effect -- to "hold an additional session of the Conference this year to complete the bulk of the drafting of the convention banning chemical weapons" -- was put forward by E. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and it has been fully supported by the socialist countries.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We believe that at this advanced stage of negotiations on Chemical Weapons we should do our best to maintain the momentum by means of full and intensive use of the time available. I can assure you that the delegations of our group will be present in Geneva on 23 November 1987 and ready to start further work on the convention under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus.

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Mr. LUDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany): . . .

Only yesterday, in introducing the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ekéus recalled how far the negotiations had gone since he was last Chairman three years ago. He pointed out that today we have a largely developed draft text with most of the elements in place. The conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons -- a matter of the highest priority for Western countries -- is no longer a distant goal but a real possibility.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now propose that we take up for adoption the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/782. Are there any delegations that would like to take the floor before we adopt the report of the Committee? I call on the representative of France.

(Mr. de la Baume, France)

... wanted to underscore the importance of security questions. Indeed, I observe that the Chairman's presentation itself notes on the same page 3, in the last paragraph, that the much discussed issue of the order of destruction of stocks is related to fundamental security concerns. I would take the liberty of recalling that it is indeed an essential question on location which has to be tied in directly with the debate under way on this subject, on the subject of which the Chairman of the Committee has himself invited all delegations to give careful attention to the relevant sections of the report and to look for mutual acceptable solutions.

... briefly put, our position on location, which has changed appreciably this year, is a specific aspect of the general debate on security. Both for reasons of form and for reasons of substance, it therefore seems to us that the remark on draft article IV which singles out my country is unfortunate and could have been avoided.

Mr. de la BAUME (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, before we give our full agreement to the text of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which marks a new, very positive step in the elaboration of the convention to ban such weapons which we all hope for, I must on behalf of the French delegation react to a particular point raised during the presentation of the report by the President of the Committee on 27 August.

I note that in his comments on article IV, the Chairman of the Committee said that we were now in a situation where only one country "still has some reservations on openly declaring and accepting verification at all stockpile locations as soon as 30 days after the entry into force of the convention". This very explicit statement refers to the French position, which is thus singled out and summarized in an inadequate manner.

I must first of all note that at no other point in his presentation did the Chairman single out any other delegation, whereas on many items various countries also have quite specific positions. Therefore as far as our delegation is concerned there is an unfortunate difference in treatment. I do not feel that this sort of approach is likely to facilitate smooth negotiations.

I would now like to recall the facts. The French delegation declared that it was prepared to accept the declaration of the stockpile locations on the thirtieth day after the entry into force of the Convention. While taking such a step forward regarding the principle for all stocks, it proposed in working paper CD/757, which was submitted on 11 June last, that special consideration should be given to ways and means of declaring security stocks: whilst accepting the possibility of a public and complete declaration of such stocks, we pointed out that it might be preferable not to make such a declaration public for reasons of security, but to resort to the so-called sealed envelope procedure. In any event, and even if this procedure were to be adopted, the location of the stock would be communicated to the international authority and would be open to challenge inspection.

(Mr. de la Baume, France)

Whilst moving forward on the question of declarations of location, we wanted to underscore the importance of security questions. Indeed, I observe that the Chairman's presentation itself notes on the same page 3, in the last paragraph, that the much discussed issue of the order of destruction of stocks is related to fundamental security concerns. I would take the liberty of recalling that it is indeed our special position on location which has to be tied in directly with the debate under way on this subject, on the subject of which the Chairman of the Committee has himself invited all delegations to give careful attention to the relevant sections of the report and to look for mutual acceptable solutions.

Briefly put, our position on location, which has changed appreciably this year, is a specific aspect of the general debate on security. Both for reasons of form and for reasons of substance, it therefore seems to us that the remark on draft article IV which singles out my country is unfortunate and could have been avoided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Do any other delegations wish to take the floor before we adopt this report? If there is no objection, I will consider that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

Mr. BELAID (Algeria) (translated from French): . . .

I do not wish to review all the work we have done. However, I would like to underscore the progress made towards the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons. Yet it must be noted that similar progress has not been recorded elsewhere, in particular on matters to which the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Group of 21 attach special priority, in other words nuclear issues. We remain hopeful that future work on the various items will be more successful thanks to contributions from all delegations.

Mrs. WANG (China) (translated from Chinese): . . .

Although the session has achieved some success in its substantive work, on chemical weapons in the main, the progress it was able to make was still a far cry from the high hopes we cherished at the initial stage of the session. In particular, little headway was made in the areas of nuclear weapons and outer space. The task before us is still a formidable one, and we need to make further efforts.

(The President)

...
Thirdly, the month of August was not exclusively devoted to the adoption of the report. I recall that last month it was explicitly contemplated that for certain subsidiary bodies the continuation of substantive work should be possible. I note that this applied particularly to the Committee on Chemical Weapons, which, formally or informally, has continued substantive work during this month of August and has even been able on this occasion to record useful progress for the future.

(The President)

I have no other points to raise during this final meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Before adjourning this plenary meeting I should like to remind you that the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday 2 February 1988, at 10 a.m. As agreed by the Conference in adopting the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons contained in document CD/782, paragraph 13 (c), the Ad hoc Committee will hold a session of limited duration from 12 to 29 January 1988. I should also like to recall that open-ended consultations of the Ad hoc Committee will be held between 30 November and 16 December 1987, and that private consultations will be undertaken by the Chairman in Geneva, in preparation for the resumption of the Committee's work, during the period 23-27 November 1987 with delegations present. The plenary meeting is adjourned.



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